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Jarred Seth Herren 4/20/2011

Poetic Philosophy Through Concrescence and Ingenium: Whitehead and Cicero

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Abstract

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This thesis details what it means to be poetic philosophy in reference to Whitehead's Process and Reality scheme as illuminated by Cicero's De Oratore. The first chapter outlines the basic elements of Whitehead's metaphysics. The second chapter details Whitehead's notion of concrescence and discovers the poetic elements within. The third chapter discusses Cicero's De Oratore, and its unique format as relative to Whitehead. The conclusion to the work harmonizes Whitehead and Cicero as poetic works through Vico's verum-factum principle.

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Introduction

What is the nature of philosophy? Etymology suggests that a philosopher is a kin of wisdom, the combination of the Greek φίλος and σοφία, kin and wisdom respectively. However, the idea of a "kin of wisdom" does not clarify what the study entails. The truth is that, in our modern epoch, philosophy has evolved from the original Greek definition into a multiplicity of studies. From aesthetics, political philosophy, and even ethics to epistemology, logic, and metaphysics, the field of philosophy suffers a lack of definition due to its broad grasp of topics. Its nature becomes apparent because of these various topics, i.e. the nature of philosophy in its simplest form is the understanding and study of truth in experience.

I believe the exclusion of any of study, such as classical philology, history, or even science, from philosophy is a mistake. In classical philology, one cannot reasonably separate the understanding of Cicero's philosophical notions concerning rhetoric, most notably in his *De Oratore*, from the study of his participation in and influence in the Roman senate. Likewise, one cannot properly conclude any study on the Italian Renaissance's humanistic influence without Giambattista Vico's *De antiquissima Italorum sapientia* and *Scienza nuova*. And lastly, one can only truly understand the scientific revolution of the early 20th century by means of Alfred North Whitehead's philosophic revision, *Process and Reality*.

The question concerning the nature of philosophy would require exploration throughout numerous volumes, detailing and differentiating the plentiful philosophers of human history, for my simple explanation of philosophy as the search for experiential truth is an understated definition for a study that has been prevalent for nearly three

millennia. This study has evolved over time, being farther subdivided as the many branches listed above show. The western notions of philosophy began with much discourse on the topic of the ancient Greek poets. In *Republic X*, Plato engages in an argument against the poets. This argument against poets need not be taken as an argument against the poetic form or against all subsequent poetry. In this dialogue, Socrates shows Glaucon how every thing can exhibit itself as one of the following: its form, its *sensum*, or its image. These three ideas are presented respectively: by a god, by a craftsman, or by a painter or poet. The god makes the form of the thing, the craftsman then makes its sensible version, but the painter or poet can only represent its image. The argument against the poets is ethical, as Socrates states: "Nonetheless, he'll go on imitating, even though he doesn't *know* the good or bad qualities of anything, but what he'll imitate, it seems, is what *appears* fine or beautiful to the majority of people who know nothing" (*Rep.* X.602.b, emphasis added). Therefore, Plato's concern is to distinguish philosophy from poetry, since the poets lack accountability and imitate both the good and the bad, and philosophy seeks the forms of truth, virtue, and the good.

The natural question which follows the above discussion is: Why should Plato need to differentiate philosophy from poetry? To the modern mind, this question seems warranted, since we too often distinguish philosophy and poetry as easily as distinguishing a computer from a book. Their forms appear different, as philosophy is in prose, and poetry in verse. We must be careful to not jump to such conclusions by judging Plato's cautiousness as unmerited. Rather, having let go of all presuppositions, we must re-evaluate Plato's *Republic* and attempt to understand why the ancient philosopher discusses this issue. Upon such re-evaluation, one first ought to take notice

of the language of the dialogue. It is full of the most important poetic form in relation to metaphysics: the metaphor. Socrates, when discussing the idea of a poet's work without its meter, verse, and rhythm, likens such poetry to "the faces of young boys who are neither fine nor beautiful after the bloom of youth has left them" (*Rep*. X.601.b). Secondly, there is a similarity between philosophy and poetry in that both may exhibit the good and virtuous. The difference, which Plato stresses, is that poetry shows no inhibitions when imitating forms, and since it imitates the forms, Plato suggests that poets do not really know anything about those forms. On the other hand, philosophy does more than merely imitate by revealing the truth of the forms of the good. Despite these differences, one can see the natural similarities between poetry and philosophy, in that they both use metaphor and make apparent certain forms, though only philosophy shows the true and good.

Plato is not alone in his recognition of a connection between philosophy and poetry. As philosophy became more renowned throughout the western world, the emphasis on its distinction from poetry became less of an issue. This can be seen in Aristotle's *Poetics*, in which no struggle is presented and poetic form is simply described in terms of its nature, rather than its differentiating qualities from philosophy. The fact that an argument about poetry and philosophy such as Plato's is absent in Aristotle's *Poetics* does not suggest that philosophy has become any less poetic. The influence of poetic form on philosophy exists through the Hellenistic period with Cicero's *De Oratore* and through the Italian Renaissance, ending with Vico's *New Science*. It is not until the spread of Cartesian philosophical thought (ironically, his *Meditations* are profoundly poetic in form) that poetic form begins to become less common. Eventually, poetics

become taboo in serious philosophical thought, beginning with the "new" scientific discoveries of the 17th and 18th centuries.

With such a strong foundation in poetics, this altering of philosophical thought and style seems unwarranted. Upon further investigation, this is not the first indication of such a change in the history of philosophy. After Plato's ideal balance of poetics and empiricism, Aristotle's philosophical works mostly focused on the later, resulting most notably in his logic and methods of induction. Cicero's *De Oratore* brought philosophy back from the grasp of the empirical to rhetoric, which for Cicero played a similar role to Plato's poetics. After the fall of the Roman Empire in the west, philosophy reverted to its emphasis on logic and reason with the scholastics. Though scholasticism did remain prevalent in certain areas of western Europe, the 14th century brought about the Italian Renaissance following the poetic inspiration of Dante Alighieri's *La divina commedia*, ushering in another era of philosophy with an emphasis in poetics and rhetoric. Giambattista Vico's *Scienza nuova* (3rd ed. 1744) marked the end of the Italian Renaissance, along with the previously mentioned popularization of Descartes' *Meditations*, beginning the epoch of modern philosophy and its focus on logic, reason, and empiricism. With scientific discoveries deeply rooted in this mode of thought, few philosophers opposed it. Among those philosophers is Alfred North Whitehead, who, in his *Process and Reality*, imbedded in his philosophy the ancient poetic form and thought, while maintaining consistency with 20th century mathematics and science. However, despite the genius of Whitehead's metaphysical system, contemporary philosophy has maintained its focus on logic, reason, and empiricism.

The topic of interest for this essay shall be the flux of poetic influence in philosophy noted above. What is the nature of poetic philosophy? Can works with vast difference in subject matter and tone belong to this genus of philosophy? Through an analysis of Whitehead's *Process and Reality* (*PR*) in comparison with Cicero's *De Oratore* (*DO*), the aim of the following essay will be to unravel the mysterious nature of poetic philosophy.

CHAPTER I—An Introduction to Whitehead's Metaphysics

> "After the initial basis of a rational life, with a civilized language, has been laid, all productive thought has proceeded either by the poetic insight of artists, or by the imaginative elaboration of schemes of thought capable of utilization as logical premises. In some measure or other, progress is always a transcendence of what is obvious" (*PR* 9).

Section I—The Speculative Scheme

Before delving into an interpretation of *PR*, I must first examine the principles of Whitehead's philosophical scheme as a whole. The correct understanding of his speculative scheme as well as his theory of feelings provides an essential basis for the poetic analysis of the scheme as a whole. Though the focus of this chapter is the illumination of Whiteheadean terminology and concepts, I also intend on exhibiting preliminary answers to the two primary questions regarding the nature of poetic philosophy and its relation to *Process and Reality*.

Whitehead begins *PR* by describing his *magnum opus* as speculative philosophy, defining such a philosophy as "the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted" (*PR* 3). In addition, this coherent and logical system must be adequate and applicable in its interpretation of experience. Through his list of definitions for each of the respective key words in the above quote, Whitehead ensures the reader that his philosophical scheme will consistently and without significant exception cover the entirety of our experiences of nature and the cosmos. However, the complexity of

Whitehead's speculative scheme requires the discussion of his many caveats in Part I, Chapter I.

Language is arduous for any philosopher since it presents many inconsistencies, such as implications of ulterior meaning or the lack of necessary descriptive detail. The task of the philosopher is therefore to overcome this burden and eliminate any inconsistencies, or misleading notions, to the furthest possible extent. "But the language of literature breaks down precisely at the task of expressing in explicit form the larger generalities—the very generalities which metaphysics seeks to express" (*PR* 11). Due to the inadequacy of language, the metaphysician must observe the use of language even more carefully. Whitehead draws attention to the importance of the surrounding universe of propositions, suggesting that every proposition must include the details of the relevant universe of the fact which it proposes. This notion of relatedness between entities' universes provides a preview for Whitehead's notion of the principal of relativity, or his fourth category of explanation. Mill and Whewell "both presuppose that language does enunciate well-defined propositions" (*PR* 12). This notion ought to be discarded because language and propositions presuppose some universe to which they are tied; however, varying instances may produce varying universes on account of the ambiguous and indeterminate nature of language. In metaphysics, the disagreement concerning verbal expression is a negligible concern. While metaphysics is concerned with capturing the generalities of all practices within its system, there is no pragmatic test for whether or not the philosopher's language is sufficient for such a task. So, "[t]he only possible procedure is to start from verbal expressions which, when taken by themselves with the current meaning of their words, are ill-defined and ambiguous" (*PR* 13).

This starting point for metaphysical language may at first seem to be a regression in reference to the language problem stated above; however, this is not the case. Whitehead's notion of beginning from "ill-defined and ambiguous" terms contributes to the opacity of *PR*, but is also necessary for the coherence of this speculative scheme's language. Terms, such as *actual entities*, *prehensions*, and *eternal objects*, are novel verbal phrases introduced by Whitehead in order that he may avoid confusion with past philosophers' terminology. Each of the above terms are far too complex to summarize their meaning within a section. Therefore, Whitehead's initial definitions are necessarily vague. *PR* also seems inaccessible to the common reader because Whitehead does not spend the initial sections and chapters of his philosophy defining each important term individually. Instead, further elaborations of these terms in subsequent sections serve to clarify their importance and place within the metaphysical scheme. The natural reasons for this sort of gradual elucidation instead of the strict definition of terms are: (i), that, just as no proposition can be stripped from its contextual universe, no term can be so simply defined; and (ii), "the fallacy of the perfect dictionary" which erringly suggests that "human language, in single words or in phrases, explicitly expresses [philosophical] ideas" (*Modes of Thought,* 173). Whitehead's terminology grows throughout the course of his organic philosophy, begging the reader to realize the elliptical nature of language, "requiring a leap of the imagination to understand its meaning in its relevance to immediate experience" (*PR* 13). With this imaginative leap, Whitehead hopes to use language coherently for the description of general, metaphysical principles which originate from experiential fact.

The key to *PR* does not lie in the memorization of mundane, technical definitions, which in reality are only applicable to their specific universes, but rather in the imaginative leap towards the realization that the apparent technicalities of Whitehead's terminology are actually metaphors, awaiting a transcendence to true understanding. The explanation for why I stress the importance of Whitehead's language is that *PR* as a whole follows a similar elliptical nature to that of language, and actually seeing the metaphor is the first step to fully grasping the complex character of this speculative philosophy. This reliance on metaphor adds to the impenetrable nature of *PR*, since there are those unlucky souls who are metaphor-blind—"an incurable illness," as Dr. Donald Phillip Verene suggests.

As has been previously noted, *PR* is an *organic* philosophy as well as speculative and metaphysical. The growth of language alludes to this notion of organism. However, the element most in need of attention is the starting point of this organic philosophy. Like that of the language of the philosopher, the starting point of organic philosophy is the vague, ill-defined particulars of our experience. Whitehead sees too many prior philosophers as having fallen victim to "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness," i.e. their categories ignore certain aspects of actuality in attempting to formulate general principles. *PR* avoids this fallacy by taking up an organic method which grows from the partial understanding of particularities of actuality to the development of general principles by the creativity of the imagination, in order to reveal further understanding of the initial particularities in question. Whitehead likens this method to the flight of an airplane: "It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin

air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by interpretation" (*PR* 5).

Whitehead's speculative philosophy also differs from traditional philosophic views by virtue of its abandonment of the subject-predicate form, most apparent in Descartes' mind-body problem. Instead of some notion of the subject passively observing the world, Whitehead emphasizes the active role the subject takes in prehending the universe surrounding it. Also, rather than subject-predicate, there is *subject-superject*. This notion will be discussed further in subsequent sections, but in brief, in the process of an actual entity, *that* actual entity is the subject which prehends all other actual entities in its universe, which are in themselves *superjects*. Once the subject reaches *satisfaction*, it becomes data for other subjects. This process is non-temporal, and therefore, every subject and superject is actually a subject-superject. Though at first it may seem like a simple exchange of terms, further discussion will prove this alteration to flip the mechanical tradition upon its head in respect to where the emphasis of experience is placed.

Section II—The Categoreal Scheme

The notion of a subject-superject is the culmination of Whitehead's various caveats concerning the most notable changes in his philosophy in comparison with traditional, mechanical philosophies. In Chapter II of Part I, Whitehead formally details his Categoreal Scheme. This scheme consists of four sets of categories: (i) the Category of the Ultimate, (ii) the Categories of Existence, (iii) the Categories of Explanation, and (iv) the Categoreal Obligations. The only one treated in detail in this section is the

Category of the Ultimate, whereas the other three sets are only listed, with an occasional remark for clarification. Though he states that the purpose of the introduction is to clarify the categories' applicability and adequacy in his philosophic scheme, Whitehead immediately warns the reader that "[t]he course of this discussion will disclose how very far they are from satisfying this ideal" (*PR* 20). For the sake of brevity, I will ignore the order to an extent, occasionally referencing Part II, so that my exposition on this philosophical scheme may be as clear and concise as possible.

The Category of the Ultimate is the first to be discussed, representing one of the most important notions for grasping Whiteheadean metaphysics. There are three ultimate notions imbedded in an entity: *creativity*, *the one*, and *the many*. These three notions are also presupposed in the special categories discussed below. A single entity represents oneness, while the many suggests a disjunctive diversity. To specify that there is a single entity exhibiting oneness means there is the possibility of an entity not exhibiting oneness, as a disjunctive diversity or a many; therefore, the one presupposes the many, and likewise the many presupposes the one.

The most crucial of these ultimate notions is creativity. It is that ultimate universal by which the disjunctive universe is brought into togetherness, forming a complex unity of the universe conjunctively, i.e., the many become one. This new one actual occasion is a novel entity among the many that are the universe disjunctively. Thus, creativity is the transcendence of an actual entity into novelty. *Creative advance* is the application of this ultimate principle, and *concrescence* is the process of an actual entity becoming novel. The Category of the Ultimate entails the creative advance of the many disjunctive into the one conjunctive, i.e., the concrescence of an actual entity.

The Categories of Existence are representative of the various things, actual and non-actual, in the universe. These eight categories, in their preserved order, are as follows: "(i) Actual Entities, [Actual Occasions,] *or* Final Realities, or *Rēs Verae* [from Descartes]. (ii) Prehensions, *or* Concrete Facts of Relatedness. (iii) Nexūs (plural of Nexus), *or* Public Matters of Fact. (iv) Subjective Forms, *or* Private Matters of Fact. (v) Eternal Objects, *or* Pure Potentials for the Specific Determination of Fact, *or* Forms of Definiteness. (vi) Propositions, *or* Matters of Fact in Potential Determination, *or* Impure Potentials for the Specific Determination of Matters of Fact, *or* Theories. (vii) Multiplicities, *or* Pure Disjunctions of Diverse Entities. (viii) Contrasts, *or* Modes of Entities in one Prehension, *or* Patterned Entities" (*PR* 22).

Actual entities are the real, final things of our universe. An actual entity may vary in many ways including its substance, its importance within the cosmological scheme, or its function. For example, on the one hand, God is an actual entity, yet on the other, "so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off space" (*PR* 18). Despite these variations, every actual entity, being of the same genus, is subject to the same principles within this metaphysical system. They are the final facts.

Actual entities can easily be compared to Leibniz's monadic system. The difference between Whitehead's actual entity and Leibniz's monads is that an actual entity does not change, but rather becomes. "Each monadic creature is a mode of process of 'feeling' the world, of housing the world in one unit of complex feeling, in every way determinate" (*PR* 80). *This* is an actual occasion, the novel product of creative advance.

Whitehead's metaphor, "[t]he philosophy of organism is a cell-theory of actuality," presents the actual entity as a living cell that seizes diverse elements from its

relevant universe for the sake of its existence (*PR* 219). The seizing of these elements are *prehensions*. Any actual entity may be broken down in an indeterminate number of ways, but the most concrete and simplistic method in which an actual occasion may be analyzed is by means of its prehensions. A prehension is the vector-like feeling of an actual entity, and in this feeling the general qualities of that actual entity are reproduced. It is important to note that a prehension is a subordinate, dependent element of an actual entity. I will discuss this notion further when we arrive at Whitehead's theory of feelings.

Togetherness is a concept that presupposes not only the one and the many, but also the creative advance, conjunctive unity, and disjunctive diversity. Considering these presuppositions, the novel, actual occasion, which is the product of creative advance, is a unity; thus, that actual occasion is a multiplicity of existent things prehended together. Another term for such an actual occasion, the term which will be used in further discussions, is a *nexus* (pl. *nexūs*), or public matters of fact. Nexūs are the unities of actual entities related by their prehensions of each other. Whitehead explains that in certain situations a nexus can be treated as one actuality, "[t]his is what we habitually do in the case of the span of life of a molecule, or of a piece of rock, or of a human body" (*PR* 287).

The next object of discussion is *subjective form*. This is the fifth and final part of a transition caused by a positive prehension, constituting *how* the subject perceives the objective datum at hand. The subject of a concrescence differentiates itself by its reactions to the surrounding data. The subjective form determines the reaction of a particular actual entity for the particular prehension in its particular universe, hence also being termed a private matter of fact.

An *eternal object* is a pure potential for actual entities. Actual entities may differ in their realizing the eternal objects within their universe. Also, "[a]ny whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world is called an 'eternal object'" (*PR* 44). The term for an eternal object's involvement in the process of concrescence is *ingression*, and regarding the desire for ingression, the eternal object remains neutral. The eternal object's potentiality is associated with its *givenness*. This notion shows the clear lack of determinateness of eternal objects' givenness, as it is stated, "that what *is* 'given' might not have been 'given'; and that what is not 'given' *might have been* 'given,'" (*PR* 44). Eternal objects present in a concrescence must either be positively prehended or negatively prehended, for the resultant superject of the satisfied actual entity must exclude anything not given for its givenness. The metaphor that Whitehead uses is that of a picture with a pattern of colors constituting its givenness for us. "But an extra patch of red does not constitute a mere addition; it alters the whole balance" (*PR* 45).

Through integrating a conceptual feeling (the prehension of an eternal object) and a physical feeling (the prehension of an actual entity), the *proposition* forms the datum of a complex feeling. A proposition is, on the simplest level, a hybrid between an actual entity and an eternal object. For on the one hand, the proposition likens itself to an actual entity in the form of "an incomplete abstraction from determinate actual entities" and likens itself to an eternal object by maintaining its indeterminateness (*PR* 257). The proposition remains indeterminate because its abstracted actual entities only determine its truth or falsehood if they are considered *formaliter*, i.e., not in abstraction. Further discussion on these unique, complex entities will follow in the discussion of Part III.

The last two of the Categories of Existence are less complex. A *multiplicity* is any group of diverse and disjunctive entities. Multiplicities of entities are usually the initial data in the creative process. A *contrast* is the unity of a complex datum of a feeling. Essentially, contrasts are present in the higher phases of concrescence, in which the feelings have complex data from groupings of the feelings felt in earlier stages. It should be noted that, though the idea of a contrast may seem simple, the idea can become infinitely complex as the data begin to be contrasts themselves, i.e. contrasts of contrasts.

At the end of his section of the Categories of Existence, Whitehead points out the importance of categories (i) and (v) by virtue of their extreme finality; but, he does not yet explain this significance. I, on the other hand, will not leave my audience blind in such an opaque cloud of confusion and despair. Both actual entities and eternal objects need to be analyzed in reference to the Category of the Ultimate in order for the notion of "extreme finality" to be explained. An actual entity is synonymous with the term "final reality" which, if it is taken as the completed, complex unity of novelty from the Category of the Ultimate, is the fully determinate matter of fact; i.e., the actual entity cannot be determined further. Eternal objects are synonymous to pure potentials for the specific determination of fact, or forms of definiteness. Therefore, if we consider an actual entity as a complex, complete unity with full determinateness, there must be an eternal object present whose forms of complex unity are proposed and prehended. As a form of definiteness, the eternal object acts as a lure for the actual entity, which proceeds from its state of partial indeterminacy to full determinateness. More simply, without the eternal object as a form of determinateness, the actual entity's complex unity would not be possible and its determinacy would lose meaning. Likewise, the eternal object needs

the unity of the actual entity as a final reality, or else its potentials cannot be realized and are thus meaningless.

The next set of categories, the twenty-seven Categories of Explanation, elucidate the functions and workings of the eight Categories of Existence. Since detailing all twenty-seven categories would be excessive, the following discussion will study only those which are necessary for an understanding of key elements in the categoreal scheme and thereby Whitehead's philosophy as a whole. The first of these is the Category of Explanation (iv), which states Whitehead's Principle of Relativity. This category explains that "it is in the nature of a 'being' that it is a potential for every 'becoming'" (*PR* 22). Also, this category is a general principle that all entities, actual and non-actual, can potentially be an element of a real concrescence. Finally, all items within a concrescing subject's universe must be involved in the process.

Another important Category of Explanation (ix) explicates the simple but integral notion of the principle of process. This category states that "*how* an actual entity *becomes* constitutes *what* that actual entity *is*" (*PR* 23). An actual entity's becoming shapes its being.

The next Categories of Explanation are (xi) and (xii), which explain the notion of a prehension, other than simply a concrete fact of relatedness. Category (xi) explains the three necessary factors for a prehension: (a) a subject prehending another actual entity, (b) the prehended 'datum', and (c) the subjective form, i.e. *how* that subject prehends the datum. This category concludes with an explanation of physical prehensions and conceptual prehensions. This is shockingly simple as the only difference is the prehended datum: for physical prehensions, it is another actual entity; for conceptual prehensions, an

eternal object. According to Elizabeth Kraus, the varying sorts of prehensions were "[i]mplied but not explicit until PR" (51). Though this will be discussed in much more detail in subsequent sections, it is important to note that consciousness is not necessarily involved in either prehension.

In Category of Explanation (xii), the notions of positive and negative prehensions are introduced. A positive prehension is a feeling and a negative prehension is an elimination from feeling, both of which have subjective forms. Negative prehensions do not ignore datum through passivity, but rather "holds its datum as inoperative in the progressive concrescence of prehensions constituting the unity of the subject," (*PR* 23-4).

The next Category of Explanation is Category (xviii), which details the Ontological Principle and clarifies that reasons are only actual entities. A concrescing subject can trace every reason for which it has conformed to either an actual entity in its actual world, or to the character of the subject of the concrescence, i.e., itself. "It follows that any condition to be satisfied by one actual entity in its process expresses a fact either about the 'real internal constitutions' of some other actual entities, or about the 'subjective aim' conditioning that process" (*PR* 24).

The last Category of Explanation I will discuss in this section is category (xxv). This category elucidates the idea of *satisfaction* as the final phase in the process of concrescence, constituting a complex, fully determinate actual entity. The satisfied actual entity is fully determinate as to its origin, its objective immortality, and its prehension of everything in its universe.

The last of the four sets of categories are the nine Categoreal Obligations. Like the Categories of Explanation, the nine Categoreal Obligations elucidate certain functions

and workings of the Categories of Existence, but they also explicate the process of concrescence itself. The discussion of these Categoreal Obligations marks the transition from The Categoreal Scheme to The Theory of Prehensions. Each one of the Categoreal Obligations is explained in great detail during Whitehead's discussion of prehensions and concrescence as a whole. Therefore, before I begin the discussion of concrescence, I would like to discuss any pertinent topics relevant to poetic philosophy discussed in the rest of Part I or Part II.

The Ontological Principle is more complex than the Category (xviii) suggests. Actual occasions are the basis for all other existence. Any entity that exists is derived from some previous actual occasion. Therefore, actual entities' "reasons" are also derivative. This principle is connected to the notion of givenness. Since there is always some sort of decision (derived from the Latin *decido, decidere*, meaning to cut off) between what is given and what is not given, this decision also alters an actual occasion's reasons for existence. Decision should not be confused with anything other than the actual. Decisions are made for the existence of an actual entity, and for the existence of other actual entities in its universe.

Another important element in Whitehead's philosophical scheme that has yet to be discussed is his notion of God. Whitehead's notion of God should not be mistaken for the Christian God, or any Western god for that matter. Insofar as I know, Whitehead's God is unique, and is a result of his philosophical endeavor more than his own interest in theology. The notion of God arises from the fact that Whitehead's philosophical system cannot work without the existence of a non-temporal entity. God is not some form of a *deus ex machina* for Whitehead's speculative scheme, but the result of applying the

Ontological Principle to eternal objects. As stated above regarding this principle, no thing can come from nothing, and all things come from some thing somewhere. "Accordingly the general potentiality of the universe must be somewhere; since it retains its proximate relevance to actual entities for which it is unrealized. This 'somewhere' is the non-temporal entity. Thus 'proximate relevance' means 'relevance as in the primordial mind of God'" (*PR* 46).

Eternal objects are necessary for the process of actual entities, but they cannot stand in isolation and abstraction from the actual world unless they are to become undifferentiated, pointless nonentities. Therefore, they are distinguished through God's conceptual realization of them. Logically, there can only be one entity that is not derivative, the one entity that is the beginning of the process. This one entity is the ἀρχή, or beginning, of Whitehead's metaphysical scheme. The cosmos cannot elude the presence and influence of the ἀρχή and his primordial creative act. As the ultimate superject, God acquires the conceptual valuation of every eternal object, thus becoming truly pertinent for future process. Without the actuality of the primordial valuation of all eternal objects, how could these eternal objects be at all differentiated? And thus, without unique eternal objects, how could novelty be achieved?

God is an actual entity in the speculative scheme. He is the primordial entity and he is non-temporal, yet he is still an entity. Thus, God is accordingly subject to the same principles of the metaphysical scheme. His creative act is both presupposed by the particularities of the actual world and presupposes the same general metaphysical principle of creative advance, with the only difference being that he is the primordial example of such creativity.

There are three parts to an actual entity and likewise, there are three aspects to God. For the actual entity, these three parts essentially make up its past, present and future. The actual entity's past is characterized by what it is given, creating an efficient cause by means of the objectifications within its universe. Its present consists of its final cause, or lure, which is its subjective aim towards satisfaction resulting in concrescence. Lastly, its future ensures objectification for other actual entities as the entity is a superject. Though not the same, God's three parts structurally mirror the actual entity's. God's past, or his primordial nature, is characterized by his creation of every possible potentiality through eternal objects, produced through his unification of conceptual feelings with his subjective aim. God's present, or consequent nature, consists of the physical prehension of the actual world, ensuring all novel actual entities provide him with the necessary elements for the proper realization. And God's future, or his superjective nature, ensures his transcendence of the actual world through creative advance.

Section III – Preliminary Poetics

The discussion of God concludes this chapter on the understanding of the foundation for *PR*. The purpose of this chapter was to familiarize oneself with the terminology of Whitehead before exploring his fundamental notion of concrescence; however, there are indicators within this chapter that may help form a preliminary notion of how *PR* is poetic. Before the analysis of concrescence, the conclusion of this chapter will explore two potential connections to poetry within Whitehead's speculative scheme.

The first of these connections is Whitehead's use of metaphor in the structure of his language. As previously mentioned, Whitehead's language is elliptical in its meaning. Definitions are not strictly established, and the terms grow organically in accordance to the whole of *PR*, rather than becoming restrained to specific usage. Metaphor constitutes one of the most important aspects of poetry, though metaphor cannot alone account for philosophy being considered poetic.

Whitehead's principle of creative advance is the second poetic aspect evident within this chapter. As described above, creative advance is the unifying force of *PR*'s speculative scheme and a necessary result of the Category of the Ultimate. The unification of the many into the one is creative advance, and this process is concrescence. How does this relate to poetry, or poetics? The etymology of the term poetic is from the Greek ποίησις, the perfect, passive participle of ποιέω, ποεῖν, meaning "to make." This etymology elucidates the notion that poetic philosophy must contain an element of "making." The heart of *PR*'s foundation is creative advance, and this central notion provides us with the first realization of "making" for Whitehead.

Chapter II – The Process of Concrescence

The following chapter will cover the central topic of *Process and Reality*, concrescence. As the first chapter was an exposition of particulars concerning the philosophical scheme, the second will focus on how the elements of Chapter I function with each other as a whole. Whitehead suggests many times that one cannot truly consider an actual entity, an eternal object, or any other existent thing in abstraction because a subject defines its actual world as much as an actual world defines a subject. The first chapter analyzed the components of the categoreal scheme in abstraction for the sake of understanding the basics of Whitehead's metaphysics. However, this chapter will focus on how a subject experiences its actual world, maintaining the closest possible connection between the one and the many. In order to be as truthful to *PR* as practical, the following evaluation on the process of concrescence will refuse extensive abstract analysis and behold the metaphysical truths in the whole.

Section I – The Theory of Feelings

Whitehead opens his Theory of Feelings with a metaphor, "the philosophy of organism is a cell-theory of actuality. Each ultimate unit of fact is a cell-complex, not analysable into components with equivalent completeness of actuality" (219). Continuing the metaphor he likens the Theory of Prehensions to the genetic theory of the cell, in which it "is exhibited as appropriating for the foundation of its own existence, the various elements of the universe out of which it arises" (*PR* 219). Whitehead explains the metaphor as follows: the cell is the subject actual entity which is becoming; the various elements of the universe are the actual entities and eternal objects in the subject's

universe; the appropriation by the cell is thus the prehension. The subject positively prehends all the actual entities, but only a selection of the eternal objects, and through all of the innumerable prehensions, entities, such as novel propositions or generic contrast, come into existence. These novel entities, if relevant, are prehended by the concrescent entity. This opening metaphor shows how prehensions work and their potential for unimaginable complexity.

As is necessary in Whitehead's scheme, yet another clarification of the term "satisfaction" is introduced; however, this instance of satisfaction is directly tied to the fulfillment of the categoreal demands. This fulfillment provides gratification of the creative urge, and thus the actual entity reaches satisfaction.

Prehensions, when of the positive sort, are also termed feelings, while negative prehensions are active exclusions of potential contributions to the concrescence. These prehensions constitute the determinate operations into which a satisfied actual entity is divisible. The division of the process of concrescence results in simple, physical feelings followed by hybrid physical feelings, propositions, and subsequent phases of greater complexity that are nonetheless integrated with the earliest feelings, ending with the satisfaction of the concrescent subject. "This [division] is the 'genetic' analysis of satisfaction" (*PR* 220).

A positive prehension's complex constitution can be broken down into five factors. Expressing the constitutive elements of the transition, the five factors are: "(i) the 'subject' which feels, (ii) the 'initial' data which are to be felt, (iii) the 'elimination' in virtue of negative prehensions, (iv) the 'objective datum' which is felt, (v) the 'subjective form' which is *how* that subject feels that objective datum" (*PR* 221). Each of these five

factors are determining. Since the explication of the mutual determination of these five factors is exceedingly complex, it shall suffice to state that this subject of the positive prehension is truly a *causa sui* (*PR* 221).

A feeling cannot be abstracted from its actual entity, so the actual entity, of which this feeling is part, is termed the subject of the feeling, or the concrescent subject. Since there can be no abstraction, the subject and the feeling share a bond, such that the feeling is as particular as its subject. The doctrine of feelings necessitates the subject-superject form of statement. This is the case because the feelings, being inseparable from the end at which they aim, aim at the feeler as their final cause. Being inseparable from their subject, the feelings are what they are *because* the subject is what it is. Therefore, the feelings are the only means for the subject to "objectively condition the creativity beyond itself" (*PR* 222).

The first three categoreal obligations, as Whitehead states, "flow from the final nature of things" (222). In other words, these first three categoreal obligations are the most general principles among the categoreal obligations. They govern the most simple phase of concrescence and constitute its foundation.

The Category (I) of "Subjective Unity": "The many feelings which belong to an incomplete phase in the process of an actual entity, though unintegrated by reason of the incompleteness of the phase, are compatible for synthesis by reason of the unity of their subject" (*PR* 223). The one final end of any prehending subject is the subject itself. Thus the one subject conditions each component feeling of the unity. Even though some feelings may be unintegrated in an incomplete phase, the subjective unity ought to emphasize the subject's aim for satisfaction, and any unconditioned feelings ought to be

conditioned by other feelings, thus leaving them integrable. The reason why no feeling can be abstracted from its subject is due to the subject's aim through the feeling to become the subject of that feeling. In other words, the subject's aim is shared with all the other feelings in its unity, and there is no abstraction of feelings from the subject. The subjective aim is represented by a conceptual feeling comprised of conditioned alternatives. However, as each subsequent phase of the concrescence passes, this conceptual feeling eliminates its alternatives and is "reduced to coherence" (*PR* 224). Nevertheless, the gradual reduction to coherence is no problem, since at each phase the many feelings, having conformed to the subjective end, remain compatible in the unity. In its most general sense, this categoreal obligation states that since the one final end of any prehending subject is the subject itself, all the component feelings of the unity, whether incomplete or unintegrated, will be conditioned for the compatibility of synthesis.

The Category (II) of "Objective Identity": "There can be no duplication of any element in the objective datum of the satisfaction of an actual entity, so far as concerns the function of that element in that satisfaction" (*PR* 225). This categoreal obligation simply states that in the process of concrescence, each entity has only one role. In addition, each entity must possess its own identity so that there is no duplication of roles.

The Category (III) of "Objective Diversity": "There can be no 'coalescence' of diverse elements in the objective datum of an actual entity, so far as concerns the functions of those elements in that satisfaction" (*PR* 225). This categoreal obligation plays the opposite role of category (II). Essentially, there can be no false representation of diverse elements as an absolute identity of function. No entity may join a real unity with

an abstract status. The lack of adherence to this category, as well as category (II), is a ground for incompatibility in reference to potential integration into the unity.

Section II – Primary Feelings

Constituting the first phase of concrescence, the primary feelings consist of two sorts of feelings, simple, physical feelings and conceptual feelings. "All other feelings of whatever complexity arise out of a process of integration which starts with a phase of these primary feelings" (*PR* 239). The obvious difference between these two species of primary feelings is the thing that is felt. In a simple, physical feeling, the feeling occurs between two actual entities, one being the subject of the feeling, the other the initial datum of the feeling. The second feeling involved is the objectification of the felt actual entity for the concrescent subject. The once initial datum is objectified and is now the subject of feeling for the objective datum. This process of a simple, physical feeling can also be described in terms of causation. In this case, the actual entity as initial datum is the cause, the simple, physical feeling is the effect, and the simple, physical feeling's subject is conditioned by the feeling/effect, but will also be termed the effect. This simple, physical feeling will sometimes be referred to as causal feelings. Yet another alternate method for describing the same simple, physical feeling can be achieved with variations of perception, which is not yet conscious. The actual entity as initial datum becomes the actual entity perceived; objective datum is the perspective having perceived that actual entity; and the simple, physical feeling's subject is the perceiver. In order to clarify that this is not conscious perception experienced, Whitehead explains that only

transmuted feelings can acquire consciousness and consciousness itself originates in the higher, more complex phases of concrescence.

In other words, the simple, physical feeling is the feeling by a feeling of another feeling. Everything that occurs in this most simple model must act in accordance with the categoreal obligations, lest even this level of simplicity bring incoherence into Whitehead's metaphysical scheme. Insofar as the simple physical feeling has been illuminated, it acts in accordance with the first three categoreal obligations. As the odds of only two actual entities interacting with each other in the most simplistic manner are not very good, Whitehead proceeds to a more complex scenario, where a multiplicity of simple, physical feelings enters into the propositional unity of a phase of concrescence. Notably, this example "constitutes the first phase in the concrescence of the actual entity which is the common subject of all these feelings" (*PR* 236-7). In this situation, we only need to refer to the Category of Subjective Unity, which demands the one, final end is that of the prehending subject. Therefore, the many actual entities felt in the original multiplicity would have their initial data objectified by the prehending entity into the perspective of one of their own feelings, which must also be present in the prehending subject. The novelty of this concrescence is affected by an indefinite number of factors within the negative prehensions and the subjective forms. I say indefinite here since the potential for positive prehensions in this example is completely unknown and could very well be infinite. "This primary phase of simple physical feelings constitutes the machinery by reason of which the creativity transcends the world already actual, and yet remains conditioned by that actual world in its new impersonation" (*PR* 237).

A conceptual feeling differs from the simple, physical feeling in that the felt object is an eternal object, not an actual entity. Another factor that is dissimilar among the primary feelings is the necessity of prehension. If there is any actual entity in the actual world of a concrescent subject, that actual entity must be integrated positively or negatively into the concrescence. The importance or triviality of this actual entity is irrelevant, and the subject must prehend it as well. Despite any negative prehensions eliminating the actual entity's importance for the subject, there must remain some trace of its original, positive prehension. Conceptual feelings, on the other hand, have no such necessity. The eternal objects may take part in the concrescence through positive prehensions, or the subject may eliminate any such opportunity by means of a negative prehension. Whitehead suggests that each concrescence contains "a twofold aspect of the creative urge" (*PR* 239). The first aspect is the physical pole of an actual entity, or the origination of simple causal feelings, and the second is the mental pole, or the origination of conceptual feelings. The name "mental pole" does not imply the presence of consciousness, but conscious feelings, when existent, originate only in the mental pole.

Conceptual feelings serve the subject of feeling through the determination of its character. "If the actual entity be *this*, then by the nature of the case it is not *that* or *that*" (*PR* 240). This exclusiveness is essential for an actual entity to abide properly by the category of objective identity and become determinate. A conceptual feeling of an actual entity narrows the scope of its potentials through the introduction of incompatible alternatives.

Conceptual feelings, upon their prehension, enter into what Whitehead calls a "supervening phase" in which they become integrated with the other prehended feelings

of the subject. The eternal object of the conceptual feeling and the objective data of the other feelings then form a new kind of data, "integrated" data. This supervening phase does not involve negative prehensions, since according to the category of subject unity, the feelings of the earlier phase are compatible for integration and the subject cannot separate into multiple subjects (the result of negative prehensions of already positively prehended feelings). Since the new datum includes the eternal object and other eternal objects and actual entities derived from the feelings of the earlier phase, it is important to determine *how* the eternal object has ingress into that integrated datum. The subjective form of the conceptual feeling determines the integral feeling's intensive pattern (the eternal object's importance relative to the other elements in the integrated datum). The valuation of the conceptual feeling establishes whether the integrated feeling's pattern of intensiveness is enhanced or attenuated. The enhancement of this pattern is called a "valuation up," the attenuation a "valuation down." A valuation of a conceptual feeling determines an eternal object's importance in the concrescence, as well as how it will be utilized on the basis of its importance. Therefore, there are three summarizing aspects of any valuation: (i) by the category of subjective unity, the valuation is not an abstraction from the effects of the other feelings present, and therefore is affected by and dependent upon them; (ii) the valuation determines how the eternal object should be used; and (iii) the valuation, whether it is up or down, determines the intensiveness of the integrated feeling, and thus the importance of the eternal object. "But . . . these three characteristics . . . are merely the outcome of the subjective aim of the subject, determining what it is itself integrally to be, in its own character of the superject of its own process" (*PR* 241).

The Category (VII) of "Subjective Harmony" applies to the valuation of a conceptual feeling. "The valuations of conceptual feelings are mutually determined by the adaptation of those feelings to be contrasted elements congruent with the subjective aim" (*PR* 27). This categoreal obligation is analogous to the category of subjective unity in that no prehension can be abstracted from its subject. Any process of concrescence has an inherent harmony in its subjective aim at satisfaction. The difference between categories (I) and (VII) is the object of focus. Category (I) focuses on the compatibility of data felt with the subjective aim, and category (VII) on the compatibility of subjective forms of conceptual feelings.

The Category (VIII) of "Subjective Intensity" relates to both categories (I) and (VII). This category is as follows: "The subjective aim, whereby there is origination of conceptual feeling, is at intensity of feeling (α) in the immediate subject, and (β) in the *relevant* future" (*PR* 27). Therefore, according to category (I), the compatibilities of data felt limit the possibilities, at which the subjective aim may aim, for intensification of feeling. For category (VII), the effect is that the subjective aim should be at the intensity of feelings, thus in favor of upward valuations.

As mentioned before, consciousness can only be present in a concrescence if there is a conceptual feeling, but consciousness is not present in every conceptual feeling. Being an aspect of feeling in specific reference to its subjective form, consciousness requires a specific sort of objective datum derived from the specific sort of initial data inherently carrying the proper elements for consciousness to arise. Therefore, consciousness is dependent upon specific instances of initial data, and pure conceptual feelings never fall into this group. When does consciousness emerge in the process of

concrescence? Consciousness requires a synthesis of the physical and the mental poles. Though the integration of both poles in an objectified nexus is not sufficient to provide the concrescence with consciousness, it is this notion of the physical, or concrete, possessing some aspect of the mental, or abstract, that elicits further possibility of consciousness. Whitehead states that physical feelings make up our concrete, not abstract, notions of our awareness of nature. Since awareness requires the integration of physical and conceptual feelings in the objective data, the contrasted combination of definite actuality and abstract potentials provides such a notion as either "what it is and might not be" or "what it is not and might be." The three components that lead to consciousness are definiteness, affirmation (what it is and might not be), and negation (what it is not and might be). The last two of these components forms Whitehead's "affirmation-negation contrast," which leads to a definition of consciousness as "how we feel about the affirmation-negation contrast" (*PR* 243). Discussion of consciousness will resurface in the section concerning propositional feelings.

Section III – Hybrid Physical Feelings and Conceptual Reversion

The term "physical," in reference to a feeling, has been shown to mean that the thing felt is an actual entity. The simple, physical feeling is not the only form of physical feelings in existence. There are two subspecies of physical feelings, consisting of "pure physical feelings" and "hybrid physical feelings." The simple, physical feeling falls into the first category, since the datum the felt actual entity forms for the concrescent subject is objectified by a physical feeling of its own. In a hybrid physical feeling, the felt actual entity still forms an objectified datum for the concrescent subject, but the datum is also

objectified by one of the actual entity's own conceptual feelings. The difference between these feelings lies in their subjective forms. While the pure physical feeling's subjective form has the characteristic of "re-enaction," the hybrid physical feeling's has that of the element of autonomy. Whereas re-enaction merely conforms to a preset pattern, the "autonomous conceptual element modifies the subjective forms throughout the whole range of feeling in that concrescence and thereby guides the integrations" (*PR* 245).

Through the introduction of hybrid physical feelings, Whitehead's speculative philosophy avoids the problematic Cartesian separation of mind and body, respectively the mental and physical poles, since the hybrid physical feeling allows conceptual feelings to give rise to physical feelings. In addition, conceptual feelings may produce other conceptual feelings, and even physical feelings may produce conceptual feelings. This is due to categoreal obligations (IV) and (V), which concern conceptual valuation and reversion. Before the exploration of these categories, it is important to note that, although the hybrid physical feeling produces for the concrescent subject a conceptual feeling with datum identical to a previous subject's conceptual feeling, these two feelings vary potentially in their subjective forms. Because the origination of subjective forms from conceptual feelings is an autonomous act, and only the categories of subjective unity (I), harmony (VII), and intensity (VIII) govern them, the variance between the two subjective forms is negligible, since they must be compatible with their subject's subjective aim and the actual world.

The Category (IV) of "Conceptual Valuation": "From each physical feeling there is the derivation of a purely conceptual feeling whose datum is an eternal object exemplified in the definiteness of the actual entity, or of the nexus, physically felt" (*PR*

26). The first notion to notice in this category is that conceptual feelings and eternal objects are derived from physical feelings and actual entities, thus we have "the old principle that mentality originates from sensitive experience" (*PR* 248). This principle does not prohibit the possibility of mental operations produced by mental operations of earlier phases of the concrescence. Category (IV) also implies the necessity of either a valuation up or down for the concrescent subject in its subsequent phases because the physical feeling of the primary phase means there will be the origination of a conceptual feeling from this physical feeling. According to subjective unity, harmony, and intensity, these feelings must be integrated, and the actual entity's subjective form of re-enaction will either gain or lose its intensity. Therefore, the valuation ensures the subjective form is not solely re-enacted, but it is also modified in intensity of its re-enaction.

The Category (V) of "Conceptual Reversion": "There is secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with, and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the first phase of the mental pole. The diversity is a relevant diversity determined by the subjective aim" (*PR* 26). The first phase of the mental pole entertains conceptual reproductions, which are the conceptual valuations of category (IV). The second phase entertains conceptual reversions, which are derived from the eternal objects of the first phase. This second phase includes the conceptual feeling of proximate novelties. These conceptual reversions aim at contrast for the enhancement in intensity and pattern of their subject forms. The positive conceptual prehension of relevant alternatives provide such contrasts. Nevertheless, conceptual reversions are no exceptions to subjective unity, harmony and intensity, and thus they must contain some compatible elements of the antecedent phase. "This 'aim at contrast'

is the expression of the ultimate creative purpose that each unification shall achieve some maximum depth of intensity of feeling, subject to the conditions of concrescence" (*PR* 249).

Section IV – Transmutation

Transmutation in the process of concrescence allows the prehending subject to feel a nexus of actual entities as a community. In order for this to occur, the pure, and hybrid, actual entities must produce a single conceptual feeling, constituting the beginning phase of the transmutation. This conceptual feeling produces an eternal object as its datum. The concrescent subject's transmuted physical feeling of the nexus as qualified by this conceptual datum allows it to physically feel both the unity of the actual world and its divisibility into smaller nexūs. The objectification of the nexus usually provides the prehending subject with enough direct information that it can preserve the prehended nexus's order; however, in cases where the objectification provides mere indirect references to the characteristics of the members of the nexus, it may institute new, but not necessarily beneficial, elements into the world. In eliminating the differences between members of the prehended nexus, transmutation originates through analogies.

The Category (VI) of "Transmutation": "When (in accordance with category [IV], or with categories [IV] and [V]) one and the same conceptual feeling is derived impartially by a prehending subject from its analogous simple physical feelings of various actual entities in its actual world, then, in a subsequent phase of integration of these simple physical feelings together with the derivate conceptual feeling, the

prehending subject may transmute the *datum* of the conceptual feeling into a characteristic of some *nexus* containing those prehended actual entities among its members, or of some part of that nexus. In this way the nexus (or its part), thus characterized, is the objective datum of a feeling entertained by this prehending subject" (*PR* 27). The transmutation of a nexus is most simply stated as follows: A nexus, prehended by some actual entity, forms a conceptual feeling, whose objectified datum is compatible with the members of the nexus, and the prehending subject feels the *conceptually* objectified datum *physically* by means of the nexus.

It is important to note the role of impartiality in this transmuted feeling. The impartiality of the conceptual feeling is the key to transmutation, since such conceptual impartiality must in some sense be present for any transmutation to occur at all. By this, it is meant that the conceptual feeling, which is the objectified datum for the transmuted feeling, must be relevant for the majority of the nexus if the nexus is going to be perceived as a community. The occurrence that makes this most problematic is when the objectified datum originates from a conceptual reversion. Since this reversion, being a conceptual feeling of another conceptual feeling, is further removed from the actual entities of the nexus, there is much opportunity for the analogous elements produced for the prehending subject to be irrelevant and trivial.

Section V – Propositional Feelings

The formation of a proposition as the objective datum in a feeling produces what Whitehead terms a "propositional feeling." A proposition is an entity that forms the datum of a complex datum which is composed of a physical feeling integrated with a

conceptual feeling. The proposition is an interesting combination of actual entity and eternal object, interweaving aspects of both into its constitution. Propositions may be either true or false, whereas actual entities are true, since they are matters of fact, and eternal objects are neither true nor false.

Propositional feelings have the objectification of this peculiar entity as its datum for the concrescent subject. The physical feeling of the proposition has one actual entity, or a determinate nexus of actual entities, as its objective datum, and the conceptual feeling has an eternal object, referent to any actual entities, as its objective datum. The integration of these feelings results in a determinate set of actual entities, which are the logical subjects of the proposition, and the elimination of the complete generality of the eternal object. This eternal object loses its reference to any actual entity, and becomes referential to those among the logical subjects of the proposition. "The proposition is the potentiality of the eternal object, as a determinant of definiteness, in some mode of restricted reference to the logical subjects" (*PR* 257). The logical subjects of a proposition constitute the primary difference between eternal objects and propositions. This difference is that the logical subjects provide givenness for the proposition in question, whereas the generality of eternal objects does not. This givenness is the required element for truth or falsehood.

Though the logical subjects provide relevance to the actual world, the proposition remains indeterminate and various prehending subjects may feel it with various feelings. Thus, the proposition becomes a lure for feeling. Its truth or falsehood is actually a subordinate aspect in regard to its importance. "[I]n the real world it is more important

that a proposition be interesting than it be true. The importance of truth is, that it adds to interest" (*PR* 259).

Pure propositional feelings are divided into two subspecies: "imaginative feelings" and "perceptive feelings." The differences between these two sorts of propositional feelings are in the formation of the proposition itself. Therefore it is necessary to briefly outline the earlier phases that lead to a propositional feeling. These requirements of these phases are as follows: (i) a physical feeling containing the logical subjects of the proposition in its objective datum; (ii) an eternal object as part of a physical feeling's datum; (iii) the conceptual feeling of this eternal object derived from the physical feeling in (ii); and possibly (iv) another conceptual feeling, which is a reversion of the conceptual feeling in (iii). Whitehead calls the physical feeling in (i) the "indicative feeling," the physical feeling in (ii) the "physical recognition," and the conceptual feeling in (iii) or (iv) the "predicative feeling." The predicative feeling arises in (iii) if the "predicative pattern" of (iv) is irrelevant for the propositional feeling. The integration of the indicative feeling and the predicative feeling forms propositional feelings, but the two types of propositional feelings arise from differences in comparison of the indicative feeling and the physical recognition.

Perceptive feelings occur when the indicative feeling and the physical recognition are the same physical feelings, and thus the predicative feeling has relevance, being derived from the logical subjects themselves. There are three variations of perceptive feelings. The first two are called "authentic perceptive feelings," and in these cases, the proposition produces a predicate, being derived from the actual nexus, and the concrescent subject prehends this as produced. The two variations of authentic perceptive

feelings are called “direct” perceptive feelings and “indirect” perceptive feelings. The important difference between these two is the role of the eternal object that forms the predicative feeling. In a direct perceptive feeling, the predicative feeling is derived from the initial conceptual feeling and no reversion is involved. Indirect perceptive feeling implies that the conceptual feeling producing the predicative feeling is a reversion, but the predicate is still realized in the nexus physically felt. Indirect perceptive feelings necessitate the transmutation of the conceptual reversion into a physical feeling enjoyed by the logical subjects according to the category of transmutation (VI). The last type of perceptive feelings is termed “unauthentic” and requires the two following elements: (i) the predicative feeling arises through conceptual reversion; and (ii) this predicate generates a contrast, thus causing the prehending subject to distort the realization of the prehended nexus.

Unauthentic perceptive feelings serve as an easy transition into the discussion of imaginative feelings. Whitehead states that unauthentic feelings originate from a “tied” imagination. The understanding of this statement presupposes the awareness of the difference between perceptive and imaginative feelings. Perceptive feelings are such that the indicative feeling and physical recognition are derived from the same actual entities, the logical subjects of the proposition. However, imaginative feelings are such that the indicative feeling and physical recognition are derived from two nexūs; thus, the logical subjects do not produce the conceptual feeling for the predicative feeling. This explanation illustrates the analogous aspects between (“tied”) imaginative and unauthentic perceptive feelings.

Whitehead sums up his notion of an imaginative feeling in this way: "The proposition which is the objective datum of an imaginative feeling has a predicate derived, with or without reversions, from a nexus which in some respects differs from the nexus providing the logical subjects" (*PR* 263). Since the imaginative feeling's logical subjects are not part of the nexus which forms the predicative feeling, the prehending subject can only feel the proposition as "an imaginative notion concerning its logical subjects" (*PR* 263). Also, since the imaginative feeling contains an indicative feeling that differs from the physical recognition, there are necessarily two subjective forms felt in the prehension, which will deviate from each other on account of their differing histories of origination. These subjective forms are necessarily determined by valuations, and thus they intensify, attenuate, inhibit, or transmute. Hence, "[a] propositional feeling is a lure to creative emergence in the transcendent future" (*PR* 263).

Section VI – Comparative Feelings

"Comparative feelings" are feelings which have as their data generic contrasts. Contrasts are the opposite of incompatibility, creating a unity in a multiplicity by combining these elements into a more profound unity. Therefore, comparative feelings, with contrasts as data, form the most complex sorts of feelings. Comparative feelings are divided into two species, each containing its own respective subdivisions. The two types of comparative feelings are "intellectual feelings" and "physical purposes." Intellectual feelings occur when a propositional feeling is integrated with a physical feeling that must have taken part in the origination of the propositional feeling. Physical purposes arise

from the integration of a physical feeling with a conceptual feeling which originated from that same physical feeling.

There is a problem inherent in the notion of these comparative feelings. If the contrast used as data for an intellectual feeling is a physical feeling and the propositional feeling is derived from that indicative feeling, then it would seem as though the actual entities, as members of the nexus of the indicative feeling, are felt twice. If this were the case, then comparative feelings would contradict the category of objective identity, category (II), thus becoming incompatible for integration. Nevertheless, this is not the case. In comparative feelings, the prehending subject feels the contrast and realizes the common entities as functioning in "one rôle with a two-way aspect" (*PR* 267). These two ways in which the actual entities function are as follows: "One way is [their] functioning in the exemplified pattern of the nexus, and the other way is [their] functioning in the potential pattern of the proposition" (*PR* 271). Therefore, the actual entities are felt only once, and there is no duplication involved.

This notion of two-way functioning leads to the understanding of how consciousness enters into concrescence by means of intellectual feelings. The two-way aspect in which these actual entities function creates the previously mentioned "affirmation-negation contrast." This type of contrast is "the contrast between the affirmation of objectified fact in the physical feeling, and the mere potentiality, which is the negation of such affirmation, in the propositional feeling. It is the contrast between *'in fact'* and *'might be,'* in respect to particular instances in *this* actual world" (*PR* 267). In other words, the affirmation-negation contrast is the comparison of matters of fact with the potentials of those matters of fact. This contrast is the data for intellectual feelings,

whose subjective form is consciousness. Thus, by the category of subjective harmony, consciousness is shared by all feelings in the concrescence. As the rarity of consciousness has finally been obtained through intellectual feelings, it is important to note that it is merely "the crown of experience, only occasionally attained, not its necessary base" (*PR* 267).

Intellectual feelings can be divided into two subspecies: (i) "conscious perceptions" and (ii) "intuitive judgments." As previously noted, both of these feelings involve a contrast of a physical feeling and a propositional feeling. Conscious perceptions specifically have as their datum the integration of a physical feeling and a perceptive feeling. These perceptive feelings can be any of all three sorts mentioned earlier, which are authentic perceptive feelings, of either the direct or the indirect variations, or even unauthentic perceptive feelings. The conscious perception with its contrast between the physical feeling and a direct perceptive feeling is the most straightforward of these intellectual feelings. In this case, the physical feeling derives from itself the proposition. Since the indicative feeling and physical recognition, thus also the direct perceptive feeling, are derived from the original physical feeling, no incompatibilities arise. Conscious perception arises with the integration of the original physical feeling and this direct perceptive feeling. This integration "confronts the nexus as fact, with the potentiality derived from itself, limited to itself, and exemplified in itself," and its "subjective form thus assumes its vivid immediate consciousness of what the nexus really *is* in the way of potentiality realized" (*PR* 269).

When either an indirect perceptive feeling or an unauthentic perceptive feeling is part of the contrasted datum of a conscious perception, the method of prehension follows

the same pattern as above, with the exceptions of how the propositional feeling is derived (cf. Section VI above). The important difference in this situation is how the predicative feelings of the respective perceptive feelings alters its usefulness. The indirect perceptive feeling introduces a transmutation into the concrescence. This transmutation allows even the authentic perceptive feeling to produce error, by the transmutation of conceptual feelings into physical feelings, concepts into fact. Though transmuted physical feelings can create novelty for the actual world, there is no guarantee such novelty will be beneficial, possibly being harmful instead. In the unauthentic perceptive feeling, the predicate has no immediate relevance to the nexus, thus it partly agrees and partly disagrees with the complex pattern of the nexus in the generic contrast. The two-way functioning of the nexus saves this type of conscious perception because it necessitates that there be some vivid relevance to the nexus, since the actual entities played a role in both the indicative feeling and the physical recognition.

The second species of intellectual feelings is the "intuitive judgment." As the integration of an indicative feeling and a perceptive feeling constitutes conscious perception, the intuitive judgment contrasts an indicative feeling and an imaginative feeling. There are four parts in the origination of an intuitive judgment, which are the following: (i) the indicative feeling and the physical recollection, as separate nexūs; (ii) the derivation of the predicative feeling from the physical recollection; (iii) the integration of indicative feeling and predicative feeling producing the imaginative feeling; and (iv) the integration and contrast of the imaginative feeling and the indicative feeling resulting in the intuitive judgment. The first part of this origination brings forth an important difference between conscious perceptions and intuitive judgments, which is the

concept that the indicative feeling and physical recollection are separate nexūs. An intuitive judgment's subjective form cannot be responsible for any error that arises, since the subjective form adjusts in respect to the datum it feels. Therefore, only the feelings subordinate to consciousness, such as the indicative feeling, can produce error in an intuitive judgment.

There are three variations of intuitive judgments. The first of these is the "yes-form" intuitive judgment, in which the pattern of the objectified nexus and the predicate are identical and consequently form a strong unity through their integration. The second is the "no-form," in which there is a contrast, instead of unity, between the pattern of the objectified nexus and the predicate on the grounds of incompatible diversity. The last of these variations is the "suspense-form," in which the pattern of the objectified nexus and the predicate are neither identical nor incompatible, creating a contrast without incompatibility.

"Belief" implicitly differentiates these three forms of intuitive judgments. A feeling of belief has in its subjective form a certain eternal object associated with some amount of intensity, with this eternal object being the integral component of its emotional pattern. In reference to intuitive judgments, there is definite belief when the predicate of the proposition is exemplified in the pattern of the objectified nexus. On the other hand, there is definite disbelief when the predicate is incompatible with the exemplification of the pattern of the objectified nexus. These two forms of belief refer to the yes-form and the no-form respectively. However, there is a third instance, relevant to the suspense-form, or a "suspended judgment," in which the predicate is "exhibited as irrelevant, wholly or partially, to the eternal objects exemplified in the objectified nexus" (*PR* 272).

This suspended judgment is characterized by neither belief nor disbelief. Therefore, the erroneous notion that belief is necessarily present in intuitive judgments is discarded.

"Physical purposes" are the last of the comparative feelings. These feelings have as their datum the contrast between a conceptual datum, which is an eternal object that has eliminated the indeterminateness of its ingressions, and the reality of an objectified nexus. The physical purpose is therefore the compatibility, or incompatibility, of the contrast of a real fact and an abstract possibility. The first species of physical purposes is the integration of a physical feeling and its primary conceptual correlate, which is the conceptual feeling derived in accordance with the category of conceptual valuation (IV). The determining factor of whether a physical purpose is an "adversion" or an "aversion" is the conceptual valuation of the eternal object as it is integrated with the physical feeling. An adversion ensures the reproduction of the physical feeling, but an aversion eliminates possibilities of the physical feeling's reproduction. "Thus adversions promote stability; and aversions promote change without any indication of the sort of change" (*PR* 277).

The second species of physical purposes differs from the first through the inclusion of conceptual reversions. These reversions act as lures for contrast in accordance with the category (VIII) of subjective intensity. Also, these physical purposes must reach a balanced complexity, where "balance" is the absence of attenuations of intensity through elimination and "complexity" is the realization of contrasts for the sake of intensity. Thus, the aim of the second species of physical purposes is contrasting the maximum number of eternal objects, while not permitting any realized eternal objects to eliminate potential contrasts. The category (VI) of transmutation also plays an integral

part in this physical purpose, since the antecedent conceptual feelings are transmuted into physical feelings for contrast with subsequent reverted conceptual feelings. These physical purposes have "the weight of repetition, the intensity of contrast, and the balance between the two factors of the contrast" (*PR* 279). As shown, the functioning of the second species of physical purposes requires subjective aim to seek intensity through contrasts and stability through compatible unification.

For Whitehead, "[a]n intense experience is an aesthetic fact" (*PR* 279), which arises from the following categoreal conditions: (i) the novel consequent must retain some relevance to the identity of the original physical feeling and its primary conceptual feeling; (ii) the novel consequent must also preserve contrast while maintaining the previously mentioned identity; and (iii) the novel realizations of conceptual feelings are then transmuted into physical feelings. These three conditions lead to aesthetic experience (that is, the feeling constituted through the realization of contrast under identity).

There are thus only two phases concerning the *process* of concrescence. First is the conformal phase. This phase entails the objectification of the initial data through positive and negative prehensions for aesthetic synthesis. It constitutes the mere reception of the actual world, which is a multiplicity of actual entities to be prehended into unification. The conformal phase is the initial primary physical feeling of the process. The second phase is the gradual transformation of the many into the one, forming "a unity of aesthetic appreciation immediately felt as private" (*PR* 212). This entire phase can be called the supplemental phase, which itself can be further divided into aesthetic and intellectual supplementation. The aesthetic includes conceptual feelings, in which

there is an emotional heightening in virtue of its own assumptions, such as beauty and distaste. Therefore, the aesthetic supplementary stage (i.e., a conceptual feeling) intensifies the prehending subject's feeling by contrasting that actual entity which is felt with the eternal object which is felt. The influx of conceptual feelings integrated with pure physical feelings constitutes the aesthetic supplementary phase. The second supplementary sub-phase is intellectual. This phase includes all of the complex feelings discussed in sections III-VI of this chapter. Intellectual supplementation contrasts propositional potentiality and realized fact to form the objectified datum which the concrescent subject feels.

Section VII – Concrescence as Poetic

In the first chapter's concluding section, I briefly discussed the poetic elements present within the fundamental elements of Whitehead's *Process and Reality*. The two poetic connections made in the first chapter were metaphor and the notion of "making," derived from ποίησις. In addition to these, the discussion on concrescence elucidates another deviation from mechanical tradition, which is the focus on the whole. Though the first chapter briefly revealed this concept, concrescence truly illuminates the depth of connection a prehending subject has with its surrounding universe. Whitehead's unique subject-superject form, which replaces the traditional subject-predicate form, contributes to the poetic notion of the whole. Among the many ways in which this change affects *PR*, the most relevant change is how the subject experiences the world. With the traditional subject-predicate form, the individual subject is not a whole, rather more individual parts. The most well-known, or rather infamous, example of a metaphysics with a subject-

predicate is Descartes', who separates mind from body. Whitehead disagrees with the subject-predicate form, as it leads to numerous inconsistencies and reduces experience to "representative perception."

Descartes mind-body problem is likely one of the most well known notions in western philosophy, yet it contains such inconsistencies. Cartesian dualism follows in this manner, "minds are one kind of particulars, and natural entities are another kind of particulars" (*PR* 54). In addition, Descartes believed that our experience of the world was from our sense-perceptions. Yet, in the second *Meditation*, Whitehead indicates that Descartes has a "peculiarly intimate association with immediate experience which Descartes claims for his body" (*PR* 75). Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* also uses this subject-predicate form. With this example, Whitehead does not quote specific lines that are inconsistent, but instead describes the generic usage of the subject-predicate form in contrast with *PR*'s subject-superject form. On the one hand, Kant believes data transfers from the subject into the perception of the objective world; on the other hand, Whitehead illustrates that the objective data both flow to and intensify the subject that is seeking satisfaction. "For Kant, the world emerges from the subject; for the philosophy of organism, the subject emerges from the world—a 'superject' rather than a 'subject'" (*PR* 88).

How does any of this affect the poetic nature of *Process and Reality*? Thus far my working definition for poetic philosophy consists of the inclusion of metaphor as a key component of anything poetic, yet its importance within Whitehead's scheme has not yet been revealed. As the other significant prerequisite, we have ποίησις, or "making." Before answering the above question, "making" as ποίησις needs elucidation in its

significance. Philosophic "making" consists of a specific approach to the overall structure of one's work. Whitehead's airplane analogy is a prime example of this poetic approach: "It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by interpretation" (*PR* 5). Essentially, poetic philosophy focuses on studying specific (*species*) facts in order to understand the nature of general (*genus*) truths. Whitehead expands upon this in his analogy, however, since this analogy is specifically in reference to his "method of discovery" by means of "imaginative rationalization" (*PR* 5). Nevertheless, philosophical "making" moves from *species* to *genus*, which is an important method for understanding the whole. Other studies of philosophy, such as analytical and skeptical, function in the opposite manner. The etymology of analysis, which in Greek is ἀνάλυσις from ἀναλύω, suggests it means "to unloose." Analytic philosophy moves from a general theory and unpacks it into further and further specific abstract concepts. Significantly, ποίησις and ἀνάλυσις provide an interesting contrast.

With all of this development on our definition for ποίησις, I can now return to the question of the significance of Whitehead's subject-superject form. Like the difference between analysis and poetics, the subject-predicate form constitutes the opposite of subject-superject. Throughout his expositions on various philosophers, the differentiating factor is the perspective of experience. As mentioned above, the subject-predicate form emphasizes the flow of one's subjective data as an appearance of the objective world while subject-superject focuses on sending objective data so that it both flows to and heightens the subject's intensity. In other words, the subject-predicate form is your mere

perception of your world, whereas the subject-superject form is your feeling of your actual world.

The last question for this chapter is: How has the information on creative advance and its role in concrescence affected the poetics of Whitehead? Creative advance is the application of creativity, i.e., “the many” disjunctively become “the one” conjunctively. The process of concrescence entails the entire production of a novel entity, thus it is always an act of creative advance.

Concrescence and creative advance constitute the two most significant elements in Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. However, our understanding regarding the nature of poetic philosophy has only been considered for *Process and Reality* thus far.

Chapter III – From Whitehead to Cicero

The following chapter will reach into the past for the sake of seeking the nature of poetic philosophy and verifying that Whitehead's speculative philosophy is poetic. Instead of examining the traditional philosophers Whitehead cites himself (e.g., Plato, Aristotle, et al.), the following chapter will cover Cicero's *De Oratore* (*DO*), and the conclusion of this thesis will utilize Giambattista Vico's *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians* (Ancient Wisdom). There are two basic reasons for not utilizing the philosophers already mentioned in *Process and Reality*: (i) being mentioned already in *PR* means their relevance to the work is either clear or made clear by Whitehead; (ii) the connection that will be drawn in the following chapter is on poetics, and therefore, *Mnemosynē* the mother of the Muses will surely give me fortune.

However, there are two crucial concepts imbedded within *PR* that must be understood before the illumination of shared poetic elements begins. Unlike Cicero, Whitehead is a twentieth century philosopher of science, influenced by the Darwinian notion of evolution. Darwin convinces Whitehead to view the world as ever-changing, and Whitehead explains this constant change through his accounts of concrescence and creative advance. In addition, *PR* is an organic philosophy of *nature* and the *cosmos* (the subtitle being *An Essay in Cosmology*), encompassing all experience from the tiniest transference of energy in an atom to the entirety of the universe. Whitehead's notion of emergent evolution and his wealth of subject matter in *PR* should only provide more interesting contrasts.

The key to good poetry is creating for the audience a memorable experience through unearthing universal, archetypal images and feelings, which the medium of

spoken and written words express. I previously stated that poetic philosophy is a philosophy of "making." This chapter will explore the distinction between Cicero's humanism and Whitehead's cosmology; however, the simple explanation that will be used for now is as follows: the poetic elements of the chosen humanistic philosophy concern making within the human mind, most importantly in reference to ingenuity and memory. The following chapter will explicate the significance of *De Oratore* as more than a simple rhetorician's guidebook. In accomplishing this, Chapter III will answer the following three questions: (i) How is the rhetoric of *DO* poetic? (ii) With many other rhetoricians having published handbooks on rhetoric, what is the significance of *De Oratore*? (iii) In what ways do *PR* and *DO* compare or contrast in reference to their poetic elements?

Section I – Structure of the Complete Speech

Through *DO*, Cicero shows that Roman oratory, or rhetoric, is more than a simple *ars* (τέχνη, or skill/craft), requiring only *exercitatio* (training/practice) for mastery. The traditional treatment of rhetoric placed the majority of the emphasis on *exercitatio*; thus, it was common to treat rhetoric as any other *ars* (e.g. carpentry), which any individual could practice it sufficiently given the proper training, disregarding the *ingenium* (natural ability) of that individual. In opposition to this popular notion of rhetoric, Cicero maintains that *ingenium* (e.g. charisma, intellect, etc.) precedes both *ars* and *exercitatio*. In addition, it is important to note that the ideal orator almost always functions in the forum, especially for the sake of judicial trials and legislative deliberation. Throughout *De Oratore*, judicial cases are used as *exempla* for how one should approach constructing

a rhetorically proper speech. With the Romans' traditional fixation with jurisprudence, there were plenty of varying handbooks on rhetoric for the sake of persuasively navigating the complex structure of Roman law.

In the process of writing a speech, the standard procedure of Cicero's time consisted of five different activities, or levels, which were followed in this order: (i) *inventio* (invention), (ii) *dispositio* (arrangement), (iii) *elocutio* (style), (iv) *memoria* (memory), and (v) *pronuntiatio* (pronunciation). There were two versions of this standard during Cicero's time, neither of which he adopted in *DO*. The first and second versions formed their roles for *elocutio*, *memoria*, and *pronuntiatio.* Crassus sums these three up in their respective order, "then to clothe the result in distinguished language; and after this, to enclose this in his memory; and finally to deliver it with dignity and charm" (*DO* I.142-43). However, these two versions differed in their interpretations of *inventio* and *dispositio*. For the first version, Crassus explains that *inventio* "[requires] him first to discover what to say; [and *dispositio* requires] next to distribute and put together what he has discovered not only with an eye to its order, but also judging critically its relative importance" (*DO* I.142). If one were to use this first order, he would have to first discover the material of the case and arrange it in the most appropriate order. The second version oddly transfers the usual emphasis on *dispositio* to *inventio*, which suggests that "someone following this scheme will already have a fixed order before him" (*DO* Intro. 31).

Of these popular methods of practicing rhetoric, the first variant was likely losing its appeal in Cicero's time, and disappearing thereafter, while the second often resulted in complications, due to the arrangement stage having no real responsibility and potentially

taking up certain aspects of other activities (*DO* Intro. 31). In view of the existent system, Cicero's remodeling of standard rhetorical practice was seemingly much needed. In Cicero's system, the general changes to overall structure and approach are as follows: (i) *inventio* rejects the idea of standardized lists of arguments for abstract argument patterns; (ii) *dispositio* concentrates on the arrangement of arguments, but also ἦθος (character of orator) and πάθος (passions of audience); (iii) *memoria* takes the third position, switching with *elocutio*—thus, the orator memorizes the ideas, argument patterns and arrangement; (iv) *elocutio* focuses on a system of qualities, consisting of correct use of language, clarity, distinction, and appropriateness; and (v) *actio* (instead of *pronuntiatio*) treats the voice, bodily gestures, and facial expressions in a nontechnical fashion.

The most drastic changes from the standard rhetorical methods are the rejection of lists of standard arguments in the first activity of *inventio* and the movement of *memoria* from the fourth to the third activity. The subsequent sections will discuss these changes in further detail.

Before discussing the individual activities of the speech, it is necessary to draw attention to the speech as a whole. Each of the activities form a necessary piece of the speech; thus the removal of one results in the failure of the speech as a whole. One of Cicero's overarching themes that remains consistent throughout the speech is the Aristotelian derived emphasis on ἦθος and πάθος as modes of persuasion, in addition to the arguments. The argument accounts for the issue to be decided and its status. This is the main focal point of the standard rhetorical scheme. However, Cicero not only introduces the Aristotelian modes of persuasion, ἦθος and πάθος , but he also places equally significant emphasis on these persuasive techniques as on the argument. ᾽Ηθος is

the term for character, and this mode of persuasion utilizes the orator's charm to win the audience's favor. The term πάθος usually translates as either experience or suffering, but in this usage it is the reference to the emotions of the audience. In rhetoric, πάθος is used to describe the orator's persuasive technique with which he stirs the audience's emotional states or soothes them.

In relation to viewing the speech as a whole, these methods of persuasion, adopted from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, pervade every activity and potentially alter the whole speech's effectiveness, despite the main argument's validity. The prominence of ἦθος and πάθος in *De Oratore* bring forth an interesting potential for the presence of poetic elements. The ideal orator, who can always effectively utilize ἦθος and πάθος will inevitably draw on poetic elements. As mentioned earlier, the key to good poetry is the effective use of archetypical imagery to incite emotional responses from the reader. Therefore, the ideal orator who convincingly employs ἦθος and πάθος will have to draw on certain archetypes and imaginative universals to fill his audience with passions operating in favor of his character and the case. Cicero's rhetorical philosophy thus possesses a strong poetic element, which aids the assertion that *DO* is poetic in its entirety.

Section II – *Inventio*

Cicero redefines the first activity, *inventio*, by returning to a concentration on the arguments, as well as the inclusion of Aristotle's other two modes of persuasion, ἦθος and πάθος . Having covered the usage of ἦθος and πάθος in the preceding section, this section will begin with the discussion of the argument. To argue that the systematic rules

of standard rhetorical practice are unwarranted, Antonius draws on the following analogy: “After all, it is unnecessary to search our minds for the letters, every time we have to write a word; and neither should we, every time we have a case to plead, go back to the arguments set aside for that type of case” (*DO* II.130). From this, Antonius introduces the notion of commonplaces, or τόποι, which are abstract argument forms that an orator has in mind and can recall for relevant cases. The analogy continues: “[i]n order to give an account of a case, we must have at hand specific commonplaces that, like letters for writing a word, occur to us on the spot” (*DO* II.130-31). An important aspect for these commonplaces is the understanding of one’s community, not only for the sake of the orator being able to charm the audience while stirring their emotions properly, but also the knowledge of legal precedents and customs that are vital for success.

The nature of commonplaces are yet another important distinction between Cicero’s rhetoric and the standard handbooks. Standard practices would have a list of arguments for specific situations for the orator to use, which seems ironic for *inventio*. The technical layout of standard rhetorical practice is far more rigid than Ciceronian rhetoric, thus limiting the options and potential of the orator. These rigid rules are exactly what Cicero avoids with commonplaces superseding argument lists. With no set argument for responding to specific cases, commonplaces are riskier than argument lists and require the orator to have broader knowledge and experience. Nevertheless, this would pose no problem for the ideal orator, since his knowledge and experience should extend over the entire relevant corpus of the case.

Whitehead would suggest that the standard rhetorical practices genuinely “lapse into triviality.” The actual occasion of a list of arguments being published and available

for rhetoricians is in direct opposition to Whitehead's ultimate metaphysical principle, i.e., creativity. However, Cicero's aversion to the inflexible lists results in their replacement by commonplaces, and these abstract argument patterns provide *DO* with an analogy to Whitehead. Though the ideal orator does not necessarily strive for novelty, commonplaces can be novel occasions. On the one hand, Cicero does not suggest that commonplaces cannot be exact replicas of current cases, which means that the production of a novel occasion is not necessary. On the other hand, Whiteheadian metaphysics suggest that there can be no "exact replicas" of experience, and therefore there must be some novelty imbedded in the feeling; however, this novelty may seem either trivial or nonexistent to the conscious orator. Whether or not this experience creates novelty necessarily, the commonplace argument form holds within itself the potential for "making."

The standard rhetorical handbook's list of arguments severely restricts any opportunity for an orator to "make" anything meaningful, since the likely result of following the standard rhetorical method is a base form of imitation. The exchange of *inventio* for a premade list of arguments is analogous to the notion of poets "making" the world around them by means of holding up a mirror. However, commonplace argument invention "makes" an argument that resembles previous arguments or ideas that are relevant to the current case. So, is this the same form of imitation, just in a different light? The form of imitation that is acceptable in Cicero's rhetoric is the imitation of certain qualities of another famous orator, such as speaking in the same fashion as Demosthenes. Imitation of personal qualities is not necessary, however, as Antonius states, "we can see around us that there are many who imitate no one, but accomplish what they want on the

strength of their own natural abilities, without resembling anyone" (*DO* II.98). Ciceronian rhetoric holds the poetic element of "making," doing so without the mirroring type of imitation exemplified in the standard rhetorical method.

Ciceronian invention combines three essential elements for the production of arguments. The first is the commonplace arguments, which are abstract argument patterns used for approaching any situation. The second is the ἦθος, which is the character of both the speaker and, in judicial cases, the client. The ἦθος takes part in the invention of speeches either by the orator aligning his argument's strengths with the natural, inherent strengths of his character, or in the case that his client's character is unseemly, avoiding speech on anything that could harm his client. The third part of Ciceronian invention is πάθος , which is the feelings of the audience. The orator uses πάθος to form a more persuasive speech by stirring the emotions of his audience, and this determines the invention of ideas by ensuring their relevance to the audience. Through this summary of Cicero's notion of *inventio*, the use of ἦθος and πάθος clearly marks the previously mentioned distinction between *DO*'s rhetoric and the standard practice. Lastly, one should note that these three aspects of *inventio* contribute to the poetic elements of Cicero's rhetoric. Ciceronian *inventio* accomplishes this through its unique consideration of the whole of the speech, rather than just a treatment of the arguments. The orator's arguments may be truthful, but *DO* shows that a complete speech must take into account its audience emotional tendencies. This treatment of the whole instead of analysis of the parts is a crucial element of poetic philosophy, as mentioned in Chapter II, Section VII

There is, however, another distinction between the two notions of *inventio*. Cicero's ideal orator must possess an incredible memory, extensive experience and

immense knowledge of all human things. The commonplace arguments, presentation of sympathetic character, and sophistry of the audience's emotions are most effective when these three prerequisites of the ideal orator are combined. However, the common view towards rhetoric was that it was an *ars*, a skill that can be taught. This produces an interesting argument over whether or not an orator can ameliorate the essential attributes of memory, experience, and knowledge. Accordingly, knowledge can be broadened with the proper amount of time spent studying, granted resources are available. Likewise, one can increase his experience directly, which is preferable since direct experience presupposes that a stronger bond forms between the orator and this experience. Also, one can increase his experience indirectly, but such indirect experience usually appears colorless in comparison with the vivid nature of direct experience. Though knowledge and experience are straightforward, the topic of memory drives the argument for rhetoric as an *ars* to uncertainty, finding itself in Dante Alighieri's "*selva oscura / ché la diritta via era smarrita*" (*Inferno*, 1.2-3). It is through the emergence from this dark forest that Cicero's Antonius praises the notion of augmenting one's artificial memory, though he ultimately concludes the natural memory is most important. Standard rhetorical handbooks argued just the opposite, suggesting natural memory cannot adequately memorize the ideas of the orator's speech. However, this full distinction cannot be made without basic explication of the stages of rhetoric through which the orator must proceed in the development of his speech.

Section III – *Memoria* before *Elocutio*

In the introduction for this chapter, the five activities of rhetoric are mentioned in their standard order: (i) *inventio,* (ii) *dispositio,* (iii) *elocutio,* (iv) *memoria,* and (v) *actio*. This chapter has thus far only extensively covered *inventio* and will cover *memoria* in a comparable amount of detail. The rationale for explaining *inventio* and *memoria* in depth, whilst only succinctly summing up the other three activities, is that these two activities are the essence of Cicero's philosophy of rhetoric.

For my consideration of Ciceronian memory, I am mostly indebted to my thesis advisor and mentor, Frederick R. Marcus. In respect to the order, Dr. Marcus made the observation that Cicero places *memoria* third, before *elocutio*, while all other influential Roman rhetoricians place it fourth, as shown above. Of course this observation has been made before, but most scholars tend to disregard this distinction or treat it superficially. James M. May and Jakob Wisse (editors of the edition I use here) suggest three possibilities for Cicero switching *elocutio* and *memoria*: (i) Cicero was avoiding the suggestion that the orator had to memorize the exact words of his speech, (ii) "the subject fits Antonius better than Crassus," and (iii) "the composition of the important third book is thus more balanced" (*DO*, p.37). Though May and Wisse's first suggestion is correct because it is a restatement of Antonius' ideas in *DO* II.359, all three of these statements remain exemplifications of shallow explanations for this curious switch. In particular, the last two are most problematic, since the second strips meaning from arrangement and the third simply makes no sense given the brevity in which *memoria* is treated (constituting only three pages in May and Wisse's edition of *DO*). Thus, I entirely agree with Dr. Marcus on the point that *memoria* deserves more attention in respect to its placement in

this work. The rationale for this follows as such: this rhetorical work does not simply represent rules and guidelines for new students of rhetoric to follow. Rather, *DO* is a dialectic telling the reader how the ideal orator writes and delivers a speech, but also this rhetorical "handbook" is an exemplification of a speech, given by the ideal orator. Therefore, the ideas represented by the speakers are also represented by the work as a whole. In other words, our perspective for approaching this work should be that *De Oratore* is Cicero's complete speech on rhetoric.

Considering the work as an orator's complete speech requires the knowledge of more than just *inventio* and *memoria*, and thus the notions of *dispositio*, *elocutio*, and *actio* will be briefly explained in more detail than before. To understand the significance *memoria* holds in its position as third, context for that position must be given. As the second activity, *dispositio* follows invention by placing the material and arguments in the most fitting order, which includes beginning and ending the speech with the strongest arguments. Differing from this standard approach, Cicero treats ἦθος and πάθος as equally influential to proper arrangement as the commonplace arguments. Thus, basing one's speech on demonstrating the most factually undeniable arguments fails to be a sufficient strategy, since the ideal orator wins the favor of the audience and stirs their emotions throughout the entire, complete speech. Ἦθος and πάθος thus "should have the power to seep into the minds of the audience," and appear "just like blood in the body, flow[ing] throughout the whole of the speech" (*DO* II.310-11). Following memory, *elocutio* places emphasis on the words of the speech itself. Cicero modifies a traditionally Greek model so that *elocutio* is divided into four parts in the following order: proper Latin, clarity, distinction, and appropriateness. Of these, Cicero gives the most attention

to distinction, or *ornatus* in Latin. Accordingly, the ideal orator's mastery of *ornatus* "produce[s] something resembling [prosaic] rhythm and verse" (*DO* III.53). Finally, *actio*, or delivery, is the way in which the orator physically delivers his speech. Cicero's *actio* is different from the standard method of rhetoric, distinct in its lack of technical terminology and emphasis on emotion. Essentially, the orator's words, emotions, and ideas should guide his facial expression, tone of voice, and gesture because these naturally work in harmony.

Section IV- *Ars, Ingenium et Memoria*

Having discussed the other stages, we must now turn to memory in order to discover why this positional change occurred. Having *memoria* come as third before *elocutio* stems from the same general theme covered in the second section on *inventio*. Cicero utilizes commonplace arguments rather than the traditional lists because an orator delivers more effective speeches when his topic is not so restricted. The abstract characteristic of commonplace arguments frees the orator from the systematic method of traditional rhetoricians, providing him with overarching generalities suitable for multitudes of situations. *Memoria* in *De Oratore* shares this same avoidance of standard rhetorical practice, exchanging the technicalities of artificial memory in favor of the talent of natural memory, or ingenious memory. In fact, Cicero maintains a similar mentality when approaching *dispositio*, *elocutio*, and *actio*. At the very base of this conflict is Cicero's inclination towards *ingenium* rather than the traditionally accepted *ars*.

This conflict does not completely rid *DO* of any sense of *ars*, but rather emphasizes that *ars*, even coupled with excessive *exercitatio*, cannot replace those

characteristics associated with *ingenium*. These characteristics are stated by Crassus to be "a certain quickness of the mind and intellect . . . which displays itself in the keenness of its thoughts, in the richness with which is unfolds and elaborates them, and in the strength and retentiveness of its memory" (*DO* I.113-14); also, Antonius furthers this definition including that "his physical qualities meet the demands of appropriateness: what he can accomplish in terms of his voice, his strength, his breath, and his tongue" (*DO* II.85). Thus, the concept of *ingenium* covers a wide range of intellectual and physical qualities of the orator, which *ars* can affect in one of three ways: (i) if the quality is good, then it can potentially be bettered by art; (ii) if the quality is bad, then art can sometimes correct and sharpen it; and (iii) if the quality is detestable, then art cannot help.

Cicero's *memoria* focuses on the interaction between the ingenious memory and artificial. In Cicero's time, there was a popular method of enhancing one's memory by means of connecting certain ideas to places, details of those ideas to details of those places, etc. As cumbersome as this method may seem, Antonius refutes the notion that "the memory is overwhelmed by the weight of the images, and that they even obscure what our natural memory could have grasped by itself" (*DO* II.360). However, there are two manners in which this art of memory was utilized, the first being associated with the standard rhetorical tradition and the other with Cicero. The difference here is *when* the orator reaches the activity of *memoria*. In *De Oratore*, the ideal orator memorizes the content of the speech, consisting of the arguments and the ordering of the speech. If *memoria* is the fourth activity as for standard rhetorical practice, the orator memorizes the entirety of the speech. This latter method once again follows the standard rhetorician's tendency for sacrificing the breadth of his speech for more rigid rules on how to compose

such a speech. The ideal orator, on the other hand, utilizes his *ingenium* throughout the speech for the ability to produce more interesting arguments.

Aside from the activity for *memoria*, the standard rhetorician does not necessarily rely on his natural memory. This is due to the fact that standard rhetoric is generally very rigid in its structure. Throughout the course of this chapter, the lack of technicalities and the openness in its possibilities exemplify Cicero's *De Oratore*. This is primarily why an exceptional orator must possess an exceptional amount of *ingenium*. For the concept of the ideal orator, *ingenium* acts as the main determinant for an orator's success, with the orator's ingenious memory most important of all natural abilities. The orator's memory not only helps him deliver his speech, but it also gives rise to the abstract argument forms the orator has used before in the activity of *inventio*. Therefore, the first requirement of rhetoric for Cicero essentially requires the orator to have ingenious memory, or at least the potential for possessing an ingenious memory. Ingenious memory is also the reason why the ideal orator does not need to memorize the entirety of his speech, because general eloquence becomes part of the orator's *ingenium*, rather than an activity that needs to be strictly memorized. From the role in which ingenious memory takes part, the orator's speech becomes more than just a speech: it becomes an act of poetic "making."

Section V – Ingenious Memory as Poetic

The purpose of this chapter has been to clarify further what it means to be poetic in philosophy in light of Cicero's *De Oratore*. In order to do this, the introduction posed three questions which concerned *DO*'s poetics, rhetorical significance and connection to *Process and Reality*. For our first question on *DO*'s poetic nature, we return to the

etymology of the word *poetic*, coming from the Greek term ποίησις, the perfect passive participle of ποιέω, ποεῖν, meaning "to make." Hence, we have the notion of a poetic philosophy being a philosophy of making. The Ciceronian activities of *inventio* and *memoria*, emphasizing the utilization of *ingenium*, provide an excellent demonstration of philosophical "making" in human thought, specifically oratory. The poetics imbedded in *DO* also account for the significance of the work, answering our second question. This chapter displays and demonstrates the distinction between *DO* and standard status theory, which manifests itself most clearly in *inventio et memoria*. The previous section details the important role which ingenious memory takes for Cicero's departure from standard to poetic rhetoric. Ingenious memory necessarily represents the largest role in the activities of *inventio et memoria*, but also pervades the entirety of the complete speech for the ideal orator. Thus, Cicero's complete speech abandons the notion of strictly following rules and, instead, flows freely to instruct, delight, and move the audience in an act of poetic "making."

However, our third and final question is not so clearly answered. Through Section II's comparison between *inventio* and concrescence, the similarities between *DO* and *PR* become apparent, yet also obscured. The introduction of ingenious memory both aids and hinders the analogous elements between Ciceronian rhetoric and Whiteheadean metaphysics. These works plainly fit our definition of poetic philosophy, with prehension and concrescence constituting similar mechanisms as ingenious memory and *inventio*. Therefore, we are left with the following answer to our third question: With our definition of poetic philosophy as a philosophy of making, both *DO* and *PR* engage in poetic making and share analogous elements. This conclusion leads us to two further

questions: (i) Why do these poetic philosophies share fundamental similarities as well as disparities? (ii) What does this mean for our understanding of the nature of poetic philosophy? In order to answer these questions adequately, the introduction of a third philosopher is required. Giambattista Vico's *De antiquissima Italorum sapientia* will cover this topic and provide this essay's conclusion through the harmonization of *De Oratore* and *Process and Reality* as poetic philosophies.

Conclusion

Though the purpose of this conclusion is to use Giambattista Vico's *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians* for the illumination of Whitehead's *Process and Reality* in relation to Cicero's *De Oratore*, it is important to note that these three philosophers are all members of "the family of Plato" a phrase from Ficino in a letter on the life of Plato (48). In the preface to *PR*, Whitehead cites Plato as "one of the founders of all Western thought" (xi) and calls the *Timaeus* one of "two cosmologies which at different periods have dominated European thought" (xiv). Also, at the beginning of Section II, Whitehead says famously, "[t]he safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato" (39). Vico says in his *Autobiography* that Plato was the first among authors "ever before him in meditation and writing" (139). Although Cicero does not praise Plato directly, the setting and structure of *DO* honors him, with Scaevola asking, "Say, Crassus, why don't we follow the example of Socrates as he appears in Plato's *Phaedrus*?" (II.28.63). The evidence for the reverence of Plato by each of these philosophers augments their interconnection. Yet, exactly how does this Platonic association bring these philosophers together?

Though he dismisses the poets from his Republic in Book X, Plato fills his philosophical works with exempla of poetic making. Plato's genius influences Whitehead's *PR* most through the *Timaeus*; Vico's *Ancient Wisdom* through the *Cratylus*; and Cicero's *DO* through the *Phaedrus*. In a sense, each philosopher took on the task of rewriting the respective Platonic works. Whitehead, Vico, and Cicero therefore share poetic elements because their philosophical works share a similar provenance. The

addition of Vico in this discussion creates a Platonic proportion. In respect to history, Vico helps fill in the gap in time between Cicero and Whitehead. The more important proportion now present is the gradual expansion in subject-matter from Cicero to Vico to Whitehead. Cicero begins with the individual as the focus of his rhetorical philosophy. Vico, especially in the *Scienza nuova*, emphasizes the human race as a whole. Whitehead calls *Process and Reality* an essay in cosmology. This balanced Platonic proportion presents the format for how Whitehead and Cicero will harmonize – that is, with Vico connecting and bridging the gap between the two philosophers. Vico provides a proportionate relationship between *PR* and *DO* by means of his *Ancient Wisdom*.

With the understanding that Vico's *Ancient Wisdom* represents a philosophy of making, we will focus solely on the key element that will serve to elucidate the relationship between *PR* and *DO*. The main focus of this work is Vico's discovery of the *verum-factum* principle. As mentioned above, Vico imitates the *Cratylus* by paying extensive attention to etymology, with *Ancient Wisdom* emphasizing the original meaning of words. Chapter I opens with "*Latinis* verum *&* factum *reciprocantur*" (16) which means "For the Latins, *the true* and *the made* are interchangeable" (17). It is important to note that *factum* does not mean "fact," but rather it is a literal translation of the perfect passive participle of *facio, facere* – "to make." Following this, Vico equates *intelligere* to *perfecte legere* and *aperte cognoscere*, which each mean "to understand," "to gather completely," and "to know openly." This first group of etymologies is essential to understanding how the *verum-factum* principle functions. "*Verum esse ipsum factum*" (16) is the full version of the principle, meaning "the true is itself made" (17). For Vico, this means that understanding the true requires understanding the making. For example, I

cannot gather completely the true nature of something that I cannot make, yet God is the first maker and maker of all things; thus, He always understands.

The *Ancient Wisdom* serves as a response to Descartes' *Discourse* and *Meditations*, and creates the groundwork for the later *New Science*. Not only does Vico refute Descartes' famous certainty principle, *cogito, ergo sum*, but he also insults Descartes through presenting a precedent of his certainty principle from a comedy, Plautus' *Amphitryon*. Nevertheless, the *verum-factum* principle establishes what can be deemed as scientific knowledge, thus made by man. Descartes' *cogito* is merely a *factum*, which does not necessitate any *verum*.

The *verum-factum* principle determines what Vico considers *scientia*, or science. In order for thought to be a *scientia*, *verum* has to be convertible with *factum*. However, if the *verum* and *factum* are not interchangeable, the resulting thought is *conscientia*, meaning both conscience and consciousness. According to this principle, Descartes' *Discourse* and *Meditations* do not constitute *scientia*, nor do others such as Bacon's, Aristotle's, and essentially any natural science. While things made by humans can be fully understood by humans, only God can fully understand nature. Consequently, any human attempt at understanding nature only results in a method for "witnessing" forms that we cannot demonstrate.

The *verum-factum* principle of Vico's *Ancient Wisdom*, if applied to Cicero and Whitehead, brings the two philosophies into harmony. *De Oratore* relates to human things, so it qualifies as *scientia*. *Process and Reality*, on the other hand, is a vast cosmology, applying to all of nature. Whitehead's organic philosophy can thus provide only a witnessing experience, or *conscientia*. These results do not suggest that one

philosophy is greater than other; rather, the *verum-factum* principle illuminates differences among these two philosophical works according to their subject matter. This is an appropriate distinction, since Axiom CVI of the *New Science* states that "Doctrines must take their beginning from that of the matters of which they treat" (par. 314).

How do these differences affect my comparison of common poetic elements? The *verum-factum* principle does not actually affect any poetic elements of a philosophy, so the difference in thought, between *scientia* and *conscientia*, strengthens the notion of philosophical making. As mentioned above, a *scientia* is an activity that grasps human making. With the emphasis on the individual involved in rhetorical practices, Cicero's *DO* is indubitably *scientia*. The rhetoric of *DO* grounds Cicero's work in human things, and the poetic elements clearly indicate the process of making. As mentioned above, *scientia* consists of these principles that humans can only have true knowledge of those things which they make. Therefore, since oration is human speech, *De Oratore* falls into the realm of *scientia*. Whitehead's philosophy of organism, however, is far from having humans play any significant role within the scheme. For example, as mentioned in Chapter II, consciousness appears for the first time only in higher phases of experience, and Whitehead acknowledges the rarity of consciousness in his scheme, stating that it represents the "crown of experience." Therefore, we can assume that the majority of experience for which *PR* accounts is of nature and the cosmos. Though humans made oratory, they did not make nature. Thus, the only possibility for experiencing nature is through a witnessing consciousness, or Vico's *conscientia*. With *Process and Reality* as *conscientia*, one can only have a witnessing consciousness of Whitehead's speculative cosmology, and therefore no truth may ever be certain.

These differences in *scientia* and *conscientia* exemplify the unique qualities of both *Process and Reality* and *De Oratore*, while my account for their common poetic elements illustrates their similarities. As stated above, Vico's concept of *scientia* is one of "human making," but his concept of *conscientia* is one of witnessing nature as the result of "divine making." This notion of *Process and Reality* constituting what Vico would call witnessing "divine making" is appropriate, since Whitehead's cosmology possesses such a strong theological account—a path he did not intend take. Vico's harmonizing separation of the human and divine provides us with an analogical proportion: Cicero's ingenious memory is to human making what Whitehead's creative advance is to divine making. The implementation of the *verum-factum* principle, in this case, reveals "the same and the different" in this analogy, which now exemplifies this honors thesis as a Ciceronian speech on the nature of poetic philosophy, human and divine.

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