Corruption in the Market for Government Procurement ContractsBribery in Government Procurement Contracts represents a significant portion of Worldwide GDP--and can have significant costs to society. This paper examines firm behavior in the context of expending both productive efforts and corrupt efforts towards winning a government procurement contract, where a government official selects the winner. In general, firms will invest more in productive behavior and less in corrupt behavior when fines on firms and officials are increased and when complementarity in detection is increased. These results were tested empirically using firm-level data collected by the World Bank in the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. I analyzed firms' decisions to investment in productive behavior and corrupt behavior using suitable proxies for fines and complementarity. Several important results emerged. In general, higher fines and complementarity lower bribery and increase investment in productive behavior.
Table of Contents
Table of Contents INTRODUCTION LITERATURE REVIEW i. CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION: GOOD, BAD, OR NEITHER? ii. CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION iii. CORRUPTION IN PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS THE MODEL i. SOLUTION AND RESULTS ii. COMPARATIVE STATICS EMPIRICAL MODEL i. DATA ii. VARIABLES iii. METHODOLOGY iv. EMPIRICAL RESULTS v. LIMITATIONS CONCLUSIONS APPENDIX 1: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES APPENDIX 2: TABLES APPENDIX 3: GRAPHS AND FIGURES APPENDIX 4: PROOFS REFERENCES
About this Honors Thesis
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|Corruption in the Market for Government Procurement Contracts ()||2018-08-28||