Conflict Processes and Courts: Repression, Dissent, and the Influence of Domestic Judicial Institutions 公开

Ritter, Emily Hencken (2010)

Permanent URL: https://etd.library.emory.edu/concern/etds/0z708x16h?locale=zh
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Abstract

Under what conditions will a state repress its citizens? Scholars have in large part turned to institutional studies to answer this question. However, we cannot evaluate how institutions affect state repression if we do not understand what would happen in the absence of these institutions. Unfortunately, the literature that examines the micro-foundations of rights violations is conflicted; scholars argue and find repression and dissent are interrelated, yet there is no consensus over exactly how. I develop a game theoretic model based on common assumptions from this literature to establish the underlying motivation for repression as a dynamic attempt to control dissent and remain in political power. Having done so, I extend the model to include a domestic court that varies in its autonomy and power in order to assess the conditions under which the court can come to effectively constrain state repression. I test the empirical implications of both the baseline and extended models on an international dataset for the years 1990 to 2004. The dissertation yields several important conclusions for our understanding of how institutions affect repression. First, the process by which the onset of repression is determined differs from that which determines its severity. This difference is highlighted by the effects of the probability of political survival on the likelihood and level of repression. Second, judicial "independence" alone will not protect citizens' rights. An autonomous court can only effectively constrain state behavior when the state authorities expect that someone will support the court and punish noncompliance. Third, institutions do not uniformly constrain rights violations; they act in the context of a conflict. Though they may make violations less likely, institutions may also induce states to opt for more severe actions, which is not equivalent to an overall reduction in abuse. Finally, institutions affect both rights violations and dissident behavior. When an institution can impose costs on the executive for repressing citizens, potential opposition groups will take advantage of this constraint and threaten more severe opposition. As such, institutions intended to constrain repressive behavior may in fact instigate it by opening opportunities for dissent.

Table of Contents

1 Introduction 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Defining Repression and Dissent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Institutions and Human Rights Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Conflicts of Repression and Dissent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.5 The First Principles of Repression-Dissent Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.6 A BaselineModel of Interdependent Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.7 Examining Institutions and Rights Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.8 Plan of the Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22


2 Baseline Model: Strategic Repression and Dissent 24
2.1 The Strategic Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2 TheModel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Utility Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4 Equilibrium Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5 Implications for Repression and Dissent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.5.1 Repression, Dissent, and Political Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.5.2 Policy Dispute as a Source of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.5.3 Strategic Repression and Dissent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50


3 Onset versus Severity: Testing the Baseline Model 54
3.1 Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.1.1 Operationalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.1.2 Statistical Estimator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.2 Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2.1 Conflict Efficiencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2.2 The Probability of Political Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.3 Empirical Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86


4 Extended Model: Repression under Judicial Constraint 88
4.1 Judicial Constraint of Executive Abuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2 An ExtendedModel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.4 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4.1 Court Rulings and Executive Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4.2 Conflict in an Institutional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116


5 Autonomy versus Power: Testing the Extended Model 120
5.1 Operationalizing Autonomy and Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.1.1 Judicial Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.1.2 Judicial Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.2 Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.3 Empirical Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136


6 Conclusion 139
6.1 Control versus Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.2 Applying Onset and Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.3 Implications for Domestic Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147


A Baseline TheoreticalModel 151
A.1 Proof of Equilibrium Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
A.2 Proofs of Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153


B Extended TheoreticalModel 155
B.1 Proof of Equilibrium Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

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