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Interim Governments' Role in Institution Building Post-Civil War

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An abstract of
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
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Abstract

Interim Governments' Role in Institution Building Post-Civil War
By Marcella H. Morris

This three-paper dissertation centers on a common, yet understudied tool in civil war termination: Interim Governments. I ask three questions: (1) What types of civil wars produce peace agreements with Interim Governments, (2) When in civil wars do interim governments arise, and (3) What sets interim governments up for success in transitioning as specified in civil wars? Chapter Two explores what types of wars produce peace agreements with interim governments. Taking the bargaining model of war as a starting point, the existence of interim governments–an observable commitment to bargaining-by-parts over a key post-war feature, namely, government institutions—is puzzling. I leverage probit regression models to test theoretically informed independent variables' relationship with interim government inclusion in agreements signed that year. Chapter Three begins with the idea that we think civil wars end with battlefield victory or peace agreement, and then peace implementation and politics start. However, some peace agreements that terminate civil wars include an interim government to handle the transition of power to a permanent government instead of laying out agreed-upon changes immediately or restarting pre-war institutions. These institutions present a continued negotiation process during peace implementation before permanent governments take over. I test these implications using a multistate model that dynamically estimates the conflict and institution-building process as an interconnected process with transitions between war, ceasefires, and different peace terms. The results generally support the information-related hypotheses and I work to unpack them in terms of my theory and the established literature. Chapter Four addresses the questions: Can interim governments lead countries to a virtuous cycle of peaceful politics after a civil war? What are the factors that can lead to their success or failure? To do so, I tackle these questions qualitatively by looking at peace agreement texts and considering the peace agreement documents linked to the Liberian civil war(s) to the conflict and peace processes. Using comparative case analysis and content analysis of agreement texts, I suggest two considerations of particular interest to the success or failure of interim governments envisioned by peace agreements linked to civil wars.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

This dissertation explores the role of interim government features in some peace agreements ending civil wars but not others. Interim governments serve as temporary, caretaker governments and, at a minimum, are tasked with transitioning power to permanent institutions. I test three questions in the following chapters: (Chapter Two) What types of civil wars produce interim governments? (Chapter Tree) When do interim governments arise through the war and peace process? (Chapter Four) What features set up an interim government for success?

The next two chapters quantitatively test hypotheses derived from applying the bargaining model of war to the inclusion of interim governments. In short, they posit that interim governments are observable commitments to continue the bargaining process over governmental questions into the peace implementation process. The theory would point to interim governments' inclusion in peace agreements under conditions of relatively lower instances of information and commitment among the bargaining parties. I test hypotheses between independent variables linked to high or low information or commitment levels to the outcome—a peace agreement including an interim government using probit models (Chapter Two) and hazard models (Chapter Three). I find little support for the overall theory, however some of the individual relationships point to interesting future work.

After that, I zoom out and refocus the texts of the agreements themselves. Qualitatively I code a random sample of agreement blocks with at least one reference to an interim government and then all comprehensive or partial agreements that include an interim government from African civil wars. Those two analyses help add richness and detail to understanding the heterogeneity of interim governments designed or implemented post-civil wars. Finally, I inductively coded all 30 peace documents linked to the Liberian civil war to note how the interim government is set up and what it includes in its structure and mandate, and other features that could relate to the conflict could influence the interim government's success or failure in transitioning power to a permanent government, in the case of Liberia—elected government. This chapter raises interesting directions for future work and some ideas for important conditions specific to interim government success.

Chapter 2

What types of wars include agreements with different institutions in civil wars?

2.1 Abstract

This paper explores what types of wars produce peace agreements with interim governments. Taking the bargaining model of war as a starting point, the existence of interim governments–an observable commitment to bargaining-by-parts over a key post-war feature, namely, government institutions—is puzzling. This paper looks at measures of information and commitment common in the war termination literature. It uses probit models after Heckman selection models are deemed unnecessary to describe the features of wars related to peace agreements that include an interim government more or less often. The models point to external actor involvement in civil wars as the only significant indicator that peace agreements will include an interim government. These findings support one of the posited hypotheses, that interim governments are more likely when more external actors are involved in a conflict, derived as an extension of the bargaining model of war theory. While more work is needed to understand interim governments as a phenomenon, the results point to another way external actors relate to more delicate peace processes in civil wars.

2.2 Introduction

Ending[1] civil wars and resolving civil conflict has commanded much academic thought in recent years and has clear implications for improving the human condition of civilians worldwide. But the results of this scholarship remain mixed and rarely indicate clear actionable policy prescriptions. We also know that wars often restart because peace agreements fail to resolve underlying problems, leading to renewed conflict [128]. Our academic theories and conflict resolution practices have yet to solve the puzzle of durable peace. Given the costs born by civilian populations directly during conflicts and in their aftermath, even after the violence ends, understanding how wars end fully and completely would improve lives.

Much of the work in the field starts with the foundational bargaining model of war, which posits that wars start due to information or commitment problems and resolve once those challenges are sufficiently resolved [47]. Other work builds off of this model to examine and make room for a bargaining-by-parts process, whereby initial agreements iron out initial issues and serve as stepping stones to the future. These more later agreements can tackle other problems after initial challenges are solved [112, 80, 110]. In line with these approaches to bargaining to end wars, identifying places where conflict issues may be under-resolved even within a signed peace agreement is critical to understanding where, when, and possibly why war restarts.

Critically for this project, some peace agreements include an observable commitment to bargain-by-parts or leave one key feature of the post-war landscape un(or under)specified. Specifically, agreements may include an interim government tasked with—at a minimum—holding the next round of elections to establish permanent government institutions. Taking interim government inclusion in a peace agreement linked to civil wars as an indicator of under-resolved conflicts reaching some peace terms, we can understand what types of wars end violence with question marks instead of certainty around governance institutions. Under-

[1]I would like to thank Danielle Jung, David Davis, Emily Gade, and Gray Barrett for helpful comments and guidance along the way and Kim Greenwell for copy edit services.

standing the conditions in the war and resolution process—broadly defined—when conflicts can reach an agreement to end the violence without clarity on a key issue—i.e., institutions of government moving forward—is an important step in understanding civil war dynamics and resolution prospects.

This paper explores this question by testing the relationship between canonical measures of information and commitment levels in a conflict against the likelihood of a peace agreement signed that conflict-year that includes an interim government provision. To reach that end, I first describe interim governments in peace agreements and what we know from the literature about war, third parties, and mediation dynamics on ending the use of violence. Next, centering the bargaining model of war, I derive hypotheses regarding the conditions under which we should expect interim governments to arise. Then, I describe the statistical tests and data before presenting the results and concluding.

2.2.1 What are Interim Governments?

Interim governments are temporary governing bodies tasked with establishing a portion of the function or design of the permanent institutions intended to replace the interim government after a short or predetermined time.[2] From the comparative politics literature, interim governments fit into one of four archetypes, (1) revolutionary: that after external actors oust sitting regimes wholesale, (2) power-sharing: temporary co-governing set-ups between former authoritarian and new democratic regimes, (3) incumbent caretakers: outgoing elites making way for a new regime, or (4) international: a temporary international organization leading the transition instead of domestic actors [111, p. 5]. These institutions, regardless of context, often "determine the subsequent regime, and may affect whether ethnic and regional conflicts will interfere with the prospects for long-term stability" [111, p. 4].[3] Given

[2]This is a minimum definition for what I consider an interim government. Agreements can task interim governments with much more than just designing permanent institutions. Interim governments are neither shadow governments that take power before the official devolution of power from the state nor are they governments with sunset clauses on specific powers or safeguards.

[3]For this paper, I look only at interim governments established by a peace agreement after a civil war, but many of the same archetypes are present. Interim governments in the post-civil war context take many

the power and responsibilities accorded to such institutions, the immediate post-conflict nature of those examined in this paper, and their lack of the traditional legitimacy[4] held by permanent or elected governments, interim governments, however, represent a particularly crucial yet delicate phase in the peace-building process.

2.3 War and Third Party Processes

Building off of the canonical bargaining mode of war [47], much scholarship has focused on theorizing, modeling, and collecting data regarding the factors in wars that hinder or solve information and commitment problems. To understand what types of wars produce interim governments in peace agreements, I use some of the measures related to information and commitment throughout the war from this literature to derive hypotheses about when violence may end with this particular form of 'under-resolution.'

A central tenet of the bargaining model of war is that wars are costly—indeed, without costs born by each side, there is no reason for bargaining to occur [47]. As wars last longer, costs–be they monetary, political, or human costs–increase for those involved. As higher costs are born on either side through battle fighting, information is shared [125]. As conflict actors exchange more information through war-fighting and costs increase through more lives lost, the likelihood of the war ending can increase. Further, where conflicts include ceasefires, conflict actors gain various forms of information regarding their adversary's/adversaries, such as their commitment to respecting the established peace or their ability to control their forces and curtail violence [24]. Further, if, how, and when a ceasefire breaks can be informative for conflict actors; therefore, as ceasefires last longer or occur more often, they likely improve the likelihood of peace among conflict actors.

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forms and are responsible for a variety of tasks, including holding new elections, overseeing disengagement of military actors, integrating security forces, revising election law, (re)registering voters, holding new elections, writing a new constitution, or some combination of these tasks [111].

[4] Leaders derive legitimacy from different sources [130, 116] similar to governments. Here, I speak of traditional legitimacy in broad strokes encompassing all of Weber's theorized. More specifically, I use legitimacy to reflect the standing that governments generally hold in international and domestic (for local or regional levels) spaces—regardless of their Weberian claim to legitimacy.

As more actors join the conflict, updating and learning between conflict actors becomes more complicated. Actors do not share direct learning of resolve or capabilities uniformly. Thus, information asymmetries increase. Where information asymmetries exist, clarity around acceptable outcomes from the conflict is muddied, resolution becomes more elusive [30], and the potential for spoilers increases [117]. Further, information updating can be even muddier if external actors, such as international actors or sponsor-type states, are involved in the conflict. What domestic conflict actors may find an acceptable solution may not satisfy an external patron bankrolling one side of the conflict. Similarly, the information gleaned about resolve to end the war or capacity to keep fighting may shift the balance from peace to war as an external actor's interest in the conflict does [31]. Thus, where there are more actors, domestic or external, wars often take longer to resolve.

However, there are steps in the resolution process when external actors can help to facilitate peace. Mediators are necessarily third parties to the conflict, and mediation can reveal new information through different pathways than those provided through the battlefield [75]. When peace agreements fail, however, as they often do [117], previous commitments are reneged on, conflict often restarts, and conflict actors can find themselves facing new, different, and possibly worse information and commitment problems. When the third-party actors are peacekeeping forces, challenges to the commitment landscape can seem smaller to conflict actors. There may be more confidence that defection or cheating on the agreement may be caught and punished [56, 54, 127], thus leading more often to peace.

Critically, these features have individual effects, but none work in isolation during a civil war. Battle-related deaths increase as wars last longer. As wars drag on, more actors have the opportunity to join, and more agreements can be signed along the way. Investigating the impact of individual relationships on agreement terms is an important step. Still, these factors must also be considered in concert with the other war-time dynamics at a given time to have a complete picture of the interrelated measures of information and commitment.

2.4 Mediator and Mediation Specific Processes

Finding agreement between conflict actors can be impossible without the benefits of outside mediation. Indeed, negotiated settlements are the most common mechanism through which civil wars end today [68]. As such, mediators and mediation play a larger role in the path forward out of conflict than in the past. But, conversely, mediation is by no means a guarantee that an agreement will be reached [132]. Mediation is a process in which all parties must be willing participants with the agency to walk away from the process should they so choose [75]. Furthermore, deleterious long-term effects can result if a mediator uses heavy pressure or inducements to incentivize peace before underlying issues are fully resolved [12].

Mediation changes the information landscape in different ways than those that happen through battle fighting. Mediators can open opportunities for discussion, find creative solutions, de-couple previously linked ideas or reformulate solutions into more acceptable forms, help prevent further intensification of the conflict, and change the established procedures or norms to help push through challenges [75]. Further, mediators themselves can absorb political pressure from conflict actors to deescalate and provide the political cover, space, and time necessary to reach a deal [94, 75]. Who mediates can also be a critical factor in getting to peace or an impediment to the process. The mediator can provide new information [75] and, depending on their relationship to the conflict or parties to the conflict, can help make certain information more trustworthy [76] or apply pressure at the right time to get an agreement signed. Once issues are resolved, however, actors may still drag their feet [41, 75].

Different mediators have different tools at their disposal. Historically, much emphasis has been placed on understanding the success of mediators in terms of their ‘capacity’ or the ability to supply peacekeepers, development aid, and peace enforcement mechanisms. However, more recent work examines the role played by mediators’ ‘credibility’ or influence from historical, cultural, or regional ties to reach an agreement [102]. Third-party involvement—peacekeeping in particular—is heralded as necessary to solving commitment problems and

installing peace [127]. However, in contexts where peace has been difficult to attain,[5] regional mediators with far less capacity available to draw from than international or Western mediators were more successful in getting to agreements than others [42]. From the established work, we see that, where present, mediation can influence the full spectrum of conflict dynamics for better or worse. Mediation *can* help to resolve conflict, but it cannot do so alone. Furthermore, who mediates and how they approach the conflict and resolution can impact the agreement reached. Such factors should be considered alongside the war-fighting process to understand resolution processes. To that end, I test each hypothesis for cases with mediation. Because of data limitations on civil war mediation events, I run separate tests for mediation, but I present them alongside the results from the full models.

Mediators could be problematic for this project if interim governments were a go-to solution for one type of mediator. In this paper, I derive hypotheses for three types of mediators: United Nations, Western, and Regional mediators based on the DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna 2011 data on third parties in mediation where the timeline allows us to explore where interim government inclusion is more or less likely.

2.5 Theory

Accepting the basic premise of the bargaining model of war, wherein wars end when conflict actors solve information and commitment problems [47], then when do interim government provisions arise in peace agreements? The inclusion of interim governments represents an agreement to participate in an additional negotiation centered on establishing how political power will be distributed and accessed in the future. This process represents a 'bargaining-by-parts' or parties to the agreement taking small steps toward full resolution [113, 110, 80]. However, if there is still bargaining to be done after signing an agreement to make peace, what parts of the conflict are under-resolved? Interim government provisions within peace agreements are observable events that indicate some lack of agreement over what government

[5] In this case African conflicts.

will look like in the future. That is to say, some of the information or commitment problems at the heart of the conflict are under-resolved. This paper seeks to answer the open question: What are the characteristics of civil wars that take this route to continue bargaining over the future shape of governing after agreeing to silence the guns?

Based on the theoretical underpinnings of the bargaining model of war, I expect peace agreements in civil wars to include interim governments where the levels of information and commitment are relatively lower in the war. Cognizant that some level of information and commitment problems must be solved to get to any agreement, I expect that peace agreements signed in a given conflict year will co-occur with other indicators of relatively low levels of information and commitment in the war. I expect features of the war, third-party involvement, and specific types of mediators to relate differently to the likelihood an interim government is included in a peace agreement, which I discuss below.

2.5.1 Hypotheses for War

As wars progress, all things being equal, more information is revealed by each conflict party reducing information problems [125]. I expect conflict actors to include interim governments in peace agreements in relatively lower information environments, so I expect they arise earlier in the war.

> **H1 Long Wars:** The longer the war, the less likely a peace agreement signed is to include an interim government.

As more actors are involved in a war, information asymmetries grow, and reaching any agreement between actors grows more difficult [30, 31]. As I expect interim governments in peace agreements that arise from lower information settings, I expect that when more actors are involved in a war, interim governments are included more often, which is formalized in H2.

H2 Number of Actors: The more parties involved in the war, the more likely interim governments to be included in an agreement.

Costlier or more deadly wars reveal more information about the resources and resolve of the parties involved [125]. Similarly to H1 and H2, I expect that as human costs increase in war, more information is shared among conflict parties, and interim governments will be included less often.

H3 Conflict Intensity: As a war sees more battle-related deaths, interim governments are less likely to arise in peace agreements.

Given that information is exchanged, and commitment credibility is tested during ceasefires [24], even if no other talks occur during that time, the length of time a ceasefire lasts is informative about the conflict and conflict actors. Therefore, conflicts that have seen more ceasefires are less likely to see an interim government included in an agreement, given one is signed that year.

H4 Prior Ceasefires: Wars with more prior ceasefires are less likely to include interim governments in peace agreements.

Peace agreements fail. When agreements fail, conflict resolution and termination efforts regress by definition. According to the bargaining model of war, information and commitment problems in the conflict increase. From this logic, I expect those conflicts with more prior agreements—as a proxy for failed agreements—are more likely to include an interim government in the agreement under study.

H5 Prior Agreements: Wars with more prior agreements are more likely to include interim governments in peace agreements.

2.5.2 Hypotheses for Third Party Involvement

Third-party involvement is a well-established aid to ending civil wars [127]. However, external actor involvement on one side or another (or both) increases uncertainty around capabilities, resolve, and what an acceptable deal at the end of the war looks like [31]. In this way, I expect peace agreements are more likely to include interim governments when an external actor is involved in the war.

> **H6 International Actors:** Wars with more external actors involved are more likely to include an interim government in a peace agreement.

But, not all third-party interventions are the same. I expect peacekeeping forces in the country to help increase the credibility of the commitments made in the agreements [127]. Therefore, when peacekeeping forces are present that year, I expect interim governments to be less common in any peace agreement signed.

> **H7 Peacekeeping:** Conflicts involving peacekeepers are less likely to include interim governments in peace agreements.

2.5.3 Hypotheses for Mediation or Mediator:

Mediation can play a critical role in conflict resolution as it can reveal information that can be additive along the conflict [11, 75]. Therefore, where the mediation occurs, I expect fewer interim governments to be included in the resulting peace agreements.

> **H8 Mediation Presence:** Wars with mediation are less likely to include interim governments in peace agreements signed when mediators are involved in negotiations that year.

Who mediates can influence the mediation [12, 76]. Where Western mediators are involved in the process, I expect more of a focus on capability-based approaches to resolution

and a focus on shorter-term, even if larger, solutions. Therefore, I expect more heavy-handed mediation [12] and fewer interim governments in the agreements.

H9 Western Mediators: Wars with Western mediators involved in negotiations that year are more likely to include interim governments in peace agreements.

On the other hand, I expect regional actors to approach mediation through a credibility lens [102, 41] and have a longer-term approach. Based on this, I expect peace agreements to include interim governments less often when regional actors participate in mediation.

H10 Regional Mediators: Wars with regional mediators involved in negotiations that year are less likely to include interim governments in peace agreements.

2.6 Method and Data

2.6.1 Method

There is an inherent and inevitable conditionally missing data question at the center of this study: an agreement must first exist before we can examine the contents. This question presents a missing-not-at-random data problem. Selection or hurdle models are a way to account for conditionally missing data [66].[6] I first ran selection models to test for bias from selection effects [66, 46]. Within these models, the estimates from the first equation are included in the second step to isolate the likely observed effect of the variable of interest [46, 66, 13]. Where the rho value is insignificant, the selection is not an influencing factor in the second estimating equation. The researcher need not consider the role of selection [13]. For all models, the rho value is insignificant except for the mediation-specific test on getting to an agreement (A.10) and for the mediation-specific model with all variables included (A.16). Both results are presented in the appendix and the results in the second stage of the model for each are insignificant so I do present the results for these two tests in a consistent

[6]Models for this paper used the selection function from the SampleSelect package for R.

manner to the others in the body of the paper.[7] In everyother model, the rho value was insignificant; therefore, below, I present probit model results for each hypothesis and one joint model of all of the factors considered together. The results with selection effects are included in the Appendix A.[8]

2.6.2 Data

The universe of cases for this analysis is all civil wars and internationalized civil war-years between 1990–2018 included in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program-Armed Conflict Dataset (UCDP-ACD) [99].[9] To capture the ever-important existence of a peace agreement and the agreement contents as they relate to interim governments, I rely on the Pa-X data, which spans all peace agreements and associated documents signed between 1990–2022; further, Pa-X links agreements back to the UCDP conflict identifier where possible [14]. DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna [37] provide the mediation data for this study. This data captures all third-party mediation in civil wars from 1946–2005. Due to the limited time coverage of this data, I run and present the mediation-specific models separately.

2.6.3 Data: Dependent Variable

After selection effects are ruled out, the only dependent variable measures if the partial or comprehensive peace agreement associated with that conflict that year includes an interim government provision or not. This variable is drawn from the PAX dataset on peace agreements, which includes all signed peace agreements between 1990–2022 [14]. This variable is a binary measure of whether an agreement does or does not include an interim government according to the coding provided in the data.[10]

[7] When estimating the first stage equation, I include control variables in the first stage models and drop them in the second stage as is necessary to avoid serious collinearity problems in the estimation process [**?**].

[8] The mediation effects are only tested separately. They neither have an effect distinguishable from zero when tested on their own on getting to an agreement, nor do they relate significantly to the terms of the agreement. For the sake of brevity, those results stand alone.

[9] My analysis ends in 2018 to parallel the timeline used in the following paper in this series.

[10] This is the *PolNewTemp* variable from [14].

2.6.4 Data: Independent Variables

This paper explores many independent variables to describe the relationship between conditions and the likelihood of interim government inclusion in civil war peace agreements. The independent variables for the war-specific hypotheses all come from UCDP project data. I calculate the war length from the episode start date for each conflict observation in UCDP's ACD [99]. I combine the total number of actors on the side of the government forces and the rebel forces listed in UCDP's ACD to measure the number of actors involved in the conflict [99]. Finally, I use the UCDP battle-related deaths dataset to measure conflict intensity [34].

For the third-party involvement hypotheses, I draw measures from two sources. First, to measure the presence of external actors in the conflict or on any side, I draw from the UCDP-External Actor Dataset [91]. Then, to measure the influence of peacekeeping forces on this conflict termination process, I rely on the Bara and Hultman [10] data, which includes counts for both United Nations and regional peacekeeping forces for deployments between 1993–2016. I truncated the years for the peacekeeping-specific models to match the data availability. For the joint models on the full timeline, peacekeeping variables are omitted from the full models (peacekeeping results are presented in the joint mediation results).

To measure mediation concepts, I rely on the [37] data on mediation events in civil wars. DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna [37] collect data from post-World War II through 2005 that captures whether mediation occurs, who leads it, and other features. Based on conflict location, combatants, and year, I added UCDP conflict identifiers by hand to the mediation data. Further, I code four categories of third-party participants from the data (where possible): regional NGO/IO, Western NGO/IO or country, regional country, and the United Nations. Some observations have all four, while others have only one. For these tests, there are only 30 complete observations, so I run a cross tab with a chi-squared diagnosis of a relationship. Below, I present a visualization of the variable to show the co-occurrence of interim governments in peace agreements and who participated as a mediator.

To control for features known to influence war onset and institutions in the future, I

include control variables. I control for the regime type [28][11] to control for the influence of regime type and current institution strength on new institution development [100], For similar reasons, I include the GDP per capita [28]. Further, I control for the overall intensity of the war with UCDP-ACD's measure indicating whether a war has reached 1000 battle-related deaths over the life of the conflict. I control for the type of conflict with UCDP-ACD's incompatibility variable as we know that self-determination and other territorial conflicts often follow different paths to resolution than others [48].

2.7 Results

I present the results below. Figure 2.1 presents the results of the probit models from the individual independent variables from the war and third-party hypotheses—each of these models are run individually with the control variable discussed above, and the independent coefficients are plotted together. Figure 2.2 presents the results from the probit model where all of the independent variables and controls are run together. The left panes (Figure 2.1a and Figure 2.2a) include the entire 1990–2018 time range available, while the right panes (Figure 2.1b and Figure 2.2b) present the results for the restricted mediation and peacekeeping data availability timeline (1993-2005).

2.7.1 War and Third Party Hypothesis Tests

Both sets of results in Figure 2.1 show that when individually modeled, with controls, none of the independent variables have a significant relationship to the inclusion of an interim government given a peace agreement was signed that year in the entire sample or the restricted mediation timeframe. However, when the features associated with the war context and third-party involvement features are modeled together, we see significant results across one independent variable and some controls worth unpacking. Figure 2.2 presents these re-

[11] V-DEM's regimes of the world measure, a 0-3 continuous measure ranging from closed autocracy (0) to liberal democracy (3)



(a) Full data without mediation considered (1990-2018 for all but peacekeeping test).



(b) Restricted to when mediation occurs and peacekeeping data is available (1993-2005).

Figure 2.1: Probit model results for each independent variable tested separately with controls for GDP, quality of the governmental regime, the cumulative intensity of the conflict, and type of conflict presented as log odds ratios.

sults. Unlike in Figure 2.1, where the color differences indicated if results were significant, color in Figure 2.2 indicates if the variable is an independent variable linked to a hypothesis or a control variable. In Figure 2.2a, we see that conflicts with more external actors at the time of signing another agreement are more likely to see an interim government included in terms of the newly signed one. Now this result—and no results—survives consideration alongside mediation occurring that year and peacekeeper presence.

Interestingly, within the two models presented in Figure 2.2, the control variable that captures if there is a territorial element to the civil war correlates strongly with the governance terms of the agreement. We see in the full period (Figure 2.2a) that both conflicts that are focused on governmental challenges or governmental and territorial (rather than strictly territorial-based civil wars) are much less likely to include an interim government in terms of an agreement signed in a given year. It may seem counter-intuitive for a conflict over government or control of the center conflict to be less likely to include government restructuring in a negotiated settlement. However, interim governments arise in territorial



(a) Full Data without mediation or peacekeeping considered (1990-2018).



(b) Restricted to when mediation occurs and peacekeeping data is available (1993-2005).

Figure 2.2: Probit model results for each independent variable tested all together with controls for GDP, quality of the governmental regime, the cumulative intensity of the conflict, and type of conflict presented as log odds ratios.

conflicts and can be regionally-specific agreements (One of the Bosnian/Croatian wars, and Sudan/South Sudan had had a regionally specific interim government).

Countries with lower quality regimes are less likely to see an interim government included in a peace agreement signed that year—when considered in the full scope of the data for this paper. This is, perhaps, unsurprising as closed autocracies or electoral autocracies may never consider an interim government arrangement at the end of a civil war as an interim government requires some change in permanent institutions, which necessitates the possibility of the autocrat's removal from power—often through elections—which may be too far off the table in any bargaining process for such regimes. In this way, interim governments might only be included in peace agreements within democracies or democratizing countries intent on political, not violent, contests in the future.

While not groundbreaking, these results taken together raise questions as to which specific interactions, or in this case, series of events, make interim governments more or less likely. None of the individual tests can address the mechanics of the other variables missing from

consideration; however, even when taken together, we see few results. This result points to the potential influence instead of another variable, namely, when external actors in civil war complicate the prospects for peace, even after the battlefield, and getting to an agreement.

2.7.2 Mediation Hypothesis Tests

Who mediates and what strategy or strategies they use can have a long-term impact on the outcome of mediation and the durability of peace. Figure 2.3 presents a visualization of the distribution of individual attributes of what types of third parties participated in the negotiations that produced an agreement with or without an interim government. There were only 30 instances of mediation with third-party actors listed in the DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna [37] data, therefore, statistical analysis is not advisable (although, the relationships are null when they are run).[12]

We see that what types of third-party actors are present when mediation occurs does not have a discernable relationship with whether an agreement signed that year includes an interim government or not. It seems all actors except Regional IOs have included interim governments in peace agreements they were involved in negotiating about equally. While these results do not follow the hypotheses derived from the bargaining model of war presented in this paper, they do possibly point to a more organic inclusion of interim governments in peace agreements than one mediator-type, like the UN, always pushing for their inclusion.

2.8 Conclusion

This paper tested whether war, third-party and mediator-related variables relate to the likelihood that an agreement signed in a civil war will include an interim government. Theoretically, this question builds off the canonical bargaining model of war logic of conflict

[12] To construct this visualization, I collapse the categories of third-party mediators even though there is often more than one of these categories present. The hierarchy I present is as follows, where the UN is present, that is what is counted regardless of who else is there; where a Western country or IO/NGO is present without the UN, that is what is included, then Regional IOs, and finally, regional country actors.



Figure 2.3: Descriptive plot for individual types of mediators present (1990-2005) co-occurrence between if an agreement signed has an interim government or not.

termination. I posit that interim governments are an observable outcome of actors agreeing to a bargaining-by-parts approach to conflict termination. Such an approach necessarily means that a key future consideration—namely, the government structures—are undecidable or at least undecided at the time an agreement is signed.

To test the theory, I relied on standard measures of information and commitment in civil wars and derived hypotheses guided by the expectation that interim governments should be more likely to arise in agreements signed at times of relatively lower levels of information and commitment. When modeled independently, none of the variables tested were significant indicators of a relationship with interim government provisions in peace agreements. The results were similar when war and third-party variables were tested together, which is more in line with a real-world data-generating process. Conflicts with more external actors were more likely to see interim governments in a peace agreement, given there is one signed that year when modeled in concert with the other variables. Yet none of the relationships, even those for the control variables, survive in the more limited timeframe with mediation data. No relationship was detected between the categories of types of third-party mediators tested

in this paper on the inclusion of interim governments.

There are still many open questions about interim governments in civil wars, such as, when in the conflict cycle do they arise, and are they effective in overcoming the sub-optimal levels of information or commitment problem resolution, to name just a few. Future work should continue to investigate these questions. Research, in particular, at the intersection of conflict and contentious politics might consider dynamics beyond those posited by classical models of war to find novel insights. This paper tested war, third-party, and mediator-related variables on if they relate to an agreement signed in a civil war related to interim government inclusion more or less often. Theoretically, this question builds off the canonical bargaining model of war logic of conflict termination. I posit that interim governments are an observable outcome of actors agreeing to a bargaining-by-parts approach to conflict termination. That necessarily means a key part of the future—the government structures—are undecidable or at least undecided at the time of signing an agreement.

Taking the findings further, Chapter Three explores a more granular looks at civil war and civil war termination processes. Sadly, peace agreements do not always resolve wars, the next chapter looks into when in the war and peace process do interim governments arise. Again, I root this question in the bargaining model of war to build our knowledge in the intersection of conflict and contentious politics to more dynamically consider the data. Further careful work in Chapter Four looks into how other dynamics than classical models of war fully explain. Careful, detailed work on successful and unsuccessful cases through analysing the texts of agreements help aid our knowledge base, too.

Chapter 3

Incomplete Negotiations?: When are interim governments used to resolve civil wars?

3.1 Abstract:

Generally, we think civil wars end with battlefield victory or peace agreement, and then peace implementation and politics start. However, some peace agreements that terminate civil wars include an interim government to handle the transition of power to a permanent government instead of laying out agreed-upon changes immediately or restarting pre-war institutions. These institutions present a continued negotiation process during peace implementation before permanent governments take over. Interim, temporary, caretaker governments have great power in the fragile immediate-post war period. Here, I explore under what conditions we see interim governments incorporated in peace agreements. Including interim governments is an observable implication of an under-resolved agreement on the path forward to institutions. Applying the bargaining model of war, I theorize that conflict actors include interim governments in peace agreements that end violence with lower levels of information than conflicts without interim governments included. I test these implications using a multistate model that dynamically models the conflict and institution-building process as an interconnected process with transitions between war, ceasefires, and different peace terms. The results generally support the information-related hypotheses and I work to unpack them in terms of my theory and the established literature. This work extends how scholars consider the reach of a peace process' information and commitment dynamics and illustrate how these factors shape post-war institution building.

3.2 Introduction:

The[1] scholarly consensus is that civil wars end either after one side is defeated militarily or after a drawn-out negotiation and peace implementation process with some assistance from international peacekeeping forces. Yet peace agreements fail, and wars restart even with large-scale third-party assistance. Conditions on the ground can transition between different stages of a war, ceasefire, implementing agreements, or resolution for decades. Where resolution efforts are present, the terms included or omitted in peace agreements are important to our understanding of when to expect these agreements to succeed or fail, especially when it comes to establishing governments. So far, the literature has considered individual features of war, ceasefire, and transitions to peace but not how these features relate to the re-establishment of governments. This paper tackles the challenge of modeling when and why actors in the course of conflict sometimes agree to a governance solution that necessitates further negotiation in peace agreements. Under what conditions do contentious politics start and violence end in the bargaining phase of war? How the terms of new governance institutions are arrived at within peace agreements is an under-explored and fundamental question to understanding successful conflict resolution and institution-building post-conflict.

Interim governments or temporary, caretaker governments tasked with establishing permanent governing institutions after a short, pre-specified amount of time are often included in peace agreements rather than newly defined or revived permanent institutions themselves. These interim governments are responsible for governing in the short term and handing over power to permanent institutions that the interim government itself sometimes designs. Liberia attempted an interim government at least three separate times between 1990–2003 through peace agreements alone. In South Africa, the final apartheid government agreed to participate in an interim government with Nelson Mandela to negotiate the structures of the post-apartheid government. An Iraqi peace agreement in the early 2000s included an interim

[1] I would like to thank Danielle Jung, David Davis, Emily Gade, Stephen Bagwell, Gray Barrett, Patrick Pearson, Pearce Edwards, Shawna Metzger, Katie Webster, and Dan Reiter for helpful comments and guidance along the way and Kim Greenwell for copy edit services.

government. And, as recently as March 2021, the Biden administration's state department proposed pushing for an interim power-sharing government between Ashraf Ghani's government and the Taliban months before the United States pulled out the last troops [38].[2] These institutions arise out of conflicts, yet our main theories say little about when and under what conditions in a conflict to expect them.

According to Fearon, wars end when information and commitment problems are sufficiently solved among conflict actors (1995). Within this framework, we are left with the question: when do interim governments (IGs) arise in some peace agreements but not others? Interim governments may be critical to individual peace processes. They could play a critical trust-building role between former combatants in the new contest of governing. Or interim governments may be harbingers of less durable peace outcomes. Yet, their inclusion is puzzling within the rationalist framework of war and termination. Why give up the fight without guaranteed access to political power or government goodies into the future?

Specifically, when in the war process do peace agreements establish an interim government rather than begin new permanent institutions or tweak existing institutions through the peace process, as other agreements do if the conflict is resolved enough to sign a comprehensive or partial peace agreement? Under what conditions can violence end without full resolution over how a government and the distribution of political power will look in the future? This paper dynamically models the full war process to address this question in a unified way. Using Cox proportional hazard models and multistate models, I focus specifically on information dynamics within the warfighting, negotiation, and immediate agreement implementation phase.[3] [4]

[2]Although the administration included this suggestion in a letter, not a peace agreement, it is still a recent observation of a related policy suggestion.

[3]While commitment issues are critically important to durable peace, external peacekeeping forces have always played a key role in analyzing these dynamics [126, 127]. Due to peacekeeping forces often deploying only once fighting ends and after agreements are signed, the data available for this analysis is too limited even when considering UN and regional peacekeeping footprints [10].

[4]I ran the multistate models with three different measures of peacekeeping forces, only one reliably converged alone—none converged with the regime type variable included in the other individual models. This analysis is already pushing up against the limits of a multistate modeling approach; with limited peacekeeping data through the earlier transitions, it didn't seem to work.

Peace agreement texts provide a snapshot of conflict dynamics and power distributions at a key point in the conflict and rebuilding process. I posit, where interim governments exist in a peace process, they represent an observable intent by those involved to adopt a piecemeal bargaining strategy. However, interim governments may also indicate a sub-optimal level of resolution to problems in the conflict.[5] If a conflict is sub-optimality resolved when moving to peace implementation, it should give us pause to consider where and when interim governments arise in conflict processes.

Interim governments are, in many ways, a puzzling option. They are empowered to make critically important decisions regarding future permanent institutions, yet often lack the legitimacy of elected governments precisely due to being installed through a peace process rather than a popular vote.[6] Established by definition during times of transition, they must simultaneously plan for future governing structures while also providing governance under deeply unstable conditions that often threaten to tip back into violence and turbulence [111]. Little research, however, has examined why or when interim governments are even included in peace agreements post-civil wars, given such disadvantages. Instead, studies of the institution-building process focus on issues of power-sharing and strong executive or party control in whatever government comes after the conflict. However, they rarely consider the timing of those processes or when they will be implemented in the interim governments versus other governing solutions. In light of these gaps in the scholarship, this paper asks a key question. It deploys a dynamic modeling process to test our understanding of war cycles fully: When are interim governments included in the conflict and conflict resolution cycle? I theorize that when interim governments are included, conflicts have resolved *enough* of the current information problems to end the fighting and reach an agreement. Still, information levels are too low for the actors to agree on the final details of government institutions.

[5]This paper, as it works to model the full conflict, ceasefire, and agreement process, focuses on sources of information to explain when in the conflict process agreements include interim governments and when they do not.

[6]Referendums on peace processes aside, as they couple so many things, not just votes on who is to take positions in the government.

In what follows, I first describe the role and nature of interim governments created by peace agreements before I review the literature on how and when civil wars end and what we know about peace agreement terms. Then, I lay out the theoretical role interim governments could play in the conflict termination process before deriving hypotheses to test the associated levels of information and commitment in wars that produce an agreement with an interim government. To test the hypotheses developed in this paper, I start with Cox proportional hazard models before running multistate models. Multistate models are a form of hazard or survival model that allows statistical modeling of the complexities of conflict termination processes, including the progression of a conflict from war through ceasefires to implementing a peace agreement and any breakdowns along that chain of events. I discuss the model, data compilation, and structure in detail before presenting and discussing the results. I conclude with avenues for future work, both on interim governments and additional applications of this modeling technique.

3.2.1 What are Interim Governments? What Role do they Play?

Interim governments are temporary governing bodies tasked with establishing in full or in part the function and design of the institutions intended to replace the interim government after a short or predetermined length of time.[7] In the comparative politics literature, interim governments fit into one of four archetypes: (1) revolutionary: emerging after ousting of a regime by external actors, (2) power-sharing: temporary co-governing between former authoritarian and new democratic regimes, (3) incumbent caretakers: outgoing elites preparing the way for a new regime, or (4) international: a temporary international organization running the transition [111, p. 5]. These institutions, regardless of context, can "determine the subsequent regime, and may affect whether ethnic and regional conflicts will interfere

[7] This is a minimum definition for what I consider an interim government. Agreements can task interim governments with much more than just designing the next institutions. Interim governments are neither shadow governments that take power before the plan, agreed to, and official devolution of power from the state nor are they governments with sunset clauses on specific powers or safeguards.

with the prospects for long-term stability" [111, p. 4].[8] Given interim governments' likely weak power, the immediate post-conflict timing of their establishment, and their lack of the traditional legitimacy [9] of pre-war, permanent, or elected governments, their period of rule is a crucially important and delicate time in the peace-building process.

I take the inclusion of interim governments in the peace process serves as an observable commitment to continue the conflict-ending negotiation process under new conditions (e.g., the previously agreed-upon terms, commitment to peace) [80].

It also represents an agreement to participate in additional negotiations regarding how political power will be distributed and accessed in the future. Through the interim government, those involved [10] can learn new information and test the credibility of previous commitments. Notably, the parties in the interim government can observe how well the peacebuilding or peace-reinforcing processes are being implemented—within the interim government itself and in the broader peace-building process. Thus, the very act of negotiating, or co-governing, while observing whether the peace holds is an opportunity for actors to assess the prospects for ongoing information and commitment. These real-time observations should inform the interim government's ongoing negotiations over the distribution of and constraints on political power for the future. This might be especially true if the agreement was signed when levels of information and commitment were too low between the conflict actors for them to reach a complete agreement on how long-term institutions would function. In this way, an interim government allows for conflict actors to engage in a bargaining-by-parts or phased approach to conflict resolution that can work to build trust, even in the toughest of circumstances

[8]For this paper, I look only at those established by a peace agreement after a civil war, but many of the same archetypes are present. Interim governments in the post-civil war context take many forms and are responsible for a variety of tasks, including holding new elections, overseeing disengagement of military actors, integrating security forces, revising election law, (re)registering voters, holding new elections, writing a new constitution, or some combination of these tasks [111].

[9]Leaders derive legitimacy from different sources,[130, 116] of similar governments. Here, I use traditional legitimacy broadly to reflect the standing that governments generally hold in international and domestic (for local or regional levels) spaces, regardless of their Weberian claim to legitimacy.

[10]In this paper, I focus on the role of conflict actors in improving the information and commitment landscape after the violence ends. However, future work could also look into the role of interim governments in improving faith in the process and gaining the trust of former conflict actors in the eyes of the citizens or international community as well.

[110, 113].

3.3 Wars End, Politics Begin. But There's More to It.

Significant academic work focuses on why wars and political violence happen, how they end, and the various challenges involved in inter-state, intra-state, and transnational conflicts—and rightly so. Understanding more about the hows and whys of war onset and resolution may save resources, relationships, and, ultimately, lives. [103, 128, 127, 90, among others]. Significant work builds on the consociational and conflict management theories of Lijphart [86] and Nordlinger [96] regarding the role of institution-building and power distribution processes in fragile, difficult post-civil war settings [64, 67, 20, 16, 18, among others]. However, interim governments are missing from full consideration in Fearon's canonical presentation of war termination, and research on immediate post-conflict political choices remains limited due to often volatile conditions and the possibility of renewed violence. Yet governing institutions included in peace agreements must operate in the thick of these conditions. Such research is thus needed; for if balancing or sharing power is considered crucial for governments post-conflict to maintain peace, then it is similarly important for an interim government that exists beforehand.

Problems over information and commitment among parties can lead to war; conversely, resolving such problems can end an armed conflict [47]. From testing and expanding the theoretical framework of the bargaining model of war, we know that different types of wars and resolution efforts are more or less complicated. Civil wars face increased commitment problems [126] and can stem from different root incompatibilities than interstate wars, making civil wars more challenging to resolve than interstate wars [49]. However, individual battles reveal information about tactics, resolve, and capacity [125]—sometimes even to the extent that long wars have little information left to reveal at the end—which can aid in resolution [49]. But war-fighting is far from a straightforward path to resolution. Factors

like adding additional parties [30], especially international actors [31], new rebel groups, new splinter groups, or wings of existing groups into the conflict [33, 32] increase information asymmetries and make accommodation or resolution more elusive [52].[11]

Important recent work unpacks the timing and logic of ceasefires in civil wars in ways that may parallel other processes in the war. Clayton et al. [23] show that ceasefires arise when the costs—fighting or audience—are lower. This new work dives deeply into defining and detailing the logics of ceasefires and provides a valuable model for approaching governance institutions in peace agreements, as the two share many similarities. First, ceasefires are common in wars [24] and can effectively pause armed conflict to make way for additional conflict termination processes—at least for some time [24]. Peace agreements—particularly those with an interim government included, may follow a similar pattern in conflicts—only occurring later in the resolution process.

In other work examining conflicts as multi-stage, messy processes, scholars have shown how the reputation of actors only grows alongside battlefield progressions. Just as repeat interactions in economic models can lead to cooperation [98] and can build a cooperative reputation [39, as referenced in [23]], how states act and react in conflict influences their reputations for action or accommodation [129]. Further, if a state engages in and honors a ceasefire in one dyad, the likelihood of ceasefires with other dyads increases within that war [9]. Additionally, Clayton et al. [23] and Bara and Clayton [9] theorize that ceasefires can add to the legitimacy of battlefield gains or claims made by non-state actors, as this is true for peace agreements [17, as referenced in [23]]. While ceasefires occur more often than peace agreements in civil wars, both likely operate through similar logics and neither guarantees to end violence. Each plays a role in the cycle of conflict and resolution, and both can arise through bad-faith actions. As is well documented in the literature, ceasefires can serve as opportunities to consolidate territory [115, as referenced in [23]], reequip, resupply, regroup forces [88, 22, 23], or work to gain moderate public support for an individual side [88, 23],

[11] Work from Nilsson [95] points to conflicts resolving through peace agreements even if not all parties sign-on, in some cases.

address morale challenges [23], or temporarily "freeze" the conflict, only for it to thaw later, ultimately prolonging things [88, 23].

I posit that the logic of conflict actors engaging in ceasefires and conflict actors including specific terms in peace agreements follow a similar path through the full conflict and conflict resolution process. To fully understand when and where to expect ceasefires or peace agreements to arise from conflict, I argue both must be considered in the cycle that includes the full conflict and peace process. When ceasefires or peace agreements fail and conflict restarts, the reputations reconfigured in that process shape how the next phase of the war will be fought and how politics will be conducted in the future–if or when–peace agreements are reached.

Negotiated settlements are replacing total battlefield victories as the norm for civil war settlement [68, 33].[12] Mediation led by third parties is often key to reaching those settlements. Third-party-led pre-settlement talks, or mediation, allow for information exchange among conflict actors [12] and the information gained is often additive through multiple rounds of negotiations [75]. Where successful, mediation efforts should support parties to resolve the issues at the heart of the conflict [62]. Nonetheless, these processes are still imperfect in practice and the available data. In the models below, I rely on the length of time spent in ceasefires in the conflict and the number of past agreements as a proxy for mediation. While it is an assumption about the process itself, it is hard to imagine a ceasefire holding or an agreement being signed without information exchanged between parties, formally in negotiations, mediation, or otherwise informally.

Third-party assistance, especially mediation, works through two pathways: capacity, or the ability to enforce or incentivize the deal, and credibility, or the leveraging of cultural or historical ties to reach an agreement [102]. But while external actors are often critical to resolving civil conflict, conflict resolution strategies that rely exclusively on capability factors

[12] Contrary to the findings about the necessity of third parties, recent work in interstate war points to an increase in mediation during wars, but a similar decrease in mediation's war termination power when conducted contemporaneously with battle-fighting [93].

or are externally imposed rather than internally developed are not likely to fully resolve the conflict, thus leaving underlying information and commitment problems [12, 11, 131] and making renewed conflict more likely. Recently, scholars have built off of the canonical idea of mutually hurting stalemates [132], pointing to the timing of mediator pressure being helpful only after parties find a mutually agreeable solution among themselves—and when pressure is needed to finalize the agreement [41]. This underscores the importance of mediator credibility. Where capacity-forward efforts have struggled, credibility-forward efforts have led to peace more often [102, 42]. However, the agreement arises, and the terms dictate the next steps in the peace process, which seeks to establish the political, social, military, and other key facets of post-war life.

Negotiated settlements can call for sweeping changes that usher in widespread change—including regime change and interim governments. Research has found mixed outcomes when looking at new regimes established through negotiated settlement [119], or, in other instances, that large-scale interventions leave behind foreign institutions that do not work well to solve domestic problems long-term [21]. Paralleling the mediation findings, heavy-handed interventions from external parties may not lead to the most durable, functional arrangements for post-conflict societies. While a wealth of work focuses on resolving conflict, there is still significant work to be done once the guns are put away.

Simply put, the challenges do not end with getting an agreement or a cessation of violence. Researchers of civil war and post-war outcomes often take a signed peace agreement as a starting point, then compare the outcomes for countries according to the terms included in their peace agreements [64, 67, 20, 16, 59, 107, among others], such as the agreements' implementation levels [70], or the inclusion levels of former rebels [89]. Such approaches, however, either fail to address the unique existence of interim governments or collapse the power-sharing requirements for interim governments into consideration of any institutions or terms established by the peace agreement [64, 53].[13] When researchers take the resump-

[13]Even the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)-Peace Agreement dataset only includes measures of whether and to what extent rebels are included in interim governments, not the latter's general presence or

tion of politics as their starting point, they risk missing features and distinctions within agreement terms that necessitate continued negotiation *during* the rebuilding phase. To my knowledge, Strasheim and Fjelde provides the only quantitative study examining the peace agreement terms governing an interim government. Their study includes 15 interim governments (and only those with significant UN mission presence) and finds that inclusion and executive constraint are important for transitioning to democracy. Considering these interim governments independently is critically important to understanding the success and failure of peace post-civil war, but more research is needed.

It is crucial to understand how the very real potential for renewed violence impacts efforts to negotiate how politics will be (re)designed post-conflict civil war and how temporary institutions define what the new political environment will look like. How well governments provide basic services and economic growth after a civil war is critically important for reducing the likelihood of further conflict [128]. And with the rise in the use of negotiated settlements to terminate wars [68], the terms, as well as the timing of these settlements, play a critical role in how societies are or are not *'put back together'*. I argue that including an interim government may allow conflict actors to resolve outstanding information or commitment problems. By establishing an interim government, trust-building (or trust erosion) can commence alongside efforts to (re)build domestic governing capacity through a piecemeal bargaining process while violence is off the table. In the next section, I discuss the theory that I draw on to understand interim governments' expected role in the bargaining model.

3.4 Theoretical Framework: Agreeing to End War But to Keep Working on Government

I posit the question of when interim governments are most likely to be employed in a peace process to end civil wars in the bargaining model of war. I focus on how information during

absence in agreements.

warfighting, ceasefires, and peace agreements shape the trajectory of the conflict. While commitment problems are critically important to conflict termination [127], third-party interventions, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or other capability-focused solutions to commitment problems are often included at the termination of the conflict and signing of an agreement which is not the main focus of this paper.[14]

Where interim governments arise, conflict actors agree to end the use of violence and 'put a pin in', agreeing right away to the long term form of political institutions. Indeed, establishing or at least transitioning to the permanent form of those institutions can be one of the main tasks of interim governments. The very fact that an interim government has been established indicates that the conflict actors have signed an agreement resolving at least some elements of the conflict. Conflict actors necessarily gain some additional information in this process, but even where interim governments are included, all information problems may not be fully solved.

Conflict actors hiving off of particular pieces of the negotiation is in line with a piecemeal [113] approach to conflict resolution. In these instances, parties take smaller, incremental steps toward a larger agreement over time through incremental trust-building [110, 113]. This piecemeal approach builds a conflict termination process that can build trust through cultivating "the necessary mutual expectations" among the parties, regardless of what is on the table for negotiation [110, p. 301]. Parties build on the fact that each additional negotiation begins with fewer agenda items for that bargaining round [80]. With increased communication and commitment to future required cooperation, this approach to bargaining can lead to "mutually satisfying agreements" [109, p. 150]. Wars may end, and peace agreements can be reached, with an agreement to continue the negotiation process.[15] We can infer that conflict actors expect to continue to update information levels during the agreed-upon

[14] In line with much of the literature, I omit issue indivisibility as a key factor. Negotiations–especially where side payments or power-sharing are available—can find ways to share or divide indivisible things as important as territory if the bargain is struck delicately and is conscious of time inconsistencies, commitment, and information problems. For a discussion of issue indivisibility, see Goddard [61].

[15] Importantly, interim governments are included in both partial and comprehensive agreements in the Bell and Badanjak [14] data.

future negotiation.

Who is included in the peace process as a conflict actor, signatory party, or some other role varies based on the peace process and particular agreement; still, some commonalities exist. I focus specifically on civil wars, that is to say, violent conflicts between a state and a domestic non-state actor.[16] The armed actors in the conflict—usually at least some of the rebels and government—are generally involved in the peace process. However, the government may have fallen completely, leaving only rebel groups to negotiate an end to the war. Further, it may be the political wings of armed groups at the table and serving as signatories instead of the violent actors, or international third parties can play a role—sometimes as a signatory, sometimes as a guarantor, sometimes in less formal ways. The role of third parties is particularly context-specific. The Catholic Church, for example, is a signatory to some agreements in the Central African Republic and named in the dispute in Colombian agreements but not in other conflicts in Latin America [14]. At times, the United Nations is specifically named as responsible for implementing specific parts of a peace agreement but may or may not sign an agreement. Similarly, the role of civil society in a peace process is an open question and can be an important lynchpin of successful agreements. Conflict resolution theorists point to successful conflict resolution processes as having a pyramid of support from all segments of society, including but not limited to the actors at the heart of the dispute (in this case, the armed actors) [81]. In this paper, when I refer to the conflict actors, I mean specifically the rebel groups, government representatives, and other third-party actors at the negotiating table with the capacity to influence not only the peace agreement terms, but also whether it is signed at all. These actors have the power and influence to alter the terms and existence of an agreement and, therefore, are likely to have a role in the political arrangements moving forward—whether in the form of an interim government or some other governing arrangement (new or otherwise).

After identifying the key actors, the next question is what actions those actors can they

[16] internationalized civil conflicts are also included.

take. Here, actors can defect back to open conflict by not signing an agreement, signing an agreement establishing the details of permanent governance institutions[17], or sign an agreement with an interim government. Any of these options can include some or all of the conflict actors and resolve some or all of the armed conflict.[18] This paper focuses on the actors described above and these three possible actions related to the conflict.

The inclusion of an interim government in a peace agreement is an observable implication of conflict actors choosing both to end violence and to continue negotiating future governing institutions. By including an interim government, conflict actors indicate some initial level of resolved information problems and commitment to continue a piecemeal bargaining process, which presumes unresolved issues among the parties involved. In this sense, actors who agree to establish an interim government have lower levels of information than those involved in successful conflict settlements outlining immediate, permanent government institutions.

Building upon existing theory, I use the definition of information from Fearon [47], or, "*private information* about relative capabilities or resolve and *incentives to misrepresent* such information." Further, to measure these concepts, I rely on similar operationalizations as those established in prior work. The previous and following sections discuss the variables used in this paper in more detail.

In peace agreements where interim governments are included, I expect lower levels of information between conflict actors than in comparable agreements[19] that do not. More specifically, I expect interim governments to be included where these levels are high enough to end violence but not high enough to determine the future government fully.

To measure levels of information, I rely on operationalizations linked theoretically to

[17]For this paper, agreements that specify new institutions and agreements that are mute on changes to institutions are treated the same. Future work can and should tease apart this distinction, but I collapse them here into one separate and distinct category from agreements that implement an interim government. For this analysis, I argue that agreements establishing "no change" and those establishing "changes to permanent institutions" speak more to the distribution of power at the end of a war between a state (no changes) and rebels (wholesale change of institutions), rather than raising the puzzling question of when conflicts (at least temporarily) resolve without answers to big questions like the very form the future government will take.

[18]I expand on the question of the terms of the agreements and how detailed they are in a future paper.

[19]This paper considers only comprehensive and partial agreements.

information like the length of the war. As warfighting reveals information throughout the war [125], I expect fewer interim governments in longer wars. Differently, as the number of actors involved in the conflict increase, information asymmetries grow [30], and I expect more interim governments included in wars with more parties. And, as instances of ceasefires among the parties as a proxy for talks where information is shared through negotiation [24, 23], and taking the count of prior agreements signed in the conflict as a proxy for broken promises in the war complicating the information landscape [129, 9, 75], I expect more interim governments when there are fewer months in ceasefire and more interim governments when there are more prior agreements. Operationalizing "information" is challenging and will leave gaps for anyone working to capture this in their data completely, although this is a universal challenge in this field.

While these paint a less-than-complete picture of information in civil war, these measures do capture the basic levels of the conflict (length of war), information difficulties (number of actors), ceasefire attempts (number of past ceasefires), and broken agreements (count of past agreements). Taken together, these variables play critical roles in the warfighting information landscape and conflict termination process. Further, this analysis provides a starting point in the process of understanding the interconnections between war and post-violence political spheres.

3.4.1 Hypotheses

Information is revealed in many ways during a conflict. Warfighting itself is one way to do this. More prolonged wars have more confrontations which, in turn, serve as opportunities to update conflict actors' information on resolve, strategy, support, and other vital factors [125, 49]. And as the number of actors increases, so do the individual preferences that need to be accommodated, the opportunities for miscommunication, and asymmetrical information issues. Accordingly, I expect more interim governments to arise from conflicts with more

actors[30, 31].

Hypothesis 1: Longer Wars: Conflict-observations later in wars are less likely to transition to agreements with interim governments from war or ceasefire states than agreements without interim governments.

Hypothesis 2: Number of Actors: Conflict-observations with more actors involved in that war phase are more likely to transition to agreements with interim governments from war or ceasefire than agreements without interim governments.

A strong signal of new information is the breaking of a peace agreement. Prior or broken agreements may indicate that either party or both parties did not sign in good faith or could not implement the terms—however basic those terms may have been. This updates the information other actors have about the past agreement, the negotiation process, and possibly even the future of the conflict. As such, I expect that in a conflict with a previous agreement, interim governments should be more likely in the subsequent agreement since the information landscape is muddied.

Hypothesis 3: Previous Agreement: Conflict-observations with more prior agreements are more likely to transition from war or ceasefire to an agreement with an interim government than one without an interim government.

Talks are another way information can be updated between conflict actors [114, 93] and become even more critical after fighting ends. However, mediation alone cannot solve a conflict, so I take ceasefire agreements to measure these opportunities for talks between actors. Because of this, conflicts that have seen previous ceasefires should have higher information levels than those that have not. Therefore, I expect that interim governments are more likely to be included in peace agreements in conflicts without (or with fewer months of) prior ceasefires.

Hypothesis 4: Previous Ceasefires: Conflict-observations with fewer months spent in previous ceasefires are more likely to transition from war or ceasefire states to agreements with interim governments than agreements without interim governments.

3.4.2 Why this is Hard

Civil wars cycle through periods of fighting, ceasefires, talks, peace enforcement, and peace-building. The outside forces that make ceasefires, mediation, external interventions, or agreements more likely further complicate the dynamics of studying this question through the selection effects surrounding conflicts that see third-party interest early or at all. Accounting for the other possible transitions is truer to form in an actual conflict setting, but capturing all the possibilities of where a peace process can break down is a modeling challenge. Figure 3.1 depicts the most basic transitions through the conflict and conflict termination process that a civil war can see. This figure helps to demonstrate the interconnected nature of this phenomenon. First, take the black arrows. Let us assume that a war starts, some time passes, and parties agree to a ceasefire. If the ceasefire is successfully established, the conflict actors can proceed to implement whatever agreement was reached—which may or may not include an interim government.

However, we know conflicts are more complicated. The blue arrows represent the real-world complications of this process in Figure 3.1. Talks can break down, and there can be a return to active fighting. The process of implementing peace agreements can fail, forcing actors to return to the negotiating table or, worse, the battlefield. From here, we can start to see more cycling possibilities. Take, for instance, the case of "The Troubles," or the civil war in Northern Ireland from 1990–1998.[20] Table 3.1 presents the data on the individual transitions among the states (including a resolved state, more on that later) in Figure 3.1 from this conflict, used in this paper. We see that for the first years, the conflict is active

[20]The Troubles lasted for longer than this timeframe, however, this is the timeframe captured in this paper, so it is what is used as an explanation here.



Figure 3.1: This figure presents the forward (black arrows) progress from war to talks to one of two types of agreements that captures a simplified conceptualization of conflict termination. It also shows the possible and, sadly, often observed breakdowns in conflict termination (blue arrows), where talks can break down, or actors can break agreements and return to war or the negotiation table. Fully understanding the information and commitment problems among conflict actors requires fuller consideration of the history of those problems throughout the conflict than previous work has considered.

in war. Then, it moves to talks and into a non-interim government peace agreement. Many readers will recognize this period as the negotiations chaired by Senator George Mitchell and that agreement as The Belfast or Good Friday Agreement, officially ending the long, active, armed conflict in Northern Ireland. However, those familiar with the history of this case also know the precariousness of the peace established in April 1998. In line with history, Table 3.1 shows that in August 1998, the conflict restarted. Now, this is a feature of history *and* how we measure civil wars. On August 15, 1998, a bomb went off in Omagh, killing 29 people [94]. This paper's measure of war occurrence comes from the UCDP-Armed Conflict Dataset (UCDP-ACD), which uses a 25-battle-related deaths threshold for inclusion. Therefore, this one bombing was enough to push the Troubles back into the category of an active war. And this one bombing was enough for the peace, so recently established in Europe's longest civil war, to possibly also crumble. Instead, other, smaller armed groups which had yet to give up arms chose to disband [94]. After the bombing, the conflict in this data moved back into ceasefire[21] state and then to resolved as armed violence subsided and no additional agreements were signed between then and the three-year-resolved timeline modeled in this paper.[22] While there was only one bombing that did not restart the wider armed conflict, this example illustrates the complexities of ending conflict and how quickly the tides can turn. Wars are messy and idiosyncratic. Modeling the complexities in the data is difficult.

All of these features of the data-generating process make selecting a modeling approach challenging. Standard regressions, regressions with selection equations (as used in the prior paper in this dissertation), or other linear models leave at least one important transition in the entire process out, not to mention the cycles of failed talks and broken agreements in a single observation. Commonly, the literature tests the success or failure of peace with Weibull, Cox, and other survival models. Generally, these can tackle some

[21] As is discussed later in the modeling and data sections of the paper, the ceasefire state captures a lot of parts of the conflict, including official mediations as well as months where fighting is not active, but there is no current agreement being implemented.

[22] It should also be noted that there were follow-up agreements, one in 2006 and 2010 related to the Troubles and reinforcing The Good Friday Agreement. This highlights the importance of flexibility in understanding what a resolved conflict looks like in our data versus in practice.

UCDP Conflict ID	Month Counter	Current Observation State	Next Conflict State
315	24	War	Ceasefire
315	55	Ceasefire	Non-IG-Agreement
315	92	Non-IG-Agreement	Resolved
315	99	War	Non-IG-Agreement
315	100	Non-IG-Agreement	War
315	104	War	Ceasefire
315	138	Ceasefire	Resolved

Table 3.1: Real-world example of the complexities in the data generating process. This table presents the transitions made through the states in Figure **??** for The Troubles in Northern Ireland from 1990 through 2005. This data shows both 'forward' transitions from war to talks to the agreement, but also a return to conflict post-agreement and ultimate resolution. The blue/black text reflects the color of the arrows that those transitions represent in Figure **??**.

possible transitions but fall short of capturing the full set of possible transitions within a conflict. A competing risk model allows an observation to be at risk for multiple events at one time, and an event history model allows for an observation to experience the same hazard or event multiple times [19]. A multistate approach can consider all of the possible transitions, including returns to war and the bargaining table, as described above—as many times as is reflected in the data—into account in one model. Therefore, I also run multistate models which combine these two capabilities [73, 92]. This model is not too prevalent in political science yet, so I further describe what it estimates and how it applies directly to this question in the next section.

3.4.3 Modeling the whole conflict together

To more fully test the above hypotheses–past what the Cox models can demonstrate—I use a multistate model to capture more of the real-world conflict transitions. This model is an extension of a Cox proportional hazard model that combines competing risk models and repeated event models [73, 92].[23] The multistate model captures an observation's progress through repeated and sequential events in any combination of those transitions [73, 101, 121]. This approach allows for dynamic modeling of the full conflict and conflict termination process together in the same model. Importantly, this includes any backward transitions,

[23] Much of the canonical literature on the durability of peace agreements rely on Cox proportional hazard models [20] or Weibull regression [64, 55] both of which are forms of these models.

like talks breaking down and war resuming [92, 73].

This modeling approach is an empirical Markov chain. There must be an absorbing state for the possible transition process to end. The ‘Resolved’ category serves this function in the model. In Figure 3.2, the arrows pointing into the ‘gray’ resolved state show how an observation can move from any other state to peace after conflict. To be considered resolved in this modeling process, a conflict needs to be dormant for 36 months. That is to say, if a conflict is neither at war nor operating under a new ceasefire nor in a new agreement for three years, it transitions to resolved. If a conflict were to restart fighting, negotiation, or signing an agreement 37 months into being dormant, that data would be entered as a new observation in the model.[24]

All of the transitions from state to state are captured in this modeling process. Further, I estimate the influence of individual covariates on the likelihood of transitioning between individual states. Figure 3.2 presents all the possible transitions modeled in this paper and provides the count of each transition present in the data. However, there are zero observations of three transitions, so I omit that transition from the analysis. These are depicted as the lightest corresponding color arrows for those starting state categories with 0’s in the arrow to capture the count of observations. While all transitions are theoretically possible and modelable, this project is a descriptive effort to understand the real-world processes across conflicts better, so I focus on the transitions that occurred in the universe of cases considered in this work. I should note that applying a multistate approach with these 16 possible transitions and the underlying data is asking a lot of the mathematics underlying the models. I note specific places in the multistate models where estimates may be less reliable than others. There is a lot to gain even demonstratively by applying these

[24]In considering the cut-off point for resolution, I model both three and five-year resolutions. The estimates from the three and five-year resolved models were similar where they were present for estimation. Due to the 28 years of available data to use for these models, there are fewer transitions into the resolved state at the five-year point, resulting in more NAs and more dropped transitions to the absorbing state. I provide the five-year resolved analysis results in the appendix for robustness checks, see Tables B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4. However, as the estimates where produced were similar in size and significance, I present the three-year results here, as they provide a complete picture.



Figure 3.2: Visualization of all theoretically possible transitions with counts of observed transitions in the data for this paper. Theoretically possible, but unobserved transitions are faded out. The arrow width corresponds to the observed transition frequency. The color of the arrows indicates the starting state, and the arrow direction points to the next observed state.

Transition Identifier	Transition Name	Count
1	W to C	308
2	W to A	139
3	W to IG	31
4	W to R	0 (removed from analysis)
5	C to W	137
6	C to A	18
7	C to IG	5
8	C to R	119
9	A to W	138
10	A to C	0 (removed from analysis)
11	A to IG	15
12	A to R	27
13	IG to W	38
14	IG to C	0 (removed from analysis)
15	IG to A	12
16	IG to R	4

Table 3.2: Count of the individual transitions from one state to another present in the dataset.

models to include war and peace processes together, future work may benefit from applying these to larger datasets or to questions with fewer transitions.

3.5 Data Structure and Unit of Analysis

To test these hypotheses, I transform existing datasets to a monthly observation level and merge them before building the indicators of transitions between war, ceasefire, peace agreements with interim governments, and peace agreements without interim governments. I summarize the data construction and transformation process for the Cox proportional hazard model tests and then clarify the overall structure for the multistate models.

As the bargaining model of war speaks directly to civil wars and civil war termination, I include all civil war and internationalized civil war observations from the Uppsala Conflict Data-Armed Conflict Data occurring between 1990–2017 [99].[25] I expand each annual observation to the monthly level allowing conflict-month-level analysis.

To identify periods of ceasefire, I pull the dates of signed ceasefire agreements from the PA-X database [14]. In this way, I assume that if a ceasefire agreement is signed within a given conflict, that ceasefire holds until either the observation reenters the UCDP-ACD data or the ceasefire agreement is replaced with a partial or comprehensive peace agreement signed within the conflict. While this is a particularly important assumption made

[25] UCDP-ACD defines a conflict as having 25-battle-related deaths in a given year.

on the data generation process, other research suggests that negotiating alongside fighting is common leading up to a ceasefire, and talks during a ceasefire may also occur [88], so focusing on the ceasefire as a distinctly different phase of the conflict cycle, as opposed to talks or mediation, fits closely with the data generating process. Further, Cox models and multistate models rely on observations occupying distinct and mutually exclusive states at any given time—observations in both war and talks simultaneously cannot be considered in this modeling strategy.[26][27]

To capture comprehensive and partial peace agreements, I use the Bell and Badanjak [14] PA-X data. This data captures all peace agreements signed from 1990 forward (thereby specifying the beginning point of the analysis). I include all signed comprehensive or partial peace agreements that Bell and Badanjak [14] link to a UCDP-ACD civil. Based on the date signed, I aggregate them to the month level and preserve whether they include terms specifying an interim government or not.[28] This data includes 159 conflicts over 336 possible months.

To consider the other independent variables of interest in this application, I construct a count of the number of actors involved in the conflict in a given year from the UCDP-ACD data. This provides a count of all groups listed in both the primary and secondary sides of the conflict—these are then carried forward through the observations associated with that conflict until another transition to war occurs, where this variable is then updated to reflect the new battle-field dynamics [99].

Table 3.3 provides a snapshot of what this first data structure looks like in practice for a portion of the Northern Ireland conflict. Observation Month here indicates that this observation was in the war stage in January 1990 (Observation Month 1 in this data). In

[26]Unless it's separately as a third state, which is theoretically possible, but poses challenges due to the number of observations in this data.

[27]In prior versions of this paper, I use the DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna [37] Civil War Mediation data as the indicator for mediation rather than ceasefires. However, this data ends in 2005 and includes data only on mediation—not negotiations or other informal talks.

[28]This particular coding distinction of whether an agreement has an interim government provision is a welcome and unique feature of this particular peace agreement dataset.

UCDP Conflict ID	Month Counter	Current Observation State	Length of State (in months)
315	1	War	23
315	2	War	23
315	3	War	23
315	4	War	23
315	5	War	23
315	6	War	23
315	7	War	23
315	8	War	23
315	9	War	23
315	10	War	23
315	11	War	23
315	12	War	23
315	13	War	23
315	14	War	23
315	15	War	23
315	16	War	23
315	17	War	23
315	18	War	23
315	19	War	23
315	20	War	23
315	21	War	23
315	22	War	23
315	23	War	23
315	24	War	31
315	25	Ceasefire	31
315	26	Ceasefire	31
315	27	Ceasefire	31

Table 3.3: Initial data structure at the observation-month level for a portion of the Northern Ireland conflict-observation.

February 1992, this observation enters ceasefire.[29]

Once I reshape the data to this level, I construct a variable for which of the states of the model each observation occupies in that observation-month: War, Ceasefire, Interim Government Agreement Implementation (IG-Agreement), Non-Interim Government Implementation (Non-IG-Agreement), Resolved, or a 'hold' category is added[30] Additionally, I build a variable capturing the state the observation occupies in the next observation month. From there, I drop every row where the current and next state is the same, leaving only those where transitions occur. Based on the observation series variable, which reflects the total number of months possible in the data, I construct a measure of how long each observation remains in each state. Table 3.4 presents a snapshot of this level of the data for the Troubles.[31] The transition from War back to Ceasefire after the Omagh bombing and then to Resolved also demonstrates an assumption in the data construction process. However, it is hard to imagine the parties to the Good Friday Agreement (or any agreement) not engaging in dialogue and agreeing to continue peaceful operations in the meantime. Further, even

[29] If the rest of the data were presented, they would show the rest of the observation's monthly status but I have truncated this for the sake of brevity.

[30] This is a placeholder and will be remedied later.

[31] Before removing any observation months, I summarize any variables that are non-constant for that observation in that state.

though additional agreements were signed in 2006 and 2010 linked to the Troubles, as no additional violence that qualified for UCDP-ACD's inclusion thresholds occurred between 1998 and those agreements, the conflict remains Resolved for the purposes of this paper. Future work could explore the role of follow-on agreements related to civil war issues that are penned well outside violent conflict, but that is beyond the scope of this work.[32][33]

After dropping the non-transition rows, I build the Resolved categories, account for

UCDP Conflict ID	Month Counter	Current Observation State	Next Conflict State
315	24	War	Ceasefire
315	55	Ceasefire	Non-IG-Agreement
315	92	Non-IG-Agreement	Resolved
315	99	War	Non-IG-Agreement
315	100	Non-IG-Agreement	War
315	104	War	Ceasefire
315	138	Ceasefire	Resolved

Table 3.4: Data structure at the observation-transition level for the entire Northern Ireland conflict-observation in the data.

the implementation time of agreements, and rectify the other reasons for the 'hold' category. If an observation is dormant (or in the 'hold' category) for 36 continuous months, it transitions to Resolved the next month, marking the end of the conflict—and its entry into the absorbing state. Observations do not and cannot exit the absorbing state. If a conflict-observation restarts after being inactive for 36 months, it reenters the data as a new conflict-observation.[34] To account for agreement implementation timeframes which Bell and Badanjak [14] do not include in their data, I carry forward the respective agreement state until the conflict-observation returns to war, ceasefire, signs another with or without an interim government, or meets the 36-month resolved threshold.[35] For all other 'hold' variables,

[32]The same assumption carries through other periods where fighting is not active in UCDP, but there has not been a new agreement signed.

[33]Where missingness occurred across the data, I carried the most recent present value forward with the assumption that things like GDP would rarely improve in a civil war, thus, estimates present a 'best case' outcome.

[34]If the observation does not reenter any data sets after entering the resolved state, I drop any remaining rows for the observation.

[35]This does collapse any agreements signed after the first one observed. If multiple agreements are signed in sequence, only the first one counts as a transition to the implementation stage. This assumption does reduce the granularity of the data and the number of agreements. However, peace processes are fluid and often see revisions and new agreements that build on each other. Especially since the data capture additional ceasefire events or conflict restarting, this seems like a relatively minor assumption placed on the peace agreement implementation process.

I replace them with the 'ceasefire' state. This is an assumption about the data-generating process. However, it is less far-fetched to imagine that if parties are not in active conflict measured at the 25-battle-related death per annum, but also within 36 months of that level of conflict or having reached an unofficial agreement (of which there is no reliable data), they have agreed to stop fighting, which is most akin to the ceasefire state even if no signed ceasefire document exists in the Bell and Badanjak (2019) data.

At this point, I divide the data into the current war or ceasefire states so that I can test individually, with the Cox proportional hazard models: given an observation is at war (or ceasefire), how likely is it to transition to any of the other states: ceasefire (or war), IG Agreement, or Non-IG Agreement. Those results are presented first.

To prepare the data for the multistate models, presented second, I expand each transition-next observed state pairing to include all transitions the observation is at risk for given it transitions out of the current state with a dummy variable that captures if that potential transition occurred. At this point, I build the necessary other independent variables. I

UCDP Conflict ID	Month Counter	Current Observation State	Potential Next Stage	Did Potential Transition Occur?
315	24	War	Ceasefire	Yes
315	24	War	Non-IG-Agreement	No
315	24	War	IG-Agreement	No
315	24	War	Resolved	No
315	55	Ceasefire	War	No
315	55	Ceasefire	Non-IG-Agreement	Yes
315	55	Ceasefire	IG-Agreement	No
315	55	Ceasefire	Resolved	No
315	92	Non-IG-Agreement	War	No
315	92	Non-IG-Agreement	Ceasefire	No
315	92	Non-IG-Agreement	IG-Agreement	No
315	92	Non-IG-Agreement	Resolved	Yes
315	99	War	Ceasefire	No
315	99	War	Non-IG-Agreement	Yes
315	99	War	IG-Agreement	No
315	99	War	Resolved	No
315	100	Non-IG-Agreement	War	Yes
315	100	Non-IG-Agreement	Ceasefire	No
315	100	Non-IG-Agreement	IG-Agreement	No
315	100	Non-IG-Agreement	Resolved	No
315	104	War	Ceasefire	Yes
315	104	War	Non-IG-Agreement	No
315	104	War	IG-Agreement	No
315	104	War	Resolved	No
315	138	Ceasefire	War	No
315	138	Ceasefire	Non-IG-Agreement	No
315	138	Ceasefire	IG-Agreement	No
315	138	Ceasefire	Resolved	Yes

Table 3.5: Final data structure with all transitions and possible transitions for the Northern Ireland case.

create a cumulative number of visits and the length of time spent in the 'ceasefire,' 'war,' or either agreement state. Table 3.5 presents the final structure of data for the Troubles as

an example. Here, we see the conflict identifier, the observation month of the transition, the current state, the next state, and critically, an indicator of whether or not this transition was the observed transition for this observation at this time.[36]

3.6 Preliminary Tests—Cox Models

To test these hypotheses, first, I use Cox proportional hazard models to test the likelihood of a conflict-observation transitioning from a war or ceasefire to an agreement with an interim government. This allows us to explore how different conditions–like the number of actors on both sides of the conflict–influence how long a conflict experiences active fighting before a ceasefire is signed or how long a ceasefire is likely to last before an agreement with an interim government is signed. These individual Cox models rely on the data construction discussed above, but I separate out observations in war and ceasefire states before expanding the data to include all potential transitions. This separate testing of categories does result in low numbers of observations in many of the tests—these results are presented with that caveat. Each table includes the results from either war or ceasefire to any of the other states for each variable of interest and control variables. In the models presented below, the key independent variables pass the proportional hazard test with non-significant p-values, except for the war to non-interim government test. For the length of war and length of cumulative ceasefires, the war to IG Agreement proportional hazard test had a p-value of 0.0568 and 0.0525, respectively, and non-significant p-values for the models altogether. While significant is close to the threshold, the result is presented with the prior modeling caveat.[37]

The next four tables present the results from the Cox models. Each table presents four separate models, each of which is modeled separately but combined into one table with each column containing the results of an individual model. Each model captures the relationship

[36] For this estimation process and model specification, this is the censoring variable.

[37] Across the war to ceasefire and ceasefire to war transitions within the war length and ceasefire length and the number of actors (for a ceasefire to war only), the p-values for those proportional hazard tests were significant for the key independent variables. As this paper focuses on transitions to agreements, these Cox models are not reported.

between the independent variable and the likelihood of moving from the current state (either of war or ceasefire) to the specific next state (one of the two agreement categories). For all models in the tables, the shorthand for each transition is the column label. The abbreviations are as follows, W for war, C for ceasefire, A for a non-interim government comprehensive or partial peace agreement, IG for an interim government comprehensive or partial peace agreement, and R is resolved for 36 or more months. Further, the table presents the hazard ratios estimated from the Cox models. All results that are greater than one mean that transition is more likely, and all results less than one indicate that transition is less likely. All models include standard controls that are presented along with the main independent variable results.[38]

3.6.1 Length of War

	W to A	W to IG	C to A	C to IG
Length of War	0.9489***	0.9618**	0.9568**	0.9483
(se)	(0.0068)	(0.0136)	(0.0138)	(0.0353)
Regime Type	1.4849**	0.8568	2.9263**	0.3747
(se)	(0.1359)	(0.3099)	(0.3958)	(0.7524)
Population	1**	1	1	0.9996
(se)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(3e-04)
GDP	0.9731	0.9326	0.9227*	0.9071
(se)	(0.0171)	(0.0589)	(0.0367)	(0.1307)
Territory Conflict	1.2779	2.3362	0.711	0.6613
(se)	(0.1821)	(0.435)	(0.5012)	(0.9894)
N	474	474	277	277
N Events	138	31	18	5

Table 3.6: Cox proportional hazard results presented as hazard ratios for the length of the war since 1990

Table 3.6 presents the results for the Cox models for the tests focused on the length of the war. Overall, these results consistently show that as wars last longer, observations are slightly less likely to move out of war or ceasefire to any agreement. These results are confirmed by the findings of the multistate model presented in Table 3.10–even when in the larger model, the common controls other than regime type are absent. While highly consistent, these results say little in support of the hypotheses on the levels of information gained in wars. It appears that as wars get longer, it is ever so slightly less likely to see

[38]For all tables in this section * = .01, ** = .05, *** = .001 significance levels.

a peace agreement—regardless of the type of governance institution, the agreement may include.

3.6.2 Number of Actors Results

	W to A	W to IG	C to A	C to IG
Number of Actors	3.9677 * * *	1.015	0.8847	1.024
(se)	(0.1979)	(0.0487)	(0.2581)	(0.0769)
Regime Type	1.0298	0.6766	2.5359*	0.2865
(se)	(0.1361)	(0.2957)	(0.4116)	(0.7299)
Population	1	1	1	0.9995
(se)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(4e-04)
GDP	0.9932	0.9304	0.9185*	0.8909
(se)	(0.0162)	(0.0566)	(0.0407)	(0.1295)
Territory Conflict	1.2068	2.789*	0.8484	0.6392
(se)	(0.1878)	(0.4301)	(0.5085)	(0.9999)
N	474	474	277	277
N Events	138	31	18	5

Table 3.7: Cox proportional hazard results presented as hazard ratios for the number of actors involved in the conflict

The results in Table 3.7 present the results of Cox proportional hazard models testing the relationships between the number of actors in a conflict on the likelihood of making a transition from war or ceasefire to a peace agreement with or without an interim government. The first model shows the likelihood that a civil war will transition to an agreement without an interim government with the same independent variable, according to the UCDP-ACD.[39] Model 2 shows the results for moving from war to an agreement with an interim government. Here, we see that the number of actors does not have an effect distinguishable from zero across these models. Moving to the next tests for leaving a ceasefire, based on the number of actors in a conflict, Model 3 presents the transition to an agreement without an interim government from a ceasefire, and the last model shows the likelihood of moving from ceasefire to an agreement with an interim government; both are null findings. However, in Table 3.11 (in the multistate model results section), we see that as the number of actors increases, when modeled with the other transitions together, so does the likelihood of moving from war or ceasefire to interim government (when holding regime type constant), which is consistent with the hypothesis presented above focused on information asymmetries among actors. Further, in the full multistate results, we see that moving from ceasefire to a non-interim

[39]This variable is a count of actors on sides a and b as listed in UCDP-ACD

government agreement with more actors is very slightly—but highly significantly—less likely, which is in line with the hypothesized role of lower levels of information in the conflict.

3.6.3 Count of Prior Agreements

	W to A	W to IG	C to A	C to IG
Prior Agrees	3.9677***	6.5783***	2.9349*	14.4997
(se)	(0.1979)	(0.5055)	(0.4974)	(1.3798)
Regime Type	1.0298	0.5468*	2.1262	0.1556*
(se)	(0.1361)	(0.305)	(0.4279)	(0.8868)
Population	1	1	1	0.9997
(se)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(3e-04)
GDP	0.9932	0.9722	0.9244	0.9017
(se)	(0.0162)	(0.0561)	(0.0435)	(0.1483)
Territory Conflict	1.2068	2.1469	0.6785	0.3153
(se)	(0.1878)	(0.451)	(0.5231)	(1.2321)
N	474	474	277	277
N Events	138	31	18	5

Table 3.8: Cox proportional hazard results presented as hazard ratios for the count of prior agreements since 1990

Moving to the results of the hypothesis regarding the role of past agreements from a conflict on their relationship to the terms of future agreements, we look to the results in Models 1 and 2 Table 3.8 for the likelihood of an observation moving from war to one of the agreement options based on the number of past agreements signed in the conflict. Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.8 present the results of leaving ceasefire to any of the other agreement states based on the number of agreements signed previously in the conflict. Here, we see that having more agreements significantly decreases the likelihood of transitioning to another agreement—regardless of the type of institution. With more previous, failed agreements, the likelihood of signing an agreement with an interim government is even larger than reaching one without an interim government (Model 3) but is not significant. Furthermore, these results are generally robust to the multistate modeling process presented in Table 3.12, although the effect sizes are smaller when accounting for the other potential transitions altogether.

	W to A	W to IG	C to A	C to IG
Ceasefire Length	0.9915**	0.9971	0.9515***	0.8294
(se)	(0.0029)	(0.0049)	(0.0144)	(0.0971)
Regime Type	1.1903	0.6919	2.6022*	0.3317
(se)	(0.13)	(0.2948)	(0.3933)	(0.8389)
Population	1*	1	1	0.9996
(se)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(3e-04)
GDP	0.9801	0.9285	0.9496	0.9129
(se)	(0.0164)	(0.0572)	(0.0378)	(0.1296)
Territory Conflict	1.4569*	2.7836*	0.7867	1.4192
(se)	(0.1794)	(0.4292)	(0.5285)	(0.9762)
N	474	474	277	277
N Events	138	31	18	5

Table 3.9: Cox proportional hazard results presented as hazard ratios for the cumulative length of ceasefires since 1990

3.6.4 Length of Ceasefire

The results for transition likelihoods based on the length of time spent in a ceasefire over the history of the conflict are rather consistent across the Cox models (presented in Table 3.9. Here, we see that the longer a conflict has spent in an active ceasefire, it is slightly more likely to move to a peace agreement without an interim government directly from war (Model 1), but not sign a peace agreement with an interim government (Model 2), even when holding standard controls at their midpoint. This is in line with the general hypothesis put forward regarding interim government inclusion in peace agreements in lower information conflicts. However, as conflicts spend more time in ceasefires, they are less likely to transition to sign any agreement regardless of the terms related to governance (Models 3 and 4).

While the likelihood is lower for the transition to an interim government agreement than one without interim government provisions, this finding is the only one from transitioning out of a ceasefire that remains significant in the multistate model presented in Table 3.13. This somewhat supports H4: conflict-observations with fewer months spent in previous ceasefires are more likely to transition from war or ceasefire to agreements with interim governments than agreements without interim governments. But, it also speaks to the stickiness of ceasefires as none of the likelihoods in Table 3.9 or the multistate results in Table 3.13 is greater than one for leaving the ceasefire state.

3.6.5 What Can We Estimate with Multistate Models?

Often used in bio-statistics to model disease remission and recurrence, multistate models allow me to examine transitions through conflict processes, to estimate individual hazard rates for transitions from each stage, and to estimate the influence of individual covariates on the likelihood of each transition [92]. In this way, they more comprehensively model conflict progressions that resemble real-world conditions, including intermediate events, while not putting constraints on the number of transitions or length of stay in any state for a given conflict-observation. Importantly, this includes allowing for sequential or temporal dependencies along the way, where "some transitions only occur sequentially, such that subjects only become at risk for a particular transition *after* experiencing a previous event" [92, p. 464]. Consider, for example, the potential influence of a failed peace agreement on the likelihood of reaching the subsequent peace agreement and the likely terms of that agreement related to government institutions.

Further, it allows for the consideration of individual covariates' influence on transitions between states in a separate analysis, for instance, if that conflict has had multiple rounds of talks or previous agreements.[40] Starting with war onset (or data onset in January 1990) and allowing the progress and reversion through these states allows the model the flexibility to account for known selection effects in the estimation process, even if those factors are not directly included in the analysis.

Likelihood of Leaving Any State

First, these models estimate a stratified baseline hazard for the possible transitions, which can include any number of covariates (e.g., the length of the war, the number of battlefield deaths) [73]. The baseline hazard gives the likelihood of transitioning out of any state to any

[40] The modeling set-up used here could test several hypotheses about transitions between war and ceasefires or when implementation may break down. However, I focus my interpretation and discussion on the hypotheses delineated above. Where relevant, I discuss where the estimates align or challenge general understandings of the field in order to provide general robustness checks for the larger model. Still, there are undoubtedly other factors that future work could include.

of the others. From these models, I show the likelihood of a conflict-observation leaving war and moving to talks or from talks to either type of agreement—and back—given the levels of information as measured by the independent variables. These jointly modeled results are presented in Table 3.14.

Transition Specific Covariate Estimation

Second, I estimate "transitional-conditional covariate effects" [73]. These estimates measure one variable at a fixed value's influence on transitioning between any two states. Take, for instance, the presence of third-party peacekeepers in a conflict. Their presence would likely make participation in negotiations more likely and the transition back to war less likely. The multistate model accounts for the differences in the current states in which the conflict may be. To demonstrate this feature of the model, I run these tests at the median of each independent variable. These results are in Figure 3.3.

3.6.6 Multi State Results

Tables 3.10 through 3.14 present the semi-parametric results of the multistate model depicted in Figure 3.2 for all the individual hypotheses and the information and commitment hypotheses together. The transition labels are the column headers, and the first letter represents one of the four possible states to move from to one of the other five (including resolved). The shorthand for each transition is the same as in the Cox results tables. I present the hazard rate for each independent variable hypothesized in the theory section above in individual tables, followed by the results of a model combining the four independent variables together. In the individual models, I include the regimes of the world measure from V-Dem regimes of the world as a control variable, however, the full model does not converge with this variable included, so it is dropped of that test. For any model with the number of actors as the independent variable, the model converges before the last transition, indicating that the estimate may be infinite. This warning may be an overly sensitive note, as discussed by

the author of the R package used,[41] however, it is the transition with the fewest number of observations in the data, as chronicled in Figure 3.2. I proceed with caution in discussing the results from those models but note that, while it is a transition related to interim government peace agreements, the main focus of this paper is to understand when within the conflict and conflict termination process agreements with interim governments are signed, not if or when they resolve conflicts, which is what the last transition with the possibly infinite estimate captures.

There are 3964 potential transitions across the observations in the data resulting in 991 total transitions observed in the data for the full 1990–2017 timeframe studied in these models. For an understanding of the distribution across all possible transitions, see Figure 3.2 and note that I do not present the transitions from war to resolved, agreement to ceasefire, and interim government agreement to ceasefire due to complete missingness in the data.

3.6.7 Semi-Parametric Results

Tables 3.10 through 3.13 present the results of the multistate model with different, individual, variable specifications with a control variable for regime type. All tables present the hazard rates and standard errors as presented above for the Cox results.

Table 3.10 presents the results testing the first hypothesis, where I expect that conflict observations are more likely to transition to agreements with interim governments earlier in the conflict than to agreements without an interim government—that is to say, as wars get longer, the likelihood of transitioning to an interim government agreement decreases and transitioning to a non-interim government agreement increases. Based on the results in Table 3.10, we see that as wars get longer, transitions from war to any state become less likely overall as the estimates are below one, however, few are significant. We see that conflicts in ceasefire are less likely to transition to an agreement given they have seen more

[41] Terry Therneau, author of the coxph package in R and many books on survival modeling notes that the warning message received on the models with the number of actors models is designed to be overly sensitive, see his comments here: https://stat.ethz.ch/pipermail/r-help/2008-September/174201.html

conflict months of fighting—and those results point to interim government agreements being less likely than an agreement without an interim government—which is in line with the hypothesis regarding the relative levels of information revealed in longer wars. This result holds when modeled together with the three other independent variables presented in Table 3.14. On a positive note for conflicts resolving, agreements without interim governments are slightly more likely to transition to the resolved category, indicating that long wars can conclude. While the difference in hazard rates is small, they do show that as wars get longer, the likelihood of transitioning to an interim government agreement does get less likely. This finding holds in Table 3.14 as well, although the estimate is smaller.

Moving to Table 3.11 and the second hypothesis, considering the number of actors involved in a conflict where I expect—in line with the literature on information asymmetries and complications when more actors are involved, from Cunningham [30]—where there are more actors, interim government agreements are more likely than non-interim agreements. In line with this expectation, the results in Table 3.11 show that transitions from the war or ceasefire states to the interim government agreement state are more likely with more actors involved in the conflict. In the full model in Table 3.14, the result for the war to interim government agreement transition is still significant but does switch signs, indicating that the transition is less likely. Interestingly, conflicts are slightly less likely to transition from ceasefires to non-interim agreements with more actors involved.[42] And these ceasefire to either type of agreement results (Models 3 and 4) are robust to the full model specification in Table 3.14.

I should note that in this model and in line with the complexities of wars with more actors, even when the actors reach agreements, the non-interim government agreements see a negative and significant coefficient for resolving (or from transitioning from A to R after three years), although one should recall that this is the model and transition that came with the warning message that the model converged before this estimate did. So, ceasefires are

[42]This result is in line with the results of the first paper in the dissertation when modeled together, more months in ceasefire, increased the likelihood of reaching an interim government.

also more likely to break down and transition back to war and less likely to transition to resolved as the number of actors increases.

Moving to the third hypothesis, Table 3.12 presents the results for the multistate models on the count of past agreements as a proxy for the number of previously broken agreements. In this hypothesis, I expect that the more prior agreements a conflict sees, the more likely it is to transition from war or ceasefire to an agreement with an interim government than to a non-interim government agreement. The results presented in Table 3.12 are in line with the hypothesized transitions out of the ceasefire stage. Transitioning from ceasefire to agreement with an interim government agreement is more likely with more past agreements—and these results hold in the full models in Table 3.14 for the two agreement-related transitions. However, signing a non-interim government is also more likely when transitioning out of a ceasefire with additional past agreements. The difference between the hazard ratios is relatively small, but the estimate for the likelihood of moving to the interim government state is higher than moving to a non-interim government one. For transitions out of wars, none of the results are significant for the different terms of agreements. Puzzlingly, there is a positive significant effect for moving from a non-interim agreement to an interim government agreement when a conflict has more past agreements, which also survives the full modeling process. Future work should look into the cases where this occurs for a deeper understanding of the data-generating process behind this and the sequencing of peace agreement terms within the full war process.

Moving to the results presented in Table 3.13, we see the results of testing Hypothesis 4. I expect the more previous months spent in ceasefire (as a proxy for fighting-based-information sharing in a conflict) a conflict has experienced, the less likely it is to transition from war or ceasefire to an interim agreement. The results in Table 3.13 show that it is slightly less likely for a conflict to transition to any other state—with longer spells spent in ceasefire previously other than from one of the two agreement states to resolved. Further, given a conflict is in a ceasefire, the only finding that is significant is that it is unlikely to sign an agreement

with an interim government the longer the conflict has spent in a ceasefire. This finding is robust to the full model specification in Table 3.14. The significant, less than one hazard ratio for this transition from ceasefire to interim government is in line with the information story I lay out in this paper, wherein conflicts with lower levels of information are more likely to see an interim government included in a peace agreement associated with that conflict. Interestingly, however, in Table 3.14, when controlling for the rest of the information-related variables, the length of time spent in ceasefire previously relates to an increased likelihood of transitioning from war or ceasefire to an interim government and all of the estimates out of the war state flip to being more likely when included in the full model. While these full model results are opposite of my initial expectations, they shed light on how prior ceasefires, independently and together with the length of the war, the number of actors, and the number of past agreements, influence the likelihood of transitioning through the states of conflict termination considered here.

Transition	W to C	W to A	W to IG	C to W	C to A	C to IG	C to R	A to W	A to IG	A to R	IG to W	IG to A	IG to R
Length of War	0.9655	0.8797	0.8397	0.9342	0.946*	0.8982**	1.0443	0.9825**	0.988***	1.0115***	1.0132***	1.0413***	0.9525***
(se)	(0.00404)	(0.00859)	(0.02758)	(0.0064)	(0.01749)	(0.0442)	(0.00483)	(0.00771)	(0.02384)	(0.00742)	(0.02389)	(0.05365)	(0.04592)
Regime Quality	1.0107***	1.0008***	0.6984***	0.6832	1.1994***	0.2808**	0.8793***	0.5584	0.3815**	0.9765***	0.8703***	0.376***	1.5241***
(se)	(0.07883)	(0.11467)	(0.29227)	(0.11241)	(0.27349)	(0.6439)	(0.13768)	(0.13315)	(0.39329)	(0.38445)	(0.21869)	(0.56888)	(0.63626)
	N = 3964	Observed	Transitions =	991	* = .05	** = .01	*** = .001						

Table 3.10: Multistate model results from each observed transition for War Length in months.

Transition	W to C	W to A	W to IG	C to W	C to A	C to IG	C to R	A to W	A to IG	A to R	IG to W	IG to A	IG to R
Count of Actors	0.9938***	1.5147	1.3758*	1.0363*	0.9882***	1.3069***	0.4749	0.9945***	0.8465***	0.5379**	0.9774***	1.1063***	8e-04***
(se)	(0.01236)	(0.06242)	(0.11785)	(0.01102)	(0.1392)	(0.13676)	(0.17514)	(0.01733)	(0.18755)	(0.26743)	(0.09945)	(0.21472)	(532.0146)
Regime Quality	0.92***	0.9142***	0.5742**	0.5912	1.2176***	0.164**	0.8658***	0.5011	0.2911*	0.6146***	0.8542***	0.4961***	1***
(se)	(0.07886)	(0.10977)	(0.24295)	(0.11982)	(0.28506)	(0.76088)	(0.13309)	(0.12864)	(0.42108)	(0.3923)	(0.24589)	(0.57174)	(1.22474)
	N = 3964	Observed	Transitions =	991	* = .05	** = .01	*** = .001						

Table 3.11: Multistate model results from each observed transition for Number of Actors involved in that phase.

Transition	W to C	W to A	W to IG	C to W	C to A	C to IG	C to R	A to W	A to IG	A to R	IG to W	IG to A	IG to R
Count Prior Agreements	0.997***	1.1468	1.2086	0.9747***	1.0619***	1.1091***	1.0277***	1.0902	1.1309**	0.9119***	1.0602**	1.0469***	0.8672***
(se)	(0.01841)	(0.01736)	(0.03865)	(0.03484)	(0.05855)	(0.07585)	(0.02564)	(0.01914)	(0.05162)	(0.06625)	(0.0268)	(0.06525)	(0.10317)
Regime Quality	0.9169***	0.7487*	0.475*	0.6143	1.2477***	0.2346**	0.8918***	0.5685	0.4453**	1.079***	1.0221***	0.4655***	1.1347***
(se)	(0.07862)	(0.10889)	(0.28186)	(0.11849)	(0.2855)	(0.70903)	(0.12726)	(0.12757)	(0.38009)	(0.36953)	(0.23111)	(0.51522)	(0.68071)
	N = 3964	Observed	Transitions =	991	* = .05	** = .01	*** = .001						

Table 3.12: Multistate model results from each observed transition for the cumulative count of past agreements linked to the conflict.

Transition	W to C	W to A	W to IG	C to W	C to A	C to IG	C to R	A to W	A to IG	A to R	IG to W	IG to A	IG to R
Cumul. Months in Ceasefire	0.9978***	0.996***	0.9996***	0.9825	0.9681	0.8606***	0.9983***	0.9983***	0.975***	1.0078***	0.9933***	0.9932***	1.0612***
(se)	(0.00125)	(0.00459)	(0.00773)	(0.0017)	(0.00788)	(0.08127)	(0.00104)	(0.00419)	(0.01833)	(0.00697)	(0.00811)	(0.01407)	(0.05059)
Regime Quality	0.9259***	0.8063**	0.5417**	0.8483***	2.0823**	0.1539***	0.9449***	0.5005	0.358*	1.3101***	0.8831***	0.4397***	1.7***
(se)	(0.07837)	(0.10751)	(0.24642)	(0.12185)	(0.31975)	(1.48432)	(0.13042)	(0.12851)	(0.36263)	(0.38929)	(0.21873)	(0.49497)	(0.58582)
	N = 3964	Observed	Transitions =	991	* = .05	** = .01	*** = .001						

Table 3.13: Multistate model results from each observed transition for the cumulative number of months a conflict spent in a ceasefire.

Transition	W to C	W to A	W to IG	C to W	C to A	C to IG	C to R	A to W	A to IG	A to R	IG to W	IG to A	IG to R
Length of War	0.9645	0.8815	0.7988	0.9588	0.9747***	0.8926***	1.0454	0.9701	0.9537***	1.0082***	1.0054***	1.0329***	1.0243***
(se)	(0.00415)	(0.00899)	(0.04722)	(0.00688)	(0.01924)	(0.17094)	(0.00517)	(0.00891)	(0.03171)	(0.00784)	(0.02771)	(0.04955)	(61.22932)
Count of Actors	0.9949***	1.1254***	0.941***	1.0158***	0.9084***	1.0254***	0.523	0.9842***	0.9148***	0.5846**	0.9276***	1.2278***	9e-04***
(se)	(0.01351)	(0.07212)	(0.17421)	(0.01316)	(0.30959)	(0.50511)	(0.18418)	(0.01576)	(0.12311)	(0.2579)	(0.1085)	(0.23064)	(623.41442)
Cumul. Months in Ceasefire	1.0013***	1.0079***	1.0389*	0.9854	0.9735	0.8331***	0.9948	1.0044***	0.9762***	1.0088***	0.9976***	0.9937***	0.9652***
(se)	(0.00127)	(0.00489)	(0.01214)	(0.00176)	(0.00723)	(0.13621)	(0.00112)	(0.00447)	(0.021)	(0.00643)	(0.00863)	(0.01697)	(90.174)
Count of Past Agreements	1.002***	1.1514	1.2157*	1.0066***	1.0134***	1.4514***	1.0191***	1.1192	1.1576*	0.9498***	1.0637**	1.0319***	0.8852***
(se)	(0.01866)	(0.02271)	(0.06251)	(0.03431)	(0.07231)	(0.41566)	(0.02825)	(0.01952)	(0.05272)	(0.07583)	(0.02977)	(0.07234)	(310.59909)
	N = 3964	Observed	Transitions =	991	* = .05	** = .01	*** = .001						

Table 3.14: Multistate model results from each observed transition for the hypotheses combined.

3.6.8 Transition Probability Results

Figure 3.3 presents probability estimates that give the likelihood of an observation transitioning at a given time (in months, the x-axis of each subplot) based on the fixed value for that covariate–the median value, given in the caption for each sub-figure.

Figure 3.3 presents the results for the transition probability results for the measure of how long a conflict phase has spent in the war state on transitioning out to any of the states over time. Figure 3.3a presents the results for 14 months of war, and Figure 3.3b presents the results for a 2-actor conflict. Figure 3.3c presents the results for 10 months of ceasefire, and Figure 3.3d presents the results for zero prior agreements. The interpretation of these graphs should follow this form: given the conflict is at the median level for the independent variables, the lines plot the likelihood of transitioning (y-axis) to the specific state based on the time (x-axis).

Figure 3.3a shows a slightly heightened likelihood of experiencing a transition to the interim government from about 100 months up until about 200 months of conflict, then the risk decreases, but it does not rival the risk of other transitions like moving to a ceasefire or resolving outright. Figure 3.3b presents the likelihood of transitioning to different states with the median number of actors involved in a conflict, two. This figure is relatively uninformative. To check the results, I ran the plots for different cutpoints. Two are presented in the appendix. There is not much difference in Figure B.1 for three actors, which is the value for the 75th percentile of the data, or Figure B.2 for 10 actors. We begin to see changes at 15 actors in Figure B.3. There is certainly more work to be done on understanding this relationship considering the external actors finding from the first paper. Figure 3.3c shows that given ten months in a ceasefire, a conflict experiences an increasing likelihood of including an interim government after about 150 months of ceasefire before that risk drops off completely after about 225 months. Finally, 3.3d shows an increased risk for transition to an interim agreement at about 50 months of conflict and again after 100 months, given there are prior agreements.



(a) Median Length of War, (14 months)



(b) Median Actor Count (2 actors)



(c) Median Length of Cumulative Ceasefire (10 months)



(d) Median Count of Prior Agreements (0 agreements)

Figure 3.3: Transition probabilities for median-level-independent variables and control variable (regime type = 1)

3.7 Alternative Explanations

Without a claim to randomization, exogenous shock, or an instrument that would influence the contents of an agreement but not the signing of it, alternative explanations for this phenomenon should be seriously considered.

First, perhaps interim governments are the hallmark of a particular negotiator or mediating party. If this were occurring, it would be a serious concern as it would indicate an external deterministic source of interim governments. That is to say if an organization or individual mediates many conflicts—e.g., if the UN negotiated all the interim government agreements —then interim governments appearing in agreements would likely be less of a feature of the conflict actors' charting their path forward, and more likely a feature of the mediator who entered to help resolve the conflict. This dynamic would further complicate this story, given the established selection effects in who mediates and which conflicts see mediation [58, 15, 37].

To test this, I categorize the mediator party listed in the DeRouen, Bercovitch and

	Dependent variable:
	IG Agreement
Country Mediator	-0.519
	(0.481)
Individual Mediator	-0.667
	(0.551)
IO Mediator	-0.425
	(0.483)
NGO Mediator	-1.000^{*}
	(0.515)
UN Mediator	-0.750
	(0.483)
Constant	1.000^{**}
	(0.477)
Observations	142
R^2	0.108
Adjusted R^2	0.075
Residual Std. Error	0.477 (df = 136)
F Statistic	3.277^{***} (df = 5; 136)
Note:	$^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table 3.15: OLS results: Mediator type on interim government agreement or non-interim government agreement.

Pospieszna [37] data as an individual, a country representative, an international organization (aside from the UN), the UN, or another NGO party, and run a regression on the type of

agreement produced. Table 3.15 presents the results of the test of the relationship between the mediator-type and the type of agreement (if any) reached in a given year. The results show no strong relationship between any category of mediator and what type of agreement is reached. Where an NGO mediates, there is a slightly significant relationship; however, there are only six observations where an NGO mediates and reaches an agreement and not one of them includes an interim government. As such, it seems that using an interim government in the mediation process is not the favored mediation strategy for any of the groups in this dataset.

3.8 Conclusion

This paper explores interim governments in civil war peace agreements by modeling the complete conflict and conflict termination process together using multistate models. I puzzle through the inclusion of interim governments in peace agreements as a previously under-explored extension of the bargaining range in a conflict termination and institution-building process. Through this, I am able to more concretely link the war-ending dynamics to post-war institutionalization. I theorize that interim governments arise in conflicts where there is some resolution to information problems, but where those levels of shared information are not high enough for actors to fully agree on future governance. Therefore, peace agreements should include interim governments in relatively shorter wars, wars with more actors involved, wars with relatively more prior agreements, and wars with relatively fewer months of ceasefires than other types of agreements. Further, interim governments should be more likely to arise in peace agreements that saw past agreements fail and fewer peacekeeping forces in the country before signing the agreement.

Through building a model that allows for a conflict-observation to flow forward and back between states of war, ceasefires, and agreements with and without interim governments, before resolving (or not), I find support for some of the hypotheses derived in the paper.

More, longer wars in ceasefires lead to agreements of any kind less often. Wars with more actors currently in ceasefires see interim government agreements more often, and they see them earlier in the ceasefire process—when information challenges are likely higher. And if a war had agreements in the conflict before, it is more likely to see an interim government in the next agreement. These support the hypotheses positing that relatively lower information outlooks result in more interim governments in peace agreements. However, these tests are plagued by low observation counts when run independently as Cox models and are fragile when combined in the multistate models. Further, this paper does not answer a key question: Can interim governments implement peace or are they always doomed by their sub-optimal starting point for future negotiations? Future work should unpack this question as it may open new avenues for peace implementation policy post-civil war.

The modeling approach applied here provides a foundation for more analysis of these conflict termination dynamics and many other questions in the conflict process space. There are several ways in which this technique could be deployed for new questions and then further refined. First and foremost, I must identify new ways to measure war intensity presence to provide meaningful results. Further, I could explore adding additional relevant measures of conflict status and agreement strength, like a measure of the strength of mediation applied, the mediator themselves (if better data were available), and the relative strength of the rebel groups involved could all add explanatory power to these models. Additionally, in light of the results in Chapter Two, future work should explore the difference between more actors and more external actors in a hazard modeling sense which this paper does not tackle.

Moreover, many important questions remain outstanding about the role, nature, mandates, and success of interim governments generally. Considering the heterogeneous nature of these governments, the design and tasks delineated in peace agreements are critical to understanding just what they look like across the universe of cases before satisfactorily answering the crucial question at play: When can they work? In future work, I explore further connections of theory and practice in conflict termination and institution building.

Chapter 4

What Conditions Set Interim Governments Up for Success?

4.1 Abstract:

Can interim governments lead countries to a virtuous cycle of peaceful politics after a civil war? What are the factors that can lead to their success or failure? This paper tackles these questions qualitatively by looking at peace agreement texts and considering the peace agreement documents linked to the Liberian civil war(s) to the conflict and peace processes. Using comparative case analysis and content analysis of agreement texts, I suggest two considerations of particular interest to the success or failure of interim governments envisioned by peace agreements linked to civil wars. First, the path can take time and revision along the way, but it does not have to lead to interim governments being able to transition power to permanent institutions as prescribed. Second, the preferences of veto players must be aligned—especially around either an 'heir apparent' or whatever the outcome of the transition mechanism may be. Notably, this outcome can be unknown at the time but must be more preferred to veto players than continued conflict. Further, I raise other questions the case raised that relate to possible scope conditions that the case of Liberia raised but is not equipped to test.

4.2 Introduction

Can[1] interim governments lead to a virtuous cycle of peaceful if contentious, politics? Or is their inclusion in a peace process a condemnation of a continued vicious circle of armed conflict? The Liberian civil war tried to implement different interim governments before being able to install peace for more than a few years in both instances of war. Liberia is not alone on this sometimes indirect path to interim governments handing over power to permanent institutions only to end up back at war. But do all conflicts that try them *have* to go through the upheavals, or can some interim governments lead countries to permanent institutions and peace?

From Chapters Two & Three in this dissertation, we see straightforward tests of information and commitment do not explain well what wars are likely to see interim governments or when within war and peace processes they should arise, nor does who is involved in the mediation effort. This paper takes a different approach. Here, I explore what shapes interim governments take in the texts of peace agreements and look deep into the Liberian peace agreements and conflict context. In this way, I work to build our understanding of the heterogeneity across interim governments, understand what they look like from the texts that establish them, and apply that to the case of Liberia.

To achieve the first goal of understanding what shapes interim governments take, I broadly walk through findings from two different data collection methods from peace agreements. The first is a random sample of global peace agreements that include an interim provision in at least one document in a peace process that I code for interim government structures and tasks. Second, I describe more detailed findings from the universe of African comprehensive or Partial peace agreements that include an interim government. Then, turning to Liberia, I provide a brief history of the conflict before discussing two key insights on what may set up interim governments for success gleaned from the cases. To apply the

[1] I would like to thank Danielle Jung and David Davis, for helpful comments and guidance along the way, Emily Gade for assigning me Liberia in the first place, and Zachary Cohen for copy edits to tighten the argument.

process from Liberian agreements to the conflict processes and veto player actions in the war and peace process, I inductively code the Liberian agreements and identify conditions for an interim government's successful instillation and transfer of power as prescribed in the peace agreement or failure to do so. Finally, I conclude with two ideas that the Liberian case sparked but could not fully test and a discussion of the heart of this work.

4.3 Structures and Tasks of Interim Governments from Texts

Interim governments are temporary governing bodies included in a peace agreement and tasked with establishing a portion of the function or design of the permanent institutions intended to replace the interim government after a short or pre-determined length of time.[2] Interim governments can be responsible for various tasks, including holding new elections, overseeing the disengagement of military actors, integrating security forces, revising election law, (re-)registering voters, holding new elections, writing a new constitution, or a combination of these. Functionally, interim regimes can define how political power will be distributed and contested in post-conflict countries. The amount of guidance provided to the interim government is dependent on the peace agreement that established it.

4.3.1 Global Sample of Agreement Documents

Interim governments arise in peace agreements linked to civil wars worldwide. To understand their differences, I randomly sampled blocks of peace agreements where at least one document included information on an interim government according to the coding of Bell and Badanjak [14]. An agreement block includes any documents signed on the same day and any prior-pre agreement or subsequent implementation or renewal documents dated/signed before/after the next comprehensive agreement, partial agreement, or renewal document. This short corpus had 13 blocks with 33 total agreements. I coded at the provision level. The

[2] At a minimum, some interim governments are tasked with a great deal more than just designing the permanent institutions.

	Interim Government		Permanent Institutions	
	Structure	Tasks	Structure	Tasks
Document	17	16	8	12

Table 4.1: Table with counts of documents containing information about interim governments or permanent institutions from a content analysis of a random sample of agreement blocks with at least one interim government reference.

codes included if that provision included a reference to an interim government or permanent institution within the text. Additionally, I coded if the provision referenced a structure[3] or task.[4] Table 4.1 includes the counts across documents where each code was applied at least once. According to my coding, ten of the 33 documents do not reference an interim government or permanent institution structure or task.[5]

Many of these provisions coded as structures include the specifics on the make-up of the interim government–including theoretically important features like powersharing [64], rebel inclusion or exclusion [89], if there is a judiciary within the interim government, how or if members of the interim government can be removed from their positions—and for what reasons. While the provisions related to tasks of the interim governments delineated the transition plan—very often elections and what business of the government tasks would fall to the interim government. Some interim governments, structurally, are to have women incorporated at all levels [27, 14]. And specify the size and age requirement for the size of the interim chamber of deputies and the age requirement of members [27, 14]. Establishing ministries or agencies within or under the purview of are structural features, while any specific 'to-do' items fall into the task categorization.

For tasks, these can relate only to transitioning to the permanent government, while

[3]A structure is any information that defines the institution. This can be how it should be organized, what offices or branches of government it should have, how many ministers may (or may not) serve in the institution, what rules the institutions or members must follow, and many other things. Generally, these provisions help define both the 'game' and the 'rules of the game' and work to define the shape and nature of the government institutions created.

[4]A task is a specific action to be carried out by a particular entity. These can be thought of as the items on the 'to-do list' of the organization. This can be to register/reregister voters, hold elections, demobilize the military/rebel groups, establish a bank, or liaise between other organizations and many other things. These are the discrete jobs tasked to an entity responsible for carrying out.

[5]Many thanks to Daniel and Maddie, two undergraduates who helped refine the codebook and code these agreements alongside me.

other times, key peace-reinforcing steps other than transitioning power are left to the interim government like security sector reform [122], truth and reconciliation processes, and post-war civilian rehabilitation. In one case, the tasks included setting socio-economic reform packages to replace feudalism in the country [120, 14]. Another interim government was to "establish and train temporary police forces" that included Croats and Serbs as was required in Croatia [63, 14]. Many times, like in Somalia, the interim government is tasked with installing heads of government agencies and overseeing agency performance [4, 14]

In one agreement block (Libya), the interim government was established—which counts for structure but had no tasks [27, 14]. Tasks and structures overlap in different ways, too. In Nepal, the interim government had a council of ministers (structure), and the interim government set the agenda and process (task) [120, 14].

Possibly the agreement with the most relevant information to the interim government, all in one place, is the agreement from Croatia detailing a regional interim government. In Croatia, the United Nations Security Council established the interim regional government that would include military and civilian aspects [106, 14]. In this way, much of the tasking of this interim regional government surrounds implementing the agreement governing peace in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium [106, 14]. However, this interim regional government was directed to include a mechanism to represent the interests of the Croatian government, Serbs in the region, returning Croatian refugees, other internally displaced people, and other ethnic minorities [63, 14]. Further, this document specified that the police force (which was to be set up in the interim regional government) should have ethnic representation that matched the part of the region. This regional government was tasked with "facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes" and reestablishing Croatian service institutions like banks, phone services, and post, citizenship, and pension offices [63, 14], which may be a less daunting punch list for a UN-backed organization than a normal regional government. However, also on that to-do list was demilitarizing the region within 30 days of deployment of international forces, training new police, and running

elections for the local governments in the region [82, 14].

From this data collection effort, we see the varied locations, structures, and tasks of interim governments across the universe of cases. Strikingly, we see that interim governments- even where they exist- are not referenced or included across all documents in an agreement block. The next section dives deeper into African cases from partial and comprehensive agreements with interim governments included.

4.3.2 African Peace Agreements with Interim Governments

To explore the variety of shapes interim governments take, I read and coded all comprehensive and partial peace agreements signed in African civil wars between 1990-2018 with interim government provisions according to the PA-X data [14], we see that interim governments outlined by these documents vary on almost every dimension.[6] Most interim governments include a legislative and executive branch—some are parliamentary systems. Very few include details of a judicial branch. 4 out of 70 peace agreement documents consulted for this part of the project place restrictions on the leaders of the interim government, barring them from running in the transitional election to be handled by the interim government.[7] South African and South Sudanese agreements, among others, delineate a full constitution for the transitional government spanning nearly one hundred pages each. On the other hand, Guinea Bissau dedicated only a few lines to outlining the intention of having an interim regime—even though this was one of only five provisions within the agreement that is just over one page long, including signatures. While all agreements claimed these institutions to be transitional or interim, the time frames established by the agreements vary greatly. Within the agreements coded, 24 out of 70 have a firm start date, and 22 have firm

[6] As background for this project, I read the interim government sections of partial and comprehensive peace agreements signed between 1990-2018 from African civil wars. I deductively coded these agreements for the structural constraints defining the interim government, the scope of the mandate, or the number of responsibilities given to the interim government.

[7] Note for the discussion of Liberia below I include all documents in the PA-X data, some of which (with details of interim governments) are implementation documents, follow on agreements, and ceasefires from Liberia.

end dates; ten include if an extension is available if needed.

Interim governments are all caretaker or temporary governments, but the number and types of tasks they are responsible for vary, as do the other peace reinforcing or peacebuilding tasks detailed to happen while the interim government operates. In 38 cases, interim governments are explicitly tasked with holding elections to hand over power to permanent representation, and 13 stipulate that there must be a popular referendum to ratify the work of the interim government. Fourteen include provisions for under what conditions members may be removed from the interim regime, while ten stipulate that the head of government may not dismiss the government. Some interim governments look more like an election commission tasked with revising election laws, re-registering voters, revising the voter rolls, and holding clean elections. Others have sweeping mandates, including assisting war-torn regions (13) and citizens impacted by the conflict (13), writing a new constitution—and possibly even holding a referendum on the new constitution. Twenty-five interim governments are directly responsible for demobilizing or reintegrating military and/or police/security services. Truth and reconciliation proceedings—or similar processes—are often and importantly included in the peace process. Still, they are the direct responsibility of interim governments in 8 cases which speaks to either another actor implementing them, like a third party, or a necessary delay until after the interim government turns over power.

4.4 Comparative Case Analysis

Throughout this paper, I take a qualitative approach. Here, I move to understand better the contexts where interim governments may or may not be successful in the real-world context of civil war. To do so, I read the 30 documents in the PA-X database [14] linked to the Liberian civil war(s) between 1990-2003. I relied on case knowledge developed through researching the civil war(s) in Liberia for a project on rebel consolidation events in civil wars. This conflict and peace process implemented—to varying degrees of success— an interim

government three distinctively different times (or four depending on how you count), two of which could be seen as being successful—one (or two) with many rounds of revisions, one between 1995-1997 when Charles Taylor was elected President of Liberia and one between 2003-2005 which led to the election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.

The central analysis of this paper is a comparative case study across the interim governments included in the Liberian civil war peace process to deepen our understanding of what conditions interim governments may succeed in transferring power to permanent institutions after taking power. As peace agreements are observable artifacts of peace processes, the texts of these documents are the focus of the data collection for this paper. These texts paint far from a complete picture of the process that produced them. They are not the minutes of the negotiation sessions, nor do they capture the reaction of the rank-and-file soldiers or civilians who must live with the consequences of the terms. Due to the known gaps in the narrative of the document texts, I take a skeptical approach and use other sources about the war and parties when answering questions that arise from reading the texts [108].[8]

Using comparative case analysis, I work to inductively identify conditions for interim government success in civil war contexts. I use the similarities and differences across the interim governments—and the contexts surrounding them—to suggest relationships between variables of interest that vary between interim governments and identify the connective mechanisms between outcome and explanatory variables [57].

4.4.1 Coding Method

This analysis takes an inductive approach to build understanding. In that way, in reading through the documents in order of signing.[9] I simultaneously applied structural and descriptive codes to the text of the document. Along with the structural and descriptive codes, I added attribute codes for who signed each agreement—and, where present who did not sign

[8]This analysis of the texts is overlaid with an existing understanding of the case from prior work focused on rebel consolidation and rebel dynamics.

[9]Due to data input errors, some documents were read out of order.

the agreement. I applied codes at the concept level, meaning a code could be applied to a word, sentence, paragraph, section, or the whole document. Also, where relevant, I applied multiple codes to the same content if it was relevant to multiple codes.

Structural coding inventories the content agreement contents of a text [108]. Descriptive coding groups and labels provisions within and across agreements focused on the topic captured in the text, not the content [108]. Both are applicable for content analysis research and help the researcher make sense of the overall content and core ideas across many sources [108]. Further, while coding each document, I kept notes in an Analytic Memo where I documented thoughts about the document, process, or questions that arose while reading, coding, and thinking about each document. When a question came up, I followed a set procedure to search for the answer.[10] In writing, I referred to these memos and the codes.

4.4.2 Why Liberia?

Liberia had multiple interim governments that attempted to end the war and stabilize the country over 15 years. Some were unable to operate without the conflict continuing around them (i.e., INGU-1991, LNGU-1993). Others were installed in peace agreements that held back the violence of the war, at least for a time, and were able to hold the transitional elections they were tasked with holding (i.e., NTGL-1995 and NTGL-2003). All were to be replaced after free and fair elections. All had different timelines, responsibilities, and support domestically and internationally. It provides a case through which to unpack the conditions that can help or hurt the success of a peace agreement and (if included) an interim government's likelihood of success. Here, success is defined by holding elections that transfer power to a permanent institution. Neither a successful interim government nor a permanent institution was without fault. Charles Taylor, elected in the transitional election in 1997,

[10]This process was that I would consult secondary sources in the following way: Note questions, answers, sources, and inference gained in analytic memos; Google easy questions, note answers, and sources in memos; Consult biographies and books for bigger questions and questions about relationships, etc.; Consult NGO and other reports as needed for more fact-based details (note: I never had to apply this step in the coding/question answering process).; I will stop searching for the answer after I find details in three reliable sources, after 30 minutes of searching, or when I cease finding new information related to the question.

was removed through a second war, and the 2003-2005 interim government was riddled with corruption that outmatched Taylor's as president [85]. However, both were able to hand over power through elections to institutions that lasted for a time.

Although selecting a single case limits the external generalizability of the findings, Liberia allows for comparison within one case, which holds constant factors that would vary across other case pairs that span different countries, which increases the internal validity of the intuitions gained.

In seeking to explore the dynamics within interim governments, Liberia presents a rather unique opportunity to observe iterative learning through multiple peace agreements and different interim governments and how the process changes over time, even with some of the same actors repeating through the process in the same and different roles. Liberia's civil war also includes many features that complicate civil wars, conflict resolution, and democratic institution building: international actor involvement, state support of rebel groups, rebel groups splintering, significant natural resources in institutionally weak nations, and horrific violence against civilians. In working to understand the role interim governments play, these complications present unique insights for the likely success or failure of institutions and peace that benefit from holding these complicating features constant over the cases being compared.

4.4.3 Liberian Civil War Overview and Context

Liberia suffered two crippling civil wars. In the first, waged from 1990-1997, rebels led by Charles Taylor fought for—and gained—control of the state, with Taylor ultimately elected president. In the second war, spanning from 1999-2003, competing against rebels initially backed by states in the region fought to remove Charles Taylor from power. Civilians and fighters alike paid high costs in both wars. Below, I summarize the key details for this paper's tests from the conflicts—and the extensive attempts to resolve them. For a timeline of key events, see Table C.1.

1990-1997

On December 24, 1989, crossing into Liberia from Côte d'Ivoire, Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) forces launched the first attack of the war. [85, 60].[11] Taylor's goal for the war was simple—to oust sitting President Samuel Doe and claim the presidency for himself [69]. Doe came to power a decade earlier through a coup in 1980, thereafter becoming increasingly autocratic [83].

Taylor's coalition fractured shortly after the initial incursion. A group of fighters led by Prince Y. Johnson split off from the Taylor and the NPFL to create the competing Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) [60, 85]. Sources point to Taylor's inability to equip forces as promised [69] and Prince Y. Johnson wanting the presidency for himself [44] as reasons for the split. Despite the spit, the NPFL and the INPFL fought against the Doe government, making quick progress throughout the country. By June 1990, the two groups had reached the outskirts of the capital, Monrovia, with the NPFL controlling much of Liberia [85].

About six months into the conflict, with Doe still in power, Taylor deemed himself President of "Greater Liberia" and established the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG) [85]. Although NPRAG, "established courts, police, and immigration offices", supposedly to protect civilians, it did not combat the actions that essentially amounted to ethnic cleansing of Krahn and Mandingo civilians in NPFL-controlled territory [85, p. 100].

In August 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)[12] intervened, deploying a peacekeeping force to Liberia—mostly around Monrovia—and drafted a peace plan to install replace the Doe regime with an interim government [85]. The peacekeeping force, however, failed to restore stability to the country. During the next month,

[11] Qaddafi provided training for Taylor, some of the NPFL rebels, and other rebels in the region in Libya [85, 69].

[12] ECOWAS, founded in 1975 by a group of West African Heads of State, is a regional organization founded as a trading union to promote regional economic connections [87].

September 1990, the INPFL tricked President Doe into leaving the Presidential residence, kidnapped him, and brutally assassinated him on camera [69, 60]. The government forces, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), fought the rest of the war as the 'state forces' but the soon-to-be-established interim government never had total control of the forces claiming to fight as the 'state' [60].

In October 1990, the AFL and INPFL signed the Banjul ceasefire. The NPFL participated in negotiations over the Banjul Ceasefire but did not sign it. A month later, in November 1990, all three groups (AFL, NPFL, and INPFL) signed the Bamako ceasefire, which committed the groups to "resolve their differences with regard to an interim government for Liberia as envisaged in the ECOWAS Peace Plan" [71, 14]. The Bamako ceasefire succeeded in stopping most fighting. The parties then entered an additional agreement in February 1991 to define the scope of the ceasefire, disarmament process, prohibited activities, and how to report violations [6, 14] in February 1991.[13]

During the All Liberia Conference held in April 1991, the conference of political parties, warring actors, and interest groups installed the Interim Government of National Unity (INGU), with Dr. Amos Sawyer, "a respected intellectual" [85] and prominent Liberian scholar and activist [83] as president of the INGU [50, 14]. The INGU comprised a unicameral interim legislature (which was to include some members from the NPFL's NPRAG government), a reappointed judiciary, and an interim elections commission comprised of members of certain prominent civil society groups [50, 14]. But before Sawyer was installed to lead the INGU, the NPFL walked out of the conference [50, 14].

Beginning in June 1991, intensive talks between the NPFL and INGU took place with the aid of the International Negotiation Network.[14] This process yielded the Yamoussoukro Accords in October 1991, which contained new details and an implementation timeline be-

[13]In March 1991, the civil war in Sierra Leone started. While not directly related to the interim governments and their success in Liberia—necessarily, Charles Taylor will be charged, tried, and convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the early 2000s for his actions supporting the conflict in Sierra Leone [85]. The regional dynamics cannot be omitted from this story and play some role in Charles Taylor's story, which is deeply related to Liberia's path in this time frame.

[14]The INPFL did not participate.

tween. These are the first agreements that Sawyer signed as President of the INGU.

The peace brought by the Yamoussoukro Accords, however, was short-lived. A new group, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO), entered the fray in 1992 seeking to remove Charles Taylor, still the leader of the NPFL and NPRAG, from power in Liberia [69, 43, 45]. ULIMO started as a self-defense group [85] for Liberians in exile in Sierra Leone to protect against Taylor-backed organizations (like the RUF) targeting Liberian refugees and exiles,[60, 85] and included former AFL soldiers [85]. One of ULIMO's leaders, Kromah, had deep ties with and received support from Guinea [104]. Throughout 1992, ULIMO made significant advances into NPFL territory [43].[15]

In October 1992, the NPFL and INPFL planned to ally for a joint attack on Monrovia—named Operation Octopus. Sensing the plan was a trick to overtake the INPFL, at the last minute, Prince Y. Johnson attempted to pull out of the partnership [43, 60] but was too late. The INPFL dissolved, and many of its fighters re-joined the NPFL [60].[16]

In the summer of 1993, the INGU, NPFL, and ULIMO held talks in Geneva. These discussions set up the Cotonou Agreement, signed by the three parties in July 1993. Cotonou dissolved the INGU and NPRAG governments and established a new interim government, the Liberia National Transitional Government (LNTG), which had a power-sharing structure. The executive branch was to include a five-member executive branch Council of State, with each signatory party contributing one member along with two positions held by eminent Liberians. The legislature was to have 35 members total, with representation from the three signatory parties. And finally, the vacancy in the judicial branch was to be filled by a ULIMO appointment, as the other two parties filled the judiciary seats provided for within the INGU, and the Supreme Court was rolled over from the INGU to the LNTG [29, 14].

The same month the Cotonou Agreement was signed, another group entered the conflict as a splinter of ULIMO [85]. Some accounts refer to this as a "tactical proliferation of factions," as these new groups could keep fighting without jeopardizing their aligned groups'

[15] In April of 1992, the Sierra Leone government fell [85].

[16] Prince Y. Johnson, with assistance from ECOMOG, made it to exile in Nigeria [60].

positions in the transitional government [60]. In March 1994, following internal disputes over the allocation of its designated seats in the transitional government, ULIMO split into two groups, mostly along ethnic lines: ULIMO-K led by Alhaji Kromah, and ULIMO-J led by Roosevelt Johnson [43, 45, 85, 60].

In September 1994, the AFL, NPFL, and ULIMO-K signed the Akosombo Agreement, which imposed line-by-line changes to the Cotonou Agreement. Most notably, the Akosombo Agreement added LNTG responsibility for the duties assigned to peacekeeping forces and stipulated that only members of the signatory parties would be entitled to amnesty through the peace process. In December 1994, ULIMO-J and other groups[17] signed a follow-up agreement, effectively adding their names to the Akosomobo Agreement [3]. During the negotiation of the Akosombo Agreement, three leaders from the NPFL split off from the group and formed NPFL-CRC. This was an effort to preserve the three NPFL-CRC leaders' seats in the LNTG even if Taylor reneged on the agreement, as they expected him to do [85].[18] These revisions and agreements did not hold for long. By early 1995, fighting covered 80% of the country [85].

In August 1995, all of the parties that signed either the Akosomobo Agreement or the follow-up Acceptance and Accession Agreement signed the Abjuja Accord. The Abuja Accord revised the Akosombo Agreement and reorganized the interim government somewhat while maintaining power-sharing and carve-outs of high-level positions for leaders of rebel groups. The Abjuja Accord allowed leaders in the revised interim government to run for office in elections for permanent posts, provided they vacated their positions at least three months before the election [2, 14]. This allowed Taylor to return to Monrovia as an interim government member [85, 45] while maintaining a path to the presidency.

After the Abuja Accord, during the wind-down of the war and implementation of the

[17] the LPC, Lofa Defense Force (LDF), NPFL-Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC), and Liberia National Council (LNC)

[18] Aside from the change to amnesty, Akosombo also added the language "The Parties further agree that the Transitional Legislative Assembly shall give consideration to providing appropriate benefits for the heads of warring parties." [7, 14, p. 6] Which could help explain both the splinters and the signing on by other parties.

disengagement and disarmament plans in the conflict, Taylor convinced ULIMO-J not to hand over a diamond field ULIMO-J was to retreat from an attack ECOMOG [45]. This attack weakened ULIMO-J, allowing the NPFL to take the territory [45]. Further, it weakened ULIMO-J's relationship with EOCMOG [45]. Taylor and ULIMO-K, now apparently allied, used this opportunity of a weakened ULIMO-J to push for Roosevelt Johnson's arrest [60].[19] This move against Roosevelt Johnson escalated into a full-scale battle in Monrovia, later deemed 'Operation Pay Yourself' in April 1996, as it was seen primarily as a large-scale looting opportunity for rebel fighters to find remuneration for their service instead of regular payment [45].

Disarmament began in November 1996 after groups reaffirmed the Abuja agreement and Charles Taylor was elected President in the transitional election in 1997 [85].

1999-2005

Beginning in July 2000, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), supplied by Guinea, launched its attacks aimed at deposing Taylor [85].[20] Taylor pushed the forces back and attacked Guinean towns in retaliation [85]. LURD continued to fight, and by January 2002, LURD controlled much of northern Liberia, including territory within 50 miles of Monrovia [83]. And by May 2002, LURD advanced to within 15 miles of Monrovia [83]. Even though he had expanded the AFL with NPFL fighters [85], Taylor faced the pressure of a UN Arms embargo levied on him [84, 83].

In April 2003, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), a new rebel group backed by Côte d'Ivoire, crossed into Liberia and began fighting against the Taylor government [83, 85]. In June, the government of Liberia, LURD, and MODEL signed a ceasefire and agreed to hold future peace talks in Accra (Agreement on Ceasefire between the Government_LURD_MODEL). In this ceasefire, the parties agreed that the political reconciliation

[19] This was done on the grounds that Roosevelt Johnson or ULIMO-J was suspected of being involved with a murder [60].

[20] In 1999, groups of former ULIMO-K soldiers launched cross-border attacks from Guinea focused on removing Charles Taylor's control of the country [83].

process would include another "transitional government," which they stipulated "would not include the current President" [26, 14]. On July 6th, 2003, Taylor publicly announced that he would resign and leave Liberia for exile in Nigeria; he officially left on August 11 [83].[21] The new National Transitional Government of Liberia (NGTL) was seated in October 2003 [83].[22] The NGTL held transitional elections in October 2005, with a run-off in November. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected President of Liberia in 2005 with just over 59% of the vote, marking the end of the transitional government [85, 97].

4.5 Analysis and Findings

4.5.1 Can Take Time to Work or Can Be the Wrong Idea

The experience of the Liberian civil wars exposes a fundamental dilemma: when to abandon a given approach and start anew. On the one hand, reaching an agreement among warring factions to bring peace is difficult and takes time. Indeed, conflict resolution and mediation scholars suggest that conflicts must be 'ripe' [132] before a resolution is possible. But on the other hand, the failure to achieve a lasting peace may reflect on the shortcomings of a given process, given the specific needs of the conflict. Further, canonical work points to heavy-handed mediation leading to short-lived peace that results in worse long-term outcomes [12].

In the next pages, I chronicle through the main peace documents of the Liberian civil wars and draw connections between where they reference, reaffirm, or revise each other or the ECOWAS Peace Plan, eventually getting to a successful interim government. This discussion shows how closely the warring parties hewed to the initial framework in the first war. In the second war, the parties were able to implement a successful interim government on the first try.

[21] The ceasefire document lists this declaration of intent to resign and exile with a June 4, 2003 date [26, 14].

[22] The 2003 Peace agreement provided for Charles Taylor's Vice President to take power for a short time between the agreement and the establishment of the NGTL.

As explained above in the conflict history, in August 1990, ECOWAS produced an initial peace plan as part of its initial deployment of peacekeeping forces to Liberia. The ECOWAS Plan laid the groundwork for ultimately establishing an interim government, the INGU. Although the ECOWAS peace plan was revised many times before the warring parties agreed in the Bamako Ceasefire (November 1990, after President Doe was murdered) to recognize the ECOWAS Peace Plan as the framework for peace and the interim government. Although the Bamako Ceasefire ultimately led to renewed fighting, the ECOWAS Peace Plan remained a central feature of each agreement or ceasefire between 1990 and 1997.

The Bamako Ceasefire (November 1990) recognizes the ECOWAS Peace Plan as the goal to work toward installing peace—particularly bringing disagreements over the interim government in line with the Peace Plan. The Lome Agreement (February 1991) was built on the Bamako Ceasefire—based on the ECOWAS Peace Plan—with additional specifications. The All-Liberia National Conference (March 1991) initially installed the INGU government envisioned by the ECOWAS Peace Plan. After walking out of the conference before the INGU leadership was installed, Taylor negotiated directly with the INGU (a product of the ECOWAS Plan) in Yamoussoukro (Yamassoukro I-IV were documents produced by this process). In 1993, the communique after the Geneva peace talks, which were held to set up the Cotonou Accord, claimed to advance "the search for a peaceful and lasting settlement of the Liberian crisis in accordance with ECOWAS Peace Plan the Yamoussoukro Accords" [25, 14]. The Akosombo Agreement of 1994 reaffirms the parties' "acceptance of the Cotonou agreement as the framework for peace in Liberia" [7, 14], and as Cotonou's preparation talks in Geneva center the Peace Plan and Yamoussoukro as efforts to advance, we see the connective tissue through these main agreements, even with new groups entering the conflict. The last large agreement follows this same pattern into 1995. The Abuja Agreement "amends and supplements the Cotonou Accord, the Akosombo Agreement, and its Accra Clarification" [2, 14].

While maintaining a framework to iterate on it to resolve a conflict can be successful,

with so many breakdowns along the way and challenges to peace and establishing a government with anything approaching a monopoly on the use of violence, the lack of revision or new ideas in the process is somewhat surprising. This process is further concerning as the peace plan was revised along the way in ceasefires and peace agreements but not produced through those processes with conflict actors involved directly. The changes made through the conflict are examples of acceptable terms to the veto players at different points in the conflict.

These agreements chronicle a prolonged attempt to build off of an initial set of ideas but without measurable or durable progress. The parties' continual tweaking of the structure of the interim government in these agreements without addressing the fundamental conflicts is telling. The first mention of an interim government arises in the ECOWAS Decision dated August 2, 1990, which specifies that the proposed interim government should comprise "Liberian citizens of high integrity and public stature drawn from the Liberian political parties and other interest groups." [36, 14]. This decision goes on to specifically bar leaders of the warring parties from heading the interim government and barring the head of the interim government from running in the transitional election that the interim government is charged with holding to transition to permanent representation [36, 14]. At face value, this appears to be reasonable, and research that explores the negative externalities of powersharing arrangements in civil war termination points to not incentivizing bad behavior on the battlefield by normalizing access to power for bad actors [123] and can institutionalize conflict divisions in politics [74]. While this plan possibly avoided some pitfalls, it was not acceptable to the parties, which included the Doe regime at that time. One of the three points included in the Bamako Ceasefire signed by the AFL,[23] NPFL and INPFL read, "[t]he parties further agree to resolve their differences about an interim government for Liberia as envisioned in the ECOWAS peace plan." (Bamako Ceasefire). The ECOWAS peace plan put forward by ECOWAS in November 1990, after the Bamako Ceasefire, included the warring parties,

[23]Note, by this time, the INPFL had assassinated Doe, but the AFL still operated as a party to the conflict.

political parties, and interest groups in the interim government [35, 14]. And the Lome agreement, signed in February 1991, included tasks for the interim government to undertake upon establishment—indicating tacit approval of that arrangement at least [6, 14].

After the Lome Agreement, Taylor, Prince Y. Johnson (leader of the INPFL), and Amos Sawyer (the future President of the INGU) agreed to meet for the National Conference to find a peaceful solution to the Liberian situation [72, 14]. The summary of the All-Liberia National Conference, included in the Bell and Badanjak data consulted for this paper, chronicle both the installation of the President and Vice President of the INGU and a change to the restrictions on members of the INGU whereby if officeholders resign before campaigning, they can run in the next election [50, 14]. Further, in the powersharing legislative branch, 19 of the 51 members would be either from the NPRAG or NPFL, both controlled by Taylor. This document further chronicles that the NPFL delegation walked out after objecting to parts of the process. Based on the included explanation of the objection and ultimate walkout, the NPFL delegation proposed a triumvirate executive, a smaller legislature, and a slight change to the judicial structure. The NPFL objected to the seating of representatives, the chairing of the conference, and what it saw as the lack of acceptance of the triumvirate executive [50, 14]. Two months later, the Yamokoussokro process began when Taylor and Sawyer negotiated directly. The Yamokoussokro accords made no real changes to the interim government structure. Between the initial plan from ECOWAS to when the interim government is installed, we see continued objection from Taylor to the institution even after the NPFL and NPRAG government gained representation in the interim government.

Between the Yamokoussoro accords and the Cotonou Agreement, which brought about the next change to the interim government's structure, there were other shifts in the war. ULIMO entered the fight, and the INPFL exited. These changes may help account for the new agreement terms. Cotonou, signed by the INGU, ULIMO, and NPFL, dissolved the INGU and NPRAG and replaced those two standing governments with a powersharing interim government that added ULIMO into the powersharing mix with the former INGU and

NPLF interim government from before [29, 14]. One of the biggest changes to the LNTG from the INGU between these two interim governments, aside from including ULIMO, is the form of the executive. Cotonou puts in place a five-member "Council of State" in the place of the sole serving President of the INGU with one member from the warring parties and two eminent Liberians also serving.[24] The other main changes make room for ULIMO in the legislature and for ULIMO to make one judicial appointment to fill a current vacancy. Interestingly, the restriction on high-level government leaders running for election is included with no exceptions even if individuals resign [29, 14]. After fighting restarted, the Akosombo Accord and the Acceptance and Accession Agreement updated parts of Cotonou, and a series of groups splintered. The changes that related to the membership of the interim government[25] made room for one seat given to a collective of civil society actors (the Liberian National Council) in the executive[26] and expands the legislature to include county representatives[27] and the timeline for appointing members. The Abuja Accord supplements and amends the Cotonou and Akosomobo agreements, and concerning the interim government structure, added clarify on who would hold positions for each group in the Council of State and allows government members to run in the transitional election if they resign their position three months before the election—except for the Chair of the Council of State—an eminent Liberian, Wilton Sankawolo. The Abuja Accord also specified that the leaders of other groups not included in the legislature or Council of State are to be given ministerial or other senior government positions and highlights specifically what organizations ULIMO-J leader Roosevelt Johnson, would have control of across different ministries and public corporations (including deputy roles).

The 2003 peace agreement only recalls an ECOWAS Peace Plan in the preamble of the ceasefire, not the full agreement and was produced through a different process than the

[24]One of the NPFL ideas in the All Liberia Conference was to have a multi-member executive [50, 14].

[25]The agreement also adds responsibilities to the LNTG.

[26]This agreement also works to balance heads and deputies of ministries, public corporations, or autonomous agencies, so no one group dominates any of the bodies.

[27]The agreement also adds that consideration should be given to giving benefits to the warring party leaders.

1990-1997 one in some key ways. Through chronicling the Liberian peace process and the changes or lack thereof in approach to resolving the conflict, we can see what conditions put on interim government co-occur with successful resolution or not.

During the second war, the government of Liberia and LURD participated in mediated talks [37]. It produced a ceasefire and one peace agreement that installed an interim government that successfully held transitional elections two years later. There were only a few differences in the overall structure of the interim government prescribed by the 2003 peace agreement [26, 14] compared to prior interim governments. Through the 2003 agreement, the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) replaced the standing institutions of the Liberian Government. After Charles Taylor left the country, his Vice President held power pending the formal establishment of the NTGL—this period was mandated to last no more than two months. Then the NTGL was to implement the peace agreement, monitor the ceasefire, implement the political, rehabilitation, and reconciliation work, and plan for the 2005 elections.

To do this, the NTGL had three branches. The executive branch was to be made up of a Chair and Vice Chair. Candidates for these positions were to be nominated by the civil society organizations and political parties who were party to the agreement—not the warring parties. Although the warring parties selected the office holders from the list of nominees provided by the civilian organizations. The Judicial branch was to have the same setup as before. Still, all supreme court justices were removed from their posts and replaced through the appointment of the executive and approved by the National Transitional Legislative Assembly of Liberia (NTLA)—this organization would serve as the interim legislature[28] The NTLA had 76 total members, 15 representing each county, 12 from each warring party (LURD, MODEL, and the government of Liberia), 18 seats for the political parties, and seven seats for civil society and special interest groups.[29] Neither the supreme court mem-

[28]The candidates for the court were to be recommended by the Bar Association members.

[29]Further, ministries, public corporations, and agencies or commissions were distributed among the three warring parties in the agreement.

bers, the executives (Chair or Vice-Chair), nor principal ministers were allowed to run in the 2005 transitional election, even if a potential candidate resigned before campaigning, as was the case under different agreements from the first war.

While not strikingly different than the structures for interim governments seen through the various iterations of the ECOWAS Peace Plan, it is interesting that it follows the same path to install an interim government when there was a government that survived the war—unlike the fragmented and failed state in the prior war. Of note here, this interim government 'worked' the first time. There was certainly learning from the past tries at establishing peace that should not be discounted. The 2003 agreement recalls the ECOWAS peace plan and past peace efforts in the preamble of the ceasefire, not the full agreement, but does not reaffirm or name it as a starting point. Notably, the DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna [37] data on mediation efforts in civil wars indicate LURD and the Government of Liberia were engaged in a mediation process from 2000 to 2003. Perhaps, the initially successful 2003 path forward was arrived at through negotiations alongside the battle-fighting rather than suggested before solving other problems at the heart of the conflict. This difference in paths to an interim government may also be a critical feature of why the 2003 process was more immediately successful.

The Liberian experience in the 1990s and early 2000s demonstrates the challenges of incrementalism in reaching peace and the potential upside of new ideas and strategies. Still, there is a path dependency argument that leads more quickly to the end of trying the same—or very similar things and expecting different results. Through the first war, agreements included an interim election commission, at least starting with Yamossoukro, and the actions of this commission arose in later agreements. Why not change course and work to arrange the structure of permanent institutions and push for elections quickly with the aid of external actors already on the ground as other civil wars have done? It is not to say this is necessarily the right answer; challenges abound. However, the singular focus of the peace process on implementing an interim government to take power—after multiple repeated fail-

ures—demonstrates the need to avoid unbridled path dependency and critically evaluate the fundamental points of conflict. It was only after fighting to remove Charles Taylor from power alongside mediated talks from 2000-2003 that Liberia was finally able to emerge from a decade of civil war.

4.5.2 Unified Goals of Veto Players

Social or rebel movements are more likely to extract larger concessions from the state when they are unified [33]. When rebel groups generally agree on the outcome they are fighting for, the range of acceptable solutions is less complicated than when groups have varied, dispirit demands [47, 79]. Across the Liberian civil war, the varied rebel groups entering the war at different times along the war and peace process with various goals allow us to analyze the relationships between group alignment and the success or failure of interim governments.

The NPFL started the war, but before any peace agreement terms were discussed, the INPFL splintered. Charles Taylor aimed to overthrow the sitting Doe regime and become President of Liberia [69]. One source notes that Taylor said he supported holding elections [69], so he did not necessarily want to become a despot, but his goal was to overthrow one (Doe) and take office through some mechanism. One reason for the INPFL split was that Prince Y. Johnson wanted the presidency for himself [69], and he saw splintering and fighting against Charles Taylor as a path to that goal. While these two groups fought the AFL forces, they signed the Bamako Ceasefire and the Lome Agreement, which included terms for an interim government. They both participated (for a time) in the All-Liberia National Conference, where Amos Sawyer was installed as President of the first interim government. Taylor then negotiated the Yamoussoukro Agreements in 1991 with Sawyer's INGU. Although the INGU was established and negotiated a peace agreement [51, 14] with Taylor, the INGU did not conclude the war or hold transitional elections.

In early 1992, ULIMO entered the war [69, 43, 45]. In October 1992, the INPFL dissolved, and Prince Y. Johnson went into exile [60]. ULIMO entered the fight to remove

the NPFL and Charles Taylor from Liberia [43]. During ULIMO's time as a unified group, it signed Cotonou Agreement, giving ULIMO seats in the LNGU. ULIMO splintered into ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J over the allocation of ULIMO seats in the LNGU in March 1994 [85, 43]. ULIMO-K fought against the NPFL with other forces in the coalition (ULIMO-J, LPC, AFL) in the fall of 1994 but looted Monrovia with NPFL forces in 'Operation Pay Yourself' [60, 45]. ECOMOG was an important partner in the war for ULIMO-J. Taylor undercut ULIMO-J's connection with ECOMOG during the disarmament process when Taylor convinced ULIMO-J to fight instead of turn over a diamond field [44, 60].

ULIMO was a powerful force to contend with throughout the war, even after the group split. However, as the war progressed, ULIMO-K aligned more with the NPFL, and in the end, ULIMO-J's relationship with ECOMOG was damaged. Roosevelt Johnson, the leader of ULIMO-J, through the Abuja Agreement, had secured a position in the LNGU [2, 14]. Going into the last iteration of the interim government, put forward in the Abuja Accord, both leaders of ULIMO splinters received high-level positions in the government. Still, the opposition to Taylor's future in Liberia was less strong, the groups had less power to oppose Taylor, and leaders secured government positions for themselves, possibly shifting their calculus over continuing to fight.

Third parties and external actors can serve as veto players and prolong wars to see their goals met [30]. To that end, their preferences over outcomes must be considered. The ECOWAS intervention played a key role in the first war in Liberia. On one hand, Nigeria initially pushed for an ECOMOG intervention to maintain a ceasefire—that had yet to go into effect in 1990 [69]. On the other hand, as the war deteriorated for the government forces under President Doe in 1990, Doe's government needed help [85]. A condition of ECOWAS deploying troops to aid in implementing the Banjul Agreement was replacing Doe's regime with the interim government was ultimately implemented and led by Amos Sawyer after the INPFL assassinated Doe [85]. Recall the NPFL did not sign the Banjul Agreement [5, 14] and had established the NPRAG government serving the NPFL-controlled territories—which

included most of the country outside of Monrovia [85].

Nigeria contributed around 75% of the troops for the mission in Liberia, with Ghana providing the second highest number of forces [45]. Not only were Nigerian civilians trapped in Liberia during the horrific war, but Nigeria also saw Taylor's actions as a possible threat to Nigerian ascendancy in the region [69]. This rivalry may reflect an anglophone-francophone divide in the region where Taylor often aligned on the francophone side, possibly to increase access to funding [105]. Even before Doe is assassinated, we see a veto player favoring and forwarding a path through an interim government to a possible non-Taylor future in Liberia. However, Charles Taylor was elected President of Liberia in 1997.

As the war progressed and other groups were removed from contention, preferences evolved. Taylor came to realize he would not be president without Nigeria's approval [60]. Prior, a key obstacle in the peace process was Taylor's desire to not stand for election in a contest he did not have sway over in some way as he feared Nigeria would intervene and thwart his victory [60]. In a 1995-pre-Abuja Agreement meeting between Taylor and Nigeria's leader, Abacha, a path that would consolidate Taylor's power and allow ECOMOG to disarm the various factions while drawing down the need for Nigeria's large support to the intervention became apparent [60]. The Abuja Agreement followed these developments. The Agreement revised the interim government that held the election that put Taylor into office in 1997 [60]. While the transitional election put Taylor in office by a large margin, many Liberians "were afraid of what he would do to them and the country if he lost the election" which may point to a collective war weariness from citizens [83] contributing to the interim government's ability to hold transitional elections.

LURD entered the second war to remove Taylor from power [83]. Some accounts link LURD's force to former ULIMO-K fighters [83], a group whose initial orientation was anti-Taylor. And Guinea supported LURD initially to help keep Taylor occupied in Libera, not across the border in Guinea [85]. When MODEL joined the fight as a Côte d'Ivoire-backed anti-Taylor force [85]. This rebel front, unified behind a shared goal of ridding Liberia of

Charles Taylor, negotiated the 2003 peace agreement that included an interim government. That interim government excluded Taylor and held elections that transferred power to permanent institutions.

4.5.3 Unified Goals for Interim Governments Specifically

It is not novel to claim or find evidence that the preferences of veto players must align to reach a peace agreement, let alone durable peace. Where the Liberian cases shed additional light on interim governments is the degree to which we see the critical role of preference alignment over the heir apparent. It was not until 1994 or 1995 that the preferences of veto players aligned to have Charles Taylor be acceptable.

By 1990, Taylor controlled a majority of the country and had established a government of sorts through the NPRAG institutions. He then removed the INPFL—the only other rebel force on the scene—in 1992. Others did not yet approve of Taylor's desire for the presidency. Then, ULIMO joined the conflict with an explicit anti-Taylor focus. As a rebel group that can spoil a peace process, either ULIMO would need to be weakened or see their preferences realigned. Throughout the war, arguably, both happened once the group split.

Other groups came into the conflict. They were included in peace agreements and processes as they were strong enough to require inclusion but did not, alone, appear to have the resolve or capacity to continue the war as the peace process and disarmament processes began. Further, by this time in the war, it appears Nigeria's interests switched to prioritizing wrapping up the ECOWAS deployment over continuing to fight to prevent Charles Taylor's ability to contest the presidency from a place of control [60]. While it was only one group's preference at the beginning of the war for Charles Taylor to become president, by the end of the war, leaders of the veto groups in the conflict either had been defeated and/or had secured positions for themselves or prized ending the suffering (and costs) from the war more than continuing to fight.

Contrast this with the process in 2003 where the next leader was much less of a 'known known'—at least there was no clear 'heir apparent' from the conflict itself who conflict actors knew it was all but certain would take power. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf won just over 59% of the vote over George Weah in the second round of the Presidential election in 2005 [1, 97]. Johnson-Sirleaf ran against Taylor in 1997 and had experience in Liberian politics before the war, so she was not an unknown or unlikely candidate [85]. But, there were 22 candidates in the first round election in October 2005, which pushed the election to a November runoff [97]. From this, we see that rebel goals need not be unified behind specific paths, leaders, or prescribed outcomes to necessarily get to a successful interim government. Unity of veto player goals can be focused on institutions and processes that insulate from the horrors of war to find a peaceful transfer of power.

Further work should dive deeper into these questions and relationships outside Liberia. I would expect an interim government to be unlikely in a conflict like the ongoing Syrian civil war, where there are drastically different goals of what government 'should look like' among the major rebel wings of the war, let alone considering the preferences within the current Syrian regime. But, if the rebels have aligned preferences for overall government outcomes, interim governments may be a successful solution if put in place—even if it takes time for all veto players to come to that shared goal or if the ranking of preferences changes throughout the war as we saw across ECOWAS in the first war where peace overtook not seeing Taylor come to power in the end.

4.6 Possible Scope Conditions for Future Work

4.6.1 A Fifth Role of IG's in Civil War

Liberia presents an interesting case for considering the different roles that interim governments may play in civil wars in the modern era of third-party intervention—especially from the United Nations (UN). UN peacekeeping missions require "Consent of the Parties" to

operate in the country [124]. Liberia presents an interesting question, especially post-Doe: How can a third-party get consent for an operation without government?

Even before the fall of Doe, the Liberian state needed help to repel the rebel forces. After he was assassinated, the power vacuum needed to be filled. The ECOWAS Peace Plan had a solution that one quote from my research for this paper speaks to:

> It was during the aftermath of the peace surrounding Monrovia and, a new-found confidence on the part of both the military and political leaders in the sub-region that ECOWAS gave critical political support to the formation of an Interim Government of National Unity (INGU). *Establishing INGU was critical for EOCWAS's ability to function both politically and militarily in Liberia. INGU provided a legitimizing political framework within which ECOWAS could manoeuvre and function.* Due to ECOWAS's role in the establishment of this interim administration, ECOMOG, was duty-bound, ethnically, militarily and politically to guarantee its survival in Monrovia. (Quoted from Levitt [83, p. 209, which quotes Aning, Emanuel Kwesi, *Security in the West African Sub-Region: An Analysis of ECOWAS's Policies in Liberia* (Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, 1999), emphasis added.]

This may further speak to when to expect interim governments to be included in peace processes and the path dependence of trying to make them work similarly through multiple iterations.

Now, peacekeeping operations and guiding principles have changed since the early 1990s, when Liberia's peacekeeping operation(s) began, and ECOWAS led the effort before the UN contributed forces. Thus, these specific principles may not have been enshrined or applied yet. However, earlier sections of this paper discussed the heterogeneity of interim governments in peace agreement terms. Perhaps the need for consent from governments, at a minimum, may incentivize a fifth type of interim government for civil war contexts in addition to those put forward by Shain and Linz (1995).

4.6.2 Balance of Power Between Government and Rebels

The Liberian case raised a second possible scope condition for where to expect interim government inclusion in civil war peace processes. Still, the cases did not directly provide strong tests for the conditions. Future work may look into the occurrence of interim governments as it relates to the relative strength of rebels and government forces. Both Liberian wars saw rebels that successfully challenged the state forces, eventually replacing the regime. In the first war, it took about nine months for the NPFL and INPFL to reach Monrovia and remove Doe, even with peacekeeping forces in Monrovia. LURD and MODEL had state backing for the second war and faced a somewhat weakened Taylor as he faced arms import embargoes. Still, the rebels went from starting the war to negotiated settlement that removed the current government in three years.

In both cases, rebels, and government forces were likely evenly matched, possibly making way for a more successful negotiation position for the rebel forces than in wars with a strong state. Interim governments may be more likely to be included when rebel forces out or equally match the government.

4.7 Conclusion

This paper provided insights from different peace agreements on what interim governments look like, and in the Liberian case, offered insights as to where individual interim governments may have succeeded or failed. Overall, interim governments are heterogeneous and case-specific but seem to reinforce findings across conflict and conflict resolution scholarship in specific and important ways. Negotiations can take time to find workable solutions, and preferences must align for veto players. For interim governments, from the Liberian cases, we can see that conflict actors can revise the same interim government as the conflict pro-

gresses and find it successful in turning over power to permanent institutions even if external actors present the idea first—but it may work faster for the groups involved in the conflict to work towards an agreement through the war. Further, all of this hinges on unified goals of veto players around what is next governmentally for the country—or area of conflict. This specifically includes mutual acceptance of who is an 'heir apparent' even if that is mutual acceptance of who can run or who may win the transitional election for the success of an interim government.

I also work to highlight two areas that may serve as scope conditions for future work in this area. First, moving forward, one must seriously consider if some interim governments are established to satisfy the needs and norms of peacekeeping interventions in weak, failing, or failed states. This challenges theories based on war dynamics or peace processes aside from peacekeeping. At worst, it may increase the number of interim governments prescribed by external actors or heavy-handed mediators rather than from the conflict actors themselves, possibly opening the door to longer-term deleterious outcomes.

Second, rather than seeing interim governments mainly as a continuation of the bargaining range of the war, perhaps they are a concession made by equally or out-matched states with rebels to save face and hold on to the possibility of power after the war. Liberia did not present the context for understanding the role of rebel-government strength balancing well, but other cases that could be explored could. If interim governments are more likely or only included in cases of weak(er) states and strong(er) rebels, those scope conditions would help narrow future studies to better understand the nuances of these institutions.

This paper, taken in concert with chapters two and three of this project, points to research in new directions of theory testing for interim governments and their nuances. Further, it pushes scholars to think more broadly about the direct connections between violent conflict and contentious politics and how to move purposefully out of the former and into the latter.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This project started from an interest in studying where and why violence enters politics, especially in ethnically fractured societies. That interest morphed into what this project focuses on finding a better way to resolve civil wars because of the cyclical nature of civil conflict; if we can fully end wars and institutions become responsible to their citizens and robust to bad actors, perhaps we can keep violence out of politics. I presented one approach to thinking about a feature of some civil wars and not others that seemed overlooked: interim governments. These present interesting questions surrounding what types of wars produce them and when in the conflict process they arise. I explored these by applying the canonical bargaining model of war logic whereby interim government inclusion signals under-resolved conflict, lower information, or commitment environments. However, the test I ran to test hypotheses derived from this theory is largely not confirmed. They individually point in interesting directions (Chapter Two, External Actors; Chapter Three: longer wars and the number of actors in ceasefires).

Chapter Four takes a different approach. There, I dive into the texts to see what the inclusion of interim governments looks like in practice across many cases and work through the details of the interim governments tried in Liberia alongside the conflict process and rebel dynamics. From that work, new and different ideas and considerations of the types of

conflicts and actors may make interim governments more likely to set up an interim government for success. Specifically, it points to the unity of veto player goals around who may lead the country next and that the timeline may need multiple iterations to hold.

Much of this process was exploratory and a descriptive effort through which my understanding of the data-generating process and relationships in the process. If I were to push this research forward or leave advice for someone coming behind me, I would point to new data from Clayton et al. [24] on ceasefires and Arı [8] on negotiations in civil war. Having these data to use in this work would advance modeling strength and theoretical tests. Further, knowing what I know now about this topic, I would focus more on the theory regarding rebel-government strength relationships and the rebel motivations and accommodations literatures to better understand where interim governments are more possible inclusions in the bargaining process to end a civil war. Finally, there is space to explore different units of analysis. The civil war and peace agreement literature sometimes takes the conflict-level approach, while others take a dyadic approach. Here, I explore the conflict-level approach, however, if data allows (especially mediation or negotiation data) allow, it may be fruitful for future scholars.

Appendix A

Paper 1

	Model 1
Intercept (1)	-2.43^{***}
	(0.25)
Cumul. Count CF (1)	0.10^{***}
	(0.02)
GDP	-0.00^{***}
	(0.00)
Regime Quality	0.20^{**}
	(0.07)
Cumul. Intensity	0.38^{**}
	(0.13)
Incompatibility	0.56^{***}
	(0.11)
Intercept (2)	0.03
	(0.20)
Cumul. Count CF (2)	0.01
	(0.01)
InvMillsRatio	0.19
	(0.13)
sigma	0.49
rho	0.39
R^2	0.01
Adj. R^2	0.00
Num. obs.	1150
Censored	992
Observed	158

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.1: Selection model: count of ceasefires.

	Model 1
Intercept (1)	-2.19^{***}
	(0.23)
PK Count (1)	0.00^{*}
	(0.00)
GDP	-0.00^{***}
	(0.00)
Regime Quality	0.13
	(0.07)
Cumul. Intensity	0.42^{**}
	(0.13)
Incompatability	0.47^{***}
	(0.11)
Intercept (2)	−0.20
	(0.23)
PK Count (2)	0.00
	(0.00)
InvMillsRatio	0.33^{*}
	(0.15)
sigma	0.54
rho	0.62
R^2	0.03
Adj. R^2	0.02
Num. obs.	1150
Censored	992
Observed	158

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.2: Selection model: count of peacekeepers

	Model 1
Intercept (1)	-1.77^{***}
	(0.24)
Count Past Agrees (1)	0.06^{***}
	(0.01)
GDP	-0.00^{**}
	(0.00)
Regime Quality	-0.03
	(0.07)
Cumul. Intensity	0.21
	(0.14)
Incompatibility	0.30^{**}
	(0.11)
Intercept (2)	0.09
	(0.30)
Count Past Agrees (2)	-0.00
	(0.01)
InvMillsRatio	0.16
	(0.18)
sigma	0.48
rho	0.35
R^2	0.02
Adj. R^2	0.01
Num. obs.	1150
Censored	992
Observed	158

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.3: Selection model: count of prior agreements

	Model 1
Intercept (1)	-2.53^{***}
	(0.26)
External Actors (1)	0.40^{**}
	(0.14)
GDP	-0.00^{***}
	(0.00)
Cumul. Intensity	0.39^{**}
	(0.13)
Incompatibility	0.51^{***}
	(0.11)
Regime Quality	0.13
	(0.07)
Intercept (2)	-0.41
	(0.28)
External Actors (2)	0.27^{*}
	(0.13)
InvMillsRatio	0.33^{*}
	(0.15)
sigma	0.54
rho	0.62
R^2	0.04
Adj. R^2	0.03
Num. obs.	1150
Censored	992
Observed	158

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.4: Selection model: external actors

	Model 1
Intercept (1)	-2.22^{***}
	(0.23)
Battle Deaths (1)	0.00
	(0.00)
GDP	-0.00^{***}
	(0.00)
Cumul. Intensity	0.41^{**}
	(0.13)
Incompatibility	0.49^{***}
	(0.11)
Regime Quality	0.14^{*}
	(0.07)
Intercept (2)	-0.16
	(0.22)
Battle Deaths (2)	-0.00
	(0.00)
InvMillsRatio	0.32^{*}
	(0.15)
sigma	0.53
rho	0.60
R^2	0.04
Adj. R^2	0.03
Num. obs.	1147
Censored	989
Observed	158

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.5: Selection model: battle deaths

	Model 1
Intercept (1)	-2.20^{***}
	(0.23)
Length of War Since '90 (1)	-0.00
	(0.01)
GDP	-0.00^{***}
	(0.00)
Regime Quality	0.13
	(0.07)
Cumul. Intensity	0.45^{**}
	(0.14)
Incompatability	0.50^{***}
	(0.11)
Intercept (2)	0.04
	(0.22)
Length of War Since '90 (2)	-0.01^{*}
	(0.00)
InvMillsRatio	0.26
	(0.14)
sigma	0.50
rho	0.51
R^2	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.05
Num. obs.	1150
Censored	992
Observed	158

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.6: Selection model: length of war

	Model 1
Intercept (1)	-2.20^{***}
	(0.23)
Number of Actors (1)	-0.00
	(0.01)
GDP	-0.00^{***}
	(0.00)
Cumul. Intensity	0.44^{***}
	(0.13)
Incompatibility	0.50^{***}
	(0.11)
Regime Quality	0.13
	(0.07)
Intercept (2)	-0.15
	(0.21)
Number of Actors (2)	-0.00
	(0.01)
InvMillsRatio	0.31^{*}
	(0.14)
sigma	0.53
rho	0.58
R^2	0.03
Adj. R^2	0.02
Num. obs.	1150
Censored	992
Observed	158

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.7: Selection model: number of actors

	Model 1
Intercept (1)	-2.27^{***}
	(0.29)
Number of Actors(1)	-0.01
	(0.01)
Length of War Since '90 (1)	-0.02^{**}
	(0.01)
Cumul. Count CF(1)	0.08^{***}
	(0.02)
Count Past Agrees (1)	0.06^{***}
	(0.01)
PK Count (1)	0.00
	(0.00)
Battle Deaths(1)	0.00
	(0.00)
External Support(1)	0.37^{*}
	(0.15)
GDP	-0.00^{*}
	(0.00)
Regime Quality	0.23
	(0.15)
Cumul. Intensity	0.42^{***}
	(0.12)
Incompatibility	0.08
	(0.08)
Intercept (2)	0.03
	(0.34)
Number of Actors (2)	-0.00
	(0.01)
Length of War Since '90 (2)	-0.01
	(0.01)
Cumul. Count CF (2)	0.01
	(0.01)
Count Past Agrees (2)	-0.00
	(0.01)
PK Count (2)	0.22
	(0.13)
Battle Deaths (2)	0.00
	(0.00)
External Support (2)	-0.00
	(0.00)
InvMillsRatio	0.14
	(0.18)
sigma	0.46
rho	0.30
R^2	0.07
Adj. R^2	0.02
Num. obs.	1147
Censored	989
Observed	158

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.8: Selection model: joint results

	Model 1
Intercept (1)	-2.20^{***}
	(0.23)
Length of War Since '90 (1)	-0.00
	(0.01)
GDP	-0.00^{***}
	(0.00)
Regime Quality	0.13
	(0.07)
Cumul. Intensity	0.45^{**}
	(0.14)
Incompatability	0.50^{***}
	(0.11)
Intercept (2)	0.04
	(0.22)
Length of War Since '90 (2)	-0.01^{*}
	(0.00)
InvMillsRatio	0.26
	(0.14)
sigma	0.50
rho	0.51
R^2	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.05
Num. obs.	1150
Censored	992
Observed	158

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.9: Selection model: mediation model, number of actors

	Model 1
Intercept (1)	-1.72^{***}
	(0.33)
Count Prior Agrees(1)	0.12^{***}
	(0.02)
GDP	-0.00
	(0.00)
Cumul. Intensity	0.20
	(0.18)
Incompatability	0.19
	(0.16)
Regime Quality	-0.00
	(0.10)
Intercept (2)	0.46
	(0.56)
Count Prior Agrees (2)	-0.00
	(0.03)
InvMillsRatio	-0.04
	(0.32)
sigma	0.49
rho	-0.08
R^2	0.00
Adj. R^2	-0.02
Num. obs.	629
Censored	543
Observed	86

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.10: Selection model: mediation model, prior agreements

	Model 1
Intercept (1)	-2.34^{***}
	(0.33)
Battle Deaths (1)	0.00
	(0.00)
GDP	-0.00^{**}
	(0.00)
Cumul. Intensity	0.44^{*}
	(0.17)
Incompatibility	0.46^{**}
	(0.15)
Regime Quality	0.25^{**}
	(0.09)
Intercept (2)	0.10
	(0.31)
Battle Deaths (2)	0.00
	(0.00)
InvMillsRatio	0.20
	(0.20)
sigma	0.52
rho	0.38
R^2	0.01
Adj. R^2	-0.01
Num. obs.	628
Censored	542
Observed	86

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.11: Selection model: mediation model, battle deaths

	Model 1
Intercept (1)	-2.72^{***}
	(0.36)
Count CF (1)	0.10^{***}
	(0.02)
GDP	-0.00^{*}
	(0.00)
Cumul. Intensity	0.44^{**}
	(0.17)
Incompatibility	0.64^{***}
	(0.16)
Regime Quality	0.29^{**}
	(0.09)
Intercept (2)	0.25
	(0.29)
Count CF (2)	0.02
	(0.01)
InvMillsRatio	0.08
	(0.19)
sigma	0.49
rho	0.16
R^2	0.03
Adj. R^2	0.00
Num. obs.	629
Censored	543
Observed	86

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.12: Selection model: mediation model, ceasefires

	Model 1
Intercept (1)	-2.61^{***}
	(0.36)
External Actors (1)	0.37^{*}
	(0.19)
GDP	-0.00^{**}
	(0.00)
Cumul. Intensity	0.43^{*}
	(0.17)
Incompatibility	0.47^{**}
	(0.15)
Regime Quality	0.23^{**}
	(0.09)
Intercept (2)	-0.15
	(0.39)
External Actors (2)	0.28
	(0.18)
InvMillsRatio	0.20
	(0.20)
sigma	0.51
rho	0.39
R^2	0.03
Adj. R^2	0.01
Num. obs.	629
Censored	543
Observed	86

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.13: Selection model: mediation model, external actors

	Model 1
Intercept (1)	-2.31^{***}
	(0.32)
Length of War Since '90 (1)	0.01
	(0.01)
GDP	-0.00^{**}
	(0.00)
Cumul. Intensity	0.45^{*}
	(0.17)
Incompatability	0.44^{**}
	(0.15)
Regime Quality	0.22^{*}
	(0.09)
Intercept (2)	0.07
	(0.34)
Length of War Since '90 (2)	0.01
	(0.01)
InvMillsRatio	0.19
	(0.20)
sigma	0.51
rho	0.36
R^2	0.01
Adj. R^2	-0.01
Num. obs.	629
Censored	543
Observed	86

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.14: Selection model: mediation model, length of war

	Model 1
Intercept (1)	-2.52^{***}
	(0.34)
Count PK (1)	0.00^{***}
	(0.00)
GDP	-0.00^{*}
	(0.00)
Incompatability	0.46^{**}
	(0.17)
Cumul. Intensity	0.51^{***}
	(0.15)
Regime Quality	0.29^{**}
	(0.09)
Intercept (2)	0.16
	(0.30)
Count PK (2)	0.00^{*}
	(0.00)
InvMillsRatio	0.12
	(0.19)
sigma	0.48
rho	0.26
R^2	0.07
Adj. R^2	0.05
Num. obs.	629
Censored	543
Observed	86

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.15: Selection model: mediation model, count peacekeepers

	Model 1
Intercept (1)	-2.38^{***}
	(0.42)
Number of Actors(1)	-0.06
	(0.05)
Length of War Since '90 (1)	-0.00
	(0.02)
Cumul. Count CF(1)	0.06^{*}
	(0.03)
Count Past Agrees (1)	0.11^{***}
	(0.02)
PK Count (1)	0.00^{*}
	(0.00)
Battle Deaths(1)	0.00
	(0.00)
External Support(1)	0.31
	(0.20)
GDP	-0.00
	(0.00)
Cumul. Intensity	0.16
	(0.19)
Incompatability	0.44^{*}
	(0.18)
Regime Quality	0.12
	(0.10)
Intercept (2)	0.00
	(0.60)
Number of Actors (2)	0.00
	(0.04)
Length of War Since '90 (2)	0.01
	(0.01)
Cumul. Count CF (2)	0.00
	(0.01)
Count Past Agrees (2)	-0.00
	(0.03)
PK Count (2)	0.00
	(0.00)
Battle Deaths (2)	-0.00
	(0.00)
External Support (2)	0.31
	(0.18)
InvMillsRatio	0.01
	(0.30)
sigma	0.46
rho	0.03
R^2	0.11
Adj. R^2	0.02
Num. obs.	628
Censored	542
Observed	86

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.16: Selection model: joint mediation model results

Appendix B

Paper 2

Transition	W to C	W to A	W to IG	C to W	C to A	C to IG	A to W	A to IG	IG to W	IG to A
Length of War	0.9751	0.9168	0.8864	0.9693	0.9626	0.9198**	0.9819*	0.9952***	1.0046***	1.0023***
(se)	(0.0024)	(0.00608)	(0.02191)	(0.00349)	(0.01132)	(0.03742)	(0.00613)	(0.01598)	(0.01403)	(0.03195)
Regime Quality	0.9696***	1.0659***	0.6597***	0.6497	1.2883***	0.2933***	0.6549*	0.4114**	1.0506***	0.6229***
(se)	(0.07919)	(0.11529)	(0.29067)	(0.10722)	(0.28523)	(0.62711)	(0.13069)	(0.40222)	(0.24153)	(0.50975)

Table B.1: Multistate model results from each observed transition for War Length in months. (5-year resolved)

Transition	W to C	W to A	W to IG	C to W	C to A	C to IG	A to W	A to IG	IG to W	IG to A
Count Prior Agreements	0.9948***	1.1586	1.2222	0.9786***	1.0642***	1.1204***	1.0915	1.1322**	1.0519**	1.047***
(se)	(0.01785)	(0.01666)	(0.03637)	(0.03055)	(0.05836)	(0.07666)	(0.01984)	(0.05242)	(0.02545)	(0.05974)
Regime Quality	0.8431**	0.6847	0.4148*	0.6185	1.3737***	0.284***	0.6239	0.4674**	1.183***	0.6534***
(se)	(0.07948)	(0.11009)	(0.2813)	(0.11042)	(0.28661)	(0.68252)	(0.12303)	(0.38275)	(0.22796)	(0.47227)

Table B.2: Multistate model results from each observed transition for the cumulative count of past agreements linked to the conflict (5 years resolved).

Transition	W to C	W to A	W to IG	C to W	C to A	C to IG	A to W	A to IG	IG to W	IG to A
Cumul. Months in Ceasefire	0.9984***	0.9997***	1.0005***	0.9793	0.9782	0.8658***	1***	0.9762***	0.9976***	0.9951***
(se)	(0.00128)	(0.0044)	(0.00774)	(0.00178)	(0.00543)	(0.0785)	(0.00371)	(0.01629)	(0.00704)	(0.01219)
Regime Quality	0.846**	0.7403*	0.4806*	0.8232***	1.8125***	0.5142***	0.5697	0.3867**	1.0894***	0.63***
(se)	(0.07883)	(0.1077)	(0.24501)	(0.10933)	(0.31047)	(0.73271)	(0.12566)	(0.37809)	(0.22261)	(0.47185)

Table B.3: Multistate model results from each observed transition for the cumulative number of months a conflict spent in a ceasefire (5 years resolved).



Figure B.1: Probtrans plot for 3 actors in a war (75%).



Figure B.2: Probtrans plot for 10 actors in a war.

Transition	W to C	W to A	W to IG	C to W	C to A	C to IG	A to W	A to IG	IG to W	IG to A
Count of Actors	0.9984***	1.6467	1.4419*	1.0331*	0.9429***	1.2803***	0.989***	0.8488***	0.9891***	1.2475***
(se)	(0.01198)	(0.06391)	(0.11509)	(0.01099)	(0.16532)	(0.13933)	(0.01895)	(0.1927)	(0.09812)	(0.2081)
Regime Quality	0.8413**	0.8513***	0.5179*	0.5973	1.3655***	0.1963**	0.5613	0.3291*	1.072***	0.8118***
(se)	(0.07911)	(0.11077)	(0.24349)	(0.11151)	(0.28937)	(0.7554)	(0.1271)	(0.4157)	(0.24178)	(0.51255)

Table B.4: Multistate model results from each observed transition for Number of Actors involved in that phase (5 years resolved).



Figure B.3: Probtrans plot for 15 actors in a war.

Appendix C

Paper 3

Timeframe	Event
1980	Samuel Doe comes to power through a coup ousting then President Tolbert [69]
December 1989	Charles Taylor and NPFL begin attacks from Côte d'Ivoire [43, 85]
January 1990	IPNFL splits from NPFL [69][a]
June 1990	INPFL, NPFL reach outskirts of Monrovia [85]
August 1990	ECOWAS/ECOMOG deploys to Monrovia, ECOWAS peace plan submitted, [85, 14]
September 1990	Samuel Doe captured, killed by INPFL [69]
October 1990	Taylor rejects the Banjul conference peace deal [14]
November 1990	Taylor signs ceasefire in Bamako [43, 14]
February 1991	Lome Ceasefire signed [14]
March 1991	RUF Invade Sierra Leone [85]
April 1991	All Liberia Conference, INGU installed. NPFL walks out.
October 1991	ULIMO invades from Sierra Leone [85]
Early 1992	Sierra Leone government overthrown by their military [83].
April 1992	ULIMO reaches outskirts of Monrovia [85]
August 1992	NPFL/Taylor attacks Monrovia in Operation Octopus; INPFL is defeated [43]
October 1992	Cotonou ceasefire signed [43, 14]
July 1993	UNOMIL co-deploys with existing ECOMOG forces [83]
September 1993	Cotonou Agreement fails, war breaks out [85]
October 1993	ECOMOG forces deploy in Liberia; ULIMO Splits [43]
March 1994	Akosombo Agreement signed as a follow up to Cotonou [85, 14]; NPFL-CRC splits from NPFL [85].
Early 1995	Fighting covered +80% of Liberia. [85]
August 1995	Abuja Agreement signed [85]. Taylor returns to Monrovia [44].
April 1996	ULIMO-J Leader arrested, fighting sparked in Monrovia [85]
November 1996	Disarmament begins [85]
1997	National Elections held, Charles Taylor wins
Mid 1999	LURD forms out of other groups/factions [78] [b];
August 1999	Government of Liberia declares state of emergency in part of Lofa County [40]
January 2000-August 2003	LURD enters mediation with the Government of Liberia. These talks last until August 18, 2003 [37].
July 2000	LURD invades from Guinea [85, 77]
October 2000	LURD retreats due to bombing campaign from Government [77]
July 2000-December 2001	LURD and Government forces "rode a see saw of military victory and retreat, with LURD capturing large swaths of Lofa County" [85].
March 2003	MODEL enters Liberia in the southeast from Côte d'Ivoire [85]
July 2003	MODEL Captured Buchanan (Liberia's second largest city) [85]
August 2003	MODEL reaches Monrovia; LURD conducts attacks on Monrovia; ECOMIL peacekeepers deploy to Monrovia[c] [85].
August 2003	Charles Taylor accepts exile in Nigeria and resigns as President
August 2003	Accra Agreement Signed [14]
October 2003	Interim Government takes over Liberia.
2005	Transitional elections held, Ellen Jonhnson-Sirleaf inaugurated as President of Liberia.

Table C.1: Timeline of key events in the Liberian civil wars and interim governments (1990-2005).

[a] Lidow puts this as February 1990

[b] Hazen2013 claims this happened in late 2000.

[c] There may have been PK forces in Liberia earlier, but maybe ECOMIL as an operation may have started then.

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Taylor, of the Second Part, and The Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia Represented by Mr. Prince Yeduo Johnson, of the Third Part, Lome, Togo, 13 February 1991 (Lome Agreement). 1991.

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