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Magdelena Paddock April 10, 2017

Refugee Resettlement in the European Union: an Examination of Factors Affecting Compliance with EU Refugee Policy

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Abstract

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In 2015, 1.3 million asylum seekers were in Europe. The resulting strain on European Union member states pushed the EU towards a policy of mandatory collective resettlement: the 2015 Relocation and Resettlement Scheme. Compliance with this plan varied greatly across the member states, with some countries going far beyond the number of refugees they were asked to resettle and some accepting only a small fraction of the number they were asked to. This paper places seeks to address the question of why there was such variation in the willingness of EU member states to comply with the 2015 Relocation and Resettlement Scheme. Contextualizing this question within the wider literature on collective action theory, this paper examines several different factors for their influence on member states compliance including economic factors, degree of member state embeddedness within the EU, population size and ruling coalition ideology. Looking across the EU and within the four case studies of Germany, Poland, Latvia and Austria, I found support for the role of both economic capacity and EU integration positively correlating with the willingness of a state to comply with the EU resettlement scheme.

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Introduction

In 2015 there were 1.3 million asylum seekers in Europe, the largest refugee crisis since World War II (UNHCR, 2015). The distribution in resettlement of these refugees and their subsequent treatment varied greatly across the European Union (EU). In the first half of 2015, the number of accepted asylum applicants varied from 41,160 in Germany to 5 in Latvia– or 51 people per 100,000 in Germany and 0.2 per 100,000 in Latvia (Eurostat, European Commission 2015). The variation in acceptance of refugees is just one component of the larger policy variation regarding refugees across Europe, despite three decades of attempts to unify policy (Loescher, 1989). Both Germany and Latvia are members of the European Union (EU), an institution that has actively sought to establish a common refugee policy since the 1980s.What causes such a large variation in compliance with EU refugee policy across its member states in the current mass influx of refugees? This paper seeks to identify factors that best account for variation in compliance with the EU's refugee policy

In answering this question, this paper identifies several potentially influential variables and then tests their influence across the EU and within four case study countries: Germany, Poland, Austria and Latvia. This paper will first outline past literature on collective action dilemmas that frames the theoretical argument. After establishing how refugee resettlement functions as a collective dilemma within the EU, the analysis then focuses on factors of economics and embeddedness and how they play a role in individual states' cooperation with EU refugee policy. Following a most-similar systems design, Germany, Poland, Austria and Latvia were chosen for their similarities as EU members taking part in the 2015 Relocation and Resettlement Scheme, and their

differences in compliance with this EU policy. Within each case, this paper tests how population size, economic capacity, EU membership date, EU embeddedness and ruling coalition ideology affect the refugee policy of each of the four states. Although conclusions are tentative, the findings in this paper suggest that economic capacity is a significant factor in whether or not a country complied with the EU resettlement scheme while population size is not. The other variables considered did not seem to systematically affect compliance with EU policy, insofar as could be concluded from the research presented in this paper.

Defining "refugee"

The definition of refugee most commonly employed in academics, policy and media discussion is the legal one outlined in the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 1951 Convention and amended in the 1967 Protocol on Refugees: someone who has fled from his or her home country for reason of a "well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion," or "because the government of this country is unable to provide her/him protection from persecution originating from nongovernmental forces" (UNHCR 2010, 3). Many scholars have been critical of the academic use of this definition because it assumes a concrete category of people that, in reality, is often a term whose definition varies country by country (Black 2001, Dowty 1997, Richmond 1988). Despite this valid concern about using a highly politicized definition in academic research, this paper employs when possible the legal UN definition of "refugees" when investigating policy in Europe. For the purposes of studying the refugee phenomena in this paper, accepting the legal UN definition of refugees will provide a clearer path to

studying policy because it is often the standard definition used in the data available through UNHCR and the European Commission.

"Accepted asylum seeker" will be used as a proxy for "refugee" in this paper. Asylum seekers are those persons applying for asylum with hopes of being accepted based on their status as a Geneva Convention recognized refugee (UNESCO, 2017). Therefore, accepted asylum seekers are those who have been positively recognized as refugees by the country where they applied for asylum. "Accepted asylum seeker" is not a perfect equal of the term "refugee" in that host nations have a degree of leeway in their sovereign territory to raise the bar of asylum seeker admittance beyond just Geneva Convention status. Thus the number of asylum seekers accepted may be a slight underestimate of the actual number of refugees in host countries. However, the use of "accepted asylum seekers" as a proxy for refugees is a useful measure of how states have complied with EU policy on refugees because it still provides a figure of how many refugees each state has accepted, even if the legal requirements to qualify for refugee status vary slightly between states.

Theoretical Framework: Collective Action

Refugee policy in the European Union is inherently a dilemma of collective action. This section provides an explanation of the major lines of collective action theory and assesses how they apply to the current refugee crisis.

Collective action theory derives from a body of work that explores the implication of a common phenomenon wherein individual rational action may lead to a suboptimal group outcome. Olson (1965) articulated this idea of collective dilemma with his central argument that "unless… the group is quite small, or unless there is coercion… rational,

self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests" (Olson, 2). While Olson's original unit of analysis was the individual, Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) expanded the theory of collective action to focus on nation states as the "rational actors" in order to analyze international institutions. They defined an actor's "collective goal" as the following two conditions: first, "if the goal is achieved, everyone who shares this goal benefits" regardless of their individual contribution to achieving the goal; and second, "if the goal is available to one actor, it can be made available to other members at little or no cost" (Olson and Zeckhauser, 266). This definition of a collective goal is repeated, with slight variations, by later works on collective action. The central "collective goal" analyzed in this paper is the resettlement of refugees across the European Union, with each member state being considered a rational unit according to the logic of Olson and Zeckhauser's analysis.

One implication of Olson's theory of collective action is what he terms the "exploitation of the great by the small" (Olson, 3). In terms of international alliances, this "tyranny" plays out in smaller nations contributing less to the alliance (e.g. the lower number of troops contributed by smaller NATO members) because their marginal benefit from the alliance is smaller (Olson and Zeckhauser, 278). In effect, smaller units are more likely to "free ride" off of larger ones. The broad conclusion by Olson and Zeckhauser was that international alliances, as organized in 1966, cannot work efficiently because of the rational interests of their member states (Olson and Zeckhauser, 278).

The implications of what Olson termed the "logic of collective action" were further explored by Hardin (1968) in what he called "the tragedy of the commons." Taking Olson's (1965) earlier assumption of individual rational choice, Hardin seeks to

explain a class of human problems, especially the "population problem," as one of a failure to act collectively to protect "the commons" (natural resources in particular) (Hardin 1968, 1243). Hardin argues that appeals to the individual conscience to solve collective action dilemmas will be futile and social responsibility can best be instilled with "mutually agreed upon coercion" (Hardin 1247). Both Olson's and Hardin's theories hint at the dual nature of the collective action of refugee resettlement in the European Union. Not only is refugee resettlement policy a collective dilemma of the EU as a whole, but at the state-level the decision making processes to create a state's policy are in themselves collective dilemmas. This analysis focuses holistically at the EU member state-level to address the first aspect of this collective action dilemma. Then, dropping to the second, individual state-level dilemma with four case studies, this paper will briefly address the internal state collective action dilemma of governance in distinguishing *why* some states do not comply to EU-level refugee policy.

The basic logic of the collective action dilemma set up by Olson and Hardin was expanded in Axelrod's *The Evolution of Cooperation* (1984). He applied "prisoner's dilemma" logic to understanding under what circumstances cooperation between individual actors is likely. Axelrod sought to understand why, given the individual's incentive not to cooperate in many situations of collective action, cooperation does often occur. Axelrod concludes that development of mutual cooperation "depends on the weight of future interactions." Given the expectation of repeated interaction, cooperation can and does begin and persist despite actors' incentive to defect (Axelrod, 1984, 19). Axelrod's model presents a two-player means of analyzing cooperation. While the EU, the institution of cooperation focused on in this paper, is obviously not a situation of only

two players, the notion of repeated interaction incentivizing cooperation can be useful in analyzing interactions within the institution.

The relative simplicity and strict assumptions of the models of collective action presented thus far (i.e., perfectly rational actors) were challenged by Ostrom (1990). Ostrom studied the roles of different types of institutions in preventing the overuse and destruction of Common Pool Resources (CPR) –the resources harmed in a tragedy of the commons situation. Her research looked at institutions created by different communities around the world in order to protect local CPRs. She found the robustness of the institution was not contingent on whether it was strictly private or public (the two prevailing policy means of solving collective action dilemmas). Ostrom's main conclusion is that the most successful institutions for solving collective action failure tend to be designed with the specific CPR in mind and involve locals at every level of the process (Ostrom, 186). Although Ostrom focuses on small-scale CPRs, her conclusions about the importance of local input on institutional design may suggest a reason for the variation in cooperation within the EU's refugee policy by many states that were late members to the EU— and thus did not have a role in the original design of the institution that seeks to solve a number of European collective dilemmas.

The theoretical role of institutions was further explored by North (1990) in his work on the mechanisms by which institutions govern their members (and by extension, solve their members' collective action problems). He emphasized the role of institutions in reducing uncertainty by providing structure to the lives of a group (North, 6). On the subject of enforcing institutional rules and norms, North says formal or informal contracts "will be self-enforcing when it pays the parties to live by them;" i.e., when the

rational cost-benefit analysis by an actor supports abiding by institutional rules (North, 55). The state is viewed as critical in imposing costs to enforce institutional norms by behaving as an impartial third party. Applying North's analysis of the critical nature of enforcement to institutional obedience, one can see the weakness of the EU's ability to institute policies among its member states without effective means of enforcement.

Refugee Policy as a Collective Action Dilemma

These theories, taken together, provide an analytical framework that presumes institutional provision of coercion is necessary in order to solve many collective dilemmas. This applies to refugee policy in that refugee resettlement should be thought of as a collective action issue of a regional scale: the containment and successful, legal resettlement of refugees is the optimal outcome for all the nations that are affected by the forced movement of people from conflict zones. Given the mass illegal movement of refugees into Europe since 2011, all EU member states would benefit if the refugees were formally resettled. However, no individual member state has the incentive to solve the refugee problem alone because they assume that if they do not resettle refugees, others will – a classic collective action dilemma.

Roper and Barria (2010) drew upon Olson's earlier definition to argue that Refugee Protection is an "impure" public good, defined as: "a good that provides multiple benefits that may vary in their degree in 'publicness'" (Roper and Barria 2010, 628). What Roper and Barria meant by the "impurity" of this public good is that individual actors (states in the case of EU refugee resettlement) may have motives to resettle refugees extending beyond the strict good of the collective. Basok's (1990) analysis of Costa Rican policy towards Nicaraguan refugees illustrates the "impurity" of this public good. Nicaraguan

refugees were treated significantly better than Salvadorian refugees because of the private benefits to the Costa Rican government in cooperating with international organizations and allowing agricultural workers into the country (Basok 1990, 733). Thus Costa Rica had private benefits from a policy that favored Nicaraguans beyond the collective benefits of refugee resettlement for all regional countries affected by Nicaraguan refugee movement. In political spheres where state-level respect for human rights is valued, two notable private benefits of accepting refugees are what Betts (2003) terms "excludable altruistic benefits" and "excludable prestige benefits" (Betts 2003, 292). One can see these "prestige benefits" in European countries that have historically accepted larger numbers of refugees. Sweden, for example, has accepted higher numbers of refugees relative to its population for decades and by extension has cultivated a reputation as a model state for respecting human rights.

Although arguably "impure" as a public good, refugee resettlement still presents the issue of resolving collective action problems. Betts (2003) argued that because refugee resettlement is still regarded as a public good, collective action will still lead to the "incentive for sub-optimal provision" of this good (Betts 2003, 293). The UNHCR and EU attempts to solve the collective action problem of regional cooperation on refugee resettlement have been unsuccessful in compelling all EU countries to take a similar burden of refugees. This failure was illustrated especially by the lack of cooperation on the part of EU member states with the 2015 "European Scheme for Relocation and Resettlement" that allocated specific refugee quotas based on a formula accounting for population size, GDP, unemployment and existing refugee population. Fewer than half of the EU member states complied with the policy (Eurostat).

The EU, Supranationalism and Collective Action

In considering, as this paper does, why there was such variation across member states, the institutional context in which these states operate is important. The European Union was originally created to address an optimal regional goal – European states' security post-WWII –that member states had individual incentive in which to invest their resources. The loose coalition of states that originally formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to prevent another intercontinental war became over time a powerful supranational institution.

A supranational organization is neither a federalist state nor a strictly international institution in which states retain full autonomy but rather something in-between that "combines a unified legal order with a pluralistic political order" (Neyer 2012, 38). Power in a supranational institution is derived from member states' voluntary commitment to granting concessions on sovereignty in exchange for the benefits of closer institutional ties, or what Olson termed the "selective incentives" of collective organization (Greenwood 1998, 15). States are voluntary members, not subordinate units, within the EU and thus the survival of the institution depends on consistently positive returns on member states' resource investment (Neyer 2012, 40). State agreement with EU-wide policies is contingent on institutional cooperation being holistically beneficial to each member state (something the UK clearly indicated they no longer felt was the case with their "Brexit").

Part of the incentive for member states to join and maintain membership in the EU is the role of supranational institutions in facilitating collective action. Hall (1986) noted that supranational institutions structure member-state interactions to be in the interest of

the greater group by “providing formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices.” Greenwood and Aspinwall (1998) added that even in policy areas where the EU as a supranational institution does not have explicit authority, it can facilitate cooperative solutions by creating informal linkages and identifying problems and potential solutions (Greenwood, 25). The “Europeanization” of the EU’s immigration and refugee policy is one area of the EU expanding its original role in resolution of collective action.

Migration policy implicates a pillar of state sovereignty: the ability to control who enters one’s borders and under what circumstances (Lavenex 2001, 2; Schuster 2000, 130). Signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention, in acknowledging the basic right of those fleeing persecution, opened up the door to international intrusion on their sovereign right to border control. It seems logical that if a country acknowledges that millions of people are in need of refuge, the national government has some obligation to allow a quantity of those people to enter into their country. The reluctance on the part of European countries to relinquish any aspect of their national sovereignty has been part of the delicate balancing act in expanding the European Union as the EU itself was originally created as a means of facilitating the resolution of EU collective action issues specific to security and economics. Compromises on national sovereignty present a barrier to the EU’s ability to coerce member to help solve collective dilemmas. Any EU-wide policies must be established while weighing concerns over sovereignty as of paramount importance.

EU Refugee Policy

The movement towards greater cooperation in Europe on refugee policy over the past three decades has primarily focused on transferring the burden to whichever country an asylum seeker first arrives and has done little in terms of effectively creating one EU policy (Lavenex 2001, 83, 85). The "Europeanization" of refugee policy across the continent, i.e. the movement towards a more unified policy, is well documented in the post-World War II period. Member states have sought to increase EU unity on refugee policy in order to facilitate an easier resolution of the collective dilemma of refugee resettlement. The history of refugee resettlement law in Europe goes back to the aftermath of World War II, beginning with the original UN membership of four of the six founding EU members and eight other European states. These states signed onto Article I, Section 3 of the United Nations charter: "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights." The establishment of the UN and its codification of human rights gave birth to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 2010) and the 1951 Geneva Convention, which formalized the right of asylum for refugees (Lavenex 2001, 29, 33). In light of the protections set up in the Geneva Convention and political conditions of the time (the onset of the Cold War), refugees were generally welcomed to Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. With their ethnic and religious similarities, this wave of refugees from Eastern Europe was easily integrated and, particularly for the Eastern Europeans, welcomed as a "vote with their feet" against Communism (Loescher 1989, 620).

The situation changed significantly in the 1970s as the arrival of greater numbers of non-European migrants and refugees coincided with the economic shocks of the oil crisis and a decreased demand for labor. By the late 1970s, receiving countries such as

France and Germany were looking for ways to curb this mass influx of less culturally similar refugees (Lavenex 2001, 46). Concern over the "refugee problem" was amplified in the 1980s when, for the first time, refugees and asylum seekers outstripped the number of other migrants (Loescher 1989, 621). This shift in the demography of those seeking entry to Europe encouraged the public perception that many migrants were "taking advantage" of the asylum process (Lavenex, 50). The 1980s are identified as a turning point in the status of refugees in Europe as the number of "third world" asylum-seekers exponentially increased and countries in the EU began looking seriously at a more unified migration policy. The individual state incentive to solve this collective action problem increased with the substantially higher numbers of refugees during this period.

The movement towards greater cooperation in Europe on refugee policy primarily focused on transferring the burden of refugee resettlement away from countries that had taken in substantial numbers of refugees in the 1970s and 1980s (especially Germany and France). However, the Europeanization of policy arguably did little in terms of effectively creating one EU refugee policy (Lavenex 2001, 83, 85). One resulting policy that came out of this era was the more formal means of distributing the burden of processing asylum applications: from the signing of Schengen through 2015 this duty was assigned to the country where refugees first land. Schengen countries like Germany, France, the UK and the Netherlands advocated for "burden sharing policies" that, in effect, only moved the problem away from these countries to others (Suhkre 1998, 397). This policy has since become a significant problem for Southern European countries like Italy and Greece in recent years due to their geographical proximity to Mediterranean routes of human smuggling into Europe.

The 1990s saw the signing of the Dublin Agreement and Schengen II, both of which were further attempts to increase EU integration– in addition to being points of major growth of EU membership with the collapse of Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe. The removal of internal border controls within the Schengen zone was critical in easing the movement of migrants and refugees once within Europe but did not solve the issue of delegating asylum request processing. In fact, Schengen II seems to have exacerbated the confusion over asylum-processing responsibilities (Lavenex 2001, 105). This failure to create a strong, united EU migration system continues to have repercussions. Cooperation on immigration policy was still characterized as "voluntary" in the 2008 European Compact on Immigration and Asylum, weakening the EU mandate to enforce a unitary policy (Council of the EU 2008, 8).

The current EU policy focuses on uniform standards for the treatment of asylum applications and increased cooperation among member states. (Council of the EU 2015). The Common European Asylum System (CEAS), created in 1999, aims at increasing collective action cooperation on this issue by standardizing asylum legislation across the EU and increasing "harmonization" among EU states (European Commission 2015). The revised, 2015 goals of CEAS are broken up into five areas of focus (European Commission, 2015):

1. "Fairer, quicker and better quality" asylum decisions
2. Ensuring provision of material support and respect for fundamental rights for asylum seekers
3. "Clarifying the grounds for granting international protection"

4. Revising the Dublin Regulation (the document that created the standard of responsibility for processing of asylum seekers being assigned to the country where they first land) to clarify the rules between states

5. Allowing access to a database of fingerprints of asylum seekers to all law enforcement officials across the EU.

In response to the influx of refugees post-2011, the EU created the 2015 European Scheme for Relocation and Resettlement, which sought to even out the burden of refugee resettlement in order to alleviate the disproportionate pressure on primary resettlement countries like Greece, Italy and Hungary. This scheme allocates a percentage of the total refugees resettled in the EU to each member state (excluding Greece, Hungary and Italy) based on a calculation weighing population size (40%), GDP (40%), number of spontaneous asylum applicants (10%) and unemployment (10%) (European Commission, 2015). Using the number of refugees designated to each EU country in this scheme in comparison with the actual number of refugees resettled by each, the percent compliance with the 2015 Resettlement Scheme was calculated to use as a measure of compliance with EU refugee policy. This measure of compliance is used as the dependent variable measure in this paper (see Table 1).

Table 1: Compliance with the 2015 Scheme for Relocation and Resettlement

Countries (EU Members Included in 2015 Refugee Resettlement Scheme)	**# Asylum Seekers EU Recommends for Resettlement**	**# Positive Asylum Decisions in 2015**	**Compliance with EU Policy?**	**Compliance: % Accepted of EU Request** (column 3/ column 2)*
Austria	3640	15045	Yes	413.30%
Belgium	4564	10475	Yes	129%
Bulgaria	1600	5595	Yes	349.60%
Croatia	1064	40	No	3.80%
Cyprus	274	1585	Yes	578.50%
Czech Republic	2978	460	No	15.40%
Finland	2398	1680	No	70.10%
France	24031	20630	No	85.80%
Germany	31443	140910	Yes	448.10%
Latvia	526	20	No	3.80%
Lithuania	780	85	No	10.90%
Luxembourg	440	185	No	42.00%
Malta	133	1250	Yes	939.80%
Netherlands	7214	16450	Yes	228.00%
Poland	9287	640	No	6.90%
Portugal	3074	195	No	6.30%
Romania	4646	480	No	10.30%
Slovakia	1502	80	No	5.30%
Slovenia	631	45	No	7.10%
Spain	14931	1020	No	6.80%
Sweden	4469	32215	Yes	720.90%

*Compliance percentages greater than 100% indicate than the country accepted more than the number required in the 2015 Refugee Resettlement Scheme.

Explanation of Independent Variables

The use of a country's size captures the crux of Olson's theory that larger countries disproportionately contribute to resolving collective dilemmas within institutions. Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) applied components of Olson's earlier theory on individual level collective action to the workings of international institutions, specifically NATO, to determine why certain countries contribute more to alliances. They found that "larger" countries –those with a "higher absolute value on the public good" – bear a disproportionate level of alliance costs. Olson and Zeckhauser reasoned that a country with double the population would have twice the absolute value of the public good, assuming every citizen has an equal marginal benefit from the public good and these citizens collectively contribute to the country's policy. Because a larger (population-wise) country has a larger amount of money from taxes to contribute to the alliance's collective goal, the burden will be shared disproportionately (Olson and Zeckhauser, 270). Testing this model on NATO contributions in 1966, Olson and Zeckhauser confirmed that larger countries bear a disproportionate share of the burden in international organizations (Olson and Zeckhauser, 278). One implication of their argument — that larger groups have more difficulty resolving collective action issues — should apply to the EU as it has grown, with the implication that newer EU states should contribute less to the alliance.

Economic factors are another measure considered to explain adherence to refugee policy. A number of authors (Basok 1990, Liden & Nyhlen 2014, Jacobsen 1996) have demonstrated that economic capacity to absorb refugees, in essence the economic ability of a country to receive refugees, is critical to a host country's degree of adherence to

international refugee policy. Jacobsen (1996), studying a group of less developed countries (LDC) and their policies towards refugees, operationalized "economic capacity" as the economic "ability" of a country to resettle refugees (Jacobsen 1996, 667). My analysis focuses on this "ability" component of Jacobsen's, measured in terms of unemployment rate and GDP per capita (Jacobsen, 667). The underlying assumption of these indicators is that a country with a higher GDP and lower unemployment rates will be able to extract a greater amount of taxes from its citizenry. These countries will therefore be more capable of accommodating an influx in demand for social services associated with resettling refugees. This economic assessment of GDP and unemployment (see Figures 1 and 2) will provide a metric with which to compare EU member states' relative economic ability to absorb refugees.

Economic capacity is used to gauge the extent to which economics plays a role in the EU's collective dilemma of refugee policy. Economic capacity, measured as economic health in terms of GDP per capita and unemployment, is expected to correlate negatively with compliance to EU policy: EU countries with higher unemployment rates and lower GDPs are expected to have a lower capacity to accept refugees and therefore exhibit noncompliance with EU policy. The lower economic capacity of a country is expected to reduce its compliance with EU policy in resolving the collective action dilemma of refugee resettlement. In order to assess the strength of the economic capacity variable, this paper will compare the economic capacity of each country relative to other member states in 2015.



*Compliance rates greater than 100% indicate greater than full compliance with the 2015 Relocation and Resettlement Scheme (ie. 600% indicates that country took in over six-times the number of asylum seekers asked of them


Fig. 2: GDP per capita and compliance with EU resettlement scheme 2015
Percent Compliance with 2015 EU Resettlement Scheme
800.00%
700.00%
600.00%
500.00%
400.00%
300.00%
200.00%
100.00%
0.00%
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
GDP Per Capita (USD 2015)
Compliance: % Accepted of EU Request
Linear (Compliance: % Accepted of EU Request)

Figure 1 plots unemployment rate in each EU country against the rate of compliance with EU policy in 2015. Rate of compliance with EU policy was measured with the percent cooperation with the 2015 resettlement scheme– a figure derived by dividing the number of asylum seekers accepted for resettlement in 2015 by the number of asylum seekers each country was asked to take in for resettlement in the EU's 2015 Resettlement Scheme (European Commission 2015, Eurostat 2016). Outlier countries like Malta and Sweden, that accepted over nine times and seven times respectively the number of asylum seekers recommended and are thus shown as over 100% compliance to indicate to the degree with which they exceeded the requirement. The relationship between asylum acceptance and unemployment as an indicator of economic capacity shows a weak negative correlation between the two variables: as the economic capacity hypothesis predicted, as unemployment increase across the EU, compliance with EU policy decreases. Economic capacity on compliance seems to matter, albeit weakly, in Figure 2, GDP per capita and compliance also supports the economic capacity argument. The positive relationship between GDP per capita and EU compliance seems to indicate that as GDP per capita increases, a country's willingness to comply with EU policy on refugee resettlement increases as well. To further test the relationship between economic capacity of EU members and their willingness to comply with EU policy, the next section will go into greater detail in case analyses of Germany, Poland, Latvia and Austria.

Another factor that possibly explains variation in the dependent variable is degree of embeddedness within the EU as an institution. One of North's (1990) findings on which institutions more effectively can resolve collective action problems was that the institutional rules are both designed, in part, by the local community and the rules are

specific to the CPR and community in question (Ostrom, 185). What North deduces in his analysis is the importance of participants' input in ensuring that institutional rules reflect the participants' preferences. Although North was studying smaller scale collective action issues, his arguments seem to apply to the level of input on refugee policy and may help explain compliance. It is expected that member states with higher levels of institutional embeddedness would exhibit higher levels of compliance with that organization's refugee policy. Embeddedness is measured in this paper as trade ties, economic contributions to the EU, date of entry, public opinion on the EU, and how pro or anti-EU major political parties are in each case study.

A final factor looked at for its potential influence on state cooperation with EU refugee policy is ruling party/ ruling coalition ideology. Liden and Nyhlen (2014) found support at the municipal level for a negative correlation between support for right wing parties and willingness to welcome refugees in their study of Sweden. The Swedish resettlement system from 2007-2010 allowed municipalities to chose how many refugees they were willing to resettle (if any). In measuring the number of refugees accepted by population in each municipality and support for right-wing parties, Liden and Nyhlen found those with higher levels of support for ideologically right-wing parties were less willing to accept refugees (Liden and Nyhlen, 2014). This paper will test whether their findings on ideology apply at the EU level to affect states' willingness to comply with EU policy. Based on Liden and Nyhlen's preliminary findings, I predict that countries with a government farther to the ideological right will be less willing to accept refugees and therefore less willing to comply with EU policy mandating refugee resettlement.

Case Selection

In order to gain a better understanding of which factors play a role in individual states' compliance with EU refugee policy, this paper utilizes four case analyses along a most similar systems design. The decision to focus on only EU countries follows the most-similar design logic outlined by Przeworski and Teune (1970). In choosing countries that are similar in many respects (geographic region, EU membership, cultural norms), this paper minimizes the number of "experimental" variables looked at to determine what accounts for variation in refugee policy. Consistent with this design logic, this paper looks at four cases similar in their geographic and cultural norms but different in the outcome of the dependent variable, degree of compliance with the EU's refugee policy in 2015.

The EU member states that cases were chosen from were further narrowed to exclude Greece, Italy, and Hungary; all of these countries were excluded from the 2015 European Resettlement Scheme. Rather than being asked to increase the number of asylum seekers they accept, these three states were the ones from which asylum seekers would be transferred to other states. Greece, Italy, and Hungary already faced a far greater burden of asylum applicants because of their proximity to the Mediterranean routes used by many migrants and refugees to reach Europe. Thus, the remaining set of cases were selected from states that similarly have a higher degree of control over whom they chose to resettle than these three primary resettlement countries. From within this most similar set in the EU, the twenty-two countries included in the EU Refugee Resettlement Scheme were analytically divided in two groups based on population size. The use of population as an explanatory variable builds on the key component of Mancur

Olson's analysis on collective action: the phenomena of "exploitation of the great by the small" (Olson, 3).

Applying Olson's analysis to case selection, the EU was divided by relative population and for comparative purposes I chose two larger countries and two smaller countries. One state in each pair complied with EU policy on refugees and one did not, thereby forming two pairs of countries most similar in population but differing in outcome– their compliance with EU refugee policy. In addition, cases were selected to capture variation in the independent variables of date of entry, embeddedness and economic capacity. The four countries looked at are Germany and Poland, two of the most populous countries in the EU, and Austria and Latvia, two of the smallest states. Austria and Germany both went beyond the minimum in complying with EU policy; Poland and Latvia both fell far short of the EU's requirements. Thus, in these four cases, the analysis looks at the factors of each country's population size, EU embeddedness, economic capacity and domestic politics related to their compliance with the EU's refugee resettlement policy in order to better understand how these factors play a role in shaping EU member countries' refugee policies. Table 2 presents graphically the logic of this most similar systems design, one that presents a summary of five independent variables followed by the dependent variable outcome of each case. The following sections will justify how each case is categorized on each independent variable and then analyze which factors appear most influential to state refugee policy.

Table 2: Case Study Assessment Framework

Factors	**Cases**			
	Germany	Poland	Austria	Latvia
Large/Small Population				
Old EU v. New EU (post Cold War)				
Economic Capacity 2015				
EU Embeddedness				
Alignment of Ruling Party/Coalition 2015				
Adherence to EU Refugee Policy	**Yes**	**No**	**Yes**	**No**

Case Studies

Germany

Refugee Policy: Germany became synonymous in 2015 for much of the world with a "welcoming" refugee policy as Angela Merkel allowed nearly half a million asylum seekers into the country in that year. Of those 441,800 asylum applicants, 140,910 received a positive asylum acceptance— over four times the 31,443 asylum seeker quota that Germany was assigned in the 2015 EU resettlement scheme. For comparison, the EU as a whole accepted 307,510 asylum applications in 2015. Germany took in nearly half of the EU's total number of refugees (Eurostat 2015). Relative to its larger population, Germany still took in one of the highest numbers of refugees: 1.7 asylum seekers were accepted per 100,000 citizens (compared to an EU average of 0.7 asylum seekers per 100,000) (Europa 2015, Eurostat 2016).

Germany's welcoming attitude towards refugees originates in the writing of its constitution post-World War II, when Article 16 of the Germany Basic Law constitutionally protected the right to asylum for those who can prove they would be the target of "serious harm" if returned to their home country (Marshall, 15). Germany also devotes significant resources to the humane resettlement and effective cultural integration of refugees, reportedly planning to spend $94 million by 2020 on refugee resettlement including extensive language training and job placement programs (Reuters 2016). Going well beyond the minimum requirements set by the EU, Germany clearly presents a case of full compliance with the EU's refugee policy.

Independent Variables

Size: Germany is the EU's most populous country in the EU with 81.2 million citizens in 2015 (Eurostat, 2015). Classifying whether a country is a large or small EU member, Germany can undoubtedly be labeled as "large." Accordingly, Germany has 96 of the 751 seats in the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2015).

Economic Capacity: Looking at Germany in 2015 in comparison to the rest of the EU, indicators of Germany's economic strength showed robust capacity to resettle refugees. At 4.6%, Germany's unemployment rate was the EU's lowest. In addition, Germany's GDP per capita was $41,219 was the eighth highest in the EU and well over the EU average of $30,120 (World Bank 2015). Because of these factors, Germany's economic capacity is considered "strong."

Old EU v. New EU: Germany was one of the founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community and later the European Economic Community, both predecessors of the EU. Germany's year of entry to the EEC was 1958, its founding year (Europa, 2017). Thus Germany has had an active role in institution and policy formation for the EU since its inception, making it clearly classified as an "Old EU" member.

EU Embeddedness: Another possible explanatory variable in refugee policy is the level of EU embeddedness of Germany in the EU. Germany is a country strongly embedded in the EU based on all of the indicators employed in this paper. First, because of its role as a founding member, Germany was essential in creating the current rules on asylum application in the European Union with the creation of the Schengen group and the Dublin Regulation (Schuster, 122).

A second component of Germany's strong embeddedness in the EU is its economic ties to other EU members. Of Germany's top five import and export partners, three of

each are EU countries (rather, were EU members in 2015): France, the UK and the Netherlands together constitute 22.62% of Germany's exports worth $300,488 million; and the Netherlands, France and Italy produce 21.37% of Germany's imports, worth $225,983 million (WITS, 2015). From just these top import and export countries, Germany evidentially has strong business ties in the EU and strong monetary incentive to maintain good relations with fellow EU member countries. Germany is also heavily embedded within the EU with its financial contributions to the institution itself. Germany contributes 21.36% of the EU's total budget. Of its own Gross National Income (GNI), Germany spends 0.79%, or €24.283 billion, on contributing to the EU. In absolute terms, Germany contributes more than any other member country to the EU. Thus in terms of both its trade ties and institutional contributions, Germany is strongly economically embedded in the EU.

In terms of political embeddedness, all of Germany's major political parties rank as highly integrated in the EU: none scored below a 6.5 on ParlGov's scale of how pro-EU or anti-EU political parties are (with 10 indicating perfectly "pro-EU") (Döring and Manow, 2016). The ParlGov scale averages measures of parties orientation towards the EU based on three other publications: Ray's (1999) expert survey on European integration, Benoit and Laver's (2006) "Party Policy in Modern Democracies" dataset, and the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data. From public opinion data, Germans appear to feel strongly embedded in the EU as well. When asked their degree of attachment to the EU in the 2013 Eurobarometer, 54% of Germans said they felt "fairly attached" (44%) or "very attached" (10%) to the EU (Eurobarometer, 2013). Only 10% of Germans claimed to feel "not attached at all" to the EU, which is well below the EU

average of 16%. In the 2014 Eurobarometer, Germans were asked to rank agreement on the statement “you feel you are a citizen of the EU.” 74% of Germans said either “yes, definitely” (30%) or “yes, to some extent” (44%) they felt that they were a citizen of the EU (Eurobarometer, 2014). Again, these feelings of attachment to the EU were above average (across the EU, 64% of people, on average, claimed feelings of EU citizenship).

Given Germans’ strong feelings of attachment to the EU, Germany’s historic influence on the institution, and Germany’s strong economic ties in the EU, Germany appears strongly embedded in the EU.

Ruling Party Ideology: In 2015, the ruling coalition in the German parliament was a grand coalition with Chancellor Merkel’s Christian Democrat Union (CDU, the - Christian Socialist Union of Bavaria (CSU), and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). According to ParlGov, the CDU is more moderate with a 6.3 score on the Left-Right ideological continuum. The CSU is ranked a slightly more conservative 7.3 and SPD is ranked further left with a 3.6 ideological ranking (Döring and Manow, 2016). Weighing the average of these ideological scores for each party’s number of seats in parliament, the score for Germany’s ruling ideology is a 5.4, nearly the exact center on the scale where zero indicates a party is perfectly “left” and ten indicates a party is perfectly “right.” The ruling political ideology in Germany is thus classified as “center” in this paper.

Poland

Refugee Policy: Poland, unlike Germany, has taken a decidedly unwelcome stance in response to the ongoing refugee crisis in Europe. Poland’s experience as a country of refugee resettlement began quite recently in comparison to Germany and other Western

European countries. Poland did not ratify the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees until 1991 (Lavenex, 2002). Through most of the 1990s Poland served not as a resettlement country, but as a transit point for refugees attempting to reach Western Europe. Poland increased the number of refugees it accepted through the 2000s (from 78 in 2000 to a peak of 3,131 in 2007) and developed its refugee resettlement system (UNHCR, 2016). Poland's refugee system has been reprimanded by the EU and on the international stage for its frequent placement of asylum seekers in detention facilities because of a lack of other housing options and inadequate access to free legal service for asylum seekers (both considered basic asylum rights by the EU and UN) (UNHCR 2011, 2-4). Discrimination in housing and employment towards refugees led to an estimated one in three refugees in Poland being homeless in 2012 (UNHCR, 2012).

In addition to the poor treatment of asylum seekers after arrival in Poland, the number of refugees that Poland accepts has remained consistently low and government officials have taken a decidedly negative view of refugees. Despite increasing EU-wide demand to refugee resettlement since 2011, Poland has substantially *decreased* its asylum acceptances in response to the current crisis (UNHCR 2016). Poland also issued a public statement denouncing the 2015 proposed EU quota system (Wigura). Poland ultimately resettled a mere 640 refugees in 2015 out of the 7,000 mandated by the EU plan, equating to only 6.9% of the asylum seeker population they were allocated in the EU resettlement scheme (Bachman, Eurostat 2016).

Independent Variables

Size: Like Germany, Poland is a large country relative to the EU. It is the sixth largest country in the EU in terms of population with over 38 million citizens, well above

the average population of an EU state of eighteen million. As a byproduct, Poland has 51 representatives in the European Parliament out of the 751 total (European Parliament, 2013). Poland is thus categorized as a "large" country relative to other EU members.

Economic Capacity: Poland's economic capacity in 2015 appears moderately weak compared to the rest of the EU. Poland's GDP per capita in 2015 was the sixth lowest in the EU at $12,494. Its unemployment rate, 7.5%, was, in contrast, relatively low also (IMF). Poland's economy continues to rely heavily on unskilled labor and the percent of the population living below the poverty line in 2015 was high at 17.3% (World Bank 2015, CIA World Factbook 2015). The indicators outlined here– low GDP, high poverty levels, moderate unemployment– lead Poland to be classified as possessing a weak economic capacity to resettle refugees.

Old EU v. New EU: Poland gained membership in the EU in the 2004 eastern expansion (Europa, 2016). Being part of the Soviet block until its collapse in the 1990s, Poland's economic and political ties to Western Europe were tenuous until the end of the Cold War. Thus, Poland did not play a role in the original institutional design of the EU nor the creation of a basis for its refugee and immigration policy, all of which occurred prior to Poland's date of entry. Because of this, Poland is classified as a "new" EU country.

Embeddedness: Poland, like Germany, seems deeply embedded economically in the EU. All of Poland's top five export partners are EU member states, accounting for 50.1% of Poland's exports among just these four countries (WITS, 2015). Poland contributes €3.7 billion, or 0.9% of its GNI, to the EU—a slightly higher percent than Germany's contribution but a much lower amount in absolute terms (Europa). Poland

thus has significant economic embeddedness within the EU in regards to its EU contributions and trade ties.

Poland's political embeddedness in the EU as an institution appears weaker relative to Germany or, to a lesser extent, Austria. As previously stated, Poland did not join the EU until 2004. Thus Poland is less embedded institutionally in the EU. Furthemore, the Law and Justice Party (PiS), the majority party after the 2015 election, is ranked a 5.48 on EU integration, which is much lower than the Civic Platform (PO), the majority party in parliament through 2015 that received a 9.4 ranking on EU integration (ParlGov 2015). Thus after the 2015 election, Poland's ruling political parties appear far less embedded in the EU.

In contrast to the rise of less-EU embedded parties in Poland, Polish citizens express strong feelings of embeddedness in the EU. Asked in the 2013 Eurobarometer how attached they felt to the EU, 58% of Poles surveyed said they felt "fairly attached" or "very attached" to the EU (the EU average was 46%) (Eurobarometer, 2013). Thus as indicated by this question, over half of Polish citizens in 2013 felt more attached than not to the EU. As another indicator of citizen feelings of embeddedness, the 2014 Eurobarometer asked respondents to rank agreement with the statement: "you feel you are a citizen of the EU". An overwhelming 74% of Polish respondents said "yes, definitely" or "yes, to some extent" they felt to be a citizen of the EU. 21% of these respondents answered "yes, definitely," indicating a high level of feelings of citizenship towards the EU (Eurobarometer, 2014). Given the conflicting rise of anti-EU political parties, the strong economic ties of Poland to other EU countries, the late date of EU

entry, and the strong feelings of attachment to the EU among Polish citizens, Poland is ranked as “moderate” in terms of its level of embeddedness to the EU.

Political Alignment of Ruling Party: Poland had an election in October 2015, mid-way through the year of study. Prior to the election, the Civic Platform (PO) party held a plurality in parliament with 45% of the seats. PO is a slightly Right-of-Center moderate party, ranked a 6.2 on the Left-Right ideology scale by ParlGov. The Polish Law and Justice party (PiS) is further to the right, with a 7.7 score to the Right in ideology. PiS was the minority party prior to the election but gained 101 seats in the October election to become the majority party in parliament. PO lost the election and its power in parliament. In the October election, Kukiz, the new anti-EU coalition previously mentioned, gained 9.1% of votes. Kukiz is an eclectic alliance of libertarians and euroskeptics led by a Polish rockstar and ranked a mere two out of ten in terms of EU embeddedness by ParlGov’s European integration scale (Reuters, ParlGov 2015). Kukiz is a further right party than either PiS or PO, ranking 8.7 on the Left-Right spectrum (Döring and Manow, 2016). Thus the ruling party ideology in Poland is classified in this paper as “center” at the beginning of 2015 and “right” at the end of 2015.

Austria

Refugee Policy: Like Germany, Austria has gone beyond the minimum to comply with EU refugee policy. With its long history of refugee resettlement post World War II, Austria responded welcomingly to the post-Arab Spring refugee crisis by establishing the 2013 Humanitarian Admission Program (HAP) to assist in resettling positively accepted asylum seekers (Kratzmann, 28). In 2015, Austria accepted 15,040 of its 85,505 asylum

applicants (Eurostat, UNHCR). The number of refugees designated to Austria in the 2015 EU Resettlement Scheme was 3,640 (European Commission). Thus Austria not only complied with the EU policy but it accepted over four times the minimum required. In relation to other EU countries, Austria accepts the second highest number of refugees per population (excluding Malta and Cyprus) with 1.7 asylum seekers per 1,000 citizens.

Independent Variables:

Size: With a population of 8.6 million, Austria is categorized as a small state relative to other EU members. Austria has 18 representatives in the European Parliament, out of its 751 total (European Parliament, 2013).

Economic Capacity: Austria showed a strong economic capacity to accept refugees relative to other EU member countries in 2015. Average GDP per capita was $43,438, the seventh highest in the EU (World Bank). Unemployment was also low at 5.7%, the fifth lowest rate in Europe. Looking at Austria relative to the rest of the EU in 2015, it appears that Austria's economic capacity to accept refugees, measured by unemployment and per capita GDP, was high relative to the rest of the EU.

Old EU v. New EU: Austria joined the EU in 1995 (Europa 2015). While this makes Austria an older member of the EU than Latvia and Poland, both of which joined in 2004, it still qualifies Austria as a new EU member country, defined here as joining after the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent eastward expansion of the EU.

EU Embeddedness: Austria has a mix of factors indicating level of embeddedness. It did not join the EU until 1995 and thus has had less time to become integrated in the institution. Like Latvia and Poland, Austria was not embedded in the EU as a member state at the time of its institutional inception. Nor was Austria a member of

the EU when the Schengen Agreement formed the basis for eased movement (including of migrants and refugees) across the EU. However, unlike Poland and Latvia, Austria was a contributing member of the EU when the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was created in 1999 to "harmonize" asylum legislation across the EU (European Commission, 2015).

With regards to its economic integration with the EU as an institutional body, Austria contributes slightly less of its GNI to the EU than other countries in this case study, but a substantial amount in absolute terms. The €2.529 billion Austria contributed to the EU in 2015 constituted 0.75% of its annual GNI. EU spending in Austria contributes 0.53% of Austria's total GNI, significantly less than its share in both Poland and Latvia (3.25% and 4.04% respectively) (Europa). Like Germany, Austria gave a greater share of its GNI to EU spending than it received.

In terms of Austria's trade embeddedness with other EU member countries, Austria, like the other case studies in this paper, exhibits close ties with other EU member countries. Of its top five export partners, four are other EU member countries: Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and France. Collectively just these four EU countries account for 45.74% of Austria's exports (WITS). Austria also imports heavily from other EU member countries. Four of its top five import partners are EU members, accounting for 52.36% of Austria's imports between Germany, Italy, Switzerland and the Czech Republic (WITS).

In terms of Austrians' feelings of embeddedness in the EU, Austria ranked lowest among the countries analyzed here based on public opinion data. When asked in the 2013 Eurobarometer of their degree of attachment to the EU, a majority of Austrians, 56%,

stated that they felt "not attached at all" or "not very attached." The EU average for these two responses in aggregate was 52%, so Austria was above average on negative feelings of attachment. A mere 9% of Austrians said they felt "very attached" to the EU (Eurobarometer, 2013). However, in the 2014 Eurobarometer, Austrians overwhelmingly expressed the feeling that they feel they are citizens of the EU, at 73%. This figure is almost the exact same as Germans (74%) and well above the EU average of 63% expressing that they "yes, definitely" or "yes, to some extent" feel that they are a citizen of the EU (Eurobarometer, 2014).

Thus given Austria's late date of entry to the EU, mixed public opinion on embeddedness, strong economic ties with the EU and varying EU integration of its major political parties, Austria is categorized in this paper as having a moderate degree of embeddedness within the EU.

Ruling Party Ideology: In 2015, the ruling coalition of the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) was solidly center on a left-right ideological spectrum. SPÖ, the Austrian socialist party, is ranked by ParlGov as a 3.7 on the scale and the ÖVP is ranked 6.5, with one indicating perfectly Left and ten indicating perfectly Right. As mentioned in the previous cases, ParlGov's rankings of pro- or anti-EU ideology is a combination of three other academic measures of political party EU integration (Ray 1999, Benoit and Laver 2006, CHES 2010). Based on the ParlGov EU rankings, the stance of Austria's political parties towards the EU indicate strong party embeddedness within the EU. The two largest parties in 2015, SPÖ and ÖVP were ranked with respective scores of 8.45 and 7.8 out of 10 by ParlGov. However, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), which held only a slightly smaller share of seats in the

Austrian parliament (21.9%) than SPÖ (28%) and ÖVP (25.7%), is ranked extremely low in EU integration with a 2.0 ranking by ParlGov. The popularity of FPO seems to indicate a rise in anti-EU sentiment. EU stance aside, the ruling coalition's weighted ParlGov average on the scale of Left to Right places the Austrian government exactly center with a score of 5.0 (Döring and Manow, 2016). Thus, Austria is categorized as ideologically "Center" for 2015 in the final table.

Latvia

Refugee Policy: Latvia ranks second among EU countries for accepting the fewest refugees per 100,000 people and presents one of the starkest examples of a lack of compliance with EU policy (Eurostat, UNHCR). Latvia failed overwhelmingly to comply with the EU resettlement scheme policy, resettling only 20 persons, or 3.8%, of the 538 asylum seekers designated for resettlement in Latvia. In addition to Latvia's noncompliance with EU policy in terms of allowing refugees entry, it has also been neglectful on the EU humanitarian requirements for refugee resettlement. In September 2016, twenty-one out of the twenty-three refugees who were part of the first EU resettlement allocation left for Germany (European Commission, 2016). They cited financial reasons; Latvia had reduced family allowances from €256 to €139 per month for the head of household and the refugees who left claimed this was an unlivable level of assistance (European Commission). Latvia presents one of the most restrictive cases in the EU in terms of refugee resettlement.

Independent Variables

Size: Latvia, population 2 million, qualifies as a small country relative to other EU members among which the average population is 18 million. Because of this, Latvia has

only 8 of the 766 representatives in the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2013).

Economic Capacity: Latvia is one of the poorest countries in the EU. GDP in Latvia in 2015 was $13,664, the sixth lowest in the EU. This GDP was slightly higher one than Poland in 2015 ($12,494. However, Latvia's unemployment rate is higher than Poland's (9.9% compared to 7.5%) and higher than average for the EU overall. Latvia is thus qualified as having a low economic capacity to accept asylum seekers.

Old EU v. New EU: Like Poland, Latvia joined the EU in the third wave of EU membership in 2004 and was thus not part of the earlier institution building in the EU. With its 2004 date of entry coming well after the fall of the Iron Curtain and subsequent EU expansion, Latvia is categorized as a "new EU" country.

Embeddedness: Latvia displays generally weak indicators of embeddedness in the EU, beginning with its late date of entry. Economically, Latvia contributes around the same proportional amount to the EU as the other cases considered in this set at 0.85% of its GNI. However, in absolute terms Latvia contributes relatively very little, €0.206 billion, compared to other EU countries: this is to be expected given its very small population but may indicate a lesser ability to use financial power as a negotiation tool at the EU level. In terms of gains from EU spending, Latvia gains the most out of the countries studied, with 4.04% of its annual GNI accounted for by EU program spending (European Commission, 2016).

Like the other case studies, Latvia trades heavily with other EU member countries. Lithuania, Estonia, Germany and Poland, four of the five top export and import partners for Latvia, account for a substantial amount of Latvia's trade. These four

countries alone count for 43.5% of Latvia's exports and 47.0% of its imports (WITS 2015). Looking at these different indicators of economic embeddedness, Latvia gains significantly more from the EU than it contributes and appears more economically than politically embedded within the EU.

In terms of political embeddedness, all of Latvia's major parties score as "highly integrated" within the EU according to ParlGov (Döring and Manow, 2016). On public opinion, Latvians expressed mixed feelings of embeddedness towards the EU. In the 2013 Eurobarometer, 57% of Latvians expressed that they felt "attached" or "very attached" to the EU: a figure above the EU average of 46%. However, in the 2014 Eurobarometer question on whether or not they felt that they were citizens of the EU, a majority of Latvians answered either "no, not really" (35%) or "no, definitely not" (21%). The EU average for a answering "no" to feelings of citizenship was 35%, significantly lower than Latvia's 56% negative response. Thus in a socio-psychological sense, Latvians appear less embedded than others in the EU. Given this public opinion information, Latvia's small contribution to the EU, and its recent admittance to the EU, Latvia's embeddedness in the EU is categorized as weak.

Ideology of Ruling Party: The ruling coalition in Latvia in 2015 was ideologically to the right, although the individual parties within the coalition varied: the Unity party ranks as a 7.4, the Green and Farmer's Union as 5.3, and the National Alliance for Latvia (NA) as 8.3 on the left-right scale (indicating that they vary from center to far right of center). Notably though, the largest single party in parliament in 2015 was the Social Democrat party (SDPS) with 24% of seats. The SDPS ranks as a 3.0, indicating it is ideologically to the left. However, the ruling coalition has a weighted average Left-Right

ranking of 6.9, classifying Latvia's dominant party ideology as "right" (Döring and Manow, 2016).

Analysis and Conclusions

As made clear in Table 3, compliance with the EU's refugee policy in 2015 varied considerably among member states. In the previous section, several different explanatory factors were classified within the case study countries of Germany, Austria, Latvia and Poland. Population size of the host country did not appear to co-vary with the dependent variable, despite the 2015 Refugee Resettlement Scheme being formulated to assign fewer refugees to smaller countries. Based on Olson's analysis, one would have expected Poland, as one of the largest countries in the EU, to comply fully in accepting the required number of asylum seekers in order to solve the collective issue of refugee influx. Austria, on the other hand, would have been expected to free ride on larger EU countries to compensate for their lower level of input resolving the collective action issue. Clearly, both of these expectations based on population size proved false: Austria took in seekers per 100,000 citizens in Austria and 1.7 asylum seekers per 100,000 in Poland) (Eurostat).

Looking at the summary of case study findings in Table 3, economic capacity stands out as following the expectation outlined in the literature. Based on the cross-EU look and within each country, it appears that the strength of a state's economic capacity plays a role in a country's likelihood to comply on EU policy on refugee resettlement. Germany and Austria both had GDPs well above average and relatively low unemployment in 2015 (World Bank 2016). Both also took in well beyond the number of asylum applicants asked of them in the 2015 resettlement scheme.

Table 3: Summary of independent variables and outcome in each case study

Independent Variables	**Cases**			
	Germany	Poland	Austria	Latvia
Large/Small Population	Large	Large	Small	Small
Old EU v. New EU (post Cold War)	Old	New	New	New
Economic Capacity 2015	Strong	Weak	Strong	Weak
EU Embeddedness	Strong	Moderate	Moderate	Weak
Alignment of Party/Coalition in Power 2015	Center	Center → Right*	Center	Right
Election in 2015 or 2016?	No	Yes	Yes	No
Adherence to EU Refugee Policy	**Yes**	**No**	**Yes**	**No**

*Poland's classification changed from "Center" to "Right" with the election of a further right coalition in mid-2015. See "ideology" under the Poland case study for further details of this classification.

In contrast, Poland and Latvia demonstrated low economic capacity in 2015 and subsequently failed to comply with the EU's policy on refugee resettlement. These case studies appear to reflect the larger trend across the EU of economic capacity playing a role in each country's compliance with EU policy. It seems that economic capacity thus makes resolution of the collective action issue faced here –refugee resettlement – more difficult by lowering members' willingness to cooperate. EU resettlement countries with lower economic capacity like Poland and Latvia seem to be "free-riding" on those with higher economic capacity, like Austria and Germany, to take in more refugees than required. Intuitively, this makes sense with the rhetoric around refugee resettlement – the perception that refugees will "steal jobs" and the reality that refugees pose a burden to a country's social safety net would make it more difficult for the government of a less wealthy state reluctant to endorse a generous refugee policy. In other words, strong economic capacity at the state level may ease the state's ability to resolve its within-state collective action dilemma on resettling refugees. Furthermore, the salience of this economic factor for the average voter may help explain the disparity among indicators of embeddedness that showed generally high feelings of citizenship across the board but support for anti-EU parties in Latvia, Austria and Poland.

Regarding factors of embeddedness, influence of a country's EU embeddedness seems to vary by country rather than having a systematic effect. Poland, for example, is curious for exhibiting extremely high levels of public support for the EU, trading heavily with other EU members and yet simultaneously completely opposing the EU's refugee policy and failing to comply. The 2015 Polish election seems to shed light on the possibility that factors of embeddedness viewed in this paper – trade relations, public

opinion, and political party support for the EU – don't tell the whole story of a country's relationship to the EU. Particularly, the rise of the Kukiz '15 anti-EU populist movement, which gained 9.1% of the vote as a first time party, seems to indicate there is a stronger element of anti-EU sentiment in Poland than public opinion data indicates (Döring and Manow, 2016). Not coincidentally, the Law and Justice party that took a majority in 2015 ran on a decidedly anti-refugee platform. Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of the Law and Justice party, was quoted calling refugees "the cholera of the Greek islands" and claimed they are "bringing in all kinds of parasites… which could prove dangerous for the local population" (Aljazeera, 2016). Thus, while Poland appears to be strongly embedded in the EU by the indicators in this paper, this is either an incomplete picture of Poland's level of commitment to the EU or suggests that Poland's cultural and trade embeddedness are not sufficient to persuade Poles to assist in resolving the EU-level collective refugee crisis.

In Germany, a combination of strong embeddedness by every indicator and a robust economic capacity has led to going well beyond the minimum to comply with EU refugee policy. Relative to its population, Germany accepted 173 asylum seekers per 100,000 citizens, the sixth greatest number of asylum seekers per population in the EU—fourth greatest excluding the geographic outliers of Malta and Cyprus. In absolute terms, Germany by far surpassed any other EU countries in the number of refugees it accepted: Germany accepted 140,910 asylum seekers and the next greatest number accepted was in Sweden, with 32,315 positive asylum decisions (Eurostat 2015). Economic capacity and strong embeddedness within the EU seem to have worked together to allow Germany to resolve (at least temporarily) internal disagreement over asylum policy to allow a huge

growth in asylum acceptances. Moreover, at the EU level, Germany's economic capacity and embeddedness appear to have allowed Germany to passively allow freeriding off of their own generous asylum policy to resolve the larger EU collective action issue of refugee resettlement. Going back to Ostrom's theory of institutional design being key to the effective resolution of collective action dilemmas, one of her key points was that resolution of a collective dilemma is made more effective when actors have input in the institutional design. Germany, being a founding member of the EU, has been instrumental in designing the various agreements (Schengen, Dublin, etc.) that have led to the current refugee policy. Following Ostrom's logic and looking at the high degree of German compliance with EU refugee policy, it seems logical that that at least one reason Germany takes on a disproportionate burden of refugee resettlement is that it was key in designing the EU as an institution to resolve collective European issues.

Also in support of Ostrom's theory, Latvia illustrates the importance of institutional input but in the opposite way of Germany: Latvia does not appear strongly embedded whatsoever in the EU as an institution and failed to comply by the widest margin with the EU's 2015 refugee policy. Particularly telling was the lack of public feelings of attachment or citizenship with the EU. Latvians seem to have a low level of attachment to the EU and had no input in the institutional creation of the EU given their 2004 entry date. It thus seems reasonable that an EU law asking for a fairly significant sacrifice of state sovereignty – allowing the EU to dictate who can move to your country – would be met with resistance. This resistance makes resolution of the collective refugee resettlement dilemma much more difficult.

In order to gain a greater understanding of the influence of economic capacity, ruling party ideology and institutional embeddedness on state level refugee policy, more research is needed. One factor that was not evaluated in this paper but that would useful in broadening understanding of compliance with refugee policy would be the enforcement mechanisms employed by the EU. The strength of the EU's enforcement mechanisms (or lack thereof) on EU-wide policies is key to individual states' willingness to follow the policy. Clearly in the case of the 2015 Relocation and Resettlement Scheme, the EU's enforcement mechanisms of the policy seemed weak enough that fourteen of the twenty-two states included in the resettlement scheme did not comply. The cases presented here suggest that all three of these factors can play a significant role in the creation of refugee policy for some nations is not clear because of the small number of cases reviewed. Overall this research is a beginning step in what needs to be a much larger look at both why EU member states continue to fail to comply on supposedly mandatory policies, and how international and supranational institutions can better compel states to accept refugees.

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