By Virtue Or By Vote: Modeling Impacts of State Accountability and Regime Type on Crisis Responses Public

Abstract

When are democratic or authoritarian states better equipped to respond to crises? The impact of constituent accountability on democratic states, particularly its ability to draw states towards electorally popular but pragmatically inefficient policies, has long been scruti- nized in comparison with the lower accountability of authoritarian regimes. Yet, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, where responses varied immensely and where many democratic states were unable to effectively respond, questions of state responsiveness to crises have become central to debates of regime type. In this thesis, I construct a decision-theoretic model where a state facing a crisis must choose a responsive policy which will minimize three costs: a responsive cost, an accountability cost, and an altruistic cost. In doing so, I identify conditions wherein citizen accountability pushes a state to either enact a more- appropriate or less-appropriate response, finding that democratic states are most efficient when the citizenry’s preferences are socially optimal or when the cost of responding is ex- traordinarily high. Conversely, I find that authoritarian states may be most efficient when the citizenry’s preferences are far from optimal or when the responsive cost is low. I further model the state’s incentive to under-represent the severity of a crisis and how this persuasive capacity may impact responses. Through theoretical depictions and references to COVID- 19, Chernobyl, and Fukushima disasters, I expand on previous “pandering”-focused work by evaluating the capacity of accountability to improve - or hinder - effective crisis responses. 

Table of Contents

1) Context & Crises - 6

2) Political Accountability & Tyrannical Majorities - 9

3) The Basic Model - 14

3.1) Actors & Interests - 14

3.2) Setup - 17

3.3) Sequence of Play - 20

3.4) Payoffs and Strategy - 21

3.5) Welfare Analysis - 22

4) Results & Propositions - 24

4.1) TheGeneralSolution - 24

4.2) SomeUsefulLimits - 25

4.3) Modifying Responsive Cost - 26

4.4) Modifying Crisis Severity - 32

4.4.1) Scenario: A Rainstorm - 33

4.5) Modifying Accountability & Regime Type - 42

4.5.1) A Minimization Approach - 45

4.5.2) A Directional Approach - 46

4.5.3) Evaluating when $\bar{x} = x_c$ - 50

4.5.4 )Evaluating when $\bar{x} > x_c$ - 50

4.5.5) Evaluating when $\bar{x} < x_c$ - 55

4.5.6) Applications to the Fukushima & Chernobyl Nuclear Disasters - 58

4.6) Optimizing $x_c$ - 63

4.6.1) A General Solution - 66

4.6.2) Welfare Analysis Implications - 70

4.6.3) Applications to COVID-19 In the United States - 74

5) Conclusion & Future Research - 79

6) Appendix - 93

6.1) Proof#1: Proof of $limα→∞γ∗$ - 93

6.2) Proof#2:Proof of $limβ→∞γ∗$ - 93

6.3) Proof#3:Proof of $limλ→∞γ∗$ - 94 

About this Honors Thesis

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School	Emory College
Department	Political Science
Degree	B.S.
Submission	Honors Thesis
Language	English
Research Field	Applied Mathematics Political Science, General
Mot-clé	game theory crisis Chernobyl responsive COVID-19 game decision theory coronavirus
Committee Chair / Thesis Advisor	John Wiggs Patty, Emory University
Committee Members	Jack Paine, Emory University Maggie Elizabeth Penn, Emory University

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