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Building Trust For Democracy's Sake: How Trust Building Helped Determine Outcomes of the Arab Spring

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Abstract

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Why is it that Tunisia experienced the only successful democrat tic transition in the aftermath of the Arab Spring? Why did the Egypt and Libya's democratic transitions fail? What can this reveal about what factors effect democratic transitions? This paper argues that trust is an invaluable asset for the success of Tunisia's democratic transition. The trust built between leaders of Tunisia's main labor union, The Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) and their members allowed for the UGTT to play the role of a watchdog organization in the post-Arab Spring era. The leaders of Tunisia's main religious political party, Al-Nahda, built trust between themselves and their secular counterparts through frequent negotiations and compromises. This trust was seen in the post-Arab Spring period, where Al-Nahda and the secular opposition came to key compromises to ensure that Tunisia remained on its course towards consolidated democracy. Egypt, on the other hand, lacked an organization capable of playing a watchdog role. The Egyptian Trade Union Federation, the organization most similar to the UGTT, was a longtime advocate of the authoritarian regime and failed to build trust with its members. The Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's most powerful political party, failed to build trust with the secular opposition, who saw them as selfish opportunists. The Muslim Brotherhood and the secular opposition's failure to build trust caused both sides to be unable to reach compromises during the post-Arab Spring era. Additionally, this tempted both the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular opposition to attempt to use the Egyptian Deep State to their advantage, which gave the Deep

State the legitimacy necessary to end Egypt's democratic experiment. Libya, on the other hand, had no civil or political society, which caused a lack of an internal watchdog organization. Additionally, this meant that many members of the new Libyan government were members of the old regime, which made Libyans suspicious of their new government. These cases highlight the importance of both kinds of trust in democratic consolidation, and indicates that its presence would support a country's democratic transition.

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Introduction

In late 2010, the Arab World was forever changed when Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian vegetable cart owner, had his cart confiscated by a policewoman in Sidi Bouzid (Time 2011). When he attempted to pay the fine, the policewoman slapped him, spit on his face, and insulted his dead father. After attempting to complain to officials, Bouazizi set himself ablaze in front of the headquarters of local party officials as a protest for this injustice. Tunisians around the country saw this action through social media and the Internet (Al Jazeera 2011), which inspired them to launch protests regarding Tunisia's weak economy, lack of political freedoms, and widespread corruption (The Brookings Institute 2016). Crucial to these protests were the support of the various civil society organizations, such as the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), whose social networks allowed for the spreading of information about protests and allowed them to mobilize their members throughout the country (Miller et. al. 2012, 70). This "Jasmine Revolution" led to the fall of Zine El Ben Ali, the dictator of Tunisia who had been in power for over 23 years (BBC January 2011). This action inspired others around the Arab World to protest, ultimately leading to two major rulers of the Arab World being deposed: Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, who had ruled Libya for 42 years (BBC October 2011), and Hosni Mubarak, who ruled Egypt for almost 30 years (BBC 2015).

However, five years after the fall of Ben Ali, the prospects for democracy are bleak in the Arab World. Egypt's democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood government was surrounded in controversy. The Brotherhood took several actions that were widely seen by Egypt's secular opposition as a broad overreach of power, such as Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi claiming that he was above judicial review in order to avoid changes to an Islamist dominated

Constitutional Council (Wickham 2015). This led to the creation of the Tamarrod (Rebellion) Movement. They created a petition calling for Mohammad Morsi to resign that received almost 22 million signatures (The New York Times 2013; BBC 2013). The Tamarrod Movement also staged massive demonstrations that saw millions of Egyptians enter the streets, causing the military to issue an ultimatum to the Brotherhood: either resolve the rift created between the Brotherhood and the Tamarrod Movement or prepare to be overthrown (The Guardian 2013). The Brotherhood refused and the military overthrew the Brotherhood and called for new elections (Wickham 2015). This resulted in the election of General Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi in 2014, who now holds greater authoritarian power than Mubarak did (The Guardian 2014a). Libya has fallen into a civil war, with multiple "governments" claiming legitimate power over the country (The Guardian, 2014b). The only country of the three that has remained on track towards democratic consolidation is Tunisia, which has maintained its commitment towards a democratic future despite numerous crises. To quote the Washington Post, "Tunisia is rightly hailed as the lone success story of the Arab Spring: the only country that has threaded a path from the uprisings of 2011 to genuine multiparty democracy today." (The Washington Post January 2015).

Why is it that Tunisia has been the only successful country in the quest for democracy? Why did Libya and Egypt fail in their quests for democratization? What does this tell us about the prospects of democracy in the Arab World, and what broader lessons do the Arab cases suggest regarding the conditions that support or hinder the spread of democracy?

Scholars contend that the role of political elites in building trust with members of their organizations and with other elites is one factor crucial for democratization (Cohen 1994, 58; Bellin 2013, 3). In the case of Tunisia, building trust in both manners helped the country succeed

in its transition to democracy. Most of the elites, both secular and Islamic, were committed to the prospects of democratization by becoming personally involved in the democratic transition. They did this through frequent negotiations and compromises that ensured that Tunisia remained on its course to democracy (Bellin 2013, 2). Also, Tunisian elites were committed to dialogue even before the Arab Spring, making it so that compromises were more likely to be reached (Bellin 2013, 3). In contrast, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood government was, depending on the circumstances, either unwilling or unable to create any sort of dialogue with the secular opposition (Haddara 2013, 4). The Brotherhood also took actions to curtail debate, such as rushing to bring a draft of the constitution to a referendum (NPR 2012). In the case of Libya, Qaddafi did not allow for any sort of civil society to grow, making most of those in the post-revolutionary government, the National Transitional Council (NTC), technocrats who were reformists within the previous authoritarian regime (Pargeter 2012, 239). This resulted in great suspicion about them by leaders of rebel militias because of their ties to the old regime (Pargeter 2012, 249).

Such variation in the outcomes of the Arab Spring begs the question: what made Tunisia's major political players during the post-authoritarian period act in a way that preserved democracy compared to those in Egypt and Libya? Why were the members of major labor organizations in Tunisia more likely to trust their leaders compared to labor organizations in Egypt? Why did the secular opposition in Tunisia trust Al-Nahda? Why did the secular opposition not trust the Muslim Brotherhood?

This paper argues that part of Tunisia's success hinged upon prior trust-building efforts by leaders of civil society organizations. Because trust is built over time, interactions must be examined that occurred during the authoritarian period, which is defined as the time from which

the authoritarian regimes in each country gained power to their downfall during the Arab Spring. Vertical trust between trade union members and their leaders was built within iterated interactions, where trade union elites proved to their members that their leaders would work to support the member's needs. This will be demonstrated in this paper through various "crisis moments" during the authoritarian period, where leaders of the UGTT in Tunisia were involved in mediating these conflicts by helping their members and the regime reach mutually beneficial agreements in most instances. For the purposes of this paper, "crisis" will be defined as instances when members of an organization depend on elites within the organization to negotiate with the government in order to achieve a certain goal defined by the members themselves. Examples of these moments include riots, strikes, and mass protests. As a result of acting in their member's interests, the leaders of the UGTT helped build trust between themselves and their members, who saw their leaders as strong advocates on their behalf. This argument hinges on path dependence in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, meaning that these trust building interactions throughout the authoritarian era helped create several divergent outcomes in Tunisia and Egypt in the aftermath of the Arab Spring:

A). Tunisian civil society groups were much more successful in negotiations during the post-authoritarian period compared to those in Egypt, whose labor leaders failed to mediate conflicts successfully during the authoritarian period.
B). Because members of the organizations felt their leaders represented their interests, they were more likely to mobilize on their leader's demand during each country's democratic transition.
C). Because leaders of civil society groups had experience negotiating, crises were more effectively averted in Tunisia compared to that of Egypt, which greatly helped in the democratic success of Tunisia compared to the failure in Egypt.

To investigate empirical support for this argument, I look at the behavior of civil society leaders within trade unions. To prove how trade union leaders built trust with their followers, I examine several crises during the authoritarian period in Egypt and Tunisia, respectively. These

crisis moments are meant to be windows into the relationship that developed over a period of time between members of civil society organizations and their leaders. These moments influence outcomes by creating vastly different degrees of trust between members and leaders in the trade unions being considered, which manifests itself in each organization's actions in the post-authoritarian period. When analyzing these crises, the actions taken by civil society leaders will be discussed, specifically if they chose to mediate the conflict on behalf of their workers or the regime, if they achieved the demands of their workers, and if their members accepted the results of the negotiations. By investigating these important crisis moments, it will be clear which civil society organizations were experienced in mediating conflicts prior to the Arab Spring. I then show how the UGTT national leadership's experience in mediating conflicts during the authoritarian period facilitated the transition process in Tunisia. Additionally, I will demonstrate that, at key junctions, local UGTT leadership placed immense pressure on their national leaders to support their members, which influenced the national UGTT leadership to act in defense of their worker's interests. Egypt, on the other hand, did not have an influential and semi-independent trade union like the UGTT. Egypt's major trade union was the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), which functioned solely as an arm of the regime. This resulted in the ETUF rarely supporting their worker's interests during crisis moments, leading to workers largely abandoning the organization during the post-Arab Spring period.

In the case of Tunisia, the UGTT acted to support their members' best interests through advocating for them via negotiations. This built trust between the UGTT's members and their leaders, which was demonstrated by the member's willingness to strike if called upon by their leadership. Additionally, the repeated negotiations gave national UGTT elites the experience necessary to be good negotiators and ensure that Tunisia's democracy remained intact. In the

case of Egypt, the opposite is true: the trade union in question, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation's (ETUF) leadership rarely acted on behalf of its members and instead acted entirely as an arm of the regime, often advocating on behalf of the regime and frequently denying the demands of their members. This variation is demonstrated in the actions of the UGTT and ETUF, respectively, in the post-authoritarian period. The UGTT played an influential role during the revolution by mobilizing its members and spreading news of the revolution across the country. After the revolution, the trust built by UGTT national leaders gave them enough power to play the role of a watchdog organization in Tunisia. This meant that, if Tunisian political elites strayed from their commitment to democracy, UGTT national leaders could use their capability to call for massive strikes as leverage to ensure that Tunisian democratic consolidation remained on course. The ETUF, on the other hand, actively fought to undermine the revolution and played almost no role in the country post-Arab Spring, with workers demanding the dissolution of the organization.

Trust also influenced the actions of religious organizations in both Egypt and Tunisia in the post-Arab Spring era. Instead of examining trust built between civil society organization leaders and their members, the horizontal trust built between the religious organization leaders and leaders of other secular political organizations will be considered. This is because whenever a crisis did emerge between these religious organizations and the regimes, the regimes almost always cracked down on the religious organization's leaders and their members. Instead, in the case of Tunisia, frequent negotiations and discussions between leaders of Al-Nahda and their secular counterparts built trust between the two. These iterated interactions over time helped built trust that is seen in the post-authoritarian context. Like the trust built between labor union members and leaders, this argument hinges on path dependence in the cases of Egypt and

Tunisia. This trust allowed for religious and secular elites to reach crucial compromises during the post-authoritarian era, which allowed for Tunisia's democratic experiment to continue. This is illustrated by considering all cases in which the secular opposition and the religious organizations interacted or worked together during the authoritarian period. I found that in the case of Tunisia's religious organization, Al-Nahda, dialogue and negotiations with the secular opposition were frequent during Al-Nahda's exile during the Ben Ali regime. This is contrary to the Muslim Brotherhood, whose interactions with the secular opposition were rare, and when they did occur, actually stoked the fears of the secular opposition, who felt that during these interactions the Brotherhood leadership acted selfishly and lacked any commitment to compromise. This created great distrust between the Brotherhood's leadership and their secular counterparts, making cooperation challenging. Al-Nahda's frequent negotiations with the secular opposition made their attempts at negotiations during the post-authoritarian period much more likely to be fruitful. This is seen during the governance of both Al-Nahda and the Muslim Brotherhood. The secular opposition and Al-Nahda were both much more willing to work together and compromise on key issues, whereas the Brotherhood and the opposition were, depending on the circumstances, either unwilling or unable to work together and compromise.

Thus, trust is an important characteristic for democratization in both Tunisia and Egypt, but it manifests itself in two different ways. Within trade unions, the vertical relationships between the trade union's leadership and their members helped build trust crucial to democratization, whereas in religious organizations horizontal relationships between religious and secular elites helped build the trust necessary for democracy. Therefore, one should expect the emergence of democracy after authoritarian breakdown in countries where both horizontal and vertical trust are present. Conversely, one should expect the absence of democratic

consolidation in the wake of authoritarian breakdown in countries that do not have strong horizontal and vertical trust.

The case of Libya represents the dangers associated with a lack of civil society during a democratic transition. Any sort of development of political or civil society was stifled by the Draconian practices of Muammar Qaddafi, leading to civil society organizations being practically non-existent after the collapse of the Qaddafi regime in 2012. This lack of civil society led to a distinct lack in both horizontal and vertical trust. Because there was no existing civil society during the authoritarian era, the transitional government had to rely on technocrats from the authoritarian era to rule. This caused severe distrust between these elites and the leaders of militias, who were wary to support a government composed of members of the old regime. Additionally, the lack of civil society meant that leaders could not build trust with their members in the years prior to the Arab Spring. This meant that so-called "watchdog groups", such as the UGTT in Tunisia, did not exist in Libya, allowing for the Congress to more easily focus on punishing Qaddafi loyalists instead of creating a robust democracy.

Theory

Mass vs. Elite Based Democratization

In the field of democratization, there is debate regarding who leads democratization during each period of democratic consolidation. While almost all agree that both the elites and the masses are crucial in the spread of democracy, authors are divided on when each group is important in democratization. This section will clarify when the elites and the masses play a role in democratization. This section serves as an overview of both theories concerning democratization, and a discussion of the approach this paper will use.

Elite Led Model

Scholars of democratization have long recognized the importance of elites in regime change. Elites play an important role because of their role as the heads of trade unions, political parties, or mass movements, which provides them the ability to mobilize their members if their interests are not met (Gill 2000, 86). This also provides them vast control of political and economic resources, allowing them to significantly influence democratic outcomes. Military elites, on the other hand, have the ability to use easily violence to influence politics in their favor.

One common framework argues the importance of elite bargaining for democratic transition. Przeworski (1991) focuses on negotiations between regime and opposition elites, but can still provide helpful insight. Przeworski argues that “Democracy cannot be dictated; it emerges from bargaining,” and the choices of elite actors determine the type of regimes that emerge (Przeworski 1991, 80). This is supported by Herbst (1997), who argues that countries with the longest lasting democratic governments result from elite compromise (Herbst 1997, 596). Liberalization and democratization within the Middle East also seem to be a product of elite actions. Brownlee et. al. (2015) argues that while the masses were important for overthrowing the government, it was elites that also determined whether democracy prevailed in the countries in question (Brownlee et. al. 2015, 27). In the case of Tunisia, working class citizens began the uprisings because of their great economic grievances (Brownlee et. al. 2015, 27). After this, civil society elites took the lead in institutional reforms, creating free and fair elections and the formation of the constitution (Brownlee et. al. 2015, 27). In the case of Egypt, middle and upper class Internet activists were the ones who created the initial protests on Police Day (Brownlee et. al. 2015, 27). After this, the military ultimately took control of the process of democratization. Bellin (2013) makes a similar argument, claiming that Tunisia was blessed with

elites that supported democratization, and that pushed for inclusiveness and were crucial for the success of democracy (Bellin 2013, 3).

Of course, the masses play a role in this account as well. Brownlee et. al. (2015) argue that democratization did start from below in the Arab Spring cases, with massive protests forcing several prominent regimes to dither and eventually to collapse (Brownlee et. al. 2015, 27). Clarke (2014) looks at the importance of brokers in the Egyptian uprising, especially those of liberal NGOs and the Muslim Brotherhood (Clarke 2014, 380). These organizations, energized by the success of the Jasmine Revolution, persuaded labor elites in Egypt to endorse the revolution and provide support (Clarke 2014, 380). This ultimately gave the protests the necessary cohesion to overcome Mubarak's security apparatus (Clarke 2014, 381). Hassanpour (2014) discusses the importance of media disruption, such as blocking Internet or cell phone service, in relation to mass uprisings. Hassanpour argues that a disruption of media in Egypt prompted apolitical citizens to become aware of the unrest and prompted more face-to-face contact in the streets (Hassanpour 2014, 27). This argument hinges upon the importance of mass-based democratization, which provides further evidence of the importance of the role of elites following authoritarian breakdown.

These developments are consistent with the general consensus in the democratization literature that mass action can play a role in facilitating political liberation or transitions. Bratton and Van de Walle (2003) argue that for many states in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, the process of democratization started only due to massive protests. These instances of mass mobilization forced incumbents to liberalize and introduce competitive elections. In a similar vein, Collier and Collier (2009) place great emphasis on the membership of labor unions whose ability to mobilize and disrupt the economic sector set the stage for political reforms in Latin

America (Collier and Collier 2009, 44). Without the support of labor unions governments have difficulty validating their claims to legitimacy, forcing them to listen to the reformist demands of the unions (Collier and Collier 2009, 44). These reforms are ultimately the result of forged agreements between labor union leaders and elites (Collier and Collier 2009, 104). Diamond (2009) argues that the masses can place pressure on regime elites, who realize that protests have hurt both the economy and their legitimacy (Diamond 2009, 53) This can force the elites to think democratically, as they realize that they cannot hold onto power forever (Diamond 2009, 102). Diamond also places an emphasis on members of civil society groups, whose mobilizing ability places pressure on elites to act (Diamond 2009, 53). However, he does not specify what factors influence the mobilization potential of civil society organizations. This failure to articulate why certain civil society organizations are more effective in mobilizing their members than others is a significant gap in the literature that this study strives to fill.

While undoubtedly mass action was a critical element in regime breakdown during the Arab Spring, it is difficult to claim that mass behavior was the determining factor in the outcomes observed in the region. First, note that mass mobilization occurred in all of the cases – Tunisia, Egypt, Libya – but democracy emerged and has survived in only one of them. Again, mass protests were important in setting the wheels in motion, destabilizing the old authoritarian regimes. But they did not determine which regimes emerged to replace the old ones. Mass movements, such as the ones seen during the Arab Spring, often times cannot be sufficiently sustained into the democratization process (Gill 2000, 62). Second, whether democracy emerged in one case versus the others cannot be explained simply by the presence or absence of mass support for democracy. There is a distinct lack of variation in support for democracy in Egypt and Tunisia. In Zoubir and White (2016), 89% of Tunisians argued that democracy is the best

form of government (Zoubir and White 2016, 24) and in Tessler (2003), around 78% of Egyptians either strongly favor or favor democracy (Tessler 2003, 175-81). Therefore, one would expect similar democratic outcomes in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, which was not the case. Because of this many scholars look towards regime elites to lead during democratization; elites must be willing to work together, they must establish democratic institutions, and they must protect the democratization process from threats. Elites from outside the regime are usually involved in negotiations because they are the heads of major movements, parties, or unions, and thus have the power to mass-mobilize if they are not satisfied with the democratic transition (Gill 2000, 86).

The Approach Used in This Paper

To explain Arab Spring regime outcomes, I rely primarily on an elite-focused framework, but incorporate citizens in the explanation by focusing on their role as members of organizations that are led by critical elites. Specifically, I argue that, in Tunisia, repeated interactions between the elites within the UGTT and elites within the authoritarian regime provided UGTT elites with the necessary skills to become successful negotiators during the post-authoritarian period. Additionally, through repeated interactions, Al-Nahda elites built trust with secular political elites by engaging in negotiations and making compromises, providing the trust necessary for these elites to work together to combat the influence of the Tunisian "Deep State" and reach key compromises that maintained Tunisia's course towards democratic consolidation. However, the importance of the masses cannot be fully discounted. The relationship between civil society elites and members of their organizations was critical because the foundation of these elites' power lie in their membership. These elites would not have been important actors during the transitional period if they had not led organizations with significant numbers of members. But in

order for their power to be fully realized, these elites needed to ensure that their members would follow their lead. For this, leaders of these organizations needed to have built trust with their members over the course of time.

Building Trust Between Members and Elites

There is a vast literature regarding how trust is built between elites and their members. Solomon and Flores (2003) argue that a way to build trust is with competence in one's role (Solomon and Flores 2003, 93). Additionally, great trust can be built in times of crisis. During periods of high stress, if the persons involved the crisis react competently and diligently, strong bonds of trust can be created with all of those involved in the crisis (Solomon and Flores 2003, 97). Hardin (2006) argues that trust implies that one's interests are considered when decisions are made (Hardin 2006, 17). Scholars also agree that trust can only be built through a history of interactions, which provides one with the information that an individual is trustworthy (Hardin 2006, 18; Deutsch 1958, 272; McLain and Hackman 1999, 156 and 161).

Building Trust Between Elites

There are also many ways that leaders of political parties can build trust between them and other political elites. Przeworski (1991) argues that personal contact through negotiation brings rapprochement among individuals. Bellin (2013) argues that with repeated dialogue, compromises and coalitions are more easily created and players will be more likely to remain on board (Bellin 2013, 3). In Bendahmane and McDonald (1986), an extension of this argument is made. The authors posit that promises and commitments cannot be maintained without trust (Bendahmane and McDonald 1986, 245). Additionally, the authors explain that creating doubts in the other player's position, such as making an intelligent counterargument to a proposed policy, is crucial for compromise, and this can only be achieved through trust (Bendahmane and

McDonald 1986, 246-7). The authors argue that continuous negotiations provide experience and a general knowledge of the players and the process (Bendahmane and McDonald 1986, 267). This experience is highly significant for finding an agreeable compromise (Bendahmane and McDonald 1986, 206). Martin (2016) makes a similar argument, claiming that repeated interactions will decrease the number of self-interested decisions made by either party (Martin 2016, 13). Additionally, these interactions allow for both parties to grasp the other's point of view and perspectives (Martin 2016, 13). Leach and Sabatier (2005) also emphasize the importance of past negotiations, arguing that the decision of trust is based on how one's opponent acted in a similar position in prior negotiations (Leach and Sabatier 2005, 492).

An important question within this literature is why exactly elites negotiate in the first place. This question is greatly under-investigated, with theories as to why this occurred, such as if other means of political action, such as lobbying, litigation, or the status quo, cannot produce the results wanted by both parties (Leach and Sabatier 2005, 494). However, these theories are not relevant to this work. Thus, this cannot be directly addressed within the context of this work and should be the subject of subsequent research.

The Importance of Unions and Religious Organizations

Both trade unions and religious organizations can play a vital role in democratization. Trade unions hold great power for a variety of reasons. First, they have great political capital because of their ability to mass mobilize their supporters if needed (Gill 2000, 86). This is crucial for the creation of agreements or pacts between trade unions and governments, because it provides an enforcement capability to the unions, such as the 2013 agreement created by the Quartet in Tunisia (Gill 2000, 86). This is fitting for countries where political parties have little potential to mobilize, especially in which harsh limitations on political parties are put in place by

the regime (Gill 2000, 62). Additionally, trade unions have an ability to disrupt the economic sector by striking, further increasing their political capital (Collier and Collier 2009, 41). Authoritarian governments must maintain their hegemony, and one way this can be done is through support by trade unions (Pratt 2007, 11). Thus, trade unions rescinding their support for the regime could provide a window for regime change to occur within an authoritarian system. Collier and Collier (2009) support this, arguing that labor organizations can provide authoritarian regimes legitimacy (Collier and Collier 2009, 44).

Religious organizations also have the potential to mobilize their members on a mass basis, similar to that of trade unions (Gill 2000, 86). Additionally, like trade unions, support from religious organizations can allow for authoritarian governments to keep their hegemonic power, making their support or ambivalence towards the regime critical (Pratt 2007, 11). Additionally, religious organizations can take advantage of religious collective life, such as spreading information about their organization at mosques, in ways that secular organizations cannot (Masoud 2014, 10). Additionally, these organizations can claim social welfare services, such as providing goods to the poor, as a part of their platform, which builds their popularity within the society they are operating (Cammett and Luong 2014, 12). This allows for religious organizations to build grassroots networks in countries where most political opposition is banned or severely restrained, providing religious groups the potential to be important political players during the initial stages of democratic consolidation. Within the context of the Arab World, this “Islamist Political Advantage” often fades when secular organizations have time to build their own networks throughout the country, but the fact remains that these factors make religious organizations powerful political players during democratic consolidation in the Arab World (Masoud 2014, 12).

Methodology

My hypothesis is as follows. In the case of Tunisia, the leadership of the UGTT built trust between themselves and their members by successfully negotiating with the regime to achieve concessions that their members wanted. This provided the UGTT with the power necessary to become a watchdog group in post-authoritarian Tunisia. This was possible because this trust built allowed for leaders to call on their members to strike during the post-authoritarian period if Tunisia strayed from its course towards democracy. Additionally, the UGTT was provided with vital experience negotiating, which they used during the post-Arab Spring era to ensure that compromises were made during key moments in Tunisia's democratic transition. Egypt's ETUF leaders were unwilling to advocate for their members, causing distrust between the members and their leaders. This caused large numbers of workers to abandon the ETUF during the post-authoritarian era, denying the opportunity for the ETUF to become a watchdog group, which, even if the opportunity existed, ETUF leaders would be unwilling to act as such. Additionally, Tunisia's Al-Nahda built trust between themselves and secular opposition elites through frequent negotiations and compromises during their time as an exiled organization under Ben Ali. This trust benefited Tunisia's transition to democracy during the post-authoritarian period, where Al-Nahda and the secular opposition were more willing to negotiate and reach key compromises that helped Tunisia continue its democratic experiment. The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's secular opposition, on the other hand, rarely interacted with each other. When they did, the secular opposition saw the Brotherhood as only acting in their interest and sought to dominate the interactions. During the post-authoritarian period, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the secular opposition worsened, turning the distrust into hostility, tempting both the Brotherhood and the opposition to use Egypt's "Deep State" to gain an advantage over their

opponents. Additionally, this caused the Brotherhood and the secular opposition, depending on the situation, to be either unwilling or unable to negotiate and compromise in order to continue Egypt's quest towards democracy.

In order to test the hypothesis regarding building vertical trust, there will be an examination of "crisis moments" in both Egypt and Tunisia. The specific crisis moments will be chosen based on several criteria. First, there must be sufficient data available on the crisis. There are often times little data to be found on these moments, simply because it may be damaging to the authoritarian government's reputation. Yet, this limitation does not detract from the critical moments' causal importance. This is because the events included were ones that were highly publicized, meaning that all members of the organizations in question had access to information about each crisis. Second, these organizations must have played a role in the post-authoritarian era. Third, this study will be examining crises where the civil society group involved in each crisis has a similar group in either country. Specifically, the organizations that will be considered are religious and labor organizations. For labor organizations, the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), and the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) will be the groups considered in this study. Regarding religious organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Al-Nahda in Tunisia will be considered. Each of these organizations will be examined in depth in the following section.

First, the vertical trust between members and their leaders will be discussed. The crises will be examined in the following way. First, the general background of the crisis in question will be provided. Second, there will be several crises examined. In the case of the UGTT, there will be an examination of the General Strike of 1977, the General Strikes from 1983-6, and the Gafsa Strike in 2008. For the ETUF, the Esco Strikes of 1984, the Misr Spinning and Weaving

Strikes from 2006 to 2007, and the General Strike of 2008 will be considered. After this, there will be an examination of whether the elites engaged in trust building behavior. This includes whether labor elites negotiated on behalf of either the government or their labor union, whether they achieved the demands set out by the members of their labor organization, and whether the results of the negotiations were accepted by the members of their labor union. Finally, there will be an analysis of the events that transpired, specifically how this crisis impacted the relations between the masses and the elites within the civil society organization.

After this, the horizontal trust built between religious organizations and the secular opposition is discussed. First, there will be a section regarding why vertical trust is not applicable in this case. After this, there will be an examination of both religious organizations' crisis moments during their existence and how the regime frequently met these with repression. Then, there will be an examination of each religious organization's interactions with the secular opposition within each country, and how it affected the relationship between the religious organizations and the secular opposition during the post-authoritarian period.

Historical Context

In this section, I will be laying out the basic history of each of the organizations that will be considered. Their histories will be divided into two sections: "The Authoritarian Era" and "The Arab Spring and Beyond". The information provided in the first section will discuss the history that occurred from the inception of each group to the immediately before the Arab Spring. The information provided in the second section will detail the history from the Arab Spring until today. These histories will especially emphasize components in their histories that may be indicative of their actions during democratization. Additionally, these organizations will be compared to demonstrate the dichotomy that emerged between the actions taken by the ETUF

and UGTT regarding unions and Al-Nahda and the Muslim Brotherhood in regard to religious organizations.

UGTT

The Authoritarian Era

The Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) holds the honor of being the first national organization in the country (Yousfi 2013, 23). Founded in 1946 under French colonial rule (Omri, 2013), it quickly gained popularity over the European unions that were operating during that period (Moore, 1965). The French allowed for the UGTT to form in hopes of taking Tunisians away from other communist led unions (Alexander 2010, 31) The UGTT played a large role in the quest for independence from France, taking actions such as building ties with American and European labor unions to publicize Tunisia's fight for independence (Alexander 2010, 32). This resulted in the UGTT being the only organization that had almost as much power as the new ruling Neo-Destour Party in the post-independence era (Vanderwalle 1988, 605).

After Tunisia's independence, the country's leader, Habib Bourguiba, wished to subordinate the UGTT (Pratt 2007, 54). Bourguiba succeeded in making them junior partners with the state, until finally making the UGTT part of the regime in 1965 (Vanderwalle 1988, 605). Their role in the independence movement secured the UGTT an influential place within Tunisian society (Angrist 2013, 14). Additionally, the government was compelled to allow for some dissent and independence in order to restrain the UGTT from asking for large labor concessions, which would place a large economic strain on the regime (Benin 2015, 73). There were no legal guarantees on this, allowing the government to crack down on the UGTT if need be. In other words, it was placed in a position of both submission while maintaining some independence (Puschra and Burke 2013, 23). This independence was usually flexed during

moments of crisis (Puschra and Burke 2013, 23), but was seen periodically within its local branches. The discrepancy between the national, regional, and local branches is frequent and well documented. Often times, those in the national leadership were removed and replaced with those more loyal to the regime, such as in the aftermath of national strikes (Bishara 2014, 3). However, local branches almost always maintained their independence and used it to support worker's demands and democratic practices if the regional or national leadership refused (Bishara 2014, 3). Additionally, these local branches would place great pressure on the national leadership to act during times of crisis. During times of crises, the national, or in some cases the local UGTT leadership would send lists of demands (Disney 1978, 13), plan strikes (Disney 1978, 13) or would support political or social movements that actively opposed the authoritarian government (Puschra and Burke 2013, 23). The government would often rein in the UGTT by either conceding, or, in times of severe crisis, by repressing and arresting their leadership.

As a result of the socialist policies during the 1950s and 1960s, the UGTT leadership happily played the role of both defending the rights of workers and controlling them (Disney 1978, 13). However, during the 1970s Bourguiba radically changed his economic policies from socialist, pro-worker policies to neo-liberal policies. Additionally, Bourguiba blamed Ahmed Ben Salah, creator of the socialist policies and former General Secretary of the UGTT, for their failure and fired him in 1969 (Moore 1988, 179). There was growing resistance against these policies amongst the ranks, particularly white collar workers, who demanded that the UGTT call for a general strike (Beinin 2001, 155). The UGTT leadership negotiated a "social contract" of sorts, which indexed wages according to both inflation and increased productivity (Shabon 1985, 6). However, the government did not actually do this, leading the UGTT to separate themselves from the government and to lead strikes against them in 1978, the details of which will be

mentioned in the UGTT's first crisis (Puschra and Burke 2013, 23). The government cracked down severely upon the UGTT and arrested many of their leaders (Walt 1984). However, the government then released these leaders and allowed for the UGTT to regain part of its independence (Walt, 1984). The Ben Ali government tolerated some opposition from the UGTT, which intermittently continued throughout his reign, in hopes of keeping its support of the regime. Strikes continued after this, but none were approved by the UGTT central committee (Beinin 2001, 156). In the 1990s, the UGTT agreed to respect President Ben Ali's efforts to liberalize, provided that the government respected the rights of workers (US Department of Labor 1996, 3). The Ben Ali government obliged, providing six consecutive annual worker's pay increases (US Department of Labor 1996, 4).

In the early 2000s, a new generation of members joined the leadership of the UGTT. These members were not necessarily leftists, but they strongly believed in the UGTT's autonomy from the state (Beinin 2015, 71). These members constituted 90% of the UGTT's local, regional and national leadership (Beinin 2015, 71). Their views were expressed in a variety of ways. Several regional offices of the UGTT refused to support Ben Ali's 2004 presidential campaign and refused to run candidates for the upper house of Tunisia's parliament (Beinin 2015, 71). On the eve of the Jasmine Revolution, the UGTT had over 350,000 members (Angrist 2013, 14). The most powerful members were its phosphate miners, public-transportation workers, bank employees, postal and communications workers, and teachers, and their membership was scattered across the country (Alexander 2000, 475).

The Arab Spring and Beyond

The UGTT played a large role in both supporting the protests in Sidi Bouzid and helping the protests expand across the country (Miller et. al. 2012, 70). In fact, UGTT members took

Bouazizi to the hospital and were the first to report Bouazizi's self-immolation to the international press (Mannone 2016; Beinin 2015, 101). The day after Bouazizi's self-immolation, clashes between protestors and the regime led to the arrest of multiple protestors. The local UGTT branch in Sidi Bouzid negotiated for their release, which greatly supported the revolution by allowing for the protestors to return to revolutionary activities (Beinin 2015, 104). The UGTT also used its education unions, a fiercely independent and democratic faction within the UGTT, to organize unemployed workers to protest Tunisia's neoliberal economic policies and its refusal to engage in meaningful dialogue with the political opposition (Alexander 2011). This was done in cities all around the country, including Tunisia's capital, Tunis (International Crisis Group, 2011).

The leadership of central committee of the UGTT were hesitant to support the revolution, but significant pressure from below forced their hand (Beinin 2015, 105). They authorized strikes in Sfax on January 12th, the UGTT heartland, and a variety of other regions, including Tunis, on January 14th (Beinin 2015, 105). Following the Tunis strike, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia, effectively signaling the end of authoritarian rule in Tunisia (Beinin 2015, 106).

After the fall of Ben Ali, the UGTT continued their activist role within the country. First, the UGTT ousted all supporters of Ben Ali from their leadership positions (Marks 2015). When the transitional government, headed by Mohammad Ghannouchi, was hesitant to remove members of the Ben Ali regime from the government, the UGTT mobilized their workers to travel to Tunis to force the government to act (Bellin 2013, 2). Additionally, the UGTT, along with 27 other NGOs, created the Council to Protect the Revolution (Brownlee et. al. 2015, 128). This group was eventually merged with the Higher Committee for Political Reform, a governmental organization of legal experts (Brownlee et. al. 2015, 129). This became the de

facto legislature until parliamentary elections were held (Brownlee et. al. 2015, 130). The major achievement of this organization was the creation of an independent, non-governmental organization to oversee elections to ensure their freedom (Brownlee et. al. 2015, 132). The UGTT also created a National Dialogue, which brought international experts to speak to over 70 civil society organizations about the issues plaguing Tunisia's transition (Fraihat 2016, 192). Within this dialogue, issues such as the independence of the judiciary and the role of Islam as a source of legislation were discussed, and a roadmap for Tunisia's transition was created (Fraihat 2016, 85).

In 2013, tensions began to grow between Al-Nahda, which won a plurality in the elections of 2011, and the UGTT, which was becoming wary of Al-Nahda's increased power. The tensions grew after an attack on the American Embassy in Tunis by radical Islamists and two assassinations of major opponents of Al-Nahda by Jihadists (Marks 2015). Many Tunisians were concerned that Al-Nahda may have been supportive of the jihadists in some sort of way, which led to a general strike by the UGTT and brought the democratic transition to a standstill (Marks 2015). Nidaa Tunis, a party made of former members of the authoritarian regime and the other major opposition party, attempted to take advantage of the situation by calling for the resignation of the government and the dissolution of the Transitional Constituent Assembly (Marks 2015). This caused a standoff between Nidaa and Al-Nahda, but the UGTT chose to mediate the crisis. The UGTT created a 'quartet' of organizations, which consisted of the UGTT, the Tunisian Order of Lawyers, the Tunisian Human Rights League and the Employer's Association (UTICA), to mediate the situation and reach a compromise (Chan 2015). A comprise was reached where Al-Nahda's leaders would abdicate all their cabinet positions in three weeks, the Constituent Assembly would finish the constitution, and elections would be held in 2014

(Marks 2015). As a result of this, the quartet was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015 (Chappell 2015).

ETUF

Authoritarian Era

The Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) was created in 1957 by President Gamal Nasser and over 101 union leaders by combining several unions and professional organizations (Alexander et. al. 2014, 43; Goldberg 1996, 180). This is contrary to the UGTT, which was created independent of the state and later became co-opted by the Bourguiba regime. The ETUF was created not as a way to meet the demands of the workers, but instead to provide a way to meet the needs of the state as defined by the president (Alexander et. al. 2014, 43). Workers would be provided economic benefits and job security in exchange for being politically obedient (Bishara 2014, 2). The ETUF was also provided a legal monopoly on unionization, which was meant to ensure the government's control over the workers (Bishara 2014, 2). Additionally, the ETUF must approve all strikes before they occur; they can only be approved "by 2/3 of the executive committee of the national-level sector union to which all local union committees must belong, and then be ratified by the ETUF executive committee" (Beinin 2009, 449). As a result of this, there have only been two strikes actually approved by the ETUF since 1957 (Beinin 2009, 449). Often times this resulted in strikes planned by workers against the leaders of the ETUF, which led to long and drawn out confrontation between the workers and the regime, which was often represented by the ETUF (Alexander 2010, 249). However, there were no major strikes and revolts until 1967 because of the pro-worker policies advocated by Nasser (Bernard-Maugiron and Hopkins 2008, 103). After this, the union still did not approve of strikes, but were selectively cooperative with the regime (Bernard-Maugiron and Hopkins 2008, 105). This did

not prevent strikes from occurring, such as the Hadisolb strike in 1989, which was planned by independent worker's committees and directly questioned the legitimacy of the ETUF as the organization meant to represent workers in Egypt (Bernard-Maugiron and Hopkins 2008, 104). While there were independent strikes under the UGTT (Beinin 2015, 83), it did not occur with the same regularity as that of the ETUF. The ETUF was provided more power under Anwar Sadat, who did this to appease workers and to prevent them from striking (Bianchi 1986, 438). Additionally, during the privatization that occurred under both Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, the ETUF made no effort to unionize private sector workers (Benin 2015, 74).

In the 1990s, similar to the UGTT, the ETUF rapidly abandoned the idea of opposing privatization (Bernard-Maugiron and Hopkins 2008, 105). In 2002, the ETUF did not protest a law that both restricted workers' rights to strike and removed restrictions in regard to firing employees (Bernard-Maugiron and Hopkins 2008, 106; Jamal 2007, 120; Beinin 2012, 3-4). This resulted in workers rapidly abandoning the ETUF, leading to the rise of militant labor groups (Beinin 2012, 1), the creation of illegal alternative trade unions (Bernard-Maugiron and Hopkins 2008, 108), and a rapid decline in ETUF membership, shrinking from 4.5 million members in 2003 to 3.8 million in 2006 (Alexander 2010, 252). This also created an unprecedented number of labor strikes led by workers independent from the ETUF from 2004-2011 in Egypt (Bishara 2014, 2). In 2006, after fraudulent union elections, nearly 13,000 workers signed a petition calling for the impeachment of union officials and the formation of an independent union, a concession which neither the regime nor the ETUF were willing to make (Beinin 2011).

The Arab Spring and Beyond

During the January 2011 uprisings, the ETUF stood firm behind Mubarak. During the protests in Tahrir Square, the hub for the Arab Spring protests in Egypt, thugs mounted on

camels viciously attacked the crowd, causing eleven to fourteen deaths and over a thousand injuries (Beinin 2015, 109). In April 2011, the president of the ETUF, Hussein Megawer, was incarcerated on charges of inciting the thugs (Beinin 2015. 109). In February of 2011 150,000 to 200,000 workers wrote "Demands of the Workers in the Revolution," which demanded, among other things, the dissolution of the ETUF (Beinin 2015, 110). In November of 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the de-facto leadership of Egypt, reinstituted many of the Mubarak era leaders who were ousted following the revolution (Beinin 2015, 112). Additionally, in October of 2012, Megawer was acquitted of all charges, a defeat for those who sought change in the hierarchy (Beinin 2015, 116). The ETUF endorsed Al-Sisi as president in 2014 and the organization still operates today (Daily News Egypt, 2015).

What explains the ETUF's firm support for the regime? This is most likely the result of its purpose. The ETUF was never meant to be anything more than an arm of the regime, acting in a way to appease workers while ultimately taking their orders from the regime. Thus, it seems logical that the ETUF refused to abandon the regime. The SCAF recognized the importance of having their support as a way to quell dissent among the workers, so it restored the Mubarak era leaders and refused to ratify laws that allowed for the formation of unions independent of the regime (Beinin 2015, 116). Thus, from its creation to today, the ETUF never went beyond its purpose of being a tool for the rulers of Egypt.

Al-Nahda

Al-Nahda was created in the 1970s as the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) and was at first divided in ideology (Murphy 1999, 72). During the 1980s, there was a wing of the MTI that was fiercely anti-democratic (Waltz 1986, 658), but there was also a pro-democratic wing, led by Rashid Al-Ghannouchi (Murphu 1999, 72). The democratic faction firmly believed that

the Islamic concept of *shura,* or consultation with believers in regard to societal affairs, meant that the Quran was in firm support of democracy (Torelli 2012, 75). The organization had its roots in universities, where they responded to the grievances common with students, such as high unemployment among the young (Ruedy 1994, 153). They also had a strong base with the poor, who they supported via small scale charity in poor neighborhoods (Cammett and Luong 2014, 9). The organization had a rocky relationship with the Bourguiba regime. MTI would regularly protest the Bourguiba regime, which often led to Bourguiba arresting most of the leaders and members of the MTI (Hopwood 1992, 101). However, after being released in 1986 in exchange for supporting Bourguiba's regime (Alexander 2010, 51), MTI leaders were charged with conspiring to overthrow the republic the following year because of a terrorist attack in Monastair and were arrested (Ware 1988, 588; Askoy et. al. 2015, 458). The trial revealed that there was no evidence to support that the MTI were the culprits of the attack and the defendants were acquitted on those grounds (Askoy et. al. 2015, 458). Bourguiba, desperately wanting to eliminate MTI, demanded a retrial and the death penalty for Ghannouchi, but Bouguiba was replaced by Ben Ali via a coup in 1987. Ben Ali made a deal with the leaders of MTI, where in exchange for letting Ben Ali consolidate his power and keeping peace in the university, they could be released (Alexander 2000, 474). Ben Ali kept his end of the bargain and released the majority of the imprisoned MTI members and called for highly managed, illiberal multi-party elections (Ruedy 1994, 156).

Ultimately, MTI decided to follow a more democratic route, in part because they wanted to compete in multi-party elections (Murphy 1999, 178-9). Ghannouchi also argued that they must drop components of their platform, such as criticizing women's dress that they saw as un-Islamic, as it was hurting their popularity (Pratt 2007, 77). Additionally, they changed their

name to Al-Nahda (The Renaissance) party as a way to show that they did not have a monopoly on religious interpretation. To show this, Al-Nahda signed an agreement affirming the 1956 Personal Status Code, a statute established under Bourguiba that protected the rights of women (Ennaji 2016, 141). As a result of these actions, many radicals left Al-Nahda (Maddy-Weitzman and Zisenwine 2007, 184). However, when Ben Ali announced multi-party elections, he purposefully excluded Al-Nahda from participating (Murphy 1999, 172). In this context, Al-Nahda participated in the elections through independent candidates. In the 1989 election, their independents won around 15% of the vote, but Al-Nahda claimed vote tampering, arguing that unofficial lists noted that they won 91% in Tunis, 80% in Ben Arroz, 85% in the Sahel, and 65% in interior districts (Garon 2003, 32; Maddy-Weitzman and Zisenwine 2007, 183). After this, Rashid Al-Ghannouchi left in self-imposed exile in London for almost two decades, arguing that the democratic route had been closed (Murphy 1999, 194).

After this election, Ben Ali feared that Al-Nahda had accumulated enough power to challenge his rule. Additionally, Islamist's overwhelming victories in Algeria's first democratic elections made Ben Ali worry that this might occur in Tunisia (Murphy 1999, 195). Al-Nahda's harsh criticism of the Gulf War, plus Ghannouchi's lack of condemnation of an attack on a ruling party office by unknown militants, accelerated repression of Al-Nahda by the regime (Murphy 1999, 195-6). Ben Ali then implicated Al-Nahda in several different terrorist plots, such as attempting to attack a hotel and attempting to assassinate Ben Ali (Garon 2003, 117). The truth of these accusations is suspect, as Ghannouchi and Al-Nahda have repeatedly condemned violence (Garon 2003, 118). But, this resulted in Al-Nahda being branded a terrorist group, with the majority of its members being either imprisoned or forced into exile (Marks 2012).

During the exile period, Al-Nahda continued to operate. In 1996, Al-Nahda held a conference in Belgium to discuss strategies for future success; they decided in this meeting to give up confrontation and instead decided for a more moderate approach (Allani 2009, 265). In 2001, another conference was held in London, where dialogue and compromise with liberal or leftist opposition elements were emphasized (Allani 2009, 265). In the mid-2000s, Al-Nahda created a forum where representatives from most major parties came and discussed democratic prospects in Tunisia (Lynch 2011). Additionally, in 2005 several opposition groups, including Al-Nahda, created the 18th of October Front, whose objectives were to promote "a civil democratic form of government that recognizes universal human rights, including the rights of women as defined by Tunisia's Personal Status Code (CPS), and one that neither imposed nor forbid any religion" (Maddy-Weitzman 2012, 198).

The Arab Spring and Beyond

Al-Nahda played a limited role in the revolution and was legalized shortly after it (Lynch 2011). While there was no formal Al-Nahda organization until after the revolution, they quickly gained popularity and received a plurality of the vote in the 2011 Constituent Elections (Peralta 2011; Lynch 2011). There were several reasons for this. First is the significance of Islam in the country and Al-Nahda's history of opposing the authoritarian regime (Grand 2007, 194; Joffe 2013, 135). Further, Al-Nahda did special outreach to both the youth and women of Tunisia, provided social services, and set up an office in every province in the country (Lynch 2011). Additionally, several viewpoints, such as advocating Sharia to be the source of law, were left out in the campaign (Feuer 2012, 3).

This Islamic victory polarized the country and upset the secular opposition, forcing Al-Nahda to tread lightly in their actions in case there was a reaction similar to Islamists in Algeria

(Lynch 2011; Feuer 2012, 13; Pratt 2007, 137). First, Al-Nahda created the Troika government, which consisted of Al-Nahda, the center-left party Congress for the Republic, and the socialist Ettakol party (Marks 2015). The majority of the cabinet positions would go to Al-Nahda, but several cabinet positions were provided to both Congress for the Republic ministers and independent ministers (Brownlee et. al. 2015, 140). Regarding writing the constitution, several constitutional committees were formed, with Al-Nahda nominating nine members to these committees and the other members of the Troika nominating five (Brownlee et. al. 2015, 140). Al-Nahda also significantly scaled back their rhetoric. For example, Al-Nahda dropped a clause in the constitution in 2011 claiming that Sharia would be the source of laws in Tunisia after it was deemed too controversial (Lynch 2011). Additionally, they argued to maintain the Personal Status Code within Tunisia (Lynch 2011). Al-Nahda attempted to restrain radical Islamists, named Salafis, within Tunisia. First, Al-Nahda worked with Salafis via their political party, Jabhat al-Islah, in parliament (Feuer 2012, 5). But, after an attack on the United States Embassy by Salafis, Al-Nahda took a firm stand on them, with Ghannouchi denouncing their violence and subjected the Salafis to bureaucratic controls to limit their influence (Marks 2013; Lynch 2011).

Nevertheless, there were some issues with Al-Nahda that concerned the Tunisian secular opposition (Pratt 2007, 137). First, Protection of the Revolution Committees, which were militia groups that provided security to various neighborhoods after the Revolution, continued under the reign of Al-Nahda (Fraihat 2016, 60). Secularists accused Al-Nahda of using these organizations as the armed wing of their party (Fraihat 2016, 60). Second, while Al-Nahda maintained their support for the Personal Status Code, rhetoric from Conservative MPs suggested otherwise (Feuer 2012, 3). Conservative MPs also advocated limiting free speech rights for those who criticize Islam (Marks 2014, 16). This is because Al-Nahda is not monolithic; they have a variety

of views that often makes Al-Nahda's message contradictory (Feuer 2012, 5-6). Third, Al-Nahda had less support than it seemed. Many of the voters claimed that they did not vote for Al-Nahda because of their Islamic identity, but rather it was because of their frequent resistance to both the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regime (Joffe 2013, 135). Additionally, Al-Nahda left the Higher Committee for Political Reform because they wanted to hold elections earlier than agreed in order to gain as many seats possible (Brownlee et. al. 2015, 133). Al-Nahda also awarded public administration jobs to their supporters (Marks 2015).

After the compromise previously discussed in UGTT subsection, which forced Al-Nahda to leave office in order to maintain Tunisia's democratic consolidation, the 2014 elections provided an opportunity for Al-Nahda to regain their lost seats. However, Nidaa Tounis, a party that had ties with the old regime, won 85 out of the 217 seats in parliament and had their presidential candidate, Beji Essbsi, elected (The Guardian, 2014). Al-Nahda won 69 seats, significantly less than what they had in the past but nonetheless enough to join a coalition government with Nidaa Tounis (The Guardian, 2014; Al-Jazeera 2016). After this, Al-Nahda decided to change their platform radically by separating their religious and political affairs within the party (Gall 2016). This is highly significant because, according to Rashid Al-Ghannocuhi, it reaffirms Tunisia's commitment to the constitution, which calls for freedom of religion and a separation of political life from civil society (Gall 2016). Additionally, this indicated that Al-Nahda is committed to acting according to the religious views of Tunisian, who are religious but nonetheless see political and religious life as separate (Kamrava 2014, 118).

The Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hasan Al-Banna, whose goal was to cultivate pious Muslims and to establish a Hizam Islam, or Islamic Order (Wickham 2015, 20;

Wickham 2011). The group spent time working within the urban communities in Egypt by building mosques and creating boys and girls clubs (Wickham 2015, 21). The group also focused many of its early efforts on fighting British rule over Egypt and, by extension, Westernized Egyptians and large landowners, who they saw as collaborators (Wickham 2003, 113; Goldschmidt 2007, 285). As a result, the Brotherhood was initially opposed to democracy and constitutionalism (Oweiss 1990, 301). However, in 1942 and 1945 the Brotherhood ran in parliamentary elections, with both resulting in no representation in parliament (Wickham 2015, 25). The Brotherhood greatly grew in popularity, from four chapters in 1929 to 2,000 in 1949 (Wickham 2015, 22). In the mid-1940s, the Brotherhood was estimated to have anywhere between three hundred to five hundred thousand members (Wickham 2015, 22). Most these members were from the middle class who stood to benefit from Brotherhood attacks on Egyptian aristocracy (Gerhsoni and Jankowski 2002, 15). This is also the Brotherhood's most violent period. In the 1940s the Brotherhood had youth militant battalions that would wage war with other youth militants, the Brotherhood was implicated in assassinating the Egyptian Prime Minister in 1949, and they sent an irregular battalion to fight the Israelis in 1948 (Hamid 2017, 125; Wickham 2015, 26).

The Muslim Brotherhood was intricately involved with the Free Officer's Coup of 1952 (Cleveland and Bunton 2016, 306). Gamal Nasser, leader of the Free Officers, claimed that he was loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood, and there was a Muslim Brotherhood member, Abd al-ra'uf, among the Free Officers (Al-Arian 2014, 22; Gordon 1992, 53). The Brotherhood also assisted by stockpiling arms and were meant to assist if the coup failed and chaos ensued by attempting to keep order (Al-Arian 2014, 24; Gordon 1992, 53). It was also alleged that the Brotherhood may have used their paramilitaries to neutralize resisting police (Joffe 2013, 33).

After the coup, the relations between the Brotherhood and the new government were at first stable. The Free Officers openly associated themselves with the Brotherhood in 1952, and The Officers brought on a former Muslim Brotherhood member to be the Minister of Pious Endowments and someone else with Brotherhood ties be the first Justice Minister (Gordon 1992, 100; Gordon 2006, 52). However, the Free Officers became wary of them because of their secret cadres within the military and police, and disputes became more frequent (Gordon 1992, 93). Nasser signed an evacuation treaty with the British in 1954, which provided concessions to British intelligence interests, which was viewed by the Brotherhood as giving away "the rights of the nation" (Wickham 2015, 27). Additionally, the Brotherhood was implicated in several terrorist attacks, which heightened tensions significantly (Gordon 2006, 54). Ultimately, a failed attempt on Nasser's life in 1954 led to banning the Muslim Brotherhood and the mass arrest of its members (Wickham 2003, 29). The Brotherhood vehemently protested that this was staged to eliminate them as a rival to the Free Officers (Gordon 2006, 179).

In the late 1950s, some of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders were released (Al-Arian 2014, 27). They attempted to restart the Muslim Brotherhood, but to no avail (Al-Arian 2014, 27). In the early 1970s, the released Brothers decided again to continue activism under the name of the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Arian 2014, 101). The Brotherhood decided to replace activists in their organizations by attracting university students. To attract these university students, the Brotherhood offered cheap books and healthcare (Al-Awadi 2004, 90). But, after the heavy criticism of the Camp David Accords and their sharp rise in membership, the Brotherhood was repressed again in 1981 (Al-Arian 2014, 175; Wickham 2015, 32-3).

After Sadat was assassinated, the new president Hosni Mubarak wanted to achieve stability. Thus, he chose to accommodate the Brotherhood and allow Muslim Brotherhood

leaders to return from exile (Al-Awadi 2004, 50). Mubarak committed to this by allowing the Brotherhood to compete in electoral elections. In the 1984 parliamentary elections, they aligned with the Wafd party, even though the Brotherhood was still technically illegal (Al-Awadi 2004, 79). The Brotherhood wished to run in these elections so they would have a pulpit to express their religious views (Wickham 2015, 53). While the Brotherhood focused on the economic issues of their constituents, their specific platform was still the application of sharia (Al-Awadi 2004, 88). This attracted supporters, along with the social services they provided and their traditional Islamic message (Ranko 2015, 85). The 1984 elections drove the Brotherhood to prominence (Zahid 2010, 97). This election provided the Brotherhood with critical experience working within the political sphere, such as the experience of operating within parliament and working with coalitions, knowledge which would greatly help them in their future political aspirations (Zahid 2010, 98). Mubarak weakened electoral laws regarding who could run for professional syndicates, which allowed for the Brotherhood to win many seats in professional syndicates throughout the 1980s. These seats constituted a substantial number of the Brotherhood’s elected positions (Al-Awadi 2004, 58; Entelis 1997, 2).

Many of the student leaders, because of their political experience as student organizers, ran for positions in professional syndicates and ran them efficiently (Al-Awadi 2004, 97). Through experiences of cooperation and dialogue with groups beyond the Brotherhood, the reformists within the Brotherhood began to champion democracy and human rights as viable political positions (Wickham 2015, 65). However, a substantial number of reformist Brothers, upset that the leadership refused to adapt with the changing times, left to create the Wasat Party in 1996 (Wickham 2015, 85).

In the 1990s, the regime began efforts to limit Brotherhood power within the country. For example, the regime passed new electoral laws on syndicate elections, such as the need for minimum turnout for an election to be valid, as a way to limit Brotherhood influence (Wickham 2014, 79). This occurred while there were increasing radical Islamist attacks within Egypt, causing those in the regime to see the Brotherhood as guilty by association because of their Islamic message (Wickham 2015, 79). In 1995, because of this, the government cracked down on the Brotherhood (Wickham 2015, 79). Despite this, the Brotherhood still did community outreach by creating small humanitarian organizations (Masoud 2014, 36). The only organization that the Brotherhood kept in power is the Doctor's Syndicate (Bayat 2013, 192). This caused the Brothers to reconsider their strategies. In the late 1990s, after immense pressure from the Brotherhood's reformist faction, the Brotherhood decided to adopt more democratic rhetoric (Bayat 2013, 217). The Brotherhood changed its motto from "Islam is the solution" to "freedom is the solution" (Kamrava 2014, 106). The Muslim Brotherhood's reasoning for democracy is, like Al-Nahda, based upon *shura*, or consultation. (Shavit 2015, 600). However, unlike that of Al-Nahda, this is not a liberal understanding of democracy, as these laws cannot interfere with Allah's (Shavit 2015, 600). In other words, the Brotherhood simply supported the procedural aspects of democracy (Wickham 2015, 296). They were much less supportive of the protection of political dissent, tolerance of other religious or political views, and providing a fair system of checks and balances (Wickham 2015, 296). According to researcher Carrie Wickham, "less sophisticated members of the Brotherhood simply equated democracy with majority rule" (Wickham 2015, 296). Thus, while the Brotherhood and Al-Nahda had similar foundations for their support of democracy within an Islamic perspective, in practice their views varied significantly.

In 2000, the Egyptian Constitutional Court found that the preceding two elections were invalid because there was no proper judicial oversight (Arjomond 2014, 187). However, parties with a religious focus could not run in elections, which forced the Muslim Brotherhood to run as independent candidates (Arjomond 2014, 189). In the 2005 elections, the Brotherhood returned to its Islamist slogans (Wickham 2015, 118), but it also called for ending torture, term limits, and strengthening judicial independence (Wickham 2015, 105). The Brotherhood won 88 seats as independents, making them the largest opposition group in parliament (Arjomond 2014, 191). In 2006, the Brotherhood was once again cracked down upon because of its growing popularity, with many of its leaders arrested (Zahid 2010, 122). In the 2010 elections, the Brotherhood did not win any seats because of government repression (Tschirgi et. al. 2013, 22). The members of the Brotherhood who could get on the ballot were harassed by security forces (Masoud 2014, 101). This election was seen as blatant tampering by the government, which added to grievances of the Egyptian people (Masoud 2014, 123).

The Arab Spring and Beyond

The Muslim Brotherhood was at first neutral in regard to the revolution (Wickham 2015, 160). However, on January 28th, the Brotherhood decided to act and join the protests (Wickham 2015, 162). In a wise move, the Brotherhood decided to refrain from using its Islamist slogans or holding up the Quran during the protests, but instead chose to wave the Egyptian flag (Wickham 2015, 167). The Brotherhood provided its expertise and logistics from its history of protests in Tahrir Square (Wickham 2015, 167). They additionally protected protestors from regime thugs and helped to build obstacles that would prevent thugs from entering the protest area (Trager 2017, 28-31).

After the revolution, the Brotherhood created the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), 80% of which was Brotherhood members (Wickham 2015, 174). In June 2011, the FJP, along with secular parties such as the Wafd, created the Democratic Alliance, the first coalition in the post-authoritarian period (Wickham 2015, 249). However, this quickly fell apart, as the Wafd left and complained of the Brotherhood dominating the coalition. In the 2012 parliamentary elections, FJP performed very well, capturing 37% of the vote and 46% of the seats (Masoud 2014, 1). Additionally, in the presidential runoff election in 2012, Mohammad Morsi won 51.7% of the vote versus Ahmed Shafik's 48.3% (NPR, 2012). Secularists were greatly alarmed by these results (Pratt 2007, 137).

There were great missteps by the Brotherhood that only further enraged the secular opposition. The Brotherhood refused to reform the police, who continued their abusive practices from the authoritarian era (Hanna 2013). Additionally, the Brotherhood chose to maintain the economic and political privileges afforded to the military during the authoritarian era (Alexander 2014, 206). The Brotherhood also failed to address the economic and social needs of workers, who expected them to make massive changes (Alexander 2014, 205). Mohammad Morsi claimed to be above judicial review when the courts threatened to dissolve the Muslim Brotherhood dominated Constitutional Council (Kirkpatrick 2012). The Brotherhood, instead of compromising with the secular opposition on the content of the constitution, decided to call for a snap referendum (New York Times February 2012). Additionally, the Brotherhood failed to revive the flagging economy, which only worsened under their rule (Khalifa 2015, 132; Kingsley 2013).

In 2013, a movement emerged that was determined to end the Brotherhood's reign of Egypt: The Tamarrod Movement, with "Tamarrod" being Arabic for rebellion (New York Times

2013). The movement created a petition demanding the resignation of Mohammad Morsi, which obtained well over a million signatures (Wickham 2015). On July 1st, after massive protests, the military demanded that Morsi step down within forty-eight hours or he would be ousted (Wickham 2013). Morsi refused and on July 3rd he was promptly removed by the military. The military suspended the constitution and announced new elections that came in the Spring of 2014, through which Abdul al-Sisi became the new president (Wickham 2015; NPR May 2014). After this, the Brotherhood was deemed a terrorist organization, Thousands of their members were arrested and many were sentenced to death or fled into exile (Shadi 2017, 115). Despite this, the Brotherhood still does grassroots work in the countryside and within urban areas (Shadi 2017, 113).

In the aftermath of the downfall of the Brotherhood, scholars have asked: what was to blame for the Brotherhood's downfall? There are several arguments. The Brotherhood believed that they had more support than they had in reality. Many people voted for Morsi in 2012 because they did not want to vote for Ahmed Shafik, who was a member of the old regime (Masoud 2014, 10). The Brotherhood was also not specific in its message, simply claiming that "Islam is the solution" to problems, without any clarification of what that entails (Masoud 2014, 18). Additionally, many citizens believed that the Brotherhood would strengthen the welfare state, but in reality they were not interested in doing this, which alienated many of their supporters after this revelation (Masoud 2014, 149).

Yet, the Brotherhood is not entirely to blame for the failure of Egypt's democracy. One group that many scholars have laid blame on is the "Deep State", or the group of unelected officials who were holdovers from the Mubarak era, such as high ranking judges, generals, and those in the security establishment. They were thought to have purposefully sabotaged the

Brotherhood's attempt at ruling (Wickham 2015, 290). One of most visible cases of this are the actions of the military. The military is extremely powerful in Egypt, and the Brotherhood felt that they had to side with them to prevent another coup (Rougier 2016, 63). After ouster of Mohammad Morsi, the electricity blackouts and gas shortages suddenly stopped and police reappeared to enforce law and order, suggesting that the military could have been sabotaging the Brotherhood all along (New York Times 2013). Also, months before the ousting of the Brotherhood, members of the military met with secular opposition officials, and, after ouster of the Brotherhood, these same officials supported the military's actions (Wickham 2015, 299). Additionally, members of the old regime financed and supported the Tamarrod Movement, suggesting conspiracies, or at least the complicity, of the powerful elite, far beyond the seemingly grassroots movement (New York Times 2013).

Crisis Episodes

In this section, various crises will be discussed that demonstrate attempts by either the UGTT or the ETUF to negotiate and mediate conflicts between workers and the government. In this section, the general background of the case will be mentioned, after which a discussion of whether the organization in question successfully mediated the crisis. As mentioned previously, success will be defined by trade organization leaders negotiating on behalf of their workers, the degree to which they achieved their worker's demands, and whether the workers accepted the result of the negotiations. Each of these sections will vary in length and depth, simply because of the difficulty of finding information about these crises, which are often seen as embarrassing by both the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes.

Labor Organizations

The Egyptian Esco Strikes of 1985

The Esco Textile Factory was the subject of a court case, which claimed that a 1981 law entitled workers to one paid work day off per week (Posusney 1993, 109-110). Although the workers had won in court earlier, the company appealed and refused to follow the results of the case (Posusney 1993, 110). When the appeals court ruled in the workers' favor, the company again refused to follow the ruling, leading workers to refuse their checks (Posusney 1993, 110). On January 30th, over 10,000 workers engaged in a sit in order to demand their holiday pay (el-Shafei 2000, 25). On February 2nd, a "Committee of Five" was created, constituting members of the Esco Union Committee and the General Union of Textile Workers (GUTW), which was a member of the ETUF (el-Shafei 2000, 26). The Committee of Five announced that an agreement had been reached between the members of the committee where workers would get off two paid days per month (Posusney 1993, 110). The workers rejected this, and most only reluctantly agreed to four paid days off per month after realizing that this pay was not retroactive (el-Shafei 2000, 26).

Analysis

This case is indicative of distrust within the ranks of the ETUF towards their leaders. Primarily, the rejection of the compromise created by the Committee of Five is indicative of the distrust between workers and leaders of the ETUF. Additionally, the GUTW negotiated on the side of the government, breeding distrust within the ranks of the workers, who believed that the GUTW was a figurehead of the government and was not interested in the rights of the workers. This strike had several repercussions. First, this strike, along with other strikes, led to a parliamentary hearing to discuss the strikes (el-Shafei 2000, 28). Second, Mubarak condemned these strikes and claimed that it showed a "lack of national responsibility" on part of the workers (el-Shafei 2000, 29).

Misr Spinning and Weaving Company: December 2006 to September 2007

In 2006, as a result of widespread wildcat strikes across the country, Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif promised that workers would be given an annual bonus equal to two month's wages (De Smet 2012, 146). When the workers came to collect their benefits from the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company, based in Kafr al-Mahalla, they found that they were significantly reduced by the management. This caused many workers to refuse to receive their wages and caused a spontaneous demonstration of 10,000 workers on December 7th, 2006 (De Smet 2012, 146-7; Beinin and El-Hamalawy 2007). The ETUF vehemently opposed the strike, forcing the workers to act independently from the organization (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 102). After 45 days of strikes, they ended and the workers' demands were fulfilled by the government, who forced the management to restore the worker's wages (Beinin and El-Hamalawy 2007).

In February 2007, as a response to this success, a petition by the workers of Misr Spinning and Weaving was sent to the General Union of Textile Workers (GUTW) calling for the resignation of the union committee members assigned to their factory (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 118). This demand was ignored, and by September another strike led by workers independent of the ETUF was created with some 12,000 members participating (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 118). Along with this, there were solidarity strikes across the country, placing further pressure on the government to act (Bernard-Maugiron and Hopkins 2008, 113). On the sixth day of the strike, a delegation, led by the ETUF and GUTW, came to Mahalla to discuss demands (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 119). It is important to note that the ETUF was not negotiating on behalf of the workers, but rather on behalf of the government (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 119). The negotiations ended with the workers obtaining most

of their demands, including the firing of the president of Misr Spinning and Weaving (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 119).

Analysis

By examining this situation, a few things are clear. First, the ETUF clearly did not engage in trust building behavior with its members. This was first seen by its refusal to support the initial strikes by workers of Misr Spinning and Weaving Company. This forced the workers to create their own independent committees that were successful in achieving their demands. This greatly delegitimized the ETUF because it not only showed workers that having their demands fulfilled did not require any support from the ETUF, but it provided them experience for strikes and negotiations in the future. Additionally, the distrust was seen as a result of the ETUF not negotiating on behalf of its workers but instead negotiating on behalf of the government. This was seen by workers as union elites betraying their member's interests in favor of maintaining a good relationship with the regime. This crisis had a great effect on future crises, as it helped spawn a national strike the following year.

Egyptian Nationwide Strike of April 2008

In order to capitalize on the momentum of the protests in Mahalla, a large national strike was planned for April 6th, 2008 by workers involved in previous strikes. This strike was created independently from the ETUF (Beinin and Duboc 2014, 3). The national strike was meant to symbolize the economic troubles in Egypt, particularly the rising gap between rich and poor, falling wages, and rising prices (New York Times 2008). The ETUF quickly recognized the danger of these protests and invited the leaders of the strike to their headquarters in Cairo to convince them to call off the strike (Beinin and Duboc 2014, 8). Five of the seven leaders called accepted the results of the negotiations, where they received a higher food allowance in

exchange for ending the strike, but two of the leaders refused (Beinin and Duboc 2014, 8). Heavy state repression ultimately intimidated workers not to protest on the 6th, and the calls for a national strike were not heeded (Beinin and Duboc 2014, 8). Thousands of Mahalla townspeople, angry with the repression of the strike, were brutally put down, along with solidarity marches that took place in Cairo (El-Ghobashy 2011). The Misr Spinning and Weaving Company, considered to be a symbol of protest against the Mubarak regime, was meant to host as much as 27,000 striking workers, but was instead occupied by the police (BBC, 2008; LA Times, 2008).

Analysis

This instance is also a clear sign of how the ETUF built distrust among their members. First, the strike was once again planned by workers independently from the ETUF. Another was the indication that workers decided that the ETUF were not necessary to achieve their goals. Additionally, the ETUF, when deciding to intervene, did so on behalf of the government, something which only furthered the distrust between the leaders and workers. Finally, not all leaders of the organizations were satisfied with the results of the negotiations. This is much less of a black and white situation that has been seen in the previous instances, but this is still arguably indicative of member distrust towards the ETUF. This is because the workers themselves were going to continue the strike when the deal was reached, but ultimately it was state repression, not concessions, that discouraged workers from striking. Therefore, these conditions significantly contributed to the distrust seen towards the ETUF.

The UGTT National Strike of 1977

In the early 1970s, the Tunisian government chose to move from socialist economic policies to a more capitalist, neo-liberal economic policy (Pratt 2007, 64). The usual rise in standard of living for workers quickly disappeared, causing discontent among Tunisians (Fawaz

2014, 73). This led to massive strikes by workers across the country, some of which were supported by the UGTT (Ananaba and Becu 1979, 86). These events coincided with the UGTT rapidly gaining influence within Tunisia. Their membership had increased from 90,000 in 1970 to 500,000 in 1978, over a fivefold increase (Wilder 2015, 352). Additionally, their ranks became increasingly more stocked with white collar workers such as teachers and bank workers, who were known for their political focus and fierce independence (Wilder 2015, 352). These groups resisted the economic policies put forth by Bourguiba (Beinin 2001, 154) The government became increasingly worried about this trend, so it chose to empower the leadership by providing them collective bargaining power and providing a large increase in the state minimum wage to provide the UGTT leadership more credibility (Wilder 2015, 353).

In 1977, as previously mentioned, the "social contract" indexed wages according to both inflation and increased productivity (Shabon 1985, 6). Because of the failure of the government to uphold the social contract, prices greatly rose, causing strikes that were supported by the UGTT (Ananaba and Becu 1979, 86). Rank and file unionists greatly pressured the UGTT leadership to strike (Beinin 2001, 155). For example, on October 20th, 1977, five workers were sentenced to six to eight months of prison for inciting a strike in the Sogitux Metallurgy Plant (Keesing's Record of World Events 1978). The UGTT, while not condemning or condoning the strikes, demanded that the regime reinstate the workers and called for the creation of a committee to investigate the strikes (Keesing's Record of World Events 1978). The UGTT issued a demand that the government must satisfy their demands within eight weeks (Disney 1978, 13).

After this, the minister of the interior, Taher Belkhodja, who had agreed in principle to the UGTT's demands, was fired, only heightening the tension. There was also an attempt on the life of the UGTT Secretary General by an unknown assassin, further alarming the leadership of

the UGTT (Amnesty International 1978). The government was hesitant to prosecute the man responsible for this, causing the UGTT on November 8th to call for more strikes (Keesing's Record of World News 1978). In order to mediate this conflict, elites within the regime invited the UGTT leadership to a meeting in order to discuss their demands (Ananaba and Becu 1979, 86). Ultimately, the UGTT felt that the government did not fully satisfy their demands (Ananaba and Becu 1979, 86). The UGTT threatened that if their demands were not met in this meeting, they would call for a national strike (Keesing's World News Archive 1978).

Finally, on January 24th, 1978, regional offices of the UGTT were attacked by militants from the ruling party, causing the UGTT to announce a general strike (Ananaba and Becu 1979, 86). This strike caused a huge uproar in political activity and rioting occurred in Tunisia's major cities for several days (Wilder 2015, 355). On January 26th, the strike began, but the majority of the UGTT's top leaders were arrested and the strikers were attacked (Disney 1978, 14). The day, called "Black Thursday", saw forty-two strikers killed and hundreds wounded before the government could restore order (Deane 2013, 13). From March-August Bourguiba released the leaders, but were expected to return to their policies of cooperation with the ruling party (Waltz 1984).

Analysis

This instance provides excellent evidence of how the UGTT built trust between the members and their leaders. First, the UGTT took the side of the strikers multiple times, showing both those who were striking and other members that the UGTT leadership had the interests of the workers in mind when making decisions. While the support for strikes was the result of pressure placed by members, this still shows that, in times of crisis, the UGTT would act to support their workers. Second, the UGTT managed to achieve the demands they sought out,

albeit in one instance. This indicated to workers that when negotiations were held, the UGTT leadership could effectively achieve the needs of their members. Additionally, in certain instances the UGTT broke off negotiations when they felt that their goals were not achieved. This also built trust between members and leaders, as it showed members that their leaders would not settle for anything less than what the workers demanded. These reasons meant that, during times of crises, the UGTT leadership proved to their members that their trust was well placed, setting the stage for the confrontations mentioned in the following sections. This strike had long lasting effects, primarily by creating a new generation of leaders with experience opposing the government, a subject which will be discussed in the following section.

National Strikes of 1983-1986

In the early 1980s, Tunisia's government decided to continue their movement towards liberalization (Vandewalle 1988, 609). Several reforms, such as the reduction of subsidies, caused confrontation between the UGTT and the Bourguiba led government (Vandewalle 1988, 610). Additionally, the 1978 General Strike created a new generation of leaders who had no affinity towards the ruling party and were interested in a new national direction (Ware 1985, 33). This pitted them against the more traditional stalwarts of the ruling party, creating divisions within the UGTT (Ware 1985, 33). In anticipation of this, Bourguiba attempted to create more divisions within the party by inviting some UGTT members to join the government led National Front coalition in the 1981 election (Vandewalle 1988, 610). This only further invigorated the UGTT, who were aware of Bourguiba's attempts to limit the UGTT's influence. In 1983, the leaders who agreed to join the government were expelled, which united the UGTT (Ware 1985, 33; Middle East Journal 1984, 513).

In 1984, these problems came to a head when price hikes in basic staples such as bread led to widespread rioting (Mannone 2016). The UGTT took advantage of these riots and sought to discuss increasing wages and provide support for the poor before the price hikes were put into place (Seddon 1984, 10; Mannone 2016). In the end, Bourguiba decided to cancel the price increases, which briefly alleviated tensions between the government and the UGTT (Seddon 1984, 14). This alleviation was continued through an agreement with the UGTT and the government, which confirmed that the UGTT would not resort to strikes, provided that opportunities for dialogue were not exhausted and that the Bourguiba government would re-negotiate salaries (Middle East Journal 1984, 514; Murphy 1999, 67).

However, in 1985 the UGTT realized that the Bourguiba government had failed to begin negotiating salaries increases and thus began openly campaigning for an increase in public sector salaries (Murphy 1999, 67; Keesing's World News Archive 1986). Additionally, the UGTT claimed that they were prepared to strike to achieve these demands (Murphy 1999, 67). The UGTT called for a strike to support a 15% pay raise for public sector employees, but this was postponed after it and the government opened negotiations (Keesing's World News Archive 1986). However, the UGTT announced the failure of negotiations on May 4th and, after deliberation, elected to call for a general strike on July 29th because of "a total impasse in negotiations with the government (Keesing's World News Archive 1986; Middle East Journal 1986a). Bourguiba used the excuse of the expulsion of Tunisian migrant workers from neighboring countries as a reason to arrest most UGTT leaders, calling them unpatriotic and accusing them of exasperating unemployment because they demanded pay raises (Middle East Journal 1986a; Keesing's World News Archive 1986).

By November, many of the UGTT's offices were shut down, with most the regional leaders arrested (Middle East Journal 1986b). On November 5th, UGTT leaders who were not in prison called for a general strike again, citing that provisional committees of the UGTT that were created by the regime in the aftermath of the crackdown were hostile to the old leadership (Middle East Journal 1986b). However, negotiations were called by the government and the UGTT, after which most the members were released and the offices re-opened (Middle East Journal 1986b). After ousting Bourguiba on November 7th, new president Ben Ali negotiated to have all top leaders released, exiled members to return, and senior government officials met with the UGTT to discuss providing amnesty to strikers from the 1984 Bread Riots (Murphy 1999, 168).

Analysis

This is another crucial example of how trust was built among UGTT members and leadership. In the first period of negotiations, the UGTT succeeded in achieving their goal of wage increases. Unfortunately, the regime did not follow the terms of their agreement, but that was of no fault of the UGTT. Additionally, when it appeared that the regime would not keep its promises, the UGTT placed great pressure on the regime to fulfill its half of the agreement. In another instance, the UGTT succeeded in pushing Bourguiba to cancel price hikes, effectively supporting their membership. Finally, when the UGTT began negotiations with the regime for the final time, they chose to announce a general strike instead of accepting results that would not be satisfactory for their workers. These actions showed members that their leadership would fight for their interests, which greatly built trust among its members. This action had a profound impact on the state of the UGTT, because most of their leaders were arrested but later released. However, this action had a long-lasting effect on the UGTT. The national leadership, concerned

that the results of strikes harmed the UGTT more than it helped it, became much less willing to support strikes but instead was more interested in protecting the rights of workers in a less confrontational manner.

Gafsa Strike of 2008

In early January 2008, a list of new hires of the Gafsa Phosphate Company was provided to employees (Beinin 2007, 86). These jobs were given as the result of a recruitment competition, which was widely seen as fraudulent (Cammett and Posusney 2010, 250). Employees accused the Phosphate Company of nepotism in their hiring practices and occupied regional UGTT offices, proclaiming a hunger strike (Beinin 2007, 86). The protests spread, with the widows of miners who were killed in recent accidents joining them to protest unsafe working conditions (Cammett and Posusney 2010, 251). A negotiation committee was created by Adnene Hajji, a dissident UGTT member and the secretary general of the local elementary school teacher's union (Beinin 2015, 87). Their role was formulated as mediating between the protestors and the government. The protests were dispersed by mid-March, when one of the subcontracting companies agreed to offer twenty jobs to the unemployed (Beinin 2015, 87).

The Gafsa Basin had experienced difficult economic times for a number of years. Modernization of the phosphate industry led to a steady decline of employment, with 14,000 employed in 1980 but only 6,000 in 2006 (Gobe 2011, 4). Locals also felt that the government did not provide the same support that other regions may have, causing widespread discontent (Gobe 2011, 4). Thus, the Gafsa mining basin erupted with protests, all while there were simultaneously riots by teenagers and men protesting their lack of economic opportunity and unemployment (Beinin 2007, 83). These protests continued for months. In April, masked youth attacked a local police station, which locals claimed was done by the regime to provide an

excuse for a brutal crackdown (Beinin 2015, 88). The members of the negotiation committee were arrested, and in the coming months a variety of protests occurred, all of them ending in violence on the part of the regime (Beinin 2015, 88).

The regional branch of the UGTT did not support the Gafsa Strike. This was because the protests were an active challenge to the Gafsa regional UGTT office in corruption (Beinin 2007, 83; Bishara 2014, 3). The UGTT regional leader, ‘Amara ‘Abbasi, owned two of the three companies that supplied janitorial and maintenance staff to the Phosphate Company, making the nepotism charges seem realistic (Beinin 2015. 87). The national leaders chose to ignore the situation in Gafsa (Wilder 2015, 358). However, as previously noted, local members of the UGTT supported the Gafsa Strike, and UGTT members were among those who initially complained about the nepotism of the hiring process (Cammett and Posusney 2010, 250).

Analysis

Out of all the cases considered within this paper, this is certainly the most complicated. In this case, the regional UGTT members were actually the ones implicated on charges of corruption. This clearly does not show that the UGTT regional or national leaders were interested in the rights of workers. However, the actions of the local UGTT leaders indicate that they were interested in supporting the worker’s demands. In this case, local UGTT leaders created a negotiating committee in hopes of achieving the worker’s demands. Thus, it is challenging to determine whether this case is indicative of leaders supporting or abandoning their members. However, it is telling of the commitment of the local branches to their workers, which was seen during the Arab Spring. As previously mentioned, it was not the national leadership that initially supported the Jasmine Revolution; rather, it was the local branches that helped the revolution by negotiating for the release of protestors and helped the revolution spread across the

country. However, in the Arab Spring case, the leadership eventually supported the Jasmine Revolution because of enormous pressure from below. This was also seen in the General Strike of 1977, where rank and file members of the UGTT forced their leaders to act. Because of this, I theorize that this case was the result of a lack of pressure from below on the regional and national branches of the UGTT. While there were some local members who were highly supportive of the workers, there was not enough pressure to force the regional or national leadership to act.

Religious Organizations

In the case of religious organizations, the hypothesis presented regarding vertical trust does not apply. There are several reasons to do this. First, both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Al-Nahda were treated significantly different from trade unions by the authoritarian regime when faced with a crisis. Instead of providing opportunities to negotiate, in almost all cases the regimes cracked down upon the religious organizations. Additionally, in several instances either the Brotherhood or Al-Nahda highly discouraged their members from being involved in protests or strikes, or in some cases actively denounced strikes. Also, the Brotherhood and Al-Nahda did not use their membership to play a watchdog role in the post-authoritarian era, making examining vertical trust within the context of this paper irrelevant.

In this section, there will first be a basic overview of these specific instances to prove that it was impossible to build vertical trust between elites and their members for either Al-Nahda and the Muslim Brotherhood with the theory used in this work. After this, there will be a discussion of the horizontal trust built between the leaders of Al-Nahda and the leaders of the secular opposition in Tunisia. Following this, the Muslim Brotherhood's interactions with the

secular opposition will be examined, followed by an analysis of the implications of these actions taken by religious elites in both Tunisia and Egypt.

Protests and Strikes

Al-Nahda

Al-Nahda regularly staged protests during the period before their exile. Protests against Habib Bourguiba were regularly either broken up or crushed by the government (Hopwood 1992, 101; Ruedy 1994, 155; Arieff 2011, 16). However, in one particular instance, MTI organized protests in universities, which caused Bourguiba to release several MTI leaders (Arieff 2011, 16). However, this one instance is not representative of the willingness of the government to negotiate. Under Ben Ali, Al-Nahda staged massive protests as a result of mass arrests of their members (The Washington Post 2016). Additionally, Al-Nahda protested the results of the 1990 elections, which they saw as fraudulent, but were repressed (The Washington Post 2016). Ghannouchi and the rest of Al-Nahda, as a response to the harsh regime crackdown, called for a popular revolt against the regime in 1991, but these calls were not heeded. (Gasiorowski 1992, 94).

The Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood also has a long history of protesting. There were several periods where the younger, more reformist members of the Brotherhood were interested in protesting, but were either denied or told to participate not as Brothers. For example, when reformist brothers asked to become involved in the 2008 General Strike, they were told that they could participate but not as members (Wickham 2015, 157). Additionally, individual Brothers participated in the Kefaya (Enough) movement, which was a pro-democratic protest movement in 2004 (Zahid 2010, 147). In response to the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, around 5,000

Muslim Brotherhood members protested in Cairo, but this was contained by government security forces (Alexander 2014, 103-4). In 2003 the Muslim Brotherhood held protests against the Iraq War, but these were approved by the government (Wickham 2015, 100). In the mid-2000s, there were frequent demonstrations by the Brotherhood in favor of reform in Cairo and various Egyptian towns (Zahid 2010, 147). In some cases, protests backfired and caused widespread outrage. For example, Muslim Brotherhood students at Al-Azhar University protested against government interference in student elections by dressing in black military clothing and showing off martial arts techniques, causing outrage about possible militancy by the Brotherhood (Wickham 2015, 121). The Brotherhood refused to support any workers' strikes, and opposed strikes at Kafr al-Dawwa in the mid-1950s, calling them enemies of the revolution in hopes of building stronger relations with the regime (Beinin 2014, 140; Gordon 1992, 99).

Discussion

In the case of both the Brotherhood and Al-Nahda, protests, with the exception of one instance, never resulted in negotiations, let alone concessions on part of the government. In the case of Al-Nahda, their protests were almost always brutally repressed, making concessions nearly impossible to achieve. In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, their protests and calls for reform were never heeded. Additionally, in several cases the Brotherhood was protesting events that occurred internationally, meaning that the opportunities for negotiating were impossible. In the following sections, all meaningful interactions between secular elites and the religious organizations will be examined. Within these interactions, there will be an analysis of both the number of incidences where religious and secular elites cooperated, but also the relationship developed between the secular and religious elites during these interactions. After this, there will

be a discussion regarding the implications of the horizontal trust built by Al-Nahda and failure in this regard by the Muslim Brotherhood during the post-authoritarian era.

Meetings With Secular Opposition

Al-Nahda

After being outlawed in Tunisia, Al-Nahda members in exile began to regroup and plan for the future. In 1996, Al-Nahda created their first congress since their exile in Belgium to evaluate their policy of confrontation, such as massive protests, against the regime (Allani 2009, 265). In this congress, Al-Nahda concluded that they needed to scrap their policy of confrontation and adopt a more moderate approach (Allani 2009, 265). In April of 2001, Al-Nahda organized a meeting with liberal and leftist organizations in London (Allani 2009, 265). In this conference, Al-Nahda emphasized a culture of dialogue and provided concessions to liberal and leftist groups (Allani 2009, 265). In 2003, the four major opposition parties, including Al-Nahda, the Congress for the Republic (CPR), the PDP and Ettakatol met in France (Stepan 2012, 96). Here they signed “Call from Tunis”, where they promised that any elected government’s sovereignty would come from the people, and that the government would have respect for other’s identities, and the liberty of belief (Stepan 2012, 96). The compromises of 2001 were implemented on October 18th, 2005, where several groups, such as leftists and socialists, met with Al-Nahda to discuss the importance of press freedom and freedom in political life (Allani 2009, 265). Here, they signed "The 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms in Tunisia", where they agreed to support freedom of political and religious belief, and the Personal Status Code. They also agreed to support human rights and that sovereignty would come from the will of the people (Stepan 2012, 97; Maddy-Weitzman 2012, 198). Additionally,

Rashid Al-Ghannouchi met with the head of CPR over twenty times during his time in exile in London (Stepan 2013, 23-4).

The Muslim Brotherhood

The Brotherhood did indeed work with secular opposition organizations, but there were two distinct differences between Al-Nahda and the Muslim Brotherhood's interactions. First, many of these actions had a negative impact on the secular opposition's views on the Brotherhood. Second, many of the interactions that stressed the importance of consensus, compromise, and dialogue were not supported by the majority of the Brotherhood.

The members of the Brotherhood did attempt to work with the secular opposition during the late 20th century. The Brotherhood ran as partners with the secular Wafd party in 1984 (Wickham 2015, 47). In 1987, The Brotherhood made a political alliance with the Liberal Party (Hamid 2015, 71). However, according to researcher Mohammad Zahid, this was done to ensure that the Brotherhood got the 8% electoral vote minimum to be represented in parliament, not because of a commitment to dialogue (Zahid 2010, 97). Furthermore, researcher Carrie Wickham argues that this was also done so that the Brotherhood could run legally (Wickham 2015, 47).

In 1994, professional syndicates held two joint conferences, named "The National Dialogue" and "Freedoms and Civil Society," which created a committee that would create The National Charter, meant to represent a national consensus on a framework of constitutional and political issues (Wickham 2015, 85). Two members of the committee were members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Wickham 2015, 86). However, heated debates broke out as to whether Sharia would be included in the pact, and members of the Brotherhood refused to sign the Pact because it made no reference to Sharia (Wickham 2015, 86). The Brotherhood, as previously mentioned, had several members act as individuals within the Kefaya (Enough) Movement, and

the Brotherhood stood with them in protesting for political change in Egypt (Wickham 2015, 112). The Brotherhood attempted to reach out to the Kefaya Movement by publicly emphasizing how similar the Brotherhood's demands were with the secular opposition (Wickham 2015, 113). Also, the Brotherhood stressed that political change could only occur if all members of the political opposition pooled their resources (Wickham 2015, 113). However, the secular opposition's interactions with the Brotherhood proved to be less than pleasant. According to researcher Carrie Wickham, "The Brotherhood was unwilling to defer to a movement led by others" (Wickham 2015, 113). The Kefaya Movement and the Brotherhood met on several occasions, but when the Brotherhood promised to send its members to the Movement's protests, none of them would show up (Wickham 2015, 114). Members of the Kefaya Movement also charged the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood with being arrogant and snobby during their interactions (Wickham 2015, 117). Additionally, the Brotherhood created The National Coalition for Reform and Change, which included several Marxist and Nasserist figures (Wickham 2015, 114). However, there was no actual dialogue within this alliance; the Brotherhood saw these figures as infidels and included these figures in order to give an impression of consensus (Wickham 2015, 114).

There were several reasons behind the Brotherhood's failure for meaningful cooperation with the secular opposition. First, the large difference between the powerful and well organized Brotherhood and the many small and insignificant secular opposition groups made dialogue and consensus unappealing to the Brotherhood. Additionally, there was great distrust on part of the secular opposition towards the Brotherhood, who saw the Brotherhood's vague support of democracy and their support of illiberal democracy in the past as proof of the Brotherhood's questionable commitment to democracy. The opposition also correctly recognized that, while

there were reformist elements within the Brotherhood that supported meaningful negotiations and compromise with Egypt's secular opposition, they were the minority in a conservative organization. For example, the reformist wing of the Brotherhood created the Conference on Freedoms and Civil Society, which brought together over five hundred political figures from across the political spectrum, including human rights groups and opposition parties (Hamid 2015, 96). However, these acts involving cooperation with the secular opposition did not have majority Brotherhood support. Finally, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood was not interested in the viewpoints of their secular counterparts. In the words of a Muslim Brother, "We thought we were the only ones qualified to manage the affairs of the country, and that other opinions and viewpoints were always mistaken." (Wickham, July 2013). This sort of viewpoints makes cooperation with other organizations pointless unless the Brotherhood had something to gain from the interaction, a concern that was clearly expressed by the secular opposition.

Analysis

The Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Nahda's dealings with the secular opposition indicates the deep dichotomy between the Brotherhood and Al-Nahda. Al-Nahda's frequent meetings with secular opposition, where they would make compromises, sign agreements, and discuss political and religious liberties, helped build trust with leaders of the secular opposition and showed their commitment to democracy. On the other hand, the Brotherhood did indeed take steps to work with the secular opposition, but they failed for several reasons. First, almost all their interactions with secular opposition did not involve negotiations, providing concessions, or a general discussion of democracy. Second, the Brotherhood's actions were often clearly the result of self-interest and not a commitment towards dialogue. A commitment to dialogue is contrary to the Brotherhood view of democracy, where respecting differing political views is not paramount

(Wickham 2015, 296). Third, the leadership of the Brotherhood was not fully committed towards cooperation with secular parties. The reformist members were the most interested in creating dialogue with the secular opposition, but the reformists were regularly marginalized and demonized by the more conservative members (Wickham 2015, 113). Al-Nahda's leadership, on the other hand, is dominated by reformists, whose ideology is dependent on support for liberal democratic principles, such as compromise and inclusion (Gall 2016). Thus, Al-Nahda was clearly devoted to working with the secular opposition within Tunisia.

Discussion

These cases greatly support the importance of both horizontal and vertical trust for democratization. Regarding the labor organizations, the building of strong relations between members and their leaders was done through supporting the worker's demands through negotiations. At the same time, religious organizations could not build trust with their members within the confines of the vertical trust hypothesis, simply because the religious organization's leadership would often be repressed during a crisis. Thus, religious organizations built trust through frequent dialogue with the secular opposition, which helped build horizontal trust that was seen during the post-authoritarian era. In the following sections, a more specific discussion of labor and religious organizations will be presented, after which the challenges and shortcomings of this study will be discussed.

Labor Unions

The six cases highlighted in the section regarding labor unions perfectly encapsulates the difference between the trust built by the ETUF and the UGTT. In the case of the ETUF, its frequent alliance with the government made workers believe that the ETUF leadership's interests lay with the Egyptian government and not with their own members. This forced workers to

create their own independent strikes and union committees. These actually proved to be successful in multiple cases, which built confidence in workers that they could achieve their own goals without the help of ETUF. The ETUF could have attempted to save face by supporting the strikes after they began, but this did not occur in any of the cases examined, mostly likely for fear of harsh repression by the regime.

The UGTT, on the other hand, is almost the exact opposite. The two general strikes that took place under Habib Bourguiba proved to members that their leadership was willing to go to great lengths to achieve concessions, even if it meant mass arrests and time spent in prison. During these crisis moments, the UGTT authorized and supported strikes that were created by their members, showing to the members that their leaders supported their attempts to gain concessions and fight for a better life for themselves. Additionally, the UGTT regularly had negotiations with the government, where they achieved concessions for their workers, showing that the UGTT leaders had the capability to support their own members. The UGTT leaders also refused to settle for unsatisfactory concessions, showing their members that the leaders were more committed to protecting the interests of their members than to appeasing the government. All of these actions led to greater trust between the members and the UGTT, setting the stage for the Arab Spring

The Gafsa Strikes of 2008 is a trickier circumstance than the previous cases. In this, the national leadership of the UGTT chose not to take a side, and the regional leadership of the UGTT was actually being demonstrated against. But, the local UGTT leadership was firmly in support of the Gafsa strike and provided the strikers support in any way they could. While this case provides mixed evidence for the hypothesis being presented, the UGTT's actions in the Arab Spring shed light on this. During the National Strike of 1977 and during the Arab Spring,

massive pressure from below forced the UGTT's national leadership to act. However, in the case of the Gafsa Strike, there was a lack of pressure from below, as only renegade local UGTT members supported the Gafsa workers. Therefore, the national leadership of the UGTT did not act. The instance in Gafsa shows that local UGTT leaders were interested in fighting for the interests of their workers. This was also seen in the Arab Spring, where local UGTT members were among the first citizens involved in the Jasmine Revolution.

This difference had a profound effect on democratic outcomes seen in the Arab Spring in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, respectively. The UGTT emerged from the Arab Spring as a powerful organization, bolstered by the trust of their members that was built through decades of negotiations on their behalf on both the local and national level. This allowed for the UGTT to play the important role of a watchdog organization in Tunisia, ensuring that Tunisia's experiment with democracy continued. In key instances, such as when the interim authoritarian government was hesitant to remove Ben Ali supporters from government posts, the UGTT used their ability to mobilize their members to ensure that the Ben Ali supporters were removed. Ultimately, this ability to mobilize masses helped avert a potential breakdown of Tunisian democracy. For example, UGTT leaders used their mass mobilization capacity to call for a general strike in protest of Al-Nahda's perceived overreach of power. This helped bring Al-Nahda to the negotiating table and ultimately led to an agreement that removed Al-Nahda from power and ensured that Tunisia remained on its course towards a consolidated democracy. This ability to mobilize ultimately came from the trust built with their members, who were willing to mobilize because they knew that their leaders would act to support their interests. Additionally, the UGTT leadership's experience with negotiations during the authoritarian era made it so that, when a crisis emerged, the UGTT could negotiate effectively to ensure that Tunisia's democracy

continued. This was also seen by the actions of the Tunisian Quartet, where the UGTT brought the leaders of Al-Nahda, Nidaa Tounis, and other civil society leaders to reach a compromise for the removal of Al-Nahda and a call for new elections, thus keeping Tunisia's democracy intact.

This is in contrast to the ETUF, which emerged from the Arab Spring as an organization highly criticized by its own members. During February of 2011, almost 200,000 workers engaged in strikes against the regime (Beinin 2015, 110). Forty of them signed an agreement called "Demands of the Workers of the Revolution", which called for the end of the ETUF, which they called "one of the most important symbols of corruption under the defunct regime." (Beinin 2015, 110). Over 1,000 unions independent of the ETUF were created after the end of the Mubarak regime (Beinin 2013). This level of distrust towards the ETUF perfectly indicates that, even if their leaders wished to play the role of a watchdog organization, they would be hard pressed to find members that would support them. Unfortunately, there was no organization in Egypt that had the ability to play the role of a watchdog organization similar to that of the UGTT.

It is challenging to determine why UGTT leaders supported democracy and the ETUF did not. One possible reason is self-interest; it is possible that the UGTT believed that their organization could gain further influence within the country if they operated under a democratic system rather than an authoritarian system. The ETUF, on the other hand, relied on the authoritarian state for power, making their support for authoritarian rule logical. There may have been practical reasons as well. The economy of Tunisia had stagnated in the recent years and unemployment was on the rise, meaning that the UGTT could have felt that the Ben Ali government was not doing enough to stimulate the economy and that a democratic government would have been more receptive to the needs of their workers (Angrist 2013, 548). However,

Egypt suffered similar economic troubles, making it unclear why the ETUF would not have acted similarly. This is all speculation; a definitive answer is not possible.

Religious Organizations

The religious organizations and labor unions, while similar in strong loyalties and the ability to mass mobilize, are drastically different in how they are treated by the government. The governments of Tunisia and Egypt were much more likely to crack down on religious organizations than on labor unions. This is most likely because workers have the ability to cripple the economy if there are massive strikes, making appeasing workers paramount for a regime's continued economic success. Additionally, the secular characteristics of both the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes, coupled with the threat of radical Islamist organizations throughout the late 20th century, made religious organizations much more likely to be dealt with harshly. While the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Nahda were not radical Islamist organizations, they were the victims of "guilt by association" (Wickham 2015, 79).

However, Al-Nahda and the Muslim Brotherhood still had an opportunity to build trust between their leaders and the leaders of the secular opposition. The Brotherhood did have opportunities to work with the secular opposition, but did so rarely. When they did decide to cooperate with the secular opposition, Brotherhood leaders were perceived as arrogant, selfish, and not truly committed to democracy. This was because those in power were the ideologically conservative and were rigid in their beliefs (Wickham 2015, 85). Al-Nahda, on the other hand, actively worked with the secular opposition, made concessions, and showed their commitment to democracy through negotiations during the authoritarian period.

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the Brotherhood and Al-Nahda both emerged as the strongest political party in their respective countries. While secularists were suspicious of both

Al-Nahda and the Muslim Brotherhood, secularists were not afraid enough in Tunisia to align with the Deep State to destroy them (Stepan 2013, 23). This was not only because the actions taken during the authoritarian period; the actions taken by the Brotherhood during the post-authoritarian period only confirmed the secular opposition's suspicions. The Muslim Brotherhood promised that during the 2011 parliamentary elections, their Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) would only contest 30% of the seats available, but ended up running for significantly more (Helleyer 2016, 69). Additionally, the Brotherhood promised not to field a presidential candidate, a promise which they broke (Helleyer 2016, 69). This caused the secular opposition to believe that the Brotherhood was never truly supportive of the revolution, they were only interested when it became clear the revolution could serve its partisan interests (Helleyer 2016, 43). These actions, along with the distrust built during the authoritarian phase, caused the secular opposition to fear the Brotherhood so much that they became tempted to use the Egyptian Deep State to limit the Brotherhood's power. For example, after the creation of the Islamist dominated Constitutional Council, some leaders of the secular forces lobbied the judiciary, which was led by members of the old regime, to intervene (Brown 2013, 48). The judiciary obliged by dissolving the Council (Brown 2013, 48). However, after Morsi claimed that he was above judicial review, the secular opposition increased its efforts to use the Deep State for its own benefit. First, thirty parties, including several parties with close ties to the old regime, created a coalition called the National Salvation Front in the hopes of curtailing Morsi's power (Brown 2013, 111). Furthermore, several elites from the secular opposition strove to remove the Brotherhood rather than limiting its power. For example, the Tamarrod Movement was aided by members of the Interior Ministry and multiple members of the judiciary (Helleyer 2016, 111). Additionally, multiple members of the secular opposition, including those in the Tamarrod

Movement, decided to appeal to the military, who they believed would remove the Brotherhood and call for new, free and fair elections, which would provide the secular opposition a political advantage (Helleyer 2016, 131). The military used the secular opposition's appeals as a justification to issue an ultimatum and ultimately to overthrow the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the secular opposition's belief that the military would "return to the barracks" and call for free and fair elections proved to be naïve, as the military returned to its authoritarian practices reminiscent of Mubarak Era.

The distrust built between the secular opposition and the Brotherhood proved to be a crucial factor in why the secular opposition chose to abort democracy via the military rather than attempting to negotiate with the Brotherhood. If the Brotherhood and the secular opposition chose to cooperate rather than frequently be at odds with one another, a vastly different outcome could have occurred. Specifically, researcher H.A. Helleyer argues that in the months following the revolution, if the Brotherhood and the secular opposition cooperated, they could have successfully limited the power of the Deep State (Helleyer 2016, 65). This would have significantly increased Egypt's chance of creating a successful democracy, as the Deep State actively sabotaged Egypt's democratic experiment, such as artificially creating electricity blackouts and removing police officers from the streets in order to increase dissent by both citizens and the secular opposition towards the Brotherhood (New York Times 2013). By significantly reducing or removing the Deep State from the equation, the devious sabotage of Egyptian democracy on part of the old regime would have never occurred, thus increasing the likelihood that Egypt might have achieved a full democratic transition.

Al-Nahda, on the other hand, was far more willing to compromise on its beliefs. Key issues, such as the inclusion of Sharia as the main source of legislation and that women were

complementary to men in the constitution, saw Al-Nahda back down in the face of pressure (Feuer 2012). This is contrary to the practices of the Brotherhood, which chose to ignore the critics of their constitutional process and brought the constitution to a referendum (NPR 2012). While Al-Nahda definitely took actions that alienated the secular opposition, such as awarding cabinet positions to supporters (Marks 2015), it was not with the same frequency as the Muslim Brotherhood. When faced with crises, Al-Nahda was much more willing to compromise than the Brotherhood. Of course, as the saying goes, "it takes two to tango," and in the case of Al-Nahda, the secular opposition was much more willing to come to the bargaining table than the secular opposition in Egypt. This was because of the trust during the authoritarian era; the secular opposition knew that, despite the tension built between themselves and Al-Nahda an agreement could be reached and that the leaders of Al-Nahda would come to a reasonable compromise. Additionally, the trust built between Al-Nahda and the secular opposition meant that the Tunisian Deep State, rather than being used as a weapon by either side to gain a partisan advantage, could be effectively limited in post-Arab Spring Tunisia. For example, Tunisia's Truth and Dignity Commission was created to investigate the crimes of the past authoritarian regime. This organization received widespread support from Al-Nahda and the secular opposition, and, despite challenges from the Deep State, has maintained its mission (The Guardian 2015). Because of this, the Deep State could not play a large role in either actively sabotaging Tunisia's democratic transition, nor could it take advantage of crises to reassert itself as the primary power broker in Tunisia.

There were other factors that influenced how both the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Nahda acted during the authoritarian and post-authoritarian era. The primary difference during the authoritarian period was location. Al-Nahda was banned and forced into exile in Europe,

while the Muslim Brotherhood lived in a state of legal limbo, where they were technically illegal but allowed to operate most of the time (Hamid 2015, 197; Masoud 2014, 74). Thus, Al-Nahda was given an opportunity to work with the secular opposition freely, whereas there were greater restrictions on the Brotherhood within Egypt. In regard to the post-authoritarian era, the existence of the UGTT in Tunisia and the lack of a comparable watchdog group in Egypt may have influenced the actions of the religious organizations. Al-Nahda most likely recognized the potential backlash by the UGTT if it attempted to push more controversial policies, such as claiming Sharia as the main source of legislation in the constitution, and decided not to pursue it. The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, did not have this restriction, allowing them to act more freely.

There were many reasons as to why Al-Nahda built trust with the secular opposition and the Muslim Brotherhood did not. The first is ideological. As previously mentioned, Al-Nahda's support for democracy was built upon dialogue and inclusion, whereas the Brotherhood's belief in democracy extend only to the procedural aspects. Of course, both groups are umbrella organizations; but in the case of Al-Nahda, the liberal democratic minded reformists retained leadership of the party, whereas the Brotherhood's conservative members controlled top leadership positions. The second is pragmatic. Al-Nahda was aware of the relatively secular nature of Tunisia's society, which could mean that Al-Nahda chose its liberal view on democracy as a way to ensure the broadest base of support (Kamrava 2014, 118). Egypt, on the other hand, is a much more religiously conservative society, meaning that the Brotherhood may have not found supporting liberal democratic principles necessary. The third is perceived power. Because of the Brotherhood's success in parliamentary elections during the authoritarian era, they were aware of their vast political strength before the Arab Spring even began. Al-Nahda, on

the other hand, had no formal organization operating in Tunisia until after the Arab Spring. Therefore, the Brotherhood may have felt that building ties with other parties was unnecessary, whereas Al-Nahda felt that it was necessary to become a political player in post-authoritarian Tunisia.

Shortcomings

There are several limitations of this work. First, the information regarding the specific crises was extremely limited. Most of these crises were seen as embarrassing by the authoritarian regimes, so the spread of information about strikes and protests was limited. Thus, a study with a larger number of cases was not possible. Many of the government documents containing these details were destroyed during the revolution as well. Finally, researching these organizations in Egypt at this time is almost impossible. A researcher studying labor organizations was murdered under the Al-Sisi government, and the Al-Sisi regime has turned away researchers who were traveling to research the Brotherhood within Egypt. Thus, gaining further information about these groups is extremely challenging to say the least.

Another issue are the significant differences between each case. Beyond the differences of the countries, both the trade unions and religious organizations have distinct differences that must be addressed. In the case of the trade union organizations, there simply was not an organization in Egypt that had the same influence and power that the UGTT had in Tunisia. The strength of this democratically minded civil society organization without a doubt was a factor in why Tunisia's transition to democracy was successful. But, for the purposes of this study, I opted to choose an organization that was most similar to the UGTT in function and type. Moreover, the intended purpose of each organization is starkly different. The UGTT, as previously mentioned,

was created to assist in Tunisia's quest for independence, whereas the ETUF was meant to control the demands of the workers and was meant simply to be an arm of the regime.

In regard to religious organizations, although these organizations can be compared easier than the trade unions, there are other differences that must be addressed. First, the legal statuses of the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Nahda were significantly different. The Muslim Brotherhood lived in legal limbo, being banned legally but allowed to operate nonetheless, throughout most its existence, whereas Al-Nahda was severely repressed throughout most of its history. Also, like trade unions, the role of Al-Nahda and the Brotherhood in the Arab Spring were significantly different, which makes drawing clear parallels between the two organizations problematic.

There is also the issue of the number of instances that can be studied. In the Arab Spring, there were only five cases where there were revolutions (Syria, Yemen, Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia), and in two of those cases the leaders were not overthrown. Additionally, Syria and Yemen are extremely dissimilar from the three cases discussed in this study, making controlling for other factors extremely challenging. The case of Libya, which will be discussed in the following section, is also drastically different from Tunisia and Egypt, but it plays an important role in advancing the hypothesis presented in this study. Additionally, because of the limited number of cases, it is not possible to rule out other hypotheses. But this work addresses the importance of building trust in a post-authoritarian setting, something which is vastly underdiscussed within the context of the Arab Spring.

What About Libya?

Libya, while dissimilar to Egypt and Tunisia, highlights the importance of the existence of civil society in the process of democratic consolidation. Libya's significance is that, since its creation in 1947, civil society has been extremely stifled, if not destroyed by the rulers

controlling it. While scholars have discussed this fact extensively, this section will highlight how the absence of trust hindered the facilitation of trust between the citizens of Libya and their post-authoritarian government. In this section, there will be a discussion of the treatment of civil and political society since Libya's inception. After this, the challenges facing Libya as a result of this will be highlighted. Finally, there will be a discussion about how this case further demonstrates the model presented in this paper.

Libya Before the Arab Spring

Since the beginning of Libya as a country, civil and political society have been stifled. After the creation of Libya in 1947, there were around a dozen political parties, but these were confined to the urban elite and were banned in 1952 by King Idiris of Libya (Pargeter 2012; Vandewalle 2012, 69). Unions were a significant political force during the kingdom era, but were greatly limited by the King Idiris in the 1960s (Bearman 1986, 44-45). In 1969, the Revolutionary Command Council overthrew the King of Libya and placed Qaddafi as the de-facto head of state (Vandewalle 2012). When Qaddafi consolidated power in 1973, he took a hard line towards opposition, making any action that could be considered political opposition punishable by death (Newsweek 2011; Vandewalle 2012, 85). Qaddafi had a virtual monopoly on power, making any sort of other politics, beyond formal and largely powerless People's Committees which merely discussed national issues, irrelevant (Joffe 2013, 103-4; Vandewalle 2011, 58; Berman 2012). Paramilitary Revolutionary Committees were given great leeway to accuse anyone they saw as counter to the revolution, which would cause the person's immediate arrest (Pargeter 2012, 102). This was often used against political opponents, making any sort of opposition within even the rubber stamp institutions created by Qaddafi extremely dangerous (Bearman 1986, 188). Qaddafi would not only repress opposition domestically, but

internationally as well. For example, a Sudanese radio station that Qaddafi believed to be a part of the opposition was viciously attacked by Revolutionary Committees (Pargeter 2012, 104). As a result of these policies, there was no independent civil society in Libya (Rishmawi and Morris 2007).

An important factor that allowed for the stifling of Libya's civil society is that it is a rentier state. A rentier state, meaning a state dependent on a singular natural resource, allows for a government to act in a manner that is independent from society (Kamrava 2007, 203). Libya would be considered an extreme rentier state, while Egypt would be considered a semi-rentier state (Quandt et. al. 1996, 291; Wright 2012, 193). Rentier states have several effects in respect to internal development. Rentier states allow for rulers to not create strong political institutions, simply because they did not have to rely on taxation or providing services to their citizens (Vandewalle 1998, 172). Rentier states further enforce clientalism within the state and make collective economic action groups, such as unions, irrelevant, because wealth can be easily achieved as an individual (Brynen 1992, 74). The lack of economic development inherent in rentier economies further stifles trade unions, making their development challenging (Brynen 1992, 75). Additionally, rentier states further ethnic and regional cleavages because rulers can allocate funds on tribal or ethnic lines (Brynen 1992, 72). The effects of the rentier state were strongly seen in Libya. Qaddafi managed to gain the acquiescence of the populace through Libya's massive oil reserves. Qaddafi used funds from crude oil trades to provide patronage to his supporters and those who were a part of his tribe (Vandewalle 2011, 23). This, combined with the harsh penalties associated with political activity, made Libyans either politically apathetic or afraid (Vandewalle 2012, 95).

Another contributing factor to the stifling of civil society was the emphasis on tribal affiliation by the Qaddafi regime. First, Qaddafi used tribalism to his advantage by promoting his own tribe, the Gadafa, to key political and military positions (Barany 2011; Vandewalle 2011, 18). Qaddafi and other elites who took advantage of Libya's vast oil reserves would only share the spoils with their tribe, deepening tribal tensions (Pargeter 2012, 42). As a result of this and the repression of political opposition, Libyans emphasized tribal affiliations over political or civil affiliations. This greatly impacted the development of civil and political society not only before the Arab Spring, but after the Arab Spring as well. Tribal leaders dominated the elections immediately after the death of Qaddafi and used their tribal connections to secure their base of support (Zoubir and White 2016, 187). These leaders, rather than focusing on building national unity and focusing on democratization, focused on the needs and interests of their tribe.

The Arab Spring and Beyond

In 2011, in the midst of the Libyan Civil War, which resulted from the protests of the Arab Spring, the National Transition Council was created (St. John 2012). The NTC called for the creation of political parties, free and fair elections, and freedom of speech (St. John 2012, 287). Much of the new transitional government was created by those in the Qaddafi government who defected early to the revolution (Kadlec 2012, 4). Others were a part of the reformist wing of the Qaddafi government and citizens returning from exile (Kadlec 2012, 4). This was because there was no one in Libya beyond these groups that had the expertise required for governing (Pargeter 2012, 232).

The newly elected government had a brief "honeymoon period" with its citizens, but this was quickly replaced by considerable amounts of unrest exasperated by strong divisions in Libyan society (Kamrava 2014, 440). However, there were significant challenges to this

government. Primarily, the leaders of rebel militias, who had taken control of swaths of land from Qaddafi's forces, refused to give up power because of most the NTC official's ties to the old regime (Pargeter 2012, 249). But, the NTC needs the support of these rebel groups in order to prevent more chaos within the country (Zoubir and White 2016, 66). The NTC attempted to disarm the militias, but this has largely stalled, with the militias carving up Libya into their own fiefdoms (Fraihat 2016, 26). Along with this, Libya has no properly functioning institutions or political culture, as a result of Qaddafi's extreme power, personalized rule, and his creation of a vast rentier state (Zoubir and White 2016, 178). Both of these issues are compounded by the severe distrust between citizens in Libya, which results from almost no history of cooperation (Fraihat 2016, 23). This was seen in the actions of NTC, which spent much of the post-revolutionary period punishing Qaddafi loyalists instead of working to unify the country (Fraihat 2016, 24). After the revolution, dozens of civil society organizations were created, but faced serious challenges, primarily that Libyans had no experience in working within organizations (St. John 2012, 292).

Discussion

Libya provides an extreme example of the importance of civil and political society as a mode of building trust between the government and its citizens. The case of Libya represents the importance of both horizontal and vertical trust in the success of a democratic transition. Regarding horizontal trust, the disarming of militias throughout the country failed because of the militia leader's hostility and suspicions towards the NTC. Qaddafi had much to do with this; his lack of tolerance of any sort of political opposition made him eliminate any sort of organization that would provide his citizens any mode to oppose his government. Qaddafi's use of fear associated with this, including the death penalty for political dissent, his willingness to send

agents to other countries to eliminate the opposition, and the use of Revolutionary Committees, made the appearance of any opposition towards Qaddafi's policies highly dangerous. This made it so that elites had no chance to negotiate and compromise, making trust built between political elites almost non-existent. Libyans have recently had to rely on former Qaddafi-era officials for governing, making it appear that this same government is betraying the ideals of the revolution. This, combined with severe ethnic and regional divisions and a post-revolutionary "us versus them" mentality has made it extremely challenging for Libyans to compromise on key issues that officials must deal with in their political careers.

Regarding vertical trust, the lack of civil society in Libya also means that there was no chance for any watchdog organizations to play a role in Libya's democratic transition. Because of the absence of watchdog organizations, no internal organization could use its mass mobilization potential to push the Libyan government to maintain its course towards democracy. This was seen in the Libyan government's action after the revolution. Specifically, there was a large divide between Azlam (loyalists) and Thuwar (revolutionary), which was perpetuated by the government by providing benefits to individuals seen as Thuwar and punishing those who were seen as Azlam (Fraihat 2016, 24). This diverted the government's attention from focusing on consolidating democracy, something that must be a primary focus of fledgling democracies.

It is important to distinguish the Libyan case from that of Egypt. While both Egypt and Libya did not experience democratic outcomes, each country faced vastly different circumstances. First, their revolutions occurred under vastly difference circumstances. While both Egypt and Libya experienced popular revolts during the Arab Spring, Egypt's people were able to topple its authoritarian government with forces within the country, whereas Libya's revolutionaries were provided external support by way of a NATO led intervention (BBC 2011).

This meant that the unification of forces, albeit temporary, that must occur for a revolution to succeed without external support did not exist in Libya. In a similar vein, because revolutionaries in Egypt did not fight an armed confrontation with the state, it meant that the military remained intact to maintain law and order. Along with this, Egypt did not have to deal with the issues surrounding disarming rebel groups, which was a major concern in the case of Libya. The greatest difference is that Egypt did not experience the state breakdown that occurred in Libya during the post-authoritarian era, where several factions claimed to be the legitimate government of Libya. This distinction is important because of the difference of development of civil society. While the majority of Egypt's political parties were greatly weakened by decades of authoritarian rule, their sheer existence meant that when Mubarak stepped down, there were political parties to fill the vacuum (Vandewalle 2011). Libya, on the other hand, did not have a civil or political society to fill this vacuum, allowing for rebel militias, radical Islamist actors, and various factions to take the place of the Libyans.

Conclusion

Democracy is dependent on trust and built on negotiations. Within these negotiations, leaders must trust that their opponents are willing to compromise on their beliefs, that they have the best interests of the country in mind, and that they both value the maintenance of democracy. With democracy fresh from a long period of authoritarian rule, this can be challenging, as the political organizations where one develops this trust are either stifled or banned by the authoritarian regime. However, within the context of the Arab Spring, stark differences arose.

Within Tunisia, major civil society organizations built trust in a variety of ways. The UGTT built trust with their members by acting in their interests, which was demonstrated by negotiating concessions with the government and supporting strikes against the authoritarian

regime. This allowed the UGTT to be a strong political player in post-Arab Spring Tunisia, simply because its members trusted their leaders and mobilized accordingly in support of the leadership's actions. Al-Nahda, on the other hand, built trust with other civil society leaders through frequent meetings, where they discussed democratization, made concessions, and developed their democratic platform. Therefore, when negotiations began with Al-Nahda and other civil society organizations that determined the fate of democracy, Al-Nahda could more easily negotiate with the secular opposition and come to an agreement.

Egypt, on the other hand, had major players that did not build adequate trust. The ETUF was frequently seen as the tool of the regime, simply because it almost always denounced strikes, negotiated on behalf of the government, and forced workers to form their own independent strikes and organizations. This made the ETUF a target of workers after the fall of the regime as a vestige of the Mubarak Era, effectively nullifying any power it might have. The Muslim Brotherhood rarely met with the secular opposition of Egypt. When the Brotherhood worked with secular organizations, they did so for practical and not ideological reasons. Additionally, those who were most interested in building bridges with the secular organizations were frequently marginalized by the Brotherhood leadership. This helped develop a deep distrust between the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular opposition, which culminated in the breakdown of negotiations between the Brotherhood and the Tamarrod movement, ultimately leading to the end of Egypt's fledgling democracy.

Libya represents an extreme set of circumstances where Libyans were deprived of any opportunity to build trust through civil society organizations. Through fear and repression, Qaddafi stifled any chance of developing a viable civil society. This made it so that Libyans had no watchdog organization to ensure that Libya's democratic transition remained on track. This

additionally made Qaddafi-era officials some of the only Libyans capable of running a competent government, causing deep distrust and divisions that have only worsened Libya's potential for democracy.

This finding does not necessarily disprove any previous findings about the outcome of the Arab Spring. Additionally, this work cannot specifically recognize if either vertical or horizontal trust is more important in a democratic transition. Also, this work cannot determine whether democratic transitions can occur with only horizontal or vertical trust. This is because both horizontal and vertical trust appeared in the case of Tunisia, whereas neither occurred in Egypt. Ultimately, this work provides greater information about why, when faced with key situations regarding the fate of democracy, Tunisians succeeded and Egyptians did not. This information also provides another important insight into why the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy is a huge feat. Hopefully, this information can be used to emphasize the importance of engagement between civil society organizations and the importance of leaders building trust with their members.

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