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Partitioning Body and State: Interethnic Conflict and Cooperation on Gender Violence in India

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Abstract

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In December 2012, India erupted in protests when a 22-year old Hindu woman, Jyoti Pandey, was gang-raped and killed on the back of a dusty bus in Delhi. Since then, attempts to combat gender violence have been made by Indian political actors, including the Violence Against Women Act. Despite the passage of many reforms, there has been little "real" change in curbing violence, considering gang-rapes like those of Priyanka Reddy continue to garner national attention. Both times, the faces of massive nation-sweeping protests have been Hindu, marginalizing the stories of Muslim women alongside other religious minorities. Scholars suggest that these policies to deter violence against women have been ineffective because they serve ulterior motives to promote Hindu Nationalism rather than structural, intersectional change. Therefore, I ask in this thesis: what incentives do rivalrous ethnic groups have for cooperation on alternate social dimensions, such as gender violence? I hypothesize that through processes of instrumentalization, there exist personal and gendered biases toward interethnic group members that can be cemented into policy. I conduct a survey through MTurk, asking batteries of questions that cover demographic information, religious and nationalistic behaviors, voting behaviors, and pre-existing gender biases. Respondents are then presented with vignettes detailing incidents similar to the gang rapes of Pandey and Reddy -- however, the associated identities are changed to signify Hindu or Muslim religious backgrounds. Similar vignettes present a woman with no other identity-signifier, one that invokes nationalism, and two that signify occupational-status. The survey then fields respondents' attitudes on mobilizing around violence against women. I find evidence that Hindu men and women hold biases against Muslim women, particularly those who work, and are less likely to support policies to combat gender violence for them. Moreover, very religious Hindus are more likely to support policies to combat gender-based violence when a target is labeled as an "Indian" rather than a Muslim, for example. Caste affiliations also color the way that people mobilize around policies. These findings prove that there is rampant Islamophobia in India and that out-group biases and antagonistic social norms can manifest into policy decisions and consolidate in-group power.

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Introduction

How do interethnic conflicts and in-group frustrations shape the way we think about gender violence? Why do ethnic in-groups decide when to vote for cross-cutting policy concerns, like feminist issues, if at all? In December 2012, India erupted into protests days after Jyoti Singh Pandey had been gang-raped on the back of a dusty bus in Delhi. These protests incited an onslaught of legislation to curb violence against women, including the Criminal Law Ordinance (2013) which expanded the definition of punishable gendered violence (Anwary 2018). Despite the passage of these laws, several other gang rape cases have caught the nation's attention, notably the gang rape of Priyanka Reddy in late 2019 and that of a young Dalit woman in Hathras just last year (2020). Given the continued prevalence of these cases, it is clear that these laws have been minimally effective in diminishing some of the most graphic incidents of gender violence. In fact, at least one in three women in India will still experience violence in her lifetime (OECD 2021). What factors might be responsible for the persistence of gang rapes and other crimes against women?

According to some scholars, the persistence of violence against women may be partially due to the co-optation of gendered issues as a site of nationalistic and ethnic conflict. Indeed, a focus on gender issues is a key to nationalism generally and historically, and being specifically activated by nationalistic policy makers (Eriksen 2017, Anand 2007, Anwary 2018, Banerjee 2006). We can see this in the co-optation of gendered issues by Hindu Nationalist politicians, such as members of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), to promote their own political agendas (Anwary 2018, Banerjee 2006). By no accident, both the Pandey and Reddy cases concerned Hindu women, just as most of the other cases that have captured the national psyche did (Anwary 2018, Banerjee 2006). Both of these cases importantly happened around major elections, including those for Prime Minister (2012 and 2019 respectively). Some speculate that Hindu Nationalist policians have used these cases to strategially garner the support of Hindu women by promoting their safety with largely decorous policies, while simultaneously casting a villanizing narrative that the threat of violence comes from Muslim men and Western influence (Anwary 2018, Banerjee 2006). Amrita Basu, nearly 16 years before the rape of Pandey, asserted that "The BJP

has made the raped Hindu woman symbolic of what they consider to be the victimisation of the entire Hindu community," which resonates as eerily true today (1996). What specific trends and phenomena gave Basu an idea that such an event may occur? Considering that Muslim women make up a minority of India's population compared to the Hindu majority, these Hindu Nationalist policymakers may view the costs of neglecting Muslim women within their policy framework as minimal. With confidence, scholars like Basu have been paying attention to the gendered contours of ethnic conflict, through histories of the Parition and gang rape as ethnic cleansing (Eriksen 2017, Anand 2007, Anwary 2018, Banerjee 2006, Seifert 1996). They have suggested that ethnic conflict can be an especially potent means for compounding discrimination and creating pathways to violence against women: essentially, conflicts can "spill over" or transgress different social identities.

Further evidence suggests that gender violence might be a particularly fertile ground for the apparent "spillover effect" of identity conflict. Despite the BJP's ready support for Pandey and Reddy, which provided them an opportunity to paint themselves as heroes and further their ulterior intentions, the party has attempted to distance themselves from cases post-election season that reveal the decorous nature of these policies. For instance, in the BJP-controlled area of Hathras, the family of the Dalit woman gang-raped last year made comments to several media sources that they were unable to report her gang rape or recieve immediate redress due to shortcomings in government enforcement of these policies[1] (Haider and Mishra 2020). Consequently, the BJP and other Hindu Nationalist groups like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh publically condemned the family of the Dalit woman in the Hathras case as those "who want to incite caste and communal riots[2]" (The Indian Express). As illustrated by the sharp difference in reaction to these cases, these Nationalist groups evaluate and react to the concerns of constituents that can keep them in power, while they can afford to further ostracize marginalized groups like Schedule Caste and religious minorities by painting an image of a "common enemy" (Anand 2007, Anwary 2018, Banerjee 2006)

Gender violence, particularly against women, presents itself as an interesting grounds for which to examine the incentives to cooperate on policy concerns across conflictual ethnic conflicts. Violence against women is a critical public health issue that can have lifelong ramifications on a woman's quality of life including on her physical and mental health (CDC 2021, Dahlberg LL 2002). Efforts to combat these gendered crimes at an international scale have only recently come into popular discourse, including through the discussion of violence against women at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995. The politicization of the issue as a site of interethnic conflict is one that has even newer and emerging discourse. It has become increasingly apparent in light of the failures of the Criminal Law Ordinance as well as other comparable policies in international settings, that progress in combating gender violence is not achievable without

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[1] "Hathras horror: Police, victim's family give contradictory accounts," *India Today*
[2] "Expose those who want to incite caste riots, says Yogi Adityanath," *India Express*

intersectionality (Anwary 2018, Crenshaw 1991, Cho 2013). According to the *social-ecological model of violence* (SEM), societal factors such as "health, economic, educational and social policies" are important to interrogate when addressing methods to promote women's security (CDC 2021, Dahlberg LL 2002). Such factors may "help create a climate in which violence is encouraged or inhibited and help to maintain economic or social inequalities between groups in society" through processes of instrumentalization (CDC 2021).

To some scholars, ethnic conflict is indeed a widespread phenomenon, and can have especially damaging ramifications for achieving cooperation on cross-cutting policy issues, especially within patronage democracies that rely on state mechanisms to distribute resources such as India (Bratton 2012, DeVotta 2002, Lindberg 2008, Aspinall 2011). To others, the effects of identity politics on achieving reform for women's rights are less helpful because they believe categories like "Muslim woman" are limiting, and don't provide enough insight into individual's decision making processes (Hasan and Menon 2004). While the latter take is critical of a primordial approach to identity politics, other scholars have suggested the reductionist effects of identity politics stem from exploitative policymakers cementing their biases into law to maintain power (Chandra 2005, Chandra 2004, Tilly 2005). Therein, they argue, lies the treatment of fluid and shifting identity politics as naturally occurring through repeated processes of instrumentalism, or what some postcolonial scholars call *essentialization* (Sen 2006, Pandey 2006). By these processes, some identities might become more "sticky" than others, and more salient than other backgrounds (Posner 2005, Posner 2017, Sen 2006, Pandey 2006, Stryker and Burke 2000). Some of these scholars, such as Gayatri Spivak, even argue for a certain *strategic essentialization*, or temporarily rallying behind these reductionist terms through coalitions to reform policy .

Several conflicting and complimentary models, including the common in-group identity model, the group project model, and the male warrior hypothesis attempt to explain the rationale that in-groups and out-groups have in their decision-making toward enacting or preventing violence, either in the forms of direct actions or policy interventions (McDonald et al. 2012, Van Vugt 2007, Gaertner 1993, Charnysh et al. 2015, Noor 2012). But few studies have examined the extent to which individual actors have incentives to cooperate with interethnic actors on cross-cutting policy issues (Murthi 2009, Dunning 2010, Goetz 2002). In this paper, I seek to examine what social and demographic determinants enable interethnic conflict and cooperation on alternate social lines. More specifically, I intend to examine gendered differences in cooperation on violence against women, as well as how these decisions are mobilized into policymaking.

First, I investigate if exposing people to information on violence against women can convince them that it is an important issue. Do members of competing ethnic groups have similar or differing opinions about gender violence depending on the characteristics of the target? What

effects do the presence of nationalistic, patriarchial, and religious values have on the ways that people rally support for a woman targeted by violence? Second, I explore how people perceive personal responsibility compared to community- and government-initiated actions in combatting violence against women. Lastly, I attempt to uncover the specific demographic differences in religion and gender, as well as nationalism, religiosity, caste, and other affiliations that drive the differences in violence prevention. For instance, some scholars suggest that women are more likely to support policies against gendered violence than men, but women from ethnic in-groups may have fewer incentives to support these policies than those from out-groups. Building off of the work of Charnysh et al. (2015) and Murthi (2009), I ask to what extent is this true?

By deploying a survey invocative of many qualities of the majoritarian Indian voting blocks — predominantly middle-class and wealthier, educated, forward caste, Hindu men and women, I attempt to shed light on some of these issues. Through the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) crowdsourcing platform, I enlist an experiment to identify the specific biases and reactions people may have to public and gruesome incidents of gender violence, such as gang rape, depending on the religion of the victim. I utilize vignettes, or fictional short stories that attempt to elicit subconscious associations with certain qualifiers, to detect any such reservations at the micro-scale. These vignettes are loosely based off of the gang rapes of Pandey and Reddy, with enough details changed to ensure differentiation from the original cases, and each are characterized either by variations in superordinate national markers, occupations, and religion.

As is evident by the arrest of several professors[3] exploring how Hindu Nationalism conditions the inequality that certain marginalized groups, like Muslims and Dalits might face, there has been a push to suppress scholarship exploring certain forms of interethnic conflict in India (The Hindu). There is a greater need, now more than ever, to investigate how notions of nationhood condition and are conditioned by those who hold power within India. This study will specifically also examine the potential that in-group biases have on turning into policy implications that further cement these biases, and may hold translatable effects to interethnic conflicts in other international resource patronage democracies, especially in Asia and Africa. Few studies have examined the mixed incentives to mobilize around gendered violence, especially when it comes to ethnic conflict, and this study intends to fill in those gaps in knowledge.

The Illusions of Primordialism & The Legitimacy of Instrumentalism

Charles Tilly, in his book *Identities, Boundaries, & Social Ties*, attempts to describe how repeated interactions lead to the formation of social institutions such as ethnic conflict (2005). Specifically, he claims that ethnic conflict is a relational theory, and that "interpersonal transactions compound into identities, create and transform social boundaries, and accumulate into durable social ties" (Tilly 2005). Two main schools of thought attempt to explain how these

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[3] "Bhima Koregaon case: NIA arrests Delhi University professor Hany Babu"

repeated interaction effects have led to the emergence of ethnic conflict: *primordialism* and *instrumentalism* (Che 2016, Fearon and Laitin 2000) .

Primordialism approaches identities as a "fixed" feature of society that is propagated through perceptions of kinship (Che 2016, Stryker and Burke 2000, Posner 2017). To primordialists, the plurality of identities within a given geo-spatial region is the predominant reason that violence between ethnic groups occurs (Che 2016, Horowitz 1985, Posner 2017). Under the assumption that identities are inherited and ancient, members of ethnic in-groups are likely to find each other "trustworthy" through repeated patterns of interactions, whereas they would find members of out-groups "deceitful" due to the perception of "ancient hatreds" and "fear of domination" (Che 2016, Horowitz 1985, Stryker and Burke 2000, Fearon and Laitin 1996). These *discursive* formations of identity are thought to be culturally bound and therefore would make conflict inevitable, and several studies have attempted to calculate the affective permutations of group sizes and prevalence within a society to explain conflict risk (Fearon and Laitin 1996, Fearon and Laitin 2000). However, these types of explanations tend to hold little ground across multiple societies given the infinite potential combinations of group-dynamics, and often do not take into account the cultural complexity, nuance, or the salience of certain identities within context (Lieberman and Singh 2012). Treating diversity as a single unit of measurement to explain conflict is hardly robust, given that "religious, linguistic, [sub-]ethnic, or foreign-national" would be evaluated under the same sets of metrics (Lieberman and Singh 2012).

Moreover, according to *instrumentalist* approaches, the presence of heterogeneity itself is not a useful enough explanation for the emergence of violence, given that many multiethnic societies do not resort to conflict (Che 2016, Fearon and Laitin 1996, Fearon and Laitin 2000, Stryker and Burke 2000, Charnysh et al. 2015, UN DESA 2014, Chandra 2005, Lieberman and Singh 2012). In fact, some scholars argue that ethnic conflict is itself rare (Fearon and Laitin 1996) — rather, tensions between ethnic groups are more common and can escalate into violent affairs given a certain exogenous catalyst such as a change in perceived reputation costs (Fearon and Laitin 1996, Horowitz 1985, Tilly 2003, Lieberman and Singh 2012).

 In this study, we instead operate under what Wimmer et al.'s definition of ethnicity, that is "a subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture" (Wimmer 2009). This definition of ethnicity may be constructed on racial, religious, cultural, or linguistic foundations, but rejects that ethnic groups are solely constructed on primordialist "genealogical terms" or "by blood[4]" (Wimmer 2009). Those connections are tenuous at best, and often overlap and merge with various other groups over time (Wimmer

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[4] Although Wimmer et al. derive their notion of ethnicity from some of Weber's works, in the spirit of Ibram X. Kendi's call to examine the history of eugenics and imperialism within the context in which these theories were written, I would like to make clear that I do not engage any further understandings of ethnicity by Weber, other than the fact that they are very complicated and nuanced identity groups.

2009, Che 2016). Additionally, these ethnic structures can take on nesting or hierarchical structures, but importantly take on a kaleidoscopic type of quality: because they are always in flux, some may come to the forefront while others are made less relevant depending on social contexts (Stryker and Burke 2000, Sen 2006). That is to say, even if the idea of primordialism itself may not explain why conflicts occur, treating socially constructed identities as "static" and "natural" through policing and the use of violence can "crystalize" and further reinforce ethnic conflict (Fearon and Laitin 1996, Che 2016, Tilly 2005, Lieberman and Singh 2012, Posner 2017).

The theory of *instrumentalism* suggests that ethnic identities are fluid and that specific acts of "politicization" can create socioeconomic inequalities (Lieberman and Singh 2012, Che 2016, Chandra 2005, Posner 2005, Posner 2017). These inequities may consequently enable pathways to violence (Lieberman and Singh 2012, Che 2016, Chandra 2005, Posner 2005, Posner 2017). This process might occur through the *constructivist* formations of everyday decisions, either by individuals via their reproduction of social norms or by political elites who wish to cement power through the cogs of a nation's legal corpus (Fearon and Laitin 2000). Informally, community discussions may dictate which traits are easily identifiable and these ideas may "diffuse into social networks" (Lieberman and Singh 2012). Alternatively, Lieberman and Singh propose two separate formal means of institutionalizing difference — either through border regeneration/partition or internal self-identification methods (2012). The first process details how changes in the demarcation of the state to a new entity reoriented as a nation-state has actively worked to suppress minority group identities (Lieberman and Singh 2012, Charnysh et al. 2015). One group of people is thought of as the primary "heirs" or constituency of the state, while other groups are sidelined, made to assimilate to the dominant structure of ethno-nationalism, or persecuted for "tainting" the reputation of the national identity (Lieberman and Singh 2012, Charnysh et al. 2015). The second process details ethnic essentialism, or how through deliberate promotions of labeling through forced choices presented by the state, political elites encourage processes of self-labeling and enforce identity rigidity (Lieberman and Singh 2012, Charnysh et al. 2015, Posner 2017, Posner 2005, Tilly 2005). These identities by "frequently occurring [in] combinations or sequences of mechanisms" therefore become "sticky" and more salient within social and political discussions of the state and community (Lieberman and Singh 2012). Either way, trait differentiation on a certain basis must become normalized and cemented into a society's systems of political and behavioral reproduction (Charnysh et al. 2015, Posner 2017, Tilly 2005, Lieberman and Singh 2012, Fearon and Laitin 2000).

All three of these informal and formal interactions compound on one another, but may also create potential pathways for ethnic conflict to be exploited across alternate social dimensions. In *Identity and Violence*, Amartya Sen describes the potential costs of essentialization (2006). For instance, in context of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Sen describes how a "Hutu labourer from Kigali" might have been "pressured to see himself only as a Hutu and incited to kill the Tutsis,

and yet he is not only a Hutu, but also a Kigalian, a Rwandan, an African, a labourer and a human being" (2006). Processes of imposed institutionalization may force us to pick and choose identities, but people cannot think of themselves in terms of reductive lines and boxes: inevitably, there is bound to be a significant intersection of identities that might lead to a "spillover" of conflict along other social lines (Sen 2006, Murty 2009, Harel-Shalev 2017). Some scholars have drawn from theories of intersectionality to explain how simply using policy reform to address a concern might fail to account for holistic social inequity cemented into a system that disadvantages identity groups (Crenshaw 1991, Cho 2013). Importantly, Tilly argues that certain social relationships can be more rigid than others, and especially that inequality can insulate and replicate due to shocks created by colonization and revolution, whereas the political structure of democracy can be easily rubbelized (2003).

In this paper, I try to further unpack the impact that colonial exogenous "shocks" of boundary translocation and instrumentalization have on policy interactions across social dimensions. Because instrumental models reinforce reductive and essentialized identities, there has been minimal scholarship that has paid attention to the interaction effects of secondary identities on collective action and policy decision making. Individuals and communities, vis-a-vis ethnic mobilization, may have different costs associated with collective action depending on if they are marginalized in other social regards (Murthi 2009, Dunning 2010, Goetz 2002).

In-group and Out-Group Logics & Ethno-Nationalistic Implications

Further models have attempted to serve as explanations for why ethnic conflicts occur, when, and why within the operational framework of institutionalized or "essentialized" identities (Lieberman and Singh 2012, Charnysh et al. 2015, Posner 2017, Posner 2005, Fearon and Laitin 1996, Fearon and Laitin 2000, Horowitz 1985, Chandra 2003, Chandra 2005). The dynamics of in-group and out-group interactions, and how they come together to address potential points of conflict, may be delianted against "cross-cutting"or "coinciding" lines. Coinciding policy cleavages occur when a singular group, based on one particular identity, resounds with a particular policy concern: group-constituents are closely aligned and invested within the policy of interest. Cross-cutting policy cleavages, on the other hand, indicate that concerns about a certain policy may traverse several different social identities, and that there may be an equal number of potential stakeholders of a certain policy across each of the potential divisions. Gender violence is an example of a cross-cutting cleavage, as it affects those of multiple religious, ethnic, caste, and other fractionalized groups (Abraham 2009). Those who support theories of intersectionality suggest that there must be mutual cooperation across these different identities in order to achieve gender parity and secure women's rights (Posner 2017). Costs to advocate for a certain policy are too expensive to attempt alone (Posner 2017, Fearon and Laitin 1996).

Although there may seem to be ample incentive to cooperate on typically non-partisan issues like gender, as stakeholders from across divisions have much at stake, competing groups may not always cooperate when society pressures them to align with certain essentialized identities (Abraham 2009, Pandey 1990, Posner 2017). Importantly, people contain a plurality of identities (Sen 2006, Stryker and Burke 2000). Horowitz argues that common histories of colonization have particularly made ethnic cleavages more relevant than all other cleavages within Africa, Asia, and the Carribean (1985). However, this argument to be somewhat reductive of situational context and cross-cutting impacts of gendered violence (1985, Hasan and Menon 2004). While Horowitz provides important insight into how processes of ethnic essentialization may disrupt power dynamics within a society, it is important to recognize that other important identity factors may be at play even while ethnic conflict is at the center of much of a nation's political discourse as many feminist works argue (Einhorn 1996, Anwary 2018, Basu 1996, Harel-Shalev 2017, Kirmani 2009, Banerjee 2006). Therefore, different permutations of in-group and out-group cooperation when a second identity is introduced into the policy in question (Sen 2006, MacDonald 2012, Van Vugt 2007, Van Vugt 2009, Johnson 2009, Misri 2009).

For instance, in their theory of "ethnic spiraling," Fearon and Laitin suggest that members of conflicting ethnic groups may have incentives to cooperate to prevent violence escalation (1996). Conflicting ethnic groups may perceive the costs of a diminishing incentive payoff-schema as harmful: that is to say, because ethnic groups are rational and self-interested, they want to maintain relatively peaceful interactions with other ethnic groups to secure necessary resources they may provide (Fearon and Laitin 1996, Fearon and Laitin 2000). Moreover, based on the idea that there are reputational costs associated when an individual of an ethnic group commits a misstep, in-groups may find systems of policing potentially beneficial (Fearon and Laitin 1996). In-group members have access to information that out-groups do not, and therefore groups have further incentives to maintain mutually beneficial relationships to punish those who perpetrate opportunism or commit acts of violence against out-groups (Fearon and Laitin 1996). While there may be incentives to cooperate, these relationships can break down given the fact that it is difficult to locate information about individual members about out-groups: therefore, in-groups may further generalize and antagonize the whole out-group (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Through repeated interactions, this process may further "crystallize" grievances or misgivings about the out-group, thus creating a "spiral" of ethnic conflict that compounds against one another (Fearon and Laitin 1996, Fearon and Laitin 2000, Che 2016, Tilly 2003, Tilly 2005).

Although Fearon and Laitin provide us some incite into the potential reasons why groups may choose to cooperate with one another until otherwise provoked, there is an assumption that might make this model less applicable to resource patronage settings (1996). Fearon and Laitin assume ethnic groups have equal access to resources that may be of interest to one another (1996). However, such identities might be made hierarchical in terms of their rights and resource access through processes of instrumentalism (Eriksen 2017, Chandra 2003, Chandra 2005). When

groups do not have the same access to sets of resources, there may be a few potential outcomes. First, a group may attempt to assimilate into the ethno-nationalistic identity to beenfit from those resources (Horowitz 1985, Charnysh et al. 2015, Gaertner 200, Gaertner 1993). Or second, a group may attempt to arbitrate violence on an out-group to further secure power (Horowitz 1985, Charnysh et al. 2015, Chandra 2003, Chandra 2005).

Gaertner (2000, 1993) and Charnysh et al. (2015) elaborate on two competing theories on why individuals may choose to cooperate or defect in a conflict that affects multiple ethnic groups. In the Common In-Group identity model, the strategic labeling of competitng ethnic groups with a *superordinate nationalistic identity* may make "members of a majority high-status ethnic group less likely to discriminate in altruistic giving toward a rival, relatively low-status ethnic minority" (Charnysh et al. 2015). Ethnic minorities, in essence, get recategorized into a larger group that is perceived as positive by the ethnic majority in power (Gaertner 2000, 1993, Abrams 2004, Vezzali 2015). Importantly, Gaertner's models demonstrate that the addition of a mutual label that crosses social dimension, such as "nationalism" may have additional effects on the incentives the conflicting ethnic groups have to cooperate (1993, 2000). The implications of this model of ethnic cooperation are important to peacebuilding and minimizing ethnic conflict by convincing the group with higher status that the group with lesser status shares a similar identity and therefore should have a share of resources (Gaertner 2000, 1993, Abrams 2004, Vezzali 2015,Charnysh et al. 2015). However, when that form of nationalism is formulated on the basis of the ethnic supremacy, such as through the means of the ethnically reproduced nation-state, the effects may be particularly damaging. For example, a supranational label risks erasing the individualism of minoritized ethnic groups within a society that stymies their access to resources — indeed, the idea of "color" or "need-blindness" has been criticized by many scholars for ignoring the social barriers that inhibit resource inequity (Tilly 2003, Crenshaw 1991, Cho 2013). Additionally, many out-groups prefer being recognized by their other identities, even if alongside the superordinate national identity (Gaertner 1993, 2000).

So what happens when minorities choose to use labels that openly address their marginalized status within society? What effects do revealing your ethnic minority status have on solidarity? Scholars have also put forward the Group Projection model as an explanation, suggesting that giving competing ethnic groups a superordinate national identity label alongside their personal ethnic identifications "can foster ethnocentrism on the part of a majority prototypical high-status ethnic group" as Charnysh et al. describe (Charnysh et al. 2015, Abrams 2004, Krueger 2010, Noor 2012). Specifically, those majority groups can "lead its members to discriminate against a relatively low-status ethnic minority" (Charnysh et al. 2015, Abrams 2004, Krueger 2010, Noor 2012). By "weeding out" members of minority ethnic groups who they perceive to be tainting their "all-encompassing" national banner, political elites as well as community leaders from the majority group may be able to cement their grasp on power (Charnysh et al. 2015, Abrams 2004, Krueger 2010, Noor 2012). Hasan and Menon cite the potentially deleterious effects of said

discrimination on how Muslim women, particularly of an upper class, choose to identify themselves, as do other scholars (2004, Kirmani 2009).

Importantly, in the Common In-group Identity model, ethnic disaggregation is displaced by realignment by a singular banner, and would ultimately encourage resource distribution among formerly competing ethnic groups (Gaertner 2000, 2013, Charnysh et al. 2015). On the other hand, the Group Projection model works to actively disenfranchise or disservice those of competing ethnic identities, and to secure power over a state's goods through further language that encourages otherizing (Gaertner 2000, 1993, Chandra 2005, 2003).

Scholars have suggested these models are better understood alongside one another rather than as those that should be put against one another (Abrams 2004, Krueger 2010). Several studies suggest that given extended contact with other groups and the face of a common threat, the In-Group identity model may hold (Abrams 2004, Andrighetto 2012, Vezzali 2015, Charnysh et al. 2015). And moreover, we see evidence for the "Group Projection Model" in examples of the "everyday primordialism" that undergirds ethnic crystallization, especially in rational-decision making over resources in post-conflict patronage settings (Lieberman and Singh 2012, Chandra 2004, 2005, Waldzus 2004, Wenzel 2010, Noor 2012, Kreuger 2010). Studies have especially shown that Group Projection has occurred in the states undergoing or that recently underwent transformative projects of ethno-national statebuilding in the late 20th century, including through the redesignation of borders (Waldzus 2004, Wenzel 2010, Noor 2012, Kreuger 2010).

While these two models prove interesting to compare and contrast the logics of cooperation and defection, few studies have described how they affect resource distribution across additional social dimensions. Intersectional contours to in-group and out-group logics would suggest that there must be more cooperation between competing ethnic groups, but does that necessarily come at the cost of self-identification as a minority? To what extent are these biases present, and how are people encouraged to mobilize differently around policy? How do the hierarchies of gender and ethnicity meaningful intersect in policymaking?

Intersectionality is a vital lens to understand how people face compounding layers of inequity (Crenshaw 1991, Cho 2013). Taking these models a step further can help us examine how self-identification as a member of a minority or majority group shapes the way people show pro-social behaviors toward not only a nation or ethnicity, but also gender. We can start to understand better how ethnic minority women either benefit or are harmed by these associations and how these biases may become entrenched within social understandings of difference. These costs may be apparent in how government leaders choose to respond to different policy agendas, implementation, and enforcement (Anwary 2018, Basu 1996, Banerjee 2006). Therefore, I find it necessary to examine the exploitative nature of government institutions in servicing ethnic

inequities, and the barriers these structures may pose to strategic collective action on cross-cutting policy issues like gender.

Invocative Divisions: Nationalism, Communalism, and the "Fierce" Indian Conflict

Amartya Sen asks in *Identity and Violence*, "how were "human beings ... [in India] suddenly transformed into the ruthless Hindus and fierce Muslims?" (2006). How were people, with multiple and complex identities, reduced to these labels and how come so much conflict centers around it?

In India, as well as many other resource patronage democracies, there has been a competing secular form of nationalism and an ethno-religious nationalism since Independence in 1947 (Pandey 2006, Dirks 2001). In essence, there might be an "Indian" identity shaped by the nation-state model that India was carved from following the partition, and the push for a more secular "India" that does not discriminate on the basis of religion (Pandey 2006, Dirks 2001). By what processes does a certain ethnic group become the basis for national identity, and to what extent do they become violent?

Some might argue that India was carved out of a history of Muslim exclusion (Harel-Shalev 2017, Wiener 2013). When the most influential Muslim party, the Muslim League, asked for a system of "power-sharing" to "split the spoils" of government, the Congress Party refused (Harel-Shalev 2017, Wiener 2013). Eventually, this led to the creation of a state for Muslims that would be separate from India, which today would be Pakistan and Bangladesh (Harel-Shalev 2017, Wiener 2013, Pandey 2006, Dirks 2001). These divisions of "India for Hindus" and "Pakistan for Muslims" are reinforced by the continual use of terms like "Hindustan" for India (Pandey 2006, Dirks 2001, Harel-Shalev 2017, Wiener 2013). To what extent do we see the Common Identity In-group model working alongside the existence of banner-terms like "Indian" that are the site for these competing identity tensions? Is there a slippage between Hindus supporting women who represent the Nationalistic imagery of the state versus those who don't?

Pandey describes in *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India*, the entrenching effects that colonialism has had on cementing norms (2006). To Pandey, colonialism worked to magnify pre-existing tensions by allowing for the most exclusionary and "authoritarian" parts of government to be formalized, thereby "inhibiting democratic tendencies," constituent with theories of institutionalization (2006). But more specifically, in India, much of the ethno-conflict centering around religion has been termed "communalism" (Wiener 2013, Pandey 2006, Dirks 2001). Communalism was presented as a primitive and alternate explanation for conflicts that relied on a school of "primordialism" that tried to assert that conflict was endemic to the Global South (Wiener 2013, Pandey 2006, Dirks 2001). Importantly, the term has been applied widely to other resource patronages which have predominantly been located within post-colonial societies

(Wiener 2013, Pandey 2006, Dirks 2001). The term "communalism"also serves to separate conflict over religion versus other ethnic cleavages in India, including ethno-linguistic conflict (Wiener 2013, Pandey 2006, Dirks 2001). In practice, however, "communalistic" conflict described the same phenomena as other ethnic conflict: these theories, now widely criticized for shifting the blame from colonial structures, border demarcation, and processes of essentialization, have been found to be reductive (Horowitz 1985, Wiener 2013, Pandey 2006, Dirks 2001). However, what does separate these societies potentially from others that have "nationalistic conflicts," was the autonomy they had to define and demarcate their territory in the way that colonial powers did under occupation (Horowitz 1985, Wiener 2013, Pandey 2006, Dirks 2001. Following colonialism, when these states had the ability to set their own borders and emulate a nation-state system, majority-minority lines were also drawn around ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985, Lieberman and Singh 2012, Charnysh et al. 2015) . But to what extent are ethnic-minorities included within these governing structures? Are all ethno-national projects violent projects?

Institutionalism in Action: Group-Projection and Postcolonial Voter Clientelism

Past studies have examined the complicated contours between voter identities, clientelism, and resource distribution (Chandra 2004, 2005, Thachil 2014, Ul-Islam and Ullah 2014, Wantchekon 2003, Kitschelt 2000). Several studies have found evidence for the rational-interest model of patronage, where voters vote for those who can secure them information, access to policymakers, or recourses needed for a good quality of life (Chandra 2004, 2005, Thachil 2014, Ul-Islam and Ullah 2014, Wantchekon 2003, Kitschelt 2000, Panda 2019). Clientelism is especially popular in highly politically competitive elections (Lindberg 2008) Importantly, collective action and organized voter mobilization allow particularly majoritarian ethnic groups to siphon resources from others (Wantchekon 2003, Chandra 2004, 2005, UN DESA 2014). Voting, specifically, allows ethnic groups to have a hand in determining what issues get onto the policy agenda, and can create systems that work to actively reinforce social inequality through social norms through legal mechanisms (Tilly 2003, Thachil 2014, Wantchekon 2003). Even though some scholars have suggested that clientelism may be on the decline in societies with more stable democracies (Lindberg 2008, Dunning 2010), these studies have still pointed to rationalist institutions, like voting based on self-interested policy or through local "cousining" (ie: picking those in office who represent presumed "kinship networks"). These studies also importantly point out the fact that when ethnic conflict occurs, these institutions can be easily compromised and create further pathways to patronage (Lindberg 2008, Dunning 2010). Importantly, many of these ethnic conflicts that have destabilized or co-opted elections in democratic societies for ethnic self-interest have been in post-colonial settings (Chandra 2004, 2005, Thachil 2014, Ul-Islam and Ullah 2014, Wantchekon 2003, Bratton 2012, DeVotta 2002, Aspinall 2011). But why do ethnic conflicts get inculcated into once-democratic power structures? How do they particularly manifest within post-colonial societies? Nicholas Dirks mentions in *Castes of Mind,* "The effects

of imperialism [on ethnic conflict] have by no means disappeared with the demise of formal colonial regimes of rule" (2001).

While colonialism may be a virtually "ubiquitous" feature of Asia and Africa, conflicts are not the norm: the number of conflicts that could occur at any given moment due to ethnic tensions is never fully realized (Fearon and Laitin 1996,2000). Scholars have proposed that across societies, colonialism has "tribalized, ethnicized, and racialized, constantly deferring the erasure of precisely those differences that were held to make the difference between colonizer and colonized, white and black" (Dirks 2001). However, it is the specific long-term translation of these differences into the political system that might be responsible for this predisposition to violence (Fearon and Laitin 1996, 2000, Charnysh et al. 2015, Lieberman and Singh 2012, Posner 2005,2017), further propagated by repeated informational and resource asymmetries (UN DESA 2014). Conversely, other scholars cite the presence of intensive ethnic conflict, such as the Gujarat Riots of 2002, in specific geo-localities that were never colonized to downplay the role of the institution in exacerbating extant regional conflicts (Verghese 2018). These types of arguments tend to dismiss the hegemonic influences of states occupied by colonialism through informational and cultural diffusion, as well as the significant acts of border demarcation and/or relocation. For instance, princely states that maintained more autonomy than those that were more colonially-ruled did not owe people representation, whereas current structures of democracy that have been shaped by colonial legacies of inequity, do (Horowitz 1985, Tilly 2005). Through processes of Parition violence, which were directly a result of post-colonial border demarcation, Gurjurat may have primed anti-Muslim sentiments. And while Gujarat may have been free from direct colonial rule, it now politically participates under a national government structure that actively creates federal policies that work to suppress Muslim voting (Harel-Shalev 2017). Indeed, Gujarat may have through the election of ethno-religious candidates that have facilitated the passage of these policies, reinforced the superpositioning of the Hindu identity onto India.

Gujarat of course, should only serve as an example of how ethnic-conflicts can transcend borders, and are also importantly shaped by the shifting of these borders as a result of structures like colonialism, as these new borders are responsible for the existence of superordinate national identities in the first place (Lieberman and Singh 2012, Posner 2005, 2017, Horowitz, 1985). Wiemer goes so far as to say that the nation-state was created on ethno-national means of legitimacy, and therefore ethnic cleavages displace others when former city-states are lumped together under the same border (Wimmer 2009).

More precisely, some scholars suggest that the Western social discourse surrounding ethnic boundaries itself might also have given rise to ethnic conflicts, and continue to do so: misunderstandings in historic perceptions of difference compounded with boundaries transposing or misaligning various groups may have either further blurred or made prominent the lines

between ethnic groups (Fearon and Laitin 1996, 2000). Within resource patronage democracies, these transpositions have created weak and relatively newly established governing systems whereby political elites can assign and divide goods to the constituencies they believe they serve (Posner 2005,2017, UN DESA 2014). Through these processes, political elites can often turn to right-wing populism and create a false dichotomy of the "true" population that is meant to be serviced, and the one that is actually serviced (Posner 2005,2017).

Indeed, we must also acknowledge the significant roles that colonial institutions have played on resource drainage, which has led to rampant poverty across many post-colonial states, making their populations especially vulnerable to exploitation (Posner 2005, 2006). Particularly, these factors have magnified the "potential for social order and opportunism" (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Indeed, access to goods often drives the way that people vote in patronages (Chandra 2004, 2005, Wantchekon 2003, Panda 2019). Colonial conditions have also further determined what identities become essentialized, and why. Chandra (2004, 2005) and Posner (2005, 2017) describe how the minimum coalition it takes to "win" or "control" a certain cog of government determines which identity takes voting precedence. Due to histories of essentialization, many people have been made to routinely identify with certain ethnic groups, which have ripened those associations within a society (Charnysh et al. 2015, Che 2016, Lieberman and Singh 2012). Especially when Western ideas of the nation-state have displaced peoples and constructed boundaries that create a socially perceived ethnic-majority, people may find that identity the least costly to organize around (Posner 2017).

People cannot afford the costs of not having access to essential resources and have little information or access to the policy-making table. And when people see that those of similar ethnic backgrounds, they also might perceive those individuals as having similar life histories and needs (Chandra 2004, 2005). Therefore, through rational, physiological, and psychological means, they will trust the heads of parties or elites who represent their ethnic identity to make those decisions for them, insinuating ethnic favoritism (Posner 2005, 2017, Chandra 2004, 2005).

In India, for example, this would mean Hindus would always be the minimum winning coalition. Especially considering the histories of partitions that politically "designated India for Hindus, Pakistan for Muslims," and that at 82% of the population, voting for a Hindu candidate would be a "safe bet" every time if you're a Hindu (Posner 2005, 2017, Lieberman and Singh 2012). Some elites will go so far to consolidate their constituency, that they will further propagate ethnic divisions or work to actively deprive minority ethnic groups of resources (Chandra 2004, 2005, UN DESA 2014). Chandra coined the term "formalized hate parties" to describe those which particularly try to consolidate power by scapegoating ethnic minority groups (2004, 2005). In India, for example, the BJP may monopolize the control of resources for a Hindu clientel at the direct expense of Muslim people. It is possible that within societies with formalized hate parties,

we will also see specific thwarts or actions taken to minimize the power of the minority voting block (Harel-Shalev 2017). In India, this might look like Hindu Nationalist parties proposing and passing Citizenship Amendment Act & National Registry of Citizens, which attempt to cub citizenship and therefore voting rights for Muslim people.

What resources are these parties exactly fighting over, and do women benefit from them? The resources that patronage politicians might distribute and argue over may have salient effects on gendered equity and violence. Studies have demonstrated that women vote for different resources, such as education, access to healthcare, and others when considering how to vote, and especially within clientelistic systems (Wantchekon 2003, Goetz 2002, Panda 2019). Some of these effects may be the result of intentional, targeted campaigns, as studies have demonstrated that some political elites will try to co-opt feminsit movements to fortify their voter block (Nayak 2003, Banerjee 2006, Basu 1996, Panda 2019). They may, for instance, attempt to recruit women through appeals to reproductive justice services. In some cases, political leaders may also use these strategies to send messages and signals about womanhood in alignment with their ethnic ideas (Nayak 2003, Banerjee 2006, Basu 1996).

On the other hand, some of these effects may be secondary and work to prevent women's interests from reaching the policy agenda (UN DESA 2014). These effects occur through systemic and domestic barriers that prevent women from voting either intentionally or unintentionally (UN DESA 2014). Women have lower literacy rates than men; are less likely to know about their rights; may lack the time, transportation, and the information needed to cast votes; or may have families who prevent them from being politically active (UN Women 2019, UN DESA 2014). Therefore, men may be able to reap resources for themselves, and elect elites who will pursue policy and funding into issues that matter most to them (Wantchekon 2003, Goetz 2002). Such funding might divert funding from resources necessary to prevent violence against women, including those related to family planning and reproductive justice, mental health and counseling resources that may prevent perpetrators of violence as well as comfort survivors of violence, and educational opportunities that can inform how violence is harmful (UN DESA 2014). Other resources might also be lost, such as those that may improve literacy and provide jobs, might mitigate many of the socioeconomic determinants for both men and women, such as poverty, that also enable pathways to violence against women according to the social-ecological model (CDC 2021, Dahlberg 2002).

Wimmer claims that "ethnic exclusion from state power and competition over the spoils of government breed ethnic conflict" (Wimmer 2009). And when ethnic hierarchies are at play, the spoils can directly translate into deplenishing resources that affect socioeconomic determinants to not only violence, but violence directed toward women (CDC 2021, Dahlberg 2002). Men from ethnic majorities, for example, can secure jobs for themselves, making it harder for women from ethnic majorities and men from ethnic minorities to get jobs, and making it hardest for the

women from ethnic minorities to do so (UN DESA 2014). Because ethnic minority men might find it hard to find a job, they may resort to intimate partner violence as a coping mechanism. And because a woman from an ethnic minority may have the least opportunity to vote and receive the spoils of patronage, she may find it incredibly difficult to leave an abusive situation because of economic immobility (CDC 2021). While examining how job distribution within ethnic patronages can have unintended effects is just one example, it is clear that these systems of hierarchy compound structural inequity for those who are suffering the most. The interacting effects of ethnic and gendered voter-suppression, and the cross-cutting effects those have on resource distribution, help to highlight how conflicts along ethnic lines can spillover into alternate social dimensions (Panda 2019).

Such spillover effects can also importantly impact political systems like the judiciary. According to Wimmer (2009), "Judiciary bodies have incentives to apply the principle of equality before the law more for co-ethnics or co-nationals than for others; the police have incentives to provide protection for co-ethnics or co-nationals, but less for others; and so forth."

These systems might also be reinforced in the other direction, where those of the ethnic minority may prefer to be serviced by other co-ethnics (Wimmer 2019). When we start to examine how the systems of justice are affected by the spillover of ethnic conflict, we might begin to get a better picture of why policies like the Criminal Law Amendment Act were minimally effective: the enforcement, and treatment of gender begins to have ethnic divisions too. Anwary goes so far as to claim that in her evaluation of these systems that "the responses of government, the main opposition political party, and prominent leaders of Hindu nationalist forces to rape cannot be separated from the intersection of gender, misogynist culture and politics" (2018).

Importantly, Liberman and Singh clarify that such conflict over "state power" is also often part of a much more encompassing set of tensions, which may work to reinforce norms and fuel protests against these policies (2012) . These conditions can make women from minority ethnic groups especially vulnerable to attacks from majority-ethnic group run institutions (Murthi 2009, Basu 1996, Banerjee 2006). Ultimately, these tensions can pose long term effects on the mobilization potential of ethnic groups vis-a-vis collective action. Action, individually, is costly — group action may therefore seem like a better way to advocate for resources. But when an ethnic majority uses their potential to determine systems of policing, they pave the way for ethnic "spirals of conflict" (Liberman and Singh 2012, Fearon and Laitin 1996).

Case Study: One need only look to the fact that ethno-religious riots in India have been on the rise in the past twenty years, and included the Delhi Riots which spanned much of last year (2020).The Delhi Riots directly emerged as a program to persecute Muslims after the Hindu Nationalist administration had passed the discriminatory Citizenship Amendment Act, which attempted to curb Muslim citizenship and therefore voice in government. Importantly, many of

those who were harassed by the police during the Delhi Riots, were Muslim women. Muslim women, who would face the brunt of harm if excluded from the systems of patronage that would benefit men and Hindus, could potentially face dire repercussions. These repercussions would include exacerbating micro-level socioeconomic determinants to violence against women, and make it more difficult for Muslim women to escape cycles of violence. Muslim women took to the streets to protest for their rights and "demand the spoils" of the patronage, so to speak, leading the Shaheen Bagh movement for over a hundred days. Constantly, they were policed by Hindus, members of the dominant religious group, and were at risk of facing further violence. Punyani gives us a warning about the cascade of ethnic-identity violence to gender violence, explaining that "Communal conflicts in the civil society create permanent scars in the psyche of women of different communities/religious/ethnic groups and prevent their united efforts to realize gender justice in the personal and public domain." Evidently, the woman's body has become a political tool for the inscription of violence.

Politics of the Body: Charting Gender Through Violence, War, and Border Conflict

Women and children have been the victims of several strategic acts of warfare throughout history (Seifert 1996, Dey 2016). One gruesome example, the Rape of Nanjing (1937), saw the deliberate sexual torture of more than 20,000 women during Japan's first month of occupation in World War II (Seifert 1996). However, discussions of the gendered dynamics of conflict and war, as well as the violence they entail, have only started to come to the forefront of the international policy table since the1990s. The shift in focus to particularly understand how women's bodies were a site of conflict comes partially due to the genocides in Rwanda and the former Republic of Yugoslavia. The International Criminal Tribunals held for each revealed mass accounts of rape, sexual assault, torutre, and murder directed toward women. In Rwanda alone, more than 500,000 women faced some form of sexual violence as a result of ethnic conflict[5], and about 60,000 women faced the same in the former Yugoslavia (Survivors Fund 2021, Seifert 1996). The decade also saw the passage of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW), one of the first pieces of legislation to condemn violence against women, and a fundamental reframing of "women's rights" as "human rights." From there, the UN began to develop gender-mainstreaming policies that were used to further understand how women's bodies have become a site of war (Seifert 1996).

Why were women particularly targeted with rape and sexual violence in these ethnic and nationalistic conflict? Some of the answers can be understood by the rationnel to pass U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). The Resolution acknowledges how sexual violence and rape, particularly against women, has been used as a tool of conflict, drawing from the horrors of Yugoslavia and Rwanda (2000). Importantly, there seems to be a slippage between

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[5] Survivors Fund. "Statistics of the Genocide"

borders of nationhood imprinted on the state, and those imprinted onto women's bodies as cultural signifiers of nationhood by men as a means of extending interethnic conflicts (Einhorn 1996). At its most extreme — rape can be understood as a form of genocide, displacing a woman's ethnic associations with that of the perpetrator's, especially in patrilienal cultures. In the aforementioned settings, as well as in The Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, sexual violence has been promoted as nationalistic endeavor through propoganda and state legitimization as an appropriate response to ethnic conflict (Seifert 1996, Einhorn 1996). Often, sexual violence is described as just "an unfortunate byproduct" of war by military and political leaders (Seifert 1996), thereby paving the grounds for its dismissal.

Within the South Asian context, Partition Violence may have cemented and legitimized gender as a cite of violence (Misri and Ilan 2014, Harel-Shalev 2017, Dey 2016). More than 75,000 Muslim and Hindu women are speculated to have been targeted with sexual violence during the Partition (Dey 2016). The Partition saw two predominat forms of violence against women: interethnic physical and sexual assault (ie: through rape and mutilitation) commited by men, as well as emotional and physical violence in family's suggestion that women commit honor killings to preserve their sexual and ethnic "purity" (Dey 2016). These acts of violence dehumanized women as "markers of communal and national pride" (Dey 2016), sending threats to interethnic men through assaults to a woman's "dignity" (Dey 2016, Misri and Ilan 2014, Harel-Shalev 2017, Puniyani 2005). Murthi importantly argues that equating a woman's honor with her community's honor helped formatively shape the way we look at "victim-blaming" within interethnic conflict: women are seen at fault for not protecting their communities, and such language enabled pushback to withhold women's role within the public sphere in order to protect her dignity and the nation's honor (2009). Protecting women and their bodies reinforces a view of women as property and as childbirthers, as creators of citizens and propagators of ethnicities(Anand 2007, Banerjee 2006, Basu 1996, Puniyani 2005). An assault to a woman was not targeting the woman her personally, but as an assault to her community, her future perceived "bloodline," and to the men who failed to protect her (Anand 2007, Banerjee 2006, Basu 1996, Puniyani 2005). Protecting women quickly becomes a concern similar to protecting the property or borders of the state, operating under a "*what's mine is mine"* and "*what's yours is yours"* logic and directly targeted masculinity of conflictual ethnic groups by framing them as poor warriors (Anand 2007, Banerjee 2006, Basu 1996, Swaine et al. 2019).

It is not a stretch to claim that the gendered dynamics of ethnic conflict would continue long after the Partition, and that images of interethnic violence can culturally reproduce norms and shape the cultural psyche of India (Dey 2016, Misri and Ilan 2014, Harel-Shalev 2017). Much of the language of Partition violence continues to be invoked today in response to gender-issues within India, thereby reinforcing ethnic conflict. Following Pandey's gang rape, Hindu Nationalist politician claimed Mohan Rao Bhagwat "Such crimes hardly take place in 'Bharat,' but they occur frequently in 'India'" (Misri and Ilan 2014). The cultural imagination of a

"secular India" is disrupted by the images of gendered violence that created the state, whereas "Bharat" or "Hindustan" is imagined as a safe haven from violence (Misri and Ilan 2014) — *no one from the other ethnic group is around, so why could violence be used as a tool of conflict?* These spliagges of ethnic discrimination seem to pave the way for gender violence, and vice versa, in an interlocking system that serves to disenfranchise those who face the harm imposed by multiple social hierarchies. Anwary poignantly illustrates how "The raped bodies of women have become a space for political debates between conservative claims about Indian traditions and the government who have attempted to mobilise men and women of various classes, castes, genders, ages, and religious groups" (2018).

The Male Warrior Hypothesis

Few studies have examined how clientelism affects issues of gender across ethnic lines, and even fewer try to evaluate how these institutional structures shape gender violence. Some scholars have adapted theories from political psychology to explain the gendered conflict dynamics of in-group and out-group logics of cooperation. They have named this theory the *male warrior hypothesis*, which posits two gendered dynamics of war (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, MacDonald 2012, Johnson 2009, Murthi 2009).

First, men are oriented *more toward interactions that occur on an intergroup basis* than women are, and their responses toward cooperation and conflict are more salient to these changes (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, MacDonald 2012, Johnson 2009). Men find and form their pride on the pride of the community more than women due, in large part due to the histories of militarization and patriotism that have socialized them to be "protectors," and particularly those of women (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, MacDonald 2012, Johnson 2009, Anand 2007, Banerjee 2006). Additionally, men may see women not only as the cultural signifier of the group as more feminist scholars have suggested, but also as potential viable mates — or as properties to be of service or value to men (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, MacDonald 2012, Johnson 2009). Men may attempt to appeal to co-ethnic women with displays of "protectionism" as a way of securing "potential mates" and "prestige" within a community (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, MacDonald 2012, Johnson 2009). However, these intentions may be further colored by the fact that men may want to propagate their "bloodline" and their perceived "ethnic identifications" (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, MacDonald 2012, Johnson 2009). Lastly, men may have more of a propensity to engage in violence to secure certain types of resources that are desired by other ethnic groups (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, MacDonald 2012, Johnson 2009).

Second, when there is competition present between ethnic groups, women are *not likely to cooperate with one another* within the same ethnic group (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Mac Donald 2012, Johnson 2009). On the other hand, women may be less likely to engage in conflictual behaviors toward those from ethnic out-groups, particularly because they may fear attacks or

sexual violence by perpetrators (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Mac Donald 2012, Johnson 2009). One understanding I hope to investigate further is if this suggestion that women have a lower propensity to engage in conflict applies not only to members of in-groups, but also to out-groups. Several studies have indicated how women from ethnic majorities often benefit from a paradox of power and vulnerability (Nayak 2003, Misri 2014, Harel-Shalev 2017, Murthi 2009, Puniyani 2005). By men of ethnic majorities, they are perceived as vulnerable to outgroup men. And to ethnic minority women, they are perceived as having greater social mobility within the political power systems (Nayak 2003, Harel-Shalev 2017, Misri 2014, Murthi 2009, Puniyani 2005). How, exactly, do these perceptions change the way that women choose to cooperate with one another? That is, to what extent is a woman from an ethnic majority likely to support one from an ethnic minority?

Importantly, these arguments should not be made on the basis of biology or the damaging "testosterone" argument that certain hormones fuel war and conflict, as some scholars have tried to do (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Mac Donald 2012, Johnson 2009). Those arguments are transphobic at worst, and fail to acknowledge the histories of violence that are inflicted onto trans and genderqueer people. Rather, more progressive scholars have pushed for an understanding of these arguments as an understanding of how gender binaries and their respective socialization and cementation have compounded within political systems. These scholars push for an understanding of how these political systems in which we have been socialized punishes all those who challenge these heteronomative patriarchal systems (Seifert 1996, Murthi 2009).

Building a Theory of Change: Institutionalizing Gender and Ethnic Conflicts

In sum, a few key processes shape the way we think about how discriminatory norms are formalized and reproduced into law, thereby paving the way for conflict (See: *Figure 1*). Society first agrees on a socially identifiable difference, which through histories of conflict and colonization, can lead to essentialization (Horowitz 1985, Wimmer 2009, Lieberman and Singh 2012). These norms are further reproduced through acts of demarcation (Lieberman and Singh 2012, Horowitz 1985, Tilly 2005) and conflict spirals. Histories of colonization have caused significant resource draining, and the priming effects of interethnic hostilities may be taken into consideration when voters choose how to vote. As rational thinkers, voters will choose to vote for parties that will give them the greatest chance of securing goods, which have been created through fierce competition over limited resources (Fearon and Laitin 1996, 2000, Chandra 2004, 2005, Wantchekon 2003). Through the repeated self-identification of majority and minority ethnic labels, people choose to vote for those along the social axis that can secure a minimum winning party coalition (Posner 2005, 2017, Lieberman and Singh 2012, Pandey 2006, Dirks 2001, Wilkinson 2006). In resource patronage states that liberated from colonial rule following the late 20th century, these coalitions might fall along new fault-lines of ethnicities that have been "made" the majority through the redrawing of borders or the pre-existing security of

political power (Horowitz 1985, Tilly 2005, Posner 2005, 2017). When elites of these parties occupy positions of power, they may attempt to further secure a hold on their power by engaging a "hate-party" system: only delivering goods to constituencies that they perceive to have put them in power, and further disadvantage minority ethnic groups (Chandra 2004, 2005). The cementation of power might further be entrenched through the passage of laws that work to disenfranchise or fail to service minority groups (Lieberman and Singh 2012, Horowitz 1985, UN DESA 2014, Chandra 2004, 2005) . These laws and the discriminatory comments of ethnic elites can work to reinforce systems of institutionalization, which can have several gendered effects in terms of resource distribution (Lieberman and Singh 2012, Horowitz 1985, UN DESA 2014, Chandra 2004, 2005). Ultimately, the reproduction of these norms can further deepen violent spirals of conflict, of which women might face the brunt (Fearon and Laitin 1996, 2000, Seifert 1996, Misri 2014). This model raises the question of responsibility: just how responsible are voters for cementing these norms, and how does this model hold up in India? Are there truly gendered consequences to proposed models of "spoils" that are assigned based on ethnic occupations of power?

FIGURE 1: *Ethnic Tensions, Norm Reproduction, and Institutionalism*

Hypotheses

Informational Exposure

First, I seek to understand if exposing people to information about gender violence can condition whether or not they intend to vote for politicians who promote policies surrounding gender violence through examining three related quesions: Can exposing Indian voters to information about violence against women convince them that it is an important issue on which to vote? Moreover, to what extent could gender issues possibly be co-opted by ethnic elites who wish to cement their power? To what extent do people view violence against women important to prevent? I hypothesize that exposing people to information about publicly-oriented violence against women, such as a gang rape, will prime people to think about the slippage of a woman's honor and that of her community (Murthi 2009, Misri 2014, Dey 2016, Banerjee 2006). Women may have personal investments in voting to understand policies that prevent gender violence, considering they would be the potential targets (Seifer 2016). Men, on the other hand, might follow logics proposed by the male warrior hypothesis (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Mac Donald 2012, Johnson 2009). To secure their personal stakes, and the social conditioning that has primed men to "step up" and "defend" women as "potential mates," but also as signifiers of community honor, they may also vote for policies related to violence prevention (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Mac Donald 2012, Johnson 2009). As a composite community, people might therefore in logic with the rational theories of decision-making, vote for politicians who have these strategic priorities with their personal interests in mind (Fearon and Laitin 1996, 2000, Posner 2005, 2017).

H1$_a$: _Indian voters are more likely to vote for policy creation on gender violence prevention when presented with information about violence that women may face._

H1$_b$: _Indian voters are not more likely to vote for policy creation on gender violence prevention when presented with information about violence that women may face._

Second, I seek to examine what specific effects certain identity markers have on the extent to which people are mobilized to vote around these issues. How can certain markers help or hinder the promotion of gender policies, and are there presences of biases? Specifically, which identities drive the cementation of pro-social gender norms into policy, and who do people see as "worth protecting?" These identity categories can be categorized into three main buckets: national associations, ethno-religious associations, and occupation. These sub-categories should give us greater understanding about the extent to which ethnic conflict "spills over" into other policy areas and how challenging norms set by a ethnic majority may potentially hinder policymaking.

National Associations

How does the presence of a "superordinate national identity" change the way that people think about voting about gender issues? I expect to see evidence for the Common-Ingroup Model as similar priming experiments have demonstrated the positive effects of nationalistic identity on promoting pro-social behaviors (Gaertner 1993, 2000, Charnysh et al. 2015, Vezzali et al. 2015, Andrighetto et al. 2012, Abrams 2004). People will sympathize with primes that identify a target of violence as "Indian" rather than "a woman" because the target would benefit from the assumption and bias of assuming this person is Hindu, especially considering that Hindus make up the majority of the population (Gaertner 1993, 2000, Charnysh et al. 2015, Vezzali et al. 2015, Andrighetto et al. 2012, Abrams 2004). The equation of Hinduism with the Indian identity would make Hindus otherwise more sympathetic to the person experiencing violence than if they knew if they were not Hindu (Charnysh et al. 2015). Additionally, even the priming of a national identity might invoke the "male warrior" idea of protecting the honor of women and thereby the state as a form of patriotism (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Mac Donald 2012, Dirk 2001).

H2$_a$: *Indian voters are more likely to promote policy creation to combat violence against women when exposed to national primes than a-national primes.*

H2$_b$: *Indian voters are not more likely to promote policy creation to combat violence against women when exposed to national primes than a-national primes.*

Ethno-Religious Associations

How does the presence of religious markers change the way that people think about voting about gender issues? Given histories of colonialism that have lead to rekindling of ethnic tensions as well signficant border redrawing, I expect to see much interethnic discrimination between Hindus and Muslims (Horowitz 1985, Pandey 2006). Strategic efforts to prevent Muslim representation in government as well as voting rights may send positive signal to those of the majority ethnic group of interest, Hindus, that perpetuating Islamophobic sentiments is acceptable (Harel-Shalev 2017, Anand 2007, Kirmani 2009). Additionally, the ironic logics of blame from Partition violence paint Hindu women as "victims" of violence (Dey 2016, Puniyani 2005), but "the rape of Muslim women is not 'real' violence for Muslims can never be victims" (Basu 1996). Because Muslims may not be viewed as "legitimate" citizens by the state by Hindu men and women, there may be less of an incentive to vote for gendered issues when they are the targets of violence.

H3$_a$: *Indian voters are more likely to promote policy creation to combat violence against women when exposed to primes about women from the ethnic majority rather than women from an ethnic minority.*

H3_b: *Indian voters are not more likely to promote policy creation to combat violence against women when exposed to primes about women from the ethnic majority rather than women from an ethnic minority.*

Occupation

How does the presence of occupation change the way that people think about voting about gender issues?

Hindu Nationalists, as many majoritarian ethnic elites, have co-opt gendered policies to promote their own orthodoxy religious values as "secularism." In order to protect the "purity" and "honor" of the state better, ethnic elites may impose norms that suggest women should stay at home and take care of the private realm (Basu 1996, Misri 2014) . Through processes of institutionalization, I expect these norms to have replicated within the majority Hindu sample. Particularly, men might view women who challenge systems of patriarchy in any way as threats or may fail to "extend their protection" or support in "protecting" women from violence again (Banerjee 2006, Anand 2007). If men view their roles as "protectors" and women reject the idea that they need "protection from male warriors," and pursue work, men might find few sympathies for women who challenge norms (Basu 1996, Banerjee 2006, Anand 2007). This would go double for Muslim women, who are seen to challenge not only the ethno-religious hegemonic order within India, but also the gendered order.

H4_a: *Indian voters are more likely to promote policy creation to combat violence against women when exposed to primes about women who are just identified as religious than women who work.*

H4_b: *Indian voters are more likely to promote policy creation to combat violence against women when exposed to primes about women who are just identified as religious than women who work.*

Mechanism of Mobilization

Next, by what mechanisms do people see mobilization around violence against women most viable, and how do these same identity differentiators complicate people's attitudes? In other words, whose responsibility do voters think it is to prevent violence against women? And, which parts within the model of norms institutionalization are voters potentially enabling as a site of exploitation, by shifting the responsibility of violence prevention? Here, I examine three primary means of mobilization: the individual, the community, and the government.

Importantly, the Male Warrior Hypothesis describes some of the incentives men might have in working together strategically with other members of the community to preserve control of

resources and potential mates. I would expect men to particularly respond to community based primes at somewhat higher rates than women (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Mac Donald 2012, Johnson 2009). Women on the other hand, may be less likely to cooperate with the community compared with the government or individuals (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Mac Donald 2012, Johnson 2009). Additionally, rationalist party-voting theories suggest that those who might be most represented by government, particularly men and Hindu, might view the government as a more reasonable way of securing change compared to those who have minimal representation, such as Muslims or women (Chandra 2004,2005, Fearon and Laitin 1996,2000). Depending on their backgrounds, voters are likely to mobilize differently on individual, community, and government levels. But considering the particular composition of the sample in question, which is predominantly Hindu men and some Hindu women, I would expect greater rates of mobilization in particularly the government and the community.

H5$_a$: *Indian voters are not equally likely to mobilize at the individual, community, and government levels to combat violence against women.*

H5$_b$: *Indian voters are equally likely to mobilize at the individual, community, and government levels to combat violence against women.*

I suspect that the biases we see within the way people choose to vote for violence promotion, depending on what identity prime they receive will translate over when it comes to evaluating what types of mobilization should be used for gender equity. I expect to particularly see less mobilization across all three fronts when the target is described either as a Muslim and/or a working woman (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Mac Donald 2012, Johnson 2009, Murthi 2009, Charnysh et al. 2015). Conversely, I expect that when the target is described as a Hindu and/or religious woman, I expect there to be greater mobilization across all three fronts of mobilization than there was for the Muslim or working women. I expect to see evidence that the study sample, who are predominantly Hindu men and women, will compound existing biases by mobilizing for their in-groups but not for out-groups (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Mac Donald 2012, Murthi 2009, Charnysh et al. 2015).

H6$_a$: *Indian voters are not equally likely to mobilize at the individual, community, and government levels to combat violence against women when exposed to identity-based primes.*

H6$_b$: *Indian voters are equally likely to mobilize at the individual, community, and government levels to combat violence against women when exposed to identity-based primes.*

<u>*What are the Driving Demographic Factors, if any?*</u>

Lastly, does everyone think the same way about the salience of information exposure and mobilization around gender issues? If not, which demographic factors seem to matter most when considering how to rally around gender issues. In this design, I will be evaluating a few key social cleavages to assess for the potential impact they have on promoting violence against women including:

- Gender (Men vs. Women):
- Caste: (High Caste vs. Low Caste):
- Level of Nationalism: (High Nationalistic Attitdues vs. Low nationalistic Attitudes):
- Level of Ethno-Linguistic Affiliation: (Low vs. High Ethno-Linguistic Affiliation)
- Religiosity: (Low vs. High Religious Affiliation)
- Ethno-Religious Affiliation: (Hindu vs. Not)
- Permutations of Ethno-Religious Affiliation and Religiosity: (Hindu and Religious, Very Religious, vs. other levels of Religiosity)
- Views on Occupation: (Those who View Working Women as Bad Influence on Children vs. Those Who Do Not)

I suspect that if any social cleavages are responsible for the divisions, they likely come down to two cleavages: gender and ethno-religious affiliation. Let us once again revisit the Male Warrior hypothesis (Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Mac Donald 2012, Johnson 2009). When two or more identities are made hierarchical and relevant to a certain policy decision, including an "essentialized" ethnic identity, those who are out-groups in both regards, like Muslim women, will have the most incentive to mobilize on policy issues related to their identities (See *Figure 2*, Eriksen 2017, Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Mac Donald 2012, Johnson 2009, Murthi 2009, Charnysh et al. 2015). Those who are only minorities in one regard may have fewer incentives to cooperate with the community or mobilize the government, such as Hindu women or Muslim men (*Figure 2,* Eriksen 2017, Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Mac Donald 2012, Johnson 2009, Murthi 2009, Charnysh et al. 2015*)*. Additionally, those who are majoritarian in both cases, like Hindu men, would have the least incentives to cooperate unless the diminishing of the status of the second identity could pose direct costs to them (*Figure 2,* Eriksen 2017, Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Mac Donald 2012, Murthi 2009, Charnysh et al. 2015*)*. Considering gender is at the crux of the policy issue proposed (ie: bolstering protections for violence against women), and the potential "spillover" of ethnic biases onto alternate social dimensions, I suspect these two factors will have the largest influence over who supports anti-violence gender policy and how.

Importantly, some Hindu women may not have the biggest incentives to cooperate with Muslim women, especially as they still benefit from Hindu Nationalism. These bring into question the particular relevance of high caste or class status alongside other factors in decision-making, and particularly within a society with rife ethnic conflict (Huber and Suryanarayan 2016, Thachil 2014, Hasan and Menon 2004). I have created an adapted model of the male warrior hypothesis here, which tries to account for caste and class (see:*Figure 2*). Since high-caste Hindu women

would still benefit from caste supremacy, they would have fewer incentives to power-share (Huber and Suryanarayan 2016, Thachil 2014, Hasan and Menon 2004). But the extent to which caste is as important of a driver than other factors remains in question.

Figure 2: Visualization of Cooperation Incentives, Male Warrior Hypothesis

H7$_a$: *Certain social cleavages, particularly gender and ethno-religious affiliation, inform if and how Indian voters make voting decisions on issues of gender violence when presented with information*

H7$_b$: *Social cleavages do not inform if and how Indian voters make voting decisions on issues of gender violence when presented with information*

Methods & Survey Design

To design this survey, I drew from two relevant survey designs that utilized vignettes to examine interethnic conflict in India.

In the first experient, Murthi examines at how interethnic groups engage in rape-blame. She presents respondents with a short story about either a Muslim or Hindu woman was gang raped, then investigate the interethnic biases respondents demonstrated (2009). While this study definitely tackled the idea of the specific statistical effect that ethno-religious and national markers have on cross dimensional issues, and is one of the first to do so, there is little data on her paper about mobilization (Murthi 2009). I wanted to specifically focus my analyses on the way these biases are cemented into policy vis-a-vis voting, and therefore wanted to get a politically active voting base for my sample of interest.

Charnysh et al. were able to achieve such a sample in their MTurk experiment, citing that Indian MTurk workers are, "on average, more educated, wealthier, and more likely to be from an urban area than the general Indian population" (2017). In their study, they explore pro-social behaviors between Hindus and Muslims when given a prime of national identity (Charnysh et al 2017). They gave respondents stories, primed with the religions of those described within by constructing names that signaled national ethno-religious connotations (Charnysh et al 2017).. In essence, they paid attention to the local types of community markers, names, and places that would let respondents know the religion of the target without outright saying it and risking intent-to-treat effects (Charnysh et al 2017)..

I guided the design and framing of my survey by principles from two primary guidelines that have been the source of shaping several studies about data collection gender based violence. These guides included The United Nation's "Guidelines for Producing Statistics on Violence against Women" (2014) and "Violence against women: A statistical overview, challenges and gaps in data collection and methodology and approaches for overcoming them" (2005). These articles suggested that internet-based approaches, where possible, could help mitigate several important concerns when conducting research about gender-based violence (UN Stats 2014, UN DAW 2005). Online surveys help protect anonymity by cutting out the role of surveyors, whose presence might encourage respondents to answer questions untruthful due to undesirability bias (UN Stats 2014, UN DAW 2005). While the risk with an online survey might be that bad-faith actors might rush through the survey while scarcely reading the questions, these respondents are easily identifiable using time, attention, and manipulation checks (UN Stats 2014, UN DAW 2005). Protecting people's anonymity and creating an environment where respondents feel safe enough to answer the questions truthfully is more than a fair tradeoff for incorporating extra variable checks (UN Stats 2014, UN DAW 2005). Capturing data online also enables any person with a smart phone or electronic device to answer questions, and in light of COVID-19, we did not want to potentially expose any surveyors to harm by violating social distancing precautions (UN Stats 2014, UN DAW 2005).

Importantly, we did not try to directly ask about whether or not respondents were survivors of violence. Past incidents of violence are likely to affect their views for sure, but we must also understand, acknowledge, and reckon with the trauma of being a survivor (UN Stats 2014, UN DAW 2005). Additionally, we may be unnecessarily putting survivors in the way of harm, considering internet search histories are traceable and respondents may forget to delete their search history (UN Stats 2014, UN DAW 2005). There may also be a significant social desirability bias that prevents us from collecting accurate numbers on the true prevalence of violence, considering many fear stigmatization from the community for coming forward with their experiences (UN Stats 2014, UN DAW 2005). Instead, we are more interested in examining treatment effects, or changes in people's opinions across the pieces of information presented.

Because treatments are assigned randomly to groups of people, we can assume that the prevalence of those who have had experiences of violence are about the same from across various treatment groups.

Procedures

The survey was designed on a survey tool called Qualtrics and launched on a crowdsourcing site called Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Using MTurk's survey tools, I was able to filter out which users could see specific assignments and limited my study to those with Indian IP addresses. Participants were fielded through the site's assignment "hit" listing, and must have been over 18 years old, English-speaking, and had access to an electronic device with Internet. Once respondents accepted the assignment, or "hit," they were given a link to the Qualtrics survey to complete. Upon completion and experimental validation (ensuring that they hadn't repeated submission of the survey), the respondents were compensated between $0.50-$1.00. The instructions directly give respondents a content warning, mentioning that the survey will deal with topics related to gender and sexual violence in order to help reduce potential trauma, and so participants will self select out of taking the survey. Participants were then taken to a screen where they were asked for their consent to participate in the survey. If they agreed, they were taken to the first battery of questions that fielded for demographic information. After answering those questions, participants were asked questions related to how they view the different parts of their identity, the role of their religion within their lives (which is the ethnic contour in question in this survey), their political behaviors, and their pre-existing gender norms. Two attention checks were incorporated at the end of the identity and the gender norms batteries of questions, where participants were told to select a certain answer to validate that they were reading the survey carefully. We also wanted to emphasize consent and not potentially re-traumatizing people within the experiment, so we included a second content warning screen. If participants did not agree to take the survey any further, they were taken to the completion screen. If they agreed to further pursue the survey, they were introduced to the treatment. After people's initial attitudes toward these questions were collected, we randomly assigned each person to one of six fictionalized vignettes that described the gang rape of a woman, but changed key identity markers (the presence of national affiliations, religious markers, and occupation). Participants may have also received no vignette, in order to serve as a control group. Two manipulation check questions were included to verify that respondents had processed the "treatment" or the key specific identity markers, and participants were asked to answer questions confirming the target's name (which can be easily identifiable as a certain religion), whether or not the target was religious or had an occupation, or the nationality of the target. Participants were then asked about their attitudes toward gender violence, and then were given a third attention check. Participants were also asked whether or not they believed violence was an important enough issue to inform which policymakers they would vote for given the opportunity. Lastly, respondents were asked about who should mobilize around the issue of gender violence,

such as individuals, the community, or the government, if any. See *Figure 3* for a visual breakdown of the procedures. Respondents remained the right to exit the survey at any time.

Figure 3: Survey Procedures

Use of MTurk and Relevance to Sample

MTurk users are likely to be wealthier and more educated, given the fact that they not only need to speak English, but also must have access to a smart phone or computer device (Charnysh et al. 2015).

While this may affect the composition of the sample size, we are interested in examining particularly how voting behaviors are affected. Considering that wealthier and more educated people also tend to vote at greater rates, we would be able to get insight into how this group of people cements any biases they have into the policy making structure (Harel-Shalev 2017, Thaker et al. 2019). Additionally, we are also most interested in examining treatment effects, and therefore the treatments are randomly assigned to groups of people with similar compositions. Any potential changes we do observe, however, could have even greater treatment effects across all Indians.

Those who were represented in our MTurk Survey were predominantly Hindus, although there were some respondents from minority ethnic backgrounds, including Muslims and those of other religions. Our respondents were also mainly men, with about twice the rate of respondents who were men than women. Considering that most voters in India are Hindu men and women, we are able to better understand how majority ethnic groups think about violence, and whether or not those who are minorities in other regards think similarly (such as women).

Piloting

I test piloted this survey with 320 different people in order to check for question clarity, operationalization, and question format. First, I tested the survey with 260 people across both India and the United States. The population was composed of at least half of those who were of South Asian descent, and tweaks were made to ensure the survey was mobile accessible. The survey was then piloted a second time with more than 60 respondents from the actual population of interest, MTurk respondents in India. Any appropriate edits were made.

Operationalization

Demographic Information:
The demographic battery of questions was designed to provide more information about the social cleavages that affect those within the sample, as well as what driving factors may affect how people view violence against women and how they mobilize around that issue. Such demographic included fielding for the gender of the respondent, age, employment status, income level, and education as these may be significant data cohorts to examine for potential variance between attitude biases. This information can also be used to understand and identify certain voting patterns based on these identity factors. Lastly, such information was also collected to evaluate if populations who are predisposed to violence vote differently, including those of low socioeconomic status, those who have low literacy attainment, and those who are or who have ever been married. These questions were derived from the United Nations' and PROMUNDO's "Understanding Masculinities in the MENA Region" survey design, which have been tested, as well as from prior experiments in India (Chinnakali 2014, Lieberman and Singh 2012, Murthi 2009, Thachil 2014).

Identity Marker Questions:

These questions asked people to critically think about how important several of their identities were to them. Respondents were primed to compare the relative importance of each identity to the another because the questions were asked in succession, in a matrix format. These questions asked each respondent to identify how important national identity as an "Indian" was to them, as well as ethno-religious identities, ethno-linguistic identities, gender, caste, or how much they

found identity within themselves as individuals. These questions were asked on a five-point Likhert scale, ranging from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree." Importantly, we directly use terms such as "ethnicity" and "religion" which are colloquially understood terms for various ethnic identity markers according to the Wimmer-Weberian definition (2009) of ethnicity that this paper operates. In this case, "ethnicity" correlates with ethno-linguistic groups (ie: if a respondent is Tamil, Telugu, Gujurati, etc.) and "religion" correlates with ethno-religious groups (ie: if a respondent is Hindu, Muslim, or other religion), or "nation" (which can be understood as the "Indian" state).

Respondents were also asked to compare how important they felt about some of these identities, such as the ethno-religious category, in comparison to how they believe the rest of their community feels about these identities. Additionally, respondents were asked whether or not they believe in a more religious or secular form of government. While these later few questions were not included within the scope of this study due to time constraints, this data may prove useful for future evaluations.

Political Norms:

In order to verify that this population was a politically active voting constituency, we asked questions about the specific behaviors they have made in past elections. We asked if the respondents had voted for Prime Minister in 2019 to evaluate their tendencies to vote in national elections, and we asked if respondents frequently voted in local elections. These questions were asked in a binary set of "Yes" and "No" responses. Adapted from the World Values Survey, we also asked how respondents tend to vote on social and financial issues using a five-point Likert Scale from "Very Liberal" to "Very Conservative."

Gender Norms:

We adapted the questions about gender norms from two different surveys, including the UN and PROMUNDO's "Understanding Masculinities" survey (2017) as well as the United Nations' "Are You Ready for Change" survey (2019) about attitudes in cross-country settings, including India. These norms were also informed by Karim's work on measuring gender norms (Karim 2018). These surveys were designed specifically to evaluate if there were certain gender differences that underscore incentives to combat violence, and therefore proved useful for this study. These questions have been tested and tried, strengthening the validity of this form of measurement. We picked questions that evaluated several categories of descriptive ("how things are") and ascriptive norms ("how things should be"), which were further broken down into political and economic attitudes, attitudes about how much autonomy women have over decision-making in their lives, perceptions of how women's autonomy affects familial and gender roles, as well as awareness of patrilineal laws and discriminatory hiring practices. See *Chart 1* for examples of questions from each of these categories. Such information must be

collected to control for pre-existing societal perceptions of gender bias, which may condition views on violence against women. We use these metrics to better understand if there are any disparities in norms that may be particularly driving differences, and include one subset of those findings here (due to time and space constraints). These questions were all phrased in a "positivist" manner (ie: "things are like this"), and were measured using a five-point Likhert scale from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree." The questions were also phrased in a "negative" directionality, meaning that the more that respondents "agreed" with certain answers, the less respect they had for gender equality. For example, questions might be phrased to suggest that "men make better leaders than women," and agreeing with such a statement would be an ascriptive agreement of gender inequality.

Chart 1: "Gender Norms"

GENDER NORMS	
Political	• Men make better political leaders than women
Economic	• Men deserve more of a right to a job than women
Autonomy	• Most women have a lot of control over their lives • Most women have a lot of influence on the decision of who to marry
Familial and Gender Roles	• When a mother works for pay, the children suffer
Awareness of Patrilineal Laws	• It is easy for most women to buy property in their own name
Awareness of Public Insecurity	• It is easier for a man to be hired as a skilled worker than a woman

Vignettes and Priming:
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six vignettes (associated below in *Chart 2)*, or were not shown a vignette at all. A story was constructed describing a woman on her way home from a location until she was gang raped. The vignettes were designed to emulate the gang rapes of Pandey and Reddy, but were depicted differently enough to not be identifiable. Additionally, I wanted the vignette to include several types of violence against women, in accordance with the "United Nations Guidelines for Producing Stats," for a more holistic type of prime (UN Stats 2014, UN DAW 2005). These acts included coercive behaviors, street harassment, physical violence, psychological violence in the form of threat of weapons, and sexual violence. I designed the vignettes so that they simply stated the acts that had happened, and were not

extremely graphic in order to prevent adverse traumatic reactions — they mentioned the bare minimal description to get the point across.

I also included specific keywords as identifiers of nationalism, religion, and occupation to understand if discrimination in terms of mobilization around poilcy might occur across treatments . I wanted to keep many other parts of the vignette the same in order to ensure treatment effects were limited to the changes in identity signals. I placed the vignette after the gender norms section to avoid any pre-emptive priming, but also wanted to enable priming before the violence against women norms section.

1. In order to signal the presence or absence of ***nationalism,*** I included both an "a-national" prime, where the woman is simply described as "a woman" with no further description, as well as a "national" prime where the woman is labeled "an Indian woman." The words "woman" or "Indian woman" were bolded within the vignettes to draw extra attention. In these two vignettes, women were also designated as coming back from an unspecified religious service to set up a metric of comparison for the "occupation-based" primes.

2. In order to signal the *assumed **religion*** of the target, I used the models and guidance provided by the Singh and Murthi experiments. In India, individuals can easily identify a person's religion based on their name. In order to double down on this phenomena, I found lists of the most common surnames and first names in India[6], and evaluated which ones especially connoted religious associations. Importantly, individuals can often tell the caste of people's names and the government also classifies many last names into caste-based groupings. I wanted to ensure that the names were pan-caste or "casteless," so that caste did not become a confounding factor in evaluating the effect of religion. I named the women either "Lakshmi Kumar" or "Fatima Khan" to signify religion. Charnysh et al., name one of the Muslim women in their experimental vignettes, "Fatima Khan" and use the last name "Kumari" to describe one her Hindu participants, indicating that these associations have been tested before (2015). I picked "Lakshmi" particularly because it is an easily recognizable name of a Hindu goddess, and provided an even stronger Hindu priming than the Hindu names used in Charnysh et al.'s experiment (2015). I cross-checked names to ensure that particularly famous people did not have them, so that there weren't any additional subconscious biases related to the celebrity status of the person. I tested the associations of these names with certain religions during both rounds of piloting. In order to further strengthen religious primes, I describe that "Lakshmi Kumar" is coming back from the temple, a Hindu site of worship, whereas "Fatima Khan" is coming back from the mosque, a Muslim site of worship. The names of the women, as well as the religious service they were coming back from, were bolded for extra emphasis.

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[6] Bhavana Navuluri, "100 Most Popular Indian Last Names For Your Baby"

3. In order to signal the presence or absence of ***occupation***, I also assigned different locations that described where the woman was coming back from. The women in the national primes received non-denominational religious services as a description, and the religious women received descriptions of coming back from services at the temple or the mosque. However, to evaluate to what extent people resonate with women who challenge the patriarchal norms potentially set by majoritarian ethno-religious leaders and policymakers, I described two vignettes where women were simply coming back from "work." The idea that women travel to "work" in the public sphere may indicate that women have a degree of economic autonomy, and challenge some of the religious-patriarchal norms. These locations were bolded for emphasis.

Chart 2: "Vignettes Matrix"

VIGNETTES MATRIX		
EFFECT TYPE	**KEY WORDS**	**VIGNETTE**
CONTROL	No Vignette	No Vignette
A-NATIONAL PRIMING	*A woman, Prayer services*	A **woman** was walking back home from **prayer services**. Men began to stare and follow her. She told them to stop, but they pushed her down, choked her, and threatened to pull out a knife. The men raped her. She was found on the side of the street the next morning, with her clothing removed.
NATIONAL PRIMING	*Indian woman, prayer services*	An **Indian woman** was walking back home from **prayer services**. Men began to stare and follow her. She told them to stop, but they pushed her down, choked her, and threatened to pull out a knife. The men raped her. She was found on the side of the street the next morning, with her clothing removed.
RELIGIOUS HINDU PRIMING	*Lakshmi Kumar, Temple*	A woman, **Lakshmi Kumar,** was walking back home from the **temple**. Men began to stare and follow her. She told them to stop, but they pushed her down, choked her, and threatened to pull out a knife. The men raped her. She was found on the side of the street the next morning, with her clothing removed.
RELIGIOUS MUSLIM PRIMING	*Fatima Khan, Mosque*	A woman, **Fatima Khan,** was walking back home from the **mosque**. Men began to stare and follow her. She told them to stop, but they pushed her down, choked her, and threatened to pull out a knife. The men raped her. She was found on the side of the street the next morning, with her clothing removed.
WORKING HINDU PRIMING	*Lakshmi Kumar, Work*	A woman, **Lakshmi Kumar,** was walking back home from **work**. Men began to stare and follow her. She told them to stop, but they pushed her down, choked her, and threatened to pull out a knife. The men raped her. She was found on the side of the street the next morning, with her clothing removed.
WORKING MUSLIM PRIMING	*Fatima Khan, Work*	A woman, **Fatima Khan,** was walking back home from **work**. Men began to stare and follow her. She told them to stop, but they pushed her down, choked her, and threatened to pull out a knife. The men raped her. She was found on the side of the street the next morning, with her clothing removed.

Perceptions of Violence Against Women:

According to the DEVAW,

> "...The term "violence against women" means any act of genderbased violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life" (UN Gen. Assembly 1993).

To measure perceptions of violence against women, I adapted from the two United Nations guides about collecting statistical information on gendered violence to collect information across multiple dimensions (UN Stats 2014, UN DAW 2005). To account for these various forms of sexual violence, I wanted to create specific questions centered around each of the following categories:

- *Physical Violence:* We wanted to capture how people felt about violence that included body-to-body contact, which may include kicking or beating.
- *Emotional Violence:* We wanted to capture how people felt about verbal insults (name-calling) or threats of violence, as well as coercive behavior.
- *Sexual Violence:* We wanted to capture how people felt about unwanted sexual touching, harssment, coercion, exploitation, or abuse, including rape.
- *Economic Violence:* We wanted to capture how people felt about the curbing of financial autonomy or decision-making, such as through threats to kick out a partner who has little to no property or money on their own.
- *Public Street Harassment:* We wanted to capture how people felt about the acts of violence that happen when women leave the confines of their home, particularly catcalling, ogling, and name-calling that happens from strangers.

See associated in *Chart 3* examples of questions that fit into each category. I adapted questions from the "World Values Survey" as well as the "Understanding Masculinities" and "Are You Ready for Change" surveys by the United Nations to span not only these associations, but also were varied among both the public and private sphere (UN Women and PROMUNDO 2017, UN Women 2019, Haerpfer et al. 2017). Some incidents of violence included public spectacles (such as street harassment or "victim-blaming" based on clothing choice) while others were domestic (wife-beating). Disaggregating by types of violence helps us understand which issues respondents are more likely to mobilize around policy-wise UN Women and PROMUNDO 2017, UN Women 2019, Haerpfer et al. 2017). Considering we are evaluating a vignette that deals primarily with public forms of violence, information about how attitudes toward violence in the household carry over into mobilization will be useful for future studies.

When phrasing the questions, I deliberately removed words like "I think" and "My belief" to create some distance between the respondent and the answer they are delivering, in order to mitigate social desirability bias. When statements begin When people are asked "attitudinal" questions, but it is framed from a perspective that is gauging what society thinks about a topic, respondents may think about the people in their own lives and personal interactions when informing their decisions (UN Women and PROMUNDO 2017, UN Women 2019). In many ways, these questions proxy understandings of personal attitudes and potentially behaviors (UN Women and PROMUNDO 2017, UN Women 2019). I also strategically put this section right before the mobilization section to prime people to think critically about how they would vote around issues of gender based violence.

All of these questions are phrased in a "positivist" manner, and respondents must once again give their opinions on the statement based on a five-point Likert Scale from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree." Almost all of these questions were phrased in a "positive direction," where agreement with a statement indicates higher acceptance for violence against women, save one question.[7]

Chart 3: Measuring Gender Violence

Gender Violence	
Physical	• Most women feel safe when in their home from physical harm • There are acceptable circumstances for someone to hit their spouse or partner
Emotional	• Most women feel safe when in their home from emotional or mental harm • There are acceptable circumstances for someone to deliberately insult or belittle women
Sexual	• A woman should be free to refuse sex with her husband or partner under any circumstances
Economic	• There are acceptable circumstances for the man of the house to throw his wife out
Public Street Harassment	• Women who are in public places at night are asking to be sexually harassed • It is acceptable to catcall, follow, or harass women if they dress provocatively

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[7] The question that was phrased in the other direction was about marital rape, which is not legally recognized in India. The surveys we had adapted the questions from used phrasing that was more centered about a woman's ability to exercise consent than it was about a man's ability. We wanted to be consistent with phrasing that had been priorly used, so the directionality doesn't match up in the same direction as the others, just for this question.

Mobilization:

In this measure, I capture four critical measurements. First I identified propensity people have to vote on issues related to violence against women by specifically asking "violence agaisnt women is an issue that **must** be priortized by **most** political candidates I will vote for in the future." Words like "must" and "most" were added as a form of hedging to capture the opinions of people who had even somewhat sympathetic views toward mobilizing around the issue of gender violence, rather than the absolute answer of "always" voting for policymakers who prioritize gender-based violence. People are complex and therefore may vote based on several different needs and identity considerations, so I wanted to allow for some nuance in picking their answer (Sen 2006, Wantchekon 2003, Bratton 2012, Goetz 2002, Panda 2019). Asking directly about mobilization through the cog of voting will give us an idea of the pathways used to cement norms into policy.

Next, I wanted to capture information on which specific actors people thought were responsible for transforming policies around gender-based violence. I asked participants in a matrix to mark who they should "try to more actively combat violence against women," including individuals, the community, and the government. The matrix format was intended to make participants consider each of the three options in succession against one another. Respondents were asked to answer each of the four questions using a five-point Likhert scale, ranging from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree."

Controls

Qualtrics has an option where respondents are assigned to treatments at equally the same distribution. Because the study is designed to incorporate experimental randomization, as well as a sample that receives no prime or vignette, identifying specific demographic controls is not necessary for this study. Random assignment allows me to make deductions about the treatment effects given the equal possibility that those of different demographic characteristics get assigned into treatment groups, compared to a group with no treatment. However, it is worth mentioning that several key factors are consistent across the respondents, including that they are over 18 years old, speak English, and are more affluent given their ability to have an electronic device attend an educational system that taught them English.

Results

My suspicion about fielding MTurk or online surveys in India was correct: I obtained a sample that was wealthier than the general population, more highly educated, and was predominantly composed of Hindu men. Consequently, this sample voted at a significantly higher rate both in national and local elections, at a rate of 92.2% and 96.8% respectfully (See *Figures 4 and 5)*. Importantly, this high voter turnout rate validates that this sample in fact has the power to engage in systems of institutionalization, or cementing any personal biases they have into law through deciding which policies are in fact most and least important to pursue (Panda 2019).

Figure 4: Voting in National Elections

Figure 5: Voting in Local Elections

Table 1: Variable Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion

In Table 1, we examine whether or not exposing the population sample to specific identity-based primes makes them want to promote policies that combat violence against women. Although no primes achieved statistical significance, the prime about the working Muslim woman (Fatima Khan), tended toward significance the most in the negative direction: that is to say, fewer people agreed that violence against women is an important policy to promote when they read the prime about "Fatima Khan" who is coming back from work. Of note, the comparison that charted the second most significance in this case, were the comparisons between the control group and the religious Hindu prime. When respondents were exposed to the Hindu prime, they were also less likely to promote policies about violence against women — however these results are not statistically significant. Additionally, when respondents were exposed to the Religious Muslim prime, they showed somehwat less support than when no prime was given as as well, but these findings were far from statistical significance and could be due to chance. In fact, there were bigger decreases in support when people were exposed to a prime that simply described "a woman" compared to no prime, although still not significant. Nevertheless, there still may be a tendency toward greater implicit bias against Muslim women compared to Hindu women given

TABLE 1

Variable Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion
Do people believe that violence against women is important?

Control Group vs. A-national "Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Woman" Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Those who Believe Violence Against Women is Important	1.84	1.97	-0.13	-1.23
Observations				n = 355

Control Group vs. Nationalized "Indian Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Indian Woman" Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Those who Believe Violence Against Women is Important	2.01	1.97	0.04	0.36
Observations				n = 370

Control Group vs. Religious Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Those who Believe Violence Against Women is Important	1.84	1.97	-0.13	-1.26
Observations				n = 371

Control Group vs. Religious Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Those who Believe Violence Against Women is Important	1.90	1.97	-0.06	-0.54
Observations				n = 361

Control Group vs. Working Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Those who Believe Violence Against Women is Important	2.02	1.97	0.05	0.43
Observations				n = 365

Control Group vs. Working Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Those who Believe Violence Against Women is Important	1.79	1.97	-0.18	-1.71
Observations				n = 365

Hindu Woman (Lakshmi Kumar) vs. Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Muslim Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Those who Believe Violence Against Women is Important	1.84	1.93	-0.08	-1.10
Observations				n = 770

Religious Woman vs. Working Woman

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Those who Believe Violence Against Women is Important	1.93	1.88	0.04	0.65
Observations				n = 1149

the effect size of the working Muslim prime. On the other hand, athough there were shifts in difference when comparing across all primes describing a Hindu woman and all primes describing a Muslim woman, they are not statistically signficant. Indeed, occupation only mattered when the target was a Muslim woman compared to a Hindu woman, and held little relevance compared to women who were simply identified as religious.

Table 2: Variable Effects on Mobilization
Table 2 evaluates which actors the sample population in question believes has a responsibility to combat violence against women: the individual, the community, and/or the government. It further examines which identity primes cause people to mobilize differently, if at all. When people received a prime that simply referred to "a woman," they were less likely to find the community as responsible for curbing violence against women. These results also tended toward significance. When exposed to a prime about a religious Hindu, people tended toward finding individuals less responsible for combating violence (near significance), but were significantly less likely to find the community responsible for combating violence. Conversely, while people who recieved the religious Muslim prime found both individuals and the community significantly less responsible for combatting violence against women, they found indviduals a lot less responsible than the community. These differences were also greater than the in the Hindu religious prime, suggesting potential bias against religious Muslim women. When presented with a prime of a Hindu working women, people tended toward finding the community less likely to support violence against women. And when presented with a prime of a working woman (no matter her religion) compared to a religious woman, people tended to find the government and community less responsible for combatting violence against women.

Table 3: Evaluating Driving Factors — Gender
Table 3 examines how gender conditions the salience of violence against women as a policy issue. Women, compared to men, tended to less likely find violence against women an important issue off of which to decide what policymakers to vote for when exposed to the prime that simply described "a woman" compared to no prime. In fact, these findings achieved virtual significance when women were given a prime that described an "Indian woman." Women were also tended toward less likely finding the community responsible for combating violence when exposed to the prime compared to none. On the other hand, men more tended toward promoting violence against women as a policy issue when provided with the same "Indian woman" prime. On the other hand, men were significantly less likely to find individuals, the community, or the government responsible for combating violence across all three measures when exposed to the religious Hindu prime, despite only somewhat tending toward less likely finding the issue important to promote. On the other hand, men were only significantly less likely to find individuals responsible for combatting violence against religious Muslim women, whereas women were signficantly less likely to find the community responsible when exposed to the same prime. When it came to the working Hindu, women were also significantly less likely to

TABLE 2

Variable Effects on Mobilization
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?

Control Group vs. A-national "Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Woman" Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Individuals	1.96	1.97	-0.01	-0.09
Community	1.90	2.09	-0.20	-1.75
Government	1.90	1.82	0.07	0.65
Observations				n = 355

Control Group vs. Nationalized "Indian Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Indian Woman" Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Individuals	1.93	1.97	-0.04	-0.33
Community	2.09	2.09	-0.01	-0.05
Government	1.96	1.82	0.14	1.27
Observations				n = 370

Control Group vs. Religious Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Individuals	1.78	1.97	-0.19	-1.89
Community	1.82	2.09	-0.27	-2.61
Government	1.73	1.82	-0.09	-0.84
Observations				n = 371

Control Group vs. Religious Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Individuals	1.68	1.97	-0.30	-2.95
Community	1.84	2.09	-0.26	-2.34
Government	1.77	1.82	-0.05	-0.46
Observations				n = 361

Control Group vs. Working Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Individuals	1.89	1.97	-0.09	-0.78
Community	1.91	2.09	-0.19	-1.64
Government	1.80	1.82	-0.02	-0.21
Observations				n = 365

Control Group vs. Working Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Individuals	1.84	1.97	-0.13	-1.19
Community	1.96	2.09	-0.13	-1.20
Government	1.80	1.82	-0.02	-0.17
Observations				n = 365

Hindu Woman (Lakshmi Kumar) vs. Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Muslim Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Individuals	1.76	1.83	-0.07	-0.98
Community	1.90	1.86	0.04	0.50
Government	1.79	1.76	0.02	0.30
Observations				n = 770

Religious Woman vs. Working Woman

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Individuals	1.83	1.85	-0.02	-0.36
Community	1.86	1.95	-0.08	-1.33
Government	1.76	1.86	-0.09	-1.43
Observations				n = 1149

Evaluating Driving Factors: Gender

TABLE 3

How does gender condition the salience of violence against women as a policy issue and percieved responsibility to enact change?

Control Group vs. A-national "Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Woman" Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Men	1.86	1.92	-0.06	-0.43
Women	1.80	2.07	-0.28	-1.58
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Men	1.98	1.94	0.04	0.30
Women	1.93	2.04	-0.11	-0.59
Community				
Men	1.93	2.01	-0.08	-0.54
Women	1.84	2.28	-0.44	-2.52
Government				
Men	1.97	1.84	0.13	0.92
Women	1.77	1.78	-0.01	-0.05
Total Observations				
Men				n = 232
Women				n = 123

Control Group vs. Nationalized "Indian Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Indian Woman" Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Men	2.13	1.92	0.21	1.48
Women	1.74	2.07	-0.33	-1.97
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Men	1.95	1.94	0.01	0.05
Women	1.90	2.04	-0.13	-0.70
Community				
Men	2.13	2.01	0.12	0.85
Women	1.98	2.28	-0.29	-1.67
Government				
Men	2.00	1.84	0.16	1.14
Women	1.89	1.78	0.11	0.57
Total Observations				
Men				n = 254
Women				n = 116

Control Group vs. Religious Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Men	1.77	1.92	-0.15	-1.28
Women	2.00	2.07	-0.07	-0.37
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Men	1.69	1.94	-0.25	-2.12
Women	1.98	2.04	-0.05	-0.28
Community				
Men	1.73	2.01	-0.28	-2.18
Women	2.02	2.28	-0.26	-1.42
Government				
Men	1.57	1.84	-0.27	-2.24
Women	2.10	1.78	0.32	1.60
Total Observations				
Men				n = 257
Women				n = 114

Control Group vs. Religious Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Men	1.94	1.92	0.02	0.17
Women	1.82	2.07	-0.25	-1.23
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Men	1.66	1.94	-0.28	-2.30
Women	1.70	2.04	-0.34	-1.84
Community				
Men	1.85	2.01	-0.16	-1.18
Women	1.81	2.28	-0.47	-2.57
Government				
Men	1.79	1.84	-0.05	-0.36
Women	1.72	1.78	-0.06	-0.31
Total Observations				
Men				n = 250
Women				n = 111

Control Group vs. Working Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Men	2.00	1.92	0.08	0.60
Women	2.04	2.07	-0.04	-0.17
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Men	1.86	1.94	-0.08	-0.60
Women	1.96	2.04	-0.08	-0.37
Community				
Men	1.91	2.01	-0.10	-0.71
Women	1.90	2.28	-0.37	-2.10
Government				
Men	1.77	1.84	-0.07	-0.53
Women	1.88	1.78	0.11	0.51
Total Observations				
Men				n = 258
Women				n = 106

Control Group vs. Working Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Men	1.87	1.92	-0.04	-0.33
Women	1.53	2.07	-0.54	-2.89
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Men	1.92	1.94	-0.02	-0.14
Women	1.61	2.04	-0.42	-2.21
Community				
Men	1.99	2.01	-0.02	-0.11
Women	1.86	2.28	-0.42	-2.48
Government				
Men	1.87	1.84	0.03	0.25
Women	1.59	1.78	-0.19	-0.96
Total Observations				
Men				n = 262
Women				n = 103

Hindu Woman (Lakshmi Kumar) vs. Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Muslim Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Men	1.90	2.06	-0.15	-1.66
Women	1.73	1.67	0.06	0.52
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Men	1.78	1.89	-0.11	-1.16
Women	1.72	1.71	0.00	0.01
Community				
Men	1.94	1.96	-0.02	-0.28
Women	1.82	1.66	0.15	1.34
Government				
Men	1.87	1.83	0.04	0.41
Women	1.63	1.64	-0.01	-0.07
Total Observations				
Men				n = 507
Women				n = 263

Religious Woman vs. Working Woman

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Men	2.06	1.97	0.09	1.14
Women	1.67	1.73	-0.06	-0.54
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Men	1.89	1.89	-0.00	-0.03
Women	1.71	1.78	-0.06	-0.65
Community				
Men	1.96	2.01	-0.04	-0.55
Women	1.66	1.83	-0.17	-1.58
Government				
Men	1.83	1.93	-0.10	-1.16
Women	1.64	1.73	-0.09	-0.86
Total Observations				
Men				n = 754
Women				n = 395

find the community responsible for combating violence. Women were significantly less likely to support policy promotion when exposed to the working Muslim prime (with the greatest change in difference across all primes in this set of tables), and were also significantly less likely to find individuals and the community responsible for combatting violence. When shown either prime (religious or working) concerning the Muslim woman, men tended toward showing more hesitations in promoting policy to combat violence. On the hand, women tended toward finding the community more responsible for combatting violence when exposed to either Muslim prime compared to either Hindu prime, but were less likely to find the community responsible when exposed to either prime about a working woman although neither result is significant.

Table 4: Evaluating Driving Factors — Caste

Table 4 evaluates the effects of caste on conditioning how people promote policies to combat violence against women. When exposed to the prime describing just "a woman," people from higher castes were less likely to vote for policies to combat violence. They were also (virtually) significantly less likely to believe individuals should combat violence against, and were especially less likely to believe the community should do so. People of lower castes, on the other hand, tended toward not finding the government responsible in combating violence when exposed to the same prime. When it came to the prime about Hindu religious women, those of higher castes were significantly less likely to vote for policies to combat violence against women, as well as find both individuals and the community less responsible for combatting violence against women. In fact, the finding about high caste status and community apathy were some of the most significant findings in this study. When those of higher castes were exposed to the religions Muslim woman prime or the working Hindu prime, they were less likely to find individuals and the community responsible for combatting violence against women to a significant extent[8]. When it came to the working Muslim prime, those of higher castes were less likely to promote policy against violence, were significantly less likely to find individuals responsible for combatting violence, and tended toward finding communities and governments less responsible as well. Clearly, those who are of higher castes seem to be negatively driving mobilization around gender violence.

Table 5: Evaluating Driving Factors — Nationalism

Table 5 investigates relative levels of nationalism as a driving force that changes the way people think about and respond to violence against women. Those who self-identify as having low levels of nationalism significantly found the community less responsible for preventing violence when exposed to the religious Hindu woman prime. Those who had higher levels of nationalism also tended toward finding the community less responsible. On the other hand, those who self-identify as having high levels of nationalism significantly found both individuals and the community less responsible for preventing violence when exposed to the religious Muslim woman prime. In fact, the relationship between high nationalism and lower expectations of

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[8] Virtually significant extent, in the case of the community factor for the Muslim woman prime

TABLE 4

Evaluating Driving Factors: Caste
How does caste condition the salience of violence agaisnt women as a policy issue and percieved responsibility to enact change?

Control Group vs. A-national "Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Woman" Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Caste	1.93	1.94	-0.01	-0.11
High Caste	1.67	1.95	-0.29	-1.61
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Caste	2.07	1.86	0.21	1.52
High Caste	1.77	2.13	-0.35	-1.90
Community				
Low Caste	2.00	2.01	-0.01	-0.07
High Caste	1.71	2.19	-0.48	-2.37
Government				
Low Caste	2.00	1.75	0.25	1.76
High Caste	1.71	1.90	-0.19	-0.98
Total Observations				
Low Caste				n = 225
High Caste				n = 129

Control Group vs. Nationalized "Indian Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Indian Woman" Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Caste	2.12	1.94	0.18	1.33
High Caste	1.77	1.95	-0.18	-0.91
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Caste	1.95	1.86	0.08	0.64
High Caste	1.91	2.13	-0.22	-1.06
Community				
Low Caste	2.15	2.01	0.14	1.02
High Caste	1.97	2.19	-0.22	-1.02
Government				
Low Caste	1.97	1.75	0.22	1.65
High Caste	1.95	1.90	0.05	0.23
Total Observations				
Low Caste				n = 240
High Caste				n = 129

Control Group vs. Religious Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Caste	1.97	1.94	0.02	0.19
High Caste	1.62	1.95	-0.34	-2.05
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Caste	1.80	1.86	-0.06	-0.50
High Caste	1.74	2.13	-0.39	-2.21
Community				
Low Caste	1.92	2.01	-0.09	-0.71
High Caste	1.64	2.19	-0.55	-2.98
Government				
Low Caste	1.75	1.75	-0.00	-0.00
High Caste	1.70	1.90	-0.21	-1.14
Total Observations				
Low Caste				n = 234
High Caste				n = 136

Control Group vs. Religious Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Caste	1.95	1.94	0.01	0.04
High Caste	1.82	1.95	-0.13	-0.67
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Caste	1.65	1.86	-0.21	-1.91
High Caste	1.72	2.13	-0.41	-2.11
Community				
Low Caste	1.85	2.01	-0.16	-1.23
High Caste	1.81	2.19	-0.38	-1.93
Government				
Low Caste	1.84	1.75	0.09	0.70
High Caste	1.65	1.90	-0.26	-1.38
Total Observations				
Low Caste				n = 229
High Caste				n = 131

Control Group vs. Working Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Caste	2.14	1.94	0.20	1.39
High Caste	1.73	1.95	-0.22	-1.11
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Caste	1.98	1.86	0.11	0.87
High Caste	1.68	2.13	-0.44	-2.32
Community				
Low Caste	2.01	2.01	-0.00	-0.01
High Caste	1.68	2.19	-0.51	-2.50
Government				
Low Caste	1.90	1.75	0.15	1.07
High Caste	1.57	1.90	-0.34	-1.85
Total Observations				
Low Caste				n = 241
High Caste				n = 123

Control Group vs. Working Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Caste	1.86	1.94	-0.08	-0.65
High Caste	1.63	1.95	-0.32	-1.82
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Caste	1.91	1.86	0.05	0.35
High Caste	1.71	2.13	-0.42	-2.19
Community				
Low Caste	2.02	2.01	0.01	0.11
High Caste	1.82	2.19	-0.37	-1.83
Government				
Low Caste	1.89	1.75	0.14	1.02
High Caste	1.61	1.90	-0.29	-1.57
Total Observations				
Low Caste				n = 239
High Caste				n = 125

Hindu Woman (Lakshmi Kumar) vs. Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Muslim Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Caste	1.90	2.06	-0.15	-1.66
High Caste	1.73	1.67	0.06	0.52
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Caste	1.78	1.89	-0.11	-1.16
High Caste	1.72	1.71	0.00	0.01
Community				
Low Caste	1.94	1.96	-0.02	-0.28
High Caste	1.82	1.66	0.15	1.34
Government				
Low Caste	1.87	1.83	0.04	0.41
High Caste	1.63	1.64	-0.01	-0.07
Total Observations				
Low Caste				n = 507
High Caste				n = 263

Religious Woman vs. Working Woman

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Caste	2.06	1.97	0.09	1.14
High Caste	1.67	1.73	-0.06	-0.54
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Caste	1.89	1.89	-0.00	-0.03
High Caste	1.71	1.78	-0.06	-0.65
Community				
Low Caste	1.96	2.01	-0.04	-0.55
High Caste	1.66	1.83	-0.17	-1.58
Government				
Low Caste	1.83	1.93	-0.10	-1.16
High Caste	1.64	1.73	-0.09	-0.86
Total Observations				
Low Caste				n = 754
High Caste				n = 395

TABLE 5

Evaluating Driving Factors: Nationalism
How do nationalistic preferences condition the salience of violence agaisnt women as a policy issue and percieved responsibility to enact change?

Control Group vs. A-national "Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Woman" Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Nationalism	2.11	2.16	-0.05	-0.28
High Nationalism	1.57	1.79	-0.22	-1.75
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Nationalism	2.41	2.30	0.11	0.72
High Nationalism	1.54	1.68	-0.14	-1.04
Community				
Low Nationalism	2.14	2.37	-0.23	-1.40
High Nationalism	1.67	1.85	-0.18	-1.23
Government				
Low Nationalism	2.26	2.05	0.21	1.22
High Nationalism	1.55	1.62	-0.07	-0.47
Total Observations				
Low Nationalism				n = 169
High Nationalism				n = 186

Control Group vs. Nationalized "Indian Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Indian Woman" Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Nationalism	2.27	2.16	0.11	0.66
High Nationalism	1.73	1.79	-0.06	-0.43
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Nationalism	2.29	2.30	-0.00	-0.02
High Nationalism	1.57	1.68	-0.11	-0.77
Community				
Low Nationalism	2.21	2.37	-0.16	-0.93
High Nationalism	1.96	1.85	0.11	0.73
Government				
Low Nationalism	2.22	2.05	0.17	1.08
High Nationalism	1.70	1.62	0.08	0.55
Total Observations				
Low Nationalism				n = 180
High Nationalism				n = 190

Control Group vs. Religious Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Nationalism	2.00	2.16	-0.16	-0.98
High Nationalism	1.69	1.79	-0.11	-0.91
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Nationalism	2.07	2.30	-0.22	-1.55
High Nationalism	1.50	1.68	-0.18	-1.38
Community				
Low Nationalism	2.02	2.37	-0.35	-2.12
High Nationalism	1.63	1.85	-0.22	-1.75
Government				
Low Nationalism	2.01	2.05	-0.04	-0.24
High Nationalism	1.47	1.62	-0.15	-1.15
Total Observations				
Low Nationalism				n = 177
High Nationalism				n = 194

Control Group vs. Religious Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Nationalism	2.28	2.16	0.12	0.65
High Nationalism	1.56	1.79	-0.23	-1.82
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Nationalism	2.06	2.30	-0.24	-1.67
High Nationalism	1.33	1.68	-0.36	-2.93
Community				
Low Nationalism	2.18	2.37	-0.19	-1.16
High Nationalism	1.52	1.85	-0.33	-2.44
Government				
Low Nationalism	2.09	2.05	0.04	0.24
High Nationalism	1.48	1.62	-0.14	-1.06
Total Observations				
Low Nationalism				n = 171
High Nationalism				n = 190

Control Group vs. Working Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Nationalism	2.34	2.16	0.18	0.94
High Nationalism	1.77	1.79	-0.02	-0.15
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Nationalism	2.41	2.30	0.12	0.72
High Nationalism	1.49	1.68	-0.19	-1.51
Community				
Low Nationalism	2.26	2.37	-0.11	-0.63
High Nationalism	1.65	1.85	-0.20	-1.51
Government				
Low Nationalism	2.27	2.05	0.22	1.20
High Nationalism	1.45	1.62	-0.17	-1.42
Total Observations				
Low Nationalism				n = 163
High Nationalism				n = 202

Control Group vs. Working Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Nationalism	2.01	2.16	-0.15	-0.87
High Nationalism	1.57	1.79	-0.22	-1.88
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Nationalism	2.11	2.30	-0.19	-1.20
High Nationalism	1.59	1.68	-0.09	-0.69
Community				
Low Nationalism	2.16	2.37	-0.21	-1.25
High Nationalism	1.77	1.85	-0.08	-0.59
Government				
Low Nationalism	2.16	2.05	0.11	0.66
High Nationalism	1.46	1.62	-0.16	-1.19
Total Observations				
Low Nationalism				n = 175
High Nationalism				n = 190

Hindu Woman (Lakshmi Kumar) vs. Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Muslim Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Nationalism	2.14	2.16	-0.02	-0.13
High Nationalism	1.57	1.73	-0.16	-2.00
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Nationalism	2.08	2.23	-0.15	-1.35
High Nationalism	1.46	1.50	-0.04	-0.45
Community				
Low Nationalism	2.17	2.13	0.04	0.32
High Nationalism	1.64	1.64	0.01	0.08
Government				
Low Nationalism	2.12	2.13	-0.00	-0.04
High Nationalism	1.47	1.46	0.01	0.15
Total Observations				
Low Nationalism				n = 362
High Nationalism				n = 408

Religious Woman vs. Working Woman

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Nationalism	2.16	2.17	-0.01	-0.12
High Nationalism	1.73	1.61	0.12	1.66
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Nationalism	2.23	2.22	0.01	0.15
High Nationalism	1.50	1.51	-0.01	-0.17
Community				
Low Nationalism	2.13	2.17	-0.04	-0.41
High Nationalism	1.64	1.73	-0.09	-1.32
Government				
Low Nationalism	2.13	2.18	-0.05	-0.52
High Nationalism	1.46	1.55	-0.09	-1.19
Total Observations				
Low Nationalism				n = 549
High Nationalism				n = 600

individual responsibility in combating violence when exposed to the religious Muslim woman prime is one of the most significant findings of this study. Those with high nationalism tended toward lower levels of promoting policy combating violence when exposed to the working Muslim woman prime. Those who were more nationalistic may have more discriminatory views toward Muslims compared to Hindus, considering they were significantly less likely to promote policies to combat violence when they were given either "Fatima Khan" prime compared to a "Lakshmi Sharma" prime. Additionally, those who had higher levels of nationalism tended to promote policy to combat violence when shown a prime about a working background compared to a religious one, regardless of the specific religion.

Table 6: Evaluating Driving Factors — Ethno-Linguistic/Sub-ethnic Identities
Table 6 elucidates the effects that the level of sub-ethnic (ethno-linguistic) affiliation may have on mobilizing people to support anti-violence policies. Those with low levels of sub-ethnic affiliation tended toward significantly finding communities less responsible in combating violence when exposed to the religious Hindu vignette.Those of high levels of sub-ethnic affiliation significantly found, to a greater extent, communities less responsible when exposed to the same vignette. Those of both low and high sub-ethnic affiliations significantly found individuals less responsible in combating violence when exposed to the religous Muslim prime, while those with higher levels sub-ethnic affiliations were more likely to find the community less responsible. Those with high levels of sub-ethnic affiliation tended to find individuals less responsible for combating violence when exposed to the working Hindu prime to a virtually significant extent, and tended to find community members less responsible as well. Lastly, those of high sub-ethnic affiliations tended to find the government less responsible for promoting change when given primes depicting a working woman compared to a religious woman.

Table 7:Evaluating Driving Factors — Religiosity
Table 7 evaluates the effect size that relative levels of religiosity have on promoting policies to curb gender violence. Those with low levels of religiosity were significantly less likely to find the community responsible for combatting violence against women when exposed to the religious Hindu prime. On the other hand, those with low levels of religiosity were significantly likely to find both individuals and the community less responsible for combatting violence when exposed to the religious Muslim prime. Those of high religiosity also tended toward finding individuals less responsible for combating violence, although not to a significant extent when exposed to the same religious Muslim prime. Those of high religiosity, when exposed to the working Hindu prime, found individuals to be less responsible in combating violence to a significant extent. Those of low religious affiliation were less likely to promote policies to combat gender violence when exposed to the working Muslim prime, to a signficant extent. To a lesser extent, those with low religious affiliation were also less likely to find the community responsible for combating violence. Those of high religious affiliation, on the other hand, tended toward finding individuals less responsible in combating violence. Those with high level of

TABLE 6

Evaluating Driving Factors: Sub-ethnic Identities
How do sub-ethnic Identities condition the salience of violence agaisnt women as a policy issue and percieved responsibility to enact change?

Control Group vs. A-national "Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Woman" Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_8	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.96	2.07	-0.11	-0.90
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.44	1.67	-0.22	-1.28
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	2.03	2.03	-0.00	-0.02
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.74	1.80	-0.06	-0.25
Community				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	2.00	2.17	-0.17	-1.33
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.56	1.87	-0.31	-1.40
Government				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.94	1.88	0.07	0.49
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.74	1.67	0.08	0.39
Total Observations				
Low Ethnic Affiliation				n = 267
High Ethnic Affiliation				n = 88

Control Group vs. Nationalized "Indian Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Indian Woman" Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_8	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	2.10	2.07	0.03	0.21
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.53	1.67	-0.14	-0.63
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	2.00	2.03	-0.03	-0.24
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.59	1.80	-0.21	-0.87
Community				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	2.18	2.17	0.00	0.03
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.62	1.87	-0.24	-0.91
Government				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	2.01	1.88	0.13	1.00
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.75	1.67	0.08	0.37
Total Observations				
Low Ethnic Affiliation				n = 293
High Ethnic Affiliation				n = 77

Control Group vs. Religious Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_8	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.92	2.07	-0.15	-1.19
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.60	1.67	-0.06	-0.39
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.88	2.03	-0.15	-1.23
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.49	1.80	-0.31	-1.65
Community				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.95	2.17	-0.22	-1.78
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.45	1.87	-0.41	-2.23
Government				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.80	1.88	-0.07	-0.59
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.55	1.67	-0.12	-0.68
Total Observations				
Low Ethnic Affiliation				n = 273
High Ethnic Affiliation				n = 98

Control Group vs. Religious Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_8	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	2.05	2.07	-0.02	-0.14
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.51	1.67	-0.16	-0.91
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.79	2.03	-0.24	-2.07
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.37	1.80	-0.43	-2.34
Community				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.98	2.17	-0.19	-1.49
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.45	1.87	-0.42	-2.15
Government				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.85	1.88	-0.03	-0.22
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.57	1.67	-0.10	-0.52
Total Observations				
Low Ethnic Affiliation				n = 265
High Ethnic Affiliation				n = 96

Control Group vs. Working Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_8	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	2.13	2.07	0.06	0.46
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.49	1.67	-0.18	-0.91
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.99	2.03	-0.04	-0.30
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.40	1.80	-0.40	-1.91
Community				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	2.01	2.17	-0.17	-1.28
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.46	1.87	-0.41	-1.77
Government				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.89	1.88	0.01	0.08
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.40	1.67	-0.27	-1.37
Total Observations				
Low Ethnic Affiliation				n = 285
High Ethnic Affiliation				n = 80

Control Group vs. Working Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_8	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.87	2.07	-0.20	-1.58
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.56	1.67	-0.11	-0.62
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.96	2.03	-0.07	-0.58
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.54	1.80	-0.26	-1.35
Community				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	2.03	2.17	-0.14	-1.11
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.77	1.87	-0.10	-0.44
Government				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.86	1.88	-0.01	-0.08
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.63	1.67	-0.03	-0.17
Total Observations				
Low Ethnic Affiliation				n = 268
High Ethnic Affiliation				n = 97

Hindu Woman (Lakshmi Kumar) vs. Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Muslim Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_8	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.96	2.03	-0.07	-0.81
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.53	1.56	-0.02	-0.22
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.87	1.94	-0.07	-0.77
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.46	1.45	0.00	0.02
Community				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	2.00	1.98	0.02	0.27
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.61	1.45	0.16	1.57
Government				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.86	1.84	0.01	0.12
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.60	1.49	0.11	1.03
Total Observations				
Low Ethnic Affiliation				n = 579
High Ethnic Affiliation				n = 191

Religious Woman vs. Working Woman

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_8	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	2.03	2.00	0.03	0.46
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.56	1.51	0.05	0.48
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.94	1.95	-0.01	-0.08
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.45	1.55	-0.10	-0.95
Community				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.98	2.05	-0.07	-0.95
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.45	1.60	-0.15	-1.51
Government				
Low Ethnic Affiliation	1.84	1.92	-0.07	-0.93
High Ethnic Affiliation	1.49	1.66	-0.17	-1.71
Total Observations				
Low Ethnic Affiliation				n = 883
High Ethnic Affiliation				n = 266

TABLE 7

Evaluating Driving Factors: Religiosity
How does religiosity condition the salience of violence agaisnt women as a policy issue and percieved responsibility to enact change?

Control Group vs. A-national "Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Woman" Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Religious Affiliation	1.99	2.11	-0.12	-0.89
High Religious Affiliation	1.53	1.68	-0.15	-0.99
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.18	2.06	0.12	0.93
High Religious Affiliation	1.53	1.80	-0.26	-1.39
Community				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.02	2.22	-0.19	-1.40
High Religious Affiliation	1.65	1.85	-0.20	-1.08
Government				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.13	1.99	0.14	0.97
High Religious Affiliation	1.44	1.49	-0.06	-0.35
Total Observations				
Low Religious Affiliation				n= 234
High Religious Affiliation				n= 121

Control Group vs. Nationalized "Indian Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Indian Woman" Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.05	2.11	-0.06	-0.43
High Religious Affiliation	1.85	1.68	0.18	1.00
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.03	2.06	-0.03	-0.27
High Religious Affiliation	1.65	1.80	-0.15	-0.69
Community				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.10	2.22	-0.12	-0.86
High Religious Affiliation	2.04	1.85	0.19	0.91
Government				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.10	1.99	0.11	0.80
High Religious Affiliation	1.54	1.49	0.05	0.27
Total Observations				
Low Religious Affiliation				n= 263
High Religious Affiliation				n= 107

Control Group vs. Religious Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Religious Affiliation	1.94	2.11	-0.18	-1.32
High Religious Affiliation	1.65	1.68	-0.03	-0.23
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Religious Affiliation	1.90	2.06	-0.16	-1.33
High Religious Affiliation	1.54	1.80	-0.25	-1.38
Community				
Low Religious Affiliation	1.93	2.22	-0.29	-2.18
High Religious Affiliation	1.60	1.85	-0.24	-1.48
Government				
Low Religious Affiliation	1.91	1.99	-0.08	-0.62
High Religious Affiliation	1.40	1.49	-0.09	-0.64
Total Observations				
Low Religious Affiliation				n= 244
High Religious Affiliation				n= 127

Control Group vs. Religious Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.01	2.11	-0.11	-0.73
High Religious Affiliation	1.67	1.68	-0.01	-0.03
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Religious Affiliation	1.75	2.06	-0.31	-2.67
High Religious Affiliation	1.50	1.80	-0.30	-1.54
Community				
Low Religious Affiliation	1.93	2.22	-0.29	-2.15
High Religious Affiliation	1.62	1.85	-0.23	-1.22
Government				
Low Religious Affiliation	1.89	1.99	-0.10	-0.75
High Religious Affiliation	1.50	1.49	0.01	0.05
Total Observations				
Low Religious Affiliation				n= 244
High Religious Affiliation				n= 117

Control Group vs. Working Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.19	2.11	0.07	0.48
High Religious Affiliation	1.71	1.68	0.03	0.19
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.15	2.06	0.08	0.65
High Religious Affiliation	1.42	1.80	-0.38	-2.09
Community				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.09	2.22	-0.13	-0.90
High Religious Affiliation	1.58	1.85	-0.27	-1.57
Government				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.02	1.99	0.03	0.17
High Religious Affiliation	1.41	1.49	-0.09	-0.57
Total Observations				
Low Religious Affiliation				n= 237
High Religious Affiliation				n= 128

Control Group vs. Working Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Religious Affiliation	1.82	2.11	-0.30	-2.20
High Religious Affiliation	1.72	1.68	0.04	0.25
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.02	2.06	-0.05	-0.36
High Religious Affiliation	1.47	1.80	-0.33	-1.79
Community				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.00	2.22	-0.22	-1.61
High Religious Affiliation	1.87	1.85	0.02	0.10
Government				
Low Religious Affiliation	1.98	1.99	-0.01	-0.05
High Religious Affiliation	1.40	1.49	-0.09	-0.55
Total Observations				
Low Religious Affiliation				n= 246
High Religious Affiliation				n= 119

Hindu Woman (Lakshmi Kumar) vs. Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Muslim Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Religious Affiliation	1.91	2.06	-0.15	-1.50
High Religious Affiliation	1.69	1.68	0.02	0.16
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Religious Affiliation	1.89	2.02	-0.13	-1.48
High Religious Affiliation	1.48	1.48	0.00	0.01
Community				
Low Religious Affiliation	1.97	2.01	-0.04	-0.44
High Religious Affiliation	1.75	1.59	0.15	1.73
Government				
Low Religious Affiliation	1.94	1.96	-0.02	-0.22
High Religious Affiliation	1.45	1.40	0.05	0.48
Total Observations				
Low Religious Affiliation				n= 515
High Religious Affiliation				n= 255

Religious Woman vs. Working Woman

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.06	1.97	0.09	1.06
High Religious Affiliation	1.68	1.68	-0.01	-0.06
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.02	1.99	0.03	0.34
High Religious Affiliation	1.48	1.53	-0.05	-0.52
Community				
Low Religious Affiliation	2.01	2.02	-0.01	-0.11
High Religious Affiliation	1.59	1.78	-0.19	-2.28
Government				
Low Religious Affiliation	1.96	2.03	-0.07	-0.79
High Religious Affiliation	1.40	1.46	-0.06	-0.72
Total Observations				
Low Religious Affiliation				n= 784
High Religious Affiliation				n= 365

religiosity tended toward finding the community more responsible in combatting violence when they recieved a prime with either a religious or working Muslim, compared to a Hindu. Lastly, those with high religiosity were significantly less likely to find the community responsible for combating religious violence when they received a prime about a working woman of either religion, compared to a religious woman of either group.

Table 8: Evaluating Driving Factors — Ethno-religious Affiliation

Table 8 provides an examination of how majority members of ethno-religious groups, Hindus in this case, may respond to policy promotion and mobilization around gender violence differently than those who are not. The sample of non-Hindus in each treatment were underpowered, so given a sample with more non-Hindus, these findings might have been more robust. Those who were not Hindu were less likely to promote policies combatting violence against women when exposed to the religious Hindu vignette, to a virtually significant extent. They were also less likely to find individuals responsible for combating violence to a virtually significant extent, and were to an especially significant extent were less likely to find the community responsible when exposed to the religious Hindu vignette. Those who were not Hindu were also less likely to promote policies combatting violence against women when exposed to the religious Muslim vignette, to about the same extent. Non-Hindus were also less likely to find individuals or the community responsible for combatting violence against women, whereas Hindus were less likely to find indiviuals responsible for combatting gender violence to an even greater extent when they recieve the religious Muslim prime. Non-Hindus, when they receive the prime about a working Hindu women, were less likely to find the community responsible for combating violence to a virtually significant extent. Importantly, non-Hindus found individuals and community members less responsible for combatting violence against women to a signifcant extent when given the working Muslim prime. Importantly, however, there were no significant findings across comparing all Hindu vignettes to all Muslim vignettes for both Hindus and non-Hindus — it seems necessary to break down these categories further by religious status as well as occupation to find meaningful differentiation.

Tables 9 and 10:Evaluating Driving Factors: Ethno-religious Affiliation and Religiosity

Tables 9 and 10 compare how self-identified religious and very religious Hindus think about passing policies to prevent gender violence (those who gave themselves 4 and 5 respectively on the "Identity" battery of questions). Religious Hindus themselves did not produce many significant findings, but there is one very significant finding: religious Hindus are least likely to find individuals responsible for combatting violence against women when exposed to the religious "Fatima Khan" prime (religious Muslim). We also do find that religious Hindus tend toward finding individuals less responsible for combating violence when presented with the religious "Lakshmi Sharma" (religious Hindu) prime, to a lesser extent. Religious Hindus tend toward finding the community less responsible for combating violence when given either the religious "Fatima Khan" or working "Lakshmi Kumar" prime. Because "Other Hindus" includes

TABLE 8

Evaluating Driving Factors: Ethno-religious Affiliation
How does ethno-religious affiliation condition the salience of violence agaisnt women as a policy issue and percieved responsibility to enact change?

Control Group vs. A-national "Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Woman" Prime μ_1	Mean of Control Population μ_2	Difference in Means b	T-Statistic t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Hindu	1.83	1.93	-0.10	-0.84
Not Hindu	1.85	2.08	-0.23	-1.02
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Hindu	1.88	1.92	-0.04	-0.35
Not Hindu	2.22	2.15	0.06	0.25
Community				
Hindu	1.87	2.07	-0.21	-1.59
Not Hindu	1.98	2.15	-0.18	-0.77
Government				
Hindu	1.90	1.82	0.08	0.59
Not Hindu	1.89	1.82	0.07	0.28
Total Observations				
Hindu				n= 270
Not Hindu				n= 85

Control Group vs. Nationalized "Indian Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Indian Woman" Prime μ_1	Mean of Control Population μ_2	Difference in Means b	T-Statistic t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Hindu	2.07	1.93	0.14	1.13
Not Hindu	1.69	2.08	-0.39	-1.57
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Hindu	1.96	1.92	0.04	0.30
Not Hindu	1.83	2.15	-0.33	-1.38
Community				
Hindu	2.11	2.07	0.04	0.28
Not Hindu	1.97	2.15	-0.18	-0.72
Government				
Hindu	2.00	1.82	0.18	1.41
Not Hindu	1.80	1.82	-0.02	-0.08
Total Observations				
Hindu				n= 296
Not Hindu				n= 74

Control Group vs. Religious Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Hindu Woman Prime μ_1	Mean of Control Population μ_2	Difference in Means b	T-Statistic t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Hindu	1.88	1.93	-0.05	-0.45
Not Hindu	1.65	2.08	-0.43	-1.90
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Hindu	1.78	1.92	-0.14	-1.16
Not Hindu	1.76	2.15	-0.40	-1.86
Community				
Hindu	1.89	2.07	-0.19	-1.57
Not Hindu	1.51	2.15	-0.64	-2.90
Government				
Hindu	1.74	1.82	-0.08	-0.69
Not Hindu	1.70	1.82	-0.12	-0.53
Total Observations				
Hindu				n= 295
Not Hindu				n= 76

Control Group vs. Religious Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Muslim Woman Prime μ_1	Mean of Control Population μ_2	Difference in Means b	T-Statistic t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Hindu	1.97	1.93	0.04	0.32
Not Hindu	1.61	2.08	-0.47	-1.91
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Hindu	1.66	1.92	-0.25	-2.24
Not Hindu	1.72	2.15	-0.43	-2.02
Community				
Hindu	1.91	2.07	-0.16	-1.29
Not Hindu	1.50	2.15	-0.65	-2.85
Government				
Hindu	1.82	1.82	-0.01	-0.04
Not Hindu	1.58	1.82	-0.24	-1.03
Total Observations				
Hindu				n= 286
Not Hindu				n= 75

Control Group vs. Working Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Hindu Woman Prime μ_1	Mean of Control Population μ_2	Difference in Means b	T-Statistic t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Hindu	2.07	1.93	0.14	1.04
Not Hindu	1.78	2.08	-0.30	-1.20
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Hindu	1.90	1.92	-0.01	-0.11
Not Hindu	1.81	2.15	-0.35	-1.49
Community				
Hindu	1.96	2.07	-0.12	-0.93
Not Hindu	1.69	2.15	-0.46	-1.89
Government				
Hindu	1.85	1.82	0.03	0.25
Not Hindu	1.56	1.82	-0.26	-1.13
Total Observations				
Hindu				n= 290
Not Hindu				n= 75

Control Group vs. Working Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Muslim Woman Prime μ_1	Mean of Control Population μ_2	Difference in Means b	T-Statistic t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Hindu	1.77	1.93	-0.16	-1.39
Not Hindu	1.88	2.08	-0.20	-0.74
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Hindu	1.87	1.92	-0.05	-0.40
Not Hindu	1.67	2.15	-0.49	-2.11
Community				
Hindu	2.02	2.07	-0.05	-0.41
Not Hindu	1.50	2.15	-0.65	-2.70
Government				
Hindu	1.76	1.82	-0.06	-0.53
Not Hindu	2.12	1.82	0.30	1.11
Total Observations				
Hindu				n= 302
Not Hindu				n= 63

Hindu Woman (Lakshmi Kumar) vs. Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Hindu Woman Prime μ_1	Mean of Population who Recieved Muslim Woman Prime μ_2	Difference in Means b	T-Statistic t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Hindu	1.87	1.97	-0.11	-1.29
Not Hindu	1.72	1.71	0.00	0.03
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Hindu	1.77	1.84	-0.07	-0.89
Not Hindu	1.70	1.78	-0.08	-0.49
Community				
Hindu	1.97	1.92	0.05	0.64
Not Hindu	1.50	1.60	-0.10	-0.69
Government				
Hindu	1.78	1.79	-0.01	-0.13
Not Hindu	1.80	1.63	0.17	0.95
Total Observations				
Hindu				n= 637
Not Hindu				n= 133

Religious Woman vs. Working Woman

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Woman Prime μ_1	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Woman Prime μ_2	Difference in Means b	T-Statistic t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Hindu	1.97	1.91	0.06	0.85
Not Hindu	1.71	1.75	-0.04	-0.28
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Hindu	1.84	1.84	-0.00	-0.01
Not Hindu	1.78	1.90	-0.12	-0.78
Community				
Hindu	1.92	1.99	-0.06	-0.91
Not Hindu	1.60	1.77	-0.17	-1.25
Government				
Hindu	1.79	1.87	-0.07	-0.96
Not Hindu	1.63	1.83	-0.20	-1.26
Total Observations				
Hindu				n= 935
Not Hindu				n= 214

both "Very religious Hindus" and "Less religious Hindus," which pull in two opposite directions, it is difficult to make general claims about this category in regards to Table 9 and isolate potential treatment effects. That is to say, it is difficult to understand how "Other Hindus" is a driving factor in affecting policy mobilization. In Table 10, however, the binary is shifted to compare the most religious Hindus to all other Hindus, therefore giving us more meaningful information.

We found that "very religious Hindus" similarly, were not driving many of the results except for when it came to the religious "Fatima Khan" prime. For those who received the religious "Fatima Khan" prime, we find that very religious and Hindu respondents were much less likely to find individuals responsible for combating violence, to a significant extent. However, those who were also Hindu and who were not "very religious" were also less likely to find individuals responsible for combating violence, to a significant extent, when given the same prime. Hindus who were "not very religious" also were much more likely to find communities less responsible for combating violence, to a virtually significant extent, when also given the same prime. Very religious Hindus were significantly less likely to find individuals responsible for combatting violence against women when given the "working Lakshmi Sharma" prime. Hindus who were "not very religious" tended toward being less likely to promote policies to combat violence when presented with the "working" Fatima Khan prime, whereas very religious Hindus tended toward finding individuals less responsible to promote these policies when presented with the same prime.

Table 11: Evaluating Driving Factors — Attitudes Toward Formally Working Women
Table 11 inspects how individuals who view working women as a negative influence on children drive effects on policy promotion. Those who did not think that working women harmed children's upbringing tended toward finding the community less responsible for combatting violence against women when shown the working Hindu woman prime. Those who did not think that working women harmed children's upbringing also tended toward finding the community less responsible for combatting violence against women when shown either working woman prime compared to a religious prime. They were also less likely to find the government responsible for combating violence when shown the working primes, to virtually significant extent. On the other hand those who did think that working women harmed children's upbringing gave both working women and religious women lower sympathies for mobilizing against violence, especially when given the working Muslim or Hindu prime.

Effects of Note:

Covid-19 has brought out a significant increase in the rates of domestic violence. The pandemic might polarize some people's attitudes toward gender violence (UN Women 2020, Das et al. 2020). Perpetrators would be more likely to condone violence, whereas survivors of violence are

TABLE 9

Evaluating Driving Factors: Ethno-religious Affiliation
How does ethno-religious affiliation condition the salience of violence agaisnt women as a policy issue and percieved responsibility to enact change?

Control Group vs. A-national "Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Woman" Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Religious Hindus	1.81	1.84	-0.03	-0.21
Other Hindus	1.91	2.06	-0.15	-0.78
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Religious Hindus	1.78	1.90	-0.12	-0.75
Other Hindus	2.22	2.04	0.18	1.03
Community				
Religious Hindus	1.79	2.03	-0.24	-1.49
Other Hindus	2.09	2.17	-0.08	-0.43
Government				
Religious Hindus	1.83	1.76	0.07	0.45
Other Hindus	2.07	1.91	0.16	0.78
Total Observations				
Religious Hindus				n= 156
Other Hindus				n= 150

Control Group vs. Nationalized "Indian Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Indian Woman" Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Religious Hindus	2.04	1.84	0.20	1.35
Other Hindus	2.06	2.06	-0.00	-0.02
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Religious Hindus	1.81	1.90	-0.09	-0.50
Other Hindus	2.16	2.04	0.12	0.71
Community				
Religious Hindus	2.12	2.03	0.09	0.54
Other Hindus	2.11	2.17	-0.06	-0.31
Government				
Religious Hindus	1.92	1.76	0.17	1.00
Other Hindus	2.09	1.91	0.18	0.97
Total Observations				
Religious Hindus				n= 161
Other Hindus				n= 170

Control Group vs. Religious Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Religious Hindus	1.85	1.84	0.01	0.08
Other Hindus	1.88	2.06	-0.18	-0.99
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Religious Hindus	1.67	1.90	-0.23	-1.55
Other Hindus	1.92	2.04	-0.12	-0.73
Community				
Religious Hindus	1.86	2.03	-0.17	-1.10
Other Hindus	1.86	2.17	-0.31	-1.85
Government				
Religious Hindus	1.68	1.76	-0.07	-0.51
Other Hindus	1.76	1.91	-0.15	-0.88
Total Observations				
Religious Hindus				n= 165
Other Hindus				n= 166

Control Group vs. Religious Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Religious Hindus	1.88	1.84	0.04	0.30
Other Hindus	2.05	2.06	-0.01	-0.07
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Religious Hindus	1.54	1.90	-0.36	-2.71
Other Hindus	1.88	2.04	-0.16	-0.91
Community				
Religious Hindus	1.78	2.03	-0.25	-1.74
Other Hindus	2.03	2.17	-0.14	-0.69
Government				
Religious Hindus	1.75	1.76	-0.01	-0.05
Other Hindus	1.84	1.91	-0.07	-0.38
Total Observations				
Religious Hindus				n= 174
Other Hindus				n= 146

Control Group vs. Working Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Religious Hindus	2.02	1.84	0.18	1.19
Other Hindus	2.11	2.06	0.05	0.23
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Religious Hindus	1.65	1.90	-0.25	-1.63
Other Hindus	2.27	2.04	0.24	1.36
Community				
Religious Hindus	1.76	2.03	-0.27	-1.80
Other Hindus	2.15	2.17	-0.02	-0.08
Government				
Religious Hindus	1.74	1.76	-0.02	-0.13
Other Hindus	1.94	1.91	0.03	0.14
Total Observations				
Religious Hindus				n= 161
Other Hindus				n= 166

Control Group vs. Working Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Religious Hindus	1.78	1.84	-0.07	-0.48
Other Hindus	1.77	2.06	-0.29	-1.54
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Religious Hindus	1.73	1.90	-0.17	-1.13
Other Hindus	2.03	2.04	-0.01	-0.05
Community				
Religious Hindus	1.98	2.03	-0.05	-0.31
Other Hindus	2.01	2.17	-0.16	-0.81
Government				
Religious Hindus	1.69	1.76	-0.07	-0.49
Other Hindus	1.92	1.91	0.00	0.00
Total Observations				
Religious Hindus				n= 178
Other Hindus				n= 153

Hindu Woman (Lakshmi Kumar) vs. Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Muslim Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Religious Hindus	1.83	1.94	-0.11	-1.19
Other Hindus	1.90	1.99	-0.09	-0.64
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Religious Hindus	1.64	1.66	-0.02	-0.30
Other Hindus	1.96	2.10	-0.14	-1.03
Community				
Religious Hindus	1.88	1.81	0.07	0.85
Other Hindus	2.02	2.01	0.02	0.12
Government				
Religious Hindus	1.72	1.71	0.01	0.08
Other Hindus	1.88	1.85	0.03	0.22
Total Observations				
Religious Hindus				n= 398
Other Hindus				n= 303

Religious Woman vs. Working Woman

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Religious Hindus	1.94	1.88	0.06	0.74
Other Hindus	1.99	1.95	0.04	0.36
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Religious Hindus	1.66	1.71	-0.05	-0.61
Other Hindus	2.10	2.08	0.02	0.14
Community				
Religious Hindus	1.81	1.92	-0.11	-1.36
Other Hindus	2.01	2.07	-0.06	-0.51
Government				
Religious Hindus	1.71	1.79	-0.08	-0.95
Other Hindus	1.85	1.99	-0.14	-1.16
Total Observations				
Religious Hindus				n= 575
Other Hindus				n= 459

TABLE 10

Evaluating Driving Factors: Ethno-religious Affiliation
How does ethno-religious affiliation condition the salience of violence agaisnt women as a policy issue and percieved responsibility to enact change?

Control Group vs. A-national "Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Woman" Prime μ_1	Mean of Control Population μ_2	Difference in Means b	T-Statistic t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.78	1.69	0.10	0.55
Other Hindus	1.87	2.05	-0.18	-1.33
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.41	1.66	-0.25	-1.15
Other Hindus	2.15	2.08	0.06	0.47
Community				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.73	1.91	-0.18	-0.97
Other Hindus	1.95	2.17	-0.22	-1.52
Government				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.59	1.43	0.17	0.96
Other Hindus	2.02	1.96	0.06	0.43
Total Observations				
Very Religious and Hindu				n= 72
Other Hindus				n= 260

Control Group vs. Nationalized "Indian Woman" Prime

	Mean of Population who Recieved "Indian Woman" Prime μ_1	Mean of Control Population μ_2	Difference in Means b	T-Statistic t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Very Religious and Hindu	2.06	1.69	0.38	2.15
Other Hindus	2.01	2.05	-0.04	-0.28
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.46	1.66	-0.20	-0.89
Other Hindus	2.12	2.08	0.04	0.31
Community				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.98	1.91	0.06	0.33
Other Hindus	2.15	2.17	-0.02	-0.16
Government				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.48	1.43	0.05	0.29
Other Hindus	2.15	1.96	0.18	1.34
Total Observations				
Very Religious and Hindu				n= 83
Other Hindus				n= 274

Control Group vs. Religious Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Hindu Woman Prime μ_1	Mean of Control Population μ_2	Difference in Means b	T-Statistic t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.79	1.69	0.11	0.76
Other Hindus	1.89	2.05	-0.16	-1.24
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.40	1.66	-0.26	-1.33
Other Hindus	1.92	2.08	-0.16	-1.36
Community				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.85	1.91	-0.06	-0.33
Other Hindus	1.86	2.17	-0.31	-2.39
Government				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.48	1.43	0.05	0.31
Other Hindus	1.84	1.96	-0.12	-0.95
Total Observations				
Very Religious and Hindu				n= 83
Other Hindus				n= 271

Control Group vs. Religious Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Muslim Woman Prime μ_1	Mean of Control Population μ_2	Difference in Means b	T-Statistic t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.89	1.69	0.20	1.13
Other Hindus	1.93	2.05	-0.11	-0.80
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.20	1.66	-0.46	-2.56
Other Hindus	1.84	2.08	-0.24	-2.03
Community				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.76	1.91	-0.16	-0.93
Other Hindus	1.90	2.17	-0.27	-1.93
Government				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.67	1.43	0.24	1.34
Other Hindus	1.81	1.96	-0.15	-1.13
Total Observations				
Very Religious and Hindu				n= 80
Other Hindus				n= 263

Control Group vs. Working Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Hindu Woman Prime μ_1	Mean of Control Population μ_2	Difference in Means b	T-Statistic t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.92	1.69	0.24	1.48
Other Hindus	2.06	2.05	0.01	0.06
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.23	1.66	-0.43	-2.18
Other Hindus	2.11	2.08	0.03	0.21
Community				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.77	1.91	-0.15	-0.80
Other Hindus	1.96	2.17	-0.21	-1.51
Government				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.38	1.43	-0.04	-0.28
Other Hindus	1.94	1.96	-0.02	-0.17
Total Observations				
Very Religious and Hindu				n= 74
Other Hindus				n= 274

Control Group vs. Working Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Muslim Woman Prime μ_1	Mean of Control Population μ_2	Difference in Means b	T-Statistic t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.70	1.69	0.01	0.06
Other Hindus	1.82	2.05	-0.23	-1.75
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.33	1.66	-0.33	-1.67
Other Hindus	2.03	2.08	-0.06	-0.45
Community				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.83	1.91	-0.09	-0.46
Other Hindus	2.02	2.17	-0.15	-1.09
Government				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.28	1.43	-0.15	-0.99
Other Hindus	1.94	1.96	-0.02	-0.13
Total Observations				
Very Religious and Hindu				n= 81
Other Hindus				n= 272

Hindu Woman (Lakshmi Kumar) vs. Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Hindu Woman Prime μ_1	Mean of Population who Recieved Muslim Woman Prime μ_2	Difference in Means b	T-Statistic t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.79	1.85	-0.06	-0.54
Other Hindus	1.87	1.97	-0.10	-1.05
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.26	1.32	-0.06	-0.67
Other Hindus	1.94	2.02	-0.08	-0.90
Community				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.79	1.82	-0.02	-0.28
Other Hindus	1.96	1.91	0.05	0.60
Government				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.47	1.44	0.04	0.32
Other Hindus	1.88	1.89	-0.01	-0.08
Total Observations				
Very Religious and Hindu				n= 178
Other Hindus				n= 560

Religious Woman vs. Working Woman

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Woman Prime μ_1	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Woman Prime μ_2	Difference in Means b	T-Statistic t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.85	1.86	-0.01	-0.13
Other Hindus	1.97	1.91	0.06	0.80
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.32	1.35	-0.02	-0.28
Other Hindus	2.02	2.04	-0.02	-0.24
Community				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.82	1.83	-0.01	-0.16
Other Hindus	1.91	2.01	-0.10	-1.23
Government				
Very Religious and Hindu	1.44	1.50	-0.06	-0.63
Other Hindus	1.89	1.98	-0.10	-1.16
Total Observations				
Very Religious and Hindu				n= 263
Other Hindus				n= 834

TABLE 11

Evaluating Driving Factors: Attitudes Toward Formally Working Women

How does participating in the formal workforce condition the salience of violence agaisnt women as a policy issue and percieved responsibility to enact change?

Control Group vs. Working Hindu Woman Prime (Lakshmi Kumar)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Hindu Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Those who believe Working Women have negative effects on Children	2.34	2.15	0.19	0.93
All Others	1.74	1.79	-0.05	-0.37
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Those who believe Working Women have negative effects on Children	2.17	2.14	0.03	0.17
All Others	1.64	1.81	-0.16	-1.17
Community				
Those who believe Working Women have negative effects on Children	2.14	2.25	-0.11	-0.61
All Others	1.71	1.94	-0.23	-1.78
Government				
Those who believe Working Women have negative effects on Children	2.05	2.01	0.03	0.18
All Others	1.59	1.64	-0.05	-0.43
Total Observations				
Those who believe Working Women have negative effects on Children				*n = 172*
All Others				*n = 193*

Control Group vs. Working Muslim Woman Prime (Fatima Khan)

	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Muslim Woman Prime	Mean of Control Population	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Those who believe Working Women have negative effects on Children	1.91	2.15	-0.25	-1.39
All Others	1.71	1.79	-0.08	-0.63
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Those who believe Working Women have negative effects on Children	1.96	2.14	-0.18	-1.16
All Others	1.77	1.81	-0.04	-0.27
Community				
Those who believe Working Women have negative effects on Children	2.05	2.25	-0.20	-1.10
All Others	1.90	1.94	-0.05	-0.33
Government				
Those who believe Working Women have negative effects on Children	2.00	2.01	-0.01	-0.07
All Others	1.68	1.64	0.03	0.26
Total Observations				
Those who believe Working Women have negative effects on Children				*n = 159*
All Others				*n = 206*

Religious Woman vs. Working Woman

	Mean of Population who Recieved Religious Woman Prime	Mean of Population who Recieved Working Woman Prime	Difference in Means	T-Statistic
	μ_1	μ_2	b	t
Do people believe that violence against women is important?				
Effects on Violence Against Women Policy Promotion				
Those who believe Working Women have negative effects on Children	2.12	2.07	0.05	0.47
All Others	1.77	1.75	0.02	0.33
Who should take action to reduce violence against women?				
Individuals				
Those who believe Working Women have negative effects on Children	2.08	2.02	0.06	0.58
All Others	1.64	1.74	-0.10	-1.23
Community				
Those who believe Working Women have negative effects on Children	2.03	2.05	-0.02	-0.19
All Others	1.73	1.87	-0.14	-1.88
Government				
Those who believe Working Women have negative effects on Children	1.99	2.02	-0.03	-0.24
All Others	1.59	1.75	-0.15	-1.97
Total Observations				
Those who believe Working Women have negative effects on Children				*n = 485*
All Others				*n = 664*

might be more likely to condemn it (UN Women 2020, Das et al. 2020). This exaggeration effect has been proven in many public health studies and is described in the UN gender violence handbook (UN Stats 2014, UN DAW 2005). Importantly, people's current life experiences shape their answers to attitude based questions, and people may be in particularly close proximity to abusers at this time (UN Stats 2014, UN DAW 2005). However, both survivors and perpetrators have an equally random chance of assignment to any one particular treatment group. This increases the possibility that the effect of perpetrators or survivors particularly affecting any one group more than the other is due to chance.

Additionally, current events such as the on-going Hindu Nationalist crackdown on Sikh and Muslim protesters, including in the Chalo Delhi movement and the protests around the Citizenship Amendment Act (like the Shaheen Bagh and Delhi Riots), might condition people's opinions. The recent gang rapes of Dalit women from Hathras and Balrampur have also been popular discussions in the media. Given these ongoing conversations and the political, it is possible that people who answered questions honestly may have even represented more extreme opinions than what they might have thought ceteris paribus. Particularly, these might have had an effect on how people thought the community and government should respond to violence considering the government's limited action on these cases.

Analyses and Robustness

In this analysis, I use a difference of means test to evaluate differences between control groups and the six treatments, calculating results to a 95% of confidence.

Unfortunately, some of the results were underpowered. Particularly, the "very religious Hindu" and the "high sub-ethnic affiliation" comparisons lacked significant data. Therefore, the results that were virtually significant in those comparisons are likely to be even more significant given the time, opportunity, and resources to garner a larger sample of those subsetted populations.

Further robustness might have been achieved given the use of alternative data-collection methods. There were several challenges when using the MTurk site for survey deployment. For starters, the survey was delivered in multiple batches. Initially, as I piloted the survey only half the desired amount completed the survey for 50 cents. As I deployed the edited survey, I increased compensation rates from 50 cents to 70 cents, and was still met with a low turnout rate. When I increased the compensation to $1, I received a significant amount of responses in the first day, at about half the goal sample of 2,000 respondents. The number of respondents dwindled the next few days, and I tried renaming the survey several times, subbing in keywords such as "gender" to potentially recruit more women, or phrases like "tell us your political attitudes." Additionally, at first I had a "quality filter" on the respondents, meaning only high performing respondents could answer the questions. This also severely limited the amount of respondents I got in the first deployment, and I received many more responses after removing the

seal. I further tried varying the time of deployment of the survey, between the morning, afternoon, evening, and night. These tactics recruited some new responses, but also many repeat responses which were filtered. But there still was a limit as to how many respondents I ultimately was able to recruit, as these largely created many repeat responses, which were removed from tabulation and analysis.

To mitigate any effects that might occur from respondents rushing through the survey, I used three attention checks. For these, I asked people to mark specific answers (ie: "click strongly disagree here" or "click this answer here") to ensure they were reading the answers carefully, and re-ran analyses.

I further used two manipulation checks to verify that participants had received the survey treatment, that is — to have read and processed the key social identity indicators described within the vignettes, including the name of the woman in the vignette, if any, her nationality, and occupational status if described. All of the information was presented on the same page as the vignettes, so participants could scroll up easily. I re-ran the analyses with these checks.

Social desirability bias plays a particularly important role in clouding people's true opinions on complicated social issues. People are not likely to answer truthfully when it comes to sensitive and moral questions (Krumpal 2013). However, we can assume that each group of people had equal rates of social desirability across the data sets, allowing us to still make claims about the treatment effects. One of the ways I attempted to mitigate social desirability bias was through the means of deployment: the "UN Guidelines on Producing Statistics on Violence Against Women" cite that surveys delivered online "reduces anxiety and social desirability effects" because respondents do not need to convey their answers to a surveyor. The Guide also claims that online surveys mitigate potential "third-party effects of a spouse or other family member being present during the interview" that might occur if it were in-person (2014). I also ensured the survey's anonymity and data protection, which as suggested by Krumpal, can lead to "lower item nonresponse, higher response rates and higher response accuracy for sensitive items (mostly illegal or socially disapproved behavior, but also income) in studies involving confidentiality assurances, although the average effect size was small" (2013).

Despite these efforts, I suspect that social desirability might have particularly affected the incident to which people truly vote for example, considering almost all respondents said they voted in local elections. Additionally, people might have been more compelled to support gender violence prevention policies, as well as mobilize around those issues more often. This bias may have particularly affected men, who might be "embarrassed" to share their true opinions on social desirability.

Discussion

Exposing people to information about violence generally drove down their tendency to vote for policies to promote violence prevention, across all vignettes. This insinuates that the association of various personal biases may change the way that people tend to view violence against women, particularly consider that the most negative effects were produced when exposed to a working Muslim woman.

Particularly, when it came to nationalistic identity markers, the "A woman" prime drove down people's likelihood to promote policy while the an "Indian woman" prime drove up results, as expected. However, these results were far from significant. Therefore, I have weak evidence supporting the Common In-Group Identity Model when examining the population as a whole.

Showing either ethnic identity marker, of either a religious Hindu or Muslim, made scores drop for the religious vignettes, however they dropped somewhat more for Hindus (b = -1.26 for religious Hindus, b = -0.54 for religious Muslims). These results, however, were not significant. But when we consider the full picture, people were less likely to promote policy when exposed to the primes of Muslims across both the religious and working vignettes, compared to Hindus across both the religious and working vignettes (a difference of b = -0.08 across both groups). Although these results also were not significant, we might be wary of bias against Muslims, and potential pathways for these biases be cemented into law considering the high voter turnout of the group (Murthi 2009, Harel-Shalev 2017, Banerjee 2006, Basu 1996).

By itself, the signifier that a woman is a "working woman" compared to a "religious woman" actually elicited more sympathy for policy promotion when considering members of both ethnic groups together (b= 0.65). However, when these stats are broken down further by each ethnic group, there are more adverse reactions to working Muslims, which drove down policy support to a more significant extent (t= -1.71), than for working Hindus, which somewhat drove up sympathies (b= 0.43). These particular observations, when broken down by religion, begin to show us evidence for the male warrior hypothesis in the regard that there were fewest sympathies for out-group women (Johnson 2009, McDonald et al. 2012, Van Vugt 2007, 2009). We also see that Muslim women who work faced more repurcussions than religious working women. This might be because Muslim women challenge social hierarchies across both dimensions of the male warrior hypothesis (Misri 2014, Banerjee 2006, Basu 1996). They challenge Hindu ideals as Muslims, and they challenge the patriarchy by working. Therefore, it is possible that both Hindus, including men and women, as well as Muslim men, might have lower symapthies for Muslim women (Misri 2014, Banerjee 2006, Basu 1996). We begin to see some evidence as to how social hierarchies compound one another and how people are less likely to promote policies around these issues.

When it came to the mechanism of mobilization, we saw variable effects across how people thought that individuals, the community, and the government should approach policy mobilization. Changes across the community level of support were definitely the most salient across the vignettes, individuals were a close second, and the perceived role of the government did not see all too much change. In the "woman" prime, support expected from the community changed the most significantly (b= -0.20). Interestingly, when shown the "Indian woman" prime, expected support from the government increased (b=0.14), but not to a significant extent (t= 1.27). When shown the "religious Hindu woman" prime, people found the community less responsible for enacting change to a significant extent (b = -0.27, t= -2.61), and also found individuals less responsible (b = -0.19, t= -1.89) When shown the "religious Muslim woman" prime, people found indiviudals (b = -0.30, t= -2.95) and the community (b = -0.26, t= -2.34) less responsible for enacting change to a significant extent. The findings were particularly robust for this prime, suggesting strong bias among the sample against religious Muslim women, especially when it comes to mobilizing around policy for them. There was a slightly larger drop in expected community responsibility for working Hindu women (b = -0.19, t= -1.64) compared to working Muslim women (b = -0.13, t= -1.20), but the findings toward working Hindu women were slightly more robust. Interestingly, this suggests that simply being a member of an ethnic majority, as Hindu women are, isn't enough to garner community support (Misri 2014, Banerjee 2006, Basu 1996). Instead, women of ethnic majorities who do not conform to expected community morals, such as by disavowing patriarchal values of staying in the private sphere, are also adversely affected (Misri 2014, Banerjee 2006, Basu 1996). Support for the male warrior hypothesis in that religious Muslim women face the greatest drop in expected community support, and some evidence that bias might be more complicated and nested into patriarchal values as well (McDonald et al. 2012, Johnson 2009, Van Vugt 2007, 2009).

Many of these differences between policy promotion and mobilization were driven by identity differences. While I suspected that the gender and religion of both the participant and the religion of that in the prime would matter the most, what we see are a variety of factors at play.

We see that women are more responsible than men for driving down various means of mobilization around violence against women. For instance, we see differences in community support are driven by women (b = -0.44, t= -2.52) for the a-national "woman" prime, the religious Muslim prime (b = -0.47, t= -2.57), the working Hindu prime (b = -0.37, t= -2.10), and the working Muslim prime (b = -0.42, t= -2.48). Indeed, women were the least like to support working Muslim women, including within policy promotion (b =-0.54 , t=-2.89) as well as in individual support as well (b =-0.42 , t=-2.21). These findings are consistent with the male warrior hypothesis, which claims that women are less likely to show in-group cooperation than men, but also tells us that this is moreso the case across interethnic lines (McDonald et al. 2012, Johnson 2009, Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Dey 2016). Women's role in driving down results can either mean that they are more disillusioned by the role that certain actors play in violence deterrence

based on prior experience, or that they feel that cooperating with others may hinder their own progress in combatting violence against women.

Men, on the other hand, were more salient in lowering their support about the same amount toward the religious Hindu woman prime when it came to mobilization of individuals (b = -0.25, t= -2.12), the community (b = -0.28, t= -2.18), and the government (b = -0.27, t= -2.24), but only to the same extent for community support when it came to the religious Muslim prime (b = -0.28, t= -2.30). Men were also responsive toward working women, showing a decrease in community support when it came to Hindu women who work (b = -0.37, t= -2.10), as well as greater decreases for individual (b = -0.42, t= -2.21) and community (b = -0.42, t= -2.48) support for working Muslim women. The fact that men were less likely to support Hindu women may reflect the mixed composition of the sample, which included both Hindu men and those of other religions. The fact that men are less likely to support working Hindu and Muslim women may reflect the idea that women who challenge patriarchal ideals by engaging in the public sphere are less likely to receive support (Anwary 2018, Miri 2014).

A person's ethno-religious affiliation was not as significant for differentiation between a-national and national primes, but did produce interesting effects on the religious and working women primes. Those who were not Hindu were very likely to have lower support community level interventions for the religious Hindu prime (b = -0.64 , t= -2.90) as well as for religious Muslim prime (b = -0.65 , t= -2.85). The differences across both primes were similar, so it is hard to differentiate if any bais might be occurring toward Hindus compared to Muslim women in this case. Because those who are not Hindu might include those who are Jain, Christian, Sikh, Buddhist, or those who are not religious in addition to Muslims, these results make it difficult to parse out who the out-groups are, but it does show that out-group bias does occur toward religious in-groups. These findings are consistent with the male warrior hypothesis (McDonald et al. 2012, Johnson 2009, Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Dey 2016), but it is more difficult to examine the relationship between these findings and attitudes toward Muslim women, considering they belong to an out-group. On the other hand, those who were Hindu (b =-0.24 , t=-2.24) were very likely to have lower support for individual interventions for religious Muslim women, as were those who were not Hindu (b =-0.43 , t=-2.02). Here, we also see evidence of Hindus demonstrating out-group bias toward those who are ethno-religious minorities, and because these groups are politically active, see that these biases may potentially turn into policy decisions. Negative effects at both the community (b = -0.65 , t= -2.70) and individual level (b =-0.49 , t=-2.11) were magnified for those who are not Hindu when the primes was that of a working Muslim woman. However, once again, it is hard to determine the specific implications of these findings given the variety of religious out-group actors at play here, however we do see evidence that women who challenge the patriarchy in multiple regards are least likely to garner support from them.

A person's religiosity played varied effects. Those with lower religiosity were more likely to show antagonistic behaviors to religious Hindu (b = -0.29 , t= -2.18) and Muslim women (b = -0.29 , t=-2.15), by decreasing community support for them. Those of low religious affiliation were also less likely to demonstrate individual-level support for Muslim women (b = -0.31 , t=-2.67), and less policy promotion for working Muslim women (b = -0.30 , t=-2.20). What we might be seeing here is a bias against religious people from those who are not as religious, and therefore more of a hesitation to assist those who are religious. These could be effects that are compounded with other identity factors. While I expected to observe more support for religious primes from those of higher religiosity at least for the Hindu religious prime, this was not the case as they also showed somewhat antagonistic behaviors as well for both primes, although not to a statistically significant extent. Significantly, those with higher religiosity were less likely to support working Hindu women at the individual level (b = -0.38 , t=-2.09).

When ethno-religious affiliation was combined with religiosity, we also strengthened the evidence that Hindu Nationalism may undergird many of the decisions to mobilize here (Banerjee 2006, Anand 2007, Anwary 2018, Basu 1996). Those who were religious Hindus were responsible for driving down individual-level support for religious Muslim women (b =-0.36 , t=-2.71). On the other hand, those who were very religious Hindus were responsible for driving up commitments toward promoting anti-violence policy when given the nationalistic, "Indian" woman prime. Very religious Hindus were also more responsible for driving down the support that was expressed for religious Muslim women (b =-0.46 , t=-2.56), although other Hindus also played a role (b =-0.24 , t=-2.03) even if not to the same extent. Importantly, Hindus who were not very religious were responsible for driving down community-level support for religious Hindu women (b =-0.31 , t=-2.39), complicating some of our findings. And to strengthen the recurrent theme that women must not only be of the ethnic-majority to garner support, but must also adhere to their code of values, we see that very religious Hindus were responsible for driving down support for working Hindu women and the individual level (b =-0.43 , t=-2.18).

Hindu Nationalist politicians may often co-opt gendered issues to promote their own moral agendas. While these myths may be particularly harmful to Muslim women, who have less space to organize, they also can harm Hindu women. Anwary, when describing Pandey's rape, gives one such example (2018):

> "Referring to Pandey's rape, a BJP politician and the Industry Minister of the state of Madhya Pradesh reconstituted the rape myth that 'women ask for it.' He recounted the story of the Hindu epic Ramayana and the abduction of Rama's wife, Sita, by the demon god Ravana. He stated, "One has to abide by certain moral limits."

We see that even Pandey was not fully met with unilateral sympathies from Hindus — she was a working woman, and therefore 'transgressed' certain patriarchal norms, and much evidence for this trend supported across religious dimensions (Anwary 2018). We also see evidence for what Nayak describes as the "collapse" between Hindu and Indian identities, given that those who

self-described themselves as very Hindu were most likely to support the "Indian woman" prime and constituting some evidence for the common-ingroup model. India, to them, is still "Hindustan." Punyani further warns us of the dangerous ways in which religious fundamentalism can be weaponized by political parties and the government, insisting that "it asserts that women should be confined to the care of the home… It insists that patriarchal control over women's sexuality, fertility, and labour are god given and should not be contested" (2005).

High levels of nationalism were less relevant for most dimensions than gender, religion, or caste, but still had very potent effects for particular groups such as working Muslim women when it came to mobilizing at the individual ($b = -0.36$, $t= -2.93$) and community ($b = -0.33$, $t= -2.44$) levels. Conversely, those who had lower national support had more reservations toward religious Hindu women and demanded lower levels of community support for them ($b = -0.35$, $t= -2.12$). These findings are consistent with the male warrior hypothesis, but were at odds with the common in-group identity model (McDonald et al. 2012, Johnson 2009, Van Vugt 2007, 2009, Dey 2016). By breaking up the data to see how much of a role nationalism actually has here, we see that those who feel most validate by the Hindu nationalist tendencies of the state also show the least support for working Muslim women, who challenge the patriarchy as well as ethnic hierachy in India (Banerjee 2006, Anand 2007, Anwary 2018, Basu 1996). On the other hand, those who feel less validated by the Hindu nationalist tendencies of the state show the most resentment toward religious Hindu women (Van Vugt 2007, 2009). The biases that are present here can also easily be cemented into policy considering the particularly high voter turnout rate (Panda 2019). Assuming that those with high levels of nationalism are likely Hindu nationalist sympathizers, given the Hindu foundations of India, we see that there can easily be tolerance for policies or rhetoric that diminutize Muslim women (Banerjee 2006, Anand 2007, Anwary 2018, Basu 1996). For instance, Einhorn describes how this slippage may occur (1996):

> "National identity can be conflated with, or constructed in terms of, political identity and gender identity in the process of political boundary setting between "us" and "them." Gender can also be used as means of "disciplining" minority ethnic groups within the nation-state, as a means of imposing a homogeneous national identity."

The role of caste was a particularly interesting, but not unexpected finding. My adapted version of the male warrior hypothesis accounts for potential class and caste differences, arguing that those of higher statuses in these regards still maintain much social privilege in other regards, and therefore would have less incentive to challenge the status quo on policies that may be beneficial to them otherwise. In this case, we see evidence for exactly that: those of higher castes were on several occasions less likely to rally community support for just "women" ($b = -0.48$, $t= -2.37$), religious Hindu women ($b =-0.55$, $t=-2.98$), and working Hindu women ($b = -0.51$, $t= -2.50$). They were also less likely to rally individual support, including for just women ($b = -0.35$, $t= -1.90$), religious Hindu women ($b =-0.39$, $t=-2.21$), religious Muslim women ($b =-0.41$, $t=-2.11$), working Hindu women ($b =-0.44$, $t=-2.32$), and working Muslim women. ($b =-0.42$,

t=-2.19). We find evidence here that policy mobilization to combat violence against women must be intersectional not only across gender and religion, but also across caste lines which are particularly salient in India (Thachil 2014, Hasan and Menon 2004, Harel-Shalev 2017). Although other societies may not have caste considerations, there still might be particular economic class considerations to take into account when mobilizing policy.

The salience of ethno-linguistic association was not particularly relevant when it came to promoting policies or mobilizing to curb violence against women, considering that those with both high levels of ethno-linguistic affiliation (*b =-0.43* , *t=-2.34*) and low levels of ethno-linguistic affiliation (*b =-2.34* , *t=-2.07*) were least likely to demand individuals to support working Muslim women. Indeed, these findings do confirm, however, that across undercurrents of other identities, there is still Islamophobic and misoginistic sentiment present. Those with high levels of ethnic-linguistic associations were less likely to support Hindu (*b = -0.41, t=-2.23*) and Muslim (*b = -0.42, t=-2.15*) working women at the community level , but this may demonstrate an overall bias against women who work and challenge the patriarchy.

A persons' value on gender norms and the workplace were not especially relevant driving factors here, showing that identity-based bias overrides personal views on the patriarchy here. It further demonstrates that gendered issues have successfully been "co-opted" or made further political across alternate social dimensions.

Ultimately, we see little statistically significant support for the common ingroup identity model throughout permutations for, except for when very religious Hindus are given the "nationalistic prime" when it comes to policy promotion. However on average, we do tend to see that men, Hindus, and particularly religious or very Religious Hindus who are given national primes compared to a-national primes are likely to show somewhat increased support for mobilization, even if minimal (Charnysh et al. 2015, Gaertner 1993, Gaertner and Dovidio 2000, Vezzali 2015, Andrighetto 2012, Abrams 2004). This trend also somewhat applies to those who are of a low caste status.

Overall, we see intergroup biases at play across gender and religious lines, therefore demonstrating support for the male warrior hypothesis, but also that issues about violence against women have been politicized by other identity factors.

Limitations and Future Directions

The MTurk sample included predominantly Hindus, and I did not get enough data on Muslim individuals to examine how these contours particularly affect them from a respondent rather than a vignette point-of-view. Future studies could be conducted with more representative samples of Hindus and Muslims, and could use a firm to specifically identity Hindu and Muslim

communities within each state. Given the time and resources, it would have also been particularly interesting to examine how the distributions of Hindus and Muslims within particular regions, and how both groups access political systems may play important roles in conditioning what people think about gendered issues. For example, in regions where Muslim men and women may have more reprsentation, would they be less likely to mobilize around violence against women? These divisions might also be particularly interesting to examine along the lines of North and South India.

Future studies may also use representative samples to include more women within the study. This study was largely composed of men, and it would be interesting to examine how the male warrior hypothesis affects biases held by all four perfumations of the hierarchy, including majority ethnic men, majority ethnic women, minority ethnic men, and minority ethnic women. Information on how Hindu and Muslim women mobilize differently may help us identify what other barrieries to policymaking exist when it comes to those who are most directly affected by its implications.

Other future directions might include breaking down which incidents of violence against women ellicited the most mobilization across social cleavages, to understand if gang rape stories are particularly more salient at affecting the way people think about public acts of violence compared to more private acts of violence. Additionally, if we were to get a sample that had representative distributions of household income, it would be interesting to examine how the economic status of respondents condition their incentives to either cooperate with in-group and out-groups.

Moreover, gender binaries are quickly becoming less useful singular forms of understanding conflict. Genderqueer and non-binary people are often excluded from the studies. Many studies also fail to acknowledge the particular circumstances around violence that trans people might face, given they face some of the highest homicide rates in the world. Rather, more useful understandings of these findings may be that those who question the existence of gender as a hierarchical binary, or challenge the patriarchy in other ways, may have different sets of incentives to combat gender violence. Unfortunately, due to the means of sampling (on MTurk), I would have been unable to field for a representative sample of people who are non-binary or trans. Future studies may choose to isolate or examine how these specific populations, including hijras, think about nationalism and the state.

Conclusion:

The institutionalizing of biased social norms into policy should be of great concern to Indians, across multiple social dimensions — especially across religious and gender lines. Anecdotally, we see examples of how "Hindu nationalists have fervently promoted a universal civil code,"

and in the process have displaced genuine feminist movements attempting to create secular means of deterring violence against women (Nayak 2003). Those civil codes have instead been used as a tool by Hindu Nationalists to disparage Muslim ideologies as "patriarchial," while inserting their own conservative norms under the guise of Hindu supremacy (Nayak 2003). Across these vignettes, we see patterns of varied support by Hindu, and particularly religious and very religious Hindus, when it comes to supporting Muslim women, and especially working Muslim women.

One only simply needs to look to the everyday examples of equating gender and nationalism within our language for further proof of these spillovers. Calling a nation "The Motherland" or using terms like "Mother India," the use of the word "patriotic" which comes from the root word "pater" are all real examples of the gendered inscriptions of nationalism. When examined through the lens of India, we see how plenty of Hindu Nationalists have directly played into this imagery. Basu explains that Hindu Nationalist leader Vijayraje Scindia once gave a speech explaining how the place of her dead mother was occupied by the Hindu nation (1996). Further evidence of this language use can even be seen in the strategic labelling of Pandey, then, as "India's Daughter" — an upper-caste, Hindu woman. Indeed, for every gang rape of an upper-caste Hindu woman we may hear, they may be many more for Muslim women that we do not hear.

Understanding the pathways to ethnic conflict are important to prevent "policy spillovers" that would make it harder to pass effective policies that combat violence against women. We see longer term implications here about the implications of how ethnic-majorities and men may try to stymie progress for women and especially those who are ethnic minorities. In doing so, they may try and consolidate their power into institutions by only supporting those they can use to maintain power as the ethnic majority, as we see in this case where Hindu men mainly supported religious Hindu women. Indeed, while the portion of the Muslim population in India is increasing, their percent of the voter share is decreasing, in part to voter suppression tactics, and therefore may compound their inability to represent their views in government (Thaker 2019). I also found caste dynamics, or intersectionality through yet a third lens, may be particularly important when considering policy mobilization.

Moreover, men and women were shown to have different biases at play, especially when it comes to reliance on community networks to combat violence. Consistent with the male warrior hypothesis, men were more likely to reduce their reliance on the community as means of combating violence against women, especially when it came to interethnic vignettes or those where women transgressed patriarchal lines by working. Women, across the board, were less likely to cooperate with one another, especially those who were not religious Hindu women: indeed, there may exist high barriers to collective action on policy issues that directly concern their well-being. This might point to the fact that political parties may further use gender

violence policies as a means to recruit women into their constituencies, considering they do not see their larger social networks as responsible for making progress in these areas. We find evidence that the politicization of gender violence is possible, and that these can be further used to preserve inequitable structures (Horowitz 1985).

In sum, this study expands upon theories of gendered and interethnic conflict to see how they compliment and intersect with one another. Particularly, it contributes a greater understanding of how popular theories such as the male warrior hypothesis or other theories of interethnic blame apply when examining issues across multiple social dimensions. It fills in informational gaps to better understand not only how these mixed incentives particularly apply to mobilization around policy, which has been little studied. It further may suggest that because these policies can be co-opted by personal biases and to promote interethnic hate, the policies that were passed in the wake of the Pandey case have been little more than decorous. Hindu men and women are ready to mobilize around gendered violence when it comes to benefitting religious Hindu women, but are hesitant to do the same for working Hindu women, and especially for any Muslim women. Picking or choosing when to care about gender violence, based on the target, suggests that there must be more intersectionality so that we can uplift and provide support to those of ethnic out-groups as well as in-groups. What this tells us is that there are many complex factors that undergird how people choose to vote about gender issues and why, and that people may not care equally about preventing violence for everyone.

Ultimately, we see the magnitude of power that voters have in cementing their biases by changing the way they would mobilize around women's issues, and that appeals to curb gender violence should strive for greater intersectionality considering these biases.

Appendix

Default Question Block

Consent

CONSENT FORM

Thank you for your interest in our political attitudes research study. We would like to provide you with all of the relevant information you may want to read before you decide whether or not to participate in our study. Participation in this study is entirely optional and requires your consent. If you decide to participate, you can choose to stop answering questions at any point in the survey and withdraw from the research study.

1) The purpose of this study is to study political behaviors in response to different types of information. You MUST meet the study qualifications which include (1) being over 18 years old, (2) living in India, and (3) being able to read and understand English.

2) The study is funded by Emory University via the Halle Institute for Global Research.

3) This study will take about **10 MINUTES to complete**. You must spend **AT LEAST 4 MINUTES** on this survey link, reading the questions thoroughly. If we see that you did not spend at least four minutes, you will **NOT** be compensated. Additionally, please finish this survey in **ONE consecutive sitting.**

4) If you join, you will be asked to answer demographic questions, read a pair of stories, and provide opinions on topics related to politics. **This is a content warning. These topics may touch on sensitive issues such as gender violence and abuse.** Please consider this before taking the assignment. **If you choose not to proceed with this part of the survey, compensation may be affected.**

5) You will be compensated for your time, and we hope this research will benefit people in the future.

6) Your privacy is very important to us. A breach of confidentiality is a potential risk of participation. However, all responses are anonymous and no identifying information will be collected. See (8) and (9) about mTurk IDs.

7) A complete debrief of the research question will be provided at the end of the survey.

8) All responses will be anonymous - mTurk IDs are only collected for the purposes of distributing compensation and will not be associated with survey responses.

9) Note that any work performed on mTurk can be linked to the user's public profile page. Thus, workers may wish to restrict information that they choose to share in their public profile. On this topic, Amazon provides the following information to workers: https://www.mturk.com/mturk/contact

Contact Information

If you have questions about this study, your part in it, your rights as a research participant, or if you have questions, concerns or complaints about the research you may contact the following:

Shreya Pabbaraju and David R. Davis
Research Team
Department of Political Science, Emory University
poldd@emory.edu
shreya.pabbaraju@emory.edu

Emory Institutional Review Board: 404-712-0720 or by email at irb@emory.edu.

By checking the box below, you acknowledge information above, and consent to these terms in taking this survey.
"I acknowledge the information above and consent to these terms in taking the survey."

○ Yes
○ No

Demographics

Do you identify more as a man or woman?

○ Man
○ Woman

What is your age?

○ 18-24
○ 25-34
○ 35-44
○ 45 -59
○ 60+

Are you employed? If so, pick the option that best fits:

○ Full time employee (30 hours a week or more)
○ Part time employee (less than 30 hours a week)
○ Retired
○ Student
○ Housewife
○ Unemployed
○ Working Informally

What is your household monthly income?

○ Less than Rs. 7,500
○ Rs. 7,501 - Rs. 10,000
○ Rs. 10,001 - Rs. 20,000s
○ Rs. 20,001 - Rs. 50,000s
○ Greater than Rs. 50,000

Is Hindi the most common language spoken at home?

○ Yes
○ No

Are you or have you ever been married?

○ Yes
○ No

What is the highest level of education you have received?

○ Primary school or Secondary school (up to 16 years)
○ Higher secondary
○ College or university
○ Post-graduate degree

What caste do you belong to?

○ Brahmin

○ General Caste/ Open Caste/ Other Forward Castes (OFC)
○ Other Backward Castes (OBC)
○ Scheduled Castes (SC) / Scheduled Tribes (ST)
○ Not applicable or Prefer not to answer

Religion

What religion do you identify with

○ Hinduism
○ Islam
○ Other (Jainism, Sikhism, Christianity, Judaism, etc.)
○ Not Religious (Atheist or Agnostic)

For each question about your religious beliefs, select the option that best describes your feelings

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
I am more religious than my community	○	○	○	○	○
The Indian identity is constructed more on a religious basis than a secular basis	○	○	○	○	○
In India, all religions have a right to be recognized and treated equally before the law	○	○	○	○	○

For each statement, please mark how much you agree or disagree.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
I view my nation (India) as an important part of my identity.	○	○	○	○	○
I view my state or province as an important part of my identity.	○	○	○	○	○
I view my religion as an important part of my identity.	○	○	○	○	○
I view my ethnic group as an important part of my identity.	○	○	○	○	○
I view my caste as an important part of my identity.	○	○	○	○	○
I view my gender as an important part of my identity.	○	○	○	○	○

Which food do you most associate with India? Regardless, select the answer choice "mango lassi."

- ○ Mango lassi
- ○ Dal chaawal / Lentils and Rice
- ○ Samosa
- ○ Namkeen

Political Participation

Did you vote in the last election for Prime Minister in 2019?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

Do you tend to vote in local elections?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

How do you tend to vote on social issues?

- ○ Very liberal
- ○ Liberal
- ○ Moderate
- ○ Conservative
- ○ Very conservative

How do you tend to vote on financial issues?

- ○ Very liberal
- ○ Liberal
- ○ Moderate
- ○ Conservative
- ○ Very conservative

Gender Norms

These questions will ask about gender norms. Mark how you feel about each statement.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
Men face just as much difficulty as women when searching for skilled jobs	○	○	○	○	○
Men make better political leaders than women	○	○	○	○	○
Men deserve more of a right to a job than women	○	○	○	○	○
Most women have a lot of control over their lives	○	○	○	○	○
Women have a lot of influence on the decision of who to marry	○	○	○	○	○

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
When a mother works for pay, the children suffer	○	○	○	○	○
It is easy for most women to buy property in their own name	○	○	○	○	○
For this option, please select "strongly agree."	○	○	○	○	○

CONTENT WARNING

This is an additional content warning. This part of the survey will now describe gender and sexual violence.

○ I would like to continue with this survey.
○ I would NOT like to continue with this survey.

VAW Norms - No Vignette/ Control

These questions will ask about attitudes toward gender violence.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
Most women feel safe when in their home from physical harm	○	○	○	○	○
Most women feel safe when in their home from emotional or mental harm	○	○	○	○	○
A woman should be free to refuse sex with her husband or partner under any circumstances	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for someone to hit their spouse or partner	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for the man of the house to throw his wife out	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for someone to deliberately insult or belittle women	○	○	○	○	○
Women who are in public places at night are asking to be sexually harassed	○	○	○	○	○
It is acceptable to catcall, follow, or harass women if they dress provocatively	○	○	○	○	○
For this option, please select "strongly disagree."	○	○	○	○	○

The last question might have mentioned a name and story. What name was mentioned?

○ No name or story was mentioned above.
○ Fatima Chowdhury
○ Fatima Khan
○ Lakshmi Sharma
○ Lakshmi Kumar

In the last question, a name and story might have been mentioned. Where was the subject coming from?

○ No story or place was mentioned above.
○ Work
○ Home
○ School
○ Temple
○ Mosque
○ Unspecified religious services

VAW Norms - Vignette # 1 (Woman)

Consider the following event. You may be asked about this event later.

A **woman** was walking back home from **prayer services**. Men began to stare and follow her. She told them to stop, but they pushed her down, choked her, and threatened to pull out a knife. The men raped her. She was found on the side of the street the next morning, with her clothing removed.

Now you will be asked about your attitudes toward gender violence.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
Most women feel safe when in their home from physical harm	○	○	○	○	○
Most women feel safe when in their home from emotional or mental harm	○	○	○	○	○
A woman should be free to refuse sex with her husband or partner under any circumstances	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for someone to hit their spouse or partner	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for the man of the house to throw his wife out	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for someone to deliberately insult or belittle women	○	○	○	○	○
Women who are in public places at night are asking to be sexually harassed	○	○	○	○	○

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
It is acceptable to catcall, follow, or harass women if they dress provocatively	○	○	○	○	○
For this option, please select "strongly disagree."	○	○	○	○	○

The last question might have mentioned a name and story. What name was mentioned?

○ No name was mentioned, just that she was a woman
○ Fatima Chowdhury
○ Fatima Khan
○ Lakshmi Sharma
○ Lakshmi Kumar

In the last question, a name and story might have been mentioned. Where was the subject coming from?

○ Unspecified prayer services
○ Work
○ Home
○ School
○ Temple
○ Mosque
○ No specific place was mentioned

VAW Norms - Vignette # 2 (Indian)

Consider the following event. You may be asked about this event later.

An **Indian woman** was walking back home from **prayer services**. Men began to stare and follow her. She told them to stop, but they pushed her down, choked her, and threatened to pull out a knife. The men raped her. She was found on the side of the street the next morning, with her clothing removed.

Now you will be asked about your attitudes toward gender violence.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
Most women feel safe when in their home from physical harm	○	○	○	○	○
Most women feel safe when in their home from emotional or mental harm	○	○	○	○	○
A woman should be free to refuse sex with her husband or partner under any circumstances	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for someone to hit their spouse or partner	○	○	○	○	○

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
There are acceptable circumstances for the man of the house to throw his wife out	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for someone to deliberately insult or belittle women	○	○	○	○	○
Women who are in public places at night are asking to be sexually harassed	○	○	○	○	○
It is acceptable to catcall, follow, or harass women if they dress provocatively	○	○	○	○	○
For this option, please select "strongly disagree."	○	○	○	○	○

The last question might have mentioned a name and story. What name was mentioned?

○ No name was mentioned, just that she was Indian
○ Fatima Chowdhury
○ Fatima Khan
○ Lakshmi Sharma
○ Lakshmi Kumar

In the last question, a name and story might have been mentioned. Where was the subject coming from?

○ Unspecified prayer services
○ Work
○ Home
○ School
○ You did not mention a specific place
○ Mosque
○ Temple

VAW Norms - Vignette # 3 (Lakshmi Kumar, temple)

Consider the following event. You may be asked about this event later.

A woman, **Lakshmi Kumar**, was walking back home from the **temple**. Men began to stare and follow her. She told them to stop, but they pushed her down, choked her, and threatened to pull out a knife. The men raped her. She was found on the side of the street the next morning, with her clothing removed.

Now you will be asked about your attitudes toward gender violence.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Most women feel safe when in their home from physical harm	○	○	○	○	○

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Most women feel safe when in their home from emotional or mental harm	○	○	○	○	○
A woman should be free to refuse sex with her husband or partner under any circumstances	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for someone to hit their spouse or partner	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for the man of the house to throw his wife out	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for someone to deliberately insult or belittle women	○	○	○	○	○
Women who are in public places at night are asking to be sexually harassed	○	○	○	○	○
It is acceptable to catcall, follow, or harass women if they dress provocatively	○	○	○	○	○
For this option, please select "strongly disagree."	○	○	○	○	○

The last question might have mentioned a name and story. What name was mentioned?

○ Lakshmi Kumar
○ Fatima Chowdhury
○ Fatima Khan
○ Lakshmi Sharma
○ You did not mention a name or story

In the last question, a name and story might have been mentioned. Where was the subject coming from?

○ Temple
○ Work
○ Home
○ School
○ You did not mention a specific place
○ Mosque
○ Unspecified prayer services

VAW Norms - Vignette # 4 (Fatima Khan, mosque)

Consider the following event. You may be asked about this event later.

A woman, **Fatima Khan**, was walking back home from the **mosque**. Men began to stare and follow her. She told them to stop, but they pushed her down, choked her, and threatened to pull out a knife.

The men raped her. She was found on the side of the street the next morning, with her clothing removed.

Now you will be asked about your attitudes toward gender violence.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
Most women feel safe when in their home from physical harm	○	○	○	○	○
Most women feel safe when in their home from emotional or mental harm	○	○	○	○	○
A woman should be free to refuse sex with her husband or partner under any circumstances	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for someone to hit their spouse or partner	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for the man of the house to throw his wife out	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for someone to deliberately insult or belittle women	○	○	○	○	○
Women who are in public places at night are asking to be sexually harassed	○	○	○	○	○
It is acceptable to catcall, follow, or harass women if they dress provocatively	○	○	○	○	○
For this option, please select "strongly disagree."	○	○	○	○	○

The last question might have mentioned a name and story. What name was mentioned?

○ Fatima Khan
○ Fatima Chowdhury
○ You did not mention a name or story
○ Lakshmi Sharma
○ Lakshmi Kumar

In the last question, a name and story might have been mentioned. Where was the subject coming from?

○ Mosque
○ Work
○ Home
○ School
○ Temple
○ You did not mention a specific place
○ Unspecified prayer services

VAW Norms - Vignette # 5 (Lakshmi Kumar, work)

Consider the following event. You may be asked about this event later.

A woman, **Lakshmi Kumar**, was walking back home from **work**. Men began to stare and follow her. She told them to stop, but they pushed her down, choked her, and threatened to pull out a knife. The men raped her. She was found on the side of the street the next morning, with her clothing removed.

Now you will be asked about your attitudes toward gender violence.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
Most women feel safe when in their home from physical harm	O	O	O	O	O
Most women feel safe when in their home from emotional or mental harm	O	O	O	O	O
A woman should be free to refuse sex with her husband or partner under any circumstances	O	O	O	O	O
There are acceptable circumstances for someone to hit their spouse or partner	O	O	O	O	O
There are acceptable circumstances for the man of the house to throw his wife out	O	O	O	O	O
There are acceptable circumstances for someone to deliberately insult or belittle women	O	O	O	O	O
Women who are in public places at night are asking to be sexually harassed	O	O	O	O	O
It is acceptable to catcall, follow, or harass women if they dress provocatively	O	O	O	O	O
For this option, please select "strongly disagree."	O	O	O	O	O

The last question might have mentioned a name and story. What name was mentioned?

O Lakshmi Kumar
O Fatima Chowdhury
O Fatima Khan
O Lakshmi Sharma
O You did not mention a name or story

In the last question, a name and story might have been mentioned. Where was the subject coming from?

O Work
O You did not mention a specific place
O Home

○ School
○ Temple
○ Mosque
○ Unspecified prayer services

VAW Norms - Vignette # 6 (Fatima Khan, work)

Consider the following event. You may be asked about this event later.

A woman, **Fatima Khan**, was walking back home from **work**. Men began to stare and follow her. She told them to stop, but they pushed her down, choked her, and threatened to pull out a knife. The men raped her. She was found on the side of the street the next morning, with her clothing removed.

Now you will be asked about your attitudes toward gender violence.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
Most women feel safe when in their home from physical harm	○	○	○	○	○
Most women feel safe when in their home from emotional or mental harm	○	○	○	○	○
A woman should be free to refuse sex with her husband or partner under any circumstances	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for someone to hit their spouse or partner	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for the man of the house to throw his wife out	○	○	○	○	○
There are acceptable circumstances for someone to deliberately insult or belittle women	○	○	○	○	○
Women who are in public places at night are asking to be sexually harassed	○	○	○	○	○
It is acceptable to catcall, follow, or harass women if they dress provocatively	○	○	○	○	○
For this option, please select "strongly disagree."	○	○	○	○	○

The last question might have mentioned a name and story. What name was mentioned?

○ Fatima Khan
○ Fatima Chowdhury
○ You did not mention a name or story
○ Lakshmi Sharma
○ Lakshmi Kumar

In the last question, a name and story might have been mentioned. Where was the subject coming from?

○ Work
○ Unspecified religious services
○ Home
○ School
○ Temple
○ Mosque
○ You did not mention a specific place

Incentives to Cooperate VAW

I will now ask you questions about violence prevention.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
I should try to more actively combat violence against women	○	○	○	○	○
My community should try to more actively combat violence against women	○	○	○	○	○
The government should try to more actively combat violence against women	○	○	○	○	○
Violence against women is an issue that **must** be prioritized by **most** political candidates I will vote for in the future	○	○	○	○	○

<u>Survey Debrief</u>
Thank you very much for participating in this survey.

Your unique MTurk ID code to enter on the HIT page is: 298902639.

All information collected in the course of this survey will remain completely anonymous. The unique ID generated from the completion of the survey is used only for compensation and does not contain any identifiable information.

If you have any questions or concerns regarding the content that you have read, please do not hesitate to contact us using the information below.

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