Decisive Victories or Negotiated Settlements: Rebel-Government Bargaining over Lootable Resources during Civil War 公开

Graham, Carleen (2011)

Permanent URL: https://etd.library.emory.edu/concern/etds/2v23vt56j?locale=zh
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Abstract

What determines whether a civil war ends in absolute victory or negotiated settlement? If a negotiated ceasefire or peace agreement is reached, will it last? This paper argues that rebel funding influences the bargaining behavior of both the government and the rebels, the probability of both sides compromising on a settlement, and the likelihood of war resuming following a ceasefire or peace agreement. Previous literature has demonstrated the effect of rebel natural resource funding on the onset and duration of conflict. This paper builds on previous work by demonstrating that rebel funding can influence not only the duration of civil conflict but also the duration of civil peace by altering the ability of the government and the insurgents to credibly commit to an agreement. Moreover, if a conflict is longer and more intractable it should also be more likely to be resolved with a decisive victory by one side rather than a compromise or stalemate. Rebel groups profiting from illicit lootable resources during civil war are less likely to come to a successful settlement with the government compared to those who do not profit from illicit funding. Additionally, rebel groups who benefit from illicit funding during war are incentivized to renege on agreements by re-engaging in illicit activities and fighting following the signing of a peace agreement.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

2. Literature Review

2.1 Commitment Problems and Civil War

2.2 An Illustrative Example: Rebel Groups in Colombia

2.3 Resources and Rebel Funding

3. Theory

3.1 Game Theoretic Model

3.2 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria

3.3 Conflictual Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria

3.4 Cooperative Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria

3.5 Comparative Statics

3.6 Hypotheses: Civil War Outcome and the Duration of Peace

4. Research Design

4.1 Quantitative Analysis

4.2 Classification of Natural Resources

4.3 Other Independent Variables

4.4 Rebel Groups vs. Criminal Organizations

5. Results

5.1 Decisive Victories

5.2 Duration of Peace

5.3 Discussion

6. Conclusion

7. Appendix

7.1 Solving for the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria of the Game

7.2 Comparative Statics for the Game

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