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This Land Is My Land:
Secessionist Group Leaders' Decisions to Decrease or Increase the Level of Violence
They Use

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M.A., Emory University, 2009
B.A., Spelman College, 1998

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Abstract

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By Keisha S. Haywood

Why do the groups that fight secessionist wars frequently go back and forth between violence and nonviolence? While empirical evidence from the existing literature shows that most secessionist conflicts are violent, the literature does not address why the level of violence within these conflicts varies over time. My dissertation examines changes in the level of violence secessionist group leaders use, which accounts for the variation. I hypothesized that a secessionist group leader will change the level of violence used if there is a change in any of the following: (1) secessionist group grievances, (2) the level of government repression, or (3) secessionist group capacity to use violence. I conducted a case study in which I interviewed leaders and members of the Mouvement des Force Démocratique de la Casamance (MFDC) in Sénégal. Using the findings from the MFDC case study, I refined and added to the dissertation's original hypotheses, and explored these hypotheses with a case study of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Southern Sudan. The evidence from these case studies shows that there is a positive, linear relationship between group grievances and the group's level of violence, and between the level government repression and the group's level of violence. I also found that splits within the group, inter-factional conflict, changes in group leaders' goals and public support for the movement or group, and intervention by external actors play a role in group leaders' decisions about the level of violence to use, but additional research is required to identify the causal mechanism between these variables and the dependent variable. In addition, there were two more general findings that have important theoretical, methodological, empirical, and policy implications: the independent variables usually changed within the six months leading up to the change in the dependent variable, which exposes a major shortcoming of the annual measures of the variables used in most political violence studies; and, secessionist groups are not unitary actors, and treating them as such ignores the fact that the factions within the group often have different goals and use different levels of violence.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AJAC-APRAN	Association des jeunes agriculteurs de la Casamance-Association pour la promotion rurale de l'arrondissement de Nyassia (Casamançais NGO)
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Spain)
IRA	Irish Republican Army (Northern Ireland)
FLEC	Frente da libertação do enclave de Cabinda (Angola)
IGO	International Governmental Organization
MAIB	Movimiento para la Autodeterminación de la Isla de Bioko (Equatorial Guinea)
MAR	<i>Minorities at Risk</i> dataset
MFDC	Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (Sénégal)
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines)
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines)
MPA	Mouvement populaire anjouanaise (Comoros)
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity (became the African Union)
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front (Ethiopia)
PRIO	International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (Houses <i>Armed</i>)

	<i>Conflict dataset)</i>
RADDHO	Rencontre africaine pour la defense des droits de l'homme (Sénégalaise-based NGO)
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SSIM	South Sudan Independence Movement
Tamil Tigers	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
VINC	Violent Intra-National Conflict dataset
WHO	World Health Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO SECESSION

We don't want autonomy because we don't recognize Casamance as a region of Sénégal, but as an independent country. Our goal is not to make war, but we are demanding our land. Our goals will not be met until the Sénégalese government leaves the Casamance, or we all die!

A Leader of Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance February 11, 2008

Throughout history, political violence has been a problem that has devastated city-states, nations and nation-states, international regions, and the world. This violence has resulted in economic and political instability, famine, decreasing access to healthcare and education for those in impacted regions, booming numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, and, most importantly, loss of human life. Approximately 191 million people worldwide died during the 20th century and in the year 2000 alone, over 300,000 people died, as a result of political violence (World Health Organization). Disputes over territory are at the root of much of this violence.

The Casamance region of Sénégal is the site of one such territorial dispute. The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) is a secessionist group fighting the Sénégalese government for control of the region. The MFDC began in 1947 as a political party working to end French colonization, but in 1983 it evolved into an armed, secessionist group fighting for an independent Casamance. This violent evolution drastically changed course in December 2004, when several factions of the MFDC, whose leaders and members still have not changed their desire for secession, signed a peace agreement with the Sénégalese government.

What factors influence group leaders' decisions about the level of violence to use? What makes group leaders change the level of violence, which ranges from killing dozens of people to signing a peace agreement? The principle assumption of this dissertation is that leaders make these decisions based on analyses of the costs and benefits of carrying out a particular strategy. Changes in these calculations explain why the path of most movements changes direction often, sometimes daily.¹ This dissertation explores the factors that caused the MFDC, and later the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and other secessionist groups, to change direction; specifically, the factors that influence the cost-benefit analysis of secessionist leaders regarding whether to employ violence, as well as the amount and type of this violence.

Using a theoretical framework based on relative deprivation and resource mobilization theories, I hypothesize that a separatist group leader will change the level of violence used if there is a change in any of the following: (1) separatist group grievances, (2) the level of government repression, or (3) separatist group capacity to use violence. After conducting a case study of the MFDC in Sénégal, I found that an increase in the level of government repression influenced MFDC leaders' decisions to increase the level of violence they used. On the other hand, a decrease in both group grievances and the level of government repression influenced their decisions to decrease the level of violence they employed. Changes in the group's capacity to use violence, however, have

¹ In creating the chronology for the MFDC, the group's use of violence changed almost daily. In fact, at times, the group (or a faction thereof) negotiates with the government, and carried out a violent attack the next month (see Chronology for 1/25/2000 and 2/20/2000), demonstrating a change in the leader(s) decision about the use of violence.

no effect on the group's level of violence. In addition to these relationships, I discovered that changes in group leaders' goals from independence to autonomy, splits within the group, and decreasing public support for the MFDC also influenced leaders' decisions to decrease the level of violence they used.

Based on the findings of the case study of the MFDC, I refined the dissertation's original hypotheses, and added the newly discovered explanatory variables. I then tested the new set of hypotheses with a case study of the SPLA, and found that changes in group grievances and the level of government repression were associated with changes in the SPLA's level of violence, which is congruent with the dissertation's previous findings. There were not enough data to identify the impact of changes in group goals or public opinion, or group splits in the case study of the SPLA, but preliminary research on several secessionist groups around the world, which is included in the concluding chapter, shows the need for future research on these variables.

This dissertation goes beyond the existing literature in that it deals *not* with the factors that cause groups to secede in the first place, but the factors that lead to secessionist leaders' decisions about violence and the consequent changes in the direction of secessionist movements. Surprisingly, there have been few studies of violent secessionist movements in Africa (Baker, 2001; Humphreys and Mohamed, 2002; Humphreys, 2005). Even more surprisingly, there has been only one study of secessionist leaders' decision-making (Weinstein, 2005). Weinstein examines sources of funding in African states, and how these sources influence leaders' decisions regarding

recruiting and retaining group members. To date, however, there have been no studies about the factors that influence changes in the level of violence used by African secessionist movements as caused by changes secessionist leaders' decisions.

IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT

The tumultuous events taking place in the South Ossetia region of Georgia are some of the most recent examples of secessionist violence that come to mind for most people. In August 2008, the global community became acutely aware of the ongoing struggle in this region northwest of Georgia's capital of Tbilisi. Unfortunately, this violence is only the newest round in a country that is home to two "breakaway" regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Long before 2008, even before Georgia itself became a "breakaway" republic of the Soviet Union, these two regions were clamoring for independence. Even though most people knew little about the troubles in Georgia before 2008, the violence in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions is not uncommon. In fact, secession and other disputes over territory are actually at the root of a great deal of political violence.

Secession is a phenomenon with far-reaching affects because, if successful, it results in the redrawing of the world map. Even if unsuccessful, secession can lead to bloody intrastate conflicts, like those seen in Nigeria's Biafran War (1967-1970) and Southern Sudan (1983-2005), with as many as two million deaths in each country, as a

direct result of the fighting, or the ensuing famines and outbreaks of deadly diseases.² Even those who are not killed are often forced to flee their homes and livelihoods, and become refugees in another country or internally displaced within their own, which can lead to famine and disease outbreaks. In addition, refugee camps, which usually house law-abiding victims of war, can also provide sanctuary for rebels, as is the case with MFDC members living in Casamançais refugee areas in Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia, and threatening domestic and international security.

Despite the tragic effects of secessionist violence, there have been few studies devoted to increasing our understanding of its causes and consequences. This is an important oversight because in 2007, there were 34 violent intrastate conflicts around the world, and over half of them (53%) were being fought over territory (*Armed Conflict v-2008*). It is equally problematic that there are not more studies on secession in Africa, specifically, because almost one-third (28%) of all violent territorial disputes in 2007 were fought on and over African soil, and the incidence of African territorial disputes is growing. In 2000, disputes over territory (as opposed to other types of conflict) in Africa made up only 21% of all violent conflict on the continent, but from 2000 to 2007, this percentage doubled to 42%. With this kind of growth, it is essential that we understand these conflicts, and the groups that are active in them, if we hope to understand and prevent political violence in Africa.

² For information on Biafra, see Uzokwe, 2003 and the *MAR* Chronology, 1998. For information on Sudan's civil war, see Johnson, 1998 and the CIA World Factbook.

The findings from this dissertation will provide evidence to help explain one type of territorial dispute: secession. They will contribute not only to our knowledge of secession in general, but to our knowledge of secession in Africa because, as will be discussed in detail below, the MFDC shares many important characteristics with other African secessionist groups. Understanding African secession is an important topic because it is on the rise, and we can only expect this trend to continue on a continent with boundaries drawn artificially by colonial powers. There are several other reasons to expect this trend to increase: regimes are no longer propped up by a Cold War super power, which leaves them weaker and exposed to pressure from internal opposition groups; African states are new enough to still have the internal struggles that plague most new states (e.g. power struggles, frequent constitutional changes, weak state-society relations, weak common identity, etc.), but old enough to have moved beyond the climate in which groups worked together in the fight for independence; and, groups have greater access to revenue from (legal and illegal) international trade, which they can use to fund the movement. The findings from this project will shed light on why violent secessionist groups in Africa, and by extension, in other parts of the world, might decide to reduce or eliminate their use of violence.

CONTENDING APPROACHES

In order to identify the factors that influence secessionist leaders' decision-making, I rely on the political violence and secession literatures. Secession is one of the most extreme types of political violence because it calls for the dissection of an existing country, a goal that almost always leads to violence as a strategy. As a phenomenon, however, it has been either largely ignored by the literature, or treated the same as other types of political violence (e.g. civil war, rebellion, ethnic conflict, terrorism). Though secessionist movements can include other types of political violence like ethnic conflict, it is very different due to the intractable nature of its goals, the radical strategies often used to achieve them, and both the group and the government's unwillingness to cede even one inch of land. The few studies that focus on secession often address one of the following questions: why secession begins and predicting future outbreaks of secession; what types of people are drawn to secessionist groups as both leaders and members; how movements recruit members; and, which nations, if any, have the right to self-determination. There have been no empirical studies on why secessionist conflicts end, or why group leaders' strategy choices change over time, the goal of the current study. For this reason, I chose to use the political violence literature, which has numerous studies and theories of leaders' decision-making and cost-benefit analyses, as a starting point to address these puzzles.

Though the approaches found in both the political violence and secessionist literatures provide important insights, they all suffer from two important shortcomings:

the explanatory variables are too static to explain change over time, and the focus is on one type of independent variable. Most theories of political violence look at either economic or societal motivations as the root cause, while those on secession look at geopolitical explanations. One of the goals of this study is to determine the ability of existing political violence and secession theories to explain secessionist leaders' decision-making processes (via cost-benefit analysis) by examining explanatory factors that change over time, and including political, economic, and societal variables.

Economic Theories of Political Violence

Most proponents of economically-based theories of political violence, who tend to focus on natural resources, argue that group leaders' decisions are motivated by the desire to control the access to and profits from oil, mineral deposits, and other primary commodities (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2002; Le Billon, 2001; Buhaug and Gates, 2002; Ross, 2004, 2006; Lujala et al., 2005). Collier and Hoeffler argue that there is a positive, curvilinear relationship between a country's natural resource endowment and group leaders' use of violence. This prediction is based on the assumption that the higher the potential profits, the more willing group leaders are to use increasingly severe violence to capture the resources. The relationship is expected to be curvilinear, however, because when natural resource endowments are very high, the government can use the resulting profits to fund large military expenditures, which it can use to defeat opposition groups. Other natural resource arguments hold that there is a positive, linear

relationship between natural resources and political violence. The researchers who make these arguments find that rebels' access to easily-looted resources (e.g. gems that are found on or just below the earth's surface) or rents from companies that extract more difficult to reach resources (e.g. oil, gems that must be mined) influence their decisions to start wars, or provide revenue to keep them going (Le Billon, 2001; Ross, 2004; Humphreys, 2005; Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore, 2005).

A related economic argument deals not with natural resources, but scarce resources. These theorists hold that the desire to control these resources (e.g. food, money, land) motivates group leaders' decisions (Caselli and Coleman, 2002; Regan and Norton, 2003). They predict a negative, linear relationship between the availability of resources and leaders' use of violence. It is assumed that the fewer the resources, the less these leaders have to lose and the more desperate they become, which increases the likelihood that they will choose violence to achieve their goals.

There are several flaws in these economic arguments. First, and most glaring, is the inability to agree on the types of resources that are most important, and most likely to lead to violence. Most focus on natural resources, but what constitutes a natural resource? Le Billon (2001) looks at differences in the location (proximate/distant) and concentration (point/diffuse) of natural resources, while Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore (2005) argue that whether or not natural resources are easily lootable (easily attained and sold) determines their influence on decisions about violence. These specifications help, but they still do not answer the question, what exactly is a natural resource? Would

illegal narcotics be considered a natural resource? They are, after all, found in nature. Are natural resources the only important resources? How much of any resource is necessary to constitute a large endowment? Several authors point out that the presence of natural resources is not enough to make them profitable for non-state actors.

Also problematic is the inability of these theories to explain why some countries with large, natural resource endowments rarely see political violence (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait), while others often erupt in violence (Nigeria, Indonesia). This puzzle is particularly problematic for those theorists who argue that natural resources lead to administratively weak, or *rentier*, states, which make political violence more likely because the state becomes an easy target and attractive prize (Fearon, 2005; Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005). Saudi Arabia is often cited as one of the best examples of a rentier state in which resource wealth has led to weak state institutions, but it has not seen the type of political violence present in other resource-rich states. In fact, most rentier state theorists, who posit an inverse, linear causal relationship between resource revenue and state administrative capacity and/or democracy, argue the opposite: we should see little resistance to the state (violent or not) because the state buys citizens' "acceptance" with resource rents (Ross, 2001; Vanderwalle, 1998). These expectations and findings, which are contradictory to those of the natural resource-political violence theorists, at the least infirm their assumptions and arguments.

A related problem of natural resource arguments is their inability to explain why countries that are rich in natural resources see violence at some times, but not others. If

group leaders are motivated by the desire to control these resources, why do they not fight continually until they gain control over these resources? Why would leaders' strategies change over time when these resources do not, and if leaders choose to use violence at some point in time, what level of violence will they choose? Will there be executions, torture, or riots (i.e. how severe will the violence be)?

Another limitation of natural resource theories is their inability to explain political violence without intervening variables. Most of these theories discuss the importance of natural resources *and* another independent variable, yet they amplify the importance of the natural resources when identifying the implications, while downplaying the importance of the other independent variable(s). For example, Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002) look at the importance of natural resources and several other variables in explaining political violence in resource-rich countries. They find that along with natural resource endowment, ethnic dominance, ethnic and religious fractionalization, secondary school enrollment, and recent conflict all influence the likelihood of political violence in a country. After these findings, however, in the conclusion of this study and future studies, they still focus on the importance of natural resources as the most important independent variable.

In addition to these critiques, several natural resource theorists point to a major shortcoming of these theories: the abundance of causal mechanisms between natural resources and political violence.³ Ross (2004) and Humphreys (2005) both layout and

³ Some of the causal mechanisms between natural resource revenues and political violence tested by Ross and Humphreys in their respective studies include the following: revenues as a motivating factor for rebel

test several causal mechanisms that are assumed in other studies of the impact of natural resources on political violence. They each find support for some of these mechanisms, and undermine others, but they both suggest further testing of these mechanisms before we can justify their assumption as “fact.”

Regarding the scarcity of resources, there is also an inability to explain several cases, or address puzzles. For instance, what are the causes of secession in countries that are not “resource-poor” or underdeveloped, like Great Britain and Spain? How scarce must resources be in order for group leaders to choose violence? Why do all groups in impoverished countries not use violence, since impoverished countries are by definition resource scarce? Not including sudden shortages of resources, why do groups in impoverished countries not fight continually, since resource scarcity is often a static variable? Finally, are there variables that influence both scarcity of resources and leaders’ decisions, like distribution of wealth and other economic group grievances?

Sociological Theories of Political Violence

Most theories that turn to the structure of a society to explain the causes of political violence and secession focus on that society’s ethnic makeup. Theories based on ethnicity tend to examine the effects of one of the following independent variables: ethnic fractionalization or ethnic dominance. Ethnic fractionalization (heterogeneity) theories explore the direct or indirect role of the number of ethnic groups in a country in

group leaders; revenues as a means to finance the creation or continuation of a rebel group; revenues as a source of funding for large militaries, which are used by governments to repress all opposition; revenues allowing the government to pay for citizens’ acquiescence.

determining the likelihood that political violence will occur (Horowitz, 1985; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Sambanis, 2001; Sorli, 2002). Many theories of ethnic fractionalization argue that greater fractionalization will increase the likelihood of group violence for various reasons, including historical hatred between groups.

Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002) find that ethnic fractionalization influences the likelihood of political violence, but not in the way most other theorists believe. They argue that political violence is more likely to occur in a country with two equally-sized ethnic groups. Their argument is based on the assumption that the costs of coordinating group members is low when the group is large (or at least equal to the size of the ruling ethnic group) because leaders have a sufficiently large pool from which to draw members. When groups are small, however, or the society is highly, ethnically fractionalized, leaders must recruit members from other ethnic groups, which increases the cost of mobilizing and taking action. For this reason, Collier and Hoeffler argue, there will be a positive, curvilinear relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the prevalence of political violence. We should see more violence when there are two, roughly equally-sized ethnic groups (one controlling the government and one that makes up the rebel group), and less violence when there is ethnic homogeneity (fewer reasons to fight) or high ethnic fractionalization.

Another group of ethnically-based theories of political violence examine the importance of ethnic dominance (Sorli, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2002, 2004). This school of thought holds that when one ethnic group makes up more than 40% of the

population of a country, smaller ethnic groups often will use violence against the dominant ethnic group when it controls the government. The underlying assumption is that dominant ethnic groups unfairly distribute resources in favor of members of the same ethnic group, which causes other groups to fight violently for equality. These theorists expect a curvilinear relationship between ethnic dominance and political violence. We will see more violence when the dominant ethnic group makes up around 50% of the population. If a group is either very dominant or not dominant (i.e. makes up less than 30% or more than 60% of the population), violence is less likely because coordination costs are too high with small ethnic groups and very dominant groups are large enough to deter small groups from using violence.

Both ethnic fractionalization and ethnic dominance theories suffer from major shortcomings. The most glaring problem is these theories' assumption that conflicts with an ethnic dimension are all based on "ancient hatreds" between different ethnic groups. As Toft (2003) points out, most ethnic conflicts involve two or more ethnic groups with problems that came about or were created within decades, not centuries, of the conflict, and therefore cannot be classified as ancient. For example, the often cited Rwandan genocide occurred between two ethnic groups, Hutus and Tutsis, whose ethnically-based animosities grew out of colonial experiences. Equally important, hundreds of thousands of moderate Hutus were killed by extremist Hutus, which directly contradicts claims of ancient inter-ethnic hatreds.⁴

⁴ See Lemarchand's (2009) discussion of the history of forced ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi in his chapter entitled, "Ethnicity as Myth."

Another problem, as Varshney (2002) points out, is that neither ethnic dominance nor ethnic fractionalization theory is able to explain changes in political violence over time. According to ethnic dominance or fractionalization theories, we should see countries with many different ethnic groups, or one dominant ethnic group, having a greater incidence of political violence. A country's ethnic make-up is a relatively static figure that does not change over time, and in order for this, or any other theory to be able to explain why we see different levels of political violence, and sometimes cooperation, over time, the main explanatory factors would have to change over time. In addition, these theories do not explain why we do not see political violence in all societies with ethnic fractionalization or a dominant ethnic group. Nor do they explain why countries with either ethnic heterogeneity or dominance may have one or two ethnic groups employing political violence, while other ethnic groups do not. For example, why do we see separatist movements in the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but not in Ajaria?⁵ All three provinces are made up of ethnic minorities, and all three are in the same country with the same dominant ethnic group- Georgians (83.8%).⁶ If these theories are accurate, we should see political violence and separatism on the part of all three groups.

A final shortcoming of theories based on ethnicity, is that beyond the assumption that there are ancient hatreds between groups, they assume a level of cohesion within

⁵ Toft (2003) argues that there are differences in whether each region considered its territory indivisible, and these difference led to different outcomes.

⁶ According to the 2002 census cited in the CIA World Factbook accessed at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html> on 8/18/08.

groups that is strong enough to fight other groups. In fact, many ethnic groups are not cohesive, as evidenced by multiple political parties and armed groups representing the same group. For example, both the Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front claim to represent the will of the Moro ethnic group in the Philippines, and the Hutu moderates and Hutu extremists in Rwanda were on different sides of the genocide. If ancient hatreds cause different ethnic groups to fight each other, then we should consistently see cohesion within ethnic groups to fight the “other.”

Geo-political Theories of Secession

Within the small literature on secession, most studies examine the role of geography in secessionist violence. Most of these studies, however, seek to explain *why* groups decide to secede, rather than why secessionist leaders make particular decisions about strategy (Treisman, 1997; Saideman, 1998; Bartkus, 1999; Ayres and Saideman, 2000a, 2000b; Ayres, 2001; Baker, 2001; Evans, 2003). The present study seeks to explain the latter, not the former. Monica Toft’s (2003) study of ethnic violence in Russia and Georgia goes one step further and examines why secessionist groups use violence. According to Toft’s theory of territorial indivisibility (TI), secessionist groups use violence when they view their culture, identity, and complete control of their homeland as intertwined and indivisible issues. Unlike conflict based on economic issues, conflict based on these issues cannot easily be resolved with compromise. For this reason, once a group has decided that secession is its goal, TI predicts that violence

will ensue.⁷ The decision to secede or not is based on the group's settlement patterns. Toft argues that if an ethnic group is a concentrated majority or minority in a region and it views this region as its homeland, it is likely that it will seek secession because it has the necessary capability (networks, resources, etc.) and the legitimacy (homeland).

The underlying logic of TI does a good job explaining why a group would choose to secede, and why it is likely to use violence to achieve its goal. Toft also provides a compelling argument for why a state would repress a secessionist group- fear of precedent-setting for other latent separatists. Though my study does not seek to explain why secessionist movements occur, or why states repress them, Toft's arguments are relevant because they help to explain the context within which these groups begin using violence, and she, like this author, bases her theory on the underlying assumption that actors take several factors into consideration, and then make a decision based on these factors.

This assumption is significant for two reasons. First, social movement and political violence literatures have, at times, assumed that actors are irrational simply because we cannot understand or predict their strategies easily with overly-simplified theories. The second reason Toft's assumption is important is that it gives agency to actors, rather than using overly-deterministic assumptions that a particular set of independent variables will lead to an outcome. By looking at the actors that make the

⁷ Governments, on the other hand, often violently repress secessionist groups because they fear setting a precedent of cooperation with such a group. This is especially true in countries with more than one active separatist group, or countries with more than one ethnic group with the potential for separatism.

decisions about the use of violence, Toft is able to show how the independent variables lead to the outcome, in her case the onset of secessionist violence.

The major problem with TI, however, is that it does not explain why we see violent secessionist groups changing paths on a regular basis. TI cannot explain this change because its independent variables are static, or unchanging. The theory does not predict change in a group's settlement patterns over time, or change in the importance of identity, culture and control over the homeland, and, therefore, it does not predict change in the indivisible nature of secessionist goals. For this reason, it cannot explain why we would see a secessionist group changing its course several times over the life of the movement. Given the shortcomings of each of these approaches in explaining secessionist group leader's strategy choices, should we just dismiss them, or build on them to create a more comprehensive theory that better explains leaders' decisions?

MY ARGUMENT

Though each school of thought discussed has major limitations, they each also make important theoretical contributions that will help in the study of secessionist group leaders' strategy choices. Economically-based theories, especially those focusing on natural resources, provide insight into groups' ability to carry out a chosen course of action. If natural resources are present in a separatist region, group leaders may be able to gain control of these resources, sell them, and use the money to buy weapons. In this scenario, natural resources are not the motivation for separatism, but they do enable

separatist action, including violence.⁸ These resources, then, become important in explaining group leaders' strategy decisions, and the duration of conflict more generally because they can make certain strategies possible, and for a longer period of time. Economic arguments can also help explain changes in group leaders' strategies because the ability to control and profit from different sources of income (including natural resources) can change often for a number of reasons, including international trade restrictions on resources from conflict areas, and increased security in resource-rich areas by the government and multinational corporations. These sometimes frequent changes can then help explain the sometimes frequent changes in group leaders' capacity, which results in changes in group leaders' decisions.

Though not as helpful in explaining change over time, ethnically-based theories can help explain the onset of political violence. In fact, theories of ethnic dominance may explain the onset of secessionist movements more specifically. Using the case of Sénégal and the Casamance region as an example, one of the major complaints of Casamançais is that Wolof dominance has privileged the Wolof in politics, economics, and society.⁹ This has actually been one of the major grievances upon which the separatist movement has been based. Although this theory does help to explain the onset of separatism in this case, it is not used in this dissertation because it cannot help explain

⁸ It is important to note the distinction between motivation and facilitation because many economic theories of violence (i.e. greed theories) argue that these resources motivate groups to become separatist. Others, including Ross (2004), Humphreys (2005), and this author, hold that more often these resources facilitate the actions of groups who have other motivations for fighting. This argument is based on the empirical evidence from Ross (2004), Humphreys (2005), and Fearon (2005), as well as the lack of tests of the greed mechanism by other natural resource theorists, like Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2000).

⁹ The Wolof make up approximately 43% of the population of Sénégal.

change over time in separatist group grievances. It is useful to this study in its ability to explain the cause of something taken as a given in this study: the existence of secessionist group grievances.

Toft's (2003) theory of territorial indivisibility actually addresses secessionist group violence directly. Her argument that culture, identity, and absolute control over homeland are indivisible bases for secessionist movements intuitively explains why a secessionist movement would spring from a particular region or group. Geo-political explanations are particularly relevant to all studies of secession because geography is a central feature of secessionist movements. By definition, the goal of secessionist groups is to win absolute control over a piece of land currently controlled by a different authority.

Though one can see the strengths of these contending approaches, there are important shortcomings of these theories: most focus on politics *or* economics to the exclusion of other factors, and none is able to adequately explain why secessionist strategies might change over time. By focusing on changes in political, economic, *and* social factors, this dissertation is better able to explain changes in secessionist leaders' cost-benefit analyses, and these changes, then, explain shifts in the strategies and direction of secessionist movements. Specifically, I will examine how changes in separatist group grievances, state repression, and secessionist group resources impact group leaders' decisions about whether to use violence, and at what level.

SECESSION

When I explain that I study secession, most non-political scientists stare at me quizzically. Even among political scientists who study this phenomenon, there is some debate on the differences between separatism and those who seek secession. As mentioned previously, the study of secession is part of the broader examination of political violence, and this section will explore the concept of secession more deeply, and place it within the broader study of political violence and armed conflict. In addition, I explain the differences between separatism and secession, and provide a comparative summary of different secessionist movements throughout the world and in Africa. I end with a brief overview of the MFDC and where it fits in the broader discussion of secessionist groups.

Political Violence and Armed Conflict

According to the *Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary* (2008), *political* is defined as “of or relating to government, a government, or the conduct of government,”¹⁰ Bufacchi (2005) explains that “the word ‘violence’ is derived from the Latin *violentia*, meaning ‘vehemence’, a passionate and uncontrolled force,” and the dictionary defines *violence* more specifically as the “exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse” (Bufacchi, 2005). Based on the combination of these words, *political violence* is the act of trying to change the government or the conduct of government by exerting physical

¹⁰*Merriam-Webster* online dictionary accessed at www.merriam-webster.com.

force. Before continuing, it is important to note that though political violence may include commonplace illegal activities, not all (or even most) of these activities are examples of political violence. Gupta explains that “the conceptual distinction [between political violence, and other forms of violence and illegal activities] lies in the former’s ultimate goal of bringing about a change in the social, political, or economic order that benefits all members of the community” (Gupta, 1990: 5).

Based on this definition, it may seem as though political violence and armed conflict are the same. Gurr and Moore (1997) define *armed conflict* as “a concerted campaign of violent action used by organizations claiming to represent an ethnic group to make claims against the state.”¹¹ Gleditsch, et al. (2001), the authors of the *Armed Conflict* dataset, define *armed conflict* as:

a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state.¹²

The major difference between these definitions, and those for political violence, is that the definitions of armed conflict speak to the actors and actions involved in the violence. While political violence can be carried out by an individual or group against another individual or group, armed conflict involves a sub-national group carrying out acts of

¹¹ Gurr and Moore, 1997: 1081. Though they call this concept rebellion, it matches most other studies’ definitions of armed conflict.

¹² Gleditsch, 2002: 619-620. Though Gleditsch et al. also mention the number of battle deaths per year in their definition, this is not as important for this study, since I am not concerned with annual measures of violence, but specific episodes of violence.

violence against the government.¹³ Gleditsch et al. go on to identify the two types of armed conflict mentioned in their definition: those over the government and those over territory. They explain that conflict over the government occurs when an opposition group seeks to change the type of political system, who makes up the political system, or to replace the existing government altogether. Conflict over territory, on the other hand, occurs when an opposition group fights for “a change from one state to another in the control of territory in an interstate conflict [e.g. South Ossetia] or demands for secession or autonomy in an intrastate conflict [e.g. Anjouan or the Casamance]” (Gleditsch et al., 2002: 620). It is the latter type of collective action against the state with which this study is concerned, and from these broad categories of political violence and armed conflict, we move to the more specific concepts of separatism and secession.

Separatism and Secession

For the purposes of this study, it is important to note that separatism and secession, though often used interchangeably, are not the same. Many authors think of separatism as a spectrum ranging from regionalism to secession. In fact, according to Bartkus (1999: 9):

separatist movements vary widely in terms of intensity, degree of violence, and duration, [but] their demands usually fall on a political spectrum somewhere between demanding greater regional autonomy, and outright secession.

¹³ Though armed conflict can conceivably occur between two groups, this study uses the more restrictive definition that looks only at group violence against the state because the scope of the definition is the same as the scope of this study.

Trzcinski (2004) explains that separatism, in particular, “is most commonly understood as a region’s drive to detach itself from a certain entity,” and Baker (2001) specifically identifies a separatist movement as one that “seeks a federal arrangement or greater [regional] autonomy...” (Trzcinski, 2004: 208; Baker, 2001: 66). All of these authors argue that secession is usually the most extreme type of separatism, which is the assumption of the current study.

At the radical end of the spectrum of separatism, secession is “the formal withdrawal from an established, internationally recognized state by a constituent unit to create a new sovereign state” (Bartkus, 1999: 3). Within this definition, there are three requirements for secession. First, there is a “constituent unit,” or a group of citizens who seek to break away from the existing state. This constituent group may seek secession for various reasons (e.g. repression, grievances), and the group’s members may share a common history, ethnicity, religion, etc. Once the group has come together, however, it must decide on the details of the new state that it seeks to create. These details include physical attributes of the new state, such as size and boundaries, as well as symbols like a flag and national anthem. Finally, once the group has formed, and decided on the details of its new state, it must take action to withdraw from the existing state. This action can come in many forms, including declarations of independence or guerilla warfare. Most often, though, the action chosen by seceding groups quickly escalates to violence because states are often violently opposed to the dismemberment of their territory (Toft, 2003).

For this reason, it is important to distinguish between other forms of political violence, which may or may not escalate in severity, and secession.

It is equally necessary to distinguish between separatism and secession because the former has less chance of violence than the latter. As Bartkus argues:

“...the crucial distinction between separatism and secession lies in the willingness or unwillingness of the discontented community to recognize the sovereignty of the existing political authority (Ibid: 9).

Not only is this distinction important because of the differences in severity of violence used by separatist and secessionist groups, it is also important because this study does not attempt to explain regionalism or conflicts in which groups are fighting for autonomy within the existing state. Instead, I focus on groups that have used violence at some point during the life of the movement, who began with the publicly stated goal of independence from the existing state. This focus includes groups that may have signed agreements for autonomy with the government as long as at the beginning of the movement, the stated goal was secession. Though the definitions listed above point to the differences in types of nonviolent and violent groups, an overview of these types of groups in Africa and the world will make the distinction clear.

Secessionist Groups

As mentioned above, disputes over territory account for over half of all violent conflict in the world, but what do the groups who carry out this violence look like? There are some characteristics shared by most secessionist groups. The most obvious characteristic is the

desire for independence. Though the goals of a group might change over time (a fact not under investigation by the current project), by definition, a secessionist group must have had the stated goal of independence at some point during the life of the movement. Also, most secessionist groups are made up of members concentrated in a particular region of the country from which they want independence. Several theorists highlight the importance of this geographic concentration, since secession is a geographic phenomenon (Baker, 2001; Le Billon, 2001; Toft, 2003). These theorists provide empirical evidence that concentration in the secessionist region is a necessary factor in the onset of secessionist movements, an argument that makes intuitive sense. Geographic concentration and the desire for independence are the two characteristics shared by the vast majority of secessionist groups, but there are many economic and social characteristics that vary among the groups and the countries in which they operate.

Economically, for example, secessionist groups, like the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, are operating in regions with few, if any, natural resources, while other groups, like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in Nigeria and Frente da libertação do enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) in Angola, are fighting in oil-rich regions. Natural resource theorists argue that we should see secessionist violence in regions rich with natural resources (e.g. oil or diamonds) but the majority of secessionist groups are fighting in regions lacking in natural resources. These theories also cannot explain why we do not see secessionist violence in countries like South Africa or Saudi Arabia, even though they are rich in

natural resources. It is equally difficult for scarce-resource theorists to explain why we have seen secessionist violence in Northern Ireland and Spain, both high-income countries, but not in the low or lower-middle income countries of South America.

Political violence theories based on ethnicity are also plagued with cases of secessionist violence that they cannot explain. For instance, ethnic-fractionalization theories maintain that the greater the number of ethnic groups in a society, the greater the likelihood of secessionist violence. There are, however, several countries with secessionist violence, with relative ethnic homogeneity, including Spain. At the same time, there are many ethnically diverse countries in which different ethnic groups coexist peacefully, such as Ghana or Benin. If we turn to theories of ethnic dominance, we still are left wondering why there is no secessionist violence in countries with a dominant ethnic group like the United States, while we do see secessionist violence in Georgia, a country in which the dominant ethnic group makes up 70% of the population.¹⁴

These contextual differences among the world's secessionist groups are important because they highlight most of the existing theories' inability to identify and explain the causes of secession. With all of these differences identified, what do actual secessionist groups in Africa look like? This section will provide a brief overview of secessionist movements on the continent before discussing the MFDC in more detail.

¹⁴ Toft, 2003: 91. See "Contending Approaches" section for details of these theories.

Secessionist Groups in Africa

A central theme of most African secessionist movements is their desire to control a geographically isolated region. Like with other secessionist groups, those in Africa are often fighting in regions that are geographically and culturally distinct from the rest of the country. For example, the MPA is fighting for control of Anjouan, one of three islands that make up the country of the Comoros (off the eastern shore of the African continent). Cabinda, the region of Angola that is the site of FLEC's secessionist movement, is separated from the rest of the country by the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Despite this common theme, there are important differences among African secessionist groups. Some groups, like the OLF and ONLF in Ethiopia are united by ethnicity, while others, like the Southern Cameroons National Council (an ethnically-diverse group), share a common language (they speak English in a mainly Francophone country). Still others, like the MFDC and FLEC, are united mainly by geography, while others have mobilized around a combination of these factors, like MEND in the Niger region of Delta. Along with these differences, African secessionist groups have varying levels of resources with which to fight. Groups like MEND are fighting in regions rich with oil, and they take advantage of this natural resource by kidnapping foreign oil workers for ransom and breaking into pipelines. Other groups, like those in Ethiopia and Comoros, are fighting in resource-poor regions with few resources at their disposal.

Though most African secessionist groups are violent, some, like the Southern Cameroons National Council or the Inkatha Freedom Party in South Africa, are not. The

vast majority of groups have used varying levels of violence, ranging from nonviolence to full-scale war. Many of the groups have fought off and on for decades, and one of the longest running secessionist movements, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (1955-1993), is the only successful secessionist movement on the continent. Groups like the ONLF (1960s-present) and the OLF (1970s-present) in Ethiopia, and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (1980s-present), have been engaged in violent struggle for decades unsuccessfully (Baker, 2001).

CASAMANCE AND THE MFDC

Like many of the groups listed above, the MFDC has been fighting for independence of the Casamance region from Sénégal for decades. In order to fully understand the MFDC and its secessionist movement, it is important to explore the context within which the movement developed. This section is divided into three sections. The first section will provide a summary of the history of Sénégal, which will lead into the second section- an historical background of the Casamance. The last section will provide a brief overview of the group itself.

Sénégal

With an area of 316,435 square miles, Sénégal is the western-most country on the mainland of the African continent. It shares borders with Mauritania to the north, Mali to the east, Guinea-Bissau to the south, and to the west is the Atlantic Ocean. The country of the Gambia runs through the middle of Sénégal, almost splitting the country in half, with

the contested region of the Casamance as the only one in the country below the Gambia (and cut off from Dakar and most of the rest of the country).

Aside from the obvious geographic separation between the Casamance and the rest of Sénégal, during colonialism, there was an administrative separation. The territory that is modern-day Sénégal was a colony of France, but did not include the area that became the Casamance region of independent Sénégal. Instead, according to Casamançais, the Casamance was a French protectorate that dealt directly with France.¹⁵ In preparation for independence from France, Léopold Senghor created the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) to represent the Sénégalese people in 1948. One year earlier, however, Victor Diatta founded the MFDC to represent the interests of the Casamance in its preparations for independence. After both parties were created, Senghor requested that Diatta and the MFDC join together with the PDS to work toward independence. Diatta refused, and was assassinated later the same year (1948).¹⁶

In 1948, Emile Badiane replaced Diatta as the head of the MFDC. Contrary to Diatta, Badiane initially agreed to work with Senghor's PDS, but refused when Senghor suggested that the MFDC drop its own name, and assume that of the PDS. Instead, Badiane agreed to call his party MFDC-BDS (BDS: Bloc Démocratique du Sénégal), but stressed the fact that while the two parties would work together, they were not the same. In return for the MFDC's support of Senghor, the story goes, "Senghor promised

¹⁵ Interview with a former combatant turned leader in the political wing, February 8, 2008; Interview with NGO staff member, February 26, 2008). There are no independent sources of evidence to support this claim, only the data from these interviews.

¹⁶ Two interviewees attributed this and other assassinations to Senghor based on the timing, and the fact that Senghor ended up getting his way (to be discussed below).

Casamance independence within twenty years of Sénégal's own independence in 1960."¹⁷

Upon independence, the Casamance became one of 10 regions in Sénégal: Dakar (which includes the country's capital city of Dakar), Diourbel, Fatick, Kaolack, Louga, Matam, Saint-Louis, Tambacounda, and Thies.¹⁸ In 1984, the Sénégalese government split the Casamance into two regions: Ziguinchor and Kolda. The fact that the change happened shortly after the beginning of the separatist movement lends itself to the argument, made by many, that it was a strategic move on the part of the Sénégalese government (de Jong, 1998; Marut, 2002; Evans, 2003). Though the region was divided and the name changed over 20 years ago, most people, both Casamançais and those who study the region, still refer to the region of the Casamance.¹⁹ This is partly due to the rich history of the Casamance and its people.

Historical Background of the Casamance

The Casamance region is almost completely cut off from the rest of the country by the Gambia to the north. Making up roughly one-seventh of Sénégal's territory, this southwestern region is bordered to the south by Guinea-Bissau, to the west by the Atlantic Ocean, and to the east by the region of Tambacounda. The Casamance makes up almost 15% of Sénégal's total land, and is vertically bisected by the Casamance River,

¹⁷ M. Humphreys and H. ag Mohamed, 2005, "Sénégal and Mali," in *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, P. Collier and N. Sambanis, eds., Washington, DC: World Bank Press: 247-302: 250.

¹⁸ CIA World Factbook; Interviews.

¹⁹ Evans, 2003; data from interviews; personal observation.

which is important because it serves as a means for transportation (the boat that travels between Dakar and Ziguinchor), fishing, and a source of water that makes the region the only one in Sénégal with arable land (Evans, 2003). In fact, most of Sénégal's rice (the major staple), comes from the Casamance.

The Baïnouk were the first inhabitants of the region, followed by the Diola.²⁰ There are several other ethnic groups who consider the Casamance to be their homeland: the Baïnouk, Manjak, Mancagne, and Balanta. Along with these ethnic groups, there are several from northern Sénégal who migrated to the Casamance after Sénégal's independence in 1960, including the Wolof (the largest ethnic group in the country), Toucouleur, and Sérér. The Mandingo (Mandingue locally) and the Peul (also called Fulani) are both relatively small populations in the Casamance, but part of larger ethnic groups that can be found in most countries of West Africa (Ibid).

According to the 2002 census, the Diola are the largest ethnic group in the Casamance, making up approximately 61% of the population. As noted by other researchers, this estimate seems quite low. In fact, of all of the villages and towns visited in the Casamance, the author only met five people who were not Diola (though all spoke Diola-Fogny fluently). For this reason, the author would estimate that in the smaller towns and villages of the Casamance, 85% of the population is Diola.

While Islam still makes up the majority religion in the Casamance, it is less dominant than in the rest of the country. Sénégal is approximately 94% Muslim, while Muslims only make up roughly 75% of the Casamançais population. It is important to

²⁰ Ibid.; various civilian sources.

note, though, that most Casamançais Muslims practice a different type of Islam than the majority of Muslims in the rest of the country, who practice a type of Islam that is specific to West Africa. The rest of the Casamançais population is approximately 17% Christian (mainly Catholic), and 8% animist.²¹

It should be noted that ethnicity and religion were discussed to provide a background on the Casamance, but neither is the basis upon which the goal of independence is founded.²² Instead, geography is a much more defining aspect of Casamançais identity.

The MFDC

In 1980, 20 years after Sénégal gained independence, Abbé Augustin Diamacoune Senghor wrote a 52-page letter to President Léopold Sédar Senghor. In this letter, Abbé Diamacoune, the future leader of the soon-to-be resurrected Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC), requested a meeting with President Senghor to discuss the separation of the Casamance from Sénégal. According to many Casamançais, on the eve of Sénégal's independence in 1960, Senghor struck a deal with Emile Badiane, the leader of the original MFDC. The agreement was that the Casamance (a French protectorate) would become a region of Sénégal (a French colony) for twenty years, so that they could help each other with various aspects of development. The logic was that Sénégal could help the Casamance develop its infrastructure, while the Casamance could

²¹ Evans, 2003; Foucher, 2004; interviews; personal observation.

²² This background is provided because much of this information will be used when describing the (in)ability of other theories to explain the actions of the MFDC, and how they change over time.

use its agricultural riches to feed the rest of Sénégal. In exchange, the Casamance would become an independent nation after the twenty years had passed.²³ By all accounts, the Sénégalese government's response to this letter and the subsequent protests sparked the longest civil war in West Africa.

As will be discussed in detail later in the dissertation, the MFDC created its armed wing in December of 1983, one year after the government responded with violence to peaceful protests. Even with this decision to employ violence, the group did not commit its first act of violence against the government until 1990, when it attacked Senegalese soldiers in Seleti, a major border crossing between Sénégal and the Gambia (Evans, 2003). The MFDC began to employ violence more regularly in the early 1990s, but the mid-1990s saw the group's highest level of violence against the government and civilians, including the disappearance of four French tourists in 1995, and an attack on army barracks that resulted in the death of 25 Senegalese soldiers. By 2000, the MFDC's attacks on the government and civilians became less frequent, but intra-group fighting increased. The lack of agreement within the group on the best course of action led to the signing of several peace agreements, though hardly any were honored for more than a few months, and none were signed by all factions, until 2004.

In December of 2004, most of the factions of the MFDC signed the most lasting peace agreement to date. Since then, there have only been sporadic acts of violence against the government or civilians, and most of these have been attributed to a hold-out faction of the MFDC, not the group as a whole. The chronology of events will be

²³ Interviews with AD, AED, KD, AD & JPS. See also Humphreys and Mohamed, 2005: 250.

discussed in greater detail during a description of the data for the congruence test, and three of the most important events- the decision to create an armed wing, the first act of violence against the government, and the signing of the 2004 peace agreement, will be examined thoroughly.

PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

In the next chapter, I discuss the theoretical arguments, hypotheses, and hypothesis tests. Chapter 3 begins with a detailed chronology of the MFDC case, followed by a congruence test of all of the events over the life of the movement. In Chapters 4-6, I conduct causal process analyses of three important moments in the movement's history: the MFDC's first use of violence in 1990; the first call for peace by one of the MFDC's leaders in 1991; and, the signing of the last peace agreement in 2004. Each of these moments constitutes a significant change in the use of violence by the MFDC, which resulted in major shifts in the direction of the movement. In Chapter 7, I use the findings from the previous chapters to refine the existing hypotheses and generate a new set, which I test with a case study of the SPLA. The concluding chapter summarizes the key findings of the project, offers implications of these findings, and outlines directions for future research.

This dissertation aims to make important theoretical and empirical contributions. Theoretically, this study will contribute to political violence and secession literatures by identifying and clarifying the causal mechanism at work between government repression,

grievances, and group capacity, and secessionist group leaders' strategy choices. At present, studies of political violence and secession examine the causes of onset and duration of secessionist violence, but not the causes of strategy changes. By conducting interviews to trace the process between the independent variables and leaders' decisions, the findings from this study will not only help clarify causal linkages that lead to secessionist group leaders' decisions, but also shed light (i.e. identify omitted variables) on this previously unstudied, but often occurring, phenomenon. In addition, by selecting cases that vary on the explanatory variables of contending theories, findings from this study will offer new insight on the direct impact of these variables on secessionist group leaders' decisions, as well as the indirect impact these variables may have on the three key independent variables of this dissertation. Empirically, not only will this dissertation address a relatively common phenomenon that has previously gone unstudied, also it will provide new information on secession and political violence in Africa specifically, which might be particularly helpful in the prevention and resolution of these types of conflicts.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL ARGUMENT AND METHODOLOGY

Two of the most well-known secessionist groups in the world, the IRA and ETA, have fought decades-long struggles for independence from Great Britain and Spain, respectively. Over the life of both secessionist movements, the groups used varying levels of violence, from severe (e.g. killing dozens of people in a single attack) to nonviolent. Evidence of this variation can be seen in the many peace agreements that were signed and later broken by the group, the government, or both. This variation in violent strategies is not unique to the IRA or ETA. In fact, of the 18 groups (or alliance of groups) fighting in territorial conflicts in 2007, all but two have used varying levels of violence, shown by their inclusion in the *Armed Conflict* dataset for certain years, but not others.²⁴ What causes this variation in violence? What factors influence secessionist group leaders' decisions about the level of violence to employ?

The goals of this chapter are to address these questions by laying out the theoretical arguments, as well as the hypotheses drawn from them, and the methods used to test them. To those ends, I begin with an overview of the article from which the two theories used- relative deprivation and resource mobilization- come. I discuss their key

²⁴ Only Palestinian and Patani insurgents fighting in Israel (Palestine) and Thailand, respectively, have used the same level of violence over the life of the movement, according to the *Armed Conflict* dataset. If we conducted case studies on these groups, however, we would probably discover that if we used opposition group-month as the unit of analysis, rather than opposition group-year (like *Armed Conflict*), they also use varying levels of violence.

arguments and assumptions, then identify the hypotheses that result from them. I then describe the hypothesis tests and their limitations, case selection, and operationalization of the variables. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the data collection methods, including the interviews for the primary data and the sources for the secondary.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

In order to identify possible causal variables that explain secessionist group leaders' decisions, I turned to the political violence literature because, as mentioned above, secession is a sub-category of political violence. Specifically, I rely on an article by Ted Gurr and Will Moore (1997) in which they combine two major schools of thought within the political violence literature: relative deprivation and resource mobilization.²⁵ The combination of these theories is valuable because it provides Gurr and Moore (and the current study) with four key variables that span politics *and* economics: rebellion, group grievances, government repression, and group mobilization.²⁶ The goal of their article is to show the relationship between all four of these variables, by creating hypotheses and equations in which one of these variables serves as the dependent variable, while the other three are the explanatory variables. These two theories, and the four variables they

²⁵ Although I agree with Gurr and Moore's assumptions and findings more than others, other theorists have combined and tested relative deprivation and resource mobilization arguments (See Korpi, 1974; Dudley and Miller, 1998; Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2006).

²⁶ I use group capacity as an extension of Gurr and Moore's concept of group mobilization. As I will explain in detail below, they conceptualize mobilization as the group's ability to take collective action. Mobilization deals specifically with the group's ability to come together, but I add to this concept the resources needed to use violence, which is why I rename it capacity.

produce, allow Gurr and Moore to better identify the causes of political violence than other theories that rely on economic, social, or political explanations.

This dissertation explores one of the four equations, in an attempt to explain separatist group leaders' choices regarding the level of violence to employ. I look at the equation with rebellion as the dependent variable, and group grievances, government repression, and group mobilization as the independent variables. Gurr and Moore define rebellion as "a concerted campaign of violent action used by organizations claiming to represent an ethnic group to make claims against the state," (1081). I make two changes to their concept, and rename it group action. First, rather than look only at organizations that represent ethnic groups, I look at secessionist groups as the organization, and broaden their base to any socio-political group. In other words, these secessionist groups can represent larger groups based on ethnicity, race, religion, geography, etc.

The other important change is that I look at both violent and nonviolent actions by the group. As previously mentioned, secessionist groups change their use of violence often, and at times, they use no violence at all. Because I am interested in varying levels of violence, including no violence, I looked at all group actions, ranging from the use of severe levels of violence, to the signing of cease-fires and peace agreements. Below, I outline Gurr and Moore's two theories, and define the three remaining (independent) variables they generate.

Relative Deprivation

Relative deprivation theorists and others point to the importance of grievances and government repression as direct and/or indirect causes of political violence, but there is little agreement on the causal mechanism (Davies, 1969; Gurr, 1970, 1993, 1996; Muller, 1985; Sambanis, 2001; Humphreys and Mohamed, 2003). Gurr, the father of this school of thought, defines relative deprivation as “a perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value capabilities” (Gurr, 1970:13). In sum, political violence occurs because of a gap between what individuals believe they are entitled to and what they believe they can achieve. This gap is what leads to group grievances, which Gurr and Moore define as “widely shared dissatisfaction among group members about their cultural, political, and/or economic standing vis a vis dominant groups,” (1081).

Donald Snow, building on Gurr (1970), outlines the specific causal process by which grievances motivate group leaders and members, thus leading to collective action and political violence. First, members of the aggrieved group realize they are lacking something, be it food, money, jobs, rights, land, etc. Next, they come to understand that not everyone else in the country is lacking what they lack. Subsequently, they determine that the factors that decide who does without are unfair. These unjust factors could be based on religion, race, geographic location, class, gender, etc. Whatever the unequal distribution is based on, it is determined to be unjust by the “have-nots.” Finally, members of the aggrieved group decide to change the situation through collective action,

which can include anything from protests to political violence (Snow, 1997). Relative deprivation theorists argue that the greater the deprivation caused by these grievances, the more likely the group is to use increasing levels of violence. I argue that this process can also work in the opposite direction: if the government resolves some of the group's issues, the group will decide to reduce the level of violence it uses against the government.

Gurr and Moore define government repression, the second independent variable from relative deprivation theories, as "action that states take to enforce claims against an ethnic group," (1081). There is much debate within the relative deprivation school of thought, and between these and other theorists, over the causal mechanism between government repression and political violence: does government repression increase or decrease the likelihood that a group will use violence, or is there a non-linear relationship? Several authors argue that an increase in government repression will increase the use of violence by challengers (Gurr, 1970; Gurr and Moore, 1997, 2000; Tarrow, 1998). These authors posit different reasons for this prediction, including the following: increasing government repression decreases the range of peaceful options available to the group; the relative deprivation caused by government repression makes groups angry enough to use violence; groups are likely to respond to violence with violence because individuals in general are more likely to mirror the most recent actions of their opponents.

A second group of authors argue that an increase in government repression will actually decrease the likelihood that a group will use violence (Lichbach, 1987; McAdam, 1996; Moore, 1998; Sabine, 2002). Basically, these authors hold that because government repression increases the cost of action, especially violent action, a group is more likely to decrease its use of violence in the face of severe government repression. Still a third group of authors argue that government repression has a non-linear impact on group violence (Gurr, 1970, 1993; Muller, 1985; Weede, 1987; Muller and Seligson, 1987; Boswell and Dixon, 1990; Muller and Weede, 1990, 1994; Lindstrom and Moore, 1995; Dudley and Miller, 1998). Specifically, at low and high levels of government repression, political violence is unlikely, but it becomes increasingly likely as the level of state repression becomes intermediate. The logic behind this argument is that at lower levels of government repression, groups are able to address their grievances within the political system or through non-violent protest. At higher levels of government repression, the cost of political violence becomes too high to justify its use. At intermediate levels, however, groups are unable to effectively address their grievances non-violently, while the cost of employing violence is low enough to allow its use. This third argument is used for the current study because it makes the most sense intuitively, and has the most empirical support of the three arguments.²⁷

²⁷ For examples of empirical findings that support the curvilinear repression argument, see Weede, 1987; Muller and Weede 1990, 1994.

Resource Mobilization

Along with relative deprivation theory, Gurr and Moore also draw their four key variables from resource mobilization theory. Resource mobilization, like relative deprivation, has several variations, but there are two major assumptions that are widely held. First, resource mobilization theory assumes that group leaders and members weigh the costs and benefits of group membership and strategies (McAdam, 1982; Jenkins, 1983; Zald, 1992; McAdam et al., 1996). Although resolution of grievances is one of the possible benefits of the use of political violence, it is not the major consideration, as it is in relative deprivation.²⁸ Other possible benefits include independence or increased autonomy. In considering the costs of political violence, the most important considerations for group leaders and members are their capacity to employ violence to reach their goal, and their ability to survive (i.e. lose as few lives and experience as little governmental violence as possible).

These considerations lead to the second major assumption of resource mobilization: a group's resources and capacity to use them, directly impact its ability to carry out collective action of any kind. It is this assumption that informs Gurr and Moore's third independent variable: group mobilization. They define group mobilization as "the capacity of an organization that represents an ethnic group to get its members to support collective action," (1081). I redefine mobilization as the capacity of a secessionist group that represents a larger socio-political group (ethnic or otherwise) to

²⁸ Resource mobilization theorists do not focus on the goals of the group, which they take as a given. For this reason, Gurr and Moore are able to use it as a compliment to relative deprivation theory, which speaks more to the motivation of opposition groups.

carry out collective action. To their concept of mobilization, I add the importance of the resources because even with the organizational ability to carry out violence, it is difficult to do so without the tools needed for violent action. Since I look at both resources and organization, I rename this concept group capacity because concepts of mobilization usually focus on the latter to the exclusion of the former.

There is little agreement among resource mobilization and other theories, on the resources needed to carry out violent collective action. For this study, I focus on those resources that enable a group to employ violence. These include number of group members, money, weapons, food, medical supplies, mercenaries, and sanctuary in neighboring countries (McAdam, 1982; Craft and Smaldone, 2002; Toft, 2003). There is also little agreement on what constitutes group organization, so for this study, I focus on group cohesion as an indicator. I have chosen this indicator because there is a great deal of empirical evidence regarding the importance of group cohesion. Gurr and Moore (1997) find that group cohesion has a positive relationship with group violence. Specifically, they find that the greater the group cohesion, the more likely the group is to use violence because the costs of mobilizing and organizing the group are low (McAdam, 1982; Zald, 1992).

ARGUMENT

Based on Gurr and Moore's combination of relative deprivation and resource mobilization theories, my theoretical model includes the following independent variables: secessionist group grievances, level of state repression, and secessionist group capacity. I argue that these variables are important because they each influence secessionist group leaders' cost-benefit analysis, which, in turn, influences secessionist group strategy.²⁹ Regarding secessionist group grievances, I expect that if group grievances decreases, the benefit of continuing the secession will also decrease. If the benefit of continuing the secession decreases, I expect that the secessionist group leaders will choose a less or non-violent strategy. For example, if the government removes a law that banned the use of a particular language, which would be considered a cultural grievance, the affected group's grievances would decrease. As a result, the benefit of continuing the secession would also decrease, which, all things being equal, would cause a group leader to choose a less violent strategy. Based on these expectations and the causal mechanism described above, I expect a decrease in group grievances to be a sufficient, but not necessary, factor in a secessionist group leader's decision to decrease the level of violence used to achieve secession.

The expectation that this variable is sufficient is based on the assumption that decreases in group grievances can decrease the benefit of secession (i.e. make secession

²⁹ It is important to note that the theoretical argument and all of the variables take secession as a given. In other words, this is not a study of why a secession begins. The goal of this study is to explain why group leaders choose certain strategies after a secessionist movement has begun. For this reason, the timeframe of this study begins at the moment the movement has begun.

less desirable), which, by itself, can cause a group leader to change to a less or non-violent strategy. If one or more of the group's grievances are addressed, the group has less of a reason to secede, and if the group has less of a reason to secede, it is less likely to be committed to using violence to achieve this goal. The expectation that a decrease in group grievances is not necessary is based on the assumption that, while it is a contributing factor in secessionist group leaders' cost-benefit analysis, it is not the only factor that can change the analysis enough to cause a change in decision.


Regarding the second independent variable, government repression, I expect it to have a non-linear (inverted "U"-shaped) impact on secessionist group leaders' use of violence. If the level of government repression increases to high, the cost of using violence to achieve secession increases, so the secessionist group leaders will reduce their level of violence. For instance, if the government moves from arresting group members to torture and murder, the cost of being seen in public, much less using violence, increases, which decreases the likelihood that group leaders will choose to use violence. If, on the other hand, the level of government repression decreases to low, the benefit of using violence to achieve secession decreases because non-violent means become available. As a result, secessionist group leaders will reduce the level of violence they employ to achieve secession. Finally, if the level of government repression decreases or increases to intermediate, the cost of employing violence decreases or the benefit of employing violence increases, respectively. For example, if the government moves from torturing group members to imprisonment or military campaigns without injury

(intermediate repression), it is still difficult for the group to effectively use non-violent strategies against the government's use of violence, and the cost of carrying out collective action has decreased because the government is no longer killing members. As a result, secessionist group leaders will choose to maintain or increase the level of violence they employ. Like group grievances, I expect that the level of government repression will be a sufficient, but not necessary factor in the change of secessionist group leaders' strategies. The expectation that this variable is sufficient but not necessary is based on the assumption that while it can impact the cost-benefit analysis enough to cause a change in strategy, it is not the only factor that can cause this change.

Secessionist group capacity, the third independent variable, has a positive, linear relationship with secessionist group strategy. Specifically, I expect that if a secessionist group's resources and cohesion decrease, the group will decrease its use of violence or change to a nonviolent strategy because the cost of violence has increased. I expect a decrease in this variable to be a sufficient, but not necessary factor in a secessionist group leader's decision to decrease the use of violence. I argue that this variable is sufficient because a decrease in resource or group cohesion makes carrying out violence more costly. For example, if the government or a neighboring country seizes a shipment of illegal goods to be purchased or sold by the group, the group's resources will decrease because it has not received needed goods or revenue. The resulting lack of weapons or money makes carrying out violent action more difficult, which makes group leaders more likely to decrease the use of violence, at least until they can replace the lost goods or

revenue. Regarding group cohesion, if a group begins to splinter into different factions (i.e. its cohesion decreases), collective action becomes more difficult because each leader now has fewer group members to carry out any action, and potentially more (new) enemies besides the government. For this reason, the group leaders will decrease the use of violence.

Although Gurr and Moore's combination of relative deprivation and resource mobilization provides new insight into the causes of political violence, there are also limitations to the inclusion of the four main variables they identify. The most potentially difficult problem, methodologically, is their assumption that group action, the dependent variable, can impact each of the three independent variables (i.e. endogeneity). This assumption is the reason that Gurr and Moore create four equations, each of which using a different variable as the dependent variable. Because the current study is only exploring one of these equations, it is more difficult to pinpoint the direction of causality. Another potential limitation is the expectation that the independent variable may impact each other (i.e. collinearity). It is very difficult, if not impossible, to create a theory of political violence or secession in which the key variables do not impact each other. Fortunately, as I will discuss in detail below, there are methodological safeguards that can mitigate the effects of endogeneity and collinearity. Even with these safeguards, though, it is important to take these limitations into consideration when drawing conclusions and implications at the completion of this dissertation (See Figure 2.1).



Hypotheses³⁰

As a result of the expectations listed above, seven distinct hypotheses are generated. Much like Gurr and Moore, I create a univariate hypothesis for each of the key independent variables, to be tested separately, as well as two hypotheses that combine the other hypotheses. First, I hypothesize that if a secessionist group's grievances decrease, leaders will change to a less violent or non-violent strategy, and if grievances increase, leaders will change to a more violent strategy.

H1: A decrease in a secessionist group's grievances will result in a group leader's decision to decrease the level of violence the group uses, and an increase in a secessionist group's grievances will result in a group leader's decision to increase the level of violence the group uses.

³⁰ These are the initial hypotheses provided by the theoretical framework. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the results from the tests of these hypotheses led to a new set of hypotheses, which will be tested in on the SPLA's separatist movement.

There are three separate hypotheses concerning government repression that each tests part of the expected, non-linear relationship between repression and group action. First, I hypothesize that if the level of government repression increases to high, leaders will decide to use a less violent strategy.

H2: An increase in the level of government repression to high will result in a secessionist group leader's decision to decrease the level of violence the group uses.

Next, if there is a decrease in government repression from high or intermediate, to none or low, I also hypothesize that a secessionist group leader will choose a less violent strategy.

H3: A decrease in the level of government repression from intermediate to low will result in a secessionist group leader's decision to decrease the level of violence the group uses.

Regarding the last hypothesis on government repression, if there is an increase in government repression from none or low, to intermediate, or if there is a decrease in government repression from high to intermediate, a secessionist group leader will choose a more violent strategy.

H4: An increase or decrease in the level of government repression to intermediate will result in a secessionist group leader's decision to increase the level of violence the group uses.

Finally, with secessionist group capacity, I hypothesize that if there is a decrease in group resources or cohesion (capacity), the leaders will decide to use a less violent strategy.

H5: A decrease in a secessionist group's capacity will result in a group leader's decision to decrease the level of violence the group uses, and an increase in a secessionist group's capacity will result in a secessionist group leader's decision to increase the level of violence the group uses.

I also hypothesize that each of these factors is sufficient to change a group's strategy because they each impact group leaders' cost-benefit analysis, which ultimately leads to a shift in group strategy. These first five hypotheses will be falsified if any of the following is observed: there is no change in any of the independent variables, but a group's leaders choose a less-violent or non-violent strategy; there is a change to a less-violent strategy, but the change occurs before there is a change in any independent variable; group strategy becomes less-violent, but there is no change in two of the independent variables, and the third one changes in the opposite direction predicted.

These five hypotheses deal with each independent variable on its own, but the last two hypotheses are about the cumulative effect of these three variables moving at the same time. I hypothesize that if there is a decrease in secessionist group grievances, a shift to high or low levels of state repression, and a decrease in secessionist group capacity, leaders are more likely to decide to use less violence than when there is a change in only one or two of the independent variables.

H6: A decrease in secessionist group grievances, a shift to high or low levels of government repression, and a decrease in group capacity is more likely to result in a group leader's decision to decrease the level of violence the group uses, than when there is a change in only one or two of the independent variables.

The final hypothesis is the inverse of H6: if secessionist group grievances increase, the level of government repression becomes intermediate, and group capacity increases, a group leader is more likely to choose a more violent strategy than when only one or two of the independent variable change in the direction expected to cause an increase in the group's violence.

H7: An increase in secessionist group grievances, an increase or decrease in the level of government repression to intermediate, and an increase in group capacity is more likely to result in a group leader's decision to increase the level of violence the group uses, than when there is a change in only one or two of the independent variables.

Hypotheses six and seven deal with the cumulative effect of each of the independent variables occurring simultaneously. Because relative deprivation and resource mobilization treat these independent variables as equal, there is no assumption that one variable is more important than another (i.e. no independent variables are weighted). For this reason, I expect that if two independent variables move in opposite directions, all things being equal, they will cancel each other out, and there will not be a change in secessionist group strategy. For example, if group grievances decrease, but the level of

state repression becomes intermediate, and there is no change in group capacity, there will be no change in group strategy because grievances and government repression are moving in opposite directions (according to my causal argument).

The hypothesized cumulative effect of the independent variables will be falsified if any of the following occurs: there is a decrease in group grievances and capacity, and the level of government repression becomes high/low, but there is no change in group strategy or it becomes more violent; two of the independent variables move in opposite directions and the third does not change, but there is a change in group strategy; there is a change in group strategy before any or all of the independent variables change.

One of the difficulties of studying secession, and political violence more generally is that one cannot assume that there is no correlation among the independent variables (i.e. collinearity). Fortunately, I do not expect that the value of any one independent variable can perfectly predict the value of another, so I am still able to test the effects of each. To address this potential problem, I have included indicators of each variable that are minimally (if at all) impacted by other independent variable. For example, government repression of a group (e.g. arrests and imprisonment, attacks on MFDC bases, etc.) may, at times, impact the group's resources (e.g. revenue from the sale of cannabis or timber, arms supply). To mitigate the impact of this problem, I looked for indicators of group resources that are not easily influenced by the government's repression of the group, such as sanctuary and bases in other countries, and inter-faction fighting within the group.

Because it is not possible to ignore indicators of independent variables that may be affected by the values of other independent variables, when conducting the hypothesis tests, I hold other independent variables as constant as possible. For example, when looking at the number of times an increase in group grievances led to an increase in group use of violence, I only include those observations during which the other independent variables were static. Then I chose one of these observations for a within case (observation) hypothesis test, which allows me to see if these variables were actually static (or just appear to be so in the larger-n congruence test). The availability of many observations from which to choose is another factor that mitigates this problem of collinearity. There are many observations because I look every month in the life of the MFDC's movement, which provides 293 distinct observations.³¹ According to King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), the more observations a researcher has, the easier it is to find those in which the values of each independent variable is independent of the values of the others, especially when there is variation on these variables.

As discussed above, another difficulty of any study that seeks to explain causality is being sure that your independent variables cause the outcomes, and not vice versa. For example, if in one observation there is an increase in government repression to high, and an increase in the group's use of violence, how can we know if the increase in repression caused the increase in group violence, or vice versa? The most important safeguard against both collinearity and endogeneity is the use of a particular hypothesis test: causal process analysis. This test allows better causal inferences because it involves picking

³¹ The exact unit of observation will be discussed in detail below.

apart a causal chain- starting from either a change in the dependent variable or one of the independent variables- to determine both the factors that influenced and resulted from this change (see below). If the sequence in the chain is as predicted by the theory, then we can conclude that the independent variables impact the dependent variable, and not the other way around. By looking at the sequential chain, we can also see if the independent variables impact each other, and how their relationships influence the dependent variable.

HYPOTHESIS TESTS

In order to test the hypotheses, I use a multi-layered approach that includes a congruence test of data from the MFDC from the start of the movement in 1982 to 2007, and a causal process analysis of two events during the movement in which the group decreased the level of violence.³² The congruence test allows me to determine whether my independent variables are correlated with my dependent variables (George and Bennett, 1997). First, I use my theory to identify the effect that I expect a particular value of an independent variable to have on the value of the dependent variable. Next, after collecting data on these variables, I determine whether the expected relationship is congruent with the

³² The inclusion of two examples of decreases in the MFDC's level of violence is a limitation because it does not allow for an in-depth causal process analysis of an increase in violence. These events were chosen because they marked important events in the life of the MFDC. More practically, these events were also included because there is much more secondary data available for ceasefires and peace agreements, than for moments in which the movement increases the level of violence.

observed relationship. If so, I can safely conclude that there is a relationship between the hypothesized independent variables and the dependent variable.

Upon completion of the congruence test, I trace the actual causal process between the set of independent variables and the outcome (George and McKeown, 1985; Vanderwalle, 1998; Varshney, 2002; Wickham, 2002). Process analysis allows me to identify discrete links in the sequential, causal chain between my set of independent variables and my outcome variables. I begin by outlining the expected, observable process between group grievances, level of government repression, and group capacity to use violence, and a change in the group's level of violence. I then pinpoint the theoretical explanations for each step in the causal process (i.e. the reason one step is expected to lead to the next step). Next, I collect data for the purpose of identifying whether these steps actually occur in the proper sequence, and whether actors cited the expected reasons for their decisions at each step in the causal process. If I observe the expected variables in the expected sequence, and actors cite the expected reasons for their decisions at step of the causal process, I will safely hold that the evidence supports the proposed causal mechanism.

There are several advantages to this multi-layered approach. First, the congruence test helps determine whether there is correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variable (and among the independent variables), and gives researchers a starting point from which to begin the causal process analysis. The causal process analysis allows me to identify the actual process by which changes in group

grievances and resources, and government repression actually leads to group strategy choice. Whereas the congruence test allows me to identify whether there is correlation between these independent variables and dependent variable, process analysis allows me to see how this process unfolds and what it looks like in the real-world. This, in turn, helps determine the direction of causality because I am looking both backward from a change in the dependent variable, as well as forward from a change in the independent variable (King Keohane, and Verba, 1994; George and Bennett, 1997, 2005).

The process analysis also allows for the simultaneous testing of my hypotheses and alternate explanations because I identify the actual process that leads to an outcome. Therefore, for example, if natural resource abundance (one of the contending explanations) really is the major factor that influences secessionist group strategy choice, I will find out because interviewees and secondary sources will identify the desire to gain control of natural resources (not the level of government repression) as a motivating factor for their decision to begin a guerrilla war rather than organize demonstrations.

One of the major benefits of using causal process analysis is that it allows the identification of the factors that influence individual decision-makers, rather than trying to make assumptions about those factors by using an alternate method that only examines violence at the national level (e.g. large-n, cross-national statistical tests). It allows me to identify the factors that influence the outcome for a small number of actual cases and generalize to a larger population, rather than identify the factors that influence the

outcome for a large population and generalize to a small sample (George and McKeown, 1985; George and Bennett, 1997; 2005).

UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND CASE SELECTION

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis for my dissertation is the secessionist group.³³ The overall case is the MFDC, but there are several observations within the case because the unit of observation is measured at time-based intervals over the life of the movement. Specifically, for the congruence test, I take monthly measures of all of the variables from January 1982 through February 2007, which provides 293 observations.³⁴ For the causal process analysis, I am less strict regarding the timeframe. I begin by choosing two key events at different points in the life of the movement. Then, I work backward from the outcome (i.e. decrease in secessionist group action), going back at least one month before the change in group action, to see if there were previous changes in the independent variables. By being flexible on the timeframe of the observations for the causal process trace, I am able to identify the observable timeframe, which will inform decisions about the unit of observation in the case study of the SPLA, as well as future studies, since

³³ Although the whole secessionist group is the main unit of analysis, it is important to note that after 1991, there were several splits within the group, and each faction usually acted independently of the others. For this reason, if a primary or secondary source is clear that an event involves a particular faction, that faction will be the unit of analysis for that observation. If no faction is identified, and no educated guess can be made about which faction is involved, I will use the group as a whole as the unit of analysis.

³⁴ Although I examined events that occurred before 1982, the dataset begins with this year because this is considered the turning point in the life of the movement by most of my primary and secondary sources. It was at the end of 1982 that the first clash between the government and the MFDC occurred.

existing theories do not provide expectations on the time it should take the independent variables to cause a change in the dependent variable. .

Case Selection

In order to explain why violent secessionist groups increase or decrease the level of violence they employ, I have chosen to conduct a case study on the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) in Senegal. Although there have been very few case studies of the MFDC (Humphreys and Habaye, 2002; Evans, 2003), this case is often cited because it is similar to other well-known cases of secession, like the IRA and ETA, but it contains some natural resources (arable land, marijuana), the presence of which has been used to explain the incidence and duration of political violence in several recent studies (see previous chapter). The MFDC is also similar to other African secessionist movements for the following reasons: the justification for secession is its geographic and cultural difference from the rest of the country; at some earlier point in history, it was either autonomous within the country, part of another country, or independent; the movement began nonviolently, but became violent; the movement has spanned multiple decades; and, there are co-ethnics in neighboring countries. For this reason, it will not be difficult to generalize the findings from this dissertation to explain other African secessionist movements, like the SPLA, the Mouvement populaire anjouanaise (MPA) in Comoros, and the Frente da libertação do enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) in Angola.

I have also chosen to study the MFDC because this case has a great deal of variation on all of the independent variables and the dependent variable. This variation provides several observations within this one case, which allows for several tests of the hypotheses. In addition to variation on the key variables of this dissertation, by looking at multiple observations within one case, I am holding the following explanatory variables of alternate theories relatively constant: presence of natural resources; economic scarcity; ethnic heterogeneity and dominance; and, geography. Finally, because the violent era of the movement officially ended in December of 2004, many of the key actors are still alive and living in Casamance, allowing for easier access (see below). The actors also have relatively fresh memories, which increase the accuracy of interview responses.

OPERATIONALIZATION

Now that I have presented the hypotheses and identified the cases, it is important to discuss the operationalization of the key variables. In order to operationalize several of the variables, I follow the lead of other political violence scholars and rely on the indicators and coding methods of the *Minorities at Risk (MAR)* dataset (Gurr and Moore, 1997; Dudley and Miller, 1998; Toft, 2003). I use *MAR* because the researchers who have worked on this dataset are among the most respected in areas of ethnic conflict and

political violence.³⁵ They have years of experience conducting large and small-n studies of political violence at the sub-national level. The framework is most helpful because it includes scales and indexes that start at low values on each indicator, which means that some events that would be excluded from other datasets (e.g. those based on number of battle-deaths per year) are included in *MAR*, like government arrests or a group's sporadic attacks.

For the dependent variable, secessionist group strategy, *MAR* uses the following scale of violent action(s): none reported (0); political banditry, sporadic terrorism (1); campaigns of terrorism (2); local rebellions (3); small-scale guerilla activity (4); intermediate guerilla activity (5); large-scale guerilla activity (6); protracted civil war (7).³⁶ Like other theorists, I collapse this scale to the following: none reported; low level of political violence (political banditry, sporadic terrorism, campaigns of terrorism); intermediate level of political violence (local rebellions, small-scale guerilla activity); high level of political violence (intermediate guerilla activity, large-scale guerilla activity, protracted civil war). I also create a scale of group cooperation, which includes high level of cooperation (signing a peace agreement or cease-fire, demobilizing fighters); medium level of cooperation (sitting down to talks with the government, governments of other countries, or NGOs), and low level of cooperation (calls for negotiations with the government, calls for peace). Change in secessionist group strategy, which is important in determining whether the group has increased, decreased, or maintained the same level

³⁵ This list includes Gurr (*MAR* creator), Moore, and Toft, all of whom sit on the Advisory Board at the time of writing.

³⁶ *MAR* calls this variable group rebellion.

of violence, is operationalized as less violent or more violent. A group's strategy is considered less violent if it moves from a higher level to a lower level on the political violence scale, and it is considered more violent if it moves from a lower level to a higher level on the scale.

In order to operationalize the first two independent variables, grievances and level of government repression, I also rely on *MAR*. Gurr (1993a) and Dudley and Miller (1998) use the following *MAR* categories of grievances in their studies of group use of political violence: autonomy, political, economic, and social/cultural grievances. Each category includes several indicators, but I focus on the ones that pertain to secession (i.e. ones that have been examined in other studies of secession). Within the autonomy grievance category, I examine whether secessionist group leaders have made public statements about past autonomy concerns or current irredentist desires. Within the political grievance category, I identify whether the secessionist group's leaders have called for greater political rights (e.g. free and fair elections, more political appointees from the region for regional and local offices, etc.), or a change in the local/regional policies. Specific examples of political grievances include lack of voting rights and ability to hold office, lack of access to public officials, and lack of government response to concerns and/or demands. Under economic grievances, I search for leaders' public and private (in interview) criticisms regarding the unfair use of land, jobs, resources, as well as a lack of public funds, public services, access to education, and other economic opportunities. Finally, under the social/cultural grievance category, I identify

secessionist group leaders' public criticisms regarding the follow indicators: lack of the freedom of religious belief and practice, restrictions on the use of the group's language, lack of government protection from attacks by other ethnic groups or the government itself.

Unlike identifying secessionist group grievances, coding has proved a difficult task. Although I was able to use the *MAR* indicators and categorization for types of grievances, I had to create a new coding scheme because according to *MAR*:

The availability of information regarding group grievances has been, historically, very limited and it was rarely possible to determine whether a group was voicing grievances and those were suppressed by authorities, whether the group was not voicing grievances because it had no open forum, or whether the group was actively seeking redress of grievances (*MAR* Codebook, 2003: 59).

First, to deal with the problem of scarce information about group grievances, I relied on primary data collected from interviews, as well as statements made in newspapers, NGO reports, etc. Then, for coding, I created a scale with the following values: government or other group makes a policy or other change to improve a grievance (-2); government or other group recognizes/addresses grievance (-1); no change (0); government or other group denounces grievance, or denies its existence (1); government or other group worsens grievance (2). Examples of these changes in grievances include the following: the World Bank loans Sénégal \$20 million for development in Casamance (-2); the president of the Gambia meets with Sénégal's President Wade to discuss unfair treatment of Casamançais (-1); President Wade refuses to meet with MFDC leaders because he will

not discuss independence as an option (1); MFDC leaders accuse President Wade of intimidating Casamançais voters and election fraud (2).³⁷ In order to measure change in group grievances, I look at the sum of group grievances for the previous month, and subtract it from the sum for the current month. For instance, if there was no change in group grievances last month (0), and this month group grievances increased because the government banned a political party representing the group (2), the change in group grievances is measured as 2 (the current month minus the previous month).

The second independent variable, government repression, refers to actions taken by the state to deter challengers to the status quo. In order to operationalize state repression, I include the following repressive activities from the *MAR* dataset: arrests, imprisonment, kidnapping, forced migration, discontinuing provision of public services (utilities, healthcare), torture, rape, disappearances, and murder. I, then, created a scale of none, low, medium, and high based on *MAR*'s scale of government repression and the number of people impacted by the repressive action (see appendix for details). In order to measure change in the level of government repression, I subtract the government's repression score from the previous month from the current month. For example, if there was no change/no repression in the previous month (0), and the government tortured three Casamançais in the current month (3), then the change in government repression is three.

³⁷ Neither relative deprivation nor resource mobilization argue that one type of grievance is more important than another, so I do not weight any type of grievance. Because my hunch is that certain grievances, like those dealing with autonomy, are more important (based on evidence from other studies of secession), I use *MAR*'s categorization when looking at the data to see if my hunch is correct.

The final independent variable, secessionist group capacity, is based on the group's resources and cohesion. In order to operationalize group resources, I identify those resources that make violence possible and the level of cohesion of the group itself. These resources include of group members, money, weapons, food, medical supplies, mercenaries, third-party support, movement splits, and popular support from the represented community (McAdam, 1982; Craft and Smaldone, 2002; Toft, 2003).

Gurr and Moore define the second dimension of group capacity, group cohesion, rather broadly- "a sense of common identity shared among group members."³⁸ This definition cannot adequately explain change over time, though, because identity is not an independent variable that changes often, if at all. For this reason, I define cohesion more narrowly as a group's ability to work together with the same strategy to achieve the same goal. I identify a group's number of factions, and fighting among these factions as measures of cohesion. For example, a split within the group that results in the formation of a new faction, or new fighting between two different factions of the group, will be considered a decrease in group cohesion, and thus a decrease in group capacity.

DATA COLLECTION

In order to collect data on these key variables, I read newspaper articles, reports from Amnesty International and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and reports from the UN and other international governmental organizations (IGOs). These sources

³⁸ Gurr and Moore, 1997: 1083. They use the term "group coherence."

provide background information on each of the variables in my case studies of the MFDC and the SPLA. For the case study, I conducted 24 interviews with leaders and members of the MFDC, and affected populations in the region. I conducted 10 interviews with MFDC leaders (8 military leaders, 2 political leaders) because they are the actors who make the decisions regarding group strategy. The purpose of these interviews is to identify group leaders' perceptions regarding the level of state repression, and their own grievances and capacity. I asked the leaders' about the factors that influenced their decisions to increase or decrease the level of violence they use. For example, I asked group leaders questions about the actions the government used against the group and its members, and if they thought about these actions when deciding what they want to do. Interviews with leaders also provided data on the sequence of events and other data collected from secondary sources. In addition, these interviews allowed me to collect data on group resources, which is necessary because this information does not exist elsewhere.

The purpose of the interviews with the MFDC member (1 interview) and MFDC sympathizers (group interview with 10 sympathizers) is to confirm the information from group leaders, and to gain a different perspective from the people who are carrying out the actions of the group. I also interviewed local NGO staff (1 interview) and civilians (2 interviews) because they can confirm the data from the MFDC interviews. I expected civilians and NGO staff to be relatively objective because they do not represent the

MFDC, and many have been negatively impacted by the actions of both the government and MFDC, so they are not really partial to either side.³⁹

In order to gain access to MFDC leaders and members, and civilians, I worked with a local NGO in Ziguinchor (the capital of the secessionist region of Casamance). The NGO has worked as an unofficial mediator between the MFDC and the government, and, as a result, has contacts in the MFDC. I also traveled to São Domingos, Guinea Bissau (an hour from Ziguinchor) to conduct interviews because many MFDC members are stationed here.⁴⁰ Although it was not easy, I had three advantages that made gaining access to interviewees possible. First, I was able to use the contacts that Dr. Evans had already made, as well as identify him as a reference. I also know a great deal about the Senegalese culture from my own extensive research and several of my Senegalese friends, and I speak French. These factors helped me fit in more easily once I arrived. Finally, being an American granted me access to group leaders because they were interested in telling their stories to broad audiences, while being an African-American granted me access to people who might otherwise be unwilling to meet with a foreigner.⁴¹

³⁹ Tens of thousands of refugees have left the Casamance region for the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. There are many more Casamançais residents displaced within the region or elsewhere in Sénégal. The exact numbers of either are difficult to obtain, especially for internally displaced persons, because many members of both groups are not under the auspices of the government (they displaced, but are living with family members or friends).

⁴⁰ São Domingos, which is just over the border from Sénégal in Guinea-Bissau, is a 30 minute drive from Ziguinchor. Many MFDC members live in São Domingos and Varela, which is on the coast of Guinea-Bissau, because their families fled here as refugees when the fighting between the group and the government became intense in the mid-1990s. Also, the Bissau-Guinean government has little control over these towns because they are far-removed from the capital city. In fact, most of the region does not have regular electricity or roads because of the government's lack of money.

⁴¹ This assumption is based on my experiences in Cote d'Ivoire and Paris (which has a large West African community), as well as stories from others who have traveled to West Africa for field research.

SUMMARY

This project relies heavily on the political violence literature in general as a starting point for explaining the strategy choices of secessionist group leaders, and why these choices change over time. My theoretical argument- secessionist group leaders' strategy decisions are based on changes in grievances, government repression, and group capacity- is based on an article by Gurr and Moore (1997) in which they rely on relative deprivation and resource mobilization. The combination of these schools of thought provides three independent variables: group grievances, government repression, and group capacity.

To explore the hypotheses generated by my theoretical argument, I conduct a congruence test and causal process analysis of the MFDC. The primary data used for these tests comes from individual and group interviews of MFDC decision-makers and members, and participant observation of decision-makers, members, and supporters of the MFDC, as well as from local and international newspapers, NGOs, and other secondary sources.

CHAPTER 3

CONGRUENCE TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESES

The goal of this chapter is to explain the results of the congruence test of the hypotheses discussed in the previous chapter. I begin with a brief description of the data and how it is organized. I, then, provide a brief chronology of the MFDC's actions (dependent variable) over the life of the movement, and identify the number of times the group increased, maintained, or decreased the level of violence it used. I go on to discuss the following aspects of each of the independent variables: brief chronology; number of times the variable's value increased, stayed the same, or decreased; and, the results of the congruence test. I end with a summary of the results and their implications.

DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA

In order to conduct the congruence test, I began by creating a detailed chronology of all events that involved the MFDC from January 1982 to February 2007. Specifically, I looked at all events that were carried out by the MFDC, as well as events that impacted the MFDC regardless of the actor. Most events that impacted the MFDC were carried out by the Senegalese, Bissau-Guinean, or Gambian governments. Other actors interacting with the MFDC include NGOs and IGOs, such as Rencontre africaine pour la defense des droits de l'homme (RADDHO), APRAN, International Red Cross, Amnesty

International, United Nations Development Programme, and World Bank. To find data on these events, I searched reports from these agencies, as well as newspapers and websites.⁴² I also used data from the interviews I conducted, but this information was mainly used to fill in gaps and confirm data from the secondary sources.

I compiled this data into a chronology that includes the actor, a description of the event, the exact date of the event (when available), and source of the data (See Appendix i). The chronology was then used to create a dataset of all events carried out by or impacting the MFDC. To create the dataset, first I created coding schemes and indices for each variable (discussed below), then assigned a value for each variable in each event. Then I summed the value of each variable to create a monthly measure. For example, I took the values of government repression from each event in a given month, and added them together to create one value of government repression for the month. This aggregation allowed me to observe monthly changes and trends for each variable individually and together. Specifically, it allowed me to identify how changes in one variable in previous months, led to changes in the dependent variable or other independent variables in preceding months (i.e. whether variables are correlated).

Although there are other datasets on sub-national conflict, some of which include the MFDC, it was necessary to create this dataset for several reasons. First, most other datasets include only annual measures of conflict, including *Armed Conflict* and *MAR*. Although annual measures can help observe very broad trends in the variables of interest,

⁴² I looked at websites for the NGOs and IGOs mentioned, news databases like BBC.com, the website for the MFDC, and the Senegalese government's site.

it is difficult for this level of aggregation to really capture the nuanced changes in variables that occur within each year. This is especially true for the variables of concern for this study because government repression and group resources and coherence change more often than more structural variables like ethnic heterogeneity or a country's resource endowment. Whereas structural variables sometimes barely change every five or ten years, other types of variables, like those based on the actions of one or a small group of actors, can change almost daily. For this reason, it is necessary to measure these variables more often.

The creation of this dataset was also required because there is not an existing dataset that includes the MFDC for every year since the conflict began in 1982. *MAR* includes the Diola as a "minority at risk," and identifies levels of government repression and group actions. The *Armed Conflict* dataset includes the MFDC and the Casamançais conflict as a minor conflict for the following years: 1990, 1992-93, 1995, 1997-2001, 2003.⁴³ Two of the reasons that these datasets do not include the MFDC consistently include the following: the threshold for inclusion in these datasets is too high to include anything but the most violent conflicts; and, they do not identify non-fatal injuries, since they only measure battle-deaths.

Regarding the first reason, the most widely used dataset on intrastate violence, *Armed Conflict*, was one of the first conflict datasets to have a threshold of fewer than 1000 battle-deaths per year, which is used by *Correlates of War* and other datasets that

⁴³ *Armed Conflict* defines minor armed conflict as "between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year."

measure other forms of conflict (i.e. interstate conflict). *Armed Conflict* was considered somewhat radical in its decision to set its threshold at 25 battle-deaths per year. This lower threshold allowed the dataset to include less-violent conflicts, which made it possible for researchers to examine the variables associated with these types of conflict. In the past, smaller-scale conflicts could only be studied by case studies, which are necessary in the explanation of conflicts in one country or a small number of countries, but somewhat limit a researchers ability to generalize her findings to the larger sample. With *Armed Conflict*, all of this changed, but not enough because conflicts with fewer than 25 battle-deaths per year were still excluded.

In addition, including only conflicts that meet this criterion leaves out those in which torture, rape, and other forms of violence are used, but that do not reach the threshold set by *Armed Conflict*. This exclusion is the second reason that the Casamançais conflict is not included in every year since its inception: there were some years in which the government or the group used other forms of violence, but did not reach the level of 25 battle-deaths. In these years, either actor may have committed numerous acts of violence including torture, rape, non-fatal injuries, property destruction, kidnapping, and disappearances. Because I consider these types of actions to be important indicators of group action and government repression, it was necessary to create a dataset that takes these actions into consideration. With the organization of the data explained, I will now provide a more detailed description of the dependent variable, group action, before explaining the results of the congruence test.

MFDC AND CASAMANÇAIS ACTIONS⁴⁴

During the period between Sénégal's independence in 1960 through the late 1970s, things in the Casamance were relatively quiet. The first signs of trouble came as Casamançais began to hold demonstrations opposing Sénégal's land-tenure law, which, although passed in 1964, began to negatively impact Casamançais only in the late 1970s (to be discussed below) (Evans, 2003). These demonstrations turned to civil disobedience in 1980, when students at the largest high school in Ziguinchor, Lycée Djignabo, staged a mass strike against the school, the principal, and the Sénégalaise government in response to the lack of equipment, poor maintenance of the buildings, and the government's decision to drastically reduce funding for schools.⁴⁵

In 1982, Abbé Diamacoune brought the MFDC, the pre-independence Casamançais political party, back to life in a quest for separation from Sénégal. The next major action on the part of Casamançais was the march on December 26, 1982. This nonviolent march, which ended at the seat of government in Ziguinchor, involved anywhere from hundreds to thousands of protestors.⁴⁶ In 1983, the MFDC held a prayer vigil and demonstration commemorating the march one year earlier, and it is after the government responded violently to this march, that the MFDC shifted from nonviolence

⁴⁴ Though most of the actions included were specifically carried out by the MFDC, the summary of these actions includes the period before the MFDC was (re)created. Because in this period future members of the group were acting along side other casamançais, I entitled this section "MFDC and Casamançais Actions,"

⁴⁵ *The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999*, 1999; USAID, 2001; M. Humphreys and H. ag Mohamed, 2005: 247-302; Evans, 2003; Interviews.

⁴⁶ Different accounts from interviews and secondary sources give conflicting numbers.

to violence.⁴⁷ In December 1983, the MFDC created the armed wing of the movement, and this wing retreated to the bush for military training.

Even with the creation of the armed wing, throughout the rest of the 1980s, the MFDC carried out only sporadic attacks on the Sénégalaise army. In 1990, however, the group attacked Seleti, the main border crossing between the Casamance and the Gambia, killing two customs officers. This is considered by most sources to be the first violent attack by the MFDC.⁴⁸ In 1991, the warring parties made their first attempt to resolve the conflict with a cease-fire agreement between the two. The Cacheu Accord, named after the Bissau-Guinean town in which it was signed, was the first in a long line of cease-fires and peace agreements between the MFDC and the Sénégalaise government. Unfortunately, neither side honored this agreement for long, and skirmishes continued until the mid-1990s. In 1995, a particularly violent year, the MFDC (no particular faction has been blamed or has taken credit) is accused of kidnapping and presumably killing four French tourists, and killing 25 soldiers in an attack on an army post.⁴⁹ Between July and September of 1997, in an even more extreme phase of violence, the MFDC is blamed for killing approximately 25 civilians (including women and children), and 29 soldiers in several different attacks.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ *The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999*, 1999; USAID, 2001; Humphreys and Mohamed, 2005; Evans, 2003; Interviews.

⁴⁸ M. Evans, 2004, "Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)," *Armed Non-State Actors Project*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs; MAR Chronology at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/chronology.asp?groupId=43301>.

⁴⁹ *Panafrican News Agency* (8/22/1997) accessed at allAfrica.com; Chronology of events created by Vincent Foucher, 2005.

⁵⁰ *Panafrican News Agency* (8/22/1997; 9/28/1997); *All Africa Press Service* (9/8/1997); *Amnesty International* (9/25/1997); Chronology of events created by Vincent Foucher, 2005. I should note that in

Throughout the rest of the 1990s, the MFDC continued periodic attacks on the army and civilians, especially those accused of helping the Sénégalaise army or not supporting the separatist movement.⁵¹ This was, by far, the period with the most acts of violence by the MFDC. In December of 1999, the MFDC signed another cease-fire agreement with the Sénégalaise government, and this began a drastic decrease in the MFDC's use of violence against civilians. In the early 2000s, the MFDC did, however, continue sporadic attacks army posts and bases.⁵² Leading up to the peace agreement of December 2004 (the most recent and lasting agreement), there was a lull in all reports of MFDC violence against civilians, and reports of attacks on the Sénégalaise army were few and far between.

Since the 2004 agreement, there have been very few reports of MFDC attacks (except on other factions of the MFDC) either against civilians or the army. Currently, Badiate's Front Sud B and Sadio's Front Sud are the only two factions who have not agreed to lay down weapons. Sadio's faction, however, is the only one still blamed for looting and the rare attack on civilians and soldiers.⁵³

all but one interview, the MFDC leaders and members denied ever attacking civilians. Though I do not think they're responsible for every attack attributed to them, I also do not believe they *never* used violence against civilians.

⁵¹ Most of the reports do not identify a specific faction that carried out a specific event, so it is impossible to know for sure who was responsible for the different acts of violence. Many of the reports imply that Sadio's Front Sud is responsible for the majority of the attacks on civilians. In the next chapter, I will make educated guesses about the specific actors based on the location and timing of the events, as well as primary and secondary data about who has taken or denied responsibility for them.

⁵² The data become much more fuzzy on details regarding MFDC violence against civilians during and after 2001, and this is partly because of the difficulty of determining which faction, if any, is responsible for these events.

⁵³ Interviews with leaders of both factions. Both factions argue that the Peace Agreement did not address any of the underlying problems that caused the war, especially Casamançais demands for separation.

Coding Group Action

To create the chronology of events involving the MFDC and/or S en egalese government, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the operationalization for group action, GRPACT, is loosely based on that of the REBEL variable in the Minorities at Risk (*MAR*) dataset. The *MAR* scale ranges from a value of 0 (“none reported”) to 7 (“protracted civil war”). I collapse this scale into four categories: none reported, low level of violent action, intermediate level of violent action, high level of violent action. This scale, which is described in table 3.1, was created to make the dataset easier to read and understand, simplify the correlation tests, and allow for results that better capture changes in this variable.⁵⁴

TABLE 3.1: Group Action Variable	
<i>Label</i>	<i>Value</i>
None reported	0
Low level of violent action	1
Intermediate level of violent action	2
High level of violent action	3

⁵⁴ If I had not collapsed *MAR*’s seven possible values of this variable into one, there would have been a very low threshold for change because it is easy for group action to change from local rebellion (3 on *MAR* scale) to small-scale guerilla activity (4 on *MAR* scale). With my collapsed scale, however, both local rebellion and small-scale guerilla activity have the same value (2). This is important because the changes in the values of variables should accurately capture changes in the real-world indicators (i.e. the measures of the variable should be valid).

GRPACT was coded as “none reported” if there was no violence used by the MFDC, which includes actions taken against the government, as long as they are not violent (e.g. demonstrations, marches). GRPACT was coded as “low level violent action” if any of the following actions were carried out by the MFDC (or a faction thereof): political banditry or looting; destruction of property; attack on military or civilians

with no injuries or deaths; or, any of the group actions considered “intermediate level of violent action” that are carried out against fewer than three people.⁵⁵ For “intermediate level of violent action,” I included the following actions (provided that 3 or more people were impacted): civilians or soldiers injured; kidnapping; campaigns of terrorism; local rebellions; and, small-scale guerilla activity that (according to *MAR*) involves fewer than 1000 armed combatants. Any of the actions considered to be high level violent actions that were carried out by the MFDC against fewer than 3 people are also coded as “intermediate level of violent action.”⁵⁶ Finally, GRPACT was coded as “high level of violent action” if any of the following MFDC actions were carried out against 3 or more people: civilians or soldiers killed, disappeared, raped, and/or tortured; or, intermediate or large-scale guerilla activity involving more than 1000 armed combatants.

⁵⁵ The last coding definition includes the number of people to capture the scope of violence. I assume, like most dataset authors, that the number of people impacted is an important indicator of the level of violence of an action. Armed Conflict dataset uses 25 battle-deaths per year as the minimum threshold. Because my dataset is a monthly measure, I divided the 25 battle-deaths per year by 12, which gave me 2.08 people impacted by a particular group action each month. I rounded 2.08 up to 3 because to round down would have made my threshold lower than that accepted by most other researchers.

⁵⁶ This coding decision is based on my assumption that if one or two people are killed, tortured, etc. by a group, the action cannot be put in the same category as destruction of property, and other action considered low-level violence.

Once the chronology was created, I aggregated the individual value of group action for each event into a monthly measure of group action. This monthly measure, called GRPACTINDEX (group action index) in the dataset, was generated by taking the sum of the values of group action for each event in a given month. GRPACTINDEX can take on a large range of values from 0 to 93 (if there is high-level violence used by the group every day in a 31-day month). I also created a variable called CHANGEGRPACTINDEX (change in group action index), the value of which is GRPACTINDEX for the current month minus GRPACTINDEX for the previous month.⁵⁷ Since the goal of this dissertation is to explain increases and decreases (i.e. changes) in the level of violence used by the group, it was necessary to create a variable that identifies changes in group action, the dependent variable. Specifically, I needed a variable that allows me to identify whether the group increased, decreased, or maintained the level of violence from month to month. I consider the group's level of violence to have increased if CHANGEGRPACTINDEX is positive, and the level of violence to have decreased if CHANGEGRPACTINDEX is negative.⁵⁸ It is these increases and decreases that each of the hypotheses is attempting to explain.

⁵⁷ The value of CHANGEGRPACTINDEX is 0 if GRPACTINDEX for the previous month is negative. The rationale: GRPACTINDEX is negative when the group has cooperated. If the group cooperated last month, but takes no action this month, the value of CHANGEGRPACTINDEX would show an increase in violence simply because they did not cooperate this month. This value would not be valid because it would not accurately reflect what actually happened.

⁵⁸ In future research, I plan to create a more nuanced scale that measures how much the level of violence increased or decreased, not just whether there was an increase or decrease. This plan is based on the desire to understand how much change in the group's level of violence is caused by a change in each independent variable, and the knowledge gained from the current study, which provides hypotheses about what causes a certain amount of change in group action. A nuanced scale was not create for the current study because

Description of CHANGEGRPACTINDEX

There are a total of 293 observations for CHANGEGRPACTINDEX, and the breakdown of the frequency of each value of this variable can be found in table 3.2. In two-thirds of the observations (66%), the MFDC either maintained the level of violence used in the previous month, or cooperated with the Sénégalaise government in the previous month, and took no action in the current month. The group decreased the level of violence from the previous month in 18% of the observations, and increased the level of violence from the previous month in 15% of the observations. The subsequent sections of this chapter will focus on whether changes in the three independent variables- group grievances, government repression, and group capacity- are able to explain these increases and decreases in the level of violence used by the MFDC.

TABLE 3.2: CHANGEGRPACTINDEX	
<i>Value</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
0 (no change)	194
<0 (decrease)	54
>0 (increase)	45
Total # of observations	293

existing theoretical assumptions do not provide expectations for relationships between the independent variables and a specific level of change in the dependent variable.

MFDC AND CASAMANÇAIS GRIEVANCES

Although the independent variable for this study is group grievances, with the MFDC being the group, this section focuses on the grievances of both the MFDC, and the larger group: Casamançais. I look at grievances more broadly because the MFDC, like most secessionist and other opposition groups, argue that they are fighting on behalf of the larger group. For this reason, the MFDC's grievances are the same as Casamançais grievances, which makes this the only independent variable in this study for which I assume that MFDC and Casamançais are one and the same.⁵⁹

Group grievances fall into three main categories: economic, political, and social/cultural. Because most existing theories of secession and repression, and specifically relative deprivation and resource mobilization theories, do not argue that any one type of grievance is more important than the next, the categorization of these grievances is nominal.⁶⁰ As will become clear in the discussion below, Casamançais and the MFDC have held grievances in all four categories at one point or another since Sénégal's independence in 1960.

⁵⁹ The other two independent variables- government repression and group capacity- are specific to the group, and therefore focus on the MFDC, rather than the larger group (Casamançais).

⁶⁰ Toft's (2003) territorial indivisibility theory does predict that social grievances are most important in determining whether a group will use secessionist violence. Specifically, she argues that a group's claim to homelands (cultural/lost autonomy grievance) and settlement-patterns (social) are the most important factors in determining which groups will start a violent secessionist movement. As will be discussed in the results portion of this section, Toft's homeland argument is supported by the evidence of the current study, but requires additional testing.

Economic Grievances

After the initial post-independence honeymoon period was over, growing discontent among Casamançais began to surface. In 1964, only four years after independence, the Sénégalaise government passed the *loi sur le domaine national*. In effect, the law:

gave the Sénégalaise state ownership of all non-private land, privileging those more able to register legal title, often *nordistes* [migrants from Northern Sénégal] benefiting from government patrimony, over local, traditional owners, often Diola or Mancagne (Evans, 2003: 24. *See also The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999*, 1999; USAID, 2001).

The impact of the expropriation of Casamançais land was huge.⁶¹ Not only did native Casamançais lose the land where they lived, and grew crops for consumption and sale, they lost land considered sacred. As many others have noted, the Diola (both Muslims and Christians) relationship with the land is part of their religious practices, including the Diola rite of passage that involves spending a period of time in the *bois sacré* (Sacred Forest) (*The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999*, 1999; USAID, 2001; Foucher, 2002; Evans, 2003). After the land tenure law passed, *nordistes* began migrating to the Casamance in droves. Once there, land disputes were not the only source of tension between the *nordistes* and native Casamançais. The fishing industry, an important source of revenue for Casamançais, also saw rising tensions between the two groups over fishing practices and rights (USAID, 2001).

⁶¹ See Toft, 2003 for the importance of homelands to ethnic and other groups.

Another source of economic discontent among many Casamançais was the lack of development in the Casamance, as compared with northern Sénégal. Many Casamançais cite the lack of public funds for hospitals, medications, paved roads, and schools.⁶² In fact, in 1980 students staged a large strike at the local high school in response to worsening conditions and the Sénégalaise government's decision to make further budget cuts for the school (see below). The government's response to this strike is one of the factors that led to the armed struggle that followed.

More recently, Casamançais have complained that the Sénégalaise government has requested and received foreign aid to help rebuild the region, but that little of it has been spent in the Casamance.⁶³ In 2004, the United Nations Development Program and the World Bank announced that they were giving Sénégal nearly \$25 million in loans and grants for development of the region, but many interviewees complained that there has been little done in the way of reconstruction or development, and that even those projects that the government has started have not been finished.⁶⁴

Political Grievances

At the same time these economic grievances were forming, political discontent amongst Casamançais was growing. One of the most significant grievances for many Casamançais is that, despite the seemingly democratic political system, there has never

⁶²*The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999*, 1999; USAID, 2001; Evans, 2003; Interviews; personal observation and informal conversations.

⁶³ Interviews; informal conversations.

⁶⁴ UNDP, 4/14/2004; World Bank Press Release, 9/9/2004; Interviews. I observed an example of projects not being completed with L'Hôpital de la Paix in Ziguinchor.

been a Casamançais government minister or other high-ranking political official.⁶⁵ There are also many complaints about the fact that the Sénégalaise government sends *nordistes* to the Casamance to fill local and regional appointed positions. For example, the principal of the local high school during the 1980 student strike was an “unpopular principal who was perceived as a ‘foreigner’ to the region” (USAID, 2001).

A more recent political grievance is the lack of political freedom. Though Sénégal is considered by many to be one of Africa’s most stable democracies, there are many Casamançais who do not agree, and argue that presidential and legislative elections are far from fair and free. This criticism was echoed by the 12 opposition parties that boycotted the June 2007 legislative elections (Sy, 2008). In fact, Casamançais are not the only ones who accused the government of problems with the 2007 elections. Sénégalaise from different backgrounds, ethnic groups, and generations make the same claim. Among the 12 parties that boycotted the elections was the *Partie Socialiste*, which was the ruling party from independence until 2000. There have also been claims that the Sénégalaise army’s presence in the Casamance increased leading up to the February elections, and there were widespread acts of intimidation of voters throughout the region.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Interviews.

⁶⁶ Interviews; personal observation of the army presence when I was in the Casamance during the February 2007 elections.

Socio-cultural Grievances

Among many Casamançais, there is the impression that most of the political and economic woes facing them are the result of the (mainly Wolof) S n galese government’s favoritism of the Wolof majority.⁶⁷ In fact, several interviewees referred to the “colonization of the Casamance” by the Wolof and other Northern S n galese ethnic groups. They call this process as “Wolofization.” In short, this phrase represents the perceived economic and political maltreatment mentioned above, but it also refers to dominance of the Wolof language in commerce, education, and the media, even in the Casamance. In Ziguinchor, many Diola children speak Wolof and French better than Diola because they are taught in Wolof, and take French classes.⁶⁸ In many Casamançais villages, school is still taught in Diola, but children and adults are all but required to learn Wolof if they want to watch the national television channels, listen to the national and local radio stations, or conduct business in any of the major towns or cities in the country (including those in the Casamance).

Along with the dominance of the Wolof language, Casamançais complain about the lack of their music and music videos on S n galese radio and television stations, and the lack of their history being taught in schools, including their own. Many interviewees and Casamançais friends argued that the fact that no university existed in the Casamance until 2006 has only compounded the problem of the disappearance of the cultures,

⁶⁷According to the CIA WorldFact Book, the Wolof make up roughly 43% of the population of S n gal. *The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999*, 1999; USAID, 2001; Evans, 2003; Interviews; informal conversations.

⁶⁸ Interviews and personal observation.

languages, and history of the Casamance's ethnic groups. In fact, several interviewees cite the S n galese government's attempts to erase their culture as one of the major justifications for the independence of the Casamance.

Description of GRPGRV and GRPGRVINDEXT

The independent variable, group grievances, which is called GRPGRV in the dataset, identifies whether and how the MFDC's grievances change. Using the chronology as the starting point, I looked at every instance in which the government or a third party (usually NGOs) took an action that might impact the group's economic, political, or social status. The actions I examined were limited to the creation of a new policy, or elimination or change of an existing policy by the government or another actor.⁶⁹ Thus, GRPGRV was measured on a scale, which is outlined in table 3.3, that ranges from the government or other actor makes, eliminates, or changes a policy in a way that positively impacts the group's grievance (-2), to the government or other actor makes, eliminates, or changes a policy in a way that negatively impacts the group's grievances (2).

⁶⁹For the congruence test, I limited changes in group grievances to government or third party policy changes because these are the most easily observed factors that can directly impact a group's grievances. There are many other factors that can influence a group's grievances, including persecution by another ethnic/religious group, and changes in the global economic climate. Because it is difficult to capture these phenomena quantitatively, they will be examined more closely in the causal process analysis, which allows more room for the sometimes idiosyncratic factors that influence actors' decisions.

An example of a policy shift that benefited the MFDC was the World Bank's decision, in September 2004, to loan US\$20 million for emergency development in the

TABLE 3.3: Group Grievance Variable	
<i>Label</i>	<i>Value</i>
Government or other actor improves group's grievance	-2
Government or other actor recognizes/addresses group's grievance	-1
No change	0
Government or other actor denounces/denies group's grievance	1
Government or other actor worsens group's grievance	2

Casamance, which would be coded as "government or other actor improves group's grievance" (-2) ("Senegal Receives US\$20 million for Emergency Recovery Project in Casamance", 2004). On the other hand, if the government makes a public statement denying that it spends less money on developing the Casamance, this would be coded as "government or other actor denounces/denies group's grievance" (1). If the government enacts a law banning a political party that represents Casamançais, this would be coded as "government or other actor worsens group's grievance" (2).

Once GRPGRV was coded, I created an index variable, GRPGRVINDEXX, which was simply the sum of the individual values of GRPGRV for each event in a given month (i.e. the net increase or decrease in group grievances in a given month). Unlike the aggregated group action variables, GRPACTINDEX and CHANGEGRPACTINDEX, it was not necessary to create a variable that captures monthly changes in group grievances,

since GRPGRV and GRPGRVINDEXT already capture change in their coding.⁷⁰

GRPGRVINDEXT was the independent variable used in the congruence test of H1.

Congruence Test of Group Grievances on Group Actions

This first congruence test, of group grievances on group actions, tests H1:

H1: A decrease in a secessionist group's grievances will result in a group leader's decision to decrease the level of violence the group uses, and an increase in a secessionist group's grievances will result in a group leader's decision to increase the level of violence the group uses.

The results of the congruence test, which can be found in table 3.4, are mixed. Group grievances, the independent variable of this hypothesis, decreased twice in the 293 episodes of this study. The two decreases in group grievances led to one decrease in group violence and one increase in group violence, which does not support the hypothesis. In order for H1 to be supported, we should have seen both cases of a decrease in violence lead to a decrease in group violence.

Along with the two times group grievances decreased in the timeframe of this study, group grievances also increased four times. Of these four times the group

⁷⁰In other words, the group action index variable, GRPACTINDEX (and the upcoming government repression index variable GVTREPINDEXT) measures simply the sum of all individual actions in a month, but does not measure an increase or decrease in actions from month to month, which is why it was necessary to create the CHANGEGRPACTINDEX variable. The group grievance variable, and the index variable that is based on it, GRPGRVINDEXT, actually measures change in the variable because it looks at policies that change the status quo of the group's grievances. For this reason, it was not necessary to create a separate CHANGEGRPGRVINDEXT variable because the value would always be equal to GRPGRVINDEXT because they would both be measuring the monthly changes in group grievances.

TABLE 3.4: Congruence Test of H1					
	Change in Group Grievances				Total
		Decrease	No change	Increase	
Change in Group Action	Decrease in violence	1	53	0	54
	No change	0	193	1	194
	Increase in violence	1	41	3	45
Total		2	287	4	293

grievances increased, the level of violence used by the MFDC remained the same once and increased three times. This is the outcome predicted by H1, which means the evidence supports this portion of H1. This hypothesis predicts a positive, linear relationship between group grievances and group action. In fact, in 75% of the observations in which group grievances increased, the group also increased its level of violence, which actually means that the evidence strongly supports the hypothesis.

In the vast majority of observations (287 out of 293), however, there was no change in group grievances from the previous month. Of these 287 observations, the majority saw no change in the group’s level of violence (67%). This result supports H1, since it is additional evidence of a positive, linear relationship between group grievances and action. The hypothesis does not, however, predict the 53 times that the group

decreased the level of violence, even though there was no change in the group's grievances. The hypothesis also does not predict the 41 times the group increased the level of violence without a change in group grievances. These decreases and increases in the level of violence employed by the group, at first glance, seem to be evidence that support the null hypothesis that changes in group grievances are not associated with changes in the group's level of violence. Though this is one interpretation, another possible reason that we see so much change in group action without changes in group grievances is that the two other independent variables of this theory are changing, even though grievances are not.

In fact, of the 53 observations in which group grievances remained constant and the group decreased its level of violence, either government repression or group capacity changed 39 times. This means that in 74% of the observations in which group action decreased without a change in group grievances, changes in government repression or group capacity might explain this decrease. There were only 14 observations, or 26%, in which the group level of violence decreased without a change in any of the independent variables. In addition, of the 41 observations in which group level of violence increased without a change in group grievances, government repression or group capacity changed 36 times. This shows that in 88% of the observations in which the level of violence increased without a change in group grievances, there were changes in government repression or group capacity that help explain the increase. When the changes in the other two independent variables are taken into consideration, the evidence still supports

H1. This is particularly so, when one remembers that group grievances are a sufficient, but not necessary independent variable (i.e. a change in group grievances is enough to cause a change in group action by itself, but a change in group action can occur without a change in group grievances).

In sum, the findings of the congruence test of H1 support the prediction that if group grievances increase, the group will increase the level of violence it employs. These findings also support the logical extension of this hypothesis that if there is no change in group grievances, there will be no change in the group's level of violence (if the other independent variables are also constant). On the other hand, these findings do not support the hypothesis' prediction that a decrease in the group's grievances will lead to a decrease in its level of violence. There are, however, several possible reasons for this finding. First, and most importantly, there is a need for more observations with variance on the values of this independent variable. It is difficult to draw any conclusions from the data, either confirming or infirming the theory, when the value of the variable only changed in 2% of the observations.

One conclusion that might be drawn from the fact that grievances changed so little is that grievances play a larger role in the formation of secessionist movements, than in their leaders' more frequent strategy changes, and specifically, leaders' decisions to increase or decrease the use of violence. This conclusion is based on the fact that though the number of group grievances changed only six times, the group either decreased or increased its use of violence 99 times. In other words, only 6% of the episodes in which

the group changed its level of violence were there also a change in group grievances. Despite this fact, group leaders cited grievances in every interview, but most of the grievances were used to explain why the MFDC was formed. As will be discussed below, this finding actually supports Toft's (2003) argument that territorial indivisibility and a group's lost autonomy leads to the onset of secessionist violence.

There is a limitation regarding the interpretation this finding: its measurement. For the purpose of this project, group grievances was measured as the number of group grievances, rather than their salience, because existing theories treat all grievances as equal (so there is no need to weight their importance), and because of the difficulty of quantifying the salience of a group's grievances with the government. In future studies, I will use salience of group grievances as a measure because they better capture the significance of a group's problems with the government that could lead to secession, and influence group leaders' decisions about whether to use or continue using violence to achieve it. This argument is based on the primary and secondary data used in this study, which show that some grievances are more important than others. For example, in interviews, newspaper articles, and NGO reports, group leaders cite lost autonomy and lack of economic development as major grievances. Political and cultural grievances were also mentioned, but with less frequency and emphasis. This supports the argument that some grievances are more important than others, and forces scholars to rethink the way in which we measure grievances.

STATE REPRESSION OF THE MFDC AND CASAMANÇAIS

In addition to the many grievances expressed by Casamançais during the early years after Sénégalaise independence, they also express concern and resentment over their ill-treatment at the hands of the Sénégalaise government. While many citizens of the region became increasingly vocal about the grievances mentioned above, most historical accounts (including those from my primary data) jump from independence to the early 1980s. Foucher (2002) and Evans (2003) are the only researchers to discuss the episodes of civil unrest during the 1970s. Most of this unrest, usually in the form of demonstrations of various sizes, was in response to the land tenure laws outlined in the previous section. The government response to these protests was minimal, at best. It was not until 1980, after the mass strike by students in Ziguinchor, that the Sénégalaise government and army began violently repressing Casamançais. In fact, it was at this strike that the government's campaign of repression against Casamançais began, with the killing of a high school student by a police officer (*The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999*, 1999; USAID, 2001; Evans, 2003).

After this incident, the next major incident of government repression came in response to a 1982 mass demonstration in Ziguinchor. Every interviewee, and almost every researcher, cites this event as the first of two critical junctures of the movement that marked the shift from nonviolent to violent actions on the part of both the Sénégalaise government and Casamançais, specifically the MFDC. During the demonstration in 1982, the Sénégalaise government used force against the protestors, which resulted in the

death of one protestor, and the serious injury of two others. In the aftermath of the demonstration, over 100 Casamançais were arrested, and many were subsequently tortured (including rape).⁷¹ Three interviewees who participated in the demonstration described their arrest and torture at the hands of the Sénégalaise army.⁷²

The second critical juncture occurred one year later, in December 1983, when the government again responded with force to a mass demonstration. This time, the Sénégalaise government's use of force against the protestors led to many deaths (some place the loss of life between 50-200 people) (Evans, 2003). This period marked the government's shift to a mostly violent strategy against Casamançais, and later the MFDC.

The mid-late 1980s marked sporadic, nonviolent and violent repression of Casamançais at the hands of the Sénégalaise government. There were more arrests of members and leaders, restrictions on the movement of known MFDC members and leaders, destruction of property by either targeted or arbitrary attacks by the army, and an increasing police and military presence throughout the region.⁷³ The government's violent repression during this period included disappearances, torture of those arrested, and sporadic military attacks on the MFDC. The next decade, however, marked a dramatic increase in the frequency of the Sénégalaise government's violent repression of the MFDC, and Casamançais more generally.

⁷¹ *The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999*, 1999; USAID, 2001; Humphreys and Mohamed, 2005; Foucher, 2002; Evans, 2003; Interviews; informal conversations.

⁷² Interviews with ABD, and group interview in Kagnobon.

⁷³ While there are not (public) statistics for the total number of Sénégalaise military members in the Casamance, their presence is definitely noticeable.⁷³ There were two gendarmerie posts on the street on which I lived, and another within a mile of my apartment. There is also a large army base on the outskirts of Ziguinchor. I also saw several of the Army and National Gendarmerie every single day, even when traveling to remote parts of the region

In 1990, the government arrested Abbé Diamacoune, the MFDC's leader, along with several others. Before his trial was complete, however, the S n galese government and the MFDC signed the first of many cease-fire agreements in May of 1991. On the terms of the agreement, all political prisoners were freed, including Abb , and there was a halt to the fighting. In 1992, however, both sides accused the other of breaking the cease-fire, and an intense round of fighting began. The government has been accused of committing massacres in the towns of Oussouy  and Djivant in 1992, and in Djifandor a few years later.⁷⁴ The 1990s ended with increased military attacks (both in S n gal and Guinea-Bissau) on the MFDC and Casaman ais civilians, many of whom were arbitrarily accused of supporting the MFDC, often on the basis of ethnicity alone. Also during this period, there was another cease-fire agreement signed between the S n galese government and the MFDC, and there was the creation of a commission to monitor the peace.

The early-mid 2000s saw more S n galese army attacks on the MFDC (and Casaman ais civilians), and more cease-fire agreements made and broken. The S n galese and Bissau-Guinean armies were able to drive the most violent elements of the MFDC out of Guinea-Bissau and southern Casamance with targeted attacks on their bases and strongholds. The next major S n galese government action came in December 2004, when it signed a peace agreement with the MFDC. Unlike previous agreements, both sides have upheld their end of the bargain, with the exception of the Sadio faction of

⁷⁴ Interviews with DD, AD and JPS, and group interview in Kagnobon. In fact, DD (MFDC member) lost his neighbor in the massacre in Oussouy , and his brother, sister, and sister's husband were all arrested. His brother and sister were tortured, and his brother-in-law was killed.

the MFDC, and there has been a drastic decrease in the use of violence by both the Sénégalaise government and the MFDC.

Description of LVLGVTREP and CHANGELVLGVTREPINDEX

The independent variable level of government repression, identified as LVLGVTREP in the dataset, measures government repression of the MFDC and Casamançais. The types of government actions that were included in the chronology and dataset, which are shown in table 3.5, range from no reported repression (which also includes government accommodation of the MFDC and Casamançais), to a high level of repression (e.g. extra-judicial executions of civilians or MFDC members).⁷⁵ LVLGVTREP is measured monthly, similarly to the indexes for the other variables, and, like GRPACTINDEX, measures not only the action taken, but the scope (i.e. the number of people impacted).

LVLGVTREP is coded as no reported repression (0), not only if there are no reports of government repression in a given month, but also if the sum of the government's accommodation of the MFDC and Casamançais in a given month is greater

⁷⁵ The types of actions included for LVLGVTREP are based on MAR's indicators for REP01-REP23. The scale, however, is not based on MAR because MAR does not use a scale for government repression. Instead, MAR uses a separate variable for each indicator of government repression (REP01, REP 02, REP03, etc.). Within each variable, there is a scale that ranges in scope from the government targeting active members of the opposition group to the government targeting all members of the larger sociological (e.g. ethnic) group. For this reason, it was necessary to create a scale that shows the range of possible government actions in one variable: LVLGVTREP.

TABLE 3.5: Level of Government Repression Variable		
<i>Label</i>	<i>Example</i>	<i>Value</i>
No repression	No reports of repression	0
Intermediate level of repression by the government	Injuries to MFDC members and/or civilians	1
High level of repression by the government	Torture, rape, extra-judicial executions	2

than or equal to the sum of its repression of the same groups, or if the government takes any of the actions that are considered to be at an intermediate level of repression (e.g. imprisonment or injury), but are only carried out against fewer than three people. For example, the following government action would be coded as no reported repression (0): government takes no action considered repressive on the LVLGVTREP scale; the government signs a ceasefire with the MFDC, and injures two civilians (the net value is 0 because neither action qualifies as intermediate or high level of government repression on the LVLGVTREP scale); or, imprisons one person.

LVLGVTREP is coded as intermediate (1) when the government commits the following acts against three or more people: arrests, destruction of property, theft, sporadic attacks with no injuries, increase in military presence in the region, kidnapping (if the person is returned safely), imprisonment, injuries to civilians or MFDC members (not as a result of torture), or military campaigns that do not result in any deaths. LVLGVTREP is also coded as intermediate (1) when the government takes any of the actions considered a high level of government repression against fewer than three people.

For example, if the government kills two MFDC members, LVLGVTREP would be coded as intermediate (1) because fewer than three people were affected. LVLGVTREP is coded as high (2) when the government takes the following actions against three or more people: extra-judicial executions of civilians or MFDC members, disappearances, torture, or rape.

CHANGELVLGVTREP measures the difference between the level of government repression in a given month and the level of government repression for the previous month. Based on the theory, there should be a curvilinear-shaped (inverted-U) relationship between the level of government repression and the group's level of violence, it was important that CHANGELVLGVTREP capture not only whether there was an increase or decrease in government repression from month to month, but also how much of an increase or decrease. In other words, it is necessary to identify whether the level of government repression increased to high or decreased to low because the theory's expectations are that when the level of government repression becomes low or high, the group will act differently than when the level of repression become intermediate. This expectation, and the data required to test its accuracy, led to the creation of a scale for CHANGELVLGVTREP, outlines in table 3.6, that ranges from level of government repression decreases to none or low, to the level of government repression increases to high. CHANGELVLGVTREP was the independent variable used in the congruence test of H2.

TABLE 3.6: Change in Level of Government Repression Variable	
<i>Label</i>	<i>Value</i>
Level of government repression decreases from intermediate or high, to none	-2
Level of government repression decreases from high to intermediate	-1
Level of government repression does not change from the previous month	0
Level of government repression increases from none to intermediate	1
Level of government repression increases from none or intermediate, to high	2

Congruence Test of Government Repression on Group Actions

The second congruence test, regarding the relationship between the level of government repression and group action, tests hypotheses two, three, and four:

H2: An increase in the level of government repression to high will result in a secessionist group leader's decision to decrease the level of violence the group uses.

H3: A decrease in the level of government repression to none or low will result in a secessionist group leader's decision to decrease the level of violence the group uses.

H4: An increase or decrease in the level of government repression to intermediate will result in a secessionist group leader's decision to increase the level of violence the group uses.

Table 3.7 shows the results for this congruence test, which show strong support for H3, provide strong evidence against H2, and are somewhat ambiguous for H4. The level of

government repression changed in 60 of the 293 observations in the dataset, and decreased to none or low in 23 of these 60 observations. H3 predicts that these 23 observations should lead to decrease in the level group violence, and the group actually reduced the level of violence it used in 13 of these observations. This means that H3 accurately predicted the outcome in over half of the observations (57%). Based on this finding, the evidence supports H3.

TABLE 3.7: Congruence Test of H2, H3, and H4						
Change in Level of Government Repression						total
Change in Group Action		No change	Increase to None/Low	Decrease/Intermediate	Increase to High	
	Decrease in violence	30	13	9	2	44
	No change	178	6	6	4	194
	Increase in violence	25	4	6	10	45
total	233	23	21	16	293	

Of the 23 times government repression decreased to none/low, the group level of violence remained the same in 6 observations (26%), and increased in 4 observations (17%). It is possible that the six observations in which the level of government repression decreased to none/low and the group's level of violence did not change, provide evidence in the support of the null hypothesis that a decrease in government repression to none/low has no impact on group action. One should keep in mind, however, that the lack of change in group action might be explained by the fact that the group did not use violence in the previous month, so it was not possible for the group to decrease to a lower level of violence. For example, in March 1987 the MFDC's level of violence (GRPACTINDEX) is coded as none reported (0) because the group did not take any violent actions in this month. In the next month, April 1987, the MFDC's level of violence is also coded as none reported (0), and the change in the level of group violence (CHANGEGRPACTINDEX) is coded as no change (0) because there was no change from March to April. At the same time, the change in the level of government repression from March to April is coded as decrease to none/low (-2) because the government released MFDC and Casamançais prisoners, but there is no corresponding decrease in group level of violence. For this reason, it might appear that this observation provides evidence that contradicts H3, even though the actual events neither support nor refute H3.⁷⁶ In fact, in all 6 observations in which the level of government repression decreased

⁷⁶ The assumption that this observation would neither support nor refute H3 is based on the underlying assumption of the theory's expectation that when the government's level of repression decreases to none/low, the group reduces its level of violence because it has other means of protest (newly) available. If the group has previously decreased its use of violence (e.g. the government previously increased its level of

to none/low, and the group level of violence remained the same, the group's level of violence was none reported in the previous months.

Also within the 23 observations in which the level of government repression decreased to none/low, 4 times the group's level of violence actually increased, which is the opposite of H3's prediction. It should be noted that in one of these observations (February 2007), the MFDC's acts of violence are attributed to one faction, rather than the group as a whole ("Attack in Sénégal's Casamance", 2000). In fact, this particular faction, which will be discussed in detail below, is the only faction considered actively violent by the government and the MFDC, and is the only faction opposed by all other factions of the MFDC.⁷⁷ Also, in both this and another of the four observations (February 2000) took place in the weeks before Sénégal's presidential elections ("Attack in Sénégal's Casamance", 2000). This is significant because Sénégal, as a whole, saw increasing levels of violence in the weeks leading up to these contentious elections (usually clashes between supporters of the different parties), and the Casamance was no different. It is possible, then, that in these two observations, there were other (omitted) variables impacting the MFDC's level of violence. This need to further investigate specific findings and observations to better understand why the hypotheses accurately

repression to high) to none/low, and, as a result, cannot further decrease the level of violence, this is not evidence for or against the assumption that the group can use other means of protest. Therefore, an observation in which this occurs would not provide evidence to make inferences about the relationship between change in the level of government repression and change in the group's level of violence.

⁷⁷ One interviewee summed up the feelings of other interviewees, other researchers, and the Sénégalaise government when he argued that the leader of this particular faction, Salif Sadio, is too ambitious and wants to be the leader of the entire MFDC. This interviewee, and others, believe that it is this desire to lead that motivates Sadio, which might explain why this observation, one of few that specify a particular faction, is not explained by the independent variables.

predict some observations, but not others, is one of the major reasons for conducting the causal process analysis in later chapters. The causal process analysis will also provide a better understanding of the reasons that the findings offer strong evidence *against* H2.

H2 predicts that the 16 observations in which the level of government repression increased from none/low or intermediate, to high should result in a decrease in the level of violence used by the group. This was not the case, though, and the group's level of violence only decreased in two of these observations (13%). In 10 of these observations (63%) in which government repression increased to high, the group actually increased its level of violence, which is the opposite of what H2 predicts. This finding is interesting in that it is theory confirming, but not for the theory presented in this dissertation. The findings support theories of repression that posit a positive, linear relationship between government repression and group level of violence (*See* Gurr, 1970; Gurr and Moore, 1997, 2000; Tarrow, 1998). Evidence from the 4 observations (25%) in which the level of government repression increased to high and the group's level of violence remained the same, on the other hand, are ambiguous. In three of these observations, the group's level of violence was coded as none reported (0) in the previous month, so there was no way the group could further decrease the level of violence. Similar to the other anomalies mentioned above, the causal process analysis, and its findings, will be used to help explain some of the outcomes that the congruence test cannot.

Regarding H4, there were 21 observations in which the level of government repression increased or decreased to intermediate. H4 predicts that we should see an

increase in the group's level of violence in these observations, but the evidence does not support this prediction. In fact, when the level of government repression became intermediate, the group's level of violence increased or remained the same in six observations each, and decreased in nine observations. In other words, there is an equal chance that a shift to an intermediate level of government repression will lead to an increase in the level of group violence or that it will lead to no change at all, and only a slightly higher chance that it will not lead to a decrease in violence. In all six of the observations in which the level of government repression became intermediate, and the group's level of violence remained the same, the group's level of violence was coded as none reported (0) in the previous month, which means that the group could not have further decreased its level of violence. Even still, these six observations, and the nine observations in which the group's level of violence decreased, are contrary to the expected outcome of an increase in the group's level of violence. These observations might, however, provide further evidence to support a positive, linear relationship between the level of government repression, and the level of violence used by the group.

If the theories that predict as the level of government repression increases, the level of violence used by the group will also increase (i.e. a positive, linear relationship) are accurate, we should see a decrease in the group's level of violence when the government's level of repression decreases from high to intermediate, and an increase in the group's level of violence when the level of government repression increases from none/low to intermediate. Of the 21 times that the level of government repression

changed to intermediate, it decreased from high to intermediate seven times. Within these seven times, the group's level of violence decreased four times, remained the same one time, and increased two times. This is consistent with a positive, linear relationship because the decrease in the government's level of repression from high to intermediate is correlated with a decrease in the group's level of violence in over half of the observations (57%). Also of the 21 times the level of government repression shifted to intermediate, it increased from none/low to intermediate 14 times. Within these 14 times, the group's level of violence decreased five times, remained the same five times, and increased 4 times. We should have seen an increase in the group's level of violence, which only happened in 28% of the cases, so these findings do not support the hypothesis of a positive, linear relationship between the level of government repression and the group's level of violence. Based strictly on the numbers, an increase in the level of government repression from none/low to intermediate appears to have no impact on the level of group violence because there is a roughly equal chance that the group's level of violence will decrease, increase, or remain the same. Though there is no obvious explanation for this finding, fortunately, the causal process analysis will involve two of these observations, so we will have a better understanding of why an increase in the level of government repression to intermediate cannot be explained by H4 or expectations of a positive, linear relationship between repression and group action.

As with the group grievances, the vast majority of observations (233) saw the government maintain the same level of repression from the previous month (i.e. no

change in the level of government repression). In 76% of these observations (178), the group's level of violence also remained constant, which is the outcome expected by the underlying assumption that, if the level of government repression does influence the level of violence used by the group, then a lack of change in repression should be correlated with a lack of change in the group's level of violence. Of these 233 cases of no change in the level of government repression, however, there are 30 observations in which the group's level of violence decreased, and 25 observations in which the level of violence increased. As with the observations discussed in the group grievances section, these changes in the level of violence used by the group without a change in the level of government repression might be explained by change in the other two independent variables. In fact, group grievances and group capacity changed in just over half of the observations (16) in which the group's level of violence decreased without a change in the government's level of repression. Also, in 20 of the 25 observations (80%) in which the group's level of violence increased without a change in the level of government repression, there was change in group grievances or group capacity. Though this does not explain all of the occurrences of change in the level of group violence without change in the level of government repression, this does explain 65% of these observations.

Overall, the findings provide strong evidence in support of H3 and against H2, and are more mixed regarding H4. The implication of the results of the congruence test is that, rather than a curvilinear (inverted-U shaped) relationship between the level of government repression and the group's level of violence, there is a positive, linear

relationship. These results, then, are theory-infirming for the theory put forth in this dissertation, but theory-confirming for other theories of political violence and secession, including (classic) relative deprivation and action-reaction theories.⁷⁸

MFDC CAPACITY

For the purpose of this dissertation, group capacity (i.e. the group's ability to use violence) consists of group resources and cohesion. The MFDC's main source of revenue is the Casamance's natural resources. In terms of natural resources, the Casamance is the richest region in Sénégal. Though most of the country has suffered from the effects of desertification, the Casamance is vertically bisected by the Casamance River. This is important because the river is a source of water that makes the region the only one in Sénégal with arable land. In fact, the majority of Sénégal's rice (the major staple), fish, and groundnuts (peanuts) come from the region (Humphreys and Mohamed, 2005; Evans, 2003; CIA World Factbook). The region is also rich in timber and cannabis, both of which the MFDC has used to fund the movement, though they did not begin exploiting these resources until the late 1980s (Humphreys and Mohamed, 2005; Evans, 2003).

⁷⁸ For classic relative deprivation theory, see Gurr (1970). Action-reaction theories hold that actors choose particular strategies based on the most recent action of their opponents. In particular, groups choose their strategy based on that of the government; if the government chooses a violent strategy, the group will choose a violent strategy. For action-reaction theories, see Smelser (1962); Lichbach (1987); and, Kowalewski and Hoover (1995).

Because the Casamançais separatist movement began nonviolently, arms did not become an important resource until after the MFDC began to employ violence in the mid-1980s.

By all accounts, during this period, the MFDC was only armed with bows and arrows, axes, spears, hatchets, machetes, old muskets, and hunting rifles (*The Casamance Conflict*, 1999; USAID, 2001; Humphreys and Mohamed, 2005). It was not until the late 1980s that the MFDC began purchasing more advanced weapons from a variety of sources, including neighboring countries. Revenue for these purchases came mainly from the sale of marijuana, and donations from Casamançais supporters of the movement. From the early 1990's to the present, however, the growing need for revenue to purchase more weapons led to the use of forced taxes and other "fees" levied on Casamançais.⁷⁹

In addition to these resources, another important factor that has contributed to the MFDC's ability to carry out various group actions (including violence) is the level of cohesion among group members. At the moment of independence, Casamançais were united as a region. This was still the case at the beginning of the 1980s, when the MFDC was revived as a separatist group by Abbé Diamacoune. The group remained this way until the first major split occurred in 1992. Sidy Badji, who Abbé Diamacoune placed in charge of the armed wing- Front Sud- broke from the original group founded by Abbé after requesting proof that former President Senghor promised Casamançais

⁷⁹ *The Casamance Conflict*, 1999; Humphreys and Mohamed, 2005. I also witnessed a bus driver on a remote Casamance road being forced to pay a "tax" to what my guide later identified as an MFDC member. This explained the driver's desire to drive at break-neck speeds and to stop to pick up as few passengers as possible!

independence after 1980. When Abbé refused to show the documents proving that Senghor made “the promise” to the Casamance, Badji accused him of inciting the civil war. Badji split from the original group, moved from southern to northern Casamance to join the relatively nonviolent Front Nord, and laid down his weapons. Currently, the Front Nord has de facto control of northwestern Casamance, based on the fact that the Sénégalaise army allows it to administer this region with little interference.⁸⁰

The next major split occurred in 1997, as a result of mixed views on whether MFDC members should be fighting a war in Guinea-Bissau. When General Ansoumana Mané launched a coup against President “Nino” Vieira in Guinea-Bissau. After Mané, a member of the Diola ethnic group that makes up the majority of the MFDC, was accused of supplying weapons to the MFDC, he enlisted the help of the MFDC to support him in a coup. Salif Sadio, the leader of the armed wing after Badji left, sent MFDC members, including his Lieutenant Léopold Sagna, to fight alongside Mané. When Sagna and his men refused to fight the Bissau-Guinean army, citing the fact that they had no quarrel with the government in Bissau, they split from Sadio to form another armed wing in southern Casamance- Front Sud B. After Sadio’s men captured and presumably killed Sagna later in 1997, fighting ensued between Sadio’s Front Sud and Badiate’s (Sagna’s successor) Front Sud B. Sadio’s group is considered by most to be the most violent of the armed factions, and his group is opposed by all other factions of the MFDC. This fighting continued until 2006, when Front Sud B, with the help of the Bissau-Guinean army, ran Front Sud out of Guinea-Bissau and southern Casamance. Later in 2006,

⁸⁰ Interview with KD; Interview with AED.

Magne Diemé split from the Front Nord, which was run by Kamougué Diatta after the death of Sidy Badji in 2003. Diemé, Badiate, and the Sénégalaise army attacked Sadio's faction in northern Sénégal as late as July 2007.

Currently, there are six major factions (recognized by majority of Casamançais and/or media): *Badiate's Front Sud B* in southern Casamance and northwestern Guinea-Bissau; *Sadio's Front Sud*, which is now actually located mostly in northeastern Casamance and in the Gambia, with smaller numbers in southeastern Casamance and northeastern Guinea-Bissau; *Diatta's Front Nord* in northwestern Casamance along the border with the Gambia; *Diemé's Front Nord B* in north-central Casamance; the *Internal Political Wing* under the leadership of *Bertrand Diamacoune* (the younger brother of the MFDC's founder, Abbé Diamacoune); and, *Nkrumah Sané's External Political Wing* in France.⁸¹ Since the death of Abbé Diamacoune in January 2007, most of the factions have been in a process of reorganization and attempted unification, with varying degrees of success.⁸²

Description of GRPCAP and GRPCAPINDEX

Group capacity is made up of group resources (GRPRES) and group cohesion (GRPCOH). GRPRES includes events that impact a group's ability to buy, barter for, or

⁸¹ Interviews. The External Political Wing is not discussed in detail because they have limited contact with the other wings, and limited control over them. They have not taken any direct group action.

⁸² Interviews; personal observation of an MFDC reunification meeting in May 2007.

receive weapons, or the revenue to purchase weapons.⁸³ This variable is measured on a scale that ranges from change that decreases the group's ability to get weapons (-1), to change that increases the group's ability to get weapons (1). The index of this variable (GRPRESINDEX) is the sum of the value of GRPRES for all observations in a given month. Because this indicator measures change, there was no need to create an indicator for change (as was necessary with group action and government repression).

The indicator of group cohesion (GRPCOH), on the other hand, measures actions taken by one faction against another. Specifically, GRPCOH is a scale that ranges from violent action by one faction against another (-3), to cooperation among different factions of the group (1). GRPCOHINDEX is the sum of the value of GRPCOH for all observations in a given month, and CHANGEGRPCOHINDEX is the value of GRPCOHINDEX for the current month minus the value of GRPCOHINDEX for the previous month.⁸⁴

The group capacity variable (GRPCAP), then, is the sum of the values of GRPRES and GRPCOH for each observation. Based on the theory's expected relationships, it is assumed that a change that increases the group's ability to get weapons, and/or an increase in group cohesion will increase the group's capacity to carryout violence. GRPCAP, which is described in table 3.8, ranges from change that

⁸³ An example of an event that would impact the group's ability to receive weapons would be a joint effort by the S n galese and Bissau-Guinean governments to crackdown on the illegal movement of weapons across the border.

⁸⁴ When the value of GRPCOHINDEX was 1 in the previous month, and GRPCOHINDEX is 0 in the current month, CHANGEGRPCOHINDEX is coded as 0. The rationale is that if the group cooperated last month (1), but takes no action this month (0), CHANGEGRPCOHINDEX is coded as -1 (0-1), even though there was no substantive decrease in group cohesion.

decreases the group’s ability to use violence (-1), to change that increases the group’s ability to use violence (1). GRPCAPINDEX is the sum of the value of GRPCAP for each observation in a given month, and CHANGEGRPCAPINDEX is value of GRPCAPINDEX for the current month minus the value of GRPCAPINDEX for the previous month. CHANGEGRPCAPINDEX is the variable used in the third congruence test.

TABLE 3.8: Change in Level of Group Capacity Variable	
<i>Label</i>	<i>Value</i>
Change that decreases the group’s ability to use violence (decrease in group resources and/or decrease in group cohesion)	-1
No change ⁸⁵	0
Change that increases the group’s ability to use violence (increase in group resources and/or increase in group cohesion)	1

Congruence Test of Group Capacity on Group Action

The third congruence test deals with H5:

⁸⁵ Months in which the net change in the group’s capacity to use violence is no change is also coded as no change. For example, if the group’s resources increase once (GRPRESINDEX = 1), but the level of cohesion decreases once (CHANGEGRPCOHINDEX = -1), the net change equals no change (0) because GRPRESINDEX plus CHANGEGRPCOHINDEX equals 0. In other words, group resources and group cohesion are moving in opposite directions, so they cancel each other out. This coding is based on the assumption that group resources and cohesion are equally important indicators of the group’s capacity to use violence, since the theory does not offer reason to believe otherwise.

H5: A decrease in a secessionist group's capacity will result in a group leader's decision to decrease the level of violence the group uses, and an increase in a secessionist group's capacity will result in a secessionist group leader's decision to increase the level of violence the group uses.

The results from this congruence test, which are outlined in table 3.9, do not support H5. Out of the 293 observations, group capacity (GRPCAPINDEX) changed 42 times. In the 23 observations in which group capacity decreased, the group's level of violence decreased nine times (39%), remained the same six times (26%), and increased eight times (35%). According to H5, the group's level of violence should have decreased with its capacity, but this only occurred in 39% of the observations, so the evidence does not support H5. The fact that a decrease in group capacity led to almost the same percentage of decreases and increases in the group's level of violence shows that this portion of H5 does not accurately predict the outcome when the group's capacity decreases.

The result are also damaging to the portion of H5 that predicts an increase in the group's capacity will lead to an increase in its level of violence. Of the 19 times that the group's capacity increased, the group's level of violence decreased six times (32%), remained the same five times (26%), and increased eight times (42%). H5 predicts that the group's level of violence should have increased in these observations in which the group's capacity increased, but this only occurred in 42% of the observations. Though these results are not quite as hypothesis-infirming as the previous set, they still do not provide evidence supporting H5.

	Change in Group Capacity				Total
Change in Group Action		Decrease	No change	Increase	
	Decrease in violence	9	39	6	54
	No change	6	183	5	194
	Increase in violence	8	29	8	45
Total		23	251	19	293

As with the two other independent variables, most observations of group capacity saw no change from month to month. The group's capacity remained the same as in the previous month in 251 observations, and of these observations, the group's level of violence decreased 39 times (16%), increased 29 times (12%), and remained the same 183 times (73%). Of the 39 observations that saw a decrease in the level of group violence without a change in group capacity, change in either group grievances or the level of government repression may explain why there was change in 23 observations. Also, in 24 of the 29 observations in which the group's level of violence increased without a change in group capacity, there was change in either group grievances or government repression. Thus, in 69% of the observations in which there is a change in

the level of group violence without a change in group capacity, changes in either group grievances or the level of government repression can explain the change.

To summarize, the findings from the congruence test of H5 suggest that group capacity is far less important than H5 predicts. In fact, the evidence actually supports the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between group capacity, as operationalized and measured in this dissertation, and the level of violence used by the group. One possible reason for this finding is the way that group capacity is operationalized in this dissertation. This study looks at group resources and group cohesion as indicators of group capacity. Perhaps there are other factors that are equally, or more, important than these, like a group's size, its internal structure (e.g. democracy or autocracy, hierarchical or egalitarian), or public support for the group. Though it is quite possible that group capacity, regardless of how it is operationalized, does not have a causal relationship with the level of violence used by a group, future hypothesis tests of H5 should be conducted with different indicators before accepting the null hypothesis that group capacity has no impact on group action. It is also important to note that the data on group resources is very limited. Most secondary sources do not have this information, and interviewees are reluctant to speak about the number of weapons their group holds. In future research, I will ask more specific questions about the resources, if resources remain a measure of group capacity.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ It should be easier to get more information on group resources in the second set of interviews, since rapport has already been built during the first set.

CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The final two hypotheses identify the expected outcomes when all of the independent variables are changing simultaneously:

H6: A decrease in secessionist group grievances, a shift to high or low levels of government repression, and a decrease in group capacity is more likely to result in a group leader's decision to decrease the level of violence the group uses, than when there is a change in only one or two of the independent variables.

H7: An increase in secessionist group grievances, an increase or decrease in the level of government repression to intermediate, and an increase in group capacity is more likely to result in a group leader's decision to increase the level of violence the group uses, than when there is a change in only one or two of the independent variables.

Table 3.10 provides a list of the expected and actual outcomes when the independent variables increased or decreased at the same time. Unfortunately, there was not an observation in which all of the independent variables changed at the same time; there were, however, seven observations in which two of the independent variables simultaneously changed in directions expected to lead to a change in the group's level of violence.

There were four observations in which two of the independent variables moved in directions predicted to cause a decrease in the level of violence used by the group. In three of these four observations, the group decreased its level of violence as expected, and in one observation the group increased the use violence. It should be noted, though, the one observation in which the group increased the use of violence, the level of

Table 3.10 Congruence Test of Simultaneous Change in Independent Variables				
Group Grievances	Government Repression	Group Capacity	Expected Outcome	Actual Outcome
No change	Decreased to none/low	Decreased	Decrease	Decreased* (2 observations)
No change	Increased to high	Decreased	Decrease	Increased
No change	Increased to high	Decreased	Decrease	Decreased*
No change	Increased to intermediate	Increased	Increase	No change
No change	Increased to intermediate	Increased	Increase	Increased*
No change	Decreased to intermediate	Increased	Increase	Increased*

* Indicates an observation in which the expected outcome is congruent with the actual outcome.

government repression increased to high. Although the increase in the group’s level of violence was not the outcome predicted by H6, it is consistent with the findings of the second congruence test that when the level of government repression increases to high, the group is more likely to increase the level of violence it uses, than to maintain or decrease the level of violence. Even with the one observation that H6 does not accurately predict, the findings from the congruence test support H6 because the other three observations move in the predicted direction.

There were three observations in which the independent variables changed in the directions predicted to cause an increase in the group’s level of violence. Of these three observations, the group increased its level of violence twice, and maintained its level of violence once. These two instances in which the group increased its level of violence are

evidence that supports H7. Overall, then, the evidence supports H6 and H7. One implication of this evidence is that though changes in group capacity, alone, cannot explain changes in the group's level of violence, when combined with the other independent variables, increases and decreases in group capacity do a better job explaining increases and decreases in the level of violence used by the group. It is possible, then, that while a change in group capacity is not a sufficient condition for changes in the group's level of violence, it becomes important when there are changes in other factors that motivate the group to increase or decrease its level of violence.⁸⁷

CONTENDING EXPLANATIONS OF CONGRUENCE TEST FINDINGS

Economic Theories

Economic theories of political violence and secession focus on the relationship between natural resource or scarce resources, and argue that the presence or lack of these resources motivates groups to use a particular level of violence to gain control over them. Neither type of economic theory includes group grievances or government repression as important causal factors, unless we consider scarce resources as a group grievance (which these theories do not).⁸⁸ Instead, they Therefore, if these theories are accurate, we should

⁸⁷ It is important to keep in mind, however, that the observations in which two independent variables simultaneously move in directions expected to lead to change in the group's level of violence are only 7 out of 293 observations, and it would be possible to make stronger inferences if there were more variation in these independent variables.

⁸⁸ Most theories of scarce resources hold that groups' desire to control these resources (i.e. greed) is the motivating factor behind group violence, rather than any grievances caused by scarce resources.

see no correlation between group grievances and the group's level of violence. While the evidence does not support the claim that decreases in group grievances will lead to decreases in the group's level of violence, the congruence test findings show a strong correlation between group grievances and group action when grievances increase or remain the same. For this reason, we cannot accept the null hypothesis that group grievances do not impact group action. In fact, both times group grievances decreased, there was a subsequent change in the group's level of violence.

Regarding the relationship between government repression and the level of violence employed by the group, we should expect to see that the level of government repression has no impact on the group's level of violence, if the hypotheses of these economic theories are accurate. Though the evidence is ambiguous about the relationship between shifts to an intermediate level of government repression and the level of group violence, it is clear regarding shifts to none/low and high levels of government repression: the majority of these shifts led to a shift in the group's level of violence. Whether or not these shifts in group violence changed in the expected direction, they changed, nonetheless. As a result, most of the economic theories of political violence and secession cannot adequately explain these observed changes in the level of violence employed by the group.

There are, however, some theories of natural resources that do expect a relationship between the level of government repression and group violence. Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore (2005), for example, argue that natural resource production is an

easy source of revenue for governments, and it can cause the government to repress its citizens in an attempt to maintain control over this revenue (Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore, 2005). For this prediction to be accurate, we should see more corruption higher military expenditures in resource-rich countries. Unfortunately, because natural resource endowment does not change over time in Sénégal, it is not possible to adequately test this hypothesis using only my dataset. It would be necessary to have data on natural resources that vary over time within one case, or multiple cases with varying natural resource endowments.⁸⁹ Without the benefit of this type of data, it should be noted that even if future evidence supports this hypothesis, it would only be able to explain the relationship between natural resources and group violence indirectly, by explaining the relationship between natural resources and government repression. Also, the natural resource hypothesis would still be applicable only to cases that have a large natural resource endowment, and would not be able to explain government repression or group violence in the many countries without one. Specifically, this hypothesis would not be able to explain the Sénégalaise government's level of repression, or MFDC's choices regarding the level of violence because the major natural resource in Sénégal, which is found in the Casamance, is marijuana. It is unlikely, though not impossible, that the government is using marijuana revenue to fund corruption and military expenditures, which is what we should see if the natural resource hypothesis is accurate.

⁸⁹ Based on empirical evidence from Lujala, et al (2005), it is my hunch that the logic of this argument makes sense, but applies to very specific situations. In fact, the authors are only looking at primary and secondary diamonds in this study. I am not sure how applicable it is to other types of natural resources, especially illegal ones, because it assumes that the government is always able to control the revenue for its benefit only, and different types of resources are more easily controlled by the government than others.

Where economic theories differ from the sociological and geopolitical theories, however, is in their inclusion of group resources. Like this dissertation, some natural resource theorists argue that resources can increase a group's ability to fight the government (i.e. the group's capacity). That said, unlike natural resource arguments, this dissertation does not limit the type of resources a group uses to natural resources. By focusing on natural resources, which range from diamonds to oil depending on the study, these theorists miss other sources of funding for groups, including money collected from the citizens the group claims to represent (whether voluntary or forced), and money received from group members living abroad and foreign supporters (governments and other actors). Regardless of how resources are defined, these economically-focused arguments are unable to explain this study's findings that there is no relationship between group capacity, including group resources, and the group's level of violence. Both this dissertation, and most natural resource theories, predict a positive, linear relationship between group resources and group level of violence (though for different reasons), while Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002) argue that there is a curvilinear relationship between the two.⁹⁰ Scarce resource theorists, on the other hand, argue that there is an inverse, linear relationship between resources and the level of violence used by the group.⁹¹ The evidence from the third congruence test does not support either of these expectations.

⁹⁰ As mentioned in chapter 1, some natural resource theorists argue that an increase in resource leads to an increase in group leaders' greed, which leads to a higher level of violence because the benefit of winning is increasing. Others argue that resources facilitate the use of violence by making it possible to purchase weapons and pay group members, which along with other motivating factors, causes group leaders to use a higher level of violence. See Le Billon (2001); Ross (2004); Humphreys (2005); Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore (2005).

⁹¹ Scarce resource argument look at a country's resources, usually measured as gross domestic product per capita. See Caselli and Coleman (2002) and Regan and Norton (2003).

Though future studies might include different indicators of group capacity, the operationalization of group resources, if used, will probably not change much because its operationalization in this dissertation was defined to include anything that could be considered a source of revenue and/or weapons. If resources were not correlated with group action, even when they were defined this loosely, it stands to reason that there will be little difference in the outcome in future studies.

Sociological Theories

Similar to economic theories, theories based on social structure, namely a country's ethnic make-up, cannot explain this dissertation's findings on the important of government repression in explaining the level of violence employed by a group. Unlike economic theories of political violence, they also cannot explain the relationship between group capacity and the group's level of violence. Sociological theories can, however, speak to the relationship between group grievances and the level of violence chosen by group leaders. The type of grievances on which they focus, however, limits their ability to explain the relationship between group grievances and the level of violence a secessionist group employs. Theories that use a country's level of ethnic fractionalization to explain political violence often focus on "ancient hatreds" among these ethnic groups as their causal mechanism. Though this might be one type of group grievance, it is far from the only type that can and does influence group actions. In fact, it was not cited as one of the reasons for the start of the MFDC's movement, or for the

changes in the level of violence employed in any of the interviews I conducted, nor in any of the secondary literature used to construct the chronology and build the dataset. To be sure, there is animosity between the MFDC and the Wolof majority in Sénégal, but it did not surface until after independence in 1960.⁹² This provides evidence to support Toft's argument that most secessionist violence, when based on ethnicity, is caused by enmity that goes back decades at most, which cannot be considered "ancient" (Toft, 2003: 7).

Society-based theories that argue ethnic dominance influences group actions do a somewhat better job of explaining the relationship between group grievances and level of violence because they explore different types of grievances beyond "ancient hatreds." Some theorists actually see group grievances, including unequal distribution of wealth and political power, as the intervening variable between ethnic dominance and group level of violence (Sorli, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2002, 2004). Specifically, they hold that a dominant group's unfair allocation of economic, political, and social resources in favor of members of its own ethnic group, lead to grievances among members of smaller ethnic groups, which, in turn, influences groups' decisions to use violence. As explained previously, this argument does help explain why secessionist groups, in general, decide to secede, and why, more specifically, the MFDC decided to secede. Also as mentioned above, however, the fact that the antecedent variable—a country's ethnic make-up—changes rarely, if ever, these theories are unable to explain changes in group grievances, which also makes them unable to explain changes in the level of

⁹² USAID, 2001; Evans, 2003; Interviews; informal conversations.

violence employed by a group.⁹³ Another shortcoming of these theories is that, while they do consider different types of group grievances, they still do not take other factors, like government repression and group capacity, into account. For these reasons, theories of ethnic fractionalization and ethnic dominance are unable to explain the relationship between group grievances and group actions.

Because these sociological theories do not consider the level of government repression as a factor that can explain the level of violence used by the group, they cannot explain the findings of the second congruence test. As discussed, shifts to none/low or high levels of government repression are correlated with increases or decreases in the level of violence used by the group. For this reason, we can reject the null hypothesis that changes in the level of government repression have no effect on the level of violence used by the group. These theories were correct, however, in their prediction that there is no relationship between group capacity and the group's level of violence. Because they do not consider the group's capacity as an explanatory factor, they predict the null hypothesis that it has no effect on group action, which is an accurate prediction based on the results of the third congruence test.

⁹³This dissertation does not make assumptions about the factors that cause changes in the independent variables, except to say that they, like the independent variables themselves, must be dynamic (i.e. they must change over time). Though it is not the purpose of this dissertation to explain the antecedent variables that explain changes in the three independent variables, the purpose of this criticism is to demonstrate that when a theory relies on static variables in any phase, antecedent or intervening, it is virtually impossible to explain an outcome that involves change over time.

Geopolitical Theories

Toft's theory of territorial indivisibility (TI), like sociological theories of political violence and secession, argues that there is a relationship between group grievances and group action. On the other hand, like economic theorists, she argues that there is a relationship between group capacity and group action. Like both of the other types of political violence and secessionist theories, however, TI does not consider a relationship between the level of government repression and group action. Regarding group grievances, TI focuses on one type: lost autonomy. Lost autonomy of a homeland, which was one of the major grievances cited in every MFDC interview, is as Toft (2003: 19-20) argues, one of the most cited reasons for the onset of secession by the vast majority of secessionist groups. In order for the findings from the congruence tests to support TI's hypothesized relationship between group grievances and group action, we should have seen that lost autonomy was the only grievance mentioned by group leaders (since it is the only grievance she considers), and that lost autonomy is the only grievance correlated with group action. This was not the case, since in the interviews and secondary sources, leaders cited several other grievances, like unequal distribution of wealth, lack of development in the Casamance, lack of political freedom for Casamançais, etc. Also, changes in these other types of grievances were correlated with changes in the level of violence used by the group, which is evidence against the null hypothesis that changes in grievances (other than lost autonomy) have no impact on the level of group violence.

Though TI does not speak directly to the relationship between the level of government repression and the level of violence used by the group, the logic of the theory might be used to explain H3- an increase in the level of government repression will lead to an increase in the level of violence used by the group. Toft argues that groups choose to secede because they see their homeland as indivisible and integral to the survival of the group (Ibid.). It stands to reason, then, that the higher the level of repression the government uses against the group in its attempt to secure the territory in question, the higher the level of violence the group will use to achieve its goal of secession. Therefore, TI might be able to explain the positive, linear relationship between the level of government repression and group action, which was not the outcome expected by H3 of this dissertation.

Like this dissertation, Toft also looks at group capacity, which she operationalizes as group settlement-patterns, so she incorporates two of the three independent variables of this study: group grievances and group capacity. Unfortunately, the same criticisms mentioned in chapter 1 still apply: TI's use of static variables like settlement-patterns and lost autonomy make it difficult, if not impossible, to explain change over time. If settlement-patterns can explain the level of violence use by the group, we should see changes in the former leading to changes in the latter. Because there is no change in settlement-patterns over time in the Casamance, there should have been no change in the group's level of violence over the life of the movement. Of course, this is not the case, as the level of violence changed 94 times between January of 1982 and February 2007. For

this reason, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that changes in group capacity, whether operationalized as settlement-patterns, or as group resources and group cohesion, lead to changes in the level of violence chosen by group leaders.

CONCLUSION

The findings from the congruence tests establish that increases in group grievances and increases in the level of government repression to high are each sufficient conditions for increases in the group's level of violence. Also, when two or three of the independent variables- group grievances, government repression, and group capacity- are simultaneously moving in the direction predicted to lead to an increase in the group's level of violence, the group is more likely to increase its violence, than when only one of the independent variables changes. Regarding decreases in the level of violence used by the group, the evidence establishes that a decrease in the level of government repression to none/low is a sufficient explanation factor. On the other hand, the congruence test findings show that a decrease in the group's level of violence cannot be explained by a decrease in group grievances, and that an increase in the group's level of violence cannot be explained by a shift in government repression to intermediate. In addition, the evidence supports the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between changes in group capacity, as operationalized and measured in this dissertation, and increases or decreases in the level of violence used by the group.

These congruence test findings are able to identify associations, or lack of association, between the independent variables and the dependent variable. While these associations tell an important part of the story about why secessionist group leaders choose to increase or decrease the level of violence their groups employ, they are not able to tell us whether and how these relationships influence their decisions. In other words, without knowing the sequences of events within these relationships (e.g. whether group grievances increased before or after the group's level of violence increased), it is impossible to identify whether these are causal relationships or simple associations.

For this reason, the following three chapters are causal process analyses of three key moments in the life of the MFDC's secessionist movement, and these analyses explore, in greater detail than the congruence tests, the individual events leading up to major changes in the group's level of violence. These in-depth analyses will lay out the sequences of events, identify interaction between the independent variables, and discover previously overlooked explanatory factors, in order to rule out endogeneity (e.g. changes in the group's level of violence causing changes in group grievances, level of government repression, and/or group's capacity), better explain the relationships among the independent variables, and identify the impact of omitted independent variables on the dependent variable.

CHAPTER 4

1991 CEASEFIRE BETWEEN THE MFDC AND SÉNÉGAL

Though the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) was created as a Casamançais, pro-independence political party in 1947, and became part of the larger Sénégalaise, pro-independence party, *Partie Démocratique Socialiste*, the group was revived in 1982 by Abbé Augustine Senghor Diamacoune. The new MFDC was a secessionist group working toward the independence of the Casamance from Sénégal. The group's first official action was to organize a nonviolent demonstration in December 1982 urging the Sénégalaise government to revisit the issue of Casamançais independence, which the group argued was promised by the country's first president, Léopold Senghor, in 1960, in exchange for the region's agreement to be part of Sénégal for 20 years. When this demonstration and the march to mark its one-year anniversary were both met with violent repression, the MFDC created an armed wing, led by Sidy Badji, a veteran of both the French and Sénégalaise armies (The Casamance Conflict, 1999; Evans, 2004).

After the MFDC's decision to create an armed wing in December 1983, the group was relatively quiet until 1990. On April 20, 1990, the MFDC attacked Sénégal's border station at Seleti, Casamance's main border crossing into the Gambia, killing two customs officials (Ibid.) As the group's first act of violence against the government, the Seleti attack marked the beginning of a new phase in the MFDC's secessionist movement: violent conflict with the Sénégalaise government. One year later,

however, Badji made the decision to decrease the MFDC's level of violence to none when he signed the group's first ceasefire agreement. Why would a secessionist group leader decide to decrease the level of violence so drastically only one year after deciding to carry out the group's first violent attack?

The findings from the large-n congruence test in the last chapter provided important evidence on the causal effect of the independent variables of concern in this dissertation. Both this chapter and the next, however, are in-depth causal process analyses of two critical decisions made by MFDC leaders: the decision to sign the first agreement with the Sénégalaise government (a ceasefire) in May 1991 and the decision to sign the last agreement with the government (a peace agreement) in December 2004.⁹⁴ I used the findings from the congruence test to guide my choice of episodes for the causal process analyses, and I chose these two important decisions because they each represent an important moment in the life of the MFDC's secessionist movement. The signing of these agreements marked the first and last time the group entered into an agreement with the government. There were several agreements signed between both actors, but the 1991 ceasefire and the 2004 peace agreement each resulted in a dramatic decrease in the MFDC's level of violence, and a major shift in the direction of the movement.

⁹⁴ I recognize the limitation of this case selection is that there is not variation on the dependent variable because both episodes involve a decrease in the level of violence used by the MFDC. For this reason, the causal inferences drawn from the process analyses will only speak to the factors that lead to group leaders' decisions to decrease the level of violence. The findings from the congruence test, however, are still able to speak to the causal effect between the independent variables and increases in group leaders' levels of violence.

In this chapter, the evidence from the analysis of the process leading up to Badji's decision highlights the importance of a decrease in the government's level of repression and a split within the MFDC (caused by a change in Badji's goals) as factors that led to Badji's decision to decrease the MFDC's level of violence. The identification of a decrease in the government's level of repression as an explanatory factor is important because it supports the congruence test finding that a decrease in repression will lead to a decrease in the group's level of violence. The finding on the importance of the split within the MFDC as a factor that led to Badji's decision to decrease the group's level of violence, however, contradicts the finding from the congruence test that there is no relationship between group capacity and the level of violence a group uses.

This chapter has four sections. The first section describes the events leading up to the May 31, 1991 ceasefire, including changes in the group's grievances, the level of government repression, the group's capacity, and/or any other events cited in the primary or secondary sources as potential explanatory factors. It also goes on to describe the signing of the ceasefire itself. The second section provides an analysis of the ability of the hypotheses of this dissertation to explain the decrease in the group's level of violence, and the third section provides a similar analysis of the relevant hypotheses of existing economic, sociological, and geopolitical explanations of political violence and secession. The final section will discuss the theoretical, empirical, and policy implications of the findings and the conclusion will summarize the findings and implications, as well as identify directions for future research.

DESCRIPTION OF THE MAY 1991 CEASEFIRE

Events Leading up to the Ceasefire

Following the MFDC's shift to violence, after its attack at Seleti in April 1990, there were several important changes that impacted the group, and influenced its decision to decrease its use of violence in 1991. The first change came in May 1990, just one month after the group's attack, when the government created a new leadership position: military governor of the Ziguinchor region.⁹⁵ This increase in the level of government repression, in the form of increasing militarization of the region, was followed by the government's escalating use of violence. Humphreys and Mohamed (2005) describe the situation:

The Sénégalaise army responded [to the MFDC's attack at Seleti] with crop destruction, internment, summary executions, and, in some cases, the clearance of entire villages. In May 1990, the intensity of the fighting was such that the Sénégalaise army, pursuing rebels into Bissau, nearly sparked an interstate war, with direct engagement of Sénégalaise and Bissau troops on 19-21 May (Humphreys and Mohamed, 2005: 251-252).

Although the Sénégalaise government was able to avoid the further escalation of tensions between the two countries, it was unable to prevent such an escalation between its army and the MFDC. In the early part of May 1990, the MFDC followed up their attack at

⁹⁵ The Casamance Conflict, 1999; Evans, 2004. Although this dissertation refers to the region in question as the Casamance, which is the region's historical name, in 1984 the Sénégalaise government split the Casamance into two regions, Ziguinchor and Kolda, named for their principle cities. For a detailed discussion of Sénégal's political motivation for changing the region's name, see Evans, 2003: 49. This dissertation, like the work of other researchers, refers to the region as the Casamance because this is the name used by the people of the region.

Seleti with an attack on a religious ceremony in Ziguinchor. This attack, which killed two civilians and injured dozens more, was the first of many more to come. In fact, the Sénégalaise government accused the MFDC committing several attacks in 1990 that resulted in the death of approximately 25 people. This claim is supported by the fact that there is an observation for the Casamance conflict in 1990 in the *Armed Conflict* dataset, which uses 25 battle-deaths per year as its threshold for inclusion (Noble, 1991; *Armed Conflict v4*, 2009).

The situation in the Casamance grew increasingly violent as a result of these attacks, as well as the rising level of government repression. According to a 1990 Amnesty International report, the Sénégalaise government carried out ““torture and the use of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment on detainees suspected of being rebels or of providing food or armaments and other supplies to them.””⁹⁶ The report goes on to accuse the government of over 300 arrests in 1990 alone, and the death of 11 people, who all died after being tortured in government custody (Noble, 1991).

By mid-late 1990, both the MFDC’s level of violence and the government’s level of repression were high. In late 1990, however, the situation changed when the government suddenly decided to decrease its level of repression against the MFDC and Casamançais civilians. Humphreys and Mohamed (2005) argue that this decision was made for two reasons: the Amnesty International report discussed above and the sagging tourist industry in the Casamance. Tourism in the Casamance is centered in Ziguinchor

⁹⁶ Noble, 1991 (accessed at <http://www.nytimes.com>): 1. For additional information, see “Sénégal: information sur l’assassinat de Jean-Marie Sagna à Casamance,” *Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada*, September 1, 1997, accessed at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6acff2c.html>.

and Cap Skiring, a beach town in southwestern Casamance, as tourist favorites. The escalation of hostilities forced the US State Department to issue a warning against travel in the region, which, along with increasing property destruction in tourist areas, began affecting the country's revenue from tourism in the Casamance (Noble, 1991).

The declining tourism revenue and the damage done to Sénégal's reputation in the international community by the Amnesty International report likely influenced the government's decision to decrease its level of repression.⁹⁷ In late 1990, the government invited the MFDC to peace talks in the hopes of negotiating a truce, and by March 1991, both groups had signed their first truce since the outbreak of violence a year earlier. The government further decreased its level of repression with the release of approximately 350 MFDC leaders (including Abbé Diamacoune who had been arrested in mid-1990) and members, and Casamançais civilians in the beginning of May ("The Casamance Conflict", 1999; Fall, 2000). These actions marked a dramatic turnaround in the government's level of repression from high in mid-1990 to low/none by May 1991.

While these events were taking place outside of the MFDC, there were other forces at work within the group. Following the group's attack at Seleti, there was a split between Sidy Badji, leader of the MFDC's armed wing, and Abbé Diamacoune, the founder and leader of the group as a whole. Neither interviewees nor secondary sources can agree on when the split occurred, with dates ranging between 1991 and August

⁹⁷ Many empirical studies of the causes of repression find that level of economic development and cultural norms impact governments' decisions to repress. In this case, falling tourism revenue was hurting Sénégal's economic development and Amnesty International's report showed an international cultural norm that looks negatively at violence against civilians. For a detailed discussion and empirical test of the causes of state repression, see Davenport, 1995; Toft, 2003.

1992.⁹⁸ I argue, however, that the split occurred in late 1990 or early 1991. My argument is based on a contentious meeting between Abbé Diamacoune and Badji that took place sometime after the MFDC's April 20 attack at Seleti.⁹⁹ In fact, the meeting likely occurred in June. I make this assumption because the group issued a declaration of independence in May, following their first attack (Posthumus, 2000). Both the attack, which was carried out by Badji's armed wing, and the declaration indicate that the MFDC was still likely functioning as a unified group, which means the meeting had probably not yet occurred. On the other hand, the meeting must have occurred before mid-July because there was an article reporting Abbé Diamacoune's arrest published on July 15 in the *Africa Research Bulletin*, and he was in prison until May 1991, which would have made it impossible for the two leaders to meet during this time.

This meeting was likely called because Badji and other combatants began losing faith in the motives of Abbé Diamacoune. In fact, a report by the Organization of African Unity explains:

[C]ertain former warriors, such as Sidy Badji, commander of the North Front of the MFDC,...realized that the revelations of Father Diamacoune relating to the calling of Casamance to independence are without foundation ("10th Annual Activity Report", 1997).

Sources cite different possible reasons for this seed of doubt, including ethnic and cultural differences between Badji and Abbé Diamacoune (these differences will be discussed in detail below) (*MAR Chronology*; Forrest, 2004). The reason the meeting

⁹⁸ "The Casamance Conflict," 1999; Fall, 2000; Evans, 2004; Interview with NGO staff member in Ziguinchor, February 26, 2008.

⁹⁹ Interview with NGO staff member in Ziguinchor, February 26, 2008.

was called notwithstanding, the meeting took place between these leaders of the military and political wings of the movement. In this meeting, both parties discussed the alleged promise that former President Senghor made to Emile Badiane, the MFDC's leader in 1960. Abbé Diamacoune claimed that Badiane possessed the documents proving the validity and details of Senghor's promise, and that when Badiane died in 1972, Abbé Diamacoune rushed to collect these documents from his home before the Sénégalaise government could find and destroy them.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, Abbé Diamacoune was the only living member of the MFDC to have ever these documents. Because of his doubts about the validity of the promise, Badji requested to see the documents, but Abbé Diamacoune refused. It was at this point that Badji accused him of lying about the promise and sparking the bloody, yet unnecessary conflict.¹⁰¹ Though the exact date and outcome of this meeting are unknown, the meeting is likely one of the factors that led to Badji's decision to split from Abbé Diamacoune.

There was another consequence of Badji's loss of faith discussed above: Badji's goal for the Casamance shifted from independence from Sénégal to autonomy within Sénégal. This shift in goals seems like the next logical step for a leader who no longer believes in his group's founder or its cause. Once Badji stopped believing that Senghor

¹⁰⁰ There is a rumor amongst many Casamançais that Emile Badiane was poisoned by the government in its effort to obtain and destroy these documents in order to eliminate all evidence of the promise. Interview with an elder in the MFDC in Ziguinchor, February 21, 2008; Interview with two military leaders of Salif Sadio's faction on the outskirts of Ziguinchor, February 11, 2008; Interview with NGO staff member in Ziguinchor, February 26, 2008.

¹⁰¹ The story of the meeting was told in an interview with an NGO staff member in Ziguinchor, February 26, 2008. Though no other sources discuss this meeting, two other interviewees referenced the documents in question, and explained, like the NGO staff member, that Abbé Diamacoune retrieved these documents from the home of Emile Badiane after his death, Interview with two military leaders of Salif Sadio's faction on the outskirts of Ziguinchor, February 11, 2008.

promised the Casamance independence, it makes sense that his goal would shift away from independence. Forrest (2004) explains this change in goals:

[T]he MFDC has recently [speaking about the period before the group's split in early 1991] been weakened by the emergence of serious internal divisions. One set of divisions is based on differences in goals: part of the MFDC leadership demands full 'national independence' for the Casamance, while other leaders aim for greater autonomy within the Sénégalaise nation-state but with more equitable treatment of Casamance by the central state and a more generous distribution of state resources (Forrest, 2004: 94).

Badji's loss of faith in the MFDC's cause, then, is another factor that likely led to both his split from Abbé Diamacoune and his change in goals.¹⁰² Therefore, when the Sénégalaise government invited the MFDC to talks, Badji accepted the invitation, and in March 1991, signed a truce with the government.

Before moving on to the discussion of the signing of the ceasefire, it is important to note that there is the possibility that Badji's decision to split the MFDC was influenced by the government's decrease in the level of repression. As noted above, it is impossible to pinpoint the exact moment the split occurred, since different accounts provide different timelines. For this reason, even though I argue the opposite based on the timeline I laid out above, it is possible that the decrease in the level of government repression occurred before his decision to split. If this is the case, this is an example of collinearity (i.e. the value of one independent variable impacted that of another). Fortunately in qualitative research, this does not pose the same methodological problems as it does in

¹⁰² Because the exact timing of Badji's decisions to split from Abbé Diamacoune and change his goals are unknown, it is possible that the split influenced the goal change, or vice versa. This possibility is reflected in Figure 4.1, which shows the causal mechanism leading to the ceasefire.

quantitative research, but it is still important to consider this possibility when making causal inferences about the impact of these independent variables in order to accurately capture the factors that influenced the dependent variable.


MFDC's First Ceasefire in May 1991

Following the March 29 truce, Badji and the Sénégalaise government continued peace talks with the goal of signing a ceasefire, and later a peace accord. On May 31, 1991, Sidy Badji, representing the MFDC, signed a ceasefire with the Sénégalaise government. Though the agreement did not have the support of the entire MFDC, it is considered the group's first attempt at peace with the government. Along with Badji, the agreement was signed by Sénégal's defense minister, Médoune Fall, who represented the government. The ceasefire, often referred to as the Bissau Accord, was signed in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau's capital city, and witnessed by two Bissau-Guinean guarantors. The text of the agreement requires that both the MFDC and the Sénégalaise government commit to the following conditions:

- (1) The cessation of all armed activity;
- (2) The return of all armed forces and forces of intervention to their barracks, and
- (3) The free circulation of individuals and goods (Humphreys and Mohamed, 2003:12).

Along with these conditions, it was agreed that both sides would continue talks to generate a more comprehensive peace agreement, and the dialogue would begin within

The National Committee on the Management of Peace in Casamance, which President Diouf created in July of 1991 (APRAN, 2001). This dialogue was necessary because, even though the leader of the military wing decided to stop using violence, there were still elements within the MFDC, including the entire political wing, that did not agree with nor abide by the terms of the ceasefire. The major sticking point for the dissenters was that the ceasefire did not make mention of Casamançais independence, the goal for which the group was fighting. Though Badji continued to express his strong desire for independence, he and his followers continued to abide by the ceasefire that he signed. What then, prompted this decision to decrease the level of violence the MFDC used by signing the ceasefire?



ANALYSIS OF THE CEASEFIRE

In this episode, three relatively simultaneous events led to Badji's decision to decrease the MFDC's level of violence: the government's invitation to negotiate a truce, the split between Badji and Abbé Diamacoune, and Badji's shift in goals from independence to autonomy. Regarding the dissertation's hypotheses, this ceasefire allows us to explore the relationship between the level of government repression and the level of group violence, as well as that between the group's cohesion and the level of group violence, since these are the variables that changed prior to the ceasefire. Though the split was an important factor, the government's invitation (i.e. its decrease in the level of repression) was the change that led to his decision to sign the truce and ceasefire, thus decreasing the MFDC's level of violence.

In fact, it is likely that the split alone would not have led to the same decision for a variety of possible reasons, including the possibility that Badji's faction would have continued using violence to defend itself against the government's high level of repression, or the possibility that he may have chosen to continue using violence because he believed it was the best strategy to achieve autonomy.¹⁰³ The decrease in the level of government repression, on the other hand, is expected, based on relative deprivation

¹⁰³ In my interview with the NGO staff member (2/26/2008), he explained that even after he came to believe that Senghor's promise never existed, he told Abbé Diamacoune that the Casamance could never go back to the way it was before the movement began because of the atrocities committed by the Sénégalaise army. This statement supports the assumption that the split alone would not have been a sufficient reason for Badji to decrease the level of violence if faced with high government repression.

theory and the congruence test results, to be a sufficient factor in Badji's decision to decrease his level of violence.

Level of Government Repression and Level of Group Violence

The expected relationship between low/no government repression and the group's level of violence, is based on the assumption that at these levels of government repression, the group is able to decrease its level of violence because legal forms of collective action, which are more difficult to carry out when the government is more repressive, are now available to the group. If this assumption is correct, we should see the group switching to new, nonviolent, legal forms of collective action around the same time that it decreased its use of violence. This would show that, indeed, the group is beginning to use other forms of collective action in the place of violence in its quest for independence.

In late 1990, the government initiated talks with the MFDC, which was the government's first decrease in repression since the MFDC's attack at Seleti in April 1990. As the government began these talks, the MFDC began to decrease the level of violence it used. The group's agreement to meet with the government was a major decrease in the level of violence from its earlier campaign of violence throughout the year. The government's next decrease in repression came in early May of 1991, with the release of 350 prisoners, including the political leadership of the MFDC. This was the last major decrease in the government's level of repression before the signing of the

ceasefire. After Badji signed the ceasefire, the military branch of the movement decreased its level of violence to none.¹⁰⁴

One month after signing the ceasefire, Badji joined The National Committee on the Management of Peace in Casamance, created by President Diouf. The goal of this committee was to work on the terms of a more comprehensive peace agreement, including discussion of the details of region's autonomy. This committee, which consisted of seven government representatives, and seven MFDC representatives, was the MFDC's first nonviolent action after the signing of the ceasefire, which supports the assumption that the decrease in repression led to a decrease in group violence because of the opportunity for other forms of action.

The sequence of events leading up to and including the ceasefire agreement between the MFDC and the S n galese government supports H3's claim that if there is a decrease in the level of government repression to none/low, there will be a decrease in the level of violence the group uses. This finding is in line with that of the congruence test, which provided strong evidence that there is a positive, linear relationship between these two variables.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ It is important to note that all members of the armed wing stopped using violence at this time. A faction of this wing, however, broke away from Badji's leadership and began using violence again at the end of 1991. Evans (2004) also notes that though Badji signed the ceasefire, he did not officially relinquish his weapons, and that until the time of his death in 2003, Badji's Front Nord maintained (government sanctioned) control over parts of northern Casamance.

¹⁰⁵ Of course, H2 and H4 spoke to the theory's expectation that there would be a curvilinear relationship between these variables. The findings from the congruence test, however, show that there is a positive, linear relationship between the two (i.e. an increase in government repression leads to an increase in group violence, and vice versa). That said, the theory did expect that a decrease in government repression would lead to a decrease in group violence, which is what both the congruence test and process analysis results support.

Before moving on to the discussion of the relationship between group capacity and the MFDC's decision to sign the ceasefire, it is important to address the possibility of a spurious relationship between the group level of violence and the level of government repression. In the aftermath of the MFDC's attack at Seleti, the S n galese government increased its level of repression with the appointment of a military governor of the Casamance, a dramatic increase in the military presence in the region, and the arrest and torture of Casaman ais. In this situation, it seems very likely that the group's increase in the level of violence it used led to an increase in the government's level of repression, though a closer examination of this episode with government repression as the dependent variable would be necessary to draw any conclusions. In the face of the government's increasing level of repression, the group continued to use a high level of violence, which supports the positive, linear relationship between government repression and group violence found in the congruence test results.

The next change came when the government decided to initiate talks with the MFDC in late 1990, which was a large decrease in its level of repression. As stated earlier in the chapter, an Amnesty International report and the sagging profits from the tourist industry mostly likely prompted this decision, since there were no other major changes before the government's decision to invite the group to talks. Based on this assessment, though the MFDC's level of violence may have influenced the government's level of repression earlier in the year, the government's decision to decrease the level of

repression at the end of the year was not directly caused by the group's level of violence.¹⁰⁶

Group Capacity and Level of Group Violence

Along with the decrease in the level of repression the government used against the group, there was another major change that occurred before the MFDC and the government signed the May 1991 ceasefire: the first split within the MFDC. Regarding this split, which is a decrease in group cohesion, resource mobilization literature argues that a decrease in cohesion, decreases group capacity, which, in turn, will lead to a decrease in the level of violence the group uses. This expectation comes from the assumption that a group that is cohesive, and whose members are working well together, has the ability to carry out collective action, including violence. The inverse is also true, when group members are not working well together, it becomes more difficult to take any type of action. If this assumption is valid, we should see public, intra-group arguing, at the least, or group fractionalization, prior to the group's decrease in the level of violence it uses.

The split in the MFDC between Abbé Diamacoune and his leader of the military wing, Sidy Badji, qualifies as group fractionalization, which decreased the group's ability to use violence. The fact that the split occurred decreased the group's cohesion, but the parties between which the split occurred is equally significant. When Badji split from

¹⁰⁶ It is likely, however, that past values of both group violence and government repression influenced the tourist industry, which then influenced the government's decision regarding the level of repression to use.

Abbé's political wing, he took the entire military wing with him. Though a subsequent split occurred within the military wing between moderate followers of Badji and hard-line followers of Abbé Diamacoune in late 1991, at the time of the original split in early 1991, there effectively was no military branch of the MFDC. With Badji and his follower's decision to lay down arms, there was no one left to continue the armed struggle of the MFDC. Therefore, this split not only decreased the group's cohesion (i.e. the group's ability to work well together), it also directly led to a decrease in the group's ability to use violence (i.e. capacity), which made this split a sufficient cause of the group's decrease in the level of violence.

Based on the analysis of this process, then, the sequence of these events supports the prediction of H5 that a decrease in group capacity will lead to a decrease in the group's level of violence. As stated above, however, the group split is neither necessary nor sufficient in this episode. Though it is possible that Badji would have decided to decrease his level of violence, after the group split, even if the government's level of repression remained the same or increased, it is not likely because if the split alone could have caused Badji's decision to decrease the group's level of violence, we should have seen him call for peace and reach out to the government, but he did not. Instead, it was after the government reached out to him that he decided to decrease the group's level of violence, even though he had already split (or begun the split) from Abbé Diamacoune.

Even though the split was not a necessary or sufficient cause of Badji's decision to decrease the MFDC's level of violence, the split still played an important role. It is

likely that Badji's split from Abbé Diamacoune, and change in goals, made him more receptive to the government's request for peace talks. This willingness on Badji's part to meet with the government, which facilitated the peace talks and ceasefire, supports H6's claim and the congruence test finding that when two or more independent variables are moving in the direction expected to cause a decrease in the group's level of violence, the group is more likely to decrease the level of violence than when only one variable is moving in this direction.

The finding that group cohesion, in the form of splits, played any role in Badji's decision, however, is in contrast to that of the congruence test of H5, which found that there is no relationship between group capacity and the level of group violence. There are several possible reasons for the contradictory findings about the relationship between group cohesion and group violence. First, unlike the congruence test, which provided a look at a few details of many observations, the in-depth examination of the causal process of this one observation allowed me to look at both indicators of group capacity separately. Studying the factors that influenced Badji's decision to sign the ceasefire led to the discovery of the importance of his split from the political wing of the MFDC as an explanatory factor. The congruence test did not capture the significance of this factor because it is not included in most of the existing theories on political violence and secession, so it was not a variable in any of the hypotheses they generated for this or other studies. Unlike the majority of existing theories, Gurr and Moore (1997) do discuss the concept of group cohesion, which they call group coherence, but they define group

cohesion as “a sense of common identity shared among group members” (1083). Though Gurr and Moore are also attempting to identify a concept that captures a group’s ability to use violence, they rely on common identity, whereas this dissertation uses fractionalization. Based on the findings from studying the MFDC’s first ceasefire, group fractionalization is important, which explains why upon a closer look at its relationship with group level of violence, the process analysis yielded different results from the congruence test.

Another possible reason the results of analyzing the process leading up to Badji’s decision to sign the ceasefire are different from those of the congruence test is that the timeframe within which the process unfolded took more than one month. Examining this one observation in greater detail meant that it was not necessary to be as rigid with the timeframe of the episode (i.e. causal process observation). As discussed in chapter 3, the observations for the congruence test consist of monthly measures of the variables, and the test of the hypotheses used a one-month lag of the independent variables to explain the group’s level of violence in the current month. Because the congruence test looks only at the current and previous month, then, it is impossible to know whether events from further in the past are impacting the group’s level of violence in the current month. This means that any changes that occurred two or more months before the change in the level of group violence would not be included in the hypothesis tests.

The split between the political and military wings of the MFDC, however, occurred in late 1990 or early 1991, before Badji signed the truce in March 1991.

Because the split occurred several months before, it would not have been correlated with the May 1991 decision to decrease the group's level of violence in the congruence test results. By analyzing the process leading up to the ceasefire, however, we are able to see the importance of the group's split, as well as the decrease in the government's level of repression, as factors that influenced Badji's decision to decrease the MFDC's level of violence.

The third possible reason that the congruence test results were different from those of this in-depth examination of the ceasefire is that more information was available on this split. Over the life of the movement, secondary sources provide little information on splits that occurred within the MFDC. In fact, after their coverage of this initial split, splits are not discussed again until the early 2000s, when violence breaks out between rival factions, even though there was at least one other major split during the 1990s. Information was more readily available for the split discussed in this chapter for two reasons. First, as the first major intra-group split, many secondary sources include at least a brief discussion of the event, especially because the split occurred between the political and military wings, and resulted in the signing of the first ceasefire. There was also more information on this split because I asked specific questions about it in the interviews. The additional data allowed me to better examine and understand the relationship between group fractionalization and group leaders' decisions regarding the level of violence.

CONTENDING EXPLANATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE

There were two major changes that occurred before Badji's decision to decrease the MFDC's level of violence: a drastic decrease in the level of government repression, and Badji's split from Abbé Diamacoune and the MFDC's political wing. Regarding the decrease in the government's level of repression, geopolitical explanations offer a possible explanation for why governments choose to use a particular level of violence. According to Toft (2003), governments violently repress groups because they fear setting a precedent of allowing groups to secede, which could spark other groups' secessionist movements. This argument is supported by Toft's examples of Russian and Georgian fears of allowing one region to secede because of the presence of other overtly secessionist regions. It cannot, however, explain Sénégal's actions because there are no other secessionist regions of the country, so fear of precedent-setting was not a factor in its decisions to increase or decrease the level of repression it used against the MFDC. This is a major shortcoming of the theory because it cannot adequately explain the actions of governments dealing with only one potentially secessionist region.

Toft's theory should, however, be able to explain the actions of the MFDC, since it is made up of a concentrated majority. According to Toft, groups that constitute a concentrated majority in a region are more likely to see the region as their homeland, and therefore are not willing to compromise for anything less than independence. This unwillingness to compromise means that the group will use violence when opposed by the government because it sees its territory as indivisible. The first part of the argument

holds true for Casamançais. As a concentrated majority in the region, Casamançais view the region as their homeland, and the territory as indivisible. As a result, the MFDC, made up of mostly Casamançais, is not willing to compromise for anything less than independence. The second part of the argument, however, cannot explain the group's decision to sign the ceasefire. The MFDC's unwillingness to settle for anything other than full independence did not preclude the military wing from signing the ceasefire and laying down its weapons, which contradicts Toft's argument that the group will use escalating levels of violence to achieve independence.

In addition, Toft assumes that a group's status as a concentrated majority means that the group will be cohesive in its fight for independence. As shown in the MFDC's first split, the group's status as a concentrated majority did not ensure the group's cohesion. Not only does the group's fractionalization show that group cohesion does not automatically come along with being a concentrated majority, but also this lack of cohesion can explain why some members of a group might sign a ceasefire, while other members of the group might continue fighting.

Regarding the possible reasons for the MFDC's lack of cohesion, and Badji's split specifically, several authors actually make sociological arguments. For example, Forrest (2004) argues that cultural and geographic differences led to the split that influenced Badji's decision to decrease the MFDC's level of violence. According to Forrest, Casamançais from the area known as Basse-Casamance (the area between the Casamance River and the Bissau-Guinean border) have a stronger indigenous (not necessarily ethnic)

identity, and fiercely resisted French colonialism. Casamançais from Haute-Casamance (the area between the Casamance River and the Gambian border), on the other hand, have a weaker indigenous identity, and were more accepting of French influence and culture during colonialism (Forrest, 2004: 94). Forrest explains that these cultural differences caused the split between Badji, who was from Haute-Casamance, and Abbé Diamacoune, from Basse-Casamance because Badji was more willing to negotiate with the government and change his goal than Abbé Diamacoune. He goes on to argue that, as a result of their influence on Badji's change in goals, these cultural and historical differences led to his decision to sign the ceasefire in May 1991.

Other secondary sources point to the importance of ethnic differences as the cause of the split between the military and political wings of the MFDC (*MAR Project Chronology*, 2007; 10th Annual Activity Report, 1997; de Jong, 1999). Though the MFDC and the Casamance are made up of a Diola majority, according to the *MAR* dataset, northern Casamance has a larger population of non-Diola residents than southern Casamance, which is overwhelming Diola. The MFDC reflects this trend in the larger Casamançais population, with the Front Sud made up primarily of Diolas, and the Front Nord made up of a mixture of Diola and non-Diola members. *MAR* maintains the following about the split between Badji's Front Nord and Abbé Diamacoune's Front Sud:

The main reason for the split was attributed to the Nord people's fear of losing their cultural [or ethnic] identity by being dominated by Diolas. Although Front Nord supporters shared the basic objective (greater political, cultural, and economic rights of the Casamance) with the Front

Sud, they feared that Diola predominance of the Front Sud could cause the loss of multi-cultural identity among the Casamançese people.¹⁰⁷

If this argument is accurate, then not only did this fear of the loss of identity lead to Badji's decision to split front Abbé Diamacoune, but by extension it influenced his decision to sign the ceasefire and decrease the level of violence the group used.

De Jong (1999) also looks at ethnic differences and their consequences, but he examines differences *within* the Diola ethnic group. He argues that the differences in colonial history and tolerance discussed by Forrest (2004) are actually not based on cultural differences, but the different Diola sub-groups. Members of the Diola-Casa sub-group, which is located mostly in Basse-Casamance, and of which Abbé Diamacoune is a part, have a shared identity based on a created history of resistance dating back to the beginning of French colonialism.¹⁰⁸ Diola-Flup (which most people, including Diolas, call Diola-Fogny), on the other hand, is more tolerant and open to compromise.¹⁰⁹ Badji, who comes from the Diola-Fogny sub-group, was willing and able to compromise. Along with these changes, however, de Jong discusses Abbé Diamacoune's focus on the history of Diola-Casa in his discussions of Casamançais history and the legitimacy of the

¹⁰⁷ MAR Project's Chronology, 2007: entry for August 1992.

¹⁰⁸ De Jong (1999) argues that this history is created around Aline Sitoé Diatta, a member of the Diola-Casa sub-group, who Abbé Diamacoune incorrectly labels a resistance heroine (12). I disagree with de Jong's assessment of Aline Sitoé's, and argue that she was in fact a resistance heroine. Also, Abbé was not responsible for labeling her as such because a film entitled "Emitai," by Ousmane Sembene, released in 1971, was based on the life of Aline Sitoé Diatta. The film, which detailed the actions of Diola Women, shed so much light on her movement that after its release, schools, stadiums, and businesses were named after Aline Sitoé. See Samba Gadjigo, 2004, "Ousmane Sembene and History on the Screen: A Look Back to the Future," in *Focus on African Films*, F. Pfaff, ed., Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

¹⁰⁹ I will refer to what de Jong calls Diola-Flup as Diola-Fogny. While living in Sénégal, and learning the Diola language and sub-groups of the Diola, Flup was never mentioned. After searching for information on Diola-Flup in various sources, the only thing I could find was a plant by this name.

MFDC's fight for independence, to the exclusion of other Diola sub-groups, which fostered resentment. De Jong argues it was this resentment, and not cultural or inter-ethnic differences, that caused the rift that led to Badji's decision to split, which influenced his decision to decrease the MFDC's level of violence by signing the May 1991 ceasefire.

Though some of these distinctions between groups made by scholars are accurate (e.g. the fact that Diola-Casa are mainly in southern Casamance, and Diola-Fogny are in northern Casamance), Foucher (2005) warns against the fallacy of oversimplification of the internal dynamics of the MFDC. He argues that social scientists' desire to fit explanations of the causes of conflict into pre-determined categories (i.e. parsimony) sometimes leads us to assume they fall into these categories. Ethnicity and religion are often-cited causes of conflict in Africa (rightly so), and Foucher correctly argues that researchers who have not spent much time on the ground in Sénégal make assumptions that the Casamance conflict falls into one or both of these categories of the causes of conflict. In reality, the existence and importance of religious differences (not discussed here) between the Casamance and the rest of Sénégal have been overestimated, while inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic differences exist within the MFDC, they do not seem to have played a role in the MFDC's lack of cohesion.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ During my discussions with Drs. Martin Evans and Vincent Foucher before beginning my field research, both researchers corrected my erroneous assumption (based on some secondary sources) that the Casamance was predominantly Christian, while the rest of Sénégal was overwhelmingly Muslim. Thanks to their explanations, and spending time in many different parts of the region, I can agree with their assessment that even with a pocket of Christians living in Ziguinchor, a large majority of Casamançais are Muslim. For a detailed discussion of other erroneous assumptions about the MFDC, see Vincent Foucher,

In addition, even if these ethnic and religious cleavages existed, they still would not be able to explain the 1990/1991 split. Assuming that ethnicity and religion do not change much over time, and at the very least assuming that they did not change much between the group's first attack in 1990 and the split, how did the group form and carry out violent attacks if these cleavages were so strong and divisive? Based on the fact that these ethnicity and religion-based explanations cannot answer this question, and the fact that neither ethnicity nor religion seem to have been an important factor in MFDC cohesion, they cannot adequately explain the split between Badji and Abbé Diamacoune, so they fall short of being able to explain Badji's decision to sign the ceasefire and give up violence.

IMPLICATIONS

There are several important theoretical implications of the findings from the in-depth analysis of the events leading up to the ceasefire between the MFDC and the Sénégalaise government. First, regarding the relationship between group cohesion and the group's level of violence, group fractionalization should be added as an explanatory variable to future hypotheses that predict changes in the group's level of violence. Though intra-group splits change the group's ability to use violence, which indirectly impacts leaders'

decisions about the level of violence to use, splits might also have a direct impact on group leaders' decisions without necessarily affecting group capacity.

For example, once a group is already split, one faction's decision to cooperate with the government might influence another faction's leaders to increase the level of violence in retaliation against the cooperating faction and/or the government, or the leader might increase the level of violence to make the statement that they are not willing to cooperate. The leader of the uncooperative faction might also choose to increase the level of violence it uses to show the government that the cooperating group does not control its faction or the larger group. In this instance, the larger group's cohesion decreases because there is an increase in disagreements among factions, but this decrease in cohesion does not cause a decrease in group capacity. In other words, there is no change in the group's ability to use collective action, and specifically in its ability to use violence, because there is no change in the make-up of the group (no loss of members, splitting of resources, etc.). In addition, because the group's capacity does not decrease, the decrease in cohesion does not lead to a decrease in the group's level of violence. In fact, the group actually increases its level of violence in this example, which might explain why the new faction of the military wing increased its level of violence in late 1991 following the signing the ceasefire in May.

Another theoretical implication of these findings is that future research on political violence and secession must reconsider examining violent groups as unitary actors. Many other groups, including the MFDC, split into different factions at various

points in the life of the movement. Sometimes new factions form separate groups altogether, like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which was created after a split from the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines. Whether groups split into different groups, or simply into different factions within the same group, it is often the case that the group no longer acts as a unitary actor after the split. Often groups split into moderate and hard-line factions, whether this distinction is made based on the different tactics of the factions (nonviolent vs. violent), the different goals of the factions (autonomy vs. independence), or both. Once the larger group splits, then, it becomes necessary to examine the actions of each faction individually because there is no longer only one unitary actor that makes decisions and acts on behalf of the group. In order to explain the causes and consequences of the actions of the group as a whole, researchers must begin studying the actions of the different factions within the group.

An additional theoretical implication of the findings of this analysis is that one-month lags of the independent variables is not enough to explain changes in the dependent variable, group level of violence. This implication highlights the need for looking at changes in the independent variables further in the past than one month. The study of the ceasefire does, however, show that annual measures might be too long a period of time between variables because it took roughly six months for the decrease in the government's level of repression, and the decrease in the group's cohesion, to lead to Badji's decision to sign the ceasefire. This suggests that monthly measures are useful because annual measures miss important variation within the year, but that it is necessary

to increase the expected time it takes for a change in the independent variables to lead to a change in the dependent variable. This longer expected timeframe would mean using longer lags in large-n hypothesis tests, and this might lead to more accurate findings about the relationship between these variables. More importantly, this evidence will help refine future hypotheses on the relationship between group capacity and group violence because it provides clearer expectations about the length of time it takes for changes in group capacity to influence group leaders' decisions about the level of violence to use. The evidence from those tests, in turn, will help refine existing theories of secession and political violence, which do not provide clear expectations on the timeframe of these causal relationships.

The final theoretical implication refers back to the discussion of the possibility that the decrease in the government's level of repression influenced Badji's decision to split from the political wing of the MFDC. If the sequence of events, which is somewhat ambiguous, had shown Badji's decision to split coming after the government decreased its level of repression, the relationship between the level of government repression and level of group violence would be both direct and indirect. Directly, the impact of government repression would be as discussed in the congruence test: positive and linear. The process leading up to Badji's decision to decrease the group's level of violence, however, would also include an indirect relationship with the level of group violence. In this indirect relationship, the level of government repression would have an inverse relationship with group fractionalization, since the decrease in the level of government

repression would have led to an increase in fractionalization. In turn, this group fractionalization would have an inverse relationship with group level of violence, since the increase in fractionalization would have led to the decision to decrease the group's level of violence. Though all of this is possible, I still argue that the level of government repression did not cause the MFDC's split because the rift had already formed after the meeting between Badji and Abbé Diamacoune earlier in the year.

Regarding empirical implications, one lesson from the findings of the analysis of the causal process between group cohesion and group level of violence is that group leaders take these splits, and the actions of other factions, into consideration when making decisions about the level of violence to use. Group fractionalization is an often-occurring phenomenon in the real world of violent groups, and several of this study's interviewees cited it as a problem, and as something that guides their decisions about the future actions of their factions. In fact, when asked if there was anything he would like to add to the interview, one interviewee told me that I should have asked about Salif Sadio, the current leader of the most active military faction, and his ambitions to be the military commander and leader of the MFDC as a whole. He stated that these ambitions were the driving force behind Sadio's decisions, and that all other factions of the MFDC oppose his actions.¹¹¹

The leaders of different factions also view changes in the world around them, including changes in the independent variables of this study, through different lenses. As evidence, military leaders of different factions gave very different accounts of the

¹¹¹ Interview with military commander of the MFDC's bases in Guinea-Bissau, February 11, 2008.

MFDC's political wing (some more favorable than others), while leaders of the Sadio faction near the Gambia would not grant an interview at all.¹¹² Interviewees from other factions, on the other hand, were somewhat more willing to talk once the interview was set up by my guide, whom they trusted because he was good friends with a member of MFDC. The major empirical implication of the prevalence and importance of intra-group splits, however, is that getting multiple factions to adhere to a ceasefire is much more difficult than getting a unified group to do so. This means that the more factions a group has, the more likely it is that the conflict will last longer because agreements are more difficult to create and enforce, which leads to the first policy implication and suggestion.

Governments must be sure that they are dealing with those who are actually in control of the military wing(s) of the group, rather than those with only nominal power. Sénégal's government started dealing with Badji, who was the leader of the military wing at the time, but once the military wing split, the government began dealing with the political wing, which had little control over the newer, more radical faction of the military wing. It is this faction, now controlled by Sadio, who often refused to sign or adhere to the conditions of peace agreements, including the one signed in December 2004. Rather than alienate hard-liners, which the government did in 2001 when it offered

¹¹² I was able to interview two leaders of Sadio's faction in Ziguinchor, but even this process was much more difficult than other interviews. I was interviewed in a neutral location, and then brought to another location for the interview. Only after I earned the trust of the leaders, was I granted a full interview and invited to the home of one of the interviewees.

\$200,000 to anyone who brought in Sadio dead or alive, government must work with moderates to bring all factions together at the negotiating table.¹¹³

The other major policy lesson from this in-depth analysis of the factors that led to the May 1991 ceasefire is that governments must initiate dialogue. The government's willingness to sit down to talks was an important factor in Badji's decision to sign the ceasefire. In addition, the government's willingness to release prisoners ahead of the ceasefire influenced Badji's decision. This decrease in repression was much more effective than the government's increase in repression following the April 1990 attack at Seleti. In fact, the increased repression led to the escalation of the MFDC's violence during the rest of 1990. This is not to suggest that governments should always decrease repression in the face of group violence, rather to point out that they must be prepared for the outcome if they decide to increase repression.

CONCLUSION

The signing of the May 1991 ceasefire by Sidy Badji, leader of the military wing of the MFDC, was a major decrease in the level of violence the group as a whole used throughout 1990. The S n galese government's decision to decrease its level of repression from high to none led to Badji's decision to sign the MFDC's first ceasefire. This sequence of events, like the results from congruence test, supports this dissertation's

¹¹³ Pan African News Agency, March 12, 2001, accessed at allAfrica.com.

hypothesis that a decrease in the government's level of repression to none/low will lead to a decrease in the level of violence the group uses.

In addition to the decrease in government repression, the MFDC's first major split, which occurred between the military and political wings of the group, decreased the group's cohesion, which decreased the group's capacity to use violence and also led to the decrease in the group's level of violence. This sequence of events supports the hypothesis that a decrease in group capacity will lead to a decrease in the group's level of violence. This finding, however, contradicts that of the congruence test, which showed no relationship between group capacity and group level of violence. For the reasons stated earlier in this chapter, it is likely that future research on these findings will help further explain this contradiction. The most important lesson from this chapter is that intra-group splits, though not a necessary or sufficient cause in this episode, play a key role in the strategic decisions of group leaders regarding the level of violence to use.

CHAPTER 5

2004 PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE MFDC AND SÉNÉGAL

Though the MFDC and the Sénégalaise government signed several agreements since the first ceasefire in May 1991, on December 30, 2004, the MFDC signed the last and most enduring peace agreement since the creation of its armed wing in 1983. Though not all leaders of the group agreed with or signed the document, the movement's use of violence against the army or civilians dramatically decreased after it was signed. Why would a group that has fought violently for independence for 14 years decrease its use of violence by signing and abiding by a peace agreement that does not offer independence?

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the factors that contributed to group leaders' decisions to decrease their use of violence, and to explain the process by which they came to this decision. Building on the congruence tests of the hypotheses in chapter three, and the in-depth analysis of the 1991 ceasefire in the previous chapter, this chapter's causal process analysis of the 2004 peace agreement will take one congruence test observation, December 2004, and explore it in greater detail. Specifically, I will explore the events leading up to the signing of the peace agreement, and, using group leaders' statements from interviews and secondary sources, identify the impact of these events on the leaders' decisions to decrease the level of violence they used.¹¹⁴ This

¹¹⁴ Although this peace agreement was the most lasting one signed by the MFDC and the government, I consider it a decrease in the level of violence, rather than a cessation of violence. The political wing of the MFDC has not condoned the use of violence since the agreement was signed, and has called for all factions to lay down their arms. As will be explained below, there were military factions of the MFDC that did not

analysis of the process by which MFDC leaders made decisions will identify and explain the causal relationships between the independent variables and these decisions, a task that cannot be accomplished with congruence tests alone.

Based on the analysis in this chapter, I find that the political wing of the MFDC, led by Abbé Diamacoune, changed its goal from independence to autonomy, which led to its decision to stop using violence and sign the peace agreement. All of the other factions (for which there is documented information) decided to stop using violence out of respect for Abbé Diamacoune's call for peace, even though not all factions signed or agreed to the terms of the peace agreement.

This chapter is broken up into four substantive sections. The first section describes the events leading up to the signing of the December 2004 peace agreement, including changes in group grievances, government repression, and group capacity. This section will also identify any other events or changes that are cited by primary or secondary sources as potential explanatory factors, then it will go on to provide a detailed account of the actual signing of the peace agreement itself, including which factions signed the agreement. The second section is an analysis of the ability of the hypotheses of this dissertation to explain the decrease in the MFDC's level of violence, and the third section is a similar analysis of the ability of contending theories of political violence and secession to explain the group's decrease in violence. The final section offers a

sign the agreement, however, and at least one of these factions began using violence again in the last few years. That said, the agreement was important because all groups stopped using violence for a period of time, which was the first time this happened since the MFDC became violent.

discussion on the theoretical, empirical, and policy implications of the findings of this chapter.

DECEMBER 2004 PEACE AGREEMENT

Events Leading up to the Peace Agreement

Throughout the tumultuous 1990s, both the MFDC and the Sénégalaise army carried out numerous violent attacks, many of which were condemned in a 1998 report by Amnesty International (“Climate of Terror in Casamance”, 1998). Hope for peace in the Casamance was renewed, however, with the election of a new president, Abdoulaye Wade, in April 2000. During his campaign, Wade, who ran on a platform of change, promised that he would work directly with the MFDC and Casamançais to bring an end to the war, and he promised that this end would come within weeks of his election. Toward this end, upon his election, Wade halted the activities of all domestic and international NGOs, as well as those of other governments and IGOs in an attempt to “cut out the middle men.” (Fall, 2000; “En Casamance (Sénégal) une organisation paysanne agit pour le retour de la paix et le pardon”, 2000). He basically dismissed all those who formerly mediated between the government and MFDC, including the governments of Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia, the Imam of Ziguinchor, the Sénégalaise government’s National Committee for Peace in Casamance. Wade vowed to negotiate directly with the MFDC to expedite the peace process. Though he could not meet his promise to bring an

end to the war within weeks, he was able to negotiate a peace agreement with the MFDC on December 16, 2000.

Unfortunately, this peace agreement was just one in a long line of failed agreements that came before, and would come after this one. In fact, within two weeks of the December 2000 peace agreement, the MFDC carried out two attacks (one in Ziguinchor and one in Guinea-Bissau) that resulted in the death of 13 Bissau-Guinean soldiers, and injuries to 20 Bissau-Guinean soldiers and several civilians and both sides of the border.¹¹⁵ Following the peace agreement in December 2000, the Sénégalaise government and the MFDC signed a peace agreement in March 2001 and a ceasefire in July 2002. In between these agreements, there were several talks between President Wade and Abbé Diamacoune, but none were able to stop the fighting between the army and armed wing of the MFDC.¹¹⁶ 2003 saw more sporadic violence carried out by both groups, but in February 2004, fighting intensified, when the Sénégalaise and Bissau-Guinean armies began a major offensive against the MFDC. This was followed by two MFDC attacks in March and April, in which three soldiers were killed and five were injured. There were two more MFDC attacks in June and July, but both only resulted in property theft and damage. These were the last reported attacks, by either the government or the MFDC, before the peace agreement in December, though there was

¹¹⁵ Reported in *The Independent* (Banjul, Gambia) on January 5, 2001; and by the PanAfrican News Agency on January 8, 2001. Both sources were accessed at allAfrica.com.

¹¹⁶ 2001 Report by APRAN on the history of the conflict, accessed in APRAN's office in Ziguinchor; "Dozens Killed in Sénégal Fighting," BBC January 8, 2003, accessed at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2638199.stm>.

fighting between two factions of the MFDC in October.¹¹⁷ By November, both the Sénégalaise government and the MFDC had agreed to meet at the end of December in the hopes of negotiating a peace agreement.

Before the decision to meet, however, there was a major announcement by a third party that would greatly impact both the Sénégalaise government and the MFDC. On September 9, the World Bank announced that it would lend Sénégal US\$20 million for development in the Casamance. As part of its Emergency Recovery Project, the World Bank planned to give Sénégal an International Development Association loan to be used for the government's Investment Program for Economic and Social Activities in the Casamance. According the World Bank, the purpose of the program was "the restoration of normal social and economic activities and the preparation for future development programs in the Casamance region..." ("Sénégal Receives US\$20 million", 2005). The program would facilitate civilians returning to their home towns and villages, while helping 2000 MFDC combatants return to civilian life with their families. The Sénégalaise government went one step further by promising MFDC leaders that it would use €1.5 million for the sole purpose of helping 3000 MFDC combatants with economic and social reintegration. In addition, the signing of a peace agreement would potentially unlock approximately US\$ 129 million from other donors, who made such a peace agreement a condition of their funding (Carayol, 2004; "Casamance Looks Forward to More Prosperous 2005", 2004). These were not the first promises of development for the Casamance region, but it was the first time that the government made such a promise to

¹¹⁷ Evans, 2004; Reports in IRIN on February 13 and April 2, 2004.

help MFDC combatants specifically, and that it was backed with third-party funding from a major, financial IGO, ensuring that lack of money, at least, would not be an obstacle to development in the Casamance.

The government's change of heart might have been influenced by domestic and international reactions to articles in *Le Quotidien*, a S n galese newspaper, and the government's response. These articles, published in late July 2004, accused the S n galese customs service of corruption, and published documents from the finance ministry. In addition, the articles claimed that the government regularly tampered with the country's judiciary, rendering it independent in name only. In response to the articles, the newspaper's editor, Madiambal Diagne, was thrown in jail on several charges, including reporting news that could lead to civil unrest. International and domestic media, *Reporters Without Borders*, *Committee to Protect Journalists*, and other International and domestic media and NGOs expressed their outrage in various forms, including a "Day Without The Press." On this day, which included all forms of media and had the participation of 12 out of 16 independent newspapers, daily newspapers ran a common editorial blasting the government's interference in the freedom of the press. In addition, independent radio stations played songs of protest and freedom. As a result of the international attention and domestic protests, the editor of *Le Quotidien* was released after spending over two weeks in jail, but the damage was already done to S n gal's image ("Newspapers Go On Strike", 2004; "Journalist Freed from Prison", 2004; "Managing Editor of Privately-Owned Newspaper...Detained", 2004).

As these changes were taking place outside of the MFDC, within the group, relations were increasingly strained. One of the major causes of this strain was a shift in goals for the sometimes radical Abbé Diamacoune and the political wing of the MFDC. The change of Abbé Diamacoune's goal from full independence to autonomy could be seen as early as September of 2004, when the (de jure) Secretary General of the MFDC, Jean-Marie Biagui, announced that the MFDC would become a political party, and participate in the 2007 presidential and legislative elections (Carayol, 2004). Several interviewees spoke against this claim (and against Biagui), showing that most factions did not agree with the decision to work within the framework of the S n galese government to seek autonomy. Abb  Diamacoune, however, did not publically contradict this announcement, which is significant because Biagui made a similar claim that the group would become a political party in October of 2002, but Abb  Diamacoune publically disagreed.¹¹⁸ Though he denied that the group would move in that direction in 2002, Abb  Diamacoune made no such denial in 2004. In fact, according to a former combatant and leader of a new faction within the political wing, Abb  was the only member of the original political wing leaders who would settle for autonomy, despite the alleged promise of independence made by President Senghor in 1960.¹¹⁹

Though the MFDC never became a political party, his tacit agreement with Biagui's claim demonstrates a possible shift in Abb  Diamacoune's goals. The clearest

¹¹⁸ Interview with a former combatant turned leader in the political wing, February 8, 2008, Ziguinchor; Interview with military commander of the MFDC's bases in Guinea-Bissau, February 11, 2008, Sa  Domingos, Guinea-Bissau; interview with military leaders of Salif Sadio's faction, February 11, 2008, Ziguinchor.

¹¹⁹ Interview with a former combatant turned leader in the political wing, February 8, 2008, Ziguinchor.

evidence that his goal had changed to autonomy, however, came in an interview I conducted with his brother, Bertrand, who became the (nominal) head of the political wing, and by extension the MFDC as a whole, since his brother's death in January 2007. Mr. Diamacoune was the only interviewee who did not answer "independence" when asked about his desires for the future of the Casamance. Every other interviewee who was asked answered this question unequivocally and emphatically with one word: independence. Mr. Diamacoune, however, answered that he wanted "peace, if it is sincere, and parity [in levels of development] with the other regions of Sénégal."¹²⁰ This answer is telling for two reasons: there is no mention of independence, and he speaks of the Casamance as a region within Sénégal. Other interviewees were adamant about the fact that the Casamance was not currently, nor had ever been, a part of Sénégal, and corrected me when I called it a region of Sénégal.¹²¹ The difference between Mr. Diamacoune's answer and that of every other interviewee regarding the importance of independence for the Casamance is a clear indication that his goal, and that of his brother before him, is autonomy within Sénégal.

Along with Abbé Diamacoune's change in goals, the MFDC's cohesion was also strained in other ways. For example, in October 2004, one military faction (led by César Badiate) attacked another (led by Salif Sadio) in Guinea Bissau in an attempt to establish control over the MFDC bases in the entire region, but Badiate was not successful. At the

¹²⁰ Interview with Bertrand Diamacoune, leader of the MFDC, May 11, 2007, Ziguinchor.

¹²¹ Interview with a former combatant turned leader in the political wing, February 8, 2008, Ziguinchor; Interview with military commander of the MFDC's bases in Guinea-Bissau, February 11, 2008, Saõ Domingos, Guinea-Bissau; interview with military leaders of Salif Sadio's faction, February 11, 2008, Ziguinchor.

same time, however, Abbé Diamacoune was meeting with faction leaders, including Badiate, in an attempt to create a unified MFDC position. Once a date was set for negotiations between the MFDC and the government, the MFDC met again in the hopes of coming to an agreement and being able to speak with one voice at the December peace talks. Unfortunately, the leaders of three factions, including both Badiate and Sadio, did not agree with even meeting with the government without a discussion of independence being on the agenda, a topic that had not been discussed in any of the previous peace talks.¹²² Thus, going into the December 2004 peace talks, few observers expected a result different from those of the many peace talks that had come before these.

The Signing of the Peace Agreement

In late December 2004, many members of the Sénégalaise government, including President Abdoulaye Wade, as well as several foreign ambassadors and ministers, religious leaders from Sénégal and abroad, and the international media arrived in Ziguinchor to witness the signing of a peace agreement between the Sénégalaise government and the MFDC. Wade, who acknowledged the many failed talks and agreements between the warring parties, announced that this peace agreement was “ ‘not just one more peace deal’ ” (“Casamance Looks Forward to More Prosperous 2005”, 2004). On December 30, Sénégal’s Interior Minister Ousmane Ngom and MFDC leader Abbé Augustine Senghor Diamacoune signed a five-clause peace agreement.

¹²² Evans, 2004; Interview with military commander of the MFDC’s bases in Guinea-Bissau (leader in Badiate faction) on February 11, 2008 in Saõ Domingos, Guinea-Bissau.

For its part, the MFDC agreed to “ ‘solemnly decide once and for all to give up armed struggle and the use of violence’ ” (Ibid). This language was definitely stronger than any of the previous agreements, as it required the group and its members to agree to the permanent dismantling of the armed wing of the movement. This meant that MFDC combatants would have to lay down their weapons, and return from the bush and rejoin society. Of course, after the signing, it remained to be seen which factions would abide by this clause.

Regarding the Sénégalaise government’s role, its first commitment in the peace agreement was to grant amnesty to all MFDC combatants, which would facilitate the MFDC’s commitment to give up violence and return from their bases in the bush. Next, the government agreed to two important tasks to aid in the development of the region. First, it would provide aid for Casamançais civilians returning to their villages in the form of infrastructure rebuilding. Since most Casamançais who fled their homes were living as refugees in the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, or as internally displaced persons throughout Sénégal, whole villages were left in ruin after fighting between the army and the MFDC. As a result, it was necessary to rebuild homes, schools, and roads, as well as replant crops and complete other agricultural tasks. To that end, the government’s second development task, demining, was key. According to *Amnesty International*, both the MFDC and the Sénégalaise government began laying mines throughout the Casamance in the early 1990s. In fact, according to *Handicap International*, there have been over 1000 landmine deaths and injuries to Casamançais civilians, Sénégalaise

soldiers, and staff members of local and international NGOs and IGOs, including the International Red Cross and the UN.¹²³ According to a local NGO in Ziguinchor, demining will be an essential part of any development plan for the Casamance because the people cannot complete their return to normal life living in fear of injuries or death (AJAC-APRAN, 2000).

Along with these development objectives, the Sénégalaise government also agreed to create a committee tasked with supervising the peace process, which contained two subgroups. The purpose of the first group, which will be run by the *International Committee of the Red Cross* and *la Rencontre africaine des droits de l'Homme* (RADDHO), is to manage the return of MFDC combatants to their villages, and to ensure the decommissioning of their weapons and other military equipment. The second group has the specific task of ensuring that both the Sénégalaise government and the MFDC adhere to ceasefire portion of the peace agreement. This second group would consist of representatives from the government, as well as leaders and members of the MFDC (“Casamance Looks Forward to More Prosperous 2005”, 2004).

Before moving to the analysis of the process leading up to this agreement, it is important to note that it was not without its obstacles. First, there was no mention of independence in the agreement, though there were planned talks for January and March 2005 to discuss the political future of the region (USAID, 2005). This failure to address the issue of independence led to another major obstacle: three MFDC factions’ refusal to

¹²³“Landmines Claim New Victims in Casamance”, 1998; Interview with local NGO staff member, February 26, 2008; Informal conversations with staff member from *Handicap International* in Ziguinchor.

sign the December 2004 peace agreement. These armed factions were led by Salif Sadio, César Badiate, and Daniel Diatta, and leaders of all three factions explained that until there was a document that addressed Casamançais independence, they would not make any agreements to lay down their arms.¹²⁴ Despite these objections, all factions of the MFDC decreased their level of violence to none following the peace agreement, and though there have been very sporadic acts of violence (usually attributed to Sadio's faction) in the last few years, there were no acts of violence attributed to the MFDC or any of its factions until March of 2006. What made the December 30, 2004 peace agreement different from the agreements and ceasefires that came before it? In other words, why did *all* factions of the MFDC decrease their use of violence following the signing of the agreement?

ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION TO SIGN THE PEACE AGREEMENT


In the process leading up to the peace agreement, several changes occurred. These changes include the following: an announcement by the World Bank about its US\$20 million for development in the Casamance; a decrease in the level of government repression; Abbé Diamacoune's change in goals from independence to autonomy; and, a decrease in the MFDC's cohesion. These changes allow for an in-depth analysis of the impact of group grievances, level of government repression, and group capacity on group

¹²⁴ "Authorities Close Radios", 2005, Dakar; Interview with Daniel Diatta at MFDC meeting, May 13, 2007, Ziguinchor; Interview with military leader in Badiate's faction, February 11, 2008.

leaders' decisions about the level of violence to use. In addition, the impact of the change in Abbé Diamacoune's goals on his and other leaders' decisions to decrease the use of violence (an unanticipated relationship) enable an exploration of the role of goal changes in group leaders' decisions, much like in the previous chapter's exploration of the possible causes and consequences of Sidy Badji's change in goals. The analysis will begin with an examination of the process by which Abbé Diamacoune decided to decrease the MFDC's level of violence, to be followed by a discussion of why the leaders of other factions agreed to this decision (even though they did not agree to the peace agreement).

Abbé Diamacoune's Decision to Decrease the MFDC's Level of Violence

In the decision-making process leading up to Abbé Diamacoune's signature of the peace agreement, I argue that his change in goals was the most important factor (see figure 5.1). Although he had become increasingly moderate since President Wade's election in 2000, I argue that the change in goals by September 2004 was a sufficient factor that led to his decision to decrease the MFDC's level of violence. It is important to note that I am not arguing that it was a necessary factor in his decision to decrease the MFDC's level of violence because, according to the findings of the congruence tests and process analysis of the 1991 ceasefire, the changes in the other variables would have led to the same outcome. In fact, I argue that it was a change in these other variables- group grievances and level of government repression- that likely led to the change in Abbé



Note: The World Bank loan and the decrease in public support have dashed arrows leading to decrease in government repression because these are unexpected findings, and these relationships were not tested in this dissertation (i.e. level of government repression was not the dependent variable of this study).

Diamacoune's goals at this point in time, so in this episode, they act as antecedent variables, rather than direct independent variables (like in the episode discussed in the previous chapter), as predicted by the hypotheses. Specifically, decreases in grievances and the level of government repression probably influenced Abbé Diamacoune's change in goals from independence from Sénégal to autonomy within the country.¹²⁵

With the World Bank's announcement that it would loan US\$20 million to Sénégal for development in the Casamance, the group's grievances against the government decreases dramatically. The Sénégalese government's decision to use a portion of this loan to help former MFDC combatants adapt to civilian life further

¹²⁵ Changes in group cohesion did not influence Abbé Diamacoune's change in goals because the earliest evidence of his change in goals is in September 2004, but the cohesion didn't begin decreasing until October and November.

decreased grievances. The lack of development in the Casamance as compared to other parts of Sénégal was a constant theme in every interview I conducted, and was the first grievance cited by every interviewee, from Bertrand Diamacoune to the MFDC combatant living in the bush (who did not discuss much of the politics of the MFDC). In fact, Mr. Diamacoune explained that “without peace, there cannot be development, and without development there cannot be peace.”¹²⁶ In 2004, this loan and the government’s promise of monies for combatants were the first real promises of development in the region that were backed by external funding.

In addition, the loan legitimized the MFDC’s claim that the Casamance is underdeveloped relative to the rest of Sénégal. Though the group has been making this claim since its independence movement began, there had never been an acknowledgement by the Sénégalaise government that the Casamance was any less developed than other regions of the country. By taking the World Bank’s loan, the government had to admit that there was a need for targeted development in the Casamance, and the fact that the MFDC’s Secretary General announced that the group would become a political party just two weeks after the announcement of the World Bank’s loan highlights the importance of this decrease in group grievances on his decision to change his goal to autonomy.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Interview with Bertrand Diamacoune, May 11, 2007.

¹²⁷ It is important to note, however, that this relationship is somewhat speculative because Abbé Diamacoune did not discuss this loan in public documents, nor did his brother, Bertrand, discuss the loan in his interview.

Another probable factor that led to Abbé Diamacoune's change in goals to autonomy for the Casamance was the Sénégalaise government's decrease in repression. Following the February 2004 joint offensive between the Sénégalaise and Bissau-Guinean armies against the MFDC, there were no more attacks carried out by the army against the MFDC. This is significant because since January 2003, over 30 MFDC combatants had been killed in army campaigns against the group (Jallow, 2003). Perhaps this decrease in the level of government repression lent credence to the government's desire to negotiate a peace agreement once the dates were set, as did the government's promise of help for former MFDC combatants.

Yet another possible reason for Abbé Diamacoune's shift in goals is the unexpected decrease in public support for the violent conflict. By all accounts, support for the independence movement was high amongst Casamançais after the 1982 and 1983 peaceful protests to which the Sénégalaise government responded violently (The Casamance Conflict, 1999; Evans, 2004; Humphreys and Mohamed, 2005). After over a decade of fighting, living as refugees and internally displaced persons, and death and injuries from landmines, however, many Casamançais wanted peace by any means. Ernest Harsch explains:

But, gradually, other segments of Casamançais society- women, youth associations, artists and musicians, civil servants and traditional leaders- started holding meetings, street marches and other actions to demand that both sides sit down at the peace table. This put further pressure on various MFDC leaders to renounce armed struggle, and paved the way for the 30 December accord (Harsch, 2005: 3).

It is likely, then, that this growing pressure from civil society, along with the World Bank loan and decrease in government repression, influenced Abbé Diamacoune's decision to shift his goal from independence to autonomy. Though it is impossible to identify with certainty his reasons for shifting his goal, it is clear that this shift occurred, and that it influenced his decision to decrease the MFDC's level of violence by signing the December 2004 peace agreement.

Before moving on to the examination of why the leaders of the MFDC's armed factions decreased the level of violence they used, it is important to note their perceptions regarding Abbé Diamacoune and the political wing's change in goals from independence for the Casamance to autonomy within Sénégal, and why the goals of the armed factions did not change following the change of the political wing's goals. Some interviewees argue that most, if not all members of the political wings were co-opted by the Sénégalaise government.¹²⁸ Though no one specifically accused Abbé of being paid off, every interviewee, with the exception of Bertrand Diamacoune, accused Biagui of being completely bought and paid for by the government. It stands to reason, then, that Abbé might have been influenced by those who were paid off by the government, or he may have been paid off himself. Considering Abbé was under constant surveillance by the government, without freedom of movement, until the time of his death, the latter scenario is not likely.

¹²⁸ Interview with a former combatant turned leader in the political wing, February 8, 2008; Interview with military commander of the MFDC's bases in Guinea-Bissau, February 11, 2008; interview with military leaders of Salif Sadio's faction, February 11, 2008.

A more plausible explanation was offered by Daniel Diatta, the leader of a growing military faction. This leader explained that as someone who has (voluntarily) been a member of the military wing from a young age, he has never known what it was like to live in town (as opposed to living in the bush), able to come and go as he pleases, with food and water, and to sleep in a comfortable bed. Political leaders, on the other hand, have never known what it was like to live in the bush, with little to eat and drink, living in make-shift shelters, unable to see family for long periods of time, and forced to come and go under cover of darkness. He argued that it might be easier for political leaders of the MFDC to make the decision to end the independence movement because they have not made the same sacrifice as many of the combatants.¹²⁹ Though he was not speaking about anyone in particular, this argument might explain why Abbé Diamacoune was able to change his goal, and why leaders of the military factions were not willing to change the goal of independence, nor were they willing to sign a peace agreement that did not address this goal. Even without signing the document, however, these military leaders did decide to decrease their levels of violence, and the next section examines the factors that contributed to these decisions.

Military Leaders' Decisions to Decrease the Level of Violence

After 14 years of fighting for independence, leaders of all of the military factions of the MFDC decided to decrease their level of violence to none. In interviews with leaders of the Badiate and Sadio factions, as well as with other leaders of other factions,

¹²⁹ Interview with Daniel Diatta, May 13, 2007.

when asked about the December 2004 peace agreement, the answer was simple: we do not recognize that agreement because there was no discussion of Casamançais independence.¹³⁰ They explained that it was impossible to have a peaceful resolution to the conflict if the main reason for the conflict is not addressed, and their main criticism of all of the ceasefires and agreements since 1991 is that none of them address the political future of the Casamance. As one MFDC combatant put it, “If someone tries to take your sack of rice, and he’s holding it and you’re holding it, who owns the sack [translated from French]?”¹³¹ This analogy accurately depicted the situation in the Casamance, and the MFDC leaders interviewed, as well as those who have made public statements in the past few years, have made it clear that as long as this stalemate exists, the conflict will continue.


Their objections to the peace agreement notwithstanding, leaders of every faction of the MFDC stopped using violence before or immediately following the December 30 agreement (see figure 5.2). When asked why they made this decision, all of the MFDC members interviewed- including the military leaders, former combatant turned political leader, current combatant, and the group of members and sympathizers- spoke to the importance of Abbé Diamacoune and his call for peace leading up to his signature on the document.¹³² The level of reverence each interviewee expressed was somewhat

¹³⁰ Interview with military commander of the MFDC’s bases in Guinea-Bissau, February 11, 2008; Interview with military leaders of Salif Sadio’s faction, February 11, 2008.

¹³¹ Interview with MFDC combatant in César Badiate’s faction, February 12, 2008, Varela, Guinea-Bissau.

¹³² Interview with a former combatant turned leader in the political wing, February 8, 2008; Interview with military commander of the MFDC’s bases in Guinea-Bissau, February 11, 2008; Interview with military leaders of Salif Sadio’s faction, February 11, 2008; Interview with MFDC combatant in César Badiate’s faction, February 12, 2008, Varela, Guinea-Bissau; Interview with MFDC members and sympathizers,

surprising considering Abbé Diamacoune's inability to control the armed wing of the MFDC, but it warrants a brief explanation.



* See figure 5.1 for details on the factors that influenced Abbé Diamacoune's decision.

Note: The World Bank loan and the decrease in public support have dashed arrows leading to decrease in government repression because these are unexpected findings, and these relationships were not tested in this dissertation (i.e. level of government repression was not the dependent variable of this study).

Abbé Augustine Senghor Diamacoune, who was a Roman Catholic priest, was the only living member of the original MFDC. As the person responsible for bringing the group back to life in 1982, he was a symbol of the history of the Casamance and the MFDC for group members and Casamançais throughout the region. Speaking of Abbé Diamacoune before his death, De Jong (1999) explains:

It is beyond doubt that Diamacoune is the most important leader of the MFDC. He is educated and versed in rhetorical skills, and acts as the movement's spokesman. He is respected by members of the various factions within the MFDC, even though he does not transcend the cleavages among those factions (de Jong, 1999).

Even though at times he was the leader of the MFDC in name only, he always had the respect of group members, and still has the respect of each interviewee. This respect explains why not one interviewee said anything negative about Abbé Diamacoune, even though most spoke negatively about the political wing that he led. More importantly, this respect was one of the main reasons the armed factions decided to heed Abbé Diamacoune's call for peace in 2004.

Another possible reason these leaders decided to decrease the levels of violence they used is an extension of the first reason: Abbé Diamacoune reached out to the military factions before the agreement. His call for peace in late 2004 was not the first time Abbé Diamacoune made such a call (though history of Abbé Diamacoune moving between moderate and hard-liner roles made these calls difficult to follow), but it was one of the few times he reached out specifically to the leaders of the various military factions. In October 2004, he met with César Badiate, leader of the armed Front Sud (Evans, 2004). In November, Abbé Diamacoune called a meeting with all faction leaders of the MFDC. This was not the first time the MFDC had met ahead of talks with the government. Most of these meetings, however, only included members of the political wing (both internal and external). Unlike these meetings, though, Abbé sought to meet with military leaders, and despite the fact that three of these leaders refused to sign the

agreement (including Badiate), perhaps the fact that their symbolic leader had reached out to them influenced their decisions not to use violence.

The third possible reason that military leaders decreased their use of violence is the same as one of the reasons Abbé Diamacoune changed his goals: waning public support for the movement among Casamançais civilians. Some interviewees said that part of the reason they stopped using violence in 2004 was because they did not want to see Casamançais villages continue being destroyed by their battles with the Sénégalaise government. When asked why the Badiate faction of the MFDC stopped using violence against the army after the December 2004 agreement, one combatant responded that they stopped fighting “out of respect for Casamançais civilians. When we fight the army in the villages, they are the ones who die.”¹³³ It is probable that the marches and other events at which members of the Casamançais civil society demanded peace brought this problem to the forefront of everyone’s minds, including leaders and members of the MFDC.

The final two factors that likely led to the MFDC’s military leaders’ decisions to stop using violence following the December 2004 peace agreement are also reasons that impacted Abbé Diamacoune’s change in goals: a decrease in group grievances and a decrease in the level of government repression. Regarding the decrease in grievances, when the World Bank promised its Emergency Recovery Project loan, which was specifically for reconstruction in the Casamance, the MFDC’s military leaders probably had a newfound hope in the future development of the region. Though they are currently

¹³³ Interview with combatant in the Badiate faction of the MFDC, February 12, 2008.

skeptical of the S n galese government's use of these funds, when the loan was announced in September 2004, there was no reason to doubt that they would be used to rebuild the region.

As discussed above, though this was not the first promise of development, this loan, which was from arguably the most important lender for development programs around the world, was unique for two reasons. First, it was earmarked specifically for the construction and reconstruction of homes, schools, clinics, and other important projects in the Casamance. Second, the S n galese government promised to use  1.5 million solely for the reintegration of former MFDC combatants. Though there were already NGOs working in the region, most were involved in demining, helping landmine victims, agricultural assistance, and ensuring the protection of human rights. While all of the programs carried out by these NGOs were necessary and worthwhile, they did not offer direct help to combatants who were returning to their homes and families after living in the bush for years. In order to make such a transition, most combatants probably would need help rebuilding homes, (re)planting crops, and other micro-level reconstruction tasks, and the loan from the World Bank could help them achieve these tasks.

Along with the decrease in grievances, the government's decrease in repression influenced the MFDC's military leaders' decisions to decrease their level of violence. Military leaders, with the exception of those from Salif Sadio's faction, explained that they had not attacked the S n galese army for years before the peace agreement, but that the army attacked them, which required them to fight back. As the military commander

of the MFDC's bases in Guinea-Bissau explained, "We're [the MFDC] not making war, now we're just defending ourselves; they're trying to exterminate us."¹³⁴ As long as the army attacked the group, then, leaders and members argued that it was the S n galese government's goal to kill Casaman ais civilians and MFDC members. When the army stopped attacking the MFDC after February 2004, the need to defend itself was removed, which was the hypothesized outcome based on the theoretical expectation that once the need to defend the group by fighting back against violence was removed, the group would decrease its level of violence accordingly.

By examining this decrease in the government's level of repression, as well as the other factors that influenced the MFDC's military leaders to decrease their level of violence, we can see that the causal process is less parsimonious than predicted by the hypotheses (see Figure 5.2). Based on the theoretical framework of this dissertation, in order for the leaders' to decide to decrease the level of violence, we should have seen a decrease in group grievances, a decrease in the government's level of repression, and/or a decrease in group capacity. Though there was a decrease in both group grievances and level of government repression, there were other important factors that influenced these leaders' decisions: Abb  Diamacoune's call for peace and his attempt to reach out to the military factions; and the appeals for peace by various groups within the Casaman ais civil society. Because these latter factors were only discovered during the process analysis, there were no expectations for them, but there were theoretical expectations for the impact of the decreases in group grievances and government repression on leaders'

¹³⁴ Interview with military commander of the MFDC's bases in Guinea-Bissau, February 11, 2008.

decisions to decrease the level of violence. The finding that the government's decrease in the level of repression was one of the factors that influenced military leaders' decisions to decrease violence in 2004 is the predicted outcome from H3, hypotheses and is similar to the findings from the congruence test.¹³⁵ On the other hand, even though the finding that the World Bank's loan for the Casamance contributed to leaders' decisions to decrease the level of violence is predicted by H1, it contradicts the finding from the congruence test that a decrease in grievances will have no impact on group leaders' decisions regarding the level of violence to employ.

The most probable reason for this contradiction in findings is that there were so few observations of decreases in repression, two out 293 total observations. According to King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) and others, one of the benefits of small-n studies is the depth of knowledge of the case and observations being examined (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). The congruence tests in this dissertation, however, were tested on data from a larger-n dataset of 293 observations. Unlike the observations used for the causal process analyses of the 1991 ceasefire and the 2004 peace agreement, the goal for the dataset observations was breadth (i.e. to collect information on as many observations as possible) rather than depth (i.e. to collect as much information as possible on one observation). For this reason, there is not nearly as much information about the two dataset observations in which the group's grievances decreased as there is for the observation upon which this process analysis focuses: the December 2004 peace

¹³⁵ A comparison between the findings of the two process analyses will be offered in the conclusion chapter.

agreement. The contradiction between the findings is likely the result of the process analysis' use of the additional data from both the interviews and secondary data.

Another possible reason that the process analysis found that group grievances influence group leaders' decisions regarding the level of violence to use is based on the operationalization of group grievances. As discussed in chapter three, one of the limitations of the congruence test of the group grievance hypothesis is that change in the independent variable "group grievances" was operationalized as an increase or decrease in the number of grievances. The problem is that this operationalization does not capture the salience of a particular grievance. In the congruence test observations, it is unclear which grievances changed, whether they are those mentioned by MFDC leaders in interviews or secondary sources. If not, it stands to reason that these grievances are less important, if important at all, than those mentioned by name in interviews. Based on this assumption, the decrease in group grievances caused by the World Bank loan would be very salient because lack of development was mentioned by every interviewee as an important grievance. The fact that there was a decrease in this very salient grievance, then, would explain why there was a causal relationship between its decrease and the decrease in the group's level of violence.

Regarding the other observation of the decrease in group grievances specifically, it occurred in April 2004 when the UNDP announced a US\$4.5 million development project in the Casamance. Though this promise of development funding also resulted in a decrease in group grievances, I argue that it was not as salient for MFDC leaders because

it did not target MFDC leaders and members in the program. The project also did not seem to be as well publicized as the World Bank loan, nor was it followed up with a governmental promise of funding for the reintegration of former combatants.¹³⁶ That said, not knowing interviewees' specific perception about the UNDP loan is a limitation, which means that any discussion of its level of salience among the MFDC's military leaders is speculative.

CONTENDING EXPLANATIONS OF THE DECEMBER 2004 PEACE AGREEMENT

Though economic and sociological explanations of political violence and secession are unable to account for the MFDC leaders' decisions to decrease their level of violence to none, Monica Toft's (2003) geopolitical theory is able to provide some insight. Her theory of territorial indivisibility (TI) specifically speaks to Abbé Diamacoune's decision. Unlike the leaders of the military factions of the group, Abbé Diamacoune and the political wing of the MFDC changed their goal for the future of the Casamance. TI explains why a leader's change in goal from independence to anything short of independence (including autonomy) will lead to a decrease in the group's level of violence. Toft argues that when groups seek independence, they see their territory as indivisible, and violence is likely because the state also sees its territory as indivisible and

¹³⁶ One of the interviewees discussed the World Bank program specifically, whereas no one mentioned the UNDP program. Interview with military leaders in Salif Sadio's faction, February 11, 2008. One of the few sources that reports the UNDP poverty reduction program is *afrol News*. "Development efforts in post-conflict southern Sénégal, *afrol News*, April 14, 2004, accessed at www.afrol.com. There is a possibility that this program was announced but not implemented.

will use violence to maintain its territorial integrity. Once a group is willing to compromise and accept anything less than independence, violence is less likely because governments are more willing to discuss this possibility, and groups are usually able to pursue autonomy using nonviolent tactics (Toft, 2003).

In the case of Abbé Diamacoune, this shift in his view of the Casamance from indivisible to divisible made real negotiations with the Sénégalaise government possible, which led to his call for peace and decrease in the MFDC's level of violence. TI actually accounts for the impact of goals on a group leader's decision regarding the level of violence to use better than the theoretical framework of this dissertation, which did not include goals as an explanatory variable. What TI cannot explain, however, is why a group's goals would change. According to TI, a group's secessionist goals are based on group settlement patterns (e.g. concentrated majority or dispersed) and the legitimacy of the group's claims to the secessionist region as its homeland. Because neither of these factors is expected to change much over time, TI does not predict change over time in a group's goals.

In addition, the theory does not explain why the political wing's goals changed, but there was no change in the goal of independence for the military leaders. Also, why did military leaders decide to decrease their level of violence without a preceding change in goals, since groups seeking secession are expected to use violence? Without being able to answer these questions, Toft's theory of territorial indivisibility is unable to

explain why the political wing's goals changed, or the political wing and military factions all decided to decrease their use of violence in December 2004.

IMPLICATIONS

There are several theoretical and policy implications of the findings from the process analysis of the 2004 peace agreement. Theoretically, the biggest lesson from this in-depth examination is that intra-group dynamics play a very important role, and even when external factors matter, they are filtered through these dynamics. By intra-group dynamics, I mean the forces at work inside of the group that influence leaders' decisions, including shifting goals and symbolic leadership. In this episode, the shift in Abbé Diamacoune's goals from independence to autonomy played an important role in his decision to sign the peace agreement and decrease the MFDC's level of violence. Though it is possible that the decreases in group grievances and government repression would have directly influenced his decision to decrease the level of violence, his change in goals was a sufficient factor because once the goal changed, violence was no longer necessary as a strategy, since negotiations with the government became a viable option. It is likely, however, that the decreases in grievances and repression influenced this change in goals, though. Because goals were not included as an independent variable in the hypotheses of this dissertation, the implication of their importance in this episode is that they should be included as an explanatory factor in future explanations of secession.

The other intra-group dynamic that proved important in this episode is Abbé Diamacoune's ability to use his position to influence other MFDC leaders to decrease their level of violence. As mentioned above, interviewees said that one of the reasons they decreased the use of violence after the December 2004 peace agreement was that they respected Abbé Diamacoune's call for peace. As one the reasons for the decrease in violence mentioned by several interviewees, the effect of MFDC leaders' reverence for their symbolic leader is an explanatory factor that must be considered in hypotheses of secession going forward. Though the importance of leadership in group cohesion is not a new concept in political violence or social movement literatures, it is not a factor that has been considered in existing explanations of secessionist violence.¹³⁷ Considering the importance of Abbé Diamacoune's leadership and call for peace for the MFDC military leaders' decisions to decrease the use of violence, this phenomenon should be explored in future research.

Regarding important external factors that influenced MFDC leaders' decisions, the announcement of the World Bank loan and the public calls for peace were both important factors that indirectly influenced these decisions as antecedent variables (see figures 5.1 and 5.2) that influenced group grievances and/or government repression. In addition, the analysis showed that public opinion (i.e. decrease in public support for the movement) directly impacted military leaders' decisions to decrease the level of violence

¹³⁷ For a discussion of the role of political leadership in creating or politicizing identity, see Nicholas Sambanis 2001, "Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (June) 45: 263; and James Fearon and David Laitin 1996, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review*, (December) 90: 4: 717.

they used. There is another possible relationship that was not discussed. There is a possibility that the announcement of the World Bank loan, as well as other donor funding that was conditional on a peace agreement, influenced not only group grievances, but also the government's decision to decrease its level of repression, indicated by the dashed lines in figures 5.1 and 5.2. The same possibility exists for the relationship between declining public tolerance for violence by either side (i.e. increasingly negative public opinion of both sides of the conflict influenced the government's decision to decrease its level of repression).

These possible relationships are important to note because they are not part of the theorized causal mechanism leading to changes in the group's level of violence, and they must be untangled. The impact of the level of government repression and group grievances does not change, but now we have identified potential factors that impact both of these variables. The announcement of the World Bank loan was considered an indicator of group grievance because it was an event that would increase economic development in the Casamance. The importance of public support for group leaders' decisions about the level of violence to use, however, was an omitted variable that was discovered in the process analysis, and both the loan and public support are possibly omitted variables concerning the factors leading to the change in the level of government repression. Because the level of government repression was not a dependent variable in any of the hypotheses or tests, it is impossible to identify the factors that led to the decisions to change it, but the possibility of this relationship discovered in this process

analysis points to the need for future research on third-party funding and changes in public support as explanatory variables for decisions to change the level of government repression and decisions to change the level of violence the group uses.

Though the potential for these relationships exists, in this episode, the announcement of the World Bank loan likely did not lead to the government's level of repression. The government committed its last act of repression in July 2004, two months before the announcement of the loan, when it detained a newspaper editor for publishing unflattering opinions of the Sénégalaise government (an act that did not impact the MFDC directly). The government's last use of repression against the MFDC was in February of the same year, when it began its offensive with the Bissau-Guinean army against the MFDC. Therefore, the government had decreased its level of repression against the MFDC months before the announcement of the World Bank loan. The evidence from this episode notwithstanding, the relationship between conditional, external funding and the level of government repression is still worth exploring. Assuming that these relationships between conditional, external funding and public support, and the decrease in the level of government repression exist, they do not negate the significance of government repression because in the congruence test there were many observations in which repression changed and grievances remained constant. This isolation of the impact of changes in the level of government repression on the group's level of violence also helped identify the causal mechanism between these variables in the previous causal process analysis, since there was no change in group grievances.

Regarding the relationship between public support and secessionist group leaders' decisions, as discussed above, by December 2004, women, youth, artists, musicians, religious and traditional leaders, and other members of Casamançais civil society came together to show both the MFDC and the Sénégalaise government that they wanted them to sit down and negotiate a lasting peace for the region. There were no longer calls for independence among these groups, rather calls for peace by any means. Though Ashutosh Varshney (2002) examines the role of civic associations and informal interaction across cleavages in his study of ethnic violence, existing studies of secession have failed to include civil society as an explanatory variable, the present study included (Varshney, 2002). Based on Varshney's finding that civil society played a critical role in averting potential ethnic violence, it would be useful to explore the role of civil society in ending the secessionist violence used by the MFDC and other secessionist groups.

The final theoretical lesson learned from the December 2004 peace agreement is that while changes in group grievances and the level of government repression lead to changes in the group's level of violence, they do not always play a direct role in this process. Regarding Abbé Diamacoune's change in goals, I argued that it was the change in goals that led to his decision to decrease the group's level of violence. The decreases in group grievances and level of government repression, however, influenced this goal shift, so they indirectly influenced his decision to decrease the group's level of violence. These decreases in grievances and repression did, however, directly influence military leaders' decisions to decrease the level of violence, as predicted by the hypotheses. For

the purposes of theory refining, though, it is important to note the different roles these decreases can play, as both antecedent and independent variables, in the causal chain leading up to leaders' decisions about the level of violence to use.

Along with these theoretical implications of the findings of the analysis of the process leading up to the December 2004 peace agreement, there are key policy lessons. The most policy suggestion is that governments should work to address and alleviate salient group grievances, as well as decrease their level of repression against groups. In this episode, decreases in grievances and government repression influenced Abbé Diamacoune's decision to change his goal from independence to autonomy, which led to his decision to sign the peace agreement. In addition, the decreases directly influenced the MFDC's military leaders' decision to decrease their use of violence. If other governments can adequately address group grievances and reduce their levels of repression, then it is possible that they would see similar shifts in secessionist goals and/or decreases in secessionist groups' levels of violence in their countries.

Another task for governments hoping to end secessionist violence is to identify the key leaders in the group. By key I mean the leaders who make decisions about the level of violence to use, or the ones that influence these decision-makers. If governments know the roles of the key actors, they have a better chance of knowing how to negotiate with them and the group as a whole. In the case of the 2004 peace agreement, once the government agreed to talks, Abbé Diamacoune, the founder and symbolic leader of the MFDC, was able to convince other leaders to decrease their levels of violence. Even

though he was unable to persuade them to sign the agreement, he did persuade them to stop using violence. This approach by itself, however, is incomplete because relying on one leader's ability to influence the rest of the group will lead to an unstable peace. One leader's call for a decrease or elimination of violence is not enough to maintain the group's level of violence at none indefinitely because there is still no lasting solution to the issues that motivated the group to take up arms in the first place, which is why some military leaders began using violence again in 2006. What this suggestion might achieve, however, is a long break from the fighting, during which all of the parties involved can come to a more comprehensive agreement that addresses the underlying causes of the group's desire for secession.

CONCLUSION

The signing of the December 2004 peace agreement by Abbé Diamacoune and several factions of the MFDC was the most dramatic decrease in the MFDC's level of violence since the group created its armed wing in 1983. Though the signing was met with much fanfare by the Sénégalaise government, foreign ministers, international aid organizations, and the international media, at least three armed factions of the MFDC refused to sign the document. Even with this refusal, all of the MFDC's faction leaders decided to decrease the level of violence they employed following the agreement.

I argued that Abbé Diamacoune and the political wing signed the document because they shifted their goal from independence for the Casamance to autonomy within

Sénégal. This shift in goals was caused by decreases in a salient group grievance (announcement of the World Bank Emergency Recovery Project for the Casamance) and the level of government repression, as well as waning public support amongst Casamançais for the violent independence movement. The MFDC's military leaders, on the other hand, decided to decrease their levels of violence out of a common reverence for Abbé Diamacoune as the founder and (largely symbolic) leader of the revived MFDC. In addition, these leaders' decisions were influenced by the decreases in group grievances and the level of government repression, and the lack of public support for their movement.

One of the major lessons from this chapter is that intra-group dynamics, like changing goals and persuasive leadership, influence group leaders' decisions about the level of violence to use. Another key lesson is that when examining the role of group grievances in leaders' decisions, it is necessary to identify the salience of these grievances for leaders because not all grievances are equally important to leaders, therefore they do not have the same effect on leaders' decisions about the level of violence to use. Finally, the findings from the analysis of the process leading up to the 2004 peace agreement show that group grievances and the level of government repression do not always have the same impact on leaders' decisions about violence. In this episode, in fact, grievances and repression had both direct and indirect effects on MFDC leaders' decisions to decrease the level of violence they used, which points to the advantage of process analyses to identify and explain these complex causal relationships.

CHAPTER 6

THE MFDC IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THE CASE OF THE SPLA

In 1991 and 2004, the MFDC signed agreements with the S n galese government that each resulted in a decrease in the group's level of violence. The purpose of the previous two chapters was to analyze the process by which MFDC leaders made these decisions to decrease the level of violence the group used. Specifically, the objective was to take the hypotheses, as well as the findings from the congruence tests, and see whether they were able to explain why leaders made these decisions. These causal process analyses showed that decreases in group grievances and the level of government repression are factors that influence group leaders' decisions to decrease the level of violence to use, which supports the hypotheses' claims regarding the importance of grievances and repression. There were two unexpected factors, however, that also played important roles in the causal processes leading up to each decision: change in leaders' goals, and splits and inter-factional conflict within the group.

The purpose of this chapter is to conduct congruence tests on a new case, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Southern Sudan, in order to identify whether the independent variables from this dissertation's hypotheses, and the new independent variables from the causal process analyses, are associated with increases and/or decreases

in the level of violence a secessionist group uses.¹³⁸ To that end, I have chosen two pivotal changes in the SPLA's level of violence: the last major increase in the SPLA's level of violence in September 1998, and the first truce between the Sudanese government and the SPLA in October 2002. I will conduct congruence tests to see if the observed relationships between the independent variables and the group's level of violence match the predicted relationship.

This chapter will consist of five sections, the first of which briefly highlights the findings from the congruence tests of the MFDC, and the causal process analyses of the 1991 ceasefire and the 2004 peace agreement. The second section lays out the refined hypotheses. In the third section I discuss why the SPLA was chosen, the specific observations for the congruence tests, and background on the SPLA and the context within which it operates. The fourth section presents the congruence test results for each hypothesis. The chapter concludes with a discussion of contending explanations, implications of the findings and whether these findings fit with those of the case study of the MFDC.

¹³⁸ I use congruence tests to explore the hypotheses in this chapter because unlike the MFDC case study, I do not have primary data for the SPLA group leaders. The lack of primary data makes it difficult, if not impossible to identify group leaders' perceptions, which is necessary when trying to identify causal relationships between independent variables and decision-making. Congruence tests, on the other hand, do not require primary data because the goal is to identify the presence of a certain variable and outcome (i.e. association), rather than causality.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The goal of the last three chapters was to explore the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 2, using congruence tests and causal process analyses. One of the most interesting findings is that the factors that lead to a secessionist group leader's decision to decrease the level of violence are different from the factors that lead to the decision to increase the level of violence. The dissertation's original hypotheses reflected the assumption that changes in the direction of the same set of factors led to changes in these decisions. For example, I hypothesized that an increase in group grievances would lead to an increase in the group's level of violence, and that a decrease in group grievances would lead to a decrease in the group's level of violence. The underlying assumption, based on the theoretical model, is that group grievances can lead to both an increase and decrease in the group's level of violence depending on whether grievances increase or decrease, but this is not the case.

Instead, the findings show that the set of independent variables that influence a leader's decision to decrease the level of violence is different from the set that influences the decision to increase the level of violence. Specifically, the findings show that the following variables influence secessionist group leaders' decisions to decrease the level of violence they use: decrease in group grievances; decrease in the level of government repression to low or none; a change in goals from independence to autonomy; and, a decrease in public support for the movement. On the other hand, the findings show that

Table 6.1 Expected Relationships Between Variables and Group Violence		
Variable	Increase in Group Violence	Decrease in Group Violence
Group Grievances	Increase in grievances associated with increase in group violence	Decrease in grievances associated with decrease in group violence
Government Repression	Increase in repression associated with increase in group violence	Decrease in repression associated with decrease in group violence
Change in Leaders' Goals*	No expected relationship	Change from secession to autonomy associated with decrease in group violence
Split within the Group*	No expected relationship	Split associated with decrease in group violence
Public Opinion*	No expected relationship	Decreasing public support for group/movement associated with decrease in group violence
* New variable not included in the original theoretical framework, but discovered in causal process analysis of the MFDC.		

increases in group grievances, and in the level of government repression to high, are associated with an increase in the group's level of violence.

Along with these unambiguous findings, the evidence was unable to clearly identify the nature of the relationship between some of the independent variables and the dependent variable. First, what impact, if any, does an intra-group split have on a group leader's decision to increase or decrease the level of violence the group uses? In the events leading up to the 1991 ceasefire, Sidy Badji's decision to split from the MFDC's political wing, at first glance, appears to have led to his decision to sign the ceasefire (i.e.

decrease the level of violence he used). It is more likely, however, that Badji's loss of faith in the MFDC's *raison d'être* led to his decision to split from the political wing, as well as his decision to change his goals from independence to autonomy within Sénégal.

Because these decisions happened almost simultaneously, it is impossible to tease out the exact sequence of events (without more data). For this reason, I cannot argue that the split led to the decision to sign the ceasefire because I cannot pinpoint the exact sequence, which must be established in order to show causality. It is possible that Badji's split from the political wing, by itself, had no impact on his decision to sign the ceasefire. The split might have been simply a consequence of his decision to change his goals, or the split might have only had an effect on Badji's decision as part of an interactive variable that included both the split and the goal change.

A second, related question is whether group splits, and fighting between existing factions, have the same impact on group leaders' decisions regarding the level of violence. It is possible that Badji's split from the political wing of the MFDC influenced his decision to sign the 1991 ceasefire. In the months leading up to the 2004 peace agreement, there was inter-factional fighting within the MFDC, but it is unclear whether this fighting had any effect on faction leaders' decisions to sign the agreement. There is a possibility that the inter-factional fighting led to decrease in the level of violence for all factions of the MFDC. It is also possible however, that this inter-factional fighting influenced some faction leaders' decisions *not* to sign the peace agreement because they did not want to cooperate with other factions.

A final question that arises from the findings deals with two of the independent variables: Does the level of government repression impact other independent variables, including goal change, group splits, and inter-factional fighting within groups (i.e. collinearity)? The evidence is clear on the role of the level of government repression leading up to the events leading up to the 2004 peace agreement: the S n galese government's decrease in the level of repression, along with the decrease in group grievances, influenced Abb  Diamacoune's decision to change his goal to autonomy. On the other hand, the evidence does not show that the level of government repression influenced inter-factional fighting. In February of 2004, the armies of S n gal and Guinea-Bissau launched a major offensive against the MFDC, which increased the level of government repression to high. At the same time, there was intense fighting between two factions of the MFDC. Leading up to the 2004 peace agreement, the government decreased its level of repression, but there was still fighting between the same two factions. If the level of government repression influenced inter-factional fighting, we should have seen the fighting change when the level of repression changed, but it did not. For this reason, I conclude that there is not collinearity between the level of government repression and inter-factional fighting in this observation.

REFINED HYPOTHESES

Based on the findings from the case study of the MFDC, as well as some of the questions not answered by the findings, I will explore a new set of hypotheses in this chapter.

These hypotheses address the unexpected explanatory variables found in the causal process analyses. In addition, the hypotheses include some of the old hypotheses that the findings supported, and the unclear relationships on which the findings shed light. The first set of hypotheses deals with increases in the group's level of violence, while the second set looks at decreases in the level of violence.¹³⁹

The first hypothesis, H1, addresses the importance of the level of government repression.

H1: If the level of government repression increases, the secessionist group will increase the level of violence it uses.

I should point out that though it includes one of the original independent variables, this hypothesized relationship is different from that expected in the original hypotheses on government repression. The findings from the congruence tests, and analyses of the 1991 ceasefire and 2004 peace agreement show that rather than the expected curvilinear relationship, there is a positive, linear relationship between the level of government repression and the group's level of violence. In other words, the empirical evidence shows that when the level of government repression increases, the group's level of violence also increases.

The second hypothesis addresses the relationship between group grievances and increases in the group's level of violence.

H2: If the secessionist group's grievances increase, the group will increase the level of violence it uses.

¹³⁹ Similar to the dissertation's original hypotheses, and Gurr and Moore's (1997) article, I test each of the possible relationships as its own univariate hypothesis.

The findings from the congruence test of group grievances supported this hypothesis, which is the same as the original hypothesis on group grievances. The next set of hypotheses will be used to predict the factors that lead to a secessionist group's decrease in the level of violence.

The third hypothesis concerns the relationship between a change in a group leader's goals, and the group's decrease in the level of violence.

H3: If a secessionist group leader changes goals from independence to autonomy, the leader will decrease the level of violence the group uses.

This hypothesized relationship is based on the findings from the analyses of the causal processes leading up to the 1991 ceasefire and the 2004 peace agreement. In both episodes, MFDC leaders changed goals from independence to autonomy, showing a likely association between this change in goals and the decision to decrease the group's level of violence with a formal agreement to stop fighting.

The fourth hypothesis addresses the relationship between splits within a group and the group's decrease in the level of violence it uses.

H4: If a split occurs within a secessionist group, secessionist group leaders will decrease the level of violence the group uses.

This expected relationship is based on the assumption that a split within the group decreases the group's ability to carry out any collective action, including violence. If this expectation is accurate, we should see the group's level of violence decrease in the period of time following the split, similar to the decrease in the MFDC's level of violence

following the split between Sidy Badji's military wing and Abbé Diamacoune's political wing.

The relationship between public support for the movement and the group's level of violence is the subject of the fifth hypothesis.

H5: If public support for the secessionist group, its goals, or its actions decreases, the secessionist group will decrease the level of violence it uses.

In the period leading up to the 1991 ceasefire, the public support for the MFDC and the Casamançais secessionist movement was strong, but by the 2004 peace agreement, the people in Casamance and the rest of the Sénégal were vocally opposed to continued violence. There were demonstrations, marches, and other gatherings urging the MFDC and Sénégalaise government to end the violence, and both sides responded by signing the peace agreement in 2004. For this reason, I expect that a similar decrease in public support for other secessionist groups will lead to a decrease in the level of violence they use.

The last two hypotheses that predict the factors associated with a decrease in the group's level of violence are taken from the original hypotheses.

H6: If the level of government repression decreases to low or none, the secessionist group will decrease the level of violence it uses.

H7: If secessionist group grievances decrease, the group will decrease the level of violence it uses.¹⁴⁰

¹⁴⁰ Because there are five independent variables and only two congruence test observations, it was not possible to test the hypotheses on the SPLA case without doing both a congruence test and causal process

These hypotheses are included in an effort to collect more empirical evidence on these relationships, and to identify whether the factors that were important in the MFDC's decreases in violence are also important in other secessionist groups' decreases in violence.

I should note that there are only two hypotheses that predict the factors associated with an increase in the group's level of violence because these are the only hypotheses on increases in group violence that were supported in the original tests. Unlike decreases in the group's level of violence, increases were only tested in the congruence tests, which are unable to discover new explanatory factors.¹⁴¹ The causal process analyses identified the three new independent variables included in the hypotheses on group decreases in violence. Because these same types of analyses were not used to test the hypotheses on increases in group violence, there are no other independent variables to explore in this case study.

In addition to these hypotheses, I will be exploring the role of other possible explanatory variables, including inter-factional conflict. Because the relationship between fighting amongst MFDC factions and leaders' decisions about the level of violence to use is unclear, it was not possible to formulate a clear hypothesis. Empirical evidence from studies of conflict resolution show that the presence of and conflict between multiple factions within a group make peace less likely (Stedman, 1997; Kydd

analysis (like in the MFDC case) . A causal process analysis would have provided evidence on the sequence of events and actors perceptions, which would have provided the additional evidence needed to test the hypotheses.

¹⁴¹ There is no hypothesis on the impact of group capacity because the findings showed that it had no relationship with increases in the group's level of violence.

and Walter, 2002). At the same time, the findings from my analysis of the 2004 peace agreement show that fighting between different factions of the MFDC was associated with faction leaders' decisions to decrease the level of violence they used. I do not argue that this fighting caused the decision to decrease the level of violence, however, because there were no observable implications that the fighting led to the decrease (i.e. none of the primary or secondary data cited a causal relationship). With all of these possibilities, the relationship between inter-factional conflict and decreases in a group's level of violence is ambiguous at best, and possibly spurious or non-existent. For this reason, I will use the case study of the SPLA to explore this relationship in order to generate hypotheses for future studies.

SUDAN AND THE SPLA

Case Selection

The purpose of this dissertation is to explain the decision-making processes of leaders of African secessionist groups with the hopes of generalizing beyond Africa in future research. I focus on secessionist movements in this region of the world because there is already a large body of empirical knowledge about secessionist groups in other parts of the world, especially Europe and the post-Soviet countries (though there are still few studies that examine changes in the group's level of violence over time).

Significantly fewer studies have been conducted on secessionist groups in Africa, which is one of the reasons I have chosen to focus on these groups for this dissertation.

I have also decided to limit the scope of generalizability to the population of African secessionist groups based on the assumption that secessionist movements operate differently around the world. This assumption is based on the findings of previous studies, which identify some of the following differences between African countries and countries in other regions of the world: lack of accountability for heads of state, even in relatively democratic countries; most electoral systems do not offer representation for smaller ethnic or religious groups while favoring the largest group; many artificial boundaries drawn by colonial powers, and several of these boundaries are the basis for secessionist groups; the international spread of violence, even secessionist violence, into neighboring countries, and the involvement of governments in civil wars in neighboring countries; and, the availability of potential revenue from easily-looted natural resources (e.g. alluvial diamonds, timber, drugs) (Baker, 2001; Englebert and Hummel, 2005; Buhaug and Rod, 2005).¹⁴²

Even with the similarities between countries on the African continent, there are many differences between countries, peoples, and secessionist groups. For this reason, I have chosen to use Przeworski and Teune's (1970) most different systems approach. According to Przeworski and Teune, the most different systems approach, "takes as its starting point the variation of the observed behavior at a level lower than that of

¹⁴² It is important to note that the assumption is not that these phenomena only occur on African soil, rather that they are more prevalent in more countries in this region than in any other in the world.

systems,” (34). In the context of this dissertation, the systems are countries, and the observed behavior is the increase or decrease in the level of violence used by secessionist groups, which are the units of analysis. Using the most different systems approach, “systemic factors are not given any special place among the possible predictors of behavior,” (34). This statement accurately reflects the predictors, or independent variables, for this dissertation, which focuses on the actions of the government and the intra-group characteristics as factors that can explain changes in secessionist groups’ levels of violence. As discussed in Chapter 1, most existing studies of political violence and secession focus on structural or systemic-level independent variables, such as a country’s ethnic make-up or natural resource dependence, and I chose the SPLA for the second case study because of the ways in which its context differs from the MFDC.

The first important difference between the two countries is that Sudan is a resource-rich country, and Sénégal is not. In fact, the disputed regions in Central and Southern Sudan are home to the country’s oil production and the 24th largest oil reserves in the world (*CIA World Factbook*). This is significant for several reasons, including the government’s desire to hold on to these regions at all costs. The difference in Sudan and Sénégal’s resource endowments is also significant because it will allow me to explore the importance of natural resources in secessionist group increases and decreases in violence. If the observed relationships between the independent variables of this dissertation and the dependent variable are similar in both cases, even though the resource endowments

are very different, the evidence will cast doubt on the importance of natural resource-based explanations.

In addition to the differences in the natural resource endowments of Sénégal and Sudan, there are differences in the religious and racial make-up of the groups fighting for independence. The MFDC is made up of Muslim, Christian, and animist members. Racially, there is no difference between MFDC members and the rest of the Sénégalaise population, who are all black. The SPLA, on the other hand, is comprised of mostly black, Christian and animist members.¹⁴³ These members differ from Sudanese in the north of the country, who are by and large Arab Muslims. In fact, religion and race are at the heart of group identity in southern Sudan, and the differences in religion and race are at the heart of the SPLA's claims against the northern-run Sudanese government. By contrasting the SPLA and the MFDC, I will be able to explore whether there are differences in the increases and decreases in violence in a group that is based on racial and religious identity, and one that is not.

Along with the ability to explore the hypotheses of this study, and those of contending theories, the most different systems approach increases the generalizability of the findings to other African secessionist groups. As discussed in Chapter 2, the MFDC was chosen as a case because of its resemblance to other secessionist groups in Africa, and for this reason, I argued that the findings from the case study would be generalizable to other groups in this population. The inclusion of a case study of the SPLA, however,

¹⁴³ Though many scholars refer to the race of southern Sudanese as African, I use the term "black" because both northerners and southerners are African, in the sense that they both inhabit the African continent.

will provide additional evidence on whether the findings on the MFDC are, in fact, generalizable to the SPLA and other African secessionist groups. If the findings from the MFDC are similar to those from the SPLA, this would provide additional evidence that the findings are generalizable. If the relationships between the variables are similar in two secessionist groups operating in such different countries- with very different natural resource endowments, ethnic make-up, and the several other variables of competing arguments- I will conclude that the findings are generalizable to other African secessionist groups.

In addition to the differences in the contexts within which the SPLA and the MFDC operate, the SPLA was chosen because it provides variation on the independent and dependent variables of concern for this study. The SPLA, like the MFDC, has seen several splits within the group, as well as changes in the levels of government repression, group grievances, goals, public support, and the level of violence the SPLA has used. This variation provides multiple observations from which to choose for the two congruence tests I will conduct.

Observations

In order to carry out the congruence test, I chose one observation of an increase in the SPLA's level of violence, and one observation of a decrease.¹⁴⁴ Secondary data was collected on the events during the year leading up to the SPLA's increase in its level of

¹⁴⁴ For an explanation of the congruence test's methods of data analysis, please see Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

violence in September 1998, and the SPLA's decrease in its level of violence in October 2002. I chose to collect data for one year prior to each event because the findings from the causal process analyses of the MFDC's 1991 ceasefire and 2004 peace agreement showed that it took between six months and one month for a change in an independent variable to lead to a change in the group's level of violence. For this reason, I aggregated the value of all events into two, six month episodes leading up to the month of the congruence test observation. I then subtracted the value of each variable in the first episode ($t - 12$ through $t - 7$) from the values in the second episode ($t - 6$ through $t - 1$), in order to calculate the change (i.e. increase or decrease) in each independent variable. For example, for the observation of the SPLA's increase in its level of violence in September 1998, I subtracted the value of government repression for episode 1 (September 1997 – February 1998), which was 8, from the value of government repression for episode 2 (March – August 1998), which was 10. Because this subtraction left me with a positive number (2), I coded the change in the level of government repression as an increase for the episode leading up to the increase in the SPLA's increase in violence in September 1998.

The choice of the specific observation was based on several factors. First, the observations were chosen based on their value on the dependent variable - an increase or decrease in the group's level of violence). Both observations were also chosen because they mark a significant milestone in the civil war that has lasted over two decades. The SPLA's increase in violence in September 1998 marked a major increase in successful

attacks against the Sudanese govt. The SPLA's decrease in its level of violence in October 2002 was chosen because it marked the first time that the political wing of the SPLA, often referred to as the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), agreed to a comprehensive ceasefire with the government. Both of these observations also show a clear change from the SPLA's actions in the previous month and episode, which allows me to be relatively sure that the change did not actually occur over a period of more than one month. Before moving to the discussion of the observations, it is important to understand the context within which this secessionist movement operates.

Sudan, Southern Sudan, and the SPLA

The SPLA has been fighting the Sudanese government for either autonomy or independence since 1983.¹⁴⁵ Long before the emergence of the SPLA, however, Southern Sudan began the first civil war against the newly independent Sudan. For a variety of reasons, since Sudan's independence from Egypt and Britain in 1956, the southern region has sought separation. The most often cited reasons include the stark differences between the peoples of the north and south of the country, as well as the grievances that stem from these differences. Race, religion, and ethnicity are the three major differences between Southern Sudan, and the remainder of the country. The majority of Sudan's population is Arab and Muslim (45%), and most of this group lives

¹⁴⁵ Though John Garang, the leader of the SPLA until his death in 2005, was unwavering in his desire for autonomy within Sudan, the vast majority of Southern Sudanese were in favor of secession. As a compromise with citizens and leaders of other Southern Sudanese groups, Garang agreed to allow everyone to vote in a referendum on the status of the region. For details of Garang's strategy, see Collins, 1999.

in the north.¹⁴⁶ Southern Sudan, on the other hand, is largely black, and Christian or animist. Though Arabs are not the only ethnic group in northern Sudan, the only other ethnic group that constitutes more than 5% of the country's total population is the Beja, which make up 6%. Most of the country's ethnic diversity, however, can be found in Southern Sudan. The Dinka and Nuer make up the largest ethnic groups of Southern Sudan at 16% and 6%, respectively, and even within both of these groupings, there are further distinctions made at the clan level (www.pplgrps.net; Johnson, 1998; *CIA World Factbook*, 2009).

The fact that these differences exist is not, in and of itself, what aggrieves the SPLA. Instead, the fact that the racial and religious differences are directly related to the distribution of power and wealth in Sudan is the source of Southern Sudan's grievances. According to Douglas Johnson, the citizens of Southern Sudan have been largely excluded from positions of power, and "it is their marginalization from the main thrust of post-independence political and economic control in the Sudan which has created the grievances leading to two periods of civil war," (1998: 55). In addition, since the country's first military coup in 1958 each regime was increasingly hostile to non-Arab Muslims. These grievances, which were not exclusive to Southern Sudan, led to the creation of Anyanya, the first group to fight for the independence of Southern Sudan.

The disputed territory of Southern Sudan is roughly one-third of the total area of Sudan, the largest country on the African continent. It is from this region that the

¹⁴⁶ Because there does not seem to be a clear consensus on whether Arabs constitute a race or ethnic group, for the purpose of this dissertation, I consider them both. This is in line with most sources that provide numbers for the races and ethnic groups of Sudan (*CIA World Factbook*; www.pplgrps.net, etc.).

Anyanya launched Sudan's first civil war in the early 1960s. Though the group experienced some successes, including some measure of self-government, Anyanya, like the future SPLA, was split along ethno-geographic lines. Within Anyanya, there were factions representing various clans of the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups in different parts of the region, and these factions often fought each other as much as they fought the Sudanese government.

Despite these differences within Southern Sudan, and between the north and the south, all parties were able to negotiate a peace agreement in 1972, ending the war. The Addis Ababa Agreement, named for the Ethiopian capital where it was signed, was supposed to give Southern Sudan the right to self-government (*BBC* "Timeline: Sudan," 2009). By the early 1980s, however, leaders in Southern Sudan began voicing growing opposition to the Sudanese government. Along with the grievances that sparked the first civil war, there were several new ones, including the government's failure to implement any of the concessions of the Addis Ababa Agreement (Johnson, 1998; Rone, 2003). One of the most significant post-civil-war grievances grew out of an event that would change Sudan forever: the discovery of oil in 1978.

Despite the government's best efforts to encourage the discovery of oil in the north, Chevron discovered oil in Bentiu in Southern Sudan (Rone, 2003). Though this discovery should have been the beginning of a better economic future for the people of the region, instead they became increasingly aware that the government had little intention of allowing them to reap the benefits of the discovery. The first sign came from

the government's decision to change the map of Sudan to move the oilfield from Southern Sudan to the north (Rone, 2003: 129). Though the government changed the decision before it was carried out, it confirmed the suspicions of Southern Sudanese Leaders and citizens. The last new grievance that developed before the SPLA's creation was the government's 1983 declaration that the entire country would follow Shari'a law. Given that the vast majority of citizens in Southern Sudan were Christian or animist, perhaps this was the catalyst for the founding of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its army (SPLA) in the same year (*BBC* "Timeline: Sudan," 2009). At the time of its creation, the SPLA's goal was autonomy within a united Sudan, which was a major point of departure from its secessionist predecessor, Anyanya.

With help from Ethiopia (and later Eritrea and Uganda), by the late 1980s the SPLA had gained "control of much of the Ethiopian border, the whole of the Kenyan border, and almost all of the rural area of the Southern Sudan, and planted its forces outside the South in the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile," (Johnson, 1998: 59).¹⁴⁷ This area represents almost the entire region of Southern Sudan, and parts of northern Sudan just over the border. By the early 1990s, however, the SPLA began facing internal strife, and 1991 saw the group's first official split. The SPLA's first splinter group was the SPLA-United, run by Riek Mashar.¹⁴⁸ While the Dinka ethnic group made

¹⁴⁷ Ethiopia accused the government of Sudan of supporting opposition groups within Ethiopia, which is one of the reasons Johnson cites for Ethiopia's role in helping the SPLA. Uganda and Eritrea would later make the same claims, and offer similar assistance, which included equipment, military training, and sanctuary for rear bases.

¹⁴⁸ To ease confusion, I will refer to the original SPLA simply as the SPLA, and any splinter group will be identified by SPLA followed by the name it goes by or the location in which it operates.

up the majority of the SPLA's members, SPLA-United was majority Nuer. Though this split appears to be solely along ethnic lines, there was another major point of contention: the SPLA's goal was autonomy, but the SPLA-United's goal was secession (Johnson, 1998; Collins, 1999).

In fact, according to Robert Collins (1999), the majority of the population in Southern Sudan wanted to secede, regardless of their ethnic identity. This difference in goals was the main factor that distinguished the SPLA from each of its splinter groups. Though the SPLA's leader, John Garang, was genuinely committed to autonomy, the fact that his group's goal was *not* secession opened up the possibility of alliances with opposition groups throughout Sudan, as well as alliances with the governments of neighboring countries (Johnson, 1998; Collins, 1999).¹⁴⁹ These alliances, especially those with other governments, helped the SPLA achieve success throughout the 1980s, but the 1991 split hurt the group. By the end of 1991, the different factions were actually fighting each other and killing civilians based on their ethnicity and assumed support for a rival faction (*MAR* "Chronology," 1998; Johnson, 1998).

Several more splits occurred in 1992-1993, and 1993 saw the first of many ceasefires signed by the SPLA (the other factions did not sign). Fighting continued amongst the different factions, and between these factions and the government of Sudan throughout the mid-1990s. In 1997, the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM),

¹⁴⁹ Collins (1999) and Johnson (1998) argue that other Sudanese opposition groups would only ally themselves with other groups that were fighting to change the system of a united, federal Sudan. They both also argue that other governments in the region would not support a group fighting for independence for fear of setting a dangerous precedent for secessionist groups operating within their borders.

the name by which the SPLA-United came to be known, and the SPLA-Bahr al-Ghazal faction signed a comprehensive peace agreement with the government. This agreement, which was denounced by the SPLA, made Southern Sudan an autonomous, self-governing region (again), and contained a clause for a referendum on Southern Sudan's independence to be held in 2001 (*MAR* "Chronology," 1998). In March 1998, the government appointed the leader of SSIM, Riek Mashar as President of the new government, and named this government the Democratic Salvation Front ("New Government Appointed for Southern Sudan," 1998). In the same month, the government drafted a new constitution that included provisions for the new, autonomous government in Southern Sudan, and in May 1998, 96% of Sudanese voters supported the new constitution.

At the same time that the government was drafting this constitution and appointing the new Southern Sudan government, however, it was bombing cities in Southern Sudan held by the SPLA, including the bombing of a hospital that killed 11 civilians and wounded 48 others ("Sudanese Government Aircraft Bombs Southern Town," 1998). Following the government's increased bombings of SPLA-held areas, and despite a unilateral ceasefire the SPLA signed just two months earlier, the SPLA began a major offensive against government positions in the region in September 1998. Intense fighting continued until October 2002, when the SPLA and the government signed their first comprehensive peace agreement since the war began (*BBC* "Timeline: Sudan," 2009). These major changes in the SPLA's actions- the drastic increase in the level of

violence in September 1998 and the first comprehensive peace agreement in October 2002- are the observations for the congruence tests that follow.

CONGRUENCE TESTS OF THE SPLA INCREASE IN VIOLENCE

In September 1998, the SPLA began a series of successful military campaigns that resulted in the capture of key government positions. Though violence between the SPLA and the government had been fairly constant throughout the 1990s, these campaigns marked a dramatic increase in the SPLA's level of violence from previous months. In fact, only two months before these attacks, the SPLA had announced a unilateral ceasefire in an effort to improve the ability of humanitarian agencies to provide food and medical services to the region ("Sudan rebels declare ceasefire," 1998). In order to identify the factors associated with the SPLA's increase in its level of violence in September, I collected secondary data on all events in the region from September 1997-September 1998. I then created a measure of each independent variable for each month, and aggregated these into two separate episodes: September 1997 – February 1998 (Episode 1); March – August 1998 (Episode 2).

For the congruence test of H1, the evidence supports the claim that an increase in group grievances will lead to an increase in the group's level of violence. During Episode 2, the six month period immediately before the SPLA's increase in violence, the group's grievances increased dramatically from the prior six month period. In addition to drafting a new constitution that made Islam and Shari'a the basis for law in Sudan, the

government set up the leader of a rival faction, Riek Mashar, to lead the newly appointed government of Southern Sudan (*MAR* “Chronology,” 1998; “New Government Appointed for Southern Sudan,” 1998). The observed association between the increase in group grievances and the increase in the group’s level of violence is congruent with the hypothesized relationship, which provides support for H1.

For H2, the hypothesis about government repression, the evidence also supports the prediction that an increase in the level of government repression will lead to an increase in the group’s level of violence. Though the government used repression in Episode 1, there was only one incident of severe repression that resulted in the death of five civilians (“Sudanese Government Aircraft Bombs Southern Town,” 1998). Beginning in March, however, there were several incidents of the government bombing civilian targets, including hospitals and humanitarian agencies, which resulted in dozens of civilian casualties and injuries (*MAR* “Chronology,” 1998; “Hospital bombed in rebel-held south,” 1998; “Horror Massacre Reported in Southern Sudan,” 1998; “Sudan warplane bombs hospital,” 1998). Like the congruence tests and causal process analyses of the MFDC, the observed relationship between the increase in the government’s level of repression and the SPLA’s increase in its level of violence is congruent with the hypothesized relationship. This provides further evidence that there is a positive, linear relationship between the level of government repression and the group’s level of violence.

CONGRUENCE TESTS FOR THE SPLA DECREASE IN VIOLENCE

Once the SPLA increased its level of violence in late 1998, intense fighting continued over the next three years between the SPLA and Sudan's government, as well as between the SPLA and rival factions. During this time, Riek Mashar was still running the autonomous government of Southern Sudan, but in February 2001, he resigned his post. He cited the government's failure to uphold its part of the 1997 peace agreement, and the government's use of force on Mashar's troops in Southern Sudan. In January 2002, Garang and Mashar announced that the SPLA and the SSIM had reconciled, in the hopes of successfully ending the civil war ("Rebel Leaders Announce Merger," 2002). Though both leaders committed to the peace process, which took place in fits and spurts throughout the war without much success, the newly-merged SPLA also committed to continuing to fight until the government agreed to negotiate the Southern Sudan's right to self-determination.

The month after the reconciliation, a government attack killed a Medicines Sans Frontiers employee and four other civilians ("MSF Worker and Four Civilians Killed in Bentiu Area," 2002). There was also fierce fighting around the oil fields along the border between Southern Sudan and the north, and a series of several successful SPLA attacks on strategic government positions ("Focus on Oil-Related Clashes in Western Upper Nile," 2002). Also during this time, there were continued peace talks, but neither side was committed to a genuine cessation of military activities for the benefit of the talks ("Peace Process in the Balance," 2002). All of this changed in October 2002, however,

when both sides agreed to a “landmark ceasefire agreement” that included the entire country (“Truce Agreement Signed,” 2002; *BBC* “Timeline: Sudan, 2009). In fact, though there were and continue to be clashes between the SPLA and the government, this ceasefire marked the end of continuous fighting, and the beginning of the end of the war. The end result of the peace talks that were facilitated by the October 2002 ceasefire was a comprehensive peace agreement between the SPLA and the government of Sudan in January 2005, and the end of the 22-year-old civil war.

Results

For the congruence tests of the hypotheses addressing a decrease in a group’s level of violence, I collected data from October 2001 – October 2002, and divided the monthly measures into two episodes: October 2001 – March 2002 (Episode 1); April – September 2002 (Episode 2). Unfortunately, the level of government repression was the only independent variable to change from Episode 1 to Episode 2, so it was only possible to conduct a congruence test of H7.¹⁵⁰

The evidence from the congruence test of the relationship between the level of government repression and group level of violence supports H7’s claim that a decrease in the former will lead to a decrease in the latter. Throughout much of 2001 and early 2002, the Sudanese government continued using a high level of repression against the SPLA, which, by January 2002, was operating as a relatively unitary actor. After significant

¹⁵⁰ To combat this problem in future research, I will include more observations, and some of these observations will be chosen based on a change in the value of these independent variables. The impact of splits in the SPLA will be discussed in the conclusion.

pressure from the international community, especially neighboring countries and the US, the Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, and the SPLA's leader, John Garang, met in person for the first time since the war began ("Talks Bring Hope for Sudan Peace," 2002; "Government Denies Launching Offensive in Oil Region," 2002). They were unable to reach a ceasefire, but the government's willingness to meet with the SPLA was an important change in its policy toward Southern Sudan. This was not the first time representatives of these leaders had met, but it was the first time they themselves met. Agreeing to meet with Garang and the SPLA meant that the President, for the first time, acknowledged his important role in the peace process, and recognized the SPLA's position of leadership in Southern Sudan.

These peace talks did not end the fighting, as there was no ceasefire put in place, but they were evidence of the government's decrease in the level of repression. Just before the ceasefire was signed in October 2002, however, both sides dramatically increased their levels of repression and violence, respectively, in a last-ditch effort to gain territory before an agreement was reached ("Government Suspends Peace Talks," 2002; "Ceasefire Will Bring Us Back to Talks," 2002; "SPLA Commander Speaks," 2002). Even with this fighting, however, the government's overall level of repression decreased from Episode 1 to Episode 2, though the SPLA's level of violence increased over the same period. This finding supports H7, which predicted that a decrease in the level of government repression would lead to a decrease in the group's level of violence.

Inter-Faction Fighting Within the SPLA

As mentioned above, I could not conduct a congruence test of the impact of the SPLA's inter-factional conflict, but I did observe the values of this independent variable in the hopes of discovering a pattern regarding the causes and consequences of inter-factional conflict, as well as group splits, in the SPLA and the MFDC. Regarding the causes of these phenomena, in the early 1990s, only one decade after the creation of the SPLA, the group experienced two major splits (these splits will be discussed in detail in the next chapter). Johnson (1998) cites differences in goals, and the loss of Ethiopia as an ally as the main reasons for this split. Though Garang, the SPLA's leader, created the group to fight for autonomy, the majority of Southern Sudanese, including the leaders of the future splinter groups, wanted independence. Before its fall, however, the Ethiopian government backed Garang as the sole leader of the group, and helped him quell opposition within the group. With regime change in Ethiopia, Garang no longer benefited from this support, and the splinter groups broke away from the SPLA to fight for independence. Another source of friction within the group was inter-ethnic rivalry. Though Sudan is often portrayed as a contradiction between the Arab north and Black south, this picture does not accurately reflect the ethnic heterogeneity of Southern Sudan. In addition to the differences in goals, the first split in the SPLA, between Garang and Mashar, was also based on ethnic rivalry between the Dinka (Garang) and the Nuer (Mashar).

Along with the different goals and ethnic rivalries seen in the SPLA case, there are other possible reasons for group splits and inter-factional conflict. In the MFDC, the most violent faction is led by Salif Sadio, and is opposed by all other factions of the group. A leader of one of these other factions explained that Sadio is young and overly ambitious, which has led to strife within the group.¹⁵¹ This comment points to differences in age and entrepreneurial leadership as possible causes of inter-factional conflict. These differences in goals, ethnicity, age, and self-interests (whatever they may be) all potentially impact group splits and/or inter-factional fighting, and are definitely worth exploring in greater detail in future research. Since splits and inter-factional fighting are not addressed in studies of secession and rarely addressed in studies of political violence, the future research that would address the occurrence of these phenomena in secession might utilize theories from the institutions and political parties literature, which includes debates on the roles of hardliners and moderates, and rational choice and collective action literatures, which might offer explanations of differences in actors preferences.

Along with potential explanations of the causes of splits and inter-factional conflict, the observations of these phenomena in the MFDC and SPLA cases might also offer potential explanations of their consequences. Prior to the SPLA's increase in its level of violence in September 1998, there was conflict between the SPLA and one of its splinter groups, the SSIM. The conflict was mainly due to the latter's appointment as the ruling party of the region, with the leader of the SSIM being appointed president of

¹⁵¹ Interview with military commander of the MFDC's bases in Guinea-Bissau, February 11, 2008.

Southern Sudan. There were no reports of violence between the two groups, but the SPLA began increasing its level of violence less than two months after the appointment, with the major increase coming just six months after the appointment. Not only did the SPLA dramatically increase its level of violence in September, its military campaign was more successful than any of its other campaigns in years. Though this is not definitive evidence that the inter-factional conflict between the SPLA and the SSIM influenced the SPLA's decision to increase its level of violence, it is evidence that the relationship between inter-factional conflict and group level of violence should be further explored.

The dynamics of inter-factional relations between the SPLA and its splinter groups also changed in the period before the SPLA's decrease in the level of violence in October 2002. In January 2002, John Garang and Riek Mashar, leader of the SSIM, declared that the SPLA and SSIM were reconciling, and would work together going forward. This announcement came just ten months before the October ceasefire. The causal process analyses did not provide evidence to generate expectations about the role of inter-factional cooperation. This observation of the SPLA in 2002, however, highlights the possibility of a relationship between inter-factional cooperation and a decrease in the group's level of violence. Of course, more research would be needed to identify such a relationship. This exploration of inter-factional relations, then, demonstrates that there is a possible relationship between changes in these relations and changes in a secessionist group's level of violence, and that the consequences of inter-factional conflict and cooperation might lead to these changes in group violence. To

explore this possibility in future research, I will look at bargaining literature within the study of international conflict, which highlights the role of uncertainty, a problem that grows with the presence of each additional faction at the bargaining table, as an obstacle to conflict resolution. Studies of democratic transition and development might also offer insight into the consequences of many different actors (with different goals) being involved in negotiations, since these studies often examine the resulting paths that emerge from the conflicting goals of the actors in these negotiations.

CONTENDING APPROACHES AND IMPLICATIONS

Contending Approaches

Of the two main independent variables of economic approaches to the study of secession, natural resources and scarce resources, natural resources are the only independent variable that changed during the course of the war. With the discovery of oil in Southern Sudan in 1978, one might conclude that the SPLA began fighting the civil war with Sudan out of greed. There is evidence, however, that this conclusion would be premature. It is true that the discovery of oil changed the future of both Sudan, but one thing it did not change was the tension that already existing between the north and south of the country. In fact, the first civil war between the two, which began in the early 1960s, was fought and ended long before this discovery. The grievances mentioned

above had been brewing since before Sudan gained independence in 1956, and it is the existence of these grievances that led to the first civil war.

Another important piece of evidence that refutes the argument that the discovery of oil motivated the SPLA to begin Sudan's second civil war is that when the war began, the SPLA's goal was neither secession, nor overtaking the government in Khartoum. Until his death in 2005, John Garang fought for greater autonomy and self-rule as part of a federal democracy, but at no point expressed a desire to secede from Sudan. To be sure, Southern Sudan and the SPLA wanted what it considered to be its share of the oil revenue, but did not seek control over the oil fields, some of which are located outside of and on the border with the region.

If control of future oil production, or what Michael Ross (2004) calls "booty futures," was a motivating factor for the SPLA, we should have seen the group fighting for control of the oil fields once the discovery was made. Instead, the group wasn't even founded until 1983, five years after oil was discovered, and there are no reports of the group working with oil companies to secure revenue from the promise of future rights to oil production. In fact, the Sudanese government still controls all production of oil in the country, even in Southern Sudan, and simply pays Southern Sudan a share of the profits.

Even with the evidence to the contrary, if one were to assume that the desire to control oil revenue was one of the factors that motivated the SPLA to begin the second civil war, the discovery of oil in 1978 cannot explain the SPLA's decision to increase its level of violence twenty years later. There were no significant changes in Sudan's oil

industry in the months, or even years, before the SPLA increased its level of violence in September 1998. To the contrary, the country did not begin exporting oil until August 1999, nearly a year after the SPLA's increase in violence. Even after oil exports began, the country was not expected to make a large profit for years ("Sudan Begins Oil Exports," 1999). For these reasons, natural resource arguments are unable to explain any changes in the level of violence used by the SPLA, including both the September 1998 increase and October 2002 decrease.

Unlike natural resource arguments, ethnicity-based sociological arguments do a much better job explaining the SPLA's motivation for beginning the civil war in 1983. Both the ethnic fractionalization and the ethnic dominance arguments accurately predict the onset of civil war in Sudan. The SPLA's major grievances involve political and economic discrimination, which is based on ethnic/racial and religious differences between the north and Southern Sudan. Ethnic fractionalization arguments hold that the presence of roughly one hundred different ethnic groups in Sudan will lead to violence between these ethnic groups.¹⁵² Ethnic dominance arguments, on the other hand, hold that smaller ethnic groups in Sudan will fight Arabs because they make up approximately 45% of the population, making them politically and economically dominant. Both sets of arguments correctly predict both civil wars that have occurred in Sudan.

These ethnicity-based arguments are not, however, able to explain changes in the SPLA's level of violence once the war began. There were no changes in Sudan's ethnic

¹⁵² None of the sources identify the number of ethnic groups in Sudan. The estimate of one hundred ethnic groups comes from Douglas Johnson's (1998) assessment that there are one hundred distinct languages spoken in Sudan.

make-up before the SPLA increased its level of violence in September 1998, and decreased its level of violence in October 2002, nor were there any changes in ethnic make-up before any of the other instances in which the group changed its level of violence. If ethnic fractionalization or dominance had any impact on the group's decision to increase or decrease its level of violence, there would have been changes in these variables prior to the changes in the group's level of violence.

Unlike the ethnicity-based arguments, but similar to the economic arguments, the independent variables of geopolitical theories are unable to account for either the onset of the war or changes in the SPLA's level of violence during the war. In Southern Sudan, the Dinka, who make up 16% of the total population of Sudan, make up the majority of population, followed by the Nuer, who make up only 6% of Sudan's total population. Toft's (2003) theory of territorial indivisibility would predict that the Dinka will use violence to gain independence because they are a concentrated majority in Southern Sudan, and they consider this region to be their territorial homeland, which gives them the ability and legitimacy to secede. In actuality, the SPLA, which is majority Dinka, began the movement fighting for greater autonomy in a united Sudan, rather than secession. The SSIM, on the other hand, which is made up by Nuer majority, was a secessionist group when it split from the SPLA in 1991. The Nuer secessionist goals are not contrary to Toft's prediction because she argues that concentrated minorities in a region are also likely to fight for independence when they also consider the territory their homeland. Therefore, territorial indivisibility theory can explain Nuer secessionist goals,

but not the lack of secessionist goals within the group representing Southern Sudan's largest ethnic group.

Toft's argument with respect to the government's reasons for using repression, however, might explain the Sudanese government's use and level of repression, which would indirectly explain changes in the group's level of violence. Toft argues that when a country is home to more than one separatist group, the government's fear of setting a dangerous precedent will force it to use repression against a group that attempts to secede. This argument might shed light on why the Sudanese government increased its level of repression in 1998, leading to the SPLA's increase in its level of violence later the same year. In the years leading up to the government's dramatic increase in repression in 1998, another region of Sudan began expressing its desire for self-determination. Though there had rarely, if ever, been good relations between the Sudanese government and the western region of Darfur, in June 1997, the region declared that it wanted an agreement granting them autonomy similar to the one the government had signed with Southern Sudan (represented by the SSIM) two months earlier (*MAR* "Chronology," 1998).

The government did not reach an agreement with Darfur. In fact, as most of the world has seen, the government and its sponsored militia have responded to this declaration with a level of violence that has led to an International Criminal Court warrant for President al-Bashir's arrest for war crimes and crimes against humanity ("World reaction: Bashir warrant," 2009). Even with its agreement with the SSIM to run

the government of Southern Sudan, the government increased its level of repression against the SPLA, who controlled large parts of the region, and was calling for greater autonomy. Perhaps the government feared that by granting the SPLA the level of autonomy that it desired, the precedent would be set for Darfur, which might have motivated its decision to increase the level of repression against the group. Even considering this possibility, the argument regarding the fear of precedent-setting cannot explain why the government decreased its level of repression in 2002, since Darfur was still calling for autonomy at the time.

Implications

The findings from the data on the SPLA case offer several implications.¹⁵³ First, the government's decrease in its level of repression against the SPLA in 1998 was a sufficient factor in the group's decrease in its level of violence. I draw this conclusion because none of the other independent variables of this study changed, which shows that even when the level of repression is the only variable to change, the group's level of violence will also change. Though repression changed in both the 1998 increase and 2002 decrease in the SPLA's level of violence, these two observations alone are not enough evidence to argue that a change in repression is a necessary factor for a change in the group's level of violence.

¹⁵³ This section will discuss the specific implications of this case. In the concluding chapter I compare and contrast the findings from the SPLA case with those from the MFDC.

Unlike the role of repression, the role of group grievances in explaining changes in the group's level of violence in these two observations is clear: changes in group grievances were neither a necessary, nor sufficient cause of changes in the SPLA's level of violence. A change in group grievances was not a necessary factor in SPLA changes in violence because group grievances neither increased nor decreased in the months leading up to the October 2002 ceasefire, yet the SPLA's level of violence dramatically decreased. There is also no evidence that a change in group grievances was sufficient in the SPLA's 1998 increase in violence because there was a simultaneous change in the level of government repression, both of which led to the SPLA's increase in its level of violence.

It is even clearer that changes in group goals or public opinion, or group splits are neither necessary nor sufficient explanations in decreases in a group's level of violence. There was absolutely no change in any of these variables in the year leading up to the ceasefire in 2002, yet the SPLA decreased its level of violence in October. This fact leads to a related question: Why were there no changes in group goals or public opinion, and why were there no group splits in this time period? The first and most obvious possible answer is that these variables simply do not change as often as group grievances or the level of government repression in separatist movements in general, or the SPLM specifically.

There is also the possibility that change in these variables is so gradual that it is not often reported because it is impossible to pinpoint the exact moment that public

opinion, for example, changed from unwavering support of the SPLA to wanting the SPLA to negotiate an end to the war regardless of the outcome. The only way to identify these graduate changes would be to ask about them specifically when conducting interviews (a strategy I will use in future research). Yet another possibility is that goals and public opinion change, and groups split, but they just happened not to have changed in the year before this observation. This is the most likely possibility for splits because several splinter groups split from the SPLA, especially during the early 1990s.

The existence of these splinter groups highlights another important implication: separatist and secessionist groups are not unitary actors. Even though there was not a split in the SPLA in the months leading up to its increase in violence in September 1998, or the decrease in October 2002, the data from the entire timeframe of the movement provide additional evidence that researchers must carefully examine and explain which faction is responsible for the actions being studied. With the first split in 1991, which led to the formation of the first splinter group, the SPLA-United (which became the SSIM), it was no longer accurate to refer to the SPLA as a unitary actor, and since 1991, the name the “SPLA” should only have been used when referring to the original, mainstream group. In collecting data, I had to be sure that reports were speaking of John Garang’s SPLA, rather than the SPLA-United, SPLA-Bahr al-Ghazal, SPLA-Nasir, or any other splinter group.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ Fortunately, journalists reporting on Southern Sudan, unlike those reporting on the MFDC, treated these as separate groups, so it was not difficult to identify the specific actors.

Treating each faction as a separate group or actor is particularly important for Southern Sudan because there are several significant differences between the groups. The major difference has been that they do not share the same goals: the SPLA has always fought for autonomy within Sudan, while most other groups in the region want secession (Johnson, 1998; *MAR* "Chronology," 1998). The groups have also had very different relationships with the Sudanese government, which has led to different grievances and different levels of repression.

The fact that Riek Mashar, leader of the SSIM at the time, was made president of the government of the semi-autonomous Southern Sudan, yet John Garang did not meet with President al-Bashir until 2002 speaks volumes about the differences in the groups' relationships with the government. Even while working with the SSIM, the government continued to bomb everyone in SPLA-held towns, including Sudanese civilians and relief agency staff, which shows the different levels of repression experienced by the SSIM and the SPLA. These different relationships were, at some points, the basis for new grievances (e.g. the government's appointment of Mashar to the head of Southern Sudan's government became a grievance for the SPLA), which provides even more evidence that these groups cannot be treated as a unitary actor.

The differences between these two rival factions became a non-issue in January 2002 when they merged, a fact that leads to an important policy implication. Once these two groups, which had been at odds since 1991, reconciled their differences and merged, it took less than one year to sign the first comprehensive ceasefire in the 19 years since

the war began. This is significant because both the SSIM and the SPLA at various points throughout the 1990s sat down to talks with the government, but even when an agreement was signed, it never lasted long.¹⁵⁵

Once the two groups came together, however, the SPLA, the name used by the newly merged group, had better leverage at the bargaining table because it could make credible commitments to the government based on the fact that it now controlled the majority of the combatants. The government no longer had to worry that if it made a deal with one group, then the other group would attempt to foil the peace process.¹⁵⁶ The government also knew that it was speaking to the leaders who controlled the vast majority of Southern Sudan, which it had not done before, so there was a greater likelihood that any agreement that was reached could be applied to most, if not all of the region. The speed with which the government was able to reach an agreement with the newly merged SPLA should serve as a deterrent to governments that seek to “divide and conquer” opposition groups because in this case, it was not until the divisions disappeared that the real peace process began.

¹⁵⁵ After the SSIM split from the SPLA in 1991, it went back and forth between working with the government (who some accused of helping create the splinter group) and fighting violently against it. In 1998, Riek Mashar, leader of the SSIM, was appointed president of the government of Southern Sudan, and worked with the government. In 2001, however, Mashar left his post as leader of the government of Southern Sudan and went back to fighting the government (Johnson, 1998; *MAR* “Chronology,” 1998; *BBC News* “Timeline: Sudan,” 2009).

¹⁵⁶ The other factions were not a significant threat for the government because they were small, poorly organized, and had few resources. The government’s assessment paid off when all warring parties signed the 2005 peace agreement.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to collect data and conduct congruence tests on the hypotheses generated from the findings in the MFDC case study. Though I collected data on the SPLA from 1983-2005, I focused on two observations for the tests: a major increase in the SPLA's level of violence in September 1998; and, the decrease in the SPLA's level of violence in October 2002 that resulted in the signing of the first comprehensive ceasefire between the SPLA and the Sudanese government. I found that an increase in group grievances and the level of government repression led to the increase in the SPLA's level of violence in 1998, while a decrease in the level of government repression led to decrease in 2002.

These findings support the hypotheses, and are consistent with the findings from the MFDC congruence tests and causal process analyses. Though the systems (in this case countries) that the groups operated in were "most different," the observed relationships between the variables were similar. These similar outcomes in two countries that differed on most of the variables of concern for contending arguments, including very different natural resource endowments, provides additional evidence that these arguments cannot explain changes in separatist or secessionist groups' levels of violence.

Even though the evidence supported the hypotheses of this project, there are definitely questions that remain that provide possible directions for future research. First, continuing to examine the SPLA, can this dissertation's hypotheses explain the current

situation in Southern Sudan? Following the 2002 ceasefire, the government and the SPLA continued peace talks until they reached a peace agreement in January 2005. This agreement covers the major grievances of the SPLA and Southern Sudan by granting greater autonomy in the region, and scheduling a 2011 referendum on whether Southern Sudan will remain an autonomous region of Sudan, or secede. This peace agreement was a compromise between the SPLA and the government, and the people of Southern Sudan because both the SPLA and the government want a united Sudan, while the majority of the population in the region wants independence (Johnson, 1998; Matheson, 2005).

In July 2005, just three weeks before his death in a helicopter crash, John Garang became the Vice President of Sudan, a new post to be held by the leader of the autonomous government in Southern Sudan. Later the same year, the government of Southern Sudan is appointed and granted self-rule, as well as membership in the national unity government. Though there were violent clashes between the government and the SPLA in November 2006, there was relative peace in the region until fighting broke out in May 2008. Most of the fighting has taken place on the border between north and south, which is home to most of the oil fields. By July 2009, most of the cross-border fighting died down when The Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague decided the boundary between the north and south. Though the ruling gave most of the disputed territory to the north, both sides accepted the ruling (*BBC* "Timeline: Sudan," 2009; "Sudan tense for oil border ruling," 2009).

Unfortunately, as the border dispute ended, the region experienced a sharp increase in violence between the ethnic groups of Southern Sudan. In 2009, over 2000 people have died as a result of this violence, a situation that is currently unfolding as the country prepares for national elections in 2010 and the referendum on secession in 2011 (“Scores die in south Sudan attack,” 2009). The question remains whether the hypotheses of this dissertation would be able to accurately predict the outcomes in the recent instances of increases and decreases in the SPLA’s level of violence (not the instances of unrelated ethnic violence)? My hunch is that the outcomes would match the predictions. There was most likely a preceding increase in at least one of the independent variables of this dissertation, the group’s grievances, leading up to the SPLA’s increase in violence in November 2006 because the group continued to publically accuse the Sudanese government of not implementing all clauses of the January 2005 peace agreement until late 2007 ((*BBC* “Timeline: Sudan,” 2009), though I would need to do more research before drawing any conclusions.

Another important question for future research goes beyond this specific case: Would the evidence continue to support the hypotheses if we tested them in systems that were even more different than Sénégal and Sudan? Specifically, would the findings from the MFDC case study help explain changes in a group’s level of violence in an even more different system? Using Spain as an example of a system that is very different from Sénégal, we could ask the following question: Did a decrease in the level of government repression lead to Euskadi Ta Askatasuna’s (ETA) decision to sign a peace agreement in

2006 (though it still uses violence)? Some of these questions regarding applicability to other cases will be addressed, on a small scale, in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The secessionist conflict in the Casamance region of Sénégal, which is the longest running war in West Africa, is often referred to as “the forgotten war”; there are even article titles that classify it as such (Evans:5-7; Sonko, 2004). Outside of Sénégal, the Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau, most people have not even heard of the troubles, with the possible exception of the European tourists who venture beyond the walls of the Club Med® in Cap Skiring. The Casamançais conflict has been forgotten by the Western media and researchers because it is difficult to classify. Though the Sénégalaise government has tried to dismiss it as “une affaire diola,” referring to the largest ethnic group in the Casamance, the conflict is not an inter-ethnic conflict. Because the conflict cannot be easily classified as ethnic or religious, and because it has not resulted in tens of thousands of deaths, it is often neglected by Africanists who focus on the conflicts in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which also receive more media attention.

For the approximately 3000-5000 people who have died since the 1982 protest, the 10,000-13,000 Casamançais refugees who have lived in the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, the over 62,000 internally displaced persons who have lived anywhere but home, as well as the over 1000 victims of landmine deaths or injuries, this conflict has not been forgotten (Evans, 2004; M. Humphreys and H. ag Mohamed, 2005). For the villagers who were “afraid to carry their knives and other tools into the fields to cultivate because

they didn't want to be mistaken for MFDC rebels,” or the young men who let their hair grow longer and grew beards for fear of being mistaken for a Sénégalaise soldier, the conflict has not been forgotten.¹⁵⁷ The goal of this dissertation was to gain a better understanding of the factors that lead to the ebbs and flows of violence in secessionist movements. The research question that guided the dissertation as I worked toward this goal was, “What factors influence secessionist group leaders’ decisions about the level of violence to use? Specifically, why do these leaders decide to increase or decrease the level of violence they employ?”

Relying on an article by Ted Gurr and Will Moore (1997) in which they combine relative deprivation and resource mobilization theories, I argued that changes in the group’s grievances, government’s level of repression, and group capacity would lead to changes in the level of violence used by secessionist group leaders. I presented seven hypotheses, and, in Chapter 3, I used the primary and secondary data I collected on the MFDC to create a dataset, and conduct a large-n congruence test. In Chapters 4 and 5, I examined the causal processes leading up to two key decisions made by MFDC leaders: the signing of the first ceasefire agreement in May 1991, and the signing of the last peace agreement in December 2004. In Chapter 6, I used the findings from the MFDC case to refine the dissertation’s existing hypotheses and generate new ones. I then used congruence tests to explore the new set of hypotheses. With the data from the MFDC and the SPLA, I found that group grievances and level of government repression both

¹⁵⁷ Interview with MFDC combatant in César Badiate’s faction, February 12, 2008, Varela, Guinea-Bissau; personal communication with Casamançais friend.

have positive, linear causal relationships with the group's level of violence. I also found that group capacity, when operationalized as group cohesion and group resources, does not impact secessionist group leaders' decisions regarding the level of violence to use. I also found three unexpected explanatory variables- group splits, changes in group leaders' goals, and shifts in public opinion- that provided additional insight into secessionist group leaders' decisions.

The rest of this concluding chapter has three sections. In the first section, I summarize the findings for each independent variable (included and omitted). In the second section, I briefly explore whether secessionist groups in other parts of the world often experience goal changes and group splits in an effort to identify whether these variables should be included in future studies of secessionist groups. In the final section, I outline possible directions for future research based on this preliminary exploration and the findings from the rest of the dissertation.

SUMMARY FOR EACH VARIABLE

Group Grievances

Group grievances were expected to have a positive, linear relationship with the group's level of violence. I hypothesized that an increase in group grievances will result

in a secessionist group leader's decision to increase the level of violence the group uses, and a decrease in group grievances will result in a secessionist group leader's decision to decrease the level of violence the group uses. The findings from the studies of both the MFDC and the SPLA support this hypothesis. The results from both the congruence test of all increases in the MFDC's level of violence, and the congruence test of the SPLA's increase in violence in September 1998 support the prediction that if group grievances increase, the group will increase the level of violence it employs.

With respect to decreases in group grievances, the findings from the congruence test of all decreases in the MFDC's level of violence do not support the hypothesis' prediction that a decrease in the group's grievances will lead to a decrease in its level of violence. The findings from the causal process analysis of the events leading up to the 2004 peace agreement between the MFDC and the Sénégalaise government, however, contradict the congruence test results. Two months before the 2004 peace agreement, which was the most drastic decrease in the MFDC's level of violence up to that point, there was a major decrease in group grievances when the World Bank promised a US\$20 million loan for reconstruction in the Casamance and reintegration of MFDC combatants.

Based on these findings, the evidence from the congruence tests of the MFDC and the SPLA supports the prediction that an increase in group grievances will lead to an increase in group violence, while the evidence from the causal process analysis of the MFDC's 2004 peace agreement supports the prediction that a decrease in group grievances will lead to a decrease in the group's level of violence. Even though the

evidence supports the group grievance hypotheses, these grievances are neither necessary nor sufficient in explaining changes in a secessionist group's level of violence. Change in group grievances is not a necessary cause of change in the group's level of violence because there were many observations of changes in the level of violence used by the MFDC and the SPLA without a preceding change in group grievances.

In addition, the evidence does not demonstrate that group grievances are sufficient because all four times that a change in group grievances led to the expected change in the group's level of violence in the MFDC congruence test, there were simultaneous changes in one of the other independent variables. The same is true for the observations of change in group grievances in the causal process analyses of the MFDC and the congruence test of the SPLA's 1998 increase in the level of violence (grievances did not change before the SPLA's decrease in its level of violence in 2002). Of course, the fact that group grievances are neither necessary nor sufficient does not negate the fact that when they do change, group grievances influence secessionist group leaders' decisions about the level of violence to use.

There are key lessons to be learned from the findings, and the contradiction between some of the results of the congruence tests and causal process analysis. First, the MFDC's grievances only changed in 2% of the 293 observations, and the SPLA's grievances changed once in the two years (total) of observations. If this is the norm for other groups, researchers must reconsider using grievances as a variable in large-n studies because these types of studies will not be able to capture enough variation on this

variable to adequately test hypotheses. In other words, researcher would be using large-n methods on what would essentially be a small-n sample (do to the small number of observations in which this variable actually changes value), thus losing the benefits of large-n studies, and without gaining the benefits of small-n studies.

Another reason to reconsider using group grievances as a variable in large-n studies is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to measure the salience of leaders' grievances, which I found was more important than initially expected. In interviews with MFDC leaders, lack of development in the Casamance region was cited as one of the most salient grievances (right after lost autonomy), but the significance of this relationship was not captured in the large-n congruence test because all grievances were considered equal. In the earliest phases of the Minorities at Risk (*MAR*) dataset, scholars measured group grievances based on whether they were highly salient or had lesser salience among the groups in question.

In later phases, *MAR* had to admit, however, that finding reliable data on group grievances is difficult, which is especially true if a researcher is attempting to identify not only the existence of a grievance, but also its salience (*Minorities at Risk* dataset, Phase IV). For this reason, in its February 2009 version, *MAR*, like the dataset I created for this dissertation, decided to move away from trying to measure salience and simply identify whether and for what purpose a grievance was expressed (e.g. whether the grievance was stated in the hopes of creating a new state, or to end a discriminatory policy) (*MAR* dataset, 2009). Based on the findings of this dissertation, though, I argue that salience is

important, and since it is too difficult to capture it accurately in a large-n study, small-n and case studies are the best way to examine the effects of this explanatory variable.

Government Repression

For the case study of the MFDC, I expected that the level of government repression would have a curvilinear (inverted-U) relationship with the group's level of violence. I hypothesized that if the government's level of repression increased to high or decreased to none/low, secessionist group leaders would decrease the level of violence they used. The findings from the congruence tests and causal process analyses were very clear: there is a positive, linear (rather than curvilinear) relationship between the level of government repression and group level of violence. In the analysis of both the 1991 ceasefire and 2004 peace agreement, the government's decrease in the level of repression was a key factor in the group's decision to decrease its level of violence, even when different factions of the group were not in agreement on whether to sign the documents.

In addition, every leader and member of the MFDC interviewed blamed the Sénégalaise government for numerous acts of violent repression, and every interviewee to a person told at least one story of such an act committed against him/her or something they saw happening to someone else. Based on these findings, I changed the government repression hypothesis for the congruence tests of the SPLA. Once again, the evidence was clear that the relationship between the level of government repression and the group's level of violence is positive and linear. In both the increase in the SPLA's level

of violence in 1998, and its decrease in the level of violence 2002, there was a preceding change in the level of government repression in the predicted direction.

Based on the findings from the congruence tests of the MFDC and the SPLA, as well as the fact that every interviewee (and most researchers) cited the level of government repression as a major concern, the evidence from this dissertation offers strong support for the refined government repression hypothesis: as the level of government repression increases, group leaders will choose to use increasing levels of violence, and that decreases in the level of government repression will lead to decreasing levels of secessionist group violence. It is also important to note that the level of government repression was the only independent variable for which the evidence was the same in every test; the findings from every test of both the MFDC and the SPLA provided evidence for the existence of a positive, linear relationship between government repression and group violence, making government repression the most significant variable in this study.¹⁵⁸ The fact that the level of government repression was a the only independent variable to change in the months preceding the SPLA's decrease in the level of violence in October 2002 supports the claim that a change in this variable is a sufficient cause of change in the group's level of violence. A change in this independent variable is not, however, necessary for there to be a change in the group's level of violence because there were several observations of an increase or decrease in the

¹⁵⁸ Even with the importance of the level of government repression as an explanatory variable, I argue that it is a sufficient, but not necessary cause of change in the group's level of violence. This argument is based on the findings from the congruence tests of increases and decreases in the MFDC's level of violence, which showed that there were more than 50 observations in which the group's level of violence changed without a preceding change in the government's level of repression.

MFDC's level of violence without a preceding change in the level of government repression over the life of the movement.

Group Capacity

For the purposes of the case study of the MFDC, group capacity, which measured the group's ability to carry out violent acts, consisted of two indicators: group resources and group cohesion. I expected a positive, linear relationship between group capacity and the group's level of violence, with positive, linear relationships between group resources and group level of violence, and group cohesion and group level of violence, respectively. I hypothesized that if a secessionist group's capacity decreased, group leaders would choose to decrease the level of violence they use, and the findings were unexpected. The congruence test of group capacity on group level of violence showed that there was no relationship between these two variables. In the causal process analysis of the 1991 ceasefire, however, a decrease in group cohesion, namely a split between the military and political wings of the MFDC, and the level of government repression both led to the decrease in the MFDC's level of violence.

Based on these findings from the case study of the MFDC, I concluded that group capacity, as measured in this dissertation, does not impact a secessionist group's level of violence. The group's split in 1990, however, was an important explanatory factor in the group's decrease in its level of violence in 1991. This finding highlighted the fact that group splits, rather than group capacity, might explain a secessionist group leader's

decision to decrease the level of violence used in other observations. As a result, for the congruence tests of the SPLA, I dropped group capacity as a hypothesized independent variable, and added group splits. Unfortunately, there were no observations of group splits in the months leading up to the SPLA's increase in violence in September 1998, or its decrease in violence in October 2002, so it was not possible to explore the hypothesis that a group split will lead to a decrease in the group's level of violence. There were, however, several group splits at other points in the SPLA's movement, some of which will be discussed below.

One of the most important findings from the examination of the role of group splits goes beyond this one variable. Before arriving in the Casamance, I treated the MFDC as a unitary actor. Though most reporters, as well as researchers, mention the existence of different factions, when discussing the MFDC, they usually only refer to "the MFDC." Martin Evans (2004) and Vincent Foucher (2005) do a better job than most explaining the roles and background of the different factions, but it was not until arriving on the ground, and conducting a few interviews that I realized that, for all intents and purposes, these were completely different groups. Though two interviewees attempted to explain that there was only one MFDC (leaders in Salif Sadio's faction), and there were no such things as factions, several interviewees were forthcoming about the fact that not only are there factions, but they are not working together at all (no interviewee discussed the violent conflict between different factions).¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁹ Interview with a former combatant turned leader in the political wing, February 8, 2008, Ziguinchor; Interview with military commander of the MFDC's bases in Guinea-Bissau, February 11, 2008, Saõ

The presence of multiple SPLA splinter groups in Southern Sudan is further evidence that secessionist groups as unitary actors is more myth than reality. As discussed in Chapter 6, these different groups in Southern Sudan often had different goals, controlled different parts of the region, and had very different relationships with the Sudanese government. Until the merger between the SPLA and SSIM in 2002, to call the SPLA a unitary actor because it was the first group to represent Southern Sudanese citizens is analogous to calling The Black Panther Party, Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) a part of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) because it was the first group to represent African-Americans. Therefore, based on the existence of different factions operating completely independently, and sometimes in opposite directions, it is no longer possible to consider the MFDC or the SPLA as unitary actors. As will be discussed in the next section, this finding has important implications for other secessionist and separatist groups because group fractionalization is not unique to the MFDC.

Unexpected Explanatory Variables

As a result of the analyses of the processes leading up to the 1991 ceasefire and 2004 peace agreement, there were three previously omitted explanatory factors that influenced group leaders' decisions about the level of violence to use: change in group

Domingos, Guinea-Bissau; interview with military leaders of Salif Sadio's faction, February 11, 2008, Ziguinchor; Interview with NGO staff member, February 26, 2008, Ziguinchor.

leaders' goals, respect for the wishes of an influential movement leader, and public sentiment about the actions of the group and the government.¹⁶⁰ Sidy Badji, the commander of the MFDC's armed wing in 1991, for various reasons changed his goal from independence to autonomy, which led to his decision to sign the ceasefire and decrease the MFDC's level of violence. In the decision-making process leading up to the signing of the peace agreement by Abbé Diamacoune, I argued that he changed his goal from independence for the Casamance to autonomy within the Sénégalaise state. This change in goals, which was caused by several factors, was a sufficient factor that led to his decision to decrease the MFDC's level of violence by signing the agreement.

These leaders' decisions to change their goal from independence to autonomy were unexpected links in the causal chain leading to the group's decrease in the level of violence. The fact that a shift in goals was a key factor in both the ceasefire and peace agreement speaks to its importance. The lesson from this finding is that more needs to be studied on the role of goals in secessionist leaders' decision-making processes. Goals were taken as a given for this dissertation for two reasons: it was not one of the explanatory variables in either of the two theories used, and it is difficult to collect accurate data on goals (especially for large-n datasets). Goals are often particularly tricky to measure because, similar to statements about the amount and type of group resources, it might be in group leaders' best interest to exaggerate their position for bargaining purposes. The findings from this dissertation, however, make it clear that goals warrant

¹⁶⁰ Though the importance of splits was discovered during the analysis of the events leading up to the 1991 ceasefire, this was not considered an omitted variable because it was an indicator of group cohesion.

further examination in studies of secession, regardless of the difficulty of obtaining information on them. Though it was not easy, I was able to collect this information in the in-depth analyses, which means that group goals, like group grievances, might be best left to small-n or case studies. Toft (2003) actually does include group goals as an important explanatory factor, but still cannot account for changes in these goals, since the variables that determine group goals are relatively stationary, and she is not attempting to explain change in these variables or group goals.

The second unexpected variable, loyalty to a symbolic movement leader, was discovered in the analysis of the causal process leading to the 2004 peace agreement. As discussed in chapter five, even though the political leaders of the MFDC were ready to sign the peace agreement, for various reasons, several of the group's military leaders refused. Even with their refusal, these leaders decided to decrease the level of violence used by their respective factions. In interviews, when asked why they made this decision, the MFDC leaders discussed the importance of Abbé Diamacoune and his call for peace leading up to his signature on the document. The level of reverence each interviewee expressed was an unexpected explanatory factor in the military leaders' decisions to decrease their use of violence, and the key implication from this finding is that governments must know who the symbolic leader is, and negotiate with him or her. In the case of the MFDC, by decreasing repression and group grievances, the S n galese government was able to bring about a change in goals for Abb  Diamacoune. After this,

they were able to negotiate a peace agreement with him, which led to the decrease in the level of violence for the political and military wings of the group.

The final explanatory factor discovered during the in-depth examinations of the ceasefire and peace agreement was the support, or lack thereof, of Casamançais civilians for the actions of both the Sénégalaise government and the MFDC. Support for the independence movement was high amongst Casamançais after the 1982 and 1983 peaceful protests but after over a decade of fighting, many Casamançais wanted peace by any means. A report by *World Education* explains that the September 2002 sinking of the *Joola*, the Sénégalaise boat that was the safest (in theory) and easiest means of travel between the Casamance and Dakar, Sénégal's capital, was an important motivator for many Casamançais to become active participants in the peace process:

This disaster, the worst in Senegal's modern history, galvanized people's desire for peace. More than ever, they wanted a return to normalcy. More than ever, they raised their voices in support of the peace process and an end to the civil conflict (Carrol and Jonathan Otto, 2005).

Regardless of the reason, the increase in the calls for peace by Casamançais civilians unexpectedly influenced the Sénégalaise government's decision to decrease its level of repression, and also influenced the MFDC's political and military leaders' decisions to decrease the level of violence they used to none in December 2004.

The major lesson from this finding is that civil society matters, and both governments and secessionist groups listen to its voice. The implication being that civil society actors in other secessionist regions have a responsibility to become actively

involved in the peace process, and the governments and secessionist groups operating in other secessionist regions should listen to them. There have been several studies of the importance of third-party intervention in political violence and secession, and while there have been reports by donor agencies and NGOs on the role of civil society organizations in peace-building, there have not been any scholarly studies that examine whether and how they influence secessionist leaders' decisions to increase or decrease the level of violence they use. Researchers dealing with changing levels of violence in secessionist conflicts, then, must include the actions of civil society as a factor that might explain these changing levels.

Before moving on to an exploration of secessionist groups around the world, it is important to note two general theoretical implications of this dissertation. First, the findings from the SPLA case offer evidence regarding the timeframe within which the independent variables lead to a change in the dependent variable. For the congruence tests in Chapter 3, I explained that most studies of secession and political violence use annual measures of the variables when testing hypotheses. I also offered a critique of using these annual measures: researchers ignore the variation that occurs for both the independent and dependent variables within the year. This critique is especially relevant for studies such as this dissertation that examine actors' decisions because more often than not, actors make these decisions more than once each year, so it is misleading to assume that the independent variables only change once a year. For this reason, I chose

to use monthly measures of the variables for the congruence tests of the MFDC in an effort to capture as much variation as possible.

It was not until the causal process analyses were completed that it became clear that using monthly measures of the variable, with one month lags of the independent variables used to explain the value of the dependent variable, also has a major flaw: one month lags do not allow enough time for the causal mechanism between the independent variables and the dependent variable to unfold. In both of the analyses, changes in the independent variables that were expected to lead to a decrease in the group's level of violence occurred at least two months before the decrease. This longer span of time than expected led to the conclusion that one month lags were not long enough.

To combat the problem of annual measures that were too long a time period to capture variation in the variables, and one month lags that were too short a time period to observe the causal mechanism between the variables, I opted to observe six-month time periods for the SPLA congruence tests. The evidence from these congruence tests supported this decision. Several events that would not have been captured with either the annual or monthly measures were included in the six-month observations. For example, in March 1998 the Sudanese government drafted a new constitution that called for the observation of Shari'a in all of Sudan, and the government appointed Riek Mashar (leader of the SSIM) as the president of the new Southern Sudan government. Both of these events increased the SPLA's grievances, and these increases in group grievances were associated with the SPLA's increase in its level of violence in September 1998.

Neither of the events would have been included using annual or monthly measures. Though it is not possible to say for sure whether six-month measures are best in all cases, I plan to use these measures in future studies of secession in an effort to further explore their utility.

Another general theoretical implication of the findings of this dissertation concerns the causal mechanism between the independent variables and group level of violence: because none of the independent variables is found to be necessary, different combinations of these variables can lead to the same outcome. According to Mahoney and Goertz (2006), this phenomenon, known as equifinality or multiple causation, explains why it is possible for a change in group grievances and government repression to lead to a decrease in the group's level of violence in one observation, and a change in group leaders' goals and government repression to lead to another decrease in the group's level of violence in the next observation. The theories from which this dissertation's hypotheses were drawn do not explicitly predict equifinality, but the expected relationships between the independent variables and the secessionist group leaders' costs and benefits of secession leave room for the researcher to infer the possibility of multiple causal pathways.

For example, relative deprivation theory posits that a decrease in secessionist group leaders' grievances will lead to a decrease in their level of violence because the benefit of seceding decreases. At the same time, relative deprivation theory holds that a decrease in the level of government repression will also lead to a decrease in the level of

violence used by group leaders because it decreases the benefit (or need) of using violence. Because the theory expects both a decrease in grievances and a decrease in the level of government repression impact group leaders' benefits, I argued that if *either* occurs alone or in combination with another independent variable, group leaders would decide to decrease the level of violence the group uses. The possibility that either variable, or a combination of variables that includes either variable can lead to a decrease in the group's level of violence is an example of equifinality. Along with the theory's expectations, the data from the hypothesis tests support the existence of multiple causal pathways to the same outcome.

SECESSIONIST GROUPS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The causal process analyses conducted in this dissertation led to the discovery of explanatory factors that were not part of the theoretical framework or hypotheses. In addition, these in-depth analyses shed light on the importance of group splits as a factor that should be considered an independent variable rather than simply an indicator of another independent variable. Disappointingly, the congruence tests of the SPLA's increase and decrease in violence were not able to provide additional evidence because there were no changes in these variables in any of the included episodes. In an attempt to address this limitation, this section will survey other secessionist groups, both in Africa and other regions of the world, to explore whether changes in the variables discovered in this dissertation occur. I will focus on two of the key, unexpected explanatory variables

from the case study of the MFDC- change in goals and group splits/factional conflict- to see whether they change, and if these changes often occur around the same time as changes in the groups' levels of violence, which will inform the next section's discussion on directions for future research.¹⁶¹

The change in goals by some MFDC leaders was a key, yet unexpected, factor in the signing of both the 1991 ceasefire and 2004 peace agreement. Though not all secessionist groups experience a change in goal among their leadership, many groups sign peace agreements that offer less than independence, which at least demonstrates secessionist leaders' willingness to compromise. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) experienced its first shift in goals in 1921 when, rather than continue fighting for an end to British rule over the entire island of Ireland, some leaders agreed to the Anglo-Irish Treaty that allowed British rule over six counties in what became Northern Ireland. Another shift in goals within the IRA leadership came with the signing of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement in which all parties agreed to a power-sharing government. Although this was a compromise that benefited the IRA, Sinn Fein, and their supporters, it still fell short of the independence for which the IRA had fought violently since it was created in 1919 ("The IRA and Sinn Fein: chronology", 1998).

The IRA is not alone in its experience with shifting goals among secessionist group leaders, and peace agreements that do not grant independence. In 1996, the Moro

¹⁶¹ The purpose of this section is *not* to determine whether these factors actually influence decisions made within these secessionist groups because that is outside of the scope of this dissertation (though a promising area for future research). I chose to focus on these two variables because they influenced leaders' decisions in both the 1991 ceasefire and the 2004 peace agreement, whereas public opinion and loyalty to a leader only influenced the latter decrease in the MFDC's level of violence.

National Liberation Front (MNLF), a secessionist group fighting for independence in several regions of the southern Philippines, made an agreement with its government for autonomy. The MNLF signed a peace agreement that granted them autonomous control over two provinces on the island of Mindanao and three nearby islands, but did not grant them full independence from the Philippines ("Guide to the Philippines conflict", 2009). In 2002, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers) signed a ceasefire agreement with the Sri Lankan government. The group, which was founded in 1976, has been fighting for independence for the Tamil populations since 1983. Although the group later changed its goal back to independence and continued using violence until its defeat earlier this year, in the 2002 ceasefire it agreed to autonomy within the Sri Lankan state, rather than independence from it ("Full Text: Tamil Tiger Proposals", 2003; "Q&A: Sri Lanka Crisis", 2005; "Timeline: Sri Lanka", 2009).

African secessionist groups appear to be no different than their counterparts in the rest of the world when it comes to shifting goals that are sometimes difficult to discern. The Frente da libertação do enclave de Cabinda (FLEC), in the Cabinda region of Angola, began its fight for independence before Angola itself was an independent country. In 2006, the group signed an agreement with the Angolan government that granted the region a measure of autonomy, which was much less than the independence for which the group had been fighting for over 30 years ("'Deadly Attack' in Angola Enclave", 2008; "Angola Signs Deal with Cabindans", 2006). The fact that FLEC, like other secessionist groups, signed an agreement that did not grant independence does not

provide indisputable evidence that its goals changed from independence to autonomy. It could simply mean that this was the best outcome the group believed it could achieve, or that it never actually wanted independence, rather it assumed that by seeking independence, it would have a better bargaining position when it negotiated with the government. Even with these possibilities, though, the fact that so many groups that fought violently for secession end up settling for something less, merits future research.

The importance of splits and inter-factional conflict as explanatory factors in MFDC leaders' decisions became clear during the causal process analyses, and after a survey of other secessionist groups, it is clear that the MFDC is not alone. Almost every secessionist group identified experienced at least one split, and some groups saw multiple splits and fighting between factions that emerged. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which was founded as a secessionist group fighting for independence from Ethiopia in 1961, experienced a split after the creation of a splinter group: the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). In 1972, this split led to a bloody war between the ELF and the EPLF, which forced both groups to pause their battles against the Ethiopian army. After the war between these two groups led to a stalemate, both groups refocused on fighting Ethiopia, but in 1982, the rekindled war led to the defeat of the ELF by the EPLF and Ethiopian army (not fighting together). The EPLF went on to win the only successful secessionist movement in post-colonial Africa. In this case, the split and inter-factional fighting led not only to the demise of the original secessionist group, the ELF, but also helped lead to a successful end to the secessionist conflict (Pool, 1998).

Sadly, splits within the SPLA have been no less violence. The first signs of trouble within the group came when the Ethiopian regime that supported the John Garang and the SPLA fell in a military coup in 1991. Until 1991, Ethiopia's President Mengistu provided equipment and bases to the SPLA, and helped Garang suppress any dissent within the group.¹⁶² Mengistu provided this assistance in return for Garang's support in fighting the OLF and other groups trying to overthrow the Ethiopian regime. The end of the Mengistu regime and its support, however, created an opportunity for the other potential SPLA leaders to openly opposed Garang, and eventually split from the SPLA. The first group to do so was Riek Mashar's SPLA-United, which later became the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), in August 1991 (Johnson, 1998; *MAR* "Chronology," 1998). By November 1991, there was intense fighting between these two groups, and by the end of the year, approximately 5,000 civilians had been killed, many by SPLA-United raids on villages known to support the SPLA (*MAR* "Chronology," 1998). Fighting between these groups often involved the torture, rape, and massacre of civilians of one ethnic group by the group representing members of another.

In September 1992, the SPLA experienced another split. This time, William Nyuon Bany broke away to form the SPLA-Jebel Lafon. By 1994, two more splinter groups had formed: the Patriotic Resistance Movement of South Sudan (PRMSS), under

¹⁶² Johnson (1998) and Collins (1999) do not clearly explain why Ethiopia supported Garang, specifically, though there are several possibilities: Mengistu was impressed with Garang's military and leadership experience as a former Colonel in the Sudanese army; Garang was able to provide Mengistu with more intelligence on the Sudanese army than other potential SPLA leaders because of his former position; Garang was one of very few potential SPLA leaders who wanted autonomy rather than independence, which was important to the leader of a sovereign country who did not want to support secessionist movements in any country.

the leadership of Alfred Lado Gore; and, the SPLA-Bahr al-Ghazal, led by Kerubino Kuanyin. In addition to these splinter groups, the SPLA was engaged in a struggle against the Anyanya II, the successor to the original secessionist group in Southern Sudan, and the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), who received support in their fight against the Ugandan government from the government of Sudan (*MAR* "Chronology," 1998; Johnson, 2003). Of course, all of this fighting was in addition to the SPLA's struggle against the Sudanese government, which was made more difficult and somewhat confusing with the fighting within the group, and the numerous agreements made between the government and the different Southern Sudanese groups.

There are also many examples of less extreme splits within secessionist groups, including that with FLEC. The split, which left several factions, predated the 2006 peace agreement with Angola, which was signed by a group called Cabinda Forum for Dialogue (FCD). FCD consisted of most factions of FLEC, as well as civilian leaders in the region. FCD does not, however, include the FLEC-FAC faction, which refused to sign the agreement. It was probably this latter faction that carried out a violent attack in 2008, killing three people ("'Deadly Attack' in Angola Enclave."; "Angola Signs Deal with Cabindans").

The MFDC, SPLA, and FLEC are not the only secessionist groups to experience splits resulting in some factions signing peace agreements, while others continue using violence. Splits within the MNLF, which signed a peace agreement with the Philippine government in 1996, has resulted in two, more violent groups. The first split came in

1977, when the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the largest of the splinter groups, formed, and Abu Sayyaf, the most violent of the three groups, formed in the early 1990s. Though these groups have not fought each other, they have not worked together, which has made any peace agreement more difficult to negotiate and enforce ("Guide to the Philippines Conflict", 2009).

The IRA, one of the most well-known secessionist movements, has also had to deal with splits that impact the peace process. In the late 1960s, the Provisional IRA split from the original IRA, and most of the violent attacks attributed to the IRA after this split were actually the works of the Provisional IRA. The next splinter group, the Continuity IRA, formed in the late 1980s, and shortly before the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which created a power-sharing government in Northern Ireland, the Real IRA emerged as a splinter from the Provisional IRA because it did not support the agreement. In 2005, the IRA, including the Provisional IRA, denounced violence, and joined the power-sharing government. Despite the agreement, however, in March 2009, both the Continuity and Real IRA carried out deadly attacks, showing the danger of the existence of different factions within a secessionist group (Reynolds, 2009).

FUTURE RESEARCH

There are several questions left by the findings of this dissertation, and they provide several possible directions for future research. These directions and the research

questions they generate fall into the following categories: changing goals; splits and inter-factional conflict; and, the future of Sénégal, Casamance, and the MFDC.

The fact that MFDC leaders changed their goals before the 1991 ceasefire and the 2004 peace agreement, and that these changing goals impacted their decisions, was an interesting, yet unexpected finding. The fact that secessionist groups around the world possibly change their goals and sign peace agreements granting less than independence is worth examining in greater detail. In particular, why do some secessionist group's goals change, while the goals of other groups remain the same? Are we actually seeing changing goals, or merely changing bargaining positions in negotiations with governments? In most secessionist groups, there are those in the leadership whose goals appear to change to autonomy, while other leaders' retain the group's original goal of secession. If these leaders are all influenced by the same explanatory factors, why do only some leaders' goals change? *Are* all leaders influenced by the same explanatory factors?

In future research on changing goals among secessionist leaders, I will reexamine political violence and secession theories, and possibly social movement theories, to identify existing theories that can provide hypotheses that address these questions. I will focus on theories that provide predictions about strategic interaction, including rational-actor and bargaining theories, as well as theories that focus on collective interests versus self-interests and short-term versus long-term interests in preference formation. In addition to these theories, I will also use the findings from this dissertation to generate

hypotheses, and test these hypotheses on data from other secessionist groups, using both congruence tests and causal process analyses. The findings from this future research might help explain the causes of these goal changes, which possibly include changes in public opinion, grievances, the level of government repression, updated information on the capacity of the other actors, or the success/failure of previous group actions. This research could also help explain the consequences of these changes in goals, which I suspect not only include changes in the group's level of violence, but also group splits, inter-factional conflict, and possibly the government's level of repression.

Regarding splits, factions, and inter-factional conflict, I am already aware that discussions of these phenomena are all but non-existent in theories of political violence and secession. Despite the findings of this dissertation regarding their importance, or mentions of their existence in other studies on groups, to date, I do not know of any studies, large or small-n, that examine the causes of splits. Specifically, what factors lead to the occurrence of splits in secessionist groups like the MFDC or IRA, but not in groups like Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) or the Tamil Tigers? Are these factors idiosyncratic, or are they generally present in secessionist movements around the world? What are the consequences of these splits for secessionist group capacity, especially when there is fighting between factions, like in the cases of the MFDC and the EPLF? Does the presence of factions within a group make leaders more or less likely to decrease the use of violence in general, or does the presence of factions have a different impact on leaders at different times (or when other factors are at work)? What is the best strategy for

governments that are ready to sign peace agreements with one or more faction; should the government wait until all factions are onboard or sign agreements with the factions willing to sign? If they sign with willing factions, will the unwilling factions become more or less violent, or will the agreement have no impact on their levels of violence?

The questions on both changing goals and group splits are relevant to the MFDC. After collecting primary and secondary data on the MFDC, as well as conducting congruence tests and causal process analyses, there are questions that can only be answered with future research that includes another round of interviews. The most pressing question is what would it take, if at all possible, for all factions of the MFDC to agree to peace without independence? Though most factions of the group signed the December 2004 peace agreement, there are factions that began using violence in 2006, and are accused of being responsible for an increase in violence in the region in September and October 2009 (“Soldiers killed in south Sénégal,” 2009). In interviews, leaders from these factions explained that they have only been quiet in the last two years because of the death of Abbé Diamacoune in 2007, and the subsequent reorganization that was taking place at the time of the interviews.¹⁶³ What will these factions do once they feel the reorganization is complete? Is there anything that would convince them to change their goal from independence to autonomy? Is there anything that would convince them to permanently renounce violence as they work toward their goals? Would the refined hypotheses of this dissertation explain the recent increase in these

¹⁶³ Interview with military commander of the MFDC’s bases in Guinea-Bissau, February 11, 2008; Interview with military leaders of Salif Sadio’s faction, February 11, 2008.

factions' levels of violence? I would also ask the S n galese government, what concessions it would be willing to make if the group renounced violence? Is it willing to meet some of the terms of previous agreements, including the demilitarization of the Casamance?

If I were able to address these questions, the data from new research, when added to the findings of this dissertation, might assist in the peace-building process in S n gal, which is one of the long-term goals of this project. This goal, which did not crystallize until seeing the humanitarian impact of the Casamance conflict on local populations, extends beyond this case's peace process. Territorial disputes making up almost half of all violent conflict on a continent plagued by violence. The larger goal of my research is to help the parties in these conflicts gain a better understanding of each others' positions, which would help the peace-building process. If the findings can help bring an end to even one violent conflict, my goal will have been achieved.

APPENDIX 1: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN SÉNÉGAL

Month	Year	Event
12	1982	MFDC and Casamançais hold a nonviolent march against the Ziguinchor local GVT;
12	1982	GVT uses force against marchers
12	1982	GVT arrests marchers;
12	1982	The army went to homes and killed everyone they found. The only survivors were the ones who hid in the bush, but their homes were destroyed
12	1982	Abbé Senghor is jailed
12	1982	One interviewee in Kagnobon was captured; he was tortured; [He showed me certificate releasing him from prison in 1983];
	1983	The army took people from their homes and shot up the houses*
12	1983	Interviewee from Kagnobon was arrested and tortured
12	1983	Some women from Kagnobon and surrounding villages were executed by the Sénégalaise army
12	1983	Trial of political prisoners
12	1983	The gendarmerie on patrol tries to break up a secret meeting of the MFDC in the "bois sacré"; the MFDC kills 3 gendarmes; MFDC destroys gendarmerie property
12	1983	The GVT arrests approximately 50 people for the incident involving the killing of the gendarmes.
12	1983	clashes between the GVT and the MFDC in Ziguinchor; 10 MFDC killed; 5 soldiers killed

12	1983	MFDC and CVLS hold a massive demonstration in remembrance of the one the year before; they march on the GVT's administrative building, the gendarmerie, and the local radio station
12	1983	the GVT kills between 50 and 200 CVLS and MFDC who marched in Ziguinchor
12	1983	Massive arrests of MFDC and sympathizers
12	1983	MFDC retreated to the bush to create the armed branch of the MFDC- Atika; Sidy Badji is the leader of Atika
12	1983	GVT imposed curfew in Ziguinchor
	1984	GVT changes the regional structure of the country, dividing the Casamance into two separate regions: Ziguinchor and Kolda. This angered many Casamançais, who saw this as an attempt to end the separatist movement
		The GVT appoints four Casamançais ministers to the cabinet
	1986	The Sénégalese army bombed AD's father's home; his father was not home; AD was home and escaped being killed by jumping out of the window
4	1987	GVT releases Casamançais prisoners, including MFDC members and leaders
	1988	GVT releases Casamançais prisoners, including MFDC members and leaders
4	1989	MFDC members purchased approximately 50 automatic rifles from Mauritians (either the GVT, traders, or both) during the border war between Sénégal and Mauritania (because of the latter's anger with the former)
4	1990	MFDC creates the Front Nord (not a split but a repositioning) to generate revenue and make the MFDC a harder target by becoming a moving target
4	1990	Front Nord begins growing cannabis and generating revenue for MFDC

4	1990	MFDC attacks the border station at Seleti (border between the Casamance and the Gambia); 2 customs officers killed; this is the first armed attack by the MFDC
5	1990	GVT appoints a military governor in the Casamance, and drastically increases its presence in the region
	1990	Abbé arrested, imprisoned
5	1991	The trial of Abbé and others is stopped and the political prisoners are freed. Amnesty was granted to all prisoners
5	1991	Badji signs the Cacheu Accord; A cease-fire agreement was signed under the rules of the mediators
5	1991	Abbé denounces Cacheu Accords for not addressing issue of independence; aligns with Leopold Sagna and the Front Sud
5	1991	Badji leaves the maquis (i.e. split); Badji gains de facto control of most of the area in the northwest of the Bignona department. Because he has stopped fighting the GVT, they have allowed informal control of the area
	1991	GVT releases Casamançais prisoners, including MFDC members and leaders
	1991	Many armed MFDC members put down their weapons, leave the maquis, and reintegrate into their villages
9	1991	Sidy Badji calls for peace (for the first time)
7	1991	The National Committee on the Management of Peace in Casamance was created by the President. The President charged this committee with the mission of coordinating peace initiatives
	1991	There was a GVT massacre in Oussouyé (interviewee's home town)
	1991	army soldiers went to buy cigarettes in a boutique in Djivant, and killed everyone in the boutique; Interviewee's friend's son was one of the victims who was killed

4	1992	Government kills civilian in Kaguite accused of being MFDC leader (mistaken identity)
	1992	The Sénégalaise army broke the Cacheu peace agreement and started fighting; Sénégalaise army came back to the Casamance
9	1992	Clashes between the GVT and the MFDC in Kaguite; more than 50 MFDC killed; 2 soldiers killed
9	1992	MFDC kills chief of Bissine for opposing independence
9	1992	GVT kills 2 teens in Bissine while razing their village
9	1992	GVT disappears 2 civilians in Kaguite
10	1992	MFDC kills 31 Nordiste and foreign fishermen in Cap Skirring and at Pointe St. Georges
11	1992	Government disappears civilian in Ziguinchor
11	1992	Government disappears 2 civilians in Ponta
11	1992	Government disappears a father and three sons (after arresting whole family and letting women go)
12	1992	MFDC kills member of PS in Ziguinchor
12	1992	The Sénégalaise army accused many of supporting rebels; killed 2 or more CVLS, burned houses down; we were forced to flee to Guinea-Bissau
12	1992	Government disappeared civilian in Oussouye
1	1993	Government disappeared civilian near Ziguinchor
1	1993	MFDC kills retired gendarme in his village of Kignabou
1	1993	Government kills civilian in Ziguinchor
1	1993	Government disappeared 7 civilians in Dar Salam
1	1993	Government kills civilian (no location)

2	1993	MFDC kills two PDS members in Boukitingo because they refused to boycott elections
2	1993	MFDC launches a rocket attack of the Ziguinchor airport
2	1993	Government disappeared a civilian in Oussouye
3	1993	MFDC kills Peul herdsman in Diakene Oulouf
3	1993	MFDC kills member of PS in Diakene Oulouf
4	1993	MFDC kills president of the rural community of Oukout (near Ousouye)
5	1993	Government kills civilian in Diakene Oulouff
	1993	Appeal [for peace] made by the MFDC; MFDC laid down arms and appealed for negotiations; Turns to political solutions
5	1994	Government disappeared 60 year-old man
1	1995	Government disappeared civilian in Camaracounda
1	1995	Government killed civilian with mental disability on outskirts of Ziguinchor
2	1995	MFDC killed two Nordiste fishermen in Kaleane
2	1995	Government disappeared 2 civilians in Aniack (near Niaguis)
2	1995	Government disappeared 2 civilians in Bissine
3	1995	MFDC killed civilian in Youtou
3	1995	MFDC killed civilian and his wife near Boutoupa
4	1995	MFDC killed traditional chief and president of Dignataries of Ziguinchor Department
4	1995	the MFDC is suspected of disappearing 4 French tourists, who were never found
7	1995	Government disappeared six civilians from Edjoungo (Oussouye dept)

7	1995	MFDC attacks soldiers in Babonda; 25 soldiers killed and buried in common grave
7	1995	MFDC killed two Manjack civilians
8	1995	Government disappeared 5 civilians in Essaoute (Oussouye dept)
8	1995	Government disappeared civilian at Niambalang bridge (on road between Ziguinchor and Oussouye)
8	1995	MFDC killed civilian
8	1995	Government killed 70 year old civilian in Carouate (near Oussouye)
10	1995	Government disappeared 3 civilians (a father and his two children) near Essoukoudiak in Guinea Bissau
4	1997	Leaders of MFDC in Ziguinchor travel to France to meet with external wing; Meeting is to prepare for talks with the GVT
7	1997	Government killed civilian in Ziguinchor
7	1997	MFDC strike a fishing village; 11 CVLS killed
8	1997	Government disappeared civilian in Kandialan
8	1997	Government disappeared civilian in Nyassia
8	1997	MFDC attacks soldiers in Mandina Mancagne; 25 soldiers killed
8	1997	Army searches for MFDC near Mandina Mancagne; (according to army) about 30 MFDC members killed
8	1997	Wal Fadjri, a newspaper in Dakar, reports army sent planeloads of troops to Ziguinchor; reports army sending some US trained soldiers (trained for peacekeeping in Brazzaville; army denies reason for sending troops is for reinforcement because of latest violence;

8	1997	Government disappeared 3 civilians including <i>Sarani Badiane</i> , lt. to Abbé Senghor [PNA cites Sud Quotidienne, which said that a faction of the MFDC was responsible]
8	1997	Government disappeared 3 civilians from Ziguinchor
8	1997	Suspected MFDC members attack a family in Nyassia; 5 CVLS killed (1 man, 4 children); 1 civilian (witness) severely injured
9	1997	Amnesty International committee accuses MFDC of killing 9 CVLS (5 adults and 4 children) on September 7-8, 1997 at a youth hostel in Djinabar “for dancing while they themselves were fighting for Casamance independence; 15 more were injured; the village was publically opposed to the secessionist movement
9	1997	Government disappeared president of the parents committee of Niaguis school
9	1997	Clash between MFDC and GVT in Santhiaba-Mandjack; 22 MFDC members killed; 4 soldiers killed
		President Diouf rejects talks with MFDC because he will not compromise Sénégal’s territorial integrity; stated there would be no special autonomy for Casamance, that it is like every other region; said he would open a dialogue about other possibilities in the region; said he will reinforce army in Casamance
9	1997	Government disappeared Gouraf village chief in Niaguis
9	1997	Army wipes out 2 MFDC bases east of Ziguinchor;
9	1997	Suspected MFDC members attack Diogue; 11 CVLS killed; MFDC members looted shops, and stole fishing supplies and gasoline;
9	1997	Secret meetings between Abbé Senghor, Bishop of Saint Louise, Monsignor Pierre Sagna (from Casamance), and the Catholic Bishops conference; Abbé Senghor called for negotiations at Christmas; Bishops conference asks that MFDC compromise with autonomy

10	1997	Army begins major campaign against MFDC; over 3000 soldiers (more than at any other time since 1995 cease-fire)
10	1997	Army begins an operation to destroy 6 MFDC bases near Ziguinchor; 3000 troops and "heavy artillery"; 2 MFDC bases destroyed; 22 MFDC members killed; 2 MFDC members captured; 2 soldiers killed; 3 soldiers injured
10	1997	Government kills 7 civilians in Adeane; showed them to the national and international press as rebels who had been captured and killed during fighting
10	1997	Clashes between MFDC and GVT; began when MFDC attempted to regain control of the area; MFDC has bases in this area; MFDC grows fruit to fund war in this area; 18 soldiers killed; 80 MFDC members killed
11	1997	Landmine explosions; 2 CVLS killed; 4 soldiers killed; MFDC kills soldiers clearing landmines
11	1997	Battle between MFDC and army in Guidel-Babandika; 27 MFDC members killed; 1 soldier killed
12	1997	MFDC ambush taxis on highway that runs from Dakar to Ziguinchor; 4 people killed
12	1997	MFDC ambush taxis on highway that runs from Dakar to Ziguinchor; 4 people killed
12	1997	MFDC suspected in explosion in city administration building in Thionck Essyl; no injuries
12	1997	Government disappeared 2 civilians in Dioher
12	1997	Government disappeared a wife who's husband was sought by the army
1	1998	Gambia willing to mediate talks between MFDC and GVT; Sénégalaise GVT supports idea because it thinks MFDC will listen to Gambia (president is Diola); Sénégalaise President Diouf has been willing to talk with MFDC; GVT will not entertain the idea of independence;

1	1998	Abbé calls for peace; calls for MFDC and GVT to sit down to talks
2	1998	Government disappeared civilian from Cabrousse
2	1998	Government kills civilian in Kailou (in Ziguinchor department)
3	1998	GB military detains 15 GB soldiers and CVLS in Bissau on suspicion of illegal arms trade with MFDC
3	1998	Battle between MFDC and army in Banghangha, 15 miles east of Ziguinchor; Army surrounded MFDC members who were trying to get out of canoes near a military base; 50 MFDC members killed;
3	1998	Government kills civilian (no location)
4	1998	MFDC suspected of attack near Ziguinchor; 7 CVLS killed; 2 police officers injured; several houses burned
4	1998	Battle between MFDC and GVT near GB border; according to army 1 soldier killed; 10 MFDC members killed
4	1998	MFDC spokesman, Nkrumah Saneh, announced MFDC cease-fire until after parliamentary elections; MFDC does not want to interfere with elections
4	1998	Government disappeared 3 civilians in Ziguinchor
5	1998	Government disappeared civilian in Ziguinchor
5	1998	Government kills 7 civilians in Diogue (Oussouye dept)
5	1998	MFDC suspected in attack on funeral in Ziguinchor; 4 CVLS killed
5	1998	Army destroys 3 MFDC bases; 5 CVLS killed; 1 soldier killed; 30 MFDC members killed
6	1998	MFDC kills two women after MFDC stopped the vehicle they were in, and they tried to flee

6	1998	GB President Vieira fires army chief of staff, Gen. Ansoumane Mane for giving GB army weapons to MFDC
6	1998	Mane allows MFDC members to keep some of the weapons they seized from the GB GVT (most of the GB army supported Mane, so they were fighting GVT loyalists) in exchange for their help in the war; weapons included 82mm mortars, b-10 82mm recoil-less guns, DshK-38 12.7mm heavy machine guns
7	1998	Sagna and Badiate broke away from Sadio when he sent them into Guinea-Bissau to fight for Ansoumana Mané against President Nino Vieira; They refused to fight against the Bissau-Guinean GVT
7	1998	50 suspected MFDC members attack a commuter bus in Kolda; 3 CVLS killed; 8 CVLS injured; Army found suspects; shoot-out between army and suspects; unspecified number of suspects killed
	1998	Ansoumana Mané divided the maquis because he made Sadio the leader
7	1998	Government disappeared civilian in Cabrousse
8	1998	Government disappeared civilian in Niaguis
8	1998	Government disappeared civilian in Sindiane
8	1998	Government disappeared civilian in Nema II area of Ziguinchor
8	1998	2 separate battles on the GB border between MFDC and GVT; 56 people killed; 4 soldiers killed
8	1998	Government disappeared civilian near Niaguis
9	1998	Government disappeared civilian in Ziguinchor
9	1998	Government disappeared civilian in Bignona
10	1998	Government disappeared 60 year-old man in Oussouye
10	1998	Government killed civilian in Ziguinchor

10	1998	World Organization Against Torture posts statement from Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders; statement accuses army of torturing Anquiling Diabone (RADDHO Exec Dir for Regional Section in Ziguinchor) for 4 days; detaining his family for hours
11	1998	Government disappeared civilian in Oussouye
11	1998	Government disappeared father and his two young daughters in Djifanghor
11	1998	Government disappeared 2 civilian in Boutoute
11	1998	MFDC attacks Jisankoh; 10 CVLS killed; 19 MFDC members killed (according to army); 4th attack on village in the last month; MFDC blames villagers for helping army
11	1998	Government over 30 kills civilians (including women, a pregnant woman, 8 children under aged 10 and under) in Djifanghor Bandial and Djifanghor Koucouhoutou (near Ziguinchor); soldiers burned down homes and left the bodies
11	1998	Government disappeared civilian in Ziguinchor
12	1998	Government disappeared civilian in Ziguinchor
12	1998	Gambia suspected of training MFDC members and offering sanctuary for strategy meetings amongst MFDC leaders
1	1999	President Diouf visits Ziguinchor; fervently calls for peace; Diouf and Abbé Diamacoune Senghor meet and agree on the negotiation process
1	1999	A global anti-narcotic group lists Sénégal as 3rd largest producer of cannabis [in West Africa?]; report said most comes from Casamance; in January group confiscated 180 kgs of hemp seeds, over 66 tons of hemp, and over 120 acres of crops
2	1999	Sénégalèse army destroys over 1000 tons of marijuana used by MFDC to fund war; INTERPOL says marijuana trade in Casamance is “highly organized” and Sénégal had become one of Africa’s leading producers

2	1999	President Diouf releases 123 suspected MFDC members from prisons in Dakar. Kolda, and Ziguinchor;
3	1999	“heavy clashes” between MFDC and GVT; 22 MFDC members killed; 3 soldiers wounded;
3	1999	Government kills high school student in Thionck Essyl; he was shot point blank when soldiers entered his home on suspicion his family housed rebels
4	1999	MFDC disarms its members; weapons are stockpiled in undisclosed location; Chief of staff and others refused to hand over weapons
4	1999	MFDC kills Peul civilian collecting cashews in Mandina Mankagne
4	1999	MFDC hardliners fires shells into Ziguinchor; 2 CVLS killed; 10 CVLS wounded
4	1999	President Diouf meets with Abbé in Ziguinchor in the presence of French Ambassador Andre Lewin
4	1999	Fighting in and around Ziguinchor; 15 MFDC members killed; 2 soldiers killed; army accuses MFDC of firing shells into a house in Ziguinchor where a baptism was taking place; 2 CVLS killed; 15 CVLS injured (children included)
4	1999	Fighting in Ziguinchor; 19 CVLS killed; loosely attributed to faction of MFDC
4	1999	Fighting in Ziguinchor; 1 civilian (17 year-old boy) killed; loosely attributed to faction of MFDC; 2 soldiers killed; 3 soldiers wounded; 15 MFDC killed
4	1999	MFDC attacks (bombs, bullets, etc.) Ziguinchor; 4 CVLS killed; 2 soldiers killed; 15 MFDC members killed
5	1999	GB Gen. Ansoumane Mane defeats President Vieira
5	1999	Government disappeared civilian in Niaguis

5	1999	Government disappeared civilian in Niaguis
5	1999	Sénégalaise GVT declares that it will provide a large aid package to Casamance; Aid will include landmine clearing; job creation; rebuilding; Casamançais support package
5	1999	Government disappeared civilian in Diantene
5	1999	Government disappeared civilian in Djifanghor
5	1999	Government disappeared 2 civilians in Ediouma
5	1999	Government kills in his home in Nyassia
5	1999	MFDC fires shells into Ziguinchor; 2 CVLS killed
5	1999	Government disappeared 4 civilians in Bassere
5	1999	MFDC fires shells into Ziguinchor; 2 CVLS wounded; homes and stadium damaged; CVLS escape
5	1999	Mane makes Sadio head of military wing of MFDC; some within MFDC accuse Mane of choosing Sadio because they are both Muslim; 1 MFDC member (A.D.) said Christians were angered by this and backed Leopold Sagna, a fellow Christian;
6	1999	Government disappeared 4 civilians in Ziguinchor
6	1999	Government disappeared civilian in Djibelor
6	1999	100 delegates from different factions of MFDC holds 4 –day mtg in Banjul to agree on a unified position in preparation for expected negotiations with the govt; call for immediate cease-fire from their members and army; call for army withdrawal from the region (except those in the region before war); Abbe emphasizes that the MFDC is still seeking independence
7	1999	Government disappeared civilian in Ziguinchor
8	1999	Government disappeared civilian in Djifanghor

8	1999	MFDC kidnaps 10 people from a shop in Ziguinchor; MFDC loots the shop
8	1999	2 suspected MFDC members arrested for kidnapping;
11	1999	Government disappeared civilian in Djibock
11	1999	Banjul II negotiation talks
12	1999	MFDC and GVT meet for two days in Banjul; Cease-fire signed; Abbé signed; agreed to no kidnapping, no attacks on the other, no looting; issue of independence not discussed; they create the Mission d'Observation et de Consolidation des Accords de Paix (MOCAP); rep in Paris criticizes talks; Alexander Djiba, MFDC spokesman, defended accord
12	1999	MFDC faction clashes with army in Bagonda near Gambian border; gunfire for several hours; MFDC retreated
12	1999	Nkrumah criticizes peace accords
1	2000	Sénégalaise GVT releases 40 MFDC members from prison (along with about 150 other prisoners)
1	2000	Government kills 65 year-old man
1	2000	Peace talks between Sénégalaise GVT and MFDC (Abbé); both agreed to create commission to monitor cease-fire agreement, and meet in February; GVT agreed to remove restrictions on travel for MFDC political leaders, and help repatriate refugees living in GB and Gambia
1	2000	Government disappeared civilian (whose father disappeared 9231997) in Ziguinchor
2	2000	MFDC kills 2 Nordistes civilians after taking over their bus
2	2000	MFDC attempts to take over a bus; 2 soldiers killed; 2 soldiers wounded; third time same type of attack has been carried out since December
2	2000	Banjul III negotiation talks
3	2000	Government kills 2 civilians in Loudia Ouoloff

4	2000	MFDC kills retired police officer
4	2000	Government disappeared civilian in Cabrousse
4	2000	MFDC attacks military post at Sare Wali on the Guinea-Bissau border; 3 Sénégalaise soldiers killed; 15 MFDC members killed; army pushed MFDC back into GB
4	2000	Sénégalaise army drops bombs on two villages in Guinea-Bissau near border; Guinean GVT believes it was an accident;
4	2000	Army attacks MFDC on border with GB; 19 people killed
4	2000	MFDC faction attacks a army post near border with GB; several hours of gunfire; 3 soldiers killed; 6 MFDC members killed
4	2000	Government disappeared civilian in Cabrousse
4	2000	MFDC faction and army fight near border; 2 soldiers injured
4	2000	MFDC attacks army post near Mpack; MFDC takes control of post for several hours; 3 soldiers killed; 5 soldiers injured
4	2000	Government disappeared civilian in Dioher (on Oussouye road)
4	2000	All initiatives are stopped by the new President (Wade)
4	2000	New President Wade dismisses all those who formerly mediated between GVT and MFDC; dismissed GB, Gambia, Imam of Ziguinchor, GVT's national committee for peace in Casamance, and many others; said he will talk to MFDC directly
5	2000	MFDC attacks army post 60 miles SW of Ziguinchor [probably Nyassia]; according to army a number of CVLS killed; 2 businessmen from Gambia killed
5	2000	MFDC launch attack of army post near Nyassia; 2 soldiers killed; 2 MFDC members killed

5	2000	President offers to negotiate; president claims war will end in weeks; president in Paris requesting weapons for soldiers to help in DRC peace keeping; president denies these weapons are to fight MFDC
6	2000	Army kills 3 “armed bandits”; claims victory in operation against MFDC
6	2000	Villagers from Joben Saraba, Sare Butty and Amadallai village in Lower Fulladu East, Central River Division (Gambia) report frequent sightings of MFDC members; some accuse them of stealing cattle; majority (including some officials) said they come out of bush for water, fetch it, then leave without bothering residents; Gambian hunter says when he sees MFDC members in the forest, they do not bother him when they see he is Gambian
7	2000	MFDC attacks army; killed a high-ranking officer; wounded many soldiers
7	2000	Army bombs GB border
7	2000	MFDC members attack Sankha and Sibithiong, both on GB border; kidnap and later release 3 CVLS; steal 100 cattle; Djiba denies MFDC is responsible for this incident and others like it
8	2000	MFDC killed 70 year old man
9	2000	MFDC kills woman trying to help son after home was attacked
11	2000	Sadio and Sagna factions of MFDC fought on different sides in clashes between GB GVT and Mane; Sadio supported Mane; Sagna supported GB GVT; GB arrests 8 MFDC members (probably from Sadio faction)
11	2000	First meeting between Abbé and the GVT's Commission on the Management of Peace

12	2000	The three organs of the MFDC cannot agree; Abbé (General Secretariat), external wing [Djiba?], internal wing; 3 organs fall under the Executive Committee, which has final authority; external wing demands Gambia and GB be present at meeting; Gambia withdrew from mediation process earlier in the year
12	2000	Djiba says MFDC will boycott upcoming peace talks if they do not take place in a neutral country; Abbé accepted Ziguinchor as site for proposed talks; Abbé in radio interview (Sud FM) says MFDC is ready to end the fighting; upcoming talks can be successful; urged military wing to cease fighting;
12	2000	Clashes between Sadio and Sagna factions of MFDC; Sadio disagrees with upcoming talks and Abbé; he accuses talks of being “based on politics”; Sagna says Sadio never wants peace in region
12	2000	Peace accord is signed between the GVT, MFDC (represented by Abbé and 12 others) and Diocese of Ziguinchor; the Gambia and GB were observers
1	2001	MFDC members ambush vehicle on road to Ziguinchor; several CVLS wounded; money, jewelry and other property stolen; broke windshield of car
1	2001	Clashes between GB army and MFDC in GB; 13 GB soldiers killed; 20 GB soldiers wounded; GB sends more troops to Sao Domingos and Varela
1	2001	Sadio organized a fake meeting with Sagna’s group (Badiate was still in Guinea-Bissau); He ambushed them, imprisoned them
2	2001	Abbé fires 3 top executives of MFDC: Djiba (spokesman), Badji (military advisor), and Diedhiou (chief of security); reported cause is Badji’s critical remarks in recent interview
2	2001	Clashes between army and MFDC members; landmine explodes; 2 soldiers killed; 6 soldiers wounded

2	2001	Suspected MFDC members attack convoy of vehicles on Trans-Gambia highway in Sedhiou District; 14 CVLS killed; at least 2 civilian wounded; attack possibly organized by Bori Diedhiou (“warlord of northern front”); Diedhiou’s father suspiciously died while in custody at Seedhiou Prison
2	2001	Suspected MFDC members ambush several trucks north of Ziguinchor; kill 13 Nordiste CVLS; robbed victims; Wade demands a judicial inquiry
3	2001	Suspected MFDC members ambush 10 vehicles; rob passengers; assault passengers; open fire and kill 7; Army to send more troops
3	2001	GB authorities arrest over 60 suspected MFDC members in Bsak (Bissau neighborhood); GB found a stockpile of weapons in the area (and seizes them)
3	2001	Suspected MFDC members attack convoy of CVLS on highway in Belaye; 7 CVLS killed
3	2001	Gambia seized 1244kg of illegal drugs in the last year; officials say most of drugs are from Casamance
3	2001	Sénégalaise GVT offers \$200,000 for the capture of Sadio
3	2001	2 CVLS killed by suspected MFDC faction; Sadio’s faction is suspected; main wing of MFDC condemned the violence
3	2001	“unidentified gunmen” attack trucks on highway near Ziguinchor; 1 civilian killed; 17 CVLS wounded; third such attack since 02162001
3	2001	Peace accord in Dakar (signed by Abbe?); accord calls for GVT to lift restrictions on MFDC, withdraw troops from some regions, dropping the arrest warrant for Sadio, release of political prisoners, aid to clear landmines, plan of development for the region;
3	2001	16 MFDC members are released from prison
3	2001	Gambia commits to work with Sénégalaise GVT by ensuring MFDC does not use Gambian territory

4	2001	2 separate incidents north of Ziguinchor; suspected MFDC members ambush vehicles; 1 civilian killed; property stolen
4	2001	President Wade talks with Abbé Senghor in Ziguinchor
4	2001	4 incidents since peace accord in 032001; suspected MFDC members ambush several vehicles; steal property and cars
4	2001	Gambia President Jammeh meets with Bertrand Diamacoune; Diamacoune on a “consultative mission”
5	2001	Sénégalèse and GB armies surround Sadio faction of MFDC at their Baracapata headquarters; Sénégalèse army to the north; GB army to the south; Leopold Sagna faction of MFDC to the east and west; recently Sagna faction has taken territory from Sadio faction
5	2001	Army begins operation to rid Djibidione area (near Gambian border) of MFDC;
5	2001	Clashes between army and MFDC in Djibidione; 1 soldier killed; several soldiers wounded
5	2001	Sénégalèse army carries out military operations to wipe out MFDC bases over several weeks; over 1500 troops; over 2000 of Casamançais flee to Gambia; “heavy civilian casualties”
6	2001	Banjul IV; 63 members of internal wing of MFDC meet with Gambia President Jammeh in Banjul; requests that Gambia and GB mediate peace talks between MFDC and Sénégalèse GVT; goal is to create unified position for future of Casamance and future talks with Sénégalèse GVT
6	2001	Clashes between army and MFDC near Bignona; 2 soldiers killed; 1 soldier captured and released
6	2001	MFDC members attack vehicle between Biala and Capra; money and property stolen
6	2001	MFDC members attack Killy Village; 2 CVLS injured; shops looted; Gambia sending paramilitary to area

		Sadio organized a fake meeting with Sagna's group (Badiate was still in Guinea-Bissau); He ambushed them, imprisoned them, then executed everyone, including Sagna
6	2001	Sadio and Sagna factions of MFDC clash in Buro faye Manjack in GB (less than half mile from Bissau); 2 factions were meeting to discuss truce; Sadio faction attacked [IRIN cites Sud Quotidien saying Sagna faction attacked 06272001]; 200 people reported killed (including those killed while fleeing)
6	2001	GB attacks Sadio's positions along border; MFDC faction loyal to Leopold Sagna help GB army; Sadio faction has held Sagna for months
8	2001	Banjul IV, actors formulate a unified position in preparation for the negotiations with the S�n�galese GVT; elected Biagui, who was formerly living in France; Abb� Senghor is made honorary president; Gambian President Yahya Jammeh mediates to help make MFDC more cohesive, but unsuccessful
8	2001	Abb� Senghor fires several members of his executive staff
8	2001	Abb� states that MFDC is ready to resume peace talks as early as 09152001
8	2001	Rep for external wing of MFDC, Mamadou Nkrumah Sane, says Abb� is MFDC leader; Djiba responds that Sane is not head of external wing in France, nor member of executive, so he has no power
8	2001	Salif Sadio ordered the execution of Leopold Sagna and 20-50 of his men (who Sadio had been holding hostage since January) before they were chased from their bases by those loyal to L�opold Sagna and regrouped in northern Casamance near to the border with the Gambia
9	2001	Suspected MFDC members attack a village 9 miles from Ziguinchor; CVLS injured; stole chickens, goats
9	2001	Suspected MFDC members attack CVLS traveling south of Ziguinchor; stole money and possessions

9	2001	Meeting on peace and development in Casamance held involving President Abdoulaye Wade and Abbé Diamacoune at the Presidential palace
9	2001	Woman arrested with 12kg of cannabis brought from Casamance
10	2001	30 suspected MFDC members attack Ziguinchor; several shops looted; several homes looted; money stolen from CVLS
10	2001	Suspected MFDC members attack 6 miles east of Ziguinchor; 1 soldier injured (slightly); 6 shops and 1 tourist camp looted
10	2001	Fighting between army and MFDC near Ziguinchor in the town of Djibonker; 4 MFDC killed; 2 CVLS killed
10	2001	Suspected MFDC members attack Bureng in the Lower River Division; held police officer hostage; shots fired; CVLS fled area; property damage of D58,000
11	2001	Bertrand Diamacoune (Abbé's brother) says Badji only wants to lead MFDC to make money; Badji says Abbé is not an MFDC executive; he will "no more accept working under Diamacoune's leadership";
11	2001	Biagui resigns as Secretary-General; Biagui cites disloyalty within MFDC as reason; Sidy Badji (former Secretary for Military Affairs) becomes the acting Secretary-General; Abbé Senghor disagrees with this decision; Badji condemned Senghor for not bringing about independence or peace; MFDC international wing appoints Badji because he is oldest in movement (age 84)
11	2001	Abbé re-appoints Biagui as Secretary General
11	2001	Badji writes letter to President Wade; letter states that Abbé is not in power to appoint anyone; negotiations must happen with full MFDC and not Abbé and Biagui

11	2001	Djiba says that Abbé is no longer the chief executive of MFDC so he is not in position to appoint anyone; says Badji is Secretary General; accuses Sénégalaise GVT of using Abbé to divide MFDC
11	2001	MFDC announces it is ready for peace talks
12	2001	MFDC, under Badji, condemns Abbé's re-appointment of Biagui as Secretary General; Badji said after Biagui's resignation, Badji was appointed acting Secretary General; says Abbé has no constitutional power as honorary president; accuses Abbé and Biagui of secret deals with Sénégalaise GVT; whole of military wing supports Badji
1	2002	MFDC attacks CVLS and soldiers in Ziguinchor; 1 soldier killed; several CVLS were injured in the shoot-out between rebels and soldiers; market and shops looted; CVLS kidnapped; MFDC members escape
1	2002	50 MFDC members attack Ziguinchor; 1 police officer killed; 7 police officers wounded; several shops destroyed; stole rice, milk, beer
1	2002	7 suspected MFDC members attack two shops in Brikima-Ba; 1 suspect killed (by victim); 1 suspect injured (by victim); stole D5,000 and 25,000 CFA;
2	2002	Suspected MFDC attack a Gambian businessman; he is severely injured; robbed of D2,000; have been several such attacks recently
3	2002	Suspected MFDC members take refuge in Kartong (Gambia); villages say already many rebels living in the area; Sénégalaise army has a base in Kartong; MFDC members fleeing advancing army
3	2002	200 suspected MFDC soldiers killed 5 Sénégalaise workers in Kafoutine, looted hotels and shops, overtook Sénégalaise soldiers

3	2002	Talks between Sénégalaise GVT and MFDC in Banjul; Badji attended; no discussion about disarmament; both sides willing to talk again soon; Mohammed Diatta and Badiane also attended; Abbé refused to attend
3	2002	200 suspected MFDC members attack village and clash with army near Kafoutine; 5 CVLS killed; 15 CVLS injured
4	2002	Suspected MFDC members attack 2 CVLS in Balingor; both CVLS (a headmaster and teacher) were executed; both were forced to dig his own grave; victims targeted because last name implied that they were from Dakar
4	2002	Suspected MFDC kill 5 after ambushing several vehicles; victims were robbed and shot; High-level GVT officials were attending an election rally near Bignona in the village of Birassou
5	2002	Suspected MFDC members attack a PDS (political party) rally; “almost seven” people killed [IRIN says at least 8 people 05102002]; Casamançais refugees in Gambia blame MFDC for “lawless acts”; CVLS say MFDC not fighting for independence because they attack CVLS and not army
5	2002	Suspected MFDC members attack CVLS between Brikima and Kafoutine; 5 CVLS killed (1 Gambian); money stolen; MFDC members accused Gambian of telling Sénégalaise army MFDC location in Diouloulou
5	2002	Gambian citizen accuses another Gambian citizen of buying timber from MFDC members
5	2002	Clashes between army and MFDC members in Mamuda, Kartak, and Diouloulou; Mamuda and Kartak used to house MFDC bases; army uses aerial assault; 9000 Casamançais fled to Gambia since 05062002
5	2002	Army begins campaign in Diouloulou in response to MFDC attacks

5	2002	Army campaign along Gambia border; Casamançais CVLS accuse army of burning down villages that the army accused of helping MFDC; report that building in Gambia caught fire from army artillery; MFDC members hid among CVLS making them human shields
6	2002	Djiba calls for peace and peace talks with GVT; Casamance should be weapons-free
7	2002	“unidentified gunmen” ambush vehicle; 3 CVLS killed (1 Gambian, 2 Bissau-Guineans)
7	2002	Sénégalaise army finishes operation started on 06212002; purpose to protect CVLS; clashes with MFDC; Djiba says no loss of life or equipment for MFDC;
7	2002	Sénégalaise army move into Gambia to fight MFDC; MFDC suspected of having bases over the border
7	2002	19 suspected MFDC members attack CVLS in Amdalaye (Gambian village on the border); CVLS were assaulted; property looted; property damage; 19 suspects arrested by Gambian authorities during the attack
7	2002	MFDC capture 2 Gambian CVLS living in Kujubey (Casamance); 2 CVLS assumed to have been killed; MFDC accused 2 CVLS of telling Sénégalaise army MFDC location
7	2002	6 month cease-fire begins
8	2002	Abbé and Badji write joint letter requesting that the Sénégalaise GVT resume peace talks; 2 factions have agreed to work together united
9	2002	Suspected MFDC members killed three people after ambushing their taxi
9	2002	2 high ranking Sénégalaise GVT officials meet with MFDC Badji and Abbé Senghor; considered preliminary meeting for future peace talks next month
10	2002	Biagui proclaimed the MFDC was becoming a political party, but Abbé disagreed

10	2002	Badji faction of MFDC declares MFDC will not become a political party; calls Biagui “immature” and “irresponsible”; says world should know that Biagui is not an exec member of MFDC any longer because he resigned as Secretary General in 2001; Badji has been acting as Secretary General [not sure if this is official or self-appointed] until elections
10	2002	MFDC Secretary for Internal Affairs, Abdoulaye Diedhiou, says MFDC still wants to hold peace talks; President Wade suggested (a while ago?) talks in GB; MFDC’s conditions: GB officially promises to secure MFDC members’ safety in writing, Sénégalaise GVT pays for transportation for MFDC abroad
11	2002	Gambia police seize 36kg of cannabis found in vehicle coming from Casamance; 2 men from Brufut arrested
1	2003	Army “launches an operation” near Nyassia against MFDC; Intense fighting near Ziguinchor and Cap Skirring, ending a 6 month truce; according to army, several rebel bases have been destroyed in the last few days; Villagers flee to Ziguinchor; Ziguinchor residents say army is to blame for recent fighting
1	2003	Gambia’s National Drug Control Council announces that 1232 kgs of cannabis was destroyed; most trafficking occurs in western Gambia because borders with Casamance are not well secured; new measures being taken to stop flow of drugs into Gambia
1	2003	According to army, 30 MFDC members and 4 Sénégalaise soldiers were killed, and 24 Sénégalaise soldiers were injured; Colonel Gueye says rebels have recently planted more landmines;
5	2003	Abbé Senghor meets with President Wade for peace talks
5	2003	Clashes between army and MFDC in Bofa; 1 soldier killed; 1 soldier wounded; Abbé Senghor’s faction denies any involvement

5	2003	Magne Dieme (a former member of Front Nord and friend of Kamougue) splits from Badji's faction (now headed by Kamougue Diatta)
5	2003	Dieme faction attacks Diatta faction
10	2003	Meeting of hundreds of MFDC delegates; Biagui declares the war is over for the MFDC; "hardline factions" didn't attend the meeting;
2	2004	Clashes GB army and MFDC; 4 GB soldiers killed; 14 GB soldiers wounded
2	2004	GB and Sénégalaise army begin campaign to clear out MFDC
3	2004	60 suspected MFDC members attack Gouraf (6 miles from Ziguinchor); no injuries; looted material goods
4	2004	Suspected Sadio faction of MFDC attacks army in Guidel (about 10 miles southeast of Ziguinchor); army was conducting anti-mine mission; 3 soldiers killed; 5 soldiers injured; Guidel is a stronghold of Sadio
4	2004	UNDP announces \$4.5 million program to reduce poverty and encourage development in Casamance
6	2004	A military post in Djirack (near border with Guinea Bissau?) was hit by two rockets by a faction of the MFDC
7	2004	Sud Quotidien Newspaper Editor, Madiambal Diagne, is freed from jail; was charged with publishing classified documents, spreading false information, and committing acts likely to cause public unrest; published articles alleging lack of independence of judiciary and corruption in customs service; independent TV stations responded with 24 hour black-out, independent newspapers suspended publication for one day, and independent radio played freedom songs; Reporters without Borders criticized Wade regime for hindering free press since 2003

7	2004	MFDC faction initiates clashes with army on the Kolda road and gave one of the victims a letter in which they reiterated their call for independent (Evans 2004 speculates that this odd means of communication is a sign that this particular faction was alienated from talks between the govt and other factions)
9	2004	World Bank gives Sénégal \$20 million loan for social and economic development in Casamance
9	2004	Biagui announces decision to turn MFDC into a political party that will participate in 2007 national elections;
10	2004	the World Bank gave \$20 million to Sénégal, but the GVT only built four houses in Oussouyé, and took the rest of the money for itself
10	2004	Badiate faction launches attacks against Sadio's positions in GB
10	2004	Meeting between Abbé and representatives of the Badiate faction
		Sénégalaise GVT will use 1.5 million euros from the World Bank to help 3000 former fighters adapt to civilian life
11	2004	MFDC meets in preparation for the peace accord of December 30
12	2004	Abbé Senghor, representing the main wing of the MFDC, and the Interior Minister Ousman Ngom of Sénégal sign a cease-fire peace agreement; 3 factions did not sign because they are waiting on an agreement dealing with the political and economic future of Casamance (no source cited)
12	2004	MFDC Badiate faction NOT a signatory of the peace agreement because it's not possible to have a cease-fire without trying to understand and negotiate
6	2005	Kalagi (Foni District) police arrest 11 suspected MFDC members; suspects had no weapons; group included Spanish national accused of training MFDC members; later taken by Gambian army

8	2005	Suspected MFDC members ambush vehicles in Jarra in 2 separate attacks; Several CVLS injured; looted personal property and special equipment from Medical Research Council workers
10	2005	Sénégalaise GVT shut down Sud FM, an independent radio station, for interviewing Sadio; Staff were arrested and questioned; the suspension lasted 1 day
1	2006	Suspected MFDC faction ambush vehicle 30 miles northwest of Ziguinchor; 1 civilian killed (Gorgui Mbengue, second ranking GVT official in Diouloulou); 2 CVLS wounded; MFDC denied involvement
3	2006	Landmine explodes in GB; 13 CVLS killed (mostly women); MFDC executes a GB civilian for trying to help injured; most other GB CVLS too scared to help injured
3	2006	fighting between MFDC factions led by Sadio and Cesar Badiate; Badiate invaded Sadio's territory; main MFDC accuses GB army of helping Badiate; GB denies support
3	2006	Soldiers from the main MFDC launched attacks on Sadio's faction near Kassarol; Sadio launches attacks on both sides of the border with Guinea Bissau; 2 Guinean troops are killed; fighting continues for at least three weeks
3	2006	Guinea Bissau army stops an MFDC faction from purchasing weapons in Sao Domingos
4	2006	Former Guinea-Bissau Interior Minister Marcelino Simoes Lopes Cabral is arrested for helping MFDC soldiers fight the GB GVT near the border
4	2006	MFDC Sadio faction ambushes vehicles on highway between Ziguinchor and Gambia/Dakar; 1 civilian wounded; stole 1 UNICEF vehicle; stole one vehicle belonging to SENELEC (Sénégal's electricity company); stole cell phones, money, jewelry; Sadio's main military base is in Tambaf (48 miles north of Ziguinchor)
6	2006	Clashes along Gambian border between Sadio faction and Magne Dieme faction of MFDC; 2 factions sign a truce;

6	2006	Fighting resumes between Sadio faction and Dieme faction of MFDC; Sadio captured 17 villages from Dieme faction since 06092006; 100 MFDC members killed; 100 MFDC wounded; most killed and wounded from Dieme faction; reported that Dieme faction helped GB army defeat Sadio in March; army officer in charge of Casamance, Commandant Thiam, says army will not get involved
8	2006	Fighting between army and Sadio faction; Army raids Jifanga village; army soldiers shot at least 2 CVLS from Jifanga; 1 civilian (boy) killed; 3 CVLS seriously wounded
8	2006	Abbé Senghor writes letter to President Wade requesting info on the status of the peace agreement; letter expresses concern over the recent deployment of soldiers to all parts of the Casamance
8	2006	Sadio MFDC faction has stopped all timber trade between Casamance and Gambia; moderate faction displaced by Sadio was trading with Gambia; moderate faction provided 70% of Gambia's timber; moderate faction had tacit approval of army
8	2006	President Wade sends army chief of staff Ebrima Garba Diop and another official to Banjul; Sénégalaise GVT has suspected Gambian support of the MFDC for years all of the way up to President Jammeh (who is Jola); many MFDC members are found with Gambian identity documents; MFDC in northern Casamance freely trades goods in Gambia including timber and cannabis; Gambian GVT paid for Alexandra Djibba (member of Sadio faction) to live in a hotel in Gambia (owned by Libya) for two years; when President Wade took office, he leaned on Gambia to expel Djibba
8	2006	Fighting between MFDC factions led by Sadio and ? (paper calls the other faction pro-GVT faction)
8	2006	Sibanor's (Foni District) Assistant Superintendent of police, Abdoulai Colley, arrested for helping MFDC members; transported 7 wounded MFDC members to Banjul hospital; prevented Gambian army soldiers from talking with superiors

8	2006	Recent clashes between army and MFDC faction; thousands of refugees; 5 CVLS with gunshot wounds arrive in Banjul; some CVLS blame army for arbitrarily shooting CVLS
8	2006	Sénégalèse army launches attacks near Gambian border on MFDC faction led by Sadio; over 4000 Casamançais flee to Gambia; a total of 12,500 refugees in Gambia
9	2006	Landmine explodes; 1 civilian killed (ICRC staff member); 3 CVLS injured; 2 men from Lefeu (an Imam and village chief) were arrested for helping MFDC members plant landmine; MFDC rep states men have no connection to group and army arrests people arbitrarily if they live near landmine
9	2006	Fighting between the army, Sadio's faction of MFDC, and a new MFDC faction led by Alexandra Djibba near the Gambian border; 7000 Casamançais flee to Gambia
9	2006	Suspected faction of MFDC ambushes vehicles on road near Kaparan; CVLS robbed; army pursued; 4th such attack in last 10 days in Bignona area
10	2006	Army takes over important MFDC base in northern Casamance
11	2006	President Wade meets with over 100 Casamançais elders; asks them to foster a peace deal with MFDC; reps from different MFDC factions were present including Sadio, Magne Dieme and Kamoughe Diatta; Wade promised \$122,000 to elders to carry out their mission; MFDC faction led by Daniel Diatta does not support elders; accuses them of opportunism
12	2006	20 suspected MFDC faction attacks vehicles 80 km north of Ziguinchor; 1 civilian killed; 5 CVLS injured; CVLS robbed; MFDC faction suspected in attack on vehicle in Manpalago; 2 CVLS injured; thousands of CVLS flee to Gambia
12	2006	MFDC suspected in attacks on a Sénégalèse army convoy near Bignona; 2 soldiers killed and 14 injured;

12	2006	Suspected MFDC faction attack home in Sindian; Chairman of the Ziguinchor Regional Council (rep of ruling party) killed
		Suspected MFDC members wound 6 civilians, including regional administrator and Chinese national in highway attacks
1	2007	MFDC has slowed down to reorganize after Abbé's death
1	2007	Fighting breaks out between Cesar Badiate's faction of MFDC and army; Badiate controlled area near GB border since 032006; claims army started by entering his territory without notification and attacking; army says it's in the area only to remove landmines, but MFDC attacked them; army accompanied by 500 Moroccan troops; CVLS flee area; GB sends troops to border to keep Sénégalaise army out
2	2007	Sadio faction of MFDC suspected in 3 attacks in Oulampane and Sindian; in 1 attack on 02142007 Sadio MFDC members surrounded 40 cars; killed 3 CVLS (2 were members of main MFDC); over a dozen CVLS injured; senior rep for main MFDC in Ziguinchor, Lang Djiba, said attacks were not because of elections, but because GVT failed to deliver promised food to MFDC
2	2007	Wade elected to a second term; President Wade buys/forces votes in the Casamance; there was an increase of army soldiers in the region; Soldiers displayed their guns to intimidate people to vote for Wade

* Events for which there is either no month or year are not included in the dataset.

Sources: www.allafrica.com (United Nations *Integrated Regional Information Network*; *Panafrican News Agency*); *BBC News* online; AJAC-APRAN, 2001; Evans, 2003; 2004; Foucher, 2005; 2007; Interview with a former combatant turned leader in the political wing, February 8, 2008; Interview with military commander of the MFDC's bases in Guinea-Bissau, February 11, 2008; Interview with military leaders of Salif Sadio's faction, February 11, 2008; Interview with MFDC combatant in César Badiate's faction, February 12, 2008, Varela, Guinea-Bissau; Interview with MFDC members and sympathizers, February 20, 2008, village in northern Casamance; Interview with

Casamançais elder and former MFDC member, February 21, 2008, Ziguinchor; Interview with NGO staff member, February 26, 2008.

APPENDIX 2: KNOWN FACTIONS OF THE MFDC

Date	Event
1947	The MFDC was created in 1947 (before independence) as a political party representing Casamançais.
1982	Abbé Diamacoune revived the MFDC as a secessionist group. Abbé Diamacoune said he had the mandate of Casamançais. After the creation of the military wing in 1983, Abbé Diamacoune's group became known as the political wing. The political wing is now led by his brother Bertrand Diamacoune (though Bertrand has little control over the other factions). (Salif Sadio was in charge of the armed wing of the Southern Front under Abbé)
1983	Abbé Diamacoune creates the armed wing and appoints Sidy Badji as its leader.
mid-1980s	Sidy Badji sends Kamougué Diatta to northern Casamance to earn revenue (from marijuana production) and grow food. This started out as the group in charge of earning revenue for the movement. This faction broke from Abbé because he accused him of making up the story about Senghor's promise to let Casamance separate from Sénégal; Badji said that Abbé caused the war because he made up the story about the promise. This was the first faction to break from the original group of the MFDC; Controls the area along the northwestern border with the Gambia
1991	Badji split from Abbé Diamacoune, left the MFDC, and moved to northern Casamance because Abbé Diamacoune refused to show the documents proving that Senghor made "the promise" to the Casamance; Badji's group becomes known as the <u>Front Nord</u> because of its location in Casamance. This front became significantly less active after 1991, but it controlled much of northern Casamance with tacit government support.

Date	Event
1992	<p>Abbé Diamacoune brought back the military wing with some former members of Badji's group. He appointed Salif Sadio as the new leader of the military wing. Under Badji, Sadio had been responsible for the members of the military wing located along the Guinea-Bissau border. Sadio's grouping became known as <u>Front Sud</u> or the Sadio faction.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This faction is considered by most (Sénégalèse government, other MFDC factions, and Casamançais) to be the most violent and active faction presently. • Sadio is opposed by all other factions of the MFDC. • Sadio supported the successful coup of Ansoumana Mané in neighboring Guinea-Bissau; • Sadio is rumored to be supported by the Gambian President Jammeh because Jammeh is angry with the Sénégalèse government. Jammeh allegedly helps Sadio (sanctuary, troops, arms) because his is the only faction still actively fighting the government.
1997	<p><u>Sagna/Badiate faction</u>: Leopold Sagna, who used to be Salif Sadio's assistant in the Front Sud, and Caesar Badiate, who was Sagna's lieutenant split from Front Sud. Sagna and Badiate broke away when Sadio sent them into Guinea-Bissau to fight for Ansoumana Mané against President Nino Vieira. They refused to fight against the Bissau-Guinean government because it had done nothing to the MFDC.</p>
1997	<p>Sadio organized a fake meeting with Sagna's group (Badiate was not in attendance), and ambushed Sagna and the men who were with him. Sadio imprisoned them, then executed everyone, including Sagna. Badiate became the new leader of this faction; Badiate now controls the <u>Sagna/Badiate faction</u>, which includes the area in southern Casamance and the MFDC bases over the border in Guinea-Bissau.</p>
2005	<p>Biagui proclaimed the MFDC was becoming a political party, but Abbé and other factions disagreed</p>
2006	<p>Badiate and the Bissau-Guinean army fought Salif Sadio for control of southern Casamance and won. They drove Sadio out, and he fled to northern Casamance.</p>

Date	Event
2006	<u>Magne Diemé faction</u> : Diemé was Kamougué Diatta's lieutenant in the Front Nord. Diemé split from and attacked Diatta's Front Nord.
072007	Badiate and Diemé factions join to fight Sadio faction.
2007-2008	MFDC is currently in a phase of reorganization after the death of Abbé Diamacoune in January 2007.

Sources: AJAC-APRAN, 2001; Evans, 2003; 2004; Foucher, 2005; 2007; Interview with a former combatant turned leader in the political wing, February 8, 2008; Interview with military commander of the MFDC's bases in Guinea-Bissau, February 11, 2008; Interview with military leaders of Salif Sadio's faction, February 11, 2008; Interview with MFDC combatant in César Badiate's faction, February 12, 2008, Varela, Guinea-Bissau; Interview with MFDC members and sympathizers, February 20, 2008, village in northern Casamance; Interview with Casamançais elder and former MFDC member, February 21, 2008, Ziguinchor; Interview with NGO staff member, February 26, 2008.

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Interviewees

Bertrand Diamacoune (younger brother of Abbé Diamacoune), political leader of the MFDC, May 11, 2007, Ziguinchor.

Daniel Diatta (leader of relatively new faction of the MFDC), May 13, 2007, Ziguinchor.

Former combatant turned leader in the political wing, February 8, 2008, Ziguinchor

Military leaders of Salif Sadio faction of the MFDC, February 11, 2008, Ziguinchor.

Military commander of the MFDC's bases in Guinea-Bissau (leader in the Badiate faction of the MFDC), February 11, 2008, Saõ Domingos, Guinea-Bissau.

MFDC combatant in Badiate faction, February 12, 2008, Varela, Guinea-Bissau.

MFDC members and sympathizers, February 20, 2008, village in northern Casamance.

Casamançais elder and former MFDC member, February 21, 2008, Ziguinchor.

Interview with local NGO staff member, February 26, 2008, Ziguinchor.