Distribution Agreement

In presenting this thesis as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for a degree from Emory University, I hereby grant to Emory University and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive, make accessible, and display my thesis in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter now, including display on the World Wide Web. I understand that I may select some access restrictions as part of the online submission of this thesis. I retain all ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis.

Thomas Hugh McGlade April 11, 2017

Feeding Other Hungers: How a U.S.-Brazilian Food Program Reveals the Complexities of Development Economics, 1941-1945

by

Hugh McGlade

Thomas D. Rogers

Adviser

Department of History

Thomas D. Rogers

Adviser

Jeffrey Lesser

Committee Member

Ana C. Teixeira

Committee Member

2017

Feeding Other Hungers: How a U.S.-Brazilian Food Program Reveals the Complexities of Development Economics, 1941-1945

By

Hugh McGlade

Thomas D. Rogers

Adviser

An abstract of
a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Emory College of Arts and Sciences
of Emory University in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the degree of
Bachelor of Arts with Honors

Department of History

2017

Abstract

Feeding Other Hungers: How a U.S.-Brazilian Food Program Reveals the Complexities of Development Economics, 1941-1945

By Hugh McGlade

This thesis examines the Food Supply Division (FSD), a hunger alleviation program operated by the governments of Brazil and the United States between 1942 and 1945. As World War II escalated, the U.S. government needed rubber from the Brazilian Amazon for wartime supplies. The FSD aimed to nourish rubber workers so that they could continue to labor. This thesis argues that the FSD was a development organization with political and economic aims beyond rubber production. Using Brazilian and U.S. government correspondence, it contends that the urban, elite founders of the program understood the rural Brazilian agricultural poor as culturally inferior. The architects of the FSD used a language of truth (of science and capitalism) to create a universal definition of development to justify the expansion of political control and the extraction of resources. It shows that in practice, the FSD faced resistance from the subjects it attempted to develop, exposing the limits of model-based development and the influence of local realities on a transnational organization. It concludes that the FSD was an early example of food aid as a vehicle for national and international political and economic agendas.

Feeding Other Hungers: How a U.S.-Brazilian Food Program Reveals the Complexities of Development Economics, 1941-1945

By

Hugh McGlade

Thomas D. Rogers

Adviser

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Emory College of Arts and Sciences
of Emory University in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the degree of
Bachelor of Arts with Honors

Department of History

2017

Acknowledgements

This thesis is an amalgamation of multiple interests and passions of mine. As such, I owe thanks to dozens of people who have encouraged me to learn, think, and express my own ideas. I feel so fortunate that my youth was filled with adults who believe that curiosity about the world is paramount to building a rich and meaningful life. I hope that this thesis indicates to those adults—especially educators—that I carry with me their many lessons.

I arrived at college with intellectual energy, an interest in Latin America, and tangible hubris. I found in my advisor, Thomas D. Rogers, a mentor who channeled my interests without ever dictating them. His encouragement (and rigorous and timely feedback) made this thesis possible. Dr. Rogers sets an example of dedication to others that has guided me through Emory. For his superb mentorship, I thank him.

Jeffrey Lesser taught me that history is not abstract, but rather rooted in the specificities of people, places, and events. I thank him for those lessons, and for building the Brazil program at Emory. I thank Ana Teixeira and Katherine Ostrom for introducing me to the study of Portuguese, through which they demonstrated the critical role of language and literature in history and culture.

I am grateful to the Fox Center for Humanistic Inquiry for providing a literal and intellectual home from which I produced most of this thesis. From the Robert W. Woodruff Library, Phil MacLeod helped me make sense of historiography and provided useful edits on my thesis. The Bradley Currey Jr. Grant from the Rose Library sent me to Rio de Janeiro, where I worked in the archives of the *Palácio Itamaraty* with the help of archivists who forgave the mistakes of a new researcher. Thank you to them, and to the archivists at the Rockefeller Archive Center in Sleepy Hollow, New York.

My final thanks are to friends and family. Since sitting next to me in a Mexican history course four year ago, Emily Jo Coady has become an intellectual partner and close friend. I also thank many other friends who supported me, and endured my musings about Brazilian history, while I researched and wrote.

I dedicate this thesis to my parents, who first taught me to be curious.

Table of Contents

Introduction

In the evening hours of October 22, 1942, a crowd demonstrated in front of the residence of the governor of the Brazilian state of Pará. They demanded sugar, which had been absent from the shelves of food markets for weeks. Since May, the city of Belém had been in a food crisis, and the most recent sugar shortage frustrated the city's residents to the point of uprising. As the protests escalated, an old woman was trampled to death. Police intervened, and the protestors dissipated, still without sugar.[1]

Edwin McLaughlin, a U.S. diplomat in Belém, authored this story of hunger and protest on the evening of October 22. He sent his account to U.S. embassies and even to the U.S. Secretary of State. Addressing what McLaughlin called the "food crisis" in Belém became the first major task of a newly created binational Food Supply Division, a hunger program that commissioned a group of Brazilian and U.S. diplomats and agriculture experts to nourish the residents of the Amazon, North, and Northeast of Brazil.

This thesis analyzes the Food Supply Division (FSD), which the governments of Brazil and the United States operated from 1942 to 1945.[2] Why did the FSD emerge? Who were the principle historical actors, and how did they think and act? Why and how did the institution change over time? And how do the answers to those questions reflect or undermine broader trends in the history of development and the geopolitics of the 1940s?

---

[1] "Edward D. McLaughlin, "Sugar Riots in Belém, October 22, 1942," October 24, 1942, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.

[2] U.S. actors referred to it as the Food Supply Division, a reference to the department of the Office of Inter-American Affairs that co-funded the program. Brazilian actors called the program "a Comissão Brasileira-Americana pela Produção de Alimentos," or the Brazilian-American Commission for the Production of Foodstuffs. For the sake of clarity, I refer to the program as the Food Supply Division (FSD).

The central actors of this thesis are politicians, diplomats, and experts. Government correspondence comprises the majority of my source base. I use materials from the archives of the Rockefeller Family, the Getúlio Vargas collection at the Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil, the U.S. Department of State, and the *Itamaraty*, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I draw occasionally on newspaper articles. While my sources reflect an elite discourse that over-represents North American voices, I give a critical analysis of the documents that, with the support of secondary scholarship, attempts to tell a transnational story that considers the influence of non-U.S. and non-elite actors.

Why did a set of political elites conceive of and construct the FSD? In the organization's founding document, the authors stated that the objective of the program was the "development of foodstuffs."[3] Those authors identified malnourished Amazonian rubber workers as the impetus for the FSD. As conflict in Europe escalated, U.S. government executives wanted to secure large amounts of rubber for military equipment. Rubber workers, therefore, needed to be nourished in order to labor. Nelson Rockefeller, the chief executive of the U.S. agency that oversaw the FSD, summarized the rubber-centric argument in a speech to U.S. businessmen on October 8, 1942:

> "We need rubber and our neighbors can provide it, if the conditions are right. That means more men in the rubber forests, and that in turn means human beings and their families, all of whom must be transported, and fed, and furnished with housing, education, and medical care. We must make it possible for them to do all these things for themselves, or give up all idea of increasing our supply of natural rubber. It's as simple as that, and it might not be going too far to say that it is as simple as the choice between victory and defeat."[4]

---

[3] "The Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and of the United States of Brazil, for the Development of Food Stuffs Production in Brazil, Especially in the States in the Amazon Region, the North and Northeast, Including the Sate of Baía.," Sep. 3, 1942, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.

[4] Speech to 29th Foreign Trade Commission, Oct. 8, 1942, Nelson A. Rockefeller Personal Papers, Record Group 4, Series 1, Box 8, Folder 69, Rockefeller Archive Center.

The government of Brazilian dictator Getúlio Vargas identified a similar rationale. Oswaldo Aranha, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Apolônio Salles, the Brazilian Minister of Agriculture, wrote that the Brazilian government supported the creation of the FSD to address "the situation created by the war and the difficulties of transportation [of food]."[5]

Chapter one of this thesis complicates the narrative that I just described. Rubber interests undoubtedly inspired the creation of the FSD, but the motives were manifold. I show that the architects of the FSD constructed a logic of development (of foodstuffs, of land, of people) that carried political, economic, and cultural meaning beyond this "simple" choice of rubber production. The rationale for development originated with a racist North American worldview that framed the agricultural development of the Amazon as a social and cultural endeavor that would benefit U.S. political and economic interests. U.S. political bureaucrats then transformed the racialized call for intervention into a rhetoric of truth predicated on scientific knowledge and liberal ideals.

Brazilian political elites proceeded to subscribe to the theory of economic development that the U.S. bureaucrats posited, as it reflected an existing political and economic agenda of the Vargas government. Beyond those immediate political and economic aims, the FSD also represented an attempt by urban elites to envelope the Amazon into a national Brazilian identity that had individualism and competitive capitalism as defining characteristics. "In Brazil, where the primitive type of patriarchal family dominated for a long time, urbanization—which results not only from the growth of cities but also from the growth in the means of communication, this attracting vast, rural areas into the urban sphere of

---

[5] "The Agreement."

influence—caused a social disequilibrium with lasting effects."[6] The Brazilian historian and writer Sérgio Buarque de Holanda espoused his expansive definition of urbanization in his 1936 book *Roots of Brazil.* He posited that in colonial times, the "cordial man," an "affable" rural patriarch whose political actions were familial and personal, dominated the Brazilian political and social order.[7] As power became concentrated in the Southeastern urban spaces of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the bureaucrat, a man with "objective interests" that benefited his notion of public good, began to compete with the cordial man. The competition between cordial and bureaucratic caused the "social disequilibrium" that he referenced. The FSD was an institutional manifestation of the urbanizing bureaucrat that brought with it to the Amazon an objective sense of what Buarque de Holanda called an "impersonal order." The architects of the FSD referred to the "impersonal order" as "development." The complex and evolutionary logic of the founders of the FSD—both U.S. and Brazilian—indicated that the program aimed to accomplish broad political and economic goals beyond rubber production.[8]

Chapter two compares the actions of the FSD to the discursive logic of its architects. The operatives of the FSD implemented hubris-laden models for development that relied on basic principles of capitalism, namely supply and demand. The organization, whether deliberately or not, tested a theory of economic development that held that market expansion and technical expertise produced positive economic, political, and social outcomes for the elite and the working poor. The efforts of the FSD often failed to increase food supply, and local businesspeople, consumers, and politicians undermined the attempts to manipulate the agriculture market. The behavior began with short term measures to increase foodstuffs through direct supply and price controls. The FSD then developed institutions to provide agricultural

---

[6] Sérgio Buaruqe de Holanda, *The Roots of Brazil*, trans. G. Harvey Summ (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2012), 118.
[7] Ibid., 119.
[8] Ibid., 118-120.

education, which created spaces of cultural exchange but produced no significant impact on short-term food supply. The final step of the FSD was to divert its attention away from the rubber workers and the Amazon region and instead toward national trade policies that intended to benefit U.S. consumers and Brazilian producers. Environmental and political realities undermined the attempt at a national trade strategy. Over the course of the three-year material history of the FSD, U.S. and Brazilian bureaucrats and experts inserted into the agricultural landscape of the Brazilian Amazon, North, and Northeast a system of centralized political power and economic manipulation.

The history of the FSD is one component part in an expansive historiography of U.S. government intervention in Brazil during the mid-twentieth century. Nelson Rockefeller and the organization that he led, the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA), appear in any history of U.S.-Brazil relations during the 1940s. As Coordinator of the OIAA from 1940 to 1944, he was the embodiment of an increasingly interventionist Good Neighbor Policy, a Roosevelt Administration diplomatic approach to Latin America based on nonintervention and hemispheric unity. The OIAA promoted U.S. interests in Latin America through "culture and commerce," and it was the parent organization of the FSD.[9] Between September 3, 1942 and August 20, 1945, the OIAA spent $2,000,000 on the FSD in Brazil.[10]

Today's students of Brazil are perhaps most familiar with the cultural initiatives of the OIAA, such as Donald Duck and Zé Carioca, Orson Welles' *It's All True*, or Carmen Miranda on Broadway. Our collective awareness of the propaganda of the era is in part a testament to its lasting impact on Brazilian and U.S. culture. But it also reflects a historiographical focus on the

[9] Gisela Cramer and Ursula Prutsch. "Nelson A. Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs (1940-1946) and Record Group 229" in *Hispanic American Historical Review* 86, no. 4 (November 1, 2006): 786.
[10] "The Food Supply Division, A Summary Report," (Washington: Institute of Inter-American Affairs), 80.

cultural efforts of the North Americans in Latin America during World War II. Ariel Dorfman, a Chilean-American literary critic, and Armand Mattelart, a Belgian sociologist who taught in Chile and France, published *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic* in 1971.[11] They argue that through Disney characters, the U.S. indoctrinated Latin American youth with a liberal capitalist worldview while at the same time undermining local culture. More recent scholars reject the *How to Read Donald Duck* interpretation of the "Americanization of Latin America" and instead argue that it was a moment of cultural synthesis. "Peoples of one nation incorporate a specific cultural value from another nation if it makes sense in the general collectivity of the culture. This means that cultural assimilation does not occur by imitation, but, rather, by a complicated process of recreation," Antonio Pedro Tota writes in his 2009 history of OIAA cultural activities in Brazil.[12] While I accept the idea that the imposition of culture is a form of imperialism, this thesis approaches the FSD as a synthetic product of the ideas and actions of both Brazilian and U.S. actors.

The intellectual progression from understanding U.S. intervention as unidirectional neo-imperialism to reading it as a process of exchange (as exemplified in the comparison between Dorfman/Mattelart and Tota) reflects a broader trend in the historiography of diplomacy. In the 1940s and 1950s, realist U.S. historians wrote progressive-liberal studies that focused their analyses on elite officials and often attributed diplomatic decisions to "misplaced faith in legalisms and morality."[13] William Appleman Williams famously shattered the realist camp with

---

[11] Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart, trans. David Kunzle, *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic* (New York: International General, 1991).

[12] Antonio Perdro Tota, *The Seduction of Brazil: the Americanization of Brazil during World War II* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), 120.

[13] Lafeber, Walter, "Liberty and Power: U.S. Diplomatic History, 1750-1945," in *The New American History*, ed. Eric Foner (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 273-274.

his 1959 book *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*.[14] Williams and others shifted the focus to economic exchange, the relationship between domestic and international politics, and the role of non-elites in culture and politics, which continue to be the foci of many contemporary studies. In the ensuing years, diplomatic historians have become effectively extinct, replaced by regionalists writing international and transnational histories which posit social and cultural, as well as political and economic, explanations.

But what exactly is transnational history? Is it different than diplomatic history or international history, and if so, how? The first important step in answering these questions is to recognize that historians are not exactly sure, or at least they are not collectively sure. The chronological historiographic progression of the study of inter-state and inter-nation history goes something like: world history, diplomatic history, international history, transnational history. The relevant juncture for this thesis is the transition between international and transnational history. In an *American Historical Review* roundtable discussion in 2006, six practitioners of transnational history debated its definition and its practice. Despite frequent intellectual incongruence, the historians agreed on two main tenets of transnational history: it concerns "movements, flows, and circulation" of people, ideas, and goods, and it pays attention to the impact of cultural and social "beliefs and practices" on events traditionally seen as political and economic.[15] Methodologically, transnational histories rely on multinational archives. Surveying the field, Sven Beckert writes:

> "[Transnational history] is an approach to history that focuses on a whole range of connections that transcend politically bounded territories and connect various parts of the world to one another. Networks, institutions, ideas, and processes constitute these

[14] William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1959)

[15] C. A. Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyr, Wendy Kozol, and Patricia Seed, "*AHR* Conversation: On Transnational History," *American Historical Review* 111.5 (2006): 1441-1464

> connections, and though rulers, empires, and states are important in structuring them, they transcend politically bounded territories."[16]

Another way of understanding the concept might be by comparing examples of international and transnational history in this thesis. In my discussion later in this introduction of the diplomacy of agricultural economics in 1939 and 1940, I write a traditional international history, in which the unit of analysis is the state and the historical actors are exclusively rulers, diplomats, and bureaucrats. Geography, beyond entire national territories, and culture, beyond political culture, are absent. A more transnational approach ensues in my material analysis of the FSD, as I am still interested in politicians and bureaucrats, and in politics and economics, but I am keenly aware of the cultural and social explanations of those things. For example, I pay close attention to the influence of local politicians, shopkeepers, and protestors on the FSD. I turn my focus beyond national space, foregrounding the meaning of rural, urban, and regional space as they relate to national and international agendas. I also emphasize exchange—the flow of experts, of capital, of knowledge.

In the transnational tradition, the most contemporary study that handles questions similar to my own is Seth Garfield's *In Search of the Amazon: Brazil, the United States, and the Nature of a Region*.[17] The book contends that during the push for rubber in 1942 and 1943, myriad "mediators" (elites, experts, rubber bosses, laborers, etc.) expressed their interests through conceptions of the Amazon as a region and a space. The material outcome, he argues, of these debates about modernization was a more economically connected, environmentally ravaged Amazon with a comparatively more enfranchised rural poor. I borrow especially from Garfield in

---

[16] Ibid, 1446.
[17] Seth Garfield, *In Search of the Amazon: Brazil, the United States, and the Nature of a Region* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).

understanding the transfer of capital and technical knowledge as form of diplomacy that represented U.S. interests well beyond rubber production.

Garfield was not the first to approach the Amazon through the lens of rubber. Warren Dean devotes a chapter in his classic study *Brazil and the Struggle for Rubber* to rubber development in the Amazon between 1940 and 1945.[18] In many ways, his story parallels my history of the FSD, as it studies how the U.S. government attempted to rapidly increase rubber production with a combination of economic manipulation and technical expertise. Dean shows that those attempts failed, arguing that the North American enterprise—with its purported knowledge and capital—could not defeat South America Leaf Blight, a deadly plant fungus. While my explanation for the failure of the FSD is not ecological, my contention is similar in that I argue that an environment (political and economic) proved unsuitable for models of development crafted by political and technical elites.

Scholars have given close analyses to the cultural activities, political dynamics, and health and sanitation work of U.S. government initiatives in Brazil during World War II.[19] They have also studied food aid in Brazil in the post-war years, including Rockefeller's private philanthropic efforts and missions of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.[20] There is also a robust literature on food and development.[21] But even the two most prominent contemporary scholars of the OIAA, Gisela Cramer and Ursula Prutsch, have not seriously

---

[18] Warren Dean, *Brazil and the Struggle for Rubber,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987)

[19] In addition to previously cited works, see Ursula Prutsch, "Americanization of Brazil or a Pragmatic Wartime Alliance? The Politics of Nelson Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs in Brazil During World War II" *Passagens. Revista Internacional de História Política e Cultura Jurídica* 2.4 May 2010, 181-216; and Marcos Cueto, ed., *Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).

[20] See Elizabeth A. Cobbs, *The Rich Neighbor Policy: Rockefeller and Kaiser in Brazil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992)

[21] I will mention a number throughout the thesis, perhaps most importantly James Vernon, *Hunger: A Modern History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), and James Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

examined the FSD. This thesis expands our understanding of the historical moment and provides critical context for post-war histories. The history of the FSD contributes to the historiographies of modern Brazilian politics, the U.S. in the World, and economic development.

To write the history of the FSD, I employ an analytical approach that first examines discourse (the rationale of the FSD) and then progresses into material action (the behavior of the FSD). I believe that ideas, as articulated in discourses, influence actions, and I make arguments that use discursive evidence to explain material phenomena. Throughout the chapter, I return to my rigorous analysis of the discursive underpinnings of the FSD as a prism through which we can understand the on-the-ground actions of the organization. I contend that the ideas that circulated among the founders of the FSD—and therefore informed its prerogatives, its funding, its politics—influenced every aspect of its material history, even if not explicitly. For example, I show that an intellectual godfather of the FSD assigned racial, political, and social meaning to "agricultural practices," and for the remainder of my analysis, I understand agriculture through the prism of that complex understanding, as opposed to through a neutral definition that I would impose on the concept.

The actors in control of the FSD often pursued reactive and opportunistic policies. But my reading of the ideological framework of the organization informs my analysis of each material example, thereby connecting ideas with actions at every juncture. With that schematic in mind, I pay close attention to the tensions between discourse and action. By focusing my analysis on where *plans* of action failed to materialize into *action*, I find examples of resistance to the imposition of the FSD. The gaps between discourse and action also expose moments when FSD operatives acted in contradiction to the mission or rationale of the program.

I am interested in how international economic and political relations affected a comparatively miniscule group of people in the northern part of Brazil. I am also interested in how those people responded to the actors and institutions that channeled those international currents—thereby understanding the upstream influence on international phenomena. I use the discursive and material history of the FSD as the vehicle through which to observe the convergence of global trends and local places. I emphatically believe that transnational phenomena—transatlantic trade patterns, for example, or antagonistic wartime ideologies—lack substantive meaning until we observe them in highly specific forms. The study of a highly temporally and geographically bounded institution helps us understand expansive trends in the global histories of development and geopolitics.

▪

The history of U.S. government intervention in Brazilian agriculture began before the creation of the FSD in September 1942. Throughout the 1930s, the governments of the U.S. and Germany engaged in a trade war for control of Brazilian export and import markets.[22] The exchange of goods and capital became a political act for both the Vargas government, and the governments of the U.S. and Germany. "It's necessary to ponder, with the utmost care, the consequences of a separation or a withdrawal from the North Americans," Vargas wrote in 1934, referring to the potential political consequences of trading with the Germans.[23]

Over the course of the 1930s, the Vargas regime remained noncommittal about its allegiance to the U.S. or Germany, which gave the Brazilian government significant political

---

[22] For a comprehensive overview of this "war", see Stanley E. Hilton, *Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930-1939* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975).

[23] Vargas to Aranha, Oct. 30, 1934, "Cartas sobre tratado comercial Brasil-Estados Unidos, Oct. 9 to Dec. 12, 1934," GV c 1934.10.09/1, Centro de Pesquisa de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC), Fundação Getúlio Vargas.

leverage. In November of 1937, Vargas orchestrated a military coup that replaced a democratic state with an authoritarian regime, of which he became the leader. The Estado Novo, or "New State," reflected European fascism much more than North American republicanism. The name itself, Estado Novo, was borrowed from the Portuguese state, where Antonio de Oliveira Salazar ruled as a corporatist authoritarian dictator. "Vargas publicly stated that his goal was the creation of a 'corporate state' that would bring economic and social benefits to all citizens," historian Joseph Smith writes.[24]

In an act of U.S. deference to Brazil, Sumner Welles publicly excused the authoritarian regime change. In a speech at George Washington University on December 7, 1937, he defended the November 1937 coup d'état that ended Brazilian democracy. "One of the most salient principles of the [Good Neighbor] policy is to refrain from minding your neighbor's business for him," he said.[25]. The political relationship between the U.S. and Brazilian governments was defined in part by a North American paranoia about Brazil's potential alignment with fascist powers in Europe. Vargas received unconditional support from the U.S. government while continuing to trade with Germany. Perhaps one additional sentence stating that Vargas had advisors with different views—Aranha and his pro-Americanism, Oliveira Vianna and his crypto-fascism?

The escalation of war in Europe benefited the trade interests, as well as political aims, of the U.S. government. Between September 1939 and August 1940, U.S. diplomats throughout Latin America reported on the adverse effects of World War II on the region's agriculture. Documents that reached the upper echelons of the State Department and the White House

---

[24] Joseph Smith in *Latin America During World War II*, Thomas M. Leonard and John F Bratzel, eds., (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007): 144.
[25] Newspaper Clipping, Aranha to Vargas, CPDOC.

provided drastic statistics about a downtrodden continental economy. In 1938, one report indicated, continental Europe consumed 60% of Chilean copper exports and 75% of Peruvian cotton exports. By 1940, European consumption of those commodities had all but ceased.[26] The war across the Atlantic Ocean was affecting Latin American farmers and miners, and the U.S. government was concerned about the social and political stability in the region.

The Roosevelt administration capitalized on the opportunity to become the primary creditor and trade partner of the region. After years of trade wars with the German government over Brazilian goods in the 1930s, the U.S. government effectively secured its place as the dominant trade partner with Brazil in 1940. In the North American summer of that year, Roosevelt organized weekly meetings with State, Commerce, and Export-Import Bank executives to monitor the situation. In a memorandum to his cabinet, Roosevelt wrote:

> "Because markets for forty percent of the normal exports of Latin America have been lost due to the war, there is grave danger that in some of these countries economic and political deterioration may proceed to a point where defense of the western hemisphere would be rendered much more difficult and costly." [27]

On August 16, Roosevelt signed an executive order to create the Office of Inter-American Affairs, essentially an organization to manage commerce with Latin America while denouncing Nazism. Scholars Ursula Prutsch and Gisela Cramer explain:

> "[The OIAA] was established, essentially, to assist in the preparation and coordination of policies to stabilize the Latin American economies, to secure and deepen U.S. influence in the region, and to combat Axis inroads into the hemisphere, particularly in the commercial and cultural spheres."[28]

---

[26] "Development on Economic Welfare," Dec. 24, 1942, Nelson A. Rockefeller Personal Papers, Record Group 4, Series 1, Box 8, FA350, Rockefeller Archive Center.
[27] "Development of Economic Welfare," September 1942, NAR Personal Papers, Record Group 4, Series 1, Box 8, September 1942, Rockefeller Archive Center, 2.
[28] Gisela Cramer and Ursula Prutsch. "Nelson A. Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs (1940-1946) and Record Group 229" in *Hispanic American Historical Review* 86, no. 4 (November 1, 2006): 786.

As the European market collapsed and the Vargas regime began accepting larger amounts of credit from American banks, the U.S. heavily indebted Brazil. By 1940, the Brazilian government owed $356,577,745 to the Export Import Bank, all of which was in default.[29] The U.S. government purchased Brazilian goods in excess amounts in order to keep prices artificially high, which rendered the Brazilian exporter totally preferential to the North American buyer. This arrangement created a trap: In order to pay off the U.S. debt, the Brazilian government needed cash, which it generated through trade surplus. The only viable trading partner, given the war in Europe and the artificially inflated prices, was the U.S. In a matter of two years, U.S policies. had made Brazilian producers dependent upon North American capital.

The economics of the agriculture trade, more than political persuasion or ideological arguments, created the environment in which the Vargas government prioritized its relationship with the U.S. government over the Third Reich.[30] A string of violent German submarine attacks that sank six Brazilian ships in August 1942 propelled Vargas to officially join the Allied cause—and to sign the agreement to create the FSD. After the attacks, Getúlio Vargas instructed all Brazilian steamers to return to port, thereby paralyzing the food supply chain. Rockefeller and the OIAA were concerned about the effect of the halt in shipping on impoverished, rubber producing Brazilian North, which received staple food items from the South and Southeast. He sent U.S. officials to Rio, and within a week, the U.S. and Brazilian governments signed an agreement to form the FSD.[31] The ideas, interests, and beliefs that the architects of the FSD used to design the program are the subject of the next chapter.

---

[29] "Increasing the Lending Authority of the Export-Import Bank of Washington," H.R. 10361, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940.
[30] Joseph Smith in *Latin America During World War II*, Thomas M. Leonard and John F Bratzel, eds., (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007): 149.
[31] *History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs: Historical Reports on War Administration* (Washington, D.C.: Government Publishing Office, 1947), Rockefeller Archive Center, 351.89 UNI.

Chapter I

Developing Development: The Ideas That Made the FSD

In this chapter, I trace the evolution of the rationale that the founders of the FSD used to create the program. I make an argument about the rhetorical development of the FSD that examines three discursive events in the history of the OIAA: a November 1941 survey of Latin American agriculture, a March 1942 organizational philosophy, and the September 1942 Food Supply Agreement between the U.S. and Brazilian governments. I contend that the U.S. architects of the FSD transformed a racist, classist argument for agricultural intervention into a universalist pitch for development economics. Through the guise of the truth of scientific knowledge and free market economics, Brazilian and U.S. political elites conceived of an ostensibly humanitarian program that addressed wartime needs, especially rubber production. In doing so, they created an organization that could enact, in different ways, political and economic interests of the Vargas regime and the U.S. government. Those interests, while related to a wartime agenda, were broader aims that included the extraction of resources, the increased productivity of the laborer, and the promotion of a liberal theory of development that created political and economic interdependence between the people (elite and non-elite) of the U.S. and Brazil.

Tropical and Temperate: Agriculture as Culture, Economics, and Politics

On July 28, 1941, horticulturist Edwin J. Kyle embarked on a 23,000-mile tour of Latin America. Earlier that year, Nelson Rockefeller had commissioned Kyle to complete an intensive study of agriculture in the region. Kyle started in Mexico, flew to Costa Rica, then Venezuela,

followed by Trinidad; next was Brazil, then Argentina, then Chile, up to Peru, and finally to Panama. He lassoed the continent. After returning to the U.S. in November of 1941, he wrote a report on his travels entitled "A Tour of Central and South America."[32]

Kyle was an illustrious figure in the field of agriculture, both as an academic and a government bureaucrat. After receiving a master's degree in horticulture from Cornell in 1902, Kyle moved back to his home state to teach at Texas A&M University. By 1911, he was Dean of the School of Agriculture, a position that he held until 1944. While still serving as Dean, he worked as a Director of the Farm Credit Administration, a New Deal program that helped farmers get access to capital. He finished his career as the U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala from 1945 to 1948.[33] His story was similar to many of the agricultural experts that worked for the Food Supply Division; he was primarily an academic, though he often worked on behalf of the U.S. government and private corporations.

Rockefeller sponsored Kyle's trip in his capacity as Coordinator of the OIAA. In addition to the OIAA, Standard Oil and the cotton-trading firm Anderson, Clayton & Company financed Kyle's survey of the region. As an organization, the OIAA sought an approach to Latin America that benefited U.S. economic interests (private and public) while simultaneously improving the political perception of the U.S. in Brazil. The Kyle report applied the OIAA political and economic agenda to agriculture specifically. The mission of the research trip was threefold:

"1. To study the agricultural economy of the countries visited.

2. To study their agricultural educational systems.

---

[32] E. J. Kyle, "A Tour of Central and South America, July 28-November 6, 1941." September 27, 1942, Rockefeller Foundation Records, Series 300, Box 6, Rockefeller Archive Center: 1-11.

[33] Ann Miller Strom, "Kyle, Edwin Jackson," *Handbook of Texas Online* (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 2010). Accessed Feb. 20, 2017.

3. To promote better relations."[34]

The three goals of the research trip reflected the broader logic of OIAA intervention in agriculture. The OIAA had explicit economic interests in Latin American agriculture, both for the profit of private sector corporations and for supporting the war effort. But the OIAA also hoped to improve political relations with Latin America, both to ward off Axis influence and to establish a long-term post-war relationship with the nations of the region. To accomplish those goals, the OIAA needed to understand where and what people learned about agriculture in Latin America, hence the study of "agricultural educational system." As I will show, Kyle argued that those institutions were fertile ground for U.S. actors to impose agricultural knowledge, which reached beyond technical skills and into economics, politics, and culture. Eventually, the OIAA constructed the FSD as an institution intended to deploy the OIAA agenda, often through education.

In "A Tour of Central and South America," Kyle applied his agro-centric worldview to the case study of Latin America, and his worldview offers a multilayered and historicized definition of development from the perspective of the OIAA. His first declaration was that the environment was the strongest influence on living organisms. "The two factors that have exerted the most profound influence throughout the centuries upon man, upon animals, and upon plants in all parts of the world have been climate and soil," he wrote.[35] The idea that agricultural conditions explained the human experience—including its social, political, and cultural dimensions—was the basis of his prescriptive report. When Kyle made an assessment of

[34] Kyle, cover page.
[35] Ibid., 1.

agricultural life, he was critiquing a society at large and not merely a trade or practice. In addition, his agro-centric worldview meant that any recommendation to alter agricultural practices was in fact a recommendation to alter the political, social, and cultural makeup of a people and a place.

In his introductory remarks to the report, Kyle argued that "two other factors"—in addition to soil and climate—were foundational to understanding the Latin American "man." "These are the Catholic religion, and the topography of the country," he wrote.[36] He did not significantly expand upon his assertion that the Catholic religion was one of the "strongest influences" on Latin Americans, except in brief when he said that "the Catholic church [had] been the principal artificial influence from the Colonial days up until this time."[37] At one point, he also noted that Latin America was part of a "Catholic and Latin culture which we do not share."[38]

Kyle emphasized the prevalence of Catholicism as a means to show that *all* Latin Americans were different than and inferior to Anglo North Americans. Kyle regularly drew comparisons between U.S. and Latin American elites in his report—both were white, "Upper Class," knowledgeable people from "temperate" climates. He used Catholicism, though, as a blanket cultural differentiator. While he never articulated the viewpoint, it was implicit in his text that he believed that Latin American rulers were beholden to the authority of the Roman Catholic Church. His belief reflected anti-Catholic currents of U.S. intellectualism in the 1940s. As historian John McGreevy shows, American liberals in the 1940s, especially in universities, portrayed the Catholic Church as anti-science, anti-rational, and anti-democratic. "Proof that

---

[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.

Catholicism hindered science…possessed high polemical value [in the academy]," McGreevy writes.[39] The Brazilian writer Clodomir Vianna Moog also used Catholicism to explain the underdevelopment of Latin America when he argued that Catholicism and capitalism were "mutually repellant" in his 1954 book *Bandits and Pioneers.*[40] It is interesting to see examples of intellectuals from both nations pitting Catholicism against modernization as they examined the relationship between economic development and religion,.

Topography, the second additional differentiating "factor" that Kyle identified, was an extension of climate and soil. These variables, which I collectively refer to as the environment, played a crucial role in his analysis of the region. Kyle believed that the world consisted of two categories of people: "temperate" people and "tropical" people. He did not divide Latin America by national borders, but rather by proximity to the equator. He argued that the more sophisticated "temperate" peoples of the far north and far south had an obligation to assist and educate the "tropical" peoples that operated under a different set of "natural laws." The FSD (which would not be created until September 1942) specifically targeted the "tropical zone," which Kyle defined as "practically all the Central American countries and that part of South America lying north of the coffee zone in Sothern Brazil."[41] Kyle's conception of the differences between "tropical" and "temperate" people informed the ideas of the founders of the FSD, as he remained involved in the OIAA after his 1941 report as "Advisor on Inter-American educational affairs." In 1942, for example, he represented the U.S. government at the Second Annual Inter-American Conference on Agriculture in Mexico City, along with eleven other U.S. delegates including

---

[39] John T. McGreevy, "Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the American Intellectual Imagination, 1928-1960," *The Journal of American History* 18.4 (Jun. 1997), 98.
[40]Clodomir Vianna Moog, *Bandeirantes and Pioneers* (New York: G. Braziller, 1964).
[41] Kyle, 5.

James E. LeCron, a longtime agricultural expert with the FSD in Brazil.[42] Kyle's beliefs also offer a framework through which I understand the approach of Brazilian and U.S. "temperate" people (the founders of the FSD) to Brazilian "tropical" people (the subjects of the FSD), even if those historical actors never encountered Kyle or his ideas.

Kyle employed a binary argument to illustrate and analyze the people of Latin America. The "tropical" person was the antithesis of the "temperate" one, and only in explaining the latter could the former be understood.[43] Kyle took a dogmatic approach to agriculture: there were "proper" agricultural techniques that were the "right approach" to creating a "sane, sound, and just plan of life."[44] In this section, I first assess the more simplistic binaries that Kyle conceived: wealthy vs. poor and white vs. non-white. I then explore a more nuanced binary, the "complementary" nature of "tropical" economies as opposed to the "competitive" nature of "temperate" ones. In this set of opposing concepts, Kyle differentiated between the "temperate" developer and the "tropical" person in need of being developed. Kyle conceived of a world in which the knowledge-holding temperate people had a duty to develop the tropical people of the "equatorial countries"—an educational endeavor that resulted in the increased productivity of the laborer and the increased extraction of natural resources. To fulfill this mandate, those with knowledge of the right way—of the truth—needed to create institutions to educate those that did not have knowledge. One of those development institutions was the FSD.

Kyle constructed a class binary that incorporated both race and socioeconomics. Latin America, he argued, had no middle class. Instead, there was an upper class and a lower class. His

---

[42] "Final Act of the Second Inter-American Conference of Agriculture," (Washington: Pan American Union, 1942), 6.
[43] To reiterate: The temperate zone consists of Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and the South of Brazil. It also includes Northern Mexico and the United States. The tropical zone is Central America and the Amazon Basin.
[44] Ibid., 8.

first comments on the differences between the two classes were racial. “The upper class is Spanish and Portuguese, especially in Brazil. The lower class is made up principally of Spaniards, Indians, and Negroes,” he wrote.[45] In other words, the people in control of capital were all white, and the people without it were all non-white. He was not merely making an observation, though. His argument was based in part on a perceived racial purity of the European white upper class. “The lower class in most of the countries has mixed freely, that is, there is no color line; they inter-marry. This seems to have had a deteriorating effect upon all of them,” he wrote.[46] He was constantly returning to his tropical/temperate binary, contending that tropical countries such as Guatemala are 60 percent “pure Indian” and 35 percent “mixed”—leaving whites at only five percent of the population. He contrasted this with Argentina and Chile, “temperate” nations that more closely reflected the racial makeup of the U.S. “The percentage of whites increases as one goes south below the Equator,” he wrote.[47]

After establishing the racial inferiority of the lower class, he described their “dire poverty.” He wrote:

> “They sleep in hammocks or on dirt floors. They do not have a properly balanced diet. From forty to sixty per cent of their children die in infancy. The adults are improperly clothed and improperly fed. They are small of statue, light of frame, and not capable under their living conditions of doing anything like as much hard manual labor as the laborers in this country [the United States].”[48]

The two facets of Kyle’s construction of class—race and wealth—created one of the paradoxes of his argument. His racist argument was almost Malthusian; he implied that the inherent

---

[45] Ibid., 4.
[46] Ibid., 6.
[47] Ibid., 7.
[48] Ibid., 2.

inferiority of the "deteriorating" lower class helps explain their poverty. He even cited the enormity of the group, saying that "the great majority" was lower class. Yet Kyle offered a second explanation of malnutrition that reflected then-contemporary thought on hunger and poverty, such as Brazilian thinker and agricultural bureaucrat Josué de Castro's argument that hunger was a "man made blight."[49] Kyle contended that controllable environmental factors created destitution, not the character or size of an impoverished group. The Malthusian/anti-Malthusian paradox was highly convenient for Kyle and later for the FSD.[50] The racial inferiority proved the necessity for paternalism and the superiority of "temperate" ideas, as the lower class people were inherently less capable and knowledgeable than the white upper class. The latter argument that explained poverty as man-made established the capacity for change. Kyle argued that better ideas and better people could solve hunger and poverty, contrary to the neo-Malthusian belief that those life situations were permanent realities that only population control could prevent.

Kyle always returned to the economic benefits of hunger alleviation. All of the solutions that he presented led to an end in which a more productive labor force produced more goods for export. "…[We] must aid the [equatorial countries] greatly in the searching out and development of their natural resources, purchase for ourselves large quantities of their exportable surpluses, and place those which we cannot use on the open markets of the world," he wrote.[51]

In its rudimentary form, the complementary/competitive binary that Kyle created was an economic one. His argument was that Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Southern Brazil, and Northern

---

[49] Josué de Castro, *Geography of Hunger* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1952), 24.
[50] For a brilliant study of how "social" hunger alleviation programs of the 20th century retained liberal Malthusian ideas of the 19th century, see James Vernon, *Hunger: A Modern History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007)
[51] Kyle, 4.

Mexico—the "temperate" zones—grew and exported similar agricultural goods to the U.S. In particular, he mentioned "corn, wheat, beef, cotton, flax, and wool."[52] The farmers in the "temperate" zones were therefore competitors to U.S. farmers, as they competed to sell the same goods to the European market. The "tropical" zone, on the other hand, produced "complementary" goods such as coffee, rubber, bananas, silk, beans, sugar, and many other export commodities that the U.S. did not. The U.S., Kyle believed, could only benefit economically from increased production in the tropical environments.

Kyle quickly inserted the racist, classist arguments that I explained earlier into the complementary/competitive binary. He wrote:

> "Returning to the temperate countries—Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Southern Brazil—racially and culturally they will continue to be our competitors and complementary with Continental Europe…. If they are to be subordinate to another temperate race, there is a strong probability that they eventually will choose their cousins and material customers of Continental Europe."[53]

He operated under the assumption that the "temperate" race—the white "Spanish and Portuguese" of Latin America—were capable of competition, unlike tropical people. At one point, he referred to the temperate people as "more aggressive."[54] Kyle worried that the Southern European ethnic composition of the "temperate" people, coupled with their interest in selling agricultural goods to the European market, posed a political threat to the U.S. Without OIAA intervention, the "temperate" people would side with the fascist and Nazi Europeans. While the "temperate" upper class was white and industrious in similar ways to North Americans, they

---

[52] Ibid., 5.
[53] Ibid., 3.
[54] Ibid, 5.

continued to be inferior in their appreciation for democracy and freedom. The OIAA, therefore, needed to instill those values. Here was another paradox: Latin American elites were at once equal and inferior, for they were temperate yet predisposed to the Axis cause.

Unlike the "temperate race," Kyle argued that "tropical" people could not compete. They were inherently incapable. He wrote:

> "As for the equatorial countries, I think history and economic geography tell us in unmistakable terms that we must aid them greatly in searching out and development of their natural resources, purchase for ourselves large quantities of their exportable surpluses, and place those which we cannot use upon the open markets of the world, or be prepared to see some other temperate country come in and take control of this important and vital territory."[55]

Kyle again employed a binary. One could only understand the "tropical" people through the inevitable reality that "temperate" people would take control of them and their land. His argument created a mandate for U.S. experts to intervene, as they were (in his mind) the most competent. He called on the U.S. to "exercise the influence that is rightfully ours" to develop the tropical zone, a zone about which Kyle said, "I do not believe that there is a more pitifully unscratched part of the world than Central and South America, north of twenty degrees south."[56]

---

[55] Ibid., 4.
[56] Ibid., 4.



A map of Central and South America with the 20th Parallel South ("twenty degrees south") inserted

The final critical point that Kyle made was a diplomatic one. How should Rockefeller and the OIAA approach these people? "It seems to me closer relations with the people of temperate South America is to recognize…that they are the temperate people of their part of the earth and build them up and encourage and protect them in assuming the destiny to which that fact invites them," he wrote. His policy advice was to treat them as partners, as they were too white and too industrious and too temperate to be subordinated. The tropical peoples, on the other hand, needed aid and development. Not only would this aid produce more complementary goods for the U.S., but it would "[render] a valuable service to the [tropical people]." Those people, he suggests, need U.S. "assistance…administered with wisdom, fairness, and justice." Kyle constructed a moral mandate for programs such as the FSD, grounded in the racial inferiority of the people of the Amazon basin.[57]

Kyle was not the only American intellectual to make arguments about "temperate" people, cultural exchange, and the need for development. For example, American journalist and

[57] Ibid., 5.

cultural commentator Waldo Frank made a similar argument in a 1943 edition of *Foreign Affairs.* While he acknowledged that "British mores and values" explained "the pioneer life of temperate North America" and satisfied "the needs of a commercial industrial civilization," he did not disregard the educated Latin American man's capacity for adoption of the American *modus vivendi*. He wrote:

> "But the deeper, more organic, consciousness of the Ibero-American can embrace at least the surfaces of our commercial civilization and of our culture of comfort, entertainment and fact-finding. The great, dissident voices of our culture—Emerson, Poe, Whitman, Thoreau—have always been recognized and respected in the Ibero-Americas. And our masters of technics, industrial or political, have always found Ibero-American disciples."[58]

Waldo created a similar paradox in which Latin American elites were culturally similar *enough* to comprehend and welcome the superior North American way of life. Waldo reached similar conclusions to Kyle about the need to deploy U.S. ideas through institutions in Latin America. While noting the capacity of the elite Latin American to embrace the North American way, he reminded the reader that "hundreds of thousands of peasants from Mexico and Brazil…have scarcely heard of our existence."[59] He suggested that individuals with "authority" should enforce "cultural and intellectual exchange between our America and the other," and "it should begin in our schools."[60] As exemplified by Waldo, Kyle channeled a worldview that was not totally unique. "A Tour of Central and South America" was one iteration of a larger narrative among U.S. thinkers focused on Latin America.

---

[58] Frank Waldo, "Our Island Hemisphere," *Foreign Affairs* 21.3 (April 1943), 515.
[59] Ibid., 514.
[60] Ibid., 522.

The ideas in Kyle's 1941 report constituted a foundation on which a set of OIAA bureaucrats imagined development. The world that Kyle constructed in his report was the one from which those same bureaucrats took inspiration when organizing the FSD. His ideas reappeared in the founding documents of the Department of Basic Economy and eventually in the September 1942 Food Supply Agreement between the governments of the U.S. and Brazil. At each juncture, authors interpreted and modified them in meaningful ways—ways that went on to have material effects on the operations of the FSD. While the FSD always couched its economic interests in moral and cultural terms, the bureaucrats eliminated the explicit racism, classism, anti-Catholicism, and North American supremacy of the Kyle worldview.

The Credo: Liberalizing the Kyle Argument

> "The U.S. Credo is founded on truth and therefore is in the best interest of Latin Americans; the Axis Credo is founded on falsehood and therefore is not in the best interests of Latin Americans."[61]
>
> -"The Philosophy of the OIAA," 1942

On March 24, 1942, President Roosevelt established an ostensibly humanitarian division of the OIAA. Writing to Rockefeller, Roosevelt allocated $25 million to "execute a program to aid and improve the health, safety, and general welfare" of Latin Americans.[62] This program became the Department of Basic Economy, which in turn would house the FSD. Shortly after Roosevelt commissioned the Department of Basic Economy, the OIAA drafted a report on its

[61] "Philosophy of the OIAA," 1.
[62] Roosevelt to Rockefeller, March 24, 1942, Nelson A. Rockefeller Personal Papers, Box 4, FA350, Rockefeller Archive Center.

organizational philosophy. The central tenet of the report was the "U.S. Credo for the Individual Citizen of Latin America."[63]

In my analysis of the Credo philosophy, I show how its architects used a number of strategies to transform the ideas presented in Kyle's report into a language of universalism and development. First, the authors centered the "suffering Latin American," as opposed to the collective "tropical race." The rhetorical act allowed the authors to incorporate ideas about a collective inferiority without the language of racial superiority, but rather by expanding on Kyle's argument that the U.S. had a monopoly on "truth" and knowledge. Second, the authors made Kyle's ideas actionable, most simply by replacing collective rhetoric with individual references. The individuals that they constructed were both truth-holders (the authors and the experts) and those in need of truth (the "Latin American man"). The Credo, as a result, empowered future FSD operatives to deploy truth as compensation for Latin American labor or goods.

By combining "truth" and "action," the authors of the Credo created a universal concept of development. Actors with the knowledge of truth, they suggested, could develop the world in the right way. This constituted the liberalization (in the Lockean sense) of Kyle's ideas. As scholar Uday Mehta writes, "Liberal theoretical claims typically tend to be transhistorical, transcultural, and most certainly transracial."[64] At the heart of liberalism, of course, is the individual. The Credo inserted the individual into the Kyle worldview with a language of universality. Within a few months, a transnational group of political and economic elites used

---

[63] "Philosophy of the OIAA," Nelson A. Rockefeller Personal Papers, Record Group 4, Box 8, Series 1, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[64] Uday Singh Mehta, "Liberal Strategies of Exclusion," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World,* eds. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 62.

this liberal justification for intervention to impose universal ideas of development on the rural agricultural poor. The Credo also represents an early example of OIAA development philosophy that would inform the international doctrine of development that emerged after World War II.

While this analysis remains in the discursive register, I see the Credo as an intermediary step between the ideological basis that Kyle presented in late 1941 and the policy agreement that created the FSD in Brazil in September of 1942. Beginning in September of 1942, the FSD became a material enterprise—with human beings doing things, not just saying or writing them. But those actions, I argue, were informed by the sequence of discursive events that started with Kyle's report and ended with the signing of the Food Supply Agreement. Later, I will compare these prescriptive plans with the material actions of the FSD, revealing contradictions and continuities. But first, I will unpack the Credo in order to show the evolution of the ideas that undergirded the FSD.

The Credo was predicated on the idea that the U.S. had a monopoly on truth, including the true path to progress. The authors were also explicit about the economic rationale for intervention, which was that the U.S. needed Latin American raw materials. As with the Kyle report, the authors acknowledged the primary end of the OIAA as an economic one, yet they mostly discussed the social and political benefits of U.S. presence. I argue that this was a central justification of what I call "humanitarian economics": We give them truth in exchange for goods and labor.

The implication was that the Latin Americans did not have truth and could only embrace it with the assistance of North Americans. The authors never fleshed out a definition of this

"truth," instead they assumed that the Latin Americans would see the obvious rightness of the U.S. model. The authors wrote that the ideal Latin American man should say:

> "1. I believe that my best interests are linked with the U.S., because:
>
> a. I like the U.S. way of life–specifically, I like its social, political and economic institutions…its science and medicine; and its general philosophy."[65]

The viewpoint that the U.S. way of life—or *modus vivendi*—was objectively superior to all others was an extension of the racialized temperate/tropical argument that Kyle made. But it had evolved. The Credo now gave license to individual U.S actors to employ the rationale of superiority to their actions; it offered operatives a blanket justification for behavior that benefited U.S. economic interests. For example, in exchange for relocating or increasing the working hours of an Amazonian laborer, the U.S. could offer him a fondness for North American institutions, or, in other words, nothing material. Later in the document, the authors wrote that the ideal Latin American should say to himself, "I wish my country to furnish raw materials to the U.S."[66] The economic goals of the U.S., the document suggested, were not only beneficial to the Latin American but they were indeed what he wanted because all humans want truth. Kyle used this logic in his report, and the OIAA applied it specifically to the individuals with whom it planned to work.

The idea that the "tropical" man should demand U.S. intervention clarified the OIAA's concept of development. Kyle remained vague about the specifics of development—on what constituted the development of a tropical man. The Credo expanded on this idea, with a threefold explanation that reflects what scholar Tracy Devine Guzmán describes as the "trinity of

---

[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid., 3.

modernity: technological progress, national security, and economic development."[67] The authors wrote, again in the voice of a Latin American:

> "I am acquiring for myself and my children:
>
> 1) A better standard of living
>   a. An opportunity to advance my own country
> 2) Greater personal security
>   a. Safety from Axis aggression.
> 3) More individual freedom
>   a. A better education
>   b. Greater opportunity to follow my religious principles
>   c. Increased respect for my country's sovereignty
>   d. Wider contact with the world's culture."[68]

I want to make two observations on this part of the Credo, which even without analysis helps us understand the approach of the OIAA. The first is to point out how the authors transformed the U.S. "truth" into a language of universals. It is obvious that by wider contact with the "world's culture", they indeed meant with an Allied Liberal democratic culture, and by a "better education" they indeed meant a North American agricultural or health education. But by rendering those ideas in the language of humanity—of the true destiny of any developed human—the authors provided further license for the FSD to justify its mission and its actions as humanitarian and altruistic, as opposed to economically utilitarian. The incongruence between the universal philosophy (all men are equal) and the paternalist rhetoric that called on the tropical man to labor for the temperate one represents a paradox of liberalism in action. In an article about the strategies that liberals used to exclude people in 19th century India, Uday Mehta writes,

> "In Locke, the grounds on which the inclusionary vision is anchored is the universality of certain purported aspects of our nature. These aspects by being minimal extend their reach over a broad, universal, constituency. Ironically…the grounds on which, a century

[67] Trace Devine Guzmán, "Our Indians In Our America: Anti-Imperialist Imperialism and the Construction of Brazilian Modernity," *Latin American Research Review* 45, no. 3 (2010): 35-62.
[68] "Philosophy of the OIAA," 2.

> and a half after Locke [in the late 1800s], people get politically excluded are also aspects of their nature."[69]

I argue that some fifty years later, the authors of the Credo employed this same logic. The main difference was that they did not represent an overtly imperial or colonial power. In fact, they collaborated with elites of a sovereign nation—Brazil—to rationalize an extractive hierarchical labor model with liberal universalist claims of development.

The second observation is that the Credo aligned with political priorities of the Vargas government. The Credo authors called for increased productivity, technological advancement, and a commitment to country—all of which reflected the Vargas Regime's March to the West, a state-based development plan for the Amazon region. Seth Garfield argues that between 1937 and 1945, "the rehabilitation of Amazonia morphed from a localized oligarchic longing into a state-backed crusade. Experts trumpeted the potential of science, technology, and state planning to remake nature and society in the Amazon." [70] The state committed to the cultural and economic "development" of the region. Vargas launched the March to the West in 1938. By building infrastructure, providing healthcare, and "educating" the Indians of the Amazon, the Vargas government believed that it could unify Brazilian national identity by including Indians. An additional benefit, the logic went, was that a healthier, more industrialized Amazon would benefit the Brazilian economy.

On September 3 and 4 of 1942, at least ten Brazilian newspapers ran articles about the signing of the Agreement for the Development of Foodstuffs—the creation of the FSD—that had

---

[69] Mehta, 76.
[70] Seth Garfield, *In Search of the Amazon: Brazil, the United States, and the Nature of a Region* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 9-10.

just occurred. The language of the articles was similar throughout, as they included entire paragraphs of the government press release. But the headlines differed: the Rio-based *Gazeta de Notícias* wrote, "A Collaboration with the United States on the Recharge of Amazonia," while *Jornal do Brasil* wrote, "Agreement Will Have Vital Importance for the Development of Amazonia." The majority of the articles included celebratory government language that the agreement meant "more production, more work, and more prosperity" and a "faster progress" for Brazil.[71]

The public attention directed at the signing of the FSD brought the north and west of Brazil, and its indigenous residents, into the national story, while championing the potential benefits of productive Indian labor. Garfield writes, "As part of [Vargas's] multifaceted project to construct a new Brazil—more economically independent, politically integrated, and socially unified—Vargas set his sights on its aboriginal inhabitants for their symbolic value."[72] The publicity surrounding the FSD agreement reflected those categorizations, as the newspapers spoke of increased rubber output, centralized control under the direction of the Minister of Agriculture, and lauded the agreement as increasing the "development" of the Brazilian nation. The newspaper coverage of the Agreement shows that the aims of the FSD aligned with the political agenda of the Vargas regime at the time.

The articles also reveal that the Vargas government and the OIAA agreed that the rhetorical justification for "development" was the idea that the means to a better life was the

---

[71] Newspaper Clippings, Sep. 1942, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.
[72] Garfield, "The Roots of a Plant that Today Is Brazil," 747.

expansion of a capitalist economy. The authors of the Credo reiterated the point that the financial empowerment of the regular "Latin American man" was paramount to national progress.

> "I am acquiring for myself and my children:
>
> 1) A better standard of living
>   a. An opportunity to advance my own country"

The authors tied "advance of my own country" to the increase of individual citizens' buying power and consumption. The association between national progress and individual buying power was central to the theory of development that the Credo and the Vargas government promoted. As a Brazilian delegate to Conference on Food and Agriculture in Hot Springs, Virginia, wrote in an internal memo in 1943, "The basis of a campaign for rational food, for the increase of agricultural production and for the good circulation of products throughout the world, indirectly promises to raise the standard of living of all peoples."[73] The conference, which lasted about a month in May and June of 1943, produced the framework for the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.[74]

The commitment of the Vargas regime to the principles of the Credo upends the idea of a neo-imperial U.S. that imposed itself on a vulnerable Brazil. Instead, the similarities between the Credo and the March to the West demonstrate how a complex network of elites—Brazilian, American, and otherwise—believed in the imposition of an economic and political system on the poor that benefited those elites under the guise of a universal, true path to development. In my material analysis of the FSD (chapter 2), the evidence shows that the behavior of FSD executives reflected Kyle's temperate/tropical divide, where national boundaries were less important than

---

[73] Bellere to Oswaldo Aranha, May 1943, Official Documents, "*Conferencia de Alimentção e Agricultura*: 1944 to 1946," 80.1.17, Archives of the Itamaraty, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

[74] Amy L. S. Staples, *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945-1965* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2006), 61-66.

distinctions between an urban political and economic elite and a rural agricultural subaltern. In other words, a binational group of elites worked together to manage the poor with the universalist language of the Credo as the rhetorical bedrock of its behavior.

Finally, I invoke the Credo as an example of economics-based development doctrine as evidence for a more ambitious claim that I make about the history of humanitarianism and development. The claim is that the Credo represented a theory of development based on the logic of free markets and technical expertise as a form of governance *before* the Cold War. Many scholars of humanitarianism argue that the "doctrine" of economic development was a product of the Cold War—of a developed world figuring out how to approach the newly formed, decolonized Third World while warding off Communism. For example, Michael Barnett writes:

> "…after World War II, development, at least as a project, took off. What was good for the state in the West was now good for the state in the developing world; in fact, late-industrializing countries needed a more active and muscular state to mobilize the needed resources and channel them to the right sectors. There emerged a new field of development economics and a cadre of development economists preaching that the science of economics, with its universal and timeless insights, could benefit the Third World."[75]

I trouble this temporality, and instead show that the seeds of development economics appeared during World War II, well before the tensions of the Cold War. I am borrowing from James Scott's arguments about mid-twentieth century "high-modernist ideology," which he defines as "a strong, one might even say muscle-bound, version of the self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and, above all, the rational design of social order

---

[75] Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 100.

commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws."[76] Scott shows that elite practitioners of high modernism, especially in imperial contexts, aligned state-run development with their own political and economic interests. If one accepts those claims, the FSD becomes a rich example of the practice of high-modernist ideology; U.S. elites collaborated with authoritarian rulers to impose a model of development grounded in the truth of science and technology. Later in this thesis, I show how it failed, as many high modernist attempts did.

Whether we call it "high modernism" or economic humanitarianism, Brazilian and American architects of the FSD professed the tenets of market-based development couched in the language of "standards of living" and "science and technology." I will show in the coming pages how this doctrine played out in the operations of the FSD. For now, I want the reader to keep in mind that these moments are component parts of a larger narrative about the making of a new humanitarianism and new model of global governance.

Truth in the Hands of Experts: The Agreement

On September 3, 1942, the U.S. and Brazil entered into "The Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and of the United States of Brazil, for the Development of Food Stuffs Production in Brazil, Especially in the States in the Amazon Region, the North and Northeast, Including the Sate of Baía."[77] I have told the story of why, in the immediate, the two nations signed the agreement—a German submarine attack had frozen all coastal shipping in Brazil.

---

[76] James Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 4.
[77] "The Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and of the United States of Brazil, for the Development of Food Stuffs Production in Brazil, Especially in the States in the Amazon Region, the North and Northeast, Including the Sate of Baía.," Sep. 3, 1942, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.

In this section, I discuss the content of the agreement, especially its place in the progression of ideas about development that I have charted in these most recent pages. I want to show how the authors of the agreement created an organization that reflected a growing convergence between the OIAA and Vargas regime, both in worldview and in policy. I argue that through a shared a belief in the political neutrality and rightness of science and truth, U.S. and Brazilian political elites gave agricultural experts wide-ranging powers—powers that those experts would go on to use in highly political ways.[78]

The official signatories of the agreement were four: Jefferson Caffrey, the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil; Nelson Rockefeller, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs; Oswaldo Aranha, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Apolônio Sales, Brazilian Minister of Agriculture. The mandate that they conceived for the FSD was relatively simple: Those with knowledge about agriculture should travel to the Amazon and Northeast, funded for two years by the U.S. and Brazilian governments, to impart that knowledge. The intended result was a more productive—and, in turn, better fed—population. (Here, again, we see the rationale of market-based development.)

While the agreement's language gave operatives in the field broad license for interpretation of the mission of FSD, the authors outlined four general areas of focus: education, distribution, finance, and welfare. The majority of the six clauses that established the mission of the FSD were about education. The authors called for experts to provide "technical assistance," both in knowledge and in technology itself. The agreement calls for an "amplification of resources…designed to establish an efficient extension service, in accordance with the modern

[78] See Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

techniques followed in Brazil and in the United States." The "extension service" became a primary practice of the FSD in which experts travelled farm to farm to assess agricultural practices and instruct in new ones.

In the authors' emphasis on technical advice and educational outreach, they foregrounded science and backgrounded politics and nationality, at least overtly. They developed a model in which specialists with expertise in agricultural science, both Brazilian and American, would orchestrate the program with minimal oversight from the political elites, as they would stay stationed in the far-off cities of Rio de Janeiro or Washington DC. The underlying thesis here was that "modern agricultural techniques," and therefore the pedagogues of those techniques, were apolitical and transnational. Elite, educated Brazilians could possess the "true" modern ideas that the OIAA Credo described. Because the "truth" was universal, those experts could operate in the field with limited political monitoring, as they were not political actors.[79] As we know, the authors of the FSD agreement were a transnational urban coalition of political elites. Operating as such, they designed an organization that professed the "right" way to develop the rural poor by empowering a narrow set of experts. To return to Kyle, he wrote in his 1941 report:

> "…the key to closer relations with the people of temperate South America…would mean a division between them and us of the prerogative and responsibility for the development of the equatorial countries which lie between us and an alliance by which we would assure them protection against aggression from outside their continent."[80]

[79] See James Ferguson, *Anti-Politics Machine* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1994).
[80] Kyle, 4.

In the FSD agreement, the U.S. officials divided the prerogative with the "temperate" Brazilians of Rio de Janeiro, and vice versa. It was a combination, I argue, of the Kyle worldview with the Credo philosophy and the March to the West, out of which came a material institution.

The additional mandates for distribution and finance were very vague. In effect, they said: store food and finance farmers. These directives became increasingly important as the FSD evolved, though at this juncture they are noteworthy as yet another example of the expansive prerogative that the FSD agreement gave to field operatives. These agricultural experts were tasked not only with executing agricultural services, but also with extending credit, collecting debt, and managing expansive supply chains and trade routes.

The final clause addressed "welfare." It posited that the FSD should assist in the "betterment of the conditions of nutrition of the populations in the areas in which this Agreement is carried out."[81] Prior to this clause, the FSD mandates focused on production and supply, in which rubber workers (the producers) were the primary recipients of the increased output of food. This final clause was more humanitarian in the literal sense, as in it called for the "betterment" of humans in general, of "populations." The welfare clause failed to satisfy the humanitarian economics argument that I described earlier because non-rubber worker populations did not produce direct profit for the U.S. or Brazilian governments. Yet the welfare clause was an extension of the humanitarian justification for a program that benefited self-interest—an attempt to insert altruism into acts that otherwise served to produce economic and political profit. Feeding the non-rubber working poor was in the political interest of both governments, as it allowed them to assume control. Borrowing again from Michael Barnett, he

[81] "Philosophy of OIAA," 2.

writes about the paradox of humanitarian altruism/political control. "[A]ny act of intervention, no matter how well intended, is also an act of control," he argues, "Humanitarian governance may have its heart in the right place, but it is still a form of governance, and governance always includes power."[82] The authors of the agreement may have genuinely cared about the welfare of the malnourished Amazonian. But as I have showed, the Vargas regime wanted to centralize power and the OIAA sought to instill the Credo in as many Latin Americans as possible, for long-term political and economic reasons. The extension of a perfectly nutritious diet to all populations in the region was, of course, an impossible task, but it was one that, in theory, promoted the interests of the elites in Rio and Washington.

Through a consensus about the inherent rightness of development and the neutrality of science, the authors of the agreement designed an organization that gave broad license to U.S. and Brazilian experts to infiltrate the far-away, premodern land of rural Brazil. Those experts would bring cultural ideas about labor, education, gender, and more—or, in other words, they would bring highly politicized ideas about the right *modus vivendi*. Through science came politics and cultural exchange. Through transnational "temperate" cooperation came the "development" of the Amazon.[83]

Conclusion

First, I showed that the original idea for OIAA intervention in Latin American agriculture (the Kyle report) was grounded in belief that "tropical" people were racially and intellectually inferior. The report, I argued, demonstrated that the architects of the FSD understood agriculture as a vehicle through which they could impart economic, political, and cultural knowledge. As

---

[82] Barnett, 12.
[83] See Marcos Cueto, ed. *Missionaries of Science* (Indiana University Press, 1994)

such, they constructed a moral mandate to “develop” the people of the tropics, using a definition of development that tied labor productivity and export surplus to success. Lastly, the Kyle report advocated for U.S. elites to collaborate with their temperate counterparts to enact development—a lesson that the FSD architects went on to actualize.

Second, I contended that the U.S. Credo for the Latin American Man represented the rhetorical liberalization of the Kyle worldview. The authors transformed the overtly pejorative and racialized language of Kyle into a universalist discourse of aid and development. They dressed up two U.S. national interests—the promotion of the Allied cause and the philosophy of development economics—in the rhetoric of absolute truth. In doing so (in emphasizing the individual Latin American man and the “truth” of the Allied cause), the Credo empowered U.S. operatives to employ their righteous worldview as compensation for the labor of tropical people. The liberal Credo also reflected the agenda of the March to the West, which showed that Brazilian and U.S. political elites shared ideas about the merits of development economics for the ”tropical” poor. In other words, the underlying logic of superiority and development that Kyle promoted remained intact, while the Credo made the proposition marketable, actionable, and multinational.

My third discursive analysis handled the Food Supply Agreement itself. I argued that the document showed that Brazilian and American political elites acted together in a way that resembled the temperate/tropical divide that Kyle had imagined. In other words, Rio and Washington jointly developed a management system that employed poor rural Brazilian labor and land. I showed that the agreement adopted the universalist truth of the Credo and empowered a set of experts with it. Those individuals—the eventual managers of the FSD—ostensibly had expertise in agriculture, but I contended that agriculture carried a similar meaning to what it did

in the Kyle report; agriculture was a mechanism through which those experts influenced economics, politics, and culture, or the *modus vivendi* of the FSD recipient. In this same vein, the agreement created an economic, political, and cultural organization. In the next chapter, I examine how the loaded ideas that formed the FSD played out on the ground.

Chapter II

(Non-)Experts at Work: The FSD in Practice

In this chapter, I analyze four material events in the history of the FSD: a food crisis in Belém (1942), price control initiatives in Salvador (1942-3), educational efforts in Pará (1943), and a national trade strategy (1943-1944). I show that the FSD failed to significantly improve food conditions for the working poor in the North and Northeast. I argue that the primary outcomes of the program were the centralization of political and economic power and the implementation of regulatory economic policies (such as price fixing) that proved ineffective in local contexts. I also provide evidence that the FSD constructed educational institutions and technical services to disseminate knowledge and tools, though those initiatives did not alleviate hunger on a large scale. Instead, the initiatives created spaces for the exchange of agricultural ideas—and therefore cultural, social, political and, economic ideas. My source base only allows us to imagine the content of those exchanges. Finally, I contend that FSD executives, especially the North American ones, became increasingly interested in using the FSD to secure a long-term economic and political relationship between the U.S. and Brazil. By 1944, the executives of the FSD focused on creating permanent institutions and trading in major export commodities, as opposed to the "development of foodstuffs...in the Amazon Region, the North and Northeast."[84]

Crisis in Belém: Making the FSD Material

In the early morning hours of October 22, 1942, local newspapers in Belém reported good news. One-kilogram sacks of sugar, according to the state government, were scheduled to arrive at the markets. The Amazonian port city of 300,000 people had been in a food crisis since

[84] "The Agreement."

at least May of that year, and sugar—a basic necessity—had been particularly scarce. The German submarine attack in August, and its paralyzing effect on coastal shipping, had made things worse. After hearing the news of a new sugar shipment, city residents gathered outside of markets in anticipation. The crowds, as observed by a U.S. consul Edward P. McLaughlin, were "large" and "patient."[85]

All day they waited. No sugar came. As dusk arrived, McLaughlin claimed that the crowds became "mobs." One group marched to the official residence of the Interventor, the Vargas-appointed governor of the state, to demand sugar. Another group demonstrated in front of the home of General Zenóbio da Costa, the commander of the Brazilian federal military in Belém. The consul stated that the protests proliferated throughout the city.

At the Interventor's residence, where McLaughlin described the demonstration as particularly impassioned, police intervened. The encounter turned violent. Protesters injured police officers, and police officers injured protesters. Somewhere in the commotion, an old woman was trampled to death. Eventually the police succeeded in dissipating the crowd, all of whom remained without sugar.

Writing from Belém in the late evening, McLaughlin remarked, "It appears that the people generally attribute this situation to the local State Government's ineffectiveness. It is understood that several food ships are due shortly from the south which, if true, will be most helpful in the present situation."[86] Eight days later on October 30, a ship carrying 3600 tons of

---

[85] Edward D. McLaughlin, "Sugar Riots in Belém, October 22, 1942," October 24, 1942, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.
[86] Ibid.

food, purchased by the Rubber Reserve Company, arrived in the city.[87] The food shortage was so dire throughout the Amazon that Belém only received a portion of the goods, the rest going to the state governments of Pará, Acre, and Amazonas, as well as to the municipal government of Porto Velho. For the first time since the founding of the FSD, foodstuffs paid for by the U.S. were reaching the Amazon basin, providing short-term relief to hundreds of thousands.

The 3600 tons of food that arrived in Belém on October 30, 1942, was not intended for the general population of the Amazon. The Rubber Reserve Company (RRC), a U.S. government corporation that purchased some 50,000 tons of rubber a month for the war effort, purchased the goods with the intention feeding rubber workers with it.[88] But the food crisis was so dire that FSD officials requested permission to usurp the foodstuffs for general use. The Brazilian FSD executives insisted that if general populations were to receive this food, the U.S. could not distribute it. As a solution, the Brazilians bought the food from the Rubber Reserve Corporation and distributed it on their own. "Their political feeling in this matter," Caffrey wrote in a memo to Washington, "might be compared to the political reaction we would have if the British Government were to buy food in the United States and engage in the direct distribution of food in the Mississippi Valley and in the city of New Orleans to relieve a temporary shortage caused by war shipping conditions."[89] Even the Americans agreed that the act appeared too imperial.

For the malnourished resident of Belém, the newly arrived food had nothing to do with the U.S. or the FSD. Local and state governments distributed it, as they had promised to do on October 22. Two more shipments of food would arrive in the coming weeks, and the same

---

[87] Jefferson Caffrey to Secretary of State, October 30, 1942, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.
[88] Warren Dean, *Brazil and the Struggle for Rubber: A Study in Environmental History* (New York: University of Cambridge, 1987), 87.
[89] Caffrey to Secretary of State.

process of distribution would unfold. News of the impromptu solution to the regional crisis reached both Rio and Washington. By November of 1942, both governments had organized targeted agendas to formalize the control of food distribution in the Amazon. By December, those agendas were institutionalized.

On November 3, 1942—four days after the arrival of the foodstuffs in Belém—officials from the Bureau of Economic Welfare, the OIAA, and the RRC met in Washington to discuss the crisis. The meeting included an analysis of the problem and a set of recommendations. First, they estimated the population of the Amazon at 1.5 million, each of whom should consume 750 pounds of food annually. At this rate, the region would need 500,000 tons of food per year, and their estimate of current production was 100,000 to 150,000. They understood that their mission to enact a five-fold increase in food production in the Amazon was an ambitious task.[90]

Why feed all of these people? In a memo to the U.S. Embassy in Rio, an RRC official explains the logic, writing:

> "The formation of adequate stockpiles of food in the Basin will give the assurance of permanency to the program and speed the recruiting of rubber tappers. We feel that in view of the magnitude of the proposed recruiting program we cannot afford to run the risk of even a temporary food shortage such as occurred recently at Belém."[91]

In other words, the food crises of the Amazon, and the riotous reactions to them, constituted a threat to rubber production.

---

[90] Telegram from Defense Supplies Corporation to U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro, November 3, 1942, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.
[91] Ibid, 2.

The next question after "Why feed all of these people" was "What should we feed them?" Based on "studies of the food deficiency in the Amazonian diet," the group developed what they believed to be the ideal formula: vitamin-infused dried skimmed milk. "This would be mixed ten percent with mandioca or wheat flour and would serve to correct the main dietary deficiency of the area," they wrote.[92]

The solution, in the eyes of the American government bureaucrats, was clear: Provide hundreds of tons of the long-lasting, cheap skimmed milk formula to the millions of malnourished Amazonians. As a result, rubber tappers and their families would come in droves, assured by the absence of a food crisis in the region. Their final task was to figure out how to do it. Their answer: Create a central agency and manipulate prices. A singular group of educated experts, they believed, should orchestrate all food supply in the Amazon. At those experts' discretion should be the price of food, which they would fix to make affordable for the regular Amazonian.

While my source base for the Brazilian deliberations is more limited than for the U.S. response, the sources indicate two things. First, the Vargas government assigned one man to lead all Amazonian food supply programs. Second, the Brazilian FSD executives communicated to the RRC that they envisioned a long-term, regular relationship with the corporation on the issue of nutrition.

Of the behaviors of the FSD, one of the most consistent was the centralization of power through institutions. The FSD did not introduce this political behavior to Brazil. A defining characteristic of the political style of the Estado Novo, as any contemporary historical survey of

---

[92] Ibid, 3.

the era shows, was government centralization. "[Vargas] championed economic independence and the progress that would come from abandoning [individual] state-based interest," writes Robert Levine.[93] Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, the Vargas regime consolidated power through federal bureaucratic agencies that usurped powers from governors and municipal executives. The regime centralized messaging and by 1938 controlled some sixty percent of newspaper and magazine articles by 1938.[94] As the regime created powerful organs of the federal government, it "rationalized" them by implementing civil service exams and promoting technocrats.[95]

Most relevant to the FSD, the Vargas government assumed increased control of agriculture throughout the 1930s and 1940s. The government developed a system of *autarquias,* which historian Fiona Gordon-Aschworth defines as "semi-autonomous administrative units…established to supervise and direct the activities of selected areas of the economy and of society."[96] In 1934, for example, the government created the *Departamento Nacional do Café*, which regulated coffee production through commodity control, price fixing, crop burning, and international trade negotiation.[97] Through market regulation, the state controlled agricultural production.

Atarquias did not regulate staple foodstuffs. As Gordon-Ashworth explains, the *autarquias* of the 1930s and early 1940s instead focused on export commodities such as coffee,

---

[93]Robert M. Levine, *Father of the Poor?: Vargas and his Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 55.
[94] Ibid., 60.
[95] Sebastião C. Velasco e Crez and Reginaldo C. Moraes, Chapter 13 "State and Nation in Brazil: Old Questions, New Challengers," in *Reclaiming the Nation: The Return of the National Question in Africa, Asia, and Latin America* (New York: Pluto Press, 2011), 279.
[96] Fiona Gordon-Ashworth "Agricultural Commodity Control under Vargas in Brazil, 1930-45" *Journal of Latin American Studies* 12, no. 1, May 1980: 87.
[97] Ibid., 90-91.

cotton, and sugar. "Commodities such as maize, rice and beans, all Brazilian staples, were excluded from direct governmental supervision," she writes.[98] The FSD offered an opportunity for the Vargas government to extend its control of agricultural production to foodstuffs. By 1944, the FSD was attempting to treat foodstuffs as export commodities similar to cotton and coffee. Yet the Vargas government, in coordination with the FSD, began to amass control of the agricultural economy in late 1942.

On December 4, 1942, Vargas centralized power at the bequest of the FSD, signing a federal decree establishing the *Superintendencia de Abastecimento do Vale Amazonico* (SAVA, or Amazon Valley Food Supply Agency). The decree placed a Brazilian bureaucrat formerly in charge of national immigration, Dorias Vasconcellos, in charge of all questions of Amazonian food supply. The organization was to be headquartered in Belém. Its mission was to supervise the supply of foodstuffs "in view of the program of producing rubber and other products agreed upon in agreements made with the Government of the United States."[99] The director, Vasconcellos, was given a budget of 300,000 *cruzeiros* and sole discretion on all decisions, including price fixing and export control. Representatives from the Amazonian states served as advisors to him, though they had no decision-making powers. The decree established only two authorities with control over Vasconcellos: Vargas and "The Control Commission of the Washington Accords," or, in other words, the top American diplomats in Rio.[100]

The first acts of the FSD, and the reactions to them by government officials, show that ostensibly paramount objectives of the program—including providing food to rubber workers,

---

[98] Ibid., 89.
[99] "Report on Amazon Valley Food Supply Agency," December 8, 1942, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.
[100] Ibid.

educating people on agricultural practices, and spreading the U.S. Credo for the Latin American Man—fell by the wayside during this time of crisis. The FSD merely operated as a mediator between local governments and the Rubber Reserve Corporation to get food on the shelves of Amazonian markets. Over the coming years, the RRC and the FSD became increasingly intertwined, and both Brazilian and U.S. FSD executives employed the labor and capital of various government and quasi-governmental organizations to purchase, store, distribute, and sell foodstuffs—to both rubber workers and lay people. At an increasing rate over the course of the history of the FSD, elite actors with economic and political capital cooperated despite representing separate programs or entities. Often, the institutional organization of the FSD was unclear, even to the historical actors themselves. Here we see another example of how Brazilian and U.S. political elites conspired to manage the rural poor, as they had done with universal rhetoric in the official Agreement in 1942. The cohesive force that bounded these elite parties was a similar vision of development, grounded in the goal of increasing Amazonian production of goods.

Finally, the crisis in Belém resulted in institutionalization and political centralization, two central themes to the behavior of the FSD. The Brazilian FSD officials reacted to the situation in Belém by assigning "one man" to run all Amazonian food programs. The U.S. officials called for the "establishment of a single agency to control food supplies and distribution within the Basin."[101] Both governments wanted power removed from local and state boards and placed in the hands of experts that they selected. They accomplished this with the creation of *SAVA*. The institutionalization of the Amazon food project fit into the longstanding centralization objectives of the Vargas regime, as well as the U.S. agenda to actively develop the Amazonian region.

---

[101] Telegram from Defense Supplies Corporation to U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro.

Interestingly, the Vargas government did not include the "paramount objectives" that I mentioned earlier into the *SAVA* decree. The mission of the FSD remained to import foodstuffs to the Amazon. But now, a bureaucrat with the ability to fix prices was leading the effort.

After the Crisis: From Belém to Salvador

On April 8, 1943, Brazilian Minister of Agriculture Apolônio Salles sat down for an interview with a journalist from *A Noite,* a Rio de Janeiro newspaper. He had just returned from a tour of various Northeastern and Amazonian states, including Bahia, Pernambuco, and Pará. "I have the great satisfaction of saying that I returned less pessimistic concerning the problem of supply of these states. The results of the campaign which the federal government has carried on…[with] the Brazilian-American Commission for Increased Production of Food Stuffs (FSD) are now evident," he said.[102] After highlighting various destinations of his trip, he concluded the interview by saying that he had returned "more encouraged to carry on the campaign for increased production."[103]

Eleven days later on April 19, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull sent twenty-one copies of the Brazilian-American Food Supply Agreement to the Director General of the Pan American Union, a coalition of all American nations. The director gladly accepted the documents and sent one copy to each of the twenty-one countries in the Americas.[104] Five of those countries would organize Food Supply Divisions within the next year and half.[105]

---

[102] Apolônio Salles, trans. U.S. State Department, "Interview with *A Noite*," April 8, 1943, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.
[103] Ibid..
[104] L.S. Rowe to Coredell Hull, April 30, 1943, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.
[105] The Food Supply Division, A Summary Report," (Washington: Institute of Inter-American Affairs), 80.

The reports coming from the field in the first four months of 1943 did not reflect the narratives of success and scalability that Salles and Hull broadcasted. In this section, I tell the story of the food situation in early 1943 in the state of Bahia, one of Salles' destinations. While I am departing the Amazon for the Northeast, the situation in Salvador (the largest city in Bahia) reflected the one in Belém; a small set of actors controlled prices in an attempt to improve food conditions in a city that had endured food crises. And the central theme—one of enforcement problems and unreliable food supply—reflected the realities of many of the cities in which the FSD operated.

Price fixing in Bahia did not begin with the FSD. Local government officials—similar to the food boards in Belém—fixed prices in the early war years of 1939, 1940, and 1941. In the final months of 1942, FSD operatives, such as "agricultural analyst" Joseph T. Elvove, moved to the city and consulted on price fixing policy. The exact relationship between state of Bahia officials and FSD operatives is unclear, though my sources indicate that the FSD had the ability to institute authoritative policy changes. As of early 1943, the government only fixed prices on "staple" foods, including meat, beans, coffee, mandioca, milk, salt, sugar, and other goods that one could eat, in the opinion of the local government, on a daily basis. For these foods, the government set an "official maximum" per unit in *cruzeiros*, above which it was illegal for shop owners or farmers to sell those goods.[106]

The calculation of price ceilings was a difficult task for the government because dealers lied about stocks in an effort to conceal hoarded goods. The dealers then sold those goods once the government raised the price ceiling—making staple foods more expensive for the consumer.

---

[106] Joseph T. Elvove, "The Food Situation in the Bahia Consular District," Memorandum, February 3, 1943, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.

In fact, price ceilings only reduced the cost of two staple foods, beans and milk, between 1942 and 1943, with the prices of fifteen other foodstuffs increasing five to forty-five percent.[107]

In the eyes of the Brazilian and U.S. FSD operatives on the ground in Salvador, there were four primary obstacles to instituting effective price ceilings on staple foods: hoarders, speculators, black market salesmen, and rich people. As the FSD analyst Elvove wrote in February of 1943, "The black market operator, the private hoarder, and the speculating dealer who hoards his stocks in anticipation for higher legal prices constitute serious threats to the maintenance of adequate food supplies in the hands of consumers."[108] The final obstacle—the rich person—impeded food supply efforts because once price-fixed goods reached the market, the wealthy buyer would purchase in bulk before the poor consumer, who could only buy food in daily increments, could acquire anything. "Subsistence consumers, if they can purchase at all, are limited to buying for immediate needs," Elvove wrote.[109]

How, exactly, did producers evade price ceilings? The FSD operatives laid out two "favorite methods" of the dealer. The first was the dealers (either farmers or shop owners) would charge the legal price for a good but require a mandatory tip for delivery. Only those who could afford the good plus gratuity could purchase it. Another strategy of dealers was to bundle controlled and uncontrolled goods. For example, a consumer could only purchase meat (price-fixed) if she too bought olive oil (non-price-fixed). These efforts reinforced the barriers to food for poor people. Even if production increased or a shipment from the South arrived, dealers

---

[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid.

managed to sell goods at a market value above the price ceiling, at the expense of the malnourished laborer.

As one might expect, the FSD wanted to stop these practices. "…[In] a region where a large proportion of the people live on sub-standard levels of nutrition the problems enumerated directly involve the health of the people and the ability of the people to continue as wartime producers," Elvove concluded in a report that he co-authored with Jay Walker, the American consul to Salvador, Bahia. Their solution was for the government to place ceilings on all goods, not merely staple foods. In addition, they believed that trade should be totally regulated as to eliminate consumers that paid comparatively higher prices outside of Salvador or Bahia (or the equivalent for any city or state).[110]

Within six months of the founding of the FSD, top Brazilian and U.S. government executives promoted the program in national and international venues. Their endorsements were incongruent with realities on the ground. The government-ordered price controls in Bahia potentially increased food prices for the states' poorest residents. Contrary to what Salles claimed to *A Noite*, the FSD was failing to accomplish both its humanitarian and its extractive economic goals. But it was succeeding at broadcasting its theoretical model. As Seth Garfield writes, "For U.S. emissaries, a Good Neighbor's technology and capital transfers would wow the public in Brazil and at home, extend the Eagle's shadow over the heart of South America, and civilize the natives."[111] The "Good Neighbor" did not need to transfer technology or capital to extend the "Eagle's shadow." It accomplished those ends through propaganda, as it had with

---

[110] Ibid.
[111] Seth Garfield, *In Search of the Amazon: Brazil, the United States, and the Nature of a Region* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 88.

OIAA sponsored initiatives that brought Donald Duck, Orson Welles, and American radio to the Brazilian consumer.

Up to this point, I have shown an FSD that did not operationalize the educational aspects of its mission. The reader should not interpret this as an indication that the organization did not. In the coming pages, I explore FSD-led technical and educational initiatives, which were mostly rural and small in scale. What I want to convey is that in its first year of operation, FSD officials prioritized food supply in urban areas through economic manipulation. Here, we see a contradiction of ideas and action. The Credo endorsed development economics based in a universal set of liberal capitalist goals. FSD operatives indeed used economic levers to attempt to remedy the food problem, but those levers were anti-free market. Those policies, in turn, interfered with the functioning of the Brazilian agricultural economy and created an expanded black market. In Salvador and Belém, FSD officials wanted to stabilize food supply, both to curb civil unrest and nourish laborers. Neither was accomplished; the city of Belém, for example, fell into another sugar crisis in July of 1943.[112] The behavior of the early FSD was comprised of reactionary short-term measures that attempted to import food and manipulate prices.

Extending the FSD: Educational and Technical Initiatives

Between November 1942 and June 1943, the Brazilian Ministry of Labor's National Department of Immigration (DNI) relocated some 50,000 Northeasterners to the Amazon. In support of the DNI program, the OIAA published propaganda in pamphlets and newspapers about the financial and personal benefits of life in the Amazon.[113] At any given time, some 3,000

[112] John H. Burns to Jefferson Caffrey, July 9, 1943, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.
[113] Garfield, *In Search of the Amazon*, 105-106.

of those migrants worked and lived at a labor camp for rubber workers in Tapana, on the outskirts of Belém.[114] According to the FSD, the laborers received six *cruzeiros* per day, three of which were allotted for food. For four additional *cruzeiros*, the laborers could elect to work in a vegetable garden under the supervision of American agricultural technicians. The foreman of the camp, a Brazilian hired by the FSD, observed the laborers, and he sent the most promising ones to the rubber plantations of Pará.[115]

After transfer to a rubber farm, *seringalistas*, or rubber bosses, worked with *fomentos*, or "extension specialists" who worked for the FSD, to feed the newly arrived laborers. *Fomentos* provided hoes (17,000 of which the FSD distributed in the Amazon in 1943) and seeds (114,560 pounds of which the FSD distributed in 1943). If the *fomento* offered more than twelve pounds of seed, the *seringalista* owed the FSD the equivalent amount after the season's harvest. Some workers stopped tapping and instead labored with the *fomento* to build, sow, and learn to manage the new vegetable garden.[116] The FSD involved itself in each stage of the journey of the migrant rubber worker: recruitment, training, and rubber tapping.

The FSD operated additional educational initiatives in the Amazon. For example, jute growers in Santarém turned 500 hectacres of jute field into bean field, with the help of a *fomento*. In Bragança, about twenty miles outside of Belém, a large landowner requested that the FSD help him "settle" 100 families into a self-sustaining cooperative. Those families would then work in his tannery.

---

[114] Kenneth Wernimont, "The C.I.A.A. Food and Nutrition Program in Pará," June 30, 1943, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid.

The FSD also organized formal educational spaces to disseminate agricultural knowledge. The *Legião Brasileira de Assistencia*, an aid organization that an FSD economic analyst called "comparable to the Red Cross," opened a school in Belém. With FSD support, the *Legião* funded "Victory Garden schools," where Brazilian and U.S. agricultural experts rotated as instructors. They taught managers of newly seeded "Victory Gardens" throughout Pará. While we do not know the exact curriculum, the experts taught management and farming practices while also distributing seeds. By mid-1943, some 3,407 people had attended these classes.

The FSD itself also forayed into landownership and farming. Around a dilapidated railroad outside of Belém, the FSD purchased 1,000 acres of land, where it cleared the jungle and experimented with rice and corn crops. Kenneth Wernimont, a U.S. analyst for the FSD, was not optimistic about the future of the experiment; the fields, he wrote, "will be back in jungle again within two or three years…[the experiment] illustrates some of the difficulties to be met in attempting any large scale farming enterprise here."[117]

The stories of the educational and technical initiatives in greater Belém are helpful in understanding the "accomplishments" of the FSD. The organization successfully disseminated technical knowledge and tools to a group of rubber workers and producers in the Amazon. From an analytical perspective, the initiatives created spaces where non-elite laborers encountered FSD experts and their ideas, and vice versa. While I cannot show a distinct product or outcome of those encounters, the fact that they occurred demonstrates that the FSD behaved as a cultural and diplomatic institution not only in the high political offices of Rio de Janeiro but also on the ground in the Amazon.

---

[117] Ibid.

By 1944, the FSD claimed to have created "approximately 330,000 additional acres staple food production" in all of its Brazilian efforts.[118] Accounts from multiple FSD officials indicate that the Amazonian acres did not produce significant amounts of food—most definitely not enough to nourish a rapidly growing Amazonian labor force. In his 1945 technical overview of the FSD in Brazil, horticulturalist Kenneth Kadow, chief of the field division of the FSD in Brazil, described the land as "very poor and unbalanced minerally," and he wrote that the FSD farms "rapidly covered with brush" after one year of crop cultivation.[119] With that said, the farmland did produce corn, mandioca, rice, and beans that Amazonians consumed. No source material indicates exactly how much was produced, though the reports from 1944 and 1945 continued to describe a massively undernourished population.

The educational and technical efforts did not radically reshape Amazonian agriculture or even significantly increase food supply. Why? With the support of a first-hand account by FSD analyst Kenneth Wernimont, I show how local Brazilian political actors resisted the FSD. Those acts of resistance upended the FSD assumption that the Latin American man would welcome aid and "development." This teaches us a broader lesson about the hubris of humanitarian intervention and foreign policy. It also helps reframe the subjects of the FSD as actors that also shaped the direction and behavior of the institution. My analysis of the Wernimont report also shows that while the educational and technical initiatives of the FSD failed to solve immediate nourishment needs of rubber workers, the U.S. pursued the practices to establish an infrastructure of intellectual exchange and economic dependence that served a post-war political and economic

---

[118] Floyd E. Dominy, "Extension of Brazilian Food Supply Agreement," February 12, 1944, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37

[119] Kenneth Kadow, *Fruits and Vegetables in Brazil*, (Washington: Institute of Inter-American Affairs, 1945): 6.

agenda. If Amazonians knew about and relied upon U.S. aid, Brazil would be more likely to maintain its political and economic ties with the U.S. after the war.

In 1943 in Belém, the FSD attempted to construct a refrigeration plant and a pasteurization plant. Local political actors stopped both efforts. "This turned out to be too much of a 'hot potato' in local politics to warrant American intervention," Wernimont wrote in a June 30, 1943, memorandum.[120] He also complained about the powers of Brazilians in the control of the FSD. The fact that two of the three top executives of the program were Brazilian "[had] the effect of prejudicing the selection of projects in accordance with certain locally pre-conceived notions, not always without political significance."[121] The idea that tropical people—directly or indirectly—influenced the autonomy of the U.S. officials bothered Wernimont in principle. But it also limited the material expansion of the FSD. As historian Daniel Immerwahr writes:

> "Indeed, one of the reasons that the modernization/technocracy focus [of diplomatic history] has been so compelling is that it traces the failures of U.S. foreign policy to an ethical flaw: hubris, particularly the hubris to suppose that the rest of the world could be known and manipulated with ease by men whose understanding of global affairs came from abstract models rather than deep familiarity with other places."[122]

Immerwahr's general observation is particularly applicable to the specific situation of the FSD in 1943. The residents and politicians of Belém—those with "deep familiarity" of place—resisted the imposition of the FSD. And even the Brazilian elites, with a more moderate familiarity, resisted the U.S. actors within the FSD. The U.S. ideologues that conceived of the FSD

---

120 Wernimont.
121 Ibid.
122 Daniel Immerwahr, "Modernization and Development in Foreign Policy," *Passport* Sep. 2012: 24.

employed universal language that when applied in practice to local and national contexts proved non-universal.

In an ideal world, Wernimont would have wanted the FSD to be "carried out entirely as a North American project." He understood that this was not an option. Therefore, he recommended a shift in the FSD education and technical outreach—one in which its purpose was propagandized and post-war oriented while still branding it as a wartime organization. He wrote:

> "[The FSD] was a contract motivated at least in part to show the spirit of good neighborliness for a new member of the United Nations. Thus if we have paid too much for 'the whistle' in contributing two million dollars for the two-year contract,[123] we can do little more now than be sure the Brazilian-American Commission spends the money to the greatest advantage of the United Nations and of Brazil." [124]

In effect, he argued that the U.S. should make decisions that benefited the political agenda of the U.S. vision for a new international order. Those included, for example, repurposing money for U.S. technicians on the ground in Brazil and instead using it to send Brazilian students to the U.S. for agricultural and cultural education. The FSD indeed invested in exchange programs, which did not boost food supply for rubber workers but instead were intended to instill Brazilians (both the exchange students and the Rio elites) with a long-term commitment to the U.S. The FSD sent 43 Brazilians to the U.S. for agricultural training in 1944, and it built six "farm training centers" in which U.S. experts taught Brazilian agriculture students.[125] It also constructed "demonstration farms" in the Amazon "to show improved Brazilian management practices…[to] young Brazilian agriculturists." The FSD continued to justify its existence to

---

[123] He was referencing the idea that the U.S. had wasted two million dollars, as the rubber workers remained malnourished.
[124] Wernimont.
[125] Dominy, 2.

Brazilian officials with immediate war needs, while in fact its U.S. officials focused its resources on institutionalizing the presence of U.S. knowledge in Brazil.[126] While the war would end, issues of food supply in Brazil would not; it was therefore in the interest of the U.S. to establish itself as a permanent actor. Wernimont wrote at the end of his report:

> "A good many people, both American and Brazilian, are beginning to ask—"After rubber, what?" Pure farming, as we think of it in the states and even in other parts of Brazil—the raising of staples foods—is going to be a subsistence proposition here for years to come. The Amazon Valley should, however, be a good source of products which compliment United State agriculture. There are great riches….many of which are as yet undiscovered."[127]

In other words, the development of educational infrastructure was good politics ("a subsistence proposition") and good economics ("great riches") for a soon-to-be hegemonic U.S.

"Rice, Peanuts, and Beans": A Return to Trade

By May of 1943, U.S. officials had begun circulating memos about a new food production strategy. Despite the success stories being broadcast in national and international arenas, FSD managers in Brazil (agriculture experts and diplomats) recognized that local price manipulation and educational initiatives failed to produce large volumes of foodstuffs. They decided to return to the economic lever of the 1930s: trade manipulation. The U.S. logic went as follows: If export demand for Brazilian foodstuffs increased dramatically, farmers would ramp up production, which would provide food for local people as well as consumers in North

---

[126] Ibid.
[127] Wernimont.

America and Allied Europe.[128] As a top American diplomat wrote in August of 1943, "The objective is 'All that can be produced and procured.'"[129]

The first step that the OIAA took to accomplish this mission was to collaborate with economists. In May, FSD officials invited the Office of Economic Welfare (OEW) to "coordinate" on "food production activities." The OEW was a newly formed parent agency that managed a number of economically-oriented wartime divisions, including the Rubber Development Corporation and the Export-Import Bank. In July, the OEW sent Hubert C. Winans, a production specialist, to Brazil. The U.S. embassy requested that the Commodity Credit Corporation, the agricultural price-fixing division of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, also send representatives. In the months of June, July, and August, some six or eight U.S. government bureaucrats with expertise in the economics of agriculture—and not farming itself—arrived in Brazil. Economists and credit specialists joined horticulturalists and diplomats.[130]

In August, U.S. diplomat H.S. Tewell, the First Secretary of the Embassy in Rio de Janeiro, gathered together these new experts, along with experienced FSD managers, to form the Food Production Advisory Committee. The committee was designed to imagine and implement the new export-heavy trade strategy. Of the eight committee members, only two were experienced FSD operatives from the OIAA. The remaining seats went to experts from the OEW, the Commodity Credit Corporation, and the embassy itself.[131]

---

[128] "Formation of Food Production Advisory Committee," August 26, 1943, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.
[129] "Embassy Memorandum: Food Production Advisory Committee," August 19, 1943, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.
[130] "Formation of Food Production Advisory Committee."
[131] "Embassy Memorandum."

On September 20, the committee met to draft a detailed proposal before approaching the Brazilians. They reimagined the U.S. role in Brazilian agriculture in three dramatic ways. First, they abandoned the geographic focus on the Amazon, North, and Northeast and replaced it with an opportunistic method—the U.S. would buy exports from any producer. Second, while widening the geographic scope, they simultaneously narrowed the agricultural scope of the mission—reducing it from the highly general "foodstuffs" to three main crops. To streamline the process of increased production and leverage the specified knowledge of certain experts, the committee decided that it would focus its buying power on rice, beans, and peanuts. And third, under a new trade model, the U.S. would guarantee purchase of agricultural surpluses of those three crops at a fixed price before the growing season. Despite these changes, the committee did not call for any increase in U.S. personnel on the ground. In fact, they reinforced the idea that educated Brazilians were capable, with gentle guidance from U.S. experts. "It was pointed out that Brazil now has many capable agronomists whom with guidance from American Agricultural experts, already here, will probably be able to carry out any practicable program," Tewell wrote in an overview of the meeting.[132]

The next step was to approach Brazilian bureaucrats from the Ministry of Agriculture who would lead the program for the Vargas government. Preemptively, the committee sought to minimize a number of potential political pitfalls of the system. Tewell wrote:

> "It was agreed that no purchases of beans and rice should be made in northeastern States unless Brazilian Government declared definite exportable surplus, to avoid the charge that we are responsible for a food shortage in that area."[133]

---

[132] "Meeting with regard to the Program for the Procurement of Foodstuffs in Brazil," September 20, 1943, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.
[133] Ibid.

As I showed earlier, local political actors had resisted FSD programs in the Amazon. One concern was that the U.S. military personnel and Rubber Development staff purchased foodstuffs at artificially high prices, therefore pricing out Brazilian consumers. In addition, I showed that a problem of the price fixing strategy was that middle and upper class people consumed foodstuffs before low income Bahians could purchase anything. The new proposal from the committee, the Americans recognized, could dramatically exacerbate this issue. If the U.S. committed to purchasing crops at a higher price than market value, the producers would sell nothing to the local consumer.

On September 22, the committee met with seven Brazilian food experts to discuss the proposition of fixed-price exports of beans, rice, and peanuts. In his opening comments, Brazilian Garibaldi Dantas, a commissioner of the Washington Agreements, expressed two immediate concerns. He worried that the price that the U.S. proposed for peanuts was too low, and that Brazil had "no exportable surplus of beans, only rice." Despite these substantial roadblocks, the Brazilian delegation endorsed the program. "Brazil needs to increase her production and the United Nations need to buy it," Valentim Bouças, executive director of the Commission for the Control of the Washington Agreements, said. Dantas responded, "If we had a buyer like the United States then the producers would not be afraid of surpluses."[134] One dissenting voice—that of João Mauricio de Medeiros, an agricultural bureaucrat who later served as Minister—worried about the agreement's effect on the laborer. "We should study carefully the various problems connect with [a great shortage of labor]," he said, indicating the labor supply

[134] Report of the Meeting with the Commission for the Control of the Washington Agreement, September 22, 1943, at the Hollerith Building, 11th Floor," September 30, 1943, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.

could become both overworked and, in the eyes of producers, overpaid. No one entertained his comment.[135]

On September 30, 1943, the two parties signed an official agreement. The agreement placed all price fixing powers in the hands of a Brazilian federal bureaucrat—the Coordinator of Economic Mobilization, an economist. It usurped power from local authorities, mandating that "…decisions issued by state or municipal authorities with a view to prohibiting or restricting the free circulation of foodstuffs…are revoked."[136] It also gave the U.S. the "exclusive right" to purchase surpluses. The third clause of note was that the agreement mandated that local consumption be satisfied before any surplus was exported—something that, as I will show, did not happen. With that, the agreement set export numbers for 1944: "80,000 to 100,000" tons of peanuts at $85 per ton; "100,000 to 150,000 tons of beans; even "40,000 to 50,000" tons of manioc starch.[137]

While details about the day-to-day functioning of the new agreement are scarce, all source material indicates that it was a failure—price disagreements, enforcement issues, and transportation problems plagued the attempts to sell hundreds of thousands of tons of price-fixed goods to the North Americans. On April 21, 1944, the Coordinator of Economic Mobilization—the man in charge—wrote to Tewell about the "great difficulties to be overcome before distribution and price control of foodstuffs can be effected."[138] Discussing the rice export portion of the agreement, historian Frank McCann writes:

---

[135] Ibid.
[136] "Coordination of Economic Mobilization – Administrative Order No. 133," October 6, 1943," Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Reginald S. Kazanjian to Tewell, April 21, 1944,Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Roll 37.

> "Theoretically, local need would be satisfied before any grain was offered for export but, given the artificially low level of consumption due to poverty, the sales agreement necessarily supported rice prices at a level that would discourage increased domestic consumption."[139]

The program failed to satisfy local consumption, while also creating political tensions. McCann continues, "…the multiplicity of programs affecting Brazilian interests and American agencies operating in Brazil were difficult to correlate or control."[140]

Indeed, the problems proliferated to the point that the Coordinator of Economic Mobilization abdicated responsibility for the program, which was receiving public criticism, in April 1944. He created a new organization, the "Metropolitan Supply Service," to handle the issue of fixed-priced exports. Recounting a conversation with the Coordinator, U.S. diplomat Reginald S. Kazanjian wrote:

> "…inner circles knew that the Coordinator was pleased to be rid of the responsibility as the problems were too great; and that the President was not well informed and made a mistake in selecting his son-in-law to head a department which would subject the latter to public criticism."[141]

My sources indicate that the program fizzled in 1944, as it was not mentioned in overview documents or official histories anytime after that.

The narrative of the price-fixing agreement is one of raveling and unraveling—a central theme of this chapter. A set of U.S. actors conceived of an idea, a set of Brazilian actors subscribed to the concept after they negotiated changes, and together, those actors struggled to

---

139 Frank D. McCann, *The Brazilian American Alliance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 401.
140 Ibid, 402.
141 Kazanjian.

enact the concept on the ground. In each iteration of this series of events, we gain new insights (or add nuance to existing insights) about how the FSD worked—and therefore about how diplomacy worked, how aid worked, how agriculture worked, how politics worked.

The price-fixing agreement was a resounding endorsement of development economics. It attempted to enact the most basic concept of economics—that demand creates supply—as a sweeping solution to problems of food supply in Brazil. They operated, at least rhetorically, under a basic tenet of free market economics: that a rising tide lifts all boats. They argued that the local Brazilian consumer and the North American importer could simultaneously benefit. Yet the agreement was profoundly anti-free market. In fact, it created, in writing, a total monopoly for the U.S. This tension exposed a paradox of U.S. foreign policy with Brazil that had existed since the trade wars of the 1930s—under the guise of liberal internationalism predicated on the free exchange of goods and services, the U.S. created illiberal, undemocratic policies and institutions that manipulated the market to the benefit of U.S. political and economic interests. What the price-fixing strategy further exposed was that it did not always work. As much as the committee wanted the U.S. to receive hundreds of thousands of tons of cheap Brazilian food, local and national political and infrastructural realities—combined with the inadequacy of hubris-laden U.S. models of development that relied on simplistic economic concepts—impeded that outcome. Of the many inadequacies of the fixed-price trade model, one was its inability to maneuver increasingly bureaucratic political organization on multiple levels: between the U.S. and Brazil, between competing U.S. organizations, between federal, state, and local Brazilian authorities, between U.S. organizations and local Brazilian authorities. Here was another tension: The FSD pursued centralization, and as a result, the competition to control prices and manage

foodstuffs expanded from rural Amazonia to the bureaucracies of Rio de Janeiro and Washington DC.

The final two points that I want to make about this anecdote relate to humanitarianism and the global outlook of the FSD. With the support of McCann's analysis, I showed that low-income Brazilian consumers did not benefit from the price-fixing trade strategy. As in Salvador, price-fixing benefited the wealthy, only now the consumer was the U.S. and not the local elite. In addition, the new strategy overtly abandoned the rubber worker and the emphasis on developing sustainable agricultural practices, departing from core tenets of the FSD that ostensibly served to benefit the poor laborer. Instead, the agreement set to increase agricultural labor by demanding more production.

All the while, the U.S. experts that crafted the program had a global outlook in mind. The intended result of the strategy was the materialization of a longtime U.S. interest: A Brazilian agricultural system that depended on U.S. demand to operate—therefore creating permanent reliance on U.S. consumption. As the FSD had done with educational institutions, a post-war agenda dominated the behavior of the ostensibly wartime organization. The experts regularly referenced the potential for the exports to benefit the "United Nations"—by which they meant the Allied nations. Here again we saw the U.S. advocate for a universalistic nationalism, in which they couched U.S. interests (a long-term economic relationship with Brazil) in international terms ("the United Nations"). The U.S. orchestrators also had long-term political interests in mind when they demonstrated a sensitivity to the potential negative effects of price-fixed exports on Brazilian consumers. As I showed, this concern was not humanitarian, but rather a political concern for how the Brazilians might react to a U.S. food supply initiative that in fact reduced the supply of food. The buy-in of the Brazilian elites was paramount to the

conception of the program as mutually beneficial and as universally applicable. To politicize the work of the FSD would be to expose it for what it was in this moment: a poorly orchestrated U.S. ruse to extract goods from Brazil and create dependence. In this sense, we can understand the FSD—and in particular the price-fixed export strategy—as U.S. experiments in humanitarian economics and foreign aid from which the blossoming hegemon could draw lessons when developing post-war institutions. How far could the U.S. go before the Brazilians rejected its efforts as neither humanitarian nor necessary for wartime? And for the Brazilians—some of whom at the *Itamaraty* were voicing skepticism about the intent of all U.S. operations in Brazil—we can understand it as an example of how foreign intervention produced negative political and economic outcomes.[142] Those negative outcomes, though, were overshadowed by dense bureaucracy, the fervor of wartime, and a commitment to the theories of development economics.

Conclusion

In the food crisis of Belém, I showed that the behavior of protestors caused the organization's first major action, which was a reactionary short-term solution to a sugar shortage. I argued that this was important for two reasons: First, it demonstrated that local actors influenced the FSD, and second, it showed that the first actions of the FSD prioritized makeshift solutions that relied on a small number of elite economic actors over educational or technical initiatives. I then showed that the response of the FSD to Belém was to consolidate and centralize power, in this case by requesting the creation of *SAVA*, an organization with wide geographic purview and broad discretion over economic controls. My second case study, the

[142] McCann, 402.

story of price fixing in Salvador, revealed that the FSD continued to rely on macroeconomic levers (price control and export/import control) to curb food shortages. Again, local realities such as black market trading and municipal government bureaucracy undermined the power of the FSD, rendering its attempts at control mostly futile.

My third case study returned to Pará for an examination of technical and educational initiatives of greater Belém. The programs were relatively small in scale, and there was resistance against the U.S. actors and actions from local and national Brazilian politicians and bearcats. But the initiatives created space for cultural exchange through agriculture, which was indeed a transnational moment. I argued that the U.S repurposed the initiatives with a post-war agenda, namely investing in elite intellectual exchange and the development of a small number of permanent institutions. I showed that this represented an abandonment of both wartime economic interests and the humanitarian claims made in the founding document, effectively reframing the FSD as a political and economic organ for long-term U.S. foreign policy objectives.

My final analysis centered on a national trade strategy in 1943 and 1944. The FSD abandoned its focus on geography and on the rubber worker and replaced it with a simplistic macroeconomic model that relied on monopolized demand for Brazilian goods. I showed that while it was theoretically the largest in scale, transportation issues and political bureaucracy impeded its ability to function and eventually led to its demise. The strategy, I contended, represented a number of the behaviors that defined the FSD in material practice: political centralization, U.S. hubris that disregarded local realities, contradictions between universalist/free market rhetoric and nationalist/monopolist practice, complicity between U.S. and Brazilian elites, and a failure of humanitarian economics to produce humanitarian outcomes.

The trade strategy was the starkest example of failure. Hungry people did not eat; agricultural production did not proliferate; the Brazilian government suffered politically; and the U.S. failed to insert itself as a permanent economic actor.

My analysis of the ideas and actions of the FSD produces no definitive conclusion about the success of the program. There were many people who benefitted from the FSD, such as shopkeepers in Salvador who increased profits by selling to the black market, Brazilian bureaucrats who furthered their careers through *SAVA*, rice farmers who grew and sold more crop, or rubber tappers on *estradas* in Pará who ate vegetables from an FSD garden. There were also people for whom the FSD made life harder, such as poor consumers in Salvador who were priced out of food, Brazilian bureaucrats who were blamed for the failures of trade agreements with the U.S., laborers who had to produce larger rice crops, or those same rubber tappers on *estradas* in Pará who were coerced into migrating to the Amazon, where they had to labor to provide goods for a war in Europe. In short, the FSD created outcomes that, like the motives of its founders, expanded beyond food and into the political, economic, social, and cultural lives of the people it involved.

The successes and failures of the FSD were not lost in the government buildings of Rio or the fields of Pará. In Hot Springs, Virginia in 1943 and in Quebec City, Canada, in 1945, Brazilian and U.S. delegates were busy informing the United Nations about the FSD. As I discuss in my conclusion, the ideas of the FSD—now influenced by three years of material practice—found their way into the making of a new model of global governance of food supply. Now that I have examined closely one case (the FSD), we can zoom back out to transnational politics and world orders. Our intimate familiarity with the FSD helps us understand those concepts in two ways. First, the stories that I have told are useful as traditional historical

evidence to connect the FSD with the architects of the United Nations, specifically the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). And second, we can use the FSD as a prism to understand the FAO and, by extension, geopolitics and humanitarianism. My analysis of the FSD gave meaning to the pervasive language of "development"—of "production," "welfare," "tropical environments," "cooperation," and more—with material examples of the deployment of those ideas in a specific historical moment. The FSD was not the only example, though its contemporaneous counterparts likely had similarities. Our one case study provides a story that gives specificity to abstract ideas—ideas that outlived the organization itself.

Conclusion

Hanging Together: The FSD and the "Birth of Development"

Around nine o'clock at night on May 18, 1943, Nelson Rockefeller addressed a room full of businessmen at the Chamber of Commerce in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. His topic was "The Americas in War and In Peace." In his opening sentences, he offered a Benjamin Franklin quote: "We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately."[143]

After some thousand words on the history of the Good Neighbor Policy, the OIAA, and potential business opportunities in Latin America, Rockefeller came to his final point: inter-American relations after the war. He said:

> "As I see it, there must be a political framework supported by intelligent and enlightened opinions throughout the 21 republics, which will allow the maximum development and integration of an economic life based on the freedom of individual initiative, and moving toward a rising standard of living. There must be, in addition, a rational program for improving food distribution…"[144]

The benefit of such a framework, he continued, was the "growth of democracy" and an atmosphere for "commerce and trade to flourish." Rockefeller echoed Edwin Kyle, the Credo for the Latin American Man, and the Agreement itself. Like the puppeteers of the FSD, Rockefeller believed that an enlightened political and economic elite could develop the poor while simultaneously promoting their own personal and national interests. The model for peace and prosperity was development economics, couched in a language of liberal ideals. But Rockefeller's gaze extended far beyond the Brazilian Amazon or even the OIAA, as he concluded:

---

143 Nelson Rockefeller, "Speech by Nelson Rockefeller Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs at Foreign Trade Week Dinner Chamber of Commerce and Board of Trade of Philadelphia," May 18, 1943, Nelson A. Rockefeller Personal Papers Record Group 4, Series 1, Box 8, Folder 69, Rockefeller Archive Center.
144 Ibid.

> "Finally, it may not be too much to hope for that the system of international cooperation evolved in this hemisphere may serve as a practical pattern for the development of regional groupings in other parts of the world. Taken together, they might well form a durable world structure making for a permanent peace."[145]

The work of the OIAA, according to its chief executive, was a model for the post-war world order.

On the very same day that Rockefeller addressed the Chamber of Commerce in Philadelphia, delegates from forty-four countries convened in Hot Springs, Virginia, for the first United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture.[146] Roosevelt organized the meeting at the request of technocrats and diplomats who believed that food security was paramount to economic and political stability. The Conference produced the framework that became FAO, which was formally installed as a permanent arm of the U.N. on October 16, 1945, at a similar conference in Quebec City, Canada. The mission of the organization was the "achievement of an economy of abundance" that solve hunger through agricultural education and the expansion of trade.[147]

Newton Belleza, a bureaucrat, agronomist, and educator, represented Brazil at Hot Springs. On May 21, 1943, he addressed the Conference on the "food situation" in Brazil. The causes of hunger, he argued, were straightforward. Brazilians were "not yet trained to distinguish between a healthful and adequate diet and a deficient one."[148] In addition, poverty was "responsible to considerable degree for the deficiencies."[149] But the most important reason,

---

[145] Ibid.
[146] "FAO: The First 40 Years, 1945-85," (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1985), 8.
[147] Ibid., 10.
[148] Newton Belleza, "General Statement Regarding Food Situation in Brazil," May 21, 1943, *Conferencia de Alimentacao e Agriculturl: Copehague e Washington, Oficios,* 80.1.7, Archives of the *Itamaraty*, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2.
[149] The opening statement of the "Resolution Adopted by the United Nations" at Hot Springs was, "The first cause of hunger and malnutrition is poverty."

which he emphasized in his analysis of "responsible factors" for malnutrition, was production. He said:

> "In view of such factors as enormous territory, insufficient means of communication, lack of laborers, insufficient equipment, and economic pressure…our country has not yet been able to organize its production in such a way as to solve the food problem."[150]

The roots of malnutrition, he concluded, were of a "technical nature" and a "social nature." Implicit in his comment was that Brazil *could* solve the food problem, if it only could educate its people, alleviate poverty, and organize production.

At moments, Belleza's argument for agricultural development reverted to the foundational ideas of Edwin Kyle, the man who penned the agricultural survey of Latin America for the OIAA in 1941. Like Kyle, Belleza believed that the populations of the tropical areas of Brazil were in part responsible for its underdevelopment, an argument with a Malthusian tinge. In a May 25, 1943, report to the FAO, Belleza proposed racial whitening as a solution to labor supply. "…Only white races would suit the purposes of an intensified immigration policy [for agricultural labor], so as to avoid further ethnic complications in the formation of our people," he wrote.[151] (3) In other words, he made an argument that equated white European immigrants—and their ideas and capabilities—with development. While Kyle and Belleza likely never met, I use this example to show that despite the emphasis on the truth of science and technology, Belleza revealed at moments that racialized arguments of "temperate" superiority continued to undergird his argument, as they had Kyle's.

---

[150] Belleza, "General Statment," 3.

[151] [151] Newton Belleza, "Report of the Brazilian Delegation on the Headings Proposed by Committee," May 25, 1943, *Conferência de Alimentação e Agricultura: Copenhague e Washington, Ofícios,* 80.1.7, Archives of the *Itamaraty*, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

What makes Belleza's address most significant to this thesis is that he went on to describe the FSD as an example of a solution to the problem of hunger. In a section of his speech on "measures" to address hunger, he said:

> "Another campaign for proper nutrition is being set up in the states of the North and Northeast by the Brazilian-American Committee for the Production of Foods [the FSD]…This Committee, beside working to increase food production, also carries on the job of educating the people of those regions in the matter of improved food standards."[152]

Belleza and, by extension, the audience members who listened to his speech, knew about the FSD. Those same people constructed the FAO. While I have no source material that indicates if (and if so, how much) the other delegates considered the FSD, the fact that it appeared in the discourse indicates that knowledge about the FSD expanded beyond its immediate orchestrators and into a multinational, if not global, arena. In addition, Belleza's use of the FSD as an example carried with it the implication that an international, intergovernmental coalition could address the universal social and economic issues of hunger through development initiatives. He mentioned the FSD, for example, alongside examples of exclusively Brazilian agricultural initiatives, and he ended his address with a call for cooperation between governments; in other words, he did not differentiate between national/international efforts. He projected the binational FSD in a way that made it universal, under the presumption that any nation that believed in truth could agree that production and education created development. While the FSD promoted the national interests of Brazil and the U.S., Belleza used it as an example of inter-nation cooperation on agricultural development—the intended goal of the Conference at Hot Springs.

The aim of this conclusion is to suggest the possibility of a relationship between the wartime efforts of the OIAA and the "birth of development," which Amy L. S. Staples defines as

---

[152] Belleza, "General Statment," 4.

"a key moment in history when discrete groups of people with international stature, expertise, money, power, influence, and the best of intentions began working to better the lives of other human beings whom they had never met or known."[153] She and other historians point to the late 1940s and the creation of international institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the World Health Organization as the moment of the "birth of development." Historians also mark the starting point as U.S. President Harry Truman's 1949 proposal of "fair deal" foreign policy, which held that only through "capital, science, and technology…could the American dream of peace and abundance be extended to all the peoples of the planet."[154] All of the scholars point toward a new strategy of global governance based on the principles of economic development, which was characterized by professional experts who promoted the "liberal order" through capital, technology, education, and an endorsement of free market economics. Newton Belleza articulated those arguments, as had many of the central actors of the FSD over the course of its conception and actualization. My hope is to inspire future research that investigates if and how the policies and practices of the OIAA informed the "birth of development."

The FSD possessed multiple traits that reflect post-war developmentalism. Multinational political elites constructed an institution that promoted the economic and political interests of their nations under the guise of theories of development that relied on technical experts and capitalism. Technical experts then orchestrated the program by creating institutions for the exchange of knowledge and tools, and political bureaucrats orchestrated the program by manipulating economic markets. The outcome was a more politically and economically

---

153 Amy L. S. Staples, *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945-1965* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2006), 1.
154 Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994), 4.

intertwined agricultural relationship between the governments of the U.S. and Brazil, despite insignificant increases in food production.

My final thought relates to how the FSD remembered itself. On August 20, 1945, the OIAA stopped funding the FSD in Brazil after thirty five months of operation, and the program ended. My sources do not indicate exact reasons for its termination, though the end of World War II made the wartime mission of OIAA irrelevant, which led to a gradual shutting down of operations. In 1947 bureaucrats employed by the U.S. State Department authored "The Food Supply Division: A Summary Report 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947."[155] They opened with the "objective" of the FSD: "To further the growth of democracy by raising the levels of living in other American republics—this is the basic aim of the FSD."[156]

Nowhere in any of the roughly one thousand documents that I have read about the FSD in Brazil was democracy mentioned. The authors of the Summary Report were reading "the growth of democracy" back into the history of the FSD. Why? Could it have been because they wrote in a new political moment in which the tensions of East versus West, and not Allied versus Axis, characterized geopolitics?[157] Could it be that the authors took the model that the FSD created—development through inter-governmental cooperation, technical expertise, and market expansion—and inserted into it the political interests of the moment?

---

[155] "The Food Supply Division, A Summary Report," (Washington: Institute of Inter-American Affairs), 80.
[156] Ibid., 1.
[157] For multinational perspectives on the relationship between technology, development, and politics in the Cold War see Gabriel Hecht, ed. *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011).

Bibliography

Archival collections

Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, Centro de Pesquisa de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC), Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs on Brazil, 1940-44, File 832, Rolls 37 and 51.

The Archive of the *Palácio Itamaraty*, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

The Personal Papers of Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller, the Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York.

Sources

Barnett, Michael. *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011.

Bayly, et. al. "AHR Conversation: On Transnational History." *American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (2006): 1441-1464.

Bratzel, John F. and Leonard, Thomas M. *Latin America During World War II*. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.

Cobbs, Elizabeth A. *The Rich Neighbor Policy: Rockefeller and Kaiser in Brazil.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

- - -. "Entrepreneurship as Diplomacy: Nelson Rockefeller and the Development of the Brazilian Capital Market." *The Business History Review* 63, no. 1 (1989): 88-121.

Cramer, Gisela, and Ursula Prutsch. "Nelson A. Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs (1940-1946) and Record Group 229." *Hispanic American Historical Review* 86, no. 4 (November 1, 2006): 785–806.

Cramer, Gisela, and Ursula Prutsch. *¡Américas unidas! Nelson A. Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs (1940-46).* Madrid: Iberoamericano, 2012.

Cueto, Marcos. *Missionaries of Science: the Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.

De Castro, Josué. *The Geography of Hunger.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1952.

Dean, Warren. *Brazil and the Struggle for Rubber: A Study in Environmental History.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Dorfman, Ariel and Armand Mattelart. Trans. David Kunzle. *How to Read Donald Duck:Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic*. New York: International General, 1991.

Escobar, Arturo. *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994.

FAO: The First 40 Years, 1945-85. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1985.

Fejes, Fred. *Imperialism, Media, and The Good Neighbor: New Deal Foreign Policy and United States Shortwave Broadcasting to Latin America*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing, 1986.

Ferguson, James. *Anti-Politics Machine.* Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1994.

"Final Act of the Second Inter-American Conference of Agriculture." Washington: Pan American Union, 1942.

Friedman, Max Paul. *Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against the Germans of Latin America in World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Garfield, Seth. *In Search of the Amazon: Brazil, the United States, and the Nature of a Region.* Durham: Duke University Press, 2011.

- - -. "'The Roots of a Plant That Today Is Brazil': Indians and the Nation-State under the Brazilian Estado Novo." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 29, no. 3, 1997: 747-768.

Gordon-Ashworth, Fiona. "Agricultural Commodity Control under Vargas in Brazil, 1930-45." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 12, no. 1, May 1980: 87-105.

Guzmán, Trace Devine. "Our Indians In Our America: Anti-Imperialist Imperialism and the Construction of Brazilian Modernity." *Latin American Research Review* 45,no. 3 (2010): 35-62.

Hecht, Gabriel, edited by. *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War.* Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2011.

Hilton, Stanley E. *Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930-1939.* Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975.

Immerwahr, Daniel. "Modernization and Development in Foreign Policy." *Passport* (Sep. 2012): 22-25.

Kadow, Kenneth. *Fruits and Vegetables in Brazil: A Special Report*. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Inter-American Affairs, 1945.

Lafeber, Walter. "Liberty and Power: U.S. Diplomatic History, 1750-1945." In *The New American History*, edited by Eric Foner, 271-289. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990.

Levine, Robert M. *Father of the Poor?: Vargas and his Era.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Marcio da Silva, Claiton. 2009. *Agricultura E Cooperação Internacional: A Atuação de American International Assosciation for Economic and Social Development (AIA) e os programmas de modernização no Brasil (1946-1961).* Rio de Janeiro, Dissertation.

McCann, Frank D. *The Brazilian American Alliance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.

McGreevy, John T. "Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the American Intellectual Imagination, 1928-1960." *The Journal of American History* 18, no. 4 (Jun. 1997), 99-131.

Mehta, Uday Singh. "Liberal Strategies of Exclusion." In *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, edited by Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, 59-86. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

Mitchell, Timothy. *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

Moraes, Reginaldo C. and Sebastião C. Velasco e Crez. "State and Nation in Brazil: Old Questions, New Challenges." In *Reclaiming the Nation: The Return of the National Question in Africa, Asia, and Latin America*, edited by Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, 275-298. New York: Pluto Press, 2011.

Ninovich, Frank A. *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Prutsch, Ursula. "Americanization of Brazil or a Pragmatic Wartime Alliance? The Politics of Nelson Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affair in Brazil During World War II." *Passagens. Revista Internacional de História Política e Cultura Jurídica* 2, no. 4 (2010): 181-216.

Reich, Cary. *The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller: Worlds to Conquer, 1908-1958.* New York: Doubleday, 1996.

Scheper-Hughes, Nancy. *Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Scott, James. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

Smith, Joseph. "Brazil: Benefits of Cooperation." In *Latin America During World War II*, edited by John F Bratze and Thomas M. Leonard, 144-16l. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.

Staples (Sayword), Amy L. *The Birth of Development: how the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization changed the world, 1945-1965*. Kent: Kent State University Press, 2006.

Stepan, Nancy Leys. “The National and the International in Public Health: Carlos Chagas and the Rockefeller Foundation in Brazil, 1917 - 1930s.” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 91, no. 3 (August 2011): 469–502.

Strom, Ann Miller. “Kyle, Edwin Jackson,” *Handbook of Texas Online*. Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 2010. Accessed Feb. 20, 2017.

“The Food Supply Division, A Summary Report.” Washington: Institute of Inter-American Affairs, 1947.

Tota, Antonio Pedro. *O Amigo Americano: Nelson Rockefeller e o Brasil*. São Paulo: Companhia Das Letras, 2014.

- - -. “The Seduction of Brazil: The Americanization of Brazil During World War II.” Trans. Lorena B. Ellis. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009.

Vianna Moog, Clodomir. *Bandeirantes and Pioneers*. New York: G. Braziller, 1964.

Vernon, James. *Hunger: A Modern History*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Wlado, Frank. “Our Island Hemisphere.” *Foreign Affairs* 21, no. 3 (April 1943), 513-523.

Williams, William Appleman. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.* Cleveland: World Pub., 1959.