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Fighting for Statehood: The Perverse Incentives of the International Community

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Why do some secessionist movements succeed while others fail? Another central question is what causes rebels to target civilians? The international community has professed a strong preference that separatist movements respect human rights, but at the same time it has recognized the independence of a number of violent secessionist organizations granting legitimacy to their new states. This thesis proposes a new explanation of state formation. Secessionist groups target civilians as a catalytic strategy to incentivize third-party intervention, which helps relatively weak movements defeat existing states. Using a novel measure of civilian targeting and an expansive universe of secessionist movements from 1970 to 2011, survival analysis provides support for the relationship between violence against noncombatants and external intervention, but not for that of third-party involvement and statehood. The international community responds to secessionist groups that engage in violence, but not peaceful ones. By prioritizing security over justice, the international community may have created a perverse set of incentives for secessionist groups to target civilians and it should work to develop a mechanism to facilitate independence for non-violent groups or face more violent conflicts in the future.

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April 1, 2019

Abstract

Why do some secessionist movements succeed while others fail? Another central question is what causes rebels to target civilians? The international community has professed a strong preference that separatist movements respect human rights, but at the same time it has recognized the independence of a number of violent secessionist organizations granting legitimacy to their new states. This thesis proposes a new explanation of state formation. Secessionist groups target civilians as a catalytic strategy to incentivize third-party intervention, which helps relatively weak movements defeat existing states. Using a novel measure of civilian targeting and an expansive universe of secessionist movements from 1970 to 2011, survival analysis provides support for the relationship between violence against noncombatants and external intervention, but not for that of third-party involvement and statehood. The international community responds to secessionist groups that engage in violence, but not peaceful ones. By prioritizing security over justice, the international community may have created a perverse set of incentives for secessionist groups to target civilians and it should work to develop a mechanism to facilitate independence for non-violent groups or face more violent conflicts in the future.

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1 Introduction

In 2011 under the watchful eye of the United Nations (UN), the South Sudanese people successfully voted in a referendum to establish a new independent state. The referendum represented the culmination of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the rebels and state in response to pressure from the international community to end the bloody civil war (Arnold and LeRiche 2013). In the course of the Sudanese conflict, over two million civilians were killed by both sides (de Waal 2016). The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) displaced thousands of noncombatants, committed countless acts of sexual and gender-based violence, and used child soldiers (Human Rights Council 2018). Instead of facing punitive consequences for its violence against civilians, the South Sudanese walked away from negotiations with a new state. The success of the SPLM/A is puzzling given the international community's pronounced preference that secessionist groups respect human rights (Fazal 2018a). What explains the seeming contradiction between the rhetoric of the international community and its actions? And how does the dynamic speak to the broader question of how new states form?

South Sudan's independence runs contrary to the expectation of legitimacy-based theories of state formation that suggest non-violent secessionists will be more likely to achieve statehood because they build a reservoir of good will with the international community which will then support the group in its quest for independence (Caspersen 2012; Fazal 2018a, 2018a; Griffiths and Wasser 2018; Stewart 2018; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). The case also defies explanation by other theories of statehood such as norm diffusion (Wimmer and Feinstein 2010), reputation (Walter 2006, 2009), power politics (Coggins 2011, 2014), and autonomy (Roeder 2007, 2009; Griffiths 2015).

This thesis proposes a new theoretical argument that secessionist groups instrumentalize violence against civilians, in particular, as a catalytic strategic to compel international intervention on their behalf. The secessionist movement by itself lacks the strength to defeat the existing state on the battlefield, but the introduction of a third party can shift the bargaining range to reach an outcome favorable to the separatists. The international community's preference to maintain stability and protect civilians outweighs its desire for secessionists to abide by human rights leading it to impose peace settlements that benefit violent groups. A secessionist group is a subset of rebel

organizations that demands the creation of its own independent state. For the sake of variety, the term "secessionist" throughout is used interchangeably with "self-determination" and "separatist."

To preview the conclusion, the results from a survival analysis provided moderate support for the proposition that civilian targeting catalyzes third-party intervention. However, the model yielded inconclusive results regarding the efficacy of external intervention as a mechanism for secessionists to achieve statehood. For the determinants of civilian targeting, the results revealed that secessionists fighting (post)colonial powers almost never engage in violence against noncombatants. Separatist groups fighting more powerful, democratic states were more likely to target civilians.

As such, the findings further enrich our understanding of secessionist violence, which represents a salient political question. The international system has expanded from 51 countries in 1912 to 195 in 2013 (Griffiths and Butcher 2013). Currently, fifty-five secessionist movements around the world are actively organizing to build new states to call home (Griffiths 2015). To date, it appears that some self-determination movements have taken the international community at its word; that it expects secessionists to uphold human rights. However, if separatists come to believe that the international community does not reward non-violence, secessionists could update their tactics and resume civilian targeting, which may reignite simmering conflicts (Fazal 2018a). Further, failure to receive international recognition could be perceived as punishment for non-violence, which would create a wicked incentive to target civilians.

The thesis proceeds as follows: first, it outlines existing theories of state formation; second, it examines the contemporary explanations of civilian targeting by rebels; third, it details a new catalytic theory of secessionist violence; fourth, it describes an empirical approach to test the catalytic theory; fifth, results are presented; sixth, the implication of the results are discussed; seventh, a short case study highlights aspects of the catalytic strategy; and eighth, the conclusion highlights policy implications and directions for future research.

2   Explaining Statehood

The existing literature provides a number of explanations for how and why new states form. Most studies examine state formation through one of three levels of analysis: the international system, the state, and the secessionist group. Analyses at the level of the international system examine

how state-to-state interactions influence self-determination movement success. Those that center the state itself as the relevant unit of analysis explore how different governance arrangements affect state formation. And those that focus on secessionists evaluate how their tactical decisions advance or curtail its prospects of achieving independence. The levels do not exist in isolation, but interact to produce a series a complex relations. This section details the prominent causal processes specified in the contemporary scholarship.

Norm diffusion proposes that secessionist movements learn and take inspiration from each other, which presumes information about secessionist tactics serves as the catalyst for statehood, and successful movements both legitimize the process of state-building and diffuse tactics around the world allowing for innovation (Wimmer and Feinstein 2010). Examples abound of separatist groups that point to each other's movements as inspiration. African nationalists cite France's independence, the Kurds mention Turkey's statehood, and the Welsh reference Czech nationalists (Wimmer and Feinstein 2010; Brooks 2017). No good measure exists to quantify the nebulous concept of global norms. Even if such an indicator were available, it could not account for variation between secessionist groups because global norms as a treatment applies equally to all subjects. Why did East Timor achieve independence from Indonesia, while West Papua failed? Both movements were exposed to the same international environment, but one succeeded while the other fizzled.

Decolonization provides another explanation of the formation of new states via three pathways. First, colonies occupied defined territorial areas and possessed administrative experience. Second the European educational system exposed the population to liberal ideals that inspired secessionist movements. Third, public opinion in the metropole pressured colonial powers to dissolve their empires (Meyer et al. 1997; Wimmer and Feinstein 2010).

Great power politics supplies an additional account for why some secessionist groups receive recognition but not others (Coggins 2011, 2014). Using a Cox proportional hazards (PH) model, Coggins found that a great power's hostility with a rival state in the post-1945 era, measured by the existence of a militarized dispute between the two, increased the likelihood of recognition. States wield recognition as a tactic to weaken rivals home to secessionist movements because self-determination movements dilute the state's control of territory, access to resources, and claim to sovereignty. A number of historical examples illustrate the importance of international-level

variables in state formation. The French collaborated with American revolutionaries from 1755 through 1783 with the hope that American independence would weaken the British empire (Dull 2015). Russia recognized South Ossetia and the Republic of Abkhazia to expand its sphere of influence and undermine Georgia's autonomy (Cooley 2017). Coggins's (2011) work, however, has several methodological limitations. First, Coggins did not test for violations of the proportional hazards assumption. Replicating the study found that a number of the covariates violated the assumption (see Appendix B, Tables 7 and 8). Second, the article makes no indication of if standard errors were clustered by dyad. That omission is especially important because one state's decision to recognize a secessionist is likely not isolated from another's given the consensus required at the UN to admit a new state.

One theory of statehood, with a state-level independent variable, posits that the reputation of the existing state for opposing secessionist demands influences the probability of independence. Empirical research found that governments that refused to acquiesce to secessionists were significantly less likely to face subsequent separatist challenges (Walter 2006, 2009). The theory assumes that secessionists pay attention to the resolve of the state and if the government appears willing to concede, groups will press their demands for independence. However, a recent study that expanded upon Walter's (2006) universe of self-determination movements found no statistically significant relationship between the number of secessionist challengers and degree of state accommodation (Sambanis, Germann, and Schädel 2018).

An institutional explanation suggests that secessionists with preexisting autonomy arrangements are more likely to achieve statehood (Roeder 2007, 2009; Griffiths 2015). Power sharing agreements within a state demarcate secessionist territory, develop national identity, and foster administrative skills, which all lower the opportunity cost to forming a new state. Autonomy arrangements also allow groups to concentrate resources and force competing movements to bandwagon instead of challenging entrenched elites (Roeder 2007, 17).

A new wave of scholarship has emphasized the importance of a secessionist group's ability to build legitimacy in the eyes of the international community and the domestic population (Fazal 2018b; Caspersen 2012; Stewart 2018; Fabry 2010). The theory assumes that a secessionist group must receive international recognition to achieve statehood, and that the separatist movement will fail if it loses the "hearts and minds" of the domestic population. Inability to achieve recognition

from the international community comes at a heavy price by eliminating a secessionist group's ability to join trade agreements, conduct diplomacy, participate in international organizations, and exercise sovereignty (Fabry 2010). Further, failure to receive support from the domestic population undercuts a movement's capacity to recruit new members and defeat the state.

Strategies that secessionists adopt to win the local population's support go hand-in-hand with garnering international legitimacy. Separatist groups attempt to mimic state behavior by providing inclusive services such as healthcare and education (Caspersen 2012; Stewart 2018). Jo and Simmons (2016) argue that secessionist groups attune themselves to the preferences of international organizations finding that when the International Criminal Court involved itself in a conflict, separatists targeted civilians at a lower rate than other types of rebel groups due to concerns that violence against noncombatants could hurt the group's legitimacy. Caspersen (2012) provides a series of case studies that anecdotally remark that separatists engaging in civilian targeting and illicit activity, such as narcotics trafficking, remain unrecognized. However, Caspersen provides no empirical test of the proposition. Further, many of the cases of nonrecognition that Caspersen attributes to lack of legitimacy—Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh, Somaliland, and Transnistria—can be explained by the group's failure to achieve, whether through military force or moral persuasion, the consent of the existing state to declare independence.

The legitimacy-based theories assume that non-violent secessionist groups will achieve statehood at a higher rate than those that engage in attacks on the government or civilians. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) provide the seminal text on the efficacy of nonviolent resistance. They identify four mechanisms by which nonviolent groups can defeat powerful adversaries, whereas rebels employing violence would fail. First, nonviolent movements have lower barriers to entry, which increases participation. Involvement in a violent campaign requires weapons expertise, physical fitness, and mental endurance, whereas nonviolent campaigns are accessible to a wider range of individuals (Ibid, 35). Higher levels of participation make the group more resilient, increase the likelihood of tactical innovations, raise the cost to the regime, and peel away members of the opposition (Ibid, 10). Second, nonviolent groups provide more public information as to their activities boosting turnout. Violent groups have a mobilization disadvantage because the risk of employing violence makes secrecy essential (Ibid, 35). Third, nonviolent groups make for more credible negotiating partners because civil resistance leaders appear more trustworthy, which should lead peaceful movements

to win a greater number of concessions (Ibid, 11). Finally, nonviolent groups have higher levels of domestic support, whereas insurgents tend to depend on international assistance or illicit activities, which are less reliable and make disciplining violent behavior difficult (Ibid, 11).

Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) work suffers from selection bias. A group does not make a nonrandom decision to engage in nonviolence, but adopts an approach that maximizes its probability of success. Further, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 40) theorize winning concessions as simply a numbers game. The more people in the street making demands, the more likely the government caves to public pressure. Even if that dynamic is valid and sound, which is tenuous, it does not apply to secessionist groups because they have a small ethnic base that has trouble pressuring the government with nonviolent tactics. In fact, according to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 7), violent secessionists were on average more likely to achieve independence.

More specific to the secessionist context, Fazal (2018b) argues that separatists make a deliberate effort to abide by international law as a tactic to foster good will with the international community. This study is worth spending time assessing because it represents the most comprehensive work analyzing the interactions between secessionist groups and the international community. Fazal provides two tests of the theory. First, results from a logit regression suggest that strong secessionist groups on average, in line with the preferences of the international community, do not issue unilateral declarations of independence (Fazal 2018b, 190). Second, results from another logit model indicate that secessionists target civilians to a lesser degree than other rebel groups (Fazal 2018b, 194-195). Fazal limits the scope of the study to examine secessionist behavior and does not test whether the international community rewards secessionist adherence to international law with recognition. In a subsequent article, Fazal (2018a) expressed concerns that the international community may not actually live up to its word, but did not provide an empirical test of the relationship between human rights violations and statehood outcomes.

Fazal's (2018b) first test of the theory using independence declarations as the dependent variable and group strength as the explanatory variable did not provide convincing evidence. First, the model results were quite weak with none achieving a statistical significance below $p = 0.1$. While the greater absolute number of secessionist troops had a faint association with declarations of independence, the results did not hold when operationalizing the measure as a ratio of secessionist to government troops (Fazal 2018b, 178). A ratio of troops provides a more valid indicator of

secessionist strength because it represents the group's ability to prevail on the battlefield, whereas the absolute number of secessionist troops may simply reflect the size of a state's population, which also suggests the government can field a larger army.

Second, some of the examples provided to establish face validity for the theory complicate Fazal's (2018b) logic more than they illuminate. For example, Fazal (2018b, 163) points to the Syrian Kurds' preference to form an autonomous federal region instead of declaring formal independence as an indication of the group's preference to appease the international community. Why then did the Iraqi Kurds issue a declaration of independence in 2017 if they also faced a similar predicament to their Syrian brethren? Masoud Barzani, the former president of the semi-autonomous Kurdish regional government in Iraq, decided to hold an independence referendum against the advice of American officials. The United States preferred that the Iraqi Kurds work through a deal it brokered with Baghdad, but were willing to hold a referendum if that agreement failed (Arraf 2017). While Fazal (2018b) supplies anecdotes of secessionist groups that bound themselves to international law, Fazal provides no example of the consequences that a group faced if it decided to disregard the norm against independence declarations. Fazal actually forwards evidence to the contrary when detailing how international lawyers found Kosovo's unconventional declaration of independence legitimate.

The second test Fazal (2018b) provides examines the relationship between rebel group type and civilian targeting in civil war. Fazal (2018b, 194-195) proposes that secessionists will target civilians to a lesser degree than other types of rebels to preserve their reputation with the international community as a responsible and capable actor. The results of a logit regression with civilian targeting as the dependent variable and secessionist group as the predictor suggest that secessionists are less likely to target civilians, but other control variables such as state violence and group fragmentation had a stronger and more significant association with violence against noncombatants. The data suggest that the environment rather than international preferences shaped a secessionist's decision to target civilians.

Fazal's unit of analysis has a number of problematic limitations. Using civil war instead of civil-war-*year* artificially inflated the importance of short civil wars. For example, the Sicilian revolution in 1848 that lasted only one year is equivalent to the Second Somalia war that lasted for eight years. The aggregation of the data erases whether secessionists targeted civilians for all

eight years of the war, or for only the first year. Additionally, by limiting the analysis to only civil wars, Fazal excluded important instances of civilian targeting by secessionists such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, and Fatah in Israel, all of which attacked noncombatants, but did not count as observations in Fazal's analysis because they did not take place in active civil wars.

3 Explaining Civilian Targeting

Given that the existing theories suggest that secessionists have reputational and domestic incentives to avoid targeting civilians, why would a group ever do so? If they do, which civilians would they target and why? The dilemma raises important political, sociological, and psychological questions about human conflict that do not have a single parsimonious answer, but depend on a host of factors. A litany of theories have attempted to explain why rebel groups target civilians from focusing on opportunity costs (Weinstein 2007; Ross 2004), to movement structure (Krause 2017; Roeder 2018), to ethnic grievance (Geertz 1973), and mobilization (Wood 2010). None of the studies, except Roeder (2018), explicitly examines inter-secessionist variation. But Roeder only looks at absolute violence levels, such as number of combatants killed, and does not distinguish between government and civilian targets.

Civilian targeting refers to a tactic of intentional violence against the public, excluding collateral damage in a military engagement with the opponent (Stanton 2015; Fazal 2018b). Where does the demand for violence come from? Conflict is not a natural human impulse because generations of socialization has compelled humans to live in solidarity with each other (Jasper 2018, 53-54). Yet violence still exists in abundance around the world. Arendt (1970, 79) argues that "violence, being instrumental by nature, is rational to the extent that it is effective in reaching the end that must justify it." As such, secessionists organize around the objective of statehood and behave as rational actors by selecting the tactics that maximize their likelihood of independence. What conditions make individuals feel that they must use violence against civilians, in particular, as a tool to achieve their ends? This section will apply existing rebel theory to the secessionist context and purpose some new theoretical directions to explain why groups attack noncombatants.

3.1 Refining the "Hearts and Minds" Assumption

The potential of losing the "hearts and minds" of the local population is a commonly referenced reason for why secessionist groups should avoid civilian targeting. Insurgents require popular support to avoid betrayal by the local population. Counterinsurgency campaigns often fail because they cannot overcome the identification problem: the ability to distinguish allies from adversaries. However, if the rebel group falls out of favor with the population, locals can provide valuable intelligence to the state, which overcomes the information asymmetry (Kalyvas 2006, 88-94).

However, even if rebel groups need to maintain support of the local population, it does not logically follow that winning the "hearts and minds" requires abstaining from violence. Rather, the type of violence that rebel groups engage in matters more for whether they lose the public's support. Indiscriminate targeting undermines the population's willingness to back the rebels whereas selective violence can make nonstate groups stronger via two mechanisms: first, deterring defection; and second, bolstering recruitment (Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2010). Oftentimes research on civil war codes instances of selective violence as indiscriminate causing scholars to misidentify the instrumental use of violence (Kalyvas 2006, 161).

Rebel organizations that have the ability to control territory and collect intelligence about noncombatants can engage in selective violence that deters the population from collaborating with the state (Kalyvas 2006, 111). Civilians care most about their survival and have malleable allegiances, so they will side with whatever actor appears capable of offering protection. Control of territory provides an indication of the side that has the ability to shield the local population from violence. The rebel organization must have an accurate and reliable mechanism to determine where to employ violence, otherwise it risks public backlash. An individual must believe that by adhering to the rebel's preferences, they will avoid being killed. Indiscriminate violence undermines the credibility of the rebel's promise to protect civilians.

Additionally, rebel groups can employ selective violence to bolster recruitment via two mechanisms: first, directly compelling individuals to join the group via the use of force; and second, altering the expected benefits of remaining neutral (Wood 2010, 603). The Lord's Resistance Army's (LRA) use of child soldiers provides an example of direct coercion. Civilian targeting demonstrates that the state lacks the power to protect civilians, which pushes citizens to align themselves with the

rebel group. Even if the population decides to flee the country instead of joining the secessionists, migration dilutes the state's power by weakening its tax base and potential military conscripts. Wood (2010, 606) finds that as rebels become more capable as measured by the ratio of insurgent troops to those of the government, the number of civilians killed by the rebel group decreases, raising the question of who actually promotes stability and security. However, if the group has the capability to do so, it will attempt to recruit through the provision of selective incentives such as public goods or wages to avoid losing the local population's support (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008, 441; Wood 2010, 603). Pape (2003) notes that insurgent groups calibrate their actions to meet strategic goals. Groups interested in recruitment, instead of coercion, often take hostages, hijack airplanes, and denote explosives instead of engaging in suicide bombing. The logic of strategic terrorism applies in the secessionist context because some independence movements also leverage violence as an instrument to achieve a political demand.

The conflict environment can influence the power of the "hearts and minds" dynamic. Conflicts with lootable resources and external financing may lower a rebel group's dependence on the population, which increases the likelihood of violence against civilians (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Conflicts with lootable resources such as secondary diamonds or narcotics can make war a profitable endeavor for rebel groups. The resource flow from stolen goods decreases the rebel's reliance on the local population, which lowers inhibitions to civilian targeting because the public is no longer necessary to supply economic resources (Weinstein 2007; Ross 2004; Walsh et al. 2018). The Revolutionary United Front's (RUF) control of blood diamonds in Sierra Leone has coincided with mass brutalization of civilians for use as forced labor in the mines (Walsh et al. 2018). Oftentimes rebels will displace civilians so they can extract resources (Lujala 2009).

Weinstein (2007) also identifies a principal-agent problem where rebel groups reliant upon social instead of economic endowments exhibit better unit discipline because the close-knit communal ties allow leaders to better punish transgressions. Unit cohesion should reduce violence committed against non-combatants. Secessionist groups unite around a shared project of forming a nation state, so most should have a baseline level of social endowment, but priorities can change once a group comes to control resources. The RUF emerged with the goal of overthrowing the government of Sierra Leone, but once Foday Sankoh, its leader, consolidated control over the diamond mines, the group's sole focus shifted towards protecting its resource wealth (Walsh et al. 2018).

Rebels that receive more external funding do not depend on the population to the same extent as locally financed organizations, so one should expect them on average to target civilians more frequently. However, the effect depends on the regime type of the state providing external support. Aid from democratic states, which prefer that its beneficiaries respect human rights, decreases the probability that the rebel group targets civilians. Autocratic support, in contrast, comes with fewer strings attached and increases the likelihood of civilian abuse at the hands of the rebels (Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014). Secessionist groups have many potential sources of external funding ranging from states to diasporas. The Zionist diaspora sent money and weapons to aid the fight to establish a Jewish state (Krause 2017, 63-64). Provision of assistance can even cause internal rebel conflict demonstrated by Ben-Gurion's decision to sink a shipment of arms and ammunition destined for Zionist forces because it would have empowered a faction that could have challenged the Israeli Defense Force and Mapai's group dominance (Krause 2017, 64). Thus, through two causal mechanisms external aid can result in civilian targeting. First, external support decreases the need to win the hearts and minds of the people reducing barriers to civilian brutalization. Second, external funding creates intra-secessionist conflict as factions fight to divide up the pie. The later causal mechanism suggests that as the number of competing secessionist groups grows, the greater the likelihood of civilian targeting becomes.

Some states provide aid, not with the benevolent intent of helping the secessionist group win independence, but to undermine the power of a rival state by creating internal discontent and even violence within its borders. Iran, for example, supported the Hazaras in Afghanistan, but played the factions off of each other to ensure that they did not become strong enough to topple the Afghani government, and so that each group would develop a dependence on Iranian aid (Ibrahimi 2017, 181). The plight of the Hazaras illustrates how external funding can cause conflict to become protracted and fragment secessionist resistance creating greater pressure for and opportunities to target civilians.

Opportunity can explain why some rebel groups target civilians with greater ease, but it alone does not clarify the demand for civilian targeting. Militant groups do not brutalize civilians simply because no limitations exist on their actions, but because violence serves an instrumental purpose that helps them grow their power and achieve their goals (Kalyvas 2006, 17). As such, the relationship is an important one to understand because it shapes the environment of rebel

decision-making, but it is not determinative of a secessionist's decision to attack noncombatants. Factors that change a secessionist group's motivation to commit violence against the population should be treated with more weight in analysis.

The qualification of the "hearts and minds" theory above has operated under the assumption that the theory is sound—winning broad public support is necessary for the rebel group to win the civil war. However, the basic premise of the "hearts and minds" may not apply to secessionist groups. Separatists may not need the entire public's support, but only that of their co-nationals. Self-determination movements often have a common ethnic or religious identity around which they organize. Not only do they share an identity, but many groups are concentrated in the same geographic area, such as the East Timorese in East Timor, the Palestinians in the West Bank, and the Moro people in Bangsamoro region. The social endowment of secessionist groups and geographical proximity combined overcome the identification problem that prevents other rebel groups from engaging in violence. More importantly, the secessionist group should not incur the same backlash if it uses indiscriminate violence against non-secessionists because the group does not depend on the broader population's support. Separatists may even have an incentive to target non-group members to rally support within their movement by creating a common enemy. Potential targets include the state, state supporters, and ethnic or religious others. Analysis of transitional democracies finds a similar dynamic where elites demonize ethnic others to manipulate public opinion and solidify their hold on power (Snyder 2000).

3.2   Additional Civilian Targeting Explanations

3.2.1   Unit Cohesion

Civilian victimization may occur as a consequence of how the rebel group mobilizes its personnel. Cohen (2016) finds that armed groups that recruit members through forcible means such as abduction are more likely to commit massive wartime rape as a perverse mechanism to create unit cohesion. Cohen work draws on extensive fieldwork from Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, and El Salvador, and provides a compelling account of rebel decision-making. Rebels that recruit through coercion instead of social ties are more likely to victimize noncombatants.

3.2.2 Desperation

A group's progress, or lack thereof, in a civil war may explain why secessionists target noncombatants. Hultman (2007) proposes that if a rebel group begins to lose the civil war, the probability that it shifts to a strategy of attacking civilians increases because violence against noncombatants represents a cost effective strategy to coerce the government into making concessions. Killing civilians imposes costs on the government because the state has the responsibility to protect the population. Violence creates an atmosphere of fear that weakens the government's social control. Hultman tested the theory using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model with data on monthly observations of rebel groups in intrastate conflict.

However, Hultman's argument contains contradictory assumptions. On one hand, the theory suggests that rebel groups have a preference against targeting civilians if they are winning the civil war, which suggests that civilian killing is a strategy with a low probability of success. On the other, Hultman argues that violence against noncombatants is a cheap and effective strategy to defeat the state. If the later is the case, and rebel groups are on average weaker than the state, then all rebel groups should logically ex ante select civilian targeting as the optimal strategy.

The necessity for the rebel group to win the "hearts and minds" of the population may explain Hultman's apparent contradiction. As described above, having the support of the population assists the rebel group in defeating the state, which implies that rebels that protect noncombatants may have a higher probability of victory. If a nonstate actor is weak and is losing its fight against the state, it may already lack the capacity to win the "hearts and minds" of the population. Or it may have attempted to employ strategies to garner popular support, but failed. At this point, the relative cost of targeting civilians versus the benefits the rebel group garners from coercing the state is lower.

Whether the shift to target civilians provides an effective strategy remains unexplored by Hultman. However, research on African civil wars finds that the state is more likely to respond to the demands of, and negotiate with, groups that engage in terrorism (Thomas 2014). Simply put, the government pays more attention to violent groups and attempts to utilize all of the tools at its disposal to restore stability out of fear of domestic unrest. That can lead the state to negotiate with violent actors while ignoring peaceful ones. However, rebel groups may not always choose a

violent strategy for fear of repression in authoritarian states and also in some democratic ones.

3.2.3 Ethnic Fragmentation

Ethnic fragmentation provides an additional explanation of violence against noncombatants. Greater number of ethnic divisions in a country creates more potential conflict dyads that increase the likelihood of social conflict and civilian targeting. Social identity theory proposes that the mere division of people into groups is enough to trigger discriminatory behavior and even violence (Tajfel 1970). However, it is unclear if a secessionist would target non-coethnics simply out of prejudice. While distrust and resentment can lay the foundations for violence to occur, it does not provide a sufficient explanation for why secessionist groups in some states target civilians, but not others.

4 Civilian Targeting: A Catalytic Strategy

As demonstrated above, existing theories that emphasize the importance of secessionist group's strategy to build legitimacy as a tactic to achieve statehood ignore the nuance of the relationship between "hearts and minds" and movement success. Winning the public's support is not mutually exclusive with violence against civilians, and may even increase cohesion amongst secessionists as suggested by the rally effect theory. However, that still leaves unanswered the second claim forwarded by legitimacy scholars: that civilian targeting by secessionists makes the international community less likely to grant them independence. This thesis, like the legitimacy-based theories, acknowledges the importance of tactical decisions made by secessionists, but disagrees about the efficacy of violence.

Instead of turning a separatist group into an international pariah that is denied statehood, secessionist violence against civilians has a catalytic effect that compels third-party intervention allowing relatively weak movements to defeat stronger states and attain independence. An important qualification at the outset must be noted. The theory does not claim to be determinative of statehood. Rather it is probabilistic. Secessionist groups have a low starting likelihood of achieving independence. Given that low likelihood of success, even small changes at the margins can have an important impact, which makes them relevant considerations for study. The following section unpacks the catalytic theory by specifying the relevant actors, their preferences and strategies.

The secessionist's dilemma contains three central actors: the secessionist group, the state, and the external third-party. First, a secessionist group, as referenced in the introduction, is a subset of rebel organizations that demands the creation of its own independent state. Secessionists differ from other groups demanding autonomy in that they ground their claim to independence on the basis that its people constitute a distinct national identity tied to a specific territory. The concept excludes groups that attempt to establish regional autonomy, overthrow the existing government, or join with another state (Kirgis 1994). The conceptualization employed here includes decolonization movements because they represent "an extreme form of an independence movement" (Griffiths and Wasser 2018, 8).

A state, using the classic definition from Weber (2004, 33), "is a human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical violence within a particular territory–and this idea of 'territory' is an essential defining feature." In international law, the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States defines a state as having (1) a permanent population, (2) defined territory, (3) a government, and (4) capacity to enter into relations with other states.[1] The definition from international law is important for legitimacy theories of state formation because they assume that sovereignty is a relational concept and as such new states must receive the recognition of existing sovereign entities otherwise the state aspirant's autonomy will not be respected.

A third-party is a politically-relevant actor that could plausibly intervene in a secessionist conflict. Three primary types of actors could realistically become involved in a separatist's clash with the state. First, a great power such as the United States or Russia may intervene because its economic and security interests span the globe and could become endangered by separatist-induced instability. Second, a neighboring state might involve itself out of concern of conflict spilling across borders. Third, the international community could inject itself into the dispute given its prerogative to maintain stability and protect civilians. The international community as a general concept refers to a grouping of states that have adopted a similar policy approach on a particular matter such as human rights. While states have conflicting interests, they join together in international institutions such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World Bank, etc. to pursue shared goals such as reducing the risk of armed conflict. Although many potential third-party actors

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[1]Convention on Rights and Duties of States (inter-American), art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 U.T.S. 881.

exist, the thesis limits its scope to formal inter-governmental organizations with a specific focus on the United Nations.

The secessionist group has a range of preferences of varying importance. The most important goal above all is achieving statehood. Short of statehood, it also aims to carve out an autonomous sphere of self-governance. The Kurds in Northern Iraq, for example, have created a quasi-independent region, but lack international recognition. Some states have devised specific federal arrangements to balance power between the central government and an ethnic group. In the United States, indigenous groups exercise governance over tribal land. In the Soviet Union, ethnic groups exercised autonomy in the Republics, such as the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Khyrgizs. The Welsh and Scottish in the United Kingdom both have their own political assemblies with the ability to craft legislation and change taxes. In lieu of an autonomous region, a secessionist group could also achieve political representation in the state. In Sri Lanka, for example, the Tamils have a political party that participates in parliamentary elections. However, exclusion from formal political institutions often drives resentment that makes independence desirable.

The state's main preference is survival. Survival requires maintaining territorial integrity and economic prosperity, both of which are threatened by independence movements that would dilute state territory and control of resources. The government can adopt a range of strategies in response to a secessionist's demand for independence. At one extreme, the state could crackdown on the secessionist group and engage in repression by disrupting its meetings, assassinating its leaders, and detaining its supporters. In contrast, it could grant outright recognition. The state is unlikely to do the latter because that represents the worst possible bargain. A state can also pursue an accommodation strategy by granting political representation to the secessionist group or crafting power sharing arrangements. In the short term, a state may believe that such an arrangement enhances security and stability. However, such a deal presents risks for the state because the secessionist group cannot make a credible commitment to abide by the deal for two reasons. First, by gaining political power, the group strengthens its capacity to push for more demands that include statehood. Second, the organization founded itself on the platform of statehood, so it can not credibly remove that objective from its manifesto. There will always be a more extreme wing of the secessionist group that will reject any state compromise short of independence. As such, the incentives for the state align so that it rejects the demands of the secessionist group and pursues

repression instead of recognition or accommodation.

Whether a state decides to repress or accommodate a secessionist's demands may depend on its regime type. A state's domestic structure can also influence the tactics that the independence movement adopts. The public in democratic states is sensitive to domestic unrest, which may lead the state to negotiate with the rebel group to stop bloodshed (Pape 2003; Thomas 2014). This creates a mutual feedback where democratic states are pre-disposed to grant concessions to preserve stability, and because of that dynamic secessionists are more likely to attack civilians democracies.

In contrast, autocratic states do not face the same political costs to repressing dissent, so authoritarian regimes may be less likely to accommodate secessionist demands. Even facing certain repression, separatist groups may still choose to engage in strategic violence against the regime because secessionists lack the ability to express their preferences through formal political institutions. Some may argue, however, that authoritarian states exhibit a similar degree of responsiveness as democracies because civilian targeting places pressure on elites by destroying businesses and infrastructure. Authoritarian leaders are beholden to a selectorate and depend on elite support to stay in power (Miller 2015). Autocratic states may respond more pro-actively to pressure because they can take expeditious action unlike democracies that have more hurdles to granting concessions due to the greater number of veto players and legislative gridlock.

The third-party's preference, as analyzed through the lens of the international community, is to maintain security and protect civilians. In the aftermath of World War II, states negotiated the Geneva Conventions, which outlined protections for noncombatants although it primarily focused on interstate conflict. Of note, the conventions applied to intrastate conflict and proclaimed a prerogative for states to not discriminate against civilians and respect the rights of prisoners.[2] The international community also holds a number of auxiliary concerns such as promotion of human rights, protection of the environment, and fostering economic development. A stable international system is an essential precondition for the international community to achieve all of those secondary goals. Violent ethnic conflict presents a number of security and humanitarian risks, such as the disruption of global trade and potential for ethnic cleansing. Regardless of the cause of unrest, the international community has an incentive to restore stability and protect civilians. This preference

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[2]Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 3, Dec. 8, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 973.

for human security can brush considerations of justice to the wayside. A rebel group may have instigated the unrest, but ends up being rewarded with a favorable peace settlement.

In this environment, secessionists have a narrow range of strategies. Achieving independence requires taking sovereignty from a state that is often more powerful than the separatist movement. Most self-determination groups do not have the capabilities to conquer the existing state (Griffiths 2015). Only 39 groups between 1816 and 2011 defeated the state on the battlefield, which equates to roughly 11 percent of secessionists. However, censoring the data to the post-1945 era causes the proportion of war wins to plummet to less than six percent, or 15 groups out of 251. And even among the 15 that won on the battlefield, only 13 actually achieved independence post-combat victory.[3]

Some secessionists instead of fighting the existing government head-on adopt a long-term strategy to build the infrastructure for a future state and wait for the current regime to collapse. Strategies to build capacity include provision of public services such as healthcare which bolsters recruitment and sends an international signal of competency (Stewart 2018). A number of groups have achieved independence via the sudden collapse of the state, such as the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, etc. However, waiting it out represents a long-term strategy, and most groups prefer short-term gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).

To overcome the power of the state, secessionist groups can engage in tactical violence that catalyzes third-party intervention. External involvement increases the likelihood of statehood via two mechanisms. First, the introduction of a new actor shifts the bargaining range to result in a settlement that favors the separatists. Second, the third-party, especially if it is the international community, believes that independence is an effective solution to protect civilians from rebel violence.

The term "catalytic strategy" is borrowed from Narang's (2014) work on nuclear strategy that argues that states can threaten the breakout of nuclear weapons to compel third-party intervention on their behalf. The third-party has an interest in regional stability and is powerful enough to balance against other states. While the nuclear state may not possess secure second strike capabilities or a functioning weapons program, external assistance augments its power. Israel's

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[3]Griffiths (2015) codes the Saharawis as defeating Morocco in 1983, and the Chechens as defeating Russia in 1996, but neither group achieved statehood.

behavior in the days before and during the 1973 Yom Kippur War provides a good illustration of a catalytic nuclear strategy. Israel conducted operational checks on its nuclear weapons in a manner that only the United States could detect. The revelation to American foreign policymakers that the unfolding conflict could involve the use of nuclear weapons compelled the United States to pressure the Soviet Union to restrain its Egyptian and Syrian allies. Israel alone may not have been able to defeat Egypt and Syria, but the United State could wield its clout to influence regional powers (Narang 2014, 16-17). Extending the analogy to the secessionist context, the international community functions as the third party and the separatist group operates as the potential nuclear state.

Several examples exist of secessionists engaging in catalytic strategies. A later section examines one of these cases in greater detail. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1991 launched attacks on Serbian law enforcement that spiraled into a larger conflict with Yugoslavia. The conflagration forced the UN to deploy peacekeepers and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to intervene to protect the UN mission (Roeder 2018, 31). While Kosovo has struggled to achieve widespread recognition, as a result of the UN peacekeeping mission and NATO protection, it now exercises internal sovereignty over its territory and has functional independence.

Following the bloody civil war between the Eritrean secessionists and Ethiopian state, the UN launched a peace keeping mission to monitor hostilities, which had the effect of solidifying the borders of the newly sovereign Eritrea. The UN approved an Observer Mission that also ratified the Eritrean's independence referendum, which provided a credible signal of the new state's legitimacy (Roeder 2018, 32). Why did the UN deploy peacekeeping forces to Eritrea, but not for the Malays in Thailand? While a national-secession movement exists in Thailand, the Malays have not had a protracted civil conflict that would necessitate an international response. As such, no third-party has seen the need to broker a peace for a non-existent war.

The Tamils in Sri Lanka used terrorism to provoke the government in to overreacting and the resulting repression caused India to support the Tamil's cause by providing arms and training (Tikku 2016, 10). Civilian targeting by the Tamils, rather than resulting in outrage, provoked international sympathy because states viewed the Tamils as oppressed at the hands of a majority Sinhalese government. India did not, however, push for an independence referendum, and after a number of years Indian-Tamil relations soured and the secessionist group lost international support.

While some uphold East Timor as an example of nonviolent resistance par excellence (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), the Frietlin engaged in violent guerrilla tactics that contributed to bloodshed. The state proceeded to repress the East Timorese to the horror of the international community. Only then, after the state intensified its crack down in the region did the movement adopt nonviolence as a praxis. The UN later organized the country's first election in 2001 and ensured that Indonesia did not re-invade the newly formed state (Roeder 2018, 32).

The international community has two strategies in response to secessionist unrest: intervention or non-intervention. Absent a significant threat to international stability or a salient humanitarian crisis, the international community errs on the side of non-intervention due to its deference to state sovereignty. If it selects intervention, it has a range of options from sanctions, to military aid, to deploying peacekeepers. If it intervenes with boots on the ground, the tactic will often result in an imposed settlement on the warring parties.

The settlement that the international community helps impose increases the likelihood of statehood for two reasons. First, the international community's preference to protect civilians leads it to believe that statehood provides the only effective mechanism to end the bloodshed because it partitions ethnic groups into separate and defensible enclaves that dampen the security dilemma. Negotiated settlements that only create power-sharing arrangements may not prove durable because war hardens ethnic identities making individuals unwilling to accept settlements. Further, power-sharing cannot solve the commitment problem because the stronger group cannot make a believable promise to respect the political rights of the weaker group (Kaufmann 1996). Some evidence indicates that partition does not bring durable peace (Sambanis 2000), but the failure of alternatives to partition may make the international community believe that independence is the only option.

Second, independent of the international community's belief in the efficacy of statehood as a viable solution to domestic unrest, by targeting civilians and fomenting instability, secessionists shift the bargaining range to make it appear that they will accept no settlement short of independence. Literature on conflict termination in inter- and intra-state wars finds that external intervention can shift the bargaining range by changing both information and commitment dynamics, which makes it possible for both sides to reach a settlement (Reiter 2009; Walter 2002). If the international community or state believes the separatists will settle for a payoff less than independence, they

will not grant recognition. Further, the international community only listens when the prospect of deadly conflict is real. While a secessionist group alone does not have the power to force the state to enforce a settlement, international actors do.

That creates a powerful incentive for secessionist groups to forward a seemingly uncompromising bargaining position. If the separatists remain peaceful, that sends a signal to the international community that the secessionists and the state have the capability to live side-by-side in harmony, which results in an outcome short of independence that is suboptimal for the separatist group. However, violence eliminates alternatives for the international community by making independence appear as the only viable option (Roeder 2018, 152). Even if the secessionist group does not have the capabilities to achieve statehood itself, it should bluff as to what settlement it is willing to accept because that allows it to extract greater concessions from the state and international community. Thomas, Reed, and Wolford (2016) come to a similar finding using data from civil conflict in Africa, which show that weak rebel groups make unrealistically large demands when bargaining with strong governments. This is not a normative claim about which states should be recognized, but describes the perverse incentives created by the status quo.

The effect of civilian targeting on international intervention should increase with time. As the conflict worsens and civilian casualties stack up, pressure will mount for the international community to take action to stop the bloodshed. In the early years of a conflict, the international community may hesitate to involve themselves by holding out hope that the warring parties can reach a settlement themselves. Longer and bloodier conflicts appear more intractable, which compels intervention. Additionally, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and activists often lobby states to take a more proactive stance in an unfolding humanitarian crisis, but the political process takes time. For example, the United States for the greater part of the 20th-century aligned itself with Indonesia during its occupation of East Timor. Only after sustained pressure by activists detailing the humanitarian crisis on the island did the United States change its policy and favor independence (Fernandes 2011, 62).

If civilian targeting is the dominant strategy, why do some secessionist groups select ineffective nonviolent tactics? At least four explanations exist. First, the secessionist group may have the false belief that the international community rewards peaceful behavior with statehood. Examples such as South Sudan may appear to separatist leaders as exceptions to the rule. Further, the

perceived cost of losing the international community's support may pose an existential threat to the group's existence, which deters civilian targeting. Second, some secessionist groups, especially those located in island nations or former colonies, may be largely ethnically homogeneous eliminating the opportunity to attack noncombatants. The Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, and the Seychelles all achieved independence without engaging in civilian targeting, which likely resulted from their unique geographic and political circumstances. Third, secessionists may perceive a viable route to independence through formal political processes, which increases the costs of violence. For example, the Quebecois have pursued a number of independence referendums, and violence would only serve to alienate individuals on the fence about secession. Fourth, secessionists may believe that winning the "hearts and minds" is necessary, so they will not target civilians unless it is a weak group adopting the strategy out of desperation.

If external intervention strikes a blow to the state's power, why would the government ever allow a third-party to involve itself in a secessionist conflict? First, the external intervention envisioned by the catalytic hypothesis does not only occur on the basis of the home state's consent, but can be forced upon the government in the form of other types of external pressure such as sanctions. Second, the international community has not always received the consent of the home state before intervening in its affairs. The UN has engaged in many peace enforcement missions in Bosnia and Sierra Leone without the permission of the state. Third, the state may hold the false belief that external intervention will restore the ex ante balance of power given the international community's purported preference to protect state sovereignty. The UN has sent conflicting signals as to its preferences, and that noise may cause state leaders to make suboptimal decisions. Fourth, the second step in the causal relationship could be wrong. Civilian targeting may spur external intervention, but third party involvement may only help the state at the expense of the secessionist movement.

The catalytic theory yields the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Third-party actors are more likely to intervene in a secessionist conflict in a given year as the cumulative number of civilians targeted by the secessionist group increases.

Hypothesis 2: Third-party intervention in a secessionist conflict in a given year

increases the likelihood that the secessionist group achieves statehood in that year.

5   Methods

5.1   Research Design

Event history, or survival, analysis provided an appropriate model choice to test both hypotheses. Similar to a drug trial where patients receive different drugs and then doctors record their survival rates, a secessionist group's decision to target a civilian operated as the "treatment" in this analogy, and third-party intervention marked the "failure" event. In the second hypothesis, third-party intervention represented the "treatment," and statehood functioned as the "failure" event.

Specifically, the study utilized a Cox proportional hazards (PH) model. A key assumption of the model is that hazard rates are proportional. In practice, this assumption is often violated. To account for nonproportional hazards and nonlinear functional forms, this study employed a multi-step procedure outlined by Keele (2010) to properly specify the model and maximize internal validity. First, the Therneau-Grambsch nonproportionality test indicated which covariates violated the proportional hazard assumption (Therneau and Grambsch 1994). P-values less than five percent qualified as significant violations. The second step located the cause of the violation. Statistical significance indicated one of two possibilities: first, the covariate had the incorrect functional form; or second, an omitted variable or interactions of covariates existed. To diagnose the optimal functional form of the covariate, the plot of Martingale-residuals provided an initial test of nonlinearity (Therneau and Grambsch 1990). A further test estimated a Cox model with a penalized smoothing splines using four degrees of freedom for the variable with the suspected nonlinear functional form, and then used a Wald test to diagnose nonlinearity. At this point, the Therneau-Grambsch nonproportionality test was applied again to the model. Any remaining significant results were likely due to failure to account for temporal variation in the hazard rate. An interaction term of the log of time with the remaining significant results provided a valid approach to account for nonproportional hazards (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003). All diagnostic tables are reported in Appendix B.

For the Cox PH model, two equations calculated the R^2. The first used Allison's (1995)

procedure.[4] That method of calculation may have underestimated the R^2 for data due to the high number of censored events. To account for this bias, the R^2 was adjusted using O'Quigley, Xu, and Stare's (2005) procedure. Both values are reported. The concordance index provides another indication of the model's performance that avoids being biased by the quantity of censored data (Harrell, Lee, and Mark 1996; Therneau and Atkinson 2018; Therneau and Watson 2017). Concordance measures the percent of cases in which the actual order of events matched the model's prediction.

To test the strength of the effect of civilian targeting and third-party intervention alone on the probability of statehood, the data were censored into two groups: one in which there was ever any civilian targeting, and the other in which it never occurred. The Cox PH model was run using each subset of data to then compare the magnitude of the effect of violence against noncombatants plus external intervention. While conceptually a sound methodological approach, the modest sample size meant that the two subsets were too small to have the multivariate Cox PH model converge. While the multivariate model could not converge, the bivariate one could, so the following section reports the results of the later.

To account for endogenity and multicollinearity, a separate statistical model tested potential correlates of civilian targeting to discover if they were co-linear with the determinants of third-party intervention or statehood. A zero-inflated negative binomial regression was employed because the distribution of the civilian targeting variable was heavily skewed towards zero with some groups never employing violence and others engaging in frequent targeting of many civilians (see Figure 1). A number of studies of nonstate terrorism have utilized a similar statistical technique (see Wade and Reiter 2007). Standard errors, for this and all models, were clustered around the secessionist group to correct for heteroskedasticity and correlated responses from panel data.

5.2 Data Specifications

5.2.1 Secessionist Group

A group qualified as a secessionist movement if it met all the following criteria established by Coggins (2011): (1) dedicated to separating from the common government to form a new and

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[4]Allison's (1995) method proposes: $R^2 = 1 - e^{LRT/n}$ where $LRT = -2\log L_0 - [-2\log L_p]$ and n equals the total number of censored events.

Figure 1: Frequency of Civilian Targeting by Secessionists, 1970-2011

independent state; (2) possession of a national flag; (3) made a claim to both the territory and population; (4) existed for at least seven days; (5) fielded more than 100 members; and (6) claimed at least 100 square-meters of land. The first criterion captures the demand to form a new state. The second and third criteria ensure that a group attempts to establish a common identity linked to a unique group of people and territory. The last three standards filter out insignificant secessionist claims, such as the fleeting demand by Key West residents to secede and establish the Conch Republic (UPI 1982).

The universe of cases included 97 secessionist-state dyad years between 1970 and 2010 using panel data from Griffiths (2015). Observations began in 1970 due to the limited temporal coverage of civilian targeting. Including movements not involved in active civil wars corrected for the bias in the existing literature that selects on the dependent variable.

Examining secessionist organizations at the group level presented some trade-offs. While it made data collection and analysis easier, it assumed that separatists function as unitary actors, which does not capture the different and sometimes competing blocs that comprise secessionist organizations. Controlling for certain group level characteristics, such as the number of factions and the ethnic composition of the state, mitigated some bias. Until a more fine-grain database of secessionist movement factions exists, the operationalization employed here represents the most precise measure available.

5.2.2 Civilian Targeting

Civilian Targeting indicates if a secessionist group perpetrated a terror attack against civilians in a given year. Terrorism epitomizes the logic of civilian targeting because it represents an attack directed at civilians outside of military engagement. For robustness, the measure was operationalized in several different ways. A binary indicator recorded (1) if a secessionist group engaged in a terror attack against civilians in a given year, and (0) if not. The international community may be more likely to intervene in conflicts where more civilians were targeted. To control for the influence of outliers, two additional measures took the natural log and the square root of the count of attacks in a year. It could be the case that the violence has to reach a threshold to catch the attention of the international community, so a measure recorded the cumulative count of the number of terror attacks against civilians since the secessionist campaign started. Another version used the natural log of the cumulative measure to account for outliers. The model results using all measures of civilian targeting are reported in Appendix B (see Table 19). The results presented in the body of the paper report the binary, logarithm of the count, and logarithm of the cumulative count measures because those operationalizations best fit the model.

Data came from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) that defines a terrorist attack using the following criteria: (1) intentional; (2) entailed the threat of or actual violence; (3) perpetrated by subnational actors; (4) had a political, economic, religious, or social goal; (5) contained evidence of intention to convey a message to an audience larger than the immediate victim(s); and (6) occurred outside of a military engagement (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 2018, 9-10).

Advantages of the GTD include its comprehensiveness as it recorded detailed information on the target, perpetrator, location, casualties, and economic damage of each attack. To qualify as an attack against civilians, the target must have been one of the following: abortion clinic, airport, business, educational institution, food and water supply, maritime shipping, NGO, other nonstate actors, the press, private citizen, religious center, tourists, public transportation, and utilities. Those coding criteria excluded attacks on the government, diplomatic personnel, military, and police. Including businesses and utilities did not undermine the validity of the measure because individuals working those jobs do so in a capacity unaffiliated with the government, otherwise the

GTD would have classified the target type as "government."

The GTD's data collection process may have under-counted terrorist attacks from 1970-1997. The observations for those years came from the records of a private security agency that START then supplemented with electronic news archives to identify terrorist attacks. The paucity of electronic media during that time period may under-represent the extent of terrorism. That provided a harder test of the theory because if violence results in independence, and some groups were coded as nonviolent and succeed in coercing the state, that should diminish the strength of the relationship. The binary indicator corrected for some measurement bias because it weighs groups that targeted a smaller number of civilians the same as those that attacked many.

Another difficulty of using the GTD was that it did not record if a group was secessionist, nor did it use the same identifier codes as other databases, which made merging difficult. I devised a set of search terms associated with self-determination movements to create a subset of likely secessionist groups, then hand coded if each group was secessionist or not. The process is well-documented and replicable. Groups in the GTD that met at least one of the following criteria made it into the initial subset: (1) the group's name matched that of a historical or current secessionist group; (2) the group's name included any of the following words "separatist," "liberation," "independence," "independent," "self-determination," "determination," "front," "nationalist," or "free." Each of the terms represents a synonym for secession that is often employed in the literature. The broad range of terms cast a wide net to include as many cases of potential secessionist terrorism as possible. Further, the search used multiple alternative spellings of group names to avoid accidental exclusion. After winnowing down the list of groups, each entry was coded as (non)secessionist. Not all groups made the cut. For example, "Armenian nationalists" is not a separatist movement despite including the search term "nationalist" in its name. An automated string matching test using a strict Damerau–Levenshtein distance found the manual coding process reliable.

The incident-level data were then aggregated recording the sum of terrorist attacks by a group in a given year. Aggregation may have erased some nuance and complexity of local political dynamics. A secessionist group may have many factions, some of which advocate for a peaceful approach while others believe in political violence. The Palestinian fight for statehood illustrates the intra-separatist group tension. Elements such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) preach pacifism whereas some in the very same organization promote violence. Aggregating the

data ascribes a terrorist attack to the organization as a whole. However, this does not undermine the measure's reliability or accuracy. Even if a faction did not commit the attack, it would poison the well and the organization as a whole would bear the blame as the international community chastises it for not restraining its militant faction. Further, the international community may not recognize or choose to ignore the nuance of local dynamics. For example, many in the American media conflate the PLO with Hezbollah (Bazzi 2016).

To determine if the effect of civilian targeting is unique relative to the overall severity of bloodshed in a conflict, *Violence Level* captures the degree of violence in a conflict for a given year coding no armed conflict as (0), 25 to 99 battle deaths as (1), and greater than 1,000 battle deaths as (2). Griffiths's (2015) provided the data that originated from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

Approximately 13.5 percent of secessionist groups attacked noncombatants in a given year (see Table 1). The maximum number of civilians killed in terrorist attacks perpetrated by separatists in a given year was 250. Civilian targeting was more frequent that attacks against government targets. The maximum number of civilians targeted by a secessionist group in its lifetime was 2,152.

The following variables controlled for the various alternative explanations of rebel civilian targeting and statehood. The assumption of the mobilization and cohesiveness theories is that weak groups have a greater need to target civilians than strong groups. *Autonomy* is a binary indicator that denotes if a secessionist movement had an ethnofederal or autonomy arrangement in a given year. Ethnofederal refers to if a state had an ethnically defined sub-unit of government that the secessionist group administers (Anderson 2014; Roeder 2007). Autonomy provides a valid measure of group strength because it demonstrates if the separatists could control territory, operate a bureaucratic apparatus, and win concessions from the state. Examples of secessionists with autonomy arrangements include the Republic of Abkhazia within the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan within the United Kingdom's empire. Data come from Griffiths (2015). Autonomy also operated as a control in the statehood model.

Social Services supplies another measure of economic and bureaucratic strength by capturing the total number of services provided by a secessionist group in a given year including education, health, security, financial, disaster, public services, and religious services. For example, if a group offered medical clinics and K-12 education, that would count as two social services provided in

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	N	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Statehood	1,872	0.012	0	0.110	0	1
UN Intervention	1,872	0.048	0	0.214	0	1
Civilian Targeting (Count)	1,872	2.243	0	13.53	0	250
Civilian Targeting (Binary)	1,872	0.135	0	0.341	0	1
Civilian Targeting (Cumulative)	1,872	37.57	0	209.6	0	2,152
Civilian Targeting (Cumulative Log)	1,872	0.841	0	1.663	0	8
Civilian Targeting (Count Sqrt)	1,872	0.423	0	1.437	0	16
Autonomy	1,872	0.530	1	0.499	0	1
Colony	1,872	0.026	0	0.158	0	1
Concurrent	1,872	1.675	1	1.952	0	6
Diamonds	1,872	0.411	0	0.492	0	1
Fragmentation	1,826	6.311	6	2.324	2	14
Oil	1,872	2.547	0.04	6.979	0	60
Polity	1,869	11.63	14	7.247	0	20
Social Services	1,872	0.534	0	4.768	0	56
Troops (per capita)	1,838	0.006	0.005	0.007	0	0.059
War Win	1,872	0.005	0	0.073	0	1

that year. Adopting a strategy of social service provision would demonstrate that an organization is attuned to "hearts and minds" concerns and has the capability to provide nonviolent selective incentives for group membership. Groups have finite resources with which to carry out their goals, so only those with the greatest economic and bureaucratic capacity can provide social services. Greater number of services provided in a given year indicates a higher degree of capacity implying stronger overall organizational ability. Research on other rebel groups suggests that provision of public goods serves as an effective tactic to build domestic support (Stewart 2018). While the data from Stewart (2018) only captured if a group provides education or healthcare, the measure included nonviolent groups, which helped avoid potential sampling bias. The same identifying technique used to select secessionist movements in the GTD was employed here.

To measure the social cohesion of a group, a continuous variable, *Fragmentation*, coded for the number of ethnic movements inside the state for a given year according to criteria for concentrated

groups developed by Walter (2006). Griffiths (2015) provided data that expanded upon Walter's work to include observations for missing years. Fragmentation provides a valid indicator of strength because only the strongest groups can prevent competitors from arising. Independent of the measure's ability to operate as a proxy for group strength, fragmentation itself serves as a theoretical explanation for civilian targeting because the presence of more ethnic cleavages magnifies the number of possible conflict dyads. A large number of ethnic movements in a geographic space dilutes the ability of one to achieve a monopoly on power. One limitation is that the measure cannot capture if different ethnic movements form alliances or actually oppose each other. However, the increased number of factions should heighten the probability on average of conflict among secessionist groups.

War Win is a binary measure that coded (1) if a secessionist movement defeated the state in battle in a given year and (0) if not. By definition, war win provides a valid measure of group strength because only the most powerful organizations could defeat the state. Groups that conquered the existing state are also more likely to achieve independence, so the measure functioned as a control in the statehood model. Data came from Griffiths (2015).

To account for the effect of lootable resources, *Diamonds* indicates the presence of secondary diamonds in a country for a given year. Primary diamonds do not qualify as lootable because they require capital intensive extraction to obtain. Data come from DIADATA (Gilmore et al. 2005). The measure provided a crude approximation to test the lootable resources hypothesis because one does not know the secessionist's geographical proximity to resources. However, the ecological fallacy does not apply in this instance. Unlike a drug trial where a researcher would want to guarantee a subject received the treatment, the effect of lootable resources does not require separatist groups to be located on the diamond mine. Secessionists are mobile and if profit motivates their actions, the groups would seek out diamonds regardless of where they reside.

Regime type serves as an explanation for why some secessionists target civilians, but others do not. *Polity* measured the regime type of the state in a given year on a twenty-point scale (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2012). The scale rated regimes according to competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the executive, and competitiveness of political participation.

5.2.3 Third-Party Intervention

UN Intervention functioned as the dependent variable in the first model that tested the relationship between civilian targeting and external intervention (H1), and operated as the independent variable in the second model that examined how third-party intervention influences statehood outcomes (H2). The concept of third-party intervention includes unilateral pressure by a state for the secessionist and the common government to resolve the dispute, multilateral engagement by a collection of states seeking resolution of the civil war, and peace enforcement missions by an international organization such as the UN. Each of these actions represents a move by a more powerful third-party to alter the range of possible settlement outcomes in a civil war. If the external third-party lacks the capacity to enforce a settlement, its intervention should not have a substantial impact.

To operationalize intervention, a binary indicator captured if the UN initiated a peacekeeping operation (PKO) in a state for a given year. Data on PKO deployment comes from *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (2015). The PKO must be in response to a secessionist movement. The data excluded cases where secessionists initiate a conflict, but when the UN intervenes, there was no group that continued to demand independence. Angola, for example, fell into civil war following independence in 1975, but as the conflict dragged on, different groups that had previously demanded independence dissolved. UN intervention provided a tougher test of the hypothesis because it excluded other mechanisms of third-party intervention, such as sanctions, and required the consent of the home state, which may have under-estimated the treatment's effectiveness. The UN intervened in 91 secessionist-state dyad years from 1970 to 2011 or 4.8 percent of secessionist conflicts (see Table 1). Despite the small-N nature of the study, the data covered nearly all cases of UN intervention and was not just a representative sample, which minimized inference problems normally attributed to small-N research.

Additional external factors might influence the deployment of UN peacekeepers. Fortna's (2004, 279) research suggests that the UN is less likely to conduct PKOs when there is a decisive military victory, if the state is a primary commodity exporter, and if the government has a larger army. The following measures controlled for those alternative explanations. *Oil* recorded a state's total oil revenue as a percent of GDP in a given year, which indicates the reliance of a state's economy on

primary commodity exports (The World Bank 2018). The oil variable also provided an additional measure of the relationship between resource wealth and civilian targeting. The war win variable described above provided a measure of if the secessionist group achieves a decisive military victory. *Troops* recorded the number of government soldiers per capita in a given year using COW's National Military Capabilities (NMC) database (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). The polity measure described above controlled for regime type (see Section 5.2.2). Although Fortna (2004) did not find an association between polity and UN PKO deployment, one might reasonably argue that autocratic states are less likely to consent to UN peacekeeping missions within their borders, whereas the public in democratic states would be more willing to accept peacekeepers.

The UN may hesitate to intervene in states that have recently bound themselves to international human rights treaties. The state has committed itself to the UN regime and intervention would make the state less willing to cooperate in the future. *Ratify* recorded (1) if a state ratified or had previously ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in a given year and (0) if not. Data came from the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2019). The ICCPR provided a good measure for this study's focus on secessionist groups because Article 1 of the treaty compels parties to uphold the right of self-determination.[5]

5.2.4 Statehood

The second model tested the relationship between PKO deployments and successful state formation (H2). The dependent variable *Statehood* indicates (1) if a group achieved independence in a given year and (0) if not. Statehood requires an actor meet the three following criteria: "(1) a population of at least 100,000; (2) autonomy over a specific territory; (3) sovereignty that is either uncontested or acknowledged by the relevant international actors" (Griffiths and Butcher 2013, 756). Relevant actors refers to the regionally important states. While on its face that appears ambiguous, few disputed cases of recognition actually exist (Ibid, 758). Using the International System(s) Dataset (ISD) represented a major improvement over COW's State Membership data that require states have a population of over 500,000, and in the post 1920 era join the United Nations or establish diplomatic missions with at least two great powers (Ibid, 752). That high bar for statehood may have excluded several small nations that obtained regional recognition and exercise sovereignty but

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[5]International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 14668.

did not meet COW's Eurocentric criteria. Statehood provided a challenging test of the theory because it represents the most difficult concession for a secessionist group to achieve. Figure 2 highlights the locations of successful secessionist movements. From 1970 to 2011, 60 separatist groups achieved independence.

Figure 2: Successful Secessionist Movements, 1970-2011

The following variables controlled for the prominent theories of state formation. The norm diffusion theory suggests that as more secessionists secede, other groups will take inspiration and attempt to overthrow the state (Wimmer and Feinstein 2010). *Concurrent* used data from Griffiths (2015) to code for the number of secessionist movements that the state faced in a given year. The measure tested Walter's (2009) reputation argument that predicts states facing many self-determination movements are less likely to grant independence out of fear that demands for statehood will cascade.

Former colonies may be more likely to gain statehood than secessionists in non-colonial settings (Wimmer and Feinstein 2010). Griffiths (2015) provided data for a binary indicator *Colony* that marked if a secessionist movement resided in a former colony in a given year. Secessionist movements within former colonies which themselves achieved independence such as Kashmir in India and Pakistan were not coded as colonies.

The stronger the state, the lower the likelihood the secessionist movement prevails because the government can better repress dissent. State strength has a number of dimensions including military power, bureaucratic capacity, and quality of political institutions (Hendrix 2010, 273). The

troops variable described above provided a measure for the military capabilities of the state that are the most relevant when considering the secessionist's ability to defeat the existing state (see Section 5.2.3). Other measures of state capacity were tested, but had too many missing values for the temporal range and geographic scope of the data. However, when using alternative measures such as *Relative Political Capacity* that recorded the ratio of actual to expected tax revenue, the results became more favorable for the catalytic theory (Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al. 2011). The study avoided using the classic Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score because it only measures the absolute size of a state.

5.2.5   Censoring Great Powers

The data excluded secessionist groups in states that qualified as a *Great Power*, defined here as one of the five permanent members on the UN Security Council: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, or the United States. Great power status had a perfect correlation with non-intervention by the UN, which logically follows because any of the permanent members of the UN Security Council could veto the deployment of UN PKOs inside its borders. Great powers may also be less likely to grant statehood, but unlike the case with UN intervention, variation did exist. As such, including great power-secessionist dyads would only introduce statistical noise. The hypotheses were tested with by the great power-censored data and then compared with the full universe of cases as a robustness check.

6   Results

The results from the 2x2 table and Chi-square test indicate that a statistically significance difference exists between secessionist groups that targeted civilians and those that did not (see Table 2). For the 5.6 percent of groups that experienced UN intervention, 59 percent targeted civilians whereas 41 percent did not. Note that the table is not being used to assert a causal claim, rather it illustrates the existence of a difference between two populations. Of note, the table also reveals the infrequency of UN PKOs.

The output from the Cox PH model indicated that UN intervention was most likely to occur in the first year and a half of a conflict, but declined over time (see Table 3). The relationship held

Table 2: Frequency of Civilian Targeting and UN Intervention by Group-Year, 1970-2011

	UN Intervention		
Civilian Targeting	Yes	No	Total
Yes	59% (59)	11% (203)	14% (262)
No	41% (41)	89% (1579)	86% (1620)
Total	5.6% (100)	95% (1782)	1882

Note: Pearson's Chi-squared = 132.64; *p*-value = 0.000.

for different specifications of civilian targeting. Note that a hazard ratio greater than one indicates a positive relationship exists, whereas a value less than one denotes a negative association. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the log of the cumulative number of civilians targeted and the relative hazard of UN intervention over time. As the 95 percent confidence interval highlights, the risk of intervention compared with the baseline hazard spiked in the first year and a half of a conflict, and then proceeded to decline but remained significant up until around twelve years of civilian targeting. After ten years, the approximated range of values approached so close to one that it lost its substantive predictive value.

Darker red shading indicates the 95% confidence interval. Cumulative (log) measure reported.

Figure 3: Relative Hazard of UN Intervention Explained by Civilian Targeting, 1970-2011

The results of the model that used the level of violence in a conflict instead of only civilian

Table 3: Cox Model of UN Intervention with Log-Time Interactions, 1970-2011

	Cumulative (log)	Binary	Count (log)	Violence Level
Civilian Targeting	2.04**	6.51*	3.29***	
	(0.63)	(2.62)	(0.81)	
Oil	−0.24**	−0.31***	−0.30***	−0.28***
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Polity	−0.34***	−0.32***	−0.33***	−0.30***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ratify	−4.07***	−3.80***	−4.03***	−3.99***
	(0.77)	(0.77)	(0.85)	(0.87)
State Troops	90.29*	105.08*	89.87*	58.74
	(41.87)	(43.11)	(44.38)	(56.26)
Civilian Targeting x Time	−0.71***	−1.79	−0.92**	
	(0.21)	(0.93)	(0.29)	
Violence Level				5.74***
				(1.58)
Violence Level x Time				−2.19***
				(0.62)
R^2	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.09
Adjusted-R^2	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99
Concordance	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.93
Events	25	25	25	25
Clusters	97	97	97	97
Observations	1481	1481	1481	1481

Note: Standard errors clustered at the secessionist level. Coefficients reported. R^2 and adjusted-R^2 calculated using Allison's (1995) and O'Quigley, Xu, and Stare's (2005) methods, respectively. ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$.

targeting by secessionists indicated that UN intervention could also be prompted by other forms of unrest not necessarily induced by the separatist group. Figure 4 illustrates the change in the relative hazard of UN intervention over time in response to the level of violence. The international community was more likely to intervene immediately if the overall level of violence was high, but in the long-run civilian targeting alone was more likely to result in third party involvement on average.

Darker red shading indicates the 95% confidence interval.

Figure 4: Relative Hazard of UN Intervention Explained by Violence Level, 1970-2011

The different model specifications have similar goodness of fit statistics (see Table 3). Values of R^2 calculated using Allison's (1995) method range from 0.08 to 0.09 across the different measures of civilian targeting. Using O'Quigley, Xu, and Stare's (2005) formula to calculate the Adjusted-R^2 that accounts for the quantity of censored data yields a drastically larger value of 0.99 for all models. The concordance index ranged from 0.84 to 0.93. The model that used the overall level of violence had the highest degree of concordance.

The diagnostic results (see Appendix B, Tables 9–11) all suggested that using the interaction term between civilian targeting and the log of time was a valid approach to cope with nonproportional hazards. The statistical significance increased for both the civilian targeting covariate and the global test in the Therneau-Grambsch test across all operationalizations of the civilian targeting measure.

The first model also yielded additional intriguing results regarding other covariates of UN

intervention. Ratification of the ICCPR on average reduced the likelihood of a UN PKO within a state's borders in a given year (see Table 3). With respect to regime type, the less democratic a state was as measured by its polity score, the greater the odds were that the UN would intervene relative to the baseline hazard. The result held across all models. On average, the UN was less likely to intervene in states that were primary energy producers.

Before delving into the results of the second Cox PH model that tested the relationship between UN intervention and statehood, take note of two limitations. First, many of the predictors exhibited a moderate to high degree of multicollinearity. To account for this, multiple iterations of the model were employed using different covariates to minimize the effect of multicollinearity. A standardized process determined which variables to use. If the variance inflation factor (VIF) diagnosed high levels of collinearity, defined as a VIF greater than five, a version of the model was run that excluded the violating covariate. The diagnostic test assessed high degrees of collinearity between autonomy, colony, and concurrent. Each model used a different combination of predictors to minimize collinearity. All results are reported.

Second, the small number of failure events ($N = 23$) meant that the model with the full set of predictors had trouble converging. Therefore, reducing the number of variables proved necessary not only to address potential multicollinearity, but also to build a model that could converge. When employing the Cox PH regression without the time interacted terms, the models converged using all of the predictors. However, the diagnostic tests indicate the presence of non-proportional hazards (see Appendix B, Tables 12–17), which necessitated use of time-dependent terms. Adding these additional predictors to the model undermined its inability to converge. The troops variable had a number of missing observations, so a version of the model excluded it.

The results from the second Cox PH model that tested the relationship between third-party intervention and statehood failed to find support for the relationship (see Table 4). Models two and four had a statistically significant and negative coefficient for the first year of a UN intervention suggesting that in the short-run third-party involvement lowered the likelihood of statehood. However, the UN intervention variable interacted with time had a positive and statistically significant coefficient for model four indicating that in the long-run the likelihood of statehood increased for secessionist groups that experienced third-party involvement. Model four suggests that after approximately seven years of a UN peacekeeping operation, the probability of statehood increased

relative to the baseline hazard rate. For context, data from this study estimated that the average duration of UN PKOs rests between 2.72 to 15.2 years with 95 percent confidence. The descriptive statistic suggests that a UN peacekeeping mission lasting eleven years is not outside of the realm of possibility. A version of all the models was run that dropped outliers in the peacekeeping data, and the results did not change. Important to note is that a significant temporal relationship between UN intervention and statehood only occurred in the second and fourth model. Figure 5 illustrates the relative hazard of statehood over time for model one. The red line, representing the median hazard rate, remains close to zero, which suggests a negative relationship. The upper bound of simulated values reaches up to 1,500. The graph for model one is similar to the outputs for the other modes.

Darker red shading indicates the 95% confidence interval.

Figure 5: Relative Hazard of Statehood Explained by UN Intervention (Model 1), 1970-2011

The models have comparable goodness of fit statistics (see Table 4). Values of R^2 calculated using Allison's (1995) method range from 0.02 to 0.09. Using O'Quigley, Xu, and Stare's (2005) formula to calculate the Adjusted-R^2 that accounts for the quantity of censored data yielded a drastically larger value that ranges from 0.71 to 1.0. Models one, two, four, and six have high concordance index values of 0.99, 0.99, 0.99, and 0.96, respectively. Model three and five have much lower concordance values of 0.71 and 0.74, respectively.

Table 5 reports the results of the isolated effect of civilian targeting on statehood relative to

Table 4: Cox Model of Statehood with Log-Time Interactions, 1970-2011

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
UN Interv.	−23.43	−7.16*	−3.65	−27.05**	−4.30	−17.22
	(17.16)	(2.90)	(2.46)	(9.39)	(3.81)	(10.09)
Autonomy	89.43***			96.66***		
	(26.20)			(24.69)		
Colony		1.68*			5.16***	
		(0.74)			(1.33)	
Concurrent			0.07			4.51**
			(0.10)			(1.65)
Polity	0.12	0.41***	0.06	0.04	0.01	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Troops				50.31	−77.61	105.91
				(31.35)	(43.65)	(69.00)
War Win	3.72***	3.68***	6.74***	3.72***	1.66	1.66
	(0.70)	(0.75)	(0.67)	(0.74)	(0.94)	(2.83)
UN Interv. x Time	7.69	2.73*	1.14	9.35**	1.84	6.03
	(5.29)	(1.10)	(0.77)	(3.02)	(1.32)	(3.16)
Autonomy x Time	−26.11***			−28.13***		
	(7.85)			(7.24)		
Polity x Time	−0.04	−0.15***				
	(0.03)	(0.03)				
Troops x Time				−41.83		−90.53***
				(22.19)		(19.62)
War Win x Time			−0.90***			0.31
			(0.18)			(0.82)
R^2	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.09	0.04	0.05
Adjusted-R^2	1.00	1.00	0.85	1.00	0.98	0.99
Concordance	0.99	0.99	0.71	0.99	0.74	0.96
Events	23	23	23	20	20	20
Clusters	97	97	97	97	97	97
Observations	1869	1869	1869	1835	1835	1835

Note: Standard errors clustered at the secessionist level. Coefficients reported. R^2 and adjusted-R^2 calculated using Allison's (1995) and O'Quigley, Xu, and Stare's (2005) methods, respectively. ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$.

groups that avoided violence against noncombatants. The model used only the bivariate regression because adding more predictors, with such a small sample size (N clusters = 25 and 96) and limited number of failure events (N failure = 2 and 21), undermined its ability to converge. For groups that never targeted civilians, UN intervention increased the probability of statehood. Whereas for groups that engaged in violence against noncombatants, UN intervention had an inconclusive effect. However, the low R^2 and concordance statistic both suggest that the models did not provide a good fit for the data.

Table 5: Isolated Effect of Civilian Targeting on Statehood, 1970-2011

	Civilian Targeting	No Civilian Targeting
UN Intervention	1.01	1.01***
	(1.68)	(0.71)
R^2	0.00	0.16
Adjusted-R^2	0.22	0.04
Concordance	0.58	0.51
Events	2	21
Clusters	25	96
Observations	252	1620

Note: Standard errors clustered at the secessionist level. Coefficients reported. R^2 and adjusted-R^2 calculated using Allison's (1995) and O'Quigley, Xu, and Stare's (2005) methods, respectively. ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$.

The results from the second Cox PH model also provide insight into other potential causes of statehood (see Table 4). Polity had a positive and statistically significant relationship with independence in the third model. The effect did not hold in the fourth model, however. Colony, in the second model, had a strong and positive relationship with independence. The term interacted with time did not have statistical significance, suggesting that the positive relationship is temporally constant. Autonomy, in the fourth model, had a substantive and statistically significant positive association with statehood. The interaction term with time had a statistically significant and negative relationship, suggesting that the effect of a secessionist autonomy decreased in the long-run. Defeating the existing state on the battle field, across all models, had a positive and statistically significant relationship with statehood. Finally, the number of concurrent secessionist challengers

had no statistically significant relationship with independence outcomes.

Regarding the determinants of civilian targeting, polity on average increases the probability of violence against noncombatants across bivariate (see Appendix B, Table 18) and multivariate models (see Table 6). Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between regime type and civilian targeting and suggests that some of the correlation may be driven by outliers, such as the second iteration of the Palestinian movement and the Namibian independence movement. Theoretically, the zero-inflated negative binomial regression should account for over-dispersion of the data and excess zeros. In the Cox PH regression of the determinants of statehood, polity only has a statistically significant and positive relationship in the second model (see Table 4). Dropping outliers did not change the results.

Figure 6: Civilian Targeting Explained by Regime Type, 1970-2011

Colony, within the data subset that excluded great powers, had perfect correlation with not targeting civilians (see Table 6). As such it was dropped from the model. However, running the same model but using the complete universe of cases that included great powers found no statistically significant association between colonialism and degree of civilian targeting. The model also revealed that as the number of state troops increased, the likelihood that a secessionist group targeted civilians increased. That result held across both universes of cases. War win and ethnic fragmentation did not have correlations with civilian targeting. Lootable resources as measured by the presence of secondary diamonds decreased the probability that a group targeted civilians,

Table 6: Determinants of Civilian Targeting, 1970-2011

	Excluding Great Powers	Including Great Powers
(Intercept)	−0.63	−1.26
	(1.13)	(1.08)
Autonomy	−0.34	0.08
	(0.56)	(0.52)
Diamond	−0.31	−1.01*
	(0.55)	(0.49)
Fragmentation	−0.00	0.06
	(0.10)	(0.09)
Oil	−0.03	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Polity	0.09***	0.13***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Troops	65.80*	48.34*
	(31.91)	(20.87)
War Win	0.39	0.18
	(0.73)	(0.82)
Colony		−0.65
		(0.73)
R^2	0.10	0.08
Log Likelihood	−1487.53	−2295.64
Observations	1723	2189

Note: Standard errors clustered at the secessionist level. Year and group fixed effects. ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$.

but the relationship lost significance when censoring the data to exclude great powers. The social service variable was also dropped because it had perfect correlation with avoiding violence against noncombatants.

7 Discussion

The results yield seven intriguing findings. This section details them and discusses methodological limitations.

7.1 Civilian Targeting and UN Intervention

First, civilian targeting increased the probability of UN intervention. Contrary to expectations of state-centric theories, the tactical choices of secessionist groups had an independent effect on the behavior of the international community rather than simply being endogenous to external dynamics. Secessionist movements do not lack agency, but can change the behavior of larger actors. If other rebel groups share similar characteristics of secessionist organizations, then these findings can be generalized to apply to additional nonstate actors.

The finding refutes legitimacy-based theories that assume the international community will not respond to violent secessionist groups in an attempt to deny them recognition (Caspersen 2012). The positive relationship between civilian targeting and UN intervention also contradicts Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) argument that nonviolent groups are more effective. Ostensibly, secessionist groups prefer the involvement of the international community because it can tip the balance of power in their favor, so being able to attain international involvement represents an important achievement for separatists.

The international community's responsiveness to violent actors mirrors the relationship between the state and terrorist organizations identified by Thomas (2014) where the state grants more concessions to violent rebel groups than nonviolent ones. The dynamic suggests that the way the international community and states prioritize their agendas is shaped by immediate security considerations rather than normative concerns for human rights. When choosing whether to address a violent or non-violent group at any given moment of time, the state or international community will attempt to resolve the violent group's demands first even though the non-violent group has the potential to fight the state in the future. Given that states have limited time and resources, this may cause leaders to invest in immediate solutions to intrastate war that do not effectively anticipate or prepare for potential future unrest.

The relationship between civilian targeting and UN intervention comes with two qualifications.

First, although the finding is robust to different model specifications, diagnostic measures of the model's fit provide a mixed picture regarding its internal validity. The R^2 using the Allison's (1995) method ranges from 0.059 to 0.066. The measure calculated using O'Quigley, Xu, and Stare's (2005) procedure yields a much higher range of values of 0.83 to 0.93. The later calculation is a more valid approach given the high percentage of censored data. However, the drastic divergence between the two measures of R^2 call into question its reliability as an indicator for this Cox PH regression or it suggests that the model does not have stable results.

The concordance index provides another indication of the model's fit that is unbiased by the amount of censored data. The models could accurately predict the sequencing of the failure event in 83 to 93 percent of cases. The concordance index does not indicate the degree of explained variation, but it does provide a good evaluation of the different models' predictive power. Concordance can reveal if a treated subjected is more likely to experience an event, but does not reveal how much more likely it is (Therneau and Watson 2017).

The second qualification is that the effect of civilian targeting on UN intervention in the short run is not unique to secessionist violence against noncombatants. The level of violence that included both civilian and government deaths had a positive and statistically significant relationship with third-party intervention. The UN may respond to violence in general, not just violence perpetrated by the secessionist group, because the international community has a preference to preserve stability.

It also logically follows that if the international community has a preference to protect civilians, violence by the state against noncombatants should elicit the same response from the UN as when a nonstate actor attacks civilians. The results, however, suggest that the actor committing the violence matters. Civilian targeting by secessionists was more likely to lead to UN intervention over a longer period of time, whereas a high level of violence perpetrated by all actors only resulted in a short-term bump in the likelihood of international intervention.

7.2   UN Intervention and Statehood

The second important finding is that third-party intervention did not increase the probability of statehood. The model produced inconclusive results across different specifications. Several limitations of this study may explain this noisy relationship. First, the small number of secessionist movements combined with the low occurrence of UN intervention and even fewer cases of statehood

undermined the model's internal validity. The small number of cases meant that the Cox PH regression had difficulty converging using the full set of predictors. Further, it increased the uncertainty of the point estimates.

Second, the narrow operationalization of third-party intervention may not fully have captured the concept outlined in the catalytic theory. UN PKOs represent only one of many tools that the international community could use to intervene in a conflict. Additional strategies could levy sanctions or facilitate conflict mediation. Further, the concept of third-party intervention envisions regional states and great powers as relevant actors in addition to the international community. The UN may not involve itself in all conflicts, but the United States can also respond to secessionist unrest, and its intervention shifts the bargaining range in a manner that increases the probability of statehood. Regional organization such as the African Union also intervene in conflicts, which the UN intervention indicator does not capture.

Third, it could be the case that the legitimacy and non-violence theories are correct. However, the results are not dispositive in either direction. If violence were counterproductive, then one would expect to see a statistically significant negative association between UN intervention and statehood because UN intervention is colinear with civilian targeting, but the results did not reveal such a relationship. To the contrary, secessionist groups that waged war against the existing state were more likely to achieve statehood. The output from the zero-inflated negative binomial regression also indicated that no statistically significant relationship existed between civilian targeting and defeating the existing state in battle. The combination of those results suggests that a group's decision to target civilians in its fight against the state does not undermine its ability to defeat the government. That pushes back at the claim from Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) that nonviolence is a more effective strategy. Perhaps secessionists can better navigate the "hearts and minds" dilemma because they have neatly defined ethnic and territorial cleavages that lower the cost of acquiring information, which facilitates selective violence as described by Kalyvas (2006). Further, secessionists only need to win the support of their co-nationals. As such, civilian targeting of the non-co-national population does not undermine the separatist's ability to mobilize.

7.3 Alternative Explanations for Statehood

If UN intervention does not increase the likelihood of statehood, then what does? That leads to the third important finding of this thesis. Group structure and strength were more important determinants of independence than third-party intervention and state-level factors. First, secessionist organizations that had autonomy arrangements were more likely to achieve statehood compared to the baseline hazard. That lends support to the institutional explanation of state formation proposed by Roeder (2007) and Griffiths (2015). Separatists that have power sharing arrangements develop a common identity and the administrative skills necessary to create a new state. Further, the autonomy arrangement allows groups to concentrate resources towards the goal of statehood. The results presented here, however, qualify the institutional theory. For the first three years of having an autonomous region, the likelihood of statehood increased. As time progressed, the probability of statehood began to decrease. The temporal relationships suggested that if secessionist groups become placated by a power sharing agreement, they were unlikely to push for independence. That finding contradicts Walter's (2009) theory that states which concede to secessionist demands will develop a reputation for weak resolve and consequently face a cascade of further demands for independence. To the contrary, states that grant limited power sharing arrangements, such as the establishment of an ethno-federal institution, may reduce the prospect of future unrest if they can placate the secessionist group sufficiently.

Colonialism also functioned as a strong predictor of statehood. Across all model specifications, secessionist groups in former colonies were more likely to achieve independence relative to the baseline hazard. That lends credence to the theory that decolonization serves as a major explanation for the creation of new states in the 20th-century (Meyer et al. 1997; Wimmer and Feinstein 2010). However, colonialism may lack predictive power in the contemporary era because many of the secessionist movements struggling for independence today are no longer former colonies attempting to separate from their metropoles.

Achieving a military victory over the existing state has a strong positive correlation with independence. The causal mechanism behind the relationship is apparent and noncontroversial. When the secessionist group defeats the government, it has the power to install itself or form a new state. As discussed above, however, a battlefield victory is an unlikely occurrence. Often the state

possesses the military advantage, which complicates the separatist's ability to win the war.

State-specific factors such as the size of the government's army or the number of concurrent secessionist challengers the state faces did not have any explanatory power regarding independence outcomes. The non-relationship between number of concurrent challengers and independence contradicts the reputation theory's expectations (Walter 2009). The lack of an association between the strength of the state's military and secessionist success does not surprise because the size of a state's military has diminishing marginal returns. At a certain point, the state has strong enough capabilities to defeat the rebels, so the added utility of additional troops becomes marginal. However, the troops variable was adjusted by taking the log form, which should minimize the influence of large values, and no relationship was found.

7.4   The Influence of Regime Type

The fourth significant finding is that secessionists were more likely to target civilians in democratic regimes. Across both model specifications, a higher polity score corresponded on average with a greater likelihood that secessionist groups attacked noncombatants. Secessionist groups may view democracies as more vulnerable to coercion. Democratic states may respond to violence with concessions whereas authoritarian regimes engage in repression. The logic of the relationship between secessionist employment of violence against civilians and regime type mirrors the argument forwarded by Pape (2003). However, given the magnitude of the secessionist's demand—statehood—it is unlikely that a state would ever respond to violence by granting independence.

Despite the relationship between civilian targeting and polity, it was not a potential confounding variable in the survival analysis models. While a more democratic regime increased the likelihood of civilian targeting, polity had a negative correlation with UN intervention and a negative or nonexistent relationship with statehood. The regime type variable, if anything, provided a tougher test of the catalytic theory because it biased the model results downwards by mediating the strength of the relationship between civilian targeting and UN intervention.

The relationship between regime type and UN intervention itself represents an intriguing finding. Future research could examine why democracies were less likely to have UN peacekeepers deployed within their borders. Two potential answers exist. First, the international community might have a bias against authoritarian states because they do not share the same democratic values. That bias

may lead international bodies, such as the UN, to presume that democracies can resolve domestic unrest through formal political processes, whereas autocracies are perceived to need a third-party to enforce a peace settlement. Second, if democracies are more likely to resolve secessionist violence by dolling out concessions, then by appeasing the separatist group, the regime obviates the need for third-party intervention. Both mechanisms represent fruitful questions for future research.

7.5 Colonialism and Civilian Targeting

The fifth politically salient finding is that secessionist groups residing in former colonies were less likely to target civilians. Separatists in such states may identify along colonial lines instead of intra-state ethnic cleavages, which makes the state the enemy instead of one's fellow civilians. Fanon (1963, 51), an Algerian revolutionary, articulated a vision of colonial violence as directed against the state: "[e]ven if the armed struggle has been symbolic, and even if they have been demobilized by rapid decolonization, the people have time to realize that liberation was the achievement of each and every one and no special merit should go to the leader. Violence hoists the people up to the level of the leader." Fighting an oppressive state empowers the people and makes rebels feel as if they are part of a greater community. The only secessionist groups in colonies that ever targeted civilians were the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional Puertorriqueña in Puerto Rico and the National Liberation Front of Corsica in France and Italy. These radical groups did not reflect the views of their co-nationals and as a result they fizzled out.

The relationship between colonialism and civilian targeting raises an important warning for future research attempting to assess the efficacy of nonviolent secessionist resistance. Previous secessionist movements in colonies may have avoided civilian targeting due to the unique nature of the colonial environment, but their success should not be taken as evidence that nonviolence will work for current secessionist movements outside of that context. As such, colonialism represents a potential confounding variable to which scholars should attune themselves.

7.6 Civilian Targeting and Asymmetric Conflict

The sixth critical discovery is that civilian targeting appeared as a response to overwhelming state military power. The greater number of state troops per capita increased the likelihood that secessionists attacked noncombatants. The result was robust to alternative model specifications.

The finding aligned with research on asymmetric conflict. Actors have two strategies in war: a direct approach where one targets the enemy's armed forces to destroy their capacity to fight or an indirect strategy where one attempts to destroy the enemy's will to fight (Arreguin-Toft 2001, 105). Weak actors if they adopt a direct strategy versus a stronger opponent will on average lose. As such, the finding here confirmed that secessionist groups operate according to the logic of other insurgent rebel groups. That also pushes back at legitimacy-based theories that hypothesize that secessionists avoid violence against noncombatants. Rather, the strategic environment a secessionist group faces determines whether it attacks civilians.

7.7 Treaty Ratification and UN Intervention

The final intriguing finding is that ratification of the UN ICCPR decreased the likelihood that the UN deployed peacekeepers to a state. One possible explanation is that a selection effect occurs where states that ratify the treaty are those that already respect the rights of minority groups within their borders given the treaty's self-determination clause, so they are not at risk of secessionist-induced upheaval. Additionally, ratification of the ICCPR may be a function of how democratic a state is. However, a bivariate regression of treaty ratification and polity found no statistically significant relationship (see Appendix B, Table 20). Perhaps the UN avoids intervention in states that recently sign a protocol because they want the new treaty party to stay invested in the UN treaty regime. Punishing a state immediately after it joins a new treaty regime may cause it to not want to participate in future UN initiatives. This represents an area for future research.

8 Case Illustration: South Sudan

This section will provide a short case study to illustrate some of the mechanisms at play in the catalytic theory. South Sudan represents a prime example of the interactions between a secessionist group, the state, and the international community. For decades the Southern Sudanese labored to achieve statehood. Its first negotiated peace settlement that lacked international intervention failed miserably. Only with the outside pressure of the United States, and the enforcement of the UN, did South Sudan become a reality. The following will provide a brief background of the Sudan conflict, describe the applicability of the catalytic theory, and compare the case with alternative

explanations of state formation and civilian targeting.

South Sudan is somewhat of an organizational anomaly given Sudan's more than 400 different languages, 50 ethnic groups, and 600 tribes and clans (Arnold and LeRiche 2013, 4). The first inklings of a collective South Sudanese identity began to form under the rule of the Mahdist regime from 1885 to 1898. The Mahdist government, and the subsequent British rulers, operated from the North and used the South for its resources that came primarily in the form of slaves (Arnold and LeRiche 2013, 9). Before colonization, the Southern tribes did not have a common identity. Only by defining themselves against the Northern government in Khartoum did they find a united purpose. Many of these divisions carried into the contemporary era, and some fault lines widened as the profits from oil wells in the South flowed to the North leaving the Southerners further impoverished (Johnson 2011, 6-7).

Sudan, both North and South, achieved independence as a unitary state from the United Kingdom in 1956. The British, when deliberating on whether to create a separate South Sudanese state, viewed the region as geographically and economically tied to the North, and opted for unity. The Northern elite, seizing the power vacuum created by independence, consolidated their rule over the entire country. The British administrators in the South were replaced by Northern officials (Arnold and LeRiche 2013, 10-11). As such, self-determination for Sudan only meant independence for Northern elites and the continued subjugation of the South.

The colonial borders drawn in London could not hold, and shortly after Sudan was granted independence, the first Sudanese civil war broke out in 1958. The trigger for the conflict came when Khartoum began to implement an assimilation program in the South that the Southern Christian's viewed as hostile imposition of Islamic ideology (Arnold and LeRiche 2013, 12). The intrastate war lasted from 1956 to 1972. Most of the fighting remained localized in the South resulting in 500,000 casualties and 180,00 refugees (Ibid, 1-2). Of note, the first civil war was marked by the absence of international involvement. The fighting came to a ceasefire in 1972 with the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement, which created a semi-autonomous region for the Southerners. The North hoped that the deal would quell the Southerns' desire for independence (Ibid, 16).

However, the peace agreement could not hold. Despite lasting for 11 years, it collapsed in 1983 due to blatant abrogation by the North and political opposition in the South (Arnold and LeRiche 2013, 16-17). The two sides fell back into conflict marking the beginning of the second

Sudanese civil war. This second chapter of fighting lasted until 2005, killing two million Sudanese and displacing four million (Ibid, 1-2). Unlike the first civil war that resulted in an indecisive settlement, the second conflict ended with South Sudan's independence.

Why did the first civil war end with a temporary political compromise whereas the second conflict concluded with the formation of a new state? The answer lies in the involvement of the international community. The first civil war remained a local affair devoid of international involvement. The lack of third-party involvement meant that the Addis Ababa agreement ultimately lacked any hard guarantees or enforcement power, making it nothing more than a watered down list of aspirations. In contrast, the scale of the humanitarian crisis during the second civil war catalyzed international involvement by the United States, the UN, and regional actors (Johnson 2011, 5).

International involvement was a necessary condition to resolve the Sudanese civil war. The Norwegian Development Minister who helped facilitate the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) remarked in her memoir that "[n]one of these [domestic] political developments was decisive [in achieving peace]. External factors were" (Johnson 2011, 18). The conflict had become bloody and protracted. Neither side could achieve an outright victory. The state was too weak to defeat the insurgency and the rebels lacked the power to defeat the North (Arnold and LeRiche 2013, 105). The SPLM/A recognized the need for international support and made an active attempt to abandon its ideological commitment to Marxism to court American assistance (Ibid, 94-95).

Why did international actors intervene Sudan's internal affairs? For the UN, the humanitarian crisis compelled its involvement. As a result of massive civilian brutalization by both sides, millions died and were internally displaced (Johnson 2011, 9). Sudan's neighbors—Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia—involved themselves out of concern for regional stability as violence and displaced civilians risked spilling over borders (Ibid, 5). The United States intervened because it feared that the atmosphere of violence created by the civil war would create an ideal petri dish for terrorists organizations (Johnson 2011, 3; Arnold and LeRiche 2013, 108).

The United States' intervention proved essential to South Sudan's efforts to secede. A diplomat involved in the negotiations remarked that "no peace effort on Sudan would have any chance of succeeding without the Americans' close involvement. The US had the broadest and most powerful set of carrots and sticks at their disposal..." (Johnson 2011, 27). First, the United States

provided aid to the Ugandan and Ethiopian militaries which subsequently assisted the SPLM/A (Arnold and LeRiche 2013, 102). Second, Washington's aggressive engagement in the peace process persuaded the South Sudanese to support a settlement because they viewed an agreement to be more durable with international backing (Johnson 2011, 21-22). As a gesture of the United States' seriousness, President George W. Bush became the first American leader to directly talk to the chairperson of the SPLM/A (Johnson 2011, 25). Third, the United States coordinated a campaign of international condemnation that included barring Sudan from joining the UN security council as the African representative (El-Affendi 2001, 591). Fourth, the Bush administration leveraged economic sanctions to coerce the al-Bashir regime to reach a settlement. Given the drop in oil prices in the early 2000s, Khartoum felt acute pressure to find relief from American sanctions (Johnson 2011, 20).

The second civil war ended in 2005 with the CPA. The most significant part of the settlement was the compromise to hold a referendum on full independence after a six-year waiting period (Arnold and LeRiche 2013, 17). Why did the North sign an agreement that could potentially dilute its political and economic power? Losing access to the South's oil wells would severely undermine a key source of revenue for the Northern elite. Khartoum signed the agreement for two reasons. First, the international pressure imposed by the international community and the United States, in particular, compelled it to do so (Johnson 2011, 20). Second, the al-Bashir regime had the false belief that the South would vote for unity in the referendum (Arnold and LeRiche 2013, 132).

In the interim period between the CPA and independence referendum, the UN played an essential role by deploying peacekeepers to the region. First, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) deployed with the mandate to protect civilians and humanitarian workers from physical violence (Lijin 2010). The presence of UNMIS had a stabilizing influence. Although the peacekeepers deployed did not succeed in preventing all violence, they had an observer effect that mediated and resolved some clashes between ethnic groups (Lijin 2010, 44). While far from perfect, the UN provided information that helped mitigate cheating by parties on the CPA (Arnold and LeRiche 2013, 136).

Second, the UN supervised the independence referendum held in January 2011. External intervention protected civilians who wanted to vote, which provided an aura of credibility to the election results. South Sudan voted overwhelmingly to separate and in July 2011 it emerged as its

own independent state. The referendum marked the successful completing of the 2005 CPA. Had the United States not compelled the state and the SPLM/A to sign an agreement, a referendum would not have even been on the table. As such, the creation of South Sudan depended heavily upon outside intervention catalyzed by the humanitarian crisis.

Some criticized the CPA and peacekeeping mission because it appeared to empower the violent actors at the expense of more peaceful ones (Arnold and LeRiche 2013, 111). Defenders of the ceasefire made an appeal to pragmatism, arguing that it was more important to achieve a solution to a long and deadly civil war. "[T]here existed a simple but unfortunate necessity: the civil war in the South was by far the most devastating one and hence required prioritization if the country were ever to experience sustainable peace" (Arnold and LeRiche 2013, 112). That demonstrates how the international community, and the parties fighting the conflict, preferred a resolution to the violence even if it benefited the actors that caused the bloodshed in the first place.

Given this outcome, did the SPLM/A intentionally target civilians to achieve external intervention? A "smoking gun" does not exist. It does not appear that South Sudan acted with the cold and calculating intention that by killing civilians it would coerce third-parties to intervene. However, the instability created by civilian targeting operated as a necessary condition for third-party intervention. Civilian targeting changes the strategic environment in ways that have third-order effects that are important to understand even if rebels today are not acting with the intent to catalyze intervention.

If the SPLM/A did not have the immediate intention of forcing intervention, even if it had that effect, why did it target civilians? Contrary to expectations about winning the "hearts and minds," scholars note that "the SPLM/A was basically a peasant army with little political consciousness...divorced from the concerns of ordinary southerners, concentrating solely on military force to achieve success without any popular participation" (Arnold and LeRiche 2013, 93). Instead, both sides of the conflict instrumentalized violence as a tactic to weaken opposing ethnic groups. Violence became self-perpetuating as targeting civilians brought retaliation by the other side (Ibid, 100-101). Fragmentation within the SPLM/A also contributed to targeting noncombatants. The group fought amongst itself to control relief supplies (Johnson 2011, 6). In all, South Sudan provides evidence that group fragmentation contributes to civilian targeting. This secessionist-level phenomenon is something that the catalytic theory does not explain. However, that does not

diminish the value of theory in explaining the interactions between secessionist groups, the state, and the international community.

How do alternative explanations of statehood apply to the South Sudanese case? Norm diffusion appears to have little explanatory power. South Sudan did not look to other secessionist movements for inspiration, nor did it adopt any innovations of regional separatist movements. Colonialism also provides an insufficient explanation because the South Sudanese never had administrative control over their region during Mahdist or British rule. Resentment towards the North did, however, play an important role in crafting a common South Sudanese political identity. Walter's (2009) reputation argument does not apply given that the Sudanese government in Khartoum did not face a large number of secessionist groups, but still broadly opposed granting the South independence due to the economic blow it would deal to the state. As such, the catalytic theory provides a stronger explanation for why a durable settlement was signed that granted South Sudan statehood.

In all, South Sudan demonstrates the importance of third-party intervention in breaking the deadlock to allow a weaker secessionist to achieve an outcome that it could not otherwise achieve by itself. Civilian targeting generated a humanitarian crisis that compelled international involvement. Absent the United States' interest in the region, it likely would not have felt pressured to intervene. Similarly, the UN deployed with the mission to protect civilians from violence and its involvement proved essential to offer a stamp of legitimacy on South Sudan's independence referendum and to maintain the peace during the interim period. The case does demonstrate a short-coming of the catalytic theory: rebels do not always act with the intent of compelling third-party intervention even if its actions have that effect. That does not deal a fatal blow to the theory. It only demonstrates an important limitation to keep in mind.

9   Conclusion

The international community faces a trade-off between security and justice. Although the UN pushes secessionist groups to protect human rights, the international community's preference for stability and civilian protection can cause it to inadvertently reward inhumane behavior such as civilian targeting. Faced with ethnic conflict, the international community feels pressured to bring peace and stability without consideration for how its intervention changes the balance of power

between the state and secessionist group in ways that favor the rebel group, regardless of its respect for human rights.

This thesis provides the first empirical test of the catalytic theory and the findings support the argument that third-parties intervene in response to violence. However, the effect of that intervention on the likelihood that separatists attain independence is inconclusive. Use of a broader unit of analysis that includes secessionist movements not involved in an active civil war helps mitigate selection bias of previous analysis. The novel operationalization of civilian targeting improves upon existing measurement techniques and allows for greater generalizability.

The results also speak to the broader debate about the efficacy of nonviolent resistance. Contrary to expectations of such theories (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), the international community is more likely to respond to violent secessionists. Further, a secessionist's ability to defeat the existing state is not influenced by whether it targets civilians, which pushes back at the "hearts and minds" assumption prevalent in analyses of rebel violence. However, the results do suggest that some separatist groups care about the "hearts and minds" and provide selective incentives, such as social services, instead of targeting civilians.

The findings point towards a troubling trend that the UN needs to take steps to address. Instead of reacting to secessionist conflicts as they break out, the UN needs to devise a mechanism to proactively help self-determination movements achieve independence or accommodation from the existing state. This is by no means an easy task. States cling to their sovereignty and are loath to have an international body meddle in their internal affairs. However, if the international community continues on its current path, it only creates a set of perverse incentives for secessionists to force their hand by fomenting instability and perpetuating violence. Even if the UN's involvement does not guarantee independence, secessionists groups may be desperate for statehood and will use whatever strategy they can.

Appendix A

Figure 7: Martingale Residuals of the Determinants of UN Intervention, 1970-2011

Figure 8: Martingale Residuals of the Determinants of Statehood, 1970-2011

Appendix B

Table 7: Nonproportionality Test of Coggins' (2011) Study

	ρ	χ^2	p-value
Colony	0.43	152.16	0.00
Ethnic Federation	-0.45	126.96	0.00
Violence Level	0.20	29.98	0.00
War Victory	0.03	0.67	0.41
Hostility w/Home State	-0.27	26.96	0.00
Mutual Democracy	-0.32	102.49	0.00
Mutual Autocracy	0.25	54.48	0.00
High Challengers	0.13	8.18	0.00
Violence Challengers	0.06	2.04	0.15
Previous Recognition	-0.45	270.30	0.00
Global test		702.17	0.00

Table 8: Coggins Replication with Log-Time Interactions

	Coggins	Replication	Replication w/ NPH
Colony	8.08**	10.64***	313586.25***
Ethnic Federation	4.98**	6.01***	1526927.59***
Violence Level	0.62**	0.61***	0.88
War Victory	5.21**	3.62***	5.27***
Hostility w/Home State	1.38	2.08**	6.14***
Mutual Democracy	1.50*	1.35	2.66***
Mutual Autocracy	0.35**	0.21***	0.49
High Challengers	0.89	0.84	1.22
Violent Challenge	0.79*	0.83*	0.79**
Previous Recognition	30.35**	38.34***	31.95***
Colony x Time			0.05***
Ethnic Federation x Time			0.01***
Violence Level x Time			0.88
Hostility w/Home State x Time			0.20**
Mutual Democracy x Time			0.67***
High Challenges x Time			0.88
Previous Recognition x Time			0.80
R^2	–	0.06	0.09
Concordance	–	0.90	0.97
Events	276	280	280
Observations	18388	18521	18521

Note: Standard errors in the replication clustered at the secessionist level. Hazard ratios reported. NPH = nonproportional hazards. R^2 and concordance not reported in Coggins (2011). ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$

Table 9: Nonproportionality Test of UN Intervention (Binary), 1970-2011

	ρ	χ^2	p-value
Civilian Targeting	-0.00	0.00	0.99
Oil	-0.19	1.59	0.21
Polity	-0.24	1.22	0.27
Ratify	-0.11	0.18	0.67
Troops	-0.15	1.74	0.19
Civilian Targeting x Time	-0.02	0.01	0.93
Global test		3.95	0.68

Table 10: Nonproportionality Test of UN Intervention (Count (log)), 1970-2011

	ρ	χ^2	p-value
Civilian Targeting	0.08	0.14	0.70
Oil	-0.20	1.63	0.20
Polity	-0.25	1.03	0.31
Ratify	-0.11	0.13	0.72
Troops	-0.17	1.79	0.18
Civilian Targeting x Time	-0.17	0.21	0.64
Global test		3.89	0.69

Table 11: Nonproportionality Test of UN Intervention (Cumulative (log)), 1970-2011

	ρ	χ^2	p-value
Civilian Targeting	0.13	0.28	0.60
Oil	-0.16	0.66	0.42
Polity	-0.24	1.07	0.30
Ratify	-0.11	0.14	0.71
Troops	-0.15	1.42	0.23
Civilian Targeting x Time	-0.20	0.37	0.55
Global test		2.81	0.83

Table 12: Nonproportionality Test of Statehood (Model 1), 1970-2011

	ρ	χ^2	p-value
UN Intervention	0.46	19.89	0.00
Autonomy	-0.52	21.50	0.00
Polity	-0.30	3.35	0.07
War Win	0.60	10.82	0.00
Global test		29.08	0.00

Table 13: Nonproportionality Test of Statehood (Model 2), 1970-2011

	ρ	χ^2	p-value
UN Intervention	0.38	6.05	0.01
Colony	-0.07	0.51	0.47
Polity	-0.22	4.74	0.03
War Win	0.20	4.36	0.04
Global test		12.45	0.01

Table 14: Nonproportionality Test of Statehood (Model 3), 1970-2011

	ρ	χ^2	p-value
UN Intervention	0.39	6.69	0.01
Concurrent	-0.21	0.66	0.41
Polity	-0.26	2.06	0.15
War Win	0.45	3.50	0.06
Global test		9.99	0.04

Table 15: Nonproportionality Test of Statehood (Model 4), 1970-2011

	ρ	χ^2	p-value
UN Intervention	0.44	33.32	0.00
Autonomy	-0.49	31.33	0.00
Polity	-0.33	7.11	0.01
Troops	-0.46	27.57	0.00
War Win	0.59	21.29	0.00
Global test		40.81	0.00

Table 16: Nonproportionality Test of Statehood (Model 5), 1970-2011

	ρ	χ^2	p-value
UN Intervention	0.34	7.57	0.01
Colony	0.08	1.26	0.26
Polity	-0.21	1.57	0.21
Troops	-0.11	1.78	0.18
War Win	0.04	0.29	0.59
Global test		11.81	0.04

Table 17: Nonproportionality Test of Statehood (Model 5), 1970-2011

	ρ	χ^2	p-value
UN Intervention	0.38	10.27	0.00
Concurrent	-0.18	0.25	0.62
Polity	-0.24	2.13	0.14
Troops	-0.41	7.22	0.01
War Win	0.56	6.28	0.01
Global test		13.10	0.02

Table 18: Correlation between Polity and Civilian Targeting

	OLS	Logit	Zero Infl.
(Intercept)	−0.12	0.09*	−1.17**
	(0.78)	(0.04)	(0.44)
Polity	0.20	0.00	0.14**
	(0.16)	(0.00)	(0.04)
R^2	0.012	0.0081	0.016
Observations	1908	1908	1908

Note: Standard errors clustered at the secessionist level. ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$.

Table 19: Performance of Different Measures of Civilian Targeting, 1970-2011

	Binary	Count	Count (log)	Count (sqrt)	Cumulative	Cumulative (log)
Civilian Targeting	6.51*	0.65***	3.29***	2.42***	0.20**	2.04**
	(2.62)	(0.15)	(0.81)	(0.57)	(0.06)	(0.63)
Oil	−0.31***	−0.30***	−0.30***	−0.30***	−0.25**	−0.24**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Polity	−0.32***	−0.33***	−0.33***	−0.33***	−0.34***	−0.34***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ratify	−3.80***	−4.09***	−4.03***	−4.07***	−4.03***	−4.07***
	(0.77)	(0.86)	(0.85)	(0.86)	(0.77)	(0.77)
State Troops	105.08*	89.39*	89.87*	89.14*	85.81*	90.29*
	(43.11)	(44.60)	(44.38)	(44.51)	(41.99)	(41.87)
Civilian Targeting x Time	−1.79	−0.21***	−0.92**	−0.70***	−0.07**	−0.71***
	(0.93)	(0.06)	(0.29)	(0.20)	(0.02)	(0.21)
R^2	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.09
Adjusted-R^2	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99
Concordance	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.82	0.84
Events	25	25	25	25	25	25
Clusters	97	97	97	97	97	97
Observations	1481	1481	1481	1481	1481	1481

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the secessionist level. Coefficients are reported. R^2 and adjusted-R^2 calculated using Allison's (1995) and O'Quigley, Xu, and Stare's (2005) methods, respectively. $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$.

Table 20: Determinants of Ratification, 1970-2011

	Ratification
Intercept	1.48***
	(0.16)
Polity	-0.00
	(0.01)
R^2	0.72
Observations	1496

Note: Standard errors clustered at the secessionist level with group and year fixed effects. ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$.

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