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April 16, 2013
Voting in New Democracies: the Case of Egypt’s First Post-Mubarak Elections

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Abstract

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This thesis attempts to discern why Egyptians voted the way they did in both rounds of Egypt’s first free and fair presidential elections in 2012. More specifically, this thesis compared governorate level electoral results to governorate level socio-demographic data in order to distinguish which factors were most influential on voters’ choices. Through this examination, I hope to contribute to the larger literature on voting in new democracies by demonstrating what models of voter behavior and influences were most salient in Egypt’s case. The first part of this study focuses on the first round of the elections and how voters chose between the many candidates with different platforms. The second part turns to the runoffs and studies how those voters whose first choice was no longer in the running decided between Morsi and Shafiq. The findings in the first round indicate that the significant urban/rural divide in Egypt both because of the large disparities it causes in lifestyles but also because it allowed for organizational mobilization to be effective in rural areas which contain a majority of voters. In the second round, this thesis finds that voters would support whichever candidate had the most similar platform to their first choice candidate, particularly in regards to religion in politics and support for the revolution. Ultimately, this thesis provides further support for the sociological model of voter behavior in new democracies but emphasizes that rather than being the singular mechanism behind voter choice, sociological factors served as a facilitator for organizational effects.
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The Egyptian revolution in early 2011 was largely initiated by young, secular activists. However, when the country held its parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011 and 2012, the party that won by far the most support was the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom & Justice Party (FJP). During the first round of the presidential elections in May 2012, the top contenders represented a larger variety of policy and ideological stances. The FJP’s candidate, Mohammed Morsi, only won 24.78% of the vote, but received the most votes of all and advanced to the final round, which was held in June 2012. Competing against a member of the old regime, Ahmed Shafiq, Morsi received 51.7% of votes to Shafiq’s 48.3%, thus winning by a small margin.

I will examine both rounds of Egypt’s first democratic elections and in each examine what factors influenced voter behavior. In the first round, I will ask what the influences were that prompted voters to cast their ballot for one candidate over the others. Within this question we can ask more specifically why more Egyptians voted for Morsi than for other candidates, particularly those with platforms more similar to the messages of the revolution. In order to answer this first question, I will look at several models of voting behavior that offer different explanations of voter choice in new democracies and examine whether they apply in the Egyptian case.

In the June presidential runoffs, I will examine how voters whose first choice candidate was eliminated in the first round decided who to vote for. In order to do so, I will investigate how voters chose between two candidates they did not initially support.
For the purposes of my research, I will classify Egypt as a new democracy that is the result of a popular revolution. Some may argue that Egypt never had a complete revolution due to the many institutions and politicians that remain in place and unchanged. Even after Mubarak’s ousting there were countless protests held against the interim military government demanding the punishment and removal of regime holdovers. Many would argue that despite successfully removing its authoritarian leader, Egypt has not fully undergone a revolution. Additionally, some may point to these regime holdovers and ask if Egypt is truly a democracy if many of the same institutions that worked for the old regime have not been overhauled. While these are all important considerations, for the purposes of my study I have chosen to classify Egypt as a new democracy that came out of a revolution. As I am studying Egypt’s first elections, this is the most important political institution for me to consider. The elections in Egypt, although not void of issues and violations, were overall considered to be free, fair, and truly representative. If this is true, I believe the questions surrounding the completeness of Egypt’s revolution and its democracy are not central to my study. Additionally, this is the most effective way to classify Egypt because it shares many of the same characteristics as other countries undergoing post-revolutionary transitions, in particular conditions of uncertainty, political (and economic) instability, and the significance of post-revolutionary elections in the country’s history. Therefore, while concerns about the revolution are an important factor to keep in mind, I believe that for the purposes of this study the events that took place in Egypt in January and February of 2011 have the most important elements of a revolution.

Additionally, I will categorize the 2012 presidential elections as founding elections. These two classifications allow us to consider the context surrounding the events and to compare
Egypt’s specific case to other founding elections that have occurred in other new democracies. Due to the fact that these were the first elections in a new democracy we can be relatively certain that these elections have different issues, meanings, and elements than we would see in an established democracy, such as the United States. Thus, as I examine the case of voter behavior during the elections, it will be crucial to consider what these differences may be and how they affected voters. Before discussing the differences between elections in new and established democracies, I will first examine the body of literature concerning voting behavior in established democracies. I will then discuss how this literature may or may not apply to elections in emerging democracies.

*Voter Behavior in Established Democracies*

Why do people vote the way they do? There are three primary theoretical approaches to explaining this, each emphasizing a different set of influences on voters. The first of these follows the ‘sociological school’ of thought and argues that group affiliations and social cleavages are the most important divisions along which citizens vote (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, van der Brug and Franklin 2008, De La O and Rodden 2008). There are a large variety of potential cleavages in a country, with some of the most commonly examined being age, gender, ethnicity, religion, and level of urbanism. This sociological school of literature claims that certain values and attitudes are linked to group affiliations, thus resulting in voting trends within groups. There are three central assumptions to this theory, the first being that society is made up of subgroups. The second states that the people who are members of these subgroups hold many of the same values, and the third says that political groups purposefully appeal to particular subgroups that would support their platforms. Therefore, partisan preferences emerge along these
existing social cleavages as a result of their shared values and political interests. Although social cleavages may shift over time, these divisions and subgroups are generally regarded as stable in the societies of established democracies.

The second of these approaches is an economic understanding of voting, as promoted by public choice theory. It differs greatly from the sociological model, as it disregards the presence of societal groups and claims instead that all voters are self-directed, rational actors who vote to maximize their utility (Arrow 1951; Downs 1957; Buchanan and Tullock 1962). If this is correct then the consideration of material well-being is the most significant influence on voters’ choices. Following this logic, we would see divisions within the electorate along lines of social class, since someone who is of a certain economic standing would vote for candidates that offer the most benefits to their material well-being.

The third major theory on voter choices emphasizes the importance of ‘media effects’ on how voters choose. This final school of thought argues that voters are persuadable and are primarily influenced by elements such as political rhetoric, candidate characteristics, advertising, and media (Toka and Popescu 2003).

Scholars on voting behavior in established democracies have not come to a clear consensus on which of these explanatory models is best supported. Since there is no definitive model to test in the context of emerging democracies, I will consider how each theoretical approach might be applied to explain voting behavior in founding elections.

Differences Between Emerging and Established Democracies

These three groups of literature have been tested extensively in the case of established democracies, however we must now examine how these may apply in the very different context
of a new democracy. The economic model of voting has been challenged by a sub-group of the literature on voting in new democracies (De Gaaf et al 1994, Mateju and Rehakova 1997, Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta 2000). These studies claim that the conditions of emerging democracies make it impossible for the economic school to apply. Emerging democracies are characterized by a lack of certainty and stability that in turn affect voter choice in elections. Among the characteristics of founding elections in new democracies is the entrance of many different political parties on the stage. It is common for a large number of new parties to be formed, many of which may have no real intention or capability of gaining power. In an established democracy, it is well known which candidates and parties have a remote chance at success and this variable is an important consideration for voters. Absent this familiarity, it can be difficult for voters in emerging democracies to discern which parties or candidates have genuine intentions to win and stand an actual chance at being elected.

Making the situation even more chaotic is the fact that these parties typically have not fully developed their platforms. Thus, they fail to provide clear signals to the electorate regarding exactly what their policy positions are. This causes further confusion for voters and makes it much more difficult to be certain which party or candidate is the best choice to support certain policies. This is the central challenge posed to the economic school. The literature argues that unclear platforms coupled with the economic uncertainty typical of a new democracy prevents voters from identifying which economic policies would maximize their material well-being and which political parties would then support these policies. Thus, voters cannot make decisions based on what would maximize their material interests. Consistent with this hypothesis, these studies found that in emerging democracies social class has a weaker effect on voter preferences than in established democracies.
The importance of this uncertainty cannot be stressed enough. It is important, however, to distinguish uncertainty from volatility. Volatility refers to changes in voter support, while uncertainty indicates that political actors cannot know for certain the intentions, future actions, and goals of other actors. In the case of Egypt, it was uncertainty and not volatility that was witnessed. It was not that voters changed who they supported, but rather that many did not know who they would vote for until it actually came time to vote (some sources even mention voters that still had not decided even while waiting in line at the voting station). As I will discuss further, many opinion polls taken just weeks or days before the elections reported that one third of respondents still did not know whom they would vote for. This uncertainty is not only important because it impacts other political actors, but also because it places severe limits on the predictive power of surveys and opinion polls that many established democracies use regularly.

Returning to the applicability of models of voter behavior, the literature has not found problems of applicability with the other two schools. In fact, many of the studies on voting in new democracies use the sociological school in their central analysis. This is likely because the sociological model does not rely on factors that are easily destabilized during political transitions. The economic school relied on stable economic divisions and left-right cleavages, but this proves problematic within the economic and political instability of a new democracy. The sociological model, on the other hand, believes the central influences on voters are social and group affiliations. Although uncertainty may cause slight changes in group loyalty, by and large these cleavages remain stable regardless of political and economic changes.

Although many studies have chosen to use the sociological model of voter behavior, there have been some issues raised about its accuracy. In particular, some have pointed out the discrepancy between the number of sociological divisions in society and the number of political
party or policy options. This difference brings into question the assertion that all sociological cleavages will translate into political divisions, which we do not see in the real world.

There have been many fewer studies examining media effects in new democracies, so it is not clear how well supported it is in this context. However, logically, it would make sense for campaigning to play some role in voter behavior due to the absence of a left-right scale which forces voters to use short term cues. Although most of the literature contends that these short term cues come from sociological affiliations and values, campaigning could potentially also be an important and influential one.

*Voter Behavior in Emerging Democracies*

I have now discussed theories on voting in established democracies in addition to the different conditions that arise during founding elections. As I have already said, these differing circumstances may result in different determinants of voter behavior. I will now turn to the literature that examines voting behavior specifically in emerging democracies. I have chosen to focus primarily on the studies of post-Communist Eastern European states in the 1990s because their elections fit into the same category as Egypt’s 2012 elections. Both are cases of founding elections in new democracies that were created as a result of popular uprisings. I have chosen to focus on Eastern Europe, rather than Latin America, Asia, or Sub-Saharan Africa, largely due to the available literature. Many Latin American countries underwent regime change during the same time frame as the “third wave” of democratization that affected Eastern Europe, however there is a large disparity in literature examining elections in these new democracies. There is a substantial body of literature concerned with explaining voter behavior in post-Communist Eastern Europe, while studies of this sort in other new democracies are much less extensive.
I am unable to compare Egypt to a new democracy with a more similar cultural context, as before the Arab Spring there had never been a revolution leading to democratic regime change in an Arab, Muslim country. While comparison with non-Arab cases is valuable, it will be crucial to consider how Egypt differs culturally and historically from Eastern European countries and how that may have affected the influences on voters.

I will now turn to the literature on voting in post-Communist Eastern Europe to assess its opinion of the significant influences on voters in the region’s new democracies. The large majority of works use the sociological model of voting and examine which of the many social cleavages influenced voters’ choices in the new democracies of Eastern Europe (Kitschelt 1992; Toka 1992; Evans 1996; McFaul 1997; Colton 2000; van der Brug and Franklin 2008). Such studies contend that, as I have already described, the political uncertainty in developing democracies destabilizes and obscures traditional political cues and leaves voters without a clear indication of who to vote for. Therefore, voters must get their cues from other sources, such as the social, ethnic, or political groups that they are a part of. These groups and affiliations, whose members hold similar values, provide signals to voters as to which candidates or policies to support.

While existing studies consider a wide range of social factors that could have influenced voter behavior in the Eastern European elections, the literature has not come to a consensus on which of these factors had the most significant impact. A study by van der Brug and Franklin compares 13 established, Western democracies to 7 emerging ones and examines which influences affect voter preferences in the two different contexts. In the 7 emerging democracies (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), this study found that religion had the largest effect on voter preferences (van der Brug and Franklin 2008). The
authors associate these influences with the absence of a left-right division, which results in a need for other cues. Their study argues that ethno-religious associations offer the strongest and easiest policy stances.

Another study found that social divisions such as age had a greater importance than ethnic or religious identities (Colton 2005). In his study of the 1996 Russian elections, Colton argues that age is an often overlooked social variable, but an important one due to generational differences that are only further exacerbated by the sudden change that has typically just taken place. Differences in age also indicate different experiences and memories, resulting in different opinions and associations. Youth may be more receptive to a new option because they don’t have the same memories as their parents and grandparents. They also may support something because they have not had as much time to become set in long-term behavioral patterns. Colton goes further and divides the influence of age on voting into two categories. The first category is the differences in normative opinions. The second is differences in partisan loyalties.

Interestingly, another study done examining the 1996 Russian presidential elections found results that differ from Colton’s. McFaul’s work argues that the most influential variable was the urban-rural divide due to organizational support varying by province (McFaul 1997). However, McFaul’s findings are not necessarily contradictory to Colton’s. McFaul notes that, while he found the urban-rural divide to be most influential, there exist typical covariates with this cleavage. These covariates, which include age and level of education, were also found to be correlated with voter choices. Therefore, these studies, although choosing different factors, may be examining a similar mechanism behind voter choice.

It is important to note when considering the literature by Colton and McFaul that the Russian elections they examine are the second presidential elections Russia had as a
democracy, and thus do not fall into the category of ‘founding elections’ within which I have placed Egypt. Despite this difference, I still believe that these studies are useful to help consider Egypt’s case, particularly in the runoffs, due to the positions of the candidates. In Egypt, voters had a choice between a candidate who was strongly associated with the previous government (and also connected to the then ruling interim, military government), or a candidate whose stance was in total opposition to it. In the 1996 Russian presidential elections, voters had the choice between a candidate who was a member of the current government or a candidate whose stance was in total opposition to it. This type of scenario did not occur in any of the founding elections in post-Communist Eastern European countries, and thus may serve as a useful point of reference.

It becomes clear from reading the large body of literature on voting in these new post-Communist Eastern European democracies that there has not been a variable or set of variables that are agreed to be most significant. Without a single definitive model of voting behavior suggested by the literature, there is no singular influence I can test in the case of Egypt. Rather, I will have to look at each of the different factors cited in these previous studies and consider them in the context of Egypt’s 2012 presidential elections.

Conclusion

This study will first attempt to assess the applicability of theories of voting behavior in post-Communist Eastern European democracies to Egypt’s 2012 elections and examine whether the Egyptian results conform to their expectations. As mentioned previously, none of this literature has ever studied an Arab country, since there was no case of an emerging Arab democracy until the Arab Spring protests began in late 2010. Since the Arab Spring’s beginning,
multiple Arab countries have begun transitioning into democratic systems. Thus, the findings of this study can help to capture the electoral trends occurring within one of these countries and could help to identify the causal mechanisms in other new democracies of the same cultural background.

The study will also examine the plausibility of overarching theories of voter behavior in new democracies. In order for such theories to be plausible, it would mean that we accept the underlying assumption that voters will respond similarly if placed in the same conditions associated with new democracies. This assumption, however, implies that voters will act the same regardless of any cultural, societal, or political history or characteristics. Citizens in new democracies can have vastly different social values (e.g. secularism), attitudes, and experiences, which make it difficult to imagine they would all choose the same candidate or policy option, or vote along the same lines. Thus, it seems difficult to form a set of generalizable conclusions that can apply regardless of national context.
PRESENTATION OF HYPOTHESES

First Round

In my examination of the first round of the elections, this thesis will test a hypothesis that attempts to explain what factors influenced voters. My first hypothesis predicts that the most important influence on voters’ choices in the first round was the urban/rural divide for reasons that I will elaborate on below. I expect that the more urban a governorate is, the more likely it is to vote for ‘third-way,’ revolutionary, candidates. Third-way in the context of these specific elections signifies that they are not associated with the old regime nor are they Muslim Brotherhood affiliates.

My second hypothesis concerns differences in voting behavior across rural governorates. I predict that how rural governorates voted depended on which networks were mobilized for a certain candidate. Therefore, I expect that the Nile Delta governorates, which are where most of the remaining network of the National Democratic Party (NDP) (the now disbanded party of the old regime) is located, will favor the secular, feloul candidates. Conversely, I expect that all other rural governorates were mobilized by the Muslim Brotherhood and are therefore more likely to vote in favor of the Islamist, Brotherhood candidate, Morsi. As I was unable to find any numbers concerning offices of each organization in governorates, I have had to rely on interviews and accounts reported in media sources for information on organizations’ presence throughout the governorates. This does not necessarily restrict the information I can gather about network mobilization because the existence of an organization’s office does not necessarily equate to its activity or mobilization in favor of a certain candidate. Where I am somewhat restricted in regards to this information, however, is in the region of Upper Egypt where very little information is available. In my examination, I have made the assumption that the NDP has not
mobilized its networks, if they even exist, in this area because not a single report discussed that possibility. This therefore points to the likelihood that the only organization that exists or is active in the region is the Brotherhood. I may find, however, that once more detailed information becomes available on voting in Upper Egypt that this assumption is challenged.

I believe the urban/rural divide was the most important influence on voters in Egypt for multiple reasons. First, it is important to note that the disparity between rural and urban life in Egypt is much larger than in many other countries. Much of Egypt’s land is taken up by the Sahara Desert, making it very difficult to develop and creating large differences between the lifestyles of those living in desert areas and those living in developed areas along the Nile or the coast. Although many of these desert areas are sparsely populated, rural voters as a whole constitute over half of total registered voters in Egypt. Due to the poor economic circumstances in which many Egyptians find themselves (40% live on less than $2 a day), investment or movement throughout the country is difficult and many families remain in the same village relying on the same form of subsistence. Due to the large disparity between urban and rural conditions, it is logical that this divide would have a larger impact on voters than in other countries where it is not as pronounced. This may explain why the urban/rural divide is more important in Egypt than in post-Communist Eastern European countries like Hungary or the Czech Republic. In these countries, rural citizens have access to services, resources, and information that is more equal to their urban counterparts than in Egypt. This is not to say that Eastern European countries in the 1990s were evenly developed across their different regions,

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but rather that Egypt’s disparity between urban and rural lifestyles, particularly in the present day, is remarkable.

The first aspect of the urban/rural divide that I believe has an effect on voters is the exposure to different people and beliefs. Simply by living in a large city like Cairo, a citizen is exposed to many people with various ideologies, beliefs, opinions, and experiences. Being exposed to these people and ideas increases the possibility that a voter may learn more about a different opinion and grow to support it than if he were in an isolated, homogenous, rural village. This also raises the question of name recognition. Some voters in rural Egypt had not even heard of the majority of eligible candidates, thus clearly affecting how they chose to vote. Additionally, the isolation and lack of development in rural areas also affects access to multiple or alternate sources of information. Urban areas have media sources that report information from many different perspectives. Rural areas, however, often don’t even have the electricity required to receive information broadcasted through the internet, satellites, or television. In these areas, information will typically come from whatever organization has offices in the area, most commonly either the NDP or the Brotherhood, in addition to mosques. Other parties and organizations have a significantly weaker presence in rural areas, as the vast majority were not tolerated or were not allowed to grow under the Mubarak regime. Therefore, they were never able to establish networks as only the NDP and the Brotherhood did and were at a significant disadvantage when it came time for elections. Whatever organization has the strongest local presence will be villagers’ main source information on the candidates or the elections. These types of conditions are conducive to effects on voters by campaign and informational sources.

The urban/rural divide is also important particularly in the case of Egypt due to how the revolution unfolded. The Egyptian revolution largely took place in the cities, and the university
students living in these urban areas were its key organizers and supporters, and the ones who defined its demands. While the revolution was able to connect the Western ideals of political freedom with economic complaints that encompassed many more Egyptians, it remained principally an urban phenomenon. Rural areas were much less concerned about the regime. Many rural citizens report that the only difference they have seen from the revolution is a struggling economy and deteriorating security. It seems reasonable then, to think that candidates who were said to represent the revolution and its ideals, in particular Sabbahi, would have significantly higher vote share in Cairo and Alexandria where many of the people who started and participated in the revolution voted.

The vastly different circumstances between the urban and rural areas are also connected to other factors, most importantly level of education and religiosity. Egyptians living in urban areas typically have higher levels of education, which I believe played a role in voter behavior. An Egyptian living and studying in a city like Cairo has a better knowledge of politics, alternate ideologies (like secular liberalism), and history, whereas those living out in a very rural area like the New Valley governorate will have a much more limited knowledge of political thought. Therefore, it is logical to expect that in governorates with higher levels of urbanism and education there will be a stronger turnout for candidates who support platforms that are Western in nature, such as secularism. If a voter has never learned about these policies, or potentially may only have heard very negative, biased accounts of these ideas, these candidates will not be as attractive.

The second important factor affected by the urban/rural divide is religiosity. In this case I use the term religiosity to refer to the level of religious piety and observance. High levels of religiosity are typical in rural areas due to the important function that mosques and religious
activity serves. Mosques are a typical channel through which villagers form social ties and interactions. These activities and the general religious presence in the community in turn reinforce a strong commitment to religion and encourage Islamist ideas. Highly religious Muslims will tend to vote for candidates who support Islamism in politics - and are seen as pious Muslims themselves - because they want their president to have a similar ideology, strong moral values (such as honesty), and share their belief that Islam should play a role in the government. Those who are less pious, atheist, or Coptic Christian, will typically value different characteristics. They may not prioritize Islamism in politics as highly, may oppose it, or, as in the case of the Copts, may be concerned that it will impede on their rights. Thus, I expect that governorates with lower Islamic religiosity will tend to support the secular candidates. However, it is important to note that I have not encountered any data on religiosity throughout Egypt, so it will be difficult to measure this.

My hypotheses stem primarily from the sociological school, as I expect a sociological factor, the urban/rural divide, to be most influential on voters. However, the disparities that this divide creates are not only important because of how they affect voters’ lifestyles, but also because they facilitated the ability for organizations to mobilize support effectively. The rural areas are largely isolated, economically underdeveloped, and less educated. These characteristics give established organizations and networks the ability to influence votes in favor of a certain candidate. First, organizations can use their power, and in many cases monopoly, over information on the elections in order to guide voter opinions. Second, organizations can mobilize their preexisting patronage networks to present incentives or threats, either indirect or explicit, to those voters whose standing is dependent on them. This, I argue, is why the preexisting networks of the NDP and the Brotherhood were so important in the rural areas during the first round. This
would also explain why third way candidates, namely Sabbahi and Aboul Fotouh, were unable to perform better in these areas. These candidates did not have the strong, well established organizations with a presence throughout the country to bolster support in areas without high levels of political knowledge and information. The consideration of organizational mobilization also helps answer the question raised about the sociological school and the disparity between sociological divisions and political ones. If my hypotheses are correct, it would indicate that the reason why we see fewer political divisions or options than sociological divisions is due to political groups’ attempts to appeal to subgroups. Organizations will try to attract multiple groups of voters and use their power to combine many sociological divisions into larger groups of political supporters. If these organizational efforts are effective, as I argue they were in Egypt’s case, then we would see many different groups of voters supporting one platform.

Second Round

My hypothesis regarding voter behavior in the runoffs attempts to use the information from the first round regarding which governorates preferred which candidates to then explain who voters chose in the second round. Underlying my hypothesis is the assumption that all voters that chose Morsi or Shafiq in the first round will vote for them in the second round as well. I then predict that those governorates that voted for Aboul Fotouh are more likely to vote for Morsi in the runoffs. As I will expound upon further in my examination of each candidate, Aboul Fotouh can be placed both in the Islamist and the liberal revolutionary categories. Much of his support came from voters who valued his Islamist policies, particularly since he was officially endorsed by the Salafist al-Nour Party, while many also liked him because they thought he was liberal enough to form a bridge between secularists and Islamists and thus
complete the revolution. I expect that voters whose first choice was Aboul Fotouh would vote for Morsi in the runoffs because he represented both the Islamist policies and the revolutionary ideals that they valued in a president.

Next, I predict that those who voted for Sabbahi would also be more likely to vote for Morsi. I expect this relationship to be weaker than for that of Aboul Fotouh supporters, as I believe that Sabbahi supporters were more conflicted because Morsi did not represent their position on both important issues. While Aboul Fotouh supporters valued Islamism and the revolution, both of which Morsi came to represent, Sabbahi voters’ values were present in both candidate’s images. Many despised the thought of electing one of the feloul, therefore on this topic Morsi was the best candidate. However, many of these voters did not agree with Morsi’s Islamism and preferred Shafiq’s civil state over a government controlled by Islamists. Although this was certainly a difficult decision, I hypothesize that in the end, Sabbahi supporters were more likely to vote for Morsi over Shafiq in the runoffs because they prioritized the goals of the revolution over the separation of religion and politics.

The final candidate to come in first in a governorate in the first round was Moussa, whose supporters, like those of Aboul Fotouh, were most likely not as conflicted as Sabbahi’s. I expect that Egyptians who voted for Moussa in the first round were more likely to vote for Shafiq in the runoffs. Moussa supporters valued the civil state over an Islamic one and had fewer concerns with a feloul candidate. In fact, some of them may have purposefully voted for Moussa because of his political experience. Thus, Moussa supporters would prefer Shafiq over Morsi because of his secularist image and would have fewer hesitations regarding Shafiq’s previous position in the old regime.
RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis will qualitatively examine the case of Egypt’s 2012 presidential elections. I have chosen to look at both stages of the elections because they demonstrate how people vote in two different scenarios. The first round reveals how Egyptians voted when they had a large array of candidates to choose from. The runoffs revealed how they voted when their choices were limited to two contradicting platforms and many voters were forced to choose between two candidates they had rejected in the first round.

I will analyze both rounds of the elections at the governorate-level. In order to do so, I will use the official electoral results disaggregated by governorate and compare them to socio-demographic information on each governorate gathered during the 2006 Egyptian government’s census, available at the website of the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics. There are some concerns regarding this census data, as it is not as recent as we might prefer and Egypt’s census has not always been completely accurate. However, I have chosen to use this data in my research because it is the best source of demographic information at the governorate level that is currently available. By comparing this data with the electoral results from each governorate, I will test my hypotheses regarding which characteristics impacted voters’ choices the most.

There are some concerns due to my choice to use aggregate data, in particular regarding the potential for an ecological fallacy. Although it is useful to compare election results across governorates and see how they related to their different characteristics, I ultimately could be falsely attributing votes to a certain group. There is no definitive way for me to prove that if a relationship is found between group characteristics and electoral results that the relationship also exists between individuals and electoral results. For example, I may predict that level of
education has a positive relationship with support for Sabbahi. Sabbahi may come in first in a governorate with high levels of education, however it is not necessarily the voters of the governorate with this high education that voted for Sabbahi. In the second round, I predict that governorates that in the aggregate voted highest for Moussa will support Shafiq, however the votes that Shafiq received in that governorate could come from other groups of voters.

Unfortunately, due to the data available I will not be able to disaggregate the results or eliminate the potential for an ecological fallacy in my study. This will be an important issue to keep in mind throughout my analysis.

When examining the cases of the governorates and the mechanisms that result in voting trends, a significant amount of the data I use will stem from media sources published by Egyptian and foreign news organizations. This information, while largely anecdotal, will be an important source of first hand observations coming from journalists who were present throughout the process of the elections. Their work will thus reveal a significant amount of information about the details of the elections and voters’ opinions.

The reason that I have chosen not to focus on quantitative data gathered from surveys is due to the inaccurate and unreliable nature of most surveys conducted in Egypt to date. As clearly displayed by Al-Ahram, every major public opinion poll before the presidential elections failed to accurately predict true levels of support for candidates.2 Opinion polls conducted by four of the most prestigious Egyptian institutions (the Al-Ahram Political Studies Centre, the newspapers Al-Shorouk and Al-Masry Al-Youm, and the state run Information and Decision Support Centre (IDSC)) were incorrect by large margins about how candidates would place.

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According to these polls, candidates Amr Moussa and Ahmed Shafiq would compete in the runoffs, and none predicted Mohamed Morsi would place higher than fourth or fifth place. These large differences between polls and electoral results is in part due to the obstacles facing surveyors in Egypt, such as difficulty in reaching rural citizens, but I would argue it is also a function of the uncertainty following the emergence of a new democracy. Many opinion polls reported that when these surveys were conducted immediately before the elections, one third of voters reported that they were still undecided. This large amount of uncertainty among voters severely limited the predictive ability of these polls, particularly because they were mostly taken before respondents had actually voted. These surveys would have been much more effective if they had been taken as exit polls. Instead, many of these polls found inaccurate results, even if they asked voters a day before the elections.

Concerns about the accuracy of surveys are also relevant to other sources of data that I have chosen not to use in this study. A quantitative study of the Egyptian elections like those we have seen conducted for Eastern European democracies in the early 1990s is unfeasible due to the limits of available data. Most information on the elections, such as the opinion polls I mentioned previously, has either not yet been published or is unreliable and would not lend itself to an accurate analysis of the results. While most of the evidence I will rely on is anecdotal in nature and drawn from media reports, these sources provide the most detailed and accurate accounts of the elections that are currently available. By choosing to conduct one of the first formal examinations of the presidential elections my study will by necessity be constrained by available information. However, I hope that my research will still provide a valuable resource for future scholars.

\[3\text{ Ibid.}\]
BACKGROUND

Egypt’s president and dictator for 30 years, Hosni Mubarak, was overthrown in early 2011 by a popular revolution that saw millions of Egyptian protesting in the streets. Mubarak and his party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), outwardly stood for secular, pro-Western ideals despite the oppression and torture the regime frequently subjected its citizens to. After Mubarak’s resignation, a move that he was forced into by military leaders, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took over as a transitional government. Although the military repeatedly claimed that they had no desire to run the government permanently, many Egyptians were concerned that it would never complete its promise to hand over rule to a civilian government after elections. This fear was exacerbated when the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled the 2011 parliamentary election results null and void and the military moved quickly to enforce it. The parliamentary elections, held in November 2011 and January 2012, resulted in 47.2% of seats going to the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and 24.3% going to the Salafist Al Nour Party. All other parties gained a significantly smaller percentage of seats.

This is the context in which we find Egypt during the presidential elections. The elections were done by direct voting by secret ballots and were a majority two-round system. Thus, if no candidate reached 50% of the vote in the first round, as would end up happening, a runoff would be take place. The first round occurred on the 23rd and 24th of May, 2012 and the second round was held on the 16th and 17th of June, 2012. The election results would determine who would be the first leader of Egypt to be chosen by the people in free and fair elections in the history of the country. The president is elected for a four-year term with a two-term limit.
To be permitted to register as a candidate, an individual could either be nominated by one of the parties that won at least one seat in the People’s Assembly, or had to be endorsed by either 30 members of parliament or 30,000 eligible voters from at least 15 governorates. An individual was not eligible to run if they, their parents, or their spouse held anything other than Egyptian citizenship. This new rule was in reference to the concern of many Egyptians that foreign influences might pervade Egyptian politics. Other conditions for candidacy were that an individual must be at least 40 years old, must not have served in a top position in the former regime in the past 10 years, and may only run if it has been at least 6 years since they were released from prison. Of the 23 individuals who registered for candidacy, 11 were disqualified due to these stipulations. One of these rejections, that of Ahmed Shafiq, was appealed and overturned, bringing the total number of candidates to 13. Shafiq’s application was initially disqualified because during the revolution he had been appointed by Mubarak to the position of Prime Minister in an attempt to appease protestors. Thus, he had been a senior official of the old regime. His appeal, however, challenged the constitutionality of this law and was accepted by the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC). Other important candidates, such as Khayrat al-Shater, Ayman Nour, and Hazam Salah Abu Ismail were also disqualified but their appeals were not met with the same luck. Both al-Shater, a very popular businessman and a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Nour, the liberal leader of the al-Ghad party, were not permitted to run under the law that requires candidates to have been released from prison or pardoned no sooner than six years before. Both candidates were sentenced to prison under the Mubarak regime for politically-motivated reasons. Nour was the first person ever to run against Mubarak for the presidency, and

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shortly after losing the elections was found guilty of ‘forgery’ and was not released until 2009. Al-Shater is a businessman and is believed to be the main financier and behind the scenes leader of the Brotherhood. He was imprisoned in 2007 and was released shortly after Mubarak’s ousting. The FJP nominated him as their candidate, but because of his recent release he was disqualified. The FJP and Brotherhood thus had to find another candidate to nominate, setting up the scene for Morsi’s arrival.

Overseeing and administering the presidential elections was the Supreme Presidential Elections Commission (SPEC), largely comprised of senior judicial officials carried over from the Mubarak regime (which made many Egyptians suspicious of their true loyalties). The Minister of the Interior was responsible for administrative and logistical support, such as the provision of ballot papers, ballot boxes, ink, etc. in addition to supervising security arrangements at voting stations. Each polling station was headed and supervised by a member of Egypt’s judiciary, who also supervised the vote tabulation. Voters were assigned to whichever polling station was closest to the address they had listed on their National Identity Card, with a 1,000 person maximum at each station.\(^5\)

While the election results are generally accepted as an accurate account of votes, many fraud allegations and issues were brought up during and after the elections. Each allegation was considered by the SPEC but the organization ultimately decided they did not warrant holding another vote. Allegations were particularly numerous after the runoff elections, where both candidates were the target of many of the same complaints. Both were accused of campaign violations ranging from “vote buying and herding voters to polling stations, to violating bans on

\(^5\) Ibid, 3-5.
promoting candidates on polling day and arranging votes for military police personnel.”⁶ This last accusation was directed at the Shafiq campaign, which some claimed had arranged for as many as 900,000 military votes (under Egyptian law citizens currently serving in the military or police are ineligible to vote).⁷ Another complaint filed with the SPEC was by Shafiq campaign coordinator Mohamed El-Bukhari, who claimed that he witnessed a judge who was in charge of supervising a polling station leave to pray and not take proper measures to ensure voting would follow the correct procedures.⁸

The Carter Center, one of the groups of independent witnesses that monitored the election, also reported a number of concerns. Although Carter Center witnesses did not directly observe any of these instances, they reported that concerns of vote buying were very present during the elections and created tension between the two campaigns. Most allegations of vote buying pointed to the Muslim Brotherhood’s preexisting network of charity and social services (which helped Morsi) and to the provision of funds to families and leaders in different governorates by Shafiq’s campaign.⁹ Other concerns reported by Carter Center witnesses were largely due to the many structural and socioeconomic problems in Egypt. With a population that is only 72% literate, there were many difficulties with maintaining an uninfluenced, secret ballot

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⁸ Ibid.
system while assisting illiterate voters. Additionally, the Carter Center reported concerns about the inconsistency with which certain voting procedures were practiced. These procedures included finger inking, voter identification procedures for women who wear veils, and the determination by judges of what counted as a valid vote or not. It is important, however, to note that despite these concerns, the Carter Center stated overall that it found “that most aspects of the June 16-17 voting and counting process were free from major and systematic flaws that unfairly advantaged either candidate.” Now that I have examined the election’s context and laws, I will turn to the context of the individual candidates and examine how they performed in the first round.

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11 “The Carter Center Releases Preliminary Statement on Second Round of Egypt’s Presidential Election.”
12 Ibid.
Mohamed Morsi

Mohamed Morsi, the winner of the elections and current president of Egypt, was born in 1951 to a middle class family in the governorate of Al Sharqiya. He has earned multiple degrees in engineering, including one from the University of Southern California. Morsi remained in California as a professor from 1981 to 1985, until he returned to Cairo to continue teaching.\(^1\) By this time Morsi had already become a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and continuously rose up in the organization over the following years. In 1995 Morsi became a member of the Brotherhood’s highest decision-making body and was elected to Parliament for the first time. During his time in Parliament from 1995 to 2005, Morsi was the official spokesperson for the Brotherhood’s parliamentary bloc and was one of the most active MPs.\(^2\) Morsi then went on to serve as official spokesperson for the Brotherhood after Khayrat al-Shater was imprisoned in 2005.

Morsi participated in many protests during the 2011 revolution and was arrested on the “Day of Rage” along with other Brotherhood leaders. After Mubarak’s ousting, Morsi resigned from the Guidance Bureau of the Brotherhood in order to become president of the organization’s first ever political party, the Freedom & Justice Party (FJP) that was founded in May 2011. In this new position, Morsi was in charge of putting together a political coalition for the parliamentary elections that consisted of 11 parties (including the FJP) and was named the Democratic Alliance for Egypt. While this coalition would ultimately fall apart, the FJP still

\(^2\) Ibid.
received an incredible 45% of the vote.\textsuperscript{15} Morsi would soon resign from this post as well, however, as after Khayrat el-Shater’s candidacy was rejected Morsi was quickly chosen to be the Brotherhood’s candidate for president.

As the official candidate of the FJP and the Brotherhood, Morsi’s campaign had an enormous organization behind it that had access to voters all over the country. In many parts of Egypt, the Brotherhood provided citizens with the social welfare programs that the government was unable or unmotivated to provide, and built up a solid base of support over the decades. Much of Morsi’s campaign relied on the mobilization of this social network, an advantage that most other candidates could not match. Morsi’s past within the Brotherhood was another appealing aspect for the candidate, as he supported a very popular brand of Islam in Egypt that is conservative but not the hard-line version called Salafi.

While the Brotherhood’s support was certainly a crucial aspect of the Morsi campaign’s success, it was also the reason that a lot of Egyptians did not like him. First, it was clear that Morsi had not been the Brotherhood’s first choice. With el-Shater ineligible to run, Morsi was hastily chosen but was not able to create the same excitement around himself. Throughout his campaign Morsi held events with el-Shater and attempted to associate himself as much as possible with the popular businessman in order to transfer some enthusiasm and legitimacy into his candidacy. Morsi was quiet, awkward, and certainly not a charismatic leader like el-Shater, and so it was difficult for him to drop his association with the unfortunate nickname, “the spare tire.” Morsi’s association with the Brotherhood also hurt him because of many Egyptians’ quarrels with the organization’s recent choices. Since Mubarak’s departure, the Brotherhood

promised that they would not field a candidate for president, claiming they did not want to dominate politics. However, shortly after the Brotherhood’s immense success in the parliamentary elections they announced that they would indeed nominate a candidate after all. Many Egyptians feared that this was a sign that the Brotherhood was attempting a power grab and encouraged voters to choose another candidate in order to punish them for reneging on their promise. The final challenge that the Morsi campaign had to struggle with was the largely anti-Brotherhood state media. The ruling military, which was largely in control of the media, had ongoing conflicts with the Brotherhood and FJP since the time of the revolution, and thus most media accounts were not favorable towards Morsi.16

_Ahmed Shafiq_

Ahmed Shafiq, the candidate who received the second largest vote share in the first round of the presidential elections, was born in Cairo in 1941. He graduated from the Air Force Academy in 1961 at which point he began his career in Egypt’s air force. During his career, he fought as a pilot in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, an important moment for Shafiq due to the recognition it would bring him from the then Commander of the Air Force, Hosni Mubarak. As all three of Egypt’s past presidents rose up in the government through the military, a background such as Shafiq’s was a promising career path into politics. Indeed, Shafiq was repeatedly promoted by Mubarak after the 1973 war, resulting in him serving as the military attaché for the embassy in Rome, chief of staff of the Air Force, and eventually as commander of the Air Force from 1996 to 2002.

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16 “Mohamed Morsi.”
Shafiq did not become well known among Egyptians, however, until he became civil aviation minister in 2002, a position he occupied until the revolution began in 2011. As minister he received mixed reviews. Many praised his assertiveness, which resulted in improvements in the national airline, Egypt Air, the inclusion of Egypt Air as a Star Alliance member, and an agreement by the World Bank to finance air transport projects. However, Shafiq’s term as minister was simultaneously surrounded by corruption allegations, with many accusing him of such violations as directly ordering airport construction contracts from regime-affiliated businesses rather than awarding them through a law-mandated bidding process.\(^\text{17}\)

Despite these allegations, Shafiq remained in this position until the revolution began in January 2011. In an attempt to appease protestors, Mubarak dissolved his government and appointed Shafiq as Egypt’s new Prime Minister. Shafiq quickly turned Egyptians against him, as he showed no empathy for protestors and was in charge during the Battle of the Camel (where thugs that were thought to be hired by the government charged into Tahrir Square, killing 11 and wounding over 600).\(^\text{18}\) His popularity continued to decrease even after Mubarak’s ousting, until the ruling military council chose to replace him with Essam Sharaf. After his replacement he did not return to politics until the announcement of his presidential candidacy. This announcement, however, was soon rejected due to a law passed by the recently elected Parliament stating that no one who had served in a senior position in the past 10 years would be allowed to run. Shafiq appealed this rejection to the SCC, claiming that the law was unconstitutional, and won his case.


Shafiq ran in the presidential elections as an independent candidate, although many still associated him with the old regime’s NDP that was dissolved in April 2011. His platform focused around two central issues in order to appeal to voters: stability and minority rights. The revolution dealt an enormous blow to Egypt’s economy and by the time of the elections economic instability continued to be an important issue. Both local and foreign confidence in the economy was further decreased by the continued political unrest in Egypt. Thus, political and economic stability was first and foremost in many Egyptians’ minds. Shafiq promised that he was the candidate who could implement quick and effective policies to restore calm and bring life back to normal. The second issue that his campaign focused on was minority and women’s rights. His platform was given a clear secularist connotation both by his association with the previous ruling party and his stances relative to other opponents (particularly in the runoff).

While Shafiq attempted in many interviews to express that he is a pious Muslim (an important factor in a country that is 90% Muslim)\textsuperscript{19}, much of Shafiq’s campaigning reached out to women and Coptic Christians. Coptic Christians make up the 10% of Egypt’s population that are not Muslim and, like many women, were extremely uncertain about their future after the revolution. The Mubarak regime had provided protection for the rights of Copts and women, and although these groups still supported the revolution, many were concerned that it would lead to an Islamist-dominated government with no tolerance for minorities and that would place restrictions on women’s rights. Islamists had won an absolute majority in Parliament and so Shafiq’s positioning as a challenger to them appealed to the many who feared that the Islamists would take over another branch of government.

\textsuperscript{19} Central Intelligence Agency. “Egypt” World Factbook. 
Arguments against Shafiq overwhelmingly focused on one term: *feloul*, meaning remnant of the old regime. Many considered him to be an extension of the Mubarak government, a fear that was in no way alleviated by Shafiq’s repeated assertion that Mubarak is his role model. Many Egyptians thought that if Shafiq won the election he would essentially revive the old government and that the revolution would have been in vain.

*Hamdeen Sabbahi*

Hamdeen Sabbahi was born in 1954 in the Delta governorate of Kafr el-Sheikh into a peasant family with 11 children. He first gained political fame shortly after beginning his studies in mass communication at Cairo University. In 1977, Sabbahi confronted President Anwar Sadat at a televised meeting and criticized the *infitah* and the regime’s move towards peace with Israel. Following this famous argument, Sabbahi was banned from working as a journalist for many years. During his time at school he also founded the Nasserist Thought Club, and would later become a member of the Arab Democratic Nasserist Party. When his membership from this group was suspended, Sabbahi went on to form the Nasserist Al-Karama (Dignity) Party, under whose membership he ran and was elected in both the 2000 and the 2005 parliamentary elections under Mubarak.²⁰

Sabbahi was arrested a total of 17 times under the Sadat and Mubarak regimes. Many of these arrests were because of the success he had in leading and instigating the opposition.²¹ Sabbahi is also well known for the large role he played in the Kefaya (Enough) movement that

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was essential to building opposition against the Mubarak regime. Sabbahi was a vocal supporter of the 2011 revolution and participated in many protests from its very beginning. After Mubarak’s ousting, Sabbahi continued to participate in protests, this time criticizing the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’ (SCAF) handling of Egypt during its time as the interim government.

The Sabbahi campaign focused on the slogan “one of us.” This phrase echoed Sabbahi’s image as a nationalist and a socialist who had been raised in a poor, rural area and could identify with the majority of Egyptians. His platform also centered around Sabbahi’s support for the democratic spirit of the revolution and its completion by incorporating its ideals into political policies. In an interview with al-Ahram, Sabbahi said that “what is important to the Egyptian people was specified in Tahrir Square: bread, freedom, social justice, and human dignity. These are the slogans that guide the programme for my candidacy.”22 It is important to note that Sabbahi comes from a strong, leftist background and that he may have appealed to voters either because of these leftist stances, or because of his democratic stances, or both.

*Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh*

Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh was born in 1951 in Cairo where he later went to school to become a physician. At Cairo University he became the leader of the student’s union of the Faculty of Medicine. Aboul Fotouh, on a separate occasion from Sabbahi, also confronted President Sadat in the mid-70s. His criticism of the president focused, however, on the regime’s restrictions on demonstrations and Islamic activity. By this time Aboul Fotouh had already become a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, where he would serve in the Guidance Office.

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from 1987 to 2009. He shared other similar experiences to Hamdeen Sabbahi, as he was arrested 3 times during the old regime and was another leading member of the Kefaya movement. He has also been a leading member of the Arab Union of Physicians, and has worked in multiple relief organizations that gave him extensive international experience.

Over the years Aboul Fotouh’s ideology has changed from ultraconservative to liberal Islamist, a position that he played upon in order to serve as a bridge between liberalists and Islamists. His ideological evolution is also important because it is allegedly the reason for growing tensions between Aboul Fotouh and the Brotherhood’s old guard that remains largely in charge of the organization. As a long time critic of the Mubarak regime, Aboul Fotouh participated extensively in the January 25th revolution. He played an important role, as he was able to mobilize his connections with the physicians’ union to set up medical tents to attend to wounded protestors. After the revolution, he announced his candidacy for president as an independent, and was expelled from the Muslim Brotherhood due to the organization’s (at the time still intact) promise not to field a candidate. However the break between the Brotherhood and Aboul Fotouh was thought by many to have been an expression of the Brotherhood’s issues with his reformist views.

Aboul Fotouh’s campaign focused on his image as a bridge between liberalists and Islamists. His ideology, including his view that women and Copts should receive equal rights, gave Islamist-oriented voters an alternative to Morsi. In an interview with Al-Jazeera, Aboul Fotouh stated that his main voter base is the moderate Egyptian, however his platform will also

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24 Ibid.
appeal to all different kinds of voters.\textsuperscript{25} Despite his liberal-Islamist stances, particularly relative to Morsi’s, he received the backing of the Salafist al-Nour (Light) Party. This endorsement was largely for political reasons, as the Salafists did not want their organization to be overshadowed by the Brotherhood, as would have happened if they had endorsed Morsi (who actually follows a brand of Islam much closer to their ultraconservative ideology than Aboul Fotouh). While this support certainly provided Aboul Fotouh with some support, the Muslim Brotherhood prohibited its members from voting for him. As many of the Brotherhood youth supported Aboul Fotouh, this demand from the Brotherhood likely inhibited his success in the polls.

\textit{Amr Moussa}

Amr Moussa was born in 1936 and, after graduating from Cairo University with a degree in law, has had a long diplomatic career. He has worked on behalf of Egypt in countries such as Switzerland, India, and the United States, and eventually became a permanent representative of Egypt in the United Nations. Moussa first became popular in Egypt during his term serving as foreign minister from 1991 to 2001 due to his bold criticisms of Israel.\textsuperscript{26} He was then appointed to the position of Secretary General of the Arab League, which he occupied until 2011.

When the revolution began Moussa publicly supported its efforts, and claimed in a May 2012 interview with al-Ahram that he in fact predicted it would happen. However, Moussa was heavily criticized by pro-democracy groups a few months later when he took part in a council constructed by the ruling SCAF in order to calm protests after the deadly clashes on Mohammed


Mahmoud Street in November 2011. These groups argued that the council was simply a way for the ruling military to end protests without making concessions.

Moussa’s impressive diplomatic career was one of his strongest selling points in the elections. His campaign attempted to prove how useful his international and political experience and wisdom would be at such a critical moment. While many also called Moussa one of the feloul, he was able to distance himself somewhat from the old regime as it is rumored that Mubarak removed him from national politics in 2001 because he felt threatened by his popularity. Similarly to Shafiq, Moussa had liberal views on social issues and so appealed to minorities. Besides being associated with the old regime, one of Moussa’s negative aspects for many Egyptians was his age. As the oldest of all the presidential candidates, many saw Moussa as part of the old generation and out of touch with the youth who began the revolution.

\[\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
THE RESULTS

The first round of the presidential elections resulted in Morsi, Shafiq, and Sabbahi receiving very close numbers of votes. Although Morsi won more votes than all his competitors, many pointed to the marked decline in support for the Brotherhood’s presidential candidate compared with support for the Brotherhood’s parliamentary candidates, who won nearly half of the seats. Close behind Morsi’s 24.78% of the vote was Shafiq with 23.66%, meaning that the two would move on to compete in the runoffs. Additionally, Sabbahi received 20.72%, Aboul Fotouh received 17.47%, and Moussa received 11.13%. Some of the vote’s most surprising aspects were the success of ‘dark horse’ candidate Sabbahi and the poor showing by Moussa, who had been placed in the top two by opinion polls taken in the weeks previous to the elections. Table 1.1 below shows the results of both rounds of the presidential elections by candidate.
### Table 1.1 - Electoral Results of 2012 Presidential Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Round</th>
<th>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td># Votes</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Morsi</td>
<td>Freedom and Justice Party</td>
<td>5,764,952</td>
<td>24.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Shafiq</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>5,505,327</td>
<td>23.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamdeen Sabbahi</td>
<td>Dignity Party</td>
<td>4,820,273</td>
<td>20.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>4,065,239</td>
<td>17.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amr Moussa</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2,588,850</td>
<td>11.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Salim al-Awa</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>235,374</td>
<td>1.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaled Ali</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>134,056</td>
<td>0.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu al-Izz al-Hariri</td>
<td>Socialist Popular Alliance Party</td>
<td>40,090</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hisham Bastawisy</td>
<td>National Progressive Unionist Party</td>
<td>29,189</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmoud Houssam</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>23,992</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Fawzi Issa</td>
<td>Democratic Generation Party</td>
<td>23,889</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houssak Khairallah</td>
<td>Democratic Peace Party</td>
<td>22,036</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdulla Alashaal</td>
<td>Authenticity Party</td>
<td>12,240</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Supreme Presidential Election Council Press Conference

Table 1.1 indicates how each candidate did country-wide, however in order to test my hypothesis I will need to examine the electoral results of each candidate disaggregated by governorate. Table 1.2 shows the results in each of Egypt’s 27 governorates. The table shows the electoral share of each of the top 5 candidates and all other candidates’ votes are combined as ‘other.’ I have chosen to group the 8 least successful candidates together because after the candidate with the 5<sup>th</sup> highest share of votes (Amr Moussa with 11.13%), vote share got significantly smaller. Numbers in bold indicate the winner in each governorate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Valley</td>
<td>5,960</td>
<td>2,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>6,924</td>
<td>3,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafrelsheikh</td>
<td>6,924</td>
<td>3,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>8,968</td>
<td>4,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>9,065</td>
<td>4,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giza</td>
<td>9,265</td>
<td>4,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Said</td>
<td>9,272</td>
<td>4,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharkia</td>
<td>9,378</td>
<td>4,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beni Suef</td>
<td>9,588</td>
<td>4,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beheira</td>
<td>9,788</td>
<td>4,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qena</td>
<td>9,988</td>
<td>5,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxor</td>
<td>10,188</td>
<td>5,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asyut</td>
<td>10,388</td>
<td>5,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minya</td>
<td>10,588</td>
<td>5,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sohag</td>
<td>10,788</td>
<td>5,457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1.2: Electoral Results of First Round of 2012 Presidential Elections (by Governorate)**

Source: Judges for Egypt
Categories of Candidates

I have categorized the presidential candidates into 3 groups. I will label the first group as the secular, liberal, *feloul* candidates, which are made up of Shafiq and Moussa. These candidates both held important positions under the previous regime, and both argued for the maintenance of a secular, civil state and promised to stand up to Islamists in government. The second group, made up of Sabbahi and Aboul Fotouh, I will call the liberal revolutionaries. This category of candidates made it clear that they would facilitate the finalization of the revolution, and would follow relatively liberal policies. In the final category is Morsi, who I will simply refer to as an Islamist candidate. Morsi was the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood and was the most socially conservative candidate in the elections, making him clearly fit into this category. Some may take issue with my categorization, particularly regarding Aboul Fotouh. One could argue that he fits better with Morsi in the Islamist category than with Sabbahi as a revolutionary. In fact, Aboul Fotouh’s campaign purposefully presented him as a link between these two groups. However, I will place Aboul Fotouh with Sabbahi for the purposes of my research because I believe that despite his support from the Salafist Al-Nour Party, his campaign was too liberally Islamist to be placed with Morsi and placed more of an emphasis on third-way, revolutionary ideals.

Categories of Governorates

I have placed Cairo’s 27 governorates into three different groups. The Egyptian government places Egypt’s governorates into four categories: urban, Lower Egypt, Upper Egypt, and border governorates, but I have decided that it is more effective for my research to alter these categories slightly. The four governorates classified by the Egyptian government as urban (Cairo,
Alexandria, Port Said, Suez) are those that have no rural populations because they are actually cities. I will keep these governorates’ ‘urban’ status but add to it other governorates whose population has a substantial urban majority. The first of these added governorates is the Red Sea, whose population is 95% urban according to available census data. The second addition, Giza, is slightly more complicated. The Giza governorate used to be very small and simply consist of the neighborhood that lays on the outskirts of the greater Cairo area. However, in April 2011, Egypt’s Prime Minister chose to absorb the no longer existent governorate, Helwan, into Giza. This not only increased the size of the Giza governorate by a large amount, it also created a diverse population within itself. Now, there is the Giza of the pyramids, which is considered to be one of Cairo’s neighborhoods and as such has been developed, and there is the Giza that used to be Helwan, which is made up of rural villages such as those we would see in other governorates. Therefore, it is difficult to place Giza into either the urban or rural category. However, I have chosen to add Giza as one of my urban governorates because overall its population is 64% urban according to available census data. It is important however to keep this issue in mind as I examine the electoral results. Turning back to my categorization of governorates, my final list of urban governorates is as follows: Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, Red Sea, and Giza.

My second group of governorates is located in Lower Egypt, in the Delta region stretching from Cairo to the northern coast. I have chosen to use the same governorates as the Egyptian government (Damietta, Daqalia, Al Sharqia, Qalyubia, Gharbia, Monufia, Beheira, and Ismailia) with the exception of Kafr el-Sheikh. I have chosen to exclude this governorate from

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31 Carrie Wickham, personal interview, March 25, 2013.
32 Population in Governorates (Urban/Rural).
my examination because it contains Sabbahi’s hometown and his results in the governorate are not representative of regular voter behavior in Egypt.

The final group is made up of the rest of the governorates, which are rural in nature. I have chosen to place the Egyptian government’s ‘border governorates’ into this category, rather than keep them separate, because I don’t believe that their geographical location on borders has any effect on voter behavior. This final category consists of the final 12 governorates: Beni Suef, Fayoum, Minya, Asyut, Sohag, Qena, Aswan, Luxor, New Valley, Matrouh, North Sinai, and South Sinai.

Hypothesis Testing: Urban/Rural Divide

My predictions in the first round center on two hypotheses. My first hypothesis predicts that whether a governorate is rural or urban will have the foremost influence on how it votes. I expect that the more urban a governorate is, the more likely it will vote for candidates in the third-way, revolutionary category. The rest of the governorates, which are rural in nature, will vote depending on organizational effects. Therefore, I hypothesize that Nile Delta governorates were more likely to vote for the secular, feloul candidates, and that the final group of rural governorates will vote for Morsi, the Islamist candidate. I hypothesize that the reason that these different rural areas voted differently is because of the preexisting networks that mobilized in favor of a certain candidate. In the Nile Delta, this network was that of the old NDP, while in the others it was the Muslim Brotherhood.

I will first examine whether the evidence supports my hypothesis regarding urban governorates. I will also examine the relationship between levels of education and religiosity in order to test my claim that these serve as two of the mechanisms making the urban/rural divide
particularly salient in Egypt’s case. I will then turn to the two rural categories of governorates and examine whether my hypothesis based on organizational effects holds true.

My first hypothesis predicts that the six urban governorates will vote at higher rates for the third-way, revolutionary candidates, Aboul Fotouh and Sabbahi. Conversely, rural governorates will either vote at higher rates for the Islamist candidate or for the secular, *feloul* candidates. The results reveal a relationship between rurality and voting for these latter two categories of candidates. Each of the governorates where Shafiq and Moussa received the most amount of votes fall into the rural category. Additionally, Morsi came in first in the majority of rural governorates. If we look beyond which governorates these candidates came in first, we see this trend continues. Morsi received his highest proportions of votes all in rural governorates and received his lowest proportions of votes almost exclusively in urban governorates (specifically Cairo, Red Sea, Alexandria, and Port Said) where he lost by significant margins.

Trends around Shafiq’s vote share were similar, as he came in first and did his best in Nile Delta regions (which will be discussed further). Moussa received his highest proportions of votes almost exclusively in rural areas, although he also did well in Suez, where he came within 3% of beating Morsi. However, his lowest proportions of vote share were also in rural governorates, so we may not be able to discern as easily from the electoral results which types of governorates favored Moussa.

Now I will examine the other side to this hypothesis: the third way, revolutionary candidates’ performance in urban governorates. In four out of six urban governorates, Sabbahi received the largest amount of votes. In three of these he received a significant amount more of the vote share than the other candidates. Cairo, the fourth governorate where he came in first, was the only one where another candidate, in this case Shafiq, received a similar amount of vote
Sabbahi received all of his lowest proportions of vote share in rural regions. There is a striking difference between where Sabbahi’s performance in urban and rural governorates. The portions of vote share in places where he did best (urban) are very large, while the portion of vote share in places where he did his worst (rural) are very small. This suggests that support for Sabbahi is strongly linked to the urban/rural divide.

In the other two urban governorates, Suez and Giza, Morsi received the most votes. Suez, however, was a close race, as Morsi came in first only by a small margin and Sabbahi, Aboul Fotouh, and Moussa all received very close proportions of votes. Morsi came in first in Giza by a nearly 6% margin, which would contradict my hypothesis. However, these results are likely due to the disparate living conditions within the governorate. Part of the governorate is much more urban in nature, which would explain why Sabbahi came in second, and the other part is very rural. Additionally, Giza is known to be a Brotherhood stronghold. With this context in mind, it is much more logical that we would see Morsi receive the most amount of votes. Due to the difficulty in categorizing Giza as either urban or rural, it is difficult to use Giza to demonstrate trends along the urban/rural divide.

Finally, I turn to Aboul Fotouh’s electoral results to see whether they fit with my hypothesis. I expected to see that Aboul Fotouh, as a third way revolutionary, would do best in urban governorates. However, we find that the opposite is true. The governorates where he did best all fall into the rural category. Additionally, the only places where he came close to receiving the largest proportion of votes were also in rural governorates. The two governorates where he did come in first were both rural. In urban governorates, he did not receive proportions of the vote large enough to threaten other candidates except in Suez. These results contradict my hypothesis and suggest two things. First, I may have placed Aboul Fotouh in the wrong category.
of candidates and that these results are demonstrating that in the end voters supported Aboul Fotouh because of his Islamist policies, not his revolutionary ones. The second reason behind Aboul Fotouh’s poor performance in urban governorates could be that Sabbahi took votes in these areas from Aboul Fotouh. This would mean that voters supported Aboul Fotouh because of his third way policies, but that in the end Sabbahi was a more attractive third way candidate.

Overall, the electoral results demonstrate that there is indeed a relationship between urbanism and support for Sabbahi, although this was not also found to be true with the other third way, revolutionary candidate, Aboul Fotouh. Conversely, Morsi, Shafiq, and Moussa all did their best in rural governorates, and almost exclusively did their worst in urban ones. Table 1.3 below displays which type of governorates (either rural or urban) each candidate came in first in. In order to also display this information in a less dichotomous way, I have provided average candidate performance in urban and rural governorates, which can be seen in Table 1.4. Since Kafr el-Sheikh is not representative of regular voter behavior I have removed it from the data in both of these tables so as not to skew the results (which is particularly important in Table 1.4).

**Table 1.3- Candidate that Came in First by Urbanism/Rurality at Governorate Level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban/Rural Governorate</th>
<th>Morsi</th>
<th>Shafiq</th>
<th>Sabbahi</th>
<th>Aboul Fotouh</th>
<th>Moussa</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1.4- Average Vote Share in Urban and Rural Governorates by Candidate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban/Rural Governorate</th>
<th>Morsi (%)</th>
<th>Shafiq (%)</th>
<th>Sabbahi (%)</th>
<th>Aboul Fotouh (%)</th>
<th>Moussa (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>19.47</td>
<td>16.85</td>
<td>28.04</td>
<td>17.86</td>
<td>15.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>28.66</td>
<td>20.08</td>
<td>13.24</td>
<td>20.58</td>
<td>13.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Now that we have discussed the urban/rural divide in general, I will look more closely at the different factors that this divide influences. I believe that there are three central aspects that this cleavage causes: religiosity, education, and access to various information sources. The latter will be examined as I test my second hypothesis, but first I will look at the former two to see their relation to the electoral results. In the available census data on education among those 10 years and older, illiteracy was the lowest level possible, while the highest required having a post-university education. The highest levels of education had extremely small numbers in every governorate (none made it even to 1% of their population), so I have chosen to look instead at the second highest level of education, a university degree. In the governorates with the highest levels of illiteracy: Beni Suef, Fayoum, Minya, Asyut, and Beheira, Morsi received the highest number of votes. In the five governorates with the highest percentages of university educated citizens (Cairo, Giza, Alexandria, Port Said, and Red Sea), Sabbahi came in first in every one except Giza (won by Morsi).

Table 1.5 below illustrates which candidates came in first in which governorates, categorized by level of education. I have categorized these governorates into high, moderate, or low levels of education using the available census data. This census data provides the percentage of each governorate’s population that has a particular level of education, ranging from illiterate to university. I used this information to group governorates into one of the three categories, by examining how their population is distributed along these lines. These groupings are relative to each other, as discerning whether or not a governorate is well educated compared to another country would not necessarily be as helpful. The group with the highest level of education, interestingly, is made up of the exact same governorates that I have categorized as urban (Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, Red Sea, and Giza). Those governorates with moderate levels of
education are: New Valley, North Sinai, South Sinai, Gharbia, Monufia, Aswan, Luxor, Kafr el-Sheikh, Daqalia, Damietta, and Qalyubia. Those governorates with low levels of education are: Beni Suef, Fayoum, Minya, Asyut, Sohag, Qena, Beheira, Sohag, Matrouh, Ismailia, and Al Sharqia. This data indicates a strong relationship between level of education and voting behavior.\(^{33}\)

### Table 1.5- Candidate that Came in First by Education at Governorate Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education of Governorate</th>
<th>Morsi</th>
<th>Shafiq</th>
<th>Sabbahi</th>
<th>Aboul Fotouh</th>
<th>Moussa</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I will now turn to religion and its relation to voter behavior in the elections. I expect that governorates that have higher levels of Islamic religiosity to prefer Islamist candidates while governorates with low levels of Islamic religiosity to vote for candidates with more secular platforms. Like income, religion is a factor that is related to the urban-rural divide in Egypt. Copts and atheists, the only real religious alternatives to Egypt’s Sunni Muslims, are nearly completely clustered in Cairo, Alexandria, and somewhat in the urban areas of Upper Egypt like the Red Sea.\(^{34}\) Most of the other governorates are made up of virtually all Sunni Muslim Egyptians.

The governorates with the highest concentrations of Copts (and atheists for that matter) all went to Sabbahi. This may be for a few reasons. First, these Copts and atheists may have

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voted for a secular candidate in order to protect themselves from Islamists, who many thought would infringe upon minority rights if they were elected. Second, Copts, atheists, and non-pious Muslims may not have prioritized Islamist platforms in a presidential candidate, thus they voted on other policies. Without Islamism as a priority, voters are more likely to vote for one of the three secular candidates, whereas for voters who ranked Islamism highly in their evaluation of candidates, sometimes other unfavorable policy platforms were overridden. Finally, mosques and other Islamic organizations, such as the Brotherhood, are common settings in rural areas for social interactions and sources of political or current events news. Thus, they are more likely to support Islamist candidates both because of Islam’s importance in their community and because of their lack of exposure to alternative religious views that may have challenged and persuaded them to vote otherwise.

**Hypothesis Testing: Organizational effects in Rural Governorates**

I now turn to my next hypothesis that explains voting in rural governorates. I predicted that rural governorates would either vote for the secular, *féloul* candidates or the Brotherhood’s Islamist candidate. I believe that the ultimate influence on rural voter behavior is the existing networks in these areas due to the lack of access to multiple, varied sources of information. I expect that the Nile Delta governorates were more likely to vote for Shafiq because of the strength of the NDP network in this area, while in other rural regions the Brotherhood’s network went unrivaled.

Of the eight governorates in the Nile Delta category, Shafiq received the most votes in five. Shafiq beat out the other candidates in Monufia, Al Sharqia, Gharbia, and Qalyubia by substantial margins, while he barely came in first in Daqalia (with Sabbahi and Morsi both
receiving very close vote shares). In Damietta, Aboul Fotouh received the largest number of votes, with Morsi a close second. In Beheira and Islamilia, Morsi received the largest number of vote shares and no other candidates come very close. Additionally, Shafiq’s vote share in the non-Delta, rural governorates is not high enough to challenge the winning candidate (usually Morsi). Although there is some variation, these results indicate that there is indeed a positive relationship between Nile Delta governorates and their likelihood of voting for Shafiq. However, my hypothesis attempted to predict the likelihood of voting for the secular, feloul candidates, which also includes Moussa. In fact, the electoral results show that Moussa did poorly in the Delta governorates. Moussa did not receive enough votes in any of these governorates to challenge the first place candidate, and he received many of his lowest proportions of vote share in these areas.

Now I turn to my final category of governorates, which I predict are more likely to vote for Morsi. Of the 12 governorates, nine went to Morsi (Beni Suef, Fayoum, Minya, Asyut, Sohag, Qena, Aswan, New Valley, and North Sinai). Matrouh went to Aboul Fotouh, Luxor went to Shafiq, and South Sinai went to Moussa. Again, despite variation we see a clear tendency towards Morsi in these rural governorates with little NDP presence. Now that I have demonstrated the presence of a relationship between regions of rural governorates and their support for certain candidates, I will now seek to confirm the underlying mechanism. I expected these relationships to be a result of organizational effects because many villagers’ livelihoods and knowledge are dependent on whatever organization has the largest or most influential presence. Thus, if one organization mobilizes in support of a certain candidate, the region in which it has power will be told information biased towards this candidate and may also feel pressured by their peers or the organizations to which they are indebted to vote a certain way. I
have attempted to test my hypothesis against the available information on voting in rural areas and found that nearly all reports corroborate my hypothesis. These reports indicate that, despite the fact that the Brotherhood is known to have a strong network in the Nile Delta region, ultimately the remaining NDP business and political networks were activated more forcefully in this region. Allegedly, after many old NDP figures lost seats to Brotherhood candidates in the parliamentary elections, they “decided to retaliate using strong familial and tribal connections to beat Morsi.” This notion was reiterated in countless reports, which said that the NDP used preexisting patronage networks of businessmen and politicians who had connections to the former regime in order to mobilize support for Shafiq. One illustrative example of this type of campaigning is a former politician, Kamal al-Shazli, who died in 2010 but whose network remains strong and active in a village in Monufia. One journalist explained that “Shazli’s spider-web networks reach into every business and every government office throughout al-Bagour. You either owe your job to him, or your business, or if you weren’t in his good graces, you owe your poverty to him.” Another report says that “moreover, many state employees (around 5.1 million of them eligible to vote) and their families supported Shafiq, owing either to direct instructions from their bosses, or to the perceived threat of creeping MB influence on government bureaucracies.”

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The latter part of this quote raises another important factor in why these networks could so easily mobilize in favor of Shafiq: growing dissatisfaction with the Brotherhood, and by extension, Morsi. Many of the interviews with Nile Delta citizens reported in media sources at the time include some quote about how they no longer can trust the Brotherhood. Among their complaints are that the Brotherhood has not done anything with the power it so long sought for, that its only legislative accomplishments have been in its own interests rather than in the peoples’, that it has broken all its promises, and that it will simply create a regime of its own. We see clearly that in this part of Egypt, the NDP was able to successfully mobilize its patronage networks in order to flame anti Brotherhood sentiments. Other rural governorates, however, did not have such a strong NDP presence. This meant that villagers received much more of their information from the Brotherhood, who was able to easily mobilize this network for Morsi. These results follow my expectations. Overall, rural governorates supported the candidate that was able to use their supporting organization most effectively in each region.

Choosing Between Similar Candidates

Now that we have determined which factors contributed to voters choosing candidates with particular categories of policies, the question we must ask now is how they chose between similar candidates. My examination revealed that, contrary to my hypothesis, candidates with similar policies did not actually do well in the same governorates. The mistake I made when forming my hypothesis was to not account for competition between similar candidates. It may be the case that two similar candidates appeal to the same voters, however this does not mean that they will receive similar amounts of vote share among these voters. In fact, as we saw in the results, it means that these two candidates must compete for these votes. Therefore, if one of
these candidates can find an advantage, they can then take many of the votes away from the other, resulting in their poor showings in governorates that may have still supported them, just not as their first choice.

In order to examine this more closely I will first look at the ‘secular, feloul’ category of candidates. The foremost difference between Shafiq and Moussa was their relation to the remaining NDP. The NDP chose to endorse, unofficially, Shafiq instead of Moussa, which would explain why we saw that Moussa did poorly in the Delta while Shafiq did so well. However, the NDP was not the only distinction between the two candidates. One of their largest policy differences was their stance in relation to Islamists. While both had secular agendas, they differed in how staunchly they claimed they opposed these policies. Shafiq created an image of himself as a strong leader who would not allow any further power to fall into the Islamists’ hands. Moussa presented a more diplomatic point of view, saying that the president must negotiate with all of Egypt’s political groups. While many may have considered diplomacy and negotiation positive attributes, the Coptic Christian and women voters who feared for their rights did not feel the same way. The priests and bishops of the Coptic Christian Church reportedly made it clear that Copts must vote either for Shafiq or Moussa. However, as the election neared, the Church’s leadership unofficially chose Shafiq as the better candidate for Copts due to his stronger stance against Islamists. Copts believed that “unlike Moussa, Shafiq would launch a head-on confrontation with the Islamist trend to curtail its mushrooming powers.”38 Shafiq’s strongman image also aided him in gaining votes outside the Coptic community, among those tired of the revolution. According to a poll taken by the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and

Strategic Studies (ACPSS), many Egyptians thought that he was the only candidate with the firm leadership to set the country straight. Although we must question the accuracy of these opinion polls, as I have already shown that they cannot necessarily be trusted, these sentiments were reflected in many quotes. One mayor expressed that he would vote for Shafiq because “he is the most valuable candidate in ensuring us stability and bringing back security to this country.”

Additionally, a political analyst at ACPSS explained that many have grown impatient with “the irresponsible behaviour of the revolutionary youth movements that toppled Mubarak, and the dismal performance of the Islamist forces in Parliament in the last few months.” Ragaie Attia, a lawyer, stated that “the irresponsibility of these revolutionary youth movements led the vast majority of citizens to seek shelter in a man with a strong personality and who can stand up to these anarchistic elements and contain Islamists.” With this context in mind, it is easier to understand the large differences that the two candidates had in the electoral results. Additionally it is clear that Shafiq is likely responsible for Moussa’s poor showing.

The choice between Sabbahi and Aboul Fotouh is clear: the central issue that they differed on was religion in politics. Sabbahi had a secular agenda while Aboul Fotouh was an Islamist, thus, it was easy for revolutionary voters to decide between the two. In fact, this choice became even clearer after a presidential debate in which only Aboul Fotouh and Moussa participated. Reportedly, during the debate viewers believed that Aboul Fotouh’s performance

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39 “How Did Mubarak’s Last PM Make It To Egypt’s Second Round of Presidential Elections?”
41 “How Did Mubarak’s Last PM Make It To Egypt’s Second Round of Presidential Elections?”
demonstrated he was more of an Islamist candidate than initially thought to be. This may have caused a shift among voters deciding between Sabbahi and Aboul Fotouh, resulting in Aboul Fotouh’s poor showing in the urban governorates.

In addition to deciding between Sabbahi and Aboul Fotouh, I would also like to examine how voters chose between Aboul Fotouh and Morsi. As I discussed, I placed Aboul Fotouh in a category with Sabbahi rather than Morsi because I felt that overall he was considered more of a third-way, revolutionary candidate. However, as it is clear that many voters also associated him with Islamists policies, it is interesting to study how voters chose between the two Islamist candidates. In this decision, we can see the presence of organizational effects on voter behavior. At first, Aboul Fotouh’s more liberal stance made him an attractive candidate because he presented the image of an open-minded bridge between Islamists and liberals. Under this platform, Aboul Fotouh gained a relatively large support base. However, as the elections approached the Brotherhood began a campaign against him that seemed to have a large effect on electoral results. Firstly, the Brotherhood banned its members from voting for any candidate besides Morsi, a rule that struck Aboul Fotouh’s campaign the hardest. This ban alone eliminated a large portion of Aboul Fotouh’s support base, which came from the Brotherhood (mostly in the form of youth members). Next, the Brotherhood reportedly began “going to the villages and telling the locals that Abul-Fotouh has abandoned the cause of Islam; that he has liberal women and Copts working on his campaign.” This crucial campaign move was likely partially responsible for Morsi’s increase in support shortly before the elections (at the expense of Aboul

43 “Reading the Tea-Leaves.”
Fotouh). This is one clear example of the importance of rurality. The Brotherhood was able to mobilize its already established network in order to spread negative information about Aboul Fotouh, who was not able to retaliate or respond due to the limited reach of his campaign network.

Conclusions

Overall, the electoral results largely fit with my expectations. Urban governorates like Cairo whose populations have had more education and a larger variety of religious views voted at higher rates for Sabbahi, a liberal, revolutionary candidate. Amongst rural voters, those in the Nile Delta region were more likely to vote for the candidate associated with the NDP because of the organization’s ability to encourage anti-Brotherhood sentiments and to mobilize remaining patronage networks. In other rural governorates, the NDP had a much smaller presence and did not provide any challenge to the Brotherhood’s existing social, religious, and economic networks. Thus, these regions were more likely to vote for Morsi.

It is important to note that in some cases my hypotheses were not completely confirmed. First, Aboul Fotouh, did not come in first or even perform well in any urban governorates. Instead, he received the most votes only in two rural governorates, Matrouh and Damietta. A likely explanation for these results is that despite his popularity with urban, revolutionary voters, his support was always second to Sabbahi, who took nearly every urban governorate. It is also important to keep in mind that Aboul Fotouh’s image could change drastically depending on the voter. On one hand, he was officially endorsed by the Salafists and used to hold very conservative beliefs. This helped him by encouraging ultraconservative Muslims to support him who would have otherwise voted for Morsi, however it also discouraged more secular voters. On
the other hand, many of his current policies were very liberal and he encouraged the idea of linking liberalism with Islamism. Yet again, this could either be a negative or a positive depending on the voter. Because of this strange characteristic to Aboul Fotouh’s candidacy, it is difficult to know exactly why voters chose Aboul Fotouh.

Organizational effects seem to have played an important role in these elections. Not only did they influence voters in rural areas to choose either Morsi or Shafiq, but they also affected voters choosing between Moussa and Shafiq, Sabbahi and Aboul Fotouh, and Aboul Fotouh and Morsi. Strategic targeting by these candidates seemed to persuade the numerous uncertain voters. This influence also reveals that only Shafiq and Morsi had preexisting networks to support them. Although Moussa is considered to have a relationship with the regime, ultimately the NDP remnants chose Shafiq as their candidate. These networks proved to be influential sources of support, particularly in rural areas where education and political knowledge is minimal.
PART II- SECOND ROUND OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

The second round of the presidential elections pitted Morsi against Shafiq, two candidates with strikingly different platforms. The attitude surrounding the runoffs was different than that of the first round. With 13 candidates to choose from in the first round, nearly every Egyptian seemed to find one they could support as president. Now that the field had been narrowed down to two, this was no longer the case. In the cities in particular, many asked how it was possible that these were the two candidates that garnered the largest amount of votes. Countless sources, both official, like Al-Ahram, and informal, like bloggers, endlessly described their choice in the runoffs as a worst-case scenario. In just a brief overview of these sources, one can find the runoffs described as a choice between a rock and a hard place, cholera and the plague, Islamist fascism versus military fascism, and an oppressive and corrupt police state versus a rigid theocracy.

The only other option for voters was to boycott or spoil their vote, for reasons that varied from ideological to strategic. Some argued that voters should not validate the interim SCAF government and the results of the first round (which some thought were rigged) by voting in the

44 Dina Ezzat, “Mubarak’s NDP Versus the Brotherhood: Déjà vu?” *Ahram Online*, 27 May 2012, [http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/36/0/42979/Presidential-elections-/0/Mubaraks-NDP-versus-the-Brotherhood-D%C3%A9j%C3%A0-vu.aspx](http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/36/0/42979/Presidential-elections-/0/Mubaraks-NDP-versus-the-Brotherhood-D%C3%A9j%C3%A0-vu.aspx) (accessed 30 Mar. 2013).
47 “Mubarak’s NDP Versus the Brotherhood: Déjà vu?”
runoffs. Others simply could not support either candidate and thought that if enough voters boycotted or spoiled their vote, Egyptians could deal a significant blow to the legitimacy of whoever won and reduce their power in office. These types of rationale were supported by prominent organizations such as Sabbahi’s Al-Karama Party, further encouraging voters to follow this lead. However, many attempted to convince those considering this path that if they were to go through with the boycott, they would simply be aiding a certain candidate by not voting against him. Many also pointed out that there was no way that enough people would boycott to have any significant impact on the elections, therefore they would simply be wasting their vote.\footnote{Bassem Sabry, “Morsi, Shafiq, or Boycott: A Voters Guide to Egypt’s Presidential Runoff.” 14 Jun, 2012, \url{http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/44859.aspx} (accessed 30 Mar. 2013).} Overall, numbers of invalid votes increased from 1.72% in the first round to 3.79% in the runoffs, suggesting that a certain amount of voters did indeed go through with spoiling their vote. The boycott option seems to have been less successful, however, as the participation rate actually increased from the first round. Due to the relatively small proportion of voters who seem to have chosen this route, it will not have a significant presence in my examination of the runoffs. Instead, I will focus on the options that most Egyptians had to decide between: Morsi versus Shafiq. And for those Egyptians that did not favor either of these two in the first round: a rock versus a hard place.

Presented with this decision, how then did those Egyptians that did not vote for Morsi or Shafiq in the first round pick which candidate was the lesser of two evils? Along with the shift in attitude from the first to second round came a shift in how voters made their decision. As we saw in the first round, certain demographic factors influenced which policies a voter would prefer, and they would then choose the candidate who supported these policies. In the runoffs, however, the candidates’ policies were quickly overshadowed by the broader ideologies they came to
symbolize. Morsi and Shafiq represented stances on completely opposite ends of the spectrum. Additionally, there were only two stances that voters discussed and decided based on: religion in politics and their support of the goals of the revolution. On the topic of religion, Morsi was an Islamist who would implement Islamic ideals in the government and the Constitution. Shafiq was a secularist who would maintain Egypt’s civil state. Both of these stances could be seen as positive or negative simply dependent on the Egyptian making the decision. On one hand many had no desire to see Islam gain any more of a presence in the Egyptian government than it already had. However many also thought that what Egypt needed in order to right its path is the honesty of a pious president and favored a central role for Islam in the affairs of the state.

The second topic that was constantly mentioned in discussions of the two candidates was their attitude towards the old regime and the revolution. Morsi came to represent the revolution and its only chance for survival, partially as a reaction to his opponent but also because he attempted to frame himself this way. Shafiq, never able to rid himself of the term *feloul*, symbolized the counter-revolution and was expected to reinstate the last regime’s policies if elected. Again, how Egyptians received these images was completely dependent on the individual. While my description of Shafiq in regards to the revolution may sound inherently biased or negative, many in fact though that his relationship to the old regime meant that he would be able to rid the country of the instability and chaos that had reigned ever since Mubarak’s ousting. Conversely, voters could either consider Morsi to be the champion of the revolution, and their only way to ensure it had not happened in vain, or as an unfit and inexperienced candidate.

Perhaps with the exception of Morsi as the candidate of the revolution, all of these associations had already been made, whether intentionally or not, with the candidates in the
previous round. Morsi had always been labeled an Islamist candidate and Shafiq a secular one. Shafiq had always been called *feloul*, but was also thought of by many as the only candidate who could bring stability and security back to Egypt. What, then, was so different about voting in the runoffs? Firstly, 51.56% of voters in the first round no longer had their first choice candidate as an option. They now had to choose between voting for one of two candidates they did not initially support or a boycott. Particularly in this case where many Egyptians not only hadn’t initially supported either candidate, but actually disliked both of them, this inherently changes how voters choose. Secondly, although these associations were already present in the candidates’ policy platforms in the first round, what changed is that these symbolisms came to be the only important factors. Policies regarding anything else, such as the economy, played a significantly smaller role in voters’ decisions. Additionally, their policies regarding the two topics that voters did consider were no longer policies but larger ideologies. While in the first round voters weighed different policies against each other and considered the gradated differences between candidates, the second round produced a two part question: first, does one candidate represent both of the stances on religion in politics and on the goals of the revolution that you support? If not, and each candidate represents one stance that matters to you, which topic do you value highest? This second question was an important one for many Egyptians, such as the ‘revolutionaries’ (the young, educated, urban Egyptians that played an important role in the revolution). A large portion of the revolutionaries voted for Sabbahi in the first round, and if not Sabbahi then Aboul Fotouh. They are characterized as wanting the continuation of a secular, civil state and equal rights, in addition to the continuation and political implementation of the revolutionary ideals. Voters like these, therefore, had a difficult decision to make. Do they vote for Shafiq, who will not allow Islamists to overrun government but is a symbol for what they
fought to overthrow, or do they choose Morsi, who would allow Islamists to dominate
government and the Constitution, but was their only choice to defend the revolution? This
decision, a painful one for many, came down to which issue mattered more in the eyes of the
voter.

Before I begin to examine the runoff results, I will briefly discuss the campaign efforts of
both candidates. Both candidates knew that there were many undecided and uncertain voters and
were aware of these voters’ concerns. While campaigning, each candidate attempted to address
the issues people raised with them as well as emphasize and encourage criticism of their
opponent. Shafiq, well aware of his association with the old regime, held multiple press
conferences where he took strong stances to appeal to revolutionaries. Among these statements,
Shafiq “pledg[ed] now, to all Egyptians, we shall start a new era. There is no going back. We
must accept the results [of the revolution’."⁴⁹ Shafiq also tried to portray Morsi and the
Brotherhood as a group that is the worst choice for revolutionaries because they will simply
establish yet another authoritarian regime whose only difference from the previous would be that
in this one, the Islamists were the one with a monopoly on power. In order to convince voters of
this he reminded them of the promises the Brotherhood broke, their past secret agreements with
the old regime, and said that the “revolution has been hijacked and I am committed to bringing it
back.”⁵⁰ In one final statement, Shafiq said that “the Brotherhood represents darkness and
sectarianism; having them in power will take us backwards. They will seek to dominate their
political rivals… you must choose a better future for your children, not a country where there is

⁴⁹ Zeinab El Gundy, “Shafiq: No Going Back to the Former Regime.” 26 May, 2012,
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/36/122/42945/Presidential-elections-/Presidential-
⁵⁰ Ibid.
no place for anyone except those of a particular faction.” Shafiq also made direct appeals to the same women and Coptic voters as he had in the first round.

The Morsi campaign has made equally forceful accusations and many appeals to certain voter demographics. To the revolutionaries, Morsi promised that as president he would ask the judiciary to review the cases of the protestors killed during the revolution, and he also held a press conference specifically for women. In this press conference he attempted to appease the concerns of some women who fear that his Islamist policies will restrict their freedoms. In an attempt to further appease the fears of women and minorities, Morsi also repeatedly promised to form an inclusive government. Morsi, who has little natural speaking ability or charisma, was aided tremendously by the Brotherhood in the runoffs as well. Ikhwan Online, the Brotherhood’s Arabic and English website, was just one facet through which the organization released information targeted at voters. After the first round results were finalized the website announced that in addition to a popular Egyptian singer, Sabbahi and Aboul Fotouh had endorsed Morsi (which was false, as Sabbahi never endorsed Morsi and Aboul Fotouh did not until later). They also released “reports from mothers of martyrs who say that anyone who votes for Shafiq will be killing their children again.” This was a powerful statement, particularly for the conflicted revolutionaries who already felt uncomfortable voting for someone that had close ties with the very man they had just overthrown.

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While it is important to keep in mind the campaigns behind these candidates and how they may have appealed to voters, there is no evidence that they ultimately had any effect on the electoral results as they did in the first round. I did not encounter any reports where a voter expressed thoughts that echoed the candidates’ attempts to reframe their image; instead, voters reiterated the standard views on Morsi and Shafiq. Their importance here stems more so from their demonstration of voters’ concerns. Both candidates’ focused nearly all their attention on the two issues I have already identified: religion and the revolution. Their focus on these issues and on appealing to specific groups of voters confirms their importance in the runoffs. I would additionally like to call attention to the fact that much of the campaigning by Morsi and Shafiq took the form of criticism of the other candidate rather than emphasis on their own platform. This reveals a crucial element of these elections: many voters made their decision based on who they liked the least. Support for a certain candidate was as a result of deciding it was impossible to support the other. Even political endorsements, such as those of Aboul Fotouh and Abu Ela Mady’s Al-Wasat (Middle) Party, said that voters must prevent the election of one candidate by voting for another. Specifically, they called for support of Morsi in order to prevent an ally of Mubarak from gaining power. This endorsement in the negative underlines the frustration of many Egyptians with the choice they were presented with and how they came to decide.
THE RESULTS

Table 2.1 below depicts the electoral results of the runoffs broken down by governorate and displays the winner in bold. According to official results, overall voter turnout increased from 46% in the first round to 52% in the runoffs. The number of invalid votes nearly doubled, going from 1.72% in the first round to 3.19% in the runoffs. This is due to the push by some organizations to demonstrate their frustration with their choice by invalidating their votes.

Table 2.1-Electoral Results of 2012 Presidential Election Runoffs (by Governorate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Morsi votes</th>
<th>Morsi %</th>
<th>Shafiq votes</th>
<th>Shafiq %</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aswan</td>
<td>164,826</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>152,598</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>317,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asyut</td>
<td>554,519</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>347,020</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>901,539</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxor</td>
<td>124,120</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>140,233</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>264,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>970,131</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>717,017</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>1,687,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismailia</td>
<td>204,307</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>172,269</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>376,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>46,803</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>47,988</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>94,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beheira</td>
<td>907,377</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>640,894</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>1,548,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beni Suef</td>
<td>512,079</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>258,263</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>770,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Said</td>
<td>109,768</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>130,122</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>239,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giza</td>
<td>1,351,526</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>911,899</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>2,263,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sinai</td>
<td>12,286</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>12,456</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>24,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daqalia</td>
<td>845,390</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>1,059,354</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>1,904,744</td>
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<tr>
<td>Damietta</td>
<td>258,475</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>202,928</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>461,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez</td>
<td>129,229</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>76,734</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>205,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sohag</td>
<td>531,636</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>381,217</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>912,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Sharqia</td>
<td>881,581</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>1,046,635</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>1,928,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sinai</td>
<td>58,415</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>36,549</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>94,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gharbia</td>
<td>583,748</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>992,135</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>1,575,883</td>
</tr>
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<td>Fayoum</td>
<td>591,995</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>169,335</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>761,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>1,505,103</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>1,894,007</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>3,399,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalyubia</td>
<td>609,253</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>851,284</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>1,460,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qena</td>
<td>285,894</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>228,195</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>514,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafr el-Sheikh</td>
<td>425,514</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>342,491</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>768,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monufia</td>
<td>376,677</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>946,588</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>1,323,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minya</td>
<td>858,557</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>474,120</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>1,332,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matrouh</td>
<td>65,095</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>16,147</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>81,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Valley</td>
<td>39,934</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>12,075</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>52,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,230,131</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>12,347,380</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>25,577,511</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Egypt Elections 2012
Hypothesis Testing

My first hypothesis regarding the runoff results is that all the governorates that voted for Morsi or Shafiq in the first round would vote for the same candidate again in the second round. Since voters already chose one of these candidates as their first choice, it is logical that they would choose them again in the runoffs when the field has been narrowed even further. The results from the second round strongly confirm my hypothesis. In each of the 13 governorates where Morsi came in first in the first round, a majority voted for him in the second, while in each of the 6 governorates where Shafiq came in first in the first round, he received a majority in the second. Now that we have established that voters who already supported Morsi or Shafiq continued to support them in the runoffs, we may now turn to those governorates whose first choice was no longer an option.

My next hypothesis predicted that those governorates where Aboul Fotouh came in first in the first round were more likely to vote for Morsi in the second round. Morsi represented another Islamist candidate, and the only one of the two options who was thought to support the goals of the revolution. As Aboul Fotouh supporters are thought to have valued these characteristics in the first round, they would support the candidate with the next closest platform in the second: Morsi. Again, the results strongly confirm my expectations. The two governorates where Aboul Fotouh received the most amount of votes in the first round, Damietta and Matrouh, both went to Morsi in the second round. Morsi won both governorates by solid margins, with 56% of the vote in Damietta and a striking 80% in Matrouh. These results reflect the fact that Morsi supported stances on the revolution and religion that voters who initially supported Aboul Fotouh agreed with. Although not their first choice, when presented with a decision between an Islamist candidate who could ‘complete’ the revolution and a secularist
candidate who had ties with the old regime, Aboul Fotouh supporters logically found a more appealing platform in Morsi. Additionally, it is important to mention that after his loss in the first round, Aboul Fotouh officially endorsed Morsi in the runoffs. A statement made by the Aboul Fotouh campaign added that this “decision was a means of maintaining its struggle to purge state institutions of all elements of the former regime.”

On the other side of the spectrum were Moussa supporters, who both valued the maintenance of a civil state and had fewer concerns with regime association. My hypothesis regarding Moussa supporters states that the only governorate in which Moussa gained a majority in the first round (South Sinai) would vote for Shafiq in the runoffs. I expected to see this because those voters who supported Moussa in the first round most likely had fewer problems with their candidates being associated with the old regime, as Moussa was, and also agreed with Moussa’s secular stance. The next closest candidate to Moussa was Shafiq (particularly in the runoffs) therefore I hypothesized that these voters would vote for Shafiq. Additionally, as I mentioned in my examination of the previous round, tourism is a very important factor in Sinai, where many of Egypt’s resorts are located. Thus, despite the rurality of the governorate, we would expect that concerns of Islamist laws hurting tourism would further persuade Sinai voters to choose Shafiq in the runoffs. This is indeed what happened, as South Sinai went to Shafiq with 50.3% of the vote. It is important to note, however, that this is a very small margin, and so this relationship does not seem as strong as the one we saw between Aboul Fotouh and Morsi supporters.

Finally, I turn to those voters who chose Sabbahi in the first round. Of the three groups of voters, those that supported Sabbahi are perhaps the most important. Not only were these voters the most conflicted about which candidate to vote for in the runoffs, but they were also the voters in some of the most urban areas of Egypt. If we leave out the votes gained from Kafr el-Sheikh (which as I have already mentioned was Sabbahi’s birthplace and not representative of Egyptian voting patterns at large), Sabbahi won 1,674,627 votes from these urban governorates. The final results of the second round, which decided who would become the first freely elected president of Egypt and set the new course for the country, was decided by a margin of 882,751 votes. It is clear then, that for either candidate to win, they had to appeal to Sabbahi voters as best they could. However, this was a difficult task for both candidates, as many Sabbahi supporters, and Sabbahi himself, repeatedly expressed exasperation at the choice of the runoffs. Sabbahi chose not to endorse either candidate, and instead announced that his Al-Karama (Pride) Party “rejects the notion of the Muslim Brotherhood dominating the country’s legislative bodies and it also rejects the notion of handing power over to remnants of the old regime.”54 It is therefore likely that many of the purposefully voided ballots were those of Sabbahi supporters.

Sabbahi supporters were both the most numerous of undecided runoff voters and some of the most torn. As I have said, many of them were heavily involved in the Egyptian revolution, and felt as if their efforts would have been in vain if they voted for Shafiq. However, they were also very critical of the Islamist majority in Parliament, both in principle and in their recent performance. Thus, each candidate had one stance they preferred, but neither presented a favorable platform. I hypothesized that when these voters were forced to choose between which

topic they valued highest, they would vote along the issue of the revolution. Therefore, I expect to see that those governorates in which Sabbahi came first were more likely to vote for Morsi in the runoffs, because of the two choices he was the ‘candidate of the revolution.’ However, due to the difficult decision these voters were faced with this relationship may not be as strong as the others.

My expectations parallel the results of a countrywide poll taken a few days before the first round and the runoffs by the ACPSS in partnership with the Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI), published June 21st, 2012. This survey is on an individual level of analysis so I cannot use it directly as evidence to support my hypothesis, however its findings still serve as an interesting point of comparison to mine. This survey polled its respondents who supported Moussa, Aboul Fotouh, or Sabbahi in the first round to see which candidate they supported in the runoffs. Of those who supported Moussa in the first round, 71% supported Shafiq in the runoffs. Of those who supported Aboul Fotouh in the first round, 80% supported Morsi in the runoffs. Of those respondents who supported Sabbahi in the first round, the survey results say that in the runoffs 49% now supported Morsi, while 37% supported Shafiq and 14% supported neither candidate. This study suggests some support for my hypothesis, in that Sabbahi supporters had a harder time deciding between candidates, as is evident in the much smaller margin between Morsi and Shafiq. This is also reflected in the 14% who supported neither candidate. This number for the Moussa and Aboul Fotouh groups was 4% and 5%, so it is clear that Sabbahi supporters had a more difficult time. This is also likely due to the fact that Sabbahi and his political party chose to boycott the elections, prompting some of his supporters to follow suit. Now I will examine if this study’s results and my hypothesis regarding Sabbahi supporters is borne out by the evidence.
The results in Sabbahi governorates varied between Morsi and Shafiq. I will note that Kafr el-Sheikh voted for Morsi in the second round, which is not surprising due to the fact that, following my examination of the first round, if Sabbahi had not run Morsi would have come in first. However I have excluded this governorate from my analysis thus far and will continue to do so. Of the other four governorates won by Sabbahi, three went to Shafiq (Cairo, Red Sea, and Port Said) and one to Morsi (Alexandria). Morsi received a majority in Alexandria by a substantial margin of 15%. In Cairo and Port Said, Shafiq came in first by a margin of 11.4% and 8.4%, respectively. Red Sea was by far the closest of all these governorates, as Morsi received 49.4% of the vote and Shafiq 50.6%. These results do not offer support for my hypothesis, as the majority of governorates that supported Sabbahi in the first round went to Shafiq in the runoffs. However, the results in the Red Sea governorate are extremely close, and the margins in Cairo and Port Said were not strikingly large, so I would argue that they do not necessarily show an inverse relationship between Sabbahi supporters and likelihood of voting for Morsi. The most important purpose these results may serve, then, is to emphasize how split Sabbahi supporters were in the runoffs.

Additionally, these results contradict the results of the ACPSS/DEDI poll. When questioning why we may have received different results, we must remind ourselves that this poll may not be as accurate as we would hope. The ACPSS/DEDI poll was taken before the vote, not after. Therefore, due to the large amount of uncertainty surrounding these elections, these poll results are not as reliable as we may hope. Additionally, it is not at the same level of analysis as my study, which could cause variations in findings.

Many of the media sources that interviewed Sabbahi supporters reported that they felt that they could not allow themselves to vote for a member of the old regime, however, we see
that this thought was not reflected in the electoral results. There are a few potential explanations for why Sabbahi supporters may have ultimately supported Shafiq in the runoffs, although my study will not be able to test their accuracy. First, voters may not have bought into Morsi’s branding as the ‘candidate of the revolution,’ and may have instead been influenced by Shafiq’s campaigning which attempted to portray Islamists as just another authoritarian organization. My examination of the runoffs did not account for campaigning’s influence on voters, as I believe that these press conferences ultimately did not change voters’ opinions on candidates, however this may be something to examine more closely. Secondly, I did not consider the possibility that significant portions of Sabbahi’s support base consist of Coptic and women voters and that may have affected the electoral results in the runoffs. These groups may have favored Shafiq due to his secularism and his strong stance in favor of protecting minorities’ rights. Therefore, if they were a significant enough proportion, they could have influenced the trends we see in Sabbahi supporters’ candidate choices. Finally, there is the methodological concern that I have already mentioned should be kept in mind throughout my study. Due to the fact that I have chosen to examine the electoral results at the aggregate level, I may be accounting for many non-Sabbahi voters in my analysis. For example, in Cairo in the first round over one million voted for candidates that were not Morsi, Shafiq, or Sabbahi. Add these voters to the over 900,000 that voted for Shafiq as their first round, and you have reached the number of votes Shafiq received in Cairo in the runoffs. Thus, just because a governorate that went to Sabbahi in the first round went to Shafiq in the second does not necessarily mean that Sabbahi voters supported Shafiq in the second round. As I have already discussed, this is one major limitation of my study.

Conclusions
In this chapter I have attempted to explain what values and stances had the largest influence on Egyptians when faced with a decision between two unpalatable options. I found varying amounts of support for each of my hypotheses. First, I found that every single governorate where a majority voted for a runoff candidate in the first round had a majority vote for that same candidate in the second. This reveals that there was not a great deal of volatility. I then found that each governorate in which Aboul Fotouh came in first in the first round voted for Morsi in the second by solid margins. I found less support for my hypothesis on Moussa supporters, who I predicted would vote for Shafiq. The one governorate that did go to Moussa indeed voted for Shafiq in the runoffs, however by a very small margin. It is difficult to draw any concrete conclusions either for or against my hypothesis due to the fact that there was only one example to examine. Finally, I examined governorates where Sabbahi came in first in the first round. I predicted that they would choose to vote for Morsi in the runoffs due to the value they place on the revolution. However, I found that three of the governorates where Sabbahi received a majority in the first round went to Shafiq in the runoffs. I argue that this may not necessarily indicate that more Sabbahi supporters ultimately voted for Shafiq in the runoffs, however this is certainly a possibility. This finding would indicate that, in fact, those Sabbahi supporters that did not boycott decided in the end that they preferred regime remnants over Islamic domination.

It is difficult to exaggerate the significance of this election to Egyptians. The results of the runoffs would decide who would become Egypt’s first freely elected president, what path the country would take going forward, and what the new Constitution would look like. The extraordinariness of these founding elections was only emphasized by the frustration and uncertainty felt by many Egyptians. The legitimacy of the new president depended on these elections, but for many Morsi did not command the power of a newly elected president. First, he
won with 51.7% of the vote—hardly a mandate—and secondly, many believe that his election was simply a vote against Shafiq rather than a vote of confidence in his leadership and policy agenda.

Overall, the runoffs marked a frustrating time for many Egyptians who felt that the democratic freedoms they had fought for were not yielding the results they wanted. It is important to note, however, that these people are mostly those who live in cities and have access to the internet and media sources that allow them to broadcast their opinions. Although these Egyptians may have been confounded by the first round results, 60% of voters live outside of cities, and as my examination of the first round revealed, this creates a large impact on voting. The political landscape in the rural areas is very different from the one that these Egyptians were a part of, causing their votes to vary. This issue is clearly expressed in one young internet entrepreneur’s frustration: “so what a few hundred thousand packed Tahrir Square? We’re a country of 80 million…the media got this story all wrong, never seeing that Tahrir wasn’t Egypt.”

These presidential elections sent out a message to Egyptians and the world that they cannot underestimate the rural regions, which in the end chose the candidates that advanced to the runoffs, who became the first democratically elected president, and what Egypt’s new path would look like.

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CONCLUSIONS

First Round

In my examination of the first round of Egypt’s founding presidential elections, I found that the foremost influence on voter behavior was the urban/rural divide. In Egypt, there are large differences between the lives of those in cities and those in villages. First, rural Egyptians are more prone to rely on Islam, whether for services, social interaction, or a sense of identity. Second, citizens in rural areas typically have much lower levels of education and much less exposure to political knowledge like alternate ideologies and candidates. Finally, in addition to their physical isolation they are also very limited in their access to information. Much of the information they can gather comes through whatever organization has control and their access to alternative sources and opinions is limited. We saw the importance of this factor in its influence on rural voters in the first round. Nile Delta voters supported Shafiq, unlike other rural voters, because the NDP was able to mobilize their remaining networks. This also indicates that, despite the fact that the literature has paid limited attention to the campaign effects school in the context of new democracies, it played an important role in the Egyptian case. This may not be applicable in all new democracies, as the reason that campaign effects had such a large influence was because of the significance of the urban/rural divide; nonetheless, we should not disregard its importance and should keep it in mind when studying other new democracies.

Regarding the literature on voting in new democracies, my study has been able to provide support for the presence of certain trends. First, it is clear that uncertainty is an important factor in new democracies. Across regions, the revolutions and changes in the political sphere that lead to new democracies also result in confusion surrounding political actors and their objectives. New political parties and candidates enter on the scene, policy platforms are not as clear, and
voters have more difficulty discerning what or who to support. This lack of clarity and instability then impacts elections. As this uncertainty was present in both my study of Egypt and previous studies of Eastern European democracies, it seems clear that it is a commonality across new democracies, if not a fundamental characteristic.

Second, my findings support the use of the sociological model of voter behavior in new democracies. The factor that I found to be most influential, the urban/rural divide, follows this sociological model. The fact that this school is supported by both the literature on post-Communist Eastern European democracies and in my study of Egypt’s new democracy indicates that it may be the best model to analyze voter behavior across all new democracies. Additionally, my study provides a potential answer to the central doubt about this model. According to my findings, the reason why we see fewer political options than we do sociological groups is due to efforts by organizations to persuade and gather voters in support of certain policies or candidates. This suggests that future literature on voting in new democracies should be sure to account for efforts by organizations, as voters do not simply have an innate knowledge of which policies to support according to their sociological subgroup, but rather that organizations are the ones using their power to appeal to and sway voters in their favor.

This finding is also reflected in another study done in McFaul’s study of Russia’s 1996 presidential elections. First, McFaul finds that the urban-rural divide was a determining factor in these elections. He also finds that the importance of this divide is largely due to the mobilization of regional networks in favor of certain candidates. In the case of the Russian elections, he finds that the leaders of the different republics mobilized their regions in favor of the incumbent, or
whoever was seen as being with the party in power. These parallels suggest that organizational effects are important across countries. However, it may be the case that their influence on voters is conditional upon certain characteristics, specifically those created by a strong urban/rural divide. Nonetheless, this trend suggests that the question of organizational effects is an important one when considering voting in new democracies, particularly in regards to the sociological model of voter behavior.

Despite some of the trends that I was able to draw to the literature on voting in new democracies from different regions, I would argue that the ability to generalize trends across many new democracies may be a difficult or impossible task. Although my study’s findings were consistent with McFaul’s research, these findings differed from those of the rest of the literature on what specific socio-demographic factor was most influential. In my review of the literature, I gave examples of other factors that were found to affect voter behavior, like ethno-religious affiliations and age. The fact that the literature studying new democracies within a region all found different socio-demographic factors to be most important raises the question: can we really find one overarching theory on ‘voters in new democracies’ or even ‘voters in founding elections?’ I would argue that these studies have found different results because it is impossible to expect that all voters will act exactly the same way under the same conditions in new democracies. Voters within post-Communist democracies did not even have the same factors influencing their behavior, let alone voters across Eastern Europe and Egypt. Although they were exposed to many of the same circumstances, such as political uncertainty, voters behaved differently depending on their cultural and social contexts. Therefore, I argue that the search for one fixed theory to apply to all voters, although being one of the central questions of this field, is

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unproductive. Instead, what may be more helpful for future scholars and policy makers would be to focus on assessing the applicability of each model of voter behavior in emerging democracies and then using a country’s cultural context to discern which specific factors are most influential.

Second Round

In the runoffs of the presidential elections, I found that there was a strong likelihood that Aboul Fotouh supporters would vote for Morsi. Additionally, I found that Moussa supporters were more likely to vote for Shafiq in the runoffs. Both of these relationships make sense, as the supporters essentially voted for the next closest candidate to their first choice. What becomes less clear, however, is how voters decide when neither candidate is similar to your first choice and both have characteristics you strongly disagree with. These are the Sabbahi supporters. My expectation that Sabbahi supporters would ultimately choose to vote for Morsi due to Shafiq’s feloul association was not confirmed by the electoral results. In fact, the results may indicate that there was the opposite relationship.

My examination of the Egyptian presidential runoffs hoped to provide some insight into how voters decided whom to endorse when the candidate they initially supported was no longer in the running. Egypt’s case is probably a more extreme example than other founding elections, as it is not typical that a member so closely associated with the former regime would make it to the first elections’ runoffs. Indeed, we see that the only case of this in post-Communist Eastern Europe occurred in Russia’s second presidential elections after becoming a democracy. However, in this example we see that when the field becomes limited to just two candidates, particularly in such formative elections, voters came to think of them in a much larger, more ideological manner. Rather than evaluating each item in the candidates’ policy platforms, voters
see the candidates as counterpoints to each other and hone in on what they feel are the most important issues. These findings are also reflected in McFaul’s study, where he says that “the causal relationship between type of election and electoral outcome is striking: presidential elections and referenda increase bifurcation and clustering of voters in two camps.”

The results of Egypt’s runoffs, and the frustration associated with it, also brought up an important point in Egypt’s case: the role that the much overlooked rural voters play. Coverage of the revolution and post-revolutionary events were disproportionately focused on the urban, educated Egyptians who have a distinctive set of characteristics, goals, and beliefs. Because much of the media that is relayed to the international community is biased to focus on these Egyptians, it is easy to forget that the majority of Egypt’s population lives in rural areas with little education, religious, social, and political heterogeneity, and little access to independent information. In these regions, the overwhelming majority did not take part in the revolution and did not necessarily share the revolutionaries’ ideals. For them, the only thing the revolution brought was even more difficult living conditions due to increased economic instability and decreased security.

Ultimately, this reveals that Egypt’s revolution, although an incredible feat, did not encompass the entire nation. It was primarily instigated and led by educated, urban Egyptians who pushed for democratic freedoms. Although these leaders also incorporated economic issues into the revolution that appealed to all Egyptians, the central objectives resonated most with urban citizens. This is abundantly clear in the participation rates in protests, which nearly all took place in urban areas. Once Mubarak had left and it came time to establish a new political path, this disparity become more apparent. The revolution’s leaders, who had just called for

57 Ibid, 74.
democratic elections, had not truly realized the implications of a free and fair vote across the entire nation. They seem to have overestimated support for the revolution’s priorities in the rural areas, and underestimated the strength of the Brotherhood and the remaining NDP networks in these regions in particular. Additionally, these revolutionaries did not combine forces in order to unite the vote in favor of their platform. After the elections, many pointed out that if the different revolutionary candidates, such as Sabbahi and Aboul Fotouh had formed a coalition, their combined votes would have beat out Morsi and Shafiq. Without this united front and without strong support in rural areas, the revolutionaries were left frustrated in the runoffs. These voters should take these lessons and apply them to the next elections. They should attempt to strengthen their popularity and organizational capacity in rural areas, as well as form a more united front in order to better challenge their opponents.

**Suggestions for Future Research**

My study is constrained in multiple areas by the information and data that is currently available on these recent events. Hopefully, much more information will be released such as opinion polls and in depth data and analysis at the individual level of the Egyptian presidential elections that will greatly improve the ability of future studies to give an accurate assessment of what occurred. To these future scholars, I would suggest that they take this information and test my findings in order to assess their accuracy and to gain a clearer and more precise understanding of influences on voter behavior. Because individual level data will allows scholars to find a clearer understanding of why exactly each voter supported a particular candidate, I would be particularly interested in testing my conclusions regarding Aboul Fotouh’s support in the first round. It was extremely difficult to discern why voters supported him, as he was seen as
a different candidate by different voters. Additionally, I would be interested in testing my conclusions regarding Sabbahi supporters in the runoffs. Because I did not expect them to support Shafiq in the second round, I would be curious to test if this finding still holds true at the individual level. Scholars in many of the studies on voting in post-Communist Eastern Europe were able to produce quantitative analysis measuring every sociological variable’s relationship with individual voters’ choices. A study of this sort for Egypt would provide researchers with a better picture of the different variables and would additionally facilitate comparison between regions.

The next step after grasping the influences and mechanisms in Egypt is to look internationally for generalizable conclusions. The Arab Spring resulted in the creation of new democracies in Tunisia and Libya, and possibly more in the near future. A study comparing voter behavior across these Arab, Muslim countries would be a significant contribution to the literature on voting in new democracies. It would provide further insight into the issue of cultural context and a basis upon which to compare the North African/Middle Eastern region to others.


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