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Finding Justice: The City-Soul Analogy in Plato's *Republic*

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Abstract

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This paper enters into the existing debate about the legitimacy of the city-soul analogy in Plato's *Republic*. In order to determine if the city-soul analogy is a legitimate argumentative tool, I evaluate Plato's implicit assumptions in shifting the search for justice from the individual to the city, the structural inconsistencies within the city-soul analogy, and most importantly, the analogy's success in giving an account of justice that satisfies Glaucon's, Adeimantus', and the reader's challenges. Glaucon's and Adeimantus' expectations for justice are met in the later books of the *Republic*, but not at the analogy's conclusion in Book IV. I argue that Plato's delay in responding to these challenges to justice allows room for his political treatise and philosophy. Though the city-soul analogy is unsuccessful in giving an immediate account of justice that satisfies the initial challenge, it provides the foundation for a later account of justice that responds to Glaucon's and Adeimantus' challenges in full. This later account of justice however, remains insular, static, and apolitical, and thus never adequately addresses the reader's expectations for justice. In this paper, I tie this failure back to inconsistencies within the city-soul analogy itself.

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Introduction

The *Republic* is both Plato's masterpiece and least representative work. A fundamental text of Western philosophy, Plato's *Republic* is a culmination of Platonic dialogue, his many theories, most memorable allegories, and profound commentary on the political state. The *Republic* is the least representative of Plato's dialogues for this very reason. Rather than evaluating one topic at length, like knowledge in his *Theaetetus*, the theory of the Forms in his *Parmenides* or friendship in *Lysis*, Plato presents the reader of the *Republic* with many different theories united in one complex text.

Because the dimensions of Plato's philosophy are inextricably linked to one another in the *Republic*, and often depend on each other for viability, it can be immensely challenging to separate theories in the text and criticize them in isolation of one another. For example, in Book VII, Plato's theory of education is closely tied to a complex argument about calculation and geometry. As such, analysis and study of the *Republic* is often like the *Republic* itself; a long journey into complex theory and argument.

As Plato scholarship moves to criticize or comprehend individual elements of Platonic philosophy, scholars identify much of the difficulty in doing so in understanding the foundation of the *Republic*, the city-soul analogy. In the opening books of the *Republic*, Glaucon and Adeimantus challenge Socrates, Plato's mouthpiece[1], to give a powerful account of justice. They ask Socrates to prove that justice is the greatest good in itself, that it is profitable to the man who has it, that it is worth its effort, that it affords a good reputation and positive effects to men who

[1] As stated, there are many angles from which to approach interpreting Plato's *Republic*. For the purposes of this work, Socrates exists as Plato's mouthpiece and a dramatic character in the text. I do not attempt to establish the validity of Socrates' existence as a historical figure. Nor do I attempt to enter the debate about dating Plato's dialogues, or the significance of dramatic elements in Platonic text. I take the dramatic elements of Plato's dialogues to be important in understanding the theories and assume that the presentation of the text in the form of dialogue is deliberate.

have it, and most powerfully, that it is the cause of happiness. Socrates attempts to answer this challenge to justice by first finding justice in the city and then the individual, whose structures he argues are analogous (368e-369b) [2].

In this thesis I argue that the best way to evaluate the legitimacy of the city-soul analogy is to determine whether it is successful in its undertaking; answering Glaucon's and Adeimantus' challenges to justice. The account of justice at the end of the city-soul analogy in Book IV does not meet the initial challenge of Books I and II. Upon close reading and comparison of the brothers' requests with Plato's account of justice, it seems as though the city-soul analogy fails to fulfill their demands. However, the city-soul analogy provides a foundation for an account of justice that later, in Books VIII-X, does answer their earlier challenges. This delay in giving a full account of justice is a deliberate move to provide space for Plato's political philosophy and ideas on bringing the just city into reality. For example, in Book VII, Plato argues that the just city can be realized by establishing rule of philosopher kings and invading an existing city and exiling everyone in it over the age of ten (540d-541b). Though Glaucon's, Adeimantus', and the prior interlocutors' expectations for justice are met eventually, the reader's expectations, which are also brought to the *Republic*, remain unsatisfied.

At the start of Book II, first Glaucon, and then Adeimantus levy powerful criticisms against justice and praise injustice to force Socrates to give an incredible account of justice and its superiority. Their requests embody the previous interlocutors' sentiments that triumph injustice over justice, and the reader's expectations for an account of justice as well. In discussing justice, Plato chooses a political and social concept that the reader already has many developed intuitions of. He fully expects the readers to pose their own challenges to justice, and

[2] All citations in this format refer to Plato's *Republic.* The translations used in this thesis are from Allan Bloom's *The Republic of Plato (*1968).

attempts to answer them and the requests of the dialogue's interlocutors through the city-soul analogy. If the account of justice at the conclusion of the city-soul analogy does respond to these powerful demands, then the city-soul analogy is a legitimate argumentative tool. To determine whether Plato's justice satisfactorily responds to the challenge of answering Thrasymachus', Glaucon's, Adeimantus', and the reader's requests, we must understand these requests in full, the motivations in putting these as challenges to Socrates to defend justice, the city-soul analogy itself, and the account of justice found at its completion.

Much scholarly debate exists on the best method of evaluating the city-soul analogy and its legitimacy as an argumentative tool. Plato scholarship on this topic is roughly divided into two camps. Either scholars allege that the city-soul analogy is a fallacy, or that it is a legitimate device for finding justice and that the justice found through it satisfactorily meets Glaucon's and Adeimantus' requests of Socrates. However, in order to argue that Plato's city-soul analogy is legitimate, every scholar who makes this claim must add some sort of external device or mechanism of his or her own making, or an interpretation that has no founding in the actual text of the *Republic*. For example, Terence Irwin breaks our common understandings, which Plato must also address in giving an account of justice, into common descriptions of justice and common intuitions about it (1995, 257). He writes that in giving an account of justice, Plato attempts to address our common intuitions about justice rather than our descriptions of it (ibid). Irwin argues that our common descriptions of justice "misrepresent" what our common intuitions wish to articulate (ibid). Plato however, never makes this distinction between our intuitions and descriptions of justice in the text, indicating at various places only that he is aware of our common, "vulgar" (442e) understandings of justice in total. Had Plato believed this distinction to exist, he would have indicated as much, as he sometimes indicates a distinction between a

political and individual virtue, for example. Irwin imputes this distinction between intuition and description in common understandings of justice in order to remedy Plato's failure to satisfactorily address challenges the reader poses to justice.

In the same vein, Julia Annas also proposes a mechanism for understanding Platonic justice that has no bearing in the text. Annas shows that she is well aware that Plato's city-soul analogy is potentially fallacious, and is often accused of being so (1981, 153). She cites the most common criticism of the city-soul analogy is that it produces an account of justice that is "psychic" at the expense of our common or "garden" sense of justice (ibid). In order to argue that the account of justice found through the city-soul analogy satisfactorily meets the challenges put to it in Book II and the reader's expectations for it, Annas must call on "just agents" vs. "just action" moral theories that exist outside of the Platonic dialogue (1981, 160). Annas argues that if we understand Glaucon's and Adeimantus' requests to Socrates as requests for a description of just actions, but Plato's account to be a description of a just agent, then the city-soul analogy is valid (ibid). Annas argues that though Glaucon and Adeimantus are unaware of it, they ask Socrates for an account of justice that is realized through action. Plato, however, believes just actions are only what a just agent does, and so the just agent must be described in full. However, this too is a fallacy, as Plato still does not answer the challenges put to him. Even if Plato felt it necessary to give an account of the just agent prior to describing just actions (if this really is all Glaucon and Adeimantus request), he must still describe just actions. Plato does not do so at any point in the dialogue of the *Republic*, either as results of the common understandings of justice or his psychic account. Moreover, there is no place in the text where Plato indicates a distinction between the just agent and just actions, or argues that his city-soul analogy will answer one over the other. Though Annas' theory of the accounts of justice may be a legitimate way to interpret

Platonic justice in modern times, the just agent-just action theory is a device of her own making and nowhere with the *Republic* itself.

In another example of defending the legitimacy of the city-soul analogy, Kimon Lycos, like a number of scholars, argues that through the *Republic*, Plato means to transform the interlocutors' and reader's intuitions of justice. Thus, his new account of justice will accord with the new intuitions developed through reading the text (1987, 78). However, as I will show, there are many points in which Plato allows space for the reader's intuition to differ from the interlocutors' in the dialogue, or where the reader can raise objections contrary to those in the dialogue. Rather than attempting to transform the reader's psyche, Plato's choice not to account for a political understanding of justice is deliberate.

The other group of Plato scholars openly alleges that the city-soul analogy is an illegitimate argumentative tool, and that it fails to give a satisfactory account of justice. As such, these scholars can unreservedly criticize Plato's account of justice and point to where it fails to meet expectations. Basil Mitchell and J.R. Lucas argue in *An Engagement with Plato's Republic* that Plato's use of the city-soul analogy is "unfortunate" (2003, 27), implying that Plato has been careless or stupid in his use of the analogy to find justice. Mitchell and Lucas argue that Plato "gets his wires crossed" (ibid) in the analogy and mixes up external and internal justice. The challenge Thrasymachus poses to Socrates in Book I is to give an account of justice that is external, but through the city-soul analogy, Plato gets confused and gives an account of justice that is wholly internal by the end of Book IV (Mitchell and Lucas 2003, 27). While I do not go so far as to argue that Plato is careless or confused, in this thesis I do argue that Plato's account of justice at the conclusion of the city-soul analogy is troublingly internal, and that it does not accord with our common understandings of justice.

David Sachs is the most prominent scholar to make this claim, and in "A Fallacy in Plato's *Republic*" he argues that there is an irreparable gap between the Platonic account of justice and the general understanding of it (1963, 141-158). While Sachs too identifies a difference between the "vulgar" conception of justice and the Platonic conception of it, he argues that in order for Plato to account for the vulgar understanding of justice, Plato must meet two standards (1963, 153). Sachs argues that Platonic justice must preclude ordinarily criminal behavior and that the Platonic account of justice can be applied to the man who conforms to vulgar standards. While I do not agree that the Platonic account of justice must meet the second standard Sachs proposes, I argue that in order to satisfy the reader Plato's account of justice must meet the first. I further argue that the "vulgar" standards for justice include more than just the petty crime Sachs identifies. The vulgar, common, and general understanding of justice includes intuitions that justice be political, aimed towards others, serve common good, and include service to the city and citizens. Though Plato's account of justice eventually meets the first standard of justice, precluding petty crime, it does not meet the remaining portions of a vulgar justice I identify. As such, the city-soul analogy fails to find a justice that meets all interlocutors' expectations of it.

I. Origins of the City-Soul Analogy

The comparison of the city and the soul is undertaken for the express purpose of answering Socrates' many interlocutors, which includes the reader, in their challenges to justice (368d-369a). There are many spaces within the dialogue in which Socrates' interlocutors are characteristically passive or readily agree to a contentious assertion, and the reader must consider for him or herself whether the Socratic assertion is correct or objectionable. This makes the reader an invisible interlocutor of sorts, an engaged thinker who must debate with Plato in a dialogue of his or her own. There are many indications throughout the text that Plato is aware of our common or general understandings of justice, some of which he answers and some of which remain unaddressed. Plato fully expects the reader of the *Republic* to come to the text with their own expectations of justice; after all, justice is a loaded term and a political notion of which we have intuitions.

Because the city-soul analogy is constructed to respond to these many challenges, I evaluate the challenges themselves, the shift from the individual to the city, the city-soul analogy, and the account of justice at the analogy's conclusion in Book IV. It is at this point that the city-soul analogy is fully constructed and Socrates declares the "dream" of finding justice as the interlocutors require it perfectly fulfilled (443b). In order for this declaration to be true, the account of justice at this point must meet the demands placed on it in Books I and II. Though scholars generally do not include the accounts of justice from Book I as a challenge to justice, I do because Socrates' answers to them leave Glaucon unconvinced and motivate him to join the dialogue as Socrates' next interlocutor. Glaucon, in posing his own challenges to Socrates refers to the accounts left unanswered in Book I, and embodies them within his own requests.

Plato's justice, a specific product of the city-soul analogy does not fully answer these challenges at the analogy's conclusion. The account of justice at the end of Book IV leaves much remaining in Glaucon's, Adeimantus' and the reader's expectations of a justice superior to injustice. As such, the city-soul analogy is not immediately successful in meeting its initial challenge to find a true justice. However, the city-soul analogy provides a base for an account of justice which later, in Books VIII-X, answers Glaucon and Adeimantus in full. Though Glaucon and Adeimantus can be satisfied with this account, the reader must not be. Platonic justice at the *Republic*'s end is insular, static, and apolitical. It in no way considers the good of others or service to the city, important aspects of justice Plato leaves unaddressed.

As the account of justice found through the city-soul analogy does not fully meet these challenges, the city-soul analogy is unsuccessful as an argumentative tool for finding justice. Nevertheless, it allows for Plato's city-building project, and the delay in completing the account of justice from the conclusion of Book IV to the start of Book VIII gives Plato space for his political criticisms and philosophy. That the *Republic* is a political project and treatise is apparent from Book V onwards, when Socrates argues that philosophers must rule if the just city were to ever come "forth from nature" into reality (473e). Many discussions in the work, like the one of sharing women and children in common (449c) take on a logistical tone that would unnecessary were the *Republic* not meant to be understood as a political project in part. By dramatizing the accounts of justice in Book II, Plato adds to a notion the reader is already familiar with and cares for in some manner, be it as a Thrasymachus, Adeimantus, or Glaucon. After declaring justice found in Book IV, the reader is deliberately left unsatisfied. The delay in fully describing justice forces the reader to evaluate for him or herself whether Plato has adequately responded to Glaucon and Adeimantus. If he has not, the reader must determine what

remains to be accounted for in a true defense of justice. The intention in this delay is that the reader will continue reading until the end of the text, and will read through both Plato's political project as well as his final account of justice.

Many scholars allege that the initial shift from the individual to a city in speech is a non-sequitur. It appears to come out of nowhere. However, according to Socrates, the nature of Glaucon's and Adeimantus' descriptions of injustice and justice themselves give rise to the analogy (368d-369b). Thus, the specific requests Glaucon and Adeimantus make, their responsibility for the birth of the city-soul analogy, and the shift from the individual to the city are important to analyze thoroughly before examining the city-soul analogy itself and justice in it. The brothers' respective descriptions are imputed with the personal characteristics, fears, and desires of each. Moreover, each description of justice and injustice is representative of a particular section of society, and specific characters in the dialogue who exemplify these societal aspects. Glaucon's and Adeimantus' challenges to Socrates represent more than their personal views on justice and injustice; they include the popular and prevalent ideas of justice at the time and the views of the interlocutors before them. To understand how Glaucon's and Adeimantus' challenges to Socrates encompass more than their own demands, we must investigate the beliefs about justice that are presented before their entrance into the dialogue.

i. Thrasymachus

After listening to Polemarchus and Socrates come to a conclusion of what justice is not, Thrasymachus, Socrates' next interlocutor, can no longer contain himself and bursts onto the same. It is important to outline Thrasymachus' claims about injustice and his arguments against justice, as Socrates' discussion with him leaves every character wanting. As Glaucon's and Adeimantus' requests to Socrates are also rife with Thrasymachus' claims, outlining

Thrasymachus' argument in Book I allows for a clearer understanding of what the many say about justice, where there are holes in Socrates' initial defense, and what justice at the conclusion of the city-soul analogy must account for. Though Socrates' defense of justice in Book I appears logically sound and is technically triumphant over Thrasymachus' account of injustice, Socrates case for justice is not persuasive. Socrates can really only declare victory over Thrasymachus because Thrasymachus is unable to grasp logical distinctions and realize that there are problems in Socrates' analogies (Bloom 1968, 336). Socrates' defense of justice in Book I is only logically adequate and a deeper, more philosophical search for justice is necessary. In evaluating Plato's account of justice presented at the end of Book IV, not only must we evaluate whether it meets Glaucon and Adeimantus' demands for it, but if this time it can answer Thrasymachus' claims from Book I as well.

Thrasymachus starts his true account of injustice by mocking Socrates (343a). Though Thrasymachus is venomous, he makes the legitimate argument that Socrates is naïve in his perspective on the relationship between the ruled and their rulers. Socrates' idea that in their rule, masters look towards the benefit of those they lord over (342e) does not match the reality of the ruler-ruled relationship. Instead, rulers look to their subjects as shepherds look to their flock. The shepherd only cares about his sheep insofar as he can fatten them up and sell them at a later profit (343b). Rulers are powerful individuals only aiming towards their own good. Rulers make their subjects subservient for their own happiness at the expense and subjugation of the ruled.

After correcting this misinterpretation of the ruler-rule relationship, Thrasymachus gives his true definition of justice in terms of advantage to the ruler. According to Thrasymachus, justice is someone else's good and "the advantage of the stronger" (338c) or ruling body. The ruling body is the strongest entity in the city and sets down laws that provide for its own

advantage. The ruling body declares these laws just, and mandates that it just for those ruled to follow them. Because justice is the weaker serving the stronger, "the just man everywhere has less than the unjust man" (343d). The unjust man gets the better of the just man in everything; contracts, government matters, and official positions are the purview of the unjust rulers.

In order to truly illustrate his point, Thrasymachus turns to a lengthy description of the perfect injustice (344a). Glaucon starts off his quest for justice with Socrates using these same descriptions. Glaucon describes the perfect injustice and justice, the perfectly just and unjust man, the life of each, and the perceptions and reputations each hold in their perfect existence. Thrasymachus too describes injustice in its perfect form; injustice without censure, repercussion, or witness. Glaucon's detailed description of injustice and the perfectly unjust man mirror Thrasymachus' and set the parameters within which Socrates must later defend justice.

Thrasymachus describes the perfect injustice as one that makes the one who does it most happy and the one who suffers it most wretched. The perfect injustice is exceedingly awful. Thrasymachus calls this perfect injustice tyranny. In the final books of the *Republic,* injustice is referred to as tyranny as well. Thrasymachus describes tyranny as taking away everything that belongs to others (344a). Happiness is doing this completely and suffering no punishment or retribution. Left without possession and without anything of their own, victims of the perfect injustice have no power to raise objections against the perfect injustice. According to Thrasymachus, the only reason injustice is not praised more often and more verbosely is because fear of experiencing it is too pronounced. One would rather live justly than ever face the possibility of having to suffer the perfect injustice, and so society comes together and enters a contract to be just. Anyone would be tempted to be perfectly unjust, because as told by

Thrasymachus (and ultimately the many), injustice is "mightier, freer, and more masterful" (344c) than justice ever could be. Hence, when injustice is feasible it is the greatest good.

Socrates revisits Thrasymachus' claim that injustice is more powerful and mightier than justice. First, Socrates asks Thrasymachus if a city is unjust if it tries to enslave other cities (351b). Given Thrasymachus' past definitions of injustice and his glorification of tyranny (344a), it seems as though his response would be obvious. Socrates really only asks this to provide a premise for his logical argument and to provoke Thrasymachus. Of course, Thrasymachus answers that this is precisely what the perfectly unjust city does (351b). Socrates asks if it is possible for a city to enslave another city without justice. Thrasymachus answers that in his view, enslaving another city is possible only with absolute injustice, but that if, as Socrates argues, justice is wisdom, then justice is needed to enslave others (351c). Socrates asks if even the most unscrupulous groups, like a gang of pirates or robbers, would ever be able to accomplish anything if their injustice extended to their relationships with one another (351c). Thrasymachus concedes that it would be impossible for this unjust group to accomplish anything without at least a small amount of justice for one another. Thus, justice proves necessary in even seemingly unjust circumstances. Socrates makes the claim that injustice creates "factions, hatreds, and quarrels" among members of a group, and that justice creates friendship and unanimity instead (351d). Thrasymachus does not agree to this point but gives it to Socrates for the sake of argument. At this point (351d), Thrasymachus seems to sense that he is losing the debate. From here until the end of Book I, Thrasymachus no longer objects to Socrates but gives him his points, though he makes sure to tell Socrates and the assembled party that he does so only to pacify them. Thrasymachus loses steam and gives up right at the point when the most

crucial defenses of justice should be given and critically challenged. Because of this surrender, there are many holes left in the argument for Glaucon to address

Socrates pushes on, arguing that the same principle of faction holds even for two individuals. Injustice causes factions and hatred between two, and when it does, they are unable to do anything with or for each other. Instead, they become enemies, always fighting each other and just men (351e). Socrates argues that the same holds true when injustice comes "into being within one man" (351e). Injustice takes hold of the individual and makes it so that he cannot accomplish anything or ever act as one in accord with himself. When injustice settles into a man he becomes his own worst enemy. Plato's deduction of injustice from a group to the pair to the individual reveals his proclivity for reducing from the larger to the smaller and his belief that the argument keeps its form in its reduction. The presumption that what is true for the larger or multiple men is true for the individual speaks to Plato's later disregard for differences between the city and individual.

Thrasymachus then goes on to agree with Socrates that all things do their work better and properly when done with virtue, and poorly when done with vice (353c). Because Thrasymachus had earlier agreed that justice is virtue of the soul (350d), he must agree that the soul needs justice in order to do its work well (353e). A soul without justice does its work poorly. Socrates identifies the work of the soul as "managing, ruling," deliberating, and things of that nature (353d). The identification of this as the work of the soul, and the good life as one in which these tasks are well accomplished is important to the definition of justice in the city and the soul at the end of Book IV. At the end of the city-soul analogy, justice is each part of a man minding its own business and the calculating part of the soul managing affairs well for the entire soul.

Thrasymachus no longer has the effort to challenge Socrates. Thrasymachus agrees that the work of the soul is to manage, and does not refute Socrates when he asserts that the unjust man is an enemy of the gods (352a) or that the just man will have the good life and the unjust man a bad one (353e). These are controversial points that require more defense than Thrasymachus' immediate concessions allow. Thus, by the end of Book I, Thrasymachus' claim that justice is better than injustice has technically been proven wrong, a few times. However, Plato pointedly shows that this is only because Thrasymachus has given up (357a), and not because his claims have truly been refuted. Nor has the true power of justice over injustice been revealed. Thus, Thrasymachus' ideas about justice and injustice remain, though as an interlocutor Thrasymachus has been defeated. Plato indicates to the reader that he or she, like Glaucon and Adeimantus, must remain unconvinced by Socrates at this time.

So, with Thrasymachus' concessions, Socrates "proves" that the just man has the good life and that he is happy (354a). And of course, it is more profitable to the individual to be happy than wretched, and so justice is more profitable than injustice (354a). However, even Socrates admits that he has only won a logical argument, thanks in large part to Thrasymachus' good graces (354b). Socrates has not even satisfied himself with his answers. At the end of his tête-à-tête with Thrasymachus, Socrates admits he does not know what justice is, whether it is a virtue, and if the one who possesses it is truly happy (354c). Finding answer to these will be the first steps in answering Glaucon, Adeimantus, and the reader.

ii. Glaucon

Glaucon, like Socrates himself, is not convinced by Socrates' discussion with Thrasymachus. Neither Socrates nor Thrasymachus have offered valid proofs for their respective positions and Glaucon is not convinced that justice has really been defended, though his interest

in its superiority is piqued (358b). Building on Thrasymachus' claims and including them in his own, "courageous" Glaucon (357a) gives Socrates the first set of requirements his justice must fulfill[3].

Glaucon, though on the side of justice tells Socrates that he will "speak in vehement praise" (358d) of injustice. He does this so Socrates has a model of how he must praise justice to convince Glaucon of its superiority. While this motivation for praising injustice is legitimate, Glaucon also does so to give full breadth to the views of the many. The many argue that justice is a bothersome, annoying crutch of the weak, and necessary only for a functioning society and goods that come from a just reputation. As Glaucon claims, the many always say that the life of the unjust man is "far better" than that of the just man. If the masses are in agreement on this particular point, it is natural for Glaucon to wonder why he too should not believe them. Admittedly, Glaucon is of a different set from the many and his desire to hear the good of justice may be expected of his station. Because of his position in society, or because of a true yearning in his soul, Glaucon desires that justice be "extolled all by itself" (358d). If Socrates can successfully defend the superiority of justice in itself, Glaucon's decision to side with the just life is validated. With Socrates' help, Glaucon would be equipped to defend justice from the many. Socrates' account of justice must provide Glaucon with powerful reasons for choosing justice and an ability to articulate why. Working from the parameters Thrasymachus sets in Book I and his own motivations, at the start of Book II Glaucon asks Socrates to provide a drastic and powerful account of justice (358d).

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[3] Glaucon is "courageous" for many reasons (357a). He does not hesitate to jump in the discussion of Book I between Thrasymachus and Socrates (347a) and is bold enough to pose questions to Socrates where Thrasymachus has lost the effort to, though they are necessary to understanding Socrates' arguments. From the beginning of Book II, Glaucon challenges Socrates and pushes him farther than even Socrates admits he would go in a thorough contemplation of justice (357a). Furthermore, Glaucon is brave for picking up the flag where Thrasymachus puts it down (358c), and shouldering the views of the many on injustice though they are not high-minded or noble. His courage resides in his still being on the side of justice though he is clearly aware, knows, and can reiterate in exceptional detail prevailing ideas about injustice.

a. The Contractual Request

There are three main requests Glaucon puts to Socrates; that justice be more than a mere societal contract, that justice be good in itself, and that it provide for the good life. The first account Glaucon gives Socrates to refute is the contractual one (Santas 2006, 129). Glaucon argues that the many claim "that doing injustice is naturally good, and suffering it bad, but that the bad in suffering injustice far exceeds the good in doing it" (358e). Thus, those not able to do injustice deem it "profitable" to "set down a compact among themselves neither to do injustice nor suffer it" (358e-359a). When men reprimand or criticize unjust actions to one another, they are really only "deceiving each other for fear of suffering injustice" (360d) rather than genuinely criticizing injustice itself. They set down laws to abide by these social contracts, and justice is only what is deemed just by these laws. This directly echoes Thrasymachus' claims from Book I. Glaucon's assertion implies that justice is not good in itself, and that it does not exist on its own if it is only ever a by-product of the laws. As Thrasymachus stated in Book I, laws are the purview of the ruling body. As such, there is no true justice or it is solely the advantage of the stronger. Glaucon's first request to Socrates is that he show that justice is more than a mere compact and series of laws to avoid injustice.

By this point in the dialogue (359b), Glaucon's contractual account of the multitude's views on justice and injustice has been repeated several times, from Thrasymachus and now in detail from Glaucon. What is unique about this particular reiteration is that Glaucon makes it clear that injustice is a wholly external practice and action. Practicing injustice means imposing it on others, making them suffer, and doing something to ensure their unhappiness and misery. Injustice is action that requires others; it necessarily includes the presence and subjugation of other beings. Without others, injustice does not exist. Glaucon's contractual description of

injustice accounts for its effect on others, and so Socrates' justice at the conclusion of the city-soul analogy must do the same. However, at the end of the city-soul analogy and the quest for justice, justice is a wholly internal and contained virtue. At the end of the city-soul analogy, Plato's concept of justice is incomplete because it lacks accountability towards others and a consideration of relationships with other people.

b. Justice in Itself

Glaucon's second request stems from his argument that the many do not praise justice in itself but for its effects. Glaucon asks Socrates to defend justice as good in itself without these extraneous goods.

Glaucon and Socrates agree that justice is the type of good beneficial both for its own sake and the things that come from it (358a). According to the many, justice is a good that should be practiced only "for the sake of wages and the reputation that comes from opinion" (358a). By itself or on its own, justice should be avoided at all costs. Glaucon maintains that he does not share this opinion, and wants to hear what power both injustice and justice have on their own without external benefits of wages, reputation, or consequence (358b). The justice we find at the end of the city-soul analogy must answer this second request that justice be good in itself.

Glaucon delves into the first of the *Republic*'s many thought experiments to better illustrate his point that justice is not good in itself and that no one practices it willingly. He argues that if the just man and the unjust man were both given "license to do whatever he wants" (359c), neither would act with justice. Glaucon argues that this freedom is best imagined if both men had the power of the ring of Gyges (359d). In this Lydian myth, Gyges' ancestor, a mere shepherd, takes a gold ring from a corpse he stumbles upon after an earthquake (359d)[4]. The

[4] The "shepherd" (358d) recalls Thrasymachus' comparison of the ruler-ruled relationship to a shepherd's with his, and foreshadows Gyges becoming a ruler in his city through injustice.

ring, when twisted, makes one invisible and allows one to reappear when twisted again. After learning that he has the power to be invisible, Gyges wreaks havoc on Lydia. He is unjust; he commits adultery with the king's wife, kills the king, steals the throne, and rules the city. Glaucon asks Socrates to imagine what both the just and unjust man would do with two identical rings. Because the ring gives the men free reign, both the just and unjust man would behave in the same manner. Neither would act with justice because justice is not good in itself. Glaucon argues that we would find both the just and unjust man on the same path, trying to get "the better" (359c). The better is what nature pursues as the good and instinctively pushes men towards (359c). Both men, regardless of their initial characterization as just or unjust act unjustly.

The ring of Gyges thought experiment further functions to remove reputation as a reason for Socrates to argue that justice is superior to injustice. Removing reputation forces Socrates to praise justice in itself. Examining the lives of both men with the rings illustrates that men only act with justice in the presence of others or when reputation is at stake.

To fully render justice alone in itself, Glaucon finally removes tangible goods and effects from an account of justice (358a) by pushing Socrates into another thought experiment. Glaucon asks Socrates to imagine the life of the unjust and just man in perfect opposition (360e), and gives all the effects a just reputation yields to the unjust man. Thus, Socrates must praise the life of the just man even when the effects of seeming just are absent.

The ring of Gyges is the first thought experiment in the *Republic* utilized to better depict justice and injustice. As this becomes a pattern in the text, justice is increasingly thought of and referred to as a physical object or possession, and the interlocutors and reader start to think of

justice as a tangible and physical thing. This tendency gives rise to the assumption that justice can be found in the city and then the soul as though it were a visible, physical entity.

c. Justice and the Good Life

Glaucon asks Socrates to show the superiority of justice over injustice to be so pronounced that the two lives will be as radically different Glaucon describes. In the just/unjust man thought experiment, Glaucon describes the life of the unjust man as the good life he wants to belong to the just man.

The perfectly unjust man acts in a completely unjust manner and gets away with it. Further, he has a reputation of justice (361a). Glaucon argues that this is the truly perfect injustice- the ability to do the greatest injustice in the city with the greatest reputation of justice, and the power to correct any mistakes that might detract from this reputation (361b). The perfectly unjust man has all skills at his disposal, force, rhetoric, courage, and strength to be as unjust as possible while maintaining the facade of justice. The unjust man obtains whatever he desires because of his reputation for justice and the cunning of his true injustice. His reputation for justice allows the unjust man unlimited power over enemies, friends, and the gods in the form of harm, gifts, and sacrifices (362b-c). The gods, the ultimate authorities, for their part even prefer the unjust man to the just, as they are frequently pampered with the sacrifices injustice allows men to afford. If Plato's account of justice at the completion of the city-soul analogy is to fully meet Glaucon's expectations, this description will actually be the just man's good life.

Though Glaucon argues that he describes the life of the perfectly unjust man in this way to praise justice on its own and provide a model for the just life, it seems impossible that anyone could have such a pronounced dichotomy between his actions and reputation. It is unlikely that one could have a totally untarnished reputation in the city while acting in a significantly unjust

manner. It is impossible that injustice as extreme as Glaucon describes would escape the notice of human beings and the gods. Socrates brings up a similar objection in Book X (612c), but for the time being he leaves it. As such, it too must be answered in an account of justice found through the city-soul analogy.

The just man, on the other hand, lives a life in complete opposition to the unjust man. The just man is simple and noble, and truly good rather than only seemingly so (361b). Thus, in the thought experiment his life is miserable. The unjust man has no honors, no gifts, and no positive reputation associated with justice (361c). He is robbed of family, home, and any wealth he would have acquired. Instead, without ever committing an unjust act he has the most prominent reputation of injustice (361d). Glaucon strips this man of gifts and honors so that it is clear this man is just for the sake of justice itself (361c). If Socrates can praise the life of this man, justice is truly good in itself and in the face of all adversity. The just man undergoes every sort of evil and punishment, and is crucified at the end of his life for his seeming injustice. By including death at the hands of the city, albeit implicitly, Glaucon demands Socrates give an account of a justice worth dying for. Thus, when Socrates declares the interlocutors' dream of finding justice fulfilled (443), the justice found must answer Glaucon's second and third requests in addition to the contractual one usually identified (Annas 1981, 64; Santas 2006, 129).

iii. Adeimantus

After having seemingly exhausted every extreme description of justice and injustice, Glaucon leaves Socrates to respond. Glaucon's brother Adeimantus however, immediately protests, saying that the task of describing injustice is far from over (362d). Though Socrates tells Adeimantus that there is almost more than he can contend with, Adeimantus claims that Glaucon has left out the most important and necessary part of a portrayal of injustice. Thus, the

justice at the city-soul analogy's conclusion at Book IV must also include Adeimantus' expectations of it.

Adeimantus' requests often mirror his brother's, as he too asks Socrates to "take way the reputations from justice" (367b) and praise the just life unnoticed by the gods or human beings (367e). Besides this. Adeimantus has three distinct requests of his own. He asks Socrates to show that even if justice is difficult it is worth the effort (367c), that justice is more profitable to the individual than injustice (364a), and that justice is the greatest good and injustice the greatest evil (366e). So, Socrates' justice at the end of the city-soul analogy must answer these three demands as well.

Adeimantus starts his challenge to Socrates by claiming that Glaucon has not included a necessary, but obscured class of people. These people actually support injustice over justice, though they do not do so publically (362e). These people, with the good breeding to mask their true feelings, probably occupy a higher place in society than the many, and have more of an opportunity to affect the brothers. More than those who openly praise injustice, like Thrasymachus, or describe injustice in the manner Glaucon has, these people threaten the gentleman's psyche with their deceptive preference for justice. The class Adeimantus describes is made up of fathers, like Cephalus, who tell their sons to be just for the good things that come from seeming just (363a), rather than for the value of justice in itself. These people, as opposed to the many Glaucon describes receive a much greater profit from a just reputation; "ruling offices and marriage," and a "good reputation with the gods" so that they have "an inexhaustible store of goods" in the afterlife (363a).

Adeimantus' description of the just reputation is an exact repetition of Glaucon's. Adeimantus' account of good marriages, ruling offices, profitable contracts, power in the city,

and divine rewards for justice (363d) echo Glaucon's. If Adeimantus provides a necessary part of injustice Glaucon has missed, then it is not clear why he should simply repeat his brother's description of the goods accompanying a just reputation. Kent Moors argues that Adeimantus explains why one praises justice over injustice, while Glaucon cites reasons to openly praise injustice instead (1981, 80). However, Glaucon is well aware that this good reputation and its effects are why people praise justice, and it is because he wants a unique account of justice from Socrates that he renders him incapable of praising justice for its reputation. Glaucon makes the perfectly unjust man "seemingly just," and even in his thought experiment the just reputation accounts for the unjust man's goods rather than the injustice in his soul[5]. It is precisely so that Socrates does not praise these goods instead of justice itself that Glaucon gives them to the unjust man, and they stay out of consideration until Adeimantus brings them back in again. Thus, this part of Adeimantus' discussion with Socrates only serves to make explicit the reputation portion of Glaucon's soliloquy.

Adeimantus' request that Socrates show justice worth its effort is based on the popular opinions and literature of the time. Adeimantus argues that in popular literature, poetry and prose, justice is considered fair, but "hard and full of drudgery" (364a). Injustice is admired as "sweet and easy" and shameful only by law and opinion (364a). This recalls Thrasymachus' argument that justice is the advantage of the ruling body because they set down laws for their own benefit and tell the ruled that obeying these laws is justice.

Adeimantus' second request that Socrates show justice more profitable than injustice also comes from popular opinion. Popular literature also cites injustice as more profitable than justice, calls happy and honorable bad men with wealth and power, and shames those who are poor but just (364a). The poets and the novelists say that the gods give good men bad fate and

[5] "he rules in the city because he seems to be just," 362b

bad men fame and fortune (ibid). The young men of the city learn that the citizens, poets, and even the gods honor vice, and these young men are persuaded that the unjust life is truly the one worth living. There seem to be no advantages to justice itself, only the reputation of it. As such, young men are made to believe that so long as one is unjust with a reputation for justice, like Glaucon's perfectly unjust man, a divine life on earth is to be had (382b-d). All that is worth having of justice is a façade to cover the realities of unjust actions (365c).

Adeimantus articulates that people are aware of the extreme difficulty in seeming just while being unjust in reality. Though Glaucon describes a reputedly just life very similar to the one Adeimantus describes, Adeimantus recognizes that living an unjust life with the reputation of justice is a nearly impossible. Adeimantus and the young men of Athens are constantly told that this life does exist, and can exist for them should they have the strength to make it theirs (365a-366b). Because this is a difficult task, there are endless resources devoted to obtaining this ideal state of injustice and seeming justice. As the champions of this life tell Adeimantus, "nothing great is easy," (365d), especially obtaining a life of such grandeur. Thus, for this purpose there are secret societies and clubs, teachers of persuasion like Thrasymachus, and sacrifices to turn the opinions of the gods (365d-e). The most successfully unjust men become rulers of the city and act as intermediaries between men and gods, and interpret gods' commands for the city, which remarkably echo their own intentions. As such, the good life is ensured for them both among humans and among the gods in the afterlife.

Adeimantus' soliloquy adds to Glaucon's powerful one, because Adeimantus' words are tinged with a note of personal exasperation. Perhaps in referring to the "young men" whose souls are corrupted by these tales (365a) Adeimantus refers to himself. Perhaps at one point Adeimantus was persuaded to believe that this life existed, and it is all the more important to him

that Socrates show it does not, and that justice is truly better than injustice. Throughout his speech, Adeimantus asks Socrates what a young man (like himself) is to do in the face of overwhelming advocacy for injustice; popular opinions, poets, leaders, and "good" men in the city all triumph injustice, though sometimes secretly or through prose. Though Adeimantus never asks Socrates what he himself should do, it is apparent that the problem Adeimantus poses to Socrates is personal. Adeimantus seeks answers for himself, perhaps to respond to his peers or quell his inner fears, in the same way Glaucon pleads with Socrates to quell the voices of the many.

Adeimantus however, gives Socrates an allowance Glaucon has not provided. Adeimantus argues that men do not choose justice willingly, unless they have "adequate knowledge that justice is best' (366d). Though this is a minor point in Adeimantus' lengthy monologue, this space provides a foundation for Socrates' case for justice. Through the city-soul analogy and the search for justice, Socrates gives Glaucon, Adeimantus, and the reader the knowledge to willingly choose justice. As Socrates teaches his interlocutors about virtue, vice, justice, and knowledge itself, he eventually makes clear that virtue and justice cannot exist without blessed knowledge and reason in the soul. Socrates argues that those who choose pleasures besides justice only do so out of ignorance, and once they have true knowledge, they always choose the just life (585b).

Adeimantus' last request is that justice be the greatest good (366e). Adeimantus tells Socrates he has never heard justice glorified for "its own power when it is in the soul of a man who possesses it" (366e), and requires Socrates to do so. No one popularly, in "poetry or prose" argues that injustice is "the greatest of evils a soul can have in it and justice the greatest good" (366e). Adeimantus argues that had justice been talked about in this manner and had injustice

been exposed as the greatest of a soul's evils, then young men would not be influenced to think of injustice so highly (367a). Because this speech is what Adeimantus himself needs, he asks Socrates not only to show why justice is stronger than injustice, but to denigrate injustice and extoll justice. Adeimantus needs Socrates to show that injustice in the soul of a man ruins him in order to truly be convinced (3677b). Adeimantus, just as much as he wants to hear that his choice of justice in itself will be rewarded, needs to hear that those who choose injustice will be punished. Simply making the wrong decision is not enough for Adeimantus. Adeimantus wants a full defense of justice, stripped of its external glories, and wants injustice to be shameful in the soul of others.

Thus, Adeimantus challenges Socrates to account for a justice worth the effort, profitable, and the greatest good possible within a soul.

iii. The Reader

As soon as the dialogue of the *Republic* turns to justice, the reader brings his or her own understandings, assumptions, and intuitions about justice to the text. This is expected. This is not because every reader approaches the *Republic* looking to challenge Plato themselves or to impute the text with their personal expectations of justice. Instead, it is because we exist as social animals within political communities, and justice is a political notion inherent in our existence with others. Besides this micro-level, personal understanding of justice, as a modern society we have become very familiar with complex and advanced notions of justice. We have built intricate judicial systems to arbitrate every level of interaction between human beings. Thus, when the topic of justice is raised in the dialogue, the reader inevitably and immediately has his own expectations and understandings of justice that he or she too is looking to see addressed. Plato

expects this in using the term justice and at many points in the dialogue refers to our common, general, and even "vulgar" standards of justice (422e).

Our ordinary and common notions of justice almost exclusively refer to interactions with other people. I suppose one could be just towards one's self, but this is an irregular use of the word and in this sense refers more to being fair to one's self than just. Justice, a matter discussed primarily in the context of our legal system and courts, refers to acting fairly, positively, and equally towards other human beings. Further, a measure of retribution and settlement is included in our common understandings of justice. We consider it just to make people pay their debt to society or subject them to the penal system if they have violated society's codified values. Thus, the reader expects Platonic justice to account for one's relationship with others and service to the city.

Socrates is overwhelmed by the task of answering these many challenges, but knows he cannot shy away from it. He argues that on one hand, it is an incredibly difficult task, but on the other, that it would be impossible for him not to answer this demand of the utmost importance (368b). After his interlocutors beg him to (368c), Socrates agrees to take on the challenge to find a justice that is good in itself, powerful in the soul of the man who possesses it, profitable, and the cause of happiness.

II. Answering these Challenges; the City-Soul Analogy

i. Shifting the Search for Justice

Because he appreciates the gravity of the challenge Glaucon and Adeimantus have put to him, Socrates proposes moving the search for justice in the individual to a larger scale, so that he and his interlocutors can see justice more clearly (368d). Socrates likens justice in the individual to "little letters," and argues that justice in the city is these same letters, only larger, clearer, and in a bigger place (368d-e).

That the justice of a city and man are the same is the first problematic assumption of the city-soul analogy. Justice of the city refers to political justice, whereas justice of the man is an interpersonal or individual justice. At least in the verbal metaphor, Socrates implies that justice in the man is the same as justice in the city (368d). He directly makes this claim when he argues that there would be "more justice in the bigger [the city]" (368e) than the man, implying that justice of the man and the city are the same and only different in quantifiable size. However, when he asks Adeimantus about justice, Socrates asks if there are two separate and distinct ones; "justice of the one man" and "justice of a whole city" (ibid), not as the same kind of justice but as two distinct types. However, in the text, Plato never explicitly makes a distinction between political and individual justice, though the question implies that there are. Adeimantus, in answering Socrates affirmatively, could be assuming this distinction in the question. Instead, Socrates uses his "yes" to make the claim that political and individual justice are the same thing. This does not make intuitive sense. Men can be (and presumably are) described as just. However, it is unusual to refer to an entire city as just, or to discuss the justice of a city as a whole. It is more common to say that a country is just, and even if in this instance the city is taken as a smaller model of the nation, justice is still only used to describe a city's political relationship to

other cities or a government's relationship to its people. Yet, as the dialogue continues, it becomes apparent that Plato does not approach justice politically or in relation to others. This is one of the biggest flaws in his initial and final presentations of justice. So, with the two competing assertions, that justice in the city is the same as justice in the man, and that there is a separate justice of a whole city and justice of a man, Socrates creates a paradox. Either "justice of the one man" and "justice of the whole city" (368d) are the same thing, only different in size, or there are two different types of justice that separately characterize the city and the man. Leo Strauss argues that this paradox arises from Socrates' assumption that there is "no essential difference, but only a quantitative difference, between the city and the individual" (1964, 91). This raises the possibility of there being a political justice that is different from individual justice, though Socrates and Adeimantus agree they are the same (368d). Though this paradox exists, Plato proceeds as if both political and individual justice are the same thing, creating the first problematic assumption of the city-soul analogy.

The second paradox of the city-soul analogy is whether individuals and classes of individuals give a city its character, or if a city's character comes from its citizens in sum. In building the city-soul analogy, Plato operates on the assumption that the virtues of the city and the soul will come from all classes and parts working together as a whole. For example, the whole city is just when each class tends to its own affairs and follows its duties, not because the individuals within it are particularly just. However, at earlier and various points in the *Republic*, Plato attributes the character of a city to the particular men in it. For example, at 435e, Socrates argues that cities like Thrace and Scythia, Athens, and Phoenicia are spirited, knowledgeable, or greedy because the men in it are, and not because all classes in it work together to produce spirit, knowledge, or greed. Either a city is of a certain quality because the men in it are, or different

classes of individuals perform different roles and together contribute to the characterization of a city. The city-soul analogy operates from this second premise, though it is much more likely that a city is characterized by the general nature of the majority of people in it, as stated at 435e. In *An Introduction to Plato's Republic,* Julia Annas points to the same problem and terms it "an infinite regress" (1981, 149). She argues that the assumption that person and city are virtuous in the same way and are structurally identical is "irreconcilable with the earlier suggestion that in some sense a city is" virtuous because the citizens in it are (Annas 1981, 148-149). She argues that we must either "give up the idea that the city and person are just in the same sense, or we have to give up the idea that there is any way in which we can explain the city's" virtue by appeal to the virtue of its citizens (as Socrates does at 435e) (ibid). In attempting to find justice through the city-soul analogy, Plato operates on the assumption that we can do both.

The third problematic assumption in attempting to find justice through the city-soul analogy is illustrated by Socrates' description of justice as letters that will be bigger and more visible in the city, but the same as in the individual (368d). This recalls the ease with which Plato earlier reduced injustice from the group to the individual, and his belief that traits are the same within different sized groups and only different in size or amount rather than quality.

The metaphor also illustrates Socrates', and the entire group's proclivity to think of justice as a quantifiable, physical trait. Adeimantus earlier argues that no one has stated an adequate case for the man who possesses justice in his soul (366e), implying that justice is a possession or physical thing, or at least must be thought of as such to intellectually grasp justice and debate its merits. Socrates even refers to justice as a "her" (368b), saying that he will do his best to succor her as much as he is able (368c). Though the reference to and discussion of justice

as a physical entity may be a device to make the dialogue less abstract, it is a strange assumption and is in part responsible for the initial creation of the city-soul analogy.

Because of these assumptions, Socrates proposes building a city in speech to find justice and then comparing it to the soul to find justice there (369a). Socrates argues that building a city in speech will allow the interlocutors to clearly see how justice comes into being (369b). The proposal to build an entirely new city also functions as Plato's claim that there is no just city in existence The account of justice Plato is looking to give is not one any person would use to describe a city, and he builds a new account just as he builds a new polis. In fact, after Socrates and his interlocutors have finished building the city in speech, Socrates argues that only the city they have built can truly be called a city. Everything else with that name is many cities in one (423a). This is one of many points in which Plato makes a political criticism; in actual cities, the poor live so differently from the wealthy that it is as if they reside in entirely different towns within the same city. An argument for building the city in speech is that it will be free of these sorts of problems.

Socrates asks Adeimantus to pause and fully contemplate the proposed undertaking (369b). Adeimantus does not and instead immediately answers that Socrates must not "do anything else" but find justice by building this city in speech (369b). Because Adeimantus does not consider the assumptions of Socrates' proposal, the reader must do so in order to understand whether the city-soul analogy is a legitimate way to find justice.

Many scholars weigh in on the city-soul debate and the best way to unveil its assumptions and determine its legitimacy. Scholars like Bernard Williams use formal logic and implications in word choice to argue that the city-soul analogy is invalid and (2001, 157-167). Others defend the legitimacy of the city-soul analogy and the shift from the individual to the city.

For example, Ioannis D. Evrigenis argues in "The Psychology of Politics: The City-Soul Analogy in Plato's *Republic"* (2002) that the recurring topic of justice's power in the city in the opening books clearly signals the analogy's origin and thus give it its legitimacy. Jonathan Lear argues against Williams' claim that "the analogy disguises a fundamental tension" (Lear 2001, 176) in Plato's account of the city and soul. Lear instead argues that the analogy must be understood in terms of internalization and externalization (ibid). In Lear's account, the city both characterizes the individual (internalization) and the individual shapes the city so much as he is able (externalization). G.R.F. Ferrari, arguing against Lear, claims that Plato does not use internalization or externalization to "ground the city-soul analogy" (Ferrari 2005, 52). Instead Ferrari proposes that we should understand the city-soul analogy as a metaphor instead. He argues that doing this allows the reader to understand that Plato is "mapping" the city onto the soul in the analogy (Ferrari 2005, 77). Ferrari argues that Plato really wishes to make assertions and criticisms about the city, but because the reader can better understand the individual, Plato uses the soul as a platform to describe the city (ibid). Allan Bloom argues that in building the city-soul analogy, Socrates caters to Glaucon's and Adeimantus' ambitions as political young men and offers them the most glorious of political acts (1968, 343). Bloom claims that understanding this motivation allows us to the overlook the seeming obscurity from which the analogy comes (1968, 343).

However, as stated before, the best way to determine if the city-soul analogy is legitimate is to examine whether the purposes for which it was constructed are fulfilled. The task in using the city-soul analogy to find justice in the soul is to provide an account of justice as powerful as Glaucon and Adeimantus wish it to be. The answer to the question of the city-soul analogy's legitimacy is best answered by another question; is the justice we find at the end of the analogy

(441d) the justice Glaucon, Adeimantus, and we are looking for? If the analogy is unsuccessful in giving this account of justice, we can look to the assumptions I have identified in the shift from the city to the soul as cause for why.

While Socrates builds the city-soul analogy, the reader and interlocutors have a tendency to get lost within the city itself and lose sight of the bigger project. Socrates, in building the city builds a corresponding part of the city-soul analogy, but because it is a slow and complex process, the reader easily forgets that the city itself does not stand alone. It is often difficult to remember that we are not looking for justice within the city's citizens, but to their role as components of the city-soul analogy. In fact, Plato expects and relies on this proclivity of the interlocutors and readers. This is indicated at 419a when Adeimantus asks about the happiness of the guardians, and Socrates must remind him that we are looking for the happiness of the whole city as it corresponds to the soul (419a-420c). This proclivity and Plato's awareness of it also implicitly refers to the possibility raised at 368d that there are distinct political and individual justices rather than the same justice in the man and the city. The reader often confuses political qualities for individual ones. As one imagines the city along with Socrates, and receives the detailed accounts of the guardian class, it seems as though the guardian are individuals themselves. The descriptions of the guardians' strict rearing and self-control seem to contribute to the individual guardians' justice than the city's political one. However, what will seem like political justice, justice of the entire city will later correspond to justice of the man, according to the initial argument prompting the rise of the city-soul analogy. Rather than reminding the reader at every step of the city's construction that it will later correspond to the just soul, Plato uses the gap between the account of the city and soul to raise political criticisms and commentary. Only

after he has made a number of these criticisms does Plato remind the reader that the initial project was to find justice in the individual (420c).

ii. The Healthy City, the Feverish City, and the Birth of Justice

Adeimantus and Socrates start the quest for justice by imagining a relatively simple city. It is small, with enough people (four or five) to fulfill only the most basic tasks necessary for a functioning village. After some debate, Adeimantus and Socrates agree that it would be more beneficial for the individuals in the city and for the city itself that each person specialize in one task they excel at, and produce enough of their crop or service to share with everyone. Adeimantus and Socrates refer to this principle as "one man one art" (370b), which is important to note as this theory forms the essence of Plato's definition of justice in the individual.

Socrates argues that in the "one man one art" city, a necessity arises for more than the four or five citizens currently present. The city now requires an influx of citizens to act as toolmakers, cobblers, blacksmiths, and other craftsmen (370e). Slowly, the village in speech grows and expands until it becomes a bustling city. Socrates goes on to garnish the city by equipping it with mercenaries, tradesmen, sailors, and paid laborers. Socrates and Adeimantus pause to consider whether this city is complete, but when they fail to find justice immediately in this modest city, they continue their efforts (371e). Adeimantus suggest that justice could exist in the need men have of one another (372a), but when Socrates begins to depict the life of these men to find where this need would be, Glaucon interrupts and notes that the lives of these men are completely without relish or luxury (372c-e). Though Socrates gives the men of this hypothetical city a few extravagancies, Glaucon protests that it is not enough for the men to truly enjoy themselves. Socrates realizes that in order for his interlocutors to be satisfied, he will have to build them a "luxurious city" (372e). Socrates argues that the city he and Adeimantus have

described is a healthy city, and that in his opinion it is the true and honest city (372e). When matched with an individual, this city will probably prove to be analogous to the healthy and honest soul. However, the city does not have a need for justice in it or a space for injustice to exist. This is irregular among human beings, as all human beings have negative tendencies, though strength is measured in one's ability to overpower or control them. Plato himself makes a similar claim at 572b, when Socrates says that "some terrible, savage, and lawless form of desires is in every man" but that men who are reared well control them. If Adeimantus and Socrates are unable to locate justice in the city they have built, then their task remains unfulfilled. Plato only spends a small portion of the dialogue describing this true and healthy city, and does not pause to match it up to its analogous soul. Perhaps an individual with this type of soul does not exist, as Plato believes bad desires reside in the soul of all human beings (572b). Thus, justice does not exist in this "true city" (372e) and Socrates must build another. Just as Glaucon cannot even listen to a city come into being in speech without complaining of lack of luxury, pleasure, and excess, so too men of the world cannot not exist without getting sick. Any justice in this healthy city would be illegitimate because it would lack the analogous human element. Plato's later account of the just and unjust regimes follows this same model of moving from healthy to sick cities. Accordingly, Socrates turns to describing what he considers a sick or "feverish" city, but one that has justice (372e).

Socrates adds many indulgences to the existing city in speech in order to satisfy Glaucon. He adds "relishes, perfume, incense, courtesans and cakes," superfluous craftsmen, and decorative citizens (373a). Because the feverish city contains many more people than the healthy one, it needs more land support its citizens' extravagant lifestyles. The only way to get more land is to take it from neighboring cities, or as Thrasymachus would say, to act unjustly. This land

acquisition results in war (373e). Socrates hesitates to determine whether this war produces good or evil (ibid). He pauses because war is necessary for the feverish city, just as extravagancies and luxuries were needed to satisfy Glaucon. As war for the feverish city necessarily exists, the human equivalent of this war, injustice, or taking things from others as Thrasymachus and the many term it (344a), is also a reality. By bringing the unhealthy city into being, Plato comments on the fact that many healthy souls devolve into feverish ones through interactions with others and the development of extraneous desires, and sometimes this seems inevitable. Perhaps this is why Plato makes his account of justice and the city-soul analogy's justice wholly insular. Interactions with other people seem to produce injustice. The unhealthy lifestyles and superfluous desires of the city are supported by taking things (land) from others. The healthy city is impossible to sustain, even in the speech, because it does not accord with human desire. In the same way, the person motivated solely by necessary wants does not exist in society either.

As war becomes a necessary extension of the city's effort, the city requires defense. An army class comes into being to protect the wealth and luxuries of the city (374a). Glaucon questions the necessity of the army class in this city, arguing that the city is already adequate in its composition (374a). Socrates informs Glaucon that because he has added to the city and moved it from healthy to sick, it must necessarily have an army as well (374a).

iii. The Multitude

After the guardian class is introduced into the city, the multitude, the biggest and lowest class in the city is no longer discussed. In describing the shift from the healthy to the unhealthy city, Socrates already describes the multitude. They are the unnecessary desires, relishes, superfluous craftsmen, beauticians, and courtesans of the feverish city. Beyond their bringing the need for an army into the city, the multitude only exists to complicate the ideal state. However, they

necessarily exist in the city, and as such they need to be protected, watched over, and ruled carefully. If let out of sight the desires of the multitude could easily overrun the city. For this reason, the warrior/guardian class is borne, and from this warrior class the complete guardians are born to rule the city.

iv. The Warrior Class

Socrates argues that it will take very special skills and a particular nature to guard this feverish city. He tells Glaucon and Adeimantus that they must carefully choose the guardians for their city (374e). Thus, Glaucon, Socrates, and Adeimantus spend a large portion of Books II-IV describing, debating the merits of, and searching for the perfect traits of their warrior class. This is especially important because the rulers of their city will eventually come from this class. The feverish city, with its different wants, requirements, and pulls, demands warriors of the most unique nature. The guardians of the city will have to be gentle and spirited, courageous and orderly, "philosophic, spirited, swift and strong" (376c) to meet the city's many requirements. In order for the guardians to embody these many and often conflicting traits, they must be subjected to an intense education, upbringing, and lifestyle. As stated before, the lengthy description of the guardian upbringing serves to make the reader view them as individuals rather than a class in the city that will later correspond to a piece of the soul. The lengthy descriptions also contribute to the political and individual justice paradox first exhibited in the shift from the individual to the city.

Socrates starts off this detailed account by asking how the guardians will be educated (376c). Socrates considers that a discussion of the guardians' education and exercise regimen may not "contribute anything to our goal of discerning that for the sake of which we are considering all these things- in what way justice and injustice come into being in a city" (376c-d), but describes

them anyway. Socrates argues that "we don't want to scant the argument, but we don't want an overlong one either" (ibid), and while we do not scant the argument, we definitely prolong it. There is no corresponding human element to the education of the guardian class in the city. In the city-soul analogy, the guardians and the spirited part of the soul are analogous. In the soul, the calculations and deliberations of reason keep the spirited part in line, where the education, rearing, and communal lifestyle in the city are responsible for the discipline of the guardian class. Though Adeimantus claims that the discussion of the warriors' education and upbringing will contribute to the goal of finding justice, he does not offer any reason for this expectation, and we do not see any realized. Because Socrates again asks Adeimantus to consider the undertaking and he again does not pause to consider it, the reader must[6]. While this education digression does not serve an obvious function in the context of the city-soul analogy, it does provide the framework for Plato's later discussion about education when he moves to his actual city-building project in Book V[7].

Plato also uses the education digression to address Adeimantus' earlier point that poets unduly praise injustice and make the unjust life overly tempting for young men (363e-364d). Socrates criticizes poets who say that "that many happy men are unjust, and many wretched men ones just, and that doing injustice is profitable if one gets away with it" (392b). Socrates tells his interlocutors that poets, filling the heads of the youth with these sorts of falsehood, will not be allowed into the ideal polis.

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[6] The first time Adeimantus agrees to an unsupported Socratic assertion is at 369b, when Socrates asks Adeimantus to consider their proposed methodology in finding justice through the city-soul analogy.

[7] Plato also uses the education digression as a free space to openly criticize poets, especially the most revered Homer and Hesiod. Plato has the defense that his severe criticisms of poets are not actual criticisms, but only remarks on the education of the guardians. Thus he can make harsh reproaches against them. Socrates first criticizes Hesiod and Homer for their misrepresentation of the gods (377e), and claims that their poetry depicts the gods as jealous and petty. Plato then uses the digression to bring up a religious point aside from his criticisms of Hesiod and Homer. Socrates argues that god is not the cause of everything but only the good (379c).

Later within the education discussion, Plato makes political commentaries on the state of free people and their vulgar use of justice. Using examples of doctors and lawyers (referring to the health of the body and soul, respectively), Plato argues that the extravagancies and superfluous refinements of existing cities have made it so that free people, with their bad education and breeding, are no better than slaves (405a). This is reflected in their increased need of doctors and lawyers and petty justice. People in these cities need doctors for illnesses resulting from overindulgence. They require lawyers to apply justice to their trivial squabbles, played out in courtrooms (405a-c). Plato, in his criticism of these free people, indicates that his justice will be loftier than that currently in existence, and shows that he is aware of current understandings of justice.

After discussing the exercise regimen and education of the guardians at length, Adeimantus protests that the lives of the warriors sounds bleak and without pleasure (419a). The lives of the warriors are stringent, incredibly regulated, and miserably austere. Socrates reminds Adeimantus that the guardians are part of the city; they exist as a piece of the bigger picture and their happiness must be subjugated to the larger happiness of the city as a whole. The happiness of the guardian class is of no importance as long as they do their duty and the city is happy as a whole. It would seem that justice in the city is contained within the guardian class and their austere upbringing, but Plato makes it a point to mislead us here and then remind us that this is not where justice is. The good news is that only one class of the city has to endure this type of lifestyle. In looking ahead to the soul analogy, this means that only one part of the soul must be austere rather than the whole soul. It is a relief to know that in order to be just one does not have to emulate the guardian lifestyle. In the dramatic context of the *Republic*, Plato inspires a bit of fear in the reader that the just life is the guardian life and the

length of the description of the guardian lives contributes to the suspense. Plato later assuages fears that the just life is the guardian life by reminding Adeimantus and the reader that the auxiliary class is only a part of the city rather than the model for the soul.

At 412a, the discussion of the guardians evolves into a discussion about the ruler of the city. The rulers must be guardians within whom all aspects of the guardian upbringing are well harmonized. These rulers will be able to harmonize all of the various components of the city, and eventually, the corresponding ruler of the soul will do so in the individual. The rulers of the city will be the best the guardians; the ones who love the city most and care most for what is advantageous to it as a whole (412e).

v. The Complete Guardians

Socrates then describes the ruling class of the city, who are born of the auxiliary class. These guardians stand out as the best among the other warriors (412c). They are prudent, powerful, and love and care for the city above all else (412c). Those who are chosen to rule are "the most skillful at guarding the city" (412c) and can perfectly harmonize all aspects of the guardian upbringing within their own persons. Men able to harmonize themselves in this way are most qualified to harmonize the city and keep it well ordered. Socrates argues that in order to find the appropriate rulers of the city, individuals in the guardian class will have to be carefully monitored and tested starting from birth so that the best ones can be identified. In describing the complete guardians as individuals, distinct within the guardian class, capable of harmonizing their own souls, Plato provides another instance in which the reader loses sight of the city-soul analogy and mistakes a class for individuals within whom we might find justice.

From this point on (414b), the rulers are referred to as the guardians and the previous guardians (warriors) are referred to as the auxiliary class. The auxiliary class' duty is to carry out the wishes of the complete guardians, who only look to the best of the city as a whole (414b).

vi. Justice in the City

Once the city is built, Socrates and Adeimantus can finally begin to search for justice. In Book I, the discussion turns from wealth to justice because Cephalus argues that wealth keeps men just by ensuring that they pay their debts and do not steal. At 422a, Socrates stresses that the guardians must keep the city safe from wealth and poverty, not because these cause injustice, but because they produce luxury, idleness, illiberality, and wrongdoing. According to Socrates, this is not injustice. In arguing that wealth and poverty are not the causes of justice and injustice, Socrates more fully answers Cephalus' lingering claim that wealth is the source of justice and common understandings we may have that it is.

At 425a, another general intuition about justice, expressed by Thrasymachus in Book I is answered; that the law dictates what is and is not just. Socrates argues that generally, the guardians are so well trained and educated that they will need few laws dictating their actions. Anything that needs legislation they will decide for themselves (425e-d). Socrates dismisses the possible digression without further debate, showing that the justice of the good city does not come from its laws.

Just when it seems that the dialogue will finally turn to justice, Socrates tells the interlocutors that we must first find every other virtue in the city (427d-428a). Plato's account of justice is "what's left over" (428a) in the city after every other virtue has been accounted for. The "left over" (ibid) good will be central to Plato's definition of justice.

Plato presents the good as containing four elements; moderation, wisdom, courage, and justice. It is not clear where this definition of the good comes from but Plato presents it as "plain" and necessary that this must be its account (427e). This account of the good as containing four different elements, of which justice is one, addresses Adeimantus' request that justice be the greatest good. While justice is good, there is a greater good or the "perfectly good" (427e), and justice is equal to the three other virtues that compose it. As Plato's account of justice will necessarily hinge on his account of the three other virtues, Plato presents them before giving the account of justice.

The city is wise because it has good advisors in its guardians. "Good counsel" (428b) in the city is knowledge of "how the city as a whole would best deal with itself and other cities" (428d). While this seems like an account of political justice or foreign relations, it is understandable how wisdom and counsel contributes to good relations between the guardians and the rest of the city or the city with others. The city whose guardians have this knowledge is truly wise (428d).

The city is almost obviously courageous, because its courage comes from its auxiliary and guardian class whose rigorous training we have almost witnessed firsthand. However, in terming the city "courageous" (429c), Plato does not refer to the guardians' and auxiliaries' role as the army of the city. Instead, Plato refers to a sort of emotional courage. The guardians and auxiliaries are courageous because they have the strength to defend their beliefs and stick to their knowledge of right and wrong even when confronted or tempted by falsehoods. They are able to preserve opinions regarding good and bad in the city (429c). This is not courage in our ordinary sense, and does not appeal to our general understanding of bravery. Glaucon says as much to Socrates, telling him that he "didn't quite understand what" Socrates said about courage and tells

him to “say it again” (429c). Glaucon’s confusion reflects our own and Plato indicates that he is aware that this account of courage will catch us off guard, as he is aware his account of justice will as well. Generally understood, bravery comes from taking on enemies, remaining steadfast when confronted by violence, putting oneself in harm’s way during battle or war, and defending one’s notions of dignity, honor, or glory at any cost. For Plato, courage also has this element of confrontation, but it is a confrontation between truth, falsity, and correct beliefs in the city. The guardians of the city, and thus the whole city are courageous because the guardians steadfastly preserve the city’s opinions about what is right and wrong (429c). They do this even in the face of “pains and pleasures and desires and fears” (429d), exerting great courage as Plato presents it. Socrates admits that this courage is “political” (430c), and this qualification gives rise to the possibility that Plato is aware he understands this courage differently than we do. Plato allows for a difference between a political and individual virtue with courage, showing that he is aware his virtues can exist in two different dimensions. Thus, justice can also exist both politically and individually. However, Plato does not give a political account of justice, only an individual one, just as he only gives a political account of courage. In the discussion of the city, political courage is “sufficient” (430c) and the dialogue moves to moderation.

Plato’s presentation of moderation is “a certain kind of order and mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires” (430e). A moderate man is often described as “stronger than himself” (430e), in which one part of his being controls the rowdy, unsuitable, base desires of his other part. Socrates argues that it is “ridiculous” (430e) to divide a man into parts and claim that there is a weaker and stronger part of him when “the same ‘himself’ is referred to” (431a) throughout. Though Socrates calls this ridiculous in relation to a man, he does exactly this when he talks about the wisdom of a city, defining wisdom as “how the city as a whole would best deal with

itself" (428d), or argues that the city is "courageous by a part of itself" (429b). If the city is a larger construction of the man, then one should be able to discuss man in relation to himself. Though Socrates argues it is ridiculous to talk about a man having different parts of himself, in describing moderation of the city, he does this again. A moderate city is one "in which the better rules over the worse" and can appropriately be called "stronger than itself" (431b). The desires and "prudence" of the "decent few" overrule, master, and keep in check the diverse and free desires of the many (431b-d). By calculation, intelligence, and right opinion (431c), the ruling few know which "simple and moderate desires, pleasures and pains" must dictate behavior in their city.

All classes are responsible for moderation in the city, where courage and wisdom were the purview of particular classes (432a). Both the rulers and the ruled are of "the same opinion about who should rule" (431e) and thus the ruled follow the moderate dictates of the rulers. Moderation works to bring "a kind of harmony" to the city (431e) by synchronizing all parts together in at least one respect. Wisdom (knowledge) and courage (preserving the right opinion) direct this moderation.

Finally, Glaucon and Socrates are truly at a point where they can find justice in the city, the purported purpose of constructing the city in the first place. Having found the first three components of the good, justice must be what is left of it. In order to mentally prepare the reader and interlocutors for the grandeur and finale of finding justice, Socrates dramatizes this quest for justice in the city (432b-d). Socrates likens the search for justice to a hunt, and tells Glaucon that they must act like hunters. He tells Glaucon to pay close attention so that "justice doesn't slip through" (432b) and escape their efforts, which they must strenuously apply (432c). Socrates even tells Glaucon to pray that they find justice (432c). Socrates continues to reach for the

dramatic effect and describes the allegorical place in their search for justice as dark, “hard going and steeped in shadows” (432c). However, after this commotion, Socrates abruptly changes direction and declares that he has found justice, and that it was before them all along (432d). The abrupt switch shows that Socrates mocks Glaucon and the reader as well. Socrates reflects back to the interlocutors the initial drama in describing justice at the start of Book II and the grand expectations for an all-encompassing justice. Socrates refers to it as “a stupid state” (432d), and describes the interlocutors and his exploits as “ridiculous” (432e). But whatever Plato believes the qualifications and demands placed on justice to be, ridiculous or stupid, he inspires the curiosity and desire in the reader to see them answered in the way Glaucon, Adeimantus, Thrasymachus, Polemarchus, and the reader demand. Socrates’ change in description of the search for justice prepares us to realize that our expectations for justice’s grandeur will not be met.

Socrates argues that justice is plain and all around us (432d). He tells the reader and interlocutors that we have had justice from the start, but that the drama around it has distracted our gaze away from it (432e). Socrates says that justice was the rule laid down at the very beginning for the functioning city; one man, one art, or that each person in the city “must practice one of the functions in the city” (433a). Justice in the city is each class doing what is appropriate to it; “each of them minding its own business” (434c). This is the only thing left in the good city, the only virtue left without name.

It is not plain that this is a virtue or that this is justice. This account does not appeal to any general or intuitive understandings of justice, and it does not account for many of Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’ requests to Socrates.

Though the account of justice Plato presents in the city is underwhelming, it has yet to be transmuted to the soul. Justice in the city is what is left after eliminating the three other virtues (433b). Socrates argues that this justice, each class minding their own business and not being busybodies "provided the power for all the" other virtues to come into being (ibid). Minding one's own business preserves these virtues in the city (433d). Justice is powerful in this way and is at least as important as every other virtue in the city (433c), though this power and importance falls very short of our expectations.

This failure to meet our expectations is not due to Plato's ignorance of them. Aware that the reader brings his or her own intuitions about justice to the text, Plato makes the claim that people often say justice is "the minding of one's own business and not being a busy body" (433a). Socrates even goes so far to say that he and Glaucon often say this themselves (434b). This shows Plato is aware of our common understandings of justice, but rather than appealing to them, he replaces them with his own unique account of justice.

To call this account of justice one commonly heard is an absurd claim. Though our personal definitions of justice may be varied, muddied, or ambiguous, it usually is not "minding your own business and not being a busybody." Our intuitive sense of justice includes some notion of retribution and duty towards one another as fellow human beings. We primarily apply our understandings of justice to those who break the law. To obtain justice, we demand people pay for their crimes and debt to society. Plato's appeal to what is commonly said of justice includes none of this.

At the very least, Plato's inclusion of this claim about common understandings of justice (433a) forces the reader to pause and consider what is actually said of justice and whether this is it. Plato is aware of the reader's expectations of the dialogue and the search for justice. Though

Plato himself is responsible for inspiring many of them, he does not play to these expectations at this point in the dialogue. Plato may be presenting a new definition of justice, warning us to lower our expectations for it, or compelling us to explore our understandings of justice as the dialogue challenges us back.

After creating confusion between our understandings of justice and his own, Plato attempts to alleviate it slightly by showing that his account of justice can be derived from matters we commonly take to be the purview of justice. The Platonic account of justice in the city can also be derived from "the judging of lawsuits" (433e) and the judicial system. Plato argues that the "aim" of the rulers in judging lawsuits is to ensure that "no one have what belongs to others, nor be deprived of what belongs to him" (433e), and that this is essentially minding one's own business and not meddling in others' affairs. Interfering in the affairs of another class would rightly deprive them of their own business, and the intervening class would be taking what belongs to the other classes, the duties of their respective station. If one did not mind his own business and instead tended that of other peoples, in some respect he would be taking something that belongs to them. This also recalls Thrasymachus' account of justice, in which he argues that injustice is gleefully taking away others' belongings. This appeal to common and previous accounts of justice is meant to provide some proof that Plato's justice accords with justice more commonly understood. The appeal is meant to assuage our fears about this wholly new justice and clear up our confusion, but also to dismiss our common understandings of justice. In an incredibly brief treatment, Plato applies his definition of justice to lawsuits and moves on, dismissing what we usually take to be justice.

Socrates then applies the Platonic definition of justice to injustice. Injustice in the city arises when classes meddle and exchange among each other (434b). Socrates calls this injustice

"the greatest harm for the city" and "extreme evil-doing" (434c). Though Socrates freely condemns injustice in the city, describing it harshly and extremely, he does not and cannot do so to his account of justice. At most, justice has power because it allows other virtues to exist in the city (433b). This stark contrast between the mild treatment of justice and the extreme condemnation of injustice is another indication that justice found through the city-soul analogy will not meet the initial expectations of Book II.

From this extreme definition of injustice, in which it seems a dramatization to call exchange between the classes the greatest possible evil for the city, we receive a class-oriented definition of justice. When each class minds its own business and does what is appropriate to it, the city is just (434c). Though we finally have some definition of justice, it has yet to be described as verbosely as the initial challenges put to it were. However, with an account of justice in the city, we can finally complete the last portion of our initial project and find an account of justice in the individual that may answer our expectations.

vii. Justice in the Soul

At 434d, Socrates reminds us and Glaucon of this initial project. When Socrates gives his definition of justice (434c), Glaucon, like his brother before him, does not pause to consider it, but definitively answers that justice in the city is exactly what Socrates purposes and "no other" (434d). Socrates, indicating to the reader that she too should be cautious, tells Glaucon that they should "not assert it so positively just yet" (434d), and should wait to declare justice found only when they have identified it in the individual through the analogy. In order to do this, Socrates tells Glaucon that the same forms they have identified in the city must also be present in human beings. If the forms resembling these classes are present, then justice will be so as well

Socrates asks Glaucon if the same three forms in the city are present in the soul, and with a dose of his characteristic irony, calls this "a slight question" (435c). Glaucon rightly tells Socrates that the question is anything but slight, and Socrates tells him that finding this answer will be long, weary, and difficult. However, just as he does in the passage concerning finding justice in the city (432b-d), Socrates dramatizes the search and then abruptly changes direction. He tells Glaucon that the road to answering the question of the human forms will be long and hard, and that all of the methodology used to obtain answers up to this point must be discarded (435d). Then abruptly, in a tautology, Socrates poses a must-be true question to Glaucon that already contains its answer. "Isn't it quite necessary," Socrates asks, "for us to agree that the very same forms and dispositions as are in the city are in each of us?" (435e). Socrates calls it "ridiculous" to suppose that the characteristics of the city come from any place other than the those of the men in them.

Besides this being a tautological question, to which Glaucon must agree both to the premise and the answer, Socrates does not provide any proof why it is "necessary" that the same forms must exist in the city and the soul (435e), except for that the claim that the character of a city comes from its people. This proof is strange because it argues that men are characterized primarily by one form of their soul or another, though Socrates has spent most of the preceding books breaking down various classes and showing how they must work in harmony with each other and the city. This is another instance in which the paradox between the character of the city and the individual's contributing to the city's character arises, as first identified in shifting the individual to the city.

After Socrates determines that one aspect of an individual's character determines a city's character as a whole, to clarify the confusion that arises from this assertion, Socrates tries to

show it within the individual himself. He asks Glaucon if individuals act spirited, philosophically, or base due to the "same part" in themselves or different parts. Socrates asks Glaucon if we learn with one part of our soul, "become spirited with another" (436a), and desire pleasure with a third. Glaucon claims that this is more likely, and through logic and argument by example (436b-439d), Socrates and Glaucon find a calculating, rational part of us, a part containing our many desires (434e), and a spirited part that houses our emotions. The spirited part of our soul also aids the calculating part in its deliberations (441a). The calculating, rational part of our soul contains different types of knowledge, reason, and judgment. The desiring part of our soul contains basic desires for food, drink, and sex, as well as extraneous desires beyond these. Remembering how superfluous desires naturally arose in the healthy city after conversation with his interlocutors, Socrates allows for desires beyond the basic ones in our souls (438a).

Thus, not only is there an equal number of classes and forms in both the city and the soul, the functions of the forms themselves are analogous. Each class in the city has a corresponding form in the soul that operates in the same manner. Because justice in the city was understood as each class minding its own business (434c), and both the soul and the city have the same classes within them, "a man is just in the same manner that a city" is (441d). The just man is one in whom each part of his soul minds its own business.

Though Glaucon agrees that justice in the soul is the equivalent to justice in the city, Socrates alludes to "doubts" the interlocutors and reader may still have with this account (442e). This doubt stems from the fact that the justice Plato has presented in no way accords with our intuitive, traditional, or commonsense understandings of it. Plato terms these common expectations for justice "vulgar" (442e) and then cursorily answers them. When this justice is

applied to our vulgar standards or common injustices of theft, adultery, and other vice, Socrates claims it is unthinkable that the man just described would renege on contracts, steal, rob temples, or commit adultery (443a). The allusion to temple robbing reminds the reader of the initial discussion with Thrasymachus, in which even a gang of robber needs justice. Though it was not criticized in Book I, that account of justice between a gang of thieves was not adequate. Though the robbers have some modicum of justice within their group, as a body their efforts are directed towards an unjust enterprise and so they are not just. By virtue of their name, robbers are understood to be unjust people.

Plato's account of justice at 443b faces this same problem. The just man may be internally and Platonically just, but if his external efforts are directed towards an unjust enterprise, like a methodical bank robbery or an art heist, he is not just. All parts of his soul might fulfill their duties, but if they are aimed towards injustice then this individual is not just. Plato allows him to be. Plato's account of justice, now at the conclusion of the city-soul analogy does not address this discrepancy.

Socrates refers to this account of justice in the soul (the one at 443b) as a "phantom" of true justice (443c) and expands the definition. Thus, at the end of Book IV and the completion of the city-soul analogy, the man who possesses justice in his soul is a man who "doesn't let each part in him mind other people's business or the three classes in the soul meddle with each other, but really sets his own house in good order and rules himself" (443d). This man sets his affairs in order, harmonizes his soul, and only acts, if at all, in ways that will preserve his "just" condition (443e). Thus, justice in the soul is minding the business of what is truly one's own (443d).

Socrates asserts that he and the interlocutors have found the just city, the just man, and true justice in them (444a). He tells Glaucon and his interlocutors that their dream of finding their

powerful justice has reached its "perfect fulfillment" (443b). However, while the task of the city-soul analogy was to find justice in the man through construction of the city in speech, the "dream" for it was to find a justice with enough power to meet Glaucon's, Adeimantus', and the reader's challenges and fears. While it may be tempting for the reader to follow the interlocutors in accepting that the city-soul analogy has achieved its purpose solely because Socrates has said so, the reader must pause. As has become a pattern in the text, Glaucon agrees to Socrates' assertion much too quickly and without consideration. The reader must stop and consider whether the dream of finding a compelling justice has been fulfilled. To do so, one must go back to Glaucon's, Adeimantus', and the reader's challenges and compare them to Plato's account of justice derived through the city-soul analogy.

III. Justice at the Analogy's Conclusion

i. Meeting Glaucon's Challenges

Glaucon's challenges to Socrates, though complex, were earlier categorized into three main requests. Glaucon asks Socrates for a defense of justice that proves it is more than a societal compact to avoid injustice. He asks Socrates to show that justice is good in itself, without its positive reputation or the material effects this reputation yields. Finally, he asks Socrates to give an account of justice that shows how justice rather than injustice provides for the good life. Justice as good health and a good condition of the soul answers some of these requirements, but leaves much to be desired in its form at the conclusion of the city-soul analogy (443d).

Glaucon's first request, that justice be more than a contract made from fear is answered minimally by the fact that the analogy's justice has no external component. It is good in itself insofar as health of the soul is good, and is not contractual because this state does not require a relationship with others. In giving the true definition of justice (443c), Socrates tells Glaucon that justice does not concern a man's "external business" at all (ibid), but only "what truly concerns him and his own" (443d). This is his soul and the management of his household. If justice does not include external business and it is unjust to manage others' affairs, then socially obligating them to refrain from injustice through a compact is not just. However, this application of justice only minimally addresses Glaucon's first challenge, and Plato never explicitly addresses Glaucon's point that justice may only be a societal agreement. The account of justice at 443d is a type of health of the soul (444e), and a healthy and harmonious soul is good in itself. The argument that justice is a contract is unaddressed at the analogy's conclusion, and the lack of its mention combined with justice's lack of external focus is troubling. If justice is wholly contained within the individual and his internal business, then a social contract not to commit injustice

leaves a man safer than Plato's justice does now. Because Plato argues that a just man only acts or enters a private contract if it preserves his harmonized soul (443e), telling others that they must act justly towards him would be meddling in affairs and would denigrate his soul's own healthy condition. Thus, Plato's justice leaves his just man regularly open to injustice from others, one of the very issues Glaucon wanted Socrates to defend against (362a).

Glaucon's second challenge to Socrates is that justice may only be good for its positive reputation rather than any virtue in itself. This challenge is unaccounted for in Plato's phantom presentation of justice at 441d and its extended version at 443c-444a.While justice is a "certain health… and good condition of the soul" (444d-e), Plato does not describe the health of this man's relationships with others, his reputation. In the dialogue, Socrates does not refer to the reputation of the just man whatsoever, leaving open the possibility that this man, concerned only with his own affairs could as easily acquire a reputation of selfishness as he could of justice. Socrates, like Glaucon eliminates reputation as a reason to practice justice, but only because he does not mention it at all. This is not a response to Glaucon's challenge, and instead is a missing piece that justice found through the city-soul analogy should have accounted for.

Glaucon also challenges Socrates to show that justice provides for the good life, and that tangible effects and a good reputation come from justice. Glaucon identifies the good life as wealth, good marriages, good offices, and riches in the afterlife. Glaucon removes them from justice by giving them to the perfectly unjust man, and in doing so asks that Socrates later give them to the perfectly just man. At no point in this conclusion of the city-soul analogy does Socrates make a mention of material effects, or just reputation, which at this point in the dialogue could still belong to the unjust man with whom Glaucon originally put them. Justice as health, as good as health is, still falters in light of riches and material wealth on earth and in the afterlife.

Until Plato presents a mechanism through which this good health and harmony compensates for this lack of material comfort, or leads to it, justice at the end of the city-soul analogy wants in this respect as well. At the analogy's conclusion, Plato's account of justice almost completely disregards the outside world. Justice does not concern a man's external business; a just man has the option of never acting outside his home, and if he does act he only does so in a manner that preserves his soul's harmonious condition (443e). Though this is an abstract and complex notion, Plato does not provide any example of what an activity like this might be, as anything "concerning the acquisition of money…something political, or concerning private contracts " (443e) would necessarily involve other people and meddling in their business. Because the account of justice at the end of the city-soul analogy has not met Glaucon's challenges in the way he asked, the use of the city-soul analogy to find justice has initially failed. While justice as health of the soul is good in itself, Glaucon very powerfully demands more from Socrates, and because the city-soul comparison is undertaken to find a justice that answers these demands, the analogy is not legitimate at this point in the dialogue.

ii. Meeting Adeimantus' Challenge

Adeimantus' requests are met with more success than his brother's by the account of justice given at the end of the city-soul analogy. Adeimantus' first request, that justice be good for more than its positive reputation is answered in the same way his brother's was (barely), but his second challenge, that justice be more profitable than injustice is addressed directly (444e-445a). In fact, Socrates not only refers to Adeimantus' request that justice should be more profitable than injustice "whether or not one's being [just] remains unnoticed" (445a), but also Thrasymachus' earlier challenge that injustice is profitable when one does not have to pay a penalty and can get away with it cleanly (ibid). Glaucon answers for his brother, and argues that

life is not "livable" with a soul corrupted by injustice, and thus it is not profitable (ibid). No amount of food, drink, wealth, or power could make life worth living without the harmony of justice, even if a man could do whatever he wanted to (ibid). It is not profitable to the man, even with a great deal of actual money, to be unjust if his soul is in a state of disrepair.

Glaucon claims that the gravity and power of the justice they have found at the end of the analogy makes these statements obvious (445a), and Socrates agrees (445b). It is not at all clear how this is so. Justice at the conclusion of the analogy is a man minding his own affairs, or more specifically each part of a man's soul minding its own business. That the health of a man's soul makes boundless riches seem less profitable than a harmonized condition is difficult to see from this account alone. From this account of justice and the dialogue so far, there seems to be no overwhelming appeal to justice if an unjust man can still do whatever he wants and can even have "every sort of food and drink and every sort of wealth and every sort of rule" he so desires (445a).

Adeimantus' last request, that Socrates prove justice the greatest good and injustice the greatest evil is the most profound. However, Socrates does not, at any point in the construction of the city and the soul, nor in his brief description of justice at the end of the city-soul analogy, argue that justice is the greatest good. In fact, Plato takes great pains to illustrate his belief that justice is not the greatest good, but one of four components of good, and that "the good" (427e) exists above justice. Even adding Adeimantus' qualifier that Socrates should prove justice the greatest good a man can have in his soul (366e), Plato's definition of justice refers to a state or condition of the soul rather than a possession in it. This is problematic because the continued physical reference to justice in part gave rise to city-soul analogy. Justice as a condition of the

soul also leaves Adeimantus' final and most grave request that justice be the greatest good unaddressed.

iii. Meeting the Reader's Challenges

Though the reader's expectations and intuitions upon reading about justice are referred to throughout the text, the reader's challenges to justice are the ones left most unfulfilled by Plato's account of justice at the conclusion of the city-soul analogy (443c-444a). Though one might object that Plato has no duty to address the reader's challenges and expectations, in using the term justice, in leaving spaces for the reader to respond, and in often dramatizing the search for justice, Plato fully expects the reader to engage in his dialogues as the implicit interlocutor.

Though Plato indicates at various points that he is aware of the reader's expectations for justice, he only addresses one portion of our common, "vulgar standards" (442e) and not the other. Plato applies his definition of justice in the city to the judgment of lawsuits (433e) and justice in the man to "temple robberies, thefts," adultery, and unjust things of that nature (443a). Plato dismisses our common understandings of justice by terming them vulgar, meeting them at their surface, and then moving on. The just individual Plato describes would not rob temples or renege on contracts because this would presumably be outside his internal business or the affairs of any part of his soul. In fact, Socrates says that the "cause" of the just or harmonized man's abstention from these commonly unjust acts is because "each of the parts in him minds its own business" (443b). It is not obvious to the reader, even after the journey through the city-soul analogy, how exactly the rightfully minded soul would abstain from these unjust acts, but Plato does not provide any more detail as Glaucon readily agrees to Socrates' assertions.

This lack of detail and support for how the rightfully minded soul will refrain from injustice leaves open the possibility that this soul, in minding its own affairs, could easily make injustice

its business. Because Plato offers no outside standards of justice for the soul to respond to, not even something as "vulgar" as the many's categorization of unjust acts, the soul's idea of just and unjust are completely self-determined. The calculating part of the soul could determine that what is traditionally unjust is its rightful business, and could enlist all parts of the soul in an unjust enterprise. So long as each part does its duty in and obeys the ruling part, the soul aimed towards this unjust enterprise is still just according to the Platonic account. As stated before, Plato himself points to this conundrum in Book I when Socrates tells Thrasymachus that even an unjust gang of pirates will have to act with justice towards one another in order to achieve their injustice. Platonic justice not only fails to meet basic requirements we have for justice but allows for "vulgarly" unjust acts. Of course, the calculating part of the soul is ruled by wisdom, knowledge, and correct opinions about right and wrong, but even if the calculating part of the soul did not possess the correct wisdom but still ruled all the parts of the soul in concert, this ignorant individual would be just. He would only be just, but not wise.

As stated before, while our "vulgar standards" (442e) are met their surface, the second portion of our understanding of justice is that it should refer to some sort of interaction with others. This is left unanswered. This is especially troubling because justice is an inherently political notion. Plato too recognizes this, as he attempts to find justice through the construction of a polis. However, justice does not refer to our relationships in the city at all (443c-d). Extending our relationships with others too far is actually a violation of the Platonic account of justice. Justice only refers to a man's external business and what truly concerns him and his own, and often bids a man not to act. This bars him from prolonged interaction with others. At line 443e, Socrates says that a man only does something political or enters into contracts with others if it serves to contribute to the harmony of his soul. But Plato does not give an indication of what

an action like this might be, and since it is not obvious an example is necessary. In the line directly above the mention of political action and private contracts, Socrates says that only if the just man successfully harmonizes the three parts of his soul and all aspects in between, sets his house in good order, and becomes his own friend (443d), "then, and only then, will he act, if he *does* act" (443e, emphasis added). This implies that if the just man takes a lifetime to meet all of Plato's requirements for justice, or chooses not to act at all (as Plato allows for this), this individual could still be just, even without doing positive things for others or contributing to the common good. This goes against our intuitions of justice, and completely removes the political aspect of justice inherent in Plato's use of the term. The city-soul analogy, at the point Socrates declares its task fulfilled, has failed to live up to Glaucon's, Adeimantus', and the reader's expectations for its legitimacy in finding justice.

IV. True Justice

At the end of Book IV, when Socrates declares the justice they are looking for found, Glaucon readily agrees and tells Socrates that life only seems worth living with this Platonic account of justice in the soul. Though the city-soul analogy is illegitimate at this point in providing an account of justice that meets its many expectations, Glaucon agrees that justice has been found and the various challenges satisfied (443c). Plato pushes forward, and in Books V-VIII contemplates ways to bring the just polis into reality. Glaucon's ready agreement allows room for Plato's political philosophy, and gives space for him to provide support for ideas like rule of the philosopher kings (473d) and invasions of existing cities (540e/541a). It is made clear that to an extent, Plato believes that the things said about the most just regime "are not in every way prayers" and are "hard but in a way possible" to bring to reality if one or more true philosophers ruled a city (540d). Further, Plato connects many of the problems in existing regimes to their deviation from this most just city structure. If Glaucon had doubted that justice in the individual was really found, rather than examining the logistics of the just city, Socrates and his interlocutors would have had to "go back again to the city" and compare it to the soul, consider them side by side, and" would again have to "make justice burst into flame" (434e-435a). However, Glaucon declares justice found, and Plato expands his political philosophy in Books V-VII.

Though Socrates declares justice found at the end of Book IV, it is not until Book VIII that the remaining gaps in Glaucon's, Adeimantus', and the reader's challenge to justice are filled. Though Plato makes a delay in answering them and showing how his account of justice fully answers these expectations, the delay makes space for his political project. True justice is found eventually. At the start of Book VI, Socrates says that there are "many things left to treat

for one who is going to see…the difference … between the just life and the unjust one" (484a). This indicates that Plato is aware that his account of justice in Book IV has failed to live up to expectations, and that the space before he answers them is deliberate.

In order to fully realize justice so that it lives up to the parameters set in Book II, Socrates argues that "a complete consideration" of pure justice must involve a comparison to pure injustice, "with respect to the happiness and wretchedness of the men possessing them" (545a). Socrates argues that this will answer Thrasymachus' claims and persuade them to choose either the just or unjust life (ibid). That Socrates still considers Thrasymachus' claims unanswered and the unjust life still an option for the interlocutors, even so far into the *Republic* as Book VIII shows how drastically incomplete Book IV's account of justice is. Furthermore, though justice as good health of the soul is meant to be good enough in itself, its power is not enough to answer Glaucon, Adeimantus, and the reader without a comparison to injustice and a more thorough description of the good life.

Just as the feverish city evolves from the denigration of the healthy city, so do progressively unjust regimes and men. As more people and more mistakes come into the just city, aristocracy devolves into timocracy, in which the honor- and victory-loving few rule. Timocracy quickly devolves into an oligarchy in which those with the most property rule, and this becomes a democracy that the many control. Out of democratic chaos, the need for a leader is born, and when a tyrant inevitably seizes power, the just city has fully devolved into a tyranny. The same holds true for corresponding men; the aristocratically just man, through years of mistakes devolves into the timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and finally the tyrannical man. Each degradation of the man involves increased injustice, until the tyrannical man finally encompasses all of the injustices of the men before him. In describing the injustices of the different type of

men, Socrates discusses them in traditionally Platonic terms and in ways we more commonly think of injustice. This serves to meet some of the reader's expectations as well. For example, the timocratic man, in allowing his spirited part to overrule his soul, develops a brutish, victory-loving nature (549a). This man is unjust in ways we traditionally understand; for example, he is cruel and brutal to slaves (ibid). In another example, the oligarchic regime is unjust because it allows the greatest of evils into its city, giving men the right to acquire things that do not belong to them while other men are made poor (552a). This account appeals to the Platonic account of justice found through the city-soul analogy in which each man only has what is rightfully his. In the oligarchic city where men are easily made poor, beggars, thieves, cutpurses, and temple robbers run rampant (552d), exhibiting behavior the reader considers traditionally unjust. The oligarchic man would let the desiring part of his soul overrun his whole person and would be obsessed with acquiring money (553d). This makes the oligarchic man "stingy" (554a) and ungenerous, and he refuses to contribute to the common good of the city (555a). This is something the reader too understands as traditionally unjust. While the oligarchic man works hard to hide his unjust desires which are always at the forefront of his soul, when he has opportunities for traditional injustice, like in the "guardianship of orphans" or care of those less fortunate (554c), he takes full advantage of them. The tyrannical man robs temples and strikes his parents (574b-d). Examples like these more fully answer our general or "vulgar" (442e) expectations of injustice, and even slightly address our desire that justice include some account of relations with each other and to the city.

Glaucon's request that the just life be the good life is answered completely in the latter books of the *Republic*. In Book IX Socrates argues that the comparison between the life of the tyrant, the most unjust man and the life of the most just man really comes down to a question about "the

greatest thing, a good life" (578c). The good life is the happiest and best one, and by the end of Book IX, Glaucon is truly ready to declare the just life the happiest (580b). In meeting Glaucon's challenge, Socrates sets the life of the most unjust man in perfect opposition to the just man, exactly as Glaucon did in Book II. Like Thrasymachus, Socrates too calls the perfectly unjust man the tyrant, only he shows that the unjust man in no way participates in happiness or the good life.

The tyrant is a man in whom the desiring part of his soul runs rampant and controls his entire person. Unlike the oligarchic man whose desire for money outweighs and suppresses his other desires, or the democratic man who satisfies each desire as it occurs to him, the tyrant is enslaved by his unruly desires (577d). The desires of the tyrant overpower his person and enslave and direct the calculating and spirited parts of his soul to turn his tyrannical desires into overwhelming obsessions. These desires control the tyrant so that he thirsts for the power and wealth to satisfy them at any cost. This renders the tyrant friendless (576a), an enemy to everyone and himself, and accountable to no one. The tyrant exists in a hell of his own personal making. As such, he in no way participates in the good life but is "envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious" and full of vice (580a). He is completely alone, abandoned by the gods, other human beings, and himself most of all. Even more miserable than this man, is the public tyrant who has the misfortune to obtain political power, sought after to feed his desires. He is forced to play out his enslavement on the public stage. As such, everyone can witness his weaknesses and he is at the most vulnerable vantage point to his enemies.

The just man however, lives a life in complete opposition to this. He is the master, king, and friend firstly of himself, and to the gods and people he chooses to interact with, if at all. The just, happiest man is the philosopher, and his life is truly the good life because he has the sweetest and

fullest of all the pleasures, wisdom (583b). Knowledge is the true purview of the just man ruled by reason, and both honor and desire accompany it (581d). The man who chooses the pleasure of wisdom tastes all the pleasures, and possesses them all to an extent, but makes the best one the priority of his life. Those who settle for lower pleasures, such as good food, drink, honor, or victory only do so because they are ignorant of the higher pleasure of knowledge (585b). When the soul is just and each part minds its own business, each part is allowed to enjoy its respective pleasures more fully. The pleasures of one part do not overrun the soul and ruin the pleasures of the others (586e). To address one of Thrasymachus' claims; the just man gets more of and the better of everything because he more fully participates in truth and pleasure than any other man (585b-c)

The just also live the good life because they possess the positive reputations associated with justice and the goods these yield. Though Socrates leaves the claim standing in the initial answer to justice, he frankly tells Glaucon that it would be impossible for the unjust man to act in the city as Glaucon described and get away with it. This man could never have a reputation of justice (612c). A man only obtains a reputation of justice from acting with justice, and this reputation yields all the things Glaucon and Adeimantus correctly associated with the just man. The just man's actions do not go unnoticed by other humans or gods, and the unjust man eventually makes himself ridiculous through his unjust actions (613b-c).

This account of reputation addresses the remaining gap in the brothers' challenge that the just man should get effects and goods in the city. These come from the positive reputations, only possible through true justice itself. For example, the just man can pursue honors and awards in the city, and chooses to obtain them when they better his soul (591e-592a). For further effects belonging to justice, Socrates asks Glaucon back for the goods he took away from justice in

Book II. The rightfully belong to *being* rather than only seeming just (612c-d, emphasis added). These goods include divine blessings, good marriages, prizes and awards from humans and gods, all the domain of the just man (613d).

Thus, the just life is complete, and fully meets the challenges explicitly articulated in Book II. The city-soul analogy, though immediately unsuccessful, is so eventually in its ability to provide for the *Republic*'s later account of justice. While Glaucon's and Adeimantus' demands for justice are answered, the initial and final accounts of justice do not fully meet the reader's expectations.

Conclusion

Though Glaucon's, Adeimantus', and most of the reader's challenges for justice are satisfied, one fundamental gap in the Platonic account of justice still remains. Justice, for all of its effects, reputations, and power for the good life, is as insular at the conclusion of the *Republic* as it was at the conclusion of the city-soul analogy in Book IV. The just man, even after the additions of Book VIII-X, can remain as selfish as he was when justice was simply "each part of a man's soul minding its own business" (441d). Justice, though expanded does not include any reference to its political implications and its place in relationships between people and in the city.

Justice in this state is also static. Even after the expansion of justice in Books VIII-X, the just man's acting upon others or in the city is conditional upon his proclivities. Whenever Socrates refers to the activity of the just man, he prefaces it with "if" (443e). If the just man acts, it is only in ways that he ensures he remains just, and as Plato offers no suggestion of what these activities might be, it is possible that this just man could not act at all. In fact, Aristotle makes this same criticism of Platonic justice, arguing that the "possession of [this] virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity" (Nicomachean Ethics, I.V). This man, though he never provides service to other citizens, or does anything good for others, is still just according to Plato. This does not accord with our intuitive or general understandings of what makes a person just, and is a hole in the *Republic*'s account of justice.

Lastly, Plato's justice is completely apolitical. Justice is an inherently political notion, rather than a concept used to describe the state of one's being. Plato, in attempting to find justice, does it through construction of the city, a political act to find a political virtue. Plato is aware of the political nature of justice, yet justice in its most complete form in the *Republic* is completely apolitical. Glaucon, at the close of the *Republic*, tells Socrates that it is apparent that the just man

will not be politically involved or motivated by political honors (592a). Socrates reassures Glaucon, the lover of honor (548d), that the just man will be political, but only in the most just city (592a). Glaucon understands exactly what Socrates means by this; the just city exists only in speeches (592b). Plato's just man is only involved politically in an internal and possibly verbal contemplation of political philosophy, and does not give back to the city in the form of justice as we generally understand it. Though the just men of the *Republic* are the philosophers, there are other needs human beings have of one another, and philosophy does not seem to address all the gaps we expect justice to account for in reading the *Republic.*

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