Abstract
The United Nations frequently engages in peacekeeping
activities in post-conflict societies in order to build and sustain
peace. A crucial component to the durability of peace is the rule
of law. While there is extensive empirical literature on whether or
not UN peacekeeping is effective in improving the durability of
peace in a post-conflict setting, there is little literature that
empirically examines whether or not UN peacekeeping can improve the
rule of law in a post-conflict state. This study empirically
examines the relationship between UN peacekeeping and the rule of
law in a post-conflict state to ultimately determine if UN
peacekeeping has a positive effect in improving the quality of rule
of law. Using regression and matching analysis, this study does not
find support for UN peacekeeping influencing the rule of law in a
post-conflict setting in either a positive or negative direction.
Even then, the "non-findings" of this study have implications for
policy makers who wish to have post-conflict peacebuilding efforts
have a positive substantive effect on improving the rule of
law.
Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction - 1
Defining Key Concepts - 2
Literature Review - 4
Factors that affect durability of peace -
5
Peacekeeping and the durability of peace -
10
Rule of law and the durability of peace -
14
Post-conflict justice and the durability of
peace -17
Peacekeeping and the rule of law - 20
Non-random Assignment - 22
Theory & Hypotheses - 25
Research Design - 28
Regression Analysis Results - 37
Results, Empirical Findings, and
Interpretation for World Bank Measure - 37
Results, Empirical Findings, and
Interpretation for CIM measure - 44
Matching Analysis Results - 52
Results for Matching Analysis using World Bank
Measure as DV - 52
Results for Matching Analysis using CIM
measure as DV - 53
Discussion of Empirical Results -
55
Case Study: UN Peacekeeping Rule of Law Programming in Liberia
- 57
Context of engagement - 57
Evaluating UNMIL's work - 69
Conclusion - 83
Conclusion & Further Research -
84
Appendix - 90
Works Cited - 91
FIGURES AND TABLES
Table 1: Variables in Analysis - 31
Table 2: Independent Variable Models - 32
Results for difference in World Bank rule of law scores as
dependent variable
Table 3: PCJ Amnesty - 40
Table 4: SSRI - 41
Table 5: No PCJ Amnesty or SSRI - 42
Figure 1: Substantive Effects with World Bank measure (Table
3, Model A) - 43
Results for difference in CIM values as dependent
variable
Table 6: All controls (Amnesty and SSR at the same time) -
47
Table 7: Controls + Amnesty control (no SSRI) - 48
Table 8: Controls + SSRI control (No Amnesty) - 49
Table 9: Controls sans Amnesty and SSR controls - 50
Figure 2: Substantive Effects for CIM measure (Table 6, Model
A) - 51
Matching Analysis
Table 10: Regression Results with CEM weight (using algorithm)
using World Bank DV - 52
Table 11: Regression Results with CEM weight (explicit user
choice) using World Bank DV - 52
Table 12: Regression Results with algorithm CEM weight using
CIM DV - 53
Table 13: Regression Results with CEM weight (explicit user
choice) using DV - 54
Summary Statistics
Table 14: Summary Statistics for World Bank Rule of Law
dataset - 90
Table 15: Summary Statistics for CIM values dataset - 90
About this Honors Thesis
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