No Friends, No Foes: How Ideological Disparity in the Executive Branch Incentivizes Policy Valence and Careerist Effort 公开
Archibald, Thomas (Spring 2019)
Published
Abstract
Ideology is at the center of political decision-making, and public administration is no exception. This paper seeks to uncover how ideological dynamics in the American Executive Branch affect careerist effort incentives and policy quality. Situated in the broader principal-agent literature, I develop a new game theoretical model of bureaucratic policymaking to explain ideological and policy valence decisions. I test the model empirically using ideological measurement techniques from the literature, which derive individual ideal point estimates from campaign contribution data. This new and innovative approach to ideal point estimation allows us to quantitatively test claims previously reserved for qualitative research.
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION.. 2
II. LITERATURE REVIEW... 5
III. THEORY.. 11
IV. HYPOTHESES. 20
V. DATA.. 21
VI. METHODS. 24
VII. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS. 29
VIII. CONCLUSION.. 36
IX. MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX.. 38
X. WORKS CITED 45
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