Despite its importance, the Supreme Court’s early history is rarely studied empirically. As McGuire acknowledges (2004), “[L]ongitudinal knowledge of the Supreme Court is quite limited” (128). There was an interesting quirk in the federal judicial hierarchy: the institution of circuit riding (1790-1891), where Supreme Court justices heard appellate cases on their assigned circuit courts and then could hear the same cases again when appealed to the Supreme Court. Since there was not a clear delineation between circuit judges and Supreme Court justices and Supreme Court did not have docket control during the “Circuit Riding Century,” current models of judicial hierarchy struggle explain this institutional setup (e.g. Cameron, Segal and Songer 2000). By reinterpreting the model in Carrubba and Clark (2012) to account for collegiality and legitimacy costs, this thesis is the first to formally model both judicial decision-making during the “Circuit Riding Century” and analyze the institutional impact of circuit riding on the Supreme Court. I provide an empirical design to quantitatively test the results of the model and discuss results that support the prediction made by the formal model.
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