Compliance with the Regular Order in the U.S. Senate 公开
Moscow, Josh (2013)
Published
Abstract
The rules and precedents of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate establish a "regular order" in the legislative process, but many have noted a trend in which deviation from the regular order is becoming more common and a bill's path through Congress can be chaotic and unpredictable. This phenomenon is evident in the Senate, where a traditional emphasis on deliberation and minority rights has been threatened by many unorthodox procedures. This trend raises two questions: Why should the Senate follow the regular order? And why does the Senate follow or not follow the regular order in the legislative process?
Using an original measure that tracks the occurrence of several types of such unorthodox procedures, this study uses quantitative evidence to confirm that violations of the regular order are increasing. From 2008 to 2010, violations occurred with greater frequency than at any point in the previous 29 years. Increases in centralization in particular as well as the length of the Senate's legislative sessions provide the greatest leverage in explaining the upward trend in violations. Contrary to expectations, increased partisan polarization and the presence of electoral cycle years have no direct effect on increased violations. Moreover, while partisan polarization is highly correlated with centralization, systematic multivariate analysis clearly demonstrates that centralization explains most of the variance in violations. These findings motivate future inquiries that explore the roles of centralization and time in the regular order and legislative decision-making.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction...........................................................................................................1
II. What is the Regular Order?...................................................................................7
III. Hypotheses...........................................................................................................21
IV. Research Design...................................................................................................24
V. Results..................................................................................................................28
VI. Conclusions..........................................................................................................35
VII. Tables...................................................................................................................41
1. Bill Coding Sample........................................................................................41
2. Average Individual and Total Violations per Bill per Year, 1979-2010.........41
3. Active Days per Legislative Session, 1979-2010..........................................42
4. Percentage of Party Line Roll Call Votes, 1979-2010...................................43
5. Appropriations to Party Leadership Offices, 1979-2010...............................44
6. Bivariate Regression Coefficients..................................................................45
7. Ordinal-Level Independent Variable Correlation Coefficients......................45
8. Partisan Polarization Multivariate Regression Coefficients..........................45
9. Centralization Multivariate Regression Coefficients.....................................45
10. Partisan Polarization Regression Coefficients for Individual Violations.......46
11. Centralization Regression Coefficients for Individual Violations..................46
12. Partisan Polarization Multivariate Regression Coefficients by Electoral Years...............................................................................................................46
13. Centralization Multivariate Regression Coefficients by Electoral Years.......47
VIII. Figures..................................................................................................................48
1. Average Total Violations per Bill per Year, 1979-2010.................................48
2. Average Committee Bypasses per Bill per Year, 1979-2010.........................48
3. Average Multiple Committee Referral per Bill per Year, 1979-2010............49
4. Average No Committee Hearing per Bill per Year, 1979-2010.....................49
5. Average No Committee Markup per Bill per Year, 1979-2010.....................50
6. Average No Committee Report per Bill per Year, 1979-2010.......................50
7. Average Amendment Tree Fills per Bill per Year, 1979-2010.......................51
8. Average Omnibus Measures per Bill per Year, 1979-2010............................51
9. Average Filibuster per Bill per Year, 1979-2010............................................52
10. The Effect of Centralization on Violations per Bill.......................................52
11. The Effect of Session Length on Violations per Bill.....................................53
12. The Effect of Partisan Polarization on Violations per Bill............................53
13. Average Violations per Bill by Election Year................................................54
14. The Effect of Session Length on Average Roll Call Votes per Day..............54
15. Average Roll Call Votes per Day by Election Years.....................................55
IX. Works Cited..........................................................................................................56
X. Appendix: Codebook............................................................................................60
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