The Effects of Targeted Foreign Aid on Clientelism: The Case of the European Recovery Program in Italy Público

Abstract

This study evaluates the relationship between the targeted disbursement of foreign aid by domestic actors and clientelist outcomes. The theory is moderated by the clientelism and economic influence on the vote literature, which offer insights into how and why voters respond to distributable benefits. Two hypotheses – one focused on fluctuations in electoral outcomes, the other on monitoring mechanisms of clientelist exchanges – are tested in a case study of the Christian Democrats’ disbursement of European Recovery Program (ERP) project funding between the 1948 and 1953 national elections. Sufficient evidence is found to negate both original hypotheses, with the author concluding that the disbursement of ERP funds generated higher expectations amongst voters, which ultimately harmed the Christian Democrats’ subsequent electoral performance in 1953. The study is significant insofar as it tests quantitative hypotheses related to the expansion of clientelist ties, tests specific funding mechanisms on support for a mass political party, and investigates the efficacy of foreign aid in developing clientelist networks.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Introduction       1

Literature Review and Theory       4

The strategic incentives of foreign aid…………………………………………..…4

Clientelism……….…………………………………………………………………...…..6

Economic influence on the vote………………………………………………...….11

Foreign actors and clientelism…………..……………………………..……..……14

Hypotheses      15

Hypothesis 1……………………………...…………………………………………..…15

Hypothesis 2………...……………………………………………………………..……16

Case Study      17

Why a case study?.....................................................................................17

Clientelism in Italy…………………………...…………………………………….....19

The ERP in Postwar Italy……………………….………………………………...…..22

Data and Methodology      25

Dependent variables………………………….………………………………………..25

Independent variable………………….……………………………………………....27

Control variables……………….………………………………………………….…...28

ERP Project Funding at Various Regional and Subsidy Type Levels….…...31

Results and Discussion      33

Testing Hypothesis 1……………………..………………………………….………..33

Map 1………...…………………………………………………………...….............34

Table 1…………………...……………………………………………….......…….…35

Results Based on ERP Project Funding by Region…………….………………..39

Table 2………….…………………………………………………………….......…...41

Table 3……………………………………………….…………………….......……...42

Results Based on ERP Project Funding by Subsidy Type...………………...…43

Table 4…………………………………………….…………………………........…...44

Table 5………………………………………….…………………………........……...45

Explaining the Results from Testing Hypothesis 1…………….…………….…46

Map 2………………………………………………………………………….........….49

Testing Hypothesis 2………………………………….……………………...….…….53

Table 6………………………………….……………………………………........…...54

Conclusion      55

References            58

Appendix A: Data Entry Guidelines – ERP Projects Data                         64

Appendix B: Image File Data Entry Guidelines       74

Appendix C: Models including Small Parties’ Control Variable      76

Appendix C Table………………………………………………..……………….….….77

Appendix D: ERP Project Funding Per Capita Models      78

Appendix D Table 1……………………………………..………………………..…….80

Appendix D Table 2…………………………..………………………………………...81

Appendix E: Models including Fixed Effects for the Regions      82

Appendix E Table 1…………………………...………………………………….…….83

Appendix E Table 2……………………………...………………………………….….84

Appendix F: Data Used to Generate Map 2      85

Appendix G: Descriptive Statistics Tables      86

Appendix G Table 1………………………………………...…………..………………86

Appendix G Table 2…………………………………………………………..……..….87

Appendix G Table 3………………………………………………………...……..……88

Appendix G Table 4…………………………………………………………..……..….89

Appendix G Table 5………………………………………………………...……..……90

Appendix G Table 6…………………………………………………………..……..….91

About this Honors Thesis

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School	Emory College
Department	International Studies
Degree	B.A.
Submission	Honors Thesis
Language	English
Research Field	Political Science, General European Studies Political Science, International Relations
Palabra Clave	Foreign aid Italy Clientelism Italian politics International studies European politics European Recovery Program Political science
Committee Chair / Thesis Advisor	Dr. Thomas D. Lancaster, Emory University
Committee Members	Dr. Simona Muratore, Emory University Dr. Jennifer Gandhi, Emory University

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