The Power and Politicized Expansion of the International Criminal Court Público
Hashimoto, Barry Masanori (2010)
Published
Abstract
Abstract
This dissertation contributes to an understanding of why national
leaders voluntarily accept the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), granting it
the authority to prosecute them.
It theorizes that leaders trade off the risk of unwanted
prosecutions against the deterrent threat
that prosecutions pose to political rivals and patrons of domestic
enemies, who may conspire to
violently oust leaders. The risk of unwanted prosecutions and the
ICC's deterrent threat both arise
because the court's prosecutions credibly communicate guilt for
atrocities and may trigger leader-specific
sanctions by wealthy donor states that prefer to keep politicians
who commit atrocities out
of office. Three qualities explain the ICC's credibility: a
legitimacy quality, an investment quality,
and a reputational quality. Empirical analysis of panel data on
leaders and all modern international
criminal courts supports the theory. National leaders accept the
ICC's jurisdiction when it can
deter their rivals from anti-regime violence--when the state
depends heavily on development
capital disbursed by wealthy democracies--and when the leaders can
limit their own exposure
to prosecution. The protection leaders obtain under the ICC's
jurisdiction gives them longer and
more peaceful terms in office. If an international criminal
court--including, but not limited to,
the ICC--indicts them, however, their chance of losing office
increases greatly. If they insist on
remaining in power, both the state's receipt of development capital
and its domestic production
tumble. These courts' indictments prove to be more consequential
than other public reports about
prosecutable human-rights abuses ostensibly committed by the
leader's administration. The ICC's
power is real, but it has gaps, politicizing the expansion of its
jurisdiction.
Table of Contents
CONTENTS
1 Introduction 1
1.1 International criminal courts and the punishment of atrocity .
. . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The question and the argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Plan of the dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix 1: Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 10
2 Perspectives on International Criminal Courts 13
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 The political-culture perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.1 The principled-justice theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 17
2.2.2 The coordination theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 19
2.2.3 Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 22
2.2.4 Concluding thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 23
2.3 The persuasion perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.1 Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 30
2.3.2 Concluding thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 32
2.4 The diffuse-reciprocity perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.1 Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 36
2.4.2 Concluding thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 39
2.5 The civil-peace perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.5.1 Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 42
2.5.2 Concluding thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 44
2.6 The soft-balancing perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.6.1 Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 51
2.6.2 Concluding thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 52
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 53
Appendix 2: Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 56
3 Why Leaders Accept the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court 57
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2 Why prosecutions hurt careers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 58
3.3 Why leaders accept the court's jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3.1 The court's effect on the threat to leaders from their rivals
and enemies . 62
3.3.2 A leader's exposure to unwanted prosecutions . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 66
3.4 Empirical implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4.1 The decision to accept the court's jurisdiction . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 68
3.4.2 The effects of the court's jurisdiction on political survival
and anti-regime
violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 70
3.4.3 The economic effects of indictments . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 70
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 73
4 Development, Conflict, and the International Criminal Court's
Jurisdiction 75
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2 Review of hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3 Operationalization and data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.4 Empirical strategy and estimation framework . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 81
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.5.1 Hypothesis 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 84
4.5.2 Hypotheses 2 and 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 85
4.6 Energy rents and dictators' aid: wrenches in the machine? . . .
. . . . . . . . . 86
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 87
Appendix 4.A: Technical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 89
Appendix 4.B: Tables and figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5 The Consequences of Indictment 101
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.2 Review of hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.3 Operationalization and data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.4 Empirical strategy and estimation framework . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 107
5.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.5.1 Hypothesis 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 109
5.5.2 Hypothesis 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 110
5.5.3 Hypothesis 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 111
5.6 Case studies of states whose incumbents were indicted . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 112
5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 115
Appendix 5: Tables and figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6 The History of the International Criminal Court 121
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.2 The orthodox history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.3 The revised history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.3.1 "We were infiltrated" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 127
6.3.2 "Uttermost ends of the earth" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 129
6.3.3 Explaining the appearance of the court after the Cold War . .
. . . . . . 135
6.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 138
Appendix 5: Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 139
7 Conclusion 141
7.1 Summary of the dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 141
7.2 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 145
References 149
LIST OF TABLES
4.1 Summary of the multiply imputed panel data, 1998(3)-2008(4) . .
. . . . . . . . 93
4.2 Models predicting whether a leader ratified the Rome Statute,
1998(3)-2008(4):
Estimates of bp and dz from varying-intercepts logits . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 94
4.3 Rome-Statute ratification status of states receiving at or
above the 90th percentile
($1.65B) of development capital from rich democracies in at least
one quarter,
1998(3)-2008(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 96
4.4 Models predicting a leader's exit from office and civil
conflict, 1998(3)-2008(4):
Estimates of bp and dz from varying-intercepts regressions and
quantities of
interest derived from the models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 97
4.5 Fourteen-fold geopolitical classification of states used in the
multiple imputation
procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 98
5.1 Summary of the multiply imputed panel data, 1993(1)-2008(4) . .
. . . . . . . . 116
5.2 Investigations of atrocities by international criminal courts,
1948-2012 . . . . . . 117
5.3 Levels of The Political Terror Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.4 Models predicting leaders' tenure, receipts of development
capital from wealthy
democracies, and GDP, 1993(1)-2008(4): Estimates of bp from
varying-intercepts
regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 119
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Time series of Wikipedia searches for "International Criminal
Court" versus
searches for "United States Supreme Court" and "European Court of
Human
Rights," 2008-2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 10
1.2 Abnormalities in Google search volumes for politicians targeted
for prosecution
by international criminal courts, 2004-2012 . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 11
1.3 Cumulative and per-quarter Rome Statute ratifications,
1998-2008 . . . . . . . . 12
2.1 The interactive relationship between democracy, a history of
civil conflict, and the
choice to ratify the Rome Statute, 1998-2008 . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 56
4.1 The effect of development capital from wealthy democracies on
the probability
that a leader ratifies the Rome Statute, 1998-2008: Estimates from
Model 1 . . . 95
4.2 Development capital disbursed by democracies and autocracies,
1990-2008 . . . 100
5.1 Time series of development capital flows, exports, and GDP for
states whose
incumbents were indicted by international criminal courts,
1993-2010 . . . . . . 120
6.1 Development capital disbursed by democracies and autocracies,
1960-2008 . . . 139
6.2 Insurgencies, material support, sanctuary, and insurgent
victories in insurgencies
beginning each year, 1808-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 140
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