On the Strategic Implications of Power Shifts: Reassurance, Coercion and Preventive Action Open Access

Fuerst, Kai Philipp (2010)

Permanent URL: https://etd.library.emory.edu/concern/etds/zp38wd363?locale=en
Published

Abstract

Commitment problems by rising states to refrain from exploiting gains in power to revise the status quo (e.g., the location of an international border) in their favor are widely believed to constitute a key reason why declining states engage in preventive wars and preventive strikes. This dissertation reexamines the alleged nexus between power shifts and preventive action by focusing on the strategic interaction between rising and declining states. Using a game-theoretic model, this dissertation argues that the destabilizing effects of interstate power shifts are generally overrated because rising states have strong incentives to reassure declining states that their fears of an impending power shift are unwarranted. Importantly, the model suggests that policies of reassurance are common and effective means of averting preventive action and fostering peace. Yet, the game-theoretic model also suggests that in some circumstances, rising states can and will engage in coercive policies in order to extract more generous concessions from declining states. Furthermore, the game-theoretic model makes predictions regarding the circumstances under which rising states will neither reassure nor coerce their declining opponents and develops hypotheses on why and when the anticipation of power shifts may actually result in preventive action.

This dissertation examines the empirical validity of the theoretical model on the strategic implications of interstate power shifts by offering three in-depth case studies. The first case study examines Franco-German relations between 1949 and 1955 and suggests that Germany's fear of preventive action induced it to pursue a policy of reassurance vis-à-vis France, which in turn encouraged France to grant Germany's limited military revitalization after World War II. The second case study looks at Franco-German relations between 1933 and 1938 and argues that Germany exploited France's unwillingness to take preventive action against Germany's gain in power by remilitarizing the Rhineland and annexing the Sudetenland. The third case study focuses on Israeli-Egyptian relations between 1952 and 1956 and suggests that Israel's decision to take preventive action in the form of the 1956 Sinai campaign can largely be attributed to Egypt's domestically induced unwillingness to reassure Israel.

Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................. 1
2
LITERATURE REVIEW: POWER SHIFTS AND PREVENTIVE ACTION ............... 6
2.1
INFORMAL APPROACHES................................................................................................ 9
2.2
FORMAL APPROACHES ..................................................................................................32
2.3
SUMMARY .....................................................................................................................37
3
POWER SHIFTS, PREVENTIVE ACTION
AND THE ROLE OF REASSURANCE............................................................................40
3.1
POWER SHIFTS AND COMMITMENT PROBLEMS ............................................................41
3.2
POWER SHIFTS AND UNCERTAINTY ..............................................................................44
3.3
POWER SHIFTS AND REASSURANCE..............................................................................51
3.3.1
Sunk-Cost Signals .................................................................................................53
3.3.2
Audience Cost-Based Signals ...............................................................................58
3.3.3
Security-Related Tying-Hands Signals .................................................................68
3.4
SUMMARY .....................................................................................................................74
4
FORMAL ANALYSIS I: REASSURANCE, COERCION AND POWER SHIFTS......77
4.1
OVERVIEW.....................................................................................................................77
4.2
THE BASELINE MODEL I: COMPLETE INFORMATION VERSION ....................................79
4.2.1
Setup .....................................................................................................................79
4.2.2
Equilibria..............................................................................................................82
4.2.3
Discussion ............................................................................................................85
4.3
THE BASELINE MODEL II: INCOMPLETE INFORMATION VERSION................................91
4.3.1
Setup .....................................................................................................................91
4.3.2
Equilibria..............................................................................................................92
4.3.3
Discussion ..........................................................................................................100
4.4
POWER SHIFTS AND SUNK-COST SIGNALS..................................................................105
4.4.1
Setup ...................................................................................................................105
4.4.2
Equilibria............................................................................................................107
4.4.3
Discussion ..........................................................................................................113
4.5
POWER SHIFTS AND AUDIENCE COST-BASED SIGNALS..............................................118
4.5.1
Setup ...................................................................................................................118
4.5.2
Equilibria............................................................................................................122
4.5.3
Discussion ..........................................................................................................129
4.6
POWER SHIFTS AND SECURITY-RELATED TYING-HANDS SIGNALS............................132
4.6.1
Setup ...................................................................................................................132
4.6.2
Equilibria............................................................................................................135
4.6.3
Discussion ..........................................................................................................147
5
FORMAL ANALYSIS II: A UNIFIED MODEL OF REASSURANCE, COERCION
AND POWER SHIFTS ..............................................................................................................152
5.1
OVERVIEW...................................................................................................................152
5.2
THE UNIFIED MODEL ..................................................................................................154
5.2.1
Setup ...................................................................................................................154
5.2.2
Equilibria............................................................................................................157
5.2.3
Discussion ..........................................................................................................168

6
FRENCH FEARS AND GERMANY'S POLICY OF REASSURANCE, 1949-1955 ..175

6.1
OVERVIEW...................................................................................................................175
6.2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ........................................................................................180
6.3
THE FRENCH PERSPECTIVE .........................................................................................190
6.3.1
France's fears of decline ....................................................................................190
6.3.2
France reassured I: the European Coal and Steel Community ..........................197
6.3.3
France reassured II: the European Defense Community ...................................202
6.3.4
France reassured III: the NATO/WEU solution .................................................207
6.4
THE GERMAN PERSPECTIVE ........................................................................................212
6.4.1
Germany's assessment of France's fears ...........................................................212
6.4.2
Reassuring France I: the European Coal and Steel Community ........................214
6.4.3
Reassuring France II: the European Defense Community .................................218
6.4.4
Reassuring France III: the NATO/WEU solution ...............................................223
6.5
SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................226
7
FRENCH FEARS AND GERMANY'S POLICY OF COERCION, 1933-1938...........234
7.1
OVERVIEW...................................................................................................................234
7.2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ........................................................................................236
7.3
THE FRENCH PERSPECTIVE..........................................................................................238
7.3.1
France's fears of decline ....................................................................................238
7.3.2
France coerced I: the remilitarization of the Rhineland ....................................240
7.3.3
France coerced II: the annexation of the Sudetenland .......................................246
7.4
THE GERMAN PERSPECTIVE ........................................................................................253
7.4.1
Germany's assessment of France's fears ...........................................................253
7.4.2
Coercing France I: the remilitarization of the Rhineland ..................................255
7.4.3
Coercing France II: the annexation of the Sudetenland.....................................259
7.5
SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................265
8
ISRAEL'S FEARS AND EGYPT'S POLICY OF PASSIVITY, 1952-1956 .................271
8.1
OVERVIEW...................................................................................................................271
8.2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ........................................................................................274
8.3
THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE..........................................................................................278
8.3.1
Israel's fears of decline ......................................................................................278
8.3.2
Israel's fears unredressed: the 1956 Sinai campaign.........................................288
8.4
THE EGYPTIAN PERSPECTIVE ......................................................................................297
8.4.1
Egypt's assessment of Israel's fears ...................................................................297
8.4.2
Leaving Israel's fears unredressed.....................................................................304
8.4
SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................310
9
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................314
REFERENCES ...........................................................................................................................323
APPENDIX .................................................................................................................................346
PROOFS.....................................................................................................................................346
NOTATION ................................................................................................................................363

TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1: The baseline model.........................................................................................................82
Figure 2: Power shifts and rising states' propensity to accept x.....................................................94
Figure 3: Rising states: categories and types..................................................................................98
Figure 4: Equilibrium space for complete information baseline model with cR=.2 and cD=.5 .....101
Figure 5: Equilibrium space for incomplete information baseline model with cR=.2 and cD=.5 ..102
Figure 6: Coercion and reassurance with sunk-cost signals .........................................................107
Figure 7: SC-model equilibrium space with cR=0.1 and cD=0.2...................................................112
Figure 8: Coercion and reassurance with audience cost-based signals ........................................121
Figure 9: AC-model equilibrium space with cR=0.1 and cD=0.2 ..................................................129
Figure 10: Coercion and reassurance with security-related tying-hands signals ..........................134
Figure 11: SRTH-model equilibrium space with cR=0.1 and cD=0.2 ...........................................146
Figure 12: A unified model of coercion and reassurance.............................................................156
Figure 13: Unified model equilibrium space with cR=0.1, cD=0.2, γs<γa, γa=0.8..........................167
Figure 14: Unified model equilibrium space with cR=0.1, cD=0.2, γa≤γs, γs=0.8 ..........................167
Table 1: Properties of non-revisionist vs. revisionist rising states..................................................85
Table 2: A summary of the unified model's key propositions ......................................................174
Table 3: Franco-German relations, 1949-1955: Key findings ......................................................233
Table 4: Franco-German relations, 1933-1938: Key findings ......................................................270
Table 5: Israeli-Egyptian relations, 1952-1956: Key findings......................................................313

About this Dissertation

Rights statement
  • Permission granted by the author to include this thesis or dissertation in this repository. All rights reserved by the author. Please contact the author for information regarding the reproduction and use of this thesis or dissertation.
School
Department
Degree
Submission
Language
  • English
Research Field
Keyword
Committee Chair / Thesis Advisor
Committee Members
Last modified

Primary PDF

Thumbnail Title Date Uploaded Actions
On the Strategic Implications of Power Shifts: Reassurance, Coercion and Preventive Action () 2018-08-28 14:52:08 -0400

Supplemental Files

Thumbnail Title Date Uploaded Actions