

**Distribution Agreement**

In presenting this thesis as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for a degree from Emory University, I hereby grant to Emory University and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive, make accessible, and display my thesis in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter now, including display on the World Wide Web. I understand that I may select some access restrictions as part of the online submission of this thesis. I retain all ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis.

Sweta Maturu

16 April 2013

The United Nations Peacekeeping and Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Societies

by

Sweta Maturu

Dr. Kyle Beardsley

Advisor

Department of Political Science

Dr. Kyle Beardsley

Advisor

Dr. David Davis

Committee Member

Dr. Carol Anderson

Committee Member

2013

The United Nations Peacekeeping and Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Societies

by

Sweta Maturu

Dr. Kyle Beardsley

Advisor

An abstract of  
a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Emory College of Arts and Sciences  
of Emory University in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements of the degree of  
Bachelor of Arts with Honors

Department of Political Science

2013

## **ABSTRACT**

The United Nations Peacekeeping and Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Societies

By Sweta Maturu

The United Nations frequently engages in peacekeeping activities in post-conflict societies in order to build and sustain peace. A crucial component to the durability of peace is the rule of law. While there is extensive empirical literature on whether or not UN peacekeeping is effective in improving the durability of peace in a post-conflict setting, there is little literature that empirically examines whether or not UN peacekeeping can improve the rule of law in a post-conflict state. This study empirically examines the relationship between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law in a post-conflict state to ultimately determine if UN peacekeeping has a positive effect in improving the quality of rule of law. Using regression and matching analysis, this study does not find support for UN peacekeeping influencing the rule of law in a post-conflict setting in either a positive or negative direction. Even then, the "non-findings" of this study have implications for policy makers who wish to have post-conflict peacebuilding efforts have a positive substantive effect on improving the rule of law.

The United Nations Peacekeeping and Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Societies

by

Sweta Maturu

Dr. Kyle Beardsley

Advisor

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Emory College of Arts and Sciences  
of Emory University in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements of the degree of  
Bachelor of Arts with Honors

Department of Political Science

2013

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I would first like to thank Dr. Kyle Beardsley for his guidance, advice, suggestions and patience throughout this project. This thesis would not have materialized if it weren't for his help, particularly with understanding political science quantitative methods. I am very thankful for all I have learned and for his thoughtful comments and suggestions.

I would also like to thank Dr. David Davis and Dr. Carol Anderson for their important suggestions with various quantitative and qualitative aspects of my study. I would also like to thank Dr. Thomas Remington for his guidance in understanding the political science research process, and Rob O'Reilly at the Emory Data Center for his help in collecting and manipulating data used in this study.

Finally, I would like to thank my family, friends and thesis cohort for their endless encouragement, unwavering support and award-worthy, incredible levels of patience throughout this process. They are all phenomenal human beings, and I cannot thank them enough.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.....	1
Defining Key Concepts.....	2
Literature Review.....	4
Factors that affect durability of peace.....	5
Peacekeeping and the durability of peace.....	10
Rule of law and the durability of peace.....	14
Post-conflict justice and the durability of peace.....	17
Peacekeeping and the rule of law.....	20
Non-random Assignment.....	22
Theory & Hypotheses.....	25
Research Design.....	28
Regression Analysis Results.....	37
Results, Empirical Findings, and Interpretation for World Bank Measure.....	37
Results, Empirical Findings, and Interpretation for CIM measure.....	44
Matching Analysis Results.....	52
Results for Matching Analysis using World Bank Measure as DV.....	52
Results for Matching Analysis using CIM measure as DV.....	53
Discussion of Empirical Results.....	55
Case Study: UN Peacekeeping Rule of Law Programming in Liberia.....	57
Context of engagement.....	57
Evaluating UNMIL's work.....	69
Conclusion.....	83
Conclusion & Further Research.....	84
Appendix.....	90
Works Cited.....	91
<b>FIGURES AND TABLES:</b>	
Table 1: Variables in Analysis.....	31
Table 2: Independent Variable Models.....	32
<i>Results for difference in World Bank rule of law scores as dependent variable</i>	
Table 3: PCJ Amnesty.....	40
Table 4: SSRI.....	41
Table 5: No PCJ Amnesty or SSRI.....	42
Figure 1: Substantive Effects with World Bank measure (Table 3, Model A).....	43
<i>Results for difference in CIM values as dependent variable</i>	
Table 6: All controls (Amnesty and SSR at the same time).....	47
Table 7: Controls + Amnesty control (no SSRI).....	48

Table 8: Controls + SSRI control (No Amnesty) .....	49
Table 9: Controls sans Amnesty and SSR controls .....	50
Figure 2: Substantive Effects for CIM measure (Table 6, Model A) .....	51

*Matching Analysis*

Table 10: Regression Results with CEM weight (using algorithm) using World Bank DV .....	52
Table 11: Regression Results with CEM weight (explicit user choice) using World Bank DV ...	52
Table 12: Regression Results with algorithm CEM weight using CIM DV.....	53
Table 13: Regression Results with CEM weight (explicit user choice) using DV .....	54

*Summary Statistics*

Table 14: Summary Statistics for World Bank Rule of Law dataset.....	90
Table 15: Summary Statistics for CIM values dataset.....	90



## INTRODUCTION

“[In Bosnia] we thought that democracy was the highest priority, and we measured it by the number of elections we could organize...In hindsight, we should have put the establishment of the rule of law first, for everything else depends on it: a functioning economy, a free and fair political system, the development of civil society, [and] public confidence in police and the courts.”

– Lord Paddy Ashdown, UN High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, October 2002

The United Nations since its inception has worked to ensure international peace and security through various means, particularly through the use of UN peacekeeping forces.

International interventions, especially those carried out by the UN, however, are questioned for their actual ability to end conflict and maintain peace in the aftermath of a conflict. This thesis will examine the effect that United Nations actions, specifically peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures, have on security and the political and social conditions in intrastate conflict and post intrastate conflict societies.

One important aspect of a post-conflict state is the status of its rule of law institutions. The rule of law is a principle of governance in which people, institutions, entities both public and private, and the government itself, are accountable to laws. In post-conflict settings, countries require the strengthening of confidence in police, justice systems and correctional services (key components of rule of law) to ensure the promise of durable peace. Therefore, this paper will explore the following question: In a conflict and post-conflict setting, is UN peacekeeping effective in the improving the rule of law? I want to compare the UN's effectiveness in improving the quality of a host country's three main rule of law institutions: police, justice, corrections. Does the presence of UN peacekeeping troops, UN police, and/or UN formed police units help improve the effectiveness of the police, justice, and corrections sectors and the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict society?

Underlying this main question are several other important factors: What conditions facilitate and prevent the success of UN peacekeepers in restoring the rule of law, or creating where none – the systems, norms and value systems – previously existed? Are UN peacekeeping efforts in rule of law reform effective in the short-term where they must stabilize the environment so violence does not outbreak, *and* the long-term when peacekeeping forces have left? Are UN rule of law efforts ultimately helpful for the development of good governance practices and sustainable peace?

## **DEFINING KEY CONCEPTS**

### ***Rule of Law***

What exactly is the rule of law? Academics and policy-makers have historically struggled to accurately define this term, as it is a concept that encompasses several issues and can be applied to different situations. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his 2004 report, *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies*, defines the rule of law as: “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.”

Moreover, Thomas Carothers (1998) defines the rule of law as “a system in which the laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone.” Specifically,

the rule of law involves the following “anyone accused of a crime has the right to a fair, prompt hearing and is presumed innocent until proved guilty. The central institutions of the legal system, including courts, prosecutors, and police, are reasonably fair, competent, and efficient. Judges are impartial and independent, not subject to political influence or manipulation. Perhaps most important, the government is embedded in a comprehensive legal framework, its officials accept that the law will be applied to their own conduct, and the government seeks to be law-abiding.”

These two definitions encompass the manner in which the term “rule of law” will be used in this thesis. The rule of law is a system in which people are held accountable to the law equitably and independently, and requires the effective functioning of several institutions of the legal system including the judicial, police, and corrections sectors of a society.

### *Peacekeeping*

Not all UN peacekeeping missions are the same. Borrowing from the conceptual definitions of Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and Fortna (2004), we can divide UN peacekeeping missions into different categories.

*A monitoring or observer mission* is an “interim arrangement used in violent conflicts with the consent of the host government. In these conflicts, there is no formal determination of aggression. The purpose is to monitor a truce and help negotiate a peace through the presence of military and civilian observers” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). These missions are not armed; their main task is to simply watch and report on what they observe (Fortna 2004).

*A traditional peacekeeping mission* involves deploying military units and civilian expert officials to facilitate the negotiated settlement of a conflict. It is usually authorized with a Chapter VI mandate under the UN Charter, meaning it is deployed with the consent of the parties

involved. This type of peacekeeping mission is meant to monitor compliance with an agreement, but they can also “establish and police a buffer zone and assist the demobilization and disarmament of military forces” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004).

*A multidimensional peacekeeping mission* is also consent based, but it is structured towards implementing a more comprehensive peace agreement. It includes “a mix of strategies to build a self-sustaining peace, ranging from those of traditional peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to more multidimensional strategies for capacity expansion (e.g., economic reconstruction) and institutional transformation (e.g., reform of the police, army, and judicial system; elections; civil society rebuilding)” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Rule of law reform activities then are a part of multidimensional peacekeeping missions.

*Peace enforcement missions* involve military intervention and operate under a Chapter VII mandate. Peacekeeping missions that operate under a Chapter VII mandate are sent into volatile conflict settings where the State is either unable or unwilling to maintain security and order. Chapter VII mandated missions involve traditional peacekeeping tasks but also include more complex tasks whose success may require the use of active and coercive force against armed forces.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

Current literature on peacekeeping and peacebuilding covers the factors that affect the durability of peace and post-conflict stability, and the overall impact that peacekeeping has on the durability of peace. There is also a body of literature, though not as extensive, on the impact that the rule of law and democracy has on the durability of peace in a post-conflict setting. The academic literature on the effect of peacekeeping on the rule of law in a post-conflict setting,

however, is minimal. Most literature on the relationship exists is policy-based and is more qualitative in nature. Thus, this literature review will go over the factors that influence the durability of peace in a post-conflict setting, how peacekeeping operations affect the durability of peace, how the rule of law affects the durability of peace, and the potential effect of post-conflict justice on the rule of law and the durability of peace. I will then identify the gap in peacekeeping literature on the rule of law. Finally, I discuss how previous peacekeeping literature has handled the problem of peacekeeping being non-randomly assigned.

### *What affects the durability of peace after a civil war?*

Understanding what factors affect the durability of peace is helpful in understanding what impacts the rule of law in a post-conflict setting. There is a significant focus in the peacekeeping literature that discusses the factors that affect the overall durability of peace after a civil war. One factor is the military outcome of the war; if a war ends in stalemate or a compromised settlement, as opposed to if one side achieves a clear military victory, peace is thought to be more difficult to maintain. This is because an indecisive military outcome leaves all opponents able to resume fighting, and no one completely satisfied with the provisions of peace (Licklider 1995; Toft 2003; Fortna 2004).

In particular, Toft argues that negotiated settlements are insufficient in establishing the durability of peace because they lack “credible mechanisms that establish the threat of harm to perpetrators of violence – and most notably reforming the security sector – are often given little to no consideration” (Toft 2010). Negotiated settlements are more appealing to warring factions after a conflict because they offer the promise of reduced violence. They are also more appealing because “the security sector may be implicated in the worst excesses of the war, in which case

the people would be disinclined to reconstitute security institutions, thereby re-empowering them with a capacity that could be used for future repression and civil war.” Toft argues, however, that while negotiated settlements are favored by those involved in a conflict, most fail in establishing a durable peace after a conflict as they do not include comprehensive provisions to reform security sector institutions. Security sector reform offers the possibility of an enduring peace after a conflict as it improves state capacity to respond to future conflicts (Toft 2010).

Another factor that impacts the durability of peace after a civil war is the type of institutional arrangement agreed upon in a conflict settlement agreement. There is currently a divide in the literature on the exact effect partition agreements have on the durability of peace. On the one hand, partition arrangements that are fully implemented, as opposed to unitarism and autonomy arrangements or less-than fully implemented partition agreements, could be better at preserving post-conflict peace and facilitating democratization. Chapman and Roeder argue that by reducing the occurrence of identity incompatibility, limiting the number of decisions that have to be made jointly (partition agreements are stronger at preventing conflicts on who owns decision rights over disputed territories and populations), preventing the creation of political institutions that empower parties with more resources to coerce other parties to do what they want, and reducing opportunities for escalation due to a failure of deterrence. Partition, Chapman and Roeder argue, helps the durability of peace in post-conflict setting by resolving commitment problems held by each party involved (Chapman and Roeder 2007). On the other hand, Sambanis finds that partition tends to be painful, costly, and potentially plant the seeds for future conflict. He finds that partition does not make any difference in reducing the risk of war recurrence, thus finding that separating ethnic groups does not resolve problems of violent ethnic antagonism. He argues that there are other sustaining factors that are more important in

maintaining post-conflict stability other than partition, such as strengthening political institutions and promoting socioeconomic development (Sambanis 2000).

Another factor that potentially affects the durability of peace in a post-conflict setting is the level of ethnic heterogeneity/divisions within a country. There is disagreement in the literature on whether the effect is positive, negative, or neutral. Some argue that since ethnic groups will have varying preferences over the terms of a settlement, finding a mutually acceptable peace settlement will be more difficult the more ethnic groups that are involved. Additionally, ethnically polarized societies make it more difficult for combatants to reconcile after the end of a civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004). On the other hand, others find that ethnic divisions do not influence the duration of a peace settlement because in conflicts of all types (not just ethnic conflicts) “antagonists face the same set of security concerns regarding questions of how and by who and to what end central state authority is to be exercised after the war’s end” (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001). Related to ethnic heterogeneity, the number of factions also affects the ability of involved parties to reach a settlement in the first place. The number of factions involved in a civil war can make it harder to solve and make peace harder to maintain if a settlement as been reach, compared to wars that just involve two factions. More factions mean that there is a larger pool of diverging preferences, which makes it harder to reach a cooperative agreement (Doyle and Sambanis 2000).

Two related factors that also affect the presence of sustainable peace are the cost and duration of civil wars. More costly wars are indicative of intractable conflicts that have a high probability of resuming. Higher death tolls make it more difficult for parties involved in a conflict to reconcile with those responsible for the deaths of their loved ones (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004). On the other hand, the longer duration of war could also provide

both sides incentives to cooperate (as they do not want to bear the costs of war/fighting any longer), which could make peace easier to maintain after a settlement as been reached (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001; Fortna 2004).

The peacekeeping literature also cites economic development as a factor that can improve the likelihood of a durable peace after war. A higher level of development can reduce the likelihood of renewed war. Walter (2004) argues that civil wars recur because rebel groups are able to recruit large amounts of citizens. Citizens will choose to enlist with rebel groups because they hold grievances and/or hold a severe dissatisfaction with their current situation. Rebel recruitment is vital for the emergence (or re-emergence) of war. Economic development affects the opportunity costs that individuals face in choosing to enlist/re-enlist in war. Because economic development improves the living conditions of citizens, it removes the incentives that citizens have to enlist with rebel groups that want to engage in conflict. Thus, countries that have higher levels of economic development are able to provide to their citizens and better create a more open political system, consequently reducing the likelihood of conflict recurrence (Walter 2004). More developed countries with lower levels of poverty have better capabilities in rebuilding after war, and are less susceptible to conflict that stems from economic grievance. A larger local capacity (that stems from economic development) allows for a country to better address war-related hostilities after a civil war, thus increasing the probability for peacebuilding success (Doyle and Sambanis 2000).

Numerous studies have found that peace is more difficult to maintain in countries that have a high economic dependence on primary commodity exports (which include natural resources). Many of these goods are easily “lootable,” such as diamonds and oil, and can drive conflict further as they increase the availability of finance. This increase in finance allows rebel



groups to build armed capacity and military resources, and therefore increase the risk of war. Furthermore, natural resource/primary commodity dependence implies that a country has an undiversified economy, which is more vulnerable to price shocks. These countries lack manufacturing and service sectors that help develop human capital and economic growth, two key factors in sustaining peace (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2001).

Lastly, the level of democracy in a country can also affect the durability of peace after conflict. If a country has experienced a democratic political regime before the conflict, actors are more likely to have experience dealing with multiple factions that compete for inclusion in political institutions. A history of being able to accommodate and include multiple groups in political institutions can help ease fears by involved parties that one group will be politically aggressive and dominating in the post-conflict setting. This, in turn, alleviates concerns regarding the potential for an antagonist to defect from a negotiated settlement (Hartzell, Hoddie, Rothchild 2001; Walter 2004)

The factors listed above (military outcome of war, form of conflict settlement, levels of ethnic heterogeneity, cost and duration of civil war, economic development, and democracy levels) have the potential to help improve state capacity. Improved state capacity to respond to crises helps deter conflict/prevent conflict recurrence. Much like the factors discussed above, rule of law reform in a post-conflict setting has the potential to increase the capacity and improve the quality of state institutions and their ability to prevent conflict from recurring. The factors listed above help prevent the resumption of a civil war and contribute to the durability of peace. Consequently, viewing the rule of law in terms of a contributing factor to the durability of peace, these factors could potentially affect the strength of the rule of law in a post-conflict setting. The

next section discusses the mechanisms by which peacekeeping missions impact the durability of peace in post-conflict settings.

### *How do PKOs affect the durability of peace?*

One way in which a peacekeeping operation can affect the durability of peace is by altering the incentives that parties have to go to war or maintain peace. A well-equipped mission makes deliberate aggression more costly. If an aggressor wants to re-engage in conflict, they will have to take on both their enemy and the intervention force. Peacekeeping in this sense raises the cost of war through deterrence (Fortna 2007). Doyle and Sambanis hypothesize that the probability of peacebuilding success is higher if UN peace operations are deployed, and that it will be more effective in successfully building peace if the operation is strong and has an extensive mandate. They ultimately find that UN involvement is positively and significantly correlated with peacebuilding, but that simple involvement is not enough to facilitate a peaceful transition. They find multidimensional peacekeeping missions (ones that have strong mandates and comprehensive goals) are significantly and positively associated with peacebuilding success (Doyle and Sambanis 2000).

Peacekeeping missions can also raise the benefits of peace. In a post-conflict environment, deep hostility, multiple factions, and a lack of coherent leadership could prevent the achievement of a self-enforcing peace. Peacekeeping missions, therefore, can work to establish this peace by demobilizing and disarming the armies of the factions, arresting war criminals, and policing states (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). They can also provide material incentives to involved parties to maintain peace, such as infrastructure development and the influx of resources needed to undertake infrastructure projects. Peacekeeping missions also

provide jobs for locals (Fortna 2007). Economic relief and productive jobs are signs to rival factions that they can disarm and engage in peaceful politics. Thus, peacekeeping missions (particularly multidimensional ones) can engage in economic reconstruction activities and institution building (that include a unified army and competent police force), and overall assist in longer-term development projects that contribute to self-enforcing peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie, Rothchild 2001).

Another way in which peacekeepers could improve the durability of peace is by reducing uncertainty and fear that factions have towards each other. Peacekeepers may disrupt security dilemmas that are prompted by fear and insecurity. The presence of a peacekeeping mission as a neutral observer that monitors an agreement's implementation could reassure both sides that each side is acting in good faith; the mission in essence alleviates any uncertainty that each side has about each other's actions. This is particularly true for the disarmament and demobilization process. In a post-conflict setting, both sides have a strong incentive to maintain armed forces. With that, each side will benefit from having credible information that the other side is disarming, which the peacekeeping mission can provide. Monitoring by a third party, in this case a peacekeeping operation, could create transparency among parties that lack trust but have a similar incentive to establish peace. In this way, peacekeeping missions could potentially reduce the likelihood that conflict resumes from uncertainty and fears about the intentions of others (Fortna 2007; Doyle and Sambanis 2000).

By deterring rogue groups, facilitating communication, providing mediation, temporary law-and-order, and alternatives to escalation in response to violations of a settlement, peacekeeping missions can prevent and control accidents from involuntary defection. By preventing accidents that could potentially create a spiral of conflict, peacekeeping missions are

capable of preventing a country from going to war again and make peace more likely to last (Fortna 2007).

Peacekeeping missions can also take on peacebuilding roles in addition to military tasks. Peacebuilding, according to the Secretary-General's Policy Committee on Peacebuilding, "involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development" (United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office 2010, 3). Peacekeeping missions (particularly multidimensional peacekeeping operations) could sustain peace after a conflict by preventing the political abuses that may have started conflict in the first place. Peacekeeping missions are increasingly taking on tasks that involve improving governance and the rule of law, such as monitoring elections, reforming police forces and the judiciary, human rights monitoring and training, and rebuilding state institutions. These functions of peacekeeping missions help move conflicts from the battlefield into institutions that are meant to handle dispute settlements. Additionally, by improving the security sector through police and judicial reform, peacekeeping missions help reduce the likelihood of political abuse that provokes rebel and opposition groups (usually comprised of oppressed minorities) into conflict against the government. By shaping the political process during a transition from conflict to peace, peacekeeping missions can make sure neither side excludes the other, and thus provide incentives to both sides to work within the political system, rather than go against it by rebelling and going back into war (Fortna 2007).

Roland Paris, in his book "At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict," surveys fourteen peacebuilding missions from the 1990s and concludes that their approach of rapid liberalization, both economically and politically (by promoting democratization), increased,

rather than decreased, the danger of renewed fighting. What is needed before liberalization, Paris argues, is the building of democratic institutions. Peacekeeping missions in the 1990s in post-conflict countries promoted “liberalization” as a means for countries emerging from civil war to create conditions for a sustainable peace. Politically, this meant democratization, which includes: free and fair elections, checks and balances on governmental power, and respect for civil liberties such as freedom of speech and assembly. Economically, liberalization encompasses marketization, or movement towards a more market-oriented economy, which includes limiting government involvement in the economy and maximizing the freedom of private investors, producers, and consumers to pursue their own economic interests.

Underlying this approach to peacekeeping was the hope that democratization would shift conflicts away from the battlefield and into the political arena and marketization would promote economic growth. This approach, however, turned out to be more problematic than helpful in leading to successful peacebuilding. Paris found that international efforts to build sustainable peace in post-civil war countries actually worsened social tensions and/or recreated the very conditions that prompted violence in the first place.

Paris finds that the process of liberalization fails to take into account the serious hazards that are inherent in the transition from civil conflict to a well-developed market-based democracy. Democratization and marketization have the potential to encourage higher and volatile societal competition at a moment when states are the least equipped to contain such tensions. Third-party actors failed to take into account the destabilizing side effects of liberalization when crafting their approach to peacebuilding. Consequently, it was not the desire to turn post-conflict societies into market democracies that was wrong; it was the methods they used to facilitate this change, mainly liberalization, which made things worse.

Importantly, Paris argues that creating and/or strengthening institutionalization before liberalization prevents the endangerment of a fragile post-conflict peace. By developing a network of democratic institutions that can manage the strains that come with liberalization, and facilitating a more “controlled and gradual approach to liberalization” through the institutions, third party actors can help manage the political and economic reforms that are needed in a post-conflict setting.

Overall, the literature posits that peacekeeping can help the durability of peace through alleviating mistrust between formerly warring parties and strengthening domestic political institutions to prevent any abuses that provoke parties into war. By strengthening domestic institutions and improving their legitimacy, UN peacekeeping improves their capacity to respond to problems that could provoke conflict. One such political institution that can influence the durability of peace is the rule of law, which UN peacekeeping can help establish and/or improve.

### ***How does the rule of law affect the durability of peace?***

The rule of law helps make society stable, in all sorts of settings (not just post-conflict ones). The rule of law, by protecting people against anarchy, allowing people to plan for their affairs with confidence because they know the actual consequences of their actions, and protecting people from an arbitrary exercise of power by public institutions, creates a state in a society that is stable and orderly. Theoretically, with the establishment of rule of law, people need not fear unfair civil and political human rights abuses by authorities. Additionally, in a state with the rule of law, government decision makers are bound by laws that have “a historical legitimacy that predates their enforcement” (Stromseth, Wippman, Brooks 2006; Fallon 1997; Carothers 1998). Consequently opportunities for unfairness and gaining the system are limited,

thus removing incentives for citizens to rebel against the state. The rule of law encompasses institutions that establish stability in a society by reducing the likelihood of disorder and unpredictability in a state.

The rule of law also helps the durability of peace by providing institutions for dispute settlement that serve as an alternative to using violence. Strengthening the rule of law involves establishing/developing institutions that are transparent and inclusive (which involves an independent judicial system, a responsible security apparatus, and updated legal codes reflective of human rights). If the judicial and security institutions uphold the rule of law and are effective in what they are supposed to do, people will use them to resolve their disputes and problems rather than resorting to violence or self-help. By reducing this risk of violence, the rule of law serves as an essential component of sustainable peace (Stromseth 2008; Stromseth, Wippman, Brooks 2006).

In the long term, peace is obtained in a post-conflict period if the population is confident that redress for grievances can be obtained through legitimate structures for peaceful dispute settlement, and that there will be a fair administration of justice. In the short term, the heightened vulnerability facing civilian populations (particularly women, children, refugees, minorities, internally displaced persons, prisoners and detainees) and the security risks they face in the immediate post-conflict environment necessitate the restoration of rule of law to facilitate effective civilian protection (United Nations 2004).

In fully democratic societies, the police (a security component of the rule of law) are crucial in maintaining public security. In a post-conflict environment, because police capacities are nearly non-existent and what exists is usually ineffective and/or abusive, there is a need for both short-term public security to create an environment in which a peace agreement can be

implemented, and long-term capacity to provide security to citizens. Thus, the presence of rule of law in a post-conflict setting strengthens the durability by peace by allowing for civilian protection in the short term and more systematic public security long term (Durch and England 2010).

Another way in which the rule of law promotes the durability of peace is by allowing for greater economic development. Many in the economic development and corporate communities view the rule of law entailing “sensible, intelligible regulations, effective dispute resolution mechanisms, and a predictable fair legal framework in which property interests can effectively be protected” (Stromseth, Wippman, Brooks 2006). The rule of law in a country entails legislative and institutional mechanisms that make legal proceedings more efficient, relevant, and cost-effective, aspects that private investors take into account when deciding to invest abroad. Rule of law ensures the security of property rights and integrity of contracts, which are key elements for trade and investment to occur. Keeping in mind that several studies have studied the positive relationship between economic development and the durability of peace, the rule of law allows for the creation of a stable business environment in which private investment and trade (and consequently economic growth and development) can occur (Stromseth, Wippman, Brooks 2006; Hewko 2002; Haggard, MacIntyre, Tiede 2008).

While the causes of terrorism are multifaceted, underlying terrorism is misery and repression that terrorists use as grounds for recruitment. If the rule of law facilitates economic growth and stops human rights abuses, by extension, the rule of law also eliminates the conditions that give rise to terrorism in the first place (Stromseth, Wippman, Brooks 2006).

The rule of law is important because it is a crucial component in creating stable environments, particularly in a post-conflict setting. Even though belligerents have put down



their arms, there is always a high risk that conflict could start again. As a third-party actor, UN peacekeeping plays an important role in making sure violence does not recur. One way in which UN peacekeeping contributes to post-conflict peacebuilding efforts to establish peace and security is by developing and/or reforming rule of law institutions.

### *Post-conflict justice and the durability of peace*

One important factor that influences the durability of peace is the form of post-conflict justice that takes place in a post-conflict society. Post-conflict justice, as discussed in this thesis, is separate from peacekeeping activities; it may function as a complement to peacekeeping activities but remains separate from peacekeeping itself. Post-conflict justice is important to discuss in the context of the rule of law and UN peacekeeping activities as it could serve as an influencing factor on the UN's effectiveness in reforming the rule of law.

Non-retributive post-conflict justice leaves many perpetrators of conflict free on the streets. This presence of perpetrators (and their potential to commit further violence) could influence the ability of the UN and national security forces to effectively re-establish the rule of law, as it is an additional security risk they have to address. The literature is divided on the impact of retributive versus non-retributive post-conflict justice on the durability of peace.

### *Retributive post-conflict justice*

Retributive justice focuses on holding perpetrators accountable for the crimes they committed during the conflict. Institutional mechanisms that pursue retributive justice include prosecution and sentencing in domestic courts and/or special tribunals, international tribunals, and joint international and domestic tribunals created to address crimes during the conflict

(Gloppen 2005). In democratic settings, these measures are usually taken a part of a greater reconciliation process meant to further human rights in a post-conflict setting. In an autocratic setting, however, retributive justice is more arbitrary and aimed at the losing side of the conflict. Typically, trials are often “show trials” where the outcome is known even before the legal process occurs (Elster 2004).

Post-conflict justice could also protect against a cycle of revenge attacks (Elster 2004; Pankhurst 1999). If victims of war feel that crimes and wrongdoings are inadequately addressed, they may be tempted conduct “private justice,” as a substitute for insufficient legal justice (Elster 2004). Private justice could take on the form of extra-legal killings, and thus fragment a fragile peace between forces in a post-conflict state, increasing the risk of civil war recurrence. The immunity of insurgents increases the risk of “wild justice,” which is the unpredictable revenge by one side to obtain justice that could inadvertently provoke conflict again (Elster 2005). Consequently, retributive post-conflict justice that holds criminals accountable may help a post-conflict government make sure that individuals do not seek revenge through private (and often violent) means.

Post-conflict justice takes on different causal mechanisms for post-conflict peace in different regime types. Particularly in an autocratic state, post-conflict justice could contribute to political stability by deterring and suppressing rebellion through “winner’s justice” (in which the trial is intentionally unfair). Post-conflict justice ensures that perpetrators/insurgents are put away so they cannot launch a new insurgency if the opportunity ever arises (Elster 2005). By holding retributive post-conflict justice trials, particularly in autocratic states, chances for peace increase in the long term as perpetrators of crimes (who may have incentives for renewed conflict) are excluded from positions of power (Pankhurst 1999). Putting away government

opponents prevents attacks on the government's policy and thus prevents state destabilization and the risk of civil war recurrence.

On the other hand, some argue that retributive post-conflict justice can have a negative effect on peace. Post-conflict justice, particularly retributive PCJ, could create more resentment among the former participants of civil war by opening old wounds and creating new ones in already fractious societies (Long and Brecke 2003). Additionally, trials that focus on an individual's guilt could reduce the "collective incentive for forgiveness" (Fletcher and Weinstein 2002).

#### *Non-retributive post-conflict justice*

Retributive justice is easier to carry out when the military outcome of the conflict is clear; prosecuting war criminals is more feasible when insurgents or the former regime is clearly and severely defeated and no longer poses a threat to the present leadership. In situations where there is no clear victory or where the perpetrators are hard to identify, non-retributive post-conflict justice might be easier to conduct.

Truth commissions are non-judicial bodies that focus on the stories of victims to bring awareness of human rights violations that occurred during conflict. Truth commissions do not have power to impose punishment on perpetrators. Their main purpose is to advance reconciliation. Truth commissions hope to heal social wounds by making it easier for perpetrators to tell true extent of their crimes. They hope to establish a peace based on reconciliation, rather than deterrence (Long and Brecke 2003).

Amnesty measures, while non-retributive in nature, may have a negative effect on the durability of peace in a post-conflict setting. Post-conflict justice is sometimes compromised for

the sake of solidifying peace. Rebels will be unlikely to stop fighting if they fear post-war prosecution (Fearon 2005). Post conflict amnesty, which protects perpetrators from post-conflict prosecution, may then be granted to buy off rebels and prevent them from committing future violence, as seen in Colombia (International Federation for Human Rights).

Theoretically, amnesties are meant to convince parties to put down arms in exchange for a guarantee of not being prosecuted. However, they could limit the actual realization of justice and may reduce the post-conflict period of peace, as they may help perpetrators avoid prosecution and consequently remain politically intact to launch into conflict again. Additionally, amnesty measures increase the risk of wild justice and/or private revenge and distort the process of peaceful reconciliation. This, combined with the fact that post-conflict societies often lack the resources to carry out fair and impartial trials without harming other aspects of peace-building, creates uncertainty in the value of amnesty in contributing to the durability of peace (Long and Brecke 2003; Lie, Binningsbø, and Gates 2006).

It is important to look at post-conflict justice because it is a potential interactive factor that could impact the way in which UN peacekeeping affects the rule of law in a post-conflict setting. The UN historically has been involved in several post-conflict justice institutions. The externalities of post-conflict justice, however, may or may not have a positive effect on the strength of rule of law.

### ***Peacekeeping and the Rule of Law***

All the literature reviewed has skirted the question this thesis wishes to address: How does peacekeeping impact the rule of law? There exists some policy literature that looks at the relationship between peacekeeping and the rule of law. Two qualitative studies conducted by the

Stimson Center's Future of Peace Operations program have looked into this relationship between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law extensively. In the report "Enhancing United Nations Capacity To Support Post-Conflict Policing And Rule Of Law," Durch and England, after extensive interviewing of UNPOL and UNDPKO personnel and case studies, find that the UN has historically approached post-conflict policing and reforming the rule of law in an ad-hoc manner because of resource constraints and a lack of clear vision on how the mission should assist and/or develop policing in a post-conflict setting. The report recommends that the UN develop an approach that involves more "systematic planning, recruiting, and rapid deployment of larger numbers of quality UN police (UNPOL) and other rule of law personnel for integrated peace operations" (Durch and England 2007).

The Stimson Center study titled *Understanding the Impact of Police, Justice and Corrections Components in UN Peace Operations* finds that while certain rule of law tasks by the UNDPKO may be necessary, the implementation of these tasks is very dependent on the characteristics of a mission's operating environment, something which the mission cannot control. Missions face intractable problems when they are asked to deploy quickly in post-conflict environments in which politics prevents the quick actions that peacebuilding requires and the lack of mission resources inhibits the mission in assisting the government. Missions often have resources, but only a sufficient amount to provide for short-term security and stability. Because of these constraints, UN peacekeeping cannot consistently impact key rule of law institutions in post-conflict settings in a positive manner (Durch, England, Mangan, Ker 2012).

In their book "Can Might Make Rights?: Building the Rule of Law after Military," Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks discuss why past post-conflict rule of law efforts have disappointing results and the challenges that third-party military forces face in rule of law

building. The authors argue that rule of law efforts are not as successful because it is difficult for third-parties to invest the amount of time, energy, and resources required to overcome public distrust of rule of law institutions.

Additionally, many hallmark attributes of a well-functioning rule of law system may conflict with the goals of the intervening force. For example, encouraging local ownership and respecting local cultural norms (such as the use of a traditional justice system) could conflict with efficiency interests and/or international standards of the rule of law. Even when interveners empower local actors, they do so at the expense of others, given that promoting the rule of law is not completely neutral. As such, the promotion of one group over the other could potentially provoke opposition (sometimes even violent opposition) and internal strife.

Finally, the authors argue that rule of law efforts have fallen short because they tend to focus on formal institutions. UN rule of law reform efforts tend to heavily focus on building institutions and legal codes apart of the formal sector. This effort, however, can end up futile, as the institutions themselves are useless if the people do not believe in their value, efficacy, and ability to resolve disputes (Stromseth, Wippman, Brooks 2006).

While there is qualitative policy-oriented literature examining the relationship that peacekeeping and the rule of law have on the durability of peace respectively, there is very little empirical quantitative research examining the impact that peacekeeping missions have on the development of rule of law. Thus, this thesis hopes to fill this gap in the academic literature by providing both a quantitative large-N and qualitative case study analysis of the relationship between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law in post-conflict societies.

### *Non-Random Assignment*

Peacekeeping missions are not randomly assigned. If peacekeepers are deployed to more difficult cases and peacekeeping improves the chances that peace will be durable, then estimates of the degree of difficulty of a country will be biased by the fact that peacekeepers affect the eventual outcome. The most difficult cases are the most likely to get peacekeepers, but they will appear less difficult than they really are as peace automatically will last longer than it would have if no peacekeepers were deployed. The problem exists in the other way as well; if peacekeepers go to the easiest cases, then the easiest cases will appear even easier than they actually are, and the effects of the peacekeeping mission will be exaggerated. Either way, estimates of the effect that peacekeeping missions have on the durability of peace will be incorrect because of this issue of non-random assignment of the peacekeeping treatment. This in turn can lead to endogeneity problems.

Fortna (2004), recognizing this problem, uses a set of cases that are not affected by the UN's tendency to select. Fortna uses a set of cases before the end of the Cold War to provide information on what would happen if no peacekeepers were deployed to help sustain peace in a post-conflict setting. She uses these cases because before the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping missions were very rarely used; they were only just used to contain a conflict, and not necessarily prevent recurrence of conflict. She uses these cases to create unbiased estimates of the effect of how a war ends (victory for one side, truce, peace treaty), the number of factions, access to lootable resources, ethnic heterogeneity, and economic development on the "ease or difficulty of keeping peace." She then "plugs the values of these variables from the post-Cold War cases into the model to generate the predicted probability of renewed war since 1989." She also develops 10 indicators on what affects the difficulty of a case: infant mortality, democracy, war aims, identity conflict, numbers killed or displaced, military outcome, whether a treaty was

signed, the number of factions, contraband financing for rebels, and a neighboring country's support for rebels. These indicators of difficulty provide evidence that peacekeepers go to places where peace is most difficult to keep.

I hope to resolve this selection issue by carrying out a matching analysis. This would involve choosing two countries that are very similar on multiple dimensions. Then one mission would be "treated" with a UN mission, whereas the other one does not get the treatment. This sort of analysis is used by Gilligan and Sergenti (2007), in which they determine whether or not UN interventions cause peace. Gilligan and Sergenti, noticing that previous literature did not randomly assign UN missions in studying the relationship between UN interventions and sustainable peace, correct for this with matching techniques, using a sample of UN interventions in post Cold War conflicts. They ultimately find, similar to the previous studies, that UN interventions are effective in sustaining peace in post-conflict environments, but have no causal effect on peace while civil wars are still ongoing. By using non-random assignment of UN missions using matching techniques, they find that previous studies have underestimated the positive impact that UN interventions have on sustainable peace in a post-conflict setting. Their results then suggest that the UN does have a strong independent causal effect in extending periods of peace, and that the effect is larger than previously estimated by previous studies because of the correction for the nonrandom assignment of UN missions.



## THEORY & HYPOTHESES

The UN positively affects the rule of law by physically improving the efficacy of rule of law institutions and bolstering public confidence in the police and judicial institutions. The UN facilitates the reformation of rule of law in post-conflict countries by specifically working to improve each aspect of rule of law in a country: the police sector, justice institutions, and corrections facilities. By training local police and building the capacity and improving the quality of judicial institutions through training and programming, the UN not only improves institutional capacity to settle disputes, but also works to build trust in local and national rule of law institutions. UN peacekeeping essentially attempts to alleviate fear and mistrust towards rule of law institutions (much of which is a legacy of many conflicts) by strengthening the capacity of those rule of law institutions to address wrong doings. By alleviating this mistrust of rule of law institutions, the UN hopes people will use and approach these statutory rules of law institutions, therefore further increasing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the institutions. The UN then perpetuates a cycle of trust, legitimacy, and effectiveness in rule of law institutions in post-conflict societies. Therefore:

*Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions.*

Not all UN missions are the same, however. Given the various types of peacekeeping missions, some will be better at strengthening the rule of law in a post-conflict setting more than others, given what type of mandate and capacity they have. For instance, a simple monitoring mission, whose purview solely involves observing a truce and/or cease-fire, will not be as effective in reforming and/or developing rule of law institutions as a multidimensional peacekeeping mission, which has the capacity and strength of mandate to carry out rule of law reform tasks. Therefore:

*Hypothesis 2: An increase in the strength of UN mission mandate will increase its ability to strengthen the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.*

As previously discussed in the literature review, Monica Toft finds that a negotiated settlement tends to reduce the likelihood of the durability of peace, unless there is comprehensive security sector reform that is aimed at restructuring rule of law institutions. Thus, if a peace agreement does not include provisions for security sector reform a UN peacekeeping mission will most likely not have the mandate to carry out rule of law reform (a component of security sector reform). Therefore:

*Hypothesis 3: A negotiated settlement that does not include provisions for security sector reform will lower the probability that a UN peacekeeping mission can successfully strengthen the rule of law.*

Post-conflict justice, depending on the type, can also influence the UN's ability to successfully implement rule of law reform. Particularly, amnesty measures may help perpetrators avoid prosecution and consequently remain politically intact to launch into conflict again. Additionally, amnesty measures increase the risk of wild justice and/or private revenge and distort the process of peaceful reconciliation. Thus:

*Hypothesis 4: The presence of amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism will weaken UN peacekeeping's ability to improve rule of law institutions in a post-conflict setting.*

### *Control Factors*

There are several factors that influence the UN's ability to implement rule of law reform in a post-conflict setting. Notably, the severity and degree of hostility of the conflict could be a determinant of how successful the UN is in improving the rule of law. In a post-conflict environment where deep hostility, ethnic fractionalization, and high levels of death exist, it may be more difficult for UN peacekeeping to improve the rule of law, as it has to overcome hostile

conditions. These hostile conditions can be reinforced by the duration of the conflict as well; longer fighting implies higher fatalities in conflict and ultimately deeper hostility. The more hostile the conflict (as indicated by the number of fatalities, level of ethnic fractionalization, and duration of conflict), the more difficult it will be for UN peacekeeping to improve the rule of law in the post-conflict environment. Additionally, the level of economic development can influence the level of political stability and security in a post-conflict setting. The more stable and secure a post-conflict setting is, the more feasible it is for the UN to implement rule of law reforms, as they do not have to deal with external security risks relating to economic concerns compared to a situation in which there was no economic development taking place. Thus, the linear regression between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law is controlled by the number of deaths in conflict, war duration, ethnic fractionalization, and economic development (through proxies of electricity consumption per capita and real GDP per capita).

## RESEARCH DESIGN

### *Unit of Analysis*

For the data used in the empirical analysis, I use the International Peacebuilding Data Set from Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. The original data set is a cross-sectional data set that includes 124 events of civil wars. It includes "wars that started since 1944 and terminated before 1997 and wars which were ongoing as of December 1999, but which had at least one significant settlement or truce or third-party peace operation, signaling the parties' desire to terminate the war and start a peacebuilding process" (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). This aspect of the data set allows for the examination of peacebuilding outcomes at least two years after the end of the war or the start of a peace operation. Doyle and Sambanis also classify the data into four categories of peacekeeping missions: monitoring or observing missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. This classification is used to examine the relationship between the scope of a mission and its ability to improve rule of law institutions in a post-conflict state.

To measure the dependent variable rule of law, I use the Rule of Law estimate from the World Bank Governance Indicators. "Rule of Law," as measured by the World Bank, encompasses several indicators that "measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society." These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. These indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected.

The World Bank's estimates of the quality of rule of law are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one each year of measurement. This implies that virtually all scores lie between  $-2.5$  and  $2.5$ . Higher scores correspond to better outcomes/higher qualities of rule of law. This data spans from 1996 to 2012. Given this data limitation, for my first set of regressions, I only used those civil wars that ended 1986 or later in the Doyle and Sambanis data set, providing me with 66 events of civil war. I then coded the Rule of Law score 10 years after a civil war ended (hence, why I dropped the pre-1986 scores). I also coded the Rule of Law scores 11 years after the conflict ended. I then coded and calculated a new dependent variable, the change in Rule of Law score by subtracting the ROL score for 10 years after the conflict from the score for 11 years after the conflict. I ultimately decided to use this difference in scores, as it would give me a sense if each country's rule of law improves. If I were to just look at only the level of rule of law 10 years after a conflict has ended, there would be no way to control for baseline, pre-existing levels of rule of law. It would not be possible to know if the treatment (peacekeeping or no peacekeeping) actually improves the rule of law. By looking at the change in rule of law, I can directly observe if there is any improvement in the rule of law.

Another variable I use to measure the rule of law (as a proxy) is Contract Intensive Money. Contract Intensive Money (CIM) is the ratio of non-currency money to total money supply, or  $(M2-C)/M2$ , where  $M2$  is a broad definition of the money supply and  $C$  is currency held outside banks. I calculate CIM in this analysis using the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics data on currency outside of banks, money supply, and quasi-money supply. CIM is supposed to act as a proxy for the rule of law because the more effective legal methods of enforcing contracts and securing property rights are, the more willing actors in society should be able to hold money in a form other than currency. This is because the value of

non-currency money depends on the ability of depositors to enforce claims against banks and the banks ability to enforce claims against borrowers. Therefore, the higher that CIM is (the higher amount of non-currency money that people hold, indicative of stronger property rights and contract enforceability therefore stronger rule of law), the better quality that society's legal institutions have. Essentially, a higher CIM value correlates with a better quality of rule of law (Clague, Keefer, Knack, Olson 2010; Davis 2005).

Much like the calculations for the World Bank rule of law variable, I calculate the difference between the CIM value a country has 10 years after the conflict and 11 years after the conflict. This is done to measure the extent to which rule of law is improving and not rule of law itself. Calculating this difference helps reduce endogeneity concerns and reverse causality concerns relating to the fact that peacekeepers are meant to go to the places where low baseline rule of law exists in the first place. As the data on CIM spans a longer time frame, I am able to use 119 cases from the original Doyle and Sambanis data set for a second round of regressions with this dependent variable.

The data for the controls come from a variety of sources. The controls of deaths from conflict, real GDP per capita, development, ethnic fractionalization, and the presence of a treaty signed all come from the data set constructed by Doyle and Sambanis. The data for the amnesty measures come from Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster and the data for the security sector reform comes from Toft. These data sets do not match up with Doyle and Sambanis. Thus I had to merge these data sets by matching each conflict in Doyle and Sambanis data set to their corresponding data in the post-conflict justice and the SSR data sets.

Table 1 lists the independent variables, controls, and dependent variables that are used in the analysis.

**Table 1: Variables in Analysis**

Independent Variables	Controls	Dependent Variable
<b>un2int:</b> Was there a UN peace operation? 0 = no; 1 = yes (Doyle & Sambanis 2000)	<b>Log of deaths during conflict (logcost):</b> The log of the total number of dead, including civilians and battle deaths (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	<b>World Bank Rule of Law score 10 years after a conflict ended (wbgi.rle 10 years after):</b> World Bank Governance Indicator Rule of Law score 10 years after a civil war has ended (World Bank Governance Indicators).
<b>untype 2:</b> UN peace operation involving deployment of neutral military and/or civilian observers (Doyle & Sambanis 2000)	<b>Real GDP per capita (rgdpcaps):</b> Real GDP per capita in US\$ (Doyle & Sambanis 2000)	<b>Difference between World Bank Rule of Law scores 10 and 11 years after a conflict has ended (difference.wbgi.rle):</b> Change in Rule of Law score; the difference between the ROL score 11 years after the conflict and 10 years after the conflict (calculated from World Bank Governance Indicators).
<b>untype 3:</b> UN peace operation involving traditional peacekeeping operation (military and civilian personnel) (Doyle & Sambanis 2000)	<b>Development levels (develop):</b> measured by a proxy of electricity consumption per capita (Doyle & Sambanis 2000)	<b>Difference in CIM values 10 and 11 years after a conflict has ended (difference.cim):</b> the change in Contract-Intensive Money 10 years and 11 years after a conflict has ended. CIM is the ratio of non-currency money to total money supply (IMF International Financial Statistics)
<b>untype 4:</b> UN multidimensional peacekeeping/peacebuilding operation (Doyle & Sambanis 2000)	<b>Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (elf):</b> Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index; The index ranges from 0-100 and higher values correspond to higher degrees of ethnolinguistic fractionalization in the country (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	
<b>untype 5:</b> Peace enforcement, either multilateral through the United Nations or by a third party or coalition of parties, acting under a multilateral, UN-sanctioned mandate. Also includes executive authority and supervising authority (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	<b>War duration (wardur):</b> Duration of the war measured in months (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	
	<b>Presence of a treaty signed to end a conflict (treaty):</b> coded 1 = treaty signed by the parties with intent to end the war; 0 = no major treaty was signed (although cease-fires were possibly agreed upon at various times) (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	
	<b>Presence of amnesty measures (pcj.amnesty):</b> Records whether or not an amnesty was given in the post-conflict peace period. Coded 0 - No Amnesty: There were no amnesties after the conflict; Coded 1 - Amnesty: At least one amnesty was initiated after the conflict (Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster 2012).	
	<b>Presence of Security Sector Reform (SSRI):</b> Security sector reform; a dummy variable that is a combination of 2 factors: 1) whether or not the combatants will form a new army after the war based on quotas from each side and 2) indicates the extent to which a settlement is implemented. The combination SSRI variable only includes those cases in which a successfully implemented settlement was present. If the settlement was well-executed, the variable was coded "1." Unsuccessful implementations were "0" (Toft 2010).	

### *Regression Models*

To first test my hypotheses, I conduct several ordinary least squares regressions to estimate the relationship between UN peacekeeping and the quality of rule of law institutions, while controlling for factors that detail the hostility of conflict, the presence of security sector reform, and the presence of amnesty measures as post-conflict justice mechanisms. I run two major sets of regressions, each using a different dependent variable. The first set uses the rule of law measure from the World Bank, and the second uses the Contract Intensive Money variable as a proxy for the quality of rule of law.

I first test the hypotheses by carrying out a variety of regressions with the dependent variable as the difference in rule of law/CIM scores 10 years and 11 years after a conflict has ended. In order to test all facets of hypotheses 1 and 2 on the independent variable of peacekeeping, I create 5 models with different variations of the general independent variable "UN peacekeeping" to test on the dependent variable. By testing each mandate type by itself, I can examine if a different mandate type has a varying influence on the quality of rule of law (what Hypothesis 2 is questioning). Below is a table that describes the independent variable(s) that each model contains.

***Table 2: Independent Variable Models<sup>1</sup>***

Model	Independent Variables/Mission type
Model A	All mandate types (untype 2, 3, 4, 5)
Model B	Presence of UN peacekeeping (un2int)
Model C	Monitoring/observer mission (untype 2)
Model D	Traditional peacekeeping mission (untype 3)
Model E	Multidimensional peacekeeping mission (untype 4)
Model F	Peace enforcement mission (untype 5)

<sup>1</sup> Please refer to the "Defining Key Concepts" section for fuller definitions of each type of mandated mission.



Additionally, I also interact the amnesty measures and security sector reform variables with the UN peacekeeping presence variable (un2int) to further test Hypotheses 3 and 4. I wish to test if the effectiveness of peacekeeping will vary depending on what values the amnesty and security sector reform variables take. The interactive terms are the products of the basic peacekeeping variable (un2int) and the SSRI and amnesty variables.

### *I. Regressions with the World Bank measure as dependent variable*

This set of tests has  $N = 66$ . Due to data missing in the post-conflict justice amnesty variable and the security sector reform variable, I ran three different sets of tests. The first set of tests includes all the independent variables and controls listed in Table 1 excluding the Security Sector Reform variable (Table 3: PCJ Amnesty). The second set of tests includes all independent variables and controls listed in Table 1, excluding the amnesty dummy variable (Table 4: SSRI). The third set of tests includes all independent variables and controls listed in Table 1, but excludes both the amnesty and security sector reform variables (Table 5: Neither). The results in Tables 3, 4, and 5 are the coefficient estimates of the controls/independent variables on the dependent variable.

### *II. Regressions with CIM measure as dependent variable*

This set of tests has an  $N = 120$ . Due to data missing in the post-conflict justice amnesty variable and the security sector reform variable, I ran four different sets of tests with the CIM measure as the dependent variable. The first set of tests includes all the independent variables and controls listed in Table 1 including *both* the Security Sector Reform and PCJ amnesty variable (Table 6: All controls (Amnesty and SSR at the same time)). The second set of tests

includes all independent variables and controls listed in Table 1, including the amnesty variable and excluding the SSRI dummy variable (Table 7: Controls + Amnesty control (No SSRI)). The third set of tests includes all independent variables and controls listed in Table 1, but included the SSRI variable and excludes the amnesty variables (Table 8: Controls + SSRI control (No Amnesty)). The fourth set of tests includes all independent variables and controls listed in Table 1 and excludes both the amnesty and SSRI variables (Table 9: Controls sans Amnesty and SSRI). The results in the tables are the coefficient estimates of the controls/independent variables on the dependent variable. Additionally, I tried to interact the SSRI and amnesty variables with presence of peacekeeping variable (un2int) and did not find any significant relationships. The results of these tests are indicated in the tables under the IV/Controls column (“Interactive term on UN Presence and [amnesty or SSRI]”).

### ***Matching analysis***

UN peacekeeping missions are not randomly assigned. UN peacekeeping and peace building missions intentionally go to the most difficult places, the places where the intensity of conflict was incredibly high, and in the case of this study, where rule of law is poor or practically non-existent. Cases in which the UN intervenes for improving the rule of law are very different from cases in which the UN does not intervene. Thus, linear regressions may not effectively estimate the effect that UN peacekeeping has on the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict state, as a linear regression model results in effects that are more of a result of the model rather than the data itself.

The purpose of a matching analysis then, is to compare “apples to apples.” Matching allows for finding an overlap in cases of conflict that vary solely on whether or not UN

peacekeeping was present. These cases are all matched based on a variety of controls. By finding the overlap of non-UN intervention and UN intervention cases on the similarity of controls, matching allows for the comparison of similar cases. The controls used in this matching analysis are the log of deaths during conflict, ethnic fractionalization, and the duration of war. Matching thus allows for us to see whether or not UN intervention makes a difference in cases that had the same level of hostility in conflict. Matching helps give an average assessment of the treatment of peacekeeping on the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict state.

To start the matching analysis, I temporarily coarsen exact match (CEM) the data by creating “bins.” The CEM command sorts the data into the various bins. The CEM command creates one “stratum” per observation of  $X$ , and then places each observation in a stratum. Then, the CEM command assigns each stratum to the original data and drops observations that do not contain at least one treated and one control unit. Then CEM command then creates a weight measure that I use in a regression with the uncoarsened data. The results of the “weighted” regression are the results of the matching analysis (Blackwell, Iacus, King, Porro 2009).

With CEM, there are two ways to coarsen the data. One way is to run the automatic binning algorithm, while the other way involves self-defining cut points and bins for each control. The automatic binning will result in more bins, but fewer bins will actually have matched cases. This allows for a better comparison of exact matches, as there are fewer cases. Thus, using the automatic algorithm provides matching analysis with better internal validity. Using pre-determined cut points allows for more observations to have matches, and allows for a larger set of cases to be analyzed in a weighted regression. Using the pre-determined cut points, however, can result in more coarsening of the data, and involve more cases in the weighted regression analysis that are not an exact match. Thus, using the pre-determined cut points method

will result in a higher external validity, but lower internal validity of the weighted regression. In this study, I run the matching analysis with both the automatic binning algorithm and the pre-determined user defined cut points method.

***Case study: the United Nations Mission in Liberia***

I also carry out a qualitative analytical case study of the United Nations Mission in Liberia's (UNMIL) rule of law programming and activities. By detailing UNMIL's rule of law work, I hope to demonstrate some of the dynamics that in my theoretical framework and in empirical tests. This case study is not tests for my hypotheses, but rather acts as real-world case where many of the dynamics discussed in the literature review and theoretical hypotheses can be seen. The purpose of the case study is more to assess UNMIL and the state of rule of law in Liberia, rather than to use it to prove a point.

## REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS

### *A. Results, Empirical Findings, and Interpretation for World Bank measure*

The empirical evidence does not support my theoretical hypotheses. There is not ample enough evidence to show that UN peacekeeping (in any variation of mandate type) is significant in positively improving the rule of law quality in a post-conflict state.

*Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions*

*H<sub>0</sub> (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.*

*Hypothesis 2: An increase in the strength of UN mission mandate will increase its ability to strengthen the quality of a country's rule of law institutions*

*H<sub>0</sub> (Null): There is no significant relationship between the UN peacekeeping mission mandate and the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict setting.*

The regression tests conducted with the World Bank rule of law measure do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping, or any increase in the mandate of UN peacekeeping, is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. As seen each set of tests, the coefficients for the peacekeeping variables (un2int, untype2, untype3, untype4, and untype5) are not statistically significant. Thus I fail to reject the null hypothesis. These results show that there is no clear relationship or association between UN peacekeeping and the quality of rule of law.

*Hypothesis 3: A negotiated settlement that does not include provisions for security sector reform will lower the probability that a UN peacekeeping mission can successfully strengthen the rule of law.*

*H<sub>0</sub> (null): There is no significant relationship between the provision of security sector reform and the UN's ability to strengthen the rule of law in a post-conflict setting.*

The presence of security sector reform is not significantly correlated with UN peacekeeping's ability to improve the rule of law, thus I fail to reject the null hypothesis. Conversely, the lack of presence of security sector reform in a negotiated settlement (as indicated

by 0 in the dummy variable) is not significantly correlated with a lower quality of rule of law. The coefficient for this variable, while positive (indicating that the direction the hypothesis put forward is correct), is not statistically significant. Thus, the results show that there is no clear relationship or association between the presence of security sector reform, UN peacekeeping, and the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment.

*Hypothesis 4: The presence of amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism will weaken UN peacekeeping's ability to improve rule of law institutions in a post-conflict setting. H<sub>0</sub> (null): There is no significant relationship between the presence of amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism and UN peacekeeping's ability to strengthen the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict setting.*

The presence of amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism is not significantly correlated with UN peacekeeping's ability to improve the rule of law, thus I fail to reject the null hypothesis. Amnesty measures, (controlling for several variables, including UN peacekeeping) however, are negatively correlated with the quality of rule of law in post-conflict states. Regarding Model A in the first set of tests that include the amnesty dummy variable, in a post-conflict environment, controlling for all UN mandate types, the log of deaths during conflict, ethnic fractionalization, development, real GDP per capita, and the presence of a peace treaty:

The results show for Model A that the presence of amnesty measures will cause a -0.123 unit change in the difference between rule of law quality 10 years and 11 years after a conflict has ended. Given that the correlation coefficient of this regression is a negative number, the regression model results in a negative relationship between amnesty measures and the quality of rule of law in post-conflict environments after 1986. With 22 degrees of freedom in a 2-tailed test, the 90% confidence interval of the slope will be  $-0.123 \pm 0.06846(1.72)$  from -0.241 to -0.005.

Regarding Model C in the first set of tests that include the amnesty dummy variable, controlling for UN peacekeeping missions with a mandate to deploy of neutral military and/or civilian observers (untype 2), the log of deaths during conflict, ethnic fractionalization, development, real GDP per capita, and the presence of a peace treaty:

The results show for Model C that the presence of amnesty measures will cause a -0.09863 unit change in the difference between rule of law quality 10 years and 11 years after a conflict has ended. Just like the results from Model A detailed above, given the correlation coefficient of this regression is a negative number, the regression model results in a negative relationship between amnesty measures and the quality of rule of law in post-conflict environments after 1986. With 25 degrees of freedom in a 2-tailed test, the 90% confidence interval of the slope will be  $-0.09863 \pm 0.0561(1.71)$  from -0.195 to -0.003.

Given the correlation coefficients of the regression equations for Models A and C for the amnesty variable are negative numbers, the multiple regression models result in describing a negative relationship between post-conflict amnesty measures and the rule of law. While it is not possible to conclude that post-conflict amnesty measures distort/influence the UN's ability to improve the rule of law (as Hypothesis 4 intended to test), the data is consistent with the theoretical explanation that the presence of amnesty measures can result in an overall poorer quality of rule of law.

## Results for difference in World Bank rule of law scores as dependent variable

Significance codes: 0 '\*\*\*' 0.001 '\*\*' 0.01 '\*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Standard errors are in parentheses

Significant results colored yellow

**Table 3: PCJ Amnesty**

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-1.20E-02 (1.285e-02)	-6.067E-03 (3.512e-05)	-1.09E-02 (1.183e-02)	-9.04E-03 (1.199e-02)	-8.46E-03 (1.222e-02)	-6.96E-03 (1.233e-02)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	2.35E-05 (2.342e-05)	1.500E-05 (2.281e-05)	3.05E-05 (2.083e-05)	1.25E-05 (2.081e-05)	1.64E-05 (2.161e-05)	2.01E-05 (2.024e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	-3.89E-05 (4.054e-05)	-2.365E-05 (3.512e-05)	-4.38E-05 (3.375e-05)	-2.36E-05 (3.258e-05)	-2.15E-05 (3.657e-05)	-2.12E-05 (3.480e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	-8.68E-04 (9.652e-04)	-3.827E-04 (8.216e-04)	-6.64E-04 (8.163e-04)	-6.21E-04 (8.489e-04)	-3.01E-04 (8.580e-04)	-2.97E-04 (8.405e-04)
War duration in months (wardur)	1.15E-04 (3.054e-04)	6.793E-05 (2.939e-04)	1.85E-04 (2.548e-04)	4.77E-05 (2.641e-04)	9.52E-05 (2.655e-04)	5.60E-05 (2.851e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	8.47E-02 (7.155e-02)	3.509E-02 (5.287e-02)	6.31E-02 (5.356e-02)	6.45E-02 (5.838e-02)	3.00E-02 (5.931e-02)	3.96E-02 (5.301e-02)
Amnesty measures present? (pcj.amnesty)	-0.123. (6.846e-02)	-7.915E-02 (1.196e-01)	-9.863E-02. (5.610e-02)	-8.46E-02 (5.674e-02)	-6.09E-02 (5.180e-02)	-5.26E-02 (5.347e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	-2.271E-02 (7.106e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	1.07E-01 (7.860e-02)	NA	1.07E-01 (7.190e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	-9.74E-02 (1.107e-01)	NA	NA	-1.02E-01 (1.028e-01)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	9.91E-03 (8.802e-02)	NA	NA	NA	2.66E-02 (8.220e-02)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	-3.28E-03 (1.745e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	-7.87E-02 (1.651e-01)
Interactive term on UN presence and amnesty (un2int*pcj.amnesty)	NA	3.029e-02 (1.285e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA




**Table 4: SSRI**

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-8.56E-03 (2.487e-02)	-6.721e-03 (1.961e-02)	-1.46E-02 (2.092e-02)	-1.29E-02 (2.142e-02)	-1.61E-02 (2.237e-02)	-2.00E-02 (2.036e-02)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	4.36E-05 (3.524e-05)	3.181e-05 (3.726e-05)	4.85E-05 (3.118e-05)	3.69E-05 (3.297e-05)	4.52E-05 (3.103e-05)	4.92E-05 (3.024e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	-2.98E-05 (5.027e-05)	-2.257e-05 (4.481e-05)	-4.56E-05 (4.240e-05)	-3.34E-05 (4.192e-05)	-4.08E-05 (4.526e-05)	-2.30E-05 (4.286e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	-7.03E-04 (1.562e-03)	8.711e-06 (1.091e-03)	-3.08E-04 (1.199e-03)	-4.61E-04 (1.299e-03)	4.08E-06 (1.119e-03)	2.22E-04 (1.053e-03)
War duration in months (wardur)	-7.60E-05 (3.680e-04)	1.598e-05 (3.503e-04)	1.74E-04 (2.880e-04)	7.90E-05 (3.016e-04)	1.51E-04 (2.926e-04)	-1.81E-05 (3.166e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	6.34E-02 (9.434e-02)	1.807e-02 (8.352e-02)	3.50E-02 (8.577e-02)	6.08E-02 (8.824e-02)	4.33E-02 (8.567e-02)	5.09E-02 (8.299e-02)
Security sector reform present? (SSRI)	3.87E-02 (1.433e-01)	-1.77E-02 (1.821e-01)	6.637e-02 (9.376e-02)	-5.48E-02 (9.366e-02)	-3.79E-02 (1.259e-01)	-2.56E-02 (9.259e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	-2.111e-02 (9.750e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	1.99E-02 (9.441e-02)	NA	5.29E-02 (8.649e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	-1.18E-01 (1.652e-01)	NA	NA	-1.00E-01 (1.527e-01)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	-1.10E-01 (1.597e-01)	NA	NA	NA	-1.23E-02 (1.365e-01)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	-2.42E-01 (2.239e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	-2.00E-01 (1.838e-01)
Interactive term on UN presence and SSR (un2int*SSRI)	NA	-9.723e-02 (1.999e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA

**Table 5: No PCJ Amnesty or SSRI**

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
logcost (log of deaths during conflict)	-3.07E-03 (1.241e-02)	-2.81E-03 (1.165e-02)	-4.07E-03 (1.161e-02)	-3.75E-03 (1.171e-02)	-4.21E-03 (1.175e-02)	-3.02E-03 (1.166e-02)
rgdpcaps (rGDP per capita)	2.20E-05 (2.451e-05)	9.68E-06 (2.248e-05)	2.33E-05 (2.123e-05)	1.62E-05 (2.115e-05)	1.66E-05 (2.177e-05)	2.03E-05 (2.023e-05)
Develop (electricity consumption per capita)	-1.65E-05 (4.040e-05)	-1.55E-05 (3.315e-05)	-2.71E-05 (3.366e-05)	-1.93E-05 (3.321e-05)	-1.74E-05 (3.667e-05)	-1.37E-05 (3.393e-05)
elf (ethnic fractionalization)	-4.60E-04 (9.825e-04)	-4.79E-04 (8.231e-04)	-5.66E-04 (8.465e-04)	-5.09E-04 (8.652e-04)	-3.72E-04 (8.621e-04)	-2.91E-04 (8.399e-04)
wardur (war duration in months)	2.65E-05 (3.157e-04)	-8.27E-07 (2.864e-04)	1.32E-04 (2.631e-04)	8.02E-05 (2.693e-04)	9.08E-05 (2.674e-04)	1.72E-05 (2.821e-04)
treaty (Was there a peace treaty?)	2.78E-02 (6.719e-02)	3.63E-02 (5.436e-02)	2.21E-02 (5.014e-02)	2.29E-02 (5.249e-02)	1.11E-02 (5.750e-02)	2.28E-02 (5.014e-02)
un2int (UN presence)	NA	-5.34E-02 (6.317e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
untype 2 (UN observer missions)	3.93E-02 (7.213e-02)	NA	4.80E-02 (6.603e-02)	NA	NA	NA
untype 3 (traditional UN PKO missions)	-2.43E-02 (1.078e-01)	NA	NA	-3.32E-02 (9.405e-02)	NA	NA
untype 4 (multidimensional PKOs)	7.18E-03 (9.217e-02)	NA	NA	NA	1.84E-02 (8.250e-02)	NA
untype 5 (peace enforcement UN missions)	-1.14E-01 (1.709e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	-1.22E-01 (1.589e-01)

*Figure 1: Substantive Effects with World Bank measure (Table 3, Model A)*



### ***B. Results, Empirical Findings, and Interpretation for CIM measure***

The empirical evidence does not support the theoretical hypotheses. There is not ample enough evidence to show that UN peacekeeping (in any variation of mandate type) is significant in positively improving the rule of law quality in a post-conflict state.

*Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions.*

*H<sub>0</sub> (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.*

*Hypothesis 2: An increase in the strength of UN mission mandate will increase its ability to strengthen the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.*

*H<sub>0</sub> (Null): There is no significant relationship between the UN peacekeeping mission mandate and the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict setting.*

The regression tests conducted with the CIM measure as the dependent variable do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping, or any increase in the mandate of UN peacekeeping, is a causal mechanism for *improving* the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. As seen each set of tests, the coefficients for the peacekeeping variables (un2int, untype2, untype3, untype4, and untype5) are not statistically significant. Thus we fail to reject the null hypothesis. These results show that there is no clear relationship or association between UN peacekeeping and the change in the quality of rule of law after a conflict has ended.

*Hypothesis 3: A negotiated settlement that does not include provisions for security sector reform will lower the probability that a UN peacekeeping mission can successfully strengthen the rule of law.*

*H<sub>0</sub> (null): There is no significant relationship between the provision of security sector reform and the UN's ability to strengthen the rule of law in a post-conflict setting.*

With the CIM proxy for the rule of law dependent variable, the presence of security sector reform is not significantly correlated with UN peacekeeping's ability to improve the rule of law. The coefficient for this variable is not statistically significant. Thus we fail to reject the

null hypothesis. The results show that there is no clear relationship or association between the presence of security sector reform, UN peacekeeping, and the change in the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment.

*Hypothesis 4: The presence of amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism (pcj.amnesty) will weaken UN peacekeeping's ability to improve rule of law institutions in a post-conflict setting.*

*H<sub>0</sub> (null): There is no significant relationship between the presence of amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism and UN peacekeeping's ability to strengthen the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict setting.*

With the CIM proxy for the rule of law dependent variable, the presence of amnesty as a post-conflict justice mechanism is not significantly correlated with UN peacekeeping's ability to improve the rule of law; I fail to reject the null hypothesis.

### *Controls*

While none of the hypotheses were accepted, this particular analysis shows that the log of deaths during a conflict has a negative correlation with the change in the quality of rule of law. In the first set of tests with Models A, B, and D, controlling for all UN mandate types, rGDP per capita, electricity consumption per capita, ethnic fractionalization, amnesty measures, security sector reform, and war duration, the log of deaths per conflict is negatively correlated with the difference in CIM values 10 years and 11 years after a conflict has ended. Additionally, in the second set of tests with Models A, B, C, D, E, and F, controlling for all mandate types, rGDP per capita, electricity consumption per capita, ethnic fractionalization, amnesty measures, and war duration, the log of deaths per conflict is also negatively correlated with the difference in CIM values 10 years and 11 years after the conflict.

For example, the results in the first set of tests show that for Model A (in which all UN mission mandate types are present), a one unit increase in the log number of deaths during

conflict (logcost) will cause a -0.02451 unit change in the difference between CIM value 10 years and 11 years after a conflict has ended. Given the correlation coefficient of this regression is a negative number, the regression model results in a negative relationship between log of deaths during conflict and the change in quality of rule of law in post-conflict environments after 1947. With 33 degrees of freedom in a 2-tailed test, the 90% confidence interval of the slope will be  $-0.02451 \pm 0.01246(1.6924)$  from -0.0456 to -0.00342.

This particular analysis also shows that ethnic fractionalization has a positive correlation with the change in the quality of rule of law. In the first set of tests, Models A, B, C, D, E and F, controlling for all mandate types, rGDP per capita, electricity consumption per capita, ethnic fractionalization, amnesty measures, and war duration, ethnic fractionalization is positively correlated with the difference in CIM values 10 years and 11 years after the conflict.

Additionally, in the second set of tests, Models A, B, C, D, E and F show a positive correlation between ethnic fractionalization and the difference in CIM values.

For example, the results in the first set of tests show that for Model A (in which all UN mission mandate types are present), a one unit increase in the level of ethnic fractionalization will cause a 0.002193 unit change in the difference between CIM values 10 years and 11 years after a conflict has ended. Given the correlation coefficient of this regression is a positive number, the regression model results in a positive relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the change in quality of rule of law in post-conflict environments after 1947. With 33 degrees of freedom in a 2-tailed test, the 95% confidence interval of the slope will be  $0.002193 \pm 0.001012(1.6924)$  from 0.0005 to 0.0039.

## Results for difference in CIM values as dependent variable

Significance codes: 0 '\*\*\*' 0.001 '\*\*' 0.01 '\*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Standard errors are in parentheses

Significant results colored yellow

**Table 6: All controls (Amnesty and SSR at the same time)**

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-2.451e-02. (1.246e-02)	-2.325e-02. (1.214e-02)	-1.838e-02 (1.161e-02)	-1.994e-02. (1.135e-02)	-1.806e-02 (1.133e-02)	-1.712e-02 (1.121e-02)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	-1.172e-05 (2.006e-05)	-7.066e-06 (1.964e-05)	-1.161e-05 (1.896e-05)	-9.624e-06 (1.866e-05)	-1.504e-05 (1.902e-05)	-1.304e-05 (1.867e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	2.508e-05 (4.494e-05)	1.004e-06 (3.559e-05)	4.679e-06 (3.451e-05)	1.670e-06 (3.419e-05)	1.824e-05 (4.268e-05)	6.812e-06 (3.658e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	2.193e-03* (1.012e-03)	1.529e-03. (8.831e-04)	1.609e-03. (8.839e-04)	1.746e-03. (8.825e-04)	1.733e-03. (9.372e-04)	1.588e-03. (9.059e-04)
War duration in months (wardur)	1.168e-04 (2.999e-04)	2.389e-04 (2.713e-04)	1.051e-04 (2.507e-04)	1.757e-04 (2.574e-04)	2.596e-05 (2.772e-04)	7.928e-05 (2.654e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	4.421e-02 (6.752e-02)	6.682e-02 (6.313e-02)	7.826e-02 (5.971e-02)	6.280e-02 (5.765e-02)	6.615e-02 (5.888e-02)	7.279e-02 (5.827e-02)
Amnesty measures present? (pcj.amnesty)	3.773e-02 (6.172e-02)	5.721e-02 (7.494e-02)	1.083e-02 (5.636e-02)	1.963e-02 (5.227e-02)	8.247e-04 (4.951e-02)	3.217e-04 (4.980e-02)
Security sector reform present? (SSRI)	-1.122e-01 (1.189e-01)	-4.795e-02 (1.558e-01)	-3.550e-03 (7.309e-02)	-9.539e-03 (7.006e-02)	-3.016e-02 (9.951e-02)	6.264e-03 (6.997e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	1.049e-01 (7.141e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	-1.788e-02 (8.280e-02)	NA	-3.092e-02 (7.621e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	1.610e-01 (1.135e-01)	NA	NA	1.031e-01 (9.672e-02)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	1.595e-01 (1.631e-01)	NA	NA	NA	6.598e-02 (1.315e-01)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	6.228e-02 (1.858e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	-1.706e-02 (1.667e-01)
Interactive term on UN presence and amnesty (un2int*pcj.amnesty)	NA	-1.345e-01 (1.107e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA
Interactive term on UN presence and SSR (un2int*SSRI)	NA	3.408e-02 (1.771e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA

**Table 7: Controls + Amnesty control (no SSRI)**

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-1.860e-02* (8.753e-03)	-2.011e-02* (8.584e-03)	-1.590e-02. (8.294e-03)	-1.810e-02* 8.410e-03	-1.597e-02. (8.292e-03)	-1.587e-02. (8.333e-03)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	-9.044e-06 (1.529e-05)	-5.784e-06 (1.376e-05)	-7.860e-06 (1.392e-05)	-6.461e-06 (1.378e-05)	-9.742e-06 (1.491e-05)	-7.791e-06 (1.393e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	-3.176e-06 (3.228e-05)	-8.838e-06 (2.812e-05)	-3.944e-06 (2.785e-05)	-6.995e-06 (2.759e-05)	7.786e-07 (3.023e-05)	-4.013e-06 (2.918e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	1.460e-03* (7.105e-04)	1.302e-03. (6.580e-04)	1.299e-03. (6.695e-04)	1.457e-03* (6.717e-04)	1.328e-03. (6.699e-04)	1.301e-03. (6.862e-04)
War duration in months (wardur)	1.879e-04 (2.495e-04)	2.442e-04 (2.234e-04)	1.328e-04 (2.144e-04)	2.010e-04 (2.198e-04)	1.026e-04 (2.235e-04)	1.310e-04 (2.257e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	4.333e-02 (4.889e-02)	5.899e-02 (4.608e-02)	6.057e-02 (4.334e-02)	5.136e-02 (4.315e-02)	5.410e-02 (4.562e-02)	5.937e-02 (4.330e-02)
Amnesty measures present? (pcj.amnesty)	1.706e-02 (4.557e-02)	4.434e-02 (5.443e-02)	1.072e-02 (4.115e-02)	1.875e-02 (3.802e-02)	4.184e-03 (3.728e-02)	5.856e-03 (3.732e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	9.143e-02 (5.736e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	-3.367e-03 (6.067e-02)	NA	-1.393e-02 (5.512e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	1.017e-01 (8.629e-02)	NA	NA	9.602e-02 (8.272e-02)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	3.763e-02 (8.584e-02)	NA	NA	NA	2.842e-02 (7.801e-02)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	2.642e-02 (1.478e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	7.336e-03 (1.424e-01)
Interactive term on UN presence and amnesty (un2int*pcj.amnesty)	NA	-1.156e-01 (8.376e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA




**Table 8: Controls + SSRI control (No Amnesty)**

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-7.612e-03 (7.135e-03)	-7.114e-03 (6.880e-03)	-5.938e-03 (6.916e-03)	-6.998e-03 (6.961e-03)	-6.355e-03 (6.875e-03)	-5.922e-03 (6.882e-03)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	-2.023e-05 (1.400e-05)	-1.870e-05 (1.392e-05)	-1.721e-05 (1.327e-05)	-1.673e-05 (1.320e-05)	-2.004e-05 (1.373e-05)	-1.726e-05 (1.327e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	1.486e-05 (2.871e-05)	1.366e-05 (2.450e-05)	1.546e-05 (2.459e-05)	1.015e-05 (2.520e-05)	2.359e-05 (2.674e-05)	1.443e-05 (2.564e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	6.884e-04 (5.557e-04)	5.172e-04 (5.154e-04)	6.313e-04 (5.348e-04)	6.893e-04 (5.158e-04)	6.871e-04 (5.173e-04)	6.141e-04 (5.224e-04)
War duration in months (wardur)	4.114e-05 (1.961e-04)	3.864e-05 (1.706e-04)	-4.375e-06 (1.672e-04)	4.224e-05 (1.746e-04)	-4.061e-05 (1.730e-04)	3.885e-06 (1.769e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	1.150e-02 (4.280e-02)	7.976e-03 (4.023e-02)	2.484e-02 (4.065e-02)	2.193e-02 (3.815e-02)	2.128e-02 (3.831e-02)	2.379e-02 (3.856e-02)
Security sector reform present? (SSRI)	-2.823e-02 (5.553e-02)	-2.501e-02 (6.486e-02)	-3.682e-03 (4.713e-02)	-2.979e-03 (4.520e-02)	-2.380e-02 (5.275e-02)	-4.203e-03 (4.591e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	3.650e-02 (3.469e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	1.067e-02 (4.444e-02)	NA	-1.205e-03 (4.281e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	5.576e-02 (5.710e-02)	NA	NA	4.577e-02 (5.402e-02)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	6.889e-02 (7.797e-02)	NA	NA	NA	5.627e-02 (7.456e-02)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	6.872e-02 (1.398e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.774e-02 (1.315e-01)
Interactive term on UN presence and amnesty (un2int*SSRI)	NA	3.286e-02 (8.270e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA

**Table 9: Controls sans Amnesty and SSR controls**

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-6.272e-03 (5.461e-03)	-6.333e-03 (5.278e-03)	-5.675e-03 (5.298e-03)	-6.063e-03 (5.338e-03)	-5.599e-03 (5.284e-03)	-5.731e-03 (5.303e-03)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	-1.527e-05 (1.106e-05)	-1.286e-05 (1.016e-05)	-1.312e-05 (1.032e-05)	-1.287e-05 (1.024e-05)	-1.516e-05 (1.082e-05)	-1.328e-05 (1.028e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	1.048e-05 (2.109e-05)	9.620e-06 (1.860e-05)	9.613e-06 (1.877e-05)	7.706e-06 (1.909e-05)	1.368e-05 (2.001e-05)	8.861e-06 (1.926e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	5.225e-04 (4.339e-04)	4.672e-04 (4.127e-04)	5.109e-04 (4.180e-04)	5.278e-04 (4.150e-04)	5.366e-04 (4.160e-04)	4.975e-04 (4.221e-04)
War duration in months (wardur)	4.380e-05 (1.630e-04)	5.271e-05 (1.447e-04)	2.146e-05 (1.436e-04)	4.371e-05 (1.496e-04)	2.338e-06 (1.469e-04)	2.874e-05 (1.496e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	5.075e-03 (3.144e-02)	4.692e-03 (2.881e-02)	1.821e-02 (2.701e-02)	1.620e-02 (2.682e-02)	1.216e-02 (2.855e-02)	1.744e-02 (2.698e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	3.003e-02 (2.583e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	9.343e-03 (3.573e-02)	NA	2.655e-04 (3.374e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	3.008e-02 (4.651e-02)	NA	NA	2.271e-02 (4.405e-02)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	3.667e-02 (5.397e-02)	NA	NA	NA	2.953e-02 (5.140e-02)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	3.880e-02 (1.191e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.983e-02 (1.148e-01)

*Figure 2: Substantive Effects for CIM measure (Table 6, Model A)*



## RESULTS FOR MATCHING ANALYSIS

### *A. Results for Matching Analysis using World Bank measure as dependent variable*

#### *I. Using CEM algorithm*

Algorithm used in STATA: cem wardur elf\_destringed logcost, treatment(un2int)

Multivariate L1 distance: 0

**Table 10: Regression Results with CEM weight (using algorithm)**

Dependent variable (difference.wbgirle)	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-value	Min.	Max.
un2int	-.1495865	.1261033	0.301	-.4997054	.2005324
wardur	.0007444	.0007952	0.402	-.0014633	.0029521
elf	-.000358	.0021241	0.874	-.0062555	.0055395
logcost	-.0782816	.0527691	0.212	-.2247922	.068229
Constant	1.050172	.6103211	0.160	-.6443509	2.744695

#### *Interpretation with algorithm CEM*

*Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions*

*H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.*

The regression tests conducted with the World Bank difference measure as the dependent variable, with the CEM weight using the CEM algorithm, do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. Thus, I fail to reject the null hypothesis.

#### *II. Using coarsened matching by explicit user choice*

Algorithm used in STATA: cem wardur (80) elf\_destringed (25 65) logcost (10 12), treatment(un2int)

Multivariate L1 distance: .51111111

**Table 11: Regression Results with CEM weight (explicit user choice)**

Dependent variable (difference.wbgirle)	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-value	Min.	Max.
un2int	-.0618187	.0535736	0.260	-.172644	.0490067
wardur	-.0000715	.000202	0.727	-.0004893	.0003463

elf	-.0003919	.0008771	0.659	-.0022063	.0014226
logcost	-.0066913	.0140664	0.639	-.0357899	.0224072
Constant	.1495394	.1915143	0.443	-.2466381	.5457169

*Interpretation with explicit user choice CEM*

*Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions*

*H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.*

The regression tests conducted with the World Bank difference measure as the dependent variable, with the CEM weight using predetermined bins that I chose based on the distribution of the controls, do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. Thus, I fail to reject the null hypothesis.

***B. Results for Matching Analysis using CIM measure as dependent variable***

*I. Using CEM algorithm*

Algorithm used in STATA: `cem wardur elf_destringed logcost, treatment(un2int)`

Multivariate L1 distance: .18965517

***Table 12: Regression Results with algorithm CEM weight***

<b>Dependent variable (CIM difference)</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>P-value</b>	<b>Min.</b>	<b>Max.</b>
un2int	.001116	.0089213	0.901	-.0169951	.0192271
wardur	-.0000529	.0000782	0.503	-.0002116	.0001058
elf	-.0000333	.000155	0.831	-.000348	.0002815
logcost	.0021292	.0020669	0.310	-.0020668	.0063251
constant	-.0156197	.0228245	0.498	-.0619559	.0307166

*Interpretation with algorithm CEM*

*Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions*

*H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.*

The regression tests conducted with the CIM difference measure as the dependent variable, with the CEM weight using the CEM algorithm, do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. Thus, I fail to reject the null hypothesis.

## *II. Using coarsened matching by explicit user choice*

Algorithm used in STATA: cem wardur (80) elf\_destringed (25 65) logcost (10 12), treatment(un2int)

Multivariate L1 distance: .50222575

***Table 13: Regression Results with CEM weight (explicit user choice)***

Dependent variable (CIM difference)	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-value	Min.	Max.
un2int	.0155614	.0192143	0.420	-.022669	.0537918
wardur	.0000436	.000082	0.597	-.0001195	.0002066
elf	.0003126	.0003133	0.321	-.0003108	.0009361
logcost	-.004761	.0047257	0.317	-.0141636	.0046416
constant	.0280284	.0560619	0.618	-.0835172	.1395741

### *Interpretation with explicit user choice CEM*

*Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions*

*H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.*

The regression tests conducted with the CIM difference measure as the dependent variable, with the CEM weight using predetermined bins that I chose based on the distribution of the controls, do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. Thus, I fail to reject the null hypothesis.

## DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The results of the regression and matching tests were on the whole inconclusive on finding any specific directional relationship between peacekeeping and the rule of law in post-conflict state. The limitations of existing measures and data on the rule of law ultimately reduce the number of data points that can be analyzed in such a study. Given the limited data and quality of data on the rule of law there is a limited amount that can be said, using empirical large-N analysis as evidence, on whether or not UN peacekeeping improves the rule of law.

That being said, there is still much to be ascertained from the finding that peacekeeping had neither a significantly positive or negative effect on the rule of law in both the regression and matching analyses. For both the World Bank Rule of Law measure and the Contract Intensive Money measure, there was no significant relationship between UN peacekeeping, in all iterations of the independent variable and hypotheses 1 and 2, and whether or not the rule of law improved after a conflict had ended. This has important implications for UN peacekeeping rule of law activity. Even though UN peacekeeping spends a concerted effort in promoting the rule of law in post-conflict states, its impact is undetectable. They are not making a significant impact in the post-conflict environment. The fact that UN peacekeeping is not making an obvious improvement in the quality of rule of law in post-conflict states, despite massive amounts of time and resources dedicated towards improving the rule of law, means that there is most likely other factors/issues at hand (whether it be UN-based or host-country based) that impede the UN's ability to decisively and comprehensively improve the rule of law.

Another interesting conclusion that can be pulled from this analysis is the finding that amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism are negatively correlated with the difference in rule of law quality after a conflict has ended. While I was not able to find evidence

that amnesty measures act as a conditional/interactive factor between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law, there is much to be said about this finding about the relationship between amnesty measures and the rule of law. As discussed in the literature review, post-conflict amnesty measures can protect perpetrators of conflict and leave them politically and physically intact to launch into conflict again, thus harming efforts to improve the rule of law. This particular finding supports findings in the literature that amnesty measures can harm the durability of peace in a post-conflict setting.



## **CASE STUDY: UN PEACEKEEPING RULE OF LAW PROGRAMMING IN LIBERIA**

### **CONTEXT OF ENGAGEMENT**

#### ***Legacy of Conflict***

To understand the context that UNMIL operates in and what necessitated international involvement in rebuilding the rule of law, it is necessary to understand the legacy of conflict in Liberia. In 1980, Samuel Doe, backed by a group of indigenous members of the Krahn tribe, organized a military coup against the Liberian government (at that time headed by William Tolbert). In the next ten years, Doe ruled Liberia with brutal political repression towards his opponents and patronage and political favoritism towards members of the Krahn ethnic group. Doe actively used the judiciary system to consolidate power, remove political opponents and dissent of the regime, and abuse basic human rights. Continuous manipulation of the justice system and military brutality fostered widespread resentment against the Doe regime (Insight on Conflict; Scott 2005, 356; Lubkemann, Isser, Banks 2011, 198).

Charles Taylor, a former Doe administration minister, led the National Patriotic Front of Liberia to overtake the Doe regime in December 1989. Underlying this coup and the subsequent 8-year civil war were several internal factors including natural resource exploration and the proliferation of extremely competitive warlord and ethnic factions (Scott 2005, 357). While the Doe regime fell quickly, the conflict devolved into a power struggle between Taylor (who controlled the majority of the country outside Monrovia) and various armed groups and warlords throughout Liberia. The conflict increasingly turned more complex and multifaceted as military factions splintered into various groups and militia (Insight on Conflict). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) organized a peacekeeping force to address the civil war in Liberia, but was largely considered ineffective in addressing the root causes of

conflict. By 1990, the country had devolved into full conflict and warfare. During this war, the country witnessed the effective dissolution of the national government, and the resounding deterioration of what remained of its justice system and institutions.

The first civil war (and subsequent violence) only stopped in August 1996 after a ceasefire that laid the ground for elections in 1997. Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Party, taking advantage of Taylor's access to natural resources/funds, and regional backing by Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Libya, won these elections with 75% of the vote (Scott 2005, 358). This signal of democracy, however, did not translate into complete peacebuilding success in the aftermath of the first civil war. Despite being elected to presidency, Taylor ruled Liberia for five years by centralizing power through rewarding loyalists to his political party and brutally intimidating critics of his regime (Scott 2005, 359). Liberia's state institutions, particularly the judiciary and legislature, were unable to promote the rule of law in any true capacity. State officials abused justice and other state institutions for personal enrichment and political power. The very justice and state institutions meant to provide checks on Taylor's power remained incredibly weak. Through the Taylor regime's continual corruption and abuse associated with these institutions, Liberian civilians further developed a deep distrust of state institutions (Human Rights Watch 2003).

Warlords and Liberian exiles, in response to frustration from being excluded from the implementation process of the Abuja Peace Accords ending the first civil war and from roles in the Taylor government after his election, formed Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in Guinea. LURD organized to wage war and unseat Taylor in 1999, marking the start of the Second Civil War. Taylor, weakened by international sanctions, was unable to fight back the rebel group. In 2002, Taylor imposed a state of emergency as LURD

fighters gained closer access to the capital of Monrovia. While the government was able to regain territory in 2002, Taylor's regime faced increasing challenges as a new rebel group, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), emerged and organized in the southeast (Dowd and Raleigh 2012, 14).

By 2003, Taylor controlled less than one-third of the country. An intensification of fighting (with Taylor and rebel groups and between various rebel groups), the arrival of ECOWAS peacekeepers and US troops, and the resignation of Charles Taylor all contributed to the eventual termination of the civil war. The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in June 2003 between an interim government, LURD, MODEL, and other political parties/rebel groups, officially marked the end of the war (Insight on Conflict). In accordance with the Accra Peace Agreement, the UN deployed a peacekeeping mission with 15,000 troops, more than 1,100 civilian police, and hundreds of civilian staff (Lubkemann, Isser, Banks 2011, 198).

The effects of war and conflict in Liberia were clearly devastating. Around 250,000 people were killed in Liberia's civil war, and thousands more fled to neighboring countries. The conflict ruined the economy and destroyed basic infrastructure (BBC 2012). Many analysts in the aftermath of the conflict viewed the deterioration of state institutions and government authority as a major consequence of the war's severity. After the conflict, the formal justice system had ceased to function and the massive numbers of internally displaced peoples and refugees prevented informal justice institutions from working effectively throughout the country (Lubkemann, Isser, Banks 2011, 199). The International Legal Assistance Consortium, in a 2003 report, summarized the state of affairs in regards to Liberia's rule of law institutions:

There is an almost unanimous distrust of Liberia's courts and a corresponding collapse of the rule of law. Liberia's Constitution provides for an Anglo-American legal system, but in reality, there is no effective separation of powers, a limited understanding of the principles of transparency and accountability, little

knowledge of contemporary notions of human rights, limited access to legal advice and defense counsel, and unconscionable delays. Taylor's government withheld salaries from judges, prosecutors, court staff, police, and prison officers for 2.5 years. Judgment, freedom, and even life itself, were often sold to the highest bidder.

In 2005, runoff presidential elections resulted in the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the first African democratically elected female president. While she has won praise for her reform efforts, she has inherited Liberia's legacy of conflict. National and international peacebuilding efforts have faced challenges in the face of Liberia's ingrained history of corruption and longstanding distrust and disillusionment in rule of law institutions.

### ***UNMIL's Mandate***

The culture of corruption and impunity that fostered and fueled the conflict in Liberia paralyzed the justice system and various rule of law institutions. It is in this context then in which the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) carries out its rule of law activities. UNMIL officially assumed peacekeeping responsibilities from ECOWAS in October 2003. Armed with a Chapter VII mandate from the Security Council, UNMIL is charged with implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2003) that ended the second Liberian civil war, providing humanitarian and human rights assistance, carrying out security sector reform, and overall supervising and carrying out the peace process. UNMIL's mandate has been extended several times since its creation in 2003. For example, in 2005, its mandate was expanded to include the handling of former President Charles Taylor's prosecution at the Special Court of Sierra Leone. UNMIL is a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation, and works in close conjunction with the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire, and the United Nations Office for West Africa

(The Stimson Center 2012, 1; S/RES/1509).

Specifically relating to the rule of law, Resolution 1509 mandates UNMIL to provide operational support for the police, assist the government in monitoring and restructuring the Liberian National Police (LNP), and train and develop programs for the LNP. Additionally, Resolution 1509 calls for UNMIL to assist the government in developing national legal frameworks and statutory judicial institutions, ensuring cooperation between security and justice sectors in the country, and building human rights protections within various state institutions. The Security Council also mandates UNMIL with assisting the government in developing correctional institutions (S/RES/1509). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement itself also contains provisions for security sector reform that involve the restructuring of the LNP. In addition to outlining plans for security sector reform, the CPA also establishes an Independent National Commission on Human Rights to monitor Liberia's compliance with international human rights standards. It also set out a new structure for the judiciary for the interim government period (Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2003).

### ***Factors that influence mission's work***

There are several broadly applicable factors that have either impeded or supported UNMIL's work in the past 10 years. UNMIL has seen an inconsistent level of political cooperation from the government and has had to deal with national political tension between the government and its opposition, rivals, and co-signatories of the peace agreement. Additionally, there are several societal factors that also serve as challenges to UNMIL's rule of law work.

### *Politics*

President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf faced several internal and regional challenges when first elected in 2005 including: deep ethnic and social fractionalization, a tense and insecure political atmosphere in which former wartime faction leaders transitioned to political roles, endemic corruption, and nearly nonexistent infrastructure. President Sireleaf has worked throughout her tenure as President to address these challenges and stabilize the country by driving political and economic development. She worked to develop an inclusive cabinet that included members of rival political parties and civil society actors. Notably, Sirleaf appointed an unprecedented amount of women to important ministry and high-profile positions. Sirleaf was reelected as President in 2011 in a runoff election.

Under Sirleaf, Liberia has seen policies aimed at increasing transparency, improving human rights, and reducing political persecutions. There has also been unprecedented freedom of speech and regular salary payments in the public sector. The pace of reform, however, has been relatively slow, and the dividends of said reforms for peace on stability and security have been uneven. Governance remains highly centralized and focused in the executive branch. Sirleaf's administration has also been criticized for not taking decisive action on key issues and reports such as the General Auditing Commission and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Corruption, particularly, remains a pervasive problem throughout Liberia in various forms ranging from the “the mismanagement of public funds to magistrates and police demanding bribes before they perform their duties.” While the government has taken on several initiatives to fight corruption (including the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) (2008), the Whistleblower Act (2010), the Freedom of Information Act (2010), and the General Auditing Commission (GAC) (2005)), none have really translated into tangible action, possibly due to a lack of political will. The capacity of the government to address corruption ultimately influences

not only how UNMIL works in the country to assist rule of law reform, but also the ability for national and local ownership of rule of law reform plans.

### *Society*

Unemployment among the youth and former combatants remains a major security concern. The DDR process in Liberia did not include provisions to recruit ex-combatants into the new army. This left the country with high levels of unemployment and frustration. The resulting unemployment rates have coincided with an increased crime rate and threats of violence that have posed problems for the local police and UNMIL (International Crisis Group 2009, 5). Additionally, despite general relative improvements in the past decade in security and stability within the country, loyalty structures persist among ex-combatant youth and serve as a potential destabilizing effect. Rebel group structures and command chains from the previous conflict remain intact and could potentially be reignited.

While unrest over food price fluctuations and land disputes serve as potential triggers for violence, ex-combatants themselves serve as a serious problem for the security of Liberia. Many ex-combatants are unemployed. Employment training provided by the government is not targeting the right people or providing the necessary skills for available in-demand jobs. For example, vocational training provided during the DDR process did not provide high-demand technical mining skills, an industry that had an availability of jobs. This unemployment of ex-combatants has led to a fear that they could be mobilized to fight (International Crisis Group 2011, 14; S/2011/72).

These fears materialized when a group of ex-combatants crossed the Liberia-Cote d'Ivoire border between December 2010 and April 2011. Former Ivorian President Laurent

Gbago is accused of recruiting Liberian mercenaries during the post-electoral crisis in Cote d'Ivoire. These ex-combatants were recruited selectively based on former fighting experience. They were promised incentives and \$500-\$1500 as payment. Around several hundred Liberian mercenaries were used in various stages during the Ivorian electoral crisis. Many were used to carry out attacks on President Alassane Outtara's supporters in the immediate aftermath of the election. UNMIL and the LNP monitored the border and were able to arrest several mercenaries and Ivorian fighters. The developments in Cote d'Ivoire posed a serious regional security threat to Liberia (International Crisis Group 2011, 14 - 15; S/2011/72).

Instability that comes with the cross border flows of weapons and ammunition also contributes to the precarious security situation in Liberia. Firearms are becoming an increasing problem. Ex-combatants and mercenaries have brought back weapons and ammunition from Cote d'Ivoire and there has been an influx of manufactured single-barrel shotguns from Guinea in the country. As Liberia lacked strong firearms control legislation, President Sirleaf signed an executive order on 26 October 2011 banning the use of firearms by private citizens (International Crisis Group 2011, 15; S/2011/72; S/2012/230; Jaye 2009, 19). Cross border flows of refugees also contribute to the fragile security situation in Liberia. Around 180,000 people fled the fighting in Cote d'Ivoire between December 2010 and March 2011 into villages across eastern Liberia. Refugees strain the resources of not only Liberia's border towns but the capacity of UNMIL to address humanitarian crises while also addressing rule of law reform. Refugees also serve as potential trigger of conflict over land (International Crisis Group 2011, 16; S/2011/497).

Underlying youth unemployment and the problems that stem from it are Liberia's low literacy levels. Literacy and education levels have major implications for the efficacy of UNMIL's rule of law reforms. Only 60.8% of adults in Liberia are literate, with 64.8% male



literacy and 56.8% female literacy. These relatively low literacy levels have impeded the rebuilding of rule of law institutions. Low literacy levels, and by extension low education levels, have impeded recruitment and career advancement of women in the national police force. Additionally, low literacy levels prevent formal justice mechanisms from being actual institutions that fully comprehend, practice and apply the legal code. UNMIL has estimated that only half of the country's 300 justices of the peace are literate (The Stimson Center 2012, 3; CIA World Factbook 2012; International Crisis Group 2011, 13).

### *Dual Justice System & Societal Distrust of Statutory Rule of Law Institutions*

The customary traditional justice system in Liberia remains intact and is largely preferred for dispute resolution and the administration of justice over the statutory system. There are several realities that Liberians face in pursuing justice, as well as strongly ingrained societal beliefs that inform Liberian conceptions of justice that ultimately influence the efficacy of UNMIL's rule of law reforms of the statutory system.

The formal part of Liberia's dual justice system (of which UNMIL's rule of law reform activities are heavily focused on) is heavily modeled on the common-law and adversarial system of the United States. This encompasses a judiciary system divided into three tiers: a Supreme Court with jurisdiction over all constitutional issues, sixteen circuit courts with jurisdiction over serious criminal and civil offenses, and courts of first instance (such as the justice of the peace courts, magistrate courts, traffic courts and juvenile courts) (Lubkemann, Isser, Banks 2011, 205; Isser, Lubkemann, N'Tow 2009, 3). Liberians, however, nearly universally criticize this formal judiciary system, for a host of reasons. Liberia's legacy of conflict has instilled a deep public distrust in the courts system of which powerful figures historically manipulated to serve political

aims. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission even listed as the second root cause of civil war as the “lack of any permanent or appropriate mechanism for the settlement of disputes, the judiciary being historically weak and unreliable” (Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2009; Lubkemann et al. 2011, 205).

According to a comprehensive study carried out by the United States Institute of Peace and the George Washington University on the dual justice system in Liberia, Liberians are "overwhelmingly dissatisfied with the formal justice system, particularly at the local level." Particularly, the formal justice system is unaffordable, inaccessible, and extremely slow in providing justice. The study finds that Liberians are dissatisfied with the formal justice system, as it is associated with excessive legal fees, long amounts of traveling time to the actual courts, and a lack of transparency and impartiality. The formal system also suffers from a lack of capacity. It also lacks qualified personnel; over half the justices of peace are illiterate and a majority are “notoriously corrupt and incompetent, charging excessive fees and meting out justice beyond their jurisdiction” (Isser, Lubkemann, N’Tow 2009, 3 – 5; Lubkemann et al. 2011, 206; International Crisis Group 2006).

The same study found that even if the formal justice system were credible and effective, Liberians would still err towards the customary justice system as it aligns better with Liberian values. The main principles of individual rights, adversarialism, and punitive sanctions that make up the formal system differ from those valued by most Liberians when it comes to the provision of justice. The study found that many Liberians feel the formal system is too narrow and punitive in defining the problems it attempts to resolve, and thus fails to resolve the root causes that underlie a dispute. This concern is formed in the deeply held cultural assumption that “incorrect or injurious behavior is usually rooted in damaged and acrimonious social relations” (Isser,

Lubkemann, N'Tow 2009, 4). In order to adequately provide justice, Liberians believe that a justice authority must work to repair relations to solve the root causes of dispute, rather than just impose punitive measures to treat a symptom of dispute (Isser, Lubkemann, N'Tow 2009, 4).

Liberians believe the customary justice system is better able to provide the type of justice that they desire. Customary institutions have survived the legacy of conflict in Liberia and remain virtually intact and active in most rural communities. Customary forms of justice and dispute resolution in Liberia are aimed at addressing root causes of disputes and place a heavy emphasis on social reconciliation and restorative justice. According to the survey carried out by the Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford University, of a total of 3,181 civil cases, “only 3 percent were taken to a formal court; 38 percent to an informal forum; and 59 percent to no forum at all. Of 1,877 criminal cases, only 2 percent were taken to a formal court; 45 percent to an informal forum; and 53 percent to no forum at all” (Isser, Lubkemann, N'Tow 2009, 4). Given the acute capacity and legitimacy constraints on the formal system, and the proclivity of Liberians to use the customary justice system, the dual justice system serves as a legitimate challenge (or opportunity) for UNMIL in their rule of law reform activities that focus on improving statutory legal system and increasing access to justice throughout the country.

#### *Post-conflict justice mechanism: Truth and Reconciliation Commission*

In the face of the massive human rights violations committed during the conflict, Article XIII of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement decreed for the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (Ojielo 2010, 6). The TRC was born out of a compromise: Liberia's warring factions at the table favored the TRC as a way to avoid prosecutions while civil

society preferred criminal punitive accountability (Hayner 2007; James-Allen, Weah and Goodfriend 2010 2010, 5).

On 12 May 2005, the National Transitional Legislative Assembly of Liberia enacted the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act of Liberia, which officially charged the TRC to investigate human rights violations, address issues of impunity, and provide opportunities for victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to share experiences and clarify the events of the conflict in order to facilitate healing and reconciliation. The Commission was also tasked with researching and addressing the root causes of the crisis (including but not limited to poverty, ethnic fractionalization, and abuse of rule of law institutions). The TRC Act also charged the TRC with carrying out a critical review of Liberia's past with the goal of addressing falsehoods and misconceptions about Liberia's history (Ojielo 2010, 6 - 9). In the CPA, there was an additional provision that “the National Transitional Government of Liberia shall give consideration to a recommendation for general amnesty to all persons and parties engaged or involved in military activities during the Liberian civil conflict” (Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2003, article XXXIV).

The TRC released its final report in December 2009 after three years of researching and operating. The report makes several conclusions and recommendations. It found the major root causes of conflict to be: poverty, greed, corruption, limited access to education, inequalities across social, economic, civil and political statuses, identity conflict, land disputes, and a lack of a reliable dispute resolution institutions. The report also cited as a problem the “duality of the Liberian political, social and legal systems, which polarizes and widens the disparities between the Liberian peoples – a chasm between settler Liberia and indigenous Liberia” (The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia 2009, 16).

The TRC report recommended the establishment of an Extraordinary Criminal Tribunal for Liberia and listed out specific individuals, corporations, and institutions for prosecution and/or investigation. Additionally, it recommended the creation of a “National Palava Hut Forum” as a tool for national reconciliation utilizing traditional dispute resolution and customary justice mechanisms. The TRC also listed individuals that should be barred from running for political office for 30 years, including President Sirleaf. In January 2011, the Liberian Supreme Court held that this recommendation was unconstitutional (The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia 2009; United States Institute of Peace; James-Allen, Weah and Goodfriend 2010, 5 – 6).

Even though the TRC released its recommendations, the process of forming the final report was difficult. The TRC faced extremely limited technical capacity, poorly coordinating programming, and internal tension between the commissioners. The report lacks consistency between sections (particularly on the issue of amnesty) and faces questions of reliability due to a relative lack of detail. Even though the TRC's final report provides a way for important issues to be discussed in the country, there is disconnect in the implementation of its recommendations. This stems from not only flaws in the TRC report itself but also a lack of strong political will from governmental actors in Liberia to fully implement it (James-Allen, Weah and Goodfriend 2010, 14 – 15; International Crisis Group 2011, 19 - 20). The ability of the government to implement relevant recommendations of the TRC report and push forward with reconciliation will ultimately affect UNMIL's ability to strengthen the rule of law throughout the country.

## **EVALUATING UNMIL’S RULE OF LAW WORK**

While security has improved since the end of the civil war in 2003, there are still internal threats of violent crime and external threats of regional conflict that make rule of law reform essential. UNMIL is still primarily responsible for security in the country, though it is working to transfer some of its power to the Liberian National Police (LNP) by developing security and contingency plans for when UNMIL leaves. While the international community hails UNMIL as a peacebuilding success, its effectiveness in addressing root causes of internal and external insecurity through rule of law reform is inconsistent. It has both successes and shortcomings in reforming the police, justice and corrections sectors in Liberia.

Several divisions and departments carry out UNMIL's rule of law work. The Legal and Judicial System Support Division (LJSSD) collaborates with Liberia's national legal and judicial institutions (such as the Ministry of Justice, the Liberian Bar Association, and law schools), relevant UN organizations, and civil society to carry out rule of law reform. LJSSD's objective is to develop practical solutions that specifically face the justice sector, with the ultimate goal of helping re-establish the rule of law in Liberia. It also aims to re-establish a strong legal educational system and training services for personnel in the legal and judicial sectors (United Nations Mission in Liberia 2013).

The Corrections Advisory Unit (CAU) works with the Liberian government to re-establish the Bureau of Corrections and Rehabilitation and develop it to be more accountable and able to uphold international standards. CAU is mandated to provide strategic and technical advice on corrections issues, provide guidance on penal reforms, support infrastructure development and the expansion of the Bureau's facilities, develop corrections employees through mentoring, and train corrections staff in prison management and human rights. The Human Rights and Protection Section (HRPS) works with government and non-governmental actors in

Liberia to promote and protect human rights in all 15 countries. This involves monitoring and reporting human rights violations and contributing to the development of national policies to address civil, political, social and economic rights as they pertain to the rule of law, access to justice, transitional justice, the protection of children, women's rights, sexual and gender based violence, and more (United Nations Mission in Liberia 2013).

UN Police (UNPOL), as part of UNMIL's police component, provides support for security sector reform by assisting the government in restructuring and monitoring the police force. UNPOL assists the LNP by implementing training programs and initiatives, investigating police misconduct, providing strategic advice and expertise, and providing operational support for regular policing activities. UNPOL is responsible for carrying out activities relating to training and development, research and planning, operation of the Emergency Response Unit, and reform in general (United Nations Mission in Liberia 2013).

### ***Police***

UNMIL's success with police reform is questionable. Despite large efforts by UNPOL on police reform, the LNP are still widely considered to be ineffective and corrupt. Corruption is prevalent among LNP officers, primarily those deployed in the field. The inability of the police to address internal security issues such as armed robberies and rape, in conjunction with a judiciary that is unable to effectively enforce the rule of law and assure citizen security, has led to a growth in vigilantism and disrespect of police in Monrovia and throughout Liberia. Ineffectiveness is partly due to the fact that the police have been recruited, vetted, and trained to a far lower standard than the army. Low salaries and inadequate incentives also undermine the integrity of UNMIL's police reforms (International Crisis Group 2011, 11 - 13; Search for

Common Ground 2011, 5; International Crisis Group 2009, ii). With the recent 7 November 2011 electoral related violence, the police overreacted and was "ill-prepared, unprofessional and poorly coordinated and lacked proper leadership." The LNP's inability to effectively address this points to issues of poor coordination that still plague the police and justice ministry (International Crisis Group 2012, 14 -15).

With the assistance of UNMIL, the recruitment and vetting process for the LNP started around 2004. UNMIL helped the LNP develop a set of vetting criteria for the LNP (must be a Liberian citizen between 18 and 35 years old, have a high school education, physically and mentally competent, no criminal record, no criminal charges and no subject to any investigation of war crimes, and apolitical). There is mixed criticism, however, on the police recruitment and vetting process and UNMIL's contributions. Many Liberian officials and Liberians themselves see the police vetting process failing to eliminate corrupt officials. Despite heavy UNMIL involvement, there still remains a perception by the Liberian population that the police force is unqualified. While the young population of Liberia is known to be the least educated population group, only ten percent of candidates who applied to the police force were rejected. This implies that "many people were accepted for LNP employment even though they did not meet the requirements, particularly the educational criteria" (Mbadlanyana and Onuoha 2009, 14 - 15; International Crisis Group 2009, 17).

UNMIL, in addition to assisting in the recruiting and vetting process, also provides operational support for the LNP in several capacities by providing equipment and logistical support, formed police units, and investigative assistance. UNMIL and various donors are investing significant funds in rebuilding police stations and equipping the LNP but it is not clear if the LNP is prepared or able to utilize the new resources to their full advantage. There is a



mismatch of donor resources in providing equipment and logistics to the LNP. Despite UNMIL efforts in providing equipment and logistical support, most Liberians feel that their security situation is still precarious, and that police presence is negligible and inconsistent throughout the country (International Crisis Group 2009, 19).

Formed police units (FPUs) are used to fill security gaps in Liberia. FPUs serve as a tool to manage public order, provide protection for UN staff and facilities, and importantly, support police operations that involve higher risks. Faced with challenges of recruiting sufficient police officers, UNMIL has increasingly relied on FPUs to collaborate with the LNP in quelling tensions and mitigating mob violence. There are significant concerns by Liberians and UN officials, however, that the LNP is too dependent on the FPUs. The FPUs, while helpful for the LNP in addressing security concerns, do not necessarily address root operational deficiencies that plague the LNP (Stimson Center 2012, 7; International Crisis Group 2009, 17). UNMIL has seen relative success in joint patrols with the LNP. Joint patrols between UNPOL and LNP have been noted as effective in helping reduce crime rates, as they involve sustained foot patrols and increased police visibility (Stimson Center 2012, 7; S/2004/229, 7; Hansen 2011, 2).

UNPOL also provides the LNP with investigative assistance. This involves improving “fingerprinting, ballistics, intelligence, chain of custody, transnational crime unit set-up, strategic analysis and tactical prioritization.” UNMIL has helped the LNP increase its capacity to address sexual and gender-based violence by helping establish the Women and Children Protection Section (WACPS) in conjunction with UN Women, the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) and the Liberian government. WACPS, as part of LNP, was established in September 2005 to address specific security issues faced by children and women relating to domestic and SGB violence. It is also in charge of carrying out investigations on claims of SGBV. While

UNMIL is helping the LNP with investigative capacities, a lack of a sustainable and systematic forensic capability not only creates the LNP's dependency on UNMIL but also prevents the timely investigation of unsolved deaths and crimes (Stimson Center 2012, 7; Schia and de Carvalho 2009).

Additionally, WACPS, despite UNMIL's efforts to help increase its investigative capacity, suffers from a lack of resources, which ultimately impedes its ability to address sexual violence. The police have a limited amount of vehicles and even fewer ways in which they can pay for fuel. This leads to a situation in which the police cannot completely follow up with an investigation of sexual violence cases reported to their office. The lack of resources also has implications for women that need to report cases to the police. Since the LNP lacks resources such as vehicles, fuel, flashlights and basic communication systems, the police are unable to fully reach out to all of those under their jurisdiction. This means women must take the time to go to a city where the LNP and WACPS are located to report a case. Additionally, while there has been a WACPS office set up in every county capital, police and judicial presence and authorities dedicated to addressing sexual violence remains low in rural areas. This leads to a situation in which reporting a crime to the WACPS becomes incredibly cumbersome and economically unsound for those located in rural areas (Schia and de Carvalho 2009, 11 - 13). UNMIL has invested significant resources in setting up an institution to address and investigate sexual violence, but WACPS suffers from rudimentary issues, such as a lack of resources and capacity, to be consistently effective throughout the country.

In addition to providing operational support, UNMIL has also played a significant and comprehensive role in police development, which involves mentoring and training. UNPOL has helped run the National Police Training Academy and has made steps to increase national

ownership of this training academy. LJSSD and UNPOL have collaborated with the Academy to provide training to the LNP on penal law as well. UNMIL also works to co-locate near LNP offices in order to facilitate mentoring and processes of change. UNPOL additionally has assisted the LNP in strengthening station management and developing a Standard Operating Procedure for police stations. UNPOL, with the LNP, UNDP and the Ministry of Justice, has worked to develop community policing in order to facilitate better community engagement. Internal UNPOL bi-annual reports demonstrate positive change in LNP leadership, which has helped increase the LNP's operational capacity. UNMIL has also made concerted efforts to train women for the police force (Stimson Center 2012, 7 – 8; International Crisis Group 2009, 18). Police training is heavily dependent on external support from not just UNMIL but other international actors, particularly the United States. While this initial support is crucial in developing the LNP, there are major concerns that a reduction in UNMIL presence could cripple the ability of the LNP to sufficiently operate on its own (Search for Common Ground 2011, 4).

### *Justice*

UNMIL LJSSD carries out justice sector reform by providing direct support for the statutory justice and legal system. UNMIL has assisted the Ministry of Justice by directly supplementing salaries of public sector lawyers (specifically public prosecutors and defenders), law reform specialists, judges, and consultants in order to increase manpower and retention rates in the justice sector. UNMIL, coordinating with other donors, also has funded physical infrastructure projects that involve rebuilding and rehabilitating courts damaged from the war years. (S/2006/479, 9; Blume 2008, 7; International Crisis Group 2006, 17). In coordination with UNMIL and USIP, the Liberian government formed the Law Reform Commission to “examine

many different areas of domestic law, including—as a priority—Liberia's criminal law framework” (United States Institute of Peace 2013). UNMIL and USIP provided the Commission with equipment and materials to carry out its activities. One of its main responsibilities is to assist the Ministry of Justice in identifying laws to be repealed or reformed, including those that do not conform to international standards (S/2007/479, 9; Stimson Center 2012, 9; United States Institute of Peace 2013).

In addition to providing direct support for the justice system in the form of increasing its capacity, UNMIL also focuses on developing the skills and capacity of formal justice sector personnel. UNMIL has made progress in re-establishing legal education and training justice sector officials. In particular, it is operating the Judicial Training Institute and the University of Liberia Arthur Grimes Law School. In conjunction with the Ministry of Justice, LJSSD has provided training sessions for legal and judicial officers, justices of the peace, prosecutors, magistrate court clerks and public defenders. LJSSD has also worked with other UNMIL components to provide training modules for the LNP on penal and evidence law and ethics education (S/2007/479, 9; S/2008/553, 10; S/2011/72, 7; Stimson Center 2012, 9).

Access to justice remains woefully weak. As discussed, the majority of UN peacekeeping activities on improving the justice sector focus on increasing the capacity and technical abilities of the formal justice sector and improving state institutions. Access to justice, however, has received relatively less attention and also still remains a huge problem in Liberia. Despite UNMIL's provision of legal aid clinics and support for traditional justice practices that are in line with human rights standards, access to justice is still a huge problem and threatens the effectiveness of UNMIL's justice reforms. If people are unable to access the formal justice mechanisms (whether it be due to social stigma preventing reaching out to the formal institution

or actual physical obstacles in getting to a court), the reforms could be rendered as ineffective (Blume 2008, 13 - 14; Stimson Center 2012, 10; S/2011/72, 7; Schia and de Carvalho 2009).

There have been numerous collaborations between UNMIL, the Ministry of Justice, and the formal justice sector at large to address Liberia's high SGBV rates including a rape law introduced in 2006, a special court dedicated to address equal violence, a joint program between the government and UNMIL to improve the criminal justice system's approach to SGBV, and case tracking. The law was drafted in a collaborative effort between the government, the Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia, and LJSSD. WACPS in the LNP is meant to work very closely with the justice system. Once the WACPS completes an investigation of a criminal case, it refers the case to Special Court E. This court, established in 2008 through UN Women and Liberia's Ministry of Gender and Development, in response to resolution 1820 on sexual violence and the concurrent increase in cases of sexual violence, has the ability to hold in-camera trials, allowing for the identities of witnesses and survivors to be protected (Schia and de Carvalho 2009).

Despite UNMIL's active efforts to help the justice sector address SGBV and access to justice for women, there are still several shortcomings and challenges in improving the justice sector and sexual violence rates remain high. Indicative of issues facing the justice sector at large, courts also face a severe lack of well-trained and competent personnel willing to prosecute and research cases of sexual violence. Posts go unfilled and absenteeism is widely prevalent. Additionally, poor pay in the public and poor working conditions deter the high-qualified attorneys from working in the courts system itself. For example, in 2009, UNMIL trained 150 county and city attorneys, but the majority of these trainees went on to practice in the private sector (ActionAid 28; Herman and Martin-Ortega 2009, 7).

The rape law, while importantly attaching seriousness to the crime, faces criticism for being ineffective. Aspects of the rape law are so stringent that it is likely having the unintended effect of discouraging survivors from reporting crimes. Additionally, the rape law faces criticism for being non-implementable as the formal system is incapable in the first place to deliver justice overall. Special Court E also faces challenges. It has a backlog of thousands of detained alleged rapists as it only has the capacity to hear a few cases at a time (Lubkemann et al 2011, 223; International Crisis Group 2006, 14; Stimson Center 2012, 9). Also indicative of the larger problems facing the justice sector, while courts can utilize legal framework and policies developed at the institutional level by the Ministry of Gender and Development and UNMIL (for example, the rape law), they are not able to administer justice effectively, as they lack the most basic equipment needed to carry out prosecutions (such as typewriters, legal texts, and court houses themselves).

Despite UNMIL's efforts, judicial reform is moving at a very slow pace. Judges and court officials are still easily bribed, despite improvements in salaries. There is also a low prosecution to conviction ratio. Suspects are often released without ever being charged. While UNMIL and other international actors carry out training, judges still have poor knowledge and understanding of laws and legal procedure. There is also significant congestion in the justice system. Courts are still not able to listen to all cases on their dockets, mostly due to the absence of essential personnel. This not only results in undermining the effectiveness of the justice system but it also results in suspects and victims being denied due process rights (International Crisis Group 2011, 14; International Crisis Group 2005, i - ii; Mbadlanyana and Onuoha 2009, 14 - 15). In conjunction with a historic and deep distrust of the formal justice system, limitations

in qualified human capital, infrastructure, and capacity impede justice delivery. Access to justice thus remains a critical challenge.

### ***Corrections***

UNMIL, through the Corrections Advisory Unit, provides direct support for the corrections facilities in Liberia. Security at corrections facilities remains poor due to weak infrastructure, limited staff, and poor capacity. To maintain stability and prevent escape incidents, direct support is often required from UNMIL and FPUs to maintain stability (S/2011/72, 8; Stimson Center 2012, 10).

UNMIL, in conjunction with the Bureau of Corrections and Rehabilitation (BCR) and the Ministry of Justice, has positively developed and implemented strategic planning for prisons and corrections facilities. CAU has specifically worked to develop National Standing Operations Procedures, training documents, and documents on organizational and instructional procedure. CAU, national stakeholders, and international donors have also worked to create a Penal Reform Development Plan, which involves both law reform and Ministry of Justice policy planning on a prisoner rehabilitation plan. Both BCR and CAU have worked with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare on prison health needs (Stimson Center 2012, 10; S/2010/429, 8; United Nations Mission in Liberia 2013).

UNMIL has spent resources on training and mentoring by deploying and co-locating international corrections advisors at prisons. Mentoring focuses on operational issues and is meant to reinforce the formal training that correction staff receives. Funding issues, however, hold back more widespread and comprehensive training and mentoring of corrections facilities staff. CAU has recently made progress in working with national stakeholders to develop a

National Training Plan that involves improving prison management and human rights in prison facilities (Stimson Center 2012, 11; United Nations Mission in Liberia 2013).

UNMIL plays a crucial role in funding and implementing infrastructure projects. At the start of the mission, only a handful of prisons were operational, and even then, the infrastructure was inadequate. Since then there have been severe physical infrastructure rebuilding and rehabilitation projects carried out in coordination with other donors under UNMIL's Quick Impact Projects. Despite UNMIL's efforts, however, prison facilities are still inadequate in infrastructure and the conditions remain poor. There have been several reports of prisoner mistreatment. Even though new facilities have been built, there are an equal amount of existing facilities that are in desperate need of refurbishment. The slow process of justice has resulted in high levels of pre-trial detention (around 80-90% of detainees), which further strains prison capacity (Stimson Center 2012, 10; International Crisis Group 2011, 14; International Crisis Group 2006, 17).

### ***Overall cross-sector issues***

At the start, UNMIL faced severe internal coordination and management issues, contributing to even further short-term insecurity within Liberia. In particular, the first attempt at the DDR process ended up as a failure due to a lack of coordination between different UN agencies and a lack of troops on the ground. In 2004, UNMIL and the transitional government attempted to create a Rule of Law Implementation Committee (ROLIC) task force and working group. Little was achieved however, as there were coordination problems, a lack of political will on the behalf of Liberian officials to implement strategic decisions, and disagreements over structural hierarchies. There has been some improvement in joint planning between the Liberian



government and UNMIL since then, but it is clear that informal coordination and personalities played and currently play significant roles in guiding relationships between UNMIL and the Liberian government (rather than formalized structures and guidelines for cooperation) (International Crisis Group 2004, i - ii; The Stimson Center 2012, 4; Blume 2008, 6 - 9).

UNMIL faces trouble with significant coordination issues between the justice, police and corrections sectors. In particular, several UN Secretary-General reports have concluded that lack of progress in the justice sector risks harming progress in the security sector. A lack of police capacity also hurts the ability of courts. According to a Search for a Common Ground report:

“A good majority of citizens fail to understand that the police do not prosecute, so when the court releases an accused person due to the lack of evidence to prosecute, communities perceive the police as compromising the case. This undermines the credibility of the police in the eyes of the community.”

Slow progress in the justice sector threatens security sector reform and a lack of capacity in the police sector reduces the court's ability to provide justice (International Crisis Group 2009, 20; United Nations 2008; Search for Common Ground 2011, 4 - 5; The Stimson Center 2012, 6).

While the initial years of the mission were marked with cooperation, there have been periods throughout UNMIL's existence with extreme personality clashes and poor working relationships between the justice sector, UNMIL, and NGO partners, ultimately affecting project impact. For example, the UK Department for International Development (DFID)'s \$250,000 grant to the International Bar Association and International Legal Assistance Consortium to develop and refurbish courts and train judges ultimately went to waste as UNMIL and ILAC and IBA maintained a very difficult and tenuous relationship. Rule of law reform in general has gone at a snail's pace because of a lack of coordination between UNMIL, donors and NGOs and the government. Underlying the competing and uncoordinated goals of international and national level actors in Liberia are a lack of Liberian capacity to carry out reforms, mutual perceptions of

incompetence by UNMIL and Liberian lawyers, resistance by the Liberian judiciary to engage in meaningful reform, and UNMIL's state-centric approach to legal reform (S/2004/430, 7; International Crisis Group 2006, 1; Blume 2008, 6).

There has been active cross-sector and actor collaboration on improving access to justice for those in rural communities. While they are still in the initial implementation phase, security and justice hubs are meant to address access to justice for those living in urban and rural areas. These hubs are a collaboration among the government, UNMIL, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Peacbuilding Office, donors such as Sweden, Australia and Ireland, and the justice and corrections sectors of Liberia. The hubs are meant to improve inter-agency coordination and ensure that security and justice is more accessible to urban and rural communities in Liberia. As the first hub was established only in February 2013, it is difficult at this time to provide an accurate assessment. However, while the hubs are regarded as a “core idea of national security strategy” the lack of funding for communication equipment and transportation for rural and urban residents threaten to dilute the effectiveness of the hubs (Stimson Center 2012, 5; International Crisis Group 2011, 14; United Nations Development Programme 2013; Keane 2012, 87).

A major factor that negatively impacts the effectiveness of rule of law reforms across the police, justice and corrections sectors is the mismatching of donor funds to the needs of the country. Cycles of donor assistance are typically mismatched to the needs of the country due to “weak institutions and lack of expertise to manage aid (including the capacity to develop and implement strategy.)” Funds are often allocated in short-term cycles, and donors do not prioritize long-term national peacebuilding and rule of law needs. For example, donor funds are allocated towards providing equipment and building up the technological capacity of the LNP, but the

LNP sometimes is not able to utilize the new equipment because they lack the specific literacy and educational skills to utilize the new donor-purchased technology (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2010, 15).

## CONCLUSION

While UNMIL has made substantial progress in increasing the capacity, both in terms of physical infrastructure and human capital, of rule of law institutions in Liberia, there is much room for improvement. First, there is a high level of dependency on UNMIL to provide security and bolster the justice and corrections institutions. Liberian institutions such as the formal justice sector and the LNP are highly dependent on UNMIL in several aspects, ranging from infrastructure development to the actual payment of salaries. This dependency could reverse peacebuilding progress if UNMIL decides to leave. Another possibility is that the ingrained and multifaceted relationship between UNMIL and Liberian rule of law institutions could be difficult to sever in the first place.

Secondly, a major trend seen throughout UNMIL's assistance to the police, justice and corrections sectors is the focus on state institutional development. While it is incredibly important to rebuild and restructure institutions, it is not serving as a comprehensive solution to the underlying problems of societal historical distrust of rule of law institutions and issues of access to justice. UNMIL is focusing on addressing short-term security needs, responding to disruptions of law and order. UNMIL faces enormous challenges and shortcomings in rebuilding the rule of law, however, as it does not pay enough attention to longer-term goals of making sure the institutions they are rebuilding are sustainable, functional and effective.

## CONCLUSION & FUTURE RESEARCH

Does UN peacekeeping improve the rule of law in a post-conflict society? Theoretically, I proposed that UN peacekeeping helps improve the rule of law by both physically improving the rule of law institutions themselves and building up public confidence in various rule of law institutions (such as the police and justice sectors). The empirical results, however, do not provide ample enough evidence to confirm that UN peacekeeping improves (or harms) the rule of law after the end of a conflict. It does not appear that UN peacekeeping has a substantive effect in improving rule of law institutions. While the findings are inconclusive on the relationship between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law in a post-conflict setting, they still say something important about UN peacekeeping's effectiveness. Even though UN peacekeeping spends significant effort in rebuilding the rule of law in post-conflict states, their impact is difficult to determine.

While the empirical results did not provide significant evidence for the research question, there is specific evidence for the argument that amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism can harm the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict state. This particular finding on the negative relationship between amnesty measures and the rule of law serves as support for the findings of Lie, Binningsbø, and Gates, who find that amnesty measures negatively affect the overall, general durability of peace in a post-conflict environment. This finding may have implications for policy makers deciding what sorts of post-conflict justice mechanisms will most benefit a society in the short-term and long-term. While amnesty measures could convince armed groups to put their arms down in the immediate end of a conflict, it may have negative implications for the quality of rule of law in the post-conflict environment further down the road.

The "non-findings" of this empirical analysis regarding the relationship between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law complement the findings of the qualitative studies carried out by the Stimson Center that evaluate the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping in reforming and supporting the rule of law. While UN peacekeeping theoretically has the capability and necessary mandate to improve the rule of law in a post-conflict state, it is difficult for them to make a decisive positive impact because of several practical realities. The physical environment in which missions deploy pose unique and difficult challenges, not only surrounding logistics, but also in how to most effectively use resources. Resources may be poured into a mission's efforts to improve the rule of law, but if the mission's tasks are not finely tuned to the regional external and domestic internal challenges and frameworks that guide society, those resources could end up going to waste. This could reduce the positive impact UN peacekeeping could ultimately have on improving the rule of law.

Ultimately, the main policy implication of this study is that *smarter* peacekeeping operations are needed, not just an increase in resources or stronger mandates. It is clear that any amount of resources thrown at a problem will not automatically rebuild the rule of law. Utilizing resources effectively is crucial to longer-term success in rebuilding and restoring the rule of law. Both the empirical analysis and the UNMIL case study serve as evidence for the need for smarter peacekeeping operations.

One such way in which UN peacekeeping missions can improve their effectiveness in reforming the rule of law is by effectively utilizing donor funds to reach *both* short-term and long-term goals. UN peacekeeping missions should continue to focus on short-term goals, but they should also organize partnerships to help reach longer-term goals. There needs to be a strategic plan if any of UN peacekeeping quick impact projects on improving the rule of law are

to actually make a difference in substantively improving the rule of law. Short-term achievements are inherently undermined by the fact that much progress is needed in longer-term goals for the short-term achievements to mean anything in long run.

Secondly, right now the UN is focusing on the individual capacity of rule of law officials (so police, corrections officers, and justice sector personnel like judges and lawyers) and the institutional capacity of rule of law institutions. More focus should be placed on institutional integrity if the mechanisms proposed in the theoretical portion of this paper are to actually work. Simply put, focusing on improving the institutional integrity and reliability of rule of law institutions can help alleviate distrust of said institutions and lead to their more frequent use by the public. In the meanwhile, UN peacekeeping components might consider a policy approach to customary justice mechanisms at the start of a mission as a crucial element that can promote accessibility to justice.

Thirdly, it is also important that UN peacekeeping work on improving coordination between police, justice, and corrections sectors of rule of law institutions. It is clear that one sector affects the other, and one challenge that a sector faces will ultimately influence how effective another sector is in carrying out its essential functions. By improving information sharing, each sector could potentially improve coordination of activities and prevent issues such as over-crowding of prisons or overloading of court dockets.

The case of Sierra Leone, as compared to the case of Liberia, serves as an example as how the effective use of resources is just as important and essential, if not more, than the number of peacekeeping resources dedicated to post-conflict rule of law reform. The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) is the latest of four UN missions to the country. Sierra Leone has to deal with extensive corruption and patronage networks, a fragile

public security situation, an oppressive and politicized police force, and also maintains an informal justice system. The peacekeeping missions in both Liberia and Sierra Leone have to deal with similar situations. UNIPSIL, however, has a lower mandate strength than UNMIL. UNIPSIL, rather than focusing on all sectors of rule of law, has focused heavily on improving the Sierra Leone Police and developing mechanisms for addressing transnational organized crime. It has very little work on justice or corrections reform (Stimson Center 2012).

Despite UNMIL having a stronger mandate, and amount of resources dedicated to improve the rule of law, both Sierra Leone and Liberia 11 years after the end of their conflicts respectively have relatively similar rule of law qualities. This is indicative of a larger problem; if more resources aren't necessarily improving the rule of law relative to other host countries the answer to improving the rule of law isn't necessarily more resources. A better allocation of existing resources in the context of a greater strategic plan that addresses the contextual challenges each host country faces could potentially help UN peacekeeping focus their efforts on what impedes rule of law improvement.

There is much room for future research on the relationship between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law. As a major limitation of this study was the relatively small number of data points, future research on this topic should aim to obtain more data points for analysis. This most likely could involve looking at lower levels of conflict. This would entail extending the data set from just cases of civil wars to include cases of internal strife that maintained a lower level of hostility than a civil war. Another way in which future research could expand upon this study is by exploring alternative measures of the dependent variable of rule of law. A major limitation of the World Bank measure was its time frame. It only started releasing the rule of law scores

starting in 1996. This time frame limited the number of cases I could use from the original Doyle and Sambanis data set.

While the CIM measure, calculated from IMF data, had a much larger time frame than the World Bank data (I was able to get data dating back to 1946), the CIM measure does have downfalls as a proxy for the rule of law. The creators of the CIM value describe CIM as a measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. While property rights and the enforceability of contracts are important aspects of the rule of law, it does not completely align with the definition of rule of law presented in the start of this paper. Importantly, CIM functions as a measure that combines both legal institutional and non-legal institutional factors. It can be difficult to tell whether or not societies with high CIM values have faith in legal methods that enable higher amounts and levels of business transactions or if they have faith in legal methods that hold all persons, institutions and entities, including the government itself, accountable to laws that are equitably enforced and consistent with international human rights norms.

Thus a future avenue of research on this relationship would have to look into finding a measure of the rule of law that both has a larger time frame to cover more conflicts and also has content validity. This means that the data should have a higher degree of correspondence with the concept of rule of law and the measurement technique should include all aspects of the rule of law, as defined by the researcher.

Even though there is uncertainty in the results of the empirical findings, the end result of UN peacekeeping not having any obvious effect on the rule of law in a post-conflict setting is disconcerting. There is an expectation in the international community that UN peacekeeping, given all the resources it spends, has at least some positive effect on the rule of law. The finding



that there is no detectable positive impact is a cause for concern. More importantly, it provides grounds for the UN and international peacebuilding community to evaluate how UN peacekeeping missions can better effectively utilize resources to rebuild the rule of law and ultimately make sure that individuals in a post-conflict society feel safe and secure. The rule of law is necessary for the stability of societies, especially those emerging from conflict. Thus it will be a challenge for the peacebuilding community, not just UN peacekeepers, to focus on not just the short-term capacity needs, but also on building effective institutions that can prevent infractions and breakdowns of the rule of law that lead to conflict in the first place.

## APPENDIX

*Table 14: Summary Statistics for World Bank Rule of Law dataset*

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
develop	691.2512	1076.5450407	14.000000	5387.00000	65
difference.wbgi.rle	0.02015772	0.1538614	-0.454220	0.4546193	43
elf	51.20690	29.9764578	0	93.00000	58
logcost	12.46568	2.2113066	6.907755	15.6718100	65
pcj.amnesty	0.3846154	0.4902903	0	1	65
rgdpcaps	1624.0	1408.5310353	130.000000	5827.00000	63
SSRI	0.1666667	0.3761774	0	1	54
treaty	0.4153846	0.4966232	0	1	65
un2int	0.5230769	0.5033541	0	1	65
untype2	0.1846154	0.3910046	0	1	65
untype3	0.07692308	0.2685431	0	1	65
untype4	0.1076923	0.3124038	0	1	65
untype5	0.03076923	0.1740358	0	1	65
wardur	107.8154	108.4184446	1	600.00000	65

*Table 15: Summary Statistics for CIM values dataset*

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
CIM.difference.11.10	-0.01169318	0.09989931	-0.8950195	.09367647	94
develop	549.41978529	863.4991	10	5387.000	119
elf	47.79464286	30.45633	0	93.0000	112
logcost	12.04126899	2.357759	6.9077550	15.67181	118
pcj.amnesty	0.37179487	0.4864121	0	1	
rgdpcaps	1424.68141593	1321.930	65	5832.000	78
SSRI	0.11764706	0.3237808	0	1	113
treaty	0.29411765	0.4575717	0	1	102
un2int	0.36974790	0.4847775	0	1	119
untype2	0.14285714	0.3514067	0	1	119
untype3	0.06722689	0.2514734	0	1	119
untype4	0.05882353	0.2362890	0	1	119
untype5	0.02521008	0.1574255	0	1	119
wardur	81.00840336	94.08322	1	600.0000	119

## Works Cited

- Action Aid. 2007. *UNMIL: International Engagement in Addressing Violence Against Women*. London, United Kingdom: ActionAid International.
- BBC. 2012. "Liberia Profile." <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13729504>.
- Blackwell, Matthew, Stefano Iacus, Gary King, and Giuseppe Porro, "cem: Coarsened exact matching in Stata." *The Stata Journal* 9.4: 524-546.
- Blume, Till. 2008. "Implementing the Rule of Law in Integrated Missions: Security and Justice in the UN Mission in Liberia." *Journal of Security Sector Management* 6(3): 1 – 18.
- Carothers, Thomas. 1998. "The Rule of Law Revival." *Foreign Affairs* 77(1): 95-106.
- Chapman, Thomas and Philip G. Roeder. 2007. "Partition as a Solution to Wars of Nationalism: The Importance of Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 101(4): 677-691.
- Clague, Christopher, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack, and Mancur Olson. 2010. "Contract Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance," *Munich Personal RePEc Archive* MPRA Paper No. 25717.
- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1999. "On economic causes of civil war." *Oxford Economic Papers* 50: 563-573.
- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and grievance in civil war." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56: 563-595.
- Davis, Kevin E. 2005. "What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell US About Rule of Law Reforms?" *Michigan Journal of International Law* 26.141: 141-161.
- de Brito, Alexandra Barahona, Carmen Gonzalez-Enriquez, and Paloma Aguilar (eds.). 2001. *The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Dowd, Caitriona and Clionadh Raleigh. 2012. "Mapping conflict across Liberia and Sierra Leone." *Accord* 23: 13 – 18.
- Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 94(4): 779–802.
- Durch, William and Madeline England, eds., 2010. *Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law*. Washington, D.C.: The Stimson Center.
- Durch, William, Madeline England, Fiona Mangan, and Michelle Ker. 2012. *Understanding Impact of Police, Justice And Corrections Components in UN Peace Operations*. Washington, D.C.: The Stimson Center.
- Elbadawi, Ibrahim A., Nicholas Sambanis. 2001. "External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars." The World Bank.
- Elster, Jon. 2004. *Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Elster, Jon. 2005. "Transitional Justice and Political Violence." Paper Presented at the Transitional Justice and Civil War Settlements' workshop in Bogotá, Colombia, 18-19 October 2005.
- Fallon, Richard H. 1997. "'The Rule of Law' as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse." *Columbia Law Review* 97(1): 1-56.
- Fearon, James D. 2005. "Comments on the Ex Ante/Ex Post Problem in Transitional Justice." Paper Presented at the Transitional Justice and Civil War Settlements' workshop in Bogotá, Colombia, 18-19 October 2005.
- Fortna, V. Page. 2004. "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly* 48: 269-292.

- Fortna, V. Page. 2008. *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gilligan, Michael J. and Ernest J. Sergenti. 2008. "Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3(2): 89-122.
- Gloppen, Siri. 2005. "Roads to Reconciliation: A Conceptual Framework." in Elin Skar, Siri Gloppen, and Astrid Suhrke (eds.). *Roads to Reconciliation*. Lexington Books: Lanham: 17-50.
- Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties. 2003. Liberia Comprehensive Peace Agreement, August 18, 2003.
- Government of Liberia. 2010. *The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding*. International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. <http://www.oecd.org/countries/liberia/44918259.pdf>.
- Haggard, Stephan, Andrew MacIntyre, and Lydia Tiede. 2008. "The Rule of Law and Economic Development." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 205-234.
- Hansen, Annika S. 2011. *Policing the Peace: The Rise of United Nations Formed Police Units*. Berlin: Center for International Peace Operations.
- Hartzell, Caroline, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild. 2001. "Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables." *International Organization* 55(1): 183-208.
- Hayner, Priscilla. 2007. *Negotiating Peace in Liberia: Preserving the Possibility for Justice*. Geneva, Switzerland: Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and International

Center for Transitional Justice.

Hewko, John. 2002. "Foreign Direct Investment: Does the Rule of Law Matter?" Rule of Law Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, *Carnegie Working Papers*, April.

Herman, Johanna, and Olga Martin-Ortega. 2009. "Rule of Law Programming during Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Liberia," Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association. New York, NY: February 15 – 18.

Human Rights Watch. 2003. "Human Rights Watch World Report 2003 – Liberia."  
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3e2817df1.html>.

Insight on Conflict. 2013. "Liberia: Conflict Profile."  
<http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/liberia/conflict-profile/>.

International Crisis Group. 2006. *Liberia: Resurrecting the Justice System*. Dakar, Senegal, Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group.

International Crisis Group. 2009. *Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform*. Dakar, Senegal, Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group.

International Crisis Group. 2011. *Liberia: How Sustainable is the Recovery?* Dakar, Senegal, Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group.

International Crisis Group. 2012. *Liberia: Time for Much-Delayed Reconciliation and Reform*. Dakar, Senegal, Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group.

The International Federation for Human Rights. "Paramilitary Demobilization in Colombia: On the road to the International Criminal Court." The International Federation for Human Rights. <http://www.fidh.org/Paramilitary-Demobilization-in>.

International Legal Assistance Consortium. 2003. *ILAC Report: Assessment of the Liberian Judicial System*. Stockholm, Sweden: International Legal Assistance Consortium.

- Isser, Deborah H., Stephen Lubkemann, and Saah N'Tow. *Looking for Justice: Liberian Experiences with and Perceptions of Local Justice Options*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2009.
- James-Allen, Paul, Aaron Weah, Lizzie Goodfriend. 2010. *Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Transitional Justice Options in Liberia*. New York, NY: International Center for Transitional Justice.
- Jaye, Thomas. 2009. *Parliamentary Oversight and Lessons Learned from Internationalized Security Sector Reform*. New York, NY: Center on International Cooperation.
- Keane, Rory. 2013. "Reviewing the Justice and Security Hub Modality as Piloted in Liberia." *International Journal of Stability & Development* 1(1): 87 - 91.
- Licklider, Roy. 1995. "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlement in Civil Wars, 1945-1993." *American Political Science Review* 89(3): 681-690.
- Lie, Tove Grete, Helga M. Binningsbø, and Scott Gates. 2006. "Post-Conflict Justice and Sustainable Peace." Paper presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 31 August-3 September 2006.
- Long, William J. and Peter Brecke. 2003. *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotions in Conflict Resolution*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Lubkemann, Stephen C., Deborah H. Isser, Philip A. Z. Banks III. "Justice in a Vacuum: The Unintended Consequences of the Constraint of Customary Justice in Post-Conflict Liberia." In *Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies*, edited by Deborah Isser, 193 – 226. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace.
- Mbadlanyana, Thembanani and Freedom C. Onuoha. 2009. *Peacekeeping and post-conflict criminality: Challenges to the (re-) establishment of the rule of law in Liberia*. Pretoria,

- South Africa: Institute for Security Studies.
- Ojielo, Ozonnia. 2010. *Critical Lessons in Post-Conflict Security in Africa: The case of Liberia's Truth and Reconciliation Commission*. Wynberg, South Africa: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.
- Pankhurst, Donna. 1999. "Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex Political Emergencies: Conceptualizing Reconciliation, Justice, and Peace." *Third World Quarterly* 20(1): 239-256.
- Paris, Roland. 2004. *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sambanis, Nicholas. 2000. "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature." *World Politics* 52(4): 437 – 483.
- Schia, Niels Nagelhus and Benjamin de Carvalho. 2009. *Nobody Gets Justice Here! Addressing Sexual and Gender Based Violence and the Rule of Law in Liberia*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
- Scott, Rena L. 2005. "Moving from Impunity to Accountability in Post-War Liberia: Possibilities, Cautions, and Challenges." *International Journal of Legal Information* 33.3: 335 – 417.
- Search for Common Ground, Talking Drum Studio. 2011. *Security Sector Reform in Liberia*. Washington, D.C.: Search for Common Ground.
- The Stimson Center. 2012. *UN Police, Justice and Corrections Programming in Liberia: A Compact Case Study*. Washington, D.C.: The Stimson Center.
- The Stimson Center. 2012. *UN Police, Justice and Corrections Programming in Sierra Leone: A Compact Case Study*. Washington D.C.: The Stimson Center.
- Stromseth, Jane, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks. 2006. *Can Might Make Rights?: Building*



- the Rule of Law after Military Interventions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stromseth, Jane. 2008. "Post-conflict Rule of Law Building: The Need for a Multi-Layered, Synergistic Approach." *William & Mary Law Review* 49(4): 1443-1470.
- Toft, Monica D., 2003. "Peace through Victory: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the *American Political Science Association*, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 27–31, 2003.
- Toft, Monica D. 2010. *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia. 2008. *Final Report Volume I: Findings and Determinations*.
- United Nations. *The Rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, Report of the Secretary-General*. S/2004/616, 23 August 2004.
- United Nations. *Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*. S/2004/2009, 22 March 2004.
- United Nations. *Third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*. S/2004/430, 26 May 2004.
- United Nations. *Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*. S/2007/479, 8 August 2007.
- United Nations. *Sixteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*. S/2008/183, 19 March 2008.
- United Nations. *Seventeenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*. S/2008/553, 15 August 2008.
- United Nations. *Twenty-second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations*

- Mission in Liberia*. S/2011/72, 14 February 2011.
- United Nations. *Twenty-third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*. S/2011/497. 1 August 2011.
- United Nations. *Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*. S/2012/230, 16 April 2012.
- United Nations Mission in Liberia. 2013. "Legal and Judicial System Support Division."  
<http://unmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3958&language=en-US>.
- United Nations Mission in Liberia. 2013. "Corrections Advisory Unit."  
<http://unmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3956&language=en-US>.
- United Nations Mission in Liberia. 2013. "Human Rights and Protection Section."  
<http://unmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3957&language=en-US>.
- United Nations Mission in Liberia. 2013. "United Nations Police in Liberia."  
<http://unmil.org/2content.asp?sub=7&main=20&pqt=2>.
- United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office. 2010. *UN Peacebuilding: an Orientation*. New York, NY: United Nations.
- United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1509 (2003)* (S/RES/1509). 19 September 2003.
- United States Institute for Peace. 2013. "Truth Commission: Liberia."  
<http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-liberia>.
- United States Institute of Peace. 2013. "Rule of Law in Liberia."  
<http://www.usip.org/programs/projects/rule-law-liberia>.
- Walter, Barbara F. 2004. "Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War."  
*Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 371 – 388.