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Parliaments and Monarchies: Blame Avoidance in the Authoritarian Context

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Abstract

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Why have half of Kuwait's parliamentary sessions in the past sixty years been dissolved early? Why has Jordan experienced fourteen prime ministers in the past twenty-one years since King Abdullah II ascended to the throne? Over the past several decades there have been various instances of authoritarian monarchs interfering in established institutions, despite evidence suggesting such authoritarian institutions can be beneficial to autocrats. This paper explores this puzzle and attempts to answer the question of why monarchs sometimes choose to intervene in parliamentary politics. This paper uses blame avoidance theory and argues that a monarch may choose to interfere in parliament to signal to the public that intermediary political institutions and individuals are to blame for their grievances, thus allowing the monarch to avoid the public's blame and its associated costs. This theory is studied through qualitative text analysis, using process tracing and focusing on the case of Jordan. Specifically, this paper explores a potential correlation between protest size and issue, and monarchical interference. The results provide no support for a correlation between protest size and monarchical interference. However, the findings lend some support to the expectation that political and economic protest issues are more likely to result in monarchical interference, relative to socially-motivated protests. This paper also inductively addresses unexpected trends concerning blame avoidance language, references to the regional context, and perceptions of authoritarian institutions in Jordan.

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Parliaments and Monarchies: Blame Avoidance in the Authoritarian Context

I. Introduction

Over the past several decades we have observed various instances of monarchs intervening in established institutions. Since the 1960s, half of Kuwait's parliamentary sessions have been dissolved early (Al Najjar 2008). In 2017, Morocco's King Mohammed VI abruptly dismissed four ministers from office (Al Jazeera 2017). Yet in Bahrain, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa held the position of prime minister since the country's independence in 1971 until his death in 2020 (Gambrell 2020). This depicts a puzzling situation and generates questions surrounding authoritarian institutions and the potential for monarchical intervention.

Literature on authoritarian institutions and their potential to serve a dictator's¹ interests is extensive. Authoritarian institutions can facilitate governance and promote regime stability by enabling a leader to coopt elites, engage in power-sharing, and make more credible commitments (Boix and Svobik 2013; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Wright and Escibà-Folch 2012). Yet many of these advantages require the institution to function with minimal external intervention. For example, authoritarian institutions have been shown to help increase an authoritarian leader's perceived credibility (Magaloni 2008). Yet, if a leader establishes an institution to prove his credibility, dissolving the institution itself is unlikely to produce this effect. This raises the question of *why and under what conditions will a monarch intervene in authoritarian parliamentary politics?* This puzzle is further exacerbated by the fact that in authoritarian monarchies, the monarch typically appoints legislative positions himself.² Why would a monarch

¹ Throughout this paper, I use "dictator," "authoritarian leader," and "autocrat" interchangeably. Similarly, I use "dictatorship," "authoritarian regime," and "autocracy" interchangeably.

² Throughout this paper, I refer to monarchs with he/his/him pronouns. This decision was made based on the absence of any female authoritarian monarchs in the world today.

choose to interfere in an institution which is both expected to be beneficial to him, and is filled by individuals that he selected?

Existing theories primarily attribute monarchical intervention in parliament to an attempt to neutralize oppositional threats in the legislature (Huntington 1966; Magaloni 2008; Przeworski, Asadurian, and Bohlken 2012). I posit that these theories cannot explain all instances of intervention. Instead, I build on blame avoidance theories (Weaver 1986; Hood 2010; Baekkeskov and Rubin 2017) and argue that some cases of monarchical intervention in parliamentary politics can be attributed to a monarch's incentives to avoid blame and associated domestic costs. I suggest that by intervening in parliament, a monarch can signal to the public that he is not to be blamed for their grievances. I evaluate this theoretical argument using the case of Jordan, examining protest movements and exploring a potential relationship between the size and topics of these protests, and instances of King Abdullah II's interference.

To my knowledge, this study is the first to apply blame avoidance theory to the monarchical context, and one of few that apply this theory to authoritarian states. Therefore, this paper may contribute to a small, yet growing subsection of authoritarian politics literature that attempts to apply blame avoidance to authoritarian contexts. Additionally, this paper may contribute to the broader literature on authoritarian institutions, providing further insight into the puzzle of why authoritarian regimes sometimes establish legislatures. The question of authoritarian institutions has and continues to be studied. It is especially puzzling considering establishing such institutions typically involves elected positions and some degree of power-sharing between the monarch and governmental officials, an outcome traditional theories expect authoritarian leaders to avoid. Yet most authoritarian states today have established institutions. Thus, my theory can contribute to works concerning autocrats' choices to create institutions.

Furthermore, this study may contribute to better understanding regime-citizen dynamics. Blame avoidance theory pertains to domestic pressures and the costs of bottom-up blame from the populace toward the leader. While this is an established phenomenon in democratic politics, it is a more recent addition to authoritarian literature, thus this study could expand understandings of citizen-dictator relationships. Along similar lines, this theory may contribute to studies of dissent in the authoritarian context. Dissent may be interpreted as a manifestation of blame, therefore, better understanding an autocrat's blame avoidance behaviors may offer insights into an autocrat's response to dissent.

This study may also have some practical implications. Deepened understandings of authoritarian politics and dictator-citizen dynamics are important as they may enable policymakers and scholars to more accurately understand—and possibly predict—monarchs' actions when facing unrest. As observed in the Arab Spring, a population's discontentment when channeled as blame toward the regime can escalate into widespread protests. These protests can then both move a country toward democratization or result in a devastating war. Therefore, understanding why and when monarchs react to citizens' frustrations by intervening in parliamentary politics may be critical to identifying potential outcomes of such situations. The regime's reaction to dissent and expressed grievances by the public may reflect the degree of threat felt by the monarch, and thus may provide greater insight into the state's overall status.

The subsequent portions of this paper are structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, addressing authoritarian institutions, monarchies, and monarchical intervention in parliamentary politics. Section 3 outlines blame avoidance theories and presents my theoretical framework. Section 4 presents my testable hypotheses. Section 5 explains the choice of Jordan and provides necessary background information. Section 6 outlines my research

methods and relevant variables, including case selection criteria, case descriptions, and coding methods. Section 7 presents the results, addressing the hypotheses and exploring unexpected trends. Finally, Section 8 concludes and presents potential avenues for future research.

II. Literature Review

Authoritarian Institutions

To understand the puzzling nature of monarchical interference in parliament, it is essential to first understand the nature of authoritarian institutions. This relates to the absence of free and fair elections in dictatorships, a critical point of contrast with democracies (Svolik 2012; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). Unlike democratic leaders, dictators are not in positions of power due to popular support. Nevertheless, most authoritarian regimes have legislatures (Przeworski et al. 2013; Wilson and Woldense 2019).

While authoritarian institutions were previously largely considered “rubber-stamps” with no notable power and little purpose outside of creating an illusion of legitimacy, a growing body of literature has countered such claims. Recent work argues that such political institutions may be crucial for authoritarian systems as they can facilitate regime stability and durability (Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Truex 2016; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2012). In other words, this body of literature postulates that “nominally democratic institutions serve distinctively authoritarian ends,” (Gandhi, Noble, and Svolik 2020, 1361).

The argument that institutions can serve authoritarian interests is rooted in the undemocratic form of a dictator’s appointment; authoritarian leaders in power typically lack a base of popular support to rely on. Further contrasting with democracies, most authoritarian regimes lack the same degree of institutionalized bottom-up accountability that is typical of

democracies. Yet authoritarian leaders are not wholly immune from public discontentment (Li and Chen 2020; Weeks 2008). Therefore, they are expected to take measures to protect themselves from threats to their and their regime's power. Authoritarian leaders can protect themselves by acquiring sufficient cooperation for the regime to persist when facing popular discontentment. As outlined below, some scholars argue that institutions such as legislatures can help facilitate this process.

A dictator's primary governance challenges are defeating opposition and ensuring economic cooperation wherein threats to a leader's power can arise from both within ruling elites and from regime outsiders (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 2007). Institutions can enable authoritarian leaders to address these challenges and mitigate threats (Boix and Svulik 2013; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2012). As aforementioned, autocratic leaders typically lack a base of popular support to rely on. Instead, they may choose to incentivize necessary cooperation and facilitate power-sharing by distributing rewards to elites and opposition forces (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006).

Distributing rewards can coopt elites and thwart opposition. These rewards often range from material spoils to policy concessions. However, autocratic leaders face the challenge of credibly committing to distributing these spoils (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). It is important that a dictator credibly signals his commitment to reward distribution, as elites who doubt the leader's commitment may rebel. To do so, a leader may delegate the responsibility of distribution decisions to an authoritarian institution, thus tying his hands and publicly credibly committing to distributing rewards. In other words, institutions can facilitate power-sharing in authoritarian regimes, thus mitigating the commitment problems experienced between a regime leader and ruling elites (Boix and Svulik 2013; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2012; Reuter 2017).

Policy concessions can also help thwart opposition and garner cooperation. Institutions' information-revealing potential can help facilitate the process of awarding policy concessions (Blaydes 2010; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 2007). An institutional setting may enable a dictator to identify elites' preferences and thus determine the policy concessions necessary to ensure their cooperation. For example, dictators may observe institutional electoral competition to discern political elites' policy preferences and thus determine the policy concessions necessary to appease elites (oppositional or otherwise) and maintain cooperation (Blaydes 2010; Malesky and Schuler 2011).


The aforementioned theory explains the presence of authoritarian institutions broadly, yet these institutions differ across authoritarian regime types. According to the Political Institutions and Political Events (PIPE) dataset, for authoritarian regimes from the 1800s to 2008, 80 percent of country-year observations had legislatures (Przeworski et al. 2013). Today, almost every country has a legislature (Wilson and Woldense 2019). However, even across authoritarian states with legislatures, their structures and rules differ. For example, according to PIPE data, of the non-democratic regimes, some legislatures were fully appointed by the executive branch (six percent), others were partially appointed (27 percent), and most were fully elected (66 percent), although the elections' fairness differed by case (Przeworski et al. 2013).

Monarchies

A monarchy is a form of government wherein the monarch is the sovereign head of state whose position is typically inherited and assigned for life. As depicted in Figure 1, monarchies span a range of systems and structures and have evolved over time. Throughout this study, I

focus on monarchies as a subset of authoritarian regimes, excluding “constitutional monarchies” where the monarch is a figurehead with no influence over legislative proceedings.

Figure 1: Autocratic Regimes Across Time, taken from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014, 318)



In some authoritarian monarchies, the monarch is both the ruler and head of government, in others, a prime minister is the head of government. Some monarchies have constitutionalized the ruler’s right to appoint positions such as premier and minister, and to dismiss them from office at his discretion. Overall, authoritarian monarchs tend to retain a relatively high degree of political power and discretion over institutions. As of 2008, approximately 53 percent of monarchies’ legislatures were fully elected, 42 percent were partially elected, and the remaining five percent were fully appointed by the executive (Przeworski et al. 2013).

As aforementioned, parliaments exist in most monarchies today, albeit with various degrees of autonomy. Legislatures’ degrees of autonomy further distinguish authoritarian monarchies from the constitutional monarchies typical of Europe (Herb 2004). It may be noted that several authoritarian monarchies have constitutions by which they abide. However, in most

cases, these constitutions allow parliament limited power or award the monarch discretion over parliamentary proceedings.

Regardless of the specificities of each monarchy, theories regarding the function and potential utility of legislatures in authoritarian contexts suggest that parliaments may be beneficial to monarchs. However, there are instances of monarchical intervention in authoritarian parliamentary politics. This has manifested as various actions including rescheduling parliamentary elections, dissolving parliament, and dismissing or criticizing the premier. The existence and persistence of parliament as an institution in these monarchies, coupled with its apparent potential benefits, raises the question of why monarchs sometimes choose to intervene in parliamentary politics.

Monarchical Intervention in Parliamentary Politics

The trend of monarchs interfering in parliamentary or cabinet proceedings is traced back to the 1600s and has manifested in various ways since. This includes dissolving parliament, removing the prime minister, or rescheduling parliamentary elections, (Przeworski, Asadurian, and Bohlken 2012). However, most of the literature on this phenomenon addresses democratic monarchies; few studies have identified reasons for why authoritarian monarchs intervene in parliamentary politics.

The leading existing theory on this issue argues that a monarch might intervene in parliamentary politics to neutralize a perceived threat to his power. Huntington (1966) referred to this in his assessment of monarchies' resistance to "modernization" and their choice to dissolve or repress parliament, to avoid the threat of oppositional parties. Along similar lines, studies of primarily constitutional monarchies have addressed the monarch's incentives to dissolve

parliament when pro-royalist groups were unable to win elections or pass critical pieces of legislation (Przeworski, Asadurian, and Bohlken 2012).

The crux of this issue is that even in authoritarian contexts, parliament retains some degree of power. Thus, if members of parliament oppose the monarch or his policies, this may be perceived as a threat to his stability. In sum, while legislatures may help coopt oppositional elites and facilitate power-sharing to overcome credible commitment problems and maintain stability, the presence of oppositional forces in the legislature could potentially culminate in a threat to the leader's position.

III. Theory

The existing theory posits that monarchs will intervene when they perceive a threatening lack of sufficient support within the legislature. This logical theory offers insight into many situations of monarchical intervention; however, it cannot explain all instances. I argue that in some scenarios, a monarch intervenes in parliament to avoid blame.

As outlined by the PIPE dataset, in almost half of monarchies (47 percent) at least a portion of parliamentary positions are appointed by the monarch himself (Przeworski et al. 2013). In some contexts, elections are so rife with fraud it is virtually impossible for anyone but regime supporters to join parliament. In other scenarios, most—if not all—parliament members are appointed by the monarch or via the monarch-appointed premier, rather than elected. This suggests that parliament is unlikely to have many members who are not regime loyalists, if any. Thus, the existing theory's supposition that an opposing party could gain significant power in parliament or pro-royalist groups could lose the majority, may be inapplicable in some scenarios.

The Kingdom of Morocco

Consider the case of Morocco, an authoritarian monarchy where the king retains a relatively high degree of power over parliamentary and ministerial politics.³ Constitutionally, the king is responsible for appointing the prime minister, albeit from the winning party. The premier is then tasked with forming the government and choosing the Council of Ministers, all of whom must be approved by the king (Kingdom of Morocco 2019; Morocco's Constitution). Morocco has a bicameral parliamentary system and both the Chamber of Representatives (lower house) and Chamber of Counselors (upper house) are directly elected in multiparty elections.

In 2011, Morocco held parliamentary elections and its largest Islamist party, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) attained the majority of seats in the lower house. As a result, King Mohammed VI was obligated to select a prime minister from the PJD, and Abdelilah Benkirane became premier. In 2016, Morocco held another round of parliamentary elections and the PJD once again won the plurality of seats in the lower house, with Benkirane remaining prime minister (Freedom House 2017). However, the following March, King Mohammed dismissed Benkirane after months of unsuccessful coalition government-formation under Benkirane's guidance. In his place, the King appointed Saadeddine Othmani (also of the PJD) as premier (Sakthivel 2017).

According to the previously-outlined theory regarding why monarchs may intervene in parliamentary politics, one would expect to see some indication that the parliament or premier posed a threat to King Mohammed. For example, in line with the theory, one might expect to observe parliamentary losses for pro-royalist groups, significant seats allotted to opposition

³ It may be noted that much like several other authoritarian monarchies, Morocco has a constitution and is, in theory, a constitutional monarchy. However, most political power is concentrated with the King who enjoys significant control over parliamentary positions.

forces, or a premier from an anti-regime party. However, those factors were notably absent in Morocco and the theory seems insufficient to explain this scenario. The primary reason for this incompatibility is King Mohammed's enduring control over governmental positions. The King retains the sole power to appoint the premier and is generally expected to select someone who aligns with his ideologies and policy preferences.

This puzzle is further exacerbated when considering the PJD's historical national presence as an established party that has led Morocco's government since 2011.⁴ Benkirane himself had been prime minister for around seven years before King Mohammed deposed him. It stands to reason that King Mohammed would have likely dissolved parliament or dismissed Benkirane earlier if the PJD or Benkirane had been perceived as direct threats. Moreover, if the PJD itself had been deemed threatening, one might expect the King to intervene in elections, rather than only remove Benkirane. The argument that the monarch will intervene when he feels threatened is less likely to be the case when the monarch himself chose the prime minister, particularly when the prime minister and his party have a long-established history. This leaves the question of why King Mohammed chose to oust Benkirane, which I believe my theory can answer.

I argue that monarchical intervention in parliament may be a form of blame avoidance. When the monarch faces criticism from his citizenry, he may choose to intervene in parliament

⁴ The PJD is a well-established party with roots in earlier parties from previous decades. The PJD's origins are traced back to 1967 and the creation of the Popular Democratic and Constitutional Movement Party— itself an offshoot of the existing Popular Movement Party—in 1967 (Al Jazeera 2014). In 1996, the Popular Democratic and Constitutional Movement Party was renamed the Justice and Development Party. The following year, the PJD participated in parliamentary elections and acquired a total of fourteen seats in parliament. In the 2002 elections, the PJD's power in parliament grew as they amassed 42 seats (ibid). The PJD's parliamentary power continued to grow, and in 2016 after another round of parliamentary elections, the PJD once again won the plurality of seats in the lower house, and Benkirane remained the Prime Minister.

in an attempt to wash his hands of responsibility, and as a signal to the populace that government officials are to blame. Doing so can somewhat insulate him from the costs of public discontentment and pressure. In the following paragraphs, I explain blame avoidance theory and propose its application within this authoritarian—and specifically, monarchical—context.

Blame Avoidance

Blame avoidance is a key theory in democratic politics, if understudied. Weaver (1986) provides one of the earlier accounts of blame avoidance. He importantly notes that political officials face incentives to avoid blame, and thus will employ tactics to insulate themselves from the consequences associated with blame. Weaver's argument is based on the democratic context and builds on negativity bias theory which suggests "voters are more sensitive to what has been done to them, than to what has been done for them," (ibid 373). Based on this, Weaver posits that politicians face incentives to avoid blame when the losses outweigh the benefits for constituents. These incentives are rooted in the individual policymaker's desire to remain in office.

Hood (2010) importantly builds on this theory and outlines three main types of blame avoidance strategies (summarized in Figure 2). Presentational strategies attempt to address blame resulting from perceived losses, by reframing or presenting incidents as gains instead. This is tied to the intersection of media and politics as policymakers using this strategy often use the media to spin issues in their favor. Agency strategies address the question of who should be held responsible when citizens seek to redress their complaints. This typically entails delegating responsibilities to "lightning rods"; individuals or agencies upon whom blame is focused when citizens have complaints concerning these agents' delegated tasks. Policy strategies address agency by altering the nature and structure of the policies themselves. Policymakers may

strategically avoid or minimize making decisions or enacting policies with an associated risk of blame.

Figure 2: Three Types of Blame-Avoidance Strategy, from Hood (2010, 18)

	<i>Aspect of blame dealt with</i>	<i>Works on</i>	<i>Example</i>	<i>Assume</i>
Presentational strategies (Slogan: “ <i>Spin your way out of trouble</i> ”)	Loss or harm perception and time	Arguments for limiting blame (excuses) or turning blame into credit (justifications) and other methods of shaping public impressions	Shaping of public perceptions through news management	Presentational activity will limit or deflect rather than exacerbate or attract blame
Agency strategies (Slogan: “ <i>Find a scapegoat</i> ”)	Agency perception and time	Distribution of formal responsibility, competency, or jurisdiction among institutions and officeholders in space or time	Formal delegation of potentially blameworthy tasks to “lightning rods”	Formal allocation of organizational responsibility is sufficiently credible and salient to last through blame firestorms
Policy strategies (Slogan: “ <i>Don’t make contestable judgments that create losers</i> ”)	Agency perception and time	Selection of policies or operating routines to minimize risk of institutional or individual liability or blame	Protocolization and automaticity to remove or minimize the exercise of individual discretion by officeholders	There is a low- or no-blame option (e.g., in choosing between errors of commission and errors of omission or between opting for automaticity and opting for discretion)

Blame avoidance theory also relates to decision rights wherein blame avoidance is considered an incentive for delegating responsibility (Bartling and Fischbacher 2012; Oexl and Grossman 2013). Relevant literature shows that a leader can effectively avoid blame by delegating responsibility to an agent. Furthermore, a leader will decide to do so, regardless of the outcome’s likelihood of being perceived as “unfair.” In a laboratory experiment, Bartling and

Fischbacher (2012) demonstrated that a dictator prefers to delegate perceived “unfair” decisions to another individual or choose the “fair” decision, rarely choosing the unfair decision himself due to the potential punishment from doing so.

As aforementioned, blame avoidance has been addressed mostly in democracies where blame can cost elected officials their seats in office. While authoritarian regimes typically lack the same degree of bottom-up accountability found in democracies, dictators are not completely shielded from the consequences of citizens’ dissatisfaction, requiring some degree of support from their populace (Li and Chen 2020; Weeks 2008). Notably, Weeks (2008) found there was no evidence suggesting citizens of democratic regimes were more likely to “value credibility or competence than audiences in various types of autocratic regimes,” (42).

Baekkeskov and Rubin (2017) are among the few scholars who have attempted to apply blame avoidance to the authoritarian context. Baekkeskov and Rubin studied two cases of exogenous health shocks in China—the 2003 SARS and 2009 H1N1 outbreaks—and compared the Chinese government’s reaction and its relative transparency or secrecy with information within each epidemic. They found the Chinese government’s approach shifted from secrecy and suppression to greater transparency. The authors argue that China’s government used this transparency to shift blame onto health-related experts and agencies. Overall, Baekkeskov and Rubin focus on the “lightning rods” component of Hood’s agency strategies and argue that a blame avoidance strategy available to authoritarian regimes is the creation of agencies that may simultaneously increase transparency and provide an outlet for bottom-up blame. In China, this helped alleviate informational problems while also somewhat insulating the Chinese Communist Party.

The authors suggest that avoiding the costs of repression is an additional benefit of blame avoidance strategies. Baekkeskov and Rubin write:

“Instead of theorizing solutions as stark dichotomies between information suppression and embarking on democratization, blame avoidance can offer a more accurate theoretical framework for explanations of Chinese and other authoritarian governments’ uses of secrecy and transparency. Thus, rather than strengthening coercive measures (which is expensive) or embarking on pluralistic reforms (which undermines CPC⁵ control), the dilemma can be solved by delegation to credible technical experts who can subsequently act as lightning rods,” (2017, 439).

This insight importantly reveals that another benefit of blame avoidance agency tactics is avoiding costs of actions that would have likely otherwise occurred (e.g. repression). In other words, without blame avoidance strategies, a leader may feel significant public pressure and thus resort to the use of costly repression to quell opposition. However, if the leader shifts blame onto other agents, then he may spare himself the costs of political unrest, including costs of repression. In this study, Baekkeskov and Rubin successfully apply the blame avoidance theory to the authoritarian setting. I attempt to do the same within an authoritarian monarchy.

Blame Avoidance in a Monarchy

In its simplest form, blame avoidance theory suggests that by delegating responsibility to an intermediary, a leader can avoid blame when facing public grievances. I argue that blame avoidance might sometimes motivate monarchs to intervene in parliamentary politics. Consistent with the earlier discussion, a monarch requires some degree of support, lest he be ousted. The threat of a coup or popular uprising may create a sufficient incentive for the monarch to seek insulation from public critique.

⁵ The authors use “CPC” as an acronym for the Communist Party of China.

There are several recent examples of authoritarian monarchs being ousted by coups. For example, in 1952 a group of Egyptian military officers known as the Free Officers overthrew the reigning monarch, King Farouk, in a bloodless coup (Botman 1986). The Free Officers were primarily nationalists and their main complaint was the continued presence of British influence in Egypt. In other words, the Free Officers *blamed* King Farouk for catering to British interests and neglecting the Egyptian people (Dalachanis 2017). This is but one of several cases where authoritarian monarchs were deposed due to public discontentment.⁶ Such cases re-affirm the importance of a monarch placating his citizenry. The threat of a coup or rebellion is real and can impose severe costs on a leader and his regime. Therefore, we expect leaders will take the actions necessary to avoid such outcomes.

I argue that one method of avoiding blame and its associated costs is delegating responsibility to an intermediary agent.⁷ This intermediary would, to borrow language from Weaver (1986), Hood (2010), and others, act as a “lightning rod.” Lightning rods behave as focal points, serving to concentrate the citizenry’s complaints and discontentment, thus sparing the monarch from the threat of direct blame.

I propose that a monarch can use the parliament and premier as lightning rod intermediaries. In other words, when facing blame, the monarch may seek to avoid criticism and its consequences by signaling to the public that their blame should be directed toward the parliament or prime minister. This signal may manifest as the monarch directly criticizing these

⁶ A second, similar example is the ousting of King Idris of Libya in a coup d’état in 1969. Akin to the case of Egypt, the coup against King Idris was organized and led by military officers of the Free Officers Movement. The group of officers, led by Muammar al-Gaddafi, were frustrated by the concentration of wealth within King Idris’ hands, and his continued support of the British (Synge 2015).

⁷ This is arguably more an illusion of responsibility rather than true responsibility, particularly considering the continued power and discretion of the monarch, and constraints on public officials’ power. However, this is not the main focus of this study and thus will not be further explored within this paper.

intermediaries. However, it could also occur in the form of more direct interference, such as dismissing the prime minister, dissolving parliament, or rescheduling parliamentary elections. I argue that the monarch chooses such forms of interference because they can quell discontentment and insulate the monarch from blame.

To reiterate, by removing the prime minister or dissolving parliament, the monarch suggests to the public that these intermediaries were responsible for the decision or condition being protested. While the monarch may sit atop the political hierarchy of an authoritarian monarchy, he shares some power with the premier and members of parliament. Thus, by criticizing the parliament's decision—be it through a public statement or by dissolving parliament—the monarch signals to the public that the parliament has erred in some way. This then suggests that parliament is more deserving of the public's blame, relative to the monarch himself.

In sum, the broad implication of this theoretical argument is that a monarch who feels criticized by the public will seek to avoid blame by intervening in parliamentary politics. This is because public critique may be threatening to the leader who will then seek to insulate himself from the consequences of the public's blame. By intervening in parliament, the monarch signals to the public that he is not guilty of their accusations and that parliament should be blamed instead.

IV. Hypotheses

To reiterate, my theory implies that a monarch will intervene in parliamentary politics when he feels threatened by blame. Criticism directed toward the monarch can manifest in various ways. Arguably, the most visible critique of the monarch is protest wherein citizens take

to the streets to voice their grievances and demand concessions. Based on my theory, if the monarch feels threatened by the citizenry's blame, he will seek to avoid blame by intervening in parliament. I formulate two primary hypotheses⁸ which define the protest characteristics I expect will sufficiently incentivize the monarch to respond with interference.

As outlined, the costs of blame can motivate a leader's desire to shift blame. Blame attribution may have dire consequences, the harshest of which are ousting the leader or toppling the regime. Therefore, protests may be perceived as threatening by the monarch, prompting him to seek blame avoidance by interfering in parliament. However, not all protests are equal in the threat they pose to the monarch. Based on this, I identify two hypotheses addressing factors that may affect the threat a protest poses. First, protest size, denoted by the number of participants in a given protest, may influence threat. Larger protests are typically more threatening, thus we may expect a monarch to be more likely to shift blame when facing relatively large protests. This is clarified in my first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Large-scale protests are more likely to result in monarchical interference in parliament, relative to smaller protests.

Second, the protest's issue of focus may influence a protest's threat. Political and economic issues tend to be contentious and widespread among the population, making them more threatening. Protests driven by such issues may be likelier to entail costlier demands for a monarch, relative to social protests.⁹ Furthermore, economic and political issues often have

⁸ Originally, I had intended to study an additional hypothesis positing that when there are no protests, the monarch will not intervene in parliamentary politics. However, I was unable to evaluate any cases which could address this hypothesis, thus I decided to remove it from this study.

⁹ Here, "costlier demands" refer to the costs the demands pose on the monarch's power. For example, a protest demanding less monarchical discretion over parliamentary positions is typically costlier to the monarch, relative to

palpable, daily impacts on individuals and affect a large segment of society. Thus, they can crosscut social cleavages and unite various population groups, creating the potential for larger, more threatening protests.

On the other hand, social issues may be more divisive and thus garner less protest participation, relative to political and economic issues. Social issues tend to be connected to identities (religion, race, gender, etc.) which differ across population groups and inform perspectives on social issues, making such issues more contentious across society. I expect that political and economic protests are perceived as more threatening to the monarch, making him more likely to engage in blame avoidance. This is stated in my second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Political- or economic-based protests will be more likely to result in monarchical interference, relative to socially-driven protests.

To test these hypotheses, I analyze the case of Jordan. I identify periods of protests throughout the past two decades and evaluate the existence of a causal relationship between protest size or issue, and monarchical interference, using qualitative text analysis.

Scope conditions

While I intend for my findings to be generalizable beyond the case of Jordan and authoritarian monarchies, certain conditions must be met for the theory to be applicable. First, this study is limited to authoritarian regimes. As demonstrated in the literature, blame avoidance occurs in democracies; however, the blame avoidance behaviors targeted in this study are typically infeasible in democracies due to institutionalized checks on the leader's power.

calls for an amendment to a law concerning women's rights. Thus, it follows that political and economic issues are more likely to produce costlier demands, relative to more socially-driven protests.

Democratically-elected leaders are typically incapable of directly interfering in the legislature or head of government's behavior to the same extent that an autocrat can. This intervention is a key component of my theory, therefore, the study is limited to authoritarian regimes wherein the leader can intervene in legislatures.

Second, this study is limited to settings with authoritarian institutions, namely a legislature, as the blame avoidance behaviors studied here pertain to intervention in such institutions. Third, this study is limited to contexts wherein the head of state and head of government are distinct from each other. In monarchies, this is typically the difference between the monarch and the prime minister.¹⁰ This distinction is critical as the duality of having both these positions facilitates blame avoidance behaviors. Lastly, there must be some observable manifestation of blame. In this study, I utilize protests as indicators of blame toward the regime. However, protests themselves are not necessarily critical if citizens can voice their grievances elsewhere.

V. Case Selection & Introduction

The case of Jordan aligns with the theory and the scope conditions. Crucially, Jordan is an authoritarian monarchy, matching the study's focus. Since its independence, Jordan has witnessed a succession of monarchs, thus lending itself to a wider timeframe to draw upon for

¹⁰ While this study focuses on authoritarian monarchies, the results are not limited to such cases. This study is centered on the dynamic between the head of state and head of government, wherein the former has some degree of power over the latter. Thus, while I exclude democracies and constitutional monarchies, this study's findings may apply to non-monarchical authoritarian states where there is a head of state and head of government. Although implied by its characterization as "authoritarian," it must be clarified that this theory is contingent, to some degree, on the head of state being appointed non-democratically. Consider the case of Syria, although not a monarchy, the current president Bashar al-Assad has been categorized as a dictator and has the power to appoint the prime minister and other ministers (Svolik 2012; EIU 2016). Thus, the findings of my study may apply to such a case as the dynamic between the president and prime minister may be reminiscent of that between a monarch and prime minister.

my study. Additionally, Jordan has both a head of state (king) and head of government (premier). As aforementioned, this distinction is key to the blame avoidance dynamic studied here. Furthermore, this study focuses on monarchical interference in parliamentary politics, thus the existence of a legislature and premier in Jordan is necessary to fit this study's scope. Jordan has also experienced various protest movements which are critical to this study as an indicator of bottom-up blame.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan gained independence from British rule in 1946. Since then, Jordan has had four monarchs, all but one of whom ruled until their death.¹¹ The current monarch, King Abdullah II, came into power in 1999 after his father's death. The Jordanian ruling family, like most authoritarian monarchies, derives its legitimacy through "a strong divine or natural source outside the political regime," tracing its lineage back to the Muslim Prophet Mohammed¹² (Kailitz 2013, 48).

Jordan follows a bicameral parliamentary system where the House of Notables (upper house) and House of Representatives (lower house) compose the National Assembly. All upper house senators are directly appointed by the King, while lower house representatives are elected (The Jordanian Parliament 2019). However, elections have been rumored to be fraudulent (Freedom House 2020). Both senators and representatives have four-year term limits, although senators can be reappointed. See Appendix A for a diagram of Jordan's governmental structure.

¹¹ King Talal bin Abdullah reigned for less than a full year (1951-52) due to an illness. His son, King Hussein bin Talal was declared the king at the age of seventeen and began exercising his constitutional powers at the age of eighteen (Hashemite Monarchs of Jordan 2020).

¹² This is further reflected by the word "Hashemite" which is included in the country's formal name and used to describe the royal family. "Hashemite" is derived from "Hashem," the name of the Prophet's great grandfather, and is indicative of the ruling family's divine-based legitimacy (RHC 2017).

Despite the presence of elections and a legislature, Jordan's monarch "plays a dominant role in politics and governance" and the "electoral system puts the opposition at a disadvantage" (ibid). The extent of the King's political power is further reflected in his discretion over legislation. The parliament is tasked with deliberating and voting on bills drafted by the government; however, the King retains veto power (Governance & Politics of Jordan 2020). Furthermore, the King's constitutional power allows him to dissolve parliament, dismiss the incumbent premier, and reschedule elections (Jordanian Constitution). I refer to such behavior as interference or intervention in parliamentary politics.

Exercising this power to interfere in parliament is not unusual in the case of Jordan. The monarch has chosen to intervene multiple times over the past several decades. Throughout this study I intend to analyze such instances, using interference as an indicator of blame avoidance and attempting to find a relationship with protest movements.

VI. Research Design & Methodology

Independent Variable: Protests

Bottom-up blame directed toward the monarch is a central concept of my theory. While blame can manifest in multiple ways, I focus on protests as an indicator of blame. The reasoning behind this is twofold. First, the theoretical mechanism proposed in this paper hinges on the notion of threat vis-à-vis blame. According to my theory, we would expect a monarch to avoid blame due to the threat of its associated costs. Arguably the most threatening manifestation of blame is physical mobilization. By taking to the streets, citizens can publicly express their discontentment and direct blame toward the regime. As illustrated in earlier examples, blame attribution and grievances among the public have led to the deposition of monarchs on numerous

occasions, even in recent history. Therefore, to capture the threat of costs, I use protests as an indicator of blame.

Second, as is endemic of most authoritarian states, measuring public perceptions of the regime is difficult due to repression and censorship. In Jordan, where media is not free and criticizing the monarch is punishable, it is exceedingly difficult to gauge the public's opinion of the regime. Thus, protests are an observable form of blame, lending themselves to a more feasible analysis.

My hypotheses focus on protest size and issue. The first hypothesis addresses protest size which has fluctuated in Jordan over the past several decades, varying from 50 to 15,000 participants (Clark and Regan 2020). For this study, I define a small protest as having 50 to 350 participants. Although protest turnout in Jordan has reached notably larger numbers a few times, most protests under King Abdullah II's rule have amassed between 100-999 participants (ibid). Thus, 50-350 participants is a relatively smaller-scale protest for Jordan.¹³

My second hypothesis addresses protest issues. To identify each protest's main focus, I refer to news coverages and individual-level protest data to determine protesters' demands in each case. I then categorize each issue as political, economic, or social based on the protest's most salient cause. Naturally, certain issues cross-cut multiple categories, therefore I refer to relevant databases and texts to identify what was most recurrently framed as the salient issue. Through this process, I aim to distinguish between what I theorize as being more threatening

¹³ Note that the protest data referred to here does not include 2020, therefore King Abdullah II's most recent year as the King of Jordan is not included in this statement.

issues (political and economic) and less threatening issues (social), from the monarch's perspective.

Dependent Variable: Monarchical Interference

My theory is that a monarch will interfere in parliamentary politics to avoid blame from the citizenry. Thus, blame avoidance is operationalized as monarchical interference, in this study. I focus on four observable actions by the monarch: dissolving parliament, dismissing the prime minister, canceling or rescheduling parliamentary elections, and publicly criticizing the parliament and/or prime minister. These are clear behaviors which, according to this study's theoretical framework, should change as the independent variable changes.

Process Tracing

To test my hypotheses, I conduct qualitative text analysis using process tracing. This involves a within-case analysis that systematically evaluates evidence in an attempt to "enable strong causal inferences to be made about how causal processes work in real-world cases," (Beach 2017). There are three core features of process tracing. First, evidence tends to be sourced mainly from "causal-process observations" (CPOs) about the specific case studied (Collier 2011). Second, process tracing addresses trends and analyzes changes along the way, thus requiring detailed descriptions of the causal trajectory. Third, process tracing follows a sequence, whereby "each piece of diagnostic evidence increases or decreases the plausibility of the hypothesis under consideration," (Fairfield 2013, 47).

Process tracing is divided into four main tests, each with varying robustness in terms of its ability to confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis. The Straw-in-the-Wind test can affirm a hypothesis' relevance or weaken it but cannot confirm or eliminate it. The Hoop test can affirm a

hypothesis' relevance or eliminate it but cannot confirm it. The Smoking-Gun test can confirm a hypothesis, but cannot eliminate it, only weaken it. Doubly-Decisive is the only test both necessary and sufficient for affirming causal inference. Passing the Doubly-Decisive test eliminates alternative hypotheses while failing it substantially strengthens alternative explanations (Collier, 2011). These four tests are summarized in Appendix B.

Process tracing is a suitable method for my study for several reasons. First, the specificity of within-case evidence used in process tracing is suitable given the focus on Jordan. Second, process tracing typically follows a sequence of events which I intend to do when analyzing protest periods. Third, process tracing typically uses observational CPOs which function well in qualitative approaches such as mine. Fourth, process tracing can confirm (or disconfirm) a causal relationship. This is essential as my hypotheses propose causal linkages. Using process tracing, I will evaluate whether: (1) A monarch will be more likely to interfere in parliament when facing relatively larger protests; and (2) A monarch will be more likely to interfere in parliament when facing economic- or politics-driven protests, relative to socially-driven protests.

As aforementioned, Doubly-Decisive is the only standard that can confirm my hypotheses and eliminate others. In this study, Doubly-Decisive evidence would entail the monarch publicly criticizing parliament and/or the premier, *and* observable interference, within the protest period. Evidence of such criticism by the monarch is necessary to accept blame avoidance and reject responsiveness as the primary explanation. Thus, I posit that there must be some indication of criticism by the monarch to both confirm my hypotheses and eliminate alternatives.

The other standards of evidence are as follows: passing the Straw-in-the-Wind test requires protests and observable interference. Passing the Hoop test entails observable interference in response to blame (i.e. within the protest period). The Smoking-Gun test requires evidence of the King criticizing the parliament and/or premier and observable interference. These standards of evidence are outlined in Figure 3.¹⁴ To locate the evidence necessary to pass these tests, I qualitatively analyze English and Arabic texts published during each protest period. Throughout this process, I also keep detailed fieldnotes to record my initial findings and reactions.¹⁵

Figure 3: Tests for causal inference in process tracing

		Sufficient for affirming causal inference?	
		No	Yes
Necessary for affirming causal inference?	No	1. Straw-in-the-Wind	3. Smoking-Gun
		Protests take place and there is observable interference.	Monarch critique of parliament/PM and observable interference.
	Yes	2. Hoop	4. Doubly-Decisive
		Any observable interference, but no official criticism, within the protest period.	Monarch critique of parliament/PM and observable interference and within one month of protests.

*Note: observable interference refers to: dissolving parliament, dismissing the Prime Minister (PM), or cancelling or rescheduling elections

Within-Case Selection

To test my hypotheses, I analyze four cases of protests in Jordan, using process tracing. I use the diverse-case selection method to capture “maximum variance along relevant dimensions” in the selected cases (Gerring 2009). Based on this, I select cases from the most “extreme” ends

¹⁴ This table mirrors the structure of the table from Collier (2011), which can be found in Appendix B.

¹⁵ As has been shown in ethnographic research, fieldnotes can complement other research methods by providing additional details that bolster other types of analysis (Mulhall 2003). In this study, I use such notes to provide insight into the qualitative text analysis method and results.

of the spectrum that are most and least likely to result in blame avoidance. For both extremes, I consider scenarios with protests possessing characteristics which I hypothesize would change the probability of monarchical interference. I select and study two cases from each extreme.

According to my hypotheses, a large-scale protest addressing a political or economic issue will be most threatening to the monarch and thus will instigate monarchical interference as a blame avoidance reaction. Conversely, the least likely scenario for which I expect to observe interference in parliament is a small-scale protest addressing a social issue. Figure 4 summarizes the four main possible case scenarios depending on protest size and issue. To capture the variation, I select two most likely cases (large protest, political/economic issue) and two least likely cases (small protest, social issue).

Figure 4: Possible Case Scenarios

		Protest Size	
Protest Issue		Small protest, social issue	<p>Most likely</p> Large protest, political or economic issue
		Small protest, social issue	Large protest, social issue <p>Least likely</p>

Defining Protests & Protest Periods

Based on previous protest data and Jordan's small population, an event must have at least 50 participants to qualify as a protest in this study. Within this study, I focus on protests

concerning domestic issues. I distinguish between domestic and international issues because the link between protests and my theory is the blame that citizens direct toward the monarchy. Considering protesting foreign issues is unlikely to generate such blame towards, I exclude such protests.¹⁶

I define a “protest period” as the duration between the first and last protest within a given movement. In this way, I conceptualize “protest” as not necessarily being one incident, but rather a movement or campaign. For more than one protest to be considered within the same movement, they must fall within three months of each other *and* address the same issue. If three months pass after a protest occurs without additional protests addressing the same issue, that protest movement is deemed over.

Selection Criteria

As aforementioned, I select and study four protest cases within the case of Jordan; two which I expect to be most likely to result in monarchical interference, and two which I expect to be least likely to do so. To select these within-case protests, I consider the aforementioned factors of protest issue and size. As depicted in Figure 4, I expect large, political- or economic-based protests to be most likely to result in blame avoidance, whereas small, socially-driven protests are least likely to do so. I draw on the *Mass Mobilization Protest Data* project by Clark

¹⁶ Some issues may be cross-national and may involve Jordan’s interaction with other states or non-state actors. Such protests would be included in the study due to the involvement of the Jordanian government. For example, a protest against Israeli policy decisions, would not be included in this study, assuming the protesters blame the Israeli government, but not King Abdullah. On the other hand, protests against a trade deal between Jordan and Israel would be considered within this study, due to the direct role of the Jordanian government with regards to the issue.

and Regan and the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) to identify protests matching the criteria.¹⁷

For the two most likely cases, I chose movements with protest sizes greater than 350 participants. Both cases included protests with “thousands” of participants, reaching 8,000 in the first case and 10,000 in the second case, according to some estimates. For both most likely cases, I chose political- or economically-driven protests. For the least likely cases, I aimed to select socially-driven protests that garnered 50-350 protesters. Here “social” refers to challenges regarding topics such as gender equality, education rights, and environmental issues, etc.

It is important to note that few issues can be categorized as belonging to only one topic. That is, each case cannot be isolated to just one issue area. Its various innate complexities and its potential to have spillover effects on other areas create what can only be understood as an interdisciplinary issue. Nonetheless, I endeavored to categorize each case within one to two topic areas, based on the overarching issue. After selecting the cases within each scenario, I followed several steps to identify the texts to be qualitatively analyzed. I followed the same steps for each case to remain consistent in the text selection process. See Appendix C for a detailed explanation of this process and Appendix D for a list of all texts coded.

After selecting the texts for each case, I established a list of variables I intended to study and coded for their presence in each text. To code, I used Dedoose, a qualitative text analysis

¹⁷ I used a combination of both databases as neither individually met this study’s needs. The Mass Mobilization project focuses primarily on political and economic issues, providing little-to-no reporting on socially-motivated protests. ACLED encompasses a broader range of protest issues; however, it had no reporting for Jordan prior to 2016. Considering that the Arab Spring and some of Jordan’s largest protests occurred in the early 2010s, I decided to use a combination of these databases, referring to both when selecting cases.

software. The variables I coded for covered a range of aspects, including actors involved, protesters' demands, and protest topic. See Appendix E for a full list of variables.

Case Descriptions

As aforementioned, I selected four cases including two most likely cases with large, political or economic protests, and two least likely cases with smaller, social protests.¹⁸ As stated earlier, protests are naturally complex and cannot be limited to just one topic. Nonetheless, I attempted to identify and code articles that met the most and least likely criteria. The selected cases were as follows and are summarized in Table 1:

Table 1: Overview of cases studied

Scenario	Case	Topic	Start Date	End Date	Protest Duration (days)	No. of Texts
Most Likely	1	Tax policy, cost of living	Jan 7, 2011	Feb 18, 2011	43	93
	2	Cost of living, political system	Sep 13, 2012	Jan 18, 2013	128	245
Least Likely	1	Teachers' wages	Sep 5, 2019	Oct 3, 2019	29	73
	2	Students' tuition fees	Feb 29, 2016	March 14, 2016	14	30

Most Likely, Case 1

This case refers to Jordan's early 2011 protests around the Arab Spring when citizens across the region began to mobilize. For around six consecutive weeks, Jordanians protested

¹⁸ I selected the aforementioned cases as I believed them to be accurate representations of the "most likely" and "least likely" scenario criteria, as previously outlined. However, following my complete evaluation of the selected cases, I found that they do not map perfectly onto the most likely and least likely case archetypes and differ in ways other than originally intended or expected. This is especially true for protest duration, number of texts per case, and distribution of Arabic versus English texts for each case. A full explanation of such differences can be found in Appendix F.

across the country, calling for change. The movement, especially in its early stages, was rooted in economic grievances and centered around the increase in food and fuel prices resulting from the government's decision to slash subsidies. This occurred around when Jordan's economy was suffering and unemployment was skyrocketing. Thus, while the price hikes were the initial focus of the protest, they were akin to a tipping point after a series of economic hardships, rather than a standalone cause.

The protesters initially demanded economic reforms. However, as the movement progressed, they denounced the government and its failure to respond to the economic crisis at hand, and calls for the ouster of Prime Minister Samir Rifai grew. In the protest's earlier days, the government made some economic concessions and the King was cited urging the government to act swiftly and amend economic policies to improve the standard of living. However, the "demonstrators say the measures are insufficient, and that they will continue to protest until Prime Minister Samir Rifai steps down," (BBC 2011). On January 31, 2011, after several weeks of protests, King Abdullah removed Prime Minister Rifai and dismissed his cabinet. On February 1, the King appointed Marouf al-Bakhit as Prime Minister.

Most Likely, Case 2

This case refers to protests which occurred from September 2012 to January 2013 that were driven by a planned slash in subsidies and expected price increases. This case was considered unique as it entailed the first prominent calls for the regime's downfall and King Abdullah's removal. On September 16, 2012, the King issued a decree to adjourn parliament's extraordinary session. This constitutionally required the premier and his cabinet to resign. On October 10, the King issued a decree endorsing a new government and appointed Abdullah

Ensour as Prime Minister. Within days, protesters were calling for Ensour's resignation as protests continued and clashes occurred close to his personal residence (Halaby 2012).

Least Likely, Case 1¹⁹

This case entails a protest organized by the teachers' union that occurred in September and October 2019. Teachers across the nation went on strike to protest low wages that the government had promised them five years prior. This protest combined social and economic issues as it addressed both union rights and the more economic-based issue of wages. There was some degree of contradiction between the teachers' and the government's reports; teachers accused security forces of responding disproportionately harshly to a generally peaceful protest, while state officials denied this accusation. This case entailed no blame avoidance behavior.

Least Likely, Case 2²⁰

This case refers to student-led protests that occurred in February and March 2016, primarily around the University of Jordan's campus, in response to tuition increases. The demonstrators' demands were primarily centered around reversing the tuition change and the broader issue of education affordability. Much of the rhetoric around this movement emphasized student rights and education access as social justice issues. Several texts described these issues as

¹⁹ When conducting initial research to select the cases, I categorized this as a least likely case given the social justice nature of the topic of teachers' rights. However, upon further research, I found this protest movement contained elements of both "most likely" and "least likely" criteria. These protests had an underlying economic issue—that of the teachers' wages—and as it progressed, garnered thousands of protesters, most of whom were teachers. This size and the complex, socioeconomic nature of the topic should be noted when considering the results of my analysis.

²⁰ I considered this a least likely case as I identified the main issues in this case as belonging to a social or, more specifically, socioeconomic area. This categorization was motivated by the underlying calls for students' rights and education affordability. I considered these to be primarily social justice issues. However, there is a central economic aspect to it considering that the main incident that instigated the demonstrations was the tuition increase for certain higher education programs.

important to all Jordanians. A protesting student organization stated, “The issue we are carrying on our shoulders concerns the Jordanian population in its entirety, and we have willingly become the first line of defense for the University of Jordan and its symbolism,” (As Sabeel 2016, translated by author).

Protesters were cited criticizing the university administration for blocking formalized communication channels; however, the university rejected these claims. The protesters were also mentioned criticizing the Ministry of Interior a few times; however, their demands never escalated to include calls for the ouster of the Prime Minister or King. This case entailed no blame avoidance behavior.

VII. Results & Discussion

Throughout this study, I used process tracing to evaluate the texts analyzed in each case. My first hypothesis captured my expectation that large-scale protests would be more likely to result in monarchical interference, relative to smaller protests. I did not find support for this as, although the most likely cases experienced monarchical interference and the least likely cases did not, the latter had relatively high participant numbers. This suggests that protest size did not drive that difference.²¹ My second hypothesis addressed protest issues and I expected that politically- or economically-motivated protests would be more likely to result in monarchical interference, relative to social issues. I found support for this hypothesis as both most likely cases entailed monarchical interference while neither least likely case did.

²¹ To reiterate an earlier point, the least likely cases were not originally intended to have large protest sizes. However, as I continued conducting the text analysis it became increasingly apparent that these protests grew to be relatively large.

In addition to results directly addressing my hypotheses, I identified some unexpected trends and inductively evaluated them to reach preliminary inferences. These addressed word-choice when discussing changes in premier, references to the regional context, and quotes regarding the public's perception of authoritarian institutions. Considering the qualitative method I employed, I will necessarily include anecdotes from texts to illustrate and support my findings. I have included excerpts that I believe are representative of broader trends. I have also included selections from my fieldnotes to complement direct quotes and provide further insight into my initial findings.²²

Evidence of Blame

Per the standards of evidence outlined in Figure 3, the evidence for blame avoidance from these texts was necessary but not sufficient. The two most likely cases passed the Hoop test as both experienced monarchical interference within the protest period. In the first case, King Abdullah dismissed the prime minister, and in the second he adjourned parliament, constitutionally mandating a resignation from the premier and cabinet. The least likely cases failed all tests as they included protests but no interference. All cases failed the more robust Smoking-Gun and Doubly-Decisive tests as they required direct criticism of the premier or parliament by the king which was absent in all cases.

These findings do not provide support for the first hypothesis concerning protest size. The least likely protests, though originally intended to be small, were relatively large and attracted thousands of participants, yet neither resulted in monarchical interference. Considering

²² Fieldnotes are available upon request. My notes generally include information or metadata about the texts analyzed, notes on my first impressions and reactions, possible outside sources that I referenced or considered in light of the information revealed through the primary text analysis, and any notes on specific vocabulary, wording, tone, etc. throughout the text that may have framed an issue in a certain way.

the relatively large size of these movements and the absence of monarchical interference, it may be possible that protest size itself is insufficient for predicting blame avoidance.

Protesters' Demands

As indicated in Table 2, a greater portion of texts mentioned calls for the removal of the King or premier in the most likely cases, relative to the least likely cases. This was also true for the percentage of texts citing actual interference.²³ This trend lends support for the second hypothesis concerning protest issues.

Table 2: Cases by percentage of texts calling for removal of king or prime minister, or mentioning interference

Case	Percentage of texts mentioning call for removal of King or PM (%)	Percentage of texts mentioning interference (%)
Most Likely, Case 1	48.42	33.68
Most Likely, Case 2	35.92	11.02
Least Likely, Case 1	5.48	1.37
Least Likely, Case 2	0.00	0.00

The greater percentage of texts mentioning calls for the removal of the premier or king in the most likely cases suggests a greater degree of bottom-up blame in these cases. This supports the second hypothesis suggesting politically- or economically-motivated protests are more likely to result in blame avoidance behavior, relative to socially-motivated protests.

²³ The number of texts mentioning interference is not necessarily critical, given the fact that this study is more directly concerned with whether or not blame avoidance maneuvers occur, rather than how frequently they are mentioned. With that said, such a figure could be relevant as it may reflect the salience of this interference and the way it is framed in the media.

A key assumption that drove this hypothesis was that political and economic issues would be more likely to generate blame from the public, thus posing a greater threat to the monarch and causing him to engage in blame avoidance behavior. The percentages in Table 2 support this assumption and show that, relative to the socially-driven protests, the political and economic protests were associated with greater bottom-up blame and mentions of interference. Overall, the basic data support the second hypothesis; however, these results cannot be easily distinguished from what may be observed due to responsiveness.

Theory of Responsiveness

One alternative theoretical explanation to blame avoidance is responsiveness; the notion that the monarch may choose to intervene in parliament because the public is demanding he does so, and he wishes to appear responsive. The proportions presented in Table 2 could also be interpreted as support for this alternative explanation, rather than my blame avoidance theory. As reflected in Table 2, the most likely cases had higher percentages of texts calling for the removal of the king or premier, and citing monarchical interference, relative to the least likely cases. This could reflect a scenario where the king acts in response to pressing demands from the public.

Taking the students' protests in the second least likely case, King Abdullah did not interfere in parliamentary politics. However, this may have resulted from the absence of demands for such a move, as reflected by the lack of any texts in this case mentioning calls by the citizenry for such a response. Some texts have alluded to a causal linkage between protesters' demands and the outcome. For example, "Demonstrations in Amman early last year prompted the king to replace the prime minister and announce a number of political reforms," (Warrick and Luck 2012). However, as reflected in this quote, it is difficult to discern the specific mechanism

that motivated the King's intervention. While the quote suggests there is some degree of causality between the demonstrations and the premier's deposition, this link could potentially be the product of a desire to be responsive or to avoid blame, neither of which is explicitly clarified.

One counterargument to the responsiveness theory is that in some instances, protesters called for the removal of the monarch, but were met with parliamentary changes instead. Of the texts coded for the second most likely case, 27.35 percent cited calls for the monarch's removal and 8.57 percent included calls for the removal of the prime minister. As observed, the monarchy was never overthrown. Naturally, one would not expect the monarch to make changes that would shift much power away from the monarchy, making it unlikely that the king would completely restructure the regime. However, if he intended to appear responsive to the public, his changes seemed to do little to satisfy citizens. In this case, King Abdullah made some concessions and changes in the legislature, including adjourning the parliament's session, thereby constitutionally requiring a change of prime minister and cabinet. However, this seemed to do little to appease the public.

Public discontentment continued even after the King adjourned parliament, with protests continuing the day after the announcement (Sidner and Fantz 2012). According to one source, "King Abdullah has made some changes over the past year, but he hasn't done enough, protesters said," (ibid). Other sources echoed this sentiment, stating that King Abdullah's "recent announcements of concessions to protesters' demands to democratize have not quelled discontent," (Brumfield and Damon 2012). Furthermore, the head of the Muslim Brotherhood "said a concessionary move by the monarch to dissolve a rubber-stamp, tribal-dominated parliament on Thursday to set the stage for elections expected early next year was not enough," (Reuters 2012). These statements reflect the public's negative perceptions of King Abdullah's

response. If it were the case that the monarch was attempting to appear responsive, then one might expect more concrete changes to cater to the public's demands, yet no such changes were made. Thus, these results suggest that the king may not have necessarily been attempting to be responsive.

Nonetheless, there may have been no viable options available to King Abdullah which would have appeased protesters and portrayed him as responsive. Many demonstrators were explicitly hoping for a total regime restructuring or change. For example, in one text a protester was quoted saying "Before, we were after reforms...but now we want the regime to fall," (Bulos and Sandels 2012). According to this sentiment, there may have been no action the King could have taken that would have been deemed responsive enough if protesters were truly so adamant about toppling the regime. As was observed, the regime did not collapse and the protests eventually subsided. Overall, given these various nuances, it is difficult to infer within the scope of this study whether responsiveness was an important consideration for the King when reacting to protest movements and protesters' demands.

Blame Avoidance Examples

While I did not find explicit criticism by the King toward the premier or parliament, I identified examples alluding to blame avoidance theory. These include the use of specific blame avoidance terminology, the use of words such as "blame" and "criticism," and statements on the available channels for blame.

Several texts referred to the concept of lightning rods, both explicitly and implicitly. As outlined earlier, this term is used in blame avoidance literature to refer to intermediary agents upon whom blame is focused. One text explicitly used the term "lightning rods," writing "It was

not immediately clear whether the opposition would be satisfied with Tuesday's ouster of Rifai and members of his cabinet, who had been lightning rods for criticism." (Greenberg 2011a) The author of this text clearly depicts Prime Minister Rifai and his cabinet members as King Abdullah's lightning rods. Other texts alluded to such redirection of blame more implicitly. A different article described Rifai's role as such:

"While the Hashemite monarchy has been immune to the simmering frustrations on the Jordanian street, protesters have directed their anger at Mr. Rifai, the king's appointed prime minister and the scion of an influential family that has yielded three prime ministers.

To them, Rifai, who previously served as the chairman of an investment firm, has become a symbol of everything that is wrong in Jordan: a ruling class increasingly out of touch with the pressures facing ordinary citizens, analysts say." (Luck 2011)

This quote suggests Rifai had been left to bear the brunt of the public's criticism and serve as a "symbol of everything that is wrong in Jordan," (ibid). By characterizing him as such, the text seemingly portrays Rifai as a lightning rod.

Similarly, an Arabic article quoted a previous minister who said, "The King definitely knows that by calling for the removal of the Prime Minister, the people are actually protesting his management of the country, considering he is the one who appoints and dismisses prime ministers," (France 24 2011a, translated by author). Once again, the premier is positioned in the face of the public's blame while the king appears to remain largely unscathed.

Along similar lines, an Amman-based reporter was quoted stating "For the most part, Jordanians see King Abdullah as sort of being above the political fray. They tend to blame the problems, economic and political problems, on whoever is the prime minister and his cabinet at the time," (Siegel 2011). While such accounts cannot be considered confirming evidence of blame avoidance theory, these quotes lend some support to the notion of lightning rods and the

idea that individuals protesting the government may be intending to send a signal to the monarch himself.

A different article presented this relationship briefly but clearly, writing “Because direct criticism of the king is banned, the focus has been on his government,” (Shadid and Bronner 2011). As reflected by some of the aforementioned quotes, directing blame towards the King is challenging due to policing against such criticism. Therefore, citizens tend to resort to blaming relatively more accessible political figures to voice their frustrations. In this way, restrictions on criticizing the monarch appear to have exacerbated the premier’s role as a lightning rod.

Aside from specific blame avoidance terminology and references to challenges of directly criticizing the monarch, some articles mentioned blame as a motivation behind the king’s behavior. For example, “King Abdullah II dissolved Parliament on the eve before the demonstration in order to castigate the current legislature for its ineptitude,” (Berlinger 2012). Stating that the King dissolved parliament “to castigate” the legislature for its “ineptitude” implies that blame drove the monarch’s interference.

A second text similarly framed the situation, writing “Many Jordanians were already fed up with what they viewed as the king’s cosmetic response to Arab Spring-inspired demands for political reform,” and:

“In response, the king has named and sacked prime ministers and intelligence chiefs and revised electoral laws in what critics call a futile scramble to maintain his near-absolute governing authority. Abdullah has clearly signaled his unwillingness to become a largely symbolic, European-style monarch.” (Bulos and Sandels 2012)

Similar to the earlier quote, this excerpt seemingly implies that blame avoidance motivated the king’s decision to reappoint officials and revise laws. This is perhaps most apparent in how this text frames the King’s decision as being “in response” to Jordanians’ frustration with the monarch’s “cosmetic response,” (ibid).

Thus far, all the texts quoted here included some form of direct reference to blame, be it specific blame avoidance terms (e.g. “lightning rods”) or mentioning the public’s attempts to direct their blame toward the monarch. However, some texts referred to maneuvers by the King that, although not conventionally considered examples blame, may be interpreted as such.

Several texts from the first most likely case, mentioned the King asking newly-appointed Prime Minister al-Bakhit to “address the mistakes of the past,” (CNN 2011). Although not explicitly admonishing the prior premier and his cabinet, the King appears to indirectly criticize them for the national situation. A different article speculated that the King’s visit to the government was outside of typical protocol and thus could be interpreted as a sign of his disapproval of the cabinet (Mansour 2019). Thus, such relatively conventional behaviors by the king could be interpreted as more subtle forms of criticism.

Inductive Reasoning

Through process tracing, I qualitatively analyzed texts from four protest movements and conducted deductive analysis, beginning with my theory and hypotheses and searching for supporting results. However, throughout this process, I identified other potentially more valuable trends and inductively evaluated them to reach preliminary inferences.

Language Variation

I noticed that language was important for how events were reported on. In both English and Arabic texts, I found that when describing monarchical interference in the prime minister’s position, some articles referred to the outgoing premier as having been “dismissed” or “sacked,” while others reported that he had “resigned” or the King had “accepted his resignation.” Linguistically, these hold different meanings. Either way, the incumbent prime minister is no

longer in office; however, the way he leaves is key to this study. I encountered this issue early in the coding process. In my fieldnotes, I wrote: “It’s a lot harder than I thought to show that the [premier] isn’t resigning of his own volition, but rather asked (or *encouraged* by the monarch/regime/*diwan*²⁴) to do so,” due to the variation in language (Fieldnotes 2021, 4).

This quote documents my initial reaction to this finding. However, what was perhaps more puzzling than this language variation is that a few texts switched between phrasings within the same article. For example, an Arabic article by *Al Jazeera* reporting on the removal of Prime Minister Rifai in 2011 first stated “Today Jordanian King Abdullah II dismissed Samir Rifai’s government,” then wrote, “The Royal Hashemite Court announced—in a surprising decision to various political circles—that Abdullah II accepted the resignation of Rifai’s government,” (2011, translated by author). Within the span of a few sentences, this article seemingly contradicted itself, shifting from language that places the onus on the King for the change in premier, to language that positions the premier as the primary actor. Although such articles were not frequent, they prompted me to consider language more thoroughly.

The specific terms used can influence how the behavior itself is framed. Language such as “sacked” or “dismissed” places the King in a position of relative power, recognizing his constitutional right to remove the premier, and suggesting possible reluctance from the premier to leave office. On the other hand, the prime minister “resigning” or the monarch “accepting his resignation” reframes the incident and implies a notable share of power for the premier. In this narrative, the prime minister is choosing to leave office and the King is courteously accepting his resignation. Of course, these are mere speculations, yet the different terms used carry different

²⁴ The word *diwan* is a transliteration of the Arabic word (ديوان) referring to the King’s office, officially known as the Royal Hashemite Court (RHC).

connotations and therefore should be noted. This nuance in describing a change in premier importantly suggests an underlying pattern that was not captured within the initial scope of this study.

Part of the shift in language may be attributed to each text's background. It is realistic to assume each publisher or author has their own biases or agenda. Thus, they may opt for certain wording to influence how their readers perceive King Abdullah or Jordan. For example, Jordan has had some tensions with Qatar, where *Al Jazeera* is based. One could speculate that *Al Jazeera* intended to portray King Abdullah in a certain light to undermine his authority or power. Conversely, a Jordanian newspaper may fear the repercussions of implying the King is at fault for having dismissed his premier. Thus, each text's source may impact how it depicts the event in question and what language it opts for.

Another potential explanation for this language variation could be blame itself. The King might wish to be perceived as having accepted the premier's resignation, rather than having fired him, to avoid backlash from the public. Certain sources—particularly local, government-owned ones—might choose to use terminology centered around the concept of resignation, rather than dismissal, to minimize potential blame toward the King. I did not initially expect to observe variation in language. Rather, as it emerged, I began to consider the role of language in the overall study and its relation to blame. This language variation offers a more nuanced understanding of how power is transferred between a monarch and prime minister and how it is reported on.

Regional Context

Another element that was mentioned repeatedly across texts was the Arab Spring and the broader regional context. Several articles referenced nearby countries' outcomes as examples of what King Abdullah should avoid. Some texts commented on the King's outlook, for example, "The king saw this coming and he's been watching the Arab Spring carefully," (Sidner and Fantz 2012). This implies that King Abdullah was actively watching the surrounding region and using other states' outcomes to inform his domestic policies and protest responses.

Other articles likened Jordanian protesters' calls to those of the Arab Spring. The second most likely case included several of such instances, positing that Jordan, which had escaped the movement in 2011, was now facing a similar reckoning several years later. One article stated, "in Amman, thousands of demonstrators filled the circle outside the Interior Ministry near midnight, chanting, 'The people want the fall of the regime,' echoing similar chants in Egypt and Tunisia, where the Arab Spring began." (Rudoren 2012). Other texts used similar language, mentioning demands for the king's ouster had been "previously muted in the strategically situated kingdom, which has mostly avoided the political tumult that has convulsed the region," (Bulos and Sandels 2012) and that such slogans "echo those aimed at other Arab rulers seen by some of their people as corrupt, oppressive puppets of the West." (Lyon 2012). Other texts mentioned protesters' chants, writing "'Hey Abdullah, don't be fooled, look around and see what happened to your peers,' one crowd chanted with reference to toppled Arab autocrats," (Brumfield and Damon 2012).

The comparisons between Jordan's protests and the Arab Spring movement are important to consider as they could potentially heighten the threat perceived by the monarch. Protests calling for the downfall of the King and his regime in a manner reminiscent of the Arab Spring

likely make the potential of being ousted much more real and threatening than perhaps may have otherwise occurred, which in turn could further prompt blame avoidance behaviors.

Texts' comparisons of the Jordanian protests to the Arab Spring contrast with King Abdullah's commentary on the matter. In official statements by the King and the Royal Hashemite Court (RHC), the Arab Spring was framed as a positive movement, ushering in a phase of democratic reform. Furthermore, the King portrayed himself—and was portrayed by some political elites—as a champion of democracy and guiding figure for Jordan on its path of democratization. This portrayal was presented explicitly at times and implicitly at others. For example, an English RHC news update wrote “His Majesty stressed that ‘Jordan has embraced the Arab Spring since its start’ as an opportunity to push forward an unprecedented political reform process,” (RHC 2013).

As highlighted in this excerpt, the King is portrayed as an advocate of democratization who is ready to implement democratic reforms. Other texts echoed this sentiment, adding that not only is King Abdullah prepared to effect democratic change, but he is waiting for the citizenry to be equally ready to take the necessary steps. This was reflected in another RHC update stating “The King expressed his hope that Jordan would reach the stage where we would have political parties on the right, left, and center, and that they would have a clear vision of what concerns the people,” (RHC 2012a, translated by author). Thus, the King seemed to imply it was the public's responsibility to organize effectively enough to warrant a democratic transition.

In a formal letter to the King, newly-appointed Prime Minister Ensour addressed the monarch as “Your Majesty, leader of the path of reform,” (RHC 2012b, translated by author). I commented on the use of such language in my fieldnotes, writing:

“This is interesting - the newly appointed Prime Minister Ensour referred to the monarch as "leader of the path of reform," clearly highlighting reform and positioning the king as a supporter and advocate of such political tradition. However, of course, I cannot discern whether this is an indication of Ensour's true desire to work towards democracy and place reform on his government's agenda, or whether it is an attempt to paint the monarch as being a more pro-democracy figure than he may truly be. (Fieldnotes 2021, 27)”

As alluded to in my comment, the monarch was depicted as being a leader of democratization and political reform. However, it is not feasible to determine whether he is genuinely perceived as such, or whether he only wishes to be. Preliminarily, most of the texts that portrayed the monarch as such were published by the RHC or political elites. This suggests it is more so a desire by the King to be seen as a champion of democracy, rather than a real perception of him as such by the public. Nonetheless, it remains interesting to note this reporting on the King and Arab Spring, particularly in contrast to the aforementioned accounts which framed the Arab Spring as a cautionary tale and likened the King to nearby leaders who fell at the hands of their peoples.

Authoritarian Institutions

Another element that some texts addressed was the public's perception of authoritarian institutions. A common theme across some texts was the belief that governmental changes or reforms were meant to temporarily appease the public but not make any significant change. As stated in one text:

“Cabinet dismissals are not rare in Jordan and are used to offer a semblance of change without disrupting the underlying authority of the ruling Hashemite family. The prime minister's job has frequently rotated among members of a few well-connected clans - Rifai's father and grandfather each held the position more than once - and Abdullah's statement after the dismissal did not directly address the allegations that protesters had levied against the government.” (Greenberg 2011b)

In another text, a citizen described governmental reforms as “window-dressing” meant to “try to calm the people,” (France 24 2011b). A different text stated: “Many Jordanians were already fed up with what they viewed as the king’s cosmetic response to Arab Spring-inspired demands for political reform and a gradual transition to a constitutional monarchy,” (Bulos and Sandels 2012). These examples suggest a generally negative perception by the public of the efficacy of the government’s reforms. Evidence of this sentiment lends support to the existing theory that authoritarian institutions are rubber-stamp organizations with little-to-no influence on real political changes.

While such a perception was not mentioned in most texts, it is important to make note of, particularly given its potential to contradict my theory. If citizens view institutions as “window dressing” and consider reforms “cosmetic,” then they might not view dismissing the premier or dissolving parliament as particularly important. If this is true, then such actions may be less likely to be effective blame avoidance strategies as they are unlikely to send a strong signal to the public.

VIII. Conclusion

Throughout this study, I sought to address the question of why and under what conditions a monarch would choose to intervene in authoritarian parliamentary politics. To do this, I applied blame avoidance theory from democratic politics literature to the authoritarian context, positing that the monarch would choose to intervene in parliamentary politics to signal to the public that he should not be blamed for their grievances. I evaluated this theory using qualitative text analysis. I focused on Jordan and identified four cases, two that I expected to be most likely to result in blame avoidance behavior, and two that I expected to be least likely to do so. I then

conducted process tracing and read and coded English and Arabic articles published during each protest period.

I did not find support for my first hypothesis suggesting large-scale protests would be more likely to result in monarchical interference relative to smaller protests. I found some support for the second hypothesis that economic and political protest movements would be more likely to result in blame avoidance behavior, relative to socially-driven protests. Aside from the results relating to my hypotheses, I also found unexpected trends and analyzed them inductively. Specifically, I explored word-choice when describing changes in premier, recurring references to the Arab Spring, and indications of the Jordanian public's perception of authoritarian institutions. These surprising findings diverge from the original goals of this study, yet provide potential avenues for future research.

To my knowledge, this is the first study to apply blame avoidance theory to an authoritarian monarchical context, and one of only a few which have applied this theory to an authoritarian setting. This study's findings contribute to this understudied segment of the literature, adding insight into the role of blame in an authoritarian environment. Given the limited literature in this area, there are many opportunities for further research. One might consider exploring blame avoidance across different authoritarian monarchies, or within other types of authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, protest characteristics could be varied to explore how different factors influence the threat of blame. Such explorations might help better differentiate between responsiveness and blame avoidance in the authoritarian setting.

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
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Appendix A: Structure of Jordan's Government

I created this basic diagram to visualize the Jordanian government's structure. As indicated in the legend, each color and line style indicate a specific dynamic.



Appendix B: Process Tracing Table

This chart was taken from Collier (2011, 825) and it outlines the standards of evidence involved in the process tracing method.

Table 1

Process Tracing Tests for Causal Inference

		SUFFICIENT FOR AFFIRMING CAUSAL INFERENCE	
		No	Yes
NECESSARY FOR AFFIRMING CAUSAL INFERENCE	No	1. Straw-in-the-Wind	3. Smoking-Gun
		a. Passing: Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but does not confirm it.	a. Passing: Confirms hypothesis.
		b. Failing: Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is slightly weakened.	b. Failing: Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is somewhat weakened.
		c. Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing <i>slightly</i> weakens them. Failing <i>slightly</i> strengthens them.	c. Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing <i>substantially</i> weakens them. Failing <i>somewhat</i> strengthens them.
	Yes	2. Hoop	4. Doubly Decisive
		a. Passing: Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but does not confirm it.	a. Passing: Confirms hypothesis and eliminates others.
b. Failing: Eliminates hypothesis.		b. Failing: Eliminates hypothesis.	
	c. Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing <i>somewhat</i> weakens them. Failing <i>somewhat</i> strengthens them.	c. Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing <i>eliminates</i> them. Failing <i>substantially</i> strengthens them.	

Source: Adapted from Bennett (2010, 210), who builds on categories formulated by Van Evera (1997, 31–32).

Appendix C: Methodology

To identify and select texts for analysis, I followed the same several steps for each case. The process was as follows: first, I searched the term “Jordan [year] protests” on Google, wherein I included the year of the specific protest case being studied. I then spent up to one hour looking through the results, and selecting articles that were published within the protest period timeframe that I had identified for the case. In the case that the protest period fell across two calendar years, I spent half an hour on the first year and half an hour on the second year. I did not include any Wikipedia articles or open-source sites and personal blogs, but other than that I was relatively indiscriminate in terms of the types of sources I chose. For example, I included international, regional, and local news articles, opinion pieces, and thinktank reports, among other texts, assuming they fell within the appropriate time frame.

Next, I repeated the process using Arabic search terms. Due to the variation in translations of the word “protest,” I searched three different specific terms on Google in Arabic, following the same format of, “Jordan [year] [Arabic word meaning protest].” I used three Arabic words to substitute for “protest” in English and dedicated a maximum of 30 minutes to each term.²⁵ I repeated the same process as with the English search term and looked through the results for those that fell within the desired timeframe and which were from reliable sources.

Third, I selected texts from the official “news updates” in English and Arabic, posted on the Royal Hashemite Court’s (RHC) official website. I then selected those that were relevant and which fell within the desired timeframe. Here, I consider a relevant update to be one that relates to domestic affairs, thus I excluded any updates regarding international relations or foreign

²⁵ The Arabic words that I substituted for “protest” in English are: مظاهرات، احتجاجات، اعتصامات

policy. These news updates are published by the RHC on an almost daily basis and range from one-sentence updates to longer pieces. Overall, they document the statements from and actions by the King. For example, a news update could be one sentence about the King meeting with the leader of a neighboring country, or it could be a copy of a formal letter issued by the King to a newly-appointed Prime Minister.

These news updates are published in both Arabic and English; however, they do not necessarily always align perfectly. In some cases, there might be two news updates with the same dates and almost exactly the same title (one in English, the other in Arabic), with the body of the update covering the same issues and following the same format. However, in other instances, there may be two Arabic updates and one English post a few days later that merges between the two. Still other instances may include similarly dated and titled reports that do not report on an incident in exactly the same way. This variation is important to make note of and is something that I kept in mind throughout my text selection process. To account for this variation, I read and coded all relevant articles within the specified date range in both English and Arabic, and operated on the assumption that no two articles were exact translations, to make sure that I accounted for any specifics mentioned by one update but not the other. Considering that I draw from both Arabic and English news updates for each case, this potential variation is captured across the whole study.

My motivation behind using the news updates as texts to analyze was twofold. First, they offer clearer insight into King Abdullah's official response to certain issues. These updates have the potential to further my understanding of the King's formal relationship with other members of government, including the Prime Minister and parliamentary officials which are of relevance to my study. Second, referring to these updates for all four cases created some degree of

consistency among my results. For the texts selected based on the Google search, while some news outlets consistently arose in those searches, others appeared more sporadically across the different cases. Drawing from the King's official news updates for every case allowed for some consistency as I selected texts from this same source for every case.

The following list is a more succinct, itemized version of the methodology explained in the previous paragraphs.

Steps:

1. Search the term “Jordan [year] protests” on Google
 - a. Spend 1 hour sifting through the results and choosing articles that were published within the protest period timeframe that identified for the case
2. Search the equivalent term in Arabic, on Google
 - a. Spend 30 minutes sifting through the results of each of the following search terms:
 - i. “[year] مظاهرات الأردن”
 - ii. “[year] احتجاجات الأردن”
 - iii. “[year] اعتصامات الأردن”
3. Search through the official “news updates” published by the Royal Hashemite Court in Arabic and English which fall within the desired timeframe and which pertain to domestic issues

After identifying the relevant texts, I input them into a spreadsheet. To reduce the chance of any mistakes, I created an identification system whereby I assigned each text a unique ID number. Each ID number was made up of six to seven digits and was composed of three shorter

numbers. The first two digits represented the scenario number wherein “01” referred to Scenario 1 (most likely) and “02” referred to Scenario 2 (least likely). Thus, every ID number started with “01” or “02”. Then, the next two digits in the ID number referred to the case number. These were also either “01” or “02” depending on if the text pertained to the first or second case from the scenario. For example, a text with an ID number beginning in “0102” is from the second most likely case. The next two to three digits in the ID number were used to count the texts and were assigned to the texts in the order in which I found them. Thus, based on this identification system, I was able to instantly determine a text’s scenario and case numbers. Furthermore, the uniqueness of the ID number for each text allowed me to easily and efficiently refer back to specific texts throughout the process and when including quotes or excerpts in my fieldnotes.

Appendix D: Table of All Texts

Below is a table containing some basic metadata about all the texts analyzed for this study. You may note that there appear to be some ID numbers that have been skipped. This is likely an indication that a text that was initially added to the corpus and assigned an ID number, was later excluded. The possible reasons for excluding a text are that it was originally added accidentally despite not meeting the basic criteria of eligibility, or that it was found to be an exact copy of a different article that was already included elsewhere in the corpus, and which appeared more than once in the search.

ID	Publisher	Author	Published	Lang.	Headline
010101	Al Jazeera	N/A	1/28/2011	ENG	Thousands protest in Jordan
010103	CJPME	N/A	2/1/2011	ENG	Protests in Jordan, Jan-Feb. 2011
010104	The Guardian	McDevitt, Johnny	1/14/2011	ENG	Jordanians protest against soaring food prices
010105	Reuters	al-Khalidi, Suleiman	1/28/2011	ENG	Jordanian protesters demand political reforms
010107	DW	James, Kyle	1/27/2011	ENG	Broken promises behind ongoing protests in Jordan
010109	CNBC	Toscano, Paul	1/27/2011	ENG	Scenes From The Middle East Protests 2011
010110	PRI	Bell, Matthew and Lisa Mullins	2/18/2011	ENG	Jordan protests turn violent
010111	ABC	Sciutto, Jim	2/1/2011	ENG	Arab Leaders Trying to Keep Heads Above Waves of Mideast Protests
010112	IPS	Alami, Mona	2/10/2011	ENG	Jordan Feels a Jolt
010113	Times Free Press	Associated Press	2/1/2011	ENG	Jordan's king fires Cabinet amid protests
010114	Boston.com	Associated Press	1/29/2011	ENG	Pressure on Jordan's king grows in third week of Friday protests
010115	Christian Science Monitor	Seeley, Nicholas	2/3/2011	ENG	After Egypt's protests, Jordan's king faces more assertive public
010116	RFI	N/A	2/10/2011	ENG	Jordan unveils new cabinet to ease protests
010117	Syracuse.com	Associated Press	2/5/2011	ENG	Egyptian protests inspire hundreds in Jordan to march against their government
010118	Daily Progress	Associated Press	2/1/2011	ENG	UPDATE: Jordan's king dismisses Cabinet amid street protests

010119	New York Times	Associated Press	1/21/2011	ENG	Jordan: Protests Over Economy
010120	Reuters	al-Khalidi, Suleiman	2/9/2011	ENG	Jordan king swears in new government after protests
010121	Christian Science Monitor	Luck, Taylor	1/21/2011	ENG	In Jordan, Islamists try to spin popular protests into political uprising
010122	BBC	N/A	1/22/2011	ENG	Jordan protests: Thousands rally over economic policies
010123	New York Times	Shadid, Anthony and Ethan Bronner	1/28/2011	ENG	Protests Unsettle Jordan While Most Other Neighbors Stay Calm
010124	BBC	N/A	2/1/2011	ENG	Jordan protests: King Abdullah names Marouf Bakhit PM
010125	BBC	N/A	2/8/2011	ENG	Jordan tribes criticise Queen Rania's 'political role'
010127	Reuters	al-Khalidi, Suleiman		ENG	Jordan's king appoints new PM after protests
010128	VOA News	N/A	1/13/2011	ENG	Protests Erupt in Jordan Over Economic Conditions
010130	BBC	Gavlak, Dale	2/10/2011	ENG	Jordan's king swears in new cabinet after protests
010131	LA Times	Sandels, Alexandra	1/15/2011	ENG	JORDAN: Thousands of demonstrators protest food prices, denounce government
010132	Reuters	al-Khalidi, Suleiman	1/16/2011	ENG	Islamists in Jordan call for end to authoritarian rule
010133	Taiwan News	Halaby, Jamal	2/1/2011	ENG	Jordan's king fires Cabinet amid protests
010134	France 24	N/A	2/9/2011	ENG	Jordan king swears in government after protests
010135	France 24	N/A	1/22/2011	ENG	Thousands gather to call for the government to step down
010136	NPR	Siegel, Robert	2/1/2011	ENG	Jordan's King Sacks Cabinet After Protests
010137	France 24	N/A	1/28/2011	ENG	Jordan rejects criticism on human rights
010139	BBC	Hawley, Caroline	2/1/2011	ENG	Jordan protests: King Abdullah names Marouf Bakhit PM
010142	Foreign Policy	Lynch, Marc	1/6/2011	ENG	Obama's 'Arab Spring'?
010143	Taiwan News	Associated Press	1/13/2011	ENG	Jordan's Islamists to join opposition protests
010144	France 24	N/A	2/4/2011	ENG	Amman demonstrators march on premier's office demanding reforms
010145	DW	Dorsey, James M.	1/17/2011	ENG	Demonstrations in Libya and Jordan put Tunisian model to the test
010146	Washington Post	Greenberg, Joel	1/31/2011	ENG	Jordan's King Abdullah II ousts prime minister, cabinet in wake of mass protests
010147	Washington Post	Greenberg, Joel	2/2/2011	ENG	Jordan's king replaces cabinet
010148	CNN	CNN Wire Staff	2/2/2011	ENG	Jordan's king dismisses government, appoints new PM
010149	CNN	Hybels, Amy	1/31/2011	ENG	Protesters in Jordan demand political, economic reforms
010150	CNN	Maktabi, Rima	2/3/2011	ENG	Jordanian Islamists meet king but say protests will continue
010151	CNN	CNN Wire Staff	2/3/2011	ENG	King's prime minister choice steams Jordanian opposition

010152	RHC	N/A	1/10/2011	ARA	الملك يوجه الحكومة اليوم لاتخاذ خطوات فورية وفاعلة للتخفيف من آثار الأوضاع الاقتصادية الصعبة على المواطنين
010153	RHC	N/A	1/12/2011	ENG	King orders 'immediate' measures to ease economic difficulties
010154	RHC	N/A	1/26/2011	ARA	الملك يلتقي رئيس مجلس الاعيان وأعضاء المكتب الدائم ورؤساء اللجان في المجلس
010155	RHC	N/A	2/20/2011	ENG	King meets heads and members of executive, legislative and judicial authorities
010156	RHC	N/A	1/26/2011	ENG	King meets Senates
010157	RHC	N/A	2/1/2011	ARA	الملك يكلف الدكتور معروف البخيت تشكيل حكومة جديدة
010158	RHC	N/A	2/1/2011	ENG	King entrusts Bakhit to form new government
010159	RHC	N/A	2/1/2011	ARA	الملك يلتقي عددا من الشخصيات والقيادات الدينية الإسلامية والمسيحية الأردنية
010160	RHC	N/A	2/1/2011	ENG	King meets Jordanian Islamic and Christian figures
010161	RHC	N/A	2/3/2011	ARA	جلالة الملك يلتقي وفدا من قيادات جماعة الاخوان المسلمين وحزب جبهة العمل الاسلامي
010162	RHC	N/A	2/3/2011	ENG	King meets Islamist leaders
010163	RHC	N/A	2/9/2011	ARA	صدور الارادة الملكية السامية بتشكيل الحكومة الجديدة برئاسة الدكتور معروف البخيت
010164	RHC	N/A	2/9/2011	ENG	Royal Decree endorses new government
010165	RHC	N/A	1/27/2011	ARA	الملك يلتقي رئيس مجلس النواب واعضاء المكتب الدائم ورؤساء اللجان النيابية
010166	RHC	N/A	1/27/2011	ENG	King meets Lower House members
010167	Reuters	Reuters Staff / Suleiman al-Khalidi	1/14/2011	ARA	مئات يحتجون على ارتفاع الاسعار في جنوب الأردن
010169	دنيا الوطن	N/A	1/21/2011	ARA	آلاف يتظاهرون في الأردن احتجاجا على الفقر وارتفاع الأسعار
010170	BBC	N/A	1/14/2011	ARA	مظاهرات في الأردن احتجاجا على غلاء الاسعار والبطالة
010171	BBC	N/A	1/28/2011	ARA	مظاهرات في المحافظات الأردنية تطالب بالإصلاح وتؤيد "ما يحدث في مصر"
010172	BBC	N/A	2/6/2011	ARA	الإسلاميون يرفضون المشاركة في الحكومة الاردنية والعشائر تهدد بمظاهرات
010173	France 24	N/A	1/14/2011	ARA	مظاهرات في عمان احتجاجا على البطالة وغلاء المعيشة
010174	France 24	N/A	2/9/2011	ARA	تشكيل حكومة جديدة والإسلاميون ينتظرون "الأفعال لا الأقوال"
010176	Al Jazeera	Mohammed Najjar	1/14/2011	ARA	"جمعة غضب" بالأردن ضد الغلاء
010177	DW	N/A	1/28/2011	ARA	بعد احتجاجات مصر... الأردن واليمن يعجلان بتطبيق إصلاحات
010178	France 24	AFP	1/24/2011	ARA	الملك عبد الله الثاني يجرى مشاورات موسعة لإخماد السخط الشعبي
010179	France 24	AFP	1/21/2011	ARA	أكثر من خمسة آلاف متظاهر ينددون بغلاء الأسعار ويطالبون بإقالة الحكومة
010180	BBC	N/A	2/18/2011	ARA	تقرير خاص: بلدان الشرق الأوسط وانتفاضاتها
010181	France 24	AFP	2/6/2011	ARA	الإخوان المسلمون يرفضون المشاركة في الحكومة الجديدة
010182	البيان (Al Bayan)	N/A	1/11/2011	ARA	تظاهرات «سلمية» في الأردن الجمعة احتجاجاً على الغلاء

010183	France 24	Reuters	2/5/2011	ARA	مئات المتظاهرين يطالبون بإصلاحات سياسية
010184	BBC	N/A	1/21/2011	ARA	تظاهر الآلاف في الأردن احتجاجاً على الغلاء والمطالبة برحيل الحكومة
010185	France 24	AFP	1/26/2011	ARA	الحركة الإسلامية تنظم مسيرة احتجاجية جديدة الجمعة
010186	France 24	Reuters	2/9/2011	ARA	شخصيات عشائرية تنتقد تدخل الملكة رانيا في الحياة السياسية
010187	France 24	AFP	1/16/2011	ARA	اعتصام في العاصمة عمان احتجاجاً على سياسة الحكومة الاقتصادية
010188	DW	N/A	2/1/2011	ARA	الحكومة الأردنية تستقبل، وجبهة العمل ترفض التعيينات الجديدة
010189	BBC	N/A	2/25/2011	ARA	أكبر مظاهرة مطالبة بالديموقراطية في الأردن
010190	DW	N/A	1/3/2011	ARA	عام 2011 - عام التغيير في العالم العربي؟
010191	France 24	AFP	1/7/2011	ARA	نحو ألفي أردني يخرجون إلى الشارع للتنديد بـ "حكومة وبرلمان كازينو العار"
010192	البيان (Al Bayan)	N/A	1/13/2011	ARA	إسلاميو الأردن يشاركون في الاحتجاجات غداً
010193	Al Jazirah	N/A	1/28/2011	ARA	تزامناً مع احتجاجات مرتقبة اليوم الجمعة ملك الأردن يطالب الحكومة بإصلاحات سريعة
010194	Arabian Business	N/A	1/16/2011	ARA	الحكومة الأردنية تدرس تكلفة المعيشة بعد زيادة الاحتجاجات
010195	Amman Net	N/A	1/27/2011	ARA	اعتصام " مندد بارتفاع الاسعار " أمام رئاسة الوزراء يوم السبت
010196	الاتحاد (Al Ittihad)	N/A	2/13/2011	ARA	جريحان خلال اعتصام عشائري في الأردن
010197	Radio Sawa	Amer Al Othman	1/15/2011	ARA	اعتصام في عجلون بالأردن احتجاجاً على انتشار البطالة والفقر في الأردن
010198	البيان (Al Bayan)	Loqman Iskandar	2/15/2011	ARA	اعتصام أردني أمام رعدان للعودة إلى دستور 52
010199	البيان (Al Bayan)	Loqman Iskandar	1/17/2011	ARA	اعتصام أمام البرلمان الأردني احتجاجاً على الأوضاع الاقتصادية
0101100	CNN	Hadeel Ghabboun	2/15/2011	ARA	الأردن: اعتصام للمعارضة يدعو لإقالة الحكومة
0101101	(Al Masry Al Youm) المصري اليوم	N/A	1/15/2011	ARA	العدوى التونسية تنتشر: اعتصام ضد الغلاء في الأردن.. واعتقالات في الجزائر
0101102	Amman Net	N/A	2/16/2011	ARA	"جايبين" تعتصم أمام قصر رعدان اليوم للمطالبة بالإصلاح
0101103	Ammon News	Amal Ghabayen	1/17/2011	ARA	مجلس النقباء يحتوي خلافاً حاداً بين أعضائه و اعتصام الجمعة تحت لواء العلم الأردني
010201	New York Times	Kirkpatrick, David D.	11/15/2012	ENG	Protests in Jordan Continue, With Calls for Ending the King's Rule
010202	Reuters	Al-Khalidi, Suleiman	11/16/2012	ENG	Jordan protesters call for "downfall of the regime"
010203	CNN	Sidner, Sara and Ashley Fantz	10/5/2012	ENG	Thousands rally for political change in Jordan
010204	LA Times	Bulos, Nabih and Alexandra Sandels	11/16/2012	ENG	Protesters in Jordan denounce King Abdullah II

010205	Washington Post	Warrick, Joby and Taylor Luck	11/14/2012	ENG	Jordan hit with more protests, work stoppages over fuel price hikes
010206	Al Jazeera	N/A	11/14/2012	ENG	Protests in Jordan after spike in fuel prices
010207	Business Insider	Berlinger, Joshua	10/5/2012	ENG	It Looks A Lot Like The Arab Spring May Have Finally Reached Jordan
010208	The Guardian	AP in Amman	11/14/2012	ENG	Jordan police stations attacked by gunmen during protest
010209	Amnesty International	N/A	10/12/2012	ENG	Jordan: Arrest of 20 pro-reform activists heralds crackdown on freedom of expression
010210	Financial Times	Buck, Tobias	11/14/2012	ENG	Protests in Jordan after fuel subsidy cut
010211	CS Monitor	Seeley, Nicholas	12/18/2012	ENG	If change comes to Jordan, it won't start in Amman
010212	Washington Institute	Schenker, David	10/4/2012	ENG	Jordan Bracing for Protests
010213	BBC	N/A	10/5/2012	ENG	Jordan protests after king calls early elections
010215	VOA News	Sieg, Setareh	11/16/2012	ENG	Jordan Protests Take Aim at King
010216	Al-Monitor	N/A	11/29/2012	ENG	Jordan in Lockdown: Protests Set to Rock Capital
010218	NPR	Fadel, Leila	11/16/2012	ENG	Price Hikes Lead To Deadly Protests In Jordan
010219	WSWS.org	Shaoul, Jean	12/4/2012	ENG	Jordan hit by protests against fuel hikes and Abdullah's rule
010220	Stratfor	N/A	11/16/2012	ENG	Protests Against Jordan's King Abdullah II
010221	Arab American News	N/A	11/17/2012	ENG	Demonstrators call for 'regime change' in rare protests against Jordan's king
010222	Chicago Tribune	Reuters	11/13/2012	ENG	Protests erupt in Jordan after fuel prices rise
010223	PRI	Petersen, Freya	11/13/2012	ENG	Jordan: Jordanians protests fuel price hikes, targeting King Abdullah
010224	Taiwan News	Halaby, Jamal	12/1/2012	ENG	Jordan: Policeman wounded in October protests dies
010225	Jadaliyya	Abu-Rish, Ziyad	11/15/2012	ENG	Getting Past the Brink: Protests and the Possibilities of Change in Jordan
010226	San Diego Union Tribune	Halaby, Jamal	11/13/2012	ENG	Jordan raises fuel prices, sparking protests
010227	Toronto Star	Halaby, Jamal	11/15/2012	ENG	Fuel and gas price hikes spark protests throughout Jordan, leaving one dead amid street chaos
010229	CTV News	Halaby, Jamal	11/17/2012	ENG	Jordan's PM defends fuel price hike after 4 days of unrest
010230	Al Arabiya	AFP	11/14/2012	ENG	Strikes protests as anger over Jordan fuel hike spreads
010231	Times of Israel	Halaby, Jamal	11/17/2012	ENG	Calls for ouster of Jordan's king grow at protests

010232	Yahoo Finance	Halaby, Jamal	11/13/2012	ENG	Jordan raises fuel prices, sparking protests
010233	Jerusalem Post	Paraszczuk, Joanna	11/18/2012	ENG	Muslim Brotherhood fuel Jordan gas price protests
010234	The Nation	AFP	11/15/2012	ENG	Strikes, protests as anger over Jordan fuel hike spreads
010235	New York Times	Rudoren, Jodi	11/13/2012	ENG	Riots Erupt Across Jordan Over Gas Prices
010236	New York Times	Rudoren, Jodi and Ranya Kadri	11/14/2012	ENG	Protests Over Gas Prices in Jordan Turn Deadly
010237	CNN	Brumfield, Ben and Arwa Damon	11/15/2012	ENG	Jordanian protesters make rare move: speak out against King Abdullah
010238	New York Times	Sweis, Rana F.	9/19/2012	ENG	Jordan Limits Protests, and Internet, as Tensions Simmer
010239	Washington Post	Fisher, Max	11/13/2012	ENG	Protests break out in Jordan, mention king by name
010241	BBC	Gavlak, Dale	11/16/2012	ENG	Political and economic problems fuel Jordan protests
010242	CS Monitor	Seeley, Nicholas	11/16/2012	ENG	Jordan's crisis: Is an uneasy peace emerging?
010243	Reuters	Lyon, Alistair	11/16/2012	ENG	Analysis: Jordan's king pinched by absence of Gulf aid
010244	BBC	N/A	11/16/2012	ENG	Jordan unrest: Clashes after fuel protest
010245	Washington Post	Warrick, Joby and Taylor Luck	11/16/2012	ENG	Jordanian Protesters, Police Scuffle as Amman Demonstrations Continue
010246	Reuters	Al-Khalidi, Suleiman	11/18/2012	ENG	Jordan protesters face charges over anti-monarch chants
010247	LA Times	Abdulrahim, Rana	11/14/2012	ENG	Security forces clash with protesters in Jordan
010248	Reuters	Al-Khalidi, Suleiman	10/5/2012	ENG	In biggest protest, Jordan Islamists demand change
010249	Yahoo News	Halaby, Jamal	11/14/2012	ENG	Jordan hit by 2nd day of violent street protests
010250	BBC	N/A	12/15/2012	ENG	How fuel protests hit Jordan's economy
010251	BBC	Young, Rob and Lucy Burton	12/27/2012	ENG	Gas price rises spark anger and protests in Jordan
010252	Reuters	Lyon, Alistair	11/16/2012	ENG	Analysis: Jordan's king pinched by absence of Gulf aid
010253	Reuters	Al-Khalidi, Suleiman	11/15/2012	ENG	One dead in Jordan fuel price riots
010255	Taiwan News	Halaby, Jamal	12/1/2012	ENG	Jordan: Policeman wounded in October protests dies
010258	Taiwan News	Halaby, Jamal	11/17/2012	ENG	Calls for ouster of Jordan's king grow at protests
010260	Taiwan News	Halaby, Jamal	11/15/2012	ENG	Jordan's opposition vows to hold more protests
010261	BBC	N/A	10/5/2012	ENG	Jordan protests after king calls early elections
010262	Boston Globe	Halaby, Jamal	11/17/2012	ENG	Angry Jordanian protesters urge ouster of king
010263	Reuters	Reuters Staff	10/5/2012	ENG	Jordan Islamists stage largest pro-reform protest
010264	Reuters	Al-Khalidi, Suleiman	11/13/2012	ENG	Protests erupt in Jordan after fuel prices rise

010265	VOA News	Arrott, Elizabeth	11/16/2012	ENG	Jordanian Protesters Call for Revolution
010267	NBC News	NBC News wire services	11/16/2012	ENG	Jordan protesters call for king's 'downfall' as demonstrations escalate
010268	Al Monitor	Tamer Samadi	10/2/2012	ENG	Jordan Braces for Protests As Muslim Brotherhood Mobilizes
010269	Al Monitor	N/A	12/6/2012	ENG	Jordan Politicians Call For Release Of Prisoners Arrested at Protests
010270	Pittsburgh Post-Gazette	N/A	11/26/2012	ENG	Trouble in Jordan: Increased fuel prices set off protests
010272	The Guardian	Black, Ian	10/4/2012	ENG	Is Jordan about to experience its first big moment of the Arab spring?
010274	PRI	Cunningham, Erin	9/14/2012	ENG	Focus of anti-US protests in the Middle East evolves
010275	BBC	Keane, Fergal	11/30/2012	ENG	Rising fuel prices spark Jordan protests
010277	Open Democracy	Atalla, Munir	11/26/2012	ENG	Jordan getting chastised: another take on the protests
010278	Herald Scotland	N/A	11/16/2012	ENG	Protests spread in Jordan
010279	Reuters	Al-Khalidi, Suleiman	11/13/2012	ENG	UPDATE 2-Jordan lifts fuel subsidies, sparks protests
010280	Washington Institute	Schenker, David	1/8/2013	ENG	Will Jordan Be the First Arab Monarchy to Fall?
010281	RHC	N/A	9/16/2012	ARA	صدور الإرادة الملكية السامية بفض الدورة الاستثنائية لمجلس الأمة
010282	RHC	N/A	9/25/2012	ARA	الملك يلقي خطاب الأردن في الأمم المتحدة ويحذر من الاعتداء على المقدسات في مدينة القدس
010283	RHC	N/A	10/4/2012	ARA	صدور الإرادة الملكية السامية بحل مجلس النواب وإجراء الانتخابات النيابية
010284	RHC	N/A	9/26/2012	ARA	الملك: مفهوم الربيع العربي يختلف من بلد إلى آخر
010285	RHC	N/A	10/11/2012	ARA	صدور الإرادة الملكية السامية بتشكيل الحكومة الجديدة
010286	RHC	N/A	10/10/2012	ARA	الملك يكلف الدكتور عبدالله النسر بتشكيل حكومة جديدة
010287	RHC	N/A	10/6/2012	ARA	صدور الإرادة الملكية بتعيين رئيس وأعضاء المحكمة الدستورية
010288	RHC	N/A	10/19/2012	ARA	الملك يفاجئ عددا من الأسر العفيفة في ماركا الجنوبية بزيارة تفقدية
010289	RHC	N/A	10/15/2012	ARA	الملك يتلقى رسالة جوابية من رئيس المحكمة الدستورية
010290	RHC	N/A	10/15/2012	ARA	الملك: إنشاء المحكمة الدستورية يرسخ الفصل بين السلطات
010291	RHC	N/A	11/5/2012	ARA	إرادة ملكية سامية بإعادة تشكيل مجلس أمناء صندوق الملك عبدالله الثاني للتنمية
010293	RHC	N/A	10/23/2012	ARA	الملك يوعز لرئيس الوزراء باتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة للإفراج عن موقوفى المسيرات
010294	RHC	N/A	10/23/2012	ARA	الملك: بحجم المشاركة في الانتخابات سيكون حجم التغيير
010295	RHC	N/A	10/22/2012	ARA	الملك يلتقي مختلفا الفعاليات الوطنية غدا
010296	RHC	N/A	11/11/2012	ARA	الملك يؤكد أهمية دعم المبادرات الحاضنة للمشروعات الريادية للشباب

010297	RHC	N/A	11/7/2012	ARA	الملك يدعو الشباب إلى اغتنام الفرصة التاريخية لمأسسة عملهم السياسي عبر إسماع صوتهم
010298	RHC	N/A	11/18/2012	ARA	الملك يطمئن على مصابي قوات الدرك والأمن العام خلال الأحداث الأخيرة
010299	RHC	N/A	12/9/2012	ARA	الملك: ثقة المواطن بمؤسسات الدولة هي الأساس لنجاح مسيرة الاردن الاصلاحية
0102100	RHC	N/A	12/8/2012	ARA	الملك: ثقة المواطن بمؤسسات الدولة المختلفة هي الأساس لنجاح الجهود الإصلاحية الشاملة
0102101	RHC	N/A	12/5/2012	ARA	الملك: الإصلاح في الأردن بأيدي الناخبين وأصواتهم
0102102	RHC	N/A	12/3/2012	ARA	الملك يؤكد ضرورة تبني الحكومة لسياسات فاعلة للخروج من الأزمة الاقتصادية
0102103	RHC	N/A	12/12/2012	ARA	الملك: الربيع العربي شكل فرصة كي يمضي الأردن قدما في جهود الإصلاح وتحقيق التنمية في مختلف القطاعات
0102104	RHC	N/A	12/10/2012	ARA	الملك يكلف صندوق الملك عبدالله للتنمية بتأسيس برنامج مبادرات التمكين الديمقراطي
0102105	RHC	N/A	12/10/2012	ARA	الملك: واجب الشباب قيادة المسيرة وإحداث التغيير المطلوب
0102106	RHC	N/A	12/10/2012	ARA	الملك يوجه الحكومة لاتخاذ الاجراءات القانونية للافراج عن الموقوفين
0102107	RHC	N/A	1/2/2013	ARA	الملك يتسلم نسخة من الميثاق الاجتماعي العربي
0102108	RHC	N/A	12/27/2012	ARA	أوراق نقاش ملكية لتحفيز الحوار الوطني
0102109	RHC	N/A	12/18/2012	ARA	الملك: التحدي الرئيسي في المرحلة القادمة هو إيجاد فرص عمل مستدامة للأردنيين
0102110	RHC	N/A	1/8/2013	ARA	الملك يشيد بالمعايير الدولية التي اعتمدها "المستقلة" ويؤكد محاربة المال السياسي
0102111	RHC	N/A	1/12/2013	ARA	الملك: الأردن تقبل الربيع العربي وتبناه منذ بدايته
0102112	RHC	N/A	10/23/2012	ENG	King calls for electoral participation, urges parties and lists to organise for upcoming polls
0102113	RHC	N/A	10/22/2012	ENG	King to meet with national public figures
0102114	RHC	N/A	10/15/2012	ENG	Constitutional Court entrenches separation of powers - King
0102115	RHC	N/A	11/7/2012	ENG	King urges youth to seize historic opportunity, make sure their voice is heard
0102116	RHC	N/A	11/5/2012	ENG	King appoints new board for development fund
0102117	RHC	N/A	10/23/2012	ENG	King orders release of detained protesters
0102118	RHC	N/A	11/18/2012	ENG	King visits security personnel injured in riots
0102119	RHC	N/A	12/3/2012	ENG	Elections will be held on time - King
0102120	RHC	N/A	12/10/2012	ENG	King orders release of detainees
0102121	RHC	N/A	12/10/2012	ENG	King entrusts KAFD with new programme for social, political empowerment
0102122	RHC	N/A	12/8/2012	ENG	King launches National Integrity Committee

0102123	RHC	N/A	12/12/2012	ENG	King: Arab Spring helps Jordan move forward in reform
0102124	RHC	N/A	1/8/2013	ENG	King calls for combating election crimes
0102125	RHC	N/A	12/27/2012	ENG	Royal Discussion Papers to Encourage National Debate
0102126	RHC	N/A	1/2/2013	ENG	King receives copy of Arab Social Charter
0102127	RHC	N/A	1/12/2013	ENG	King: Jordan seeks to ensure pluralism in proper democracy
0102128	RHC	N/A	9/16/2012	ENG	Royal Decree adjourns parliament extraordinary session
0102129	RHC	N/A	10/6/2012	ENG	Royal Decree appoints president, members of Constitutional Court
0102130	RHC	N/A	9/26/2012	ENG	Arab Spring different in each country - King
0102131	RHC	N/A	10/15/2012	ENG	King receives reply letter from Constitutional Court president
0102132	RHC	N/A	10/11/2012	ENG	Royal Decree endorses new government
0102133	RHC	N/A	10/10/2012	ENG	King entrusts Abdullah Ensour to head new government
0102134	BBC	N/A	11/16/2012	ARA	آلاف المتظاهرين يطالبون "بإسقاط النظام" في الأردن
0102135	France 24	AFP	11/17/2012	ARA	مظاهرات في عمان للمطالبة "بإسقاط النظام" والعاقل الأردني يلغي زيارة للنندن
0102136	DW	N/A	11/16/2012	ARA	الشرطة الأردنية تفرق مظاهرات رفعت شعار "الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام"
0102137	Al Hurra	N/A	11/23/2012	ARA	مظاهرات في الأردن تطالب بإسقاط الحكومة
0102138	Al Jazeera	Al Najjar, Mohammed	11/16/2012	ARA	مسيرات الأردن تهتف ضد الملك
0102139	Ammon News	Abu Tair, Maher	9/18/2012	ARA	من يمول المظاهرات في الأردن؟!
0102140	BBC	N/A	11/23/2012	ARA	الآلاف يشاركون في مظاهرات في الأردن
0102141	BBC	Gavlak, Dale	11/16/2012	ARA	الأزمات السياسية والاقتصادية تدرك الاحتجاجات في الأردن
0102142	Radio Sawa	N/A	11/18/2012	ARA	اتهام 80 موقوفا بإثارة الشغب في احتجاجات الأردن الأخيرة
0102143	Ammon News	N/A	11/14/2012	ARA	احتجاجات في اربد والزرقاء ومعان وذيبيان والرنية (صور)
0102144	France 24	AFP	11/16/2012	ARA	هتافات "الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام" تهز العاصمة الأردنية
0102145	France 24	AFP	11/30/2012	ARA	آلاف المتظاهرين بشوارع العاصمة الأردنية عمان ضد رفع الأسعار
0102146	BBC	N/A	11/14/2012	ARA	مظاهرات في الأردن وإضراب للمعلمين واعتصام للمحامين
0102147	BBC	N/A	11/30/2012	ARA	مظاهرات في الاردن ضد التقشف والمطالبة بالإصلاح
0102148	BBC	N/A	10/4/2012	ARA	حل البرلمان الأردني والملك يدعو لانتخابات مبكرة
0102149	Al Balad News	N/A	11/16/2012	ARA	واشنطن: مظاهرات الأردن تعطش للتغيير
0102150	Radio Sawa	N/A	11/16/2012	ARA	تجدد المظاهرات في الأردن احتجاجا على رفع أسعار المحروقات
0102151	Al Jazeera	N/A	11/14/2012	ARA	الأمن الأردني يفرض اعتصاما لرفع الأسعار
0102152	Radio Sawa	N/A	11/24/2012	ARA	محافظ العقبة يتهم إخوان الأردن بجر البلاد إلى حرب أهلية
0102153	BBC	N/A	10/16/2012	ARA	الأردن يحدد موعد الانتخابات البرلمانية المبكرة

0102154	BBC	N/A	10/5/2012	ARA	الأردن: انطلاق مسيرات للمعارضة في عمان
0102155	Al Jazeera	N/A	12/19/2012	ARA	التغيير في الأردن لن يبدأ من العاصمة
0102156	France 24	N/A	11/20/2012	ARA	مبادرة خليجية لوقف زحف الإخوان في الأردن
0102157	Al Jazeera	N/A	10/14/2010	ARA	إضراب ثلاثة معتقلين من الحراك الأردني
0102158	France 24	AFP	11/15/2012	ARA	مقتل "مسلح" وإصابة 12 شرطيا في أعمال عنف بالأردن
0102159	DW	N/A	11/19/2012	ARA	توقيف عشرات المحتجين الأردنيين واتهامات بـ"إطالة اللسان على مقام الملك"
0102160	Ammon News	N/A	10/23/2012	ARA	الكويت: قوات اجنبية بلهجة اردنية قمعت مسيرات الكويتيين
0102161	Al Jazeera	Mahmoud, Khalid Walid	11/29/2012	ARA	حراك العشائر الأردنية.. قراءة في المشهد
0102162	France 24	N/A	10/5/2012	ARA	جمعة احتجاج في الأردن وملك البلاد يحل البرلمان ويدعو لانتخابات مبكرة
0102163	Al Masry Al Youm	N/A	12/14/2012	ARA	تجدد المظاهرات المطالبة بالإصلاح السياسي ومكافحة الفساد في الأردن
0102164	Al Balad News	N/A	11/16/2012	ARA	واشنطن: مظاهرات الأردن تعطش للتغيير
0102165	France 24	AFP	11/19/2012	ARA	مئات النقابيين يتظاهرون أمام مقر رئاسة الوزراء احتجاجا على رفع أسعار المحروقات
0102166	Al Jazeera	Muhafazah, Ali	12/11/2012	ARA	الأردن: الطريق الصعب نحو الإصلاح
0102167	Al Joumhouria	N/A	11/15/2012	ARA	مظاهرات جديدة للحركة الاسلامية في الاردن ومجموعات شبابية ستتظاهر
0102168	Akhbar El Youm	N/A	11/16/2012	ARA	الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام في الأردن
0102169	Al Watan	N/A	12/14/2012	ARA	مظاهرات في الأردن ضد الغلاء
0102170	Ammon News	N/A	11/26/2012	ARA	إخوان الأردن يرفضون "إسقاط النظام"
0102171	Al Ghad	N/A	11/16/2012	ARA	النسور: المظاهرات ليست قضية محروقات بل تهدف لإفشال الانتخابات النيابية
0102172	Aljoumhouria	N/A	11/15/2012	ARA	مظاهرات جديدة للحركة الاسلامية في الاردن ومجموعات شبابية ستتظاهر
0102173	Dostor	N/A	11/14/2012	ARA	مظاهرات في الأردن احتجاجاً على رفع أسعار الوقود
0102174	Sky News Arabia	N/A	11/18/2012	ARA	النسور: الأردن صمام أمان لدول الخليج
0102175	BBC	Gavlak, Dale	10/28/2012	ARA	الاستقرار السياسي في الأردن متوقف على نجاح الانتخابات المقبلة
0102176	Al Jazeera	Al Najjar, Mohammed	11/13/2012	ARA	انفجار شعبي بالأردن ضد رفع الأسعار
0102177	Andolu Agency	Al Juneidi, Laith	12/26/2012	ARA	الأردن في 2012: بدايته تغيير حكومات ونهايته احتجاجات
0102178	Al Jazeera	N/A	11/19/2012	ARA	احتجاجات الأردن تدخل يومها السادس
0102180	Al Hurra	N/A	10/5/2012	ARA	مظاهرات في الأردن للمطالبة بالإصلاح السياسي
0102181	Doha Institute	N/A	11/28/2012	ARA	احتجاجات الأردن: "انتفاضة أسعار" تبرز احتقانا سياسياً
0102182	BBC	N/A	11/14/2012	ARA	إلى أي حد يمكن أن تصل الاحتجاجات في الأردن؟
0102183	DW	Chamselassil, Ayari	11/14/2012	ARA	الأردن - احتجاجات عنيفة بعد قرار رفع أسعار المحروقات

0102184	Al Ittihad	N/A	11/16/2012	ARA	سقوط قتيل وإصابة 12 شرطياً في احتجاجات الأردن
0102185	DW	N/A	11/18/2012	ARA	الأردن: اتهامات ب"إثارة الشغب" لموقوفين وموجة اضطرابات تعم البلاد
0102186	Al Hurra	Al Zawawi, Mahmoud	11/15/2012	ARA	استمرار المظاهرات في الأردن احتجاجاً على زيادة أسعار المحروقات
0102187	Al Jazeera	N/A	11/15/2012	ARA	هتافات بإسقاط النظام أمام ديوان ملك الأردن
0102188	Al Hurra	N/A	11/14/2012	ARA	مظاهرات شعبية عارمة في الأردن احتجاجاً على رفع أسعار الوقود
0102189	BBC	Arikat, Iman	11/16/2012	ARA	استمرار الاحتجاجات الشعبية في الأردن
0102190	BBC	N/A	12/26/2012	ARA	صندوق النقد ينتهي على قرار الأردن برفع أسعار المحروقات
0102191	BBC	N/A	12/6/2012	ARA	وفاة شرطي أردني إثر إصابته أثناء احتجاجات ضد رفع الأسعار
0102192	Andolu Agency	Radwan, Suhaib	11/14/2012	ARA	احتجاجات الأردن تتواصل لليوم الثاني ودعوة للإضراب العام
0102193	Radio Sawa	N/A	11/16/2012	ARA	المجالي: سنضرب بيد من حديد من يحاول العبث بأمن الأردن
0102194	Ammon News	N/A	11/18/2012	ARA	احتجاجات متفرقة في عمان
0102195	Al Khaleej	N/A	11/21/2012	ARA	احتجاجات الأردن تتسبب في إلغاء 30% من حجوزات سياحية
0102196	Radio Sawa	N/A	11/14/2012	ARA	موجة من الإضرابات في الأردن احتجاجاً على رفع أسعار المحروقات
0102197	France 24	AFP	11/14/2012	ARA	أعمال عنف و اعتداءات على مباني ومؤسسات حكومية بالأردن
0102198	Al Jazeera	N/A	11/18/2012	ARA	تهم لثمانين موقفاً ومعلمو الأردن يضربون
0102199	Al Ittihad	N/A	11/15/2012	ARA	احتجاجات في الأردن بعد رفع أسعار المحروقات
0102200	Al Masry Al Youm	N/A	11/14/2012	ARA	تواصل الاحتجاجات الشعبية بالأردن ضد قرار رفع أسعار المحروقات
0102201	Sky News Arabia	Al Jaghbir, Iyad	11/14/2012	ARA	السفارة الأميركية تحذر رعاياها في الأردن
0102202	Al Jazeera	Al Najjar, Mohammed	11/19/2012	ARA	نظام الأردن يراهن على انحسار الاحتجاجات
0102203	Al Ittihad	N/A	11/14/2012	ARA	احتجاجات في الأردن بعد زيادة أسعار الوقود
0102204	BBC	N/A	11/14/2012	ARA	الأردن: قوات الأمن تقض اعتصاماً في عمان احتجاجاً على زيادة أسعار الوقود
0102205	Al Watan	N/A	11/14/2012	ARA	احتجاجات واسعة في الأردن والعنف يصل باب منزل رئيس الوزراء والأخوان تدعو الملك لتدارك الأمور.. شاهد الفيديو والصور
0102206	France 24	AFP	10/2/2012	ARA	قوات الأمن الأردنية تقض تحركاً احتجاجياً داخل مخيم للاجئين السوريين شمال البلاد
0102207	Al Arabiya	N/A	11/20/2012	ARA	الأردن الاحتجاجات تلغي 30 من الحجوزات السياحية
0102208	Andolu Agency	Al Juneidi, Laith	11/18/2012	ARA	معلمو الأردن: مسيرة احتجاجية الاثنين
0102209	Al Jazeera	N/A	11/13/2012	ARA	احتجاجات بالأردن لرفع أسعار الوقود
0102210	Al Jazeera	N/A	11/15/2012	ARA	صحف الأردن.. قلق على قلق
0102211	Al Jazeera	N/A	11/23/2012	ARA	تواصل مسيرات الأردن وغياب "إسقاط النظام"

0102212	Sky News Arabia	N/A	11/15/2012	ARA	المجالي: مخربون أجنبى بتظاهرات الأردن
0102213	Ammon News	N/A	11/13/2012	ARA	سلسلة بشرية نسانية للاحتجاج على تطبيق "سيداو"
0102214	Al Masry Al Youm	Al Mulla, Mansour	11/15/2012	ARA	الاحتجاجات الشعبية تتواصل في الأردن بعد سقوط أول قتيل في المواجهات مع الشرطة
0102215	Al Jazeera	Al Najjar, Mohammed	11/15/2012	ARA	حكومة الأردن تطلب من الإخوان تهدئة الشارع
0102216	Al Jazeera	Al Najjar, Mohammed	12/19/2012	ARA	قرار أردني بإطلاق معتقلي الاحتجاجات
0102217	France 24	AFP	12/5/2012	ARA	العاهل الأردني يؤكد أن بلاده لن تكون طرفا في أي تدخل عسكري في سوريا
0102218	Human Rights Watch	N/A	9/14/2012	ARA	موجة اعتقالات تؤثر على تنامي التشدد ضد المعارضة في الأردن
0102219	Al Jazeera	Al Najjar, Mohammed	11/21/2012	ARA	اتهامات للأمن الأردني بتعذيب معتقلين
0102220	Andolu Agency	Radwan, Suhaib	12/6/2012	ARA	وفاة ثاني شرطي في الاحتجاجات الأردنية
0102221	Arabian Business	N/A	11/20/2012	ARA	احتجاجات الأردن تتسبب في إلغاء حجوزات سياحية
0102222	Al Jazeera	N/A	11/29/2012	ARA	فض اعتصام للاجئين سوريين بالأردن
0102223	Al Khaleej	N/A	9/19/2012	ARA	اعتصام أردني للمطالبة بالإفراج عن "معتقلي الحراك"
0102224	Ammon News	Al-Fanek, Fahd	9/17/2012	ARA	اعتصامات ضد الوطن
0102225	Ammon News	N/A	9/13/2012	ARA	إعتصام عند "الدوار الثاني" للمطالبة بمزيد من الإصلاحات .. (صور)
0102226	Al Ghad	N/A	11/17/2012	ARA	الكلاذة: لا نتبنى شعار إسقاط النظام ومن نطق به لا يمثلنا
0102227	Al Hurra	N/A	11/30/2012	ARA	هيو من رايتس تدعو الأردن إلى وقف محاكمات المتظاهرين
0102228	Ammon News	N/A	9/15/2012	ARA	فصل أبو جنيب من "المجلس الوطني"
0102229	Al Hurra	N/A	11/13/2012	ARA	أبو قتادة لن يواجه اتهامات بالإرهاب في الأردن
0102230	Al Hurra	N/A	11/16/2012	ARA	في الأردن.. متظاهرون يرددون "الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام"
0102232	Al Hurra	N/A	12/3/2012	ARA	مجلس الوزراء الأردني يؤجل الانتخابات البلدية ستة أشهر أخرى
0102233	Al Jazeera	N/A	12/21/2012	ARA	اعتصام لحركات شبابية وشعبية بالأردن
0102234	Al Masry Al Youm	N/A	11/14/2012	ARA	قوات الأمن الأردنية تفض بالقوة اعتصاما بأحد ميادين عمان
0102237	Al Hurra	N/A	12/5/2012	ARA	العاهل الأردني: المملكة تعد "السيناريو الأسوأ" في سورية
0102238	Al Hurra	N/A	12/9/2012	ARA	العاهل الأردني يكلف رئيس الوزراء برئاسة لجنة لتعزيز النزاهة في البلاد
0102239	Ammon News	N/A	9/13/2012	ARA	"الشبابي الإسلامي" في اعتصام الرفض
0102241	Al Ghad	Adayleh, Hashal	11/22/2012	ARA	مسيرات واعتصامات غدا رفضا لرفع الأسعار

0102242	Ammon News	Al Khawaldeh, Mahmoud	9/21/2012	ARA	الكرك : ثلاثة اعتصامات اصلاحية واخر وفاء للوطن
0102246	Elaph	Al Zamel, Ayman	10/20/2012	ARA	رئيس وزراء الأردن على طريق التجاوب مع اعتصام ناشري المواقع الإلكترونية
0102247	Al Jazeera	Al Najjar, Mohammed	10/23/2012	ARA	ملك الأردن: قلة ترفع شعار إسقاط النظام
0102248	Andolu Agency	Al Juneidi, Laith	11/15/2012	ARA	إخوان الأردن: الاحتجاجات مستمرة حتى خفض سعر المحروقات
0102249	Ammon News	N/A	9/13/2012	ARA	ابوجنيب الفايز : لن نشارك في اعتصام "تنسيقية الحراكات"
0102250	Radio Sawa	N/A	11/16/2012	ARA	المجالي: سنضرب بيد من حديد من يحاول العبث بأمن الأردن
0102251	Arabian Business	N/A	9/18/2012	ARA	الإنتلاف الشبابي والشعبي للتغيير في الأردن يهاجمون رئيس الحكومة و"القبضة الأمنية"
0102252	Al Jazirah	Al Qaq, Abdullah	11/17/2012	ARA	الأردن: احتجاجات تطالب بالإصلاحات وخفض الأسعار
0102255	Ammon News	N/A	1/12/2013	ARA	الأردن كان على علم بقرار الحكومة العراقية إغلاق حدوده معها
0102256	France 24	AFP	1/10/2013	ARA	الأمم المتحدة تناشد المجتمع الدولي تأمين مساعدات عاجلة لإغاثة اللاجئين السوريين في الأردن
0102257	Al Hurra	Al Tarzi, Hassan	1/10/2013	ARA	الانتخابات النيابية الأردنية.. هل يحسم مصيرها الصندوق أم الشارع؟
0102258	DW	Al Anasou, Mohammed Khair	1/17/2013	ARA	الأردن- "حملات إنتخابية بشعارات فضفاضة ومستنسخة"
0102259	Al Jazeera	Al Najjar, Mohammed	1/2/2013	ARA	معتقلون بالأردن يشتكون التعذيب
0102260	Al Hurra	N/A	1/1/2013	ARA	الحكومة الأردنية تقر موازنة 2013 بعجز 1,8 مليار دولار
0102261	Sky News Arabia	N/A	1/3/2013	ARA	الأردن يكافح لخفض العجز تحت ضغط الشارع
0102262	Al Jazeera	N/A	1/1/2013	ARA	تراجع عجز ميزانية الأردن لعام 2013
0102263	Amman Net	N/A	1/11/2013	ARA	"النقابي العمالي" يطالب بإعادة النظر بقانوني الضمان والعمل
0102264	Amman Net	N/A	1/11/2013	ARA	أبو مرزوق: تصريحات الخصاونة حول إبعاد حماس.. إيجابية
0102265	Ammon News	N/A	1/14/2013	ARA	لا اعتصام مفتوحاً في الأردن الجمعة
0102266	Al Jazeera	Al Najjar, Mohammed	1/14/2013	ARA	لا اعتصام مفتوحاً في الأردن الجمعة
0102267	Amman Net	N/A	1/13/2013	ARA	اعتصام الحسيني: الفساد يحرق أبناءنا.. واعتداء على المشاركين
0102268	Al Ghad	N/A	1/12/2013	ARA	"الحقيقة السوداء" تنفذ اعتصاماً للاحتجاج على "فساد الأمانة"
020101	Atlantic Council	Nusairat, Tuqa	9/27/2019	ENG	Teachers' protest challenges Jordanian status quo
020102	Middle East Monitor	Haj Khalil, Shahd	9/9/2019	ENG	Jordan strikes back against protesting teachers
020103	Al Jazeera	N/A	9/8/2019	ENG	Teachers in Jordan launch strike demanding salary hike

020104	Al Jazeera	Vidal, Marta	9/26/2019	ENG	Teachers on strike in Jordan demand higher income, 'dignity'
020105	Arab News	Kuttab, Daoud	9/6/2019	ENG	Amman comes to a standstill as teachers demand 50% pay rise
020106	The National News	Faulkner, Charlie	9/6/2019	ENG	Jordan's teachers plan another strike after bringing Amman to standstill
020107	GardaWorld	N/A	10/2/2019	ENG	Jordan: Teachers to continue nationwide strike September 30 /update 2
020108	The New Arab (Al Araby)	N/A	9/5/2019	ENG	Jordan teachers clash with police during protests over stagnant wages
020109	Al Araby	Al Ziadat, Anwar	9/5/2019	ARA	بعد قمع اعتصامها أمام الحكومة... إضراب عام لنقابة المعلمين الأردنيين الأحد المقبل
020110	7iber	Ghabari, Mohammed	9/5/2019	ARA	لماذا يعتصم معلمو ومعلمات الأردن؟
020111	BBC	N/A	9/7/2019	ARA	هل ينفخ حراك المعلمين تحت رماد الاحتجاجات في الأردن؟
020112	CNN	Ghaboun, Hadeel	9/5/2019	ARA	الأردن.. وقفة احتجاجية لنقابة المعلمين قبل إعلان الإضراب
020113	BBC	N/A	9/9/2019	ARA	إضراب المعلمين في الأردن بين الدعوة إلى التعقل وتوجيه اللوم إلى الحكومة
020114	Al Araby	Al Ziadat, Anwar	9/22/2019	ARA	الحكومة الأردنية تسعى لكسر إضراب المعلمين: "واجهوا أولياء الأمور"
020115	Al Araby	Al Ziadat, Anwar	9/10/2019	ARA	الحكومة الأردنية ترفض مطالب نقابة المعلمين والإضراب متواصل لليوم الثالث
020116	Rai Al Youm	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	"يا سلامة يا حماد.. رئيسك واحد كذاب.. هتافات حادة لمعلمي الأردن و"تفريخ" سلسلة اعتصامات بعد "إغلاق أمني" لوسط عمان.. أزمة نقابة المعلمين تتدرج والرزاز متأخراً: "مستعد للتجاوز" صور وفيديوهات
020117	Rai Al Youm	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	فجر الاعتصام في الأردن: نداءات لـ"عقلاء" الدولة بـ"سحب الهراوات والكلاب" من مداخل الدوار الرابع وإجراءات أمنية مكثفة قبل ساعات من "إعتصام مقرر" لحراك المعلمين والمطالب "معيشية" وليست "سياسية" صور
020118	Al Jazeera	Al Sharan, Mahmoud	9/7/2019	ARA	إضراب مفتوح يبدأ الأحد.. أزمة المعلمين تتصاعد في الأردن
020119	Al Jazeera	Fadilat, Ayman	10/3/2019	ARA	تطورات متسارعة.. وقف مشروط لإضراب معلمي الأردن
020120	Al Jazeera	Al Sharan, Mahmoud	9/8/2019	ARA	التشلل يصيب مدارس الأردن بعد إضراب المعلمين
020121	Al Jazeera	N/A	10/3/2019	ARA	"المعلم ما ينهان.. معلمو الأردن يعتصمون بعمان دعماً لمطلب رفع الأجور
020122	Al Quds	N/A	10/3/2019	ARA	إضراب معلمي الأردن يكمل أسبوعه الرابع وتآهب أمني تحسباً لإقامة اعتصام في عمان
020123	Arabi 21	Al Irsan, Mohammed	9/5/2019	ARA	الأمن الأردني يجمع اعتصاماً للمعلمين أمام مقر الحكومة (شاهد)
020124	Al Araby	Al Ziadat, Anwar	9/6/2019	ARA	قمع اعتصام المعلمين الأردنيين يؤدي إلى تعاطف ودعم واسع لمطالبهم
020125	BBC	N/A	9/30/2019	ARA	إضراب المعلمين في الأردن: حق أم استغلال للطالب؟
020126	Al Mamlaka	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	نقابة المعلمين: إنهاء الاعتصام وإعلان إضراب الأحد
020127	Roya News	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	تواجد أمني مكثف للدرك والأمن على "الرابع والداخلية" قبيل اعتصام المعلمين.. فيديو وصور

020128	Al Araby	Al Ziadat, Anwar	9/17/2019	ARA	اعتصام حاشد في اليوم العاشر من إضراب المعلمين الأردنيين
020129	Al Quds	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	المعلم الأردني يهتف: "يسقط عمر الرزاز" .. ولأول مرة "إغلاق أمني" شامل للعاصمة عمان- (فيديوهات)
020130	Independent Arabia	Daylawani, Tareq	9/5/2019	ARA	اعتصام معلمي الأردن يحول عمان إلى تكتة عسكرية مغلقة
020131	Al Jazeera	Fadilat, Ayman	9/29/2019	ARA	من ساحات المدارس للمحاكم.. إضراب معلمي الأردن مستمر والحكومة تصر على تنفيذ قرار قضائي بوقفه
020132	France 24	AFP	9/8/2019	ARA	معلمو المدارس الحكومية في الأردن يدخلون إضرابا مفتوحا للتبديد برفض الحكومة منحهم علاوات
020133	Arabic RT	N/A	10/3/2019	ARA	اعتصام حاشد للمعلمين الأردنيين تأكيدا على مطالب الزيادة والاعتذار
020134	Ultra Sawt	N/A	9/6/2019	ARA	اعتصام المعلمين في الأردن.. قوات الأمن تهدر المزيد من الحقوق
020135	Arabi 21	Al Irsan, Mohammed	9/30/2019	ARA	الموقف من إضراب المعلمين يقسم النقابات المهنية الأردنية
020136	Al Quds	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	درك وهرات وكلاب بوليسية قبل "اعتصام المعلمين" و"الدوار الرابع" مجددا في الأردن- (فيديو)
020137	Al Ghad	Daana, Hamzeh	10/3/2019	ARA	تواجد أمني كثيف عند الدوار الرابع تحسبا لإقامة اعتصام
020138	Al Ordoon	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	تزامنا مع اعتصام المعلمين أزمة مروريه خانقة في عمان
020139	Al Wakeel News	Abu Rumman, Hamzeh	9/30/2019	ARA	اعتصام للمعلمين في جرش
020140	Roya News	N/A	9/11/2019	ARA	اعتصام لطلبة " الطب في السودان" أمام " التعليم العالي": الوزارة نكثت بما أوصت به- صور
020141	Al Mamlaka	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	وزير التربية لـ "المملكة": باب الحوار مع المعلمين مفتوح
020142	Al Aalam	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	الأمن الأردني يجمع اعتصاما للمعلمين أمام مقر الحكومة
020143	Al Wakeel News	N/A	9/6/2019	ARA	شاهد .. حقيقة هذه الصور خلال اعتصام المعلمين
020144	Al Ghad	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	استمرار احتجاجات المعلمين في عمان والمحافظات - صور
020145	Roya News	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	كم تبلغ قيمة رواتب قطاع التعليم في موازنة الدولة للعام 2019؟.. جرافيك
020146	Al Hurra	N/A	9/28/2019	ARA	الخارجية الأردنية: الإفراج عن اثنين من أصل 4 مواطنين احتجزوا في مصر
020147	Ad Dustour	N/A	9/6/2019	ARA	شاهد بالصور... التضليل الاعلامي وكشف حقيقة صور متداولة عن اعتصام المعلمين
020148	Al Ghad	Al Kiyali, Mohammed	9/24/2019	ARA	قانونيون: إضراب "المعلمين" مخالف للدستور ولقانون النقابة
020149	Wihda Party	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	بيان صحفي صادر عن اتحاد النقابات العمالية المستقلة الأردني فيما يخص اعتصام نقابة المعلمين
020150	Al Ghad	Muthher, Alaa	9/4/2019	ARA	"التربية": نحترم المعلمين.. ولا إجازات اليوم

020151	Jordan Engineers Association	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	بيان صحفي صادر عن نقابة المهندسين فيما يخص اعتصام نقابة المعلمين
020152	Muslim Brotherhood (Jordan)	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	“حريات العمل الإسلامي” تستنكر منع اعتصام المعلمين
020154	El Balad News	Adel, Shireen	9/5/2019	ARA	مظاهرات في الأردن للمطالبة باستقالة وزير الداخلية ومحاسبته.. شاهد
020155	BBC	N/A	9/9/2019	ARA	مع دخول العام الدراسي: كيف ترى أوضاع المعلمين في الدول العربية؟
020156	Arabic RT	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	الجيش الأردني يصدر توضيحا بشأن احتجاجات المعلمين (صور)
020157	Al Hurra	Mansour, Nadal	9/5/2019	ARA	نار متقدة تحت رماد الاحتجاجات في الأردن
020158	Al Hurra	N/A	9/22/2019	ARA	معلمو الأردن يواصلون إضرابهم للأسبوع الثالث
020159	Al Hurra	N/A	9/8/2019	ARA	معلمو الأردن يبدأون إضرابا مفتوحا احتجاجا على الرواتب
020160	Arabic RT	N/A	10/3/2019	ARA	نقابة المعلمين الأردنيين تتوعد ببدء إضراب جديد يوم الأحد
020161	Al Arabiya	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	الأردن.. وقفة احتجاجية لآلاف المعلمين للمطالبة برفع رواتبهم
020162	Al Arabiya	N/A	10/1/2019	ARA	نقابة معلمي الأردن تطعن بقرار المحكمة: الاحتجاجات سلمية
020163	RHC	N/A	9/8/2019	ARA	الملك يلتقي شخصيات سياسية واقتصادية وإعلامية
020164	RHC	N/A	9/5/2019	ARA	إرادة ملكية بفض الدورة الاستثنائية لمجلس الأمة
020165	RHC	N/A	9/23/2019	ARA	إرادة ملكية بدعوة مجلس الأمة إلى الاجتماع في دورته العادية
020166	RHC	N/A	9/16/2019	ARA	الملك مخاطبا الشباب: المطلوب العمل بجدية وشفافية دون تردد
020167	RHC	N/A	9/24/2019	ARA	النص الكامل لمقابلة الملك مع قناة (إم إس إن بي سي)
020168	RHC	N/A	9/23/2019	ARA	قناة (إم إس إن بي سي) الأمريكية تجري مقابلة تلفزيونية مع الملك
020169	RHC	N/A	9/16/2019	ENG	King urges youth to work seriously, transparently, and without hesitation
020170	RHC	N/A	9/24/2019	ENG	King in MSNBC interview says one-state solution would be catastrophe, urges diplomacy as ‘only way to go’
020171	RHC	N/A	9/23/2019	ENG	King interviewed by MSNBC
020172	RHC	N/A	9/23/2019	ENG	Royal Decree summons Parliament to convene for ordinary session
020173	RHC	N/A	9/8/2019	ENG	King meets political, economic, and media figures
020174	RHC	N/A	9/5/2019	ENG	Royal Decree prorogues Parliament’s extraordinary session
020201	Al Ghad	Malkawi, Mufawaq	3/14/2016	ARA	اعتصام “الأردنية” وخطبة التعليم في الأردن
020202	Al Ghad	N/A	3/1/2016	ARA	الطراونة: اعتصام “الأردنية” غير مبرر
020203	Al Araby	N/A	3/14/2016	ARA	رئيس الجامعة الأردنية يهدد باعتقال ناشطي “ذبحتنا”
020204	Ammon News	Al Khawaja, Mujhem	3/10/2016	ARA	الطراونة: جهات سياسية تحرك اعتصام “الأردنية” (صور)

020205	Al Ghad	Al Neimat, Tayseer	3/10/2016	ARA	الطراونة يتهم جهات سياسية بالوقوف وراء اعتصام "الأردنية"
020206	Al Ghad	N/A	3/8/2016	ARA	تواصل اعتصام طلبة الأردنية والجامعة تتهم أطرافا خارجية بـ"التحريض"
020207	Al Ghad	N/A	3/14/2016	ARA	"ذبحتنا"، تستغرب غياب الحكومة عن اعتصام طلبة "الأردنية"
020208	University of Jordan News	Mubeideen, Mohammad	3/1/2016	ARA	الطراونة: اعتصام "الأردنية" غير مبرر ولن يحال أي مشارك للجان تحقيقية
020209	Al Ghad	N/A	3/1/2016	ARA	طلبة "الأردنية" يواصلون اعتصامهم المفتوح لليوم الثالث احتجاجا على رفع الرسوم
020210	Amman Net	Freij, Mohammad	3/14/2016	ARA	اعتصام "الأردنية" واختزال الواقع التعليمي
020212	Al Jazeera	N/A	3/8/2016	ARA	اعتصام الجامعة الأردنية يشعل النقاشات مجددا
020213	Al Ghad	Mansour, Nadal	3/12/2016	ARA	اعتصام طلبة الجامعة الأردنية حق
020214	University of Jordan News	N/A	3/10/2016	ARA	بيان صادر عن الجامعة الأردنية حول اعتصام الطلبة
020215	Rai Al Youm	N/A	3/8/2016	ARA	تواصل اعتصام الطلاب في الجامعة الأردنية احتجاجا على زيادة رسوم التعليم
020216	University of Jordan News	Al Abadi, Hatem	3/13/2016	ARA	اعتصام (الأردنية).. أطراف في الواجهة ومعنيون في الظل
020217	Al Ghad	N/A	3/11/2016	ARA	طلبة في "الأردنية" يواصلون اعتصامهم رفضا لرفع الرسوم
020218	As Sabeel	Ayasra, Omar	3/10/2016	ARA	اعتصام «الأردنية» مجددا
020219	Al Jazeera	N/A	2/29/2016	ARA	طلاب الأردن ينتفضون ضد الرسوم الجامعية
020220	Al Rai	Abu Samaqa, Tawfik	3/13/2016	ARA	في اعتصام «الأردنية».. هل من ورائه مآرب أخرى
020221	University of Jordan News	Al Abadi, Hatem	3/13/2016	ARA	اعتصام (الأردنية).. أطراف في الواجهة ومعنيون في الظل
020222	As Sabeel	N/A	3/5/2016	ARA	سابع أيام اعتصام "الأردنية" .. والتجمع الطلابي يخاطب الطلبة
020223	Al Bayan	Iskandar, Loqman	3/14/2016	ARA	اعتصام طلبة «الأردنية» يدخل أسبوعه الثالث ولا أفق للحل
020225	Al Maqar	N/A	3/10/2016	ARA	الطراونة: جهات خارجية وراء اعتصام 'الأردنية'
020226	Amman JO	N/A	3/8/2016	ARA	عريضة موقعة لحل اعتصام "الأردنية"
020227	As Sabeel	N/A	3/1/2016	ARA	الطراونة: اعتصام "الأردنية" غير مبرر
020230	Al Rai	Al Abadi, Hatem	3/13/2016	ARA	اعتصام (الأردنية).. أطراف في الواجهة ومعنيون في الظل
020231	Al Ghad	Khreisat, Mohammad Akef	3/8/2016	ARA	معتصمو الأردنية يرفضون اتفاق ممثلهم مع إدارة الجامعة
020232	Roya News	N/A	3/8/2016	ARA	عريضة موقعة لحل اعتصام "الأردنية"
020233	Sawaleif	Ayasra, Omar	3/8/2016	ARA	اعتصام «الأردنية» / عمر عياصرة
020234	Al Ghad	N/A	3/7/2016	ARA	اعتصام "الأردنية" يتواصل لليوم التاسع احتجاجا على رفع الرسوم

Appendix E: Qualitative Coding Variables

Below is a list of the variables that I coded for in each text. The bolded terms are all variables that could be coded for in the analysis. The remaining rows in the table reflect descriptions of certain variables and broader variable groups which reflect the hierarchy in the coded variables.

Group	Variable	Description/Details	Code
Non-state actors	Muslim Brotherhood/IAF	Reference to Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Action Front, or any affiliated organizations, or terms such as “Islamists”	0 = no 1 = mentioned 2 = mentioned and speaking (<i>speaking means direct or paraphrased quote/statement</i>)
	Trade/econ/businesspeople	Any non-state actors who are mentioned as being in the economic sector (including businesspeople, unions, etc.)	
	Local group	Any organized groups of citizens, including opposition or pro-government groups	
Criticism	Criticism by King toward	Prime Minister	0 = absent 1 = present
		Parliament	
		Cabinet	
Topics	Economic	Prices and Inflation	
		Taxes	
		Unemployment	
	Political (domestic)	Elections	
		Democracy	
		Corruption	
	Foreign policy	Palestine/Israel	
		Gulf states	
		USA	
	Social Justice	Education issues/Student Rights	
		Environmental Issues	
		Union Rights	

		Women's Rights/Gender Equality	
Protest demands	Political Reform	Remove [current] PM/Govt	
		Elect [future] PM	
		Remove King/Regime	
		Democratic transition/Other	
	Economic Reform	Including calls for any specific economic reforms or assistance such as repealing or amending tax laws, reversing subsidies, etc.	
Language	Accepted resignation	Including similar language such as "resigned," "stepped down", etc.	
	Fired/Sacked	Including similar language such as "ousted," "removed," etc.	
Interference	Dissolved parliament	Including similar language such as "adjourning" or "dismissing" parliament.	
	Removing PM	Any references to the removal of the prime minister, regardless of the language used.	
Protest Size	Protest Size	Used to easily identify and locate the protest size mentioned in each text.	

Appendix F: Comparing Protests

Naturally, as I conducted the analysis for this study, I noticed some differences across the cases selected. As aforementioned, I selected two most likely cases with large, politically- or economically-motivated protests, and two least likely cases with smaller, more socially-motivated protests. Aside from these intended differences, I found that some cases possessed different characteristics which may pose limitations to the overall veracity of the results.

Protest Duration

Through examining the *Mass Mobilization* and ACLED databases, and based on the cases selected for this study, I observed that protest movements focused on more social issues tend to be shorter in duration than those addressing political or economic issues, at least in the case of Jordan. The durations of the cases in this study illustrate this trend. The two most likely cases spanned 43 and 128 days, respectively. In contrast, the least likely cases spanned 29 and 14 days, respectively. This is a sizeable difference in duration which must be noted. A longer protest duration is more likely to generate a greater number of texts, which in turn increases the probability of the presence of codable variables.

The relatively shorter variation of the least likely cases may be attributable to one of the reasons that drove the initial theorizing behind my first hypothesis. Social issues may not be as effective at cutting across different social groups and populations within the country, as political or economic issues are. The first least likely case addressed teachers' demands and the second concerned students' demands. Both of these are specific subgroups of the wider Jordanian population. Thus, such protests may be less likely to garner the same degree of support that a protest addressing an issue of national importance would be.

A second potential explanation for the shorter duration of the least likely cases may be the nature of the protesters' demands themselves. The demands of the socially-focused cases differ from those of the political and economic protests, focusing more on local-level changes, relative to the sweeping national political and economic reforms that protesters in the most likely cases demanded. Thus, the relatively smaller-scale demands of social protests may be more easily or realistically met, compared to the relatively larger demands of the economic- and politically-based protests. In other words, the concessions demanded from the King by the public which would be necessary to end the protest movement, are likely to be less threatening to the monarch in a social context, relative to the political and economic context. This may make it easier for the monarch to make concessions and thus for the protests to subside when the protests are socially-motivated.

Reporting

Similar to the protest duration, the number of texts differed notably across cases. As aforementioned, part of this is likely attributable to the difference in protest length. A longer protest duration is more likely to generate a greater number of texts, relative to a shorter protest. However, another possible explanation behind this variation is the degree to which the protest issue was of local or international importance. As indicated in Table 3, the corpus of texts for each of both least likely cases included many more Arabic sources, relative to the reporting on the most likely cases.

Table 3: Arabic and English Texts by Case

Case	Arabic	English	Total No. of Texts
Most Likely, Case 1	45.16% (42)	54.84% (51)	93
Most Likely, Case 2	63.27% (155)	36.73% (90)	245
Least Likely, Case 1	80.82% (59)	19.18% (14)	73
Least Likely, Case 2	100% (30)	0	30

The proportion of texts that are Arabic relative to English for each case is likely to skew the reporting, to some degree. Although not necessarily the case, English articles are more likely to be sourced from international news outlets, while Arabic texts are more likely to be domestic or regional sources. The background and source of each text may influence the objectivity of the reporting and the incidents that are covered (or excluded) in the article. Due to censorship in Jordan, local news sources will likely be somewhat conservative when reporting on calls for the removal of the monarch or discourse around toppling the regime. This is especially true of the few mainstream news sources that are still in print and that are owned—at least in part—by the state. However, there are other Jordanian sources which are more independent and which attempt to report on events objectively and freely. These sources, combined with Arabic articles that have been written by regional or international agencies likely mitigate the effects of potentially censored local reporting. Nevertheless, it is important to make note of this potential influence on the content of the articles, especially when considering the second least likely case for which there were no English texts.

One potential reason for the variation in English versus Arabic reporting across the cases is the scope and importance of the protest issue. It is rational to consider that that a protest threatening to topple the regime (e.g. in the second most likely case) is more important to foreign sources than a protest by the teachers' union calling for higher wages (e.g. first least likely case).

This variation in importance domestically versus internationally influences the type of sources that report on the protest, and thus must be considered when viewing the analysis conducted in this study.