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From Nīya to the Ballot Box: An Examination of Post-Colonial Moroccan Feminism

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An abstract of
a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Emory College of Arts and Sciences
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Abstract

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Post-colonial Moroccan feminism is the result of a variety of influences on the country and her women. Of the forces, Islam is perhaps the one most closely tied with Morocco with regards to her political and cultural identity. The Moroccan monarchy derives its legitimacy from Islam and the King holds the title “Commander of the Faithful.” Political changes in Morocco include the 2004 Mudawwana reforms which brought protesters to the street on both sides of the issue, many using Islam in their arguments. This is only one of the ways that Moroccan women have come into the public sphere in previously unseen ways. Female political involvement has increased as Moroccan women win seats in Parliament as a result of the quota system. Morocco’s leftist party has a woman as its head. The role of women in the market, or suq, is also adapting and changing as the concept of nīya become a thing of the past and a reason for nostalgia. All of these influence Moroccan feminism. Just because Morocco is a Muslim country, does not mean that all feminism that takes place there is Islamic in nature. This generic labeling of all Moroccan feminism is inaccurate and misguided. There are a variety of feminist trends occurring in Morocco presently. These feminist trends can be categorized into three categories called Islamist feminism, Islamic feminism, and secular feminism. These categories are based on the ways that each trend uses Islam and its relationship to the religion.
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Author’s Note

I first became interested in the development of identity and realities of life for women in Morocco during a study abroad program at Al-Akhawayn University in Ifrane. Located an hour away from Fez and an hour away from Meknes, the University itself was in a small town where there was very little to do. Out of sheer luck, my roommate happened to be a relatively quiet, but friendly young woman who was more than happy to answer any question I had about the University and Morocco in exchange for some lessons on English slang words.

As we got to know each other better, we discovered we had an eclectic mix of shared interests that ranged from the royal families of European countries to trying as many different desserts as we possibly could. My comfort level with her grew, and so did the depth of our conversations. I asked her a variety of questions about her life in Morocco as she asked me questions about mine, but perhaps the real reason I became interested in studying Moroccan feminism was an event that occurred during my second to last week there.

My roommate and I were in the habit of talking for about half an hour prior to sleeping each night, and one night I finally felt comfortable enough to ask the question to which I was dying to know the answer: “Why don’t you wear a hijab?” Knowing it was a personal question, I immediately explained that she did not have to answer if she did not want to have that conversation. She did answer, and I will never forget her words. Her response was simply, “Why don’t you?” My instant reaction was to say, “I am not a Muslim,” but somehow even then I knew that was not the real reason. So I simply said, “Because I don’t want to.” Her response, using some of the colloquial English I had been practicing with her was simply “Same.”

It is because of this interaction that I wanted to examine the different aspect of female life in Morocco. For ease of study, I focused on the time after French colonization, because it was the
time period that I found to be the most interesting. That period in Moroccan history following colonization witnessed many rapid changes to the political and social reality of the country. This period also witnessed the most rapid development of the formalized feminist trends and sees the increase in large scale discussions of women’s rights and equality.

Additionally, the previously mentioned encounter encouraged me to look beyond the most visible aspect of Muslim identity in Moroccan women, the hijab, and focus on the numerous other aspects of the feminist movements in the country. Because of the growing politicized atmosphere surrounding physical manifestations and expressions of Islam, I did not want to add to the debate by discussing what is only one aspect of a larger social reality. I also did not want to encourage individuals to discuss a woman’s choice of clothing fearing that my insight may only continue the discussion of what is truly a personal choice on the part of a woman to wear whatever she pleases.

In many ways, I am thankful for my roommate’s openness with me and her insight into many different aspects of life in Morocco. I am sure I asked her many questions that would have been inappropriate and offensive had we not developed such a close relationship.

On a more academic note, the study of Morocco provides American academics with a rare opportunity to view the development of an Arab country after the Arab Spring in relative safety. Morocco, for reasons that will be discussed shortly, is one of, if not the last “safe” country for the study of Arabic as well as Arab culture and history. There is relative safety for visiting academics, and the people are open and welcoming of tourists and students alike. The country has been a popular destination for European tourists for decades given its closeness to mainland Europe and the history of the country gives it importance on a worldwide scale.
Finally, Morocco represents a region of the world that is still understudied and underrepresented in comparison to Europe. Scholarship originally written in English, for an American audience about Morocco is limited and what is written is often focused on the issue of religion, rather than on the development of women’s rights. Although scholarship available in French and Arabic is available, it is not often accessible to an English speaking academic audience.

In this thesis I am attempting to address the largest aspects of Moroccan feminist development. As with all scholarship, some areas had to be condensed due to time, but I have done my best to include a fair representation of Morocco as the country continues on its path to equality. The observations and assessments made in this thesis come from a variety of sources that form a corpus of data about Moroccan feminism through time. I have used my personal experiences in Morocco and participant observation, as well as Moroccan political party platforms and news sources. Additionally, data from sources such as the World Bank regarding employment statistics as well as election reports were consulted. Books, articles, and post-graduate theses written by individuals conducting case studies in Morocco were also read. Although not all of the sources directly related to feminism or were intended as feminist studies, their contribution to this work allowed it to be a rounded view of the current situation in Morocco for women.

In no way is this thesis a comprehensive collection of all available information on Moroccan feminism, but rather I used the consulted sources to develop a fuller picture of the sociopolitical reality for Moroccan women. The scholarship is based in an interest in the ways in which Moroccan women assert their identities within a variety of contexts and necessarily uses large themes present in the body of scholarship to create this thesis.
Safe Feminists

The feminist movements in Morocco and the United States share a variety of challenges in terms of their progression. In both countries feminism is growing in popularity and sociopolitical consciousness. The two countries also face similar challenges in the expansion of the fight for equality beyond the groups that the movement most easily reaches. The way in which each country can combat these challenges may be different, but through comparison, new understandings and insights arise.

In both countries, women are still fighting to be represented equally in politics. Both Morocco and America have high percentages of middle and upper-class women enrolled in colleges and universities. Women in both countries face a similar set of challenges. It is becoming increasingly clear that the women who succeed in both countries are the ones who come from backgrounds that are financially stable. This financial stability is often coupled with a relatively liberal family background in terms of supporting the success of young women. It also means that the women who are successfully fighting for their place in both societies are the ones who would be able to live comfortable and secure lives regardless of their success. Essentially, both countries share a feminist movement that is most easily accessible to women who fit a narrow profile.

Of course it is important to keep in mind that this does not hold true of every successful Moroccan and American woman. This characterization is not intended to ignore the effort and hard work that women have put in to become successful. Rather, the following discussion is meant as an examination of the true intersectional characteristics of the Moroccan feminist movement and how it relates to the same struggles faced by women in the American feminist movement. As both Moroccan and American women face their own challenges and struggles, the
individuality of each movement is not being questioned. Instead, the ways in which each movement can learn from the other and work together for the betterment of all women is the true focus of the following discussion. The goal of this discussion is to bring awareness to a possible course of action for feminists in both countries.

Perhaps the largest shared challenge for both the Moroccan and the American feminist movements is the way in which the movement has manifested itself as a game for the elite. Only those who have the luxury of partaking in the best that the country has to offer seem to be the ones speaking the loudest about feminism. Generally speaking, those who make the most strides for feminism on a large scale are those who have a safety net beneath them. They are the women who are well educated, come from stable family backgrounds, and have developed personalities that stand in contrast to, while also working within, the male dominated world. These are women who are otherwise respected in society. Their place remains generally unquestioned. In America, these are the women who conform nicely to the preconceived standards of race and appearance that most of society has deemed acceptable. In Morocco, these women are those who speak French fluently, who have attended the best schools, and who come from families that may not be in the public eye, but who are independently respected for their contributions to society.

Nabila Mounib is an example of this type of women. Mounib has become a face for the Moroccan movement for gender equality given her position as the first Moroccan woman to be the leader of a major political party. There is no question that her success has been the result of years of time and energy put into building her vision for the future of Morocco. Her efforts have not gone unnoticed and are representing serious change for women’s political participation in the country. However, her success is just one example of a woman who is relatively “safe”. In this context safe has two different meanings. The first takes the more obvious meaning that she
herself has a background that would allow her to be able to find employment elsewhere and make a living if something were to happen and her political ambitions were to fail. Mounib’s background in endocrinology and her education in France allow her a viable career path internationally in a worst case scenario. This relative safety allows her the freedom to fight for change in Morocco. Her choice to use her own relatively safe societal position to advocate for the expansion of leftist ideology, gender equality, and democracy is the hallmark of a true leader and activist.

Mounib is also safe in another way. This second meaning behind the word “safe” is the biggest similarity between American and Moroccan feminism. This is the area that both movements can use the experience of the other learn and adapt. This type of safety is not about the woman at all, but is instead an extension of the patriarchal society in which she acts. Mounib is a “safe” feminist because she conforms to her society’s standards for behavior, stretching the boundaries while maintaining her position well within societal norms. Part of the reason that Mounib could be so politically active is her base acceptance of the patriarchal society in which she was raised and educated. Essentially, she followed all the rules, and through her hard work and dedication, Mounib rose to a position of power that allows her to bring about the necessary changes to Morocco.

Initially this lack of resistance to the patriarchy sounds like a negative action. Particular feminists would argue that this understanding and this acceptance of conventional rules on her part is akin to “selling out” and to not really fighting for the equality of women. These feminists would argue that a woman should not have to accept a base level of patriarchy in her life in order to succeed. They are completely correct. A Moroccan woman, just like any woman, should not have to live with patriarchy as her societal reality. Sadly, this is the case. Women are still
fighting an uphill battle in the majority of societies around the world today. Instead, there is an alternative way to view Mounib, and other feminists’ use of their “safety” to create a feminist revolution.

Mounib, like the author of the paper and many other American and Moroccan female academics, can be viewed as safe in the eyes of men because of their participation in the institutional systems of education and politics that favor men. She is imitating a man through her use of the education system and its inherent masculine biases. On the surface this participation can be viewed as acceptance. Another way to view this situation, which is especially fitting for Moroccan women, is the use of the patriarchal system to dismantle it internally. The best way to combat injustice is to do so from the inside. By actively participating in the institutions that limit women, women can work not only to pave the way for other women, but also to change the structure of the system.

Through their use of the system to gain positions of power, women can, and already are, creating systematic change in their countries. Mounib is using the Moroccan political system to her advantage and attempting to organize individuals who think like her. She would not be in this position with this opportunity if she had not used the system to her advantage. However, there is a hidden danger to this. Because of the use of a flawed system, this path is almost always reserved for women who have the resources to attend higher education. This effectively eliminates much of Morocco’s rural population. This is where the intersectionality of different socioeconomic classes becomes a key issue to the feminist movement.

**Introduction**

The country of Morocco is located in Northern Africa on the Western most side of the continent. She is bordered to the north by the Strait of Gibraltar, to her East by Algeria, and by
Mauritania to the South. The country contains parts of the Sahara as well as the Atlas Mountains which experience snow. Moroccans speak a variety of languages including Arabic, Berber, French, English, and Spanish. The country has a population of 33M, according to the World Bank and a GDP of $103.8B.

Although the country is located in Africa, Morocco is linguistically and religiously linked to the Middle East. Morocco’s connection to the Middle East, as well as her proximity to Europe, put her in a position to be one of the region’s most prominent and progressive countries, yet something is holding the country back. In spite of Morocco’s relative homogeneity, especially in religion as 99% of the population is Muslim, the country still faces issues of inequality. Economic inequality is one of Morocco’s greatest problems and although great strides are being made in terms of education, she still falls behind in comparison to her European counterparts.

Perhaps it is her proximity to mainland Europe that makes Morocco’s position in the region flexible and difficult to pin down. The many conflicting identities of Morocco also affect the development of feminist movements within the country. Since Moroccon independence in 1956, Morocco’s sense of self-identity has progressed. Moroccans have managed to take aspects of the French colonizer’s culture and make them distinctly Moroccan. This ability on the part of the country as a whole bodes well for the development of large scale feminist trends.

Morocco’s diplomatic relationships with other countries also help to cement her status in the region as trade deals with major European countries allow for the import and export of goods with ease. The country’s business sector is growing and her major cities rival those of Europe. In every way, Morocco is a country poised to be Northern Africa’s jewel and a posterchild for the liberalization of a Muslim, Arab country. This, however, is not a reality, especially in terms of gender equality. There are a variety of factors holding Morocco back from achieving feminist
success. These factors can be found in Morocco’s colonial history, the social implications of Islam, and the political reality of the country.

The current scholarship on Moroccan feminism is substantial. Many of the sources include case studies and field research conducted by anthropologists about a variety of subjects in Morocco. This can be found in books like Deborah Kapchan’s *Gender on the Market*. Additionally, collections of essays written about the current state of Moroccan feminism have also been produced such as *Moroccan Feminist Perspectives*. This scholarship consists of multiple essays written by a variety of scholars and is often used to create an anthology on the subject of Moroccan feminism. In particular, this thesis hopes to add to the scholarship pertaining to the classification of the feminist trends in Morocco which is addressed in these works, but is not placed in the context of larger political movements in Morocco or in the context of colonization.

Fatima Mernissi and other feminist authors such as Leila Abouzeid and Zakya Daoud have contributed to the literature about Moroccan and Islamic feminism in general. Their connection to Morocco represents a field of scholarship that is about Moroccan women examining the feminism of their country. This type of scholarship offers insight into the development of Moroccan feminism on a larger scale and address questions of Islam and feminism in an international way. Finally past students have conducted research and written theses about Morocco and Moroccan feminism, including Emory student Jessica Lambert whose 2011 thesis discusses the impact of Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on Moroccan single mothers. Other theses have also been written for graduate programs by Katja Zven who would later write a book about her experiences in Morocco.
This current scholarship is often limited in scope to one aspect of Moroccan feminism. For example there is scholarship on the experiences of women in the suq, examining marriage practices, or the relationship between women and Islam. Not all, but many books and articles detail one aspect of Moroccan feminism. This thesis aims to examine the larger influence on Moroccan feminism and the current feminist trends in the country.

The current feminist trends that are present in Morocco occur in the context of Moroccan politics, Morocco’s relationship with Islam, and Morocco’s French colonial past. Morocco is in position to have rapid gender equality on a large scale, but still has man factors holding the country back from this goal.

**Islam and Moroccan Women**

Given Morocco’s geographic location, it is no surprise that Islam has been an important influence in the region since its introduction to the country. For this reason, understanding the ways in which Islam works in Morocco provides key insight into the social forces of the Moroccan community. Additionally, because of Islam’s great importance both politically and culturally in Morocco, it necessarily impacts the development of her feminist trends. This does not, however, completely justify the use of Islam as the only defining characteristic of feminist movements, as often comes with the use of the label “Islamic feminism.”

First the role and impact of Islam in Morocco will be detailed and then there is a discussion of the role of Islam and the ways in which the use of the label “Islamic feminism” can be misleading. These discussion will emphasize the importance of Islam to Morocco and they will also set the stage for a more complex and detailed discussion of the feminist trends occurring in Morocco. Finally, a brief discussion of the King’s role as “Commander of the Faithful” will take place with regards to the implications this has for Moroccan politics.
Morocco’s Muslim History

Morocco’s relationship with Islam is one of the country’s strongest and most influential characteristics. As mentioned previously, the Sunni nature and the commitment to the Maliki school of Islam have a large impact on the political and social reality in Morocco. Additionally, Sunni Islam is the most widely followed sect of Islam and has a strong following worldwide. The Sunni nature of Morocco places the country in a long history of religious development within Islam. Islam is not a static religion and the way that communities and groups of followers address the changes in the religion are indicative of larger social themes. Morocco is no exception. By following the Sunni tradition, Morocco places herself in a position to accept or reject certain narratives and to use these narratives in distinct ways. The way in which Moroccans remember and use Islamic history is key to understanding the social reality. This is especially important with regard to women within Islam. Female participation in Islam has occurred since the religion’s beginning, but the way that these historical narratives are addressed and implemented in the daily social reality is telling of the areas in which Morocco has developed her own relationship with the Muslim female.

The concept of Muslim feminists is not a new one. While the label of “feminism” is a more recent development, ideas about the equality of men and women and their capabilities can be seen in the development of Islam. As Islam developed into a religion, it came into contact with the social realities of various societies. The Prophet’s first wife, Khadija was a successful business women with an independent wealth and two previous marriages that had produced children. By all accounts, Khadija was the epitome of a modern successful woman who was raising a family while becoming increasingly independently wealthy. The legend goes that Khadija was the first to think of the idea of her marriage to Mohammed and proceeded to set the
events in motion that would lead to their marriage. In popular Muslim understanding the marriage between Khadija and Mohammed was one of love and loyalty. She is said to be the first to hear about Mohammed’s initial revelation. She is also credited with being the first convert to Islam.

Sunni Islam, like Shi’a Islam, recognizes Khadija’s early role in the formation of the religion. The Sunni and Moroccan acceptance of this narrative about Khadija, as well as the prevalence of the use of the name for children, indicates a level of respect for her. Additionally, it adds to the complexity of the idea that Islam is an inherently oppressive religion to women when the first Muslim is said to be a woman. Essentially, all Muslims to come after are following the lead of a woman who trusted and believed Mohammed’s revelations to be true. Additionally, the relationship between Khadija and Mohammed is often described in popular Muslim literature as a partnership, and Mohammed is said to have never taken another wife during their 25 yearlong marriage. This indication of partnership and loyalty between a man and a woman implies a level of equality in the relationship because, by definition, partners are equals. Given this initial level of equality between the Prophet himself and his first follower, who happened to be a woman, there appears to be a disconnect between the early relationship between women and Islam and the later manifestation.

Another example of women fighting for their place politically and socially dates back to the Prophet’s third wife A’isha and her famous Battle of the Camel which occurred in 656CE, about 24 years after the Prophet’s death. During the Prophet’s life, it is now widely believed that A’isha was his favorite wife, and she is responsible for the transmission of many hadith. Although the Prophet died after only nine years of marriage to A’isha, her impact on Islamic history is felt to this day.
The depiction and understanding of A’isha in the Sunni tradition is markedly different from that of the Shiite tradition. A’isha is arguably most famous for her leading of the troops in the Battle of the Camel against ‘Ali who was the fourth caliph, or leader of the Muslim community. For Sunnis, A’isha is seen as intelligent, knowledgeable, and well-educated about the traditions and words of the Prophet. She is referred to as the “Mother of the Believers” and a worthy role model for women. It should be noted that for many Sunnis, the story of A’isha is widely accepted without much thought for its implications on the place of the woman in Islam. There is a break between the role of women in early Islam and the accepted treatment of women today.

This understanding of A’isha necessarily impacts the development of Muslim feminists groups who have developed within the Sunni tradition, a tradition in which A’isha’s place is not questioned. This allows for the influence and place of A’isha to exist in a realm that is both historical and religious. Although the development of Islam took place within a context of strong female leaders, seen in both A’isha and the Prophet’s first wife, Khadija bint Khuwaylid, the place of both women exists in a reality that, while religious, is still rooted in history. While A’isha’s role in the Battle of the Camel placed her against ‘Ali and therefore cemented her place in Shia Islam as an enemy, she does not have the same representation in Sunni Islam. Because of this, Morocco’s “tradition” of gender inequality becomes more complex.

The reality still remains that within the Sunni tradition in Morocco, women have had to fight for their place in the public sphere, a fight that has been met with resistance based in Islam. This proposes an interesting dilemma as in the historical tradition, the very founding of Islam, there are strong female leaders surrounding the Prophet and who are obviously important to him. Rather than view this apparent discrepancy as a problem, it is perhaps better to view it as an
answer. That is, an answer as to the role of religion and history within the context of the growth of Morocco’s religious understanding. This strong portrayal of women is far in the historical memory, which further indicates that rather than viewing the apparent patriarchy in Morocco as a strictly religiously based idea, it is better to view it as a cultural development within the context of a larger religious movement.

To illustrate this point, it may be helpful to think of Islam as an accepted constant. Islam’s importance in Morocco has remained unchanged for many centuries. Although Islam itself has changed over the centuries, the Moroccan people’s acceptance of the religion in their daily political and social lives has not. As illustrated previously, Morocco’s political structure and legitimacy are dependent on Islam. For these reasons, Islam is not to be questioned. Its position, whatever it maybe, is secure and guaranteed. While the place of Islam may remain unquestioned, social realities in Morocco have been constantly shifting since the arrival of Islam. These shifts do not always occur in the same way or in the same area as Islam’s changes. As communities are not static and respond to a variety of influences, the many of these influence are not religious in nature, but rather stem from cultural and societal developments. Given the prominence and importance of Islam, all of these changes must either be rooted in Islam or be reconciled with Islam and deemed acceptable. In this case, Islam can be used and manipulated to justify the present social reality, regardless if it was actually addressed in the Quran and hadith itself. This situation also opens the door to various interpretations of the Quran and hadith to suit the needs of the community. Simply put, over many centuries, Islam, like any religion, could be manipulated and redefined to suit whatever reality was socially present, thus making that reality acceptable.
In the earliest years of Islam, the example of A’isha demonstrates women are respected as leaders. Therefore, it would not be a stretch to think that a completely religious understanding of gender hierarchy would allow for the idea that a woman is qualified to lead a group of people. This is not necessarily the reality for all Muslim communities and it is not necessarily the reality in Morocco. Because of this, there must be another, non-religious force influencing the way religion is understood and manifested in society. This additional force is culture. As previously mentioned, Islam did not exist in a vacuum, but rather came to Morocco after being influenced by a variety of different cultures. Islam, like all religions, took on a different sociocultural meaning for the Muslims in Morocco that would eventually affect the place of women in the country. Applying this idea to the understanding of the role of Islam in Morocco makes the understanding of the development of patriarchy far simpler than the complex place of women within Islam.

Islamic Feminism: A Misleading Label

Some feminists from Morocco, the United States, and around the world see Islam as the root of the problems that Muslim women face within their countries. For those feminists outside of Islam, these understandings may be flawed as they lack a complete picture of the dissenting opinions and interpretations within the Muslim scholarly world. Islamic legal studies offer a variety of sources for correct and legal behavior to be determined. First, there is the Quran, which is seen as the most important guide in the creation of laws. Its words and commands are to remain unquestioned. Next there is the hadith. The hadith are the recorded words of the Prophet and his actions which are intended to guide Muslims in areas that may not be addressed in the Quran. Although there are many other sources for law other than these two, for the purposes of this discussion, only these two will be addressed as their position is the most widely accepted in
Islamic jurisprudence. Additionally the complex nature of the development of Islamic law does not lend itself to an easy or quick explanation. Instead, for the purposes of this discussion, only these two sources will be discussed as they are the most frequently cited by outside observers as sources regarding the role of women in Islam.

When examining, using, and studying hadith, it is essential to remember that Islam, like Catholicism, Judaism and the many other faiths present worldwide, is subject to the flawed interpretation of individuals. The practitioners and modern leaders of religion, Islam included, are human. The history of Islam dates back to the time of the Prophet Muhammed (570-632). Beginning almost shortly after the death of the Prophet, various interpretations of his wishes began to clash. There were wars about succession of the caliphs, a debate that continues to be a divisive issue within the Muslim community. These wars are one of the many differences between the Sunni and Shia’a traditions of Islam. From almost the very beginning of the religion, it has been filled with debate over the intentions of the Prophet. This is simply the largest, most easily understood example of the division that can occur within a religion based simply on two different interpretations of the Prophet’s wishes. It also serves as an example in that this division took place during a historical moment extremely close to the death of the Prophet, relative to the present time. The Prophet is thought to have begun preaching three years after his first visit from the angel Gabriel in 607CE and his death occurred about 25 years after this in the year 632 CE. If such divisions can occur so close to the life of the Prophet, it is not outrageous to believe that as time passes, increasingly different and varied understandings of his words will continue to be produced and disseminated. It is through these various interpretations that Muslim feminists find their foothold.
The influence of Islam on the development of feminism in Morocco cannot be understated, but the recent coining of the term “Islamic feminism” over simplifies and in fact, fundamentally misinterprets much of the feminist activities in Morocco. Some groups of feminists identify as Islamic feminists and because of this self-identification the name therefore is correctly applied to them. However the concern is not with the use of the term for groups that identify as such, but rather the imposition of the term on any feminist movement that takes place in a Muslim country. This is often the case when talking about feminist movements that cite Islam as part of their reasoning and as a way to legitimate their movements. Just as Islam cannot be understood as the sole oppressor of women, it is not the lone savior or basis for many of the feminist movements in Morocco.

Arguably, some Islamic feminist movements use Islam in a similar fashion to those who use it to oppress women. Participants in these movements cite quotations from the Quran and hadith and use religious reasoning in many of their arguments. Because of this parallelism, understanding “Islamic feminism” becomes far simpler. It can be understood as the reaction to the use of Islam to oppress women. Essentially, the use of Islam by some self-identified Islamic feminists is the simplest way to combat the argument of their oppressor for the oppression of women. Given the importance of Islam in Morocco, it would make sense that the best way to fight oppression that uses religion to justify its actions would be to use religion to prove them wrong. Both movements use religion in a similar way, but for a different end goal. Because their use of religion is societally necessitated, it takes a different role in the feminist movement in Morocco, than if it was an additional source of legitimacy for the feminist’s goals. In order to get through to some opponents of equality, Islam must be a part of the discussion and in Morocco,
where political legitimacy comes from Islam, the religion cannot be removed entirely from the
discussion.⁹

For comparison’s sake, it is helpful to understand the idea of “Islamic feminism” as a label as something like “Catholic feminism”. Such a label sounds strange to many readers participating in American scholarly discourse. A similar concept applies to Islamic feminism. Arguably, this labeling of the feminism that has developed with in Muslim countries as strictly Islamic feminism can be tied back to a colonial system of oppression. The idea of colonialism and its impact on the concept of “Islamic feminism” and “feminism” in general will be discussed later. However, the example given works to prove that religiously based labeling of what is inherently a social problem, the inequality of women and men, is reductive and imposing of a single identity on those who are working to realize true equality for women and men.

In terms of a specifically American understanding, Islam is often seen as the single defining characteristic of any movement to which it lends its name or ideals. Because of this, movements, such as feminism as it is seen in Morocco, can be over generalized by the lay American person who may be unaware of the many different facets of feminism in the country. To describe the present iteration of feminism in Morocco as only Islamic, would imply that Islam is the primary focus of the movement as a whole. This may be true of individual feminists, but to label all types of feminism in Morocco as Islamic simply because the majority of the country is Muslim, would be to overlook the specific ways that Morocco has developed a unique type of feminism throughout the country’s history. To continue the analogy begun previously, this labeling is akin to identifying all feminist movements occurring in Italy as “Catholic feminism” simply because a majority of Italian people, not necessarily participants in the movement, are Catholic.
While it may be argued that Moroccan feminism is Islamic feminism because it exists and moves in a political sphere that is legitimized by Islam, this understanding is not completely accurate. While the political system may be based in Islam, this does not dictate that all social movements be based in Islam or take on specifically Islamic beliefs. Although the use of Islam may be necessary to convince some Moroccans of a movement’s legitimacy, and Islam is necessarily involved with political movements, this does not dictate that the direction and goal of the movement be Islamic. For analogy’s sake, the US makes a simple comparison. The US government is not legitimized by religion, but this does not preclude any movement that finds a source of legitimacy in a particular religion from causing political change. This is similar to Morocco where the government is legitimized by Islam, but does not preclude a movement who finds its legitimacy elsewhere from moving in the political realm, as long as no laws are broken.

The issue then comes down to a matter of individual choice and identity. The self-identification of women who participate in movements as “Islamic feminists” is not incorrect, because the identity of an individual is always self-determined. Rather, the usage of Islamic as a term to describe feminism becomes a problem when it is ascribed to movements by those who are not familiar with the goals and inner workings of the movement itself and label the movement as “Islamic” simply because the participants are Muslim. Feminism can exist simultaneously within many different contexts both relating to a religion and not relating to one, thus creating an oversimplification if the nature of a movement is externally attributed.

Feminist authors, like Fatima Mernissi, have written about the role of women in Islam and the relationship between feminism and Islam. These works often take a more generalized approach and discuss the hadith and Quranic quotes as sources of legitimacy for equality. Mernissi in particular takes the examination a step further and also incorporates the societal
realities and pressures that many women face, particularly in Muslim societies that interpret and apply the hadith in various ways. Mernissi herself is a Moroccan and is therefore indicative of the idea that women who identify as Islamic feminists are present in Morocco. Perhaps one of the reasons that the idea of Islamic feminism is popular in Morocco as well as around the world is because it is one of the first ways that the modern “feminist” movement was presented academically within the region. Almost all of the initial Arabic language academic writings about feminism have linked it to or been written in the context of Islam.

Mernissi is a Muslim. She is also a feminist, her understanding of women within the context of Islam is one that is based on a combination of her personal experiences and extensive study. Her reflections are indicative of a single view of Islam among many hundreds of thousands of views. Mernissi’s work illustrates the nature of Islam, and religion in general. A more detailed example of this is discussed in the later section on Feminist trends in Morocco. While God is believed to be infallible, humans, those who worship Him, are not. Error in human understanding is central to all religious practice, especially in the modern day. Interpretation and practice are all implemented by humans and are therefore subject to error. It is reasonable to say that through the many years that have passed since the death of the Prophet and the various interpretations that the true intent and meaning of the words in the Quran and hadith have been surrounded by many different influences. Even the most perfect of beliefs, when implemented by humans, become marred by error and human transgression.

The Moroccan King as “Commander of the Faithful”

The formal title of the King is “His Majesty the King Mohammed the Sixth, Commander of the Faithful, may God grant him victory.” In this title it includes the phrase “Commander of the Faithful.” This title indicates the perceived role of the Moroccan king as a leader for “the
“faithful” which in this case refers to Muslims. Historically, this title is given to the Caliph, or leader of the Muslim community. Presently, the title is more symbolic and represents a certain level of commitment on the part of those who have it to the protection and service of the Muslim community. The use of the title does not mean that the King of Morocco sees himself as taking on the role of Caliph, but is instead used to signify authority as a protector of Muslims.

The usage of the king of Morocco of this title emphasizes that the King sees himself and Moroccans see him as a protector of Islam. Politically, this brings even greater significance to the King’s connection to Islam. With his role as the “Commander of the Faithful” the King of Morocco has an implied obligation to lead his country in the ways of Islam. This gives him political and religious significance beyond that which is given based on Morocco’s use of Islam in her laws. King Mohammed VI’s use of this title, represents a larger commitment to Islam that extends beyond its use to legitimize the government.

Because Islam is used to justify the laws of Morocco, and the place of the King himself, the inclusion of a direct reference to Islam in his title should be unsurprising. Its inclusion, however, does create an obligation to the King. His power is no longer only justifiable through Islam, but he is also required to protect it, as his title would imply. He is to lead the Muslim community and theoretically be an example for Muslims to follow. Ideally, his actions represent those of a “good” Muslim and he models the behavior expected of the community in general. This ideas takes on particular importance in light of his relationship with his wife, Princess Lalla Salma, which will be discussed later.
Politics in Morocco

Moroccan political life is complex and dependent on a variety of factors. The nature of political legitimacy as well as the ways in which Moroccans exercise their political influence vary widely from person to person. As Morocco becomes more liberal and open to change, the reality of political life in the country is also changing. The past few decades have brought major change to the country in terms of new political trends and the rise of female political participation. The political landscape of Morocco continues to be one of the few areas that offers specific data about the place of women in the male-dominated sector. This data describes the political situation for Moroccan women, but data does not tell the entire story. As women find their place within new political movements and within established political parties, their role in the public arena of politics is just beginning.

Although women and men have equal standing before the law in that laws apply to them equally and gender does not prohibit someone from voting, the reality of political involvement in Morocco for women is far more complex. In order to understand this, a basic familiarity with the political system of Morocco is necessary. This will be addressed in the first section of this chapter. Additionally, the ways in which female Moroccans participate in the public political life of the country will be examined. This includes statistics about the number of women in Parliament as well as a discussion of the challenges and problems with the current political system’s handling of gender inequality in elected office.

Because of the governmental structure of Morocco, the monarchy retains a relatively large amount of power. The King’s commitment to gender equality will be discussed as well as his apparent partnership with his wife that is a first for a Moroccan King. The Mudawwana, or family code of Morocco, will be addressed also. The Mudawwana is often cited as one of the
most liberal family codes of the region. The role of the Mudawwana and its shortcomings will be discussed. Finally, Morocco’s political future will be with regards to the section of the population forgotten by the Mudawwana, but growing in number and economic power. This new generation of educated and single Moroccan youth represents the country’s political future.

Introduction to the Moroccan Political System

Presently Morocco is an Islamic, social, democratic, constitutional hereditary monarchy. The monarchy maintains a certain level of control over the workings of the country, and the King has the right to rule by decree, disband the Parliament, select a Prime Minister, and veto members of the cabinet among other powers. Additionally, the Parliament contains two chambers. The first is a directly elected lower chamber, and the other is an upper chamber elected by local and regional councils, which are directly elected. Morocco also has a multi-party system. This means that most likely no one party is going to reach a majority and that instead, parties rely on a coalition government.

Candidates during direct elections for the lower house “are elected in multi-seat constituencies from electoral lists put together by the parties”.

The remainder of the seats are reserved in a quota system. About 30 are reserved for individuals under the age of 35, while the rest are reserved for women. Instead of being elected to seats as other members of Parliament are, based on area or region, instead, the reserved seats in Morocco are filled using a national list. These women on the list are elected to fill the reserved seats by a national vote, rather than one limited to a specific region. The problems that arise from this method will be addressed in the next section.

Morocco has a historically low level of voter turnout. Much like the United States, individuals must have their name placed on the voting rolls prior to the election in order to be
able to vote. Additionally, there is no guarantee that the elections are fair. There have been many cases of votes being bought by political parties. However, the most recent election in 2016 saw an improvement in the overall transparency and general fairness of the election, much to the surprise of international observers.¹³

Ultimately, the reality of the Moroccan government is that the King has the final say. Unlike other countries labeled as constitutional monarchies, such as the United Kingdom, the Moroccan monarchy maintains absolute power. How this power is used is at the discretion of the ruler at the time. The current Moroccan King, Mohammed VI (r. 1999 – present), chooses to exercise his power differently from his predecessors and often reserves his influence for matters exceptionally important to him, in order to keep a level of popular support.

The political reality of Morocco makes it even more challenging for women to participate, although about 45% of registered voters in Morocco are female.¹⁴ This same level of involvement on the part of women does not translate to their actual levels of representation in Parliament.

The Monarchy

Historically, the political rulers of Morocco have largely influenced the developmental direction of the country, and the current Moroccan royal family is no exception. King Mohammed VI has ruled Morocco since July 23, 1999, the date of his father, Hassan II’s death. The Moroccan monarchy plays an active role not only in the social and cultural development of Morocco, but in politics as well. The royal family acts as a guide and in some ways a model for Moroccan citizens. Although their influence is not absolute, they still remain a large factor in Moroccan public life.
The current King of Morocco is Mohammed VI (r. 1999 – present) is often tied to a liberalization of Morocco and an increase in the freedom of her people. In almost every way, the King appears to fit this characterization. He is well-educated, multi-lingual, and a successful businessman. He is often seen wearing Western style suits and is well-groomed. Through this use of Western styles, he displays a comfort with Western practices, but continues to wear distinctly Moroccan clothing at other times. He has attended school in France, but received the majority of his education at Moroccan institutions. His public persona is one of confidence, intelligence, and respect. This image is held not only by Moroccans, but by foreigners as well. Mohammed VI actively represents the changing face of Morocco. Mohammed VI manages to reflect the changing cultural and political realities of Morocco while continuing to hold fast to some of her strongest traditions. His level of comfort with the ways of the West creates an air of modernity around him, and one might mistake him for a European monarch. Through his actions, the King is aiding in the creation of a new understanding of and reality for Morocco, but he is not without his limitations and controversies. Although King Mohammed VI is making strides in his personal life and his public relationship with his wife, Princess Lalla Salama, he is not necessarily the major change for which Moroccan women have been hoping, a reality that will be addressed later.

During the 1960s, Morocco, hosted an international fashion show which included women in bikinis outside the Hassan Mosque in Rabat. During this show, women were seen in bikinis publicly and it was even attended by the sister of King Hassan II, Princess Lalla Nouzha. Through her attendance, there appears to be royal approval, or at minimum acceptance of the show. Again in 2015, Morocco showed the world her acceptance of bikinis on women when a controversial sign encouraging women not to wear bikinis was removed from a beach. During
both instances, the Moroccan government, with the support of the monarchy, allowed for the wearing of bikinis in public.

While it may appear that the Moroccan monarchy is comfortable with the idea of women exposing their bodies in public, there is a limit to their freedom. In both cases, those involved were distinctly not Moroccan. The swimsuits in the 1967 fashion show were created by a British manufacturer and the sign was posted in one of Morocco’s most popular tourist destinations. The similarity here is that the female forms being represented are not those of Moroccan women, but foreigners. Although it is a step in the right direction for Morocco, there has yet to be a large-scale acceptance of this type of public display for Moroccan women.

To a certain extent, the Moroccan monarchy is working towards a more equitable status of men and women. The King’s support and commitment to the Mudawwana reforms that took place in 2004 also shows that he is unafraid to offer a level of change for Moroccan women, but given its limitations, he is only willing to go to a certain point.

In spite of the monarchy’s apparent openness to the ideas of gender equality, what is lacking is a large politically based call for change. As the years go by, the Moroccan monarchy is increasingly dependent on the good will of a large number of people to stay in power. After witnessing the many revolts of the Arab Spring, and surviving the February 20th Movement, which included protests in over 50 Moroccan towns in 2011, the monarchy must ride a fine line between pushing its own agenda, and keeping favor with those whose support is needed to remain in power. The monarchy must be careful not to come across as too forceful or strong for fear that it would lose favor and therefore must choose its battles. Although there might be a public call to action for reform by the monarchy, those in political power include men who do not wish to see large scale change for women. Because of the political power and influence of
these men, the monarchy must mitigate its calls for reform in order to appease them. The Moroccan monarchy does have political authority to rule by decree, but in doing so, the King risks inciting a rebellion. His choice not to push for greater equality for women may not stem from a personal belief in the inferiority of women, but is rather a politically motivated choice. Unfortunately, women’s issues are not very high on the list of political issues for which the monarchy is willing to use its power.

This is not to say that the King does not make calculated political decisions to further the appearance of a strong Moroccan commitment to equality. One of these decisions was the King’s removal of the reservations that Morocco once officially had to Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). CEDAW was a convention called by the United Nations and was adopted in 1979. The text of the convention contains many comments on the status of women and their rights in relationship to men. The convention was designed to draw commitments to women’s rights form member nations. Morocco, and other nations, had formal reservations about CEDAW and how it pertained to Morocco in 1979. Later, King Mohammed VI would formally remove these reservations in 2008.17 This comes four years after the passage of the Mudawwana reforms that the King said made the reservations Morocco had to CEDAW obsolete.

The Mudawwana

The relationship between the Mudawwana and CEDAW is the subject of debate. It took 25 years after CEDAW for Moroccan women to see a change to their family code. While it is evident that the UN was ready to formally adopt the ideas of gender equality and wanted its member nations to do the same, Morocco and other countries as well were not prepared to do so without reservations. Many of Morocco’s reservations stemmed from a concern that the
guidelines spelled out in CEDAW conflicted with Morocco’s Islamic law. This may be the reason that change to the codified laws regarding marriage, women, and the family took a while to change. It is also indicative of a larger commitment on the part of Morocco to see that Islam remained a central part of her laws and practices.

The current Muslim character of Morocco is a result of a variety of historical events. Islam came to the region known as modern day Morocco in waves, but none of the early introductions of Islam were exceptionally influential or permanent. It is thought that the first contact with Islam came to the country just 50 years after the death of the Prophet Muhammed. Islam was initially introduced by those who were invading the area in hopes of conquering the land. Although this initial introduction of Islam did not have a lasting impact on the country, it indicated the prevalence of Islam in the region and the ease with which it could be introduced into the country. After centuries of contact, one dynasty in particular would cement the Muslim nature of the country for the future.

The year 1056 marked the beginning of the Almoravid dynasty. Under this dynasty, there was the unification of the Berber tribes and the introduction and widespread adoption of the Maliki school of Islam. The Almoravid dynasty allowed for the religion to spread across the country in a uniform manner. Through this unification under a single ruling power, Islam in Morocco took on its first role as a political institution, as well as a religious one. From the beginning of the history of Islam in Morocco, the religion has taken on a role that is distinctly tied to government and politics. This precedent was set early in the history of Morocco and paved the way for the introduction of Muslim beliefs and practices into the law. It also created the homogeneity of religion that is seen in modern Morocco. Today, about 99% of the population of Morocco is Muslim and the Maliki school of jurisprudence is still the most commonly
followed. This Maliki legal tradition served as the fundamental basis and source of legitimacy for the Almoravid rule, and because this has continued into the present day, the Maliki school of Islam takes on an important role in Morocco’s political development. Throughout the history of Morocco, various sects and branches of Islam have attempted to convert the population, but none of these efforts have been successful. Aside from just playing a part in the political and governmental life of Morocco, Islam is the basis for these activities and practices. For this reason, understanding the particular beliefs of the majority of Muslims in Morocco is essential.

The Sunni nature of the country, as well as the Maliki school of jurisprudence all impact the political development of Morocco and can be seen in many of her recent political developments. Because of this close nature, it is easy to consider every influence in Morocco as uniquely tied to Islam, especially in the political realm. This idea extends to social implications as well, with many believing that it is strictly the Muslim history and character of the country that dictates her social movements.

Sunni Islam is the most widely followed form of Islam, but within that group, there is still room for differences. The Maliki school of Islam is one of the four largest schools of Sunni Islam that are practiced worldwide. The many small differences between the four schools of Sunni Islam are for the purposes of this study, not relevant. Instead, it is key to understand particular beliefs and practices of the Maliki school for the purpose of understanding the relationship between the school of law and the actions of the Moroccan government and citizens. The Maliki School of Sunni Islam is often understood to be the most liberal of the four schools. This is because the Maliki School is “distinguished by an absence of strictures”. Strictures are restrictions on the actions of individuals, or in this case, Muslims. The Maliki school is also recognized as liberal because of its relative openness to the practices and beliefs of the other
schools. In the Maliki legal tradition there is a general acceptance of the beliefs of other legal schools and additionally, when there is no writing or precedent for a new occurrence within the Maliki tradition, the Shafi or Hanafi decision is to be used. This indicates a flexibility and openness to other ideas that has long been present within the Maliki tradition.

Finally, within this particular school of jurisprudence, there is a heavy emphasis on the hadith and the action of the original Muslim community in Medina. This reliance also extends to the companions of the Prophet Mohammed whose reported hadiths are highly valued within the Maliki tradition. It also indicates the importance in the Maliki tradition of custom and consensus. Consensus in the case of the Malikis means a consensus on the part of the community at Medina. The Maliki School emphasizes the importance of community and community custom.

As Vincent Cornell explains in his book, *Voices of Islam: Voices of Tradition*, the practices of the Maliki school are often adopted as the reform legislation of countries, especially as it pertains to divorce. This is because within the Maliki School, the laws regarding divorce tend to favor the wife in particular areas that the other schools do not. Morocco, as well as Algeria, Tunisia, and Upper Egypt, have all adopted these practices in regards to their divorce law. Although other countries have accepted the Maliki school to an extent, Northern Africa’s relationship with the school has a historical basis. Because of the nature of the Maliki school’s beliefs and their presence in a variety of other countries as well, it is best to look at the Maliki school’s influence in Morocco as part of a larger picture, rather than attributing many of Morocco’s advancements in terms of women’s rights to a strictly secular shift, the Maliki school is an additional influence on Morocco’s political and societal changes.

Regarding, governmental and institutional protections for women, Morocco is often praised as being one of the leaders in the MENA region. The most commonly indicated example
of this is the Mudawwana, or family code. The Moroccan Mudawwana is essentially a document that lists the rights and responsibilities of members in a family, especially husbands and wives. It dictates how marriages are to be considered legal, how to end marriages, and many other subjects relating to the family. The Mudawwana came into effect in 2004 and was largely praised as a step forward in the fight for gender equality not only in Morocco, but in the MENA region as a whole. For its supporters, the Mudawwana was seen as ushering in a new era in Moroccan gender equality. For others, it was seen as a small step forward, but mostly an attempt to placate those who were working for larger reforms.

What makes the Mudawwana so controversial is precisely what causes some to hail it as a salvation, the flexibility of the document. Like the Maliki school, the Mudawwana contains a level of flexibility that, for some, negates its advances. One of the largest issues of the Mudawwana are its so-called “loopholes”. The largest of these being the ability of individual judges to “consult the large and amorphous body of Maliki jurisprudence”. Because the Mudawwana does not specifically negate prior legal codes, there is the option for individual judges to pull from whichever legal code suits them. Although the prevalence of individual judges effectively negating the Mudawwana’s advances is not known, the reality is that this loophole opens the possibility for the entire document to become ineffective. It is with this that many critics find fault. In reality, it is unsurprising that a legal code so closely tied with the Maliki school would allow for this type of flexibility. Because Maliki tradition is deeply rooted in community and consensus, a level of flexibility is to be expected. The very flexibility that allowed the advances described in the Mudawwana in terms of the status of women, will also allow for their negation. In this case, the Maliki reliance on community and practice, may work against the advances that the same legal tradition intended.
The Mudawwana protects and provides a certain measure of security for women and children within its many articles. Perhaps one of the greatest steps towards equality is the ability of women to initiate a divorce from their husband for a variety of reasons. This allowance means that women are not stuck in a marriage that is harmful for them. Especially because the Family Code allows for physical harm to be a reason for divorce. Additionally, women and men are allowed to file for divorce citing “irreconcilable difference”. This level of freedom in the ending of a marriage is similar to that seen in the United States.

However, in spite of these seemingly liberal ideas towards women, there are still many issues in the document that imply a level of inequality or limit a woman’s free choice. In the section of the Mudawwana that focuses on the rights of children, there is a line that says that children are guaranteed the right to “breastfeeding by the mother whenever possible”. Although the benefits of breastfeeding are scientifically noted and studied, the inclusion of this line actually limits the right of a woman to choose how to care for her infant. Although it is unlikely that a woman would be taken to court and prosecuted over the choice not to breastfeed her child, the inclusion of this “right” for children implies that the woman in turn has no choice. While legal recourse might not be likely, the underlying assumption is that the woman does not have the right to choose what she believes is the best course of care for her child. This is accepted as part of the Family Code. Through the inclusion of this line and the wide acceptance of the Family Code, Moroccan society is signaling at least one area in which women are not granted the freedom to choose what to do with their own bodies.

Nowhere in the Mudawwana is there a physical requirement for men that mirrors that which is required of women. Additionally, it can be argued that some areas of the Mudawwana still favor men, especially in terms of the addition of a second or third wife. Although the Family
Code does allow a wife to divorce her husband if he wishes to take a second wife and she doesn’t consent, the reality is, many of the decisions surrounding a second marriage for the husband is left up to the courts. One example of this is the court’s ability to determine if the husband has the financial means to support a second wife. The first wife is not consulted in this and does not have a say over the court’s decision regarding the wealth of her husband.

Finally, perhaps one of the largest sticking points for Western feminists about marriage practices not only in Morocco, but in other Muslim majority countries as well, is the prohibition of a Muslim woman marrying a non-Muslim man as mentioned in Article 39 of the Mudawwana. This practice has been widely accepted as part of Islam, but the codification of this into Moroccan law adds new meaning. It points out the disparity between men and women. Muslim men are expressly allowed to marry Christian or Jewish women, while Muslim women are not allowed the same freedom. The inclusion of this in the Mudawwana is an example of the importance of Islam in Moroccan government, but it is also indicative of the inability so far, to let go of religious traditions of the past in the name of equality. This is not strictly a Moroccan problem, as modern US debates surrounding the way in which religious principles and traditions should be encoded into law are still very much present. However, what makes this distinctly Moroccan is the combination of this religious tradition with the “progressive” and “modern” law surrounding other aspects of marriage.28

Outside of the issue of marriage, there is another large inequality that is not fixed by the Mudawwana and is instead continued. This is the issue of inheritance. Currently, there is still the idea that daughters receive only half the inheritance of their brothers. Although defenders of this concept will say there are limited cases in which this type of inheritance division is used, these four cases are in fact, the most common realities for families.29 One such case is a family in
which the father dies and leaves a son and a daughter. In this case, the daughter would receive half of what her brother receives. Although the Mudawwana is in many ways progressive, this oversight is another example of the areas in which there could be improvement. With many Moroccan women receiving significantly less than their brothers, the perceived level of gender equality provided by the Mudawwana goes down. One of the most common arguments used to advocate against changing the laws on inheritance is championed by a Moroccan political party called the Justice and Development Party (PJD). Specifics about this party and their participation in Moroccan politics is not key to this discussion, but their argument as to the status of the inheritance laws sheds some light onto the relationship between the Mudawwana, politics, and Islam in Morocco,

The PJD argues that the Quran explicitly directs the rules of inheritance to be followed in this particular manner and therefore cannot be debated. Their argument works given the Islamic nature of Moroccan politics. It is impossible in Moroccan politics to argue against the acceptability of laws explicitly stated in the Quran. The directives in the Quran are accepted to be true and all political discussion must exist within this frame. The PJD’s argument represents a larger issue for the development of more progressive laws pertaining to inheritance for women. As long as some Moroccans agree with the PJD about this particular passage in the Quran, the discussion about inheritance reform will be limited. Those who are in favor of reform will have their religious convictions questioned as well as face the challenge that their view holds no merit in Morocco because there are specific references for them in the Quran.

Youth in Morocco: Singledom and Education in a Changing World

Although the Mudawwana plays a significant role in the lives of women as far as cementing their rights as they pertain to marriage and the family, there is a significant category
of women who are not represented within the Mudawwana. This category is the unmarried single woman who does not live at home. While children’s rights are discussed in connection with the family, an entire subsection of society is missing from the discussion, at least as far as codified laws are concerned.

There is a growing trend in Morocco, especially in larger, more urbanized cities and regions, for women and young people in general to postpone marriage. These individuals live lives separate from those of their families and may even live apart from their immediate family.

“Singledom” for the urban woman means a degree of freedom recognizable to many American singles in the years after they finish their formal education. This idea applies to both men and women equally. Moroccan urbanites, the vast majority of whom are highly educated and come from middle class and upper class backgrounds, are a large consumer base for the modernization of Moroccan cities. Modernization is often thought to be marked by the spending of disposable income, a trend present among the young Moroccan professionals. As Moroccan cities grow and become more internationally oriented, the demand for young workers with backgrounds in business and economics has grown too. There is a slow, but steady shift in the working culture of the youngest of the working generation. Morocco, which has a relatively large number of youthful workers seeking employment, is arguably experiencing a shift in working culture that is contributing to the ability of the young female to support herself.

This modernization, however, cannot be mistaken for the acceptance of a perpetually single lifestyle. There is still the expectation among many Moroccan families that their sons and daughters will eventually marry. This expectation of marriage is present in families from both urban and rural backgrounds.
The consumption of this demographic in Morocco mirrors that of their American counterparts. The young Moroccans most likely to delay marriage and remain single are those who had access to higher education. Their parents are more likely to be of middle class or upper class socioeconomic levels and more willing to accept the “American” idea of delaying marriage until after a few years of living as a professional single. While many young Moroccan professionals participate in romantic relationships, giving birth out of wedlock is still largely frowned upon by the families of these young singles. In spite of the acceptance of a single lifestyle in the early years after college, strong social norms still apply. The stigma associated with illegitimate children can still be very strong in some regions and social circles, but in others, people can be slightly more tolerant. The idea of a Moroccan single mother three decades ago was a taboo topic. Marriage occurred at a relatively young age for many Moroccans and legitimate children were expected. Presently, the ability of educated women to earn a living on their own in Morocco has given rise to a still small, but present class of single mothers. These women, who are single for a variety of reasons, support their families through jobs of their own. Although single motherhood is still not a large phenomenon in Morocco, its growing presence indicates a subtle societal shift toward female independence.

The life of these singles is filled with a relative freedom. Family support for the choice of life as a young, single Moroccan largely occurs in families who have the financial stability to allow for rapid exposure to and adoption of the same concepts of individual choice and freedom that are seen in many American families. This is not to say that the families and young Moroccans without a middle or upper class background have not been exposed to, adopted, and changed aspects of their beliefs and understandings as well. There is a level of freedom that comes with financial wellbeing. Socially, families that are wealthy or stable have more freedom
to engage in behavior and practices that, while within society’s acceptable standards, are still slightly strange in that they are not the practices of the masses. Often in Morocco, wealth is linked back to a base level of acceptance of French influence. The strong influence of the French may be one of the reasons that some Western behaviors are more readily adopted by middle and upper class families.

This relative freedom, however, is often limited by a number of factors as well as being limited in a number of ways. Often the ability to live as a young single is offered only to those who have a way of supporting him or herself apart from the larger family. This can come about in a variety of ways but is often the result of formalized higher education that makes one competitive in the job market. This type of formal education is usually accessible only to those who are part of the middle and upper classes. Although public institutions of higher education are free, there is still a cost of living and other expenses associated with attendance. For some, these costs are prohibitive, especially as attendance at a public university does not ensure employment following graduation. The other option is to pay to attend either a private or one of Morocco’s two tuition-based public universities. These universities offer better chances of employment following graduation, but still do not provide a guarantee of a sold and stable career. Many Moroccan college graduates foresee a difficult path ahead of them in terms of locating employment.

Additionally, as the number of university students in Morocco increases, especially in public universities, competition for a limited number of jobs also increases. The growth in education in Morocco is often seen as a positive change. As the number of students grows, so does the overall education level of the population. This increase can be viewed as a strong indication of the improvements being made in Morocco with regard to access to education, but
numbers can be misleading. While total enrollment numbers in higher education institutions may be on the rise, this does not necessarily indicate a greater access to education on the part of all Moroccans. It is often difficult for those of the lowest economic classes to attend school.

One of the biggest challenges facing Morocco today, especially for women and girls is not only the income gap, but also the education gap. The statistics surrounding education in Morocco paint a complicated tale for the involvement of women and girls in education. Over the years, the percentage of girls enrolled in education has steadily increased. In 2006, the net enrollment for girls in primary school was 85.28% while in 2014 it was 98.28%. For boys, the net enrollment in primary school in 2006 and 2014 were 89.17% and 98.57% respectively. Note that the net enrollment rate is a measure of the percentage of children enrolled in school, not necessarily a measure of their attendance. In this case, net enrollment means that because of their different starting numbers, the increase for female was larger than that for boys, but the difference between the net enrollment for girls and boys in 2014 is negligible as the numbers are almost the same. This would indicate, that at least on some level, primary education is equally as accessible for boys and girls in the recent years. The numbers on literacy would seem to indicate this positive change as well. For young men 15 to 24 years old, the literacy rate was 96.6% in 2015. For young women of the same age the literacy rate was 93.48% in the same year. These numbers are not nearly as close as the numbers for primary school net enrollment were. However, the important thing to remember is that those students enrolled in primary school in 2014 would not yet have reached the age bracket reflected in the given 2015 data. Instead, the 2015 data was given to display the apparent gap in education that was the reality in Morocco just a few short years ago. About 3% more men are literate than women, a gap that is expected to close even more as those who attended primary school reach adulthood. As Morocco requires
education from the ages of 6 to 14, the literacy rates for those aged 15 to 24 are a good indication of the education system’s ability to teach children the necessary skills for basic literacy within their required educational period.

To demonstrate the vast improvement in education that Moroccan women have enjoyed within the span of one generation, the literacy rate for women 65 and older in Morocco was 17.66% in 2017 compared to men of the same age bracket being literate at a rate of 49.73% in the same year. It is clear that women of this generation did not enjoy the same access to education that the men of their generation did. The improvement to female education can be seen in the increase in literacy and primary education enrollment.

While these advances and changes are important to the development of equality in education between the sexes, there is still much to change. Men are still slightly ahead of women in almost all areas of educational statistics. Although in some cases, the differences might be small, statistics can still be very telling of the social reality for Moroccans in education.

As far as Moroccan higher education is concerned, there are many weaknesses within the system itself. These issues are not the focus of this discussion, but rather female access to higher education is. Al-Akhawayn University is largely considered to be the best university in Morocco. According to their website, 54% of students currently enrolled at the University are female. Presently there are more men at one of the country’s top universities than there are women. This presents a surprising change from the expected numbers. Based on all the other information, one would expect that men would outnumber women, although this is clearly not the case.

There are a variety of reasons that could account for this surprising shift. The first is that while there are slightly less women in secondary education than men, these women outperform the men leading to their enrollment at a prestigious university. Another possible explanation is
that the environment of elite education is more welcoming to women than other options for post-secondary education. While there are still many more possibilities for why women outnumber men at this particular institution, the reality is, these women are participating in a high level of education in larger numbers than men.

While these reasons seem appealing, there is another, more likely reason why women may outnumber men at this university. Many wealthy Moroccan families will send their sons to foreign institutions in Europe and the United States to be educated. This same treatment is not always given to their daughters. The fear is that sending daughter abroad to be educated would in some way “corrupt” them in a way that boys cannot be corrupted. For this reason, wealthy families send their daughters to the best institutions within the country of Morocco. This could account for the discrepancy between the male and female enrollment at the university. If this were the case, then this discrepancy in enrollment would be indicative of continued ideas about what is appropriate for children of each gender and of continued stereotypes about the behavior and ideals of women and men.

The impact of higher education on Moroccan society as a whole is generally accepted to be positive. Morocco has produced some of the greatest academics and thinkers of the modern world. The country boasts many academic professors, writers, and global leaders. This stands in contrast to a large number of individuals who do not have access to higher education and the work of the country’s most influential children. It is obvious that Morocco contains a wide variety of talent. The many languages spoken around the country which include Spanish, French, and Arabic as just a few, mean that many Moroccans are at a distinct advantage in the international job market. Moroccan women especially have an advantage internationally given their high numbers in Morocco’s most elite institutions. The issue for the future of Moroccan
women comes into transitioning this training and preparation to valuable and marketable jobs both within the country and internationally. As Moroccan women become more active within their own country through social and political movements, this opens the door to their worldwide participation.

**Moroccan Women in the Public Sphere**

Recent decades have brought Moroccan women into public sphere in ways they have previously not been seen. Social and political movements as well as individual Moroccan women have all increased participation in the public arena on the part of women. This participation brings new challenges and new opportunities to Moroccan women. The role of Princess Lalla Salma in the public image of the monarchy will be discussed. As well as the differences between her public role and the roles of the wives of the Moroccan kings in the past. Additionally, the role of Moroccan women in politics will be discussed along with data about the statistics pertaining to Moroccan female involvement in politics.

**The Princess Lalla Salma**

Perhaps the most recognizable Moroccan woman the wife of King Mohammed VI, Princess Lalla Salma, is seen as the public face of Moroccan equality. Prior to the current Princess, the spouses of Moroccan monarchs were not expected to be public figures. Their role was limited to the private life of the King and they did not appear publicly or have their own identities. Often, the King had more than one wife, all of whom were kept hidden. This is different from the reality of Princess Lalla Salma. Princess Lalla Salma is the first wife of a Moroccan King to be publicly acknowledged and given an official royal title and continues to have a monogamous relationship with her husband who has no other wives.32
With uncommon red hair, tasteful clothing, and a good education, the Princess’s position next to the King seems fitting. The public image of Princess Lalla Salma is one of grace and beauty. She is often ranked among the most beautiful royals in the world and always presents a polished public look. Princess Lalla Salma is one of Morocco’s most beloved women. Prior to marrying the King, the Princess came from a middle class family in Fez, and her marriage to the King became a mild popular obsession when it occurred on March 21, 2002. The story itself takes on an almost fairytale like quality, as it is often retold to children. Everything about the story of the Princess’s rise to prominence seems to fit the public image that the monarchy wishes to create for Lalla Salma. The Princess often uses her public role to promote her own charitable projects and continues to have an identity separate from her husband. She also continues to make public appearances on behalf of Morocco, a role no previous wife of the King has played. Arguably, the Princess is using her role to further her own work as well as the goals of the monarchy.

The public recognition of the Princess, and the continued loyalty of the King to their monogamous marriage, is indicative of a changing social trend, at least with regards to the King’s personal life. Instead of having multiple wives, as Moroccan kings in the past have done, Mohammed VI’s commitment stands in contrast, representing his public image of the Princess as his partner. Additionally, the more public role of the Princess is also a step towards a greater understanding of equality. Finally, the couple are often present at functions together, acting as a unit, rather than the Princess deferring to her husband. This public acknowledgement of their relationship paints the picture of their relationship as a partnership, rather than one of dominance.

In addition to the active role she plays in the lives of her children, she is also heavily involved in her charity work which extends beyond the Moroccan borders. She has publicly
aided in the fight against cancer as well as making official international appearances on behalf of her country and the King. The Princess’s public acknowledgment and her identity as separate from her husband are all further indicators of the move within the Moroccan monarchy for equality. The King and the Princess often appear together, as partners, although his influence in her life is still undeniable. An article published in June of 2016 highlighted that King Mohammed VI chooses her outfits for official appearances. This small example from the daily life of the Princess is a good indication of the relationship between her and the King. Although they are often presented as a partnership, the King is still very much in control of many aspects of her public life. Additionally, this situation takes on new meaning when one of the most well-known and admired aspects of the Princess is her sense of elegant style.

The Princess’s place in Morocco is full of nuances. While the King may still have influence over aspects of her style, this does not discount her own efforts to aid Morocco and foreign countries through charitable work. Additionally, she is often viewed in Morocco as the face of the new Morocco. Many Moroccans see her increased involvement outside of the confines of the royal household to be representative of the King’s own acceptance of women in the public sphere.

Moroccan Female Political Participation

Politics represents another area in which Moroccan women have recently entered the public sphere in larger numbers. In recent years, the levels of female participation in politics in Morocco has been growing. As women begin to demand their place in society on par with men, there has been a flurry of female political involvement. However, this does not come without its own set of problems, implications, and areas for improvement.
In 1990, the Moroccan parliament had no female members. In 2016, 21% of seats in the parliament were held by women. In a little over a quarter of a century, there have been great strides in increasing the number of women who are elected into the Moroccan parliament. For comparison, the United States Congress is only 19% women. The numbers suggest that Morocco is doing better in including women in the national parliament. However, numbers can be deceiving. Currently, the Moroccan lower house of Parliament has a required quota of women in representation. There are 60 seats reserved for women. After the 2011 elections, 66 seats in parliament were occupied by women. This can be compared to the 81 seats held by women after the 2016 elections. Although the quota system appears to be a temporary fix for a long term problem, there is no arguing that it is successfully encouraging female participation in the Moroccan government. Additionally, the adoption of the quota system indicates a desire on the part of the political parties in Morocco to include women in Parliament, at least to a certain extent. However, this desire may not be as strong as it appears on the surface.

Following the 2010 election, seven women were elected to Parliament through district seats. Three of these women were through the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), a party often closely linked to the Moroccan monarchy. The PAM had the most female district PMs elected of any party in the 2010 election. The close relationship between this party and the Moroccan monarchy, which has existed since the party’s creation, brings a unique element to the discussion of the relationship between the monarchy, Moroccan government institution and women. Although not that many women were elected in 2010, the fact that a plurality of them came from the party most closely linked to the monarchy speaks to the relative openness of the monarchy to women’s issues.
The women elected under the aforementioned quota system are expected to act for women’s rights and agendas, rather than for the needs of a specific district. As in other parliamentary systems that may not be entirely familiar to an American, voters select a party, rather than an individual. This means that often in Morocco, the results for the national election of seats is almost identical to the election for seats for district representatives. There is little concern for the individuals listed on the national list, because often the voting process impedes their selection. Often this results in individuals voting strictly for one party. The process is not helped by the calls for a clearer ballot as sometimes the ballot itself is unclear or difficult to use.

This national list system means that most of the competition for seats takes place prior to the election as individuals jockey for a position within their party to ensure they are placed into Parliament. Just like other members of Parliament, the women elected are still beholden to their party’s beliefs and ideologies, making their actions less about their own desires, and more about securing a position within the party to ensure future election and status within the group. For women, this may mean taking fewer risks when voting, or keeping any dissenting opinions to oneself. Because of the small number of women in Parliament and the future of a women’s political career in Parliament depending on the grace of her male-dominated party, women are often not in a position to speak out in ways that their male counterparts can.

There has been some internal criticism of the quota system within Morocco. Some Moroccans think that the quota system does not create real change for women, or increase the number of women MPs that are elected from districts. The data from 2002 and 2007 would appear to support this claim, since as “no women elected from the national list in 2002 won a district seat in 2007”. This would indicate that the quota system does not seem to be working in the sense that women from the national list are elected to district seats. If the goal is to use the
quota system to help narrow the gap between the numbers of men and women in Parliament, it has clearly yet to be effective, because women are not making the transition from one role to another. A counter-argument to this is that because data for the many district elections is difficult to locate, it is possible that no party had a female district candidate from the national list in a winnable position in this election.

This brings up another problem with the inclusion of women in politics. If it is true that the political parties in Morocco did not place any women in a winnable position during the election, this indicates a bias within the parties themselves. Because the names on the lists for district seats are regulated by the political parties themselves, it is essentially up to them to increase the number of women in Parliament through strategic placing of women into winnable positions. Whether or not this bias is intentional, it still remains and is indicative of a larger social problem. Arguably, the women who had served as MPs in the past are qualified to hold district positions, given their experience and apparent loyalty to their individual political parties. Because of these qualifications it makes sense that at least one of them would have been up for election in a winnable district of the party. Because this was not the case, the reasons for this situation must be examined. One possible explanation is that the party leaders did not consider any of the women for positions in their respective districts. This means that they party leaders are themselves not receptive or confident in the ability of women to serve as MPs. Another possible explanation is that party leaders did consider women for winnable seats, but had another reservation about their election. This reservation could be a concern that if voters in that district knew a woman was up for election for a particular party, they may vote for a different party. This too would indicate a widespread belief that women are in some way politically inferior to men in
terms of voter confidence. Finally, it is possible that not many women were willing to be put on the ballot.

Female participation on local councils has also seen an increase. In 2009, 12% of the seats on local councils were held by women. This was a dramatic increase from the 0.56% following the previous election. This increase in the role and participation of women in local councils occurred following a national push to increase the political participation of Moroccan women. It should come as no surprise that local councils would see an increase in female participation. Although local government is often seen as secondary to the national level, local governments often do an accurate job of reflecting the changes occurring in various communities. Whereas national elections consist mostly of a name or party on a ballot, local elections often take on a more personal nature. Voters in a local election are more likely to know the individual for whom they are voting. Given the active role Moroccan women play in the social lives of communities, it comes as no surprise that they would also play a role in local government. As previously mentioned, Moroccan women have historically played an important role in the social and communal development of their villages and towns. This role is now being reflected on a greater level through their election to a greater percentage of seats. The explosion of women in local councils also speaks to the willingness of individuals and voters to accept an increased role of women in politics. Although the numbers are not very large, the increase was massive. This indicates although there is work to be done, the openness to change is there.

Although there is clearly still work that must be done to increase female participation in Moroccan government, there is still something to be said for the strides that have been made. Whether these gestures on the part of the Moroccan government are simply so that they appear more progressive, or whether they stem from a true desire to see greater equality, Moroccan
women are beginning to recognize and act upon their given opportunities for the growth and change of the political system.

Women in the Market

The market represents an area of Moroccan public life that has a long history of female participation. It is also one of the areas that brings with it many social conventions given the nature of the relationships that are formed through business there. The nature of the suq has changed with time and as a result of a variety of factors. These factors also influence women’s participation in the suq. Represented within the suq is the idea of nīya, which will be discussed as it pertains to women in public places, such as the market.

*An Introduction to the Suq and the Transformation of the Countryside*

The *suq* represents an aspect of public life that has long been a part of Morocco’s history. Women’s participation in the *suq* has changed over time and this change is connected to the changing reality of the *suq* itself. Until the French protectorate, the countryside of Morocco had remained relatively unchanged for many decades. The pattern of life, which consisted of small, rural communities and towns had persisted for many years with traditions and rhythms that were long established. With the French colonial government came the industrialization of these rural areas. This gave rise to a new relationship between men and women as well as challenging notions of gender roles that were rooted in the long, seemingly unchanging history of the region. The impact that the French industrialization and infrastructure building had on the rural areas and countryside was already being observed just a few years into the French occupation.

In 1936, Walter Fogg wrote about the changing reality of the countryside regarding the rural market, or *suq*. Fogg writes to how the *suq* in rural Morocco was once a locally based organization. These smaller markets would pop up every week as travelling salesmen and other
local business and tradesmen would gather in a spot to sell their wares. Fogg even goes so far as to say that when a suq was not present, it would be impossible to tell that a market ever took place there as there were no permanent structures or markings. This speaks to the transient and fleeting nature of the weekly suq that, as the author describes, has been happening that way for many decades previously. Upon the institution of the French protectorate, the infrastructure of the Moroccan countryside began to change. The introduction of vehicles and reliable roads, as well as public transportation, made the transportation of goods and people significantly easier. This in turn, according to Fogg, made it possible for individuals to travel farther distances to larger markets, effectively driving smaller, more localized markets out of business. This concentration of markets into geographically favorable areas was the first step to urbanization. Additionally, new markets which were once nonexistent grew next to new “hydro-electricity undertakings” and some markets were “created by the demand of European colonists in its vicinity”. The creation of new markets as a direct result of the actions and request of European colonists is indicative of the influence that the French had over the development and structure of the once purely Moroccan suq. What was once a locally driven, supplied, organized, and patronized weekly event, grew into a wider, larger, development frequented by outsiders, rapidly because of the influence of the French.

The importance of the suq extends beyond providing a way for individuals to buy and sell goods needed for life. The suq, prior to French interference, was a highly tribalized institution. The location of a suq, which may have appeared arbitrary was closely tied with the tribal claims to particular regions of land. Before the French take-over of the countryside, moving a suq to a seemingly more ideal location held by a different tribe would have been almost impossible.
this way, the French colonizers began to break down some of the larger social ties within communities.

The market came to represent a source of income for the French protectorate as well. Taxes were collected by the French on *suq* days. Specialized markets were created for the sale of a single commodity, often grain, to allow for the French government to collect taxes on these goods that would have otherwise been overlooked. The French created an infrastructure that allowed for the total restructuring of the previous market system, but that also allowed for better control of the rural areas. As a way to ensure the security and continuity of this income, more permanent structure pertaining to the *suq* were constructed. These buildings became a symbol of the significance of the market for the region and those who lived in the surrounding areas. They also represented an increased idea of permanence that had not been present in the previous iteration of the *suq*. Whereas before the *suq* was flexible, relatively mobile, and largely dependent on local, communal decision making and understanding, now the *suq* represented an institution. French ideas of permanency and order were imposed on a system that had been functioning smoothly for decades. The institutionalization of the *suq* would in turn impact the interaction between colonist and Moroccan as well as between men and women.

The restructuring of the Moroccan *suq* fundamentally redirected the lifestyle of rural communities quickly and irreversibly. The *suq* was a location where colonist and colonized interacted. These interactions were at the heart of a larger social development. As Fogg states, the *suq* was used by colonists to ensure a labor supply.\(^{42}\) Before the presence of the French, the *suq* took on a social and communal function providing the necessities of life, but also a gathering space for individuals in the community to work on relatively equal terms. While hierarchy existed in the *suq*, everyone was reliant on the skills and goods provided by others. The
introduction of the colonist as essentially an outsider looking for contracted labor removed an element of the communal reliance. Now some could provide labor to the colonist and the selling of services was no longer limited to local community members.

Nīya and the Women of the Suq

For many decades, the Moroccan suq was the epicenter of social and commercial life in the countryside as well as in more urban areas. The changes brought about by the French during colonization impacted the reality in the suq and brought to light issues of social contract and nostalgia that relate to women in a unique way.

Nīya is an Arabic word that roughly translates to intent. In Morocco, the terms also has an additional usage which is taken to mean gullibility. The idea is that nīya is a blind faith in your fellow man to not deceive you or to not cheat you. Nīya is often associated with old women who are portrayed as trusting others that she encounters in the suq. The concept plays on a stereotype of old women that may be familiar to the American reader. An old woman who exhibits nīya is naïve and overly trusting. To illustrate this point, Deborah Kapchan recalls a quintessential story about an old woman with nīya that she heard during her field work in Morocco. The old woman was selling turkeys when two young men approach her and inquire about the price. The seller has two turkeys, one she was charging 900 riyals and the other one 1000 riyals. The men begin to complain about the price and convince her to close her eyes in order to compare the weight of the turkeys in her hands. When the women closes her eyes, the two men run off with the turkeys leave the woman standing their saying “Should I open, should I open my eyes?” Another example of nīya can be found in the story of an old woman and her son at the suq. The son leaves his mother to watch their horse outside the suq. Eventually, a doughnut seller walks up and tells the woman that her son sent him to her. The man says the son asked him
to relay a message to her that she is to trade the horse for the string of doughnuts. The woman does so, and when the son returns, reveals that he sent no such man.

Both of these stories represent the idea of *nīya* in a slightly negative light. The women displaying *nīya* is swindled and left with the short end of the stick, so to speak. In these cases, the blind trust of *nīya* was harmful to them, but this is not always the case. *Nīya* also takes another form in the market. The perception is that in past times, *nīya* was necessary for market interactions and was the reason that the market worked. In some ways, this understanding is correct. A certain level of trust is necessary between seller and buyer in the *suq*, but the idea that the level of naivety displayed by those who possess *nīya* is necessary to the proper function of the market may not contain the same level of validity. Ultimately, the reality of the existence of *nīya* in the *suq* is not the key to its importance for Moroccan women. The importance of *nīya* can be found in how *nīya* is remembered and perceived as well as the nostalgia that it brings. In this case the reality of *nīya* is not as important as the perception of *nīya* in the collective memory.

*Nīya* brings to mind a certain nostalgia for the old ways of the market. No longer are people naïve enough to trust others blindly in a world where there are other ways to communicate and conduct business. *Nīya* could only exist in the form that it is remembered in the days of the past. Modern technology and social order dictates that the market and those who participate in it no long possess *nīya*. This places *nīya* in a complex position.

Because the concept is associated with old women, it implies that these women are too trusting, a quality that is supposed to reflect negatively on them, but it also implies that others are willing to take advantage of these women. *Nīya* is indicative of a larger social dynamic as stories of *nīya* being betrayed almost always involve a male betraying a woman. *Nīya* then becomes a gendered trait. It only applies to women, but not all women. In addition to being gendered, *nīya*
is also limited by age. A young woman does not display nīya in the same way that an old woman can.

The nostalgia felt for nīya could be a reaction to the rapid modernization of the market under the French influence, a process that continues today as Morocco becomes increasingly more connected to global economic markets. The reason for the nostalgia is less important to this discussion than its implications for the relationship between Moroccan men and women. Nostalgia does not necessarily mean a desire to return to the days of the past, but it does imply a longing or a sense of loss. This perceived loss of nīya, a concept closely tied with femininity, in turn brings with it a loss of the ways of women in the past. The actions and beliefs of women are changing and nīya is no longer the norm or the expected. What was once thought of as a common trait among older women, is now gone and replaced by a wiser, savvier business sense.

The acceptance of this reality for women is remarkable because the nostalgia is laced with patriarchal undertones. The feelings of nostalgia for nīya imply that women are no longer what they once were. They are no longer innocent and naïve about the ways of men and business and the image of women has shifted away from a sense of trust and faith. Women who were once almost “cute” in their actions have lost this trait and the nostalgia felt by people of both genders for it implies that this shift is in a way a loss and not a gain. Nostalgia is a feeling that comes after a change has been made and people think back fondly of the days of the past. In this way, nīya is viewed as a positive, although it may not always be displayed as such in stories about women who possess it.

Nīya illustrates the complex relationship between society and the change perception of women. As women change, the old traits associated with them are missed. The image of an old woman that must have someone look out for her is considered charming, not demeaning. Her
mistakes due to her *nīya* are found to be funny and cute. This sort of image does not promote equality, especially because it is never applied to men. A man who behaved as the old women with *nīya* did would be considered incompetent and most likely become the subject of ridicule. *Nīya* is gendered in such a way that the nostalgia for it illustrates the continued acceptance of a system where women are held to a different standard of belief and behavior than men.

**Moroccan Feminism**

Although the use of the term “Islamic feminism” may not be appropriate to use in a general respect when defining and discussing the feminist trends in Morocco, its use in a particular setting is valid as a tool to help distinguish the way one trend uses Islam in comparison to another. The feminist trends of Morocco are dependent on more than just Islam, but for ease of comparison, the trends seen in Morocco will be categorized based on their perceived use of Islam. This is not to discount the other individual forces involved in these trends, but rather is used because Islam is such an important force in the political life of Morocco and provides a constant through which different trends may be more easily compared.

**Feminist Trends in Morocco**

As previously indicated, feminist trends in Morocco are uniquely tied to religion and politics in a complex and hyper connected relationship. Because of this, these same feminist trends and movements develop their own relationship with and reaction to the use and general importance of Islam in Morocco. Currently, there are many different iterations of feminism present in Morocco with many movements overlapping in some areas and being completely different in others. This wide range of movements can at times be daunting as new groups and ideas come to the forefront and are sometimes replaced by others. For this reason, the majority of these trends and classifications will be discussed in broad terms. When examples are given, it is
not meant to pigeon hole or limit in any way the named movement. Because movements and trends shift and change throughout the years and in response to new social and political developments, the classification of individually named groups may also change throughout time. Just because a particular group’s ideas align most closely with one classification, does not mean that group cannot adopt some beliefs and practices of another classification. In the understanding of Moroccan feminism, there should always be a level of flexibility. Just as humans cannot be strictly classified into groups, movements cannot be either.

When creating a typology of feminist movements in Morocco, perhaps the most obvious approach would be to classify movements based on their relationship to Islam. While this approach has its benefits, and is in fact the approach that will be taken in the creation of this typology, it also has some problems. The largest of these problems is that all movements contain nuances that make their classification difficult. While it is possible to loosely group movements based on their relationship to Islam, this grouping implies a connection or similarity that in some cases may not exist on a large scale. Another problem is that within a particular movement there is not always agreement as to the motives for the use of Islam in a particular way. Although some may say that the motives behind a particular use of Islam do not matter in the classification of groups based on how Islam is used, in reality the two are closely linked. How Islam is used by a feminist movement is necessarily impacted by the motives and goals of its members. Ultimately, failing to see a more convenient way to create a short overview of the large number of feminist movements in Morocco, this is the paradigm within which these groups are classified.

As stated before, Sunni Islam has a long history of female figures, such as A’isha and Khadija, within the religion acting as leaders and creators. The first movement within Moroccan
feminism capitalizes on this Islamic history as a source of its power and influence. These women can be thought of as Islamist feminists for two main reasons.

The first reason is their close affiliation with the Justice and Development Party. Although not all Islamist feminists identify as members of the PJD, the party is the leading Islamist party of Morocco and this type of feminist was involved in the founding of the party. In many ways, the timeline of the Islamist feminist trend in Morocco can be understood through the use of political movements. The PJD was founded in 1967 and would eventually become one of the most popular political parties in Morocco. The party remained mostly a shell until 1988. In the 1992 elections, the PJD won only 8 seats in the Parliament. In the 2011 elections, the party won a plurality. The rising success of the PJD is reflective of a growing Islamist trend in Moroccan politics that corresponds to the growing Islamist feminist trend which could safely develop alongside the growing political acceptance of the moderate Islamist PJD.

Prior to the Mudawwana reforms in 2004, there were a number of demonstrations for and against the proposed changes. One of these demonstrations, which occurred on March 12, 2000, gives insight into the rise of the public participation of Islamist feminists. Women, and men, marched in Casablanca in a counter demonstration against the ongoing discussions about reforming the Mudawwana. According to Katja Zven, in her 2007 Master’s program thesis, a large part of the protest comes, not only from a desire to see the Mudawwana remain unchanged, but for some, it stems from the dislike of the non-Islamic manner and influence used to change it.

Basima al-Haqqaoui is a feminist and founding member of the PJD when it began in 1967. Her views on female saints provide an insight into the thinking of members of this group. Al-Haqqaoui sees saints as a model or “reference” that offer insight into Islamic and Moroccan
heritage. For many, but not all, feminists who fall into this category, this statement is reflective of their view of Islam and women. For them, Islam contains many examples and instances of women in power and offers a history of female activism. These feminists see this information as providing a guide for present day women who must understand the historical significance of their Muslim, female forefathers. These women use Islam as the basis for their fight for equality and see their mission not as separate from this original fight, but as a continuation of it. For these feminists to continue the struggle for equality, they must also recognize inequality within their own society and religion because they cannot continue a fight for equality if equality exists.

Women in the Islamist feminist category face a number of challenges, some which are shared with other feminists, and some which are unique to their own movement. One of these unique challenges is the backlash that they sometimes receive from other feminist movements both Moroccan and foreign. Islamist feminist are often seen as being limited in their political influence by their male colleagues. For ease of explanation, the PJD will be used as an example. While the party promotes female participation in politics, some say that their role is limited to speaking and working on distinctly “women’s issues” without focusing on the larger political tasks at hand. Additionally, Islamist feminists, especially those seeking political office, face a lack of understanding from the community and many Islamist men. Not only must Islamist feminist contend with the relative newness of the Islamist movement in the political and social life of Morocco, but they must also fight a similar battle to other feminists in garnering widespread support for equality. Related to this issue, Islamist feminists must contend with others who share their Islamist beliefs without addressing or acknowledging the feminist beliefs that they also hold. While groups and individuals who fall within the other categories often have support from more liberal people, those who would agree with the Islamist argument for
feminism often happen to be men who are resistant to the idea of female equality. That is to say, while it should be slightly easier for Islamist feminists to convince members of the PJD and other Islamist parties of their argument for feminism, these are often the individuals who need the most convincing.

Additionally, just as women are often relegated to positions that only deal with women’s issues, in a way, their role in the party is marginalized because they are relegated to auxiliary groups that while active in the party, contain no real decision making power. To parallel this, access for women to positions of authority in the party, outside of designated female subsections, is relatively limited. Through this relegation to secondary positions, the PJD may actually be continuing the very practices of inequality that Islamist feminists are fighting.

The female participation in the PJD represents a larger trend in Moroccan feminism that is identified by female participation in Islamist politics. Often the trend towards Islamist views in politics is seen as counterproductive towards equality for men and women. For this reason, the ways in which women within Islamist movements assert themselves politically and socially are either ignored or glossed over in favor of what are viewed as more liberal and progressive movements. This creates a problem as it ignores a section of women who are asserting themselves within an unexpected political context. One way that these perceptions are combated is through the public expression by women of their Islamist ideals, such as their participation in the aforementioned protests against the Mudawwana reform.

This understanding illustrates the complexity of the Islamist feminist movement in Morocco. While from one perspective it appears that these women are working against equality of the sexes, they are in another way promoting it. The active participation of women in an anti-reform protest dating back to 2000 helps to indicate their level of activation over fifteen years
ago. The participation of these women in a politically motivated protest is indicative of their sense of place and purpose. Rather than viewing these women as being active in their own oppression, their actions can be viewed as women asserting themselves within the largely male dominated Islamist movement. The agency exhibited by Islamist feminists is arguably one of the largest goals of feminism and can be viewed as a step towards a larger role for women on the entire political spectrum, not just within the most liberal groups.

While on a surface level, some of the complaints against Islamic feminism appear to be valid, often those who speak against it are not accounting for the desire of these women to assert themselves in whichever way they choose. Because of the relatively new nature of the Islamist political movements, there will necessarily be hiccups in the development process. Rather than only viewing the challenges and the problems faced by Islamist feminists, it is perhaps better to see the progress they are making by setting the stage for future female participation. These women represent their own form of feminism that stems from their own understanding of Islam.

A nonpolitical ally of the PJD is seen in the Movement of Reform and Unity (MRU). While very similar to the PJD in terms of ideology, this movement is not political in nature and allows for involvement in the Moroccan Islamist trend without active political participation.

While this previously mentioned group encompasses individuals who are using Islam politically for all reform, not just gender equality, there is another trend in Moroccan feminism that also uses Islam. Whereas the previous politicized movement can be considered Islamist feminism, this second group can be thought of as Islamic feminism. As with all typologies, there is crossover of individuals and movements between groups. This distinction is meant only to separate movements and trends which take on a distinct political identity from trends using Islam without the distinctly political nature.
Often this line becomes difficult to delineate. In order to understand the distinction, it may be helpful to think of the Islamic feminist as an individual who believes in “full compatibility between international discourse on human rights and Islam”. In other words, Islamic feminists do not see Islam and women’s rights as incompatible, but also do not demand that women’s rights necessarily be derived from Islam. In this case, individuals and movements that fall into the category, recognize the importance and necessity of Islam as a persuasive tool in terms of effecting positive change in Morocco towards equality. Islam is a source of individual and group identity within the majority of Islamic feminist movements, but Islam is often not recognized as a guarantor of equality. Ideally for these women, Islam would be the source for laws, because it plays such a large role in their personal identity as well as in the way they think about Morocco and Moroccan society. In this case, Islam is an inherent characteristic of Morocco, which ideally should be used in the creation of laws, but does not stand in the way of ideas about gender equality created outside of it. The difference is that Islamist feminists use Islam as the source of the legitimacy for their feminist claims. Islamic feminists, accept Islam as an important part of their lives, but recognize that equally as legitimate claims and arguments for gender equality exist outside of the religion.

Within Islamic feminism, there is another type of feminist who uses Islam similarly to Islamic feminism, but in a way that is slightly more specific. This type of feminism could be thought of as “modification feminism”. The movement, like Islamic feminism more generally, does not reject the principles and beliefs of Islam, including the Quran, but rather blames human error for the practices and interpretations of the Quran that are limiting to women. The Maliki tradition of Morocco and its extensive reliance on tradition and community consensus is what allows for this subcategory to exist. First the flexible and inclusive nature of the school allowed
for practices that were open for interpretation to continue. Some of these practices may allow for the continuation of gender inequality, but because of the structure and beliefs of the legal school, are allowed. Secondly, the relative openness of the Maliki School means that change is slightly easier. Additionally, the acceptance and recognition of other legal schools indicates a willingness on the part of the Maliki School in general to accept different interpretations of Islam.

This form of feminism understands the development of the patriarchy as a social concept that came to exist within a religious context. This is the source of their name. Modification feminists see the true meaning and intent behind particular passages and statements in the important works of Islam as being modified for a larger social purpose. For modification feminists Islam was used to justify social practices and may claim that many of the hadiths about women occupying a place lower than men are either mistaken or incorrectly recorded. The followers who classify themselves as modification feminists do not view their work as being contradictory or at odds with Islam. This is not to say that all Islamic feminist believe that Islam itself contains an explicit basis for feminism, only that the religion is not at odds with feminism. It is possible, in the minds of some, for Islam as a religion, to be neutral on the subject of gender equality. In their opinion, Islam provides neither a justification nor a condemnation of feminism and gender equality. One way of looking at this belief is that Islam is a means of justification for the current social situation. If the situation is one of inequality, one could conceivably use Islam to justify that, while if the situation is one of equality, one could use Islam to justify that situation as well. Modification feminists occupy a variety of positions on the relationship between Islam and feminism.

One of the champions of this type of thinking is Fatima Mernissi, a well-respected Moroccan feminist scholar. Although her work is often viewed as strictly Islamic feminism, in
reality, her work falls squarely within the line of modification feminism. One example, presented by Mernissi in her book *Women and Islam*, highlights how the writings of one person can exclude any opposing views and be present strictly as fact. Mernissi writes about Muhammed al-Bukhari, an Islamic scholar and writer of a particular hadith which she terms as “authentic” in its presentation for it lacks the customary contradictory points of view intended to allow the reader to make an informed decision.\(^{50}\) The hadith reads “Three things bring bad luck: house, woman, and horse”.\(^{51}\) Mernissi then presents the opposing view presented by another scholar, Imam Zarkashi, that according to A’isha, the Prophet’s wife, the entire phrase was “May Allah refute the Jews; they say three things bring bad luck: house, woman, and horse”.\(^{52}\) Mernissi uses this to illustrate the point that even what appears to be the most authentic hadith must be examined with a magnifying glass and that such examination is within the right of Muslims because only Allah is infallible.\(^{53}\) This is just one small sample of the many examples that Mernessi gives in her book. This type of work, created by a Muslim, who clearly accepts all the tenets of Islam, but also points out the many ways in which hadith can be misunderstood and manipulated is a perfect example of a modification feminist. Mernissi’s work in *Beyond the Veil* and *Women and Islam* discusses gender identity in the context of Islam. While *Women and Islam* does not discuss only Morocco, the insights that Mernissi offers are relevant to Moroccan women. In general, her work about the complexity of the relationship between gender and Islam and how Islam has dealt with gender issues over time aligns with the concept of modification feminism.

The final broad category of Moroccan feminism that will be discussed is a type that can be called secular feminism. Secular feminists wish to see the introduction of human and women’s rights “based on the Rule of Law” and not necessarily Islam.\(^{54}\) For them, Islam, like all religion, is a matter of private concern and not a basis for “social normativity” or citizens’
Whereas Islamic feminists address their own Muslim backgrounds and those of their community, secular feminists wish to remove Islam from the greater political and social discussion. For secular feminists, the idea that religion is part of the fight for gender equality is inherently wrong. Some may believe that Islam is incompatible with equal rights, but largely the support for this movement comes from the perceived adoption of Western feminist ideas.

In fact, it is this idea of Western influence in the feminist movement that many find to be a large fault in the secular feminist movement. Secular feminists are thought to be influenced by Western feminist ideas because of their connection to international discussions of human rights. It is this perceived influence that makes many hesitant to join the discussion with secular feminists. Secular feminism is perhaps the smallest in terms of number of participants in Morocco of all of the movements. For this reason, information about the individual movements within secular feminism is limited. This is also partially due to the limited scope and influence of the movement. Because secular feminism does not wish to address Islam in its conversation about equality, the ability of the movement to gain political traction is almost nonexistent. Morocco’s governmental legitimacy is based in Islam and a movement that does not include Islam will have a difficult time gaining public support and will not be allowed to participate in formalized politics, as acceptance of the government is a requirement.

**Conclusion**

The monarchy of Morocco has demonstrated a commitment to increasing gender equality. Women are attending universities in large numbers and literacy rates among the youngest Moroccans reach record highs for the country. Political involvement on the part of women is increasing and has made vast strides in just a few years. Individuals are using Islam to create a new social reality that is gaining widespread attention and traction at a ground level.
With all of the improvements and advances that Morocco has made in a relatively short time, the question still remains, why is the country not experiencing gender equality on a greater scale? Why are many Moroccan women still experiencing life as if they are second class citizens, lower than their male counterparts in terms of status and rights?

The answer may not be as difficult as it seems. Because of the relative “newness” of these changes in Morocco, it is quite possible that not enough time has passed for all of the changes and advancements to come into full effect. Undoing centuries of socially engrained and institutionalized patriarchy does not happen in just a few years, and maybe not even in a few decades. It often takes generations of commitment to see the goals of equality achieved on a large scale. What is an even more likely answer is that Moroccan women have not yet realized the full extent of their power.

Although there are many factors that stand in the way of Morocco’s continued progress towards gender equality, and many areas in which the country can improve, Morocco stands in a unique and enviable position to achieve a level of gender equality not seen anywhere else in the region and possibly the world. One of these reasons is the racial homogeneity of the country.

In terms of ethnic diversity, Morocco is relatively homogeneous. The two largest ethnic groups, Arab and Berber, are making strides to overcome the manufactured tension between them as a result of the French colonization. Morocco appears even less diverse when compared to the United States. Because of this difference, intersectionality must manifest itself differently for both countries. Moroccan feminist have a powerful tool in their belt in terms of increasing the reach of their movement with relative ease. Because Morocco is ethnically homogeneous, the major hurdle with intersectionality that must be jumped is socioeconomic class. Much of Morocco’s feminist movement, as previously stated, is limited to the middle and upper classes.
“Safe” Moroccan feminists can use their ethnic similarity to women in lower socioeconomic classes to bring awareness and attention to their struggle for equality. These “safe” feminists can also more easily aid these women in their own struggle as well.

To paint a clearer picture of what this entails, it is perhaps easier to compare Morocco’s use of intersectionality with that of the US. The US is burdened with an ethnically charged history on a level that is not seen in Morocco. Racial tensions in the US are so deeply engrained in society that intersectionality must combat these tensions in order for feminism to spread. In addition to issues of class, American feminists must also handle issues of race which Moroccan feminists need not address. It is far easier for an Arab Moroccan upper class feminist to lend her support and voice to a movement of working class Arab Moroccan feminists because she is unburdened by the racial history than it would be for an upper class American feminist who is white to lend her support and voice to a working class feminist movement comprised of and supported by mostly of African Americans. This is not to say that the outcome of either situation is guaranteed. Both Moroccan feminists and American feminists face many challenges with regards to increasing the reach of their movements. Instead, this comparison is meant to create an image of the importance that race plays in the feminist movements around the world. Morocco has her own racial history that allows for particular manifestations of movements to occur there that could not occur in a more hegemonic location.

On the surface this seems like an obvious argument. Of course it will be easier to aide a movement of women who are of the same race as you. The point of this example is to illustrate that because the vast majority of the country is either Arab or Berber, the racial aspects of feminism that many countries must fight, are slightly lessened. This is not to discount the racial tension between Arabs and Berbers that has occurred in Moroccan history. Rather it is to discuss
how the stage is set for Berber and Arab feminists in Morocco to come together in a way that would be impossible almost anywhere else in the world.

   Another advantage Morocco has is her monarchy. While other countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa have ethnically homogeneous populations they may lack a monarchy which is open to change or a world position that allows them close contact with and security through their associations with European countries. Although the monarchy is not willing to exercise its own power for the furthering of gender equality past a certain extent, they are also not standing in the way of gender equality. As the monarchy continues to display a public face that is more open and friendly towards equality through their own actions, the country will grow more comfortable with the idea of equality because of the fame of the monarchy within Morocco.

   Recent advances in education are also aiding in the spread of the idea of equality. For the future of Moroccan feminism education is the most powerful weapon, but there is often a lack of transition from education to social and political activism. The number of girls enrolled in Moroccan primary schools is increasing along with the literacy rates of the younger generations. This bodes well for the educational and academic future of Morocco, but these advances have their limitations and flaws. In order for the feminist trends of Morocco to be successful, educated women must work for the education of other women and aid in the transition between education and political activity.

   It is no secret that Moroccan college campuses are one of the country’s largest centers for the demand for change. University students often are idealistic and hope for a better future for their country. While gender equality would appear to be at the top of the list for these forward-thinking individuals, the reality is that for many, it does not appear to be a large problem. This
view is understandable. It is difficult to think of inequality in education when there are less men
than women in your classes. It is strange to think that some women are raising families when so
many of your classmates are deciding upon a concentration. Finally, it is almost impossible to
accept there is a problem with gender equality when you spend the majority of your time with
many of your peers who already believe in equality for women. In both Morocco and the United
States, students often live in a bubble with individuals who believe similarly liberal thoughts as
themselves. These ideas may appear to be the norm, but the reality is if no one works toward
equality for the women who are not at a university, than nothing will change.

Finally, one of Morocco’s greatest assets is her three feminist trends. Islamist feminism,
Islamic feminism, and secular feminism bring different positions to the feminist debate. These
classifications can aid in the understanding of the feminist movements in Morocco and can aid in
the process of gaining a wider audience for feminism. The distinct nature of each of these trends
means that the largest audience possible can be reached by feminism. Islamist feminism appeals
to those individuals who wish to make Islam central to their feminist fight in both political and
social issues. This trend encompasses both political and social movements to allow for maximum
participation and access.

Islamic feminism offers women who are strong in their Muslim identity, but do not wish
to use it as the sole reasoning for their feminism a place to voice their opinions and exercise their
rights. It also allows for a relationship between Islam and feminism that is more fluid and
individualized. Islamic feminism stands in a position to work with both Islamist and secular
feminists. The influence of this trend can act as a mediator, or a type of middle ground for
women who do not feel strongly about Islamist or secular feminism. It offers a place to remain
Muslim in character and beliefs while opening the door to imported ideas of feminism.
Secular feminism is the final movement. The smallest of the three by numbers, secular feminism offers women who feel there is no place for Islam in the discussion of equal rights. These women are focused in the concepts of human rights and do not believe an Islamic basis for equality is needed. They would prefer Islam have no role in the discussion of feminism. This trends offers Morocco a gateway to the thoughts and beliefs of feminist movements that exist outside of Islam and allow for an openness with other feminist trends around the world.

Together these trends in Moroccan feminism represent Morocco’s best chances at continuing the fight for equality. The trends must work together without attempting to overshadow one another and they must work with an acceptance of their shared belief in equality. No one trend is strong enough or persuasive enough to be successful on its own. Morocco’s greatest in the fight for gender equality is her ability to play host to multiple feminist trends. Although these trends have stood against each other in the past, such as the protests about the Mudawwana, this does not mean that they cannot adapt and change as time passes. These three trends are not static and unchanging. They will change with time. For now, these trends represent hope for the future of equality in Morocco through their existence and their continued fight towards equality.

Moroccan women are in a unique and enviable position to rapidly change their country in terms of gender equality. As a new generation become more educated than the previous one, more and more women are qualified, by society’s standards to participate in politics. Additionally, Moroccans can use their relatively homogenous religious background to cement their views of equality in a way that many countries cannot. Rather than viewing the Muslim nature of Morocco as an impediment or a secondary characteristic to the fight for equality, it can be used to aid in the development of a more democratic society.
Although some will continue to view feminism as incompatible with Islam, the Muslim nature of Morocco is not going to change anytime in the near future. A more viable alternative would be to use Islam, education, and social influence to speak for the equality of all women, not just those who are “safe”. As Morocco continues to grow and the fight for democracy continues, the institutions that make Morocco “Moroccan” are the country’s greatest assets. A changing and relatively open monarchy, a growing number of leftist party members, and universities with high amounts of female enrollment, leave Morocco in a position to create an equality of the genders that the country has never seen before.

None of this is to say that Morocco does not have a long and difficult journey ahead of her. There are still many factors that stand in her way. Women must be prepared and willing to fight for those who do not have the same advantages they do. There are a wide variety of beliefs and understandings in Morocco. Many will not agree with the idea of feminism and some will actively attempt to fight it. That is why it is crucial to the success of Moroccan feminism to use every and all advantages that the country has to continue in the fight for equality.
This does not mean that other women do not actively participate in their own form of feminism, rather those voices that are heard the most often come from a particular type of women.

This section is not meant as a critique of Mounib. Her work is undeniably essential to the progress of Morocco and the equality and freedom Moroccan women deserve. The following paragraphs are intended to point out the societal norms women are still expected to follow in order to have their voice heard. Mounib serves as a metaphorical “every woman”.


Ibid


In this case, the word “tradition” is place in quotes because the reality is not quite so simple. To allow for the Western idea that Morocco does not experience equality or that her women are oppressed without some qualification is to continue a history of colonization through the imposition of outside understandings on to the country, however, this will be further discussed in detail later.

This statement will be further clarified as there are some feminist movements in Morocco who wish to get away from the use of Islam in their work towards feminism. The way that these groups necessarily use Islam is different, intentional, and still always for the religion to be a source of legitimacy for their movement, but in a more complex manner that will be discussed later in the work.


Moulay Driss El-Maarouf, “Morocco.”

Ahmed El Amraoui, “Morocco election: Everything you need to know.”


Ibid.

large and amorphous body of Maliki jurisprudence
Article 97 of the Mudawwana
The words “progressive” and “modern” are included in quotes to acknowledge their Eurocentric view of what is considered the more advanced stance. While much of this paper is about the inequality and disparity between genders in Morocco, it is no way intended to pass judgment as to which system is inherently correct or morally right. Rather, these words and the ideas expressed are intended only for comparative purposes and for the ease of the reader.
Ibid
Ibid.
Ibid.
Hanane Darhour and Drude Dahlerup, “Sustainable representation of women through gender quotas: A decade’s experience in Morocco.”
Ibid, 125.
Ibid, 126.
Ibid, 128.
Ibid.
Ibid, 243.
Ibid, 37-38.
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