The Search for Credibility in Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail Público

Abstract

Do nuclear weapons always provide a coercive advantage to the blackmailer? Previous works on nuclear compellence have argued that nuclear weapons either do or do not have compellent effects. I argue that the question of nuclear weapons having compellent effect defies a clear-cut yes or no answer. I argue that a better understanding of nuclear compellence requires a careful examination of the constraints the blackmailer faces when issuing a threat. Using the International Crisis Behavior dyad data set that includes 480 international crises from 1917 to 2007, I test and find support for the nuclear audience cost theory, which posits that the nuclear challenger is much more likely to prevail than the nonnuclear challenger only if there are strong domestic audiences who can punish their leader and only if such a state fully escalates in a crisis and thus generates high audience costs. I also find that the challenger, both nuclear and nonnuclear, that generates high audience costs is, on average, more likely to prevail and that states with strong domestic political audiences are more likely to prevail in general and less likely to initiate a militarized dispute. Finally, I find that possession of nuclear weapons increases a nuclear state's conflict propensity only if leaders face strong domestic audiences.

Table of Contents

Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1

Literature Review ............................................................................................. 8

Hypothesis ..................................................................................................... 22

Research Design ............................................................................................ 41

Quantitative Analysis .................................................................................... 50

Case Study ..................................................................................................... 63

Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 79

References ..................................................................................................... 81

About this Master's Thesis

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School	Laney Graduate School
Department	Political Science
Degree	MA
Submission	Master's Thesis
Language	English
Research Field	Political Science, General
Palavra-chave	Audience Costs Crisis Bargaining Nuclear Weapons
Committee Chair / Thesis Advisor	Beardsley, Kyle, Emory University
Committee Members	Sun-Chul, Kim, Davis, David, Reiter, Dan, Emory University

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