Fishing for Ballots: Domestic Institutions, Common Pool Resource Problems, and Compliance with International Environmental Regimes Öffentlichkeit
Kirkpatrick, Andrew Barton (2012)
Published
Abstract
Abstract
Fishing for Ballots: Domestic Institutions, Common Pool Resource
Problems, and Compliance with
International Environmental Regimes
Governments have attempted a variety of measures in the last 70
years to protect international
common-pool resources. Frequently, these measures involve
international treaties which commit the
signatories to the protection of the common-pool resource through
restrictions on use: either quotas or targets.
However, one sees demonstrable empiric variation in compliance with
these treaties.
Why does cooperation with international treaties vary? One factor
might involve domestic special
interests; deviation from a common-pool resource management regime
benefits some minority of people in the
near term, usually regular users of the regime. It is clear that
small, well-organized groups can receive favors
from the government. But under what conditions will governments
grant favors to special interests? Do
electoral systems matter? Previous work has offered contradictory
theories; empirical evidence, depending on
the issue area, is muddled.
This dissertation seeks to determine the scope conditions under
which previous theories apply through
the concept of marginal costs. Some favors for special interests
are costly, whether in terms of future support
from voters, or in terms of direct budgetary cost. Others are
cheap; perhaps they cost a government nothing,
or voters do not notice.
Three empirical domains are examined: the European Union's Common
Fisheries Policy, where
marginal costs are anticipated to be low; the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organization, where marginal costs
are anticipated to be very low; and the Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution, where
marginal costs are anticipated to vary due to weather patterns in
Europe.
The theory is tested using three separate datasets
newly-constructed from archival research. In all three
domains, the quantitative evidence is supplemented with short
qualitative case studies and elite interviews. The
results show that states in low-marginal-cost situations provide
private goods to special interests in different
ways than states in high-marginal-cost situations. A concluding
chapter offers possible solutions to problems
facing international common-pool resource regimes and directions
for future research.
Table of Contents
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Literature Review 17
3 Theory 37
4 The European Union's Common Fisheries Policy 50
5 Overfishing in the Northwest Atlantic 94
6 Air pollution in Europe 116
7 Conclusion 142
Appendix I. Field Research151
Bibliography 153
List of Figures
1.1 Millions of tons of fish harvested per year 2
1.2 Cumulative number of international fishing agreements 3
3.1 Rogowski 1987 on district magnitude and overfishing 40
3.2 McGillivray 2004 on district magnitude and overfishing 41
3.3 Dissertation theory 42
4.1 Histogram of the quota overrun variable 68
4.2 Histogram of percentage-overfished variable 68
4.3 Histogram of infringements-per-boat variable 69
4.4 Histogram of report compliance variable 69
4.5 A two-way graph comparing overfishing and district magnitude 74
4.6 A two-way graph comparing quota overruns and electoral competition 75
4.7 A two-way graph comparing overfishing and electoral competition 76
4.8 A two-way graph comparing CFP infringements and electoral competition 76
4.9 Predicted values of district magnitude's effect on FIFG subsidies 84
4.10 Predicted values of electoral competition's effect on FIFG subsidies 85
4.11 Overfishing in the UK, 1986-1996 90
5.1 Scatterplot of government survival and overfishing 104
5.2 Predicted values of government survival's effect on catch-to-quota ratio 107
5.3 Predicted values of type of government on catch-to-quota ratio 109
5.4 Predicted effect of electoral competition on overfishing in Canada, 1973-83 114
List of Tables
4.1 Infringements of the Common Fisheries Policy and percentage over quotas, 2002 51
4.2 Data coverage for overfishing variables 66
4.3 Descriptive statistics 73
4.4 Results of the statistical models 77
5.1 Results from a model using government survival days 106
5.2 Results from a model using Polity 108
5.3 Results from the Canadian case, 1973-1983 113
6.1 Protocols signed under CLRTAP 123
6.2 Descriptive statistics 130
6.3 Results of the statistical models 133
List of Maps
4.1 Denmark, with fishing-intensive storkredse highlighted 86
4.2 Great Britain, with fishing-intensive constituencies highlighted 88
5.1 NAFO / ICNWAF divisions with the 200-mile exclusive economic zone 98
5.2 Canada, with fishing-intensive ridings highlighted 110
6.1 Nitrogen oxide emissions in Europe, 1994 124
6.2 Nitrogen oxide emissions in Europe, 2008 125
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