CEO-Employee Political Alignment and Financial Reporting Outcomes Restricted; Files Only

Abstract

I examine the association between CEO-employee political alignment and financial reporting outcomes. Using individual political campaign contribution data to measure CEO and employee partisanship, I find that firms with less political alignment between the CEO and employees issue less frequent management forecasts and exhibit more internal control weaknesses and restatements. The negative relation between the political distance and management forecast frequency exists for both Democratic and Republican CEOs and is driven by periods with high political polarization of economic views and by CEOs with similar partisanship to the area where the firm is headquartered. This relation is attenuated when the employees have fewer outside opportunities and when the firm has fewer employees. My evidence suggests that the political distance between the CEO and employees is associated with both voluntary and mandatory disclosure quality.

Table of Contents

Dissertation

1. Introduction 1

2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 7

3. Research Design 11

4. Results 18

5. Additional Analyses 21

6. Conclusion 27

7. References 29

Appendices

Appendix 34

Tables and Figures

Table 1 37

Table 2 39

Table 3 41

Table 4 43

Table 5 45

Table 6 47

Table 7 49

About this Dissertation

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School	Laney Graduate School
Department	Business
Subfield / Discipline	Accounting
Degree	Ph.D.
Submission	Dissertation
Language	English
Research Field	Business Administration, Accounting
Palabra Clave	political distance management-employee relations financial reporting quality
Committee Chair / Thesis Advisor	Teri Yohn, Emory University
Committee Members	Suhas Sridharan, Emory University Ilia Dichev, Emory University Jianxin Zhao, Emory University Gonzalo Maturana, Emory University

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