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To Look Like a Modern Ruler: Diffusion of Fashion among State Elites

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An abstract of
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Emory University
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Abstract

To Look Like a Modern Ruler: Diffusion of Fashion among State Elites
by Aristide Sechandice

The end of colonial regimes across the globe has left in its wake a striking and ubiquitous phenomenon: the tendency among leaders of newly independent countries to dress in Western clothing styles rather than in indigenous garments. As an aspect of cultural globalization, this transition to Western dress has accelerated even as Western political and economic dominance has receded. Appeal to three broad substantive literatures — the sociological literature on fashion, the social-psychological literature on impression formation, and the literature on cultural imperialism stemming from critical theory — offers insights into the motivations of non-Western state elites for Western presentations of self. Case studies of both exemplary and deviant cases are presented to show the operation of this process in local and national contexts. A data set of 104 countries in Africa and Asia, the continents most intensively colonized by Europeans, supplies the basis of a quantitative analysis. I use event history analysis, a statistical technique for longitudinal event data, to model this process and adjudicate between candidate explanatory theories. Functionalist theory is ruled out on theoretical grounds for this particular research problem. World-system theory is shown by a model-fitting strategy to yield no explanatory power for this phenomenon. Evidence in favor of a spatial model and world-culture theory is adduced. The status of a country as a socialist state is found to be positively and significantly associated with the hazard of a transition to Western dress by rulers, while a heritage as an erstwhile British or French colony is positively though more weakly associated with this propensity. The population of a country is found to have no effect on the hazard rate, and a world-system position index variable is not associated with the tendency of heads of state to adopt Western dress.

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CHAPTER ONE: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

> The principles of the various National Spirits, progressing in a necessary series of stages, are themselves only phases of the one universal Spirit: through them, that World Spirit elevates and completes itself in history, into a self-comprehending totality.
> – Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

> These abuses, this tyranny of uniformity in nearly all outer manifestations of life, leads notably to the banishment of provincial costumes, the representatives of climate, products of local art, so full of interest from an historical standpoint, picturesque, stable, durable, which are handed down from generation to generation.
> – Pierre Clerget

> The rules for the right thing to wear have almost entirely collapsed. Almost the only remaining rules concern men's dress at the highest levels of business and government.
> – Elizabeth Fox-Genovese

The globe is home to more than 200 nations, each with its own unique history and culture(s). But despite this richly variegated mosaic of states and peoples, as one surveys the public face of those nations, as represented by their heads of state, one notices a conspicuous sameness on the level of appearances. This is because state leaders in all parts of the globe, of the most varied ethnicities and cultures, have adopted Western attire, and more specifically the Western men's suit. For some time, diversity in the appearance of state leaders has steadily been giving way to uniformity, if not a uniform. What is responsible for this remarkable passage to a Western sartorial style among leaders of peoples to whom this style is alien and foreign? This project proposes to address this question, by systematically analyzing a process of change that is perhaps so obvious that it has escaped rigorous analysis.

The clothing that a people wears is not sheer fancy, but is endowed with enduring social and political significance (Kroeber 1919; Buckley and Roach 1974; Schneider and Weiner 1989; Tarlo 1996). Frantz Fanon recognized this well, claiming that it "constitutes the most distinctive form of a society's uniqueness" (Fanon 1965: 35).

Fanon's interest in this matter was an aspect of his general concern with the relationship between colonized and colonizers in a period when European power had been projected throughout the world, and was now undergoing its eclipse. The customary clothing that a people wears is a physical embodiment of its social identity, serving as a foundation for social solidarity and differentiation from other peoples (Hamilton and Hamilton 1989). Folk costume provides a sense of stability and continuity, and imparts the value of tradition to new generations (Polhemus and Procter 1978; Fox-Genovese 1987). It is integral to the essence of a people.

Increasing intercultural contact has bound up this issue with power relations obtaining between distinct peoples. In areas where conflict between a dominant group and a subordinate group defines their interrelations, the subordinate group generally resists assimilation by maintaining its folk costume, among other means (Bogatyrev [1937] 1971). For example, the folk costume has been a primary locus of conflict between the Karen tribe and the cultural nationalism of the Thai state (Hamilton and Hamilton 1989), and has served as an expression of Okinawan resistance to Japanization (Cort 1989). Similarly, the resistance of Moravian Slovaks to Germanization in the nineteenth century and efforts at maintaining the independence of the Russian countryside from the dominance of the towns took clothing styles as a major site of struggle and a weapon of cultural competition (Bogatyrev [1937] 1971); this pattern was replicated by the Guambianos of Colombia in the early twentieth century (Schwarz 1979). While in the short term this conflict conduced to a maintenance of historic costume in pristine form — in contrast to other areas where the consequences of assimilation were less fraught with conflict — over the long term superior power affected

cultural just as it did political and economic realities, tending toward the extinction of local costume.

In the early nineteenth century, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, from whom one of the epigraphs introducing this chapter is taken ([1840] 1988: 83), explained the cultural and near-physical extinction of Native Americans after the European arrival in terms of a world-historical collision between Nature and Spirit. He asserted that natural (i.e., indigenous) ways of life cannot survive exposure to a superior, more vital spirit emanating from the West; indigenous peoples would either have to adapt themselves to the ways of life and spirit, or culture, of the conquering Westerners — or die. Despite the unfortunate mistaking by Hegel of the machinations of power for those of spirit, his words were tragically prophetic. The twentieth century saw countless indigenous peoples succumb to a thoroughgoing Westernization and modernization, and lose their identities as distinct cultures.

The clothing that a people wears is part of a cultural lattice, an intricate web of social forms which is no more dispensable to the life of a people than its form of economy or governance. Because societies are interconnected wholes, changes in one sphere, such as costume, will have reverberations throughout the social structure (Bogatyrev [1937] 1971; Polhemus and Procter 1978; Cowen 2002). Moreover, this is a fact acknowledged by the peoples concerned (Cort 1989). Conversely, resisting a change in clothing practices may help to ward off unwelcome social changes in other spheres (Tarlo 1996). Material social facts are accompanied by immaterial cultural logics that may or may not be hostile to the identity or existence of the receiving people (Urban 2001; Cowen 2002), a notion only too well understood by self-isolating groups such as

the Amish. An economic boon may turn out to be a cultural peril (Cowen 2002). The corollary of this axiom is that clinging to autochthonous attire may be a safeguard against cultural extinction (Brodman 1994), whether the threat is real or perceived (Hamilton 1991). In some instances, cultural extinction accompanies political liberation, as when the birth of Slovakia as a nation spelled the end of the Slovak national costume (Bogatyrev [1937] 1971). In other instances, cultural extinction does not have the consolation of political enfranchisement, as the Maya of Guatemala today resist forced assimilation by the government and its cultural policy (Brodman 1994). For countless indigenous peoples, Westernization means symbolic annihilation at best, and ethnocide at worst.

The grand drama of Westernization being played out all across the world has had three phases: the phase of imperialism proper (which reached its point of no return with the end of World War II in 1945), the phase of cultural imperialism in the postcolonial era (following World War II), and the phase of globalization (whose most intensive economic and political expressions can be dated only from about the late 1980s or early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War-era bifurcated world and the formation of the World Trade Organization). A similar though not identical periodization is employed by Tomlinson (1991).[1] We are currently witnessing what Véliz (1994) has termed the Hellenistic moment of Western culture, where attraction has replaced force in the context of the non-Western world. Of course, globalization has not supplanted cultural imperialism, but has been superadded onto it, overlapping with it in time and interacting with it in effects. Some see cultural imperialism and neocolonialism as a sort of bridge

[1]For alternative periodizations, see Blaut (1970) and Mignolo (1998).

from colonialism to globalization (see Buell 1994). This project will not be concerned with the phase of imperialism proper. Where it occurred, the adoption of Western dress styles in this period is not mysterious, being undergirded by the coercive power of imperial structures.

The extent to which Western dress had been adopted became a hallmark indicating the degree of civilization of a people in the eyes of the colonials (I. Brown 1963). Clinging to native dress traditions was sometimes deemed symbolic of recalcitrance, if not resistance, to imperial rule (von Ehrenfels 1979). And generally in their role as paymasters for native civil servants, European colonial administrations established dress codes that made the natives look much more European, yet not exactly so, in order to maintain some symbolic distance, such as trousers for Europeans and shorts for natives (Eicher and Sumberg 1995). For their part, the colonists met clothing resistance with clothing imperialism. In Ghana among other places, according to one author, clothes proved more vital to the pacification of diffident tribes in the hinterland than guns, as Europeans forced tribal dignitaries to wear woven cloth instead of skins, aiming at conversion from the top down (Allman 2004b). If Fanon is correct in his estimation that costume is the most important emblem of a people's uniqueness, then it is natural that European colonial powers bent on overcoming resistance to their overlordship would target native dress, enjoining the 'savages' to dress like the 'civilized.' To control a people's everyday habits and appearance, including their attire, is to control the people, which is undoubtedly why dominant, alien powers so often seek to restrict dress styles (Brodman 1994). Denial of a people's culture abets the project of control, as indigenous culture is the last foundation of resistance for peoples who are

hopelessly dominated by a stronger political or military force. The retention of Western dress after the colonizers went home is more curious, but explicable by the construct of cultural imperialism.

Schiller (1976: 9) defines cultural imperialism as the "sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced and sometimes even bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of the dominating center of the system." This definition succinctly captures the important dimensions of the complex problem of cultural imperialism. Cultural imperialism is conceived as a continuation of the project of control initiated during the imperial era (von Ehrenfels 1979; Wallerstein and Phillips 1991). In fact, according to some dependency theorists, the primary moment of neoimperialism is cultural (Salinas and Paldán 1979). It is almost a general axiom of sociology that power seeks to stabilize and naturalize itself on bases other than coercion, for the latter is a precarious basis for domination over the long term. Ideological and cultural hegemony are especially effective tools in this endeavor (Wallerstein 1997).

The advantage of hegemony over coercive suppression lies in its self-disguising nature. Hegemony works through cultural messages which seem to carry a stamp of legitimacy and propriety, independent of the specific social formations which embody it, seeming less partisan than power. These cultural messages are self-validating, as indicated by the fact that acculturation to Western styles in dress, entertainment, media, politics, etc. continues long after the colonizers leave (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1997). The ascendance of the Western men's suit wherever Europeans ruled is only the most conspicuous and successful sign of the cultural imperialism of the West (Mazrui 1970;

Maynard 2004). The suit has contributed perhaps more than any other garment to a growing sense of sameness in world dress styles (Maynard 2004). This culminates in a renovation of bodily practices to the point that Western-style clothing articles become naturalized, at first among elite elements, who fancy them comfortable and proper (Elias [1994] 2000; von Ehrenfels 1979). From a phenomenological standpoint, a change of clothes brings about a change in ways of thinking in the direction of a Western mindset, as has been alleged by an insider account for the case of Japan, to the point that Western dress has become the "national costume" of that country, an apparent contradiction in terms (Shirasu 1970: 3). The naturalization of Western clothing in turn also affects attributions, so that the same person will come to be seen differently when appearing alternately in Western and indigenous dress. At least one empirical study (Mishra 1974) has explicitly verified this tendency of differentiation.

Schiller's definition of cultural imperialism also correctly emphasizes the role of indigenous elites in securing the victory of external social forms over indigenous practices. This is particularly true of colonial settings in which the colonizing powers (notably the British and French) sought to co-opt locals as well as dominate them. They aimed to a create a subservient *comprador* class of bureaucrats and administrators. For the British, this was the philosophy of indirect rule: first accomplished through native tribal chiefs, then by native administrators trained in an educational system organized by the colonial administration and inspired with a Western ethic. The French saw themselves on a *mission civilisatrice*, culminating at the collective level in provincial status for Algeria and at the individual level in the *evolué*, the native fully versed in the ways of French culture and life. Once this 'dominating stratum' of indigenous society

was won over, it attempted to impose its adopted dress on the populace (Polhemus and Procter 1978). And then, with the indigenous cultural forms under siege, and seemingly incompatible with the new, increasingly Westernized social forms, the defection of a few opinion leaders to Western dress sealed the fate of indigenous styles, to the point where today street scenes from Nairobi to Damascus show the masses wearing mass-produced Western-style clothing items. This defection usually has an infectious quality, weakening the power of clothing traditions and spurring others in the villages to follow (Bogatyrev [1937] 1971). Durkheim ([1893] 1997) understood this as a weakening of the traditional collective consciousness. So long as the morphology of a society has not changed, the pressure for conformity favors traditional ways. As it affects fashion, this means that "people thrown into areas of common interaction and having similar runs of experience develop common tastes" (Blumer 1968: 344). But as society changes, culture changes in tandem, and the departure of some individuals from traditional ways begins to tilt the balance in favor of the cultural forms associated with the new social forces, leading to a domino effect of personal influence.

However, the cultural imperialism thesis probably exaggerates the degree of control imposed from without by great powers on less developed states and underestimates the degree of voluntarism involved. In the present phase of globalization, it is more a question of the attractive pull of lifeways centered in the developed world than Schiller's pressure or force, although to be fair Schiller included attraction alongside the more heavy-handed mechanisms of acculturation. Crane (2002) asserts that the term imperialism has little continued viability in cultural matters outside the realm of media, so cultural imperialism today reduces to media imperialism. Tomlinson (1991) sees

cultural imperialism and globalization as more of a contrast than a continuity, owing to the less purposive nature of globalization. Whatever the relationship obtaining between a receding cultural imperialism and a less directive globalization process, the latter continues to afford opportunities for unequal influence flows with however a less predictable direction and results.

Globalization constitutes an international space at the highest level of generality, on which the most varied cultural forms meet, but not on equal terms (Hannerz 1997). Globalization in many social sectors equals Westernization, and fashion is one such sector attesting to this equation. A dynamic tension exists between the generality of fashion and its expressiveness of locality, supporting the hypothesis that the more widely adopted the particular dress fashion, the less accurately that fashion communicates the social and political identity of the wearers (Holtzclaw 1956; Lind and Roach-Higgins 1985).

We have here the asymmetry characteristic of all power relations: it may seem nearly tautological to state, but the Western suit expresses the identity of Western state leaders more nearly than it expresses the identity of Third World leaders. This asymmetry is greater in the area of culture than in economics, because although terms of trade may be uneven, the exploiter still needs the exploited economically, whereas trade in culture is more of a "one-way traffic" (Mazrui 1990: 6). As with all asymmetrical relations, the contours of this state of affairs may be brought to light by way of a thought experiment which reverses the image: consider how absurd it seems to think of a Western head of state emulating the indigenous dress of an Arab or African head of state. Ordinarily, when intercultural borrowing of clothing items occurs, such items undergo

cultural authentication (Erekosima and Eicher 1981), an adaptation of the items by the receiving culture to fit its own lifeways (Hurh 1968; Tortora and Eubank 1998). The case of fashion diffusion among state executives is thus unusual in that it rarely shows such adaptation. The borrowed item is carried over unadulterated, which is surely the point: to achieve maximum effect, imitate exactly. In such cases of pure borrowing, not only the physical item, but meanings, uses, and functions are also appropriated (Eicher and Erekosima 1980). To excavate the motivations for imitative action in the field of dress, the impression formation literature supplies theoretical leverage.

Most of the extensive social-psychological literature on impression formation concerns mundane settings and ordinary individuals in micro interactions (see L. Davis 1984; Kummen and Brown 1985), but there is no reason that the insights gleaned from this extensive literature should not apply to the interactions of individual state leaders acting in their capacities as representatives of nations. This line of research has shown that style of dress is among the most important determinants of impression formation by others, overshadowing even embodied forms such as the physical appearance of the face (Hamid 1968).

Clothes locate a person in social space, announcing a particular identity (Stone 1962). They represent a physical marker indicating role incumbency (Goffman 1961b). The clothes that state leaders choose to wear clearly communicate something about themselves, particularly their placement on the scale from traditional to modern (Blumer 1968). This observation holds whether the message content of clothes is conscious and intentional (Goffman 1959) or not. In the former case, under the impact of globalization, culture becomes less a habitus reflecting age-old parochialisms and more a reservoir of

justification and legitimation in a global cultural economy (Appadurai 1990). In the latter case, the clothing choices of individuals are epiphenomenal, and the structural influences masquerade as sheer preferences (Hamilton 1997). In either case, clothing is a manifest indicator of the outward self-definition of the wearer (Gibbins and Schneider 1980; Fiore and De Long 1984; Damhorst 1990), an essential constituent of what Goffman (1959; 1963) terms 'personal front,' a tool in one's 'identity kit' (1961a). By extension, changes over time in the mode of self-presentation through dress styles may reflect a change in the mentality of the wearer (Bush and London 1960; Crane 2000), and probably reflect changes in the social system (Lowe and Lowe 1990; Crane 2000). Changes in the international system are plausibly related to the increasing homogenization of dress styles, and this change should be most prominent at the points of greatest contact, i.e., among representatives of governments and corporations. Such actors play the conduit role for foreign fashions that the aristocracy played in former times (Tarde 1903; Nakagawa and Rosovsky 1963; Mazrui 1990). Structural causes must be suspected wherever uniformity of dress behavior is in evidence (Sanborn 1926). Appadurai (1996: 67) attributes the relative uniformity of global dress to the fact of its proximity to the body, claiming that "those practices of consumption that are closest to the body…acquire uniformity through habituation." Apart from the fact that no justification is given for this supposition about the psychological economy, other factors are at work. The abandonment of traditional dress may be particularly pregnant with status-enhancement implications among political elites in emergent and small-scale states (Schneider 1987; Cannon 1998). The longitudinal nature of this project lends itself to an identification of such changes and their theoretical and practical import.

The process by which this fashion change occurs among state leaders is essentially a two-stage affair. First, the unsettlement of existing social arrangements loosens the confining conditions of social structure and opens a field to innovation, without determining its path (Richardson and Kroeber 1940; Kroeber 1957; Polhemus and Procter 1978; Swidler 1986). Because cultures are complex wholes in the Tylorean sense, hidden but detectable homologies should be expected to exist between clothing and other fields of culture (Tarde 1903; Kroeber 1957; Lévi-Strauss [1962] 1966; Roach and Musa 1980). This is true in both a dynamic and a static sense (Blaut 1977): changes in one area of culture often reverberate throughout other areas. Traditional dress is delegitimized as a mode of self-presentation for state elites as, and to the extent that, their nations increasingly enter a global frame of reference. Then, with the obstructive pressure of tradition cleared away, the attractive pull of models of dress and behavior currently viewed as more legitimate selects for the adoption of those models. This result is advantaged by isomorphism and its crucial counterpart, theorization (Strang and Meyer 1993). Isomorphism entails the constituents of a social or organizational field assuming similar forms. As they do so, theorization by the actors themselves that they are commensurate entities invites the belief that models appropriate for one of the actors in the system are appropriate for all of them (Jo. Meyer 2000). Strang and Meyer (1993: 501) maintain that theorization produces a "world-cultural construction of 'actorhood,'" with the consequence that "the more societies are organized as nation-states (and not as 'primordial' religious or ethnic groups) the more social structures diffuse among them." Increasing similarity, in turn, makes for improved communication and further exchange in a seemingly virtuous circle of homophily (Eicher 1995; Jo. Meyer 2000).

Assuming that the increasing universality of Western fashion among state leaders is at least implicitly goal-directed, as suggested by the concept of theorization, what then is the goal? It would seem that the goal is increased legitimacy (Jo. Meyer 2000), in the projection of which clothing figures significantly (Barnard 2002), and strategic clothing can assist in that regard (Schneider and Weiner 1989). From a (world) system-maintenance perspective, where universalism takes root, it diminishes conflict in the system, which works to the advantage of the dominant core nations. From the perspective of individual leaders and ruling strata, culture may be mobilized as a tool in gaining legitimacy abroad and ascendancy over the masses at home (Wallerstein 1974, 1990; von Ehrenfels 1979; Abou-El-Haj 1997). In a sense, leaders of emerging nations must have one foot in the modern and one foot in the traditional world, must be "ambivalently modern" (Binder 1964: 627). Interestingly, leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, noted for frequently wearing indigenous dress in his relations with other states, was often seen wearing Western dress on prominent domestic occasions, such as the installation of new tribal chiefs (Smythe and Smythe 1960; Marriott 1963).

The fact that some models carry the stamp of propriety and others do not accounts in large part for the phenomenon of fashion itself, as opposed to a balkanization of tastes (Blumer 1969). In fact, uniformity of design is a distinguishing feature of Western fashion (Holtzclaw 1956). To display Western fashion is to associate oneself with the dynamism characteristic of advanced industrial societies (Brodman 1994; Renne 1995), a motive which accords with the state-building agenda of political elites in many developing countries (Wejnert 2002). According to Strang and Meyer (1993), rules and practices which carry the cachet of the modern are most likely to diffuse. In the binary of

modernity/tradition, modernity carries a positive valence, while tradition is held to be negative, and the occlusion of 'Western' with (progressive) modernity and 'non-Western' with (backward) tradition completes the epistemological circle (Sakai 1989; Tomlinson 1999). Sometimes this is explicit in the motivation of the adopters, as Hay (2004) has shown for Kenya. Often it is unconscious. The Western men's suit has a certain "self-perpetuating symbolic and emotional force" (Hollander 1994: 4). It is also a particularly univocal garment, carrying a more straightforward message content than most clothing articles (Kaiser, Nagasawa, and Hutton 1991, 1995), and part of that message is a lexicon of modernity and rationality (Negrin 1999). Marks of Western mentality and lifestyle connote an air of the modern, an identification for which there is of course an objective basis (Giddens 1990). The wives of high state officials are entranced by Western garments too, insofar as these classify them as modern (Wipper 1972).

It follows from this identification of Western fashion with modernity that elites whose domestic social position is founded upon oppositional international politics (e.g., Muammar Qaddafi of Libya for most of his tenure, Kim Jeong-Il of North Korea, the *ayatollahs* of post-revolutionary Iran) will be more likely to see in traditional fashion or military-style attire a bulwark of their rule (Schneider and Weiner 1989), and will be accordingly resistant to Western fashion, among other Western influences (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1997). Different models of time and different postures toward social change inform this anti-fashion behavior, on the one hand, and fashion behavior, on the other (F. Davis 1988). Significantly, this is a general relation, holding true of traditional elements within modern societies as well, where they coexist with modern elements

Veblen ([1899] 1979). Such is true of modern Britain, where monarchy and parliamentary rule are fused together:

> If traditional, anti-fashion adornment is a model of time as continuity (the maintenance of the status quo) and fashion is a model of time as change, then it is appropriate that Queen Elizabeth II should not have chosen a fashionable gown for her coronation. It is rational that she should have worn a gown which proclaims a message of continuity over hundreds of years, a message of timelessness and changelessness. In short, her social, economic and political situation suggests that she should prefer things to change as little as possible, and she expresses this attitude in her dress and adornment — especially at her coronation. On the other hand, a social climber who is, or would like to be, on the way up will use the latest fashions to reinforce and project an image of time as change and progress. His or her fashionable attire constitutes an advertisement for socio-temporal mobility and will remain so as long as he or she stands to benefit from social change rather than the maintenance of the social status quo (Polhemus and Procter 1978: 13).

In a Third World context, the politics of dress are often quite ritualized. A demonstrative rejection of Western fashion and a movement in favor of traditional attire has surfaced in modern India and Pakistan, in Kenya, Nigeria, Indonesia, and in Tanzania, among other places (Mazrui 1970; Martin 2004). Yet even many of the most anti-Western of Third World leaders mimic the styles of the West while denouncing it (Bell 1976), showing that oppositional politics seem more a necessary than a sufficient condition of anti-Western sartorial statements. These extend both to the wearing of items, as in veiling for political reasons in Algeria and Iran (Hamelink 1983) and Herero 'dressing like the enemy' in Namibia (Hendrickson 1996), or not wearing them, as in the shunning of hats in Nkrumah's Ghana (Allman 2004a). In fact, the wearing of traditional attire was sometimes interpreted as a political statement when it was not meant as such. More generally, the likelihood of state elites adopting Western dress should depend on their placement within the global social structure.

A Diffusion Study

The foregoing suggests the outlines of a diffusion study. If the process of adopting Western dress styles is non-random, a diffusion analysis with appropriately specified models will facilitate adjudication between alternative theoretical paradigms explaining and predicting this process (Strang 1991). The candidate paradigms are functionalist theory, world-system theory, world-culture theory, and a spatial model, as detailed in Chapter 4 below.

A diffusion study must consider a number of important variables, such as the specific nature of the diffused idea, object, or practice; its relationship to other ideas, objects, and practices, both indigenous and imported; characteristics of potential adopters or change agents; the nature and intensity of relationships between first and later adopters, among later adopters, and between each of these and non-adopters; diffusion channels; social structure; culture; local context; institutional conditions; and environmental conditions (due to the great volume of literature on these aspects, citations are found in Figure 1). But it must not stop there. Mechanical specifications of formal properties of diffusion objects, participants, and conditions say nothing about the causal mechanisms involved, the motivations for imitative action. Aside from the literature-based inferences about legitimacy and modernity earlier in this section, this exercise of interpretation will have to await the final two chapters.

Let us review a couple of the most widely cited definitions of diffusion before proceeding further. The classic definition of diffusion by Katz, Levin, and Hamilton (1963: 240) is as follows: "Viewed sociologically, the process of diffusion may be characterized as the (1) *acceptance*, (2) over *time*, (3) of some specific *item* — an idea or

Figure 1: Aspects of Diffusion and Associated Literature

Aspect	Relevant Sources
Nature of the diffused item	Bowers 1937; Devereux and Loeb 1943; Katz, Levin, and Hamilton 1963; Brandner and Kearl 1964; Fliegel and Kivlin 1966; Anspach 1967; Lekvall and Wahlbin 1973; Morrill and Manninen 1975; Katz 1976; Haynes, Mahajan, and White 1977; Mahajan and Schoeman 1977; Smith and Crano 1977; Yapa and Mayfield 1978; L. Brown 1981; M. Brown 1981; Morrill, Gaile, and Thrall 1988; Dearing and Meyer 1994; Katz 1999; Urban 2001
Relationship of the item to other items	Bowers 1937; Brandner and Kearl 1964; Hägerstrand 1968; Hurh 1968; Yeracaris 1970; Morrill and Manninen 1975; L. Brown 1981; M. Brown 1981; Morrill, Gaile, and Thrall 1988; Grübler 1991, 1996; Urban 2001; Cowen 2002
Characteristics of adopters or change agents	Anspach 1967; L. Brown 1968; Hägerstrand 1968; Yeracaris 1970; Hudson 1972; Burt 1973; Morrill and Manninen 1975; Katz 1976, 1999; Ju. Meyer 1976; Haynes, Mahajan, and White 1977; Mahajan and Schoeman 1977; L. Brown 1981; Brown, Brown, and Craig 1981; M. Brown 1981; Morrill, Gaile, and Thrall 1988; Valente 1996; Wejnert 2002
Relationships among adopters and potential adopters	C. King 1963; Burt 1973, 1987; Lekvall and Wahlbin 1973; Katz 1976; Morrill, Gaile, and Thrall 1988
Diffusion channels	Katz, Levin, and Hamilton 1963; Lin and Burt 1975; Katz 1976, 1999; Haynes, Mahajan, and White 1977; Mahajan and Schoeman 1977; Rogers 1979
Social structure	Katz, Levin, and Hamilton 1963; Hurh 1968; Morrill and Manninen 1975; Katz 1976, 1999; Haynes, Mahajan, and White 1977; Mahajan and Schoeman 1977; L. Brown 1981; Morrill, Gaile, and Thrall 1988
Culture	Katz, Levin, and Hamilton 1963; Hägerstrand 1968; Heine-Geldern 1968; Hurh 1968; Katz 1968, 1976, 1999; Yeracaris 1970; Blaut 1977; Urban 2001
Local context	Ormrod 1990; Urban 2001
Institutional conditions	Strang and Meyer 1993
Environmental conditions	Wejnert 2002

practice, (4) by individuals, groups or other *adopting units*, linked (5) to specific *channels* of communication, (6) to a *social structure*, and (7) to a given system of values, or *culture*." Rogers' ([1962] 2003: 11) definition of diffusion is the communication of an innovation "through certain channels over time among the members of a social system." Communication channels enable diffusion between otherwise disconnected actors (Friedkin 1984), but they do not ensure it. The nature and type of diffusion must be empirically investigated case by case, and this investigation will do so for the clothing choices of state executives. Given that diffusion research connotes a longitudinal process, conceptualizations of diffusion focus attention on the triangular interaction between the diffuser, the adopter, and the diffused item.

This triangular interaction has both synchronic and diachronic dimensions. Synchronically, the degree of cultural distance between the diffuser and the adopter will affect the likelihood and rate of diffusion (Strang and Meyer 1993). This is a problem of sociometry, and thus, direct relationships of friendship or exchange need not exist to ground diffusion; cultural compatibility can be a sufficient condition of diffusion in the absence of direct ties. In fact, cultural compatibility and social networks work together to strengthen the likelihood of diffusion. This is due to the fact that perceptions of compatibility partly depend on prior network connections. In the case of cross-societal emulation, "information on models is skewed toward those countries with which the developing nation has the closest interactions" (Westney [1987] 2000: 23). Diachronically, the degree of compatibility between the item of diffusion and existing cultural practices in the adopting society will affect the spread of an innovation. In the words of Fliegel and Kivlin (1966: 246), "an innovation is perceived in the context of

other things and ideas, both old and new, and…the perceived ties between the innovation and elements of the context can affect adoption decisions." *Ceteris paribus*, the likelihood of adoption will vary directly with the degree to which the new item falls in with extant culture. As it relates to this project, this insight leads to the expectation that elites in countries formerly controlled by colonial powers which permitted locals some co-administration rights and which attempted to remold the dress, language, etc. after their own practices — as opposed to a 'smash and grab' colonial policy concerned only with the economic resources and military advantages attendant on colonial possessions — should be more likely to adopt Western dress. Finally, one would expect actors who occupy a central position in the social structure in question to initiate diffusion when the item is prestigious and modern, assuming that modernity is an axial value (Strang and Meyer 1993). In other cases, mavericks who are marginal to the social structure may adopt an innovation in a bid for prestige if the innovation is successful (Becker 1970).

Clothing is not a zero-sum game. It is possible for individuals to wear Western and indigneous dress at the same time, presenting a new ensemble born of the combination, or a dissonant appearance; for them to wear Western attire on some days and for some occasions and purposes, and to wear indigenous attire on other days and for other purposes; and for them to physically or symbolically alter Western attire so that it takes on a different cast from its meaning if worn by a Westerner. This hybridity in dress is becoming increasingly common though by no means standard in some parts of the world, such as India and Egypt (Maynard 2004). Such possibilities have been allowed for in the coding of data for this project (see Chapter 5).

The sociometry of diffusion supplies a rich potential for network analysis in empirical studies. In the study to follow, alternative theories of the diffusion of Western fashion among state elites will be tested. Network effects will be tested through alternative specifications in which position is operationalized as network centrality (in this case, world-system position) and geographic position (see Chapter 5 below). Failure of network models would tip the balance toward the explanatory power of world-culture theory, although further confirmatory analyses will be undertaken along these lines.

This project promises substantive and theoretical contributions to the empirical literature on diffusion. Substantively, it helps to remedy the neglect of inequality in the diffusion literature (Kaufman and Patterson 2005), inasmuch as the structural power relations and differential material situation of nations play a role in the diffusion of cultural forms between them. The project also opens a unique opportunity for micro-macro theoretical integration. Most studies of fashion are one-sidedly micro (Hamilton 1997), and most diffusion studies are macro, never descending from the population level to the level of their units of analysis (Mahajan, Haynes and Kumar 1977). This is partly a function of the metatheoretical commitments of the investigators. Most sociological and social-psychological work on fashion is based in the interactionist tradition, which foregrounds the micro context of social behavior. And much work on diffusion has been stimulated by an interest in the diffusion process per se, not the character of the diffused items. Finally, the present research will contribute to the rectification of an imbalance in the literature on cultural imperialism, which is all too often trained on media imperialism (Tomlinson 1991), and polemical rather than empirical. The present research bridges micro and macro levels of analysis, interpretive and quantitative methodologies, and the

disparate substantive foci of fashion, cultural imperialism, and impression formation. It is my hope that the results of the research exceed its promise.

Positioning of the Research

In addition to appealing to three very different research literatures, the present research takes account of diverse scholarly paradigms (see Figure 2). At the upper left node of the figure, a critical tradition of subaltern studies has turned its attention to the cultural relations between colonizers and colonized in a very expansive way, noting the mechanisms of domination present in bureaucratic routines, literature, educational practices, and the like. The focus of this paradigm is on how colonial and postcolonial realities shape the lived experience of the peoples affected by them. At the lower left node of the figure, a critical tradition of liberation theology has sought to catalyze the spiritual basis of resistance to foreign rule in dependencies, and to oppressive postcolonial regimes. Often inspired by a confluence of high scholarship, Marxist praxis, and Christian communalism, liberation theology movements have been instrumental in raising public consciousness of international inequality, particularly among the predominantly Catholic populations of Latin American countries (Robertson 1992).

On the right side of the figure are separate lines of empirical research, from which the present research more directly unfolds. At the upper right node of the figure, an interpretive tradition has used case-based historical studies to document efforts at the self-determination of subordinate peoples within larger political entities. Two scholarly works stand out prominently as representative of this tradition, both published in the same year. Anderson, in *Imagined Communities* (1983), shows how identity politics

Figure 2: Positioning of the Research



Each research tradition addresses prospects of Third World or peripheral states and peoples moving from dependency to self-determination.

resulted in sustained efforts to consolidate new nationalities, from the construction of a new alphabet by Norwegians seeking separation from the Swedes in the nineteenth century, to the multifaceted resistance of Indonesian peoples to Dutch hegemony. *The Invention of Tradition* (1983), edited by Hobsbawm and Ranger, conveys the processes by which cultural elements may be mobilized to emphasize a cultural distinctiveness, such as the Scots or Welsh resisting English hegemony. Far from being a static resource, tradition is shown to be a malleable source of empowerment for suppressed peoples aspiring to an alternative, self-determined present. Finally, at the lower right node of the figure, a social-scientific tradition of political sociology has undertaken variable-based studies of such phenomena as economic dependency, foreign capital penetration in lesser developed countries, and the nature of political ties between the First and Third Worlds.

The epistemology and methodology of the present research reflects the nature of the topic and the positioning of the research with reference to the aforementioned streams of scholarship. The study of a cultural phenomenon among political elites situates the research at the intersection of so-called 'hard' political-economic studies and 'soft' cultural studies. Methodologically, the research will unite qualitative and quantitative approaches. The project will begin and end qualitatively, opening with case studies of various countries that have experienced the process of interest in this research especially starkly, and closing with interpretation of the qualitative and quantitative results. The bulk of the empirical portion of the research will be quantitative, testing the implications of alternative theories with data-analytic techniques. As Ragin (2000) notes of comparative studies, a plot of the number of cases in each study against the number of studies with that number of cases yields a U-shaped distribution, with a high number of

studies analyzing one to three cases and a similarly high number analyzing up to 100 cases or more. In between these extremes, the number of studies dips dramatically, reflecting the tradeoff between thick qualitative description of a small number of cases versus quantitative research which collects only small amounts of information about a much larger number of cases (Ragin 1994). Insofar as quantitative techniques are serviceable in establishing covariation, and qualitative techniques are serviceable in identifying causal mechanisms, it is surprising that the two are not combined more often so as to reap the benefits of each. The present research is a forum to do just that. The case studies serve as sensitizing observations (see next chapter), imparting contextual depth to the variable-oriented analyses to follow.

CHAPTER TWO: CASE STUDIES

Nothing is more difficult to alter than a universal and daily custom. In order to take away man's clothes and dress him up again you must demolish and remodel him.
– Hippolyte Taine

Now, as far as men are concerned, the tyranny of the tailor is universal and has invaded, even the Far East — very soon the Japanese will be as degraded savages as ourselves, for a savage is simply a person who, like ourselves, regards human life as having no other object but that of 'getting a living.'
– Eric Gill

The civilized world is far ahead of us. We have no choice but to catch up. It is time to stop nonsense, such as "Should we or should we not wear hats?" We shall adopt hats along with all other works of Western civilization. Uncivilized people are doomed to be trodden under the feet of civilized people.
– Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

Shivering and disconsolate, but happy to think that they are chilly with the best people, the Eskimos are losing their old dress-making skills and accepting the inadequate weeds of the foreigner.
– Quentin Bell

Various countries on several continents have grappled with the problem of retaining culturally distinctive ways of life in a time of globalization, and make ideal case studies of fashion change to Western styles. The postcolonial era has seen many leaders of non-Western states jettisoning their attire, presumably in an effort to conform to sartorial prescriptions emanating from the global level. Perhaps to be taken seriously on the world plane, African leaders have retired their *kufis* and *dashikis*, just as Japanese elites had earlier shed their *kimono* and *samurai* swords on their own route to modernization. Curiously, this has happened coterminously with decolonization, the rise of nation-building in the Third World, and an ascendancy of identity politics throughout the globe. And it has occurred precisely in the period of modern history when leaders of less powerful non-Western states have seemingly had the greatest incentives to stress distinctiveness and native cultural heritages. To explore the contours of this momentous change, this chapter surveys the experience of a number of non-Western countries in an

effort to bring the several facets of the problem into relief and to show the diversity of idiosyncratic responses by leaders of nations.

Ethiopia

At his coronation in 1930 and throughout the first six years of his troubled reign, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia (Abyssinia) wore the richly brocaded garb of his ancient African civilization. It was a symbol of his status as the last emperor on a once proud continent now prostrate before the imperialisms of various European powers. The swallowing of his continent by these powers had been thorough.[2] But fortunately for the emperor, the waves of European imperialism which enveloped virtually the entire African continent had left his east African homeland unusually intact and autonomous.

The Fascist regime of Benito Mussolini in Italy was a regime premised on foreign conquest as the central justification for his dictatorial rule. By the mid-1930s, the regime was stagnating, and Mussolini direly needed an imperial spectacle to restore his fading legitimacy. He chose to attack the only large African country still independent — Haile Selassie's Ethiopia. Selassie's tribal armies put up a brave fight, but faced with a technologically much superior Italian force, the outcome of the conflict could not be in doubt. By 1936, the Italians had triumphed and Selassie had fled his empire.

When Haile Selassie and his entourage arrived in London for an extended exile, they met their British hosts in Western suits, which set a new sartorial tone for the emperor. He would remain in London until the outbreak of World War II in 1939 offered an opportunity to reclaim his throne. A victorious British campaign against the Italians

[2]In 1914, among African states only Ethiopia, Liberia, and part of Morocco remained free of European dominion (Hobsbawm 1987).

achieved precisely this and reversed Selassie's fortune. By the time British arms returned him to power in 1941, the transformation of the emperor's appearance was complete. The rethroned emperor was now given to appearing in Western civilian attire and Western-style military uniforms.

Selassie's sojourn in London was a meeting of man and venue that was seemingly as consequential for his mien as for his political fate. London was the traditional world epicenter of men's fashion, just as Paris has been for women's fashion (Crane 1999, 2000). More than that, the styles issuing from London defined a certain type of man — modern, sober, efficient — and conjured a world-view epitomized by Anglo-Saxon fitness to purpose. The metamorphosis of Selassie is laden with meaning, as his legacy stands today for an independent Africa.

Japan

Of all non-Western countries, Japan met the threat of Westernization most brilliantly and decisively — by Westernizing. Unlike few others, Japan was able to pre-empt Western colonization, adapting Western-style government, economics, policing, and military organization — and clothes. The first strata to be touched by Western sartorial inspiration were the army and navy of the shogunate from the 1850s (Suga 1995); this would be formally mandated in 1870, followed soon thereafter by police, postal, and railroad uniforms (Nakagawa and Rosovsky 1963). The turn of local officials came next. In an intriguing justification, the Chinese-style costume of bureaucrats was thought to be effeminate and unreflective of Japanese sensibilities, whereas Western wear was thought to be neither (Nakagawa and Rosovsky 1963). The Meiji imperial court

received a visiting British duke in Western attire in 1869, and by the 1870s and 1880s, an inchoate but initially not widespread mania for Western culture, including Western clothing, had taken root at the popular level, encouraged and modeled by the new Meiji Restoration government installed in 1868 (Nakagawa and Rosovsky 1963; Reischauer [1970] 1981). At the level of civil society, the Meirokusha group sought to advance all things Western, including dress. As early as 1886, an 'Association of Merchants and Manufacturers of Western Suits' was organized in Tokyo and had 123 member enterprises; by the end of the century, most of the middle-class professions had taken to the Western suit (Nakagawa and Rosovsky 1963).

The more traditional sectors of Japanese society clung to their traditional clothing, poignantly evoked as uniformed Meiji forces quelled the last vestiges of indigenously attired dissident *samurai* power on the battlefield, ending the Satsuma Rebellion (Nakagawa and Rosovsky 1963). A turning point had come the previous year when members of the traditionally dominant warrior class were denied the right to wear their swords, topknots, and traditional vestments (Iriye et al. 1979). In society as a whole, the transition was not immediate, and for decades Western clothing only gradually impinged on Japanese life. The type of clothing worn varied by occasion, by degree of urbanization, and by gender. Western clothing was worn for some purposes and traditional attire retained for others. Often, those who wore suits in public changed into *kimono* when home, not least because Japanese typically sat on the floor rather than in chairs, and suits would have been more uncomfortable. Wool as a foreign fabric found a place alongside silk and cotton in Japanese life, but in no way replaced the latter materials. In fact, foreign fabrics such as muslin and serge were substituted in *kimono*

themselves. And hybrid styles were in evidence, as when a Japanese man would wear a Western suit along with *geta*, or traditional wooden sandals (Yamanaka 1982). A quite fortuitous spur to Western clothing adoption was provided by the great earthquake of 1923, whose destruction compelled those affected to replace their wardrobes, and many did so with increased proportions of more inexpensive, manufactured Western clothing (Nakagawa and Rosovsky 1963). Women, as the more tradition-bound sex, tended to wear *kimono* for everyday use while inching their way toward Western clothing norms. It was not until after World War II that Western clothing became standard for all classes and for women as well as men (Shirasu 1970). The transition began earlier, proceeded faster, and was accomplished more completely among the ranks of the elite than among common people. Western clothing was viewed by the social elite as *bunka fuku*, or cultured clothing (Nakagawa and Rosovsky 1963).

The Meiji stance on Western clothing was not purely cultural and aesthetic, but partly tactical. The Meiji rulers thought that the adoption of Western ways would help Japan to end the extraterritorial prerogatives that Westerners resident in Japan claimed, an arrangement that had long galled the Japanese (Nakagawa and Rosovsky 1963). This kind of acculturation dovetailed with a meteoric rise of Japan's real political-economic power. The new Western-clad leadership led Japan to a series of foreign policy successes and breakneck industrialization and militarization, including astonishing military victories over China and Russia. The political and international success of Japan in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth appeared to validate the approach of the Meiji government. Representatives of the Japanese government appeared early and often at international conferences, exquisitely dressed in

three-piece suits and cravats. It is difficult to conjecture as to whether their choice of costume played a large role in this development, but by World War I Japan had been conceded a place in the family of great powers, the only nation outside of Europe and the United States to gain such consideration.

Turkey

When Kemal Atatürk came to power in Turkey, he made the Westernization of dress a central plank in his platform, perhaps the most sustained state effort to accomplish this. To him it was more than cultural policy, being tied in to the rehabilitation of the state more broadly. Intent on halting the centuries-old decline of the Ottoman Empire, which shrank to its Turkish core after losing World War I, Atatürk was determined to not only rebuild the polity and economy along Western lines, but to recast Turkish sensibilities and appearances.

Atatürk's effort was not the first along these lines in Turkey. A more modest attempt at dress reform had been mooted a century earlier, during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II. In 1829, a law prescribed European-style coats, shoes, and collared shirts, and the *fez* for bureaucrats and soldiers, while proscribing robes and turbans. The *ulema*, a body of jurists overseeing religious law, were exempted from these provisions, although initially Mahmud had intended for the *fez* to be worn by them as well. They had approved the *fez* for civilian use but did not adopt it personally, and the sultan was forced to demur at this refusal (Baker 1986). The effect of the law was not as disconcerting in the capital as might have been expected, because Istanbul had steadily and organically been Europeanizing for some time (Baker 1986; Lewis 2002). But the position of

Istanbul within the Ottoman Empire was comparable to that of Paris in France before the French Revolution: the capital and the provinces were as two different worlds. Outside the capital, such cosmopolitan initiatives were certain to meet with resistance.

The issue of the clothing appropriate to the believer has deep roots in Islam, and it was for this reason that more traditionalist demographics concentrated in the countryside would rally to the defense of customary attire, citing religious authority. The Prophet Muhammad had specified that Muslims should not imitate the habits of infidels (Baker 1986), and clothing had long been addressed by religious officials who laid down strict, precise, and detailed guidelines regarding acceptable forms of attire. The rules governing headgear were especially fraught with religious implications. Because of the genuflections involved in the frequent daily prayer requirements of Islam, hats with any sort of brim or visor would not do (Baker 1986; Mango [1999] 2002). And a brim was thought tantamount to an admission of sin, as it allowed the sinner to avoid God's wrathful gaze (Baker 1986; Lewis 2002) . Such motives were imputed to European Christians who wore peaked caps (Baker 1986). In the end Mahmud II's dress reforms petered out, and in any case were not as doggedly pursued as the later ones of Kemal.

Ultimately conflicts over dress were inseparable from other schisms opening within Turkish society, such as a growing chasm between the cities (and especially the capital, which was located on the edge of the European continent) and rural areas, growing secularist tendencies, and a full range of cultural criticism usual in an empire undergoing decline. During the waning days of the Ottoman Empire, Westernization had been limited to urban elites in the cities, especially those affiliated with the reformist Young Turk movement (Jirousek 1997). A narrow change was accomplished at the

palace level, when members of the royal household were ordered to wear European-style suits and uniforms (Kinross 1977).

On the verge of World War I, with tensions in Turkish society nearing a climax, the need for a comprehensive Westernization of Turkish society began to sneak into the thoughts of the reformist Young Turk movement, of which Kemal was a sympathizer. Dress was a key part of such musings. In articles presenting a vision of Turkey's future that appeared in the popular press, writers like Abdullah Cevdet painted a tableau which involved the abolition of the *fez* (although the alternatives were at this point left open), the controversial removal of *purdah* for women (although women were still not to dress ostentatiously or salaciously), the decertification of the *ulema*'s authority to supervise dress, and the limitation of the turban and cloak to religious officials. The religious authorities were already anxiously observing backsliding in dress and manners (Lewis 2002), and the Young Turks added organization and the articulation of principles to the more spontaneous trend.

Although some of the Young Turks preferred to leave dress alone, others advocated a ban on the *fez*. Because of its lineage as the subject of the earlier dress reform of Mahmud II, it was identified by the Young Turks with the old order, the Ottoman patrimonial state, and all that was wrong with it. New headwear was needed to herald a new beginning; the *fez* was superannuated (Baker 1986; Lewis 2002). Among its critics was Ismail Hakki, who denounced the headgear in public speeches, cutting off the tassel of his own *fez* at the end of each speech (Baker 1986). The tassel seemed to represent style in lieu of substance, and useless ornamentation in lieu of function (Berkes 1964; Baker 1986). Moreover, the *fez* presented an incongruous and backward

appearance when combined with otherwise thoroughly Western dress (Baker 1986). In their denigration of the *fez*, the Young Turks had struck a note that was to be powerfully echoed by leaders of the new national Turkey following World War I.

It was in this political context that Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) formed his own views. He got a chance to register an early opinion on the question of headwear when, as a young army officer, he was asked by a commander for his thoughts on how to remedy the unkempt and motley headwear of the soldiers. He put in a recommendation in favor of the Western hat, but his suggestion was spurned as too radical at this stage, and the military command concluded that officers should wear *kalpak* fur hats and conscripts should wear cloth caps (Mango [1999] 2002). The war was to put dress reform on hold for its duration, but at its end the question was revisited with alacrity. Mustafa Kemal, now a national figure as a consequence of his distinction in the war, placed a prohibition of the *fez* alongside more weighty matters when he gave thought to devising a new Turkish politics, now that defeat in war had weakened the *ancien regime*. He would tolerate no obstinacy from the old guard, admonishing Caliph Abdulmecit not to wear traditional robes and turban for a ceremony, and advising a frock coat instead (Mango [1999] 2002). Kemal put proscription of the *fez* on a par with other, larger issues, including the transition to a republican form of government, the disposition of the dynasty, an end to the Caliphate, the closing of religious schools, cancellation of mandatory Islamic dress for women, and the Latinization of the Turkish alphabet (Mango [1999] 2002; Lewis 2002). He went so far as to call it one of the "important and fundamental questions" of his day (Kemal, cited in Lewis 2002: 260).

Once in power, Kemal moved in a determined fashion to outlaw the *fez*. While planning his impending coup of fashion, Kemal embarked on a whistle-stop tour to communicate the importance of relinquishing the *fez*. Kemal used his bully pulpit to secure acceptance of the new style by society at large, traveling the country and making speeches dedicated to that purpose. Headwear perhaps more than any other physical sign stood for the unity of Islam as a transnational community, and by proposing Western hats, Kemal was announcing his intention to break ranks with this community. It is difficult for outside observers to understand this obsession with the *fez*, but headwear was "the visible and outward token by which a Muslim indicated his allegiance to the community of Islam and his rejection of others…the last symbol of Muslim identification" (Lewis 2002: 267).

Kemal began his campaign in the towns of Kastamonu and Inebolu, where he appeared doffing a Panama hat and gave a speech deriding the *fez* and ridiculing its wearers, including spectators in the crowd (Mango [1999] 2002; Lewis 2002). He compared the peasants in their traditional garb to pigs and advocated the wearing of the brimmed fedora in place of the turban, *fez*, or *kavuk* (Kinross 1977). These public appearances were designed to prepare the people for what was coming, which was legislation against the *fez*. The first step was to mandate the Western suit and brimmed hats for civil servants, achieved in September 1925 (Aktar 1985; Baker 1986; Mango [1999] 2002; Lewis 2002). The *ulema* were allowed to keep their turbans and robes for the time being, but even they were expected to observe special provisions concerning headwear during holidays and in the midst of public greetings, or face a year in jail (Baker 1986). All brimless headgear was declared illegal for the Turkish citizenry the

next month (Jirousek 1997; Mardin 1997). Then, in November, a law was promulgated requiring all men to wear Western clothing and hats, and rendering the wearing of a *fez* a crime punishable by a month in prison, later amended to three months (Baker 1986; Lewis 2002). Coats with tails and top hats were legislated for formal occasions! Only men of religion were permitted to continue in robes and turbans (Mango [1999] 2002). The authorities were aided in their repression of violators by the fact that the Maintenance of Order Law, a martial-law order that had loosened the rule of law in response to a Kurdish rebellion, remained in force. It enabled the authorities to prosecute hat scofflaws as rebels (Mango [1999] 2002; Lewis 2002).

The reaction in some quarters was sharp. Within the Islamic world, statements condemning the new action were released. One declaration, signed by the Grand Mufti of Egypt, among others, equated those Turks who wore hats with infidels (Baker 1986; Lewis 2002). Within Turkey itself, the *ulema* responded similarly, but in a more muted tone (Baker 1986). The law on hats spawned riots in some outlying areas, and death sentences were pronounced on some who had agitated against hats. The law led to comical eventualities, such as men scrambling for hats, even women's hats, to comply with the order (Mango [1999] 2002). After the law was institutionalized, a number of embarrassing episodes reaffirmed the commitment of the Kemalist regime to upholding their principles on headgear. For example, a diplomatic incident arose out of a reception in 1932 at which Kemal putatively asked the Egyptian ambassador to remove his *fez* (Mango [1999] 2002). Normally, the concept of diplomatic courtesy and mutuality would counsel against even an informal approach of this type, but Kemal was not known for tact.

Later came the turn of the clergy to test the law. In 1934, the regime felt strong enough to extend the law's application to the *ulema* as well, excepting the wearing of turbans during religious ceremonies and in mosques. In public they too were to wear the hat now. Many chose to ignore the order. Some wore berets as an act of defiance, which then led to a ban against the beret as well (Baker 1986). In one case, Kemal reputedly shoved a turban off a cleric's head in a rural district (Mango [1999] 2002). As a measure of the seriousness with which the authorities enforced the order, 579 arrests were made in 1947 alone, long after the most of the controversy had died down (Baker 1986).

The immense prestige of Atatürk, widely regarded as the savior of Turkey, and the weight of legal sanctions, not to mention habit after a long period of inuring the citizenry to it, sufficed to secure the acceptance of Western attire by the populace. Today, residents of even the most remote villages show few traces of traditional costume. In fact, Western wear has now become the modal costume, having been appropriated by the masses (Jirousek 1997).

China

China has undergone a development roughly similar to that of Turkey, and beginning at about the same time, but with great differences in detail, owing to the ouster of the Nationalist government by Communist forces in 1949. The story of the Western suit in China begins with the founding of the Chinese Republic following the 1911 revolution. Western-educated political leaders ushered in the Western suit as part of an official policy on dress reform (Li 1998), including the abandonment of plaited hair (Clerget 1914). But the victory of Mao Zedong and the Communists in 1949 after a

protracted civil war led to a new departure: Mao went further than other Marxist-inspired leaders around the world in establishing a new form of dress for a new society. To retire the function of clothing as a badge of class identity and distinction, Mao called for simple, uniform garments for everyone, to replace both old-style Chinese garments and Western wear. The blue Mao shirt was supposed to stand for Communist commitment and conformity to the new order, and during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, it began to be worn by substantial numbers of women as well as men (Scott 1958; von Laue 1987; Li 1998). But when Chinese delegations visited abroad, this logic was suspended. The convergence of men and women from the Western suit and the *qipao*, respectively, on Maoist uniformity reversed itself abroad as Chinese men regressed to their Western ways in clothing and women to their traditional accoutrements (Scott 1958).

After the Cultural Revolution had run its course, China experienced a halting opening to the West. China was being left behind economically and technologically by its isolation under Mao, and incrementally showed itself more receptive to limited contact with Western countries. As this affected dress, a battle over culture erupted in the early 1980s. Though the government continued to preach against the decadence of bourgeois styles, the inchoate Chinese fashion industry cross-fertilized traditional Chinese garments such as the *qipao* with Western-style motifs (Li 1998). The rearguard actions of the old guard quickly succumbed to the momentum of the Western style invasion, and even the Communist leadership appeared at the 35th anniversary celebration of the founding of the People's Republic sporting suits and ties. Today, the odyssey has come full circle, with the government actively promoting a cultural policy supporting Western dress as an index of China's rise above Third World status to that of a cosmopolitan nation (Li 1998).

Tanzania

In Tanzania, the postcolonial government has practiced a quite aggressive cultural policy, aimed mainly at the Masai, a tribal people spanning the border with Kenya. The Masai stubbornly refused to wear Western-style clothing, preferring their traditional and scant attire. Citing the need for progress in matters of dress, the government embarked on a campaign of re-enculturation (Mazrui 1970). This is a particularly interesting case, for two reasons: (1) as a former German colony, Tanzania was a particularly bitter battleground between natives and colonial military forces; and (2) Tanzania has been in the forefront of nationalist and pan-Africanist politics on the continent. The latter fact would lead one to expect that Tanzania would go its own way in dress as well, but its divergence from the indulgence shown by neighboring Kenya toward the customary dress of the Masai is notable (Mazrui 1970).

The initial acquaintance with Western clothing in Tanzania dates from the 1920s, when profits from the international coffee trade afforded some Tanzanians the funds to purchase European dress items (Weiss 1996). But the prime factor influencing Tanzania's turn to the West in clothing was the prior socialization of its new post-independence elite in the mission-school culture of the colonial period, which had been thoroughly absorbed by this leadership group. This attitude was widespread among the urban masses as well. However, this soon opened a cultural Pandora's box, as Tanzanian women began adopting the mini-skirts then prevalent in the West, all under cover of modernizing their attire. This scandalized the (male) cultural arbiters in Tanzania and endangered the legitimacy of their cultural policy. They had been hoping for a more

socialist model of modernization to take root, and slavery to international fashion seemed to imperil that goal (Ivaska 2004).

The dress campaign against the Masai was formal and vigorous. Dubbed 'Operation Dress-Up,' it was an initiative of the ruling political party to require modern dress for the Masai. The purportedly uncivilized dress practices of the Masai were seen as an obstacle to the nation's development (Ivaska 2004). But the fabled development did not magically come with the adoption of Western dress, indicative of a fate that much of Africa would share: cultural Westernization without economic or technical modernization (Mazrui 1990). This is surely the worst of all possible worlds for peripheral states, as they bear all of the cultural costs of acculturation to a foreign model but enjoy none of the material benefits.

DEVIANT CASES

Notwithstanding the great prevalence of the diffusion dynamic detailed in this project, a few quite high-profile deviant cases defy the general pattern of adoption. Political elites in some countries have seized upon traditional textiles as "a potent symbol of authenticity" (Schneider 1987: 438) that can connect with a precolonial past and bolster their own legitimacy. Such cases exhibit properties of antagonistic acculturation (Devereux and Loeb 1943), wherein the diffusion model repulses rather than attracts. Deviant cases are strategically important to a study in that they can help disentangle the effects of separate but possibly interlocking causal factors that may be acting in parallel for the exemplary cases (Deutsch and Isard 1961).

Nigeria

Nigeria early showed itself to be an exception to the homogenizing tendencies of Western-inspired world dress. In stark contrast to Selassie's pilgrimage to London seeking military succor from the British after the Italian invasion (see above), a visit by a Nigerian ruler to the same capital at about the same time for the coronation of George V featured the Nigerian monarch in resplendent traditional robing and headgear (Byfield 2004). Nigerian rulers have exhibited this allegiance to their native attire in international settings consistently enough to warrant the suspicion of a national cultural effect on these choices, and the country's inclusion in this study as a deviant case.

In Nigeria, shifts in normative attire have reflected changes in self-understanding and cultural assertiveness. Although Western wear has been in vogue at times among tribal and state elites, and thus no sustained resistance to Western clothing norms has been in evidence, a fairly continuous leitmotif of sartorial independence has lain under their often abrupt and dramatic changes in attire, even during colonial days and up to the present. The especially reflexive relation between sartorial flamboyance and political *Herrschaft* among tribal chieftains in this part of the world was noted by European visitors upon their very arrival (Renne 2004). After an interregnum of capitulation to European styles, Nigerian elites readopted native modes of dress, stimulated by an unlikely source. Creole immigrants from the Western Hemisphere had established a dress reform movement as of the 1880s in nearby Sierra Leone, aiming to purge their society of Western influence. However, as a result of their extra-African origins, they also sought to distinguish themselves from the natives, whom they thought uncouth, and created a new wardrobe style sufficiently different from existing styles. The spirit of this

rejection of Western dress spread to Nigeria, but there it manifested itself in a reversion to native dress and a celebration of indigenous clothing traditions. Significantly, the dress of Christianized Nigerian elites had been properly Victorian before a deliberate rejection occurred. This was an explicit refusal of colonial culture, and was focused on Yoruba dress in the early twentieth century. Western dress was held by native commentators to be both unsuited to the Nigerian climate and a mark of mental subjection (Byfield 2004). In the transition to independence, this principled return to indigenous dress carried over to a younger generation of leaders (Smythe and Smythe 1960).

Dress patterns in Nigeria since independence have shown many nuances. Some Nigerians of the political caste who had worked within the British colonial administration had donned Western wear, and many did not change their practice afterward. In other cases, formal occasions at which both British and Nigerians were in attendance saw an almost perfect correlation: the British clad in white suits, and the Nigerians robed. A crude division of aesthetics has prevailed: generally the civil service has preferred Western wear, and the modern-day aristocratic descendants of the chiefs who once ruled under the British go native; the intelligentsia whimsically keep their wardrobe in both worlds (Marriott 1963). And although Nigerians of renown freely chose to make alternative statements with either British-inspired or historic dress, the Western suit remained a visible guarantor of elite status (Smythe and Smythe 1960). Regional differences have also been prominent. In the Yoruba south one saw a complicated pattern of Western wear for everyday use in public settings, fancy embroidered native robing for dress occasions (among those who were so inclined to reject a consistent

Westernized self-presentation), and less elaborate native gear while at home. But it becomes more complex still, because even when traditionally robed, Western shoes were frequently worn. The northern elites hewed to their native attire almost exclusively after independence (Smythe and Smythe 1960).

On the other hand, some tribal leaders, such as those of the Birom in the center of the country, a more backward tribe than the Yoruba, prided themselves on a modern appearance, invoking *Herrschaft* by a smart, more modern look as a contrast to the squalid conditions of their charges (Little 1956). It may be that such petty elites find compensations in associating with a modern, largely foreign world that conceals the fact that their status is not so far removed, in terms of wealth or power to control their destiny, from their nominal subjects. For Birom chiefs, the imitation of Western ways seemed to be more affectation than genuine conversion, as was the case for truer cosmopolites from the south; it positioned them for a slice of indirect rule under the British and elevated them above their people thereafter.

The entire, sometimes troubled history of Nigeria since gaining independence has exhibited a pattern of fairly persistent avoidance of Western civilian wear, but with an oscillation between traditional robing and military uniforms, reflecting the many coups and the power of the military in domestic politics. Nnamdi Azikiwe set a precedent early by appearing at United Nations councils in indigenous attire (Eicher and Sumberg 1995). Civilian state elites would sometimes innovate somewhat within the confines of national clothing traditions, remembering that Nigeria was a congeries of diverse groupings bearing the imprint of colonial state-making. Curiously, military elites when in power, instead of retaining Zouave uniforms with their Orientalist flavor, wore Western-style

khakis. The *agbada* costume which civilian leaders proudly wore as consciously signifying liberation from the British imperium was spurned in favor of a less antiquarian appearance by the military-politicos, and generally this correlation has held throughout the period of independence (Renne 2004). The *agbada* itself has also incorporated certain Western influences on its length and color both among leaders and the populace, as longer and more darkly colored fabrics have broken with long-standing convention somewhat (Maynard 2004). And although many transitions of power were forced, and modal dress changed with the person and provenance, civilian or military, of the leader, more recently a passage in dress has been effected without a change in head of state. When General Sani Abacha, who had taken power by force in 1993, prepared for a reestablishment of civilian rule and announced his intention to run for the presidency of the republic, he crafted a new civilian persona, clothed in a brocade *kaftan* to ratify his decision to shed his epaulets (Renne 2004). Recent Nigerian regimes since 1999 have been civilian in composition and their representatives have appeared abroad in the full splendor of historic dress.

India

The clothed experience of India, both before and after independence from the British Empire, is as varied and complex as the cultural fabric of the subcontinent itself. The roots of a clothing identity that deviates from the worldwide pattern described in this manuscript were planted along with the British flag. Alternately loyal and incorrigible, Indians jealously guarded their traditions when the British aspired to carry imperial control too far, proving a thorn in the side of empire at least as early as the Sepoy Mutiny

of 1857-1858. Clothes figured into the parameters of control joined to the doctrine of indirect rule, providing a site of conversion and resistance alike. Responses to British rule were invariably inflected by religion, and took different routes for Muslim and Hindu Indians, with slight further variations for Sikhs and Buddhists. In Muslim zones, the turban was more than a utilitarian head covering, it was endowed with the charisma of worldly power and connoted sovereignty, comparable to a crown in Europe (Cohn 1989). The British sought to harness its power and manipulate it as an instrument of indirect rule. But therein lay problems of the polysemicity of the article, for the turbaned ruler could see himself and be seen as having been confirmed in his turban by the British (in the manner of papal coronations of the kings of Europe that nominally guaranteed papal supremacy throughout the days of the Holy Roman Empire), or the turban's silent declaration of its wearer's autonomy could be stressed. In this vein, a dispute opened upon the knighthood of the Nizam of Hyderabad, a vital British ally. The Nizam raised religious and political objections to the wearing of a mantle, pendant, and insignia required by the ceremony, and although he was permitted a compromise in this incident by not wearing the mantle, his successors and others like them succumbed to their honors (Cohn 1989). This can either be read as the British seconding the authority of the Nizam or reinforcing the recognition that they were the ultimate authorities. The 1880s saw an expansion of the Western sartorial vogue from a sometime preoccupation of the princely caste to elites of wealth and education; though these might routinely wear European clothes, the clothes were frequently set off by a turban (Cohn 1989).

Around the turn of the twentieth century, Western dress had made significant inroads into the Indian elite, and Western machine-spun cloth was being consumed more

broadly still, coexisting with indigenous forms. Rural inhabitants and women, though, were scarcely touched by Western wear throughout the British imperium because contact with Europeans was very minimal or non-existent outside of places like Calcutta with a large number of expatriates. A number of factors counseled against immediate adoption of Western garments, such as their uncomfortability in India's climate, relative unavailability in most areas, and higher cost. But probably the most important impediment in rural zones was the fact that wearing Western clothes broke caste rules (Tarlo 1996). This is why the large cities, being the least caste-bound parts of India, showed more willingness to accept Western styles.

The conflicting expectations that beset Indians in colonial times, varying depending on their social locations, gave rise to a number of innovative solutions to the problem of individual self-presentation. One was to use European cloth for native styles, as mentioned before. This solution was particularly popular among wives of men who had already capitulated to European dress. The bolder of them added European accessories to predominantly traditional garb (Tarlo 1996). The fact that women were more faithful to tradition than men in India fits the usual pattern in many countries, where women are the more traditional sex. Men who opted to combine European cloth with native styles sometimes had their tailors work European elements into a basically Indian garment as a gesture toward European dress. This enabled them to avoid rebuke as sellouts while enjoying some of the advantages of a modern appearance. In the 1870s, in fact, an attempt was made to design a new syncretic garment in which European and Indian features were mixed on equal terms, but it did not find an enthusiastic reception (Tarlo 1996).

Another solution was to eclectically mix European and Indian items in a single outfit. This allowed one to navigate between two worlds in one's person while offering the fringe benefit of cost savings compared to full European dress, in case that were an issue, since European clothes were more expensive at that time than native cloth. For instance, elite Parsis in Bombay were commonly Indian from the waist up and European from the waist down, with European shoes and pants; the Western articles held them above low-caste Hindus and suffused them with a progressive aura. And as in Nigeria, local potentates exploited the possibilities created by the inclusion of some European garments into an ensemble, thus demonstrating their sophistication before the local populace. This resulted in such redundant combinations as a *sarong* wrapped over trousers, or incomplete appearances such as a *dhoti* with European coat but no shirt. Noncommittal responses like this were most likely to spark ridicule from British and Indians alike (Tarlo 1996).

A third solution to the problem of conflicting expectations in colonial India was to shift between Western and native identities through repeated changes of clothes. This might mean European clothes at work and Indian clothes at home, or European clothes while abroad and Indian clothes upon one's return (Tarlo 1996).

And of course, some chose to convert to Western dress entirely, many relegating their Indian clothing to religious rituals only. This was not a large category during the days of empire, consisting in the main of Indians who had traveled to the metropole for an education. The sons and grandsons of Indians who had sojourned in England were not judged as harshly as others without such a background for breaking the norm of Indian

wear inside the home; the latter appeared to some as parvenus. But adopting their dress wholeheartedly did not protect Indians from maltreatment by the British (Tarlo 1996).

Compared to their counterparts in other lands, some dissidents within the Indian intellectual class were exceptionally precocious in their sensitivity to the sartorial implications of empire. As early as 1905, the Ceylonese Ananda Coomaraswamy penned denunciations of the adoption of Western dress, and founded an organization encouraging the readoption of national dress, among other things (Tarlo 1996). An event happened around the same time that quickened the political implications of dress. In Calcutta, Lord Curzon's announcement of a plan to partition Bengal resulted in an upsurge in the wearing of *dhotis* to signal solidarity and opposition to the move (Tarlo 1996). This was expressed by a boycott on foreign cloth, burnings of European clothes, and sartorial baptisms in which people submerged themselves in the Ganges River and then put on hand-woven Indian cloth (Bayly 1986). Though most who had embraced Indian clothing for reasons of protest would pass back to European attire years later after the tensions had subsided, the galvanizing influence of the politics of clothes set a demonstration effect and a collective memory that was to make the task of later reformers easier (Tarlo 1996).

For their part, the British wanted Indians to dress more like them, but not too much like them, preferring to maintain a cordon of difference. The state of Indian clothing was part of the justification for their civilizing rule, and this would be diminished if they were too successful (Tarlo 1996). Hence, where the British had a direct say in dress styles, such as in army uniforms, the dress of Maharajas, and at official functions, they instituted dress regulations that established an interstitial space between normal British attire and indigenous wear (Cohn 1989; Tarlo 1996).

As soon as a movement for independence from the empire germinated, the reflection of dissidence in clothing practices took shape, tentatively at first. Inexpensive British textiles had ruined the Indian textile industry, and even invaded Indian cultural forms, being substituted for domestic product in *saris* and turbans. Besides its deleterious economic effects on the most important sector of the Indian economy, British cloth became a conspicuous symbol of side-choosing in the nationalist effort. Not all Indian nationalists considered British clothing indicative of their political affinities at first; with some militant exceptions, most were slow to give up their combination of turban and Western suit, thinking that an accommodationist approach would end empire more rapidly than obstructionism (Bean 1989). The career of Mohandas K. Gandhi, one of the twentieth century's most luminous personalities, goes far to show the ambivalences, reversals, and slow embrace of cultural nationalism typified by many Indian nationalist leaders.

On his first visit to Britain for training in law, Gandhi wore an Indian-made garment as he disembarked the ship, but quickly bedecked himself in high-street style with a fine suit, patent-leather shoes, and a silk high hat (Bean 1989). This first incarnation of Western style by Gandhi was not an ephemeral adjustment to a temporary homeland. He retained his new habit upon returning to India, and believed it a necessary ingredient for a successful career (Bean 1989). Indeed, it was more than a personal wardrobe decision. He became complicit in the British civilizing project by arguing for a relaxation of the Indian version of Jim Crow, lobbying the railway authorities to admit Indians who were appropriately dressed (read as British gentlemen) to first-class seating. When in 1896 he emigrated to South Africa, another British colony, he pressured his

family to wear European clothing (Bean 1989). But the first signs of a transition from a thorough internalization of Western clothing norms to a more strategic practice began to appear. He had considered it prudent to wear Western clothing to maximize his influence in the colony and to be of greatest service to the sizable Indian community there (Bean 1989).[3] Accustomed to wearing a turban along with stylish Western tailored clothing while practicing law, he was once asked to remove his turban by a magistrate, whereupon he removed himself from the court (Tarlo 1996). This humiliating incident had a consciousness-raising impact on Gandhi, and he began to see clothing as an avenue to social justice (Bean 1989). His later practical philosophy of *satyagraha* had a precursor in this incident, as the high-caste Gandhi personally and intensely felt the gaze and superior power of imperial authorities, and moreover it revealed to him the moral and potentially transformative properties of clothing as a means of (passive) resistance (Tarlo 1996).

From afar, Gandhi was a fellow traveler of the clothing protests back in India in the first decade of the twentieth century, and the *swadeshi* (home industry) movement allied to them (Tarlo 1996). The idea behind *swadeshi* was that British textiles were not only alien, but they were keeping Indians in a state of economic dependency. To remedy this, it was proposed to develop a thriving Indian textile industry. In South Africa, Gandhi decided to use dress as a political weapon for the first time in 1913, occasioned by the shooting of Indian coal miners at the hands of South African troops. He appeared in a *lungi* and *kurta* with a shaved head to speak at a rally (Tarlo 1996).

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[3] Indians have long occupied a medial racial position between whiteness and blackness in southern and eastern Africa, where sizable numbers have settled, comprising nearly the entire merchant class in some areas.

By the time of Gandhi's return to India, his clothing trajectory had come full circle. Building on his sometime flirtation with Indian folk attire in South Africa, he came back to India dressed as a peasant, which was far below his station in Indian society (Tarlo 1996). This anchored the populist streak that was to characterize the remainder of his career and life. His aims were to not only drive the British out of India, but to unify Indians across stark caste, regional, and religious lines. Gandhi made his own contribution to a pan-Indian clothing that would aid in both goals with his invention of what came to be known as a Gandhi cap, a simple white cap made of *khadi* fabric, which became one of the most recognizable physical symbols of the nationalist struggle for independence (Cohn 1989; Tarlo 1996). More generally, he enjoined Indians to dress in *khadi* from head to foot (Cohn 1989). To Gandhi, Western clothes represented artifice, materialism, and illusory notions of progress, whereas *khadi* was a testament to constancy, virtue, and simplicity. He went further, stating that the virtue of *khadi* would somehow improve the moral character of its wearer, whereas Western clothes were thought defiling (Tarlo 1996). In any case, one who wore foreign clothes had renounced his/her Indianness (Bakshi 1987). Sometimes this resulted in philistinism in the opposite direction as previously, when British power had been undiminished: whereas in the past many had worn European clothes while in public but changed into Indian clothes after crossing the threshold of their homes, now many who wore *khadi* to fit in politically changed into European clothes upon arriving home (Tarlo 1996)!

The *khadi* campaign was remarkably successful. *Khadi* was incorporated into the uniform of the Indian National Congress (Bean 1989), the preeminent organization in the struggle for independence, and it sold well at meetings and in the streets. Gandhi also

urged Indians to learn to spin their own cloth, and to do so daily (Tarlo 1996). By 1920, the Gandhi cap was being worn by millions of Indian men and was achieving its desired effect of being noticed by the British as an act of non-cooperation. The British replied with fines, firings, and beatings of Indians who wore them, or by confiscating the cap. Gandhi reasoned that the government could not jail everyone, and he idealistically believed that if enough Indians wore Gandhi caps, the British would have to either concede and legitimize the caps, or admit their inability to control the natives and leave India (Cohn 1989; Tarlo 1996). He also positioned his movement to occupy the moral high ground if the British were to use an iron fist to squelch the wearing of an "inoffensive" little cap (Tarlo 1996).

But Gandhi's most memorable sartorial statement was his decision to wear his trademark loincloth. The adoption of the loincloth was in part intended to answer the objections of cost raised by those who could not financially afford to go along with the *swadeshi* movement and purchase pricier Indian cloth exclusively (Tarlo 1996). Gandhi's response was to reduce the amount of cloth Indians would have to wear in order to even things out (Bean 1989; Tarlo 1996). The loincloth is also responsible for the ascetic image that Gandhi's memory carries today, but it was at first a quite pragmatic innovation; moreover, this ascetic image tends to obscure Gandhi's earlier phase as a clothes-horse of sorts. His adoption of the loincloth in 1921 was at first to be a limited-term affair, designed to heighten consciousness in the fight for self-determination, but it later became his everyday wear. To Gandhi the loincloth meant a refutation of the ostensibly high material standards of Western civilization and stilted Western standards of propriety, which required full dress even in the tropics. He even insisted on wearing it

in the heart of empire, Buckingham Palace, when invited there by King George V, despite the scandal it provoked (Bean 1989; Tarlo 1996). With that, his sartorial journey and personal revolution, begun when he had left for England decades before, was complete. Because of its populist implications and because his work of unifying India internally was not done, Gandhi continued to wear the loincloth even after India was finally granted independence. Alas, Indians deserted Gandhi's beloved *khadi* garments after independence *en masse*, but significantly the elite political class with which he had worked for an independent India preserved the costume in many particulars for their own self-presentation, on account of the political capital and legitimacy they brought by way of past service in the freedom struggle (Tarlo 1996).

The first leader of an independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru, is a case in point. He continued to wear *khadi* garments, but tailored ones that maintained their non-Western outlines, and was so successful at projecting a distinct image as to have his name co-opted for the Nehru jacket which would ironically later become fashionable in the West. Although he sometimes wore Western clothing on foreign visits, he took care to appear Indian when in India. He thought the matter of dress important enough to issue an advisory opinion on the dress of civil servants, imploring them to show their loyalty to the nation in their wardrobe. His concern with dress was passed on to his political scions, his daughter Indira Gandhi, and grandson Rajiv, both later heads of state (Tarlo 1996).

Today Indian dress is primarily concentrated among politicians, married women, some intellectuals and artists, and some though not necessarily all castes in rural areas; the remainder of the population has adopted some form of Western dress (Tarlo 1996), or as some would have it, 'world dress' (Eicher and Sumberg 1995). Still, the role of

deviant cloth in India's independence was considerable. In fact, a spinning wheel is today represented on the Indian flag, having been carried over from the Indian National Congress flag (Bean 1989; Cohn 1989).

Conclusion

Teasing out the conditions that may be common to the deviant cases but which separate them from the exemplary cases above and from the general run of cases included in the data set of all countries would pay theoretical dividends. First, both countries are relatively populous, dwarfing their immediate neighbors in size. India is of course the second most populous nation in the world, and Nigeria is the most populous on its continent. Japan is also quite populous, but its insular geography and long policy of isolation (maintained most resolutely by the Tokugawa shogunate for centuries before a forced and partial opening to the West came in the mid-nineteenth century) made it as singularly impervious to influence attempts from without as it had been reluctant to reach out to the world. China, as the most populous nation in the world and an exemplary case, directs attention to other causal conditions, which may interact with population size to produce cultural effects. But it must be said that the Chinese and Indian spheres of civilizational influence are for most intents and purposes tectonically distant, despite the sharing of a common border by the modern nations. The Chinese cultural hegemony over Tibet, the region bordering on India, is notoriously diaphanous even today, and Chinese sovereignty over the region is of recent origin, as most of the dynasties were centered in eastern and northeastern China.

A second condition characterizing the deviant cases is their rich and ancient civilizational heritage encased in superstates that were rare for their time. Kapur (1998: 193) offers a clue for the Indian case, observing that "its classical-imperialist past, its civilizational spread, and its strong nationalist movement" account for certain peculiarities of its postimperial experience, which is "alternately conservative and progressive." Memories of prior ascendancy or dominance, especially when coupled with an abundance of human resources, can serve as bases of resistance to domination in the present and as an attractive pull on other states with a less remarkable history. Both the ancientness of the Vedic tradition in India in a cultural sense, and the greatness of the Mogul Empire in a political-economic sense, not to mention the ultimate derivation of all Indo-European languages from Sanskrit, and the multivocal resonance of Aryan philology, supply such a cultural memory foundation for India.

An additional condition, perhaps stemming from the prior two, which appear to serve as necessary but not sufficient conditions for the third, is the existence of a strong tradition of cultural nationalism. This is where nationalist ideology meets clothing praxis. Even after the detachment of Pakistan in 1947 attenuated the problem, India's great religious, caste-ethnic, and regional diversity has posed a problem of integration. The Indian stratagem of a multicultural nationalism has been mirrored in the clothing of its national leaders. Nehru himself set the tone, revealing a penchant for alternating between vaguely Muslim allusions in his dress and traditional north Indian clothing traditions. This cultural balancing act between always potentially fratricidal constituencies has not only to deal with cross-sectional diversity but intertemporal diversity as well, and Mogul elements were despite their alienating possibilities lightly

inserted into the apparent national costume of the new leaders of independent India (Marriott 1963).

Finally, the deviant cases serve as regional cultural epicenters. India is the center of an emerging south Asian cultural agglomeration, perpendicular to the east Asian axis of China-Japan. Bollywood cinema eclipses Hollywood within the region, and the magnetic pull of Indian arts acts similarly. Nigeria is reemerging as a cultural power in the environs of one of the few centers of high civilization in sub-Saharan Africa to predate the modern period, at a time when Europe was muddling through its medieval period.

These deviant cases demonstrate that for all of the constraints that exist in a globalized world, choice is still possible and can be highly effective. Although state executives in a large majority of the states encompassed in this study have gone over to Western forms of dress, the ranks of those who did not are not populated only by leaders of obscure island nations or tiny enclave states; indeed, some of the more imposing actors on the world scene fill out these ranks. The overarching goal of this study is to learn which determinants of choice prove more effective than others, and why different leaders make different choices as to how to present themselves on the world stage.

CHAPTER THREE: MODES OF FASHION DIFFUSION

> It is a continual struggle between 'the great vulgar and the small' to get the start of or keep up with each other in the race of appearances, by an adoption on the part of the one of such external and fantastic symbols as strike the attention and excite the envy or admiration of the beholder, and which are no sooner made known and exposed to public view for this purpose, than they are successfully copied by the multitude, the slavish herd of imitators, who do not wish to be behind-hand with their betters in outward show and pretensions, and which then sink, without any farther notice, into disrepute and contempt. Thus fashion lives only in a perpetual round of giddy innovation and restless vanity.
> – William Hazlitt

This research effort is framed by three dimensions of fashion that stand out in the literature. The first dimension is the locus of diffusion. By or from whom is fashion diffused, and to whom? In answering this question, most theorists and researchers have usually distinguished between elites and masses as agents or subjects of fashion change (Horowitz 1975). The second dimension is the direction of diffusion. Combining the first two dimensions, four permutations exist: diffusion from elites to masses, from masses to elites, from masses to masses, and from elites to elites. A third dimension concerns the extent of diffusion in space. Is fashion primarily diffused within national communities or worldwide? The first generations of fashion theorists focused on intrasocietal diffusion. However, the increasingly global context of economic and symbolic exchange has lately made models of diffusion across societies more compelling. Accordingly, incorporating a within-society/across-societies dichotomy yields eight possibilities when overlaid on the first two dimensions. The result is an eight-cell table, schematically shown in Figure 3. The shaded area in this figure delimits particularly uncharted research terrain, a deficiency which my research seeks to remedy in some measure. This classification will serve as the framework for the literature review that follows. In order to both show how my research draws upon a rich lineage of fashion research and to position it as a contribution to a thin spot of this otherwise voluminous

Figure 3: Research Literature on Fashion Diffusion

	Elite --> Mass	Mass --> Elite	Mass --> Mass	Elite --> Elite
Within Societies	• Class-differentiation hypothesis • Extensive literature • Major theorists: Simmel, Veblen, Tarde	• Reaction to class-differentiation thesis • Rooted in symbolic interactionism • Major theorists: Blumer, Kroeber, Lang and Lang	• Scant scholarly literature • Popular media abound with instances	• Largely ignored by researchers • Major theorists: Veblen, Polhemus and Procter
Across Societies	• Fashion industry as culture industry • Major theorists: Crane, Sreberny-Mohammadi	• Co-optation of indigenous apparel • Major theorists: Crane, Brodman	• Globalization and McDonalidization • Major theorists: Appadurai, Ritzer	• Untheorized area • Relegated to fashion-industry sources

literature, I will survey the most prominent literature relating to each cell of the table.

Elite --> Mass Diffusion Within Society

Alternately termed the "class differentiation hypothesis," or the "trickle-down theory," this line of theoretical development is the oldest and most well-researched area of the literature on fashion. Although anticipated by Hazlitt (1818), Spencer (1898), Veblen ([1899] 1979) and Tarde (1903), the clearest statement of this theoretical position is that of Simmel (1904). In a now classic article, Simmel dialectically analyzed the role of clothing fashion in both producing solidarity within high status groups and demarcating them from lower groups. One of the defining features of the modern mass age is that the class structure is more ambiguously tied to material culture than in premodern times. At the very inception of this process, when the bourgeois class by their possession of new mercantile wealth gradually became able to compete on an equal footing with the nobility, the nobility responded with sumptuary legislation. These laws prohibited other classes from wearing the luxurious clothing which served as exclusive status markers for elites. Such a rearguard action would not survive the advent of a mature industrial society, as both the industrialization of textile production put previously exclusive types of clothing within the pecuniary reach of the middle classes, and the ascendance of a new aesthetic eschewed meretricious display in favor of the sober moderation of the Victorian era.

Initially, the embrace of display served to shore up the old aristocracy based in land and titles against the status assaults of the new commercial aristocracy, with its practical and serious attire. Later, as Victorian aesthetic norms gave way, luxury fashion

diffused from the hereditary nobility to the rising commercial classes in a way reminiscent of the latter's purchase of noble and honorific titles in past centuries. Clothing became a defense of their cultural position against the masses.

With the passing away of sumptuary restrictions, the only constraints on consumption are income (for the masses) and status culture (for elites). Thus, the emphasis on sartorial splendor becomes a strategy of differentiation for an elite under status threat. The increasing ability of the middle classes to afford the wares of the upper confounds the class structure at the level of appearances (Sapir 1931). Further, under conditions of industrialization, the broadening of the market for clothing items brings economies of scale, lowering units costs of production and rendering formerly high-status fashion (or items which are visually indistinguishable from such) potentially available to a much wider public. Its status as one of the first consumer goods to become broadly purchased facilitated the use of clothing for status differentiation. In particular, the business suit was and remains the garment with the most class content (Crane 2000). The trickling down of fashion items from upper to middle, and from middle to lower, classes is motivated by the desire of the subordinate classes to associate themselves with these articles and thereby receive status lift. As this happens, the upper classes who define fashion trends abandon the articles, which have by now been symbolically contaminated, in favor of new fashions, and the cycle begins anew.

Common to the various statements of the class differentiation hypothesis is a location of the impetus for fashion change squarely within the elite. In the strong words of Simmel (1904: 135), fashion proper "affects only the upper classes." Broader class segments further down the status hierarchy merely respond to and seek to participate in

the fashions set by their betters. A variant on this argument is the idea that gatekeepers within the fashion industry that serve a lower-status clientele sometimes base their marketing decisions on prior successes of clothing fashions at higher-status levels (Robinson 1963). Also, in Simmel's formulation of this theory, an interactive effect between the garment and the status of the wearer is indicated. Thus, "aesthetically impossible styles seem *distingué*, elegant, and artistically tolerable when affected by persons who carry them to the extreme" (Simmel 1904: 134), while such styles would seem ridiculous if worn by lower-class persons. Contemporary awards shows for television, film, and music, at which celebrities typically arrive in *outré* costume, superficially attest to the perspicacity of Simmel's position. These celebrities have largely taken the place as cultural bellwethers in the class differentiation hypothesis of the more anonymous society figures from the worlds of business and politics as in the past (Bell 1976; Crane 2000). As Simmel's was the most strictly sociological and the most rigorous statement of the various *fin-de-siècle* accounts of fashion as class differentiation, accounts which probably informed each other, it would be redundant to appeal to other authors' formulations of substantively almost identical insights. But before leaving this vital area of the literature, it would be worthwhile to examine the parallel accounts for what is distinctive about them relative to Simmel's more sustained analysis.

The analysis of Veblen ([1899] 1979) shares many of the same tropes as that of Simmel, though perhaps with a more economistic cast. Veblen's distinctive contribution was the articulation of canons of taste or social rules of conduct guiding the behavior of the upper class, or leisure class. These canons consisted of conspicuous leisure, which

was to demonstrate the superiority of the upper class via freedom from productive labor; conspicuous consumption, which was to display the material fruits of wealth; and conspicuous waste, which was to announce disdain for the use-value of products and show that the relative parsimony of expenditure necessary to the classes further down did not apply to the elite. The function of these practices served as tokens of visible success "putting one's efficiency in evidence" (p. 16). In view of the inefficiency implied in discarding items while they are still usable, enjoined by the idea of conspicuous waste, and the irrelevance of efficiency to a non-productive class, Veblen might have referred to worth rather than efficiency as the object of conspicuous practices, and in fact much of his analysis tends in the direction of the social and honorific rather than the economic.

Although concerned with a larger problematic of class distinction more generally, Veblen argued that dress represented an ideal implement for social display. Its portability, its ubiquity in a clothed society, its accessibility to the observer all render clothing a suitable device for making a status point. Clothing can be chosen so as to confirm leisure conspicuously, as in the wearing of easily soiled white linen; to modulate consumption conspicuously through vast and obviously expensive wardrobes; and to indicate waste by ceasing to wear it well before it becomes threadbare (Entwistle 2000), and in the extreme, to wear an item only once. These status interests in class societies give fashion its dynamic character. Burt (1980), from a more structural perspective and in more scientific language, confirms Veblen in his judgment that the marginal utility of adoption decreases precipitously with the number of prior adoptions to a degree not seen in other items, placing fashion and technological changes at two ends of a continuum in

this respect. This is because fashion is a most exclusively social domain, technology least so.

Bell (1976) has criticized Veblen's thesis for errors of argumentation. Ostensibly, according to Veblen's theory, dressing in fashion serves to advertise the personal, economic worth of the individual. But he/she seeks to do so by adopting clothing that has the effect of drowning his visibility in a mass (read class), which although higher than other masses (classes), and more exclusive than society at large, is an amorphous mass all the same. Class cultures are at least partially self-defeating, then, if they are to achieve the personal distinction to which Veblen was referring, instead of the class distinction that comprises the object of class cultures in Bourdieu's ([1979] 1984) theory. In the latter, the high-status individual glories in being linked to a sophisticated class, even at the price of some loss of individuality.

While the interest of Simmel and Veblen was largely confined to change in a single society, Tarde (1903) adds an international and global dimension which accents the present research. Though he was concerned with all manner of discrete changes in customs and mores, the matter of uniformity in dress received repeated emphasis. In his words, "Today, the same kind of comfort in food, in dwellings, and in clothing, the same kind of luxury, the same forms of politeness, bid fair to win their way through the whole of Europe, America, and the rest of the world" (p. 323). Considering how little advanced was both the economic and communicational infrastructure for homogenization of dress at the time when these words were written, Tarde's prediction was prophetic. He noted that this process had already advanced across Europe and would soon leap continents, conveyed primarily and first by the upper classes, thus integrating the standard within-

society class differentiation component of his theory with a cross-societal extension. At the very close of his work, Tarde mentions dress first among an array of more pragmatic movements toward uniformity (linguistic, scientific, legal), signaling its prominence despite relative triviality.

The class differentiation hypothesis has not gone without challenge by later theorists, who have questioned its theoretical and empirical adequacy. While some recent commentators continue to more or less defend the classical account (e.g., Fox-Genovese 1987), a growing chorus of observers has criticized its viability for various reasons. Not least among the objections has concerned the elite as the *locus classicus* of fashionable innovation.

Mass --> Elite Diffusion Within Society

Despite its elegance, the theoretical and logical status of the class differentiation hypothesis has been contested. Even in the terms propounded by Simmel, the location of the impetus for fashion change may be seen as resting with the masses rather than elites, since it is they who drive the process, adopting upper-class status markers and forcing elites to respond with new ones (McCracken 1985). While this may seem a mere semantic argument, more serious theoretical criticisms remain. Symbolic interactionist theorists have observed that clothing fashion as a succession of apparently sudden changes in taste among broad segments of a population is less a matter of class differentiation than 'collective selection' (Blumer 1969). The very nature of fashion as a self-erasing phenomenon, given to ceaseless change if it is to remain fashion, requires mass participation to establish the trend (Bell 1978). In an inversion of Simmel, Blumer

(1968) contends that if an elite does not take the boundaries of acceptable attire into account, a process of definition in which the numbers of the masses are preponderant, its innovations will not be copied and take hold as fashions. In the absence of imitation, we have taste segmentation rather than fashion. A logical contradiction weakens another prop of Simmel's argument. The decline of ascriptive criteria and the increasing significance of income and wealth for social leadership, which purportedly stimulates the fallen gentry to seek a monopoly over high-status costume, at the same time makes status available for sale, meaning that instead of costume simply *expressing* embodied status, it may aid in *creating* status among the upwardly mobile classes (Lang and Lang 1961).

Of course, it is quite possible that the class differentiation hypothesis was quite accurate at the turn of the twentieth century, when it was propounded, but that it has been qualified or invalidated more recently (Steiner and Weiss 1951; Hoyt 1956; C. King 1963; Bell 1976; King and Ring 1980; Wilson [1985] 2003; Blau 1999; Crane 2000; Maynard 2004). In fact, one empirical analysis of women's dress finds just that, showing that models based on classical concepts start to lose predictive validity after about 1935 (Carman 1966). The conclusion drawn by the analyst is that horizontal flows of fashion influence are being added to vertical flows rather than superseding them. By the 1960s, the classical model had by some accounts become antiquated (Crane 2000). Another study goes further, arguing that contemporary "style differentiation across social classes is essentially non-existent" (King and Ring 1980: 14). Moreover, the underprediction of clothing choices by education and income (i.e., indicators of class) is matched by a bewildering proliferation of taste publics within social classes (Crane 2000). Continuing democratization brought some class leveling, with the result that 'inconspicuous

consumption' gained ground, whereby one should not seek to outdistance one's peers too much in accumulation (Hoyt 1956). At the very least, more recent empirical results suggest that the class differentiation hypothesis is overstated (Hoffmann 1981).

A potential rescue of the class differentiation hypothesis arrives from the theory of culture industries, first developed by the Frankfurt School. According to this theory, large corporate interests have cornered the market in for-profit cultural items, imposing a stifling uniformity in the interest of maximizing profit through scale economies and the reduction of uncertainty. The main tools of the culture industry are a sophisticated advertising/marketing complex that generates consumer desires instead of responding to them (Mills 1963). This development was in its infancy as the class differentiation hypothesis was being set forth, and if true of a later period might yet salvage a view of elite fashion leadership, in this case the leadership of dominant business interests.

Yet here too, the culture industry variant of the class differentiation hypothesis perhaps fails on its merits. We must ask whether the fashion industry as culture industry actually behaves in the way predicted by theory. The products of a culture industry must be attuned to public tastes, or face low sales (Kroeber 1919). And if fashion hegemony ever existed within the industry, it is unlikely that it still does so (Maynard 2004). Some scholars argue that the ability of fashion producers to influence tastes is strictly limited (Sapir 1931; Robinson 1960, 1963; Anspach 1967; Gibbins 1971; Bell 1976; Lönnqvist 1979; Damhorst 1999; Crane 2000); they are more likely to canalize already existing tastes than redirect or create them anew (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1957; Roach and Musa 1980). The operations of the fashion industry are more suggestive than directive (Crane 2000). The bromide that a fashion conspiracy is in operation often occasions surprise

among the supposed conspirators themselves, the fashion industrialists (Bull 1975; Crane 2000). If they have such control over their markets, their increasing retention of fashion bureaus and employment of market research to predict nascent styles would be unnecessary. They see themselves as presenting a range of options from which consumers choose (Crane 2000). The fact that fashion as a culture industry is not monolithic, but rather is characterized by components with somewhat divergent interests, plays a part here (Fox-Genovese 1987; F. Davis 1991). Perhaps the most critical fault line is between fashion designers and fashion buyers. Though fashion designers might wish to dictate to the public, fashion buyers are constrained to buy those creations that will sell most readily, becoming "unwitting surrogates" of the fashion public (Blumer 1969: 279). And they, in turn, are the most important customers of the designers today, not the socialites of old (Bell 1976). At least one quantitative analysis has borne out this theoretical expectation of fashion buyer responsiveness for women's fashions (Jack and Schiffer 1948).

The relationship between fashion creators and consumers is not direct but mediated, as the fashion predilections of the public are subject to a reflexive process of anticipation by fashion creators (F. Davis 1991; Finkelstein 1996). The workings of the culture industry only accelerate diffusion which is primarily conveyed by other channels (Lang and Lang 1961). Finally, the rapidity of the modern fashion process simply does not allow time for a staggered dynamic of imitation (Allen 1952; Winakor 1955; C. King 1963; Carman 1966; King and Ring 1980; Rouse 1989; Crane 2000). The classical model was underlaid by a communicational mode that involved temporal and spatial lags, which was a vital prop of arguments inferring imitation and diffusion more generally, as

famous debates between Tarde and Durkheim, taking place during the same period as Simmel's theory, attest. But the instantaneity and simultaneity characteristic of contemporary media convey fashion codes to all classes at once (Crane 2000), and remove the informational barriers to the diffusion of fashion, reinforcing the effects of lower clothing prices. Thus, it may have once been natural for the upper-middle class to learn fashion codes from the upper through contact and observation, the middle class from the upper-middle, and so forth, but this is no longer necessary nor usual.

The empirical support of the class differentiation hypothesis has also been attacked. In many instances, fashion and other objects of interpersonal influence trickle up or across rather than down (Merton [1949] 1968; Wilson [1985] 2003; Rouse 1989; Polhemus 1994; Finkelstein 1996). The passage of blue jeans and denim work shirts from workers' garb to status symbol appropriated by upper classes (the introduction of a jeans line by socialite designer Gloria Vanderbilt exhibited this strikingly) is a well-known example (Blumberg 1974; Lind and Roach-Higgins 1985). Older, more conservative social types have frequently sought to take up the clothing symbols of youth culture in the decades since the debut of the class differentiation hypothesis (Field 1970). Vibrant street and retro styles have shown blithe disregard for fashion industry fiat, and the industry is increasingly tapping these styles (Finkelstein 1996; Crane 2000; Maynard 2004). For the area of women's clothes, quantitative analyses have not detected significant differences in consumption or fashion innovation by social class (Winakor 1955; C. King 1963; Grindereng 1967; Schrank and Gilmore 1973). Even the luxury fashion market, which one would expect to correspond most closely to the class

differentiation hypothesis, today shows trends of co-optation of faddish and inexpensive designs (Crane 1997).

In other cases, fashion diffuses laterally within classes but not downward through the class structure (Fallers 1954; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; C. King 1963; Carman 1966; Anspach 1967; Grindereng 1967; King and Ring 1980), though of course it is possible for fashion to diffuse both downward across classes and laterally within them (Robinson 1961), or to trickle down and then back up, as was the case for the top hat. Copied by lower-status men for a time and then abandoned, it reverted to an upper-middle-class and upper-class accessory (Crane 2000); its final resting place at the top of the class structure obscured its path in the meantime. Yet another possibility is truncated or suspended diffusion, whereby an item diffuses to a point in the class structure, and then stops (Crane 2000), defying the expectations of a full trickle. One study of fashion leadership among women found it to be distributed equitably across high- and middle-status positions, with even low-status women supplying a healthy aliquot of fashion leaders (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955). And if the word of consumers as measured in questionnaires is to be trusted, self-reported behavior largely disavows the trickle-down construct. According to an early large-sample test of this idea, 77% of respondents were not prone to imitation of social superiors, 74% did not dress so as to appear prosperous, and only 12% dressed to create the impression of a person of leisure (Hurlock 1929).

The most damaging empirical threat to the continued viability of the class differentiation hypothesis may be the marked pluralism and polycentrism of contemporary fashion (Davis 1992; Crane 2000; Maynard 2004). To be sure, in place of a monolithic model, both elite-to-mass and mass-to-elite diffusion may coexist, affecting

different market segments. Crane (1999) holds that a top-down model best suits the luxury fashion industry and market, whereas a bottom-up model best suits the industrial, mass-market manufacture of clothing. And both top-down and bottom-up models, even when combined, do not always do justice to the chaotic vectors of fashion today, which run in many directions not adequately contained in the images of upward, downward, or lateral diffusion, all of which continue to assume meaningful boundaries. According to Crane (2000), the class differentiation hypothesis is still valuable for clothing cultures in workplaces, but not outside them. These empirical patterns reduce the applicability of the class differentiation hypothesis at best, and render it implausible for contemporary life at worst, while providing ample evidence of contrary trends.

If class has lost much of its former importance as a factor in the use of dress for expressive purposes, what has taken its place, if anything? Principally age, and it is an upward float, with youth setting the styles that are picked up by the fashion system, and then distributed to and worn by older market segments; once adopted by the middle-aged and above, the styles are vacated by the young in a manner similar to the behavior of the aristocracy and then bourgeoisie when class differentiation dynamics held sway (Crane 2000). And because youth are often of limited economic means, having not yet experienced intragenerational upward mobility, this is at the same time a reversal of Simmel, in that older, more affluent consumers are taking a cue from poorer ones, if only because the latter have not yet built an individual economic position.

In postindustrial societies, the use of dress to establish and connote lifestyles as well as to ground identities has become concomitantly more important as class cultures have lost much of their punch (Crane 2000). Although Max Weber long ago virtually

invented the notion of lifestyle and associated it partly with economic means, these contemporary lifestyles are not reducible to questions of affordability. The relative affordability of all but high-end fashion has severed or at least strongly attenuated the connection between finances and lifestyle, much more than for housing, travel, and other aspects of lifestyle. However, this does not rule out the continued import of the class content of clothing in developing or undeveloped states, which constitute the greater part of the units of analysis in this study. It may be that, despite the bankruptcy of the equivalency once held to exist (particularly by early anthropology and sociology) whereby the study of simple societies was taken as a mirror of the past of complex, developed states, something similar but more delimited is valid today for clothing: that less developed states are now going through a process of class differentiation and the construction or revision of symbolic boundaries through clothing comparable to what transpired in the West before the early twentieth century.

Elite --> Mass Diffusion Across Societies

Despite the reservations of some critics regarding the ability of culture industries to dictate mass tastes, a number of commentators have recognized the influence of the fashion industry in the global spread of clothing items (Crane 1997; Sreberny-Mohammadi 1997). Notions of culture-industry leadership need not annihilate conceptions of individual or collective selection, but may be compatible with them. The organization of markets by fashion organizations sets the range of choice within which interpersonal processes of fashion diffusion operate (Crane 1999). Cross-culturally, the operational scale of the fashion industry has lately become global. For example, the

luxury fashion market has evolved into an economic sphere with high barriers to entry and prohibitive marketing costs, and is for that reason controlled by international conglomerates (Crane 1997, 2000). As most fashion theorists have taken a national frame for granted in their research (Schrank and Gilmore 1973), much work remains to be done in this area, and although the phenomenon is inchoate, the prospect of further cultural globalization of fashion seems a fertile field of inquiry.

Mass --> Elite Diffusion Across Societies

In some cases, the flow of cultural goods runs in the opposite direction from that of the cultural imperialism construct, making its way from indigenous cultures to consumer segments in Western societies (Boucher 1987; Schneider 1987). A couple of examples from the field of fashion will exemplify this development. In the global luxury fashion market studied by Crane (1997, 1999, 2000), scouts from the Western-centered fashion industry scour street-level fashion trends both among subcultures in their own societies and in developing countries, looking for new fashion ideas. And designers often copy or buy indigenous fashions and profit handsomely from their creators, completing the circle of exploitation bounded by cultural imperialism. The handicraft production of textiles by the Maya of Guatemala is a case of such exploitation, as the locals are doubly exploited: exploited by the Guatemalan government, which profits from their skills as hand-weavers in the interest of earning foreign exchange, and exploited by the foreign fashion industry agents, who obtain high-quality artisanal crochet work from hard-pressed villagers at bargain labor prices (Brodman 1994). The creations then sell as inordinately profitable, radical-chic high fashion in the Western countries. Although this

is, technically speaking, a diffusion from the masses to elites, it is one in which the terms of trade are structured by the more powerful trading partners — Western fashion firms.

Mass --> Mass Diffusion Within Society

I am aware of no extensive theoretical literature on this mode of fashion diffusion, but anecdotal evidence and case histories are legion. The movement of urban hip-hop dress and music styles from the blighted inner-city areas that spawned them to more affluent suburban communities is a notable instance. Although the commercial music and urban fashion industries belatedly responded to this collective transfer of styles between demographics with genuine marketing efforts, the initial impulse appears to have been a spontaneous borrowing. Another instance is the mainstreaming of reality-based television shows from their original youth audience base and protagonists to a mass appeal transcending a youth focus. Because of its exclusively mass location and lack of a cross-cultural dimension, this mode of fashion diffusion is perhaps least pertinent to the current project, but it is important to include it within the schema of this literature review for the sake of completeness and as a theoretical foil.

Elite --> Elite Diffusion Within Society

Little or no literature exists in this cell of the table, reflecting the fact that it is a very rare and unlikely occurrence. Symbolic warfare between rival status groups, such as the landed nobility and commercial bourgeoisie in early modern Europe, tended to be fought through fashion differentiation rather than diffusion (Polhemus and Procter 1978). On the other hand, if separate elites are on marginally different levels of a cultural

hierarchy, diffusion between them is encompassed by the class-differentiation literature. Hence, this theoretical possibility is only that, and will be given short shrift in this project.

Mass --> Mass Diffusion Across Societies

Mass-to-mass cross-cultural diffusion is becoming increasingly common, especially that from the United States to other countries. Even in many countries that maintain anti-American political postures and whose populations revile the influence of Americanism, the seductions of American music, films, food, dress, and other cultural items have proven nearly irresistible. The wave of 'McDonaldization' sweeping the globe, as described by Ritzer (1996), is imbricating itself into the very structures of everyday life in these countries. Of course, the former positions of colony and empire may be reversed in the new cultural economy. A most notable case is the popularity of Brazilian television programming in Portugal (Wise 2008). The cultural economies of scale enjoyed by Brazil as the sole Portuguese linguistic area of any world significance, and which dwarfs its former liege in size and prominence today, are considerable. Still, cultural economies of scale usually favor Western exports of mass cultural products to other countries. Mass clothing trends spread especially rapidly via the diffusion channel of cable and satellite television (Crane 1999). Just as changes in fashion are material-cultural traces of shifts in social systems, they also reflect changes in relations between societies. It has been said that fashion was one of the first forms of global culture, giving rise to marked center-periphery structuration of the fashion field, although the periphery is talking back today (Crane 2000).

Frequently the communication of cultural items between disjunctive cultures ends in simulacra, symbols that have been divorced from their referential context, as when Filipinos revel in singing Kenny Rogers and Motown songs (Appadurai 1990); or when Japanese movie viewers indulge their love of Westerns, notwithstanding that the frontier experience is as far from Japanese national consciousness and the experience of living on a small, overcrowded archipelago as it could possibly be; or when Egyptians dance to disco music in the shadows of minarets and tune in to syndicated episodes of the television series *Dallas*. As a young man in Pakistan, recently queried by a television reporter in a McDonald's within his homeland about the incongruity between his hatred of America and his eating habits, succinctly put it, "This [is] just food." One wonders to what degree the hidden and culturally specific meanings of dress cross with the items to other lands. The breakneck pace of advances in transportation and communications, and not least the advent of the internet, prompt one to project a great broadening of this diffusion mode in the future, and a steadily expanding literature.

Elite --> Elite Diffusion Across Societies

Certainly anecdotes of this form of diffusion abound, such as the circulation of fashions between Napoleon III's Paris and other world capitals (Bell 1978) and the rage for Turkish dress among English elites in the eighteenth century (Ribeiro 1979). But outside of fashion-historical works and fashion-industry publications chronicling diffusion of high-fashion items between socialite elites of different countries from an international business/marketing perspective, a dearth of accounts of cross-cultural elite-to-elite diffusion exists (Kaufman and Patterson 2005). The present research can thus

make a sizable contribution to defining this area of scholarship. In a prescient passage that almost anticipated world-system theory, contemporary spatial models in geography, and the substantive process featured in this study all at once, Elias ([1994] 2000) presents the cross-cultural diffusion of cultural forms between elites as a transposition to the international arena of the civilizing process that first transpired within individual states in the West, a 'last wave' of that process. His words are worth quoting at length:

> According to the form of colonization and the position of an area in the large network of differentiated functions, and not least to the region's own history and structure, processes of commingling are beginning to take place in specific areas outside the West similar to those sketched earlier on the example of courtly and bourgeois conduct in different countries within the West itself. In colonial regions too, according to the position and social strength of the various groups, Western standards are spreading downwards and occasionally even upwards from below, if we may adhere to this spatial image, and fusing to form new unique entities, new varieties of civilized conduct (pp. 385-386).

The study of state elites as subjects and objects of fashion diffusion will go far in ameliorating the needless de facto separation between political and cultural affairs in countless studies of everyday cultural practices. In sum, the uneven distribution of literature across the schema organizing this literature review calls for a study of intercultural fashion diffusion both for its own sake, and for its wider significance as a social indicator, illuminating with a new hue international political dynamics that have been well-researched in their own right.

CHAPTER FOUR: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

All deformations by fashion are irrational. There is no guarantee that fashions will serve expediency.
– William Graham Sumner

Klingman (1980) conceptually and exhaustively catalogs the sources of social change in societies generally, incorporating them into a general model meant for adaptation to specific research purposes and the construction of more ad hoc models. He specifies four such sources: incrementalism or momentum, in which the past constrains the future from within a society, usually providing for relative stability or continuity; within-system development, contingent on society-level variables impinging on the dependent variable of interest; across-system diffusion, wherein forces of change stem from outside the society experiencing the change, in particular from other discrete societies; and global forces, which also arrive from outside the society but not from any specific society. This last source of change will frequently, but need not, show a sudden onset and give rise to sharp discontinuities.

A variety of perspectives may theoretically account for the dimensions of fashion change among state elites limned heretofore in this project (see Figure 4 for a diagrammatic depiction of alternative causal structures). Two of these involve diffusion, strictly speaking, and two do not. Diffusion processes must be mediated; some mechanism of transmission must exist. But the possible mechanisms are several. At the level of nation-states, the two most viable candidate explanations of influence are world-system theory and a spatial model. World-system theory accords primacy to the volume and quality of international intercourse, independent of location, whereas spatial models reverse this formulation, aggregating patterns from the ground up. These correspond to

Figure 4: Alternative Causal Structures



Klingman's diffusion possibility, but with different foci (macro/world vs. micro/regional) and different diffusion channels. On the other hand, functionalist theory and world-culture theory underwrite the possibility of change without direct diffusion. A functional explanation assumes independent adoptions on the part of the adopting units, and thus discounts diffusion. Functional explanations may be seen as the foil of diffusion theory (Most and Starr 1990). The Achilles heel of functionalist explanations is their drive to overextension, and for reasons that will be discussed below, this explanation will be ruled out for the specific research question at hand on theoretical grounds. However, society-level variables will be incorporated into the analysis as controls, roughly corresponding to Klingman's modality of change through within-system development without being crudely functionalist (incrementalism or momentum is not applicable in this study, since the dependent variable is discontinuous and binary). For its part, world-culture theory does not require the point-to-point diffusion referenced in common diffusion models, positing a world-level source of change. World-cultural influence on dress would encapsulate the global forces of Klingman's typology, but without their usual concomitants of system shock and state duress.

To lend order to these alternative theoretical accounts, I present a four-cell matrix (see Figure 5) constituting a theoretical typology. The four candidate theories can be arrayed across two axes of variation. *Instrumental* change entails the selection of elements (in this case, fashion) in furtherance of desired or desirable ends; *non-instrumental* change entails no such teleology. The double *entendre* of the word 'selection' is serviceable here, and introduces the second axis of variation. Selection may be a product of conscious choice, in which case it will be classified as *directed*. But

Figure 5: Theoretical Typology



another meaning inheres in the word as well, as in the term 'natural selection.' When a process of change is an unintended consequence of other changes, it will be classified as *epiphenomenal*. As displayed by Figure 5, functionalist theory coincides with a view of fashion change among state elites as instrumental and directed; world-culture theory coincides with a view of such change as instrumental and epiphenomenal, insofar as world culture is animated by a melioristic conception of human betterment through rationalized goals, though fashion change would not be part of its core content (hence its categorization as epiphenomenal in this instance); and both world-system theory and spatial models coincide with a view of such change as non-instrumental and epiphenomenal, since it is an outgrowth of a position, whether a world-system position or a geographical position. The fourth cell — non-instrumental, directed change — is counterfactual. This typology summarizes differences between these bodies of theory, directs theoretical explication, and grounds an empirical testing strategy. As a preliminary to an outline of an empirical testing strategy in Chapter 5, the remainder of the present chapter examines the four candidate theories in turn.

Functionalist Theory

A functionalist theory of fashion confronts a vexing problem — how to reconcile the instrumental character of functionalist theories in general with the underdetermination of fashion's content by instrumental goals. The general problem has a long history in sociological theory. In Weber's taxonomy of social action (1968), four types of action are possible, according to the nature of the end, means, and the relationship between them. *Value-rational* action aims toward an end that is predetermined, unquestioned, and

presumed valid. This type of action is only a question of means; it involves no pragmatic consideration of the costs or consequences of action. In *traditional* action, both the means and end are given; action is embedded in customs, routine, and habit. Human emotion motivates *affective* action. Neither the means nor end are given; choices of means and end are not necessarily understandable by outside observers. Finally, in *instrumentally rational* action both the means and end are rationally chosen. Logical or scientific considerations guide the choice of means; whatever the end in view, rational social action involves choosing the most efficient means to the particular end. In this typology, the two most nearly opposite types of action are affective and instrumentally rational action. At its extreme, affective action is impulsive and often intelligible only to the principal, containing little or no direct or intended instrumentality. By contrast, instrumentally rational action is methodical and amenable to rational reconstruction by third parties.

A functionalist paradigm is most compatible with instrumental rationality. Efficacy, the capacity to produce generally positive effects, is the touchstone of functional social behaviors and practices. In the words of Stinchcombe, "By a functional explanation we mean one in which the consequences of some behavior or social arrangement are essential elements of the causes of that behavior" ([1968] 1987: 80). Through a feedback loop, social action in the present will tend to conserve practices which have produced (or were thought to produce) tangible positive effects in the past. Yet severing this connection, either cognitively through intellectual change, or empirically through social change, is an ever-present possibility.

Fashion, as a fairly pure cultural realm, stands at the opposite pole from strict functionality (Foley 1893; Sumner [1907] 2002; Sapir 1931; Richardson and Kroeber 1940; Lang and Lang 1961; Gibbins 1971; Hirsch 1972; Bell 1976; Lowe and Lowe 1982; Herpin 1986; F. Davis 1988; Lieberson 2000). Veblen ([1899] 1979: 132, 153) early recognized this opposition operating in Western societies, substituting "ingenuity and expense in place of beauty and serviceability," and pointing to articles such as the high hat as exemplars. In modern societies, the mainly aesthetic and functional qualities of dress are undermined by the march of fashion undertaken for purposes of invidious comparison. Bell (1976) points out that wherever high degrees of uniformity exist in fashion, as in the case of this research, *ipso facto* the styles cannot be functional for the individuals wearing them, in view of the diverse needs and situations of individuals. At a larger level of aggregation, fashion in its regimenting way tends to eradicate national self-expression through dress. With more specific reference to transcultural dimensions, John Meyer (2000: 245) states, "Variations in language, dress, food, traditions, landscapes, familial styles and so on…have no direct, rational relation to instrumental actorhood." And Wallerstein (1997: 98): "The steady internationalization of culture…has become striking even in realms where it seemed least likely — in everyday life: food habits, clothing styles, habitat; and in the arts." I will define pure culture not as the sum of all symbolic elements in society, but as that limited subset which does not affect system functioning, that is, the expressive dimension of social life. It is useful to think of a continuum running from the material to the symbolic (see Figure 6), with areas of human behavior toward the left end of the continuum being more or less invariant and having great survival value, and practices toward the right end constituting an open field (see

Figure 6).[4] Constraint is at a maximum to the left (e.g., biological and ecological imperatives), while freedom is at a maximum to the right (e.g., pure culture). Sandwiched between the two is social structure, relatively more durable and constraining than culture, yet more open to social determination than biological constraints. For instance, nutrition is a universal biological need that all societies must satisfy, a need that, like all biological imperatives, is not uniquely human. But just *how* societies satisfy this need (which crops they may choose to grow among all those that the climate permits, the technology used to gather or produce food, the distribution of food among societal members, manners or rituals surrounding the ingestion of food, etc.) is a matter of social structure. This will vary across societies (Tarde 1903), as well as among subcultures and demographic groups within societies. At the cultural end is cuisine (the preparation and presentation of food, ingredients and recipes, and the social construction of taste itself, *inter alia*). As Lévi-Strauss pithily commented, "Foods must be good to think before they can be good to eat." Thoughts about the range of foods that individuals consider appealing or appalling — tastes and preferences — are culturally bound. Hence such common phenomena as non-observing Jews feeling ill at the taste or even the thought of eating pork, the appreciation of escargot by the French but not Americans, the status of yams as a staple in west Africa as contrasted with their consumption by most American households only at Thanksgiving and in candied form, and the appeal of caviar to the wealthy but not the middle class or poor, independently of the economic barrier of price.

Keeping in mind the definition of pure culture introduced above, the domain of clothing fashions is situated at the extreme right end of the continuum (Meyersohn and

[4]For alternative conceptualizations, see White (1969) and Harris (1980).

Figure 6: Continuum of Human Behavior



Katz 1957). As Durkheim noted, "It is true that aesthetic and moral activity, because it is not regulated, appears to be free of any constraint or limitation" (Durkheim [1893] 1997: 184). And Lieberson, underscoring this quality of fashion, observes that fashion "is not purely utilitarian in the sense that features of this garment are inherently separable from its ostensible function" (Lieberson 2000: 8). The realm of pure culture is invoked by situations where "two or more alternatives that are physically possible and functionally effective…[are] equally open" (Kluckhohn 1963: 112).

A material, functional interpretation of the adoption of Western dress by non-Westerners often involutes on the problem of cultural ecology. If anything, the traditional dress of non-Western peoples is generally much better suited to their environments than is Western clothing (Wilson [1985] 2003). The adoption of Western dress was not only *not* materially functional, but in some cases it has been decidedly harmful physically or even fatal to the peoples concerned (Sumner [1907] 2002; Hughes 1960; Heine-Geldern 1968; Bell 1976; von Ehrenfels 1979).

Clothing has its functions, but they are not those commonly supposed. The functions of clothes are predominantly social in nature, contravening the intuitive yet empirically suspect protection theory, according to which clothing developed in response to the need for protection from the elements (Dunlap 1928). The famous anecdote of Charles Darwin encountering the aborigines of Tierra del Fuego, who weathered their antarctic climate without benefit of clothes and who were indifferent to the snow melting on their skin, comes to mind. Barber and Lobel (1952) enumerate three general functions of clothes: utilitarian, aesthetic, and symbolic. Skepticism of the utilitarian function has been roundly expressed (Harms 1938; Blumer 1969). Since the utilitarian function is not

applicable to my study of the clothing *choices* of state elites (Simmel 1904), and the aesthetic function is of secondary interest due to the social location of political elites, the primary focus will be placed on the symbolic function.

One symbolic function of clothes is the maintenance of culturally specific and often age-old attire as a mode of traditional social action. The discarding of indigenous attire in public appearances and the passage to a Western sartorial standard by state elites in developing countries can be theorized as a necessary concomitant of development, but this is specious, carrying no face validity owing to the nature of the case. There is no conceivable causal path whereby a state leader's sartorial habits could be causally determined by, e.g., the need for development. In other words, it is perfectly possible for a leader of a state with high GDP, modern technology, nuclear capability, and extensive bureaucracy to dress like a swami. But the correlation of development indicators with Western dress is an extraordinarily robust empirical regularity, moving one observer to describe as a "social law" the fact that "economic modernization leads to the wearing of Western suits and dresses" (Nakagawa and Rosovsky 1963: 79). To sort out the possible causal influences on this ubiquitous but quite unnecessary evolution, we must look to other theories. A prime candidate theory for the explanation of this isomorphism of dress is world-system theory.

World-System Theory

The central problematic for world-system theory is the structuration of the international system, the ramifications of this for the developmental chances of individual states, and its consequences in terms of both the amount of social inequality prevailing at

the system level, and degrees and types of exploitation relations between states and peoples. World-system theory postulates a world divided into three discontinuous and hierarchically ordered strata: the core, semiperiphery, and periphery. The core consists of developed, industrialized, affluent states that are ensconced in a privileged position within the world economy. They also tend to disproportionately dominate the world politically and militarily. The periphery consists of underdeveloped, poorer states that are unfavorably positioned in the world economy, often based unduly on raw material extraction and agricultural production and lacking world-political influence. The semiperiphery consists of developing countries that have taken over some of the more labor-intensive and less remunerative industrial activities from the core, selling inexpensive consumer and industrial items back to the core and in regional trading economies with the periphery. The placement of states within the world economy and international division of labor has far-reaching consequences for individual states, from geopolitics to domestic standards of living. The distribution of states throughout the three-tiered structure is not prefigured for all time, but upward or downward mobility is slow and rare. Begun under colonialism, states' mode of insertion into the world (capitalist) economy significantly affects their fates and is perpetuated through trade relations, which amplify initial differences through terms of trade.

World-system theory assigns a crucial role to the state and its location within the world system. Taking a cue from classical Marxism, with its mode-of-production analysis of dynamics that are largely internal to states, world-system theory conceptualizes the generalization of capitalist economy to the world plane. According to world-system theory, the primary impetus for social changes within a state emanates

from outside the state, through a dialectical process of interaction between social structures and processes at the state level and the logic of international capital penetration and accumulation. Although this process is dialectical, it is also asymmetrical, with the balance of causal power heavily tipped in favor of the world-systemic level (and hence its most powerful states and economic actors), while allowing broad scope for local contingency (Hannerz 1989a).

For a long time, world-system theory marginalized the place of culture (Robertson and Lechner 1985; Hannerz 1987; Robertson 1992; A. King 1997). But of late, the writings of its originator, Immanuel Wallerstein, and other world-system theorists (Friedman 1988) have stressed the cultural accompaniments of world-system dynamics, recognizing culture as a preeminent site of conflict between nations. To some extent, this is a return to origins, to the culturalist concerns of classical sociology (Robertson 1992). Drawing upon orthodox Marxist analysis of contradictions within social systems, Wallerstein (1990) alleges that the very projection of Western social forms into the periphery of the world system engendered a contradiction, which could only be resolved by eliding the concepts of modernization and Westernization. Contemporary state elites in underdeveloped countries continue in the cultural trajectory set in motion by colonialism, usually though not always resolving the tension in favor of Westernization rather than an indigenous modernization of whatever shape. Although popular culture in the Third World today is very susceptible to international influences (Hannerz 1987), state elites are especially impressionable (Chase-Dunn 1998).

The implications of world-system theory for the present topic are straightforward. Cultural resemblances should parallel network structure if world-system theory has

explanatory potential, because the same channels which carry goods across the globe also carry culture (Friedman 1988; Hannerz 1989a, 1990). The best-case scenario for marginal states would be to garner the benefits of international trade without their cultural baggage, but this is rarely possible (Cowen 2002). Wuthnow (1983) identifies cultural developments accompanying the alternative political-economic dynamics of three types of world orders — expansionary, polarized, and reintegrative. By his reckoning, the period since 1945 is a reintegrative period, and the present problem of increasingly homogenized dress styles among state elites reflects that fact on the cultural plane.

To be sure, this reflection model carries a danger of exaggeration (Hannerz 1987). World-system theory makes allowances for cultural pluralism, cultural currents that cross-cut political and economic relations, and for cultural conflict between a multitude of cultures (Wallerstein 1979, 1990; Hannerz 1989b, 1990; Appadurai 1990). Certainly there is more room for cultural challenge by disadvantaged nations in the world system, than for military, economic, or political challenge. But a "world cultural flow" (Hannerz 1989b) follows trade and other interaction channels like a river finding the low ground, and world-system theory assumes that center-periphery cultural dynamics fairly faithfully mirror patterns of international intercourse, meaning that culture flows more from center to periphery than from periphery to center (Hannerz 1997). A statistical model constructed on the premises of world-system theory should detect such a relationship between the density of trade and political networks on the one hand and cultural diffusion on the other. Recent methodological advances offer enriched opportunities for network

analysis along these lines (Strang and Meyer 1993). Flows between parties leave traces that can be effectively mapped. Fashion diffusion is one such highly visible flow.

Conversely, in situations of high social distance between parties to an interaction, the symbolism of clothing carries more weight in the perceiver's rating of the other party (Hoult 1954), and this could supply an incentive for fashion change to whatever item is considered more prestigious. If an inverse (or no) statistically significant relationship were found between the strength of network ties and the likelihood of Western fashion adoption, this would constitute a decisive refutation of world-system theory for this research question, since world-system theory expects low social distance to be correlated with a high likelihood of Western fashion adoption. Such a result would swing the pendulum toward a cultural theory of fashion diffusion among state elites, as suggested below in the section on world-culture theory.

Before leaving this section, a crucial question must be addressed: how the predictions of world-system theory here differ from those of modernization theory and dependency theory, its proximate theoretical antecedents. The empirical implications of world-system theory differ from those of modernization theory in three important respects. First, modernization theory does not contain the conceptual equipment to understand softer cultural phenomena such as sartorial styles, focusing as it does on changes in institutional, technological, political, and economic spheres. The present study is consistent with the recent cultural turn within world-system theory, going beyond the often narrowly materialist analyses of its first generation. Second, modernization theory posits an intrinsically gradual, continuous process of change; whereas the present work involves the study of discontinuities (marked and usually abrupt changes in dress

behavior) and their social and ideological correlates. Third, modernization theory sees the sources of social change as endogenous to the society in question, with the consequence that modernization theorists fixate on internal characteristics of nations (e.g., literacy rates, capital formation, social-psychological endowments, etc.) in explaining such change (Bendix 1967); world-system theorists (and world-culture theorists) look outside the society for causal sequences which complement, refract, or overwhelm domestic change trajectories.

The concept of the semiperiphery distinguishes the implications of world-system theory from dependency theory. To the dialectical scheme of dependency theory, according to which the world is divided into well-positioned core nations and poorly positioned peripheral nations, world-system theory adds a middle level, that of semiperipheral nations. These nations are enmeshed in relations of exploitation (in the technical Marxist sense) with both core and peripheral nations, in the one case as exploited parties and in the other case as regional exploiters. This mediation of relations between the core and peripheral nations by the semiperiphery acts both as a buffer and a disguise protecting world capitalism, which is organized from the core. Co-optation of peripheral nations in world processes of exploitation, which become naturalized through terms-of-trade and currency-value differentials, and through the dynamics of value added and commodity chains, enlists non-core collaborators in processes of exploitation, allows core nations to practice more profitable secondary exploitation, and confounds Manichean evaluative dichotomies of an exploitative West and an exploited Third World.

While world-system theory generates a theoretically cogent set of predictions for the effects of international ties, it does not exhaust possibilities for network linkages

affecting fashion behavior. In particular, transmission of cultural items may be geographically modeled. It is necessary to consider this variant of network effects (denoted the spatial model) before concluding with a consideration of world-culture theory, which looks beyond networks for a primary causal factor.

Spatial Model

The first generation of diffusion models assumed homogeneous mixing in the population, more out of mathematical convenience than an assumption of verisimilitude (Dodd 1955; Rapoport 1956; Yapa and Mayfield 1978; Granovetter and Soong 1983; Morrill, Gaile, and Thrall 1988; Strang and Tuma 1993). The more units of analysis, the more unrealistic becomes this assumption, tending to overpredict interaction (Hudson 1972). Whether all population members have an equal opportunity to influence each other in a diffusion process is an empirical question. One would expect Botswana to be influenced more by proximate Zaire and the superpower United States than by distant Mongolia. Still, in many cases an assumption of homogeneity among units of analysis is a reasonable facsimile of the real world. In the present research, the assumption is warranted by the elite status of the actors, who do not face the resource barriers to n-way communication encountered by resource-poor individuals, and by the institutional matrix of diplomatic channels, which offer a relatively unique opportunity for universal communication and influence.

Spatial modeling strategies rely on the use of a spatial-weights matrix to incorporate spatial effects into a regression model. Different research questions call for different constructions of this matrix (Granovetter and Soong 1983), depending on

relevant theory and research purposes. For geopolitical or diplomatic processes, an adjacency criterion may be profitably employed. Presumably, in these functional areas a state's neighbors loom larger in policy considerations than other states equidistant from the state in question, not to mention more distant states. The mechanisms of this effect include not only the mediation of information accessibility by space, but reference-group processes of social support and reinforcement (Whitehand and Pratt 1975). Baller and Richardson (2002) applied an adjacency criterion in their test of imitation effects on suicide rates among neighboring French departments and U.S. counties, as did Huff, Lutz, and Srivastava (1988) in their study of policy diffusion among U.S. states. In other cases, such as the cultural phenomenon studied in the present research, an assumption of a schedule of influence secularly decreasing with increasing geographic distance is empirically sound (Hägerstrand 1952, 1968; Olsson 1965; Marsden and Friedkin 1993) and theoretically supportable (Pemberton 1936b; Stewart 1948; Dodd 1950; Rashevsky 1950, 1954; Isard and Bramhall 1960; Deetz and Dethlefsen 1965; Cliff 1968; Morrill 1968; Casetti and Semple 1969; Morrill 1970; Cordey Hayes and Wilson 1971; Hudson 1971, 1972; Morrill and Manninen 1975; Whitehand and Pratt 1975; L. Brown 1981; Morrill, Gaile, and Thrall 1988), when measurements of world-system importance are present in the model. The addition of the latter allow one to capture attractive effects *across* distance, even as these are mitigated *by* distance (Deutsch and Isard 1961; Hurh 1968; Morrill, Gaile, and Thrall 1988). It should be remembered that the function of distance changes over time as transportation and especially communication infrastructures improve, attenuating the effects of network position (Ormrod 1990). Here I should distinguish between private and public consequences of an innovation's

adoption. Private consequences are in play when the utilities resulting or anticipated from adoption accrue to the actor making the decision and other persons or organizations connected to him/her on a micro scale. Public consequences entail collective selection rather than executive decision and concern the welfare of macro social units. Spatial factors can be expected to be especially strong for diffusion of innovations with private consequences, such as that featured in this study, since publicly consequential innovations spread more through non-relational channels of institutionalization and media (Wejnert 2002). More will be said on this issue in Chapter 5 below. In yet other cases, a compound of distance-dependent and adjacency criteria may be appropriate (Pemberton 1938). Such an approach was followed by Guglielmino et al. (1995), who constructed an index based on ratios of distances from nearest neighbors in their study of the spread of cultural traits in Africa.

A second generation of diffusion modeling research discards the assumption of homogeneous mixing in the population and permits the estimation of spatial effects (Hägerstrand 1967; Casetti and Semple 1969; Haynes, Mahajan, and White 1977; Mahajan and Peterson 1985; Strang and Tuma 1993). Such models reduce to the classical model with its homogenous mixing assumption in the case of spatial homogeneity (Strang and Tuma 1993), while fitting the more complex case of population heterogeneity when this obtains.

Like a model based on world-system theory, the spatial model is a relational model: effects should be magnified by more intensive interaction, mediated in this case by location rather than exchange dependence. The role played by social distance in world-system theory is occupied by physical distance in the spatial model. If the spatial

model has explanatory potential, the likelihood of fashion diffusion among state elites should be inversely related to the physical and social distance between ego and alter, and directly related to proximity in both respects (Rapoport 1956; Casetti and Semple 1969; Burt 1987). Empirical failure of both network models (world-system and spatial) would clear the way for an alternative explanation stressing cultural dynamics.

World-Culture Theory

World-culture theory is a relatively recent theoretical development. Originating in the work of John Meyer and numerous scholars associated with Stanford University, world-culture theory describes the movement toward a single world culture, albeit a diverse one with a rich texture of diversity and locality. World-polity theory falls within this tradition, accounting for largely political institutionalization of ever more widely accepted ultimacies, such as human rights, the sacralization of the individual, the rights and obligations of citizens, national sovereignty, boundary stabilization, dispute resolution processes, democratization, the value of universal education, environmental protection, etc. World-culture theory foregrounds the ideological and cultural features of this development, as opposed to the political and institutional features emphasized by world-polity theory. In fact and practice, the two belong under the same rubric and are not distinguishable as separate theories, as they are rooted in the same theoretical foundations. For instance, ideological and cultural content is immanent in the forms of institutionalization listed above; it is merely a matter of analytical convenience that I differentiate them. Insofar as my research is attuned to cultural phenomena, world-cultural strands within this body of theory will be privileged.

Despite their seeming antinomy, individualism and globalization go hand in hand (Brodman 1994). Individualism is part of the specific content of globalization. There is good reason to expect that a crystallizing world culture disseminated by globalization and emphasizing the individual would reconstitute models of state leadership on a less idiosyncratic footing. Moreover, world-level effects may show non-linearities over time. It may turn out that world-system theory was more suited to the immediate postcolonial world, but that world-culture theory generates a more compelling narrative of the current global environment, in which "cultural linkages generally outstrip direct relations. The pervasiveness of similarity in modern systems means that diffusion is often less structured by interaction and interdependence than expected" (Strang and Meyer 1993: 492). As does world-system theory, world-culture theory places greater importance on factors operating outside a state in explaining processes of change within it. But whereas world-system theory emphasizes economic and political factors, world-culture theory emphasizes the causal primacy of cultural and institutional factors.

A world-cultural effect on the clothing choices of state elites begins with advances in transportation and communication which have exponentially increased interaction possibilities between states. These advances have progressively led to the articulation of a world frame of reference in the global village (McLuhan and Powers 1989). Transnational communication networks have transported rationalized modern Western forms to the ends of the earth. Once societal models come into open competition through their collision in a now intersocietal discourse, those championing localism tend to lose out for want of legitimacy (Meyer et al. 1997). Actors within discrete national societies, including state actors, embark upon individually selective, but

collectively wholesale, mimesis of cultural goods and styles impinging upon them from world culture. The resultant increase in legitimacy bestowed upon them by this transition then selects for and buttresses this development. As indicated by Figure 4 above, one should not exaggerate the degree of strategy in this process. Mimesis occurs via taken-for-granted assumptions, not always consciously strategic choice. In pointed contrast to functionalist imagery, mimesis need not enhance efficiency in any real way (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

World-culture theory has come under vigorous attack from the world-system theoretical camp. Fundamental disagreement with world-culture theory exists on the premises of debate. Wallerstein (1997) wonders whether the construct of world culture is not an oxymoron, seeing culture as particularistic by definition. While accepting the "anomaly" (p. 93) of state isomorphism as a product of cultural diffusion, and the historical master narrative of the process tendered by world-culture theorists, Wallerstein turns world-culture theory on its head, claiming that one of the world-culturally constructed activities of states — sponsorship of national artistic activity — ends up institutionalizing a particularism that resists world-cultural encroachment. What passes for world culture is in fact the culture of dominant parties within the world system. In the more supple hands of Hannerz (1990: 237), world-system theory acknowledges the conceptual validity but doubts the strength of the world-cultural construct: "There is now a world culture, but we had better make sure that we understand what this means. It is marked by an organization of diversity rather than by a replication of uniformity."

To be sure, world-system theory and world-culture theory image different mechanisms of diffusion. Where world-system theory finds the role of global structure,

world-culture theory finds the role of culture — shared norms and values that are now being communicated, adopted, and contested the world over. The division between the two theories implicates the material/non-material opposition that is so foundational to sociological and anthropological theory. But world-culture theory need not be at war with the premises of world-system theory. Exchange and dominance relations can operate side by side with world-cultural processes (Jo. Meyer 1999). The data-analytic strategy of this research will hence incorporate options for modeling joint implications of the two theories.

World-culture/world-polity theory has few programmatic statements (but see Meyer et al. 1997; Jo. Meyer 2000), being defined more by the explanatory frameworks employed in a plethora of empirical studies in substantive areas from science to international non-governmental organizations (Meyer and Hannan 1979; Thomas et al. 1987; Boli and Thomas 1999). This theory occupies the default position in the current research, accounting for processes of fashion change among state elites where other theories (functionalist, spatial, and world-system) find little support from statistical tests and comparative case-based studies. Failure to find significant effects of network linkages (spatial or world-systemic) justifies ascribing some of the residual variation to world-culture or world-polity processes (Strang and Meyer 1993). A negative finding would thus be a substantively significant result in this case (Strang 1991). However, a confirmatory analysis will be conducted to corroborate the explanatory power of world-culture theory; for if all alternative models fail, it may as easily connote the need to cast about for yet other theories of the process as confirm the world-cultural account.

CHAPTER FIVE: DATA AND METHODS

> It seems that we could conclude that fashion is not linked to such and such a particular form of clothing but rather is exclusively a question of rhythm, a question of rate in time.
> – Roland Barthes

The methods introduced in this chapter are geared toward the elucidation and testing of hypotheses relating to the adoption of Western dress by non-Western leaders of states. Specifically, hypotheses operationalizing the theoretical perspectives reviewed in the previous chapter are presented in order to lay an empirical foundation for the results chapter following.

Methodology

The principal method of analysis used in this research is event history analysis, a longitudinal statistical technique for time-series data in which the dependent variable is the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event, supplemented by time-series regression. Besides corresponding to the nature of the topic at hand, time-series data permit a more definitive adjudication between respective theories whose empirical implications may be difficult to disentangle on the basis of cross-sectional data sets.

Data and Measures

The principal data source accessed for this study is the CIDOB Foundation's (long title: Centre d'Informació i Documentació Internacionals a Barcelona) photobank of world political leaders. The database is quite comprehensive, covering nearly all recognized nations and extending from 1945 to the present. This is precisely the period of concern to this study, as it is the period of rapid decolonization in which the process of

fashion change among state elites should be most noticeable. The sources from which the CIDOB Foundation's photos were culled are primarily the United Nations Photo Library and the file photos of press services. The photos follow a more or less standardized format: they are posed rather than captured, and present the leaders frontally instead of in profile or at a distance. Gaps in the photobank were filled in by complementary sources, including the website www.rulers.org, internet image searches, and secondary print sources. In the latter event, images were collected until a two-to-one ratio of Western to non-Western attire, or vice versa, surfaced in the clothing of leaders who sometimes wore both, and the ruler was so coded.

The content analysis of photos has several attractive properties, and has been deployed with outstanding results in cultural analysis (Wass and Eicher 1980). First, photos are brightline indicators, involving less ambiguity than written text, particularly for the coding process entailed in this project. Second, they are easily accessible and manipulable data sources (Jack and Schiffer 1948). Long time series of such data display meaningful social dynamics amenable to systematic research (Kroeber 1919; Robinson 1976; Polhemus and Procter 1978; Turnbaugh 1979; Robenstine and Kelley 1981; Lowe and Lowe 1982). Third, subject-object dichotomies do not pose their usual difficulties, and the non-reactivity of the data precludes observer or experimenter effects. By contrast, written text, even within diaries or other private documents, is often composed with an eye on posterity. The self-enhancement found in written accounts by state leaders is no obstacle in the present study, because self-enhancement is a manifest purpose of a sartorial choice, whether that be to adopt the clothes of a prestigious other or to display indigenous garb. The former strategy would be expected under conditions of

cultural imperialism, as when Latin American Indians adopted Spanish costume during the colonial period in order to confer higher status on themselves (Brodman 1994). The latter strategy would be expected in comparatively autonomous states with self-assured leaders, as in Haile Selassie's Ethiopia before the Italian conquest.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the hazard of a change in state (e.g., a head of state's transition from indigenous to Western dress) per unit time. The unit of analysis is the country-year. The units of observation in this research comprise the set of countries for which data is available, excepting countries whose modern civic heritage lies in Western civilization. Excluded are the nations of North America, South America, Europe, Asiatic Russia (Soviet Union), Australia, and New Zealand. This leaves the continents of Africa and Asia, the foci of modern Western imperialism. Turkey, despite a small foothold on the European continent and substantial historical ties to Europe, is categorized as an Asian country on account of its geography, origins, and international position in the twentieth century.

Only the first transition to Western dress constitutes an event in the models. This is because once a transition has been made by a leader in a certain country, this will factor into the decisions of later leaders of that country in a Markovian fashion, at least as much as extrasocietal influences. For example, consider Nigeria, one of the deviant cases from Chapter 2. No adoption of civilian Western dress has yet occurred in Nigeria, although Western-style military uniforms have been adopted during periods of military supremacy. One can imagine how much greater the temptation would have been for later

leaders to present themselves in Western attire if just one had done so at an earlier point. Though the hazard may or may not have increased much in absolute terms, the likelihood of a transition would no doubt have increased significantly in relative terms, since the tradition would have been broken and the precedent would have been set. Because this project is designed to investigate and test extrasocietal and world-level influences on the dress of state elites, such serial autocorrelation within cases is *ex post* to the phenomenon of interest. The point of the research is to ascertain whether covariates chosen for their theoretical promise exert a significant impact on which states experience transitions (and when), and which do not. Naturally, also, transitions from Western dress to indigenous attire do not figure here; although they are phenomenologically interesting at the case level, and although the same forces that attract most leaders may repel others and push them in the direction of an indigenous dress statement, they are far less common, and are part of the noise of the analysis. A full list of countries with transitions in the data set is available in Appendix A.

Independent Variables

World-system position. World-system position is measured by an index constructed in the following manner. For each country, measures of the volume of international trade (exports plus imports) were gathered from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's World Fact Book. The natural logarithm of this quantity was then multiplied by an ordinal indicator of world-system position based on the blockmodel analysis of Snyder and Kick (1979). Previous analyses had operationalized world-system position with purely continuous variables such as investment dependence and trade concentration, but Snyder

and Kick cogently argue for the importance of both the magnitudes of international interactions, as measured by these indicators, and structural position per se, which is not properly seen as a continuous function of these indicators. The log transformation was undertaken to trim the influence of extreme values, since otherwise the difference in international trade volume between countries such as the United States and Chad would be so great as to render placement on the same continuous metric meaningless and consign the latter to inconsequence in the analysis. The indicator of world-system position (with a multiplier of 1 for peripheral countries, 2 for semiperipheral countries, and 3 for core countries) taps the possibly discontinuous effects of world-system position, as adumbrated by world-system theory. Insofar as all non-Western states represented in the core (such as Japan) adopted Western official dress styles early (prior to the period covered by this analysis), with no contrary example in evidence, no special provision was made for such states in the analysis. The world-system position index is expected to be positively associated with an increase in the likelihood of a transition to Western dress (a schematic depiction of all variables and related hypotheses is presented in Figure 7).

Country size. Country size (population) is the first of three control variables which might be correlated with the dependent variable, as suggested by the research literature (Cannon 1998). Of course, no formal difference exists between independent and control variables in social science, other than the fact that one or more variables are the focal variables or main variables of interest, and the others are sometimes termed controls. For world-system theory and the associated model, the focal variable is the effect of world-system position. Holding world-system position constant, the size of a country may affect its standing on the global scale, and the relative visibility of its head

Figure 7: Variables and Hypotheses

Variable	Hypotheses
World-system position index	Higher values on the world-system position index will be positively related to the likelihood of a transition to Western dress.
Country size	Hypothesis A: Population size will be positively related to the likelihood of a transition to Western dress.
	Hypothesis B: Population size will be inversely related to the likelihood of a transition to Western dress.
British/French colonial status	Leaders of former British and French colonies will be significantly more likely to adopt Western dress than leaders of other countries.
Socialist state	Leaders of socialist states will be significantly less likely to adopt Western dress than leaders of other countries.
Spatial-effects parameter	The likelihood of leaders adopting Western dress will be positively related to the number of prior adoptions by leaders of other countries, and inversely related to the cumulative distance of these countries from a given leader's country.
World-cultural measure	The number of INGO foundings by year will be positively related to the number of transitions to Western dress by year.

of state. This, in turn, may affect self-presentation choices. I am theoretically agnostic about the direction of the expected effect. Large size may be correlated with system centrality and thus greater expectations of diffusion from the mainstream of the system; alternatively, small size may be correlated with greater openness to international trade (Katzenstein 1985), with the concomitant openness to cultural imports, or with greater self-enhancement incentives for leaders of those states. Cowen (2002) argues that small size produces a certain vulnerability on the cultural front. In his words, "When trying to sustain an independent ethos, cultures face a problem of critical mass….This cluster of produced meaning may require some degree of insulation from larger and wealthier outside forces….The more populous and economically large the culture, the less risk it runs of being swamped by cross-cultural contact. It will be able to absorb foreign ideas without being overwhelmed by them" (pp. 62-63). This is because larger societies tend to be more diverse and thus are able to resist foreign innovations, since not all parts of a diverse culture will be equally receptive, or they can assimilate these innovations at their own non-disruptive pace; and because they are more synthetic in their very macrocultural nature. Polynesia presents a cautionary tale of the pitfalls of small size for a culture touched by others (Cowen 2002).

The geographical literature also weighs in on this question. The implications of geographical gravity models run in the direction of greater diffusion possibilities between larger states, with the attractive force of size overcoming to some extent the friction of distance (Hudson 1972). On the other hand, large size may confer the status of a regional cultural power on a state, allowing it to more easily resist diffusion from the West.

British/French colonial status. British and French colonial practices were distinguished from those of the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, and Germany by their cultural content (Mignolo 1998; for a profile of Portuguese colonial philosophy, see Moreira 1956; for that of the Dutch, see Marriott 1963). To a certain extent, Britain and France harbored designs of bringing the colonies and their peoples along toward 'civilization' instead of merely extracting economic and military advantages from them for the benefit of the metropole. Locals were co-opted into the colonial administrations and armies of the colonial powers, and these segments of the indigenous population generally converted to Western customs and dress. In fact, 'savage' dress was part of the rationale for a civilizing force that was enunciated by the colonial administrations of Britain and France (Kuper 1973). The continued cultural ascendancy enjoyed by Britain and France in large parts of Africa and Asia, persisting long after the relative decline of these two nations' world political and economic power, perpetuated monopolies over the cultural flow to the colonies established during the imperial era (Hannerz 1989b).

The Portuguese nominally created a category superficially similar to the French notion of the *evolué*, that of the *assimilado*, but almost no natives in the colonies qualified, as this category made up less than one percent of the population (Moorman 2004). Substantively, then, the Portuguese (and *a fortiori* the Belgian and Dutch) colonial regime was quite distinct from those of Britain and France, whose developmental plans for the human capital in the colonies, though surely arrogant and racist, were at least in good faith. The category of the *assimilado*, like so much else in the Portuguese colonies, was part of the 'myth' versus the 'reality' of Portuguese

colonization (Bender 1978), an attempt to mask the brutal and exploitative nature of their colonial enterprise.

Although Western-style clothing was often worn by elites even in the more oppressive colonial regimes outside the Anglo-French orbit as a signifier of status, such as Indonesia under Dutch rule (Molnar 1998), in some cases, as in the German Cameroon, it was positively discouraged (Geary 1996). After independence, the intra-elite conflict attendant on decolonization generally led to the decline of the pro-Western faction of the elite, which was politically compromised as collaborators under the new conditions of independence. In almost every colony, the Belgians, Dutch, and Portuguese fought ruthlessly to hang on to their colonial empires (those of the Germans and Italians were separated from them by the two World Wars), whereas the stand of the French in Algeria is notable for its contrast with the gradualist approach to decolonization through home rule that Britain and France practiced elsewhere. (And even this stubborn French refusal to quit Algeria after rebellion broke out there is attributable to the fact that it was treated as civil unrest, since Algeria was juridically part of France proper.) The more contentious dynamic of decolonization in the colonies of other powers embittered the contest between colonial and postcolonial indigenous elites in these countries, such that the sartorial decisions of the rising nationalist elites in the countries not controlled by Britain or France should therefore be seen as a result of something other than imperial conditioning, whether network or world-cultural effects are responsible. Theoretically one would expect a greater proclivity for elites to maintain or revert to indigenous dress in the former colonies of states other than Britain or France, because in these lands Western socialization of a domestic elite was either never or only half-heartedly

attempted, and there the break of decolonization tended to be sharper and bloodier. To control for effects of colonial status, a dummy variable was created, with a coding of '1' representing a British or French colonial heritage, and a coding of '0' representing other heritages or no colonization at all.

Socialist state. Countries with socialist forms of political organization may be especially susceptible to a rejection of Western fashion. In keeping with their quasi-militarist structuration, such regimes may and often do prescribe solidarity-keying standard attire after the model of a state leader (China being the most obvious example; see Chapter 2 above). Leaders of socialist countries may be more than usually inclined to demonstratively renounce Western fashions as a spearhead of neocolonialism (Wilson [1985] 2003). To bring out the effect of regime type, countries are coded '1' if they are socialist when the transition to Western dress occurs, and all other regime types are coded '0.' For purposes of analysis, mixed types and democratic socialist states are treated as non-socialist; only state socialist regimes (though this still allows for some variety of political coloration) are classified as socialist. Socialist states are expected to be less likely to show a transition to Western dress than non-socialist states, controlling for other covariates in the model. The list of countries that were coded as socialist is available in Appendix B.

Analyses

In addition to global analyses, separate analyses were run for Africa and Asia to observe partials. Also, an analysis was run with petrostates deleted. The possibility of a relatively small number of petrostates dampening a vibrant relationship in the sample as a

whole is predicated on their combination of oil wealth and traditionalistic social systems. Good theoretical reasons exist to at least suspect correlations of petroeconomics with both the dependent variable and independent variables. For example, an oil economy may overstate a country's centrality on both the world-system position multiplier and the international trade components of the world-system position index, and oil wealth may act as a prop of traditionalistic social systems and their cultural correlates, such as dress. The tendency of premodern forms of political rule (e.g. kingdoms, sheikdoms) to persist longer in, and remain more prevalent among, oil-rich nations of the Middle East attests to this possibility. Of course, a few oil-rich nations are located outside this social space and have less traditionalistic social systems (e.g., Norway, Venezuela), but they are excluded on account of a Western civic heritage (see above), and oil production does not constitute nearly the entire economy, as is frequently true of Middle Eastern countries. In fact, it is this overwhelming dependence of the economy on oil production that justifies the designation 'petrostate,' a designation which clearly does not fit the oil-producing countries of Europe and the Western Hemisphere.

Coding

Appearances were binary-coded as either indigenous or Western, following Wass and Eicher (1980). Such distinctions are ultimately arbitrary (Jasper and Roach-Higgins 1995), but they are nevertheless meaningful as social facts to the social actors under study and are analytically identifiable by researchers. Throughout, Western dress was coded '1' and indigenous dress was coded '0.'

One potential coding problem is the prevalence of hybrid styles. For example, a particular leader may wear a Western suit and an indigenous hat. The wearing of a *fez* with a European frock coat and suit connoted a modern, reform-minded mien in the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the twentieth century (Jirousek 1997), just before Turkish society was revolutionized by the Young Turk movement. The symbolic message sent by a given article of clothing may be interdependent with that of other articles in a given ensemble (Bogatyrev [1937] 1971; Damhorst 1990), an idea which has some empirical validation (Gibbins and Schneider 1980; McCracken 1987). Lennon (1986) finds an additive impact of separate clothing items on impression formation, while Paek (1986) documents a *Gestalt* effect that is not strictly additive, resulting from combinations of garment stimuli. If this is so, then an obvious corollary is that the impression given off by one article of clothing can be muted or negated by another article worn at the same time which gives off dissonant impressions. Indeed, where clothing has strong sociopolitical implications under circumstances of cultural conflict, hybrid styles may symbolize tacit resistance to homogenization and the hegemony of a stronger cultural force (Bogatyrev [1937] 1971). Hybridity in dress may thus point to deeper role conflicts (Lurie 1981). Scholars disagree as to whether hybridization in dress enhances the likelihood of positive assessments by others (Lurie 1981; Rucker et al. 1985); in some cases, negative affect in the observer results from such incongruity (Knox and Mancuso 1981). At the least, hybrid styles lessen the interpretability of costume (McCracken 1987). If such a hybrid pattern appears in a non-negligible proportion of the observations (e.g., five percent), the data analysis will be run with alternative codings for the

observations in question, to discover whether this will alter the results. Otherwise, the observations are coded according to the body clothing, disregarding the head covering.

Another problem is the appearance of leaders in military (and sometimes civilian) uniforms. Civilian supremacy in government has triumphed nearly everywhere in the West: the dark business suit is now the accepted costume of political executives. But in various military regimes, Western-style military uniforms are the standard attire of the chief of state. Alternatively, a civilian uniform is sometimes decreed to epitomize a break with the past, as occurred in Indonesia, China, and Tanzania (Maynard 2004). So the problematic issue is that the uniforms may be Western in inspiration, but the wearing of military uniforms itself, while quite common among most Western leaders prior to World War I, is today an anachronism and thus un-Western. This is important insofar as state leaders trying to accumulate legitimacy in the world arena will achieve none of that by dressing like a strongman, when the dominant norm has moved to one of civilian supremacy. For example, as Nigeria democratized, its leaders shunned military uniforms, not in favor of Western civilian attire, but in favor of traditional embroidered robes (Martin 2004). To address this thorny problem, distinct analyses were conducted on two different data files. In the first, the coding rules classify the models of military attire currently deemed appropriate in the West (either understated dress uniforms, fatigues, or camouflage battle gear) as Western, and more florid styles characteristic of traditional societies — and of Western experience at an earlier stage of development — as indigenous. Examples of these latter include high epaulets, sashes, display swords, cockades, etc. In the second analysis, observations for leaders appearing in military

uniform are recoded '0.' If this should change the substantive results, discrepancies will be reported; if not, this fact will be stated in a footnote to the text.

Methods

Attention must be given to several issues of model specification. As a preliminary step, graphical examination of the diffusion curve (the number of cumulative adoptions of Western dress style plotted against time) provides clues as to the appropriateness of varying specifications, before applying standard hypothesis-testing procedures to fit alternative models (Flinn and Heckman 1982). In particular, attention should be paid to three factors: the shape of the curve, the point of inflection, and the degree of symmetry of the curve.

The shape of the curve is a telling empirical indicator, a good point of departure in the model-fitting process (Dodd 1955; Nelson 1972; Kay 1977; Allison 1984; Greve, Strang, and Tuma 1995). Different processes of cultural interaction should betray themselves in different forms of the cumulative hazard function (Pemberton 1936a; Lekvall and Wahlbin 1973; Agnew 1979; Burt 1987; Greve, Strang, and Tuma 1995), which is simply a population-level aggregation of individual adoption decisions (Lekvall and Wahlbin 1973). Specifically, examination of the diffusion curve aids in discerning whether an external-influence model on the one hand, or an internal-influence or mixed-influence model on the other hand, is more reasonable for the data (Mahajan and Peterson 1985). If the curve approximates an exponential curve (Figure 8) or a straight line, this suggests that an external-influence model should produce a best fit (Coleman, Katz, and Menzel 1966; Hudson 1972; Lekvall and Wahlbin 1973; Mahajan and Peterson 1985;

Figure 8: Exponential Curve



Strang and Tuma 1993). The external-influence model assumes a common exogenous diffusive force acting on all potential adopters (Lekvall and Wahlbin 1973; Mahajan and Peterson 1985). In this case, the cumulative number of adoptions increases at a constant rate, or a variable but monotonically increasing or decreasing rate. If, however, the curve approximates a sigmoid logistic curve (Figure 9) or a Gompertz curve (Figure 10), an internal-influence or mixed-influence model should be more appropriate (Lekvall and Wahlbin 1973). An internal-influence model assumes point-to-point diffusion through a social system via means such as interpersonal contact across the adoption frontier (Yamaguchi 1994); a mixed-influence model allows for a combination of exogenous and point-to-point effects. Both of these models are graphically differentiated from an external-influence model by the presence of an inflection point in the curve, rendering an S-shape. The S-shape is produced by a kaleidoscopically shifting balance between the number of previous adopters and potential adopters in a constant population (Hudson 1972). (For a derivation of the mathematical underpinnings of these models, see Lekvall and Wahlbin 1973.)

A number of different modeling options are available for the internal- or mixed-influence case. The point of inflection and degree of symmetry of the curve assist in eliminating modeling options which obviously do not correspond to the data. In an internal-influence model, the inflection point represents the point of constant slope, the point where the curve describing the cumulative hazard changes from an increasing to a decreasing slope. In mathematical terms, this is the point where the first derivative of the function is 1. In the case of the logistic internal-influence model, the location of this inflection point is fixed at $F^* = 0.5$ (Lekvall and Wahlbin 1973), the point where exactly

Figure 9: Logistic Curve



Figure 10: Gompertz Curve



50 percent of the potential adopters have adopted the practice. The logistic curve is characterized by symmetry, meaning that the curve is of identical (or in practice at least very similar) but inverse shape on either side of the inflection point. The Gompertz internal-influence model also has a fixed inflection point (located at F* = 0.37), but unlike the logistic function, can accommodate asymmetry. A mixed-influence model allows the point of inflection to float (between F* = 0.0-0.5) while requiring symmetry.

Extensions of these models have been derived by various scholars. Some generalized models that have been developed allow variable but bounded inflection points, while others relax both assumptions, allowing a variable and unbounded inflection point (that is, capable of being located across the entire range of F*, 0.0-1.0) and either symmetry or asymmetry. The advantage of the generalized models is that they are more flexible in application, but at the cost of additional parameters to estimate, increased degrees of freedom, and diminished statistical power. Depending on the nature of the data, these generalized models may reduce to simple external-, internal-, or mixed-influence models (Mahajan and Peterson 1985). In such a case, the simple models are more parsimonious and conserve degrees of freedom.

Substantively, a best fit of an external-influence model would suggest the explanatory utility of world-culture theory, with diffusion-positive influences emanating from the global level. External-influence models can be expected to best fit diffusion processes in which some high-prestige source is potentially diffusing an innovation to the whole population of units (Guglielmino et al. 1995). This comports well with the logic of world-culture theory, insofar as world culture is conceived as an exogenous force acting on individual states from without (Jo. Meyer 1999), one lacking an overarching

bureaucratic structure in the guise of a world government to actualize it (Boli and Thomas 1997). A best fit of an internal-influence model would suggest the explanatory utility of network models, whether the world-system position specification or the spatial specification, or both. A best fit of a mixed-influence model would suggest the simultaneous impact of significant world-system, spatial, and/or world-culture effects. Figure 11 summarizes the general properties of curves expected by the respective theories, as well as for a zone of overlap where multiple theories fit the data.

One methodological issue which must be considered is whether to use a continuous- or a discrete-time method. Ultimately all empirically measured variables are discrete, owing to the limited precision of measurement (Berry 1993), so the choice is contingent on how finely grained are the data and measurement instrumentation. If the smallest interval of measurement is so small relative to the rate of event occurrence as to approximate the assumption of continuous measurement, a continuous-time method is appropriate. Since the dependent variable in this study is measured at comparatively blunt one-year intervals, a discrete-time method is warranted (Allison 1982, 1984). In event-history modeling, the likelihood of a non-trivial proportion of the observations showing events in the same measurement interval is the key foundation of the decision rule (Prentice and Kalbfleisch 1979). The sole limitation does not arise from statistical theory, but is rather one of computational complexity attendant on iterative estimation techniques (see below) with discrete-time intervals that do not approximate continuous time (Allison 1982; Tuma 1982). The fact that in the present research the number of cases is larger than the number of observations per case, that a significant number of ties on the dependent variable exist (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002), and in addition recent advances in

Figure 11: General Properties of Diffusion Curves Implied by Various Theories

Theory	Type of Mode	Typical Shape of Curve	Point of Inflection	Symmetry of Curve Required
World-system	Internal-influence	Logistic	0.5 (fixed)	Yes
Spatial (model)	Internal-influence	Gompertz	0.37 (fixed)	No
World-culture	External-influence	Exponential or linear	None	No
Overlap	Mixed-influence	Sigmoid	0.0-0.5 (bounded)	Yes

computing power (which ease the burden of computational complexity), call for the use of a discrete-time method. This corresponds to the structure of the data, even though the actual process of fashion change may be better represented by a concept of continuity in change (Lowe and Lowe 1982; Pannabecker 1997).

In addition, the problem of censoring that plagues the use of longitudinal data must be addressed. The use of the event history method substantially eliminates the problem of censoring which would be present for linear regression estimates of longitudinal data (Allison 1984; Yamaguchi 1991), including pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis. In the case of fixed censoring, where the observation records for all cases are censored at the same time points in a way that the researcher can control (as opposed to the censoring of records due to case-level problems of missing data), no assumptions about censoring need be incorporated into the modeling process (Allison 1984). In the case of random censoring, where the observation records vary across cases, so long as the censoring is unrelated both to the variables in the model and any actions of the researcher, censoring should not pose a problem for estimation (Nelson 1972; Prentice and Kalbfleisch 1979; Allison 1984; Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002). Ideally, a diffusion analysis should have data that antedates the first event in the population (Strang 1991), but left censoring (the exclusion of events that occur before the data series begins) is of little concern in the present study, as only a handful of fashion transitions occurred before 1945. Right censoring (the exclusion of events that occur after the data series terminates) is an inevitability in all research running up to the present, but is a less serious threat to statistical reliability than left censoring (Tuma 1982; Hamerle 1991). The problem with right censoring is that an event which did not happen within an

observation window (but the covariates of which were pushing toward an event during it) may happen right after it closes but not be reflected in the hazard. For a couple of reasons, such a concern does not apply here. First, the photobank data are punctiliously kept up to date, in real time, as it were. Second, most fashion transitions occurred during or somewhat after the period of high decolonization, and had for the most part run their course by the 1980s. An interaction between events to come and the variables in the models is unlikely. Monte Carlo studies have confirmed the insensitivity of estimates to censoring except in small samples, for which biased estimates can result, but even here estimators perform well when the degree of censoring is slight (Tuma and Hannan 1979). Thus, in most applications, censoring does not present difficulties for event history analysis, and in this application it can be all but ignored.

Models

The first model to be tested is the world-system model. The modeling option with the best fit among the variety of functional form specifications will be selected for later comparison with the spatial model. The effects of the continuous variables of size and world-system position are assessed, along with the effects of the categorical variables (socialist political economy, and British/French colonial status), by maximum-likelihood estimation. Although a semi-parametric model estimated with partial-likelihood procedures might otherwise be attractive, since the shape of the transition rate function need not be known in advance, it is unreliable in case of a significant number of ties on the dependent variable (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002). This is due to the fact that semi-parametric Cox models focus only on the sequence rather than the timing of events; tied

events are at the same place in the sequence. This is precisely the situation in the data set, where the years 1960 and 1991 featured a large number of events, as will become clear in Chapter 6, and 18 different years had multiple events. The equation for the fully parametric model used here is:

$$\log h(t) = a(t) + b_0 + b_1 Position + b_2 Size + b_3 Colonial + b_4 Socialist + u$$

where h(t) represents the hazard rate; a(t) is a coefficient for the effect of time; b_0 is the intercept; b_1, b_2, b_3, and b_4 are coefficients for the effects of the independent variables; and u is a disturbance term. Unobserved heterogeneity in the population uncaptured by the covariates, if it is substantial, will be intimated by poor model fit. The left side of the equation denotes a log function, as per the mathematics of event-history estimation, to avoid negative terms.

A spatial model was estimated by the addition of a spatial-effects parameter (denoted lambda) to the first model. The spatial-effects parameter was constructed in the following way: using GIS software, the inverses of the distances between the centroid of each country having a transition and that of each prior country having a transition were summed to form an unstandardized measure of the influence of prior transitions on a state, mediated by distance. Then a row-standardized spatial-weights matrix, constrained to vary between 0 and 1, was calculated. Social proximity is best treated as a bounded quantity (Burt 1980; Greve, Strang, and Tuma 1995), and standardization avoids problems inherent in differential geographical centrality of individual states with respect to others. For instance, East Timor is through geographical accident at much greater distances from most other states in the data set than is Jordan. All else being equal, the

use of unstandardized spatial coefficients would overstate the importance of literal and figurative outliers like East Timor, and a moderate number of pairwise concordances (agreement of values on the dependent variable in the event history model) could lead to Type II error. The equation for the second model is:

$$\log h(t) = a(t) + b_0 + b_1 Position + b_2 Size + b_3 Colonial + b_4 Socialist + \lambda + u$$

The spatial model is designed to test for spatial dependencies in the diffusion process for clothing styles among state elites, as against the null hypothesis that the adoption of Western apparel is Poisson-distributed.

The above models are both internal-influence models. Failure of both models to produce significant effects would shift the explanatory burden toward world-culture theory. The failure of network structure and individual-level variables (both of which are incorporated into the two models) to account for effects may imply the residual operation of world-culture or world-polity processes, affecting the cultural and institutional levels, respectively (Strang and Meyer 1993). Such a result would indicate the limited utility of taking nations as units of analysis, as is usual in empirical world-system analyses, but somewhat contrary to the spirit of world-culture arguments, which entail supranational more than international realities (Hannerz 1989b). The models are compared impressionistically via comparison of adjusted R^2 for the two models, and statistically via calculation of the log-likelihood ratio chi-square statistic and significance tests. If both models yield significant effects of the primary variables (position in the first equation, and position and the spatial-effects parameter in the second equation) in the expected direction, the relative fit of each pair of models will be assessed in the above manner.

Finally, a world-culture model is tested using time-series regression. World-culture dynamics are intractable to quantitative measurement. In empirical studies, world-culture effects are typically "only inferred; direct evidence about its structure and operations is rare" (Boli and Thomas 1997: 172). Nevertheless, some fairly good proxies for world-cultural influences exist, such as growth in scientific activity and a mushrooming of international non-governmental organizations, or INGOs (Boli and Thomas 1997; Jo. Meyer 2000). Other indicators of varying stripes, though not always as quantifiable, include global forms of communication, the spread of world models of time, global competitions and prizes, and standardization of citizenship (Featherstone 1990). In this project, I will focus on INGOs, for it is predominantly these organizations that define and build world culture today (Jo. Meyer 1999) and they are a "rough indicator" (Lechner and Boli 2005: 132) of world culture's operation. The time-series model tests for significant correspondence between the time pattern in the growth of INGOs and the dependent variable here. Bursts of INGO proliferation paralleling spikes in the number of transitions would increase the chance of significant effects being found for world culture.

CHAPTER SIX: DATA ANALYSES

Having surveyed the theoretical basis of the problem and canvassed its qualitative dimension by way of several case studies in Chapter 2, it remains to explore the quantitative dimension of Western dress adoption by non-Western elites. In this chapter, non-parametric analyses will be performed to discern patterns in the transition rate. Then, various parametric models will be fit to the data, comparing their fit against one another. Finally, the results of the quantitative analysis will be substantively interpreted as against the observational expectations of the theories introduced in Chapter 4. But first, a few words must be said about data problems.

Data Problems

Missing data. Fortunately, this is an almost negligible problem in this data set, less troublesome than in most event history analyses or panel studies, for several reasons. Owing to the high profile of heads of state, photographic records are available for almost every leader of every state throughout the observation period. Only eleven leaders of nine countries had missing records, and these often ruled for a very short spell of less than a year, or even a matter of days (the leaders with the briefest tenures, who are not infrequently a temporary placeholder such as an acting president, are also those least likely to be represented in photographic archives). Out of 4899 country-years, 44 (0.9%) have missing values. Because the amount of missing data is so small, no imputation procedures were used.

Attrition. No attrition as such exists in the data, as would be the case when individuals drop out of a clinical study, for instance. The problem in that instance is that

these individuals would go on living and perhaps experience the focal event, but this fact would be unknown to the researcher, and the partial record which he/she would possess for those subjects would not show an event. Although attrition could and did occur in a literal sense in a scant few cases, in a technical sense and for estimation purposes, in this research attrition did not and could not occur. The analog of the clinical scenario above would be a nation that survived but whose leaders successfully enforced a complete ban on photography of themselves, a clearly fantastic prospect.

Three contingencies that could conceivably cause literal attrition offer themselves: aggression and permanent conquest, amalgamation, and fragmentation. Nations cease to exist only rarely today due to the near-total stabilization of frontiers since World War II. Although aggression has been and is still rampant for other objectives, it seldom results in territorial gains, and when it does so temporarily, the world community usually steps in and restores the *status quo ante*, as in Kuwait after Iraqi aggression and East Timor after Indonesian aggression. Permanent annexation did take place when North Vietnam incorporated South Vietnam into a singular state of Vietnam in 1976, but this is not technical attrition because the record for South Vietnam ends at that point, or if one prefers, is still represented in the data set thereafter as Vietnam. Amalgamation was witnessed in the unification of North and South Yemen to form the singular state of Yemen in 1990. This necessitated three cases in the data set, two before and one after 1990. State fragmentation did occur during the observation window in states lying outside the scope of this project, most notably the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. In this data set, when it occurred, as with Singapore/Malaysia, each state had a prior and a posterior existence as an independent

state, rendering this a case of interval censoring for Singapore (see below). Other flirtations with this eventuality were ephemeral, such as Biafra's untoward attempt at secession from Nigeria. A proposed state of Western Sahara may change this picture in the future, but the only classic case of fragmentation in the data set during the observation period of which I am cognizant is Pakistan/Bangladesh, and Bangladesh enters the analysis upon independence as a new state.

Censoring and truncation. The general aspect of the problems of censoring and truncation was discussed in Chapter 5, but here I would like to address these issues as they specifically affect this data set. Full left censoring, in which a case a state appeared and then disappeared from the population before the observation window (which in this study is 1945 to the present) would be a very serious problem. The danger would be that a considerable number of transitions could have occurred before these states even had a chance of being observed, thus in effect underestimating the total number of transitions and the hazard rate. However, these would be defunct states, which are barely represented in the data source for the dependent variable anyway, as this consists almost exclusively of currently extant states. The few defunct states in the data set, such as North Yemen, South Yemen, and South Vietnam, are presumably there for reasons of continuity. Except for North Yemen, all those states represented in the data set that existed before 1945 continued to exist after 1945 and into the observation window, and still exist today.

A less serious problem in event histories is left truncation, concerning the fact that a unit of analysis that is present within the observation window has a history, and perhaps experiences the event of interest, before that window opens. A large majority of states in

the analysis (77%) achieved independence in or after 1945. Of those that were independent before 1945 or continuously, and experienced a transition at all, 9 of 18 (50%) experienced the event within the observation window. Those leaders who appeared in Western dress in 1945 and before were assigned an immediate transition in 1945, as for estimation purposes they cannot have an event before the observation window opens. For example, King Mohammad Zahir Shah of Afghanistan appeared in Western attire during his reign which began in 1933, but he is represented in the data set as a 1945 transition, when he was still ruling that country. This approach leads to a certain loss of information in a small number of cases, but no expectations of bias (Allison 1984). Moreover, one year was added to the period at risk of all observations so as to avoid zero durations (see Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002).

Interval censoring means that a unit of analysis disappears for a time from the data set and then reappears. During the stint that they are missing from the data set, such units are not part of the risk set. This, too, is of little consequence in the project, relating to only a few nations for usually short periods of time, and in any case it is rendered harmless by including separate records in the statistical program for each spell, except for countries whose missing records lasted less than a year, inasmuch as they were at risk for parts of those years. The cases with interval-censored records will be enumerated here. Singapore was independent for less than three weeks before uniting with Malaysia in 1963, only to secede again two years later. East Timor enjoyed just nine days of independence from the Portuguese before being taken over by Indonesia in 1976, and then reestablishing its sovereignty in 2002. Syria is a complicated case of three separate independence dates. It was briefly independent in 1920 before being suppressed

militarily by French forces and subjected to a League of Nations-sponsored French mandate. It reclaimed its independence in 1946 and was so for 12 years before forming the United Arab Republic with Egypt in 1958, breaking away to become Syria once again in 1961. Vietnam was independent for an interregnum between the end of Japanese occupation in 1945 and French reoccupation of its former colony in 1946, and then won its independence back in 1955 after the calamitous defeat at Dien Bien Phu that sealed the fate of France's southeast Asian colonies. Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) is a peculiar case of interval censoring. Under its prime minister Ian Smith, it released a unilateral declaration of independence from Britain in 1965, which was not considered legitimate, but Britain vowed not to use force to make good on its colonial prerogatives, such that Rhodesia was in control of its affairs. This state of limbo persisted until 1979, when the titular British governor-general, supported by the new and more hard-line Thatcher government at home, took the colony in hand as a prelude to holding elections and granting independence, which came permanently in 1980.

The problem posed by interval censoring was easily solved by including these states in the data set as multiple-episode cases, with a record for each period of independence broken by a hiatus which does not appear in the data record, for these states were not at risk then, as per standard practice in event history data organization (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002). This was particularly useful for East Timor, which had a prolonged interim between its two periods of sovereignty, and whose last head of state before the Indonesian incursion had a predilection for non-Western attire, while his successor at some remove decades later adopted Western dress. This may hint at period effects as much as effects of the covariates.

In other cases, independence was once attained and then lost before the observation window opened, as in some of the constituent Soviet republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) plus Mongolia (which both lost its independence and regained it from China early in the twentieth century), also posing no issue of interval censoring. The post-Soviet successor states enter the observation window only after the second round of independence following the unraveling of the Soviet Union, so they each have only one episode in the data set. Mongolia, although under the thumb of the Soviets (some would say willingly so, especially since the Mongolian leadership threw in its lot with the Soviet Union after the split with Maoist China in the late 1950s afforded it an opening to go either way in the rift between its two powerful neighbors), has been continuously independent for a second time since 1921, and not in a token way, as was the case for the various Soviet republics.

The problem of full right censoring is a merely abstract one because the risk period and data source for the dependent variable run up through the present (time of writing). It would concern only countries that are yet to be created, and thus cannot appear in the risk set because they do not now exist. In view of the slow rate at which new countries have proliferated since the main waves of decolonization petered out by about 1975, this abstract problem can be discounted. The problem of right truncation revolves around the fact that all studies have to end at some time, even if that time is the time of writing. Hypothetically, a state that was present within the data set for decades (e.g., Bahrain) and experienced no event could conceivably experience an event one year into the future, and was perhaps imperceptibly drifting in that direction during the observation period. A decrease in the survivor function for that state may hence have

occurred during the observation period without the event that it generates in the non-linear, all-or-nothing character of event histories occurring until a later time. A unit represented as without an event in a study performed in 2009 would in that case be a unit with an event had the study been performed in 2010. Assuming that the timing of the end of the study is not related to the underlying process of interest, this problem is not disturbing to event history analysis because it is known when and why the observations cease for all units (Yamaguchi 1991; Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002).

Non-identifiability. The non-identifiability problem is that of being unable to pair a time unit with a particular state executive. This was extremely unusual, and happened in only a couple of odd situations. In the Sudan, a junta ruled between 1956-1958 and 1964-1965. No single leader emerged during this period of military rule, and though the junta members are identifiable personally, they leave no trace in the photographic record, not being 'normal' heads of state. The junta has not been a prevalent form of rule in Africa and Asia, the foci of this project, or outside Latin America, for that matter. Such periods are coded as missing data in the analysis. Another situation producing non-identifiability was disputed sovereignty in Somalia, where rival warlords vied for control in a failed state throughout the 1990s. In this case, nominal supremacy and international recognition sufficed to establish a fairly unbroken, if weak, line of governmental succession, and the transition to Western dress took place long before that time.

Non-parametric Analysis

As a first approach to the data, I will examine the temporal and spatial patterning of the phenomenon through descriptive statistics, maps, graphs, and other univariate

analyses. Ninety-two countries, or 88% of the data set (n = 104) experienced some form of transition at some point, whether to Western-type military uniforms or Western civilian attire. Only 12 did not. This gives some insight into the ubiquity of the phenomenon. Among another set of 12 countries whose transition first came in the form of Western military gear (recalling that alternative codings for these uniforms will be employed in the models to follow), 10 experienced both types of transitions, because a later ruler dressed in Western civilian attire. The two countries whose rulers did not go beyond military uniforms in their experimentation with Western clothing were Nigeria and Guinea (see Chapter 2 for an extended discussion of Nigeria as a deviant case). Also, 12 countries' leaders combined Western and indigenous garments (a different group of 12, although a small amount of overlap exists between countries led by a Western-clad militarist and those which later featured a leader in a hybrid style, with an indigenous head covering balancing against Western wear on the body). If the hybrids are subtracted out and categorized as indigenously attired, because they wore *some* items of indigenous clothes rather than being completely Westernized in appearance, this leaves 77% of the countries with at least one head of state who went Western. And if the further two countries whose leaders only went so far as to wear Western-style military uniforms, but never to accept Western civilian clothing, are considered to have not departed from indigenous attire at all, a still healthy 75% unquestionably converted to Western dress, even by this most conservative standard for a Western dress coding.

As one compares the 12 countries without an event at all, and those 12 with a hybridly dressed leader, a striking pattern emerges. Of the first group, again comprising under 12% of the population, eight are significant oil-exporting countries, such as

Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This may lend anecdotal support to the proposition that oil wealth may insulate elites against the need for cultural Westernization as it does seem to insulate against the need for economic modernization. Such states often maintain unbalanced economies devoted to oil exploration and production, but little else in the way of industrial development or advanced service sectors. And three of the four other states with no event are neighbors — India, one of our model deviant cases, along with Bhutan and Sri Lanka. This may hint either at a spatial effect or historical linkages between India and its ring of small satellites today such as Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. The final state of the four with no event and no oil reserves is Swaziland. Its small size probably compounds its political and economic marginality, and its anachronistic tethering to absolute monarchy as a form of rule, so that it may not matter one way or the other how its kings dress, having little impact in the world or even adjoining states and being influenced almost as little. By contrast, looking at the roster of states with hybridly dressed leaders, not a single petrostate is to be found there. Nor do they seem to have other commonalities, dispersed widely geographically and in terms of social structure, from Djibouti and Indonesia to the Comoros and Morocco. It is tempting to speculate that, denied the boons of oil wealth, leaders of these states did not feel as immune to world-level pressures as the petrostates and therefore chose to mediate between two worlds in their dress.

A histogram displaying the intertemporal pattern of adoption (Figure 12) shows normality with a few spikes. The year with the second-highest number of adoptions (1991) is fairly anomalous, reflecting the entry of the ex-Soviet republics into the data set in that year. Although the central Asian republics especially had rich folk dress that the

Figure 12: Frequency of Western Dress Adoption by Year



leaders of these newly independent states might have adopted, the identity of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and others had been suppressed by Soviet power for so long, and the hour was so late anyway, that one must judge the odds that they would go native as slim. It was not out of the realm of possibility to do what a number of leaders in Africa did by sporting indigenous attire as their countries entered the family of nations, but the circulation of elites in the Soviet Union had less to do with geography or ethnicity than Communist fealty and long service as an *apparatchik*, and it was from these elites that most of the leaders of the new countries were drawn. To be sure, many African leaders were also prone to make their debut on the international stage in Western attire, but some did not, and although most countries experienced a transition, as noted above, it was often years or decades before that took place. The immediacy and unanimity of the responses by the political patriarchs of the ex-Soviet successor states points to the contingent factor of their common past, and possibly to period influences as well.

Proceeding to the spatial pattern of adoption, the following maps exhibit the geography of adoption by decade after 1945, until the adoption curve tapers off after about 1985. The countries with leaders adopting Western dress are shaded in gray. Due to the size and decentered shape of the Asian landmass, different parts of Asia must be displayed in separate panels. In the continents or regions thereof where no transition occurred in a decade, these panels are of course omitted.

Although most of the foregoing maps do not offer strong or consistent evidence of a spatial-temporal effect, a few panels seem to do so. A belt of countries in southwestern Asia from Turkey through Afghanistan experienced transitions within a few years of each other, before the observation window opened in 1945. In the next decade, several

transitions in the adjacent Levant (Israel, Syria, and Jordan) augmented that pattern. Two distinct clusters emerged in the decade 1945-1954. One was situated on the East China Sea, consisting of the two Koreas, Japan, and Taiwan. Another in southeastern Asia comprised Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The next decade (1955-1964) witnessed an explosion of decolonization and a large number of events. Most of the countries whose leaders adopted Western dress in that decade form part of a continuous forked band of countries extending from the horn of eastern Africa to Morocco and the Ivory Coast as terminii. Again, the dissolution of the Soviet Union produced a large uptick in the number of transitions located in central Asia in 1991, likely a spurious late spike. Apart from these countries, the panels representing 1985 and after are sparsely populated with transitions.

The hazard function (Figure 13) gives an idea of changes in the risk or likelihood of a transition to Western dress over time. This is a better indicator for causal analysis than the frequency counts of the histogram in Figure 12, however useful these are for descriptive purposes. If all units of observation were to have exactly the same starting and ending times, and thus an observation window of common length, the picture presented by the hazard would be very similar to the curve fitted to the histogram. But this is seldom the case, and it is certainly not so here. The hazard function describes the situation of risk for an event at each instantaneous time point, given that the unit has not experienced the event before that point. The kernel-smoothed hazard here is a downward-sloping curve, rising to a peak shortly after the beginning of the analysis period, and then falling as a function of analysis time but not monotonically so; a second slight ‘bump’ upward in the hazard occurs after 1960 before it takes a downward path.

Figure 13


Smoothed hazard estimate
.025
.02
.015
.01
.005
0
10
20
30
40
50
analysis time

However, a second analysis (hereafter the alternative analysis) in which Western military uniforms were coded '0' (meaning that only Western civilian attire qualifies as a genuine transition, since most militarists in power will more probably conform to rationalized clothing than dress as a tribal war chief, for example) unveiled a differently shaped hazard function (Figure 14). Note the lift in the second peak of the hazard relative to that in the first graph, as well as the rebound of the hazard toward the end of the interval.

The cumulative hazard for the main analysis (that in which transitions to Western-style military uniforms are coded as '1') is roughly linear, with no clear inflection point and no sigmoid shape, increasing at a decreasing rate (Figure 15). Although only mildly indicative, recalling my adumbration of the expectations for this curve generated by various theories in Figure 11, the shape of the curve and the fact that it has no inflection point gives some support to world-culture theory as an explanation of the phenomenon. This is corroborated by the alternative analysis, which revealed no material change in the cumulative hazard (not shown). If anything, the cumulative hazard is even more linear under this condition.

Graphs of the hazard and survivor functions were requested separately for the two binary-qualitative covariates (British/French colonial status, and socialist state) and the two continents. The graphs of the survivor function present an almost obverse picture of the hazard graphs to follow, as they are essentially opposite ways of describing the same relationship. Survival functions exhibit the proportions of the population still at risk (p) versus those that have experienced an event (1-p) at each time interval. The survivor functions are summarized in the text, but not shown as graphs.

Figure 14



Figure 15



The graph of the hazard function for the effect of colonial status (Figure 16) shows the hazard for former British and French colonies running fairly consistently higher than that for other colonial regimes, bouncing in a range at a high absolute level. The line for the other regimes declines at a moderate gradient, asymptotically approaching zero by the end of the observation period. The higher hazard rate for erstwhile British and French colonies (denoting a greater likelihood of a transition to Western dress) is in line with my theoretical prognostication. The divergence after 1975 is certainly a consequence of the late independence of the Portuguese colonies. This is an artifact of low survival rates in the population of countries (a high cumulative number of transitions) in the last couple decades of observation. The hazard function for the alternative analysis (Figure 17) dramatically differs from that of the main analysis. Instead of staying higher than the curve for non-British or -French colonies as in the main analysis, the curve for British and French colonies becomes parabolic and crosses the weakly declining curve for other colonies twice, before 1960 on the upswing and after 1980 on the downturn.

The Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for British/French colonial status in the main analysis yield a lower-positioned graph after 1975; before then, the two functions are nearly coincident, which is to say that a country's status as an erstwhile British or French colony does not warrant its segmentation within the population, although that does not in itself imply that the causal impact of the variable is low. The survival function from the alternative analysis is similar in shape and placement to that of the main analysis, but the point of greatest spacing between the two curves shifts from late to early in the observation period. A variety of tests with different routines for equality of

Figure 16



Figure 17



survivor functions was applied to the data; none produced significant differences on this variable.

The story is otherwise for a country's status as a socialist state, which presented an astonishing picture. The hazard functions for socialist versus non-socialist countries begin at nearly the same point on the axis before diverging markedly a few years into the observation period (Figure 18). Non-socialist states have a declining hazard with a low slope, while the hazard for socialist states inclines steeply to a high peak before experiencing an equally steep decline. This was a result that defied theory, with rulers of socialist states actually being less inclined to resist the Western suit, and substitute a quasi-militarist uniform, or, especially in parts of Africa, retain indigenous clothing. Only a few outliers were in evidence, as when the delay in the transition was due to a long-tenured leader in a state who was animated by socialist principles, such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, whose egress from power led to both an abandonment of socialism and an adoption of Western dress by his replacement; in other places, such as Mali, a succession of rulers with socialist leanings persistently dressed in indigenous styles for decades. The hazard function for the alternative analysis (Figure 19) shows two wavy lines far apart except at the very beginning of the observation period, with the hazard for socialist states increasing at a tangent to the line for other states, which manifested a smooth decline. This may be the most stark visual demonstration of the heterogeneity involved in the political economy of states as it relates to garment choices.

In the main analysis, the two survivor curves are very divergent. The curve for socialist states declines more briskly than that for non-socialist states. The log-rank test confirmed what had been anticipated visually, a significant result at $p = .03$. In the

Figure 18



Figure 19



alternative analysis, the same basic pattern presents itself, but two points are worthy of mention. First, the lines for socialist and non-socialist countries no longer cross, giving a more unambiguous shading to the difference between the two sets of countries across the entire observation period. Second, the curve for socialist countries flattens out appreciably toward the exit time. This makes sense as a visual representation in the specific phenomenon of Western dress adoption of the more general convergence in political and economic systems (also read as more pervasive globalization) in the post-Cold War world of the last two decades. All tests for equality were significant at the .05 level, ranging from $p = 0.017$ on the log-rank test to $p = 0.046$ on the Wilcoxon test.

To observe the partials by continent, the hazard and survivor functions for African and Asian countries were reviewed. The hazard for African countries starts slightly above that for Asian countries (see Figure 20), though both lines are at a high absolute level, but after 1955 the rising hazard for Africa departs from a declining hazard for Asia. In other words, countries in Asia demonstrated an early propensity for transitions comparable to that for Africa, but thereafter settled into a downward trend. In the alternative analysis, the hazard functions for Africa and Asia are similarly shaped and run obliquely to each other, with the curve for Africa remaining high and of nearly flat slope, while the curve for Asia exhibits an almost secular downward trend (Figure 21). This suggests that the proclivity of African leaders to adopt Western dress was relatively time-invariant. It also indicates possible heterogeneity within the group of Asian countries themselves, with early transitions in the Pacific rim 'Asian tiger' states and in the more secular Semitic states in the Near East being motivated differently than later recalcitrants, especially among the petrostate holdouts.

Figure 20



Figure 21



The Kaplan-Meier function for Africa slightly crosses that for Asia around 1960 before diverging and sloping more steeply downward. The function stays moderately high for Asian countries after about the middle of the observation period due to the declining transition rate for other countries observed in the population as a whole and manifested in the declining hazard, and to the resolute stand against Western dress by the rulers of petrostates, which are almost all located in Asia. In the alternative analysis, the lines for African and Asian countries still cross but are more parallel, whereas the lines had tended to diverge across the observation period in the main analysis. Surprisingly, none of the tests for equality cleared significance, and thus continent is not a bona fide stratifying factor in the population.

Parametric Models

An array of six standard models, differing in the functional form of time dependence that each imposes of the data (and in the number of parameters in the estimating equations), was probed for a best fit. A cursory description of the distributional characteristics of these models is in order. The exponential model is the simplest model with the fewest parameters, and assumes a constant hazard. It is often set as a baseline model. The Gompertz and Weibull models each incorporate one additional parameter relative to the exponential model, and assume a hazard changing continuously with time. The difference between them is that the Weibull model posits a hazard that changes as a logarithmic function of time, whereas the Gompertz model is first-order, changing as a linear function of time. Both mandate a monotonic hazard function, brooking no reversal of direction. The log-normal and log-logistic models relax the

strictures of the aforementioned models, enabling the hazard to warp from an increasing segment to a decreasing segment, for instance. These two models are similar but differ primarily in how they handle censoring. They trade simplicity for flexibility, and are appropriate when the pattern of time dependence is itself complex. They also have one more parameter than the exponential model. The most generalized model is the gamma model, which has two more parameters than the basic exponential model. Because of its greater number of parameters than the other models, it will be superfluous and costly if the pattern of time dependence can be modeled more simply with one of the other modeling options, as it will consume degrees of freedom.

Each of the models was fit to the data in turn, including two variants of the Weibull model (a proportional hazards version and an accelerated failure time version), for a total of seven models. (Besides the exponential model, whose hazards are proportional by definition, the Weibull is the only one that straddles these two classes of models.) Comparisons of model fit were made via log likelihood ratio test statistics, and tests for significant differences between the models, which follow a chi-square distribution, were performed. Log likelihood statistics indicate model fit through maximization of the likelihood that the event times observed were in fact generated by the postulated distribution; lower values of the statistic designate better fit. The log likelihood statistics, and thus model fit, from the two versions of the Weibull model are exactly the same, but coefficient estimates can vary, if usually only to a small degree.

The best-fitting model in the main analysis was the log-normal model. However, three other models — the Gompertz, Weibull, and log-logistic — were not significantly different from the log-normal in terms of fit; the exponential and gamma models were

definitively ruled out. So, examining the output of these four models, one finds that the coefficients for the world-system position index variable, country size, and British/French colonial status were non-significant in each of the models. The variable for socialist state was significant in the Gompertz and Weibull models at p = .03 and p = .02, respectively. This variable was marginally non-significant in both the log-normal and log-logistic models at p = .07. (See Table 1 for the output of the log-normal model.) The positive sign of this coefficient reiterates the implications of the hazard functions to the effect that, contrary to expectations, socialist states were associated with a much greater likelihood of a transition to Western dress than non-socialist states. For example, in the Weibull and Gompertz models, both of which use a proportional hazards metric, the hazard ratios for the two models are each over 3, with the Gompertz model yielding a chance of transition to Western dress 205% greater for socialist states than for others, and the Weibull estimating the chance as 230% greater. Looked at another way, through the prism of survival times estimated by the accelerated failure time models, the survival time for socialist states (equating to a resistance to Western dress) was between 17% and 20% as long for socialist states. In addition, the best-fitting log-normal model was estimated with the raw continuous value for world-system position (imports plus exports, but this time not logged or multiplied by the ordinal world-system position indicator) substituted in for the world-system index. This did not change the results much, and made for a marginally worse fit of the model compared to the original estimation.

The non-significance of three of the variables contributed to a low generalized R^2, which for the log-normal model was 0.037. R^2 values in cross-national research with large data sets are infamously low, since hundreds of variables are operating within and on large

Table 1: Estimates for Log-Normal Model, Main Analysis

Log-normal regression -- accelerated failure-time form

No. of subjects =	33	Number of obs =	36
No. of failures =	21		
Time at risk =	909		
		LR chi2(4) =	3.89
Log likelihood =	-53.223888	Prob > chi2 =	0.4214

t	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wsindex	-.055701	.1057979	-0.53	0.599	-.2630611	.1516592
size	.0019065	.0016608	1.15	0.251	-.0013485	.0051616
britfren	-.171523	.7738012	-0.22	0.825	-1.688146	1.3451
socstate	-1.612554	.8925293	-1.81	0.071	-3.36188	.1367711
cons	3.598264	.6569446	5.48	0.000	2.310677	4.885852
/ln sig	.6650867	.1676637	3.97	0.000	.3364719	.9937015
sigma	1.944659	.3260488			1.399999	2.701215

units like countries at once. By contrast, social-psychological laboratory experiments using individuals as units of analysis, and possessing experimental control over variables, can have R^2 values of 0.7 or 0.8, while a value of 0.15 to 0.2 in cross-national research can be satisfactory. Even with that in mind, however, the amount of variance explained by this particular model is low, compelling a search for more adequate variables in future research on this question.

For the alternative analysis, the best-fitting model is the gamma model, although all of the models were close enough to each other in fit to preclude ruling any out. The output from the gamma model is found in Table 2. The socialist state variable was significant in all models at the .05 level, and significant at the .01 level in the Weibull model, and it was the only variable that was significant in any of the models. In terms of hazard ratios, socialist states were between approximately 3.5 times (for the Gompertz model) and 4.5 times (for the exponential model) more likely than non-socialist states to have leaders who adopted Western dress. In terms of survival times, socialist states were at risk between 14% and 16% as long as non-socialist states before a transition occurred. The generalized R^2 improves by 46% over that from the best-fitting model in the main analysis, at 0.054, but this is still quite low.

Considering all of the evidence adduced in this chapter, it is apparent that world-system theory fails as an explanation of the cultural dynamic addressed in this project, the tendency of non-Western leaders to adopt Western dress. With the proviso of low explanatory power, the maps, hazard functions, and models point to a zone of overlap featuring a mixture of spatial and world-culture effects on the phenomenon. The fact that the log-normal and gamma models, each of which is used to model complex phenomena

Table 2: Estimates for Gamma Model, Alternative Analysis

Gamma regression -- accelerated failure-time form

No. of subjects =	36	Number of obs =	39
No. of failures =	22		
Time at risk =	1090		
		LR chi2(4) =	5.73
Log likelihood =	-54.074609	Prob > chi2 =	0.2201

t	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wsindex	.0089665	.0936983	0.10	0.924	-.1746789	.1926119
size	.0015716	.001572	1.00	0.317	-.0015096	.0046527
britfren	.7479092	.7361354	1.02	0.310	-.6948897	2.190708
socstate	-1.961611	.8444536	-2.32	0.020	-3.616709	-.3065121
cons	3.589657	.8412246	4.27	0.000	1.940887	5.238427
/ln_sig	.5033566	.3235001	1.56	0.120	-.1306918	1.137405
/kappa	.3419212	1.022337	0.33	0.738	-1.661823	2.345666
sigma	1.654265	.5351547			.8774882	3.118665

that are not amenable to simpler modeling strategies, were best fits goes far to explain the low R^2. All else being equal, the amount of variance explained by a parsimonious four-variable model in a situation of great empirical complexity will be less for a gamma or log-normal model than for an exponential or Gompertz model in the case of a less complex phenomenon. It also intimates mixed effects, rather than a crisp adjudication. The key in continuing investigation of this topic is to theoretically search for better variables with more causal impact, and a model with more than four variables will probably be needed in respect of the complexity of the problem.

Before leaving this chapter, the results of a final analysis specifically pegged to world-culture theory must be detailed. As stated in Chapter 5, world-cultural influences are very difficult to measure empirically. But I performed a simple bivariate analysis in which time-series regression was used to detect longitudinal correspondence between the proxy measure of world culture referred to in Chapter 5, the level of INGO membership, and the adoption distribution found in this project. Time-series analysis is a form of regression that adjusts for autocorrelation, or the probability that measures in successive time periods are not independent. Simply put, the best predictor of a value on a variable this year will often be the value from last year, next year's value will be predicted by this year's, and so forth. The danger inherent in this is that regression estimates require the assumption of independent observations; otherwise they will yield false positives in which the effects of serial correlation over time are mistaken for effects of the independent variables. With proper allowance for such autocorrelation, the growth in INGOs should parallel the adoption curve as far as timing and magnitude of increase are concerned. Graphically, a positive relationship would be conjured by two graphs in

which the lines representing INGO foundings and transitions to Western dress are parallel, moving up or down together. An inverse relationship between the two variables would be noticed in a concave appearance produced by the line for one variable increasing while the other one decreases, or vice versa. No relationship between the variables would manifest itself in each line going its own way.

After diagnostic checks of the data, which is important as a preliminary stage in time-series analysis for fitting a proper model, an autoregressive model was estimated using Prais-Winsten regression of the number of INGO foundings by year as the indicator variable on the number of transitions to Western dress by year. The time series was begun at 1945 (when the observation window for this research begins) and terminated at 1999 because of a time lag in the source for the INGO founding data, which came from the Yearbook of International Organizations. The time lag resulted in low and underestimated counts for recent years. That being said, the time-series model did not yield a significant effect of INGOs as an indicator variable. It probably points to the dearth of good indicators of world culture, as has been lamented by world-culture theorists and as was reported in Chapter 5. However, even this makeshift measure did fare nearly as poorly as the world-system variable in the main models.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

Although the results of the quantitative data analysis in the preceding chapter are not conclusive, they do shed light on some factors in the adoption of Western dress by non-Western heads of state, and they further point the way to more targeted investigations of this and related cultural topics. Taking inventory of the variables employed in the analysis, it was found that they ran the gamut from expected effects to no apparent effects and theoretically confounding effects.

The world-system position variable was the worst-performing variable in the estimations, and did not approach statistical significance in any of the models for either the main or alternative analysis. Higher values on the world-system position index, reflecting membership in or proximity to the core, were in no way linked to a greater likelihood of transitions to Western dress. This study was originally designed as a crisp test of world-system theory for a cultural topic, with a spatial control. The intent was to be able to judge the empirical validity of world-system theory for a cultural topic, based on the recent extensions of the theory into the cultural arena by world-system scholars. To that extent, the present value of my research lies chiefly in a discounting of world-system effects, at least for this and possibly other cultural topics. The value of negative findings is often underrated, and positive (read significant) effects are often fetishized. Pierre Bourdieu has lambasted this tendency in contemporary social science, criticizing the "pseudo-refinements of statistical analysis — e.g., path analysis," and arguing that the sociologist must inquire into a relationship between a given indicator and a given practice and "scrutinize its sociological significance rather that its statistical 'significantness'" (Bourdieu [1979] 1984: 22). But we learn as much about the world when a theory fails as

when it succeeds. It must be remembered that statistical significance on the one hand and meaningfulness on the other hand are not synonyms. However, alternative measures of world-system position such as trade dependence and levels of foreign investment may yet yield significant effects in future research. They have certainly been well-utilized by scholars in explaining more directly economic and political problems such as dependency relations and political instability. It remains to be seen whether symbolic realities are so affected by these causal forces.

For a second variable, that of country size, theory inclined in opposite directions as to its likely effect (see Chapter 5). Finding both sets of arguments compelling, I remained open to either possibility in the testing of effects — either small or large population size increasing the likelihood of a transition. As it happened, no effect of size in either direction was in evidence. It is conceivable that some effect is present, perhaps in the form of a curvilinear or non-linear effect of size whereby sizes that are sufficiently large or small may increase the hazard, but either cancel each other out or are washed out by small effects in the bulking middle of nations that are neither very large nor very small. In further research, appropriate cut points sequestering nations that are at least a standard deviation or more away from the mean in size may illuminate whether such non-linear effects of size were hidden in the analysis here with its linear treatment of population size.

The variable of British/French colonial status had effects in the expected direction, though not statistically significant. It was expected that the qualitatively different colonial regime constructed by Anglo-French practices of colonization would translate into a greater proclivity of indigenous elites to accept Western ways, including

Western dress. Coercion into Western practices, or alternatively, exclusion from them, were much more common in the colonies of other powers. The Belgian, Dutch, and German colonies especially showed no inclination to civilize the natives; their colonies were oriented much more single-mindedly toward economic extraction, the exploitation of mineral and agricultural resources, and seizing prime locations within a global war of position militarily (literally and figuratively). The divergence between the hazard functions of the two sets of countries (the Anglo-French powers, and all others) is visually impressive and an unmistakable qualitative difference, but perhaps not statistically significant for want of statistical power.

The fourth variable, status as a socialist state, showed effects opposite to those expected by theory. Theory seemed to suggest that socialist leaders would take pains to culturally and symbolically dissociate themselves from their Western counterparts, but the results were contrary. This is an intriguing and puzzling finding. The effects of the socialist state variable were strongly negative in all models across both the main and alternative analysis, statistically significant in most, and only marginally non-significant (though significant at the .10 level) in a couple. At the very least, this casts doubt on the historical concept of the Second World, according to which a cultural as well as an economic, political, and military divide was held to exist during the Cold War world from 1945 to about 1990. I hesitate to speculate, but something similar to the Japanese modernization experience may have been at work in the cultural convergence of socialist states toward Western dress styles. The Japanese were among the first to modernize their state and Westernize their appearance in an attempt to catch up with the West in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They sought to deduce a lesson from the fate of

China, which was partitioned into spheres of influence by various Western powers, and which, incidentally, adhered to traditional dress much longer, although surely few Japanese at the time made that precise connection.

The question as to what made socialist rulers more rather than less likely to adopt Western dress cannot be answered in this context and requires further inquiry, but one potential motivating factor is this sense of needing to excel the West everywhere the West had a structural advantage or a head start. Such ruminations almost suggest a functional, instrumental quality to clothing, but it may be just that no distinctions were made across areas of social life, from Sputnik to lapels. This kind of synoptic approach was true of Turkey in its developmental trajectory, for instance. The largest socialist state in the twentieth century, the Soviet Union, had undergone several modernization campaigns and cultural Westernization efforts reaching back into the days of Tsarist Russia and originating with the head of state from Peter the Great to Vladimir Lenin and his New Economic Policy of the 1920s. Postwar Soviet leaders were as Western as their European and American counterparts in their dress, and they served as a beacon for socialist leaders worldwide. It is not far-fetched to imagine that Antonio Agostinho Neto of Angola, for example, whose country was the recipient of much economic and military aid from the Soviets and other socialist countries like Cuba, would converge to the Soviet way of dressing, which had already been Westernized. Although not a colonial relationship, such a tie may have an impact similar to that of the British and French colonizers of old, in that many natives were sympathetic to the ways of their powerful patron abroad, and sought to become more modern by emulating it. Clearly, the robust

character of the socialist state variable in all of the models beckons additional investigation.

Finally, general directions for subsequent research will be set forth. An entirely new path is marked off by the possibility of incorporating individual-level variables into the analysis strategy. This might entail staggeringly intensive scrutiny of the biographies of many hundreds of individual leaders, including such matters as whether they had visited Western countries or lived in them, whether they had been educated in their home country but in schools administered by Westerners (the many mission schools come to mind), whether they are fluent in Western languages, among others. It could be that a combination of country-level and individual-level variables is most appropriate to study the cultural practices of individuals who personify countries.

Also, specifications for various effects of time might be implemented in future analyses. As noted in various places throughout the text, this study occasionally found allusions to period effects. Variables such as the date of independence for particular countries and the duration of independence could be inserted into models as a collection of cohort dummy variables, and a continuous variable, respectively. (The time of independence was included in the event history models of this project, but only as the origin of the risk period, not as a variable in its own right.) The length of time that the nation was colonized may also be relevant.

A more elaborate specification of spatial effects is sorely needed as well. A spatial specification that can model the effects of time, space, and count data simultaneously would be useful. One way of doing this would be to build a spatial-effects parameter that takes in the effect of count data through the time order of

transitions to Western dress, space through the geographical proximity or remoteness of prior transitions, and time through the primacy or recency of prior transitions. The reasoning behind such a procedure consists in the fact that one would predict that the wave-like function of space, diminishing in intensity as distance from the origin of causal force increases and so well demonstrated by geographers, would be paralleled by a wave-like function of time, diminishing with the amount of time elapsed since the causal factor appeared. This is particularly warranted by the comparative neglect of temporal models of innovation diffusion (Sharif and Ramanathan 1984).

In sum, the research presented herein has produced a conclusive defeat of world-system theory for a cultural topic, has offered limited and partial evidence in support of world-cultural and spatial effects on the phenomenon of interest, and has suggested additional avenues to explain the many unexplained facets of the problem. The choices that people make with regard to what they will wear are among the more inscrutable choices from a phenomenological standpoint. Unlike purchasing behavior or other areas where economic rationality engenders a high degree of predictability and uniformity of behavior, studies that interrogate the pervasiveness of Western dress may well have to be content with more uniformity than predictability, while always seeking better models for behaviors that are hostile to modeling. The statistician D. R. Cox once pointedly stated, "All models are wrong; some are useful." In that vein, this research has helped to lay the groundwork for more useful models of the elusive question of why leaders, and people generally, dress as they do.

Appendix A: List of Transitions to Western Dress Represented in the Data Set[1]

Country	Year of Transition	Head of State
Afghanistan	1933	King Mohammad Zahir Shah
Algeria	1962	Abdurrahman Farès
Angola	1975	Antonio Agostinho Neto
Armenia	1991	Levon Ter-Petrosian
Azerbaijan	1991	Ayaz Niyazi oglu Mutalibov
Bangladesh	1972	Abu Sayid Chowdhury
Benin (Dahomey)	1960	Hubert Maga
Botswana	1966	Seretse Khama
Burkina Faso	1960	Maurice Yaméogo
Burundi	1962	King Mwambutsa IV
	1966	King Ntare V
Cambodia	1953	King Norodom Sihanouk
Cameroon	1982	Paul Biya
Cape Verde	1975	Aristides Maria Pereira
Central African Republic	1960	David Dacko
Chad	1960	N'Garta Tombalbaye
China	1978	Ye Jianying
	1997	Jiang Zemin
Comoros	1975	Ahmed Abdullah Abderemane
Congo	1960	Fulbert Youlou
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire)	1960	Joseph Kasuvubu
Djibouti	1977	Hassan Gouled Aptidon
East Timor	2002	Xanana Gusmao
Egypt	1936	King Faruk I
Equatorial Guinea	1968	Francisco Macías Nguema
Eritrea	1993	Issayas Afeworki
Ethiopia	1941	Emperor Haile Selassie I
Fiji	1987	Sitiveni Rabuka
	1987	Penaia Kanatabatu Ganilau
Gabon	1960	Gabriel Léon M'Ba
Gambia	1970	Dawda Kairaba Jawara
Georgia	1991	Zviad Gamsakhurdia
Ghana	1966	Joseph Arthur Ankrah
	1970	Edward Akufo-Addo
Guinea-Bissau	1974	Luis de Almeida Cabral
Guinea	2008	Moussa Dadis Camara
Indonesia	1949	Sukarno
	1998	Bacharuddin Yusef Habibie

[1]Note: Countries with a first transition to a Western-style military uniform in the main analysis had a second transition to Western civilian wear in the alternative analysis. Both transitions are listed here. For Guinea and Nigeria, only one transition is listed, to a Western military uniform. For all other states with a single transition, the transition is to Western civilian attire.

Appendix A (cont.)

Country	Year of Transition	Head of State
Iran	1941	Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
Iraq	1939	King Faysal II
Israel	1948	David Ben-Gurion
Ivory Coast	1960	Félix Houphouët-Boigny
Japan	1945	Kantaro Suzuki
Jordan	1951	Talal ibn Abdullah al-Hashimi
Kazakhstan	1991	Nursultan Nazarbayev
Kenya	1964	Jomo Kenyatta
Kyrgyzstan	1991	Askar Akayev
Laos	1959	Savang Vatthana
	1975	Prince Thao Souphanouvong
Lebanon	1943	Bechara Khalil El-Khoury
Lesotho	1966	King Moshoeshoe II
Liberia	1944	William V. S. Tubman
Madagascar	1960	Philibert Tsiranana
Malawi	1966	Hastings Kamuzu Banda
Malaysia	1959	Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein
Maldives	1965	Ali Mohamed Farid Didi
Mali	1992	Alpha Oumar Konaré
Mauritania	1984	Maaouya Ould Ahmed Taya
Mauritius	1992	Veerasamy Ringadoo
Mongolia	1954	Jamsrangiyn Sambuu
Morocco	1956	Sultan Mohammed V
Mozambique	1975	Samora Moisés Machel
Myanmar	1962	Ne Win
Namibia	1990	Samuel Nujoma
Nepal	1950	King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva
Niger	1960	Hamani Diori
Nigeria	1966	Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi
North Korea	1948	Kim Il Sung
Pakistan	1956	Iskander Ali Mirza
Philippines	1946	Manuel Roxas y Acuna
Rwanda	1962	Grégoire Kayibanda
Sao Tomé and Principe	1975	Manuel Pinto da Costa
Senegal	1960	Léopold Sédar Senghor
Seychelles	1976	James Richard Mancham
Sierra Leone	1971	Siaka Probyn Stevens
Singapore	1963	Lee Kwan Yen
Somalia	1960	Aden Abdullah Osman Daar
South Africa	1961	Charles Roberts Swart
South Korea	1948	Syngman Rhee
South Vietnam	1955	Ngô Dinh Diêm

Appendix A (cont.)

Country	Year of Transition	Head of State
South Yemen	1969	Salim Rubay Ali
Sudan	1956	Commission of Sovereignty
Syria	1946	Shukri al-Quwwatli
Taiwan	1949	Li Tsong-Jen
	1975	Yen Chia-Kan
Tajikistan	1991	Rakhmon Nabiyev
Tanzania	1985	Ali Hassan Mwinyi
Thailand	1944	Khuang Aphaiwong
	1945	Tawee Boonyaket
Togo	1963	Emmanuel Bodjollé
Tunisia	1957	Habib Ali Bourguiba
Turkey	1923	Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
Turkmenistan	1991	Saparmurat Niyazov
Uganda	1963	Edward Mutebi Mutesa II
	1966	Milton Obote
Uzbekistan	1991	Islam Abdugani Yeukh Karimov
Vietnam	1945	Hô Chi Minh
Yemen	1990	Ali Abdullah Saleh al-Hashidi
Zambia	1964	Kenneth Kaunda
Zimbabwe	1965	Ian Smith

Appendix B: Countries Coded as Socialist Represented in the Data Set

Country	Period
Afghanistan	1978-1992
Algeria	1962-1965, 1992
Angola	1975-present
Benin (Dahomey)	1974-1990
Burkina Faso	1983-1987
Cambodia	1975-1992
Central African Republic	1960-1966
China	1949-present
Congo	1963-1991
Egypt	1961-2007
Ethiopia	1974-1991
Ghana	1960-1966
Guinea	1958-1984
Iraq	1963-2003
Laos	1975-present
Libya	1969-present
Madagascar	1975-1993
Mali	1960-1992
Mongolia	1924-1996
Mozambique	1975-1989
Myanmar	1962-present
Nepal	2008-present
North Korea	1948-present
Sao Tomé and Principe	1975-1990
Senegal	1960-1980
Seychelles	1977-1993
Somalia	1976-1978
South Yemen	1969-1990
Sri Lanka	1972-1978
Sudan	1969-1985
Syria	1963-present
Tanzania	1964-1985
Tunisia	1956-1987
Turkmenistan	1991-present
Vietnam	1945-1946, 1955-present
Zambia	1964-1991
Zimbabwe	1987-1991

Appendix C: Maps of Transitions to Western Dress by Period

Adoptions of Western Dress Prior to 1945

Adoptions of Western Dress, 1955-64

Adoptions of Western Dress, 1965-74

Adoptions of Western Dress, 1975-84

Adoptions of Western Dress, 1985 and after

Adoptions of Western Dress Prior to 1945

Adoptions of Western Dress, 1965-74



Adoptions of Western Dress, 1975-84



Adoptions of Western Dress, 1985 and after

Adoptions of Western Dress, 1985 and after



Adoptions of Western Dress Prior to 1945

Adoptions of Western Dress, 1945-54

Adoptions of Western Dress, 1945-54

Adoptions of Western Dress, 1945-54



Adoptions of Western Dress, 1945-54

Adoptions of Western Dress, 1955-64

Adoptions of Western Dress, 1955-64



Adoptions of Western Dress, 1955-64



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