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Centralization & Strategic State Violence

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Abstract

Centralization & Strategic State Violence
By Lauren Livengood

Using Machiavellian theory and rationalist thought, the author sets up a set of expectations for the behavior of regimes as they repress their populations. Understanding that there is variance between regimes in their execution of repression, she establishes the centralized or decentralized structure of the repressive arm of the regime to be the key variable in the manner of repression adopted by a regime. She investigates this theory through the comparison of the repressive structures and resulting practices of military dictatorships in Chile (1973-1989) and Argentina (1976-1983).
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Centralization & Strategic State Violence

Introduction

Repression has been a tool of states for as long as states have sought to coerce their citizens and exercise control over their domain. Drawing on existing theory of the strategic use of violence in autocracy, as well as foundational principles of Machiavellian theory, I predict that there is a strategic incentive for states that use violence to undergo an abbreviated initial period of large-scale violence and afterwards engage in more controlled and targeted repressive operations. However, the behavior of dictatorships in real life throughout history shows that the model I propose is not universally practiced. In the history of repression, there is a great deal of variation between regimes regarding their practices of state violence, with some employing repressive patterns that increase in magnitude over time, remain constant over the life of the regime, or curtail their repression after their initial wave of violence (Greitens 2016).

The variation among regimes indicates that there are other factors at play that the theoretical framework does not account for. To gain greater perspective on why dictatorships act in the way they do, I investigate the path between strategic theory and the implementation of repression to find what prompts regimes to deviate from my expectations of their behavior. The primary issues faced by regimes in their implementation of repressive programs appear to be information problems and lack of cohesion between repressive agents, with regard to both information and operations (Tyson 2018, Policzer 2009, Greitens 2016). Lower levels of agent cohesion and information sharing result in higher levels of violence, and deviation from the strategic expectations of lower levels of repression (Tyson 2018). Following this investigation, I propose that the key additional explanatory factor for the varied patterns of repression observed in dictatorships is the level of centralization of the repressive apparatus.
There are several terms that are important to the discussion of my proposal. What constitutes repression, the repressive apparatus of a state, and what it means for such an institution to be centralized are key to the central argument of this paper. Firstly, repression in the context discussed here is violent repression or “hard” repressive tactics, which takes a page from the work of Christian Davenport being defined as of “actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against” threats to the state (Davenport 2007, 2). The repression discussed here is not inclusive of “soft” repressive tactics such as censorship and the general restriction of civil liberties (Escriba-Folch 2013). Although regimes may engage in both types of repression, the focus of this paper is restricted to the violation of personal integrity rights by the state, and the intersection of such action with other forms of coercion and repression is a subject for another investigation. Additionally, this paper deals with two different kinds of violent repression, targeted and indiscriminate. Targeted repression is violence by the state that is implemented against clearly identified groups that the state counts as threats. Indiscriminate repression, on the other hand, does entail the same investigative rigor of targeted repression, and the selection criteria for repression are ambiguous or poorly defined. This relative lack of specification results in higher numbers of “bystanders” being repressed. The second term of note for this investigation is the repressive apparatus of the state. The apparatus can be understood as the institution or set of institutions that carry out the violent repressive actions against the populace, which can take the form of a single national agency, various specialized teams across government branches, paramilitary groups, secret death squads, or a number of other agents. In considering the myriad of agencies and institutions that can carry out the repressive activities of the regime, it is then important to consider what classifies a country’s system for implementing repression as “centralized”. The classification of a regime’s repressive institutions as centralized
or decentralized is informed by Greitens’ discussion of the subject in her 2016 book *Dictators and their Secret Police*. Systems in which there is a single agency responsible for all repression, or there is a coordinating body over the executors of repression, are both considered centralized. On the other hand, systems that have multiple overlapping agents of repression with similar goals and powers but do not have an overarching coordinating body will be considered fragmented or decentralized (Greitens 2016, 13). Thus, when a regime acts through a single agency to commit violence against its citizens as a means of coercion, the repressive apparatus of that state is said agency, and it is centralized. On the other hand, if a regime delegates violence to several paramilitary groups that do not coordinate their actions with one another, the various paramilitary groups constitute the repressive apparatus, but are not centralized.

This theory is worthwhile to investigate because it is a novel contribution to the current conceptualization of political violence. Firstly, this theory is particularly concerned with repression as it is carried out over time in a regime, rather than analyzing a specific year or data point. This approach represents an attempt to gain a more comprehensive understanding of how repression and the violation of human rights develops over time, and the structural factors of a regime’s institutions that shape their behavior. Furthermore, I endeavor to blend political theory with empirical work to bring the sides of the field into a closer harmony. By taking into account Machiavellian theory, rationalist thought, and investigating their claims in case studies, theory provides unique insights as it is brought into the fold of empirical scholarship. In addition to this holistic approach, this question specifically addresses what causes high levels of repressive violence to persist over time, which can be useful for humanitarian solutions to stopping regime violence.
To investigate my theory of centralization as a key factor in the execution of repression, I establish theoretical expectations of regime behavior based on Machiavellian and rationalist thought. I follow these expectations with an examination of how states deviate from these expectations in their observed behavior. To find where reality breaks with theory to produce different results, I explore the challenges faced by regimes between strategic theory and implementation of repression. In these intervening steps, I elucidate how the level of centralization in the regime’s repressive forces is a key indicator for how closely the regime will adhere to the strategic implementation of violence I propose. Following this largely theoretical discussion, I examine two cases of repressive military dictatorships, Chile and Argentina. Noting their differing levels of centralization in their repressive systems, but relative similarity in a number of other areas, I evaluate the differences between their patterns of repressive behavior to stem from the regime’s differences in centralization level of the repressive apparatus. In my analysis of the cases, I find support for my proposal that centralization limits the amount of violent repressive activity executed by the state. Finally, I provide a summation of my analysis of the theory and present my findings from the cases concerning my hypothesis. Overall, I find a degree of support in the cases for my claim that a centralized repressive apparatus restrains the level of violent repression enacted on citizens by the state by promoting a targeted approach to repression over an indiscriminate one.

Theoretical Expectations

Goals of State Use of Violence

Across both time and locality, it is assumed that the interest of any regime or politician is to stay in power. Therefore, regimes can be expected to take actions that will increase or maintain their likelihood of holding on to their position of authority in their country. Maintaining
this authority entails the management of active threats to their power from within and outside of their government, and the discouragement of dissent from the regime by the population. Regimes may use violence to accomplish these goals, in the form of repression. By repressing the population they eliminate threats and attribute costs to dissent to discourage popular uprising. However, the utility of state violence as a means of coercion comes coupled with several challenges. In the following sections I address the goals and potential benefits of state violence, as well as how regimes can tailor their repressive activity to reap these benefits and manage the potential pitfalls of violence.

State violence is a dual-functional undertaking in that it both serves the purpose of neutralizing existing threats and signaling to potential threats that the costs of dissent are too high to engage (Braithwaite and Sudduth 2016, Rasler 1996). In the first instance, those entities who pose a threat to the regime are directly deterred from their dissident behavior with the application of “actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against” them, as Davenport defines repression (Davenport 2007, 2). The utility of the violence reaches beyond its direct effects, as it also functions as a mechanism of indirect deterrence. The perpetration of violence against dissenters serves as a disincentive for the rest of the population to take part in the dissent as they come to understand dissent to carry the cost of these physical sanctions that have been placed on others, thereby diminishing the likelihood of their participation (Hencken Ritter and Conrad 2016, Olson 1962, Hardin 1982).

The use of violence can be used as a means of neutralizing agents and organizations that emerge and present threats to the viability and stability of the regime in power, but comes with its own set of challenges. This position has been extant since the initialization of realpolitik—as Niccolò Machiavelli asserts that the use of violence as a tool of statecraft is not typically
conceived of as a “good” and virtuous in the moral sense. He notes, however, that violence can be used skillfully to serve the sovereign, if the proper care is taken to avoid the negative aspects associated with it (Machiavelli 1998). Machiavelli posits that the prudent user of violence in statecraft can swiftly exterminate threats with a surge of violence at the establishment of his regime. The spectacle of this surge of violence also serves to deter possible threats from arising, as they understand that the state is willing and able to eliminate them. To address the amorphous negative aspects of violence, he cautions against prolonging the use of violence from the early days of the regime. He supports this suggestion by stating that the level of exposure of the population to violence leads their response, with higher levels of exposure begetting more negative sentiment and resistance from the population (Machiavelli 1998). Existing scholarship acknowledges this position, reflecting that the long-term or ongoing dependence on violence contributes to a number of potential problems, including uprising, whether by the executors of violence or the masses, as well as the loss of legitimacy and popular support that help to hold up the regime (Svolik 2013, Opp and Roehl 1990, Davenport 2007, Gerschewski 2013). The following sections explicate these negative possibilities and their relationship to the ongoing use of violence. The explanation of these problems and how they can be addressed contributes to my proposal that the strategic use of violence is initially heavy to eliminate threats and establish costs, but quickly relaxes to avoid encouraging mobilization of dissent due to excessive abuses (Opp and Roehl 1990, Machiavelli 1998).

Growing Powers of the Executors of Violence

The first of the issues arising from violence against the populace is the ability of the state itself to maintain power as the sole arbiter of force within its borders. Some research suggests that in regimes that make use of agents such as the military to carry out their violence, the agent
gains influence to the extent that they can overpower the state. The repressive forces of a regime are strategic actors, and will carry out violence on behalf of the state in a way that furthers their own interests, leaving them in a net benefit (Tyson 2018). In some cases, the military is aware of its position as the pillar that supports the regime and is able to use the state’s dependency on their services to gain policy accommodations in their own interests. If the dependency of the state on the military is great enough, if the concessions are not granted to them by the government, they can refuse to perform their function to maintain the state (Tyson 2018) or alter the direction of their violence to target the state in order to ensure their desired policy outcomes (Svolik 2013). The military is powerful enough to overthrow the existing government if it does not get its desired policy outcomes from the governing powers. A key emphasis here is that the agents of repression in this scenario are not tied to the dictator’s survival directly; they can exist independently and advance a different agenda (Tyson 2018).

This externality of repression directly undermines the goals of the state to maintain their position of power and authority, as in this scenario they are overtaken by another institution as the sovereign. Therefore, in order to accomplish their goals of neutralizing threats and maintaining their sovereignty, the regime must manage their level of reliance on agents of violence in some way. This can be accomplished by curtailing the duration of time that violence is executed on a large enough scale that the military is crucial to the process of repression, a reflection of the Machiavellian proposition that large-scale executions of violence must be confined to a brief period.

Fear of Inevitable Persecution

While the use of violence on the part of the state was earlier lauded as strategy for preemptive deterrence of threats by demonstrating its high costs, there is additional scholarship
which posits that the use of violence can lead the population to rebel against the regime if done to excess (Opp and Roehl 1990, Rasler 1996). This aligns with the cautionary verbiage in *The Prince*, where Machiavelli warns of the negative repercussions of prolonged public exposure to violence (Machiavelli 1998).

The logic at play here is that of the rational actor. Just as the regime is interested in remaining in power and acts to promote that interest, the citizens are interested in maintaining their own personal security and will weigh their options in order to maximize gains and minimize costs. The likelihood of being repressed without engaging in dissent is key in the citizens’ choice between resistance and complacency under dictatorship. The execution of violence by the state against members of its population prompts the rest of the populace to consider the likelihood of being targeted in the future. This weighs against the costs of resisting the regime pre-emptively and eliminating the threat of violence. If the citizens find that there is a low risk of persecution for inaction relative to the risks of engaging in resistance, the rational actor will acquiesce to the regime (Hencken Ritter and Conrad 2016). If, on the other hand, they find that their status-quo risk of persecution is greater than or equal to the risks carried by engaging in resistance, they will act in their interest to rebel and make a bid for self-preservation. This self-preserving behavior is a threat to the regime that is brought about by the continued use of violence; such that the populace’s fear of being repressed as a bystander is a more pressing concern than the costs associated with direct rebellion. This is particularly salient in cases where the regime engages in indiscriminate violence, as there will be a greater chance that the citizen who “does nothing” will still be a victim of the regime’s repression.

This decision model between complacency and resistance of the citizenry at large can be corroborated and understood via a similar mechanism among the elites in repressive regimes,
which asserts that multiple purges increases the likelihood of an uprising, in the form of a coup. While purging of the elite for dissenters is shown to be effective in neutralizing threats in themselves and as a signal to those outside the regime that their institutions are sufficiently strong to withstand such blows (Braithwaite and Sudduth 2016), purges can have a destabilizing effect on the view of the future from within the regime itself. When elites are eliminated by the government in attempts to rid their internal ranks of subversives, the remaining elites begin to fear for the security of their own positions. The level of perceived threat rises with the number of purges, as a larger and larger proportion of the elite are effected by the violence. This anxiety increases the likelihood of the kind of coup that the actions of the state originally intended to thwart. If the anxiety concerning their own interests and safety is sufficient, the elites in the regime are likely to stage a coup to eliminate the government before it eliminates them, as the level of risk for dissent is overshadowed by the risk of inaction (Bove and Rivera 2015). The existence of this complacency versus rebellion phenomenon across populations (elite and the masses) serves as a reflection of a general behavioral trend that people will feel compelled to resist when they are witness to levels of repression that prompt them to believe they are likely to experience the same costs.

In order to manage this risk of inciting insurrection while also fulfilling the purpose of violence as deterrent signaling, the regime must carefully balance its use of violence. The model I propose based on Machiavellian principles addresses this, as there is a short period of violence that eliminates a large number of possible threats and constitutes a spectacle of power and resolve to repress by the state. This short period of indiscriminate violence serves the function of signaling that the government can and will repress threats, but such activity is restrained quickly to a targeted approach so that the threat of overzealous repression does not become a constant in
the lives of the citizens. This balance achieves a presence of state violence that is optimal for the state. Citizens are aware that the costs of being seen as a threat to the state are high, but the threat of violence does not constantly loom over citizens to the point that they feel compelled to take action to alter the system.

General Legitimacy & Dissident Groups

Machiavelli dedicates a whole chapter to the utility of violence as a tool of statecraft in *The Prince*. He posits that practical advantages of using violent activity to establish a principality include the swift and final elimination of threats, but staunchly advises against making it a pillar of state practice after the single instance as it is distasteful to the populace (Machiavelli 1998). This assertion is buttressed with the reasoning that while violently deposing of threats is efficient, the populace is not amenable to violence as an ongoing practice, an assertion corroborated with recent scholarship explained in the previous section. Machiavelli articulates that the population should not be perennially haunted by the presence of violence, as this foments discontent and erodes the legitimacy of the state.

When faced with violence from the state, the state is perceived by the populace to be less legitimate as an institution of government (Gerschewski 2013). This is theorized to be especially true in the case that repression persists in the dearth of active dissent by the population (Davenport 2007). This subjection of the population to unjustified violence weakens the faith of the populace in the state institution and lowers the threshold for them to be recruited into dissident groups (Opp 1994). Additionally, engaging in repressive violence has the potential to start or perpetuate a cyclic exchange with resistance groups operating in the state. When it engages in violence, the state creates a transgression that could open it up to reactionary violence from resistance groups (Davenport, Johnston and McClurg Mueller 2005). This can begin a tit-
for-tat exchange of violence with the groups they sought to repress (Inman 2009), creating further turmoil. Additionally, when it engages in repression, the state disincentivizes groups with lower overall resolve from engaging in resistance, but reveals groups with higher resolve to combat the regime, presenting a more potent threat (Hencken Ritter and Conrad 2016).

These potential problems extend the balancing act of the state regarding their use of violence mentioned in the previous sub-section. For violence to accomplish the goals of the state, it must be sufficient in magnitude and scope to eliminate the groups with high resolve and those that are likely to join resistance movements, but at the same time targeted enough so that it does not acquire a flavor of illegitimate persecution in the eyes of the citizens. This balance may be struck with the movement of the state from an indiscriminate repressive period at the establishment of the regime, followed by a highly tailored and targeted approach as the state matures.

Expectations from Theory

Following examinations of potential issues arising from repression, it appears prudent for the state to use violence in a limited way. This limitation allows the state to reap the benefits of violence while keeping the negative potentialities associated with long-term use at bay. The Machiavellian proposal of balancing initially high levels of violence with quick restraint to targeted, smaller scale repression (Machiavelli 1998) fits the bill of strategic action for the regime that chooses to repress. This model addresses the three strategic concerns mentioned, while preserving the benefits that violent repression stands to yield to the regime. Firstly, the abbreviated use of violence on a large scale limits the power of the institutional perpetrators of the repressive violence. By only leaning on powerful agents’ services in such a heavy manner for a short period of time, the direct perpetrators of repression are not afforded the opportunity to
exercise sufficient control over regime survival to constitute an overpowering threat to the ruling powers (Tyson 2018). Furthermore, the Machiavellian model of repression incorporates the benefits of signaling and curbs the danger of excess. The initial indiscriminate period of violence signals that the regime is capable and willing to take action against threats, which deters potential rebels with the high costs associated with dissent (Olson 1962, Hardin 1982). The shift from this initial period to targeted repression manages the immediacy of the threat of violence to the population. With lower levels of violence following the signaling period, the threat of repression is not so pervasive that the cost of existing under the regime is tantamount to resistance. This management keeps the threat of state violence to the average citizen from becoming overpowering and thus promoting insurrection (Rasler 1996, Opp and Roehl 1990). The limitation of violent persecution also manages the image of the state, in that there is less of a basis for violence to undermine the legitimacy of the state. The lower levels of awareness of abuses at the hands of the state due to more targeted practices after the initial period allows the reputation of the state to maintain a less tarnished appearance and a greater air of legitimacy than one that engages in ongoing abuses of many of its citizens (Gerschewski 2013). Finally, the curtailed period of indiscriminate violence followed by lower levels of more targeted repression present fewer opportunities to provoke violent exchange with dissident groups. By eliminating threats in the initial violent activity and following a more conservative pattern afterwards, the regime deters mobilization of resistance groups with their initial repression (Rasler 1996). By limiting the level of violence after the initial period, the state limits opportunities for dissident groups to capitalize on reactionary outrage to mount a charge of resistance (Davenport, Johnston and McClurg Mueller 2005). Considering the advantages and redresses of potential issues with violence offered by this paradigm, it appears to be the ideal strategy for a regime to engage in
repression. For the remainder of this paper, regimes’ repressive strategy preference is assumed to be the Machiavellian model of a brief period of open and indiscriminate repressive violence followed by fewer and more targeted repressive operations. This is because it accomplishes the goals of eliminating threats and signaling costs, while at the same time managing the negative s associated with state violence.

Dissonance of Theory and Practice

Cases of Alternative Regime Behavior

While the strategic preferences for repressive regimes may be established in a theoretical vacuum, researchers must consult observed regime behavior to corroborate their theories and amend them to reflect the observed world. Here is where observations of regimes that do not adhere to the expected strategic model become salient. There are a number of regimes that diverge from the expectations established in the previous section, indicating that there are additional factors that must be considered to align the model more closely with reality. The instances of divergence are not so rare that they are to be dismissed as outliers, but rather incorporated as a critique to the argument as it plays out in the real world. Two such cases of divergence from the Machiavellian repressive proposition are the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos’ autocratic rule and Iraq under Saddam Hussain. These regimes repressed in increasing volume as time went on and in high volume throughout the life of the regime, respectively (Greitens 2016). In the Philippines, violence in the form of disappearances and extrajudicial killings by the government rose consistently from 1975 until Marcos was removed from power in the beginning of 1986. This repression rose from a handful of instances of violent repression in the first few years to an annual figure of more than 700 incidents of disappearances and killings per year (Greitens 2016, Task Force Detainees of the Philippines 2011). In Iraq, the abuses of
human rights started and remained at high levels throughout the lifetime of the regime, reaching an average of executions and detainments in excess of 12,000 incidents per year (Human Rights Watch 2004). These cases fairly obviously diverge from the previously presented model, as their use of repression increases or continues unabated in beyond the initial period, (Greitens 2016) rather than curtailing quickly as Machiavelli advises.

In order to take into account the evidence of the actual behavior of regimes such as these and reconcile it with the theoretical model, I examine the pathway by which a state moves from the strategic interests of staying in power to the implementation of repressive action. Rather than relegate the strategic model I have presented to the dustbin of political thought, I aim to examine the features of regimes’ reality that prevent them from putting the strategically ideal iteration of repression into practice.

Intervening Steps between Strategy and Repression

As stated previously, it is easy to theorize what actions a regime would take to secure itself in a position of power in a perfect world where they are not hindered by the actual circumstances in which they exercise their rule. However, there are roadblocks that present themselves to states that prevent them from engaging in perfect strategic action, and cause them to change their behavior from theoretical expectations. In the following section I examine the limitations on state behavior that I believe are the most likely causes of deviation from the proposed strategic ideal.

Information Problems, Cohesion, and Principal-Agent Problems

Firstly, the issue of reliable information is key to the implementation of any form of repressive activity, so that the regime can target and repress credible threats to the regime while leaving the innocuous sectors of the population relatively unbothered. If the regime cannot
reliably collect information on which people or groups constitute credible threats to the regime, its use of violence may not target the right actors for its action to be effective in deterring and neutralizing threats. Lack of information, or information that is not reliable, may result in a longer execution period for repressive activity as the intelligence that drives the activity aggregates and develops into a body of knowledge that can be used by the state to select the most crucial or useful targets. This compounds the previously addressed issues that are associated with violence because the more indiscriminate application of repression that is associated with low information is more likely to affect citizens who are not involved in resistance activities by accident—a pattern which will raise the anxiety of the average person so that their costs of doing nothing against the regime approach the costs of those who do resist (Greitens 2016, Rasler 1996). In essence, the lack of full information hinders the regime from seeking out and eliminating the most pertinent threats in an initial fell swoop as advocated in the theoretical model. The regime, having not eliminated the most pressing threats, is then required to continue to seek out threats and repress them as they present themselves. This process extends the period of large-scale repressive action, deviating from the proposed model.

An additional issue that can hinder the adherence of the state to the theoretical model is competition among and lack of cohesion between repressive agents. This phenomenon incorporates and extends the issues of information-gathering, and compounds them with excesses and redundancies due to the existence of multiple agencies with the same goals but without unitary oversight and management. When there are multiple agencies or groups working independently of one another to execute the repression of the regime, the different branches of the repressive apparatus may not share information and resources. These divisions in the repressive apparatus promote repressive inefficiency as well as competition among the factions.
Both of these factors tend towards repressive excesses in volume and persecution (Tyson 2018, Policzer 2009, Greitens 2016), resulting in a greater level of violence. In addition to the overall higher level of violence, the state that does not have a cohesive repressive apparatus is not as reliably repressing people who present actual threats to the regime over average complacent citizens.

There is also a great deal of potential for there to be principal-agent problems in repressive regimes (Tyson 2018). Repression of the population of a country cannot be carried out by one person, so the dictator or ruling group (the principal) must delegate the repressive activities to others. Other actors (agents) gather information and perform the actual acts of repression. Although these agents execute repression, arrests, and violence on behalf of the principal, they do not necessarily have identical goals and interests to the principal. As with any system which delegates action, it is sometimes difficult for regimes to establish reliable channels by which to monitor their agents (Policzer 2009). This difficulty in observation affords room for the agents to deviate from the directives of the ruling cadre and pursue their own interests instead of exclusively pursuing the goals of the regime (Gerschewski 2010). Without the principal’s direct oversight, the agent has opportunity to pursue their own, or their own group’s, interests while using resources of the regime to do so. This is harmful to the regime insofar as violence is still happening and accruing negative sentiment, but is not accomplishing the elimination of threats as the regime needs it to.

Managing Issues through Centralization

I have assessed that the degree of centralization of the repressive apparatus is uniquely key to the patterns of repressive activity used by the state. Particularly, because the centralization of the repressive apparatus presents solutions or ameliorations to each of the major issues
previously detailed as potential negative outcomes of violence. The centralization of the regime’s repressive apparatus also overcomes the intervening hindering steps between theoretical repressive strategy and actual implementation. In the following section I detail how a centralized repressive apparatus facilitates the execution of repressive activity in accordance with the strategic model, by managing both the possible negative outcomes of violence and the practical hurdles in the process of implementation.

Amelioration of Divergent Interests

Centralization manages the potential for the executors of repression gaining undue influence by aligning their preferences and incentives with that of dictator or ruling group, as well as increasing agents’ accountability to their commanders. In this redress of the theoretical problem discussed in the previous “Growing Powers of Executors of Violence” section, the centralized regime manages the implementation hurdle of principle-agent problems through the close relationship between the executive and repressive institutions. This is accomplished by fusing the chances for principal and agent survival through institutions. By creating a unified interest, the state diminishes the incentive for the agent to deviate from the interests of their principal (Tyson 2018).

This fusion of interests and institutions is accomplished in a centralized system insofar as there is a single coordinating institution at the command of the executive in charge of repression (Greitens 2016), in contrast to a decentralized system where the perpetrators of violence are more independent in operations and interests from the central authority of the state. In a centralized system of administration of repressive violence, the executors of state-securing violence are closely tied to the central leadership. This close relationship brings the interests of the agents and the principal into accordance with one another. By aligning the interests of the
agent with those of the principal, the principal increases the likelihood of the agents to credibly work toward their goals.

Additionally, this approach keeps power concentrated in the central government rather than dispersed through different groups and institutions which could use their integral positions as executors of repression as leverage to coerce the government. In this way, the perpetration of violence can achieve the desired end of threat neutralization in the population outside of the government without the need for concessions or additional costs of providing incentives to more ancillary institutions of repression, as occurs in a decentralized system (Tyson 2018). These costs disappear because the motivation is survival, which is contingent in this case on the survival of the central coordinating body within regime, so the risk of defection is also negated by the centralization of the repression apparatus.

If this fusion of fortune is not sufficient to keep the agents’ actions in line with the interests of the principle, another beneficial aspect of the centralized apparatus is the increased monitoring capabilities of the state over its agents. This relationship allows the principal to more closely monitor their agents and limits opportunities for deviance from state goals. With a coordinated body overseeing the operations of the repressive arm of the regime, there is a central nexus that the regime can consult regarding the actions of its agents. Access to this body of knowledge in a centralized system, rather than diffuse and partial information from more independent groups, allows the state to identify and correct agents that deviate from the mandates of their principal.

Optimizing Levels of Violence and Public Fear

Centralized repressive activities, as opposed to their decentralized counterparts, provide a higher level control over the operations and scope of repression. This level of control allows the
regime to strike a balance between their use of repressive violence and restraint. As previously mentioned, publicly known violent repression by the government is useful to deter dissent as it establishes that the government is able and willing to impose costs on defectors (Davenport 2007, Olson 1962). However, this benefit is contingent on the level of demonstrated violence being restrained enough that the population does not calculate the costs of existence under the regime to be tantamount to participation in dissent. If they calculate the risk to be this high, they are likely to elect to mobilize against the state in a bid to better their chances of remaining unharmed (Opp and Roehl 1990, Rasler 1996).

Under a decentralized or fragmented system of violence, there are multiple agencies with their own aims and goals administering violence to the population. This fragmentation leads them to repress in higher volumes than if they were cohesively pursuing a singular purpose. Under a centralized and unitarily overseen system of repression, there are more focused selection criteria for the targets of state violence. In a decentralized system, the targeting of violence is less certain and less refined due to a number of factors, including the incompleteness of information held by each of the agencies due to lack of cohesive cooperation to share information and tactics, as well as lack of general oversight (Greitens 2016). In the latter case, the agencies have a lowered capacity to determine who is a credible threat, and at the same time there are more forces charged with the same goal of repressing with different approaches and interests. These factors can culminate in a higher level of violence with less apparent justification than a centralized or highly coordinated repressive operation. For a citizen observing repression, it then follows that their risk of being persecuted in their inaction to be higher in a fragmented than in a centralized repressive state. This heightened level of perceived risk makes them more
incentivized to take action to resist the state and preserve themselves under a state with a
decentralized repressive system.

Thirdly, the diminishing returns of ongoing violence described above seem to stem from
the gratuitous levels of violent activity by the state. Therefore, if the population largely remains
unaware that the state is in the business of perpetrating violence against its citizens these
negative effects would potentially be abated. This relative unawareness is brought about by the
capability of a centralized regime to target fewer people to accomplish their repressive goals.
Centralization of the regime’s repressive apparatus allows them to mandate adherence to the
regime’s goals of targeted repression by the agency under their direct supervision. This
difference is key in the explanation of why centralized administration of violence is key to the
promulgation of strategically adherent repressive practices. Under a paradigm of dispersed and
decentralized violence, there are more perpetrators that have the ability to engage in violence,
with varying levels of targeting and expertise. Additionally, the lower level of oversight from the
government on the perpetration of violence would make it more difficult for them to enforce
their preferences for targeting or discretion in repressive practices on their many agents.
However, if the agents of violence are centralized in the control of the governing power, they
would be more reliably able to control and direct both the levels of violence and the visibility of
said acts. In addition to this higher likelihood of adherence to direction by the agent, the
centralized force would likely have access to more resources than if the practice were delegated
to more diffuse institutions on the periphery.

Centralization of the repressive apparatus promotes a system which has a cohesive
direction, effective image management, as well as a higher degree of information and resources
at their disposal. With these tools that come with centralization, the regime is able to reap the
benefits of violence as a tool of statecraft as well as manage its difficulties. Centralization allows
the regime to pre-empt resistance by the population, manage the potential threats that arise from
the use of violence itself, and tackle the practical hurdles in the implementation of violence in
accordance with the strategic ideal. This centralization of the repressive apparatus allows the
regime to rationally and beneficially engage in the use of violence.

The ideal level of violence on the part of the regime is such that threats to the regime are
eliminated and potential participants in uprisings are deterred from action, but not so high that
the citizenry will determine that the costs of living under the regime are higher than the costs of
resistance to it. This level of violence can be best achieved under a state system which
centralizes the execution of repression under one agency which answers to the dictatorial power
rather than placing the responsibility of repression in the hands of diffuse groups with varied
goals and levels of oversight. This leads me to my primary hypothesis that I will investigate in
each of the dictatorship cases to follow.

Hypothesis

The incidence of repression will decrease sharply in centralized regimes due to a switch
from indiscriminate to targeted repression, in adherence to the Machiavellian model.

To find support for this hypothesis in the cases it is necessary to observe that different
levels of centralization are correlated with different levels of violence over time, and that these
two phenomena logically connect. This connection can be established by observing a promotion
of targeted repression under a centralized system but not under a decentralized one. Additionally,
to support that this hypothesis is the key explanatory factor in the differences in levels of
violence over time, we must be able to rule alternative explanations for the decrease in levels of
violence as less likely or less wholly explanatory of the behavioral outcomes of the two cases.
Cases

Investigative Methods

In order to provide additional support for the proposal that the centralization of a regime’s repressive apparatus significantly impacts the pattern of violence used by the regime, I turn to two cases of repressive dictatorship in Latin America. In these cases, I aim to analyze their differences in centralization of their repressive apparatus and the repressive behavior that follows from these structures. The intended generalizability of the investigation is across autocratic regimes, as they are the most likely to engage in violent repression as opposed to other forms of “softer” repression, which are more commonplace in democracies (Escriba-Folch 2013). The impact of the centralization of a regime’s repressive agencies on the implementation of soft repressive action has implications that reach beyond the scope of autocracies, but that is an investigation for a different paper.

In order to assess the viability of my centralization argument, the levels of centralization of the repressive apparatus between regimes must be examined. Here it is important to emphasize that the unit of analysis is that of the regime rather than the country or nation. The use or misuse of state violence is the outcome of the governing power, and contributes to the perpetuation or fall of the regime. This is not necessarily the total breakdown of the state, but a change in regime that would follow from the implementation of strategically unsound use of violence. Furthermore, there may be instances of different regimes throughout time that occupy the same state but employ different repressive strategies, and these must be considered as separate cases rather than as a singular observation.

In order to assess regimes and compare them, I examine and investigate them on a qualitative basis. I use this method in order to contextualize the numerical volume of repression
with the nuances of the organizational structures of the perpetrating state. Employing qualitative investigation, I will be able to examine the histories that brought the patterns of repression into existence. To conduct the case analysis of my theory, a comparison of two cases with most similar systems other than the repressive apparatus appears to be an appropriate approach, to attempt to isolate centralization as the key point of divergence between the repressive pattern outcomes. In the search for the cases to include in the study, there are particular variables that appeared most salient that should be given particular credence when comparing the cases.

Regime type is the first of these possibly salient variables to the strategic implementation of regime violence. Even within the category of autocracy, there are delineations between the types of autocracy that may influence regimes’ use of violence. There is literature that suggests that military regimes engage in more violent repressive strategies than other forms of autocracy because they have a degree of institutional familiarity with the practice (Davenport 2007). If this is the case across the board, the ability of the regime to conduct violent practices and execute them in a strategic manner may be connected to the type of regime in power. Therefore, when selecting cases there was a preference for there to be an agreement between their sub-types of autocracy to avoid this potential complication.

For the cases of investigation, I chose to examine Chile under military rule (1973-1989) and Argentina under military rule (1976-1983). These cases are ideal for comparison since they share a number of common features. They are both Latin American military dictatorships which rose to power in the 1970s. Both regimes were results of military takeovers of the government, and had right-wing leanings that were initially supported by segments of the population that viewed Communism as a rising existential threat. The regimes also enjoyed some initial support
The key point of departure between the two regimes are the institutions by which they carried out the repression which has since made them infamous. Describing the internal structures of the regime that drove repression, Loveman details the regimes as varying between “tight, hierarchal control under General Pinochet in Chile, to interforce (army, navy, air force) divisions in Argentina” (Loveman 1998, 486). This is reflected in other scholarship as well, as Greitens and Policzer describe Argentina as employing a decentralized system with delegation to the military branches in contrast to Chile, which adopted more centralized institutions over time (Greitens 2016, Policzer 2009). Casting the Pinochet regime as an increasingly centralized repressive state and Argentina as a decentralized counterpart, the relationship between centralization and levels of repression can be analyzed.

Data
An additional consideration regarding the selection and investigation of these cases is the availability of data regarding their repression. Both regimes have transitioned to democracy since the fall of their military governments. Under these democracies, there have been calls for the release of information regarding the repressed people to be released, both for the families of those harmed and for the world to understand the atrocities committed under military rule. After the re-establishment of the democratic state in both countries, the new governments commissioned investigations into the repression that took place under their predecessors.

Argentina established the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (abbreviated CONADEP) in 1983 to investigate the national trauma of disappearances. The commission compiled their findings in the “Nunca Más” (Never Again) report in 1984. The
report compiles data on the human costs of the regime, but in its own pages admits that the commission is only able to present a partial picture of the true scope of the violence perpetrated by the regime. This partial picture is due to destruction of documentation, reluctance of relatives of the disappeared to come forward out of fear, and other disrupting factors (National Commission on the Dissapearance of Persons 1984). While the Never Again report accounts for nearly 9,000 casualties of the Argentine Dirty War, some estimates place the total number of victims of repression at 25,000 or higher (Mendez 2014).

The Chilean National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation was established in April 1990, and was tasked with reporting on the human rights abuses of the military dictatorship that was removed from power earlier that year. The commission compiled its findings in 1991 after nine months of research and published them in a document commonly referred to as the “Rettig Report”, after the president of the commission (United States Institute of Peace). This report also suffers from the information problems faced by the CONADEP, and places the number of victims officially recorded and verified at 2,279 (Chilean National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation 1993). However, other scholars and sources claim that there may have been closer to 30,000 or more victims of regime repression (M. A. Bautista 2014, British Broadcasting Corporation 2011).

These figures are flawed in their incompleteness, both for the purposes of acknowledging the loss of human life as well as researching the phenomena in order to ensure that these repressive regimes are truly relegated to the “Never Again” category of history. These partial figures stymie the ability of the researcher to see the full picture of the actions of the regime and the reaction its prompted in the population, and to address this difficulty I rely both on the reports of the commissions of the countries and assessments of the losses by other scholars,
notably Pallida Ballesteros, Bautista, and Mendez. In my investigation of these cases, I reference totals from these different scholars regarding the number of victims of the regimes to flesh out the narrative histories of each country, and show the scope of the losses felt by the population. However, I rely on the yearly data reported by the commissions to show the trends in levels of repression over time, as this is the source material that allows for time-series evaluation that is necessary for my examination.

Centralized Case: Chile under Pinochet

Overview

The theory that use of a centralized system to administer state violence can be used to prevent the incurrence of costly consequences is illustrated by the case of Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship in Chile. The military dictatorship spanned 17 years, and was dissolved via a national plebiscite calling for the end of his extended rule and new democratic elections (Kandell, Bonnefoy and Rohter 2006). The Pinochet regime is notably longer than the average lifespan of a military dictatorship, which is only 9.5 years (Clark, Golder and Golder 2013), and the regime’s demise is unusual in that the Pinochet administration was deposed in a non-violent way. A great many military regimes are brought down by violence or some iteration of coup d’état similar to that which brought Pinochet and his junta to power (Svolik 2013). The dictatorship was known for its use of violence and forced disappearances as their choice method used to control the populace, but reaped the strategic benefits of these practices without the extensive incurrence of the negative externalities of state violence discussed previously. The regime progressed through time from a decentralized arbiter of repression to a more centralized system known as the Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia (DINA), and ultimately to the most
centralized and restrained iteration of their system with the National Center for Information (CNI) (Policzer 2009, Bautista, et al. 2018).

In this case, it is important to note the nature of the regime’s progression through different iterations of their repressive apparatus. The style of administration changed, and level of centralization was raised over the course of the dictatorship to overcome the issues of previous iterations of the system. After the initial decentralized period, the DINA was created to centralize the intelligence forces and manage the level of violence attributed to the regime, both on a domestic and international level. When the DINA fell short of some of its primary objectives in its maturity, it was eventually replaced by the CNI in an effort to centralize further and solve the problems that lingered in the administration of the DINA. The importance of this evolution for the context of the argument is that the regime opted to centralize their operations in order to maintain the advantages of repression as a tool of the state and to pre-empt the potential negative outcomes for the state that are associated with policies of violent repression.

Coup and Decentralized Era

The hardest repressive period of Pinochet’s dictatorship occurred in the period immediately following the seizure of state power by the military junta (Kornbluch 2003). There was a significant concentration of repressive activity in the very initialization and stabilization of the regime as “61% of the total number of cases of arrest and torture took place in this first year” (M. A. Bautista 2014), and “[r]oughly half of all the deaths that occurred during the military regime took place in 1973” (Policzer 2009). The notably violent first year of repression coincides with the existence of the most decentralized iteration of repressive institutions of the dictatorship. After the junta took power on the 11th of September in 1973, there was still a great deal of confusion among the military branches as to what the structure of their rule was to be and to
what extent they were to wage war on the leftist threats that had prompted them to seize power
(Policzer 2009). During this time period, each of the military branches continued to operate its
own securities division to gather intelligence and dole out repression. There was not, however,
coordination among the security operations of the branches in the form of information-sharing
concerning investigations, or even the specific whereabouts of prisoners. Additionally, only two
sections of the military, the army and the Carabineros, had presence and capacity across the
whole country. Furthermore, the Carabineros branch was internally unstable at this time, as
during the establishment of the dictatorship the normal promotional hierarchy was subverted,
leading to a lack of trust between the current commander and his subordinates (Policzer 2009,
48). This organization, or lack thereof, of the repressive effort lead to the implementation of
“large-scale and broadly targeted sweep operations” (Policzer 2009, 68) by the military which
resulted in thousands of arrests, tortures, and executions in the initial repressive wave, which was
highly visible to the public as the detainees were held in impromptu prison camps in schools and
stadiums (Bautista, et al. 2018). This repression was also highly varied across the country,
depending on the understanding of the local commanders of their goals. In some areas, such as
Talca\(^1\), the military officers took a stance that promoted reconciliation between the junta and the
population rather than war of elimination on threats to the regime as demanded by the higher
command in this initial period (Policzer 2009, Verdugo 1989).

In an effort to assess the repressive progress, the junta dispatched the Arellano mission
(Policzer 2009) to investigate the progress of the war against Marxist subversives. This “war”

\(^1\) This instance of the Arellano mission’s findings is detailed on page 61 in Policzer’s book *The Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile*, via translated quotation from *Caso Arellano: Los zarpazos del puma* by Patricia Verdugo in 1989 which quotes the base commander as holding an interest in promoting friendly military-civil relations while the upper-level dictatorial commanders advocated a state of repressive war in this initial period (Policzer 2009, Verdugo 1989)
was being carried out in the various encampments where repression was taking place throughout the country, and the Arellano mission travelled to the encampments to evaluate their progress. The mission found that there was a great deal of variation in the form and reasoning behind the repressive activities of arrest, torture, and execution among the bases in different areas of Chile, dependent upon the opinions and leanings of the local commanders of each area. To the central command, this variance in adherence to the policy of war against the “subversive forces” was unacceptable, and development began on an alternative system of doling out repression that put the execution under the tighter control of the executive. During this initial period, the regime was aiming to root out threats to the recently established regime, in adherence with the Machiavellian model of swift elimination of threats. The Arellano mission revealed that this endeavor was not being executed by the decentralized system consistently, and the regime made moves to bring repression more closely in accordance to their wishes with the establishment of a more centralized body to oversee repression in the form of the DINA.

A Move to Centralize: the DINA

The decentralized method of repression by the various branches of the armed forces was replaced in 1974 with the establishment of the Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia (DINA). The DINA served as a more cohesive agency that took the lead in Chilean repressive operations after its inception. Almost immediately after taking over repressive operations, the DINA sharply reduced the incidence of repressive activity. They redirected the repressive action from the widespread abuse of the civilian population to a system of carefully targeted repressive actions. During the course of their centralization of repressive operations, the DINA abandoned the wide punitive net that had been cast by the various military branches. Instead, the agency began specifically targeting political agents of the far left, particularly members of the Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR) party (Bautista, et al. 2018). Pallida Ballesteros presents figures on the political affiliations of the victims of disappearances at the hands of the state before and after the establishment of the DINA, and according to his figures, disappearances targeted at members of the MIR jumped from 8% of disappearances to 39%\(^2\) after the DINA began guiding the repressive system. The percentage of state disappearances without declared or apparent political affiliation of the victims decreased after the rise of the DINA as well, from constituting 44% of the disappeared to only 15%\(^3\) (Pallida Ballesteros 1995). The advent of the agency to centralize repression not only increased the level of targeting of the violence, but also greatly reduced the overall volume of violence against citizens, as after the DINA assumed coordinating control over operations there was a lower level of violence for the remaining sixteen years of the regime than there had been in the final four months of 1973 (Bautista, et al. 2018). Over half of the regime’s total volume of violence\(^4\), especially which was known to the public, was concentrated in the time between the installment of the dictatorship in power and the establishment of the DINA in 1974 (Policzer 2009), a period of less than a year compared to the whole of a seventeen year reign. Additionally, the establishment of the DINA changed the ways which the repression was carried out, as they concealed the presence of repressive violence by operating in relative secrecy and carrying out more uniformly covert operations than the haphazard disposal of bodies that characterized state violence in the country before the DINA was established (Chilean National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation 1993).


\(^3\)Victims with no identified ideology constituted 283 of 631 and 86 of 562 incidents, respectively (Pallida Ballesteros 1995)

\(^4\)57% of deaths by military repression occurred in 1973 (Bautista, et al. 2018)
The DINA was established for several reasons, two of the most pertinent being to curb the visibility of the violent repression of the population as well as to bring the execution of the war on subversive elements in Chilean society under a more coordinated and cohesive eye. After the establishment of the DINA, the investigative arms of the various military branches fell out of the spotlight and importance for the repressive undertaking. Several of them remained in operation, but their activities were limited in scope and were overshadowed by the extent and power of the DINA. The agency continued operation for four years, from its initial establishment in 1974 until its replacement by its successor agency, the CNI, in 1978 (Policzer 2009). The agency made a policy of targeting agents and groups on the far left both at home and outside of Chile, one of their most common practices in the repression being forced disappearances. This strategy was more organized than the disappearances carried out by the various military branches in 1973, partially in order to give the government plausible deniability in the cases of these disappearances to deflect the international and domestic pressures associated with the regime’s human rights violations (Policzer 2009). Additionally, the organization and consolidation of information after the initial decentralized period eased the fear of the complacent citizen with regard to their potential repression, as “for the most part, individuals recognized who the targets of persecution would be and why; this provided some minimal level of day-to-day security, if only for those who fell outside the ascriptive social categories persecuted by the state” (Loveman 1998, 497), as credible information dispersed through the agency cut down on “unintended” repressions.

Move from the DINA to the CNI

Although the DINA was remarkably more cohesive and restrained than the repressive apparatus of the preceding era, there were still some issues with the agency that the regime
aimed to ameliorate with the establishment of the successor agency, the CNI. While there was a greater degree of restraint and secrecy in the operation of the DINA compared to the previous operations of the various military branches, there was still some cohesion to be desired in the execution of their operations. The repressive regime still garnered a deal of attention on the domestic and international stage for their repressive excesses and brutality (Policzer 2009). With the establishment of the CNI, the repressive apparatus was moved from the direct control of the dictator to a more institutional management under the minister of the interior, which expanded thire web of accountability for their actions, including the placement of the intelligence-repressive agency under one of the cabinet ministers. This move institutionalized the new agency to a further extent than the DINA had been, as before the repressive apparatus was an organization at the disposal of Pinochet more so than the regime and executive institutions overall. The CNI further decreased and targeted their violent operations, as they curtailed any of their international activity and opted for more official manners of arrest over the previous policy of disappearances, which presumably to the population, ended in death. This change aligns with the strategic interest to maintain security in the regime but not to signal undue costs to the citizens. The instances of violence still existed in the memory of the citizens as a signal of resolve and capability of the regime to repress, but did not pose an immediate threat in such a way that it would promote rebellion. In this evolution, the repressive apparatus became one of maintenance and surveillance over one of terror and elimination of certain categories of the population (Policzer 2009). To illustrate the regime’s decline in repression through time visually, see figure 1 below which shows the percentage of victims of regime repression by year⁵, noting

⁵ Author generated the graph from the yearly data and totals of repression victims reported in Appendix II: Statistics, Table 8 of the report of the Chilean National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (Chilean National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation 1993)
that while 1973 is listed as an entire year, all the incidents of repression in that year occurred in the four months of said year following the seizure of power by the military on September 11, 1973.

**Figure 1**

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**Strategic Benefits of the Central Agencies**

Under the DINA and subsequent CNI, the information collected by the regime to implement in the course of their repressive activity was shared throughout the apparatus. This information nexus stood in sharp contrast to the previous system where the various intelligence branches of the military held exclusive, albeit partial information and operated in a competitive manner with one another. This kind of competition among the military branches tends to increase the levels of kidnapping and rights violations perpetrated by the government as a whole (Greitens 2016), which can be seen in the sharp decline in the number of government killings between 1973 and the levels during the primacy of the DINA between 1974 and 1978. Additionally, during this time, the DINA and thereby the vast majority of the repressive apparatus was under the supervision of an ally of Pinochet from the early days of the military government by the
name of Contreras, who reported on the activities of the agency directly to Pinochet (Policzer 2009). This direct line of control reflects the advantages of tying the fate of an agency to that of the executive, such that they would remain loyal and in alignment with the interests of the dictator (Tyson 2018), and the separation of the repressive agency from the other branches of the military pre-empts the incentive and ability of any of the military branches to gain the power and legitimacy to mount an uprising of their own to seize power and act in their own interest, as described in Svolik (Svolik 2013).

The use of violence that characterized the initial year of the regime was useful in many respects, such as broad elimination of threats and signaling of resolve to use violence to secure power. However, due to the issues brought up in literature on repression, such activities present a model of statecraft that is not tolerably sustainable in the eyes of the populace. The benefits of the initial wave of decentralized violence were preserved due to the consolidation of repression soon after the stabilization of the regime. The implication of this concentration of violence in the initialization of the regime is that the majority of those deemed by the various branches of the military to be in need of liquidation for the sake of regime security were eliminated during this time period, due to the wide punitive net cast by the decentralized military approach to repression. The curtailing of this activity by the establishment of the DINA and restriction on the use of state violence curbed the aggregation of negative sentiment surrounding a repressive regime. Under the new system, the regime opted to prune where necessary for the duration of the regime rather than clear-cut away any potential opponents on an ongoing basis. This sort of development from decentralization to a more centralized system over time allowed for there to be significant depletion in the pool of potential threats initially, but limited the uncertainty of vulnerability of the population to such repression over time.
Under the DINA and CNI, the populace did not have necessity to fear for their own position after surviving the initial period of violence (Loveman 1998) as they would have if the decentralized strategy had not been replaced. Due to the magnitude of the initial purge and the absence of further large-scale liquidations, the people understood that they were unlikely to be targeted if they survived the initial wave of violence, and therefore lack the incentive to overthrow the regime (Escriba-Folch 2013). Thusly the implementation of a massive violent event followed by highly targeted maintenance repression of regime opponents eliminates the looming threat of future purges that hangs over citizens in regimes that employ more agents of repression with less targeted patterns. This model of a massive initial purge is advantageous in the sense that it avoids the growth of paranoia among the citizenry that increases the chances of uprising. If there were multiple lower-magnitude cycles of killing, the people will become suspicious that they are likely to be harmed in the near future and are incentivized to stage a revolt to ensure their own security, under the same logic that elites will stage coups in the case of the recurrence of purges (Bove and Rivera 2015). This is especially the case because any persons who were ideologically close to the ruling faction who were removed would have been so in the initial action, as the targets of the DINA were of the far left and outside of the circles of the military elite who controlled the dictatorship (Policzer 2009). The centralization of repression into a selectively targeted program therefore removed the looming threat of repression from the prospects of the general population, and managed the risk of overthrow due to suspicion that haunts regimes that do not have a limiting factor on the agents of violence through centralization.

One of the primary goals of violent repression is the management of threats to the state, and the Pinochet regime silenced potential threats to their authority and stability through its use of violent repression. Estimates place the total number of human rights violation victims of
Pinochet’s regime at 40,018 people, although the actual total may still be higher as reports and confirmations of wrongful imprisonment and torture continue to surface and undergo verification (British Broadcasting Corporation 2011). The initial selection by the regime of which citizens constituted a threat to the regime and required repression was broad and largely decentralized, as the different military branches used their own separate intelligence agencies to seek out and repress potential enemies of the state (Policzer 2009) at their own discretion. This lack of central organization led to a massive amount of repression of a wide range of citizens in the early period of the regime. Victims of this period of de-centralized government violence held views all across the political spectrum; their positions included views from communists and the far-left to people who had opposed the Allende government, with moderates and political non-affiliates in the mix as well (Policzer 2009). In addition to outright political arrests the state also detained and executed members of the military who had not supported the coup and the military’s seizure of power (M. A. Bautista 2014) as well as artists who had leanings against the dictatorship (Adams 2012). The initial repressive violence at the hands of the military branches was incredibly broad compared to the targeted repressive violence implemented by the more centralized agencies later in the regime, as the DINA and CNI victimized almost exclusively communists and other persons of the political far-left (Policzer 2009). With this exhaustive decentralized approach to repression in the nascence of the new state, the Pinochet regime freed itself from many different threatening groups. However, this pattern of violence would not have been successful if sustained, and the regime took action. They assessed their repressive apparatus with the Arellano mission, and attempted to address the problems of internal monitoring and inconsistency by creating the DINA. By centralizing the investigative and repressive apparatus to the DINA, the regime was able to assess and eliminate threats that they deemed as legitimate rather than taking
a sweeping approach to repression that carries many negative aggregations with it over time (Policzer 2009).

The surge of violence at the beginning of the regime served not only to eliminate a broad spectrum of threats to government stability from the populace, but also served as a deterrent to potential future dissenters. Firstly, the sheer magnitude of the violence had a far-reaching effect in the populace, as many of the Chilean people would have known someone effected by the violence. This is especially the case considering the broad cross-section of the populace that was repressed during the initial period of violence. The deterrence was accomplished as the Pinochet regime tended heavily towards the use of imprisonment and torture as well as state-sponsored murder to coerce its. An astounding “28,459 people had been imprisoned for political reasons and of these 94% were tortured” (M. A. Bautista 2014). With the rate of torture from imprisonment at such a high level, any rational person would avoid risk factors for arrest and in turn self-regulate and deter engagement in political activity against the will of the regime, as dissent was shown to be correlated with high personal cost. In a study comparing those who were repressed demonstrates that on average those who were victims of political violence were more disposed to be interested in politics and participate in political parties or strikes (M. A. Bautista 2014). After the repression, however, both those who were arrested and those who were not expressed that they were less likely to participate in politics than before the repressive regime (M. A. Bautista 2014), demonstrating that the violence had a lasting deterrent effect on both the direct targets of repression and the general populace. Beyond even personal familiarity with victims of state repression, the violence and human rights abuses would have been relatively visible by the public as political prisoners “were kept in highly public places like the country’s main sports stadiums and hastily improvised concentration camps” (Policzer 2009, 57). This
visibility makes for an additional avenue of deterrence of defection from the state, in that the populace witnessing the violence against other civilians will not defect out of fear that they will incur the same punitive action from the state. Witnessing the punishments for defection from or misalignment with the regime enacted on others, the general populace has significant incentives to cooperate with the regime.

Large-scale state violence, as has been addressed, can be a double edged sword in that it serves the purpose of signaling the costs of dissent but excesses of government violence towards the citizens have the potential to spawn new movements of resistance if the population fears that their subjection to such treatment is inevitable (Gerschewski 2010, Opp and Roehl 1990). The presence of visible violence in the decentralized period followed by targeted repression aided in the deterrence of future threats. The initial brutality sufficed to give rise to fear in the population and keep them generally in line, but the swift tapering of visible violence prevented the growth of the sentiment that victimization by the state was inevitable, and staved off the resistance that might arise from that sentiment in the populace. After the takeover of the DINA and subsequent CNI and the adoption of a more restrained and targeted repressive policy, the populace retained the knowledge that the state had the power and resolve to punish defectors but were not exposed to the violence in quantities that would tip the balance of risk such that they would have an incentive to rebel rather than stay compliant. Those that were still deemed a threat to the state, however, could still be eliminated with the more targeted hand of the DINA. Due to the high initial visibility of violence by the state and the prompt curtailing of such visible activity with the centralization of repressive power, the Pinochet regime was able to reap the benefit of deterrence from their violent repression without the pitfalls of fostering populace rebellion with widespread ongoing violence.
In addition to the benefits of the centralization of the repressive apparatus of preventing problems coming from the population, the consolidation of repressive activity in the hands of the DINA helped reduce the threat from agents within the state as well. As addressed previously, one of the many threats that may lead to the fall of a repressive regime is the accumulation of power in the hands of those charged with executing the repressive activity (Svolik 2013). In the case of autocracies which heavily rely on repression to hold onto their power, the contractor of violence has the potential to hold the governing power hostage to their own demands if they deem it necessary. This could have been the case in Chile if the decentralized system of repression had continued, as the power to repress was in the hands of the various branches of the military intelligence agencies that preceded the government in existence (Policzer 2009). Rather than continuing to place the power to repress in the hands of military branches, or even consolidating the power in a single branch’s investigative agency, the Pinochet regime established a new and centralized agency in the form of the DINA for maintaining the repressive activity that ensured the safety of the regime. This move took the power of coercion by means of controlling a necessary function of statecraft, repression, away from the military and decreased these factions’ ability to control policy, by capitalizing on the ruling junta’s desire to wage an attack on factions they viewed as dissident within their country by controlling the repressive apparatus (Policzer 2009). If the regime had left the repressive apparatus as it was, each branch (army, navy, etc.) would be able to lay claim to a portion of the state’s stability and be able to give or revoke that security as an institution. If, on the other hand, the regime had chosen to consolidate the repressive agency into one of the branch’s existing intelligence agencies and dissolve the rest, that faction would have sole control of the repressive buttressing of stability for the regime. Placing the agency for repression in the hands of one faction would have had the potential to
give them the keys to the kingdom and enforce repression at their leisure to suit their policy preferences. However, the Pinochet regime took neither of these options, and instead formed a new agency, Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia (DINA), in 1974 (Policzer 2009). With the creation of this agency, the government was able to take more direct control over the agents perpetrating violence on behalf of the state and more closely monitor the execution of these tasks. This shifted the balance of power to repress into the favor of the state and an institution of their creation, and neutralized the potential threat of military branches holding power over the government.

Decentralized Case: Argentina under Military Rule

Overview

The Argentine military dictatorship that makes up the second case in this paper shares a number of similarities with the Chilean dictatorship. Both of these regimes came into power after deposing their countries’ previous leaders in the Southern Cone of South America in the 1970s. Chile’s dictatorship rose to power in 1973 commanded by army leader Augusto Pinochet, and the Argentine dictatorship, led at this time by General Videla, also the commander of the army, seized power in 1976 (Encyclopedia of Latin America 2014). Furthermore, each of the dictatorships were right-wing powers established in an effort to root out the subversive forces of Marxism and the far left (Policzer 2009, Mendez 2014). However, the key difference between the regimes explored here is that while the repressive apparatus used by the Chilean government over the course of the regime evolved into a centralized system to address their repressive needs, the Argentine repressive forces began and remained decentralized throughout the regime. The rule of the Argentine regime was also markedly shorter than the 17 year span of their Chilean
counterpart, lasting only seven years until the military regime was replaced with a democratically elected government in 1983 (Feitlowitz 2011).

Coup and Decentralized Repression

In 1976, the Argentine armed forces overthrew the government of Isabela Martinez de Peron, who had succeeded her late husband as president in 1974 after serving as his vice president (Encyclopedia of Latin America 2014). Almost immediately after the coup, three commanders of the various branches of the military, with Army General Videla at the head, came together to form the de facto government and mount the so-called “Dirty War” of repression against the forces of Marxism in the country (Mendez 2014). Their approach to this undertaking was decentralized in nature. When the dictatorship took control of the country, they divided it into different geographic areas under the stewardship of different branches of the military, which were competitive and autonomous of each other (Policzer 2009, Scharpf 2018). Not only were these military districts repressing without an overarching all-military organization, but also within the branches the governing personnel of the district operated in their roles with a high level of discretion and independence (Feitlowitz 2011). This level of discretion of the commanding military officers in a region is reflected in the differing levels of violence in areas controlled by ideologically different factions of the military. Scharpf points out “that violence was significantly higher in areas controlled by the nationalist officers of the infantry, artillery, and communications branch that shared the junta’s convictions than in areas controlled by liberal cavalry officers” (Scharpf 2018). This method of operation, with the independence and freedom of the military commanders to take the reins of coercive practices, is analogized to the period of repression that existed in Chile before the establishment of the DINA (Policzer 2009). Unlike
their Chilean counterpart, the Argentine regime did not alter their repressive apparatus with the creation of an overarching agency to control and direct repression.

During the “Dirty War” of the Argentine dictatorship, the government forces broadly aimed to eliminate the subversive forces of the left as well as those deemed to be spreading anti-Western or anti-Christian thought that threatened the Argentine way of life, according to the ruling powers. While the attested target group here is narrower than the swath of the political spectrum that was targeted in Chile before the establishment of the DINA, it remained vague enough to be implemented incredibly widely to arrest and kill an estimated 15,000 to 25,000 people in Argentina over the course of the dictatorship (Mendez 2014). The “Dirty War” in Argentina is considered to have been waged throughout the life of the regime. The bulk of the instances of repressive violence occurred between the installation of the regime in 1976 and 1978, an extended period of violence that made the first three years of the regime bloodier than the latter (Scharpf 2018, Romero 2013). Human rights organizations have estimated that the number of victims of the regime to be in excess of 30,000. About ninety percent of the repression took place in the three years between 1976 and 1978, with all three years sharing in heavy repression by the state (National Commission on the Dissapearance of Persons 1984). To reflect this pattern visually, below is a graph published in the CONADEP report detailing the percent of disappearances by year, noting that there were some violations committed before the military takeover in 1976. As can be seen graphically, the period of heavy repression in the country spanned a significantly lengthier three years than the Chilean period of heavy repression, which was limited to the last few months of 1973.
Additionally, the regime made moves not only to target those directly involved in the various leftist groups that they deemed subversive or dangerous, but also anyone suspected of being a sympathizer with them or in any way assisting their operation. This policy of guilt by association reached the ranks of lawyers, priests, and professors suspected in the involvement of subversive activities (Feitlowitz 2011, Mendez 2014). The visibility of these acts of terror were high, as many of the arrests took place in people’s workplaces, and the executors were wont to travel in distinctive vehicles to heighten the terror associated with the acts (Romero 2013). This wide net of criteria for political detainment and persecution, coupled with the decentralization of the repressive apparatus and the competition between branches of the military, such as the army and navy (Greitens 2016), resulted in a high level of human rights violations for an extended period of time. This long period of extensive violence violates the paradigm set forth by the Machiavellian strategic model, and led to resistance by the population.
Loss of Faith by the Populace and the Madres de Plaza de Mayo

An important signal of the erosion of the public’s support and complacency to submit to the military regime is found in the protests of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the Palza de Mayo). The basis of this movement stems from the outrage felt by the families, specifically the mothers, of those people who were forcibly disappeared by the military regime over the course of the Dirty War. Their organization began when a number of mothers, searching for their disappeared children, began to recognize one another from their inquiries to government agencies who turned them away (Thornton 2000). The mothers of the disappeared children realized that their plight was a more common circumstance than their individual losses, and in April of 1977 fourteen women agreed to meet to demonstrate their grievances in the Plaza de Mayo in front of the presidential palace (Hernandez 2002, Thornton 2000). Although they were living under the same dictatorship which had kidnapped their children, they found community with one another and made the decision to demand answers from the military regime, even demanding meetings with the minister of the interior and signing of numerous petitions. Ironically, the repressive apparatus may have increased the bond within the community of mothers, as the persecutive policy of guilt by association with the disappeared led to the abandonment of the mothers of the disappeared children by their former social networks (Thornton 2000). The mothers grew in number from the original fourteen to upwards of 3000 women meeting to demonstrate on the square (Hernandez 2002).

The mothers garnered local as well as international attention to destabilize the regime and publicize the military’s human rights abuses, including demonstrating during the 1978 World Cup (Hernandez 2002) and establishing their annual March for Resistance in December of 1981 (Goddard 2007). The location of their gatherings served the dual purpose of protection and
political publicity, as the visibility of the square made it harder for the government to clandestinely kidnap and disappear the protestors, as well as being a central area of Buenos Aires in front of the presidential palace (Hernandez 2002).

The mobilization of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo was a symptom of repression out of strategic bounds—a section of the population that was normally confined to the private sphere of Argentine life was moved to public demonstration. They were bonded together by the immense costs already inflicted on them, including the loss of their social networks to process grief (Thornton 2000). In a more controlled repressive regime, the victims of repression would be fewer and far between, and not allow such ample social space for their relatives to band together in their loss in the face of abandonment by their social network due to fear of persecution. This mobilization and galvanization of the Madres movement was brought about by the regime’s ongoing use of large-scale repressive violence.

A Bid to Stabilize: the Falklands War

The heavy repressive practices of the regime resulted in an aggregation of negative sentiment among the populace and erosion of support for the military government, which had taken power under the impression that it was fulfilling the mandate of the people to work in their interests against Marxism and the left (Feitlowitz 2011). This loss of faith in the government needed to be ameliorated in order for the regime to thrive and continue its control over the country. The crisis of the people’s lack of support, among other contributing factors such as the floundering economy drove the leader of the government, General Videla, to resign and hand over power to General Viola in 1981, who within the year again passed power again to General Galtieri (Encyclopedia of Latin America 2014). General Galtieri made a move to regain the nationalist backing of the people by laying claim to and invading the Falkland Islands, which
were under the domain of Great Britain but were considered by many Argentines to be within
their realm of influence. This move stirred a degree of nationalist sentiment and celebration with
early victories, and a level of pushback to the outrage of the Mothers of the Plaza with support
for the government (Goddard 2007). These pro-government sentiments were short-lived when
government made grave military blunders and the islands were quickly overtaken by British
forces. While the Argentine government had calculated that their victory would be swift and stir
up positive sentiment among the people, they were severely mistaken as they suffered an
embarrassing defeat at the hands of the British which only served to further erode the public’s
faith in and support for the government by the junta (Feitlowitz 2011, Encyclopedia of Latin
America 2014). This loss seemed to be the nail in the coffin for the credibility of the regime in
the eyes of the people, and this failure coupled with the economic problems faced by the country
at the time prompted Galtieri to resign from his command, and his successor moved to return the
country to a democratic system of rule in by 1984 (Encyclopedia of Latin America 2014), and
the country held democratic elections for the establishment of a new regime in December of
1983 (Feitlowitz 2011)

Possible Amelioration through Centralization

The regime’s ultimate loss of legitimacy and collapse was brought on by their
unsuccessful bid to regain credibility through success in the Falklands War, which failed
miserably. However, the counterfactual of this circumstance considers what would have
happened if the country had opted for a centralized apparatus of repression rather than the
decentralized model they used. In the case of the centralized regime, the information as to who
was a credible threat to the regime as a Marxist subversive or sympathizer would have been
shared across the repressive apparatus of the whole country, rather than intelligence being
confined to the military branch administering repression in their own district. This comparative information richness would have in turn allowed for a more targeted and reliable approach to repression, and thus limit the number of people detained and persecuted, especially those who were innocent of actual subversive activity. With a diminished level of persecution, there would be less outrage and fewer people directly affected by the disappearances and abuses by the government, leading to a lower level of popular negative sentiment against the government.

The lower level of popular outrage in the case of a more restrained method of repression by a centralized apparatus would have then circumvented the need felt by the government to engage in drastic measures such as the Falklands war to bring up national morale, and combat the negative image presented by the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. The negative sentiment under a centralized system may have been within the scope of management by other programs or distractions implemented by the government. If the structure of repression were incredibly secretive and effective, the negative sentiment from it may not have been significant enough to need direct amelioration by the government.

Why Not Centralize?

If the problems faced by the regime that ultimately brought it downfall could have been addressed and avoided via centralization of the apparatus, why would the rational state elect not to alter their repressive pattern to adhere to a more conservative approach? In the Argentine case, the answer seems to lie in the structure of the government following the coup and the power of the various military branches. The divided shares of power by the Argentine military branches was notably different than the comparative dominance of the army in the Chilean regime, which did centralize. In the Argentine state that was established after the coup, there was a significantly lower level of overall centralization in the regime than there was in Chile, as the country was
separated into military districts which were governed almost exclusively by that branch (Feitlowitz 2011). Additionally, there was not a single branch of the Argentine military that had a significant power advantage over the others, as they were similar in power and the army and navy were major rivals of one another, I contrast to the relatively large reach and stability of the Chilean army over other branches (Greitens 2016, Policzer 2009). This balance of power between factions of the military prevented any one branch from taking primacy or central control over the repressive apparatus for the whole country, and the competition between them truncated the likelihood that any of them would be willing to give up their intelligence operations in favor of a new agency separate from the existing branches altogether. Therefore, the Argentine dictatorship continued to use the repressive apparatus that they started with because it would have been inconceivable to establish a new centralized one given the existing institutions of their regime. This inability to centralize led them down a path of repression that promoted discontent in the population and led to the low morale of the population that contributed to the regime’s engagement in the Falklands War, which ultimately brought the regime to a crumble.

**Alternative Explanations**

This paper is not the first, nor will it likely be the last, to examine what phenomena drive the persistence of repression in regimes. However, in order to lend support to the assertion put forth in this paper that centralization of the repressive apparatus is a key determinant of the level of violence perpetrated by a regime, we must discuss why other theories do not adequately explain observations of regime behavior. The two most salient alternative explanations for the differing levels of violence over time are the condition of the economy in the country and international pressure on the regimes to stop their repression. I find it useful to address these alternatives for both regimes at the same time to highlight the similarities of their situation, but
persistence of different outcomes between them that points to my theory as a better explanatory fit.

Economic Alternative

Firstly, there are some scholars that suggest that economic growth or prosperity indicates the propensity of a regime to violate human rights, and propose that higher levels of economic growth or other development indicators are correlated with lower levels of repression and greater respect for human rights by regimes (Henderson 1991, Cole 2017, Peterson 2017). Under this alternative theory, the changes in economic prosperity of the countries should be reflected in the levels of repression in a given year. To investigate this possibility for Argentina and Chile during their periods of military rule, I compiled the countries’ annual percent growth of Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP/c) as a measure of their economic prosperity, and present it graphically in figure 3. Analyzing the relationship of the countries’ levels of economic growth compared to the levels of repression will yield an idea of whether there is a strong relationship between the two.
The annual percent change in GDP over time reflects that both countries experienced fluctuations in their levels of economic growth over the time that the repressive regimes were in power. Following the economic alternative explanation, spikes in human rights violations would be expected in Chile in 1975 and 1982. However, this is not observed, as the overall percentage of repressive incidents in Chile in 1975 was 8.34% lower than the previous and comparatively more prosperous 1974. The case is similar in 1982, as the percent of total repression that took place in that year was lower than the preceding and following, more prosperous years (Chilean National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation 1993). Regarding Argentina’s level of violence related to their economic conditions, the model connecting economic performance to levels of repression would predict 1978 and 1981 to have the highest levels, and 1977 and 1979 to have the lowest. Like in the Chilean example, these predictions are not reflected in the observed levels of repression. In fact, 1977 exhibited the second highest share of the recorded

\[ \text{Figure 3}^{6} \]

\[ \text{Yearly Percent Change in GDP per Capita} \]

\[ \text{Argentina % change in GDP/c} \quad \text{Chile % Change in GDP/c} \]

The graph was produced by the author from data obtained from the World Bank national accounts data available on their website (The World Bank 2019)
violence of the regime and 1981 had one of the lowest. 1978 and 1979 leaned towards their predicted extrema, but not remarkably enough to be convincing in light of the other data points.

Overall, the tracking of percent change in GDP per capita throughout the regimes does not accurately reflect the trends in the proportion of violent activity in a given year. This point is demonstrated in the observation that while Chile’s GDP fluctuated greatly between 1974 and 1989, the levels of repression remained consistently low. Additionally, Argentina’s economic upswing in 1977 did not significantly curb the extended period of heavy repression that held the country from 1976 until 1989 (National Commission on the Dissapearance of Persons 1984).

International Pressure Alternative

In addition to the economic alternative arguments, there are further sources and paradigms that suggest that international pressure is a mechanism by which regimes will be prompted to alter their behavior. This international pressure can manifest itself in the form of official sanctions of countries against the rights violators, or in the form of “naming and shaming” of the violators by non-government organizations. Being sanctioned or shamed on the international level creates costs for the offending country, as interactions on the international level such as diplomatic relations or aid seeking become costly for other states to engage with the “pariah state” (Brysk 1993). To show that these international pressures are not the key variable responsible for the differences in the observed repressive behavior of Chile and Argentina, it can be shown that the two states faced similar international pressures but that it did not lead to a decrease in repression in both cases.

Argentina was internationally known for their abuses of human rights under military rule. This notoriety earned them several negative consequences on the international level, including multilateral aid cuts to the country in 1977, and pressure from the United States under the Carter
administration including cuts to aid, as well as actions blocking Argentina’s loan requests in international platforms. During the first year of the regime (1976), the United Nations passed a resolution condemning the country’s violations of human rights norms, and various interest groups lobbied against the behaviors of the military government (Brysk 1993). Although these international pressures had been extant from the beginning of the repressive regime’s actions in 1976, the regime continued to exhibit high levels of repression through 1978 (National Commission on the Dissapearance of Persons 1984).

There were also international pressures applied to Chile in attempts to ameliorate human rights abuses by the state. The regime, like its counterpart in Argentina, caught criticism from the U.S. Carter administration. This pressure was especially strong after 1976, following the murder of Orlando Letelier via car bomb in Washington, DC. United States authorities determined that the death of the former Allende minister and vocal opponent of the Pinochet regime was the responsibility of Chilean forces, and cited this incident as impactful to their placement of sanctions on Chile (Hawkins 1997). The regime was condemned for their human rights violations by UN resolution in November of 1974, and similar resolutions passed for the following 14 years (Hawkins 1997). These international pressures were tantamount to those experienced in neighboring Argentina, but it is important to notice the timing of their onset. Pressure from the UN on Chile materialized at the end of 1974 and the heavy pressure from the United States came after the events of 1976. By the time that these international measures took effect, Chile had already significantly decreased its repressive activity with the replacement of their decentralized system of repression with the DINA in 1974 (Policzer 2009). Due to the fact that the international sanctions and pressures did not materialize until after the shift in repressive
behavior was already underway, it is not convincing that this pressure was the driving force behind the shift, and indicates that there were other factors that contributed to the change.

The Chilean and Argentine regimes experienced similar pressures from the international community encouraging them to stop violating the human rights of their citizens. However, in Argentina these pressures were not able to curb the violations, as the regime continued their practice of indiscriminate repression after the sanctions were enacted. In Chile, the sanctions and pressures materialized in their full force after the regime was already in the process of shifting from indiscriminate to targeted, lower levels of repression. With this information separating the behavior of the states from the international pressures proposed to explain them, other factors such as the centralization model must be considered as more impactful in shaping the behavior of the regimes.

Analysis and Conclusions

Although similar in many foundational elements, the two cases of dictatorship in Chile and Argentina differed markedly in their repressive strategies over the course of their regimes. These structural differences contributed to the divergent methods of repression observed between the regimes, and outcomes for the stability of the regimes overall. In the Chilean narrative, there was a progression towards centralization and institutionalization of the repression, which curbed the negative externalities that are associated with the use of violence in statecraft. Argentina, on the other hand, employed a decentralized approach to repression throughout their regime and eventually crumbled due to externalities associated with trying to regain the support and enthusiasm of their population.

The Argentine dictatorship employed a decentralized approach to repression throughout their rule, with multiple agencies and institutions carrying out the task of eliminating elements
considered subversive to the regime. As a result of the competition between the various branches to win the war against subversive elements, as well as lack of information sharing between the repressive groups, there was a high volume of repression of persons that posed dubious threat to the regime. This wide targeting over a long period of time resulted in the growth of negative sentiment and outrage towards the military regime, including the rise of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo who consistently protested the regime from 1977 onward. The existence of resistance movements such as this signal that the repression levels have become balanced to the point that the population rationally considers the costs of complacency to be tantamount to those of resistance in the repressive regime. In their attempt to regain their footing as a government in the positive opinions of the people, the military government lost the Falkland Islands War and crumbled in the aftermath. In this way, their lack of a centralized repressive system failed to adhere to the strategic model I proposed, and contributed to the discontent of the people which ultimately brought their regime to an end.

Under the Chilean dictatorship, the original iteration of the repressive apparatus was decentralized, with multiple branches of the military carrying out the arrests and murders of the regime’s repressive mission. However, the military government moved to centralize the execution of the repressive activities to a new agency, the DINA, in an attempt to ameliorate the negative impacts they were already incurring from the wide punitive net cast by their decentralized repressive apparatus. The more targeted approach to repression cut down on the negative sentiments and press against the regime, and the central agency was able to identify and eliminate remaining credible threats to the regime without incurring broad public costs. The DINA was eventually replaced in turn with an even further centralized and restrained intelligence institution in the form of the CNI, which carried out a lower level of violence but
maintained the intelligence advantages and selective targeting capabilities of the agency. The CNI continued operation from its inception in 1978 until the transition of the regime to democracy for over a decade later.

The cases presented here tend to support the hypothesis that the centralization of the regime’s repressive apparatus shapes the repressive behavior of the regime, with a centralized system tending towards the Machiavellian model of initial swift elimination followed by a restrained repressive approach. The Argentine regime did not have a central apparatus, and was not able to adhere to the strategic demands of the theoretical model, and continued large-scale visible repression for an extended period of time. This method of violence deviates from the strategic ideal in its inability to stabilize and coerce the population into complacency, as the repression caused outrage and popular demonstration against them with the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. Pinochet’s Chilean regime, on the other hand, moved to centralize over its time in power and implement a program of repression that curtailed the use of indiscriminate repressive violence into a more targeted and restrained model over time. This evolution allowed them to benefit from the deterrent effects of visible violence without incurring the backlash of negative public sentiment and destabilization by means of public outrage.
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