Interim Governments’ Role in Institution Building Post-Civil War Pubblico

Abstract

This three-paper dissertation centers on a common, yet understudied tool in civil war ter- mination: Interim Governments. I ask three questions: (1) What types of civil wars produce peace agreements with Interim Governments, (2) When in civil wars do interim governments arise, and (3) What sets interim governments up for success in transitioning as specified in civil wars? Chapter Two explores what types of wars produce peace agreements with interim governments. Taking the bargaining model of war as a starting point, the existence of interim governments–an observable commitment to bargaining-by-parts over a key post-war feature, namely, government institutions—is puzzling. I leverage probit regression models to test theoretically informed independent variables’ relationship with interim government inclu- sion in agreements signed that year. Chapter Three begins with the idea that we think civil wars end with battlefield victory or peace agreement, and then peace implementation and politics start. However, some peace agreements that terminate civil wars include an interim government to handle the transition of power to a permanent government instead of laying out agreed-upon changes immediately or restarting pre-war institutions. These institutions present a continued negotiation process during peace implementation before permanent gov- ernments take over. I test these implications using a multistate model that dynamically estimates the conflict and institution-building process as an interconnected process with transitions between war, ceasefires, and different peace terms. The results generally support the information-related hypotheses and I work to unpack them in terms of my theory and the established literature. Chapter Four addresses the questions: Can interim governments lead countries to a virtuous cycle of peaceful politics after a civil war? What are the factors that can lead to their success or failure? To do so, I tackle these questions qualitatively by looking at peace agreement texts and considering the peace agreement documents linked to the Liberian civil war(s) to the conflict and peace processes. Using comparative case analysis and content analysis of agreement texts, I suggest two considerations of particular interest to the success or failure of interim governments envisioned by peace agreements linked to civil wars.

Table of Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 What types of wars include agreements with different institutions in civil wars? 3

2.1 Abstract...................................... 3

2.2 Introduction.................................... 4

2.2.1 WhatareInterimGovernments?..................... 5

2.3 WarandThirdPartyProcesses ......................... 6

2.4 MediatorandMediationSpecificProcesses................... 8

2.5 Theory....................................... 9

2.5.1 HypothesesforWar............................ 10

2.5.2 HypothesesforThirdPartyInvolvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

2.5.3 HypothesesforMediationorMediator: ................. 12

2.6 MethodandData................................. 13

2.6.1 Method .................................. 13

2.6.2 Data.................................... 14

2.6.3 Data:DependentVariable ........................ 14

2.6.4 Data:IndependentVariables....................... 15

2.7 Results....................................... 16

2.7.1 WarandThirdPartyHypothesisTests................. 16

2.7.2 MediationHypothesisTests ....................... 19

2.8 Conclusion..................................... 19

3 Incomplete Negotiations?: When are interim governments used to re- solve civil wars? 22

3.1 Abstract: ..................................... 22

3.2 Introduction: ................................... 23

3.2.1 What are Interim Governments? What Role do they Play? . . . . . . 26

3.3 WarsEnd,PoliticsBegin.ButThere’sMoretoIt................ 28

3.4 Theoretical Framework: Agreeing to End War But to Keep Working on Gov- ernment...................................... 32

3.4.1 Hypotheses ................................ 36

3.4.2 WhythisisHard ............................. 38

3.4.3 Modelingthewholeconflicttogether .................. 41

3.5 DataStructureandUnitofAnalysis ...................... 44

3.6 PreliminaryTests—CoxModels ......................... 49

3.6.1 LengthofWar............................... 50

3.6.2 NumberofActorsResults ........................ 51

3.6.3 CountofPriorAgreements........................ 52

3.6.4 LengthofCeasefire............................ 53

3.6.5 WhatCanWeEstimatewithMultistateModels? . . . . . . . . . . . 54

3.6.6 MultiStateResults............................ 55

3.6.7 Semi-ParametricResults......................... 56

3.6.8 TransitionProbabilityResults...................... 62

3.7 AlternativeExplanations............................. 64

3.8 Conclusion..................................... 65

4 What Conditions Set Interim Governments Up for Success? 67

4.1 Abstract: ..................................... 67

4.2 Introduction.................................... 68

4.3 Structures and Tasks of Interim Governments from Texts . . . . . . . . . . . 69

4.3.1 GlobalSampleofAgreementDocuments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

4.3.2 African Peace Agreements with Interim Governments . . . . . . . . . 72

4.4 ComparativeCaseAnalysis ........................... 73

4.4.1 CodingMethod.............................. 74

4.4.2 WhyLiberia? ............................... 75

4.4.3 LiberianCivilWarOverviewandContext . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

4.5 AnalysisandFindings .............................. 82

4.5.1 CanTakeTimetoWorkorCanBetheWrongIdea . . . . . . . . . . 82

4.5.2 UnifiedGoalsofVetoPlayers ...................... 89

4.5.3 Unified Goals for Interim Governments Specifically . . . . . . . . . . 92

4.6 PossibleScopeConditionsforFutureWork................... 93

4.6.1 AFifthRoleofIG’sinCivilWar .................... 93

4.6.2 Balance of Power Between Government and Rebels . . . . . . . . . . 95

4.7 Conclusion..................................... 95

5 Conclusion 97

Appendix A Paper 1 99

Appendix B Paper 2 110

Appendix C Paper 3 113

Bibliography 115

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School	Laney Graduate School
Department	Political Science
Degree	Ph.D.
Submission	Dissertation
Language	English
Research Field	Political Science, International Relations
Parola chiave	interim government
Committee Chair / Thesis Advisor	David Davis, Emory University Danielle Jung, Emory University
Committee Members	Emily Gade, Emory University

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