Three Essays in Corporate Finance Restricted; Files Only
Lin, Jianzhang (Spring 2025)
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays in corporate finance, focusing on how legal and institutional frictions shape household behavior, firm strategy, and outcomes. The first essay (Collecting Less, Spending Less: Evidence from Debt Collection Restrictions) examines how debt collection restrictions affect household consumption. Causal inference is based on the staggered adoption of state laws that restrict third-party debt collection, with refined identification comparing similar counties along state borders. Using detailed household-level data, I show that as lenders “collect less,” they respond by extending less credit—causing households to “spend less,” particularly on purchases made using personal credit. The second essay (When Debt Relief Hits Main Street: Evidence from the Indirect Channel of Consumer Credit Access) establishes that creditor rights affect local entrepreneurial activity through a novel channel of consumer access to credit. Consistent with reduced consumer demand, analyses using confidential establishment-level data from the U.S. Census show that businesses in law-shocked states experience lost revenue, especially for nontradable goods and discretionary purchases, as well as reduced employment and payroll. The third essay (Corporate Behavior When Running the Firm for Stakeholders: Evidence from Hospitals), co-authored with Christoph Herpfer and Gonzalo Maturana, studies how stakeholder orientation impacts firm management and performance. We exploit state-level law changes governing the conversion of hospitals from nonprofit to for-profit and find that for-profit orientation reduces hospital spending on emergency rooms and Medicaid patients while increasing focus on revenue and affecting investment decisions. Consistent with spillovers, nonprofit hospitals located near converting hospitals experience increased emergency room visits and expenditures. We investigate governance channels that align corporate behavior with stakeholders and find that converted for-profit hospitals adjust boards by replacing MDs with MBAs and that the tax code is a major source of governance for nonprofits.
Table of Contents
First Essay: Collecting Less, Spending Less: Evidence from Debt Collection Restrictions
1. Introduction-1
2. Institutional Background and Data-5
2.1 Regulation of Debt Collection-5
2.2 Data-7
3. Empirical Method-9
3.1 Main Method-9
3.2 Validation: The Impact on Debt Collection Industry-10
3.3 Validation: The Determinants of Debt Collection Laws-11
3.4 Validation: Parallel Trends Assumption-12
4. Results-13
5. Conclusion-15
Second Essay: When Debt Relief Hits Main Street: Evidence from the Indirect Channel of Consumer Credit Access
1. Introduction-16
2. Institutional Background and Data-20
3. Empirical Method-24
4. Main Results-28
5. Robustness-32
6. Conclusion-35
Third Essay: Corporate Behavior When Running the Firm for Stakeholders: Evidence from Hospitals
1. Introduction-37
2. Data and Sample Selection-43
2.1 Primary Data-43
2.2 Secondary Data and Final Sample-44
3. Empirical Framework-45
4. The Conversion Index as an Instrument-48
5. Shareholder Focus and Firm Behavior-57
6. Corporate Governance Channels-64
7. Cross-sectional Heterogeneity-66
8. Additional Tests and Robustness-67
9. Conclusion-70
Reference-72
Tables-84
Supplementary Tables-105
Figures-134
Supplementary Figures-142
About this Dissertation
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Primary PDF
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File download under embargo until 22 May 2027 | 2025-04-21 11:10:18 -0400 | File download under embargo until 22 May 2027 |
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