Three Essays on Human Capital Outcomes of Immigrants in the United States Public

Giri, Animesh (2014)

Permanent URL: https://etd.library.emory.edu/concern/etds/mw22v5652?locale=fr
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Abstract

The chapters in this dissertation confer attention to the labor-market wage and health insurance outcomes of two specific immigrant groups in the United States. Specifically, I distinguish between immigrants who arrive in the U.S. as refugees and other documented immigrants. Economic studies using relatively large samples of refugees have been few and far between. In the following chapters, I use an innovative method to identify refugees in the U.S. Census data. This distinction in immigrant type is important as the two groups differ considerably in their pre-migration conditions and the manner in which the U.S. government treats them upon arrival. The 1996 Welfare reforms in the U.S. brought some important changes to the welfare eligibility laws with respect to immigration status. All immigrants entering the country after August 1996 are barred from welfare until naturalization. The only exceptions to this rule are refugee immigrants. The chapters here exploit this difference in welfare eligibility for the two groups and the variability in welfare generosity between states to explain the differences in outcomes for refugees and non-refugee immigrants. I find that among the most recent and youngest immigrants, wages for refugees increase at faster rates than those for non-refugee immigrants. This disparity is greater in the period when only refugees qualified for welfare. With respect to welfare participation itself, I find high rates of enrollment among refugees in programs like Medicaid. Participation is predominantly driven by local economic conditions. As such, during improved economic times, refugees are likely to opt out of Medicaid and enroll in private health insurance. In the final chapter, my co-author and I find that among recent immigrants, refugee wages tend to be higher in the lower tails and lower in the upper tails of the wage distributions. Wage differentials in the lower tails, we find, arise from differences in returns to human capital characteristics for the two immigrant groups and not composition effects. Consistent with this finding, we also notice that the wage differentials are more favorable to refugees in states with more generous welfare programs and where per head expenditures on refugees are higher.

Table of Contents


CHAPTER ONE
FROM REFUGE TO RICHES? AN ANALYSIS OF REFUGEES' WAGE ASSIMILATION IN
THE UNITED STATES
1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................2
2 Motivation and Conceptual Framework .......................................................................................5
3 Data...............................................................................................................................................9
3.1 Refugees in the U.S................................................................................................................9
3.2 Data Description ..................................................................................................................13
4 Methods ......................................................................................................................................17
5. Results........................................................................................................................................20
6 Why Refugee Assimilation Rates Differ ....................................................................................23
6.1 Labor Force Participation ....................................................................................................23
6.2 Employment Correction Model ...........................................................................................25
7 Concluding Remarks...................................................................................................................29
References......................................................................................................................................32
CHAPTER TWO
THE CURIOUS CASE OF REFUGEES: WHY DID MEDICAID PARTICIPATION FALL
FOLLOWING THE 1996 WELFARE REFORMS?
1 Introduction.................................................................................................................................63
2 Motivation...................................................................................................................................66
3 Data.............................................................................................................................................71
3.1 Identifying Refugees............................................................................................................73
3.2 Welfare Waivers..................................................................................................................75
3.3 Data Description ..................................................................................................................76
4 Methods ......................................................................................................................................79
4.1 Theoretical Framework and Model Specification................................................................80
5 Results.........................................................................................................................................83
6 Concluding Remarks...................................................................................................................88
References......................................................................................................................................90
Appendix 2.A: Robustness of Results..........................................................................................103
Empirical Strategy ...................................................................................................................103
Appendix 2.B: Comparing the Imputation Methods....................................................................104

CHAPTER THREE
THE REFUGEE WAGE GAP AND STATE ASSISTANCE
1 Introduction...............................................................................................................................113
2 Motivation and Conceptual Framework ...................................................................................116
2.1 Refugee Reception and Placement in the U.S....................................................................117
3 Methodology.............................................................................................................................119
3.1 Stochastic Dominance........................................................................................................120
3.2 The Decomposition Problem .............................................................................................122
4 Data...........................................................................................................................................124
5 Results.......................................................................................................................................126
5.1 Stochastic Dominance Tests Results..................................................................................127
5.2 Counterfactual Analysis.....................................................................................................128
6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................129
References....................................................................................................................................131


List of Tables
Table 1.1: Refugees by Country of Origin and Migration Cohorts (1990-2000) ..........................39
Table 1.2: Refugees by Country of Origin and Migration Cohorts (2000-2010) ..........................40
Table 1.4: Summary of Statistics by Immigration Status (2000-2010) .........................................42
Table 1.5: Coefficient Estimates for Male Log Wages (1990-2000).............................................43
Table 1.6: Duration Effects by Migration and Birth Cohorts (1990-2000) ...................................45
Table 1.7: Coefficient Estimates for Male Log Wages (2000-2010).............................................46
Table 1.8: Duration Effects by Migration and Birth Cohorts (2000-2010) ...................................48
Table 1.9: Labor Force Participation (%) by Migration and Birth Cohorts (1990-2000)..............50
Table 1.10: Labor Force Participation (%) by Migration and Birth Cohorts (2000-2010)............51
Table 1.A1: Regression Coefficients for Control Variables..........................................................52
Table 1.A2: Coefficient Estimates from Alternate Model 1 ..........................................................54
Table 1.A3: Coefficient Estimates from Alternate Model 2 ..........................................................56
Table 1.A4: Regression Coefficient Estimates from Alternate Model 3 .......................................58
Table 1.A5: Regression Coefficient Estimates from Alternate Model 4 .......................................60
Table 2.1: A Comparison of recent refugees and non-refugee immigrants...................................95
Table 2.2 Summary Statistics on Key Variables Pre- and Post-Reform........................................96

Table 2.2 (Continued)....................................................................................................................97
Table 2.3 Summary Statistics Before and After Welfare Reforms by Immigration Status...........98
Table 2.4. Marginal Effects at the Mean for Medicaid Participation from Multinomial Logit
Models ...........................................................................................................................................99
Table 2.5. Marginal Effects at the Mean for Private Insurance Participation from Multinomial
Logit Models................................................................................................................................100
Table 2.6 Marginal Effects for Medicaid and Private Insurance Participation from Multinomial
Logit Models................................................................................................................................101
Table 2.A1: List of Variables.......................................................................................................106
Table 2.A2: Regression Results from the MLE Model ...............................................................108
Table 2.A3. Marginal Effects at the Mean for Medicaid Participation from Multinomial Logit
Models .........................................................................................................................................110
Table 2.A4: Comparing Imputation Methods..............................................................................111
Table 3.1: Refugee and Non-refugee Immigrants' Means/ Proportions of Key Variables..........134
Table 3.2: Measures of Differences between Non-Refugee and Refugee Immigrants entering US
after 1980 .....................................................................................................................................136
Table 3.3: Measures of Differences between Recent Non-Refugee and Refugee Immigrants
.....................................................................................................................................................136
Table 3.4: Stochastic Dominance Test Results for Recent Immigrants..................................137
Table 3.5: Stochastic Dominance Test Results for Recent Immigrants-High Wage Subgroup
.....................................................................................................................................................137
Table 3.6: Stochastic Dominance Test Results for Recent Immigrants-Low wage subgroup.....138
Table 3.7: Recent Non-Refugee and Refugee Wage-gap by State Generosity............................138
Table 3.8: Stochastic Dominance Test Results for Wage-gap by State Generosity ....................138
Table 3.9: Stochastic Dominance Test Results, Counterfactual #1 .............................................139
Table 3.10: Stochastic Dominance Test Results, Counterfactual #2 ...........................................139


List of Figures
Figure1.1:.......................................................................................................................................36
Figure 1.2:......................................................................................................................................36
Figure 1.3:......................................................................................................................................37
Figure 1.4:......................................................................................................................................37
Figure 1.5:......................................................................................................................................38
Figure 2.1.......................................................................................................................................93
Figure 2.2.......................................................................................................................................94
Figure 3.1.....................................................................................................................................133

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