The Origins of Dominant Parties 公开

Reuter, Ora John Edward (2010)

Permanent URL: https://etd.library.emory.edu/concern/etds/pc289j25g?locale=zh
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Abstract




This study examines why dominant parties emerge in some non-democracies, but not in others. Institutionalized ruling parties that play a role in distributing rents, policy, and patronage contribute to elite cohesion and fortify authoritarian rule, so it is puzzling that many authoritarian leaders eschew building them. This dissertation solves the puzzle of dominant party emergence by examining dominant party emergence as a two-sided commitment problem between leaders and other elites. Specifically, it is argued that dominant parties emerge when other elites hold enough independent political resources that leaders need to coopt them, but not so many autonomous resources that they themselves are unwilling to commit to the party project.

In a span of just under 20 years, post-Soviet Russia has witnessed the failure of two ruling parties and the emergence of a dominant party. This makes contemporary Russia an excellent arena for exploring arguments about the formation of dominant parties. The dissertation shows how Russia's ruling parties failed in the 1990s because regional elites were so strong that they would not link their political machines to any ruling party project. In contrast, United Russia emerged as a dominant party in the 2000s under Vladimir Putin because elites were still strong enough that they needed to be coopted, but they were not so strong that they were prone to defect from the party. Using individual level data on Russian governors and legislators it is shown that strong elites were more reluctant to join Russia's emergent dominant party.

Using cross-national data on dominant parties in all the world's non-democracies since 1946, this study shows that dominant parties only emerge and endure in those countries where neither leaders nor elites hold a preponderance of resources. When elites control access to regional political machines, clientelistic networks, and hard-to-tax economic assets, they may need to be coopted, but if these resources give elites too much autonomy, then elites will not commit to a leader's party project and a dominant party will not emerge. By demystifying the origins of dominant party rule, this study contributes to our understanding of why some countries democratize, but others do not.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction . 1

1.1 Overview .. 1

1.2 Dominant Parties and Political Science . 6

1.3 The Argument in Brief . 10

1.4 Testing the Theory in Post-Soviet Russia . 14

1.5 Testing the Theory Cross-Nationally . 21

1.6 Implications for Comparative Politics . 23

1.7 Plan of the Dissertation . 25

1.8 Figures and Tables . 27

Chapter 2 Dominant Parties in Political Science and around the World 28

2.1 What are Dominant Parties? . 28

2.2 Classifying Dominant Parties . 31

2.3 Dominant Parties in the Literature . 42

2.4 Tables and Figures . 60

Chapter 3 A Theory of Dominant Party Formation . 69

3.1 The Argument in Brief . 69

3.2 The Actors: Building a Theory of Dominant Party Formation . 73

3.3 Dominant Party Formation as a Two-Sided Commitment Problem .. 81

3.4 Overcoming the Commitment Problem .. 94

3.5 Gradual Dominant Party Emergence and Institutional Evolution in Nascent Dominant Party Systems 114

3.6 Tables and Figures . 123

Chapter 4 Parties of Power in Post-Soviet Russia: 1993-2009 . 124

4.1 The Absence of Parties of Power in the First Russian Republic: 1990-1993 . 126

4.2 Russia's Choice: The Failure of Russia's First Party of Power 134

4.3 Our Home is Russia: Russia's Second Failed Party of Power 149

4.4 Parties of Power and Presidential Succession: The Story of "Unity": 1999-2001 . 173

4.5 United Russia's Rise to Dominance: 2002-2008 . 195

4.6 Making Commitments Credible: United Russia as an Institution . 236

4.7 Conclusion . 258

4.8 Tables and Figures . 266

Chapter 5 Elite Affiliation and Dominant Party Emergence: United Russia and Russia's Governors . 271

5.1 Introduction . 271

5.2 Individual Elites and Dominant Party Affiliation . 274

5.3 Hypotheses about Russia's Governors . 278

5.4 Alternative Explanations . 280

5.5 The Dependent Variable: Russia's Governors Decisions to Join UR .. 281

5.6 Independent Variables: The Governors' Resources . 289

5.7 Results and Discussion . 299

5.8 Conclusion . 306

5.9 Tables and Figures . 308

Chapter 6 Elite Affiliation and Dominant Party Emergence: United Russia and Regional Legislators . 310

6.1 Introduction . 310

6.2 Hypotheses . 312

6.3 The Dependent Variable: Regional Legislators . 314

6.4 Resource Ownership and United Russia Faction Membership . 320

6.5 Discussion and Future Work . 328

6.6 Conclusion . 329

6.7 Tables and Figures . 331

Chapter 7 Dominant Party Emergence Around the World 1946-2006 337

7.1 Introduction . 337

7.2 Hypothesis . 338

7.3. Data and Methods . 339

7.4 Results . 353

7.5 Discussion and Conclusion . 359

7.6 Tables and Figures . 362

Chapter 8 Conclusion and Implications . 372

8.1 Summary . 372

8.2 Implications and Future Work . 376

References . 384

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