The Influence of Business Groups as Amici on Judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Pubblico
McCall, Adam Winfield (2012)
Abstract
Abstract
The Influence of Business Groups as Amici on Judges in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals
Much has been written about the influence of business interest
groups on U.S. federal
government policy making. While most of the existing literature
focuses on administrative rule
making and legislative policy, this thesis explores the
effectiveness of business interests in
lobbying the federal judiciary. Thus, this study measures the
impact that business groups have
when participating as amici, friends of the court, before the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. I used
existing data about federal appellate cases collected from
1997-2002 and added new information
about the different interest groups which participated, including
their average expenditures on
lobbying during that time period. I find that business groups,
particularly well-resourced ones,
tend to account for most of the impact that amicus briefs have on a
judge's vote. This effect is
much clearer when businesses file for appellants than when they
support respondents. Aside
from federal agencies, other groups have little success when filing
amicus briefs. However, my
thesis finds that organizations which specialize in legal advocacy
do appear to help appellants
when they submit amicus briefs. My thesis raises questions about
whether the federal courts
provide a level playing field for all participants in litigation or
whether certain groups are
advantaged due to their expertise and resources.
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
I.
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………1
II. Courts and Public
Policy………………………………………………………………...2
III. Interest Groups and the
Courts………………………………………………………...4
IV. Amicus Briefs and Judicial Decision
Making……………………………………….....9
V. Principal
Hypotheses…………………………………………………………………...14
VI. Other Factors Influencing Judicial Decision
Making………………………………..15
VII.
Data………………………………………………………………………………….18
VIII. Analysis: An Overview of the
Data………………………………………………..25
Table 1: Respondent Success in
Dataset..............................………………………28
Table 2: Distribution of Amici in Favor of Appellant and
Respondent………...30
IX. Analysis: An Examination of the
Hypotheses………………………………………..31
Table 3: Baseline Showing Effects of Control
Variables…………………………32
Table 4: Effect of Presence of
Amici………………………………………………33
Table 5: Effect of Number of Amicus
Groups……………………………………34
Table 6: Effect of Business, Federal, and Other
Amici…………………………..36
Table 7: Effect of Number of Business, Federal and Other
Amici………………37
Graph 1: Predicted Probability of Pro-Respondent Vote with
Business Amici...39
Table 8: Effect of Average Lobbying Expenditures by
Amici…………………...40
Table 9: Influence of Lobbying Expenditures by Amici
Supporting
Appellant…………………………………………………………………………….41
Table 10: Effect of Specialized Legal Advocacy
Amici…………………………..42
Table 11: Predicted Probability of Pro-Respondent Vote for
Pro-Appellant
Legal
Groups………………………………………………………………………..43
Table 12: Effect of Business, Federal, and Other Amici on
Judge's Pro-Business
Votes…………………………………………………………………………………44
About this Honors Thesis
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