The Autocrat's Labor Dilemma: Distributional Conflict, Labor Law, and the Value of Dependent Courts Restricted; Files Only
Hsu Yumin, Wang (Spring 2024)
Published
Abstract
Why do some autocrats enact labor legislation that protects workers while others do not? How do autocrats manage the intensified distributional conflict between elites and the masses arising from pro-worker reforms? What is the effect of pro-worker legislation on regime support? Does it bolster the regime, or does it backfire instead? This dissertation attempts to address these central questions. I argue that heightened mass threats create a key dilemma for autocrats: to do nothing would fuel mass discontent, but to enact pro-worker reforms would provoke elite resistance. I develop a theory of how autocratic governments are able to enact redistributive measures that balance the demands of both workers and employers. Pro-worker reforms are possible only with judicial balancing: limited independent judiciaries that provide autocrats with the flexibility to either (1) mitigate elites' losses resulting from pro-worker legislation or (2) tilt the balance in favor of labor, particularly when social stability concerns loom large. I contend that this strategic flexibility in adjudication, made possible by constrained judiciaries, creates a conducive environment for autocrats to enact pro-worker legislation in response to mounting mass pressures.
My dissertation consists of three papers that substantiate key aspects of the core argument. First, I use cross-country evidence to support the core hypothesis that autocrats are more likely to enact pro-worker legislation in response to heightened mass threats, but only when lower court independence is limited. To illuminate the mechanisms and dynamics behind the results of the cross-country correlation analysis, I delve into the case of China's 2008 Labor Contract Law (LCL), a most-likely case, applying processing tracing to generate causal process observations for the primary aspects of my argument. Second, I provide robust quasi-experimental evidence for the adjudicative flexibility featured by limited independent courts. I do so by assembling and geo-referencing comprehensive court rulings data on labor disputes for use in a difference-in-differences analysis that takes advantage of subnational variation in levels of judicial independence in China. The results indicate that more dependent courts are more sensitive than their less dependent counterparts to the pressures exerted by both business influence and labor threats, and adapt their adjudication of labor disputes accordingly. Third, I examine whether the judicial balancing strategy, which occasionally compromises the LCL's effectiveness, is compatible with the autocrat's long-term survival interests. Examining the Chinese context and official labor statistics, I find that partially fulfilled redistribution can emerge from this regime strategy and theorize two competing effects of this form of redistribution on regime support: gains over status quo and backlash against unmet expectations. Through an original preregistered survey experiment, I find causal evidence suggesting that insofar as autocrats can exploit their control over the judiciary to still deliver partially favorable outcomes for workers, the potential backlash effects of judicial balancing can be mitigated.
My dissertation makes two main scholarly contributions. First, my work expands our understanding of authoritarian institutions and survival strategies. By situating my argument in an elite-mass interaction framework, I illustrate a dilemma that autocrats may face when reforming labor law and provide new insight into how authoritarian judiciaries help maintain autocratic rule. While previous literature has identified various functions of the judiciary in authoritarian regimes, such as regime legitimation, administrative control, commitment-making, and repression, my dissertation highlights the delicate balancing function of courts, particularly in managing distributive tensions. Second, my dissertation extends the literature on institutions and redistribution that predominantly focuses on electoral institutions and political regimes. I draw attention to judicial institutions, which, through their decisions and interpretations of the law, determine winners and losers and can thus have significant distributional consequences. Building on this insight, my work further points out the inherent flexibility of autocratic judiciaries in influencing these distributional consequences, which autocrats can exploit to advance their own interests.
Table of Contents
Introduction Appeasing Workers without Great Loss: Autocracy and Progressive Labor Legislation Authoritarian Judicial Balancing: Distributional Conflict, Labor Law, and the Value of Dependent Courts Mass Political Effects of Partially Fulfilled (Re)distributive Programs: Experimental Evidence from China
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File download under embargo until 22 May 2026 | 2024-04-03 12:04:50 -0400 | File download under embargo until 22 May 2026 |
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