REDUCING THE RISE OF POLARIZATION IN THE COURT THROUGH THE BRIDGING OF DOCTRINES: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION THROUGH QUASI-ORIGINALISM Público

Abstract

This thesis aims to deconstruct the conventional methods of constitutional interpretation—liberal and conservative—with respect to Originalism and Living Constitutionalism to illustrate the parallels and differences within both frameworks’ origins and processes. It is through this philosophical juxtaposition that I will develop an alternative interpretive method. The resources I will be using include the Federalist Papers and cases from the Marshall Court, the Warren Court, Rehnquist Court, and Roberts Court. I will also be citing interviews and discussions from constitutional scholars and Supreme Court Justices—specifically Justices John Roberts and Elena Kegan—to substantiate my claims and proposed methodology for interpretation. This research seeks to challenge the traditional understandings of constitutional interpretation by offering a fresh perspective that incorporates historical and contemporary proponents of law. By critically analyzing the existing methods and their limitations, the study aims to provide an interpretive framework that balances the needs and values of American society with the “original public meaning” of the laws—preventing the polarization and politicization of the Supreme Court that grants justices legislative powers.

Table of Contents

Introduction 2

The Case for Originalism 5

Originalism: Principles of Interpretation 10

The Case for Living Constitutionalism 12

Living Constitutionalism: Dworkin’s Principles of Interpretation 15

Living Constitutionalism: Breyer’s Principles of Interpretation 27

Originalism v. Living Constitutionalism (Case by Case): Applying Principles 30

1. Roe v. Wade: The Case Facts & Question(s) 31

2. Roe v. Wade: The Majority Opinion 33

3. Roe v. Wade: Rehnquist’s Dissent 37

4. Roe v. Wade: Synthesizing the Court’s Analysis 41

The Rise in Polarization in the Court 43

Constructing the Middle Ground: Quasi-Originalism 48

1. Justice Roberts’s Case for Quasi-Originalism 49

2. Justice Kagan’s Case for Quasi-Originalism 51

Conclusion 55

Bibliography 58

About this Honors Thesis

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School	Emory College
Department	Philosophy
Degree	B.A.
Submission	Honors Thesis
Language	English
Research Field	Law Philosophy
Palavra-chave	Constitutional Law, Legal Interpretative Theory
Committee Chair / Thesis Advisor	Rylie Johnson, Emory University Sam Cherribi, Emory University Frank Lechner, Emory University Ernesto Blanes-Martinez, Emory University

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