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Resurrecting Virtues against Evil:
A Study of the Cultivation and Exercise of Virtues of the Oppressed

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Abstract

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My dissertation aims to diversify the conventional Christian virtue discourses that in general set Jesus as the exemplary model for Christian virtues and exclusively focus on imitating the self-sacrifice of Jesus in the passion narrative. By employing a case study of a particular community, this dissertation exposes the danger of the self-sacrificial virtue discourses to the oppressed who have been structurally and culturally forced to sacrifice themselves excessively.

To adequately register the lived experience of the oppressed, this dissertation uncovers untold stories of South Korean mothers and wives of political victims oppressed by the totalitarian regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan in the 1970 and '80s. Based on my fieldwork in South Korea, I collected archival and qualitative data on their distinctive form of political resistance and democratic movement, what they call *kajok-woondong*, roughly translated as family movement.

Using the collected data, first, this dissertation offers thick historical descriptions of the sociopolitical context of South Korea in the 1970 and '80s and exposes a life-negating and dehumanizing culture, specifically totalitarian ideology, which was disseminated by the regimes to normalize individual citizens' excessive or total sacrifices for the glory of nation. Then, this dissertation resents a thick description of moral life of the mothers and wives, tracing the historical development of their family movements and exploring their radical resignification of the traditional values of motherhood and wifehood in Korean culture.

In the second part, this dissertation offers an interdisciplinary analysis of the transformative process of cultivating the moral agency of the mothers and wives by examining the process of emotional transformation and the role of transmuted emotions in providing them with moral resources. By exploring their non-violent and life-affirming protest in contrast to life-consuming suicide protest, this project argues that the mothers and wives embodied an alternative moral virtue—the virtue of *salim*—to the propagandized virtue of the total sacrifice.

Finally, given their creative use of religious symbols related to the resurrection of Christ in their public protest, the dissertation re-reads the Matthean resurrection narrative through the stories of the mothers and wives and then suggest the faithful witness to God's resurrecting power, exemplified by the women in the Gospel of Matthew, as an alternative theological virtue of the oppressed.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Mincheonghakryeon	<i>Jeonkuk-minju-cheongnyon-haksaeng-chongyonmaeng</i> National Democratic Youth-Student League
Inhyukdang	<i>Inmin-hyukmyung-dang</i> People's Revolutionary Party
Kukahyup	<i>Kusokja-kajok-hyupeuihoe</i> Association of the Families of the Arrested
<i>Samil-minju-guguk-suneon</i>	The March 1 st Democratic Declaration for the Salvation of the Nation (or the March 1 st Declaration)
TPM	Thursday Prayer Meeting
NCKK	National Council of Churches in Korea
Yangkahyup	<i>Yangshimsu-kajok-hyupeuihoe</i> Association of the Families of Conscientious Prisoners
Mincheongryon	<i>Minjoohwa-woondong-cheongnyon-yonhap</i> Youth Federation for the Democratic Movement
Minkahyup	<i>Minjuhwa-silchoen-kajokwoondong-hyupeuihoe</i> Association of the Family Movement for Practicing Democratization
Yukahyup	<i>Minjuhwa-woondong-yukajok-hyupeuihoe</i> Association of the Families of Bereaved

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

I. Main Moral Questions

Throughout my doctoral program at Emory University, I have paid special attention to the issues of structural and cultural violence against women. Specifically, I have listened to the painful stories of Korean “comfort women” during the World War II, Liberian women during the Civil Wars, and Argentine women under the military junta. The extreme level of violence in these historical accounts sometimes drove me into the state of despair and hopelessness. However, I found hope in the lives of women who survived, resisted, and transformed themselves from passive victims to active moral agents. These women exemplified moral power over the evil of violence. My dissertation reflects my lifelong commitment to uncovering the unheard stories of women in the context of violence and declaring unyielding hope embodied in moral transformation and agency.

At the same time, the journey of this dissertation helped me to clarify one of my perennial moral questions as a Korean. Reflecting on the history of my home country, Republic of Korea (better known as South Korea), I find that our nation has been built, protected, and developed based on destructive forms of sacrifice by countless citizens. After the Korean War, Korean citizens were sacrificed in poor and dehumanizing working conditions for the sake of the nation’s rapid economic growth. While achieving glorious economic development, many innocent citizens were imprisoned, tortured, and even executed as the alleged “*Ppalgaengi*” (literally meaning the Reds, referring to communists or North Korean sympathizers) by the non-

democratic regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan in the name of national security. Also, tragically, many young political martyrs (*Yeolsa*), who employed suicide protest for advancing democratization, offered their lives as living sacrifices on the altar of democracy and justice. Recounting the history of my home country, I heard a desperate cry in my heart: “Why does someone have to die for the greater causes? Why does someone have to totally sacrifice one’s life for the nation? Why does someone have to destructively burn one’s body as a living sacrifice for social transformation? My dissertation is also my personal response to these deepest questions in my heart and my attempt to cultivate moral imagination for avoiding destructive sacrifices of individuals, affirming each individual’s dignity, and contributing to social transformation. Put differently, this dissertation calls for holistic flourishing, including both individual and social flourishing.

For this quest for holistic flourishing, the language of virtue is crucial. In Korean society the destructive sacrifices of countless citizens for the greater cause have been moralized as the embodiment of the prime virtue. The moralization of total sacrifices of individual citizens for the glory of the nation, which will be discussed in detail later, lies at the heart of totalitarian ideology propagandized by the regimes of Park and Chun in the 1970 and ’80s. This historical case of the state-governed (mis)appropriation of the language of virtue to justify and even sustain the destructive sacrifices of citizens presents a great challenge to the conventional Christian virtue discourse in the field of Christian ethics and theology.

The conventional Christian virtue discourse has been constructed by utilizing Scripture, specifically the *passion narratives* in the Gospels, as the main source, and construed the *imitation of Jesus’ self-sacrifice unto death* as the ultimate ground for particular virtues of a Christian community (or the Church). Stanley Hauerwas, described as having “a deep and

transformative impact on the recovery of virtue within Christian ethics,”¹ is one of the representative scholars in this tradition. With the greater emphasis on the Gospel narratives in Scripture, Hauerwas and his co-author Charles Pinches developed their accounts of particular Christian virtues which could be distinguished from those of Greek virtues, primarily developed by Aristotle. In *Christians among the Virtues*, they provided specific chapters to examine how distinctive Christian virtues of hope, obedience, courage, and patience are exemplified in the life and death of Jesus in the Gospel narratives.² In other words, they set Jesus as the exemplary model for Christian virtues (and the moral life) and centrally relate Christian virtues to the *self-sacrifice of Jesus* in the passion narrative. They underscore that Jesus was obedient to God unto his death, endured extreme suffering, courageously accepted his own death, and forgives those who persecute him for the sake of God. They then highlight martyrdom as the key example of a Christian life in public that *imitates Jesus’ self-sacrifice unto death* and consequently embodies the Christian virtues of obedience, hope, and courage: “The martyr dies with the hope that her death will strengthen the church, but it is not quite right to say she dies for the church. Rather *in her death, she imitates Christ* [emphasis added].”³

I argue that the conventional Christian virtue discourse, which sets Jesus’ total sacrifice unto death in the passion narrative as the archetype of the virtues of a Christian community, is vulnerable to being misused to reinforce the unjust socio-cultural structures that sustain structural and cultural violence against the oppressed. The glorification of destructive sacrifices through the language of virtue, the heart of the moral problem in my dissertation, resonates with the problem of “redemptive suffering,” the misuse of Christian discourse of Jesus’ sacrifice unto

¹ Jennifer A. Herdt, “Hauerwas Among the Virtues,” *Journal of Religious Ethics* 40, no. 2 (2012): 202.

² Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Robert Pinches, *Christians among the Virtues: Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 113–79.

³ Hauerwas and Pinches, 161.

death to justify the suffering of the oppressed, that has been argued by liberationist, feminist, and womanist ethicists and theologians. For example, Anthony B. Pinn criticizes the Christian doctrine of redemptive suffering, which highlights the positive value of suffering as redemptive, and argues that this doctrine is the most powerful impediment for African American communities to liberate themselves from socio-cultural oppression in the U.S.⁴

It is very important to note that my dissertation does not intend to deny the conventional Christian virtue discourse highlighting Jesus' sacrificial death on the cross, but rather to expose its limitation and even harmfulness to the oppressed who suffer under the unjust socio-cultural structures which force them to sacrifice themselves excessively or totally for the sake of "redemptive" causes. Following Katie Cannon's groundbreaking account of womanist virtues, this dissertation aims to diversify Christian virtue discourses by reconstructing particular virtues of the oppressed in the context of oppression and violence.

In her *Katie's Canon*, Cannon presents us with a new direction to an alternative virtue discourse for the oppressed. She carefully observes the life of Zora Neale Hurston and highlights the moral values that are central in the Black community to guide their own life and maintain "feistiness about life" under the structural violence of White supremacy.⁵ She explicitly names "unctuousness" as the (alternative) virtue of the Black community: "Creatively straining against the external restraints (structural injustices) in one's life is virtuous living."⁶ For Cannon, Hurston concretely embodied this particular virtue throughout her life by celebrating "the value of rich reservoir of materials passed along in the oral tradition of her parents, neighbors, and common everyday people" and confronting "the almost universal understanding" of Black

⁴ For discussion on "redemptive suffering," see Anthony B. Pinn, *Why, Lord?: Suffering and Evil in Black Theology* (New York: Continuum, 1995).

⁵ Katie G. Cannon, *Katie's Canon: Womanism and the Soul of the Black Community* (New York: Continuum, 1995), 91.

⁶ Cannon, 92.

culture and folkways as “inferior, comic, and primitive.”⁷ In other words, Cannon uncovers virtues of the Black community cultivated in their daily strategies of survival and resistance under and against structural injustices.

To sum up, my dissertation envisions an alternative Christian virtue discourse to the self-sacrificial virtue discourse so that this particular theo-ethical discourse can appropriately reflect the lived experiences of the oppressed, specifically a community of oppressed women, in the context of violence and oppression and contributes to holistic flourishing, including their own flourishing and social flourishing. For this task, this dissertation asks the following main moral questions: **(1) How does an oppressed community in the context of violence and oppression overcome oppressive constraints on developing their own moral agency and transform themselves into active moral agents? (2) What are particular virtues—as an alternative to the conventional self-sacrificial virtues—of this oppressed community and how do they exercise their distinctive virtues through their daily practices in the course of resistance against oppression and violence?**

II. Methodology

The moral problem of the conventional Christian virtue discourse, which I pointed out above, is partly attributed to its primary sources and methodologies. Its primary sources are texts (e.g., Scripture or *Summa Theologiae*) and traditions (e.g., Christian orthodoxy or Thomism). The marginalized source is *the lived experience of a particular community*, specifically the oppressed. Second, its overriding methodological concern, constructing a normative ethic, and the lack of social scientific approaches contribute to the neglect of “thick description” of the

⁷ Cannon, 93.

moral life.⁸ For example, Hauerwas normatively prescribes particular virtues for a Christian community, and for this work he intentionally rules out the use of social scientific methods (i.e. socio-cultural analysis of power, privilege, and oppression in society). As a result of methodological limits, his virtue discourse fails to adequately capture the unequal and unjust social locations among Christian communities and present a thick descriptive account of the lived experiences of a particular community on the ground.

Given these methodological limits in the contemporary virtue discourses, **this dissertation primarily aims to thickly describe and examine a transformative process of cultivating and exercising virtues of the oppressed in the context of violence and oppression.** In order to adequately register the lived experiences of the oppressed under structural injustice, my project will employ a specific case study—the South Korean women’s social movements for democratization under the totalitarian regimes of General Park Chung-Hee and Chun Do-Hwan in the 1970 and ’80s.

I chose this case study because it clearly manifests oppressive culture and unjust political, social, and economic structures. Although it will be exposed fully in chapter 2, the political era in South Korea under the Park and Chun regimes culminated in what I call *totalitarian sickness*: a life-negating and dehumanizing cultural sickness that normalized and sustained totalitarian terror that totally sacrificed countless citizens as mere expendable parts for achieving a higher

⁸ Over the past decades, the use of ethnographic methodology in Christian theology and ethics has grown remarkably. Christian Scharen facilitated a panel on “Ethnography and Normative Ethics” at the Society of Christian Ethics Annual Meeting in 2003, and Todd Whitmore presented a provoking paper titled “Crossing the Road: The Case of Ethnographic Fieldwork in Christian Ethics” which criticizes Christian ethicists for practicing “veranda ethics.” See Todd Whitmore, “Crossing the Road: The Case of Ethnographic Fieldwork in Christian Ethics,” *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics* 27, no. 2 (2007): 273–94. Then, Scharen and Anna Vigen published a first anthology on ethnography and theology/ethics. See Christian Scharen and Aana Marie Vigen, eds., *Ethnography as Christian Theology and Ethics* (New York: Continuum, 2011). Several theologians and ethicists such as Mary McClintock Fulkerson and Luke Bretherton also published their monographs utilizing the method of ethnography. See Mary McClintock Fulkerson, *Places of Redemption: Theology for a Worldly Church* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Luke Bretherton, *Resurrecting Democracy: Faith, Citizenship, and the Politics of a Common Life* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

and noble cause. This totalitarian sickness was concretely manifested through various forms of structural and cultural violence against citizens, perpetrated by the Park and Chun regimes.

However, my preliminary research conducted in the summer of 2016 in South Korea revealed that some South Korean Christian women, whose sons, daughters, and/or husbands were imprisoned, tortured, and/or executed by the totalitarian regimes, managed to exercise a distinctive moral power and agency in actively resisting the structural and cultural violence of totalitarian sickness and passionately working for democratization, justice, and peace. These mothers and wives did not remain in the seat of victimhood. They formed their own political organizations and engaged in their own form of political resistance and democratic movement, what they call *kajok-woondong*, roughly translated as family movements, which is based on their radical re-appropriation of the traditional concept of motherhood and wifehood in Korean culture.

I also found that for these mothers and wives, their faith, and experiences of the divine presence in their communal religious rituals and public protests played a significant role in the process of forming and exercising their distinctive moral power and agency. While some Christian theologies (e.g., understanding divine love as self-sacrifice) and practices (e.g., sermon or sacraments practiced predominately by male religious leaders) tended to run counter to the formation of their moral agency, the women initiated the Thursday Prayer Meetings with the aid of the Human Rights Council of the National Council of Churches in Korea. Based on these regular prayer meetings, they eventually decided to establish the first formal organization for political activities named Kukahyup⁹, the Association of Families of Arrested, in 1974. The

⁹ Kukahyup, the first formal organization of the women in the 1970s, was eventually developed into Minkahyup in 1985 by consolidating different family organizations. The historical development of the family movements will be fully explored in chapter 3.

majority of the mothers and wives who engaged in their family movements in the 1970 and '80s was Christians, and their faith was the bedrock for their relentless political activism.

Given this preliminary research, I found the aptness of this case for addressing the main moral questions of this dissertation. However, I also found the paucity of scholarly literatures on this particular case.¹⁰ In order to collect research data, I conducted a four-months extensive fieldwork in South Korea from September to December 2017. During this fieldwork, I conducted archival research and in-depth interviews with the former participants in the family movements.

First, I collected primary and secondary sources on the topics of this dissertation in several archives located in Seoul: (1) pictures/images of protests, documents written by various political organizations, and oral testimonies of those who deeply involved in the family movements from the archive of the Korea Democracy Foundation, (2) documents on the political engagement and human rights activism of Korean churches and the Thursday Prayer Meeting from the archive of the National Council of Churches in Korea, and (3) published periodicals by several political organizations of the family movements.

Second, I employed semi-structured in-depth interviews with seven individual women who engaged in the family movements in the 1970 and '80s.¹¹ Through the interviews, I collated qualitative data covering the following topics: (1) their experiences of structural and cultural violence in Korean society under the totalitarian regimes, (2) their understanding of motherhood and wifehood, (3) the process of how they become involved in the family movement, (4) their

¹⁰ There are a lot of existing literatures on South Korea's democratization and citizens' social movements in the 1970 and '80s in the field of Korean Studies, Sociology, or Political Science. However, as far as I know, there is only one monograph on South Korean women's democratic movements. See Youngtae Shin, *Protest Politics and the Democratization of South Korea: Strategies and Roles of Women* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015).

¹¹ This dissertation research was approved by the Emory Institutional Review Board on October 26, 2017, as a exempt research which was exempt from further IRB review and approval. In order to follow the research guideline presented by the Emory IRB, throughout the dissertation, each interviewee is given a pseudonym. Among seven interviewees, two were former Kukahyup members, two former Yangkahyup members, two former Minkahyup members, and one current Yangkahyup member.

involvement in the family movement and political activism, including religious practices such as the Thursday Prayer Meetings of the *Kukahyup*, (5) their personal faith and experiences of the divine presence in their political activism, and (6) emotions experienced while engaging political/religious activities. Since these topics in general are abstract, I encouraged each individual woman to provide personal anecdotes and stories for initiating conversations on the topics (for the details of the in-depth interview, please see Appendix A).

Throughout this dissertation, the case study of the family movements, organized and practiced by the mothers and wives of the political victims under the Park and Chun regimes' oppression follows Michael Burawoy's method of the extended case study. This dissertation does not seek to develop a grounded theory, specifically a grounded theory of moral and theological virtues, from the case study of the particular communities of the mothers and wives. Rather, putting local practices of the particular communities forward, the study of practices for political resistance and democratic movement present a "crisis" to the existing theories of virtues.¹² In other words, this case study eventually presents a *normative judgment* to *challenge* the conventional Christian virtue discourse focusing on imitating Jesus' sacrificial death. Nevertheless, this case study also entails a (re) constructive aspect along with the critical aspect: by hearing unheard stories of the mothers and wives, it aims to *add an alternative moral voice* to diversify the Christian virtue discourses that would serve as a moral resource for a particular community, specifically an oppressed community, in the context of violence and oppression.

¹² See Michael Burawoy, "The Extended Case Method," *Sociological Theory* 16, no. 1 (1998): 4–33. Christian Ethicists Luke Bretherton also draws on the extended case study for presenting a crisis to the pre-existing theologies. See Luke Bretherton, "Coming to Judgment: Methodological Reflections on the Relationship Between Ecclesiology, Ethnography and Political Theory," *Modern Theology* 28, no. 2 (2012): 167–96.

III. Outline

This dissertation is divided into two main parts. In Part One, as stated above, I aim to provide a thick description of the moral life of the mothers and wives of the political victims under the Park and Chun regime's oppression. Part One consists of two chapters. First, in Chapter 2 *Heesaeng* (Sacrifice), I provide a thick historical account of the sociopolitical context of South Korea under the non-democratic regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan in the 1970 and '80s. This chapter begins by introducing excerpts from two Korean novels that painfully capture *destructive sacrifices* of countless South Korean citizens. This chapter is an attempt to critically examine what contributed to the destructive sacrifices of individuals on the altar of the "glory" of nation (such as rapid economic development, national security, or even democracy). Rather than pinpointing an individual actor such as Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, this chapter focuses on exposing a particular life-negating and dehumanizing culture that was primarily shaped and disseminated by the Park regime and the Chun regimes.

For this purpose, I draw on theories of totalitarianism developed by Juan J. Linz, Hannah Arendt, and Leonard Schapiro and examine two major totalitarian features of the Park and Chun regimes: (1) mass mobilization for rapid economic development, and (2) positive and negative propagandization of totalitarian ideology. Developing from the historical description and analysis, I critically examine the cultural manifestation of the totalitarian ideology, particularly the deliberate moralization of total sacrifices of individuals for the nation-state as the preeminent moral virtue, and argue that how this totalitarian ideology functions as cultural violence for justifying multiple forms of violence against individual citizens.

In Chapter 3 *Kajok* (Family), I offer historical narratives of the mothers and wives of political victims oppressed by the Park and Chun regime: the untold stories of how they became

the subjects of history in South Korea's democratization. Some of them were the mothers of young college students who were unjustly imprisoned. Some were the wives of the political martyrs whose bodies were totally sacrificed in the name of "national security." Some were the mothers of the long-term conscientious prisoners whose consciences were criminalized and condemned as "social evil." Some were the wives of the political prisoners who were tortured in the so-called "human slaughterhouse." In other words, they also were victims who suffered under the life-denying and dehumanizing culture that permeated Korean society and was disseminated by the Park and Chun regimes.

Nevertheless, these mothers and wives did not remain in the seat of victimhood. They formed their own political organizations and initiated a distinctive form of political resistance against the Park and Chun regimes, what they called "*kajok-woondong*" (family movement). Their family movements were based on their collective identity—the seamless fusion of their dual identities as (1) a mother or wife, a caretaker of the family, and (2) a political and moral agent of restoring democracy and human dignity. Chapter 3 both tells their unheard stories of becoming subjects in the history of Korea's democratization and traces the historical development of their family movements. For this historical description, this chapter focuses on specific practices for living out their fused dual identities, which were employed for both caretaking of the victimized family members, including affirming and saving their lives, and for public political resistance, specifically symbolic protests, against the Park and Chun regimes.

Part One provides thick historical descriptions and narratives of the family movements, and Part Two offer interdisciplinary analyses of the family movements in order to address the main moral questions of this dissertation. The first chapter of the Part Two, Chapter 4 *Kido* (Prayer), addresses one of the central moral questions: How were the mothers and wives, who

had forced to remain victims and whose public leadership had been coercively restricted in Korean society, transformed into moral agents who exercised their moral power in the a public sphere? The focal point of this chapter is the process of the moral transformation of the mothers and wives. In order to analyze this process of moral transformation, this chapter focuses on a particular practice of the family movements: the Thursday Prayer Meeting (henceforth, TMP). This practice was particularly crucial in the 1970s, since it was the only space in which the families of political prisoners and martyrs could gather and openly and publicly share their ordeals and incidents of state violence. More importantly, they shared not just information but their authentic emotions. It was the only one place where the families could vent their emotions about their family members' imprisonment in public, emotions that included sorrow, shame, and fear.

Drawing on the interdisciplinary studies of emotions developed by social movement theorists, moral philosophers, and Christian ethicists, this chapter mainly aims to examine the *moral emotions* enacted in the TPM and their contributions to the moral transformation of the families, specifically the ordinary mothers and wives, of political prisoners from “passive victims” into “active moral agents” who passionately fought for restoration of democracy and human rights in Korean society. For this main goal, this chapter analyzes emotional transformation in the collective ritual of the TPM as both a resource and indicator of the moral transformation of the mothers and wives. Based on the collected data from my fieldwork on the emotional status of the participants of the TPM, I found three major types of emotional transformation: (1) from individual sorrow to collective lament, (2) from guilt and shame to anger and pride, and (3) from *han* to joy and hope. Drawing on existing literatures on moral emotions by moral philosophers and Christian ethicists, this chapter examines these processes of

emotional transformation and argues for moral values of the transformed emotions—(1) *communal lament*, (2) *moral outrage* and *pride*, and (3) *transcendental joy*—in the transformation of the mothers and wives’ moral agency.

Chapter 5 *Salim* (Life-Giving) addresses another main moral question of this dissertation: what is a particular virtue of the mothers and wives, and how did they embody or exemplify this particular virtue through their practices of political resistance? For this task, first, I critically examine a specific form of political martyrdom, suicide protests, employed by many young South Korean protesters. Although I wholeheartedly appreciate the noble sacrifices of the suicide protesters as an heir of their sacrifices for democracy, I as a social ethicist critically examine their total self-sacrifices unto death in terms of the tragic internalization of the totalitarian ideology. As the Park and Chun regime dominated the country’s moral discourses, the suicide protesters were tragically forced to follow the internal logic of the totalitarian ideology. They thought that in their circumstances, there was no virtue other than the virtue of sacrifice (even unto death). Seeing no alternatives, they therefore offered themselves as living sacrifices on the altar of democracy.

Against this tragic internalization, in Chapter 5, I argue that the family movements, practiced by the mothers and wives of the political victims, including the political martyrs, were a *moral protest* that did indeed present an alternative *moral voice* to wider society. Their moral voice was concretely embodied as an alternative moral virtue to the totalitarian virtue of total sacrifice. In this chapter, I name this embodied alternative moral virtue as the virtue of *salim* consisting of the four essential aspects: (1) the habituation of *salim*, (2) virtuous creativity, (3) virtuous wisdom, and (4) holistic flourishing. This chapter illuminates in detail how the mothers and wives embodied this alternative moral virtue through their family movements.

The last chapter of this dissertation, Chapter 6 *Buhwal* (Resurrection), mainly aims to suggest a new direction for constructing an alternative Christian virtue discourse to the conventional discourse that primarily and perhaps exclusively focuses on imitating Jesus' self-sacrifice unto death. For this task, first, this chapter examines the faithfulness of the mothers and wives and explores how they lived out their theological commitments in the public sphere. I argue for analogical affinities between the mothers and wives of political victims who faithfully lived out their theological commitment to the resurrection of Christ and the women in the Gospel of Matthew who became the first witness to the resurrection of Christ. This chapter explores those analogical affinities between the two groups of women and then re-reads the resurrection narrative in the Gospel of Matthew through the stories of the mothers and wives uncovered throughout this dissertation. For this task, I employ a *liberative* hermeneutic, which reads Scripture from the perspective of marginalized communities with emphasis on their liberative practices. This re-reading of the resurrection narrative through the stories of the mothers and wives is also informed by historical-critical studies of Scripture and contemporary Christian ethicists' reconstructive accounts of the resurrection of Christ, particularly Kelly Brown Douglas' book *Stand Your Ground*. Based on the re-reading of the Matthean resurrection narrative, this chapter concludes by suggesting the biblical women's *faithful public witness to God's resurrecting power* as an alternative theological virtue for an oppressed Christian community that is suffering under the vicious power of evil manifested through multiple forms of structural and cultural violence.

The stories of the mothers and wives present a gift of unyielding hope to the oppressed in the context of violence and oppression. Their stories, particularly the stories of their daily practices of survival, resistance, and flourishing, shows the transformative process of cultivating

their own moral agency and power. Their emotions of lament, anger, pride, and even joy experienced in their communal practices shows how these emotions served as the moral resources in this transformative process. More importantly, their stories embody an alternative moral virtue, what I name as “the virtue of *salim*,” in this dissertation, which presents moral imagination for envisioning a particular virtue of the oppressed in the course of resistance against oppression. Their stories offer moral imagination to re-read the resurrection narrative in the Gospel of Matthew. Both the Korean mothers and wives and the biblical women exemplified the virtue of faithful witness to God’s resurrecting power over the evil culture. Their stories boldly suggest an alternative path toward a particular “virtue” affirming both individual and social flourishing and witnessing the life-giving power of resurrection, the life-giving power of *salim*.

Chapter 2

HEESAENG (SACRIFICE)

Sir, here is a person who forgot his instinct to live, who wants to die quickly without feeling any pain. He is dying. He is not a micro-organism, or an animal, but a human being. He is rejected by the rich and is used by society like *fertili[z]er*, to make the rich even richer. Sir, they are human beings who desire bread, leisure, and freedom...¹

From *Why Must We Be Slaves?*, an unfinished novel by Jeon Tae-il

They pushed their way into the thicket which backed on to the empty lot. Following the gestured instructions of one who looked to be in charge, they stacked the bodies in the neat shape of a cross. Mine was second from the bottom, jammed in tight and crushed still flatter by every body that was piled on top. Even this pressure didn't squeeze any more blood from my wounds, which could only mean that it had all leaked out already... When they threw a straw sack over the body of the man at the very top, the tower of bodies was transformed into *the corpse of some enormous beast* [emphasis added], its dozens of legs splayed out beneath it... Black smoke rolled off our rotten bodies in ragged, intermittent breaths, and in those places where there was nothing left to produce it the white gleam of bone was revealed...²

From the novel *Human Acts*, Chapter 2 Black Breaths, by Han Kang

I. Introduction

South Korea achieved unprecedented economic development in the 1970 and '80s. Adapting the phrase “Miracle on the Rhine,” which referred to Germany’s rapid economic reconstruction in the aftermath of World War II, it is commonly said that South Korea accomplished a “Miracle on the Han River” in the aftermath of the 1950–1953 Korean War, a war that totally devastated the nation’s economic and social structures and human resources.

In light of this hugely successful economic turnaround, South Korea is frequently regarded as a “role model” for developing countries. However, the glory of South Korea has been achieved at the expense of countless lives of ordinary citizens. Under export-oriented economic structures strictly controlled by the regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, it

¹ Young-rae Cho, *A Single Spark: The Biography of Chun Tae-II*, trans. Soon-ok Chun (Seoul, Korea: Korea Democracy Foundation, 2003), 230.

² Kang Han, *Human Acts: A Novel*, trans. Deborah Smith (London: Portobello Books, 2016).

was individual workers who were sacrificed in poor working conditions for the sake of the nation's rapid economic growth. One such worker was Jeon Tae-il, a tailor and labor rights activist at *Pyunghwa* Market in Seoul who self-immolated on November 13, 1970 at the age of twenty-two to protest these dehumanizing working conditions. His above mentioned novel on slavery captures the *han*³ of the workers whose lives were forcibly negated and reduced to "fertilizer" for the glory of their nation.

In addition to its unprecedented and rapid economic growth, South Korea has also been claimed as a role model for developing countries because of its democratization. South Korea is an exceptional example in history in that "it has combined growth with democracy."⁴ However, South Korea's democracy was not and is not free. Thomas Jefferson wrote, "the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants."⁵ Likewise, the tree of South Korea's democracy was grown with the blood of those who participated in the democratization movement. Since 1969, approximately 431 individuals have been sacrificed unto death as political martyrs upon the altar of democracy.⁶ The regime of General Chun Doo-hwan committed brutal state violence against innocent citizens in Gwangju in order to suppress the Gwangju Uprising of 1980; an estimated 272 citizens were killed by the heavily armed paratroopers.⁷ Han Kang's novel *Human Acts* surreally depicts the *han* of victims of the Gwangju Uprising through the eyes of schoolboy Jeong-dae's spirit. The lives of individual

³ Andrew Sung Park define *han* as "the collapsed pain of the heart due to psychosomatic, interpersonal, social, political, economic, and cultural oppression and repression." When the accumulated pain and suffering reach the maximum limit, and then it imploded and collapses into *han*, a condensed feeling of sadness, despair, and bitterness. See Andrew Sung Park, *The Wounded Heart of God: The Asian Concept of Han and the Christian Doctrine of Sin* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1993), 16.

⁴ "What Do You Do When You Reach the Top? South Korea's Economy," *The Economist*, November 12, 2011, <https://www.economist.com/briefing/2011/11/12/what-do-you-do-when-you-reach-the-top> (accessed July 9, 2019).

⁵ Thomas Jefferson, "Thomas Jefferson to William Smith," The Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/105.html> (accessed July 9, 2019).

⁶ Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 294–95.

⁷ Lee, 295.

citizens were totally negated and sacrificed. Their blood was spilled ostensibly for the sake of “national security.”⁸ Their abandoned bodies were inhumanly reduced to “the corpse of some enormous beast” exhaling black breaths from their rotting bodies.

The title of this chapter is *heesaeng*. It is a Korean word that literally means *sacrifice*. In the 1970 and '80s, although South Korea accomplished exemplary economic growth and democracy, I suggest that this was at the expense of too many sacrifices of individuals, sacrifices for the sake of higher causes, even causes as important as economic growth, national security, and democracy. As both aforementioned novels capture, these sacrifices involved the negation of life, the denial of human dignity, and the destructive reduction of human beings—human lives!—to things that can be exploited and manipulated. In other words, through the sacrifices, individuals were coercively and/or tragically disjoined from their own flourishing—the affirmation and fulfillment of life.

In *Human Acts*, though the state through its brutal violence forcibly dragged Jeong-dae's spirit out of his body, his spirit managed to tether itself to his negated body and cry out in desperation: “Why did you kill me?” He then asks himself, “Go to those who killed you then. But *where are they* [emphasis added]?”⁹ This chapter is my attempt to answer his desperate questions. In it, I examine critically what contributed to the destructive sacrifices of countless South Korean individuals for the sake of the nation-state. Rather than pinpointing an individual actor such as Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, a factory owner, or a soldier, this chapter

⁸ The Chun regime alleged that the “citywide rebellion” in Gwangju was instigated by North Korean agents “in order to destabilize society and spearhead a communist revolution” and declared it to be “the armed violence of mobs.” See N. Ganesan and Sung Chull Kim, eds., *State Violence in East Asia* (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 49–53.

⁹ Han, *Human Acts*, 56–66.

focuses on debunking a particular life-negating and dehumanizing *culture* that was primarily shaped and disseminated by the Park regime and the Chun regime in the 1970 and '80s.¹⁰

With that in mind, this chapter begins with a historical description and analysis of the sociopolitical context of South Korea in the 1960 to the 1980s from which the life-negating and dehumanizing culture emerged and was disseminated. For this task, I draw on theories of totalitarianism developed by Juan J. Linz, Hannah Arendt, and Leonard Schapiro. In particular, this chapter focuses on describing two major totalitarian features of the Park and Chun regimes: (1) mass mobilization for rapid economic development, and (2) positive and negative propagandization of totalitarian ideology, specifically creating a “new man” or transforming “human nature” in the name of the proclaimed utopian visions.

Developing from the historical description and analysis, I critically examine *the cultural manifestation of the totalitarian ideology* and argue that what Johan Galtung defines as *cultural violence* is used to justify multiple forms of violence against individual citizens. First, it justifies structural violence against workers and housewives by praising their excessive self-sacrifice for the glory of nation and by portraying them as embodying the prime moral virtue. Second, it legitimates state violence against political resisters and even innocent citizens—the “legal murder” of eight members of People’s Revolutionary Party (*Inhyukdang*), the state-led massacre of citizens during the Gwangju Uprising, and the killing of college student Park Jong-chul and Lee Han-yeol through state-controlled torture and violence—for the sake of “national security” and “justice.”

¹⁰ My attempt to debunk the life-negating and dehumanizing culture has been influenced by Kelly Brown Douglas’ critical analysis of what she calls the stand-your-ground culture. See Kelly Brown Douglas, *Stand Your Ground: Black Bodies and the Justice of God* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2015).

II. The Sociopolitical Context of South Korea in the 1960s to 1980s: The Totalitarian Regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan

South Korea achieved unprecedented economic growth within a short period of time after the Korean War—what I referred to earlier as “the Miracle on the Han River” or “the economic miracle.” South Korea had been one of the poorest countries in the world until the early 1960s: its real per capita GDP was significantly lower than that of Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia in 1962.¹¹ Most economic analysts concluded that South Korea was a “hopeless economic basket case whose people were destined to be *perpetually* dependent on foreign aid.”¹² However, their analysis turned out to be wrong. Within two decades, South Korea’s real per capita GDP increased more than five times,¹³ and its GNP increased from \$2.1 billion in 1961 to \$95.1 billion in 1987.¹⁴ This rapid economic growth and transformation surprised the world, which consequently referred to South Korea as an Asian “tiger” along with Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan.

Nonetheless, there is a dark side to South Korea’s glory, namely state repression and violence by the nondemocratic regimes of General Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan. Both regimes began with military coups in 1961 and 1979 respectively and executed nondemocratic governance with a notorious degree of political coercion and violence against South Korean citizens.

For the Park regime, its nondemocratic governance culminated in the Fourth Republic of South Korea, which began with the promulgation of the Yushin Constitution in October 1972. It was the beginning of the absolute monopoly of political power by the Park regime and its ruling

¹¹ The average income of South Koreans was almost half of that of Malaysians in 1962. See Edward M. Graham, *Reforming Korea’s Industrial Conglomerates* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2005), 1.

¹² Graham, 1.

¹³ Graham, 2.

¹⁴ George E. Ogle, *South Korea: Dissent within the Economic Miracle* (New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1990), 29.

Democratic Republican Party (henceforth, the DRP). The Park regime declared a historic necessity of taking “extraordinary measures”—the Yushin Constitution—in order to accomplish what they claimed to be “the historic mission” of “*national resurrection*.”¹⁵ The Yushin Constitution offered the Park regime a political structure to consolidate its total domination of political power by dissolving the National Assembly and banning all oppositional political activities, including the presence of opposition parties themselves, and by ensuring Park’s lifelong presidency. Even after the National Assembly was allowed to reconvene and function, the Park regime and the DRP directly appointed one-third of its members, thus securing a legislative majority and ensuring it could manipulate its legislative powers.¹⁶ The National Assembly “degenerated to a mere legislative rubber stamp” for the Park regime.¹⁷ In addition, the Park regime monopolized judicial power by unilaterally appointing “the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who then had the power to select the other Supreme Court Justices as well as lower-court judges.”¹⁸ Given this political structure of the Fourth Republic, which lasted until the assassination of Park in October, 1979, the Park regime established a *totalitarian* political system that transformed the ruling DRP, which was “highly organized, disciplined, and hierarchical with Park at the summit,” into a *monistic center of power*.¹⁹

The Fourth Republic was ended by the assassination of Park in October 1979, but in December General Chun seized power through another military coup. His military regime instituted the Fifth Republic with “symbolic [or nominal] constitutional reform that technically

¹⁵ Emphasis added; Chung Hee Park, *Major Speeches* (Seoul, Korea: The Samhwa Publishing Co., 1973), 30.

¹⁶ Paul Y. Chang, *Protest Dialectics: State Repression and South Korea’s Democracy Movement, 1970-1979* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 24.

¹⁷ Clemens Jürgenmeyer et al., *Parliaments and Political Change in Asia* (Pasir Panjang, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 33.

¹⁸ Chang, *Protest Dialectics*, 24–25.

¹⁹ Stein Ringen et al., *The Korean State and Social Policy: How South Korea Lifted Itself from Poverty and Dictatorship to Affluence and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 27.

ended the Yushin system” in October 1980.²⁰ This amendment ensures the indirect election of a president by an electoral college (called the National Conference of Unification) but limits the president’s term of office to one seven-year term.²¹ Under this constitution, Chun was indirectly elected as a president by the National Conference of Unification with one hundred percent of the votes.²² For the first five years of the Fifth Republic (1980–1985), there was ostensibly some presence of multiple minority parties other than the ruling Democratic Justice Party (henceforth, DJP), though in reality the National Assembly was a “toothless parliament in which the ruling party dominated several regime-created ‘official’ opposition parties.”²³ In other words, from their inception, the opposition parties were a mere “political creation” designed by the Chun regime.²⁴ The Chun regime even intervened in the opposition parties’ process of candidate nomination for the general election. The opposition parties’ dependence on the Chun regime renders null and void the presence of political pluralism, and makes the DJP a *monistic center of power*. In other words, like the Park regime, the Chun regime consolidated a *totalitarian* political system during the Fifth Republic.

So far, I have briefly sketched the nondemocratic political systems—that is, the *totalitarian* nature—of the Park and Chun regimes. For the rest of this chapter, I focus on the aforementioned two major features of a totalitarian regime—mass mobilization and totalitarian ideology—and descriptively analyze how they were manifested in the Park and Chun regimes.

²⁰ Ringen et al., 13.

²¹ Aurel Croissant, Gabriele Bruns, and Marei John, eds., *Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia* (Singapore: Fredrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2002), 237.

²² Croissant, Bruns, and John, 236–37.

²³ Jürgenmeyer et al., *Parliaments and Political Change in Asia*, 33.

²⁴ Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000),

II.1 Mass Mobilization for Rapid Economic Development

According to Linz, *mass mobilization* is a key feature by which to discern whether a nondemocratic regime is totalitarian or authoritarian. He argues:

[U]nless they use some form of *mass organization and participation of members of the society* beyond the armed forces and a police to impose their rule, we cannot speak of a totalitarian system but, as we shall see later, of authoritarian regimes.²⁵

If “citizen participation in and active mobilization for political and collective social tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded, and channeled” by a nondemocratic regime and its ruling party, this regime is *totalitarian* rather than authoritarian.²⁶ The presence of mass mobilization represents a totalitarian regime’s “capacity to penetrate the society, to be present and influential in many institutional realms,” and to control individual citizens’ lives.²⁷ Thanks to mass mobilization, a totalitarian regime is able to achieve “certain types of *economic and social developments*.”²⁸

As mentioned above, in the Park and Chun eras, South Korea achieved an “economic miracle.” This unprecedented economic growth within the span of two decades truly was and is the glory of the nation. This glory came with a tremendous level of industrialization that was deliberately designed and implemented by the Park and Chun regimes. For the glory of their nation, countless citizens were mobilized as a workforce, or the so-called “industrial warriors” (*Sanop Jeonsa*), under the state-driven industrial transformation.²⁹ The Park and Chun regimes’ changes penetrated economic structures, moved citizens from rural areas to urban cities where manufacturing factories were concentrated, and exploited their labor to enable rapid economic

²⁵ Emphasis added; Linz, 67.

²⁶ Linz, 70.

²⁷ Linz, 72.

²⁸ Linz, 73.

²⁹ Hagen Koo, *Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 12.

development. This mass mobilization for the glory of the nation represents another totalitarian feature of the Park and Chun regimes.

From the beginning, the Park regime controlled economic systems and policies in order to achieve what it claimed as the historic mission of economic development. Right after his military coup, in 1961 Park created “the Economic Planning Board” and designed and implemented a “series of five-year plans for Korea’s development.”³⁰ Under these state-controlled economic policies and strategies, Korea’s economic structures, which had relied heavily on the agricultural economy, went through export-oriented industrialization on a massive scale.³¹ For example, exports had accounted for “less than 5 percent of Korean GDP at the end of the 1950s,” but they had increased to “more than 35 percent of a much larger GDP by 1980.”³²

Although the Chun regime could not achieve as much control over the economic systems as the Park regime did, it was still “the strong state” and “the driver of economic and industrial development.”³³ The state-controlled export-oriented economic system under the Park regime showed “serious signs of overheating, with export performance deteriorating and inflation reaching a level near 20 percent in 1979.”³⁴ In order to avert recession and deal with this economic crisis, which was the result of a “combination of high inflation, sluggish growth, ...

³⁰ The first phase of the Park regime’s export-oriented industrialization (1961–1972) focused on light industries such as the textile and apparel industry. The second phase (1972–1979) is often called the Park regime’s “heavy and chemical industries (HCI) drive.” In order to implement the five-year plans, the Park regime, supported by the EPB, utilized a “carrot and stick” approach to encourage private firms to participate in the push to export-oriented industrialization. They implemented a “large variety of subsidies and other incentives” and disciplined companies with “threats of punishment through economic penalties” for non-compliance with the Park regime.” The Park regime thus drove the economic system as an “entrepreneur-manager.” See Graham, *Reforming Korea’s Industrial Conglomerates*, 16–26.

³¹ Koo, *Korean Workers*, 23–25.

³² Graham, *Reforming Korea’s Industrial Conglomerates*, 18.

³³ Ringen et al., *The Korean State and Social Policy*, 60.

³⁴ Ringen et al., 44.

rising unemployment” and “foreign debt,” the Chun regime implemented a new version of the five-year plan.³⁵

Under the centralized economic system designed and controlled by the Park and Chun regimes, whole populations were literally mobilized—forced to move geographically, en masse—to provide the necessary manpower for rapid economic development. The rapid and widespread industrialization had been initiated by the Park regime in the 1960s and was continued by the Chun regime in the 1980s. With this economic transformation, agriculture’s share of the GDP sharply declined “from 39.9 percent in 1960 to 14.6 percent in 1980 to 9.0 percent in 1990,” while industry’s share (manufacturing, construction, mining, and utilities) increased “from 18.6 percent in the 1960 to 41.4 percent in 1980 to 44.7 percent in 1990.”³⁶

This structural economic change inevitably caused “a large-scale sectoral shift of labor”: in the late 1950s, agricultural workers made up 81.6 percent of the total Korean labor force, but by 1990 only 18.3 percent remained working on farms, and the portion of industrial workers had increased to 81.7 percent.³⁷ Unlike Taiwan’s geographically decentralized industrialization, Korea’s industrialization was deliberately achieved in particular targeted major urban cities that the Park and Chun regimes favored.³⁸ The majority of these manufacturing industries were

³⁵ Ringen et al., 44–45. Meanwhile, the Chun regime also implemented a government-supported/controlled project like the Park regime’s HCI drive that focused on producing advanced semiconductor products: the Very Large Scale Integral Circuit (VLSIC) project. Unlike the HCI drive that from its inception was a government-created product, the VLSIC project was mainly initiated by three private firms—Samsung, Hyundai, and LG—but this project could be seen as part of the realization of Chun’s personal belief that “Korea’s future lay with the high-tech and science-based industries.” More importantly, this project could not have been accomplished without considerable financial and policy support by the Chun regime. One example is that a large amount of governmental “preferential loans classified as being ‘for [the] equipment of [the] export industry’” was assigned to support these firms to implement this project. The VLSIC project shows that the Chun regime intervened and controlled the economic system with certain government-planned directions. See Graham, *Reforming Korea’s Industrial Conglomerates*, 67–70.

³⁶ Koo, *Korean Workers*, 33.

³⁷ Koo, 33–34.

³⁸ Jeonla province (southwestern region) was marginalized and oppressed since this region was historically regarded as the so-called region of “politically-left” or “Reds” from the beginning of Republic of Korea, and it was

developed in two regions: (1) the “Seoul-Kyungin area (Seoul, Inchon, and the surrounding areas in Kyungki province)” and (2) the Kyungsang-nam province (southeastern region) including two major cities, Pusan and Taegu.³⁹

Given the massive and rapid structural changes in the economy, millions of agricultural workers and their sons and daughters had to leave their homes in rural areas and migrate to the over-populated major urban cities in order to make a living. In other words, the Park and Chun regimes deliberately mobilized them as a labor force, both by making it difficult for them to make a living where they were, and by enticing them with jobs in cities. This mobilization was distinctly gendered: while men were mobilized as “soldiers” (through conscription) in their early twenties and became “the primary workers in the industrializing economy” after their compulsory military service, women were mobilized as the “secondary workforce” before marriage and as “mothers and housewives” upon marriage.⁴⁰

The mass mobilization of Korean men through conscription was the first type of gendered mobilization implemented to support Korean economic development. It may seem odd to assume a correlation between military service and economic development, but the Park regime did indeed extensively integrate “men’s mandatory military service into the overall [functioning] of the labor market in South Korea.”⁴¹ For men, the completion of military service was not only “the precondition for any type of employment,” but military service itself was acknowledged as “work experience in the conventional and legal practices of employment,” and laid the foundation for adjusting to the militarized corporate culture characterized by “rigid hierarchy

the hometown of strong political dissidents against the Park and Chun regime such as Kim Deajung. And Both Park and Chun were born in Kyungsang-nam province (southeastern region).

³⁹ Koo, *Korean Workers*, 42.

⁴⁰ Seungsook Moon, “Militarized Modernity and Gendered Mass Mobilization,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Korean Culture and Society*, ed. Youna Kim (New York: Routledge, 2017), 58–59.

⁴¹ Moon, 55.

based on rank, the command mode of one-way communication, and a collective ethos used to justify individual sacrifice.”⁴² Their military service was indeed a prerequisite for working in the militarized corporate culture. They were subsequently mobilized as “the primary workers in the industrializing economy” or “industrial warriors” who became “involved in an economic war against foreign competitors, willing to sacrifice themselves for the glory of the nation.”⁴³

Korean women were also mobilized for Korea’s rapid economic development. Their gendered mobilization can be largely divided into two phases: before marriage and after marriage. First, young single women were mobilized as workers, specifically factory workers in the light industries. Their cheap labor was crucial in the labor-intensive manufacturing industries such as the textile industry. Even though they contributed significantly to the massive growth of exports in the 1960 to ’70s, they were recognized and treated very much as a “secondary workforce,” which remained “untrained or trained with feminized skills.”⁴⁴ These women were therefore a cheap, temporary, and secondary source of labor. Given their marginalized status in the economic system, they were expected to quit their temporary work in the public sphere when they got married and become a “wise mother and good wife (*hyunmo-yangcheo*)” in the domestic sphere in line with the traditional gender division of labor in Korean culture.⁴⁵ In other words, after their marriage, they were mobilized as *mothers* who contributed to the country’s economic development through their direct participation in “family planning (a euphemism for population control)” and *housewives* who were in charge of the “rational management of the household” economy.⁴⁶

⁴² Moon, 55–57.

⁴³ Moon, 58; Koo, *Korean Workers*, 33. The Park regime was deeply involved in the formation of male workers’ identity as economic soldiers. This identity formation is part of cultural violence perpetrated by the Park regime, and will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

⁴⁴ Moon, “Militarized Modernity and Gendered Mass Mobilization,” 59.

⁴⁵ Moon, 60.

⁴⁶ Moon, 59.

Although the specific modes of mobilization were gendered, both Korean men and women were mobilized to enable the industrial transformation and rapid economic development to occur. The mass mobilization was dictated by the Park and Chun regimes under their state-controlled economic system, a totalitarian feature of both regimes.⁴⁷

II. 2 Positive and Negative Propagandization of Totalitarian Ideology

According to Linz, the absence or presence of an “elaborate and guiding ideology” is the most important criterion that determines whether a nondemocratic regime is totalitarian or authoritarian: “Unless their power is exercised in the name of *ideology*, or *Weltanschauung*...we cannot speak of a totalitarian system but, as we shall see later, of authoritarian regimes.”⁴⁸ Linz emphasizes “the centrality of ideology” in a totalitarian system as “a source of legitimacy, a source of the sense of mission of a leader or a ruling group.”⁴⁹ Other theorists of totalitarianism also affirm the importance of ideology in a totalitarian regime. Friedrich and Brzezinski claim that a theory of totalitarianism “*centers on* the regime’s efforts to remold and transform the human beings under its control in *the image of ideology*,” and they name “an elaborate ideology” the first basic feature of totalitarianism.⁵⁰ Leonard Schapiro also defines ideology as one of three

⁴⁷ In Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski’s *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, one of the classic theories of totalitarianism, “a central control and direction of the entire economy” by a non-democratic regime is one of “six basic features” of totalitarianism. Given their descriptive theory, the state-controlled economic system itself represents a totalitarian feature of the Park and Chun regimes. The rest of the features are (1) an elaborate ideology, (2) a single party, (3) a system of terror, (4) a near-complete monopoly of control of mass communication, and (5) a near-complete monopoly of the use of weapons. See Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 22.

⁴⁸ Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology* (New York: The Free Press, 1970), 255. See also Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*, 67.

⁴⁹ Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*, 20, 77.

⁵⁰ Friedrich and Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 16, 22.

distinctive “pillars” upon which totalitarian rule is based, along with “a [single] party” and “the administrative machinery of the state.”⁵¹

By drawing on Theodor Geiger’s distinction between “mentality” and “ideology,” Linz defines the term ideology as “systems of thought more or less intellectually elaborated and organized,” and the term mentality as “ways of thinking and feeling, more emotional than rational, that provide non-codified ways of reacting to different situations.”⁵² Similarly, Friedrich and Brzezinski offer a general definition of ideology as “a reasonably coherent body of ideas,” but they qualify this definition by specifying its moral implications.⁵³ They emphasize that ideologies are “essentially *action-related* ‘systems’ of ideas which provide “practical means of *how to change and reform a society* based upon a more or less elaborate *criticism of what is wrong* with the existing or antecedent society.”⁵⁴ In other words, ideology is a system of thought that entails *moral judgment* and guides *moral action*.⁵⁵ Highlighting the moral dimension of ideology, in this chapter the two terms *ideology* and *moral discourse*—“a system of thought,” specifically “public thought (about moral rules, ideals, virtues, etc.) that informally govern our behavior as it affects others”⁵⁶—are used interchangeably.

Friedrich and Brzezinski introduce several distinctive aspects of totalitarian ideology. First, it entails “strongly utopian elements, some kind of notion of a paradise on earth.”⁵⁷ It

⁵¹ Leonard Schapiro, *Totalitarianism* (London: The Pall Mall Press, 1972), 45.

⁵² Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*, 162.

⁵³ Friedrich and Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 88.

⁵⁴ Emphasis added; Friedrich and Brzezinski, 88.

⁵⁵ Schapiro also notes the moral implication of ideology. He defines the term ideology in general as “a system of beliefs which relate to fundamental political aims and, moreover, a system which is designed, consciously or unconsciously, to *influence and direct the course of action* of those who are within its sphere of influence.” See Schapiro, *Totalitarianism*, 45.

⁵⁶ Thomas Schwandt, “Moral Discourse,” in *Encyclopedia of Evaluation*, ed. Sandra Mathison (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2011), 260.

⁵⁷ Friedrich and Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 26.

proposes a “total change and reconstruction” of society.⁵⁸ Second, with this utopian outlook in mind, it consists of an “official doctrine that radically rejects the existing society” and involves “total criticism of what is wrong with the existing or antecedent society.”⁵⁹ Third, this totalitarian ideology that is concerned with “total destruction and total reconstruction” aims for a “perfect final state of mankind.”⁶⁰ This declared goal of “creating a ‘new man,’” of remolding and transforming human beings, manifests a totalitarian regime’s ambition of “total control of the everyday life of its citizens, of its control, more particularly, of their thoughts and attitudes as well as their activities.”⁶¹ Hannah Arendt, another scholar of totalitarianism, likewise argues that totalitarian ideology primarily aims at “the transformation of human nature itself,” not “the transformation of the outside world or the revolutionizing transmutation of society.”⁶²

Creating a “new man” or transforming human nature necessarily involves a totalitarian regime’s control of its citizens’ everyday lives, specifically their moral lives, so a totalitarian ideology is propagandized intentionally to monopolize moral discourse and eliminate “the whole concept of private, individual moral judgment.”⁶³ Schapiro defines this function of totalitarian ideology as “moral anaesthesia” that paralyzes the moral agency of an individual citizen and neutralizes “the serious moral revulsion against the atrocities and brutalities” committed by the regime.⁶⁴ In other words, a totalitarian ideology serves as the monopolized moral discourse to “obscure or make acceptable something that would be absurd if regarded rationally.”⁶⁵ Its control over the moral life of its people through this totalitarian ideology allows the totalitarian regime to

⁵⁸ Friedrich and Brzezinski, 89.

⁵⁹ Friedrich and Brzezinski, 26, 89.

⁶⁰ Friedrich and Brzezinski, 22.

⁶¹ Friedrich and Brzezinski, 16–17.

⁶² Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harvest Books, 1973), 458.

⁶³ Schapiro, *Totalitarianism*, 35.

⁶⁴ Schapiro, 57.

⁶⁵ Schapiro, 46.

underline and justify the need for the mobilization of its citizens to fulfill the country's "future glory, or happiness, or greatness."⁶⁶

Most existing studies on the Park and Chun regimes pay attention to the political and economic structures they control, but these studies lack a thorough description and analysis of their ideologies and their monopoly of moral discourse to control the everyday lives of their citizens.⁶⁷ This chapter aims to fill this lacuna and to describe another totalitarian feature of the Park and Chun regimes. Following the descriptive theories of totalitarian ideology, I argue that the two regimes positively and/or negatively propagandized totalitarian ideologies that (1) project utopian visions, (2) criticize the moral decay and corruption of their citizens, and (3) seek to transform or remake them morally as a means for fulfilling the regimes' utopian goals.

Specifically, in this chapter I highlight the moral dimension of their ideologies, the deliberate moralization of what Hannah Arendt calls "terror" in totalitarianism as the standard virtue in Korean society.⁶⁸ According to Arendt, totalitarian terror refers to

the execution of a law of movement whose ultimate goal is not the welfare of men or the interest of one man but the fabrication of mankind[; it] eliminates individuals for the sake of species, sacrifices 'parts' for the sake of the 'whole.'"⁶⁹

Totalitarian terror is vicious violence against humanity: it is what Wendy Farley defines as "the most radical assaults on personhood."⁷⁰ Under a totalitarian regime, individual citizens are

⁶⁶ Schapiro, *Totalitarianism*, 58.

⁶⁷ Jungmin Seo and Sungmoon Kim argue that this lack of attention to how an authoritarian regime sustains its control over society through the monopoly of moral discourse can be found in existing literature on authoritarian regimes in general. See Jungmin Seo and Sungmoon Kim, "Civil Society under Authoritarian Rule: Bansanghoe and Extraordinary Everyday-Ness in Korean Neighborhoods," *Korea Journal* 55, no. 1 (2015): 61.

⁶⁸ The moralization of terror is not particular to Korean totalitarian regimes. "The most striking characteristic of terror under totalitarianism and perhaps the explanation for its pervasiveness and scope is *the moral self-righteousness* [emphasis added] with which it is justified by the rulers and their supporters, sometimes publicly, other times [only] in the inner circle." See Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science Volume 3: Macropolitical Theory* (Reading, UK: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), 220.

⁶⁹ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 465. Her understanding of terror in terms of dehumanizing sacrifice of individuals fits the purposes of this chapter better than "political terror," which is narrowly defined as "the arbitrary use, by organs of the political authority of severe coercion against individuals or groups, the credible threat of such use or the arbitrary extermination of such individuals or groups." See Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," 217.

inhumanely reduced into mere *parts* for the sake of the nation-state. They are dehumanized and treated as *fuel* for “the force of nature or of history to race freely.”⁷¹ As “the essence of totalitarian domination,” totalitarian terror first crushes each individual’s humanity (or individuality) and deprives each person of moral agency for action against what the totalitarian regimes defines as the law of movement: they are sacrificed as a “part of a single impersonal *movement* of total domination.”⁷² Along with the radical violence against personhood, totalitarian terror also commits violence at an interpersonal level: it obliterates “all relations between the individual and anyone else apart from the totalitarian power.”⁷³ In this light, in the rest of this chapter I carefully examine the ideologies of the Park and Chun regimes, focusing on how they moralized totalitarian terror as the prime moral virtue of citizens and the state.

The Park regime propagandized its ideology, which appeals to a utopian vision, in order to justify and sustain his political power and dominion over its citizens. In his major public speeches and published works, Park reiterated this utopian vision, namely the nation’s historic movement toward *national resurrection*: he declares that this movement is a “historical imperative”:⁷⁴

Our generation’s goal is clear; our path definite. Who shall, in the face of this lofty mission, allow himself to fall behind others in the march toward its accomplishment? Who could dare turn his back on its lofty value? The path to Korea’s national regeneration [national resurrection] is the path over which all Koreans must march: it is the act of creating a new history together. In this phase of creation, we—all of us—are present to play our role.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ Wendy Farley, *Eros for the Other: Retaining Truth in a Pluralistic World* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 56.

⁷¹ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 465.

⁷² Dava Villa, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 26–28. See also Arendt, 464.

⁷³ John McGowan, *Hannah Arendt: An Introduction* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 28.

⁷⁴ Park, *Major Speeches*, 90.

⁷⁵ He used the phrases “national salvation,” “national regeneration,” and “the re-birth of our nation” interchangeably to refer to “national resurrection.” See Chung Hee Park, *Korea Reborn: A Model for Development* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979), 146.

He then emphasized that all individual citizens must march together on this historic path to Korea's national resurrection. In other words, Park aimed to control lives of citizens in the name of the lofty cause of national resurrection.

In order to complete this historical movement toward national resurrection, Park claimed the foremost national task to be what he defined as a "human revolution" or "remaking of man."⁷⁶ This task clearly resonates with the totalitarian intention of transforming human nature or creating a new man. He argued:

A patient cannot be cured only by a surgical operation named revolution, I realize, nor is health regained merely by removing the diseased tissue. Permanent hygiene and restoration of a sound physical constitution are required to prevent a relapse.⁷⁷

Park diagnosed his nation of South Korea as having a *moral disease*—"decayed national character"—and prescribed a moral treatment for a "human revolution." For him, the moral disease of South Koreans was "our lack of national consciousness," "an extreme deficiency in the national awareness of the fact that 'we live together; we die together.'"⁷⁸ He harshly criticized individual citizens who are "so keen and intent about the interests of themselves and their narrow faction" and at the same time "so blind and disregardful of the common interest of the whole people."⁷⁹ He then provides a genealogical analysis of this moral disease by critically reflecting on "evil legacies on the Yi Dynasty."⁸⁰ He argues that Korean people's "malicious selfishness" and "their lack of unity and sectarian tendencies" were developed in a family/clan

⁷⁶ Chung Hee Park, *Our Nation's Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction*, 2nd ed. (Seoul, Korea: Hollym Corporation, 1970), 17. This book's first edition was published in 1962.

⁷⁷ Park, vii–viii.

⁷⁸ Park, 21.

⁷⁹ Park, 21.

⁸⁰ Park, 78. The Yi Dynasty (or Chosun Dynasty) was founded by General Yi Sung-key's Wihwa-do coup d'état in 1392 and lasted for about five centuries. It is interesting that Park claims that the Wihwa-do coup was "never [intended] to be a social revolution but only a violent change of regime." See also Park, 55.

system of the Yi Dynasty which “divide[d] the country into many opposed blood clans.”⁸¹ For him, this moral decay of selfish individualism/factionalism impeded the development of national consciousness.

After having diagnosed the moral disease of South Koreans, he prescribed “the moral awakening of the people” or “the moral discipline of the public” as part of his propaganda project called a human revolution for national resurrection.⁸² This *moral prescription* was practiced by the Park regime. He justified this state-controlled ideological project by declaring that, “the state should help each person develop his character and sense of responsibility.”⁸³ In other words, by appealing to the historic movement toward national resurrection, the Park regime propagandized and monopolized a moral discourse in order to control the lives of individual citizens totally. They positively framed the *total sacrifice of individuals* for the sake of national resurrection as the preeminent *moral virtue* of individual citizens.

For this ideological project, Park deliberately used stories of national heroes whom he then portrayed as exemplars of the propagandized virtue. He often praised Admiral Yi Sun-shin, who was a naval commander and fought to his death against the Japanese invasion during the Yi Dynasty, as embodying “the genuine symbol of our national spirit.”⁸⁴ His dedicated service to his nation, and giving his life on the battle ship, exemplified how to “pave the road to national salvation.” Park fervently declared, “[W]e should commit ourselves to the national cause and justice.”⁸⁵ In addition, Park praised the *Hwarang* Knights of the ancient *Silla* Kingdom as the prototype of the virtuous man who “would fearlessly give up his life for the defense of his

⁸¹ Park, 84–85.

⁸² Park, 214.

⁸³ Park, 211.

⁸⁴ Park, *Major Speeches*, 156.

⁸⁵ Park, 158.

country.”⁸⁶ As Admiral Yi and the *Hwarang* Knights virtuously sacrificed their whole lives for the sake of their nation—said Park—so too must each individual Korean citizen voluntarily follow this virtuous example in order to heal the moral decay of selfish individualism.

Two foremost tasks for national resurrection were economic development and national security. Specific aspects of the propagandized virtue were devised to fulfill these tasks. Specifically, under the slogans of “Economy comes first” and “unity, maximum efforts, maximum patience and much sweat and blood,” individual citizens were morally required to achieve “a miracle on the Han River.”⁸⁷ Park condemned “smooth hands,” “the hands of the privileged class,” as the national enemy, and urged:

Sweat, blood and tears—let us shed them. A lamp burning oil cannot last long. *We must burn our lamp with blood, sweat and tears to visualize the future perspective of our people.*⁸⁸

Citizens who faithfully observed this moral mandate to burn their bodies and shed their blood on the altar of national resurrection were deemed to be virtuous. As an interlocutor in Jeon Taeil’s novel cried out (in the chapter’s opening epitaph), citizens were dehumanized as fertilizer for the country’s economic fruits and exploited as burning oil for illuminating the glory of the nation. This dehumanization and sacrifice of individuals is the Park regime’s version of *totalitarian terror*. It was moralized as the prime moral virtue in the name of human revolution to accelerate the historic movement toward national resurrection.

The Chun regime also propagandized its ideology that projects a utopian image of a *just democratic welfare* state. In his inaugural address of 1981, Chun declared the nation’s goals to be “the development of a viable democracy, the construction of a welfare state, *the realization of*

⁸⁶ Park, *Korea Reborn*, 27.

⁸⁷ Chung Hee Park, *The Country, The Revolution and I*, 2nd ed. (Seoul, Korea: Hollym Corporation, 1970), 176–77.

⁸⁸ Park, *The Country, The Revolution and I*, 179; emphasis added.

a just society and the promotion of innovative education and culture.”⁸⁹ Ironically, as the foremost task of his regime Chun highlighted *the realization of social justice*, defining it as “the bedrock upon which democracy is established” and “the container in which practical contents of welfare society are stored.”⁹⁰

For the historic mission of the realization of a just society, the Chun regime implemented its ideological campaign, namely *the social purification movement* from the beginning of the Fifth Republic.⁹¹ Like the Park regime’s human revolution project, the social purification movement aimed to reform citizens’ moral consciousness and attitude. In his major speeches, Chun reiterated that purified social structures without purified consciousness are worthless, as if built on sand.⁹² And Chun claimed that the social purification movement is consequently a “movement for each individual citizen,” not just for a society.⁹³ Although the Chun regime did not provide a sophisticated diagnosis of the moral state of citizens, it harshly criticized the “internal decay” or “moral illness” of Korean society—“corruption,” “irregularities,” “injustices,” “chaos,” and “disorder”—which would cause national destruction.⁹⁴ The moral illness of citizens the regime generally described in terms of their reluctance to observe the “law and order” instituted by the Chun regime.⁹⁵

⁸⁹ Emphasis added; Korean Overseas Information Service, *Forging a New Era: The Fifth Republic of Korea* (Seoul, Korea: Korean Overseas Information Service, 1981), 32.

⁹⁰ Unless otherwise noted, all translations of this source are my own.; Chun Doo Hwan, “*Sahoe-jeonghwa Kukmin-woondong Jeonguk-daehoe Yoosi*” [Presidential Address for the 1st National Day of the Social Purification Movement], Presidential Archives, <http://pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp> (accessed July 10, 2019).

⁹¹ As propaganda machinery, the National Committee for the Social Purification Movement was established in November 1980 and executed this ideological campaign at a national level until March 1989. See The Academy of Korean Studies, “*Sahoe-jeonghwa-weewonhoe*” [the National Committee of the Social Purification Movement], Encyclopedia of Korean Culture, <http://rinks.aks.ac.kr/Portal/ContentsView?sCode=ENCYKOREA&slId=E0066501> (accessed July 10, 2019); unless otherwise noted, all translations of this source are my own.

⁹² The Academy of Korean Studies, “*Sahoe-jeonghwa-weewonhoe*.”

⁹³ The Academy of Korean Studies, “*Sahoe-jeonghwa-weewonhoe*.”

⁹⁴ Chun, “*Sahoe-jeonghwa Kukmin-woondong Jeonguk-daehoe Yoosi*”; See also Korean Overseas Information Service, *Forging a New Era: The Fifth Republic of Korea*, 20.

⁹⁵ Chun, “*Sahoe-jeonghwa Kukmin-woondong Jeonguk-daehoe Yoosi*.”

Based on the moral diagnosis, the Chun regime claimed to be developing “a new sense of values appropriate to a new era”—the “just democratic welfare state”—and the regime established “integrity, order, and creation” as the core values of the social purification movement.⁹⁶ The regime sought to actualize these values by instituting “the moral awakening” of citizens for cultivating “law-abiding consciousness.” Unlike the Park regime, that positively propagandized the human revolution project by urging citizens to sacrifice themselves voluntarily to achieve national resurrection, the Chun regime negatively indoctrinated the propagandized values by *eliminating* what it calls “social evils.” Burning all the social evils with “the torch of social purification” was the foremost task of this ideological campaign.⁹⁷

Regarding the elimination of social evils, the Chun regime identified as its perpetrators politicians, journalists, and citizens who raised their dissenting voices with *criminals* who destructed “law and order.” All these the regime condemned as *social evils* and brutally dehumanized. The Chun regime inhumanely reduced them to “bacteria of injustice, corruption, and disorder,” “the source of pollution,” and a “poisonous mushroom spreading cynicism and indifference.”⁹⁸ Then the burning torch of social purification eradicated and/or purged them, as the regime insisted. One of the most brutal examples of this eradication and purging was the so-called Samcheong Training Camp that operated from August 1980 to January 1981. The Chun regime detained nearly 40,000 civilians in this “military center [that] served as a prison camp for potential rebels and critics.” The detainees were “forced to endure harsh labor and dangerous military training or face the risk of being physically assaulted,” which together led to “the death

⁹⁶ Korean Overseas Information Service, *Forging a New Era: The Fifth Republic of Korea*, 14. See also Chun, “*Sahoe-jeonghwa Kukmin-woondong Jeonguk-daehoe Yoosi*.”

⁹⁷ Chun, “*Sahoe-jeonghwa Kukmin-woondong Jeonguk-daehoe Yoosi*.”

⁹⁸ My translation; Chun Doo Hwan, “83 *Sahoe-jeonghwa Kukmin-woondong Jeonguk-daehoe Yoosi*” [Presidential Address for the 3rd National Day of Social Purification Movement], Presidential Archives, <http://pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp> (accessed July 10, 2019).

of 54 people.”⁹⁹ Another example of “purification” was the forced end to publication of “172 periodicals that allegedly caused ‘social decay and juvenile delinquency’” and “the dismissal of hundreds of journalists and staff.”¹⁰⁰ The elimination of so-called social evils was indeed the Chun regime’s version of *totalitarian terror*.

All the while, the Chun regime justified this terror of dehumanizing and sacrificing critics and resisters for failing to fulfill the claimed utopian vision, and moreover doing so in the name of the realization of social justice. The regime’s propaganda insisted that the state was *virtuous*, specifically *just*, in eliminating all social evils and to purify citizens’ moral consciousness. The social purification movement was framed as the institutional practice that embodied the Chun regime’s allegedly prime moral virtue of justice. In other words, the Chun regime framed its totalitarian campaign of terror as embodying the primary virtue of the state, a virtue carried out through its ideological campaign for the creation of an allegedly just society.

III. Totalitarian Ideology as Cultural Violence

Up to this point, this chapter has offered a descriptive analysis of the two totalitarian features of the Park and Chun regimes. Now, for the main goal of this chapter—that of exposing a dehumanizing and life-negating culture in Korean society in the Park and Chun eras—I focus on the second totalitarian feature and further examine manifestations of the totalitarian ideology at the *cultural* level. For this task, I draw on Johan Galtung’s account of cultural violence and examine how this totalitarian ideology—particularly the deliberate moralization of totalitarian terror as the preeminent moral virtue—functioned as cultural violence.

⁹⁹ “S. Korean Junta Punished Civilians with Military Camp in Early 1980s,” *Hankyoreh*, November 11, 2006, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/171123.html (accessed July 10, 2019)

¹⁰⁰ Chong-Sik Lee, “Historical Setting,” in *South Korea: A Country Study*, ed. Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1990), 58.

In the early 1990s, Galtung first introduced the concept of cultural violence in order to capture violence at the cultural level. He was trying to get at the fact that it cannot always be adequately analyzed through a lens of structural or direct violence. Galtung argues:

By ‘cultural violence’ we mean those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence—exemplified by religion and *ideology*, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics)—that can be used to *justify* or *legitimize* direct or structural violence.¹⁰¹

Galtung defined violence as “avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to *life*,” and categorized violence as being of three types: (1) direct, (2) structural, and (3) cultural.¹⁰²

First, he distinguished direct violence from structural violence in terms of an actor who commits violence: “We shall refer to the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as *personal* or *direct*, and to violence where there is no such actor as *structural* or *indirect*.”¹⁰³ With direct violence, it is possible to pinpoint the violent actor or perpetrator of violence, whereas it is impossible to do so for structural violence since its actor(s) would be non-personal social systems or everyone who lives under social structures. Given this difference, direct violence is often physically manifested—“Personal [direct] violence *shows*”—while structural violence does not physically or visibly manifest, like “the tranquil waters.”¹⁰⁴

Galtung later added the concept of cultural violence in order to comprehend “processes of normalization” of direct and structural violence.¹⁰⁵ He was concerned about cultural aspects that make direct and structural violence “look, even feel, right—or at least not wrong.”¹⁰⁶ He then

¹⁰¹ Emphasis added; Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (1990): 291.

¹⁰² Galtung introduced four classes of basic human needs: “survival needs (negation: death, mortality), (2) well-being needs (negation: misery, morbidity), (3) identity, [or] meaning needs (negation: alienation); and freedom needs (negation: repression).” See Galtung, 292.

¹⁰³ Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1968): 170.

¹⁰⁴ Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 173.

¹⁰⁵ Jason A. Springs, “Structural and Cultural Violence in Religion and Peacebuilding,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding*, ed. R. Scott Appleby, Atalia Omer, and David Little (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 157.

¹⁰⁶ Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 291.

analyzed two major ways that cultural violence contributes to the normalization of violence, noting that: (1) it changes “the moral color of an act from red/wrong to green/right or at least to yellow/acceptable”; (2) it makes “reality opaque, so that we do not see the violent act or fact, or at least not as violent.”¹⁰⁷ In other words, cultural violence moralizes a certain form of violence so that it can be recognized as morally required or at least permissible. And it blurs our eyes not to detect violence embedded within social structures. As explored above, cultural violence’s function of normalization of structural and/or direct violence clearly resonates with the function of totalitarian ideology as *moral anaesthesia* that *obscures* or *makes acceptable* atrocities perpetrated by a totalitarian regime.

Following Galtung’s comprehensive analysis of violence, I argue that the totalitarian ideology of the Park and Chun regimes functioned as cultural violence that justified and inflicted multiple forms of violence upon Korean citizens in the 1970 and ’80s. For the rest of this chapter, first, I explore how the totalitarian ideology justified multiple layers of structural violence against industrial workers and mothers/housewives by praising their excessive self-sacrifices for the glory of the nation as embodying the propagandized moral virtue. Second, I examine the normalization of state violence against political resisters and even innocent citizens in the name of “national security” and “justice.”

III.1 Structural and Cultural Violence against Industrial Workers

I am going.
Do not cry;
...
Down the long and dusty road to Seoul
I am going to sell my body.

From “The Road to Seoul,” Kim Chi-ha

¹⁰⁷ Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 292.

As examined above, in the Park and Chun eras, millions of agricultural workers and their sons and daughters had to leave their homes in rural areas and migrate to the over-populated major urban centers in order to make a living. The state-controlled economic transformation entailed what Hagen Koo defines as “a swift process of proletarianization of the Korean labor force.”¹⁰⁸ As Kim Chi-ha lamented in his poem *The Road to Seoul*—“Down the long and dusty road to Seoul *I am going to sell my body*”¹⁰⁹—rural agricultural workers were forcibly sent to cities like Seoul or Pusan and pushed to sell their bodies as part of a cheap labor force that would accelerate the nation’s rapid industrialization. The Park and Chun regimes achieved remarkable industrialization and consequently economic development for only three decades, but even that would have been impossible without the substantial sacrifices of millions of ordinary industrial workers. As Robert Kearney points out, Korea’s glorious economic development was “built on the bodies of its workers,” since its only resource was “its people.”¹¹⁰

The working conditions in the urban factories to which such workers were sent were exploitative, destructive, and dehumanizing. Under these miserable conditions, living as urban workers meant “sacrificing the worker’s ‘humanlike life’ (*inkandaun-sarm*).”¹¹¹ First, given their “long hours of exhausting work,” they were forced to sacrifice their basic needs, such as time for rest and for “keeping up with families or friends.”¹¹² According to the official report of the Ministry of Labor, the average work week increased steadily “from 52.5 hours in 1970 to 53.1 hours in 1980, and to 54.5 hours in 1986.”¹¹³ This official report is highly likely to gloss over

¹⁰⁸ Koo, *Korean Workers*, 34.

¹⁰⁹ Emphasis added; Chi Ha Kim, *The Middle Hour: Selected Poems of Kim Chi Ha*, trans. David McCann (Stanfordville, NY: Human Rights Publishing Group, 1980), 16.

¹¹⁰ Robert P. Kearney, *The Warrior Workers: The Challenge of the Korean Way of Working* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1991), 6–11.

¹¹¹ Koo, *Korean Workers*, 54.

¹¹² Koo, 54.

¹¹³ In 1980, the average weekly work hours for the were 39.7 hours in the US, 38.8 in Japan, and 51 in Taiwan. See Koo, *Korean Workers*, 48.

overtime hours: most factory workers were forced to work overtime in order to increase their income given that their hourly compensation was the lowest even among developing countries in Asia.¹¹⁴ Yet even if we take the official report at face value, throughout the 1980s South Korea had “the longest workweek in the world.”¹¹⁵ This inhumane degree of labor exploitation was evident in worker’s personal journals. One such example comes from the journal of a worker at Kukje Sangsa, “a well-known export manufacturer of shoes under the brand name Prospex”:

The working hours at Kukje Sangsa are from 7:50 am to 6:30 pm, but this is only a formal rule, and frequently, whenever we fall short of the production target, we have to come to work earlier in the morning and stay longer in the evening. We have to do overnight work two to five times a week, and during the peak season from fall to spring we have to do as many as 15 overnight shifts...If we ...absent from work [even] one day for illness, we are called into the office and receive a stiff reprimand, and even corporal punishment.¹¹⁶

The brutally long hours of such poorly paid work forced individual workers to sacrifice any semblance of a humane life. This is a clear mark of the structural violence perpetrated by the state through its economic system.

Second, industrial workers worked under dangerous conditions, which led to the destruction of their bodies and even their lives. The rates for work-related deaths and injuries in South Korea were notoriously high compared with those of other developing countries. For example, in 1987, 0.61 percent of all industrial workers in Japan were injured or killed, 0.70 percent in Taiwan, 0.93 percent in Singapore; but Korea had 2.66 percent.¹¹⁷ According to a survey of female workers conducted in 1977 by the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, one-third of the workers reported “health problems as their major concern”: the majority of the

¹¹⁴ Koo, *Korean Workers*, 52–53. In 1987, the average hourly compensation among manufacturing workers in South Korea was \$ 1.69 US dollar, compared with \$13.46 in the US, \$11.34 in Japan, \$2.37 in Singapore, \$2.23 in Taiwan, and \$2.11 in Hong Kong. See Kearney, *The Warrior Workers*, 22.

¹¹⁵ Koo, 48.

¹¹⁶ Koo, 51–52.

¹¹⁷ Kearney, *The Warrior Workers*, 34.

workers aged 17 to 24 (“the ages of prime health”) suffered from “chest pains, digestion problems, hearing difficulties, loss of eyesight, frostbite, and skin problems” because of the poor working conditions, lack of rest, and malnutrition.¹¹⁸ The Park and Chun regimes prioritized the nation’s rapid economic development over the health and safety of workers. The extreme sacrifices of individual workers—in this case, work-related injuries and even deaths—are another mark of the structural violence embedded in the state-driven economic structures.

The labor-exploitative economic structures under the Park and Chun regimes totally negated industrial workers’ human dignity and inhumanly reduced humans to machines. *Dehumanization* lies at the heart of such structural violence. As Jeon Tae-il poignantly wrote in his unfinished novel, industrial workers were dehumanized into mere *fertilizer* for increasing the yields of economic development. He worked as an assistant tailor in a small textile factory in Pyunghwa Market located in Seoul and was shocked at the miserable state of young female factory workers who had been exploited since the ages of fourteen or fifteen under poor working conditions. Being empathetic toward his fellow worker’s suffering, he protested to factory owners and the labor bureau to improve working conditions and also demanded that they should observe labor laws.¹¹⁹ As his final protest, he tragically self-immolated his body while holding a labor law book in the streets of Pyunghwa Market. His last words were, “We are not machines!”¹²⁰ While his body was totally destroyed by his embrace of workers’ suffering, the flames that consumed him also shed a light on the hidden realities of structural violence and the dehumanization of industrial workers concealed in the exploitative economic structures of labor.

Through their totalitarian ideology, the Park and Chun regimes justified and normalized the brutal structural violence against workers hidden within the state-controlled economic

¹¹⁸ Koo, *Korean Workers*, 55–56.

¹¹⁹ Shin, *Protest Politics*, 41.

¹²⁰ Shin, 41.

systems. Specifically, as the human revolution project (part of the Park regime's ideological campaign), the Park regime positively framed the total sacrifice of individual workers for the sake of national resurrection as embodying the patriotic virtue of workers. For this project, the regime created a "new language that constructed a positive image of the industrial workers" in order to manipulate their identity and mobilize them for export-oriented industrialization.¹²¹ The workers were called "industrial warriors" (*Sanop Jeonsa*) and were said to be waging "an economic war against foreign competitors, [to be] willing to sacrifice themselves for the glory of the nation," and their hard work and sacrifices were praised as "patriotic behavior."¹²²

The Park regime's ideological formation of the workers' identity as a *virtuous economic soldier* was amplified by the militarized corporate culture. This toxic corporate culture entailed (1) "a routine disregard for individual constitutional rights," (2) "the imposition of unreasonable demands and harsh discipline," (3) "the expectation of unconditional obedience to orders from superiors," and (4) "constant verbal and physical punishment."¹²³ Given the state-imposed identity coupled with the militarized corporate culture, it is no coincidence for Daewoo, a Korean conglomerate, to highlight "Sacrifice" as a key element of the "Daewoo Spirit" along with "Creativity" and "Challenge."¹²⁴ In Korea's prolonged economic war against foreign countries, its sole weapon was its workers, and they have been inevitably *sacrificed*.¹²⁵ As one of the factory workers lamented, "when all the oil is squeezed out of our bodies, we are thrown out just like a trash": the workers were reduced to mere expendable parts of the economic war machine.¹²⁶ Although the Park regime positively propagandized "an exalted image of the

¹²¹ Koo, *Korean Workers*, 140.

¹²² Koo, 12.

¹²³ Koo, 66.

¹²⁴ Kearney, *The Warrior Workers*, 145.

¹²⁵ Kearney, 152.

¹²⁶ Koo, *Korean Workers*, 56.

industrial workers,” in reality its ideological formation of the workers’ identity functioned as *cultural violence* that normalized brutal structural violence against industrial workers by praising their total sacrifice as the embodiment of their moral virtue.

III.2 Structural and Cultural Violence against Mothers and Housewives

His sister, angry at his indifference, came to his office and shoved into his hands a scan of Mom’s brain. His sister related the doctor’s words that a stroke had occurred in Mom’s brain without her realization. When he listened placidly, she said, “Hyong-chol! Are you really Yun Hyong-chol?” and started into his eyes.

“*She said nothing was going on, so that’s all this?*”

“You trust her? *Mom always says that. That’s Mom’s mantra.* You know it’s true. You know she’s just saying that because she feels guilty about being a burden to you.”¹²⁷

From *Please Look After Mom*, Shin Kyung-sook

As mentioned above, one of the totalitarian features of the Park and Chun regimes—mass mobilization for the glory of the nation—was *gendered*. Specifically, Korean women were mobilized as a secondary workforce before their marriage and then as mothers and housewives after their marriage. As part of this gendered mobilization, they had to endure layers of structural violence. First, they were structurally marginalized as “temporary and ‘cheap’ workers for labor-intensive manufacturing” such as “sewing, embroidering, dyeing, weaving, spinning, operating telephones, dressing hair, and producing handicrafts” throughout the 1970 and ’80s.¹²⁸ The Park and Chun regimes ghettoized women workers in these labor-intensive industrial fields and deprived them of any opportunity to participate in state-run technical training in the heavy and chemical industries.¹²⁹ This gender-specific segregation of women to low-paying jobs led to

¹²⁷ Emphasis added; Kyung-sook Shin, *Please Look After Mom*, trans. Chi-Young Kim (New York: Vintage Contemporaries, 2011), 74.

¹²⁸ Seungsook Moon, *Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 71–72.

¹²⁹ Moon, *Militarized Modernity*, 72.

significant wage inequality between women and men. Women workers' average wage was 42.2 percent of the male workers' in 1975, 42.9 percent in 1980, and 46.7 percent in 1985.¹³⁰ The Park and Chun regimes aimed to achieve the alleged historic missions of economic development at the expense of women workers' basic rights. Women workers' segregation and marginalization was indeed structural violence perpetrated as part of the state-controlled economic system.

It is important to note that a great majority of these mobilized women workers were *unmarried* in their late teens and early twenties. For example, almost 90 percent of female factory workers in 1966 and two-thirds of women workers in the 1980s were under twenty-nine.¹³¹ One of the important factors that contributed to this demographic homogeneity is the state-governed mobilization of Korean women as mothers and housewives. The Park and Chun regimes (or society in general) construed women's ultimate identity as the so-called "wise mother and good wife" (*hyunmo-yangcheo*). The state sought to "inculcate the reproductive and domestic subjectivity of mother and housewife" in the single women workers.¹³² This state-controlled domestication of women workers is clearly manifested in this 1983 statement of the Ministry of Labor: "Women workers need common sense, civility, thrift, wisdom as well as their duty as workers because they are *mothers of future generations*."¹³³

Specifically, the Park regime implemented a campaign named "The Factory New Village Movement" in order to propagandize "women's essentialized identity as prospective wives and mothers."¹³⁴ While they worked in a factory, women workers had to participate in state-run domestic education programs for "household management" and "womanly etiquette concerning

¹³⁰ Koo, *Korean Workers*, 59.

¹³¹ Koo, 36.

¹³² Moon, *Militarized Modernity*, 75.

¹³³ Moon, 75.

¹³⁴ Moon, 75.

speaking, dressing, and overall conduct.”¹³⁵ One of main programs was a series of “four-night-and-five-day training camps,” carried out semimonthly over a year, whose intention was to manipulate women workers’ identities and indoctrinate them to conform to the following statement: “Women workers are housewives-to-be who carry out the New Village Movement in the household.”¹³⁶ These state-run programs reinforced both the marginalization of women in the domestic sphere and the broader structural inequality between men and women in Korean society as a whole.

Yet the Park and Chun regimes did not only manipulate women’s identities: they also manipulated women’s bodies. As part of their economic development plan, the two regimes aggressively propagandized family planning—limiting the number of children to two per household—and implemented related policies and campaigns. The Park regime first introduced the idea of contraception in the early 1960s, and the Park and Chun regimes utilized local health clinics (*bogunso*) to promote various types of contraception,¹³⁷ which they presented as women’s responsibility and which disproportionally controlled women’s bodies. Although the state provided men with free vasectomies, “the dominant and ‘ideal’ form of contraception” propagandized by the state throughout the 1960 and ’70s was the IUD (intrauterine device or the so-called “loop”) that has to be inserted into women’s bodies.¹³⁸ Beginning in the mid-1970s, a different form of contraception—“*female* sterilization” as “one-shot surgical sterilization”—was aggressively practiced, but it is apparent that the state once again focused on the control of women’s bodies.¹³⁹ In other words, the Park and Chun regimes perceived women’s bodies as

¹³⁵ Moon, 75.

¹³⁶ Moon, 75–76.

¹³⁷ Moon, 81–83.

¹³⁸ The Park regime set 1966 as a “Great Year of Family Planning” and fulfilled “the goal of 400,000 IUD insertions and 20,000 vasectomies.” See Moon, 84.

¹³⁹ Moon, 84.

being like *state property* that can be manipulated for the sake of economic development. Korean women essentialized as (prospective) mothers were dehumanized as mere objects under the family planning institutions and policies, which is another form of structural violence against them.

Confined to a domestic sphere, Korean women were pushed to be a “wise mother and good wife” (*hyunmo-yangcheo*), and their wisdom and goodness were gauged by the extent of their self-sacrifice on behalf of family and nation. Specifically, in the 1970 to ’80s, Korean mothers and housewives devoted their lives to educating their children. Because of their mothers’ sacrifices, their children could climb the social ladder through higher education. Shin Kyung-sook’s novel, *Please Look After Mom*, describes the conventional life of a Korean mother who sacrifices herself excessively for the sake of her children and husband in a poor and rural family. In this novel, “Mom,” whose name is Park So-nyo, has a stroke but she does not want to reveal her suffering to her oldest son, Hyong-chol, in order not to burden him. Sacrifice, suffering, and endurance are normalized in Mom’s life, and her mantra becomes, “I wish there was something going on! Don’t worry about us... Take care of yourself.”¹⁴⁰

Shin’s novel also captures the *han* of a self-sacrificial mother, “the deep wound of the heart and the soul” and “the collapsed feeling of pain.”¹⁴¹ This novel begins with Mom’s disappearance in a Seoul Station subway, and each chapter describes stories of her children, husband, and herself as a means of reflecting on the taken-for-granted life of Park So-nyo in the process of searching her. Reading through the chapters, a reader notices the discrepancies between her family’s and witnesses’ memory of Park So-nyo’s appearance. While her family remembers that she wore “low-heeled beige sandals,” a witness said that she was wearing “blue

¹⁴⁰ Shin, *Please Look After Mom*, 74.

¹⁴¹ Park, *The Wounded Heart of God*, 16, 20.

plastic sandals” that “had cut into her foot.”¹⁴² Her oldest son, Hyong-chol, recalled that once she had to wear the plastic sandals because “she had hurt her foot near her big toe, with a scythe” during the fall harvest.¹⁴³ Then another witness—a pharmacist—also said that she was wearing the blue plastic sandals and that the pharmacist had often had to disinfect a “deep cut on her foot, almost to the point of revealing bone.”¹⁴⁴ In the last chapter, So-nyo’s Mom is finally able to remove the blue plastic sandals that have caused the deep wound on So-nyo’s foot. I interpret So-nyo’s deep wound on her foot to represent symbolically the deep *han* of a Korean mother. So-nyo’s sacrifices for her children and husband were amassed over time and finally collapsed into *han*. Indeed, the very term *han* can be defined as “the collapsed pain of the heart due to psychosomatic, interpersonal, social, political, economic, and cultural oppression and repression.”¹⁴⁵ Given this definition, the blue plastic sandals could be interpreted as a literary device that alludes to a patriarchal family system that causes structural violence against Korean mothers.

The totalitarian ideologies of the Park and Chun regimes normalized and justified these multiple forms of structural violence against Korean women. Specifically, the moralization of the excessive self-sacrifices of Korean women as embodying the propagandized virtue was a form of cultural violence. A clear example of this moralization can be found in the aforementioned family planning campaign in the 1960s to the ’80s. The Park regime instituted “female family planning agents to facilitate its access to [fertile] individual mothers and wives” and manipulated the female agents as a propaganda machine to disseminate the idea of using the IUD as a

¹⁴² Shin, *Please Look After Mom*, 78.

¹⁴³ Shin, 77.

¹⁴⁴ Shin, 107.

¹⁴⁵ Park, *The Wounded Heart of God*, 16.

“patriotic” contraceptive.¹⁴⁶ In other words, the state’s control of women’s bodies, an assault on their bodily integrity, was normalized by praising their participation in the family planning projects as embodying the prime moral virtue.

The moralization of Korean women’s self-sacrifices is well represented in elementary school moral textbooks published in the 1960 to ’80s. A survey of the images of mothers used in these moral textbooks shows that the “wise mother and good wife” (*hyunmo-yangcheo*) is portrayed as the ideal and prescriptive image of the mother.¹⁴⁷ Following the social structures that segregated the Korean women in a domestic sphere, these moral textbooks associate language closely related to the domestic sphere and life with the mother’s image.¹⁴⁸

This domesticated image of the mother is also clearly portrayed in the interpretations of classical Korean literature. For example, the moral textbooks focus primarily on praising the motherly virtues of Shin Sa-im-dang who is now respected and reevaluated as a virtuous artist whose literary works and paintings challenged the oppressive Confucian-patriarchal culture and envisioned liberation of women at that time.¹⁴⁹ The dominant image of her in the moral textbooks is of a “virtuous mother” who dedicated and sacrificed her entire life to educating and raising her son, Yi-yi.¹⁵⁰ In other words, while the moral textbooks undervalue or neglect the virtues of women in the public sphere, they idealize and reinforce the self-sacrificial image of the mother in the domestic sphere. The prescriptive construction of the image of the virtuous mother in her dedicated self-sacrifice for her children, family, and nation is a clear example of the cultural manifestation of totalitarian ideology and also of the cultural violence that normalized

¹⁴⁶ Moon, *Militarized Modernity*, 83.

¹⁴⁷ Seung-hwan Yoo and Choon-Ho Nham, “An Analysis of the Father’s Image and the Mother’s Image in Elementary School Moral Textbooks: Focusing on Topic Modeling Analysis of Moral Textbooks of the First Though 2009 Revised National Curriculum,” *Theory and Research in Citizenship Education* 49, no. 2 (2017): 89.

¹⁴⁸ Yoo and Nham, 101.

¹⁴⁹ Yoo and Nham, 107–108.

¹⁵⁰ Yoo and Nham, 108.

the multi-layered structural violence against Korean women essentialized as “wise mothers and good wives.”

III.3 State and Cultural Violence against Citizens

It was a day in May.
It was a day in May 1980.
It was evening on a day in May 1980 in Gwangju.

At midnight
the city was a hart abuzz like a beehive.
At midnight
the streets were a river of blood flowing like lava.
At midnight
the breeze was stirring the bloody hair of a murdered girl.
and at midnight
the dark was devouring a child’s eyeball ejected like a bullet
and at midnight
The murderers were taking the bodies away somewhere.

Ah, what a dreadful night.
Ah, what an organized midnight.¹⁵¹

From Kim Nam-ju’s poem, “Massacre” translated by An Son-jae

In the Park and Chun eras, countless Korean citizens suffered state violence. In this chapter, state violence as “a form of political violence” refers to “aggression that is led by the state in an abstract sense and actually performed by its apparatuses, such as the military, the police, and other security agencies.”¹⁵² Listing all incidents of state violence in the 1970 and ’80s is beyond this chapter’s scope, so here I introduce few selected events—one by the Park regime and three by the Chun regime—which are closely related to democratic movements led

¹⁵¹ The original version of this poem referred to the city of Kwangju; I replaced that with Gwanju for the sake of consistency in this chapter. See Sangyong Chung, Simin Rhyu, and Keun-Sik Jung, *Memories of May 1980: A Documentary History of the Kwangju Uprising in Korea*, trans. Hye-Jin Park (Seoul, Korea: Korea Democracy Foundation, 2003), 76.

¹⁵² Ganesan and Kim, *State Violence in East Asia*, 2.

by the mothers and wives of political victims (that will be discussed in detail in chapter 2). The four incidents are: (1) the execution of eight members of the (alleged) People's Revolutionary Party (*Inhyukdang*) on April 9, 1975; (2) the massacre during the Gwangju Uprising on May 18–27, 1980; (3) the killing of Seoul National University student Park Jong-cheol by torture on January 14, 1987; and (4) the killing of Yonsei University student Lee Han-yeol, hit on the head by a tear gas grenade on July 5, 1987.

After promulgating the Yushin Constitution along with the National Security Law and the Anti-Communist Law in 1972, the Park regime faced public opposition that was initiated and supported by young college students. Park himself recognized that the political power of students could thwart a regime, as had been proved in the April 19 Revolution in 1960 that toppled the First Republic of Korea under the presidency of Rhee Seung-man.¹⁵³ In order to suppress such people power efficiently, the Park regime enacted Emergency Decrees Number 1 and Number 4 in January and April, 1974 respectively, which make any forms of criticism illegal and provide legal justification to arrest violators and put them on trial in military court.¹⁵⁴ Using such measures, the Park regime claimed to eradicate “impure” elements in Korean society, elements such as students attempting “to overthrow the government.”¹⁵⁵ A mass arrest—the so-called National Democratic Youth-Student League (*Mincheonghakryeon*) Incident—followed in which more than one thousand students were arrested and detained, and around two hundred citizens were sentenced to “prison terms ranging from 3 to 20 years.”¹⁵⁶

¹⁵³ Shin, *Protest Politics*, 36.

¹⁵⁴ Shin, 36.

¹⁵⁵ Shin, 36.

¹⁵⁶ Sheena Chestnut Greitens, *Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 248–50.

Among the many political prisoners, eight men were charged with being the impure elements who acted as ringleaders of “a communist conspiracy to overthrow the government.”¹⁵⁷ This was a false charge fabricated by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, the Park regime’s coercive apparatus. The eight men were accused of being members of the People’s Revolutionary Party (*Inhyukdang*) and were brutally tortured into “confessing that they had formed the group” with the intention of forming “a socialist government in close cooperation with North Korea.”¹⁵⁸ Under the Emergency Decrees, they were tried in military court, sentenced to death in April 8, 1975, and hastily executed “less than 24 hours after the final rulings by the Supreme Court were issued.”¹⁵⁹ The wives of the eight men received calls from the prison on the night of April 8, and they were informed that “if they would come to prison the next morning at nine o’clock, they could see their husbands”; what each wife saw was “the bodily remains of her husband” who “had been hanged three hours earlier.”¹⁶⁰ International law scholars named this unjust execution “legal murder” and declared April 9, 1975 as “the darkest day in legal history.”¹⁶¹ This legal murder marked the culmination of state violence in the Park era.

The Park regime collapsed abruptly after the assassination of Park on the night of October 26, 1979 and was followed by Chun’s military coup on December 12, 1979. When Chun seized power, many Korean citizens, especially young college students who had expected “some form of democratic reform,” were frustrated and indignant and initiated mass protests and

¹⁵⁷ George E Ogle, *How Long, O Lord: Stories of Twentieth-Century Korea* (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris Corporation, 2002), 133.

¹⁵⁸ “Families of Eight Wrongfully Executed South Korean Political Prisoners Awarded Record Compensation,” *Hankyoreh*, August 22, 2007, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/230608.html (accessed July 10, 2019)

¹⁵⁹ “Families of Eight.”

¹⁶⁰ Ogle, *How Long, O Lord*, 145.

¹⁶¹ Seolee Kim and Kyungeun Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom: 7,80 Nyondae Minjuhwa-Woondong-Euiroseoeui Kajok-Woondong* [In the Grey Era Violet-Colored Beautiful Dream: Family Movement as Democracy Movement in the 70–80s] (Seoul, Korea: Korea Democracy Foundation, 2007), 61.

demonstrations against the Chun regime in the spring of 1980.¹⁶² On May 15, around 150,000 students and citizens protested and demanded democratization at Seoul Station: this mass movement became known as the “Seoul spring.”¹⁶³ Students in Gwangju also organized mass protests. On May 16, they organized “a torchlight march to ‘illuminate the darkness’” of eighteen years of the Park regime.¹⁶⁴ As students’ protests evolved, the Chun regime declared the extension of martial law to all territories of South Korea on May 17.¹⁶⁵ The next day, students in Gwangju organized another sit-in protest in front of Cheonnam National University, but they were unexpectedly “beaten, clubbed, knifed, and bayoneted” by paratroopers: it was the prelude to the state-led massacre.¹⁶⁶

The brutal violence by soldiers ignited public anger and prompted thirty to forty thousand citizens of Gwangju to gather on Geumnam Avenue in protest on May 20 and 21.¹⁶⁷ The martial law troops responded to the mass protest with a “massive shooting”: at least seventy-four people were killed and five hundred were injured.¹⁶⁸ As self-defense against this kind of indiscriminate violence, citizens formed “the Citizen’s Army,” seized the Provincial Office, and maintained “civil order” during the five days of self-rule from May 22 to 26.¹⁶⁹ However, the hope for democracy in this “absolute community” where citizens “came together freely to reaffirm and celebrate their humanity” was quickly and viciously crushed.¹⁷⁰ In the early morning hours of May 27, troops armed with heavy weaponry such as tanks and machine guns brutally and

¹⁶²Gi-Wook Shin and Kyung Moon Hwang, eds., *Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Uprising in Korea's Past and Present* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), xiv.

¹⁶³ Shin and Hwang, xiv.

¹⁶⁴ Shin and Hwang, xiv.

¹⁶⁵ Shin and Hwang, xv.

¹⁶⁶ Shin and Hwang, xv.

¹⁶⁷ Shin and Hwang, xvi.

¹⁶⁸ Shin and Hwang, xvi.

¹⁶⁹ Shin and Hwang, xvi–xvii.

¹⁷⁰ Shin and Hwang, 6.

indiscriminately killed about five hundred citizens and injured more than three thousand.¹⁷¹ As painfully portrayed in the above poem, Geumnam Avenue and the fountain in front of the Provincial Office were filled by a river of innocent citizens' blood. This river of blood decries the brutal state violence of the Chun regime.

From the beginning, the Chun regime consolidated its power at the expense of citizens. Although it adopted the so-called “decompression” phase (*Yuhwa kookmyun*) from 1985, it continued to use another form of state violence—torture—through its coercive apparatus, specifically “the security or the anti-communist section of the National Police.”¹⁷² On January 14, 1987, it was reported that Seoul National University student Park Jong-cheol died while policemen interrogated him. A few days later on January 19, National Police Chief Kang Min-chang held a special press conference and reported that Park Jong-cheol had died as a result of a sudden heart attack. He said, “when the policeman hit the desk ‘tak,’ Park Jong-cheol died ‘uk’ grasping his heart.” This seemingly absurd report covered up the truth about Park Jong-cheol’s death. However soon after, the testimony of doctor who did an autopsy revealed the truth—that Park died of torture: the policemen had plunged Park’s head into a tub of water several times and had suffocated him by crushing his neck against the bath rim.¹⁷³ Many political protesters claimed that this brutal violence was “‘the tip of the iceberg’ of widespread, institutionalized torture of political offenders.”¹⁷⁴ Indeed, throughout the 1980s, countless innocent citizens were systematically tortured in “Namyong-dong,” a euphemism for the place of torture operated by

¹⁷¹ Shin and Hwang, xvii.

¹⁷² Amnesty International, *Torture in the Eighties* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1984), 192.

¹⁷³ Clyde Haberman, “Seoul Student’s Torture Death Changes Political Landscape,” *New York Times*, January 31, 1987, <https://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/31/world/seoul-student-s-torture-death-changes-political-landscape.html> (accessed July 10, 2019).

¹⁷⁴ “2 Top South Korean Officials Dismissed in Student’s Death,” *New York Times*, January 21, 1987, <https://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/21/world/2-top-south-korean-officials-dismissed-in-student-s-death.html> (accessed July 10, 2019).

the anti-communist section of the National Police. In his memoir, *Namyong-dong*, Kim Geun-tae, a key leader in college students' democratic movements, vividly described the ten days of brutal torture he endured with water and electric shocks, and named this place "the human slaughterhouse," a place filled with unceasing screams.¹⁷⁵

The torture death of Park Jong-cheol galvanized citizens to organize protests and demonstrations across the country in February and March of 1987 "calling for the eradication of torture" and democratization.¹⁷⁶ However, on April 13, Chun declared "the preservation of the Constitution" (*Hoheon*) that institutes indirect (sham) election of president by an electoral college.¹⁷⁷ And on May 18, during a "memorial mass for the victims of the Gwangju massacre," the Catholic Priests' Association for Justice under the leadership of Father Kim Seoung-hoon revealed that the Chun regime had covered up "those who were really responsible for" the torture death of Park Jong-cheol.¹⁷⁸ This series of events created a desperate need for civic organizations to unite with the opposition party, the Reunification Democratic Party, in order to maximize "the collective power of the people." Finally on May 27, the National Movement Headquarters to Win a Democratic Constitution was formed.¹⁷⁹ College students also joined this National Movement Headquarters and played a key role in organizing the mass rallies scheduled for June 9 and 10.¹⁸⁰

Yonsei University student Lee Han-yeol was one of the student protesters at the June 9 rally in Seoul. The Chun regime was notorious for its use of riot police and "the worst use" of tear gas to inflict brutal violence on protesters.¹⁸¹ Lee Han-yeol was at the front of the street rally

¹⁷⁵ Unless otherwise noted, all translations of this source are my own.; Geun-tae Kim, *Namyong-Dong*, 5th ed. (Seoul, Korea: Joongwon Moonhwa, 2007), 37.

¹⁷⁶ Myung-sik Lee, *The History of the Democratization Movement in Korea* (Seoul, Korea: Korea Democracy Foundation, 2010), 133.

¹⁷⁷ Lee, 133–34.

¹⁷⁸ Lee, 135.

¹⁷⁹ Lee, 135.

¹⁸⁰ Lee, 136.

¹⁸¹ Greitens, *Dictators and Their Secret Police*, 260.

near the front gate of Yonsei University and was hit “directly by a teargas canister shot by police and fell into a coma.”¹⁸² As blood poured out of his head and nose, another student protester supported the injured Lee Han-yeol—an image of brutal state violence vividly photographed on the scene by journalist Chung Tae-won and later made into a woodcut print by minjung artist Choi Byung-soo and named “Resurrect Han-yeol!” This image was subsequently printed on huge posters and became a “centerpiece for the struggle” for democratization and a visual reminder of the Chun regime’s brutality and immorality.¹⁸³ The death of the two students Park Jong-cheol and Lee Han-yeol was a prime indicator of the vicious state violence of the Chun regime.

The Park and Chun regimes attempted to justify the four incidents of state violence as occurring in the name of “national security” and “justice.” Both regimes declared national security as the most important element in their alleged historic mission toward “national resurrection” and a “just society.” The Chun regime in particular put overriding emphasis on national security.¹⁸⁴ In his inaugural address in 1981, Chun declared:

[N]o matter how fine our goals, they are meaningless unless our national security is unflinchingly preserved...there is no substitute for national security: it is fundamental to national survival. The overriding importance of national security must be indelibly ingrained in our minds.¹⁸⁵

The Chun regime deliberately utilized this political rhetoric to oppress those who raised dissenting voices and organized protests against it. As examined above, it was quite common to charge dissenters with organizing a fabricated communist conspiracy and to stigmatize them as “impure” elements that were preventing national security and justice. And the state resorted to merciless violence against them. The Chun regime through its totalitarian ideology normalized

¹⁸² Lee, *The History of the Democratization Movement in Korea*, 136.

¹⁸³ Lee, 136. You may find the image via this web link: <http://archives.kdemo.or.kr/isad/view/00703526>

¹⁸⁴ This tendency is at least partially attributed to Chun’s unpopularity compared to Park’s popularity. He needed to control the public’s opposition and consolidate power, which was achieved by institutionalizing state violence in the name of “national security.”

¹⁸⁵ Korean Overseas Information Service, *Forging a New Era*, 32.

state violence against what it called “impure” elements, and moralized citizens’ sacrifices for the sake of “national security.” Purifying society by eradicating the “impure” elements was propagandized as the prime virtue of the state: the state deemed it *just* for it to burn “Reds” and “Commies.”

One example of the cultural manifestation of this totalitarian ideology is the symbol of the *torch* that was manipulated for the Social Purification Movement.¹⁸⁶ Throughout the history of totalitarian movements, symbolism has played a central role in giving “concrete form” to or “embod[ying] an element of its [totalitarian] ideology.”¹⁸⁷ It is no coincidence that Hitler made repeated references to torches as “symbols of national and racial revolution in his book *Mein Kampf*.”¹⁸⁸ He also manipulated this symbol of the torch in order to propagandize the ideology of “racial purity”: he praised racial purity as “the fuel for the torch of human culture.”¹⁸⁹ Likewise, the Chun regime manipulated the symbol of the torch—“the flaming torch of social purification”—in order to justify and normalize the dehumanization and violence perpetrated by the state. Political dissidents and even innocent citizens were inhumanly reduced to “impure” elements that should be totally sacrificed on the altar of “national security.” Then the brutal ceremonies of burning with the flame of social purification followed. The burning scene in Han Kang’s novel *Human Acts* (introduced at the beginning of this chapter) fictitiously but poignantly captures these vicious ceremonies. Fatally dehumanized bodies of Gwangju citizens

¹⁸⁶ You may find the image of the torch symbol via the following web link:
<https://brunch.co.kr/@seochanhwe/52>

¹⁸⁷ Friedrich and Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 89.

¹⁸⁸ Edna Friedberg, “Why They Parade by Torchlight,” *Atlantic*, August 21, 2017,
<https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/why-they-parade-by-torchlight/537459/> (accessed July 10, 2019).

¹⁸⁹ Sarah Bond, “A Short History of Torches and Intimidation,” *Forbes*, August 15, 2017,
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/drsarahbond/2017/08/15/a-short-history-of-torches-and-intimidation/#2b5cda9d6762>
 (accessed July 10, 2019).

were transformed into the corpse of a beast, which emits black breath as its rotten flesh and blood burn in the flame.

IV. Conclusion

Throughout this chapter I have attempted to expose the life-negating, dehumanizing, and destructive culture saturated with the totalitarian ideology of the Park and Chun regimes. This widespread manifestation of the totalitarian ideology at a cultural level is indeed cultural violence that normalized and sustained the multiple forms of violence—structural, state, and tragic violence—against Korean citizens. I conclude this chapter by naming this particular culture a kind of cultural sickness, and more specifically a *totalitarian sickness*, by drawing on Friedrich Nietzsche’s language in his diagnosis of culture.¹⁹⁰

For Nietzsche, one of the overriding concerns throughout his philosophical career was the question of “what kind of *culture* is valuable.”¹⁹¹ Julian Young’s philosophical biography of Nietzsche shows how he strived to respond to this overriding question throughout his life. According to Young, *The Birth of Tragedy* was Nietzsche’s first major work to diagnose the problems of modern culture in his time and to explore remedies exemplified in Greek culture.¹⁹² *Beyond Good and Evil* and *The Genealogy of Morals* further crystalized his diagnosis of modern culture through his critical analysis of the moral values of his time.

¹⁹⁰ Although Nietzsche’s critical diagnosis of culture and morality aligns with what I have argued in this chapter, I do not agree with his substantive account of how to transform a sick culture into a healthy culture. And it is important to note that ironically this substantive account (such as will to power or Overman) was immorally appropriated by Hitler’s totalitarian regime.

¹⁹¹ Joe Ward, “Nietzsche’s Value Conflict: Culture, Individual, Synthesis,” *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 41 (2011): 6. Eric Blondel also argues that the object of Nietzsche’s philosophy is *culture*. See Eric Blondel, *Nietzsche: The Body and Culture*, trans. Sean Hand (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 247.

¹⁹² Julian Young, *Friedrich Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

In other words, in order to respond to the overriding concern, Nietzsche lived as what Daniel Ahern defines as a “physician of culture” who diagnoses whether a certain culture suffers from “sickness” or possesses “health” or as a “philosophical doctor for an ailing Western culture whose illness required stern diagnosis.”¹⁹³ Specifically it is important note that Nietzsche utilizes physiological and clinical concepts—sickness and health—as the standards by which to judge culture. However, he does not use these physiological concepts scientifically but philosophically: he utilizes these metaphorical-imaginaries to condemn all cultural expressions of the negation and denial of life—sick culture—and praise those that affirm life—healthy culture.

I suggest that Nietzsche’s language of *sickness* in his critical diagnosis of culture is apt for naming the life-negating, dehumanizing, and destructive culture disseminated by the totalitarian regimes of Park and Chun: hence, *totalitarian sickness*. And this philosophical-physiological language is relevant to the next chapter that will describe a distinctive form of democratic movements—*Kajok-woondong*, roughly translated as a family movement—organized and practiced by mothers and wives of political victims and martyrs in response to the brutality and immorality of the Park and Chun regimes. Interestingly, their practices of political resistance have been known in Korean society as “mother’s healing hand” (*euhmeoni-yakson*). In the next chapter, I will describe how through their family movements these women sought to heal the totalitarian sickness, which normalized and sustained countless citizens’ excessive or total sacrifices for the sake of the totalitarian causes.

¹⁹³ Daniel R. Ahern, *Nietzsche as Cultural Physician* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 1–10.

CHAPTER 3

KAJOK (FAMILY)

I. Introduction

When you and I embrace each other in a humane world
 The red sun melts down all the oppression, exploitation, and injustice
 When you and I put our arms around our shoulders in freedom
 We run towards the street of liberation
 O, warm tears of our sacrificed comrade
 O, fighting fiercely without fear
 For the bright smile of our mother...

A minjung song “*Eomeoni* (Mother)” translated by Wonchul Shin

For Korean college students and workers who fought for democracy in the 1970 to '80s, the being of a mother (following the conventional image of one who devotes her life to taking care of her children) meant “the spiritual fortress” in which they could hide from suffering.¹ For them, their mothers were always the ultimate object of their indescribable gratitude, given their deep sense of indebtedness to their devoted mothers’ sacrifices. However, when they engaged in political resistance and the governing authorities consequently condemned them as “impure elements” or “sinners,” when they went against their mothers’ wishes that they be “good” and “successful” sons and daughters, their mothers became the objects of their guilt. Nevertheless, they kept fighting for democracy and with tears of gratitude and guilt together sang a minjung song known as *Eomeoni* (Mother) in the streets. In singing this song, they were projecting their burning desire for “the street of liberation” to the ideal image of “the bright smile” of their mothers. For them, their mothers were the *ultimate objects* whose sacrifices will pay off, at least

¹ My translation; Jung-Ah Shin and Se-Young Sohn, eds., *6wol Hangjaengeul Kirokhada* [Writing the June Uprising: A Long March for Democracy in Korea] (Seoul: Korea Democracy Foundation, 2007), 168.

partially, and who will eventually receive the gifts of the democratization and liberation of their nation that they helped to bring about.

However, this chapter uncovers previously untold stories of some mothers and wives who themselves became the *subjects* of history, the mothers and wives who relentlessly offered life-giving gifts to their family members (sons, daughters, and husbands) and their nation as well. They were the mothers and wives of political victims oppressed by the Park and Chun regimes. Some of them were the mothers of young college students who were unjustly imprisoned, having been charged with violating the Yushin Constitution's Emergency Decrees. Some were the wives of the political martyrs whose bodies were totally sacrificed in the name of "national security." Some were the mothers of the long-term conscientious prisoners whose consciences were criminalized and condemned as "social evil." Some were the wives of the political prisoners who were tortured in the so-called "human slaughterhouse." In other words, they also were victims who suffered under the life-denying and dehumanizing culture—the totalitarian sickness—that permeated Korean society and was disseminated by the Park and Chun regimes.

Nevertheless, these mothers and wives did not remain in the seat of victimhood. They formed their own political organizations and initiated a distinctive form of political resistance against the Park and Chun regimes. Their political organizations can be roughly divided into four groups: (1) *Kusokja-kajok-hyupeuihoe* (henceforth, Kukahyup), Association of the Families of the Arrested, (2) *Yangshimsu-kajok-hyupeuihoe* (henceforth, Yangkahyup), Association of the Families of Conscientious Prisoners, (3) *Minjuhwa-silchoen-kajokwoondong-hyupeuihoe* (henceforth, Minkahyup), Association of the Family Movement for Practicing Democratization, and (4) *Minjuhwa-woondong-yukajok-hyupeuihoe* (henceforth, Yukahyup), Association of the Families of Bereaved. They named their distinctive democratic movements *kajok-woondong*,

roughly translated as a *family* movement. Their family movements were based on their collective identity—the seamless fusion of their dual identities as (1) a mother or wife, a caretaker of the family, and (2) a political and moral agent of restoring democracy and human dignity.

This chapter both tells their unheard stories of becoming subjects in the history of Korea's democratization and traces the historical development of their family movements. For this historical description, this chapter focuses on specific practices for living out their fused dual identities, which were employed for both caretaking of the victimized family members, including affirming and saving their lives, and for public political resistance, specifically symbolic protests, against the Park and Chun regimes.

II. Historical Narratives of Family Movements in the 1970s: Focus on Kukahyup and Yangkahyup

As explored in chapter 2, under the Yushin Constitution the Park regime declared Emergency Decrees Number 1 and 4 in January and April of 1974 as a legal justification for suppressing dissident voices in public. The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (henceforth, the KCIA), the Park regime's apparatus of political terror, fabricated the so-called National Democratic Youth-Student League (*Mincheonghakryeon*) Incident and arrested and detained more than one thousand college students, whom they accused of being members of the National Democratic Youth-Student League and convicted of treason instigated by North Korean communists, the so-called Reds. However, in reality the National Democratic Youth-Student League was *temporarily* and *coincidentally* formed by the students for the sake of efficiency in organizing mass protest against the Yushin Constitution at a national level on April 3, 1974.² In military court, the convicted students were sentenced to prison terms and even given the death

² Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 39.

penalty. The eight members of the People's Revolutionary Party and some political dissidents in civil society, including the former president Yoon Bo-sun, Reverend Park Hyung-kyu, and poet Kim Chi-ha, were also arrested and falsely convicted of being the ringleaders who initiated and/or supported the alleged treasonous action planned by the National Democratic Youth-Student League.³

Although more than one thousand students and citizens were arrested and detained in jail, the police did not inform their families of this fact. The families, specifically the mothers and wives, searched desperately for their sons, daughters, or husbands for days or even weeks. Kim Han-rim was the mother of one of those families. After searching for her daughter Kim Yoon for a week, she finally learned that her daughter, a student at Sogang University, had been arrested and confined in the Seodaemun Prison with the charge of violating Emergency Decree Number 4.⁴

When the families heard that their sons, daughters, or husbands had been arrested, they were shocked and immediately went to the jail. Many of the families lived in a rural area and had sent their sons or daughters to Seoul for their higher education, specifically to prestigious universities such as Seoul National University, Yonsei University, or Korea University. Their sons or daughters had been regarded as their families' greatest pride and asset. However, their expectations of and hopes for their children were abruptly shattered by the Park regime's state violence. Initially, the parents and families were deeply frustrated and even ashamed that their sons or daughters had violated the law and become "sinners" (*Joein*). Overwhelmed by these emotions, they just sat and cried in the prisons' visiting rooms.

³ Kim and Kyungeun, 40.

⁴ My translation; Jia Chung, *Kim Han-rim: Eomoni Woorideuleui Eomoni* [Kim Han-rim: Mother, Our Mother] (Seoul: Korea Democracy Foundation, 2006), 117–18.

Some families of the arrested desperately cried out for help when their sons or daughters were sentenced harshly in military court. Many of them did not have any support network, and they were just overwhelmed by fear and sorrow. However, some Christian mothers and wives were aware of several Christian organizations that might help them, organizations such as the National Council of Churches in Korea (henceforth, NCCCK) and the National Association of Women Christians of the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea (NAWC) located in the Christian Building (*Kidokkyo Hoegwan*). They went to the Christian Building, desperately asked for help, and cried together. For example, Jeong Geum-seoung, mother of poet Kim Chi-ha, went to the Christian Building #301 where the NAWC was housed after her son was sentenced to death. She testified:

I just opened the door [of suite 301] and said to the people gathered there, “Hey all of you, you are all mothers, right? I sacrificed everything to educate my son. And he graduated from Seoul National University. But the state forcibly arrested him and sentenced him to death. How can that be possible? My son is a conscientious man. Even heaven knows it!” Then we gathered together and cried together.⁵

As Mother Jeong did, more families of the arrested who had religious connections to the church came to the Christian Building and began to “exchange ideas and information as to the whereabouts of their family members and government activities.”⁶ Just as importantly, they spontaneously gathered in suite 301 and found “solace in each other” simply by crying together.⁷

The Christian family members of the arrested who gathered in the Christian Building felt an urgent need to support and encourage one another. Then, as faithful Korean Christians who have been formed to pray to overcome their ordeals throughout history, they formed a prayer group and prayed together from June 1974 onward. Some Christian leaders such as Rev. Lee

⁵ My translation; Geum-seoung Jeong, interviewed by Hwang Pil-kyu, September 3, 2002, Korea Democracy Oral History Archive, Seoul, Korea.

⁶ Shin, *Protest Politics*, 83.

⁷ Shin, 83.

Hae-dong, Rev. Kim Sang-keun, and Rev. Moon Dong-hwan subsequently officially launched a prayer meeting for the arrested at the National Democratic Youth-Student League (*Mincheonghakryeon*) Incident on July 19, 1974.⁸ This official prayer meeting was intended as a gathering of pastors, but its nature and structure were soon changed when the Christian families of the arrested joined. Together they renamed their gatherings “the Thursday Prayer Meeting (henceforth, TPM)” and ardently prayed every Thursday at the Christian Building.⁹ To begin with the participants of the TPM were predominantly Christians, but the scope of its participants expanded as it attracted non-Christian families of the arrested and ordinary citizens.¹⁰ Indeed, in the 1970s, it was the one and only place in which the families of the arrested could publicly report their ordeals and incidents of state violence and call for restoration of democracy and human rights.¹¹

Through their fervent prayer services, the families of the arrested consolidated a collective identity and in September 1974 decided to form an official political organization for democratic movement, which they called the Association of the Families of the Arrested (*Kusokja-kajok-hyupeuihoe* or Kukahyup).¹² Kukahyup appointed former First Lady Gong Deok-gwi (wife of convicted former President Yoon Bo-sun) as president, Congressman Kim Yoon-sik (father of convicted Yonsei University student Kim Hak-min) as vice president, and Kim Han-rim (mother of convicted Sogang University student Kim Yoon) as secretary.¹³ Interestingly, the

⁸ Unless otherwise noted, all translations of this source are my own.. See Lee Hae Dong and Lee Jong Ok, *Duri Georeun Han Gil* [Two Persons Walking One Way] vol. 1 (Seoul, Korea: The Christian Literature Society of Korea, 2014), 102.

⁹ Unless otherwise noted, all translations of this source are my own.. See National Council of Churches in Korea Human Rights Mission, *Hanguk Kyohoe Inkwonwoondong 30 Nyonsa* [The Thirty Years of Human Rights Mission of Korean Church] (Seoul: NCKK, 2005), 92.

¹⁰ National Council of Churches in Korea Human Rights Mission, 91.

¹¹ National Council of Churches in Korea Human Rights Mission, 91.

¹² The process of consolidating a collective identity and the members’ moral transformation from passive victims to active agents through their practice of prayer is analyzed in detail in the next chapter.

¹³ Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 50.

majority of this group were *mothers* or *wives* of the political victims.¹⁴ Although Kukahuyp did not coin the term Family Movement (*Kajok-woondong*) to refer to the group's democratic movement, the core concept of this term was already embedded in its democratic movement: while the members of the Kukahuyp took care of the arrested family members in prison, at the same time they were committed to uncovering the Park regime's vicious oppression of and violence toward the public, and to restoring the broken democracy and human rights of citizens.¹⁵ In other words, the concept of the family movement was already actualized in their collective identity, the seamless fusion of their dual identities as (1) caretakers of the family, and (2) as political and moral agents of restoring democracy and human rights.

Given the identity of mother or wife as the *protector* and *caretaker* of her family, Kukahuyp taught its members how to do *okbaraji*, which literally means "taking care of a person in prison," for their incarcerated sons, daughters, or husbands.¹⁶ They regularly visited the prison and provided "all the necessary care" for their family members, including "physical and emotional support."¹⁷ For example, they provided warm clothes and socks that they knitted for the inmates who lived in extremely poor conditions and sent letters as "simple expressions of love."¹⁸ More importantly, through *okbaraji*, a practice of embodying the identity of mother or wife, they also enacted the identity of agents of restoring democracy and human rights. At that time, the political inmates were absolutely isolated from society beyond the prison wall: all types of information exchange between "the small world of the prison cell" and "the large world

¹⁴ This is partially attributed to the nature of Kukahuyp's democratic movement, which entailed the protection and care of the imprisoned family members, and the traditional gender role of the Korean mother or wife (or their responsibility of taking care of their children and husband).

¹⁵ Kim and Lee, 15.

¹⁶ Shin, *Protesting Politics*, 73.

¹⁷ Shin, 72–73.

¹⁸ Shin, 72.

outside the prison” were blocked.¹⁹ Given this isolation, the mothers and wives indeed served as “the medium between the two worlds” through their *okbaraji*. Although it was strictly censored, the political inmates were informed of the political situations by letters or visitation talks from their mothers or wives, and the mothers and wives were also informed of the prison conditions and incidents of human rights violations within the prison. The mothers and wives reported the information to Kukaphyup, and it in turn made public statements to report “the human rights situation not only to Korean people in general but also the international organizations and communities.”²⁰ Specifically, informing the international communities, such as the United Nations or NGOs in the United States, of oppressive conditions was a powerful strategy to challenge the Park regime that was concerned with its public image and the implications of that image for foreign trade and investment.²¹

Kukahyup extended the boundaries of their families. Those who suffer from oppression and fight for democracy were now their families beyond blood ties. This radical inclusivity was well expressed in their embrace of the wives of eight members of *Inhyukdang*, the People’s Revolutionary Party (henceforth, the PRP). At that time, under the propagandized ideology of anti-communism, the family members of the PRP were harshly stigmatized. For example, a four-year old son was bound to a tree and bullied by being fake-executed by firing squad by his peers at school. Even some families of the political inmates imprisoned as a result of the National Democratic Youth-Student League (*Mincheonghakryeon*) Incident were afraid of being associated with the families of the PRP. Then, Kim Han-rim exercised bold leadership by crossing the line and embracing the abandoned families. She alone visited the families, listened to the *han*-ridden stories, wept and prayed with them. She prayed, “God, I firmly believe that

¹⁹ Shin, 73.

²⁰ Shin, 73.

²¹ Shin, 73.

some day your righteous kingdom will be built on earth. Please take care of these innocent and poor souls.”²²

Along with Kim Han-rim, Rev. George Ogle, a United Methodist missionary who devoted his life to promoting human rights in South Korea, first advocated in public for the eight members of the PRP in the Thursday Prayer Meeting on October 9, 1974.²³ Kim Han-rim also reported this incident in the prayer meeting and persuaded the members of Kukahyup to regard the families of the PRP members as their sisters and children. Given these two persons’ example of radical inclusivity, the wives of the PRP members were included within the larger family of the Kukahyup. The wives often stood up in the pulpit during the prayer service and cried out for justice for their husbands.

On November 11, 1974, the Kukahyup announced a public statement, “A Resolution of Unceasing Fasting and Prayer,” and held three days of fasting, prayer, and protest in the lobby of the Christian Building.²⁴ In this statement, they adopted four resolutions to demand (1) the immediate release of the political inmates convicted of violating the Emergency Decree of the Yushin Constitutions, (2) the prohibition of torture, (3) a legal guarantee that the families of the

²² Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 147–48.

²³ Rev. Ogle worked in the Urban-Industrial Mission and ministered to numerous factory workers in Incheon in the 1960 and 1970s. He returned to the United States to complete his Ph.D. degree in international labor relations and came back to Korea in 1973 as a faculty member at Seoul National University. In 1974, the wives of the eight members contacted him and asked for his help as a Christian missionary from the US, specifically to call for a retrial of the eight by a civilian court. He responded, “I can promise nothing since I have no influence in political affairs, but I will look into the matter.” He recalled that “those last six hesitant words changed my life forever.” After finding out that the charge against the eight men had been fabricated by the KCIA, he decided to report this case to the public through the Thursday Prayer Meeting. He said: “Christ is often mediated to us through the most humble and weakest of our brothers and sisters. Among those now in prison there are eight men who have received the harshest of punishments. They have been sentenced to die, even though there is little evidence against them. They are not Christians, but as the poorest among us they become the brothers of Christ. Therefore let us pray for their lives and souls. Probably they have committed no crime worthy of death.” See Ogle, *How Long, O Lord*, 133–36.

²⁴ Unless otherwise noted, all translations of this source are my own. See Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, *Amheuksogui Hwaetbul: 7, 80 nyeondae Minjuhwa-woondongeu Jeungeon* [*Torch in the Darkness: Testimonies of the Democratic Movements in the 1970–80s*] vol. 1 (Seoul, Korea: Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, 1996), 230. Note that the wives of the People’s Revolutionary Party were not allowed to visit their husbands

imprisoned be allowed to visit their loved ones, and (4) the prohibition of re-arrest and further punishment of the released students.²⁵ After finishing the three days of the sit-in protest, they marched through the streets in the heart of Seoul holding banners proclaiming “Do Not Take My Son and My Husband As a Political Sacrifice” and distributing copies of their public statement.²⁶ In the same month, they also organized a public protest against US President Ford’s visit to Seoul. They considered his visit to be an official affirmation by the US of the Park regime’s legitimacy. They engaged sit-in protest in front of the United States Embassy in Seoul and loudly chanted slogans such as “We Are Tired, Release the Arrested!” “Does Ford Support the Yushin regime?”²⁷ Suddenly, Jeong Geum-seoung, mother of the poet Kim Chi-ha, burst into tears while shouting “Release My Son,” and all the members shed tears together.²⁸ However, they never gave up. Even when the riot police disbanded them by force, they protested until the end by singing “We Shall Overcome” in the street.²⁹

On December 14, 1974, Rev. George Ogle was abruptly deported by the Park regime. It happened about two months after he had prayed for the convicted members of the PRP in the Thursday Prayer Meeting. At that time, he was teaching international labor relations at Seoul National University, but the Park regime “resorted to chicanery,” alleging that his visa as a “missionary” did not allow him to teach at a university.³⁰ However, there were “hundreds of missionaries teaching in schools all over Korea,” so the allegation was apparently a “sham.”³¹ The news of Rev. Ogle’s deportation shocked the members of Kukahyup, specifically the wives

²⁵ Specifically, the third resolution shows that the wives of the People’s Revolutionary Party were fully included in Kukahyup since only the wives were not allowed to visit their husbands in prison at that time. See Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 54.

²⁶ Kim and Lee, 54.

²⁷ Kim and Lee, 55.

²⁸ Kim and Lee, 56.

²⁹ Kim and Lee, 56.

³⁰ Ogle, *How Long, O Lord*, 145.

³¹ Ogle, 144–45.

of the PRP members who could not join the democratic movements without his strong support. Kukahyup immediately made a public statement against the deportation and organized a public protest on the pedestrian bridge near the police station in Jong-ro on December 26.³² They raised a banner which said “Reverse Rev. Ogle’s Deportation” and loudly chanted together, “Release My Son, My Husband.” This highly visible protest was quite successful in terms of drawing more support from Protestant and Catholic missionaries: on January 6, 1975, about sixty foreign missionaries submitted a petition to President Park and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court protesting Rev. Ogle’s deportation and demanding a public trial for the eight members of PRP.³³

In February 1975, after six months of intensive *okbaraji* and public protests, most of those who had become political prisoners as a result of the National Democratic Youth-Student League (*Mincheonghakryeon*) Incident, even those who were sentenced to death, were finally released.³⁴ However, Kukahyup did not end their democratic movement. Kukahyup soon arranged for the released inmates to give their testimonies at the Thursday Prayer Meetings and disclosed to the public incidents of inhumane torture and treatment in prison.³⁵ The members of the Kukahyup kept engaging *okbaraji* for those who were still imprisoned, including the eight members of the PRP, and protesting for their immediate release.

On April 10, 1975, as usual the Kukahyup organized its Thursday Prayer Meeting, originally intended as “the prayer service for liberty in mission.”³⁶ However, the meeting’s focus was immediately and spontaneously changed right after the “legal murder” of the eight members of the PRP on April 9.³⁷ Lee Jong-ok, wife of Rev. Lee Hae-dong, prepared hundreds of black

³² Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 64.

³³ Kim and Lee, 64.

³⁴ Kim and Lee, 65.

³⁵ Kim and Lee, 66.

³⁶ Kim and Lee, 70.

³⁷ Kim and Lee, 70.

ribbons as a symbol of mourning in response to this cruel state violence.³⁸ Cho Jeong-ha, wife of Rev. Park Hyung-kyu, displayed banners printed “Down with the Killing Regime” and “Park Chung-hee Is the Murderer” on the wall of the meeting room in the Christian Building.³⁹ The participants in the prayer meeting wore the black ribbon on their chests and screamed in anger, frustration, pain, and grief. Some of them shouted “Kill Park Chung-hee” and scolded the KCIA officers who came to spy on Kukahyup’s political activities shouting, “Get Away From Here!”⁴⁰

In the midst of the passionate prayer service, Im In-young, one of wives of the executed and a member of Kukahyup, ran into the service and reported that the police had come to a Catholic church in Ungam-dong where her husband’s funeral had been scheduled and were taking away by force her husband’s dead body, which showed marks of torture.⁴¹ The members of Kukahyup and some Christian leaders immediately wrapped up the prayer service, rushed to the Catholic church, and intervened to halt the forced removal of the deceased’s body. While Father Moon Jeong-hyun hid the key of the hearse, Lee So-sun, mother of Jeon Tae-il, hopped up into the hearse, opened the coffin, and saw the marks of torture on both wrists.⁴² The police finally brought a large crane to remove the hearse, and then some Christian leaders including Father Moon, Father James Sinnott, and Rev. Moon Ik-hwan, lay down in the street and blocked the road.⁴³ However, the crane kept moving and tragically the wheels of the crane rolled over Father Moon, spilling blood from his legs all over the road.⁴⁴ The police took the body by force and cremated it without the consent or presence of the family.⁴⁵

³⁸ Kim and Lee, 70.

³⁹ Kim and Lee, 75.

⁴⁰ Kim and Lee, 70.

⁴¹ Kim and Lee, 71.

⁴² Kim and Lee, 71–72.

⁴³ Kim and Lee, 71–72.

⁴⁴ Kim and Lee, 72.

⁴⁵ Kim and Lee, 72.

The Park regime's oppression went further. Next day, on April 11, the KCIA officers arrested the key members of Kukahyup, including Cho Jeong-ha and Im In-young, and Christian leaders such as Rev. Lee Hae-dong, Rev. Moon Dong-hwan, and Rev. Kim Sang-keun. Those arrested were charged with violation of the anti-communist law and blamed for being "commies" who praised the communist regime in North Korea by glorifying the death of communists (the eight members of the PRP), although they had not received the mission from North Korea directly.⁴⁶ They could be released if they posted a notice in the newspaper *Donga-Ilbo* that they would not have the Thursday Prayer Meeting the following week.⁴⁷ Nor could they henceforth use the large auditorium in the Christian Building for their prayer service. Despite all those measures, state repression could not snuff out "the breath of prayer dedicated to God," the fervor of their prayer and commitment to restoring democracy and human rights.⁴⁸ After skipping only one Thursday, they resumed the Thursday Prayer Meeting, and it was held in the lobby of the Christian Building or Kukahyup members' houses for the rest of that year.⁴⁹

Meanwhile, as the Vietnam War ended with a communist victory in April 1975, the Park regime took advantage of this political situation and declared Emergency Decree Number 9 (henceforth, ED 9) as the culmination of the repression strategies which "combined all of the past Emergency Decrees into one law" on May 13.⁵⁰ This law strictly prohibited "the spreading of 'groundless rumors' about the government, debating the Yushin Constitution, collectively mobilizing against the government, and criticizing ED 9 itself": it was commonly said among citizens in fear that "even one wrong word could land you in jail."⁵¹ Under the "legal

⁴⁶ Lee and Lee, *Duri Georeun Han Gil*, 110.

⁴⁷ Lee and Lee, 111–12.

⁴⁸ Lee and Lee, 112.

⁴⁹ Lee and Lee, 112.

⁵⁰ Chang, *Protest Dialectics*, 37.

⁵¹ Chang, 37.

justification” of ED 9, the Park regime significantly strengthened “its capacity for repressing dissident movements through various coercive tactics,” which discouraged Kukahyup’s highly visible protests in public.⁵² However, once again the members of Kukahyup secretly continued the Thursday Prayer Meeting and their devoted *okbaraji* for the remaining political inmates.

In the face of this extreme level of oppression, on March 1, 1976, the March 1st Democratic Declaration for the Salvation of the Nation (*Samil-minju-guguk-suneon*) was declared at Myung-dong Cathedral during the mass for the fifty-seventh anniversary of the March 1 Independence Movement against Japanese colonial rule.⁵³ Rev. Moon Ik-hwan drafted this document in consultation with Kim Dae-jung, one of the most influential political dissidents, and Yoon Bo-sun, President before Park Chung-hee.⁵⁴ The final declaration was signed by “eleven of the most prominent senior leaders of the 1970s democracy movement,” including (1) political leaders such as Kim Dae-jung and Yoon Bo-sun, (2) Christian philosophers and theologians such as Ham Seok-hon, Seo Nam-dong, Ahn Byung-mu, and Lee Woo-jeong, and (3) Christian ministers who closely worked with Kukahyup such as Rev. Moon Dong-hwan.⁵⁵ Lee Woo-jeong, a feminist theologian and key leader in women’s labor movements, read the declaration in front of approximately seven hundred participants at the mass and ended the declaration by proclaiming, “*Minjujueui Mansae!*” (Long Live Democracy) as Korean minjung leaders shouted “*Daehan-Dokrip Mansase!* (Long Live Korea’s Independence) in the March 1st Independence Movement.⁵⁶ Indeed, this declaration offered the public a symbolic way to associate the Park regime with “the oppression of the Japanese colonial government” and to call

⁵² Chang, 38.

⁵³ Chang, 90.

⁵⁴ Chang, 90. See also Myungsup Ko, *Lee Hee-ho Pyungjeon: Gonanui Gil, Sinnyeomui Gil* [Biography of Lee Hee-ho: the Way of Passion, the Way of Conviction] (Seoul, Korea: Hankyoreh, 2016), 255.

⁵⁵ Chang, *Protest Dialectics*, 90.

⁵⁶ Unless otherwise noted, all translations of this source are my own.; Ko, *Lee Hee-ho Pyungjeon*, 256–57.

for liberation and restoration of democracy.⁵⁷ Also, given the respected status of the principal participants, the declaration became a “rallying point for those who struggling to mobilize in the highly repressive context under ED 9.”⁵⁸

The Park regime swiftly retaliated against the leading participants in the declaration. In total, eleven dissidents, including Kim Dae-jung, Rev. Moon Dong-hwan, Rev. Moon Ik-hwan, Rev. Lee Hae-dong, Father Moon Jeong-hyun, and Father Ham Se-woong, were immediately arrested and accused of being ringleaders of a coup d'état.⁵⁹ Some key participants, including Ham Seok-hon, Lee Woo-jeong, and Father Kim Seung-hoon, were indicted without detention given their ages, gender, or level of involvement.⁶⁰ Kukahyup once again embraced the eight wives of the imprisoned men. Lee Hee-ho, wife of Kim Dae-jung, testified:

Since it was my first time to do *okbaraji*, I did not know what I needed to do. It was Thursday, the day after my husband had been arrested, so I came to the Human Rights Committee of the NCKK housed on the second floor of the Christian Building and participated in the Thursday Prayer Meeting. And all participants [mostly members of Kukahyup] encouraged and comforted me.⁶¹

The families of those imprisoned as a result of the March 1st Democratic Declaration for the Salvation of the Nation (*Samil-minju-guguk-suneon*) Incident became members of Kukahyup and collectively engaged their *okbaraji* and political activities to demand the immediate release of the political prisoners and the restoration of democracy and human rights.

While engaging in *okbaraji*, including by providing food, clothes, and blankets, the first public protest was held on the hill next to the Seodaemun Prison in the early morning of Easter Sunday on April 18, 1976. For more than a month, the families had not been allowed to visit the eleven political inmates. Interestingly, all convicted participants in the declaration and their

⁵⁷ Chang, *Protest Dialectics*, 90.

⁵⁸ Chang, 90.

⁵⁹ Ko, *Lee Hee-ho Pyungjeon*, 260.

⁶⁰ Ko, 260.

⁶¹ Ko, 261.

wives were Christians. Most of them, including Rev. Moon Dong-hwan and theologian Lee Woo-jeong, belonged to the Church of Galilee that had been established on August 17, 1975 in order to spread the good news of Christ to the oppressed through their comprehensive support of the families of political prisoners.⁶² Given this shared identity as Christians, in the early morning the wives gathered together, climbed the hill next to the prison, and loudly sang hymns that celebrate the resurrection of Christ, and other Christian hymns that they often sang at the Church of Galilee.⁶³ One of the hymns was “Low in the Grave He Lay,” whose lyrics are:

Low in the grave He lay; Jesus my Savior
 Waiting the coming day; Jesus my Lord
 Up from the grave He arose, He arose
 With a mighty triumph o’er His foes, He arose!
 He arose a victor from the dark domain
 And He lives forever with His saints to reign
 He arose! He arose! Hallelujah Christ arose!

Their loud shouts proclaiming the resurrection of Christ were regarded as a formidable protest against the Park regime, like an “attack by the guerrillas.”⁶⁴ The police immediately intervened in this protest and arrested the wives.

However, the police could not nullify the symbolic power of this protest. The loud shouts and singing had been heard over the prison wall and had awoken the wives’ imprisoned husbands and other prisoners. Rev. Lee Hae-dong testified about his experience:

I was certain that my families were there. It was certain that our families sang the hymns on the resurrection for the imprisoned. Each face of the members was visualized in my heart as if they were standing right next to me. Suddenly, the lonely and cold prison room was filled with the warm and comforting presence of the families. I could not lie down but knelt down on the holy ground and prayed. “Lord, come and be present here. Come to this place like a tomb. Come and break the door of this tomb with your power of resurrection!”⁶⁵

⁶² Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 91. Professor Ahn Byung-mu and Seo Nam-dong were also the leading members of this church. And this church served as the birthplace of Korean *minjung* theology.

⁶³ Kim and Lee, 112.

⁶⁴ Kim and Lee, 113.

⁶⁵ Lee and Lee, *Duri Georeun Han Gil*, 153.

Although the political inmates could not see the faces of their wives, the act of protest by the members of the Kukahyup in singing hymns provided them with the symbolic affirmation of the presence of the beloved in the most troubled days of their lives. More important, given this presence, they were able to envision the final victory over the vicious political oppression by the Park regime.

The resurrection hymn protest marked the beginning of artful symbolic protests in public by the members of the Kukahyup with the creative leadership of the wives of the political prisoners of the March 1st Declaration Incident. From May to July 1976, a series of trials was held in military court, and the Kukahyup creatively protested against their injustice. The first trial was held on May 4, 1976, but the families were not allowed to observe the trial.⁶⁶ They could not even enter the gate of the military court. Then, Lee Hee-ho, wife of Kim Dae-jung, proposed an idea of “putting a cross made by black tape—symbolizing the crucifixion of democracy and of the freedom of the press—on their mouths.”⁶⁷ They sat down on the street in front of the military court and shouted together, “Make the Trial Public” and “Democracy Was Killed on the Cross.”⁶⁸ After chanting the slogans, they put the black tape crosses on their mouths and proceeded to hold their silent protest.⁶⁹ For the second trial on May 15, the families had received official tickets to observe the trial, but the Park regime blocked all pathways to the court so the families simply could not approach or enter the court. Indignant at this unjust situation, they set the tickets alight in the street as a kind of “performance” and marched to the back gate of the

⁶⁶ In principle, five people for each defendant had been allowed to observe the trial, but the Park regime had already assigned five police officers to these seats, which blocked the families from observing the trial. See Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 113.

⁶⁷ Ko, *Lee Hee-ho Pyungjeon*, 263.

⁶⁸ Ko, 263.

⁶⁹ Ko, 264.

court singing hymns and spiritual songs, including “Not in Dumb Resignation,” “We Shall Overcome,” and “Oh Freedom.”⁷⁰

In their public protests in response to the rest of the trials, Kukahyup members, specifically the wives of the political inmates of the March 1st Declaration Incident, extensively drew on cultural and religious symbols. On May 29, they protested against “state violence” by marching in the street wearing purple-colored *hanbok*, the traditional Korean costume.⁷¹ They intentionally chose the color of purple in order to signify “passion and victory,” adopted from the Christian liturgical tradition.⁷² They also chose to wear *hanbok*—traditionally representing the status of mother or wife in Korean culture—as a symbol of “peaceful protest” and “resistance against violence.”⁷³ On June 12, the day of the fifth trial, they managed to enter the courtroom, but found the trial to be almost finished. As soon as they entered the courtroom, they took off their coats to display the purple-colored cross emblazoned on their white dresses.⁷⁴ Together they sang “We Shall Overcome” loudly until their husbands were dragged out of the courtroom.⁷⁵ This highly visual protest was formidable to the judges and prosecutors in the courtroom: one of the judges said that he was very scared, and felt as if he were being seized by Crusaders.⁷⁶

After the purple cross dress protest, the Park regime deprived the families of their rights to observe the trials and violently intervened in their public protests in the streets of Seoul. Given the prolonged process of the trials—there were fifteen trials in total—the Kukahyup members were physically and mentally exhausted. Then, they found a collective practice for healing their

⁷⁰ Ko, 264; Jong-sook Lee, interviewed by author, Ilisan, Korea, November 7, 2017.

⁷¹ Lee and Lee, *Duri Georeun Han Gil*, 176.

⁷² Lee and Lee, 176.

⁷³ Ko, 265.

⁷⁴ Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 120.

⁷⁵ Kim and Lee, 120.

⁷⁶ Jong-sook Lee, interview.

wounded souls: knitting what they called Victory Shawls.⁷⁷ This shawl was V-shaped and made with purple-colored yarn in order to signify the final victory that its very name connotes.⁷⁸ They gathered in the Christian Building and knitted together. This communal practice they regarded as a kind of mindful or spiritual practice. As they knitted four patterns to make the Victory Shawls, they prayed for restoration of democracy: they inwardly or outwardly prayed each syllable of “*min-ju-hoe-bok*” (which literally means the restoration of democracy) for each pattern.⁷⁹ Kukahyup sold the shawls to churches and NGOs in the US, Canada, Germany, and Japan, and used the profits to support *okbaraji* for the political inmates who did not have families supporting them.⁸⁰ In other words, the communal practice of knitting was also a different strategy of their resistance against the Park regime, and the Victory Shawl became “the symbol of resistance” at that time.⁸¹ The Park regime tried to interrupt this practice of resistance by confiscating all purple yarn from the markets, but the Kukahyup members managed to secure the yarn by directly importing them from foreign countries such as Canada.⁸²

The Park regime’s oppression of citizens continued under Emergency Decree Number 9 of the Yushin Constitution. As examined above, ED 9 was the culmination of repressive strategies which gave persons no freedom to express their own beliefs or follow their conscience if that meant going against the propagandized ideologies. Yet although their freedom was “legally” restricted in this way, more students, workers, and citizens engaged in civil disobedience to express their political views and beliefs in the face of the Park regime’s oppression. As a result of listening to their hearts and consciences, many of them were convicted

⁷⁷ You may find the image of the Victory Shawls via the following web link:
<http://archives.kdemo.or.kr/contents/view/117>

⁷⁸ Jong-sook Lee, interview; the purple color also symbolized patriotism as *mugungwha* (the rose of Sharon), the national flower of South Korea, is purple. See also Ko, 266.

⁷⁹ Jong-sook Lee, interview.

⁸⁰ Ko, 266.

⁸¹ Ko, 266.

⁸² Jong-sook Lee, interview.

of violating ED 9 and became long-term prisoners. Given this political situation, Kukahyup redefined their collective identity and the boundary of their “families.” As the group’s name suggests, the Kukahyup members’ collective identity had been defined as “the families of the arrested,” specifically the mothers and wives of the arrested. In order to respond to the changing political situation, they redefined themselves as “*families of conscientious prisoners*” and solidified their conviction that it is unjust to imprison those who practice civil disobedience and democracy by following their own conscience.⁸³ With this redefined identity and conviction, they changed the official name of their political organization from Association of the Families of the Arrested (*Kusokja-kajok-hyupeuihoe* or *Kukahyup*) to Association of the Families of Conscientious Prisoners (*Yangshimsu-kajok-hyupeuihoe* or *Yangkahyup*) on October 14, 1976.

Yet they not only renamed their political organization, they redefined the core mission of the organization. Although Kukahyup also implicitly pursued restoration of human rights in its political actions for restoring democracy in Korea, Yangkahyup explicitly articulated *restoration of human dignity and human rights* as the fundamental mission and understood restoration of democracy as the necessary means to achieve this ultimate goal.⁸⁴ The Yangkahyup’s public statement “For All Who Long For Peace,” declared on March 17, 1977, clearly shows its collective identity and core missions:

We are *families of conscientious prisoners* in Korea...Our sons, daughters, and husbands were imprisoned because of their courageous voices of conscience...We firmly believe that the problems of human rights [abuse] can be resolved through the complete realization of democracy. Hence, our actions [movements] will not end with the release of our husbands, sons, and daughters. We will continue our actions—disclosure [of human rights abuse] and witness [of our commitment to restoring dignity and human

⁸³ Emphasis added; Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 131–32.

⁸⁴ I argue that both Protestant and Catholic churches’ ministries for human dignity and human rights influenced this shift and transformation in the women’s democratic movement. Specifically, Yangkahyup worked closely with the Human Rights Mission in the National Council of Churches in Korea and with the Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice, whose core mission was affirmation and restoration of human dignity and human rights in Korean society. This argument will be further developed later in this chapter.

rights]—until we build *a true democratic society in which all persons' dignity is respected and their basic human rights are guaranteed*.⁸⁵

Members of Yangkakyup no longer identified themselves only with families of the arrested, but with families of *conscientious prisoners* (*Yangshimsoo-kajok*) who courageously gave voice to their conscience (*yangsim*). More importantly, they understood their family members' imprisonment as a matter of human rights (*Inkwon-moonjae*) and declared their core mission as the restoration of human dignity and human rights by building a true democratic society, which certainly included the release of political prisoners but which they felt could not be limited to this temporary goal.

For Yangkakyup, the term *conscience* served as one of the key moral resources in their political actions for restoring human dignity and rights. According to its public declaration “We Disclose Every Single Incident of Political Persecution,” Yangkakyup named the Park regime's core means of exercising political terror—the criminalization of human conscience—underlying their family members' imprisonment.⁸⁶ In other words, it critically analyzed the Park regime's state violence against citizens in terms of suppression (and consequently paralysis) of citizens' conscience. Besides this critical analysis, Yangkakyup utilized the concept of conscience to present a substantive account of the core mission. It defined “the freedom of conscience” as “the most fundamental freedom that guarantees human rights and freedom in all spheres,” including the political, economic, social, and cultural, and at the same time as “the core foundation of democracy that prevents the absolutization of political power and upholds the principles of

⁸⁵ Emphasis added; unless otherwise noted, all translations of this source are my own; Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, *Amheuksogui Hwaetbul*: 7, 80 nyeondae Minjuhwa-woondongui Jeungeon [*Torch in the Darkness: Testimonies of the Democratic Movements in the 1970–80s*] vol. 2 (Seoul, Korea: Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, 1996), 415-16.

⁸⁶ Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, *Amheuksogui Hwaetbul* vol. 2, 431.

popular sovereignty.”⁸⁷ For Yangkakyup, fighting for the freedom of conscience was the first step toward the restoration of human dignity and rights, since the group understood conscience as the “torch that sheds the light on [the path to restoration of] human rights, centers all the members who long for freedom and justice, and drives away all the dark grief, *han*, and suffering” under the Park regime’s oppression.⁸⁸

Yangkakyup continued what Kukakyup had primarily practiced in its democratic movement, with keen attention to issues of human dignity and human rights. First, members of Yangkakyup continually engaged *okbaraji* for the long-term political prisoners. Their *okbaraji* included providing physical items such as food, blankets, clothes, and socks. At the same time, they regularly visited their sons, daughters, and husbands in order to keep an eye out for human rights violations in prison. When they heard about an incident of abuse, they immediately made a public statement and gave a detailed account of the human rights violation as evidence of the Park regime’s state violence against citizens. For example, on April 20, 1979, some members of Yangkakyup tried to visit their sons and daughters who had been imprisoned in Seodaemoon Prison on the charge of violating ED 9, but the visit was abruptly prohibited without any clear reason. They fought against the prison officers, kept visiting the prison, and finally managed to see their family members several days later. Then, they discovered that a group of prison guards had perpetrated cruel violence against their family members. From April 20 to 22, about thirty student-prisoners had been tied up with a rope and physically attacked by a group of seven to eight guards until they fainted or became unconscious.⁸⁹ By collecting testimonies about the

⁸⁷ Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, 431.

⁸⁸ Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, 429.

⁸⁹ Unless otherwise noted, all translations of this source are my own. Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, *Amheuksogui Hwaetbul: 7, 80 nyeondae Minjuhwa-woondongeui Jeungeon* [*Torch in the Darkness: Testimonies of the Democratic Movements in the 1970–80s*] vol. 3 (Seoul, Korea: Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, 1997), 528–29.

incident from their family members in the prison, Yangkahyup gathered the necessary information to disclose this cruel incident of human rights violation to the public and noted in their public statement “After Hearing About Indiscriminate Violence in the Prison” the systemic nature of this violence—in that it had been “directly ordered and supervised by Associate Warden Choi Woo-sup.”⁹⁰ This was, in short, no mere isolated incident of cruelty toward prisoners by some rogue prison officers.

Besides *okbaraji*, the members of Yangkahyup communally participated in court trials of the political prisoners to support the prisoners’ conscience and watch out for human rights violations. They often called this communal act “*pumashi*.”⁹¹ *Pumashi* is a system of reciprocal that originates in traditional Korean agricultural society and consists of “the activity of giving, receiving, and repaying” either “material or non-material” gifts as “the form of the favor, benefit or benevolence” between two different parties.⁹² Although this cultural practice had originally been performed in a rural and agricultural context (e.g., two families help one another with each other’s harvests on their respective farms, sharing labor and equipment), *pumashi* has long been practiced in urban contexts as well by women for certain labor-intensive domestic work. For example, women help one another with *kimjang*, the collective practice of producing large vats of *kimchi* (the essential side dish in Korean meals) for yearly consumption.

Similarly, Yangkahyup members communally practiced what they call “*jaepan* [court trial] *pumashi*”: together they participated in each family member’s court trial and reciprocated bodily presence—occupying seats in court—and spiritual energy—supporting their family member’s conscientious stance. Just as *pumashi* “contributes directly and indirectly to the

⁹⁰ Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, 529.

⁹¹ Soo-young Yoon, interviewed by author, Seosan, Korea, November 9, 2017.

⁹² Joohee Kim, “P’UMASSI: Patterns of Interpersonal Relationships in a Korean Village” (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1981), 42.

initiation and maintenance of interpersonal relationship” in Korean society, so too *jaepan pumashi* contributed internally to consolidating the collective identity of Yangkakyup members as one family.⁹³ At the same time, this communal practice served as an external and embodied sign of their commitment to watching over human rights violations and restoring human dignity of the long-term conscientious prisoners.

Yangkakyup upheld the legacy of Kukakyup’s Thursday Prayer Meetings and further developed these prayer meetings. As the trials of the March 1st Declaration prisoners took place on Saturdays, the members of Kukakyup had changed the date of the regular official prayer meeting from Thursdays to Fridays in May 1976.⁹⁴ Following this custom, Yangkakyup continued to facilitate its prayer meeting on Fridays and renamed it “Payer Meeting for Those Who Suffer.”⁹⁵ More importantly given its new emphasis on restoration of human dignity and human rights, Yangkakyup reframed the nature of this prayer meeting as a “prayer meeting for restoring human rights of the oppressed who were suffering in Korean society” and paid extended attention to issues of human rights, including workers’ human rights.⁹⁶ For example, on November 8 and December 23, 1977 and February 17, 1978 the members of Yangkakyup and other citizens gathered and held a series of prayer meetings advocating for labor rights of workers in Pyeonghwa Market and supporting their labor union (*Cheongkye-nojo*).⁹⁷ In addition, working closely with the Human Rights Mission of the National Council of Churches in Korea, Yangkakyup collected information on issues of human rights in Korean society—information

⁹³ Kim, “P’UMASSI,” 43.

⁹⁴ National Council of Churches in Korea Human Rights Mission, *Hanguk Kyohoe Inkwonwoondong 30 Nyonsa*, 94.

⁹⁵ Unless otherwise noted, all translations of this source are my own. National Council of Churches in Korea Human Rights Mission, *1970 Nyondae Minjoohwawoondong: Kidokkyo Inkwonwoondong Joongshimeuro* [Democratic Movement in the 1970s: Focusing on Christian Human Rights Movement vol. 2] vol. 2 (Seoul, Korea: National Council of Churches in Korea, 1987), 496.

⁹⁶ National Council of Churches in Korea Human Rights Mission, 496.

⁹⁷ National Council of Churches in Korea Human Rights Mission, 496.

they collected from their *okbaraji*, *jaepan pumashi*, and public protests—and published and circulated a special periodical called “Human Rights News” in the prayer meetings that news of human rights violations by the Park regime to the public.⁹⁸ Under the nearly total control of public media by the state, this prayer meeting was “the only space where the public heard laments of the oppressed” and where there was a “special time for praying aloud for social justice” in the late 1970s.⁹⁹

In addition to their *okbaraji*, *jaepan pumashi*, and prayer meetings, the members of Yangkahyup also engaged in public protests to address a wide range of human rights issues in Korean society. For instance, Yangkahyup initiated a series of public protests against US President Carter’s visit to South Korea in June 1979. At that time, there was public concern that the official visit of President Carter, whose “moral leadership in politics” and “commitment to respecting human rights” were well recognized in international society, could be misused and propagandized by the Park regime to justify its political and moral legitimacy.¹⁰⁰ This concern was based on historical lessons that the official visits of the heads of the US administration had reinforced the oppressive regime of the Yushin Constitution.¹⁰¹ As Carter’s visit to South Korea was scheduled on June 29 – July 1, 1979, Yangkahyup protested ahead of that on June 11 in front of the US Embassy in Seoul holding placards reading, “How can a friend of Korea talk about Human Rights,” “Carter? Is he a Human Rights Cutter?”¹⁰² This public protest lasted for about fifteen before all protesters, including Park Yong-gil (one of the key leaders of Yangkahyup), were arrested and put in jail for several weeks.¹⁰³ On the first day of Carter’s visit,

⁹⁸ Soo-young Yoon, interview.

⁹⁹ National Council of Churches in Korea Human Rights Mission, 496.

¹⁰⁰ Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom* 135.

¹⁰¹ Kim and Lee, 136; this is why Kukahyup mounted a public protest against US President Ford’s visit to South Korea.

¹⁰² Kim and Lee, 136.

¹⁰³ Kim and Lee, 136.

the members of Yangkakyup and former journalists and reporters who had been unjustly fired from *Dong-A Ilbo* and *Chosun Ilbo* jointly published “An Open Inquiry Letter to President Carter” in which they disclosed incidents of human rights violations by the Park regime, including the inhumane treatment of conscientious prisoners and the state control of the press.¹⁰⁴ After this public declaration, they performed a sit-in protest in the Amnesty office in Seoul, demanding the immediate release of conscientious prisoners and the guarantee of the freedom of conscience, continuing until the police used force to break up their protest.¹⁰⁵

Just as their prayer meetings addressed issues of workers’ rights, the members of Yangkakyup supported labor unions and fought for workers’ basic human rights, rights indispensable for their survival and dignity as a human being. In the late 1970s, there was a series of major labor protests—the so-called “Y.H. worker protests”—organized by the Y.H. Trading Company union. These protests were in response to a plan announced in March 1979 to close the wig plant due to the owners’ corrupt management.¹⁰⁶ The union organized a series of sit-in demonstrations, which culminated on August 9 in a sit-in demonstration held at the headquarters of the major opposition party, the New Democratic Party (henceforth, NDP), whose president was Kim Young-sam.¹⁰⁷ Informed by “the advice of several Christian dissident intellectuals,” the union deliberately selected this political location in order to “escalate their [workers’] economic struggle to a political struggle” and make “a great impact on the entire society” regardless of the success or failure of this protest.¹⁰⁸ In addition, this sit-in protest was

¹⁰⁴ Kim and Lee, 138.

¹⁰⁵ Kim and Lee, 138.

¹⁰⁶ Koo, *Korean Workers*, 89.

¹⁰⁷ Koo, 90.

¹⁰⁸ Koo, 90.

monumental in the history of the Korean female workers' labor movement: the great majority of protesters consisted of 187 female textile workers.¹⁰⁹

When the protesters occupied the fourth floor of the NDP headquarters, approximately one thousand riot policemen immediately surrounded the building.¹¹⁰ On the third day of the sit-in protests (August 11), the riot policemen “broke into the building” and indiscriminately and “violently attacked NDP party members, opposition congressmen, and newspaper reporters, as well as the desperately resisting Y.H. workers.”¹¹¹ Tragically, in the midst of this brutal police violence, a female worker, Kim Kyung-sook, fell from the fourth floor and died,¹¹² and all the protesters were removed by force. Immediately upon hearing of the tragic death of the female worker, Lee So-sun, mother of Jeon Tae-il, who was respected as the mother of the oppressed *minjung* and worked as one of the core members of both the Kukahyup and Yangkahyup, rushed to the NDP headquarters and lamented over the blood spilled on the fourth floor: “How dare you! How are you to kill a worker like this! How dare the state thrive by sucking the blood and sweat of workers and killing the workers!”¹¹³ Likewise, on August 15, members of Yangkahyup expressed their indignation to the public through another sit-in demonstration and fiercely fought for the workers' basic human rights, claiming that those rights were indispensable for their survival and dignity as human beings rather than being treated as expendable parts consumed for the glory of the nation.

¹⁰⁹ Lee, *The History of the Democratization Movement in Korea*, 86.

¹¹⁰ Koo, *Korean Workers*, 90.

¹¹¹ Koo, *Korean Workers*, 90.

¹¹² At that time police claimed that Kim committed suicide, but in 2008, South Korea's Truth and Reconciliation Commission officially revealed the truth: that she was killed amidst the brutal police violence. See the Committee of Commemoration of Martyr Kim Kyung-sook, http://kwwnet.org/?page_id=4534&ckattempt=1 (accessed July 10, 2019).

¹¹³ Unless otherwise noted, all translations of this source are my own; Lee So-sun and Min Jong-duk, *Eeomoneyeui Gil* [The Way of the Mother] (Seoul: Dolbaegae, 1990), 357.

Yangkahyup's comprehensive approach to the restoration of human dignity and human rights is well captured by its direct engagement with political parties, specifically the major opposition party NDP. On May 29, 1979, Yangkahyup made a public statement that criticized and challenged the NDP's lack of attention to and lack of political activities regarding issues of human rights violations in Korean society:

What did you, the first opposition party NDP, do while Kim Chi-ha, many intellectuals, religious leaders, young students, and some of your colleges cried out for human rights and democracy in their burning thirst? What did you do? Did you know how many citizens had been arrested? Oh...what you are doing is an act of submission, compromise, and complicit? Are you on the side of dictatorship? Are you on the side of democracy?...What did you do while farmers and workers were driven away from their houses, their hometowns, and their work places and were weeping in the streets?...Respond to people and tell us who you are!¹¹⁴

Under the Park regime's tight control of public institutions and media, the NDP achieved a "stunning result"—in that it received "1.1 percentage points more votes than the ruling party" in the parliamentary election on December 12, 1978.¹¹⁵ However, Yangkahyup sharply reminded the NDP leaders that this successful voter rates which "they boast about" indeed reflected citizens' "burning thirst for democracy" and required of them devoted service to restore democracy and human dignity in Korean society.¹¹⁶ This direct challenge of the opposition party represents Yangkahyup's comprehensive spectrum of democratic movements with its keen attention to issues of the human rights of every citizen in the social, economic, and political spheres.

While Yangkahyup had been faithfully engaging its democratic movements, the Park regime abruptly collapsed as a result of Park Chung-hee assassination on October 26, 1976. No one could have anticipated that Kim Jae-kyu, "the KCIA chief and Park's long-time right-hand

¹¹⁴ Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, *Amheuksogui Hwaetbul* vol. 3, 533.

¹¹⁵ Lee, *The History of the Democratization Movement in Korea*, 84.

¹¹⁶ Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, *Amheuksogui Hwaetbul* vol. 3, 533.

man,” would shoot both Park and Cha Ji-cheol, the president’s chief bodyguard, dead while they were having dinner on that night.¹¹⁷ As the Yushin regime collapsed, on December 8, its notorious repression strategy ED 9 was also terminated.¹¹⁸ Since ED 9 was the chief means by which political “agitators” and conscientious objectors were arrested, prosecuted, and imprisoned, most imprisoned family members of Yangkhyup members were finally released.¹¹⁹ However, even after the abrupt collapse of the Park regime, the National Security Law was still the law of the land, so some families, such as families of members of the South Korean National Liberation Front Preparation Committee (*Namchosun-minjok-haebang-jeonsun-joonbi-wiwonhoe*, or *Namminjeon*), faithfully continued the democratic efforts of Yangkhyup throughout the 1980s.¹²⁰

III. Historical Narratives of Family Movements in the 1980s: Focusing on Minkhyup and Yukhyup

After the assassination of Park Chung-hee, Prime Minister Choi Kyu-ha was elected as president of the Fourth Republic of South Korea on December 6, 1976. However, General Chun Doo-hwan, head of the Defense Security Command and chief of the assassination investigation team, and his military colleagues including General Roh Tae-woo, mounted a military coup on December 12 and took down the Choi government that thus lasted for less than a week.¹²¹ This rise of the new military junta triggered a great deal of public anger and frustration, specifically among college students who had aspired to restore democracy after the demise of the Park

¹¹⁷ Lee, *The History of the Democratization Movement in Korea*, 91.

¹¹⁸ Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 185.

¹¹⁹ Kim and Lee, 185.

¹²⁰ Kim and Lee, 156–57.

¹²¹ Lee, *The History of the Democratization Movement in Korea*, 92–93.

regime.¹²² The indignant and frustrated students organized and mobilized mass protests and demonstrations against the Chun regime in the spring of 1980: this mass movement became known as the “Seoul spring.”¹²³ The students’ aspirations to democracy were heightened when on May 15, around 150,000 students and citizens protested and demanded democratization at Seoul Station.¹²⁴ In response to a series of mass protests, the Chun regime declared an extension of martial law (that was already in effect since the military coup in December 1979) to cover all territories of South Korea, shut down by force all universities across the country, and arrested many political and religious leaders including Kim Dae-joong, Rev. Moon Ik-hwan, and Rev. Lee Hae-dong, whose wives were key members of both Kukahyup and Yangkahyup.¹²⁵

However, even the extended martial law could not quell the flame of aspiration to democracy and justice that college students and citizens in Gwangju had ignited. On May 16, 1980, they organized “a torchlight march to ‘illuminate the darkness’” of eighteen years of the Park regime.¹²⁶ On May 18, they organized another sit-in protest in front of Cheonnam National University, but they were unexpectedly “beaten, clubbed, knifed, and bayoneted” by paratroopers: this marked the prelude to the state-led massacre and the subsequent Gwangju Citizens’ Uprising.¹²⁷ As discussed in chapter 2, the Chun regime’s paratroopers armed with heavy mechanized weapons brutally and indiscriminately crushed both the Citizen’s Army and civilians. As Han Kang’s novel *Human Acts* poignantly describes, the fountain in front of the Provincial Government Office, the symbolic watershed of Gwangju citizens’ spirit for democracy and justice, was filled with the blood of the Citizen’s Army and civilians. The

¹²² Shin and Hwang, *Contentious Kwangju*, xiv.

¹²³ Shin and Hwang, xiv.

¹²⁴ Shin and Hwang, xiv.

¹²⁵ Shin and Hwang, xiv.

¹²⁶ Shin and Hwang, xv.

¹²⁷ Shin and Hwang, xv.

massacre in Gwangju was indeed “exemplary violence” by the Chun’s military junta “for the purpose of regime construction—that is, to preempt any future opposition and to force the people to submit to its rule.”¹²⁸

After this incident of exemplary violence, the Chun regime’s Social Purification Movement followed. Many dissidents, including college student leaders, were condemned as “social evils” and dragged to the notorious purification camps, such as the Samcheong Training Camp. In addition, some student leaders were forcibly drafted to the military and had to go undergo the “Green Campaign (*Nokwa-saeop*),” a propaganda training that included both significant torture as a means to extract what the Chun regime called the “Red ideology” and imbuing draftees minds with the so-called “Green ideology.”¹²⁹ Under these repression strategies, many student organizations were forcibly dissolved. Only a few “clandestine circles” survived and secretly continued the student movement.¹³⁰

On September 30, 1983, former student movement leaders and labor activists formed the Youth Federation for the Democratic Movement (*Minjoohwa-woondong-cheongnyon-yonhap*, or Mincheongryon), which is a “landmark in the organizational development of the democratization movement.”¹³¹ This organization’s passion for democracy is well captured in its logo or mascot, what they called the “Martyr Toad” or “Tank Toad”: a toad consumed by a snake right before giving birth and letting its offspring eat the snake for nourishment, a toad killed yet having formidable power like a tank.¹³² Like the Martyr Toad, members of Mincheongryon committed to sacrificing themselves even unto death in their struggle to give birth to democracy. Like the

¹²⁸ Ganesan and Kim, *State Violence in East Asia*, 48.

¹²⁹ My translation; Rae-gun Park, “Nokwasaeobeul Asinayo?” [Have you heard about the “Green Campaign,”] *Hankyeoreh*, September 11, 2013, http://h21.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/35364.html (accessed July 10, 2019).

¹³⁰ Lee, *The Making of Minjung*, 177.

¹³¹ Lee, *The History of the Democratization Movement in Korea*, 115.

¹³² Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 230.

Tank Toad, they mobilized powerful democratic movements which the Chun regime regarded as a formidable threat.

One monumental act of political resistance was Mincheongryon's visit to Gwangju and its participation in the joint commemoration of the Gwangju Uprising with other democratic movement organizations in that region. Given the Chun regime's political strategy to frame the Gwangju Uprising as "a communist-agitated 'incident,'" in the early 1980s, Gwangju had been "a taboo subject among Koreans."¹³³ On May 14, 1984, as an act of publicly breaking this "communist" taboo, Mincheongryon visited the Mangwoldong Cemetery in Gwangju and commemorated the spirits of the Gwangju Uprising buried in the cemetery.¹³⁴ After this commemoration, Mincheongryon participated in a street march with other civic organizations on Geumnan Avenue where thousands of protesters had spilled their blood and sweat during the uprising.¹³⁵ For the Chun regime, this "unexpected" visit that broke the political and social isolation of Gwangju was a formidable threat, so it cruelly crushed the following Gwangju Uprising commemoration organized by Mincheongryon on May 19 in Seoul. The riot policemen indiscriminately attacked and arrested the participants, and one Minchoengryon member suffered a miscarriage as a result of the brutal police violence. This state violence reminded the public of the terror of the Chun regime during the Gwangju Uprising to kill a pregnant woman.¹³⁶

More importantly, Mincheongryon made important progress in the democratic movement. It played a leading role in forming the Council of Minjung's Democracy Movement (*Minjung-minjoowoondong-hyupeuihoe*, or Minminhyup), "the first alliance aimed at developing an organized mass movement" among college students, workers, religious leaders, and

¹³³ Shin and Hwang, *Contentious Kwangju*, xviii, xxvi.

¹³⁴ Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 235.

¹³⁵ Kim and Lee, 235.

¹³⁶ Kim and Lee, 236–37.

intellectuals in June 1984.¹³⁷ This development of allied movements was further strengthened by Minminhyup's merger with the National Congress for Democracy and Reunification (*Minjoo-tongil-kookmin-hoeui* or Kookmin-hoeui) and the subsequent launching of "the new group [in which it] vowed to play a leading role in unifying all pro-democracy forces," plus its merger with the Coalition for Democratic Reunification and with the Minjung' Movement (*Minjoo-tongil-minjung-woondong-yonhap* or Mintongryon) on March 29, 1985.¹³⁸ This surge of allied struggles showed itself to be particularly effective in the student movement: on April 17, student organizations gathered together and inaugurated "a new nationwide student alliance called the National Student Association [*Jeonkuk-daehaksaeng-chongyonhap* or Jeonhakryon], with an affiliated body in charge of organizing protests called the Struggle Committee for National Reunification, Democratization and People's Liberation [*Minjok-tongil-minjoo-jaengchwiminjung-haebang-toojaeng-wiwonhoe*, or Sammintoo]."¹³⁹ A month later, on May 23, seventy-three students affiliated with Samnintoo "stormed into the U.S. Information Service facility in Seoul" in protest, demanding the U.S. administration's "official apology for its support of the Gwangju massacre."¹⁴⁰ The seventy-two-hour-sit-in demonstration that occupied the US Information Service facility ended with arrest of student leaders who were charged with violating the National Security Law. This arrest marked the beginning of the Chun's regime's inhumane suppression of dissidents, specifically college students, in the following years.

Following the lead of Mincheongryon, labor unions joined the surge of allied struggles. In response to the arrest of three union leaders at Daewoo Apparel "on charges of illegal protests over wages" from June 24 to June 28, 1985, workers at the company and unionists at other

¹³⁷ Lee, *The History of the Democratization Movement in Korea*, 117.

¹³⁸ Lee, 120–21.

¹³⁹ Lee, 121.

¹⁴⁰ Lee, 117.

companies, including “Hyosung Trading, Garibong Electronics, and Sunil Textiles” mobilized “the first solidarity strikes since 1950.”¹⁴¹ Student organizations, religious circles, and civic organizations supported a series of solidarity strikes.¹⁴² Because of their participation in the solidarity strikes, many workers were fired and arrested, but the remainder of the allied workers were politically awakened by what had occurred and on August 25, 1985 finally formed what they claimed to be “the first working-class mass political organization”—the Federation of Seoul Labor Unions (*Seoul-nondong-woondong-yonhap*, or Seonoryon).¹⁴³

As Mincheongryon played a leading role in the surge of allied struggles, the Chun regime committed brutal state violence—specifically torture—against the leaders of Mincheongryon in order to suppress nationwide political resistance. In September 1985, key leaders of Mincheongryon, including Kim Geun-tae, the chairman of Mincheongryon, were arrested on “charges of violating the National Security Law” and cruelly tortured during “interrogation at the anti-Communist investigation bureau” in Namyoung-dong.¹⁴⁴ As discussed in chapter 2, “Namyoung-dong” was a euphemism for the place of torture operated by the anti-communist section of the National Police. In Namyoung-dong, or what Kim Geun-tae describes as “the human slaughterhouse,” Kim suffered ten days of torture involving waterboarding, electric shocks, and sexual harassment.¹⁴⁵ In his memoir *Namyoung-dong*, he describes his experience of torture as “the most vicious destruction itself”: specifically, when electricity ran through his body from his feet to his head, he felt like that “each part of his body was dissected” but only his scream like “the last breath of the slaughtered pig” managed to hold together the slaughtered

¹⁴¹ Lee, 123.

¹⁴² Lee, 123.

¹⁴³ Lee, 124.

¹⁴⁴ Lee, 117.

¹⁴⁵ Kim, *Namyoung-dong*, 37.

body parts.¹⁴⁶ During their interrogation, the arrested members of Mincheongryon were completely isolated in order to prevent any possibility of disclosing the torture to their family members. However, the wives of the arrested had engaged in democratic movements (student movement and/or labor movement) as active members of Mincheonryon. They were aware of the prosecution procedures for the charge of violating the National Security Law: after twenty days of interrogation, an arrested person is usually transferred to the Supreme Prosecutors' Office before heading to prison. They therefore sneaked into the fourth and fifth floors of the building where the anti-Communist investigation bureau was located and waited for at least a glimpse of their husbands.¹⁴⁷ On September 26, 1985, just as they had anticipated, they finally saw their husbands. Kim Geun-tae described this encounter as a "miracle": his voice trembling, he disclosed his experience of torture to his wife Lin Jae-geun and showed her the torture marks on his heels and elbows.¹⁴⁸

Coincidentally, September 26 was a Thursday, and the wives of the arrested Mincheonryon members rushed the Christian Building and intervened in the Thursday Prayer Meeting co-hosted by the National Council of Churches in Korea's Human Rights Mission Committee and Yangkahyup.¹⁴⁹ While Rev. Ahn Kang-soo, one of leading religious leaders in the labor movement, was delivering a sermon, Lin Jae-geun went forward to the pulpit, took the microphone from Ahn, and desperately disclosed her eyewitness account of the torture being committed in Namyoung-dong.¹⁵⁰ Attending this prayer meeting were also members of

¹⁴⁶ Kim, 65–66.

¹⁴⁷ Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 245.

¹⁴⁸ Kim, *Namyoung-dong*, 111.

¹⁴⁹ Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 246; given the Mincheonryon's allied democratic movements with other organizations, specifically religious bodies such as National Council of Churches in Korea and the Catholic Priests' Association for Justice, the wives of the arrested Mincheonryon members often participated in the Thursday Prayer Meeting hosted by both NCCCK's Human Rights Mission Committee and Yangkahuyup in the 1980s.

¹⁵⁰ Kim and Lee, 246.

Mincheonryon, so after this public disclosure the wives and the members of Mincheoryon wrote a public statement overnight and the very next night initiated a sit-in demonstration in the Christian Building on September 27, 1985.¹⁵¹ This series of spontaneous events established the foundation for mobilizing and further strengthening the distinctive form of democratic movement, family movement that both Kukahyup and Yangakayup had initiated and practiced since the mid-1970s.

While the wives of the arrested Mincheonryon members engaged in political activities urging the immediate release of their husbands, Moon Kook-ju, a coordinator of the Peace and Justice Committee of the Catholic Church in Korea who supported family members of the arrested students and workers who had been charged with violating the National Security Law, suggested that they consolidate all the “family” organizations for democracy.¹⁵² At that time, there were several political organizations established by the families of the arrested students and workers other than Yangkahyup. The parents, predominantly the mothers, of the students arrested at the sit-in-demonstration at the US Information Service facility played a leading role in forming a political organization, the Association of the Parents of the Arrested Students (*Kusok-haksaeng-hakboomo-hyupeuihoe*, or Kuhakhyup), which officially launched on July 10, 1985.¹⁵³ While Yangkahyup consisted of the families of long-term conscientious prisoners who had been imprisoned from the mid-1970s on, those who belonged to Kuhakhyup were families of the students who had participated in the student movement that surged in 1985 and had been arrested as a consequence. Kuhakhyup engaged in *okbaraji* for their sons and daughters in prison and at the same time worked for “the complete achievement of democratization in all spheres of

¹⁵¹ Kim and Lee, 246.

¹⁵² Kim and Lee, 257.

¹⁵³ Unless otherwise noted, all translation of this source are my own; Association of Families for Human Rights, *Minjuhwaewi-kilmookae-sun-eomony* [Mothers Standing at the Crossroads to Democratization] (Seoul: Minjungsa, 1989), 18.

society” in order to break “the evil cycle of scapegoating the students.”¹⁵⁴ In addition, although the families of the arrested workers who mobilized the solidarity strikes did not form a formal organization, they also became involved in democratic movements demanding the immediate release of the arrested workers. Specifically, some wives of the arrested workers, who had actively participated in the labor movement with their husbands, took on the leadership role in their families, and Lee So-sun, mother of Jeon Tae-il, spiritually supported the families as “the mother of all workers.”¹⁵⁵

In response to the blooming mood of allied struggles for democracy in 1985, the wives of the arrested Mincheonryon members, informed by Moon Kook-ju’s suggestion, took the initiative to consolidate all four different “family” groups. They first discussed the idea with Yangkahyup, whose members had continued and developed Kukahyup’s distinctive form of democratic movement from the 1970s, and they both agreed to form a new “family” organization.¹⁵⁶ Then, the families of Kuhakhyup and the families of the arrested workers in Seonoryon joined this initiative.¹⁵⁷ Finally, on December 12, 1985, all four individual family groups became united as the Association of the Family Movement for Practicing Democratization (*Minjuhwa-silchoen-kajokwoondong-hyupeuihoe*, or Minkahyup). The first official statement on the establishment of Minkahyup begins with the following declaration:

The Association of the Family Movement for Practicing Democratization [*Minjuhwa-silchoen-kajokwoondong-hyupeuihoe*] gathers here to share the suffering of everyone [under the Chun regime’s oppression] and join the front of democratization by consolidating the powers of the families of the arrested exercised separately in different spheres.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁴ Association of Families for Human Rights, 16.

¹⁵⁵ Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 256.

¹⁵⁶ Kim and Lee, 256.

¹⁵⁷ Kim and Lee, 256.

¹⁵⁸ Association of Families for Human Rights, *Minjuhwaui-kilmookae-sun-eomony*, 44.

As a commitment to harmonious relationships among the four different family groups, a committee of co-chairs was constituted of representatives of each family group, including Cho Manjo (mother-in-law of Lee Chul as the representative of Yangkahyup), Lee So-sun (mother of Jeon Tae-il as the representative of Seonoryon), and Kim Choon-ok (mother of Kim Min-seok as the representative of Kuhakhyup).¹⁵⁹ Under the leadership and service of Lin Jae-geun, who was appointed secretary, the wives of the arrested Mincheonryon members, who were younger than the mothers of Minkahyup and had more administrative skills and experiences in mobilizing democratic movements, took a more active role in supporting the committee and taking care of the details of operating the organization.¹⁶⁰ The united families publicly expressed their firm resolution to stand together for democratization and to take the Chun regime down by intentionally declaring the establishment of Minkahyup on December 12, the same date as when Chun Doo-hwan and his military colleague mounted a military coup.¹⁶¹

Minkahyup systematically developed the nascent idea of a “family movement,” which had been practiced by both Kukahyup and Yangkahyup until 1985. As its name clearly conveys, it defined its distinctive form of democratic movement as a *family movement (kajok-woondong)*. According to the first official statement on its establishment, Minkahyup said it was formed in order to uphold the legacies, “the practical powers,” of “the family movements” practiced by the families of the conscientious prisoners and those of the arrested students and workers.¹⁶² Based on the legacies of the past family movements, Minkahyup declared its core mission to be: practicing a “developed family movement” that “overcomes [the Chun regime’s] mischief-

¹⁵⁹ It is important to note that the wives of the arrested Mincheonryon members were not included in the committee of co-chairs. This decision was a sign of their respect for the old mothers, following the Korean custom of respecting one’s elders.

¹⁶⁰ Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 261.

¹⁶¹ Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 262.

¹⁶² Association of Families for Human Rights, *Minjuhwaewi-kilmookae-sun-eomony*, 44.

making strategies for causing divisions among the family groups” and “stand[ing] at the forefront in the journey toward democratization.” In short, they envisaged themselves going far beyond working only for the release of individual prisoners.¹⁶³

Under this commitment, Minkahyup further consolidated the power of the fused dual identities of its female members: a caretaker as a mother and/or wife in the domestic sphere and a democratic fighter and human rights activist in the public sphere. Specifically, its emblem symbolically represents this collective identity of its members (See Appendix B). The symbol of the “sun embracing the house” was created by a Minkahyup member, specifically a wife of an arrested Mincheonryon member, in her correspondence with her imprisoned husband (as part of her *okbaraji* for him). At the end of the letter to her husband, she drew a little symbol of the “sun within the house,” right next to her name as representing her status (or title) of “wife”: the Korean term *a-nae* can mean “sun within the house” [*zip-aneui-hae*] which brightens the household by engaging in all the domestic work [*salim*] such as cooking, cleaning, and educating the children.¹⁶⁴ Then, in his letter to his wife, the husband drew another symbol of the “sun embracing the house” and wrote back: “This is what you are doing now!” She showed this symbol to Lin Jae-geun, and Lin decided this symbol would become the official logo of Minkahyup.¹⁶⁵ This logo symbolizes the seamless fusion of the dual identities of a woman who is a caretaker in the domestic sphere and a political activist in the public sphere. At the same time, it shows Minkahyup’s intentional strategy of extending the power embedded in the cultural identity, norms, and even practices as a wife and/or mother in Korean society—formerly

¹⁶³ Association of Families for Human Rights, 44.

¹⁶⁴ *Salim* is the most important concept in this dissertation, and will be discussed in detail in chapter 4.

¹⁶⁵ This story is based on my interview with Kim Seol-ju, one of the key leaders of Minkahyup, a close friend of the woman who first drew the symbol.

exercised within the house—to the public sphere—now exercised beyond the house.¹⁶⁶ The members of Minkahyup deliberately utilized their own power cultivated in their role as the sun within the house for mobilizing a distinctive form of democratic movement—the family movement, as the light of the sun embracing the house and driving out the darkness in Korean society.

As Minkahyup's official logo was created and adopted as part of *okbaraji*, Minkahyup was committed to providing all the necessary *okbaraji* for the conscientious prisoners, just as both Kukahyup and Yangkahyup had provided. Thanks to the excellent administrative skills of the wives of the arrested Mincheonryon members, the group developed a system for how to teach *okbaraji* to new members and how to provide *okbaraji* for the conscientious prisoners. First, it created an A to Z action manual of *okbaraji* and distributed this to its members, so that they could systematically follow the detailed instructions in providing *okbaraji* for their imprisoned family members.¹⁶⁷ Second, it played a role as the central control tower for *okbaraji*. Before establishing Minkahyup, human rights organizations had had to donate the necessary items for *okbaraji* (blankets, socks, books, etc.) to each family organization separately.¹⁶⁸ However, after establishing Minkahyup, the human rights organizations simply donated all the items to Minkahyup, and it distributed them appropriately depending on the needs of its members. As discussed above, given the nearly complete isolation within the prison cell, the prisoners, specifically long-term conscientious prisoners, craved intellectual stimuli—specifically books—in order to sustain their critical thinking and also their commitment to democratization. In order to meet this important need, Minkahyup created the “Minkahyup Library,” bought many books that were allowed to be circulated in prison at that time, and lent them to its members at the

¹⁶⁶ Seol-ju Kim, interviewed by author, Yangpyung, Korea, December 5, 2017.

¹⁶⁷ Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 263.

¹⁶⁸ Association of Families for Human Rights, *Minjuhwaewi-kilmookae-sun-eomony*, 264.

lowest possible charge (less than 10 cents per a book).¹⁶⁹ In these ways, Minkahyup coordinated and provided more systematized and comprehensive *okbaraji* for the conscientious prisoners.

Minkahyup upheld the legacy of Yangkahyup's *jaepan pumashi* as an extension of *okbaraji*. Minkahyup comprehensively combined all the information on court trials of the conscientious prisoners and systematically coordinated its members' *jaepan pumashi*. In particular, members of Minkahyup paid special attention to the prisoners whose parents lived in remote rural areas or had already passed away (and so were unable to visit or do *okbaraji* for them) and did *pumashi* for their court trials. In the courtroom, the convicted prisoners often felt a deep sense of isolation, fear, and uncertainty. In this situation, the presence of their family members, specifically a group of "mothers," was a significant resource of emotional and spiritual support for the convicted prisoners, which greatly encouraged them to continue to follow their conscience (*yangshim*) and speak what they firmly believed.¹⁷⁰ In other words, Minkahyup members' *jaepan pumashi* was a communal way of *okbaraji* for the stressed conscientious prisoners in the courtroom.

At the same time, this communal trial-watching practice internally affected the process of developing and refining Minkahyup members' collective identity and critical consciousness. First, by communally exchanging *pumashi* for one another over and over, Minkahyup members strengthened their emotional intimacy with one another, specifically a feeling of *jeong*, a Korean emotional term for one's "attachment to somebody" in interpersonal relationships, "the pattern of affect that is associated with" *pumashi*.¹⁷¹ With this deep sense of *jeong* for one another, they

¹⁶⁹ Association of Families for Human Rights, 264.

¹⁷⁰ Association of Families for Human Rights, 266.

¹⁷¹ Unless otherwise noted, all translation of this source are my own; Minkahyup, *O, eomony, dangshineui-noonmuleun* [O, Mother, Your Tears: Essays of the Families of the Martyrs, Long-Term Prisoners, Arrested Students and Workers, and Teachers] (Seoul, Korea: Dongnyuk, 1987), 11; for the definition of *jeong*, see Kim, "P'UMASSI," 54.

were able to develop and strengthen their collective identity as “the strong mothers” who shared suffering, sorrow, anger, tears, and laughter in the journey toward democratization.¹⁷²

Second, the repeated practices of *jaepan pumshi* contributed to developing a critical consciousness among Minkahyup members, specifically in many “ordinary” mothers who had not engaged in any political activity at all prior to joining Minkahyup. Most mothers of Minkahyup had suffered from the lack of opportunities to receive proper higher education to cultivate critical thinking and had been ill-informed regarding political resistance and social movements, given state-controlled media. Lee Joong-ju, mother of Lee Ki-jeong who was a Seoul National University student arrested with the charge of violating the National Security Law in 1985, was one of these ordinary mothers. Misinformed by the media that the Chun regime manipulated, she had understood the student movement—the so-called “demo”—to have been instigated by “Reds” (or Communists) or organized by “bad” students who neglected their duty of studying.¹⁷³ When she learned of her son’s imprisonment, she felt a deep sense of *shame* for both her son and herself: she thought of her son as “a sinner [*joein*]” who had become “a traitor to the country” and herself as “the mother of a sinner [*joein-eomma*]” who had educated her son wrongly.¹⁷⁴ Even when she visited her son in prison, she asked the prison guards to “beat him so that he would admit to and repent of his wrongdoing.”¹⁷⁵

However, the more she engaged in *jaepan pumashi* with her fellow mothers, the more she realized there was “something wrong about” the mass incarceration of young students and workers.¹⁷⁶ For Mother Lee and other fellow members of Minkahyup, the courtroom served as a “classroom for the mothers” where they obtained correct information on the current political

¹⁷² Minkahyup, *O, eomony, dangshineui-noonmuleun*, 11–12.

¹⁷³ Minkahyup, 53.

¹⁷⁴ Minkahyup, 54, 58.

¹⁷⁵ Minkahyup, 59.

¹⁷⁶ Minkahyup, 59.

situations and their family members' imprisonment. In this "classroom," they developed a critical consciousness to challenge the normalized political discourse that falsely and unjustly framed political dissidents as "Reds," "Communists," and "sinners."¹⁷⁷ After developing a critical consciousness, Mother Lee came to believe that "the student movement is the right critique of this generation and this nation" and committed herself in her daily prayer to be "God's agent in this generation" to "open the eyes of those who are blinded by the [evil] power of this generation."¹⁷⁸

While practicing more systematized *okbaraji* and *jaepan pumashi*, at the same time Minkahyup practiced direct political resistance and democratic movement with its dedicated commitment to affirming and restoring human dignity and human rights of all persons, including of the conscientious prisoners. Through their *okbaraji*, specifically their prison visits, and *jaepan pumashi*, Minkahyup members discovered that in the spring of 1986, prison guards had perpetrated a series of violent attacks on the conscientious prisoners and had used "purifying" education programs [*Soonhwa-kyoyuk*] in order to force "the political conversion" of the prisoners.¹⁷⁹ Minkahyup thoroughly investigated these incidents of human rights violations. Then, on April 11, 1986, it made a public statement entitled, "Is the Prison an Authorized Site for Political Retaliation?" as a way of disclosing a list of human rights violations, including a group lynching by prison guards, committed in prisons throughout the country. In addition, Minkahyup pointed out the fallacy of the Chun regime's "purifying" education programs that aimed to convert the conscientious prisoners politically for the alleged construction of a "just society." Minkahyup criticized this propaganda campaign as "violent fascist brainwashing

¹⁷⁷ Minkahyup, 10–11.

¹⁷⁸ Minkahyup, 61, 69.

¹⁷⁹ Association of Families for Human Rights, *Minjuhwaewi-kilmookae-sun-eomony*, 56.

education” which viciously suffocates “minjung’s conscience.”¹⁸⁰ Besides these public statements, Minkahyup members mobilized a series of sit-in-demonstrations in front of the prisons where the cruel human right violations were being committed. For example, the mothers of the arrested students who were beaten by guards in the Seoul Jail boldly organized the sit-in-protest within the jail in front of the visitation room and shouted slogans such as “Release the Arrested Students!” and “Immediately Stop the Violence!”¹⁸¹ Minkahyup also occupied the NDP headquarters and organized an overnight sit-in-demonstration to push the NDP to engage in political activities for the complete removal of the purifying education programs and the constitution of the truth committee on the violence within the prisons.¹⁸²

For Minkahyup, the spring of 1986 was a tragic season. On April 28, 1986, Kim Se-jin and Lee Jae-ho, students of the Seoul National University (henceforth, SNU), immolated their bodies in protest against the Chun regime’s repressive strategy, its forceful conscription of student protesters into the frontlines, and its notorious “Green Campaign.”¹⁸³ About a month later, on May 20, Lee Dong-soo, another student of the SNU, also immolated his body shouting, “Drive Away the Violent Police!” and “Down with the Chun Regime” and jumped from the fourth floor of the Student Center.¹⁸⁴ Next day, Park Hye-jeong, a student of the SNU who witnessed Lee’s suicide protest with his burning body falling from the building, threw herself into Han River, which testified to her deep sense of shame and guilt in her lack of courage and action for democratization.¹⁸⁵ These consecutive suicide protests of the students shocked the mothers of Minkahyup and broke their hearts. While they mourned together for these tragic

¹⁸⁰ Association of Families for Human Rights, 56.

¹⁸¹ Association of Families for Human Rights, 51–53, 56.

¹⁸² Association of Families for Human Rights, 62.

¹⁸³ Association of Families for Human Rights, 76–77.

¹⁸⁴ Association of Families for Human Rights, 77.

¹⁸⁵ Hyung-min Kim, “*Ah, Saramdeuriyeo Tteonami Areumdaun Saramdeuriyeo*” [Ah, People, Beautiful People Who Left Us], *Sisain*, July 6, 2019, <https://www.sisain.co.kr/?mod=news&act=articleView&idxno=2951> (accessed July 11, 2019)

deaths, they critically pointed out the Chun regime's responsibility for forcing the students into such tragic deaths and challenged its lack of attention to and sympathy around the deaths of young students. Right after the death of Kim Se-jin, on May 14, Minkahyup sent an official appeal to the Deputy Prime Minister of Ministry of Culture and Education. In this appeal, as "ordinary housewives" in Korean society, Minkahyup members affirmed the dignity of the suicide protesters by saying that their lives were "part of our lives."¹⁸⁶ They rebuked the government officials and political leaders of the ruling party for their complete lack of expression of sympathy and mourning on the deaths of the young students: "Are this nation's officials and politicians cold-blooded animals who does not have any tears for the death of our people?"¹⁸⁷ Also, they criticized the selective "tears and sorrow" of Rho Tae-woo, the chief leader of the ruling Democratic Justice Party, who expressed sorrow only for the wounded riot policeman and declared that the students who were directly hit and wounded by tear gas canisters are also "our children" who deserve our tears and mourning.¹⁸⁸

In addition to challenging the Chun regime, Minkahyup gave moral lessons to student protesters and attempted to affirm the dignity of their own lives. Three days after Lee Dong-soo's suicide protest at the Student Center of the SNU, the mothers of Minkahyup stood on the ground where Lee's flaming body had fallen, and Kim Choon-ok, a co-chair of Minkahyup, gave a moving speech to student protesters:

Now this mother's heart is broken and filled with pain. So I came here again. Not just to come, but I came here to scold you. I came here to say that your life is not yours. Your life is dignified. You have only one life, and yours is for this generation and this nation. No one can take away this life. You have the right to be loved and the duty to preserve your life. Do not forsake these rights and this duty. Here this mother came to scold you but at the same time to scold our older generation.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁶ Association of Families for Human Rights, 72.

¹⁸⁷ Association of Families for Human Rights, 72.

¹⁸⁸ Association of Families for Human Rights, 72–73.

¹⁸⁹ Association of Families for Human Rights, 79.

On the one hand, Kim acknowledged the responsibility of the older generation, specifically its members who are in power, for the tragic death of student protesters. On the other hand, she as a *mother* gave her *children* a moral lesson to enlighten them on their duty to preserve their dignified lives.

Kim gave another moral lesson to her children regarding their use of violence as tactics of political resistance:

Breaking windows and throwing Molotov cocktails are not enough. They are violence. Self-immolation is also violence. Surely, you have your own reasons. [You might claim that] Molotov cocktails at least protect our space of discourse, and it is just violence since it resists the current regime's violence. However, that generation is gone. Violence is not the oppressor's monopoly. So the oppressed do not fear violence. You should resist and struggle. You should live out [your commitment to justice]. But, you should not use violence. Even if the goal is noble but you use violence in the process of achieving the goal, the goal itself will be lapsed and polluted. In particular, the oppressor tries to manipulate us to use violence for their political cause. Why do we need to be manipulated? Let us never use violence.¹⁹⁰

She identified violence with tactics of the oppressed, specifically the Chun regime. As she pointed out, it is a repressive strategy to instigate violence from the protesters, to use an incident of violence as political justification for exercising further state violence to oppress the protestors. She was aware of this unscrupulous strategy and taught the student protesters to protect themselves from this form of political manipulation.

From the beginning, Minkahyup paid special attention to one of the most notorious human rights violations committed by the Chun regime—torture—and fought against this vicious form of dehumanization. Soon after its official establishment, Minkahyup became “the rescue center” for the arrested and their families. At that time when a protester was arrested, he/she just told his/her friend or family, “Go to Minkahyup.”¹⁹¹ The arrested protesters were

¹⁹⁰ Association of Families for Human Rights, 82.

¹⁹¹ Shin and Sohn, *6wol Hangaengeul Kirokhada*, 160.

often illegally confined in a secret place by the Chun regime's coercive apparatuses, such as by the anti-communist section of the National Police and the National Security Council (the successor of the Park regime's KCIA), and cruelly tortured during interrogation in order to fabricate the charge of violating the National Security Law.¹⁹² Minkahyup members urgently and persistently searched out these secret and illegal torture rooms and mobilized sit-in-protests in front of the detected torture rooms.¹⁹³ These protests helped the arrested enormously; the simple presence of their mothers or wives, although they could not see or touch them, was a great source of courage and encouragement to them in their otherwise complete isolation and solitude.¹⁹⁴ More importantly, the presence of the family members and their protest put formidable pressure on the torturers and the officials, which in turn contributed to preserving the lives of the arrested. Minkahyup's commitment to fighting against torture was well captured in their public statement on the first anniversary of its establishment. In this statement entitled "Torture and Violence Should Be Removed in this Nation," Minkahyup strongly urged the Chun regime to "immediately shut down the human slaughter houses [torture rooms] in Namyoung-dong, Okindong, Jangan-dong, and Singil-dong."¹⁹⁵ At the same time, Minkahyup demanded that the public "aim the arrow of anger at the brutality of this state, the alleged 'democratic state,'" and would be part of "peaceful democratization" for "the complete removal of torture in this world."¹⁹⁶

While Minkahyup faithfully engaged its anti-torture movements, the Chun regime took an innocent life of a young student by cruel torture: as discussed in the previous chapter, Park Jong-cheol, a SNU student, was tortured with waterboarding and electric shocks and was subsequently killed during the interrogation in "the human slaughterhouse" in Namyoung-dong

¹⁹² Shin and Sohn, 161.

¹⁹³ Shin and Sohn, 162.

¹⁹⁴ Shin and Sohn, 162.

¹⁹⁵ Association of Families for Human Rights, *Minjuhwaewi-kilmookae-sun-eomony*, 120.

¹⁹⁶ Association of Families for Human Rights, 121.

on January 14, 1987. Minkahyup members lamented his unjust death together and mobilized the first public protest two days after hearing about Park's death, meeting up in front of the torture room in Namyoung-dong.¹⁹⁷ In protest against the "absurd" press conference at which the National Police Chief claimed Park had died of a sudden heart attack, on January 22 Minkahyup collaborated with other women's organization such as the Association of Women in Churches of Korea and mobilized a commemoration rally in the streets of Namyoung-dong.¹⁹⁸ At this commemoration rally, Minkahyup's now well-known symbol, a white hemp headscarf, was first introduced.¹⁹⁹ The white hemp headscarf conveyed a symbolic meaning, *mothers' lamentation and mourning for the deceased sons and daughters*. White hemp clothing has been worn by family members of the deceased as "mourning dress" during and after the funeral.²⁰⁰ Also, ordinary mothers have commonly worn such a headscarf while they worked on a farm and/or at home.

Starting from this symbolic protest, Minkahyup together with other pro-democracy civic and religious organizations jointly mobilized a series of commemorations of Park's death and protests for the eradication of torture. In this process, the Association of the Families of Bereaved (*Minjuhwa-woondong-yukajok-hyupeuihoe*, Yukahyup) founded on August 12, 1986 as "a splinter group" of Minkahyup, held a dedicated service for the family members of Park Jong-cheol and took a leading role with Minkahyup.²⁰¹ Under the faithful leadership of Lee So-sun, mother of Jeon Tae-il, "the mother of all workers," the families of the political martyrs (e.g.,

¹⁹⁷ Chul Baek, "Minkahyup, Minjuhwa silcheoneun gyesokdoenda" [Minkahyup, Democratic Practice Is Continued], Weekly Kyunghyang, February 6, 2018, <http://weekly.khan.co.kr/khnm.html?mode=view&artid=201801301039331&code=115> (accessed July 11, 2019).

¹⁹⁸ Unless otherwise noted, all translation of this source are my own; Minkahyup, "Sosik" [News], *Minjukajok* 5 (1987): 31.

¹⁹⁹ Minkahyup, 31.

²⁰⁰ Min-Sun Hwang, "Contemporary Hemp Weaving in Korea," *Textile Society of America Symposium Proceedings* 347 (2006): 396.

²⁰¹ Shin, *Protest Politics*, 92.

suicide protesters) and victims (e.g., activists who were disappeared or killed) on the journey toward democracy founded Yukahyup in order to pursue their own primary goals to (1) “investigate the cause of the death or disappearance,” (2) “change the record of” their family members “from being listed as a criminal to being counted as a patriot for democracy in Korea,” and (3) “receive compensation” for their family member’s death or disappearance.²⁰² Although Yukahyup had different immediate goals given its own situation, in the midst of the Chun regime’s brutal state violence, Yukahyup and Minkahyup shared the common goal of restoring human dignity and human rights of all persons and of realizing democracy in Korea.

With these shared goals, Minkahyup and Yukahyup actively supported several commemoration services and anti-torture protests organized by Catholic and Protestant organizations for social justice and human rights. On January 26, the Justice and Peace Committee of the Catholic Church in Korea hosted a commemoration mass for Park Jong-cheol in Myeongdong Cathedral, and members of Minkahyup and Yukahyup wearing the white hemp headscarves gathered there to mourn Park whose dignity had been completely denied by torture.²⁰³ After the mass, holding wooden crosses and wearing a portrait of Park on their chests, they stood on the frontlines of the silent protest against “the military regime committing murderous torture” and “killing Jong-cheol twice” (by fabricating and covering up this case) in front of the cathedral.²⁰⁴

From the beginning, Minkahyup strongly encouraged its members, even non-Christian members, to participate in the Thursday Prayer Meetings hosted by the Human Rights Committee of the National Council of Churches in Korea, and emphasized that this prayer

²⁰² Shin, 92.

²⁰³ Minkahyup, 32; regarding wearing the white hemp headscarf in the photo of a Minkahyup member. See Association of Families for Human Rights, *Minjuhwaewi-kilmookae-sun-eomony*, 135.

²⁰⁴ Minkahyup, 32.

meeting was open to “everyone who is under political oppression and Christians as well.”²⁰⁵

Throughout the 1980s, the Thursday Prayer Meetings served as the open space where the families of the arrested students and workers and the families of the political martyrs and victims expressed and exchanged their authentic emotions, such as lament, anger, frustration, and even pride and joy. This contributed to strengthening their collective identity and commitment to restoring human dignity and democracy in Korean society. For example, in the Thursday Prayer Meeting on February 22, Kim Choon-ok, a co-chair of Minkahyup, delivered her letter to Park Jong-cheol, shed tears with the fellow mothers, and declared the mothers’ commitment to “let [Park Jong-cheol] live in our hearts and our history forever to guide us in the journey to the bright dawn.”²⁰⁶

Throughout the 1980s, the Chun regime was notorious not only for its torture but for its excessive and cruel use of tear gas for the purpose of suppressing political resistance. As a result, the life of another innocent young student was brutally taken: the riot police fired a tear gas canister into the crowd and directly hit Yonsei University student Lee Han-yeol’s head in the street rally on June 9, 1987. Journalist Chung Tae-won vividly photographed the wounded Han-yeol bleeding from his head and nose, which provoked enormous public anger and galvanized the public into participating in subsequent massive mass protests, including the June Uprising that began on June 10.²⁰⁷

As part of the June Uprising, Minkahyup and Yukahyup took a leading role in mobilizing the “Day for the Eradication of Tear Gas” on June 18. On that day, during the street march in Seoul, the mothers of Minkahyup and Yukahyup showed another example of their “maximal

²⁰⁵ Minkahyup, “*Sosik*” [News], *Minju-kajok* 2 (1986): 18.

²⁰⁶ Association of Families for Human Rights, *Minjuhwaewi-kilmookae-sun-eomony*, 136.

²⁰⁷ You may find the copy of this photo via the following web link:
<https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20170606059700004>

utilization of Korean cultural norms and values placed on women as mothers and wives.”²⁰⁸

Wearing on their chests a banner on which was written “Please Don’t Fire Tear Gas” and holding bunches of carnations in their hands, the mothers peacefully walked toward the lines of riot policemen confronting the lines of protesters. The mothers approached the riot policemen who were of the same ages as their sons and daughters and put a carnation on each one’s chest.²⁰⁹ The mothers were well aware of the cultural norm in Korean society that children prepare a carnation as a symbol of their gratitude, respect, and love and put it on the chests of their parents on every May 8, Parents’ Day. They intended to convey publicly a symbolic message of “peace ultimately grounded in political resistance” by enacting the values of gratitude, respect, and love between the *mothers* and their *children*, the riot policemen, in the “carnation” protest.²¹⁰

While a series of nationwide protests clearly expressed Korean citizens’ burning desire for democracy and justice, the Chun regime still did not accept the proposal for constitutional reform. It secured a presidential election by popular vote and even more aggressively suppressed political resistance. In this situation, Minkahyup strongly pushed civic and political leaders of the National Movement Headquarters to Win a Democratic Constitution²¹¹ to mobilize further political resistance, and they agreed to organize mass protests again, beginning with the “National Peace March” on June 26.²¹² On that day, multiple protests throughout the country

²⁰⁸ Shin, *Protest Politics*, 97.

²⁰⁹ You may find the photo of this protest via the following web link:
<http://db.kdemocracy.or.kr/contents/view/137>

²¹⁰ Shin and Sohn, *6wol Hangaengeul Kirokhada*, 164.

²¹¹ It was a joint group of a pro-democracy civic organization and the newly formed opposition party, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), under the leadership of Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, that united in “principle on electoral reform” on May 27, 1987. See Lee, *The History of the Democratization Movement in Korea*, 134–35.

²¹² Seol-ju Kim, interview.

were mobilized, “the largest simultaneous demonstrations in the nation’s history: about “1.5 million people in 33 cities and four counties” peacefully called for democracy and justice.”²¹³

Finally, the Chun regime succumbed to the people’s power: on June 29, Rho Tae-woo, the newly appointed presidential candidate of the ruling DJP, officially announced he would adopt “popular presidential elections, restore political rights to Kim Dae-jung, and *release political prisoners*.”²¹⁴ It was moment of victory for the *minjung*, specifically the families of conscientious prisoners, and the mothers and wives of Minkahyup and Yukahyup.

Despite such advances, the family movements of Minkahyup and Yukahyup did not come to an end at that point. On July 8, the Chun regime finally granted special pardons to the conscientious prisoners. However, eighty six of the approximately three thousand conscientious prisoners were denied these special pardons. The mothers and wives of Minkahyup were indignant at this “selective pardon” and formed a sub-committee called “The Committee for Fighting for the Immediate Release of Unpardoned Prisoners” by making a public statement to urge the Chun regime to “obey the order of people that boldly commend the release of all conscientious prisoners in the name of the people.”²¹⁵ They continued to mobilize protests in order to push the Chun regime to release all conscientious prisoners who were imprisoned, charged with violating the National Security Law.

Meanwhile, Lee Han-yeol, who had been in comma, died on July 5. Several days later, on July 9, over one million people gathered at Yonsei University on the occasion of his funeral.²¹⁶ Korean citizens together mourned the sacrifice of this young student and strengthened their commitment to the complete realization of democracy in Korean society. At the funeral, the

²¹³ Lee, *The History of the Democratization Movement in Korea*, 138–39.

²¹⁴ Emphasis added; Lee, 139.

²¹⁵ Association of Families for Human Rights, *Minjuhwaewi-kilmookae-sun-eomony*, 174–75.

²¹⁶ Lee, *The History of the Democratization Movement in Korea*, 141.

mothers and wives of Yukahyup and Minkahyup again wore white hemp headscarves, accompanied by Lee's family members, specifically his mother Bae Eun-sim, and shed tears together when Rev. Moon Ik-hwan, as his eulogy, cried out the names of the martyrs (*yeolsa*) in the long march for democracy starting with Jeon Tae-il and going all the way to Lee Han-yeol.²¹⁷ They walked at the head of the funeral procession from Yonsei University to City Hall surrounded by thousands of people and together shouted the slogan, "*Han-yeol-yireul-salryonaera* (Bring Han-yeol Back to Life or Resurrect Han-yeol)!"

Minkahyup and Yukahyup faithfully engaged democratic practices through their distinctive family movements throughout the 1980s. Even today the mothers and wives of Minkahyup and Yukahyup still fight for the restoration of the human dignity and human rights of their family members who have been imprisoned, charged with violating the National Security Law, and sacrificed for the sake of either "democracy" or "national security." Ironically, their shared dream is the *dissolution* of their organizations; they long for the day when there are no more conscientious prisoners and no more political martyrs and victims.

IV. Conclusion

Over the course of this chapter, I uncovered the previously unheard stories of the mothers and wives of the political victims and traced the historical evolution of their distinctive form of political resistance and democratic movement, the family movements. Even though Kukahuyp explicitly named their democratic movement a family movement, the core concept of this term—the seamless fusion of the dual identities of a caretaker of the family and a political/moral agent for restoring democracy and human dignity—was already embedded and actualized in their practices of political resistance. Yangkahyup further developed this distinctive family movement

²¹⁷ Shin and Sohn, *6wol Hangjaengeul Kirokhada*, 166–67.

by adding the explicit commitment to the restoration of human dignity and human rights as its ultimate mission: democratization was regarded as the necessary means to achieve this final goal. Minkahyup (and Yangkahyup as its splinter group) completed the concept of the family movement—symbolized in their emblem (the sun embracing the house)—and systematized its comprehensive practices of political resistance.

In the course of practicing the family movements, the four political organizations of the mother and wives together expanded the boundary of the family beyond kinship relations and tried to include those who had suffered from the Park and Chun regimes' oppression within that expanded boundary.²¹⁸ In other words, like the sun, they aimed to embrace all suffering citizens as *one family* and call them out of the dark shadow of totalitarian sickness. They also converged on their creative re-appropriation of cultural and religious resources, specifically in relation to their cultural status as a mother and/or wife in Korean society, for the sake of their political resistance. For example, Kukahyup intentionally wore *hanbok*, which traditionally presents the status of mother, as a symbol of their non-violent protest against violence. Also, both Yangkahyup and Minkahyup reappropriated the tradition of *pumashi* and invented the practice of *japaen pumashi* (collective watching over court trials) to support the convicted family members with their collective presence and to watch over human rights violations in the courtroom.

Nevertheless, it is important to note one aspect that clearly marks differences between the family movements in the 1970s and those in the 1980s. On the one hand, the family movements practiced by Kukahyup and Yangkahyup were significantly protected *within* the religious boundary, specifically by Christian institutions such as the National Council of Churches in

²¹⁸ In particular, the political organizations in the 1970s (Kukahyup and Yangkahyup) showed some reservations about this radical inclusivity for those who were convicted of violating the National Security Law. This is partially attributed to the strong prevalence of anti-communism ideology that the Park regime disseminated in the 1970s.

Korea and the Catholic Priests' Association for Justice. On the other hand, Minkahyup and Yangkahyup more autonomously practiced their family movements *beyond* the religious boundary, even though the Christian institutions still strongly supported their movements, particularly given that the majority of their members were Christians.

This difference is partially attributed to the levels of political oppression and the later development of pluralistic forms of political resistance. First, the Park regime's oppression under the Yushin Constitution was more formidable compared to the Chun regime's under its decompression phase that began in 1985. Given the intensified political oppression, Kukahyup and Yangkahyup particularly needed the Christian institutions that had transnational ties with the international societies, such as World Council of Churches and Vatican, to shield them, since the Park regime could not totally suppress those institutions without harming the regime's image internationally.

Second, the burning desire of young college students and workers for democracy culminated in the Gwangju Uprising. After this historic moment, their political resistance and democratic movements were further systematized and evolved in a more pluralistic form so that diverse political organizations in different sectors would fight together in solidarity. This evolution was made possible through the emergence of a group of protest experts, such as Mincheongryon, who received higher education (e.g., graduates from SNU, Yonsei, Korea, or Ewha Universities) and learned professional skills and strategies from their time leading labor union movements. The wives of the imprisoned Mincheongryon members were also part of this expert group, so they applied a more systematized and pluralistic form of political resistance to Minkahyup's family movement. Given this influence, the family movements in the 1980s

became more pluralistic beyond the religious boundary in order to consolidate various family organizations and to reach out comprehensively to other political organizations.

CHAPTER 4

KIDO (PRAYER)

I. Introduction

Throughout Part One, I offered thick descriptions of the sociopolitical contexts of South Korea in the 1970 to '80s and the historical development of the family movements, organized and practiced by the four political organizations of the mothers and wives of the political victims of oppression under the Park and Chun regimes. Specifically, in chapter 2 I provided a descriptive analysis of the Park and Chun regimes' totalitarian ideology, focusing on how this moral discourse functioned as a form of cultural violence that normalized and sustained multiple forms of structural and state violence against citizens. Then, in chapter 3 I offered a historical description of the development of the family movements, highlighting the distinctive natures and practices of these movements as political resistance against the Park and Chun regimes.

This chapter, the first in Part Two of the dissertation, analyzes the thick descriptions developed in Part One in order to address one of the main moral questions raised by those descriptions: How were the mothers and wives, who had forced to remain victims and whose public leadership had been coercively restricted in Korean society, transformed into moral agents who exercised their moral power in the a public sphere? The focal point of this chapter is the process of the moral transformation of the mothers and wives. This chapter does not claim that the mother and wives did not have their own moral agency prior to their direct involvement in political resistance and the democratic movement. Certainly, even though they were marginalized, as members of Korean society they had made certain moral judgments and exercised moral actions based upon their moral judgments. However, in general, they had

exercised their moral agency as the governing authorities and as the traditionally gendered cultural/social norms *prescribed*. For example, informed by the Park and Chun regimes' propaganda, they had made moral judgments against "demo," the negatively connoted vernacular for political resistance. They had also morally educated their children at home in order to fulfill the prescribed duties of the mother and housewife in Korean society.

Nevertheless, as they organized and engaged their own forms of political resistance in the family movements, the mothers and wives of the political victims reconfigured and transformed their moral agency in a radical way. In order to analyze this process of moral transformation, this chapter focuses on a particular practice of the family movements: the Thursday Prayer Meeting (henceforth, TPM). As already explored in chapter 3, this practice was particularly crucial in the 1970s, since it was the only space in which the families of political prisoners and martyrs could gather and openly and publicly share their ordeals and incidents of state violence. More importantly, they shared not just information but their authentic emotions. James P. Sinnott, a Maryknoll Father who served as a missionary in Incheon, South Korea, in the 1970s, regularly participated in the TPM and testified:

Although I recently began to offer Mass prayers in my mother-tongue rather than in Latin, it is still somewhat passive. However, [in the TPM] I felt refreshed in praying with the Protestants who freely offer their own prayers passionately expressing their own emotions. Being fully filled with the passionate participants, we hearkened to the urgent invocation, "God, come to this place now and be with us." It was my great honor to be with these people who emitted spiritual energy that is truthful about authentic emotions of human being...After the prayer meeting, I found myself being fully enlivened with full of life and energy.¹

As he testified, the TPM was always loaded with the participants' authentic emotions. It was the only one place where the families could vent their emotions about their family members'

¹ Unless otherwise noted, all translations of this source are my own; James P. Sinnott, trans. Kim Kun-Ok and Lee Woo-Kyung, *1975 Nyon 4 Wol 9 Il: Hyunjang-jeungun*: [April 9th, 1975: Personal History] (Seoul, Korea: Bitture, 2004): 186–87.

imprisonment in public, emotions that included sorrow, shame, and fear. Jeong Geum-seoung, mother of poet Kim Chi-ha who was imprisoned following the *Mincheonghakryeon* incident, described the TPM as “an oasis in a desert.”² Indeed, this oasis was the watershed in the moral transformation of the mothers and wives, who formerly had been regarded as mere “victims,” into public moral agents who created the first formal political organization of the families of political victims, Kukahyup (the Association of the Families of the Arrested).

Over the past decades, sociologists, specifically social movement theorists, have become interested in the understudied and undervalued aspect of “the role of emotions in [social] movements and politics.”³ Drawing on Durkheim’s theory of social ritual, these theorists have endeavored to study the emotional dynamics within a group and its “moral force” to energize the group members to engage a social movement and to offer shared moral standards of “right and wrong.”⁴ These sociologists’ attention to the role of emotions resonates with some moral philosophers’ and ethicists’ attention to the constructive role of emotions in the moral life, specifically focusing on their epistemic and motivational values in making moral evaluation/judgment and motivating moral action.⁵

Following these existing studies of emotions, this chapter mainly aims to examine the *moral emotions* enacted in the TPM and their contributions to the moral transformation of the families, specifically the ordinary mothers and wives, of political prisoners from “passive victims” into “active moral agents” who passionately fought for restoration of democracy and human rights in Korean society. For this main goal, drawing on Randall Collins’ analysis of

² Geum-seoung Jeong, interview.

³ Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, eds., *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 16.

⁴ Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 28.

⁵ Jesse Prinz, “The Moral Emotions,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, ed. Peter Godie (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 520–22.

emotions in social movements, this chapter analyzes the “emotional transformation,” specifically “the transmutation of the initiating emotion into something else,” in the collective ritual of the TPM as both a resource and indicator of the moral transformation of the mothers and wives.⁶ Based on the collected data from my fieldwork on the emotional status of the participants of the TPM, I found three major types of emotional transformation: (1) from individual sorrow to collective lament, (2) from guilt and shame to anger and pride, and (3) from *han* to joy and hope. Drawing on existing literatures on moral emotions by moral philosophers and Christian ethicists, this chapter examines these processes of emotional transformation and argues for moral values of the transformed emotions—(1) *communal lament*, (2) *moral outrage and pride*, and (3) *transcendental joy*—in the transformation of the mothers and wives’ moral agency.

II. Transforming Individual Sorrow into Communal Lament

As discussed in chapter 3, the Park regime arrested more than one thousand students and citizens on charges of violating the Emergency Decree Number 4 and/or the National Security Law in April of 1974. The so-called *Mincheonghakryeon* Incident, the fabricated case by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (henceforth, KCIA), was indeed a terrible shock for the families of the arrested. When the families, specifically the mothers and wives, heard their sons, daughters, and husbands had been imprisoned, they immediately rushed to the prison. Many of the mothers lived in a rural area and had sent their sons and daughters to Seoul for their college education, so few had human resources, such as relatives or close friends, living in Seoul whom they could ask for help to deal with the ordeal. Some of them had never even visited Seoul before and did not even know how to get to the prison. Except for a few mothers and wives of political dissidents, most of the families had no knowledge of how to approach their family members’

⁶ Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, *Passionate Politics*, 29.

imprisonment. Most of them were “ordinary mothers” who had devoted their lives to nurturing and educating their sons and daughters.

Given these conditions, the mothers and wives of the arrested first reacted individually with enormous sorrow to the terrible shock of their sons’, daughters’, and husbands’ imprisonment. According to my interview with a key leader of Kukahyup, it was very common to see an old woman weeping *alone* while waiting for her son or daughter in the prison visiting room.⁷ This *individual sorrow* was one of the predominant emotions of the mothers and wives of political prisoners before participating in the TPM.

In addition, the Park regime’s repression strategy—its political rhetoric for framing the political prisoners as the so-called “Reds” or “Communists”—exacerbated the families’ sense of being alone in their sorrow. This repression strategy had permeated every level of society, and this normalized the cruel social stigma against the political prisoners who raised dissenting voices against the Park regime. In an interview with one of the wives of the executed members of the People’s Revolutionary Party (henceforth, PRP), I heard a painful story about a fellow widow:

One of my friends experienced a horrible thing. Her four-year old son was inhumanly bullied by young children in her town. They hung a rope around her son’s neck and dragged him around like a dog, shouting, “Your father is a spy.” Then, they tied her son to a tree and pretended to execute him by shooting. When she saw this, her heart completely collapsed. And she was shocked even more when she found that her [adult] neighbors just watched all this and even laughed together.⁸

This story painfully captures the brutal social stigma against the political prisoners and consequently their family members. In this oppressive context, the families of the arrested could not express their sorrow in public and share their suffering and pain with their neighbors. They had to avoid social interactions and deal with their sorrow—a sorrow often amplified by their

⁷ Jong-sook Lee, interview.

⁸ Mee-ja Kang, interviewed by author, Uiwang, Korea, November 14, 2017.

neighbors' condemnation and ostracism fueled by the Park regime's repression strategy—by themselves in isolation.

There is no more appropriate language than *han* to express the individual sorrow of the families of the arrested in the context of multilayered oppression. According to Andrew Sung Park, the Korean cultural concept of *han* refers to “the collapsed pain of the heart due to psychosomatic, interpersonal, social, political, economic, and cultural oppression and repression.”⁹ The complex matrices of political, social, and cultural oppression and alienation produced an inexpressible level of pain in the families. The pain that was amassed in the hearts of the families finally collapsed into *han*, and became engraved on their hearts. The engraved *han* on their hearts very rarely expressed in public. In other words, the *han*-ridden families were deprived of appropriate means to express the deep wounds of their hearts. Moreover, the mothers and wives of the political prisoners were doubly oppressed by a gendered cultural norm in Korean society that constrains women's agency to raise their voices in public. By not being named or expressed, their *han* became mired in their hearts.

However, in the TPM, the predominant emotion of individual sorrow was transmuted into *communal lament* largely expressed in two practices: communal hearing and expression of suffering. First of all, the TPM created and facilitated a liberatory space in which every participant communally transcends the wall of social stigma and actively listens to each participant's stories of pain and suffering. Specifically, for the wives of the imprisoned members of the PRP, the TPM served as an inclusive space where their *han*-ridden stories were truly heard.

Given the prevailing social stigma against the “Reds” or “Communists,” the families of the political prisoners and the Christian leaders who initiated the TPM could not dare to pray for

⁹ Park, *The Wounded Heart of God*, 16.

the imprisoned PRP members who were falsely condemned by the Park regime as hardcore communists. The wives of the PRP members had not been aware of the TPM, but some Christian families of the political prisoners who had met them while they were waiting to visit their husbands in Seodaemoon Prison advised them to seek the help of Rev. George Ogle, a United Methodist missionary who devoted his life to promoting human rights in South Korea.¹⁰ They were able to meet with Ogle and share their painful stories about the fabricated charges and the brutal torture of their husbands. Ogle at first hesitantly said, “I will look into the matter,” but as he testified later, those hesitant words changed his life forever: he became a life-time supporter of these women.¹¹ Ogle was one of the Christian leaders who regularly presided over the TPM. On October 9, 1974, when he was in charge of giving the meditation and leading the prayers, Ogle first broke the silence over the injustice of the Park regime and called the group to take heed of the suffering of the imprisoned PRP members and their families. Taking Matthew 25:31–46 as the text for the meditation in the TPM, he preached:

Christ is often mediated to us through the outcasts or oppressed of society. Thus through the sufferings of our brothers and sisters in prison on political charges we can see something of the suffering of Christ for our society. Those who are symbolizing Christ to us, however, are not only the Christians in prison, but also the non-Christians. There are eight men who have been given the death sentence. The KCIA has provided little evidence against these men. They have probably committed no crime worthy of death. *Their sufferings are not only their own, but are the sufferings of our entire society.* Therefore, we Christians should pray for their lives and their souls.¹²

After breaking the silence on behalf of the wives of the imprisoned PRP members, Ogle urged the participants of the TPM and the families of political prisoners to welcome the wives and invite them to the TPM. He then encouraged one of the wives to join the TPM and give a “five-

¹⁰ Ogle, *How Long, O Lord*, 134.

¹¹ Ogle, 135.

¹² Emphasis added. George E Ogle, *Liberty To The Captives: The Struggle Against Oppression in South Korea* (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1977), 137.

minutes speech” in front of other families of political prisoners.¹³ She was somewhat hesitant because she had not have any public speaking experience; she described herself as a “driver of a pot lid” who has done *salim* (domestic work).¹⁴ Nevertheless, thanks to the immense emotional and spiritual support of Ogle, she managed to speak to the TPM: her *han*-ridden story was heard communally by every participant of the TPM, thus breaking down the wall of social stigma she had felt. Her fellow wives also joined the TPM and shared their stories in public. Fellow TPM participants receive the stories of their children’s terrible suffering with tears. As the forced silence and loneliness of the *han*-ridden wives was broken by the communal hearing, the TPM served as an inclusive space in which all the families of the arrested listened to their stories of *han* together and shared their pain and suffering communally.

In addition to communally hearing the accounts of pain and suffering, the participants of the TPM also communally poured out their raw emotions of sorrow. This communal expression of lament was often enacted through their congregational hymns. As one of the regular participants of the TPM testified, the families of political prisoners did not sing hymns that expressed a “wish to go to Heaven” but sang hymns that “cried out” to God.¹⁵ Their congregational hymns were communal laments that urgently invoked God’s presence and cried out to God to listen to their *han* and resolve it.¹⁶ One of the most beloved hymns through which they expressed their communal lament was *Yeoki-Ososeo* (Come By Here). This hymn is a translated version of the African-American spiritual song *Kumbaya*. Here are the translated words of this hymn:

Come by here my Lord

¹³ Mee-ja Kang, interview.

¹⁴ Mee-ja Kang, interview; a driver of pot lid (a pot lid is like a steering wheel) is a Korean vernacular expression referring to a housewife who is commonly in charge of domestic matters.

¹⁵ Soo-young Yoon, interview.

¹⁶ Soo-young Yoon, interview.

Come by here my Lord
 Come by here my Lord
 O Lord, come by here

Come by here my Lord for the mourners
 Come by here my Lord for the mourners
 Come by here my Lord for the mourners
 O Lord, come by here

Come by here my Lord for the oppressed
 Come by here my Lord for the oppressed
 Come by here my Lord for the oppressed
 O Lord, come by here

The families of political prisoners and other participants sang this hymn over and over in tears and through it expressed their heretofore inexpressible *han* in public. By singing together, they mourned together. By singing together, they communally lamented the brutal oppression inflicted on them by the Park regime. By singing together, they identified themselves with “the mourners” and “the oppressed” and communally cried out for God’s immanent presence with them in the here and now.

Communal lament, the transmuted emotion from individual sorrow, worked as a *moral* emotion to provide the mothers and wives of political prisoners with moral resources (1) to formulate a collective identity as the one family, (2) to enable them to name and express their *han*, which had been formlessly mired in their hearts, and (3) to shape their desire for healing both their wounded hearts and their wounded society. First, as noted above, the TPM facilitated the inclusive space where unspeakable *han*-ridden stories of the families were communally heard. Through sharing their *han*-ridden stories honestly in the TPM, the mothers and wives of political prisoners realized that they were *not alone*. Such knowledge is not only cognitive but also *embodied*. As they bodily embraced one another by holding hands and crying while hearing one another’s stories together, they strengthened their sense of *community*, which defied the

forced isolation and loneliness. In other words, their shared sorrow achieved by the communal hearing of suffering was the bedrock of their embodied collective identity as *one family*. They radically reformulated the boundary of the family: as long as they shared their *han* under the Park regime's vicious oppression, all were welcomed within this one family. This collective identity was *moral* in that it embodied their moral judgment—moral transgression—against the social stigma that established the walls that divided one person from another. For the mothers and wives, communal lament was not merely a practice of venting uncontrolled raw emotion, but a way of expressing moral emotion that gave birth to the moral community that transcended the walls of social stigma and served as the social infrastructure for the development of each individual's moral agency. Subsequently, this moral community evolved into a formal political organization named Kukahyup (the Association of the Families of the Arrested).

Second, communal lament expressed within the moral community empowered the mothers and wives of political prisoners to break the forced silence and name their *han* in public. As examined above, the *han*-ridden families had been deprived of the appropriate means to raise their own voices, and the voices of the mothers and wives had been doubly suppressed by the gendered-cultural constraint on the women's public role. However, as Emmanuel Katongole has argued, for the power of lament to “give voice to the grief of the community,” the mothers and wives had first to find their own voices, which they did in sharing their *han*-ridden stories communally in the TPM.¹⁷ As they authentically verbalized their rarely-expressed stories of amassed suffering in this community, they put their *han* into the form of communal lament. A destructive feature of their *han* had been its *formlessness*. Their suffering had been amassed, then collapsed, and had clung formlessly to their very hearts, and this formless *han* had continuously

¹⁷ Emmanuel Katongole, *Born from Lament: The Theology and Politics of Hope in Africa* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2017), 63.

assailed and uprooted their lives. Christian ethicist Emilie M. Townes developed Walter Brueggemann's idea of "the formfulness" of the lament Psalms to highlight the moral power of communal lament that enables a community to "move to a pain or pains that could be named and then addressed" by "putting words to their suffering."¹⁸ This moral power was particularly effective when the mothers and wives sang *Yeoki-Ososeo* (Come By Here) together. They communally put their formless *han* into the words of lament so that they would not be ashamed to be "the mourners" who acknowledge the fullness of their suffering. More importantly, by identifying themselves with "the oppressed" who urgently cried out to God, they articulated their formless *han* as oppression, as "structures of evil and wickedness," in so doing giving form and a name to the root cause of their amassed suffering.¹⁹

Communal lament does not end with grief and mourning, but opens up a new possibility. It is a "corporate experience of calling for healing" that enables suffering to become "bearable and manageable in the community."²⁰ In other words, like two sides of a coin, communal lament expresses a the longing "for a new day, a different future" as well.²¹ As this new day, this different future, is expressed as a "gift from 'above'" in the book of Lamentations, the mothers and wives communally sang the song of lament, *Yeoki-Ososeo* (Come By Here), looking up to Heaven and turning to God.²² The repeated invocation of God to come by here expressed their desire for God who listens to their *han*-ridden cries and heals the deepest wounds of their hearts and of their society as well. In their communal lament, they envisioned a caring God who wipes away the mourners' tears and warmly embraces their wounded hearts, and a powerful God who

¹⁸ Emilie M. Townes, *Breaking the Fine Rain of Death: African American Health Issues and a Womanist Ethic of Care* (New York: Continuum, 2001), 23.

¹⁹ Townes, 24.

²⁰ Townes, 24.

²¹ Katongole, *Born from Lament*, 89.

²² Katongole, 89.

delivers and liberates the oppressed from structures of evil that sustain their *han*. These theological visions were embodied in their bodily practice of singing the song of lament, which strengthened their desire for the healing of the deepest wounds of their hearts and of their society.

III. Transforming Shame and Guilt into Anger and Pride

Along with individual sorrow, another set of predominant emotions of the mothers and wives of political prisoners before engaging the TPM includes shame and guilt. These emotions were particularly strong among the mothers of imprisoned college students. As discussed above, most of the mothers had devoted their entire lives to caring for and educating their sons and daughters. Since the cost of college education, including tuition and living expenses in Seoul, was very high at that time, it was common for the mothers to sacrifice their well-being, work hard, and pour every resource into their son's or daughter's college education. Nevertheless, they were willing to sacrifice themselves since their sons and daughters were the jewel in their crown, the greatest asset of their family. They felt proud of their sons and daughters as first-generation college students and hoped that their sons and daughters would live a better life and make great contributions to the country as a result of their college education.

However, when the mothers heard the shocking news that their sons and daughters had been imprisoned, their sense of pride and hope was utterly shattered. While they individually grieved for their sons and daughters, at the same time they were deeply *ashamed*. Often accompanying this emotion of shame was their understanding of their child's violation of the law, arrest, and imprisonment as *sin*. For example, when Kim Han-rim, mother of imprisoned college student Kim Yoon and secretary of the Kukahyup, helped an old mother whose son was imprisoned to visit the prison for the first time, the mother wept bitterly and lamented:

From his childhood, my son has been a docile boy who always smiles at everyone. I cannot understand how he dared to commit such a serious *sin* [*joe*]. He has been a top student in his schools, and everyone praises him as someone who will do great things for our country. We supported him with every resource that our family has, but how could our family's pillar have collapsed and become a *sinner* [*joe-in*]?²³

The mother was “innocently naïve”; because she believed “every act of the government [to be] right,” she regarded her son's violation of the law (specifically of the Emergency Decrees under the Yushin Constitution) and his subsequent imprisonment as a “serious sin” and identified her son as a “sinner.”²⁴ In her lamentation, now that her family's pillar had collapsed, the ideal image of her son—as a docile, hard-working, praiseworthy, and successful man in Korean society—had also collapsed. She felt *shame* about her son who had in her eyes become a sinner—someone radically different from that person she had known who was expected to do great things for his country.

As well as the mothers feeling *shame* that their sons and daughters had failed to become the longed-for ideal and had instead become sinners, they felt *guilt*: they now thought of themselves as *sinners* who had failed in their children's moral education. As discussed in chapter 2, the ideal image of the mother in Korean society—as “a wise mother and good wife (*hyunmo-yangcheo*)”—was deeply rooted at a cultural level. According to this prescriptive image, the mother was required to be a moral educator within the domestic sphere. In other words, it was her virtuous duty to educate her children morally. Specifically, this moral education at home was also prescribed by the Park and Chun regimes in order to produce virtuously patriotic citizens who actively and unquestioningly supported the state-run campaigns and were willing to sacrifice themselves for the glory of the nation. Given this state-manipulated image of the mother, to the mothers of political prisoners, their children's violation of the law and their

²³ Chung, *Kim Han-rim: Emoni Woorideuleui Emoni*, 24–25.

²⁴ Chung, 125.

subsequent imprisonment was a clear indicator that they had failed in their primary duty as a mother and had wrongly educated their children. Ashamed of what they perceived as their children's sin, they also regarded themselves as "the mother of a sinner [*joein-eomma*]" and consequently a "sinner who has to be silent."²⁵ These emotions of shame and guilt were prevalent among the mothers before they joined the moral community established in the TPM, emotions that forced them to remain silent and isolated.

However, in the TPM, the predominant emotions of shame and guilt were transmuted into anger at the root cause of suffering of the mothers and wives and into pride in their children's civil disobedience and imprisonment. In order to understand this emotional dynamic, it is important to note that the emotions of shame and guilt can be understood as different types of anger.²⁶ The mothers' shame about their imprisoned children is a kind of *anger at their children* caused by an anxiety prompted by the difference between the projected ideal image of a child and the actual (or perceived) status of their child as a "sinner." The mothers' guilt is a kind of *anger at themselves* caused by anxiety about the violation of inner moral-value systems. In contrast to these kinds of anger, the TPM helped the mothers and wives re-direct their anger: now they had the right target of their anger, the Park regime that took their sons, daughters, and husbands as a "political sacrifice."²⁷

While they were bound by shame and guilt, the mothers and wives rarely expressed their anger in a public space. However, "fiery sermons and prayers" criticizing the Park regime's vicious oppression and violence became routine at the prayer meetings, and so over time the mothers and wives began to trust the TPM as a safe space in which they felt and expressed their

²⁵ Minkahyup, *O, eomony, dangshineui-noonmuleun*, 58.

²⁶ Andrew D. Lester, *Coping With Your Anger: A Christian Guide* (Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press, 1983), 23–30.

²⁷ Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, *Amheuksogui Hwaetbul* vol. 1, 242.

anger at the Park regime.²⁸ For many of them, expressing this anger was their first subversive action against the regime. One of the wives of the imprisoned PRP members openly criticized the absurdity of the charge against her husband in a five-minute speech at the TPM. With great anger, she cried out:

You know what? What the prosecutor presented as the “evidence for the charge of being a spy for North Korea” was a small radio. This was the only evidence. This radio is one you can buy anywhere, and it can be found in anyone’s house. But, at the trial, it was presented as a “high-tech radio that is specially equipped to receive directives from North Korea.” How absurd! This is a fabricated charge! My husband fought for our nation in the Korean War. As soon as he graduated from the Korea Military Academy, he was drafted as the so-called “*O-bun-so-wi* [five-minute lieutenant]” who would stand on the most dangerous front line and die within the five minutes of combat! He was a *O-bun-so-wi*! But now the country [he fought for] is trying to kill him with this fabricated charge!²⁹

She held the microphone for more than the allowed “five minutes,” but no one dared to stop her.

Her poignant remark revealing the absurdity of the fabrication aroused great anger among the participants in the TPM.

The mothers and wives’ anger culminated in the prayer meetings after the execution of the PRP members. As discussed in chapter 3, the Kukahyup organized the TPM as “the prayer service for liberty in mission.”³⁰ However, this original plan was spontaneously and urgently changed as soon as they heard of the “legal murder” by the Park regime. Lee Jong-ok, one of the key leaders of the Kukahyup, prepared hundreds of black ribbons as a symbol of mourning this cruel instance of state violence.³¹ Cho Jeong-ha, another key leader of the Kukahyup, displayed banners that proclaimed “Away with the Murderous Dictator” and “Park Chung-hee Is the Murderer” on the wall of the meeting room in the Christian Building.³² While the mothers and

²⁸ Jim Stentzel, ed., *More Than Witnesses: How a Small Group of Missionaries Aided Korea’s Democratic Revolution* (Seoul, Korea: Korea Democracy Foundation, 2006), 51.

²⁹ When I heard this story during the interview, I could feel her great anger at the Park regime, even almost three decades later; Mee-ja Kang, interview.

³⁰ Kim and Lee, *Jatbit Sidae Boratbit Goeun Ggoom*, 70.

³¹ Kim and Lee, 70.

³² Kim and Lee, 75.

wives and other participants were communally grieving wearing the black ribbon on their chests, at the same time they screamed in unbounded anger at the Park regime's oppression and violence. Some of them shouted "Kill Park Chung-hee" and scolded the KCIA officers who came to spy on the Kukahyup's political activities, shouting indignantly, "Get Away From Here!"³³ Several weeks later, a wife of one of the executed PRP members reported her ordeal again in the TPM. After the execution, she gave several public speeches in churches in which she revealed the truth about their husbands (and the government). Then, the KCIA forcibly confined her at its headquarters for several days and harangued and beat her, and even threatened the lives of her children.³⁴ As soon as they heard about this, "the prayer meeting exploded" in anger.³⁵ As usual, there were several KCIA agents present at the meeting, who wrote down words of prayers, sermons, and speeches in the room. Then, the participants, including the mothers and wives, "rose up and grabbed the KCIA agents and threw them out the door."³⁶ The pent-up anger of the mothers and wives exploded in a subversive action against the KCIA agents who stood as a symbol of the Park regime's political oppression.

A series of acts of state violence against the family members of the mothers and wives were what James M. Jasper calls "moral shocks" that "occur when [an] unexpected event or piece of information raises such a sense of *outrage* in a person."³⁷ The TPM served as an open channel for the mothers and wives in which they freely poured out their sense of outrage. Although this sense of outrage was clearly a "visceral, and bodily feeling," as implied in the term "shock," it was not a mere raw emotion.³⁸ Rather, I argue that it was *moral outrage* that includes

³³ Kim and Lee, 75.

³⁴ Ogle, *Liberty to the Captives*, 122.

³⁵ Ogle, 122.

³⁶ Ogle, 122.

³⁷ Emphasis added; James M. Jasper, "The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movements," *Sociological Forum* 13, no. 3 (1998): 409.

³⁸ Jasper, 409.

both positive epistemic/cognitive and motivational values for empowering the mothers and wives as moral agents. Specifically, given the nature of the TPM as a communal practice, the moral outrage of the mothers and wives was a kind of “social anger” that arises in “social groups and entire communities.”³⁹

The moral outrage experienced and expressed in the community of the mothers and wives had a positive epistemic value that empowered them to develop their own moral judgment against the received moral values that formerly made them feel shame about their family members’ imprisonment and guilt about having failed in their duty as a moral educator in the household. As Audre Lorde declares, “My response to racism is anger,” she highlights the positive epistemic value of her anger.⁴⁰ She further argues: “anger is loaded with *information*.”⁴¹ According to her, anger is a source of information to empower the marginalized women of color to debunk and consequently recognize the hidden “exclusion,” “unquestioned privilege,” “radical distortions,” “ill-use,” “stereotyping,” “defensiveness,” “misnaming,” “betrayal,” and “co-optation” which have been normalized under systematic racism.⁴² Lisa Tessman also affirms Lorde’s argument for the positive epistemic value in anger. She argues that anger provides the oppressed with information about “the systemic nature of their mistreatment” and subordination.⁴³ Both Lorde and Tessman agree that anger of an oppressed/marginalized group served as a moral epistemic resource that enables them to make their own moral judgment against the root cause of their suffering, systemic injustice, and oppression. In other words, moral outrage of the oppressed is what Michael P. Jaycox calls a “cognitive interruption of the

³⁹ Michael J. Jaycox, “The Civic Virtues of Social Anger: A Critically Reconstructed Normative Ethic for Public Life,” *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics* 36, no. 1 (2016): 123.

⁴⁰ Audre Lorde, *Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches by Audre Lorde* (Berkeley, CA: Crossing Press, 2007), 124.

⁴¹ Lorde, 127.

⁴² Lorde, 124.

⁴³ Lisa Tessman, *Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 119.

ideological rationalizations for [systemic] oppression and [unjust] privilege” or “a transgressive judgment that systemic injustice is stymieing the basic human flourishing of a vulnerable social group.”⁴⁴

As examined in chapter 2, the Park regime monopolized moral discourses and confined them to the totalitarian ideology, moralizing citizens’ total/excessive sacrifices in the name of the glory of the nation. This narrative insisted that it is virtuous for individual citizens to become “one” (*hana*) by submitting to an authority—in this case, the Park regime—and to sacrifice their lives to successfully carry out state-governed projects such as rapid economic development and national security against alleged North Korean threats. Under this totalitarian ideology as the monopolized moral value system, any type of resistance against the regime, including violation of the state-controlled laws, specifically the Emergency Decrees under the Yushin Constitution, was regarded as a “grave sin (*joe*).” The Park regime’s notorious but effective repression strategy, assigning social stigma to political dissidents and even innocent citizens by calling them “Reds” or “Commies,” reinforced this oppressive moral value system.

However, with the aid of moral outrage generated in the TPM, the mothers and wives were empowered to re-evaluate this prescribed moral value system. Moral outrage loaded with information rightly informed them of the root cause of their suffering—the Park regime’s oppression, not their family members’ “sin.” Right after the TPM meeting held on November 21, 1974, the mothers and wives made the following public statement, alive with the flame of moral outrage:

Three seasons have passed since our sons and daughters, who held the torch to shed light on the reality of our nation in the darkness, were dragged into prison. Our hearts have been hardened and darkened as well. Although the flames that they left are still on fire throughout the country, the dark hands of the dictatorship still tightly hold the shackles and plots [how to stay permanently in] power.

⁴⁴ Jaycox, “The Civic Virtue of Social Anger,” 128.

Forsaking the hearts of mothers who lost their children,
 Abandoning the struggles of wives who lost their husbands,
 Neglecting the cries of young children who were wrongly abused as “sons and daughters of the Reds,”
 Suppressing the suffering of citizens who lost justice fighters,

The regime still blocks the gates of universities, suffocates the freedom of the press, and blinds the eyes of its citizens.⁴⁵

As indicated in this statement, the mothers and wives were able to re-direct the target of their anger from their family members (expressed in shame) and even themselves (expressed in guilt) to the root cause of their suffering (the Park regime’s oppression). Before expressing their moral outrage communally in the TPM, they had understood their imprisoned family members as sinner and themselves as sinners, “prisoner[s] without a prison uniform.”⁴⁶ However, through moral outrage, they made their own moral judgment about the propagandized moral system that was causing the sense of shame and guilt, and rightly pointed to “the dark hands of the dictatorship,” the reality of the political oppression committed by the Park regime.

The freshly developed moral judgment of the mothers and wives was further affirmed and legitimized by another moral emotion: *pride*. Formerly, they had been ashamed by their family members’ transgressive actions—civil disobedience involving violation of the laws under the Yushin Constitution. However, as rightly informed by moral outrage, as they began to question the regime’s prescribed moral value system and made their own transgressive judgment against the Park regime’s oppression, their sense of shame about their family members was transmuted into pride in their family members’ transgressive actions against the oppressive authorities.

⁴⁵ Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, *Amheuksogui Hwaetbul* vol. 1, 238.

⁴⁶ Kukahyup’s public statement right after the TPM held on November 11, 2917. See Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, 231.

After participating regularly in the TPM, the mothers and wives declared in public: “Now we are confident in *the innocence of our sons, daughters, and husbands before God*, although they were convicted as sinners by the authoritarian regime.”⁴⁷ This declaration of the innocence of their family members indicated that they had developed their own moral agency to re-evaluate the moral dimension of their family members’ civil disobedience. Based on this moral agency, they felt pride in the imprisoned family members: “Now we have realized that what our sons, daughters, and husbands did was indeed a *proud* action that advocated for all citizens’ aspirations [for restoration of democracy and human rights].”⁴⁸ They had formerly associated their family member’s transgressive actions with “harmful activities to others” instigated by “the communist group,” as the Park regime had deliberately framed those actions.⁴⁹ However, through the TPM, and by learning an appropriate sense of moral outrage, they became rightly informed and proud of their family members’ “sacrifice for making the crooked nation straight.”⁵⁰

Alongside moral outrage, pride as a moral emotion added a positive epistemic value to the moral agency of the mothers and wives in that it provided them with “self-approval” for their moral judgment against the Park regime’s oppression.⁵¹ As they began to feel proud of their family members’ civil disobedience and political resistance, they were able to affirm and further strengthen their conviction of the innocence of their family members and transgressive moral judgment against the conventional moral value system propagandized by the Park regime. For them, civil disobedience, including violation of laws and the consequent imprisonment, was no longer “sin,” but praiseworthy activities on behalf of their nation and people. In addition, pride as

⁴⁷ Emphasis added; Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, 231.

⁴⁸ Emphasis added; Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, 231.

⁴⁹ Min-ja Yoon, interviewed by author, Goonpo, Korea, December 20, 2017.

⁵⁰ Min-ja Yoon, interview.

⁵¹ Jasper, “The Emotions of Protest,” 409.

a moral emotion also augmented a positive motivational value, which motivated the mothers and wives to initiate moral and political actions based on their moral judgment. As discussed above, when they felt shame about their family members, they remained in silence and isolation, since shame is a “painful moral emotion” in which (in this case) one disapproves of one’s family members and consequently of oneself and so loses a sense of one’s moral power.⁵² In contrast, their newfound pride allowed them to approve of their family members and themselves, and energized their moral power to break their silence and to initiate their own political resistance against the Park regime’s oppression.

In the public statement announced after the TPM meeting held on November 11, 1974, it is no coincidence that it states both their deep sense of pride in their family members’ civil disobedience and their commitment to political resistance:

We gather in this place with our firm resolution that we would be imprisoned as well, if there would another person who could be imprisoned other than our sons, daughters, and husbands. We gather in this place to pray so that the will of our imprisoned sons, daughters, and husbands can resound throughout the nation. We gather in this place to comfort one another and exhort our weakened hearts so that we do not lose our courage to follow the voice of conscience and enlighten the truth. Until our society embraces truth and justice, we will continue our witness.⁵³

As this statement shows, their pride morally energized them to shout out with the voice of conscience, to break out of the enforced silence and witness to the truth and justice in a public sphere through their political resistance against the Park regime.

IV. Transforming *Han* into Joy and Hope

As examined above, there is no more apt language than *han* to describe the complicated layers of painful emotions that had been formlessly clinging to the hearts of the mothers and

⁵² James M. Jasper, “Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research,” *The Annual Review of Sociology* 37 (2011): 291.

⁵³ Gaudium et Spes Pastoral Institute, *Amheuksogui Hwaetbul* vol. 1, 231.

wives. I argue that *han* is also a kind of moral emotion. Nevertheless, in contrast to the moral emotions that I have argued for above such as communal lament and moral outrage, *han* is loaded with *negative* epistemic and motivational values that obstruct the development of the moral agency of the mothers and wives. The formless nature of *han*, “submerged in the unconscious,” forced the mother and wives to bury their oppressed feeling of pain below the cognitive level.⁵⁴ Under the context of extreme political oppression, the *han* of the mothers and wives took “the form of heart-rending resignation” and dragged them into a “state of helplessness.”⁵⁵ In other words, *han* as a negative moral emotion decoupled the mothers and wives from moral resources for empowering themselves as a moral agents.

However, by regularly participating in the TPM, an oasis of positive moral emotions, the mothers and wives were able to access the well of moral resources for the development of moral agency. As discussed above, first, the moral emotion of communal lament presented a cognitive form to the *han* that had mired the hearts of the mothers and wives. By lamenting communally, the mothers and wives were able to break the forced silence and isolation and name their oppressed and collapsed feeling of pain in public. Second, the moral emotion of anger morally informed and empowered them to make their own moral judgment against the prescribed moral value system, and this enabled them to transform their sense of shame and guilt into pride. Then, the moral emotion of pride provided them with moral resource of self-approval that greatly motivated their moral action—political resistance—against the root cause of their *han*, the Park regime’s vicious oppression. Lastly, with the aid of these moral emotions, the mothers and wives sublimated their sense of *han* into *joy* and *hope*, which completes the set of moral emotions necessary for the transformation of moral agency.

⁵⁴ Park, *The Wounded Heart of God*, 17.

⁵⁵ Park, 34–35.

When I interviewed some key members of the *Kukahyup* who regularly participated in the TPM about their experiences of the TPM, I was surprised to find that an emotional status of *joy*—often expressed in the Korean word *sinmyung*—was one of their predominant emotions. When they talked about the TPM and shared their personal stories of events that had occurred three decades ago, they nonetheless poured out their deep senses of lament and anger. But they all also shared unforgettable moments of joy as they smiled brightly during the interviews. This joyful emotion aroused in the TPM can be largely categorized into two kinds of joy: the joy of community and the joy of empowerment.

According to one of the key leaders of *Kukahyup*, the TPM was like a “festival,” full of joyful emotions, *sinmyung*, which even the threatening presence of the KCIA agents in the TPM could not disrupt or dispel.⁵⁶ The emotional status of *sinmyung* in Korean society is commonly used to refer to joyful energy enacted by a traditional Korean mask dance named *Talchum*. Interestingly, when professional mask dancers perform the *Talchum*, it is very common to invite audiences to dance together during or at the end of the performance by saying: *Sinmyung-nagae-chueoboja* (Let’s dance together with *sinmyung*)! This joyful collective dance captures the emotion of *sinmyung*. Like the *Talchum*, the TPM entailed various kinds of collective practices, such as loudly singing the congregational hymns together, which embodied the participants’ recognition of community. For the mothers and wives, this embodied sense of “being surrounded and accompanied by people who shared the common will” was a manifestation of *sinmyung*, the joy of community.⁵⁷ It is the joy of the birth of a “new family who immediately run to those who suffer and embrace each other’s suffering.”⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Jong-sook Lee, interview.

⁵⁷ Jong-sook Lee, interview.

⁵⁸ Jong-sook Lee, interview.

As examined above, the TPM facilitated an empowering space in which participants broke the forced silence and shared their *han*-ridden stories with fellow family members. For the mothers and wives who had been deprived of proper means to raise their voices in a public sphere, this empowerment itself presented them with opportunities for joy, particularly the joy of empowerment. During my interview with one of the wives of the executed members of the PRP, she testified: “It is miracle that I can still live, and have not become mad” given her deep *han* on her husband’s unjust death.⁵⁹ She was able at least partially to “resolve her *han*” when she took the microphone and poured out her painful stories loaded with anger and sorrow in the TPM.⁶⁰ Prior to that, she had had to conceal her stories and even her emotions given the strong social stigma against her and her family. However, when she was able to share her authentic stories and emotions for the first time in front of the participants of the TPM, she felt “liberated” and “empowered,” which brought her an “unexpected joy.”⁶¹ As she was empowered to break the forced silence and share her *han*-ridden stories, she experienced a “miracle,” the joy of empowerment that contributed to sustaining her life and keeping her from becoming mad.

The distinctive nature of the joyful emotion that the mothers and wives experienced through the TPM as a religious practice were *mysterious* and *transcendental*. Rev. Lee Hae-dong, a Christian leader who initiated the TPM with the mothers and wives of the political victims, described the atmosphere of the TPM:

The atmosphere of the Thursday Prayer Meeting was very unique and even mysterious... There is no distinction between Christians or non-Christians. What matters is whether you are a human being. We felt even closer when we shared our suffering. Regardless of our religions, we sang the hymn together, we responded to the Word of God by shouting “Amen,” and we lifted our desperate prayers to Heaven. We *cried*

⁵⁹ Mee-ja Kang, interview.

⁶⁰ Mee-ja Kang, interview.

⁶¹ Mee-ja Kang, interview.

together by sharing the deepest wounds in our hearts, and we *danced with a joy that mysteriously transcends our suffering*.⁶²

In the midst of sharing their *han*-ridden stories and lifting up their desperate prayers to Heaven, the mothers and wives mysteriously experienced joy that transcends their *han*, the formlessly condensed and collapsed pain and suffering in their hearts. This mysterious joy enabled them to transcend the wall of social stigma that had formerly forced them into isolation and individual sorrow. This mysterious joy empowered them to transcend the oppressive limits on their public leadership.

For the mothers and wives, the mysterious and transcendental joy was “Heavenly joy”⁶³ or “Joy from God”⁶⁴ that mysteriously broke into human history. It is important to note that the TPM was originally formatted as a religious practice. Although it attracted non-Christian families of the political victims as the only space where they could share their *han*-ridden stories in public, its formats and languages were explicitly religious and specifically Christian. Even though it was called a “prayer meeting,” its format followed a regular Christian worship service in Korean churches, consisting of prayers, hymns, Scripture readings, and sermon.⁶⁵ As a religious practice, the TPM facilitated a mysterious *liminal* space in which the mothers and wives invoked and encountered the presence of a transcendental being—for Christians, conceptualized as God—or transcendental reality—for non-Christians, loosely conceptualized as the (supreme) Good. In this liminal space, as they invoked through their desperate prayers, they danced with the transcendental being or reality, the ultimate source of mysterious and transcendental joy. In this liminal space, their repeated bodily experience of the mysterious and

⁶² Emphasis added; National Council of Churches in Korea Human Rights Mission. *Hanguk Kyohoe Inkwonwoondong 30 Nyonsa*, 92.

⁶³ Mee-ja Kang, interview.

⁶⁴ Jong-sook Lee, interview.

⁶⁵ Likewise, Korean churches in general practice an “early morning prayer meeting,” but its format also typically follows a regular Christian worship service.

transcendental joy shaped and strengthened their “commitment to God’s transcendence and goodness” (for Christians) and their “commitment to the goodness of the world transcending our necessarily limited attempt to understand it” (for non-Christians).⁶⁶

Based on this commitment, for the mothers and wives, the mysterious and transcendental joy served as a moral emotion to shape another emotion, what Jonathan Lear calls “radical hope.” As they danced with joy, the mothers and wives became *hopeful*. Their hope was indeed radical since all the circumstances surrounding them were enough to drive them to despair. Specifically, after the legal murder of the eight members of the PRP, after their husbands’ bodies were cremated by the Park regime, their wives suffered under the menacing attacks of despair. Nevertheless, the mothers and wives reconfigured their current circumstances that constantly drove them to despair by seeing with “the eyes of” the transcendental joy that “transcend all local circumstances.”⁶⁷ While they danced with the transcendental joy in the liminal space, their reconfiguration of the local circumstances culminated in their “imaginative excellence” that enabled them to envision their future “*imaginatively*” with the emotion of *radical hope* that transcends their current status of pain and suffering, their seemingly-unresolvable *han*.⁶⁸ Beyond the space of the TPM, their emotion of radical hope was also expressed in reference to their theological conviction in the resurrection of Christ: they radically imagined the ultimate victory of Christ over evil, the final restoration of democracy and human dignity against the Park regime’s political oppression. As explored in chapter 3, their radical hope was concretely enacted and embodied in their symbolic protests in public, which creatively drew upon Christian symbols of the resurrection of Christ. In other words, for the mothers and wives, the emotions of

⁶⁶ Jonathan Lear, *Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 94.

⁶⁷ Although Roberts says “the eyes of gratitude” in this quotation, he uses joy interchangeably with gratitude. See Robert C. Roberts, *Emotions in the Moral Life* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 185.

⁶⁸ Lear, *Radical Hope*, 117.

transcendental joy and radical hope were the moral resources for their moral actions against the Park regime's oppression and for the radically imagined victorious future.

V. Conclusion

For the mother and wives of the political victims, the TPM meant more than a mere religious practice. In the TPM, they were surrounded by the symphonic sounds of the moral emotions. Sounds aroused in each moral emotion, such as sobbing, weeping, crying out, shouting in anger, chanting in pride, laughing, made up the symphonic harmony. More importantly, in the TPM, the theatre of the symphony of the moral emotions, they were not mere audiences that listened to the symphonic sounds. Rather, they were the co-composers of the symphony as they spontaneously edited their scores in light of changing circumstances. They were also the performers of the symphony. Each performer made her own sounds with her stories, and each distinctive sound together mysteriously created a harmony that transcended all the depressing circumstances.

As the co-composers, performers, and audiences of the symphony of the moral emotions, the mothers and wives radically transformed their moral agency, formerly shaped by the prescribed moral systems. With the sound of communal lament, they were able to break the forced silence and isolation and name the root cause of their *han* that had been clinging to their hearts. With the sound of moral outrage and pride, they were empowered to make and then approve their own moral judgment against the conventional moral value system prescribed by the governing authorities. With the sound of transcendental joy, they embraced radical hope that strengthened their commitment to the goodness of the transcendental being/reality and allowed them to envision the radically imagined future, specifically God's ultimate victory over evil, the final restoration of democracy and human dignity. The symphonic sounds of the moral emotion

did not remain in the closed space for the TPM. Wherever they stood, sat down, and marched, they improvised, performed, and heard this moral symphony together.

CHAPTER 5

SALIM (LIFE-GIVING)

I. Introduction

I am a seventy-year-old man. After being released from prison yesterday, I was asked to deliver a eulogy for a twenty-one-year-old man...I couldn't sleep at all last night because I am so ashamed to come out and stand here...I couldn't think of anything to say, and so I stand here to call out the names of martyrs, including Martyr Lee Han-yeol, with all my strength...

Martyr Jeon Tae-il
 Martyr Kim Sang-jin
 Martyr Jang Joon-ha
 Martyr Kim Tae-hoon
 Martyr Hwang Jung-ha
 Martyr Kim Ui-ki
 Martyr Kim Se-jin
 Martyr Lee Jae-ho
 Martyr Lee Dong-soo
 Martyr Kim Kyung-sook
 Martyr Jin Sung-il
 Martyr Kang Sang-chul
 Martyr Song Kwang-young
 Martyr Park Young-jin
 Spirits of Gwangju Citizens
 Martyr Park Yong-man
 Martyr Kim Jong-tae
 Martyr Park Hye-jeong
 Martyr Pyo Jung-doo
 Martyr Hwangbo Young-kook
 Martyr Park Jong-man
 Martyr Hong Gi-il
 Martyr Park Jong-chul
 Martyr Oh Dong-keun
 Martyr Kim Yong-kwon
 Martyr Lee Han-yeol

From Rev. Moon Ik-hwan's eulogy at the funeral of Lee Han-yeol on July 9, 1987

“The culture of *jukim*.”

When I interviewed Lee Jong-sook, a key leader of Kukahyup, it was *jukim*, the life-negating and dehumanizing culture deeply rooted in the structures of life for South Koreans under the Park and Chun regimes, that she identified as the force in Korea that is so contrary to life.¹ According to her, the glory of nation, claimed by the regimes in the name of “national resurrection” and the “realization of social justice,” were vaingloriously and falsely rooted in the culture of *jukim*.² The term *jukim* literally means *killing*. *Jukim* is ontologically different from *jukuem*, which means death in Korean. While *jukuem* is a natural and even necessary part of *salm* (life in Korean), *jukim* is “intentional killing, murder” in a narrow sense and “the intentional destruction of reality” or “all the activities of an anti-life,” including “oppression, exploitation, coercion, contamination, destruction, marginalization, killing, etc.” in a broader sense.³ Put differently, *jukim* sums up all forms of *violence against salm*, “the central power against life.”⁴ *Jukim* is not “natural but exists contrary to nature and the unnatural activity of life engages violence.”⁵

Under the Park and Chun regimes’ oppression, the culture of *jukim* permeated Korean society. Specifically, as discussed in chapter 2, this life-denying and dehumanizing culture culminated in the totalitarian ideology of total sacrifice, which functioned as a form of cultural violence that normalized and sustained multiple forms of deadly violence against citizens. In this chapter, I critically examine a specific manifestation of the culture of *jukim*: young protesters’ suicide protests. Although I wholeheartedly appreciate the noble sacrifices of the suicide

¹ Jong-sook Lee, interview.

² Jong-sook Lee, interview.

³ Jea Sophia Oh, *A Postcolonial Theology of Life: Planetarity East and West* (Upland, CA: Sopher Press, 2011), 19–20.

⁴ Oh, 18.

⁵ Oh, 20.

protesters as an heir of their sacrifices for democracy, I as a social ethicist critically examine their total self-sacrifices unto death in terms of the tragic internalization of the totalitarian ideology that saturates the culture of *jukim*. As the Park and Chun regime dominated the country's moral discourses, the suicide protesters were tragically forced to follow the internal logic of the totalitarian ideology. They thought that in their circumstances, there was no virtue other than the virtue of sacrifice (even unto death). Seeing no alternatives, they therefore offered themselves as living sacrifices on the altar of democracy.

In this chapter, I argue that the family movements, practiced by the mothers and wives of the political victims, including the political martyrs, were a *moral protest* which did indeed presented an alternative “*moral voice*” to wider society and offered South Korean citizens an opportunity to critically plumb, articulate, and then elaborate their “*moral sensibilities and convictions*.”⁶ Their moral voice was concretely embodied as an alternative moral virtue to the totalitarian virtue of total sacrifice. In this chapter, I name this embodied alternative moral virtue as the virtue of *salim*. For the rest of chapter, I first critically examine suicide protest as the tragic internalization of the totalitarian ideology. Then, I offer a working definition of the virtue of *salim* consisting of the four essential aspects: (1) the habituation of *salim*, (2) virtuous creativity, (3) virtuous wisdom, and (4) holistic flourishing, and illuminate how the mothers and wives embodied this alternative moral virtue through their family movements.

II. Tragic Internalization of the Culture of *Jukim*: Living Sacrifices on the Altar of Democracy

It is said that the tree of democracy grows on blood. Listen, comrades! Why do you hesitate to take up the courage to shed your noble blood and have the tree of democracy thrive in this land forever?...If this is the way for the nation and history, if this is the way

⁶ Emphasis added. James M. Jasper, *The Arts of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 5.

for achieving democracy for our loving country. I would not hesitate to sacrifice my life. I will watch you move forward from the heaven. On the day of great victory, my silent yet heartfelt applause will ring out all over the world!⁷

Excerpt from Kim Sang-jin's "Statement of Consciousness"

The brutal state violence by the Park and Chun regimes ignited public anger and led to a series of protests. Korean citizens organized and participated in various types of protest such as sit-ins, rallies, marches, vigils, and memorial services that are also widely utilized across Western countries. However, there was a particular type of protest "by means of suicide"—"a suicide protest"—performed by Korean protesters in the Park and Chun eras.⁸ From 1970 to 2004, in South Korea, a "total of 107 protesters" sacrificed their lives by suicide protest.⁹ The demographic information of these political martyrs or *yeolsa* shows that the majority of them were male, in their twenties to thirties, and were students or workers.¹⁰ And 73 percent of the total employed "self-immolation" or setting "himself or herself on fire as protest" as the means of suicide.¹¹ In this chapter, I introduce two such events of suicide protest performed by two martyrs—Kim Sang-jin and Hong Gi-il—as their ultimate responses to the brutality and immorality of the Park and Chun regimes.

The promulgation of the Yushin Constitution and the subsequent of eight members of the People's Revolutionary Party (Inhyeokdang) inflamed the heart of Seoul National University

⁷ Hyojoung Kim, "Micromobilization and Suicide Protest in South Korea, 1970–2004," *Social Research* 75, no. 2 (2008): 566.

⁸ Kim, 545; This special type of protest has also been utilized in other Asian countries, such as India and Vietnam. Please note that this chapter does not specifically examine why this type of protest has been utilized in Asian countries.

⁹ Kim, 545.

¹⁰ Kim, 548.

¹¹ Kim, 549; Self-immolation has been the main means of suicide protest for Buddhist monks in Vietnam. See B. C. Ben Park, "Sociopolitical Contexts of Self-Immolations in Vietnam and South Korea," *Archives of Suicide Research* 8, no. 1 (2004): 81–82.

student Kim Sang-jin. His journals were filled with expressions of his furious anger at structural oppression and totalitarian violence:

How can they [Park Chung-hee and his followers] commit such brutal injustice [the legal murder of the Inhyeokdang members] with the pretense of being human? I cannot understand at all. It is a duty as a human to show at least minimum compassion to other fellow humans even though they committed a wrong that deserves the death penalty...But, this incident is literally a murder! Murder! And heinous brutality inciting the great anger of people and also Heaven!¹²

Kim's furious anger prompted him to take leadership in organizing a massive protest at Seoul National University. On April 11, 1975, two days after the legal murder of the Inhyeokdang members, Kim stood in front of hundreds of student protesters and angrily began to read aloud his Statement of Conscience:

Look at the dark wind of oppression and delusion! We now accuse the advent of the dreadful military state that suffocates our political liberty. This is the way for our people and history, and this is the way for striving for our beloved nation's democracy, and this is the way for achieving eternal social justice...¹³

While reading this statement, he abruptly pulled out a knife, stabbed himself in his abdomen, and cut it from the left to the right. His blood spilled out over the podium. He died before arriving at a hospital. Kim's suicide by *seppuku*¹⁴ was indeed his desperate protest against the Park regime and its brutal oppression. His angry ultimate sacrifice evoked public anger, galvanized the public into democratic movements, and marked a major turning point in South Korea's democratization in the 1970s.

In addition to the "legal murder" of Inhyeokdang members, the state-led massacre during the Gwangju Uprising was what James M. Jasper defines as a "moral shock" that evokes "a

¹² Unless otherwise noted, all translations of this source are my own; Nam-il Kim, *Sidaewi Bulkot Kim Sang-jin* [Flame of Era *Kim Sang-jin*] (Seoul: Korea Democracy Foundation, 2003), 150

¹³ Kim, 173.

¹⁴ It is important to note that seppuku is a special form of ritual suicide performed mainly in Japan. Employing the colonizer's cultural practice could be critically analyzed by post-colonial theories, specifically by an account of "mimicry."

sense of outrage in a person” and mobilizes him/her into a political action.¹⁵ Hong Gi-il, who was a former member of the citizen army during the Gwangju Uprising, was one of people who was deeply shocked by the brutal violence perpetrated by the Chun regime’s troops. Even after five years, he vividly remembered the extreme suffering of Gwangju and felt indignant and ashamed by “the widespread apathy and lack of action” among people: he described these people as “living corpses.”¹⁶ And he desperately cried out for “the awakening and penitence of the people”:

We have to be awakened and penitent...The loss of our masterhood is what we should fear more. In a state of *anesthesia*, with all kinds of false consciousness, pleasure, ignorance, and fear of the truncheon, we no longer feel the pain of the democratic forces and the nation, the divided nation...We should wake up from silence, from the anesthesia. We should be emboldened and united.¹⁷

Then, after shouting in desperation, “Gwangju citizens, wake up from your silence,” on August 15, 1985, the fortieth anniversary of Independence Day (from Japanese colonization), Hong poured gasoline over his body, set himself on fire, and performed “the total self-sacrifice on the altar of democracy.”¹⁸ He was transported to a hospital, but even on his deathbed, he murmured, “Wake up from your silence”: he finally died on August 22 at the age of twenty-six.

The suicide protests performed by political martyrs were harshly condemned by the Park and Chun regimes and undervalued as *immoral* acts that totally negate the filial duty as a son or daughter.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the regime’s strategy did not work. The suicide protests as a “[symbolic] communication” had a “special appeal to the target audience” through “the

¹⁵ Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest*, 106.

¹⁶ Kim, “Micromobilization and Suicide Protest in South Korea, 1970–2004,” 563–64.

¹⁷ Kim, 568.

¹⁸ Unless otherwise noted, all translations of this source are my own; Jong-chan Kim, ed. *Bul-ui Gilog Pi-ul Gilog Jeg-eum-ui Gilog* [The Records of Fire, Records of Blood, and Records of Death] (Seoul: Silchoenmunhak, 1988), 242.

¹⁹ In Confucian tradition, “the worst kind of filial impiety” is the death of a child before his/her parents. Given this tradition, many martyrs felt a “strong sense of guilt for committing suicide protest” and left advance apologies for their filial vice in their suicide notes or personal journals. See Kim, “Micromobilization and Suicide Protest in South Korea, 1970–2004,” 551–555.

penetrating symbolism” of “calls for action” enacted in the act of suicide.²⁰ The suicide protests served as a symbolic form of theater in which the apathetic bystanders “are forced to observe the pain of their oppressed brothers and sisters” through the imaginative burning body of themselves.²¹ Indeed, the suicide protests provided Korean protesters with “the ultimate example of sacrifice to the [high and noble] cause” of democracy.”²² These political martyrs have been regarded as living sacrifices devoted to the altar of democracy, whose burning bodies enlighten *minjung*, whose shed blood feeds the tree of democracy.

As a South Korean citizen, and as heir to their sacrifices for democracy, I wholeheartedly appreciate their noble will and devoted service to justice. However, as a social ethicist, I critically examine their total self-sacrifices in terms of the *tragic* violence against themselves within the culture of *jukim* saturated with the totalitarian ideology of the Park and Chun regimes. The suicide protests are tragic. While the political martyrs *willfully* employed this particular form of protest to shake people out of their moral anesthesia of *minjung* and to democratize their nation, at the same time by committing suicide they were *forced* to follow the same operating mechanism of the totalitarian ideology: the *total sacrifice* of individuals for the sake of a high and noble cause.

On the one hand, they voluntarily chose to disembowel or immolate themselves “out of a sense of *virtue*” and a “profound desire to make their life meaningful through a death with dignity.”²³ They deliberately performed this ultimate protest as “a serious, sincere gesture of commitment to a cause,” which can be evaluated as *truthful* compared to the false causes of “national resurrection” and “realization of social justice” propagandized by the Park and Chun

²⁰ Kim, 570.

²¹ Kim, 570.

²² Kim, 570.

²³ Emphasis added; Park, “Sociopolitical Contexts of Self-Immolations in Vietnam and South Korea,” 90.

regimes. On the other hand, tragically, they were forced to *internalize* the totalitarian ideology that prevailed within a culture of *jukim* and resort to extreme violence against themselves, a form of violence unto death.²⁴

The tragic internalization of the totalitarian ideology itself is *cultural violence* that normalized and even coerced the political martyrs to become the living sacrifice or burnt offerings on the altar of democracy. This internalized ideology ingrained in the heart monopolized a moral discourse within oneself and crushed the moral imagination, preventing it from envisioning an alternative to the denial of life, the destruction of body, and the spilling of blood. In his suicide note, Kim Ui-ki, another person who self-immolated right after the massacre in Gwangju, declares:

The remnants of the *Yushin* regime are making a last-ditch efforts. We have come to a fork in the road: we must choose either to live as dogs or slaves in anxiety and fear, or to exist as free men breathing the clean air of freedom in the high sky, and singing songs of joy and victory. We must make a decision as to whether we will continue this history of disgrace or live honorably and be respected by our descendants. Fellow countrymen! Let's stand to the last person! History is on our side in this struggle. We will win. We ought to win. Fellow countrymen, let's stand up and give a final blow to the windpipe of the *Yushin* remnants.²⁵

This note represents the conviction of the political martyrs, that there is “*no moral alternative*, in their circumstances, other than to choose death.”²⁶ For them, “the *only virtuous* option” for social change and democratization was their total self-sacrifice in the form of suicide protest.²⁷ In other words, the central tenet of their conception of virtue is *sacrifice unto death*, which follows the internal logic of totalitarian ideology. Countless citizens burned their blood, sweat, and tears as oil for the nation's economic development as the Park regime propagandized. Too many

²⁴ Friedrich and Brzezinski warn of the danger of internalization of the totalitarian ideology. “This ideology is said to have been ‘internalized,’ for example—that is to say, many people inside the party and out have become so accustomed to think, speak, and act in terms of the prevailing ideology that they are no longer aware of it.” See *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 26.

²⁵ Park, “Sociopolitical Contexts of Self-Immolations in Vietnam and South Korea,” 92.

²⁶ Emphasis added; Park, 91.

²⁷ Emphasis added; Park, 91.

innocent citizens were burned with the flame of social purification by the Chun regime's brutal violence. Tragically, the life-consuming flame was set on the bodies of the protesters. This destructive flame was burning within the culture of *jukim*.

III. The Embodied Virtue of *Salim*: Moral Virtue of the Mothers and Wives

The MinKaHyup
 They were ordinary mother and wives
 They waited up for their children late into the night
 They resented their busy husbands just like any other women
 And other wives
 ...
Look at the words they wrote with their body
 On the history of this country and to this land
 Snow or rain they wrote
 To free the conscientious prisoners,
 To gain freedom and sovereignty for the country.
 Can you read the words,
 The words
 Tinged with suffering and hurt
 Can you read them without shedding tears
 Oh, the cry, hear the cry²⁸

From the poem "MinKaHyup" by Do Jong-hwan, translated by Youngtae Shin

As explored in chapter 3, the mothers and wives of political victims, including some mothers of political martyrs such as Lee So-sun, mother of Martyr Jeon Tae-il, actively engaged in their own form of democratic movements, what they called "*kajok-woondong*," translated as *family movements* in this dissertation. It is very important to note that those mothers and wives never employed any kind of suicide as their tactic for political resistance against the Park and Chun regimes. While they publicly mourned together the tragic deaths of political martyrs and rebuked the governments' lack of sympathy and mourning, at the same time they morally exhorted young protestors to embrace their duty to affirm and preserve their dignified lives.

²⁸ Shin, *Protest Politics*, 51.

In general, the nature of the family movements was *non-violent* and *life-affirming*, although sometimes the mothers and wives were involved in physical confrontations with riot police and KCIA officers (e.g., the mothers and wives physically threw KCIA officers out of the Thursday Prayer Meeting right after the legal murder of the eight members of the People's Revolutionary Party). They engaged non-violent and life-affirming resistance against what they call the "murderous regime," including highly visible and symbolic protest, in order to *save* the jeopardized lives of their imprisoned family members and *restore* human dignity of their family members and also of all the people who suffered under the culture of *jukim*.

Highlighting the distinctive non-violent and life-affirming feature of the family movements, this chapter argues for the unearthed moral significance of the family movements under the culture of *jukim*, particularly the propagandized and tragically internalized totalitarian ideology—the moralization of total/excessive self-sacrifices for the sake of a higher and/or noble cause, such as "national resurrection," "realization of social justice," or "democratization." In this chapter, I argue that the mothers and wives served as *moral protestors* who presented an alternative "*moral voice*" to wider society and offered South Korean citizens an opportunity to critically plumb, articulate, and then elaborate their "*moral sensibilities and convictions*."²⁹ They were "sensitive to moral dilemmas"—the dilemmas of total/excessive self-sacrifices—and generated "new ways of understanding the complexities of the human conditions."³⁰ In other words, as poet Do Jong-hwan succinctly describes, they artfully wrote *moral languages* with their bodies and through their family movements.

More importantly, this chapter explores these embodied moral languages through the language of *virtues*. As critically examined in chapter 2 and in this chapter, total/excessive self-

²⁹ Jasper, *The Arts of Moral Protest*, 5; emphasis added.

³⁰ Jasper, 13.

sacrifice for higher causes was deceitfully propagandized and/or tragically internalized as reflecting *the prime moral and civic virtue*. Such total self-sacrifice was positively propagandized to be *virtuous* for individual citizens who faithfully observe the moral mandate to burn their bodies and shed their blood for the sake of national resurrection. It was negatively propagandized to be *virtuous*, specifically *just*, for the state to eliminate all the social evils and purify citizens' moral consciousness. It was tragically internalized for young protestors to *virtuously* become the living sacrifices on the altar of democracy. This use of the language of virtue, which totally denies human dignity and tragically praises the annihilating of an individual's life, lies at the heart of the culture of *jukim*—the cultural violence that normalizes and consequently sustains a variety of forms of structural and direct violence against all the Korean citizens. However, the mothers and wives wrote alternative languages of virtue with their bodies, languages that affirm the dignity of human life and constitute a counterculture against the dehumanizing and life-negating culture of *jukim*. In this chapter, I name the alternative moral languages embodied by the mothers and wives as the virtue of *salim*.

The Korean term *salim* etymologically belongs to a group of Native Korean vocabularies, not Sino-Korean vocabulary (Korean vocabularies borrowed directly or created from Chinese characters). *Salim* is “the gerund of the verb, *salida*” which means “to save, rescue, salvage; to safeguard from damage or injury.”³¹ It has the same etymological root as the Korean noun, *saram* (human), and the Korean verb, *salda* (to live).³² A commonly used expression in Korean illuminates the original meaning of *salim*. When they are in danger, Koreans say, “*Saram Salyeo!*” Here, *saram* refers to a person in danger and *salyeo* is “an imperative form of *salim* as a

³¹ Oh, *A Postcolonial Theology of Life*, 152; See also HeeSun Kim and James Newton Poling, *Korean Resources for Pastoral Theology: Dance of Han, Jeong, and Salim* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2012), 75.

³² Oh, *A Postcolonial Theology of Life*, 152.

noun,” so the phrase means, “Help me” or “Save me.”³³ Based on this common expression, the original meaning of *salim* “extends to making someone or something alive, flourishing, healing, and taking it further, applies to salvation and resurrection.”³⁴ More importantly, *salim* connotes an *action* or *activity* for “letting things live,” “keeping things alive,” and “giving things life.”³⁵ Specifically, in reference to the Korean term *jukim*, it is a “counter-concept” to *jukim*: while *jukim* refers to all kinds of unnatural and intentional violence against *salim* (life), *salim* expresses “all diverse activities of life that include intentional efforts to overcome” *jukim* and restore the power of life.³⁶ The original value of *salim* can be summarized as life-affirming, life-saving, and life-flourishing against the vicious power of whatever is anti-life, *jukim*.

With this brief etymological exposition of *salim* in mind, in this chapter I construct a working definition of the virtue of *salim* as follows:

A praiseworthy character trait, (1) cultivated by the *habitual practices* of *salim*, that displays (2) virtuous *creativity* that innovates alternative moral languages to the totalitarian one through creative resignification of cultural resources of *salim* and (3) virtuous *wisdom* that finds the appropriate mean of self-sacrifice through the communal sharing of the burdened virtue in political resistance and (4) contributes to *holistic flourishing*, including individual flourishing—the affirmation of the dignity of human life—and social flourishing—transformation of the culture of *jukim* into the culture of *salim*.

For the remainder of this chapter, I will further explore the four specific constituents of the virtue of *salim*—(1) the habituation of *salim*, (2) virtuous creativity, (3) virtuous wisdom, and (4) holistic flourishing—and illuminate how the mothers and wives inscribed or embodied this alternative moral virtue with their bodies through their family movements. First, I draw on Aristotle’s theory of virtue in his *Nicomachean Ethics* and argue that habituated daily practices

³³ Mi-Weon Yang, “A Theological Exploration of Salim as an Approach to Pastoral Care and Counseling for Korean Immigrant Women in North America” (Ph.D. diss., University of St. Michael’s College, 2017), 103–104.

³⁴ Yang, “A theological Exploration of Salim,” 104.

³⁵ Oh, *A Postcolonial Theology of Life*, 12–13; Kim and Poling, *Korean Resources for Pastoral Theology*, 75

³⁶ Oh, *A Postcolonial Theology of Life*, 20.

for household management helped to cultivate the virtue of *salim* in its initial stages. Second, following MacIntyre's account of practice, I argue that the habituated activities of the mothers and wives in their practices of household management served as the practice of *salim* through which a set of *internal goods*—(1) virtuous creativity and (2) burden-sharing practical wisdom—are achieved. Finally, by drawing on Anscombe's calls for descriptive moral philosophy, I reconstruct a particular notion of human flourishing based on a descriptive account of human suffering in the culture of *jukim*: the original value of *salim*, restoring the power of life, including restoring the dignity of life, and overcoming the vicious power of the anti-life, *jukim*. Based on this reconstructed notion of human flourishing, I explore how the mothers and wives exercised their moral virtue with the aid of the internal goods for achieving the ultimate *telos*—human flourishing—at the individual and socio-cultural levels.

III.1 Habituation of *Salim*

In *The Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle begins his treatise on moral virtues (Book II) by emphasizing the importance of habituation for developing the virtues. He clearly states that “none of the excellence of character [moral virtues] comes about in us by nature” but result from “habituation.” (*NE* 1103a18–19).³⁷ While he limits the boundary of developing moral virtues through habituation—the moral virtues cannot be developed “contrary to nature” (*NE* 1103a24)³⁸—Aristotle insists that *habituated actions* are the key to acquiring the moral virtues. However, of itself repetition of actions does not guarantee the development of moral virtues: for example, a person can become unjust by doing unjust things. Therefore, Aristotle emphasizes the *quality* of the habituated actions. He argues that moral virtues comes about “from activities of a

³⁷ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Christopher Rowe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 111.

³⁸ Aristotle, 111.

similar sort” reflected in one’s character (*NE* 1103b23–24): “we become just by doing just things, moderate by doing moderate things, and courageous by doing courageous things” (*NE* 1103b1–2).³⁹ Finally, moral virtues cannot be acquired by a single action. As the term habituation already connotes, moral virtues are acquired by *repetition* of the actions reflecting the quality of characters.

Following Aristotle’s account of the cultivation of moral virtues through habituation, I argue that even before engaging their own family movements, the mothers and wives had cultivated their virtue of *salim* in its initial stage through a certain kind of habituated activity that reflected the original value of *salim*: their *daily practices for household management* as a mother and/or housewife. Interestingly, besides the original etymological meaning of *salim*, the term *salim* has been traditionally and colloquially used in Korean society to refer to “household work in a narrow sense, usually executed by women, such as cooking, cleaning, and taking care of children.”⁴⁰ It is quite common for a Korean to describe *salim* as “just women’s work in the house” or “women’s household chores.”⁴¹ If one does an online search for the word *salim* in Korean [살림], it is images of homemakers, predominantly female housewives, who are cooking, cleaning, laundering, repairing/making clothes, that appear first. Before examining how the daily practices for household management—the colloquial expression of *salim*—reflect the original moral value of *salim*, it is very important to note that this account of the cultivation of the virtue of *salim* through habituated nurturing activities goes against any argument for essentializing Korean women as the subjects of the virtue of *salim*. Given the gendered division of labor and the rigid separation between domestic and public spheres in Korean society and culture, Korean women have been mainly responsible for all the activities for household management. It is not

³⁹ Aristotle, 111.

⁴⁰ Yang, “A Theological Exploration of Salim,” 104.

⁴¹ Kim and Poling, *Korean Resources for Pastoral Theology*, 75

women's nature, but their daily homemaking practices, that contribute to the cultivation of the virtue of *salim* in its initial stages. This account does not rule out the possibility for men to develop the virtue of *salim*, if they likewise meaningfully engage the practices of *salim*.

Interestingly, I found that the subjects of the virtue of *salim*, whom I claim in this chapter, openly identified and described themselves as *the mothers and/or housewives who do salim*. For example, when I interviewed Kang Mee-ja, wife of one of the executed member of People's Revolutionary Party, she described herself a "driver of a pot lid" who has done *salim* in the house.⁴² This expression is a Korean vernacular expression that refers to a housewife who is in charge of *salim* in the domestic sphere. The daily practices of *salim* for household management, including the nurturing and education of children, is the most essential constituent of the common self-identity of the majority of the family movement participants. Most of them have engaged the daily practices of *salim* for long periods ranging from about ten years—relatively young wives who have young children (e.g. wives of the executed members of People's Revolutionary Party or young wives of the arrested *Mincheongryun* members)—to forty years—older mothers whose sons and daughters are in their twenties or thirties (e.g. old mothers of the *Mincheonghakryun* students and the political martyrs). In other words, for the mothers and wives who were the leaders and major participants in the family movements, their habituated practices of *salim* are an inseparable part of their identity and life.

Nevertheless, in Korean society, the practices of *salim* have been *devalued* as mere household chores done by women. Kang's self-identification as the "driver of a pot lid" could be misused as a pejorative term that trivializes the original moral value embedded in the daily practices of *salim*. The original value of something life-affirming, life-saving, and life-

⁴² Mee-ja Kang, interview; a driver of a pot lid (a pot lid is like a steering wheel) is a Korean vernacular phrase that refers to a housewife who is commonly in charge of domestic works.

flourishing has been decoupled from the actual practices of *salim*. The devaluation of the practices of *salim* is partly attributed to (1) “the Confucian distinction between *nei* and *wai*, ‘inside the house’ and ‘outside the house,’ (2) the traditional gendered division of labor placing women inside the house, and (3) the hierarchical order that puts men’s work outside the house over women’s work, *salim*, inside the house.”⁴³

Against this cultural devaluation of the practices of *salim*, I argue for the life-giving value actualized and enacted by the women’s daily practices of household management. The daily chores for responding to the needs of family members, including feeding them regularly when they are hungry, looking after them when they are sick, and making/repairing their clothes for them, are indeed the necessary and inseparable part of a “decent human life.”⁴⁴ Without the women’s daily practices of *salim*, no one in the household would be able to sustain either his/her own individual or communal life. This is why *minjung* poet Kim Chi-ha, one of the key political protestors against the Park regime, praises women’s *salim* practices, specifically cooking and serving *bab* (the Korean term literally means “rice” but broadly means “the daily meal of Korean people”), as “the holy sacrament for enlivening.”⁴⁵ Reflecting on Korean mothers’ *salim* in general and his mother Jeong Geum-seoung’s *salim* in particular, he composed a poem entitled “*Bob* [rice].”

In this poem, he refers *bob* to *hanul* [heaven].⁴⁶ The Korean term *hanul* is also a term found in Native Korean vocabulary like *salim* and can be translated as heaven. Besides this meaning, in Korean culture in general, the term *hanul* has been used to address the divine or the transcendental reality. For example, in the national anthem of South Korea, Koreans invoke the

⁴³ Kim and Poling, *Korean Resources for Pastoral Theology*, 77.

⁴⁴ Kim and Poling, 77.

⁴⁵ Oh, *A Postcolonial Theology of Life*, 38.

⁴⁶ Meehyun Chung, ed., *Breaking Silence: Theology from Asian Women’s Perspective* (Delhi: Cambridge Press, 2006), 95–96.

name of the divine, *hanul-nim*, to protect their nation.⁴⁷ Culturally, *hanul* has been regarded as the eternal reality, the ultimate source of the universe, including all lives. Given the devalued status of *salim* practices, including cooking *bob*, some might judge Kim's poet equating *bob* with *hanul* to be scandalous or blasphemous. However, in his poem Kim intended to uncover the hidden value of cooking *bob*: it is the sacred medium between us and the ultimate source of life, *hanul*, through which our daily life has been sustained and nourished. In short, Kim's poem re-discovers the previously hidden and sacred value of cooking *bob* in particular and practicing *salim* in general, which has been enacted by women in Korean society.

As the drivers of pod lid, even before engaging their political resistance for saving the lives of their family members in danger, the mothers and wives have habitually engaged in *salim* in order to nourish their family members, keep their individual lives alive, and increase their communal flourishing. Their daily and mundane activities of household management indeed reflect the quality of the original value of *salim*, and these habituated activities were the essential foundation for the initial development of their virtue of *salim*.

In the course of actualizing the original value of *salim*, for the mothers and wives their habituated domestic activities serve as what MacIntyre calls a "practice":

By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which *goods internal to that form of activity* are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.⁴⁸

A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve *those goods which are internal to practices* and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ In Korean, the suffix *nim* serves as an honorific that addresses an individual in a respectful way.

⁴⁸ Emphasis added. See Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 187.

⁴⁹ Emphasis added; MacIntyre, 191.

For MacIntyre, the key or essential part to defining a practice and consequently a virtue is the achievement of *internal goods*. Taking an example of a child who plays chess once a week for a long time, MacIntyre points out a possibility of the achievement of goods internal to the practice of playing chess—“a certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity, a new set of reasons,” in the repeated practices, even if the child was at first motivated to play chess by some external good—“50 cents worth of candy” each time he played.⁵⁰ The achieved internal goods constitute the achiever’s excellent character trait, that is, his virtue, and the virtue integrated with the internal goods helps the one in the course of achieving the final *telos*, human flourishing.

Following MacIntyre’s account of practice, I argue that the habituated activities of the mothers and wives for the household management served as the *practice* of *salim* through which a set of internal goods is achieved in the course of striving for the ultimate *telos*—holistic human flourishing. Although the practices of *salim* in a domestic sphere reflect and actualize the original value of *salim*, it is important to note that these practices performed “within the house” contributed to the women’s virtue of *salim* in its *initial* stage. In order to develop the virtue fully, they had to manage at least two obstacles: (1) the gendered constraint on their exercise of moral power, and (2) the tragic burden of self-sacrifice in their passionate engagement in political resistance. For the rest of this chapter, I will explore how two internal goods achieved in the practices of *salim*—virtuous creativity and burden-sharing practical wisdom—addressed those obstacles and contributed to the full development and exercise of the virtue of *salim* “outside the house.”

⁵⁰ MacIntyre, 188.

III.2 Virtuous Creativity

Recently, feminist scholars have tried to re-discover the original value of the practice of *salim*—its life-affirming, life-giving, and life-flourishing value—as I argued above, but at the same time they critically point out the traditional and conventional use of the idea of *salim* as a “tool of oppression,” specifically a “tool for confining women’s roles mostly to the inside of the house.”⁵¹ The patriarchal discourse of framing the practice of *salim* as “the work of inside (women’s household chores)” has served as an oppressive constraint on Korean women’s leadership and exercise of life-giving power outside the house, in the public sphere.⁵² This oppressive constraint that confines Korean women to a domestic sphere has reinforced the cultural devaluation of the practice of *salim* and therefore the self-worth of the women who mainly perform the so-called “minor, undervalued, and low-level work.”⁵³

The mothers and wives of political victims were not at all free from the oppressive constraint. They were also *ordinary* mothers and wives in Korean society. Nevertheless, they successfully managed the gendered constraint through one of the internal goods achieved in the course of practicing *salim*. In this chapter, I name this internal good as *virtuous creativity*, reflecting the excellent character trait of the mothers and wives and helping them to overcome the oppressive constraint.

Psychologist Abraham H. Maslow highlights ordinary mothers’/housewives’ domestic practices as one of the key examples embodying what he defines as “self-actualizing creativeness”:

Unconsciously I had assumed that creativeness was the prerogative solely of certain professionals [e.g., painter, poet, or composer]. But these expectations were broken up by various of my subjects. For instance, one woman, uneducated, poor, a full-time

⁵¹ Yang, “A Theological Exploration of Salim,” 105–106.

⁵² Kim and Poling, *Korean Resources for Pastoral Theology*, 78.

⁵³ Yang, “A Theological Exploration of Salim,” 105.

housewife and mother, did none of these conventionally creative things and yet was a marvelous cook, mother, wife and homemaker. With little money, her home was somehow always beautiful. She was a perfect hostess. Her meals were banquets. Her taste in linens, silver, glass, crockery and furniture was impeccable. *She was in all these areas original, novel, ingenious, unexpected, inventive.* I just had to call her creative. I learned from her and others like her that a first-rate soup is more creative than a second-rate painting, and that, generally, cooking or parenthood or making a home could be creative while poetry need not be; it could be uncreative.⁵⁴

Maslow sheds a light on the unearthed excellence embedded in an ordinary housewife's practices of household management and argues for her *creativity*. More importantly, her creativity is what Maslow defines as "self-actualizing creativity" that stresses first "the *personality* rather than its achievements, considering these achievements to be epiphenomena emitted by the personality."⁵⁵ In other words, her creativity is part of her excellent character: it is "emitted like sunshine" that warmly embraces everything around her and nourishes and enables all living things to flourish.⁵⁶

Following Maslow's insightful observation and argument, I argue that the mothers and wives of political victims cultivated their excellence in creativity reflected in their daily practices of *salim*. Specifically, their creativity is *virtuous* in that it helped them to manage the oppressive gendered constraint and fully exercise their moral power as mothers and wives in a public sphere. First of all, their virtuous creativity involved *transforming a conceptual space*. Cognitive scientist Margaret A. Boden analyzes examples of novel and original innovations in the fields of science, arts, and music and then defines creativity in general as "transforming conceptual spaces."⁵⁷ A conceptual space is "the generative system that underlies that domain and defines a

⁵⁴ Emphasis added; Abraham H. Maslow, *Toward A Psychology of Being*, 2nd ed. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1968), 136.

⁵⁵ Emphasis added; Maslow, 145.

⁵⁶ Maslow, 145.

⁵⁷ Margaret A. Boden, "What Is Creativity?," in *Dimensions of Creativity*, ed. Margaret A. Boden (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 82.

certain range of possibilities.”⁵⁸ Although this generating system opens a door to some new possibilities, this system also controls and regulates those possibilities with some “limits” or “constraints.”⁵⁹ In other words, the limits or constraints are the necessary parts of the conceptual space. Boden argues that a “radically creative idea” comes from transforming this conceptual space; a “general heuristic, or method,” for this transformation is “*dropping a constraint*” operating in the space.⁶⁰ For example, a radically creative innovation in math, Non-Euclidean geometry, was invented by “dropping Euclid’s fifth axiom, about parallel lines meeting at infinity.”⁶¹

Likewise, the mothers and wives creatively dropped the oppressive gendered constraint that forces them to remain “inside the house” and consequently transformed the conceptual space that regulates and controls their moral power. This virtuous creativity, the dropping of the oppressive gendered constraint, is symbolically reflected in the official emblem of Minkahyup: the sun embracing the house from outside (See Appendix B again). As examined in chapter 3, the Korean term for (house)wife, *a-nae*, could mean “the sun *within* the house” [*zip-aneui-hae*]. Although this term might connote the recognition of the woman’s worth and power—since the sun brightens and energizes—it still reflects the gendered constraint that oppressively limits her to the boundaries of the house. However, in the emblem or logo, this gendered constraint is dropped: the sun is no longer confined within the house but soars above and surrounds the house. Nevertheless, the sun does not abandon the house; rather, it warmly embraces it. This symbol itself represents women’s virtuous creativity. Like the sun, their creativity is emitted, brightens both the worlds inside and the outside of the house, and warmly embraces all living things

⁵⁸ Boden, 79.

⁵⁹ Boden, 79.

⁶⁰ Emphasis added; Boden, 78, 82.

⁶¹ Boden, 82.

around them. As reflected in this image, women creatively dropped the oppressive gendered constraint—defying the gendered boundary between the inside and outside—and transformed the controlled and regulated space into the radically creative space in which their moral power, that had been oppressively restrained, is fully exercised.

Once they dropped the oppressive constraint, in the transformed space the mothers and wives were able to embody their virtuous creativity fully through their distinctive ways of political resistance in a public sphere, exemplifying what Judith Butler defines as a politics of “radical resignification.” In her literary analysis of a Greek tragedy *Antigone*, Butler focuses on Antigone’s languages, specifically her acts (or performative utterance), which “mirror” the male protagonist Creon’s languages.⁶² She then points out Antigone’s intentional re-appropriation of “the language of sovereignty” (as Creon represents “the State” or “the established power” in this play) in order to create a “new public sphere for a woman’s voice—a sphere that doesn’t actually exist at that time.”⁶³ Butler identifies Antigone’s “political insurrection that is based on a *citation of existing norms* and that also produces *something new*” as a politics of “radical resignification.”⁶⁴

Butler’s account of radical resignification is based on Derrida’s deconstructive analysis of language that stresses its “iterability” and “decontextualization.”⁶⁵ According to Derrida, language, specifically a performative utterance, functions as a “sign,” which entails the internal “logic of iterability”: it is “*repetitive or citational* in its structure.”⁶⁶ More importantly, when language is repeated or cited, this necessarily involves the process of “decontextualization” as a

⁶² Gary A. Olson and Lynn Worsham, “Changing the Subject: Judith Butler’s Politics of Radical Resignification,” *Journal of Advanced Composition* 20, no. 4 (2000): 741.

⁶³ Olson and Worsham, 741.

⁶⁴ Emphasis added; Olson and Worsham, 741.

⁶⁵ Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 147.

⁶⁶ Emphasis added; Butler, 148.

“structural feature of any sign that must *break with its prior contexts*.”⁶⁷ For Butler, it is important to understand these structural features of language as offering the possibility of challenging the norms structured in the original context and enacted through the performance of language and “the possibility of social transformation.”⁶⁸ Going back to the example of Antigone’s performative utterance, Antigone deliberately cites or iterates Creon’s language, which enacts “the norms of power” in the original context, but her performed language breaks with this prior context and consequently its governing norms.⁶⁹ For Butler, this process of decontextualization necessarily leads to the following process of recontextualization: Antigone puts the playfully cited language in “a radically new context,” which allows her to create “a new basis [a new norm] for legitimating” her speech and produces “a radical crisis for established power [and norms].”⁷⁰ These processes of citing but breaking with the existing norms and producing a radically new norm(s) sums up a politics of “radical resignification.”

Like Antigone, the mothers and wives of political victims exemplified a politics of radical resignification based on a creative subversion of the existing norms (and practices) of a “wise mother and good wife” (*hyunmo-yangcheo*) or “*salim*-expert” (*salim-kun*) for their own forms of political resistance—their family movements. As critically examined in chapter 2, given the oppressive gendered constraints on Korean women, their lives had been controlled and regulated by a certain standard in Korean society. They had been expected to be the so-called wise mother and good wife” (*hyunmo-yangcheo*) or “*salim*-expert (*salim-kun*) who performs and is responsible for all the *salim* practices involved in their household’s management, including house chores and child education, which often required extreme self-sacrifice given the lack of

⁶⁷ Emphasis added; Butler, 148.

⁶⁸ Butler, 147.

⁶⁹ Gary A. Olson and Lynn Worsham, “*Changing the Subject*,” 741.

⁷⁰ Olson and Worsham, 741.

economic and socio-cultural resources at that time. As already shown, as part of their propaganda projects, the Park and Chun regimes implemented state-controlled/-sponsored domestication of women aimed at manipulating women's ultimate identity as the wise mother and good wife (or *salim-kun*) and consequently at reinforcing the existing gendered norms. Specifically, for this propaganda project the Park regime mandated a series of training camps for young single female workers, through which they acquired necessary skills for household management, such as knitting clothes, and womanly etiquette regarding overall social behaviors, including dressing.⁷¹ As I argued in chapter 2, these prescribed norms of the wise mother and good wife, which were depicted even in elementary school moral textbooks published in the 1960 to 1980s, functioned as a form of cultural violence against Korean women that normalized and sustained multiple forms of gendered violence, including their forced domestication and excessive self-sacrifice in household management.

Nevertheless, the mothers and wives creatively used and re-signified the oppressive gendered norms that governed their identity, status, and social behaviors as mothers or wives in their artful symbolic protest in a public sphere. As explored in chapter 3, the members of Kukahyup intentionally chose to wear a purple-colored *hanbok* at their street marches and public protests in response to their convicted husbands' trials for the so-called March 1st Democratic Declaration for the Salvation of the Nation (*Samil-minju-guguk-suneon*) Incident. At that time, wearing *hanbok* culturally represented a typical and expected image of mother or wife in a domestic sphere. However, they playfully cited this existing convention in a radically different context—a context of public engagement and political resistance—and creatively re-signified the

⁷¹ Moon, *Militarized Modernity*, 75.

traditional and domestic womanly costume as a symbol of “peaceful protest” and “resistance against [state] violence.”⁷²

Kukahyup’s Victory Shawl project is another key example of a politics of radical resignification. As examined above, in the Factory New village Movement, knitting clothes was one of the domestic skills and practices that the Park regime mandated that single female workers learn it in order to manipulate their identity and social behavior. In other words, this domestic practice functioned as an oppressive tool. However, the members of Kukahyup creatively re-signified the symbolic meaning of this domestic practice: as they distributed and circulated the shawls within the prisons all over the country, the shawl itself became “the symbol of resistance” that reinvigorated the political prisoners’ passion for justice and democracy.⁷³ Knitting the shawls so radically subverted the oppressive strategy of the Park regime that the Park regime confiscated all purple yarns in the markets (in South Korea) in order to suppress this practice of political resistance. The members of Kukahyup overcame this obstacle by directly importing purple yarn from foreign countries such as Canada and continuing to knit the threads of resistance.⁷⁴

The members of Minkahyup and Yukahyup were also the masters of artful symbolic protest, re-signifying the existing norms of Korean mother or wife. After the shocking act of state violence against Lee Han-yeol, who was hit directly on his head by a tear gas canister fired by riot police, the members of Minkahyup and Yukahyup played a leading role in mobilizing the “Day for the Eradication of Tear Gas” on June 18, 1987. During this massive street march in Seoul, they were confronted with the lines of riot policemen who were heavily armed with clubs and tear gas. In this context, they creatively re-signified the existing norms imposed on them as a

⁷² Lee and Lee, *Duri Georeun Han Gil*, 176.

⁷³ Ko, *Lee Hee-ho Pyungjeon*, 266.

⁷⁴ Jong-sook Lee, interview.

mother or wife in Korean society. Wearing banners saying “Please Don’t Fire Tear Gas,” they approached the riot policemen who were the same ages as their sons and daughters and put a *carnation flower* on each one’s chest. It was a playful resignification of the cultural convention that children prepare a carnation as a symbol of their gratitude, respect, and love for their parents on every May 8, Parents’ Day in Korean society. Putting the flower on their parents’ chests is a symbolic recognition of their parents’ devoted sacrifices for nurturing and educating them. It is children’s expected duty and responsibility to express their deep sense of unpayable indebtedness and boundless gratitude through this cultural practice and object. The mothers of Minkahyup and Yukahyup were aware of this convention and playfully inverted the order between the giver and the receiver. According to the cultural norms, the riot policemen should have prepared and put the carnation on the chests of the mothers. The inversion of the convention evoked the policemen’s *shame*. More importantly, this emotion of shame represents the mothers’ moral power based on their creative resignification of their cultural status as a “mother” and the young policemen’s deep sense of unpayable indebtedness toward their parents, especially their own mothers.

As the sun warmly embraces the house from outside and emits bright sunshine, the mothers and wives of political victims virtuously emitted their excellent character: by being creative. Their virtuous creativity made it possible for them to let go of the oppressive gendered constraint on their moral leadership and power and racially re-signify the exiting norms, conventions, and practices placed on them as a mother or wife in Korean society as creative resources for their own public engagement and political resistance. Following Martha Nussbaum’s insightful account of the inseparable relationship between creativity and practical

wisdom,⁷⁵ now I move to explore another internal good achieved in the course of practicing *salim*—what I call “burden-sharing practical wisdom”—and I argue for how the mothers and wives *wisely* and *practically* managed another stumbling block—what Lissa Tessman calls “the [costly] burdens of virtues”—to enable the full development and exercise of the virtue of *salim*.

III.3 Burden-Sharing Practical Wisdom

Even though the mothers and wives of political victims creatively and radically managed the problem of the oppressive gendered constraint and norms, they had to deal with the tragic nature of the virtue of *salim*—the burden of excessive/total self-sacrifice—as it motivates and sustains their active and passionate engagement in political resistance. According to Lissa Tessman, this tragic burden not only applies to the mothers and wives in particular but also to the oppressed in general who are involved in political resistance and social activism. In *Burdened Virtues*, Tessman studies particular virtues of an oppressed community under conditions of structural injustice. She pays keen attention to the issue of structural oppression and lived experiences of the oppressed in their survival and resistance. From the beginning of this book, she clearly states her concern with “the selves who endure and resist [structural] oppression.”⁷⁶

She then identifies two forms of moral trouble of the oppressed. First, the oppressed under structural injustice can be “morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising certain virtues.”⁷⁷ The most devastating effect of structural oppression is the *internalization* of marginalization into the very soul of the self: it also blocks the oppressed from empowering

⁷⁵ Nussbaum highlights creativity or “creative improvisation” as the key constituent of the Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom: “The highest virtue of a leader [who possesses practical wisdom]” is an ability “to improvise on his [or her] own what the concrete situation requires.” See Martha Nussbaum, *Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 54–105.

⁷⁶ Tessman, *Burdened Virtues*, 3.

⁷⁷ Tessman, 4.

themselves to recognize and address the root cause of oppression. The second form of moral trouble is very important for this chapter. Even if the oppressed overcome the first form of moral trouble by empowering themselves to practice moral virtues, they are still vulnerable to the second form of moral trouble: *disconnection from their own flourishing*. The oppressed can have a set of character traits that could be affirmed as moral virtues within the context of political struggle and resistance. However, Tessman points out that though these traits of the oppressed are indeed moral virtues, they are somewhat *damaged* virtues, or what she calls “*burdened virtues*” that have the unusual feature of being “disjoined from their bearer’s own flourishing.”⁷⁸

In other words, *burdened virtues* refer to particular moral virtues of the oppressed embodied in their practices of resistance against structural oppression. These virtues can be morally praiseworthy since they contribute to empowering the oppressed and sustaining their liberatory struggles: they are recommended and even required within the context of oppression. Nevertheless, these virtues are *burdened* since they are tragically “unhealthy” in terms of the well-being of the oppressed: while they engage political resistance, these virtues motivate the oppressed to excessively or totally *sacrifice* their own lives or their own possibilities of flourishing, “the affirmation and embrace of life.”⁷⁹ This burden of self-sacrifice is an internal and structural nature of the moral virtues of the oppressed in political resistance.

Along with courage and loyalty (to the resistance group), Tessman highlights anger as one of *burdened virtues* of the oppressed. By critically surveying feminist writings on anger, she endorses anger as a moral virtue of the oppressed in their resistance against systemic injustice. Much as Audre Lorde conceives of anger as her “response to racism” and argues that “anger is

⁷⁸ Emphasis added; Tessman, 4.

⁷⁹ Tessman, 107–108, 168.

loaded with *information* and *energy*,”⁸⁰ so Tessman acknowledges the “positive epistemic value in anger” that provides the oppressed with information about “the systemic nature of their mistreatment” and subordination.⁸¹ In other words, anger is a moral virtue that enables the oppressed to make moral judgments about the root cause of their suffering, systemic injustice, and oppression: anger serves as a “cognitive interruption of the ideological rationalizations for [systemic] oppression and [unjust] privilege.”⁸² Anger also has moral motivational value that provides the oppressed with the energy to refuse to accept their subordinate positions in society and inspires “more spontaneous acts of defense against one’s own or others’ subordination.”⁸³ Anger as a morally praiseworthy trait motivates the oppressed to engage practices of resistance against structural oppression.

On the other hand, Tessman also points out the *tragic nature* of anger as a burdened virtue. When it is mistargeted and/or excessive in degree, it imposes costly burdens on its bearers, driving them apart from their own flourishing.⁸⁴ First, the oppressed have to risk anger hitting the wrong target.⁸⁵ Suffering from “the internalization of oppression,” they are vulnerable to misdirecting their anger toward themselves.⁸⁶ This potential self-hatred is a costly burden that the oppressed have to bear while engaging resistance. Second, under conditions of great and prolonged structural injustice, the oppressed are highly likely to feel anger too much or too strongly. Following the Aristotelian system of virtues that calculates a virtuous mean relative to particular contexts, Tessman argues that the oppressed need to feel a tremendous level of morally

⁸⁰ Emphasis added; Lorde, *Sister Outsider*, 124–27.

⁸¹ Tessman, *Burdened Virtues*, 119.

⁸² Jaycox, “The Civic Virtue of Social Anger,” 128.

⁸³ Tessman, *Burdened Virtues*, 118–19.

⁸⁴ Tessman, 120.

⁸⁵ Tessman, 121.

⁸⁶ Tessman, 118–19.

praiseworthy anger proportionate to the context of grave systemic injustice.⁸⁷ However, tragically, they are unlikely to “metabolize” their tremendous anger and “suffer from the level of anger prescribed for them, even if such a high level best serves their oppositional struggles.”⁸⁸ Although anger at structural injustice can serve as a moral resource for the oppressed, it is tragically costly in leading the oppressed to take risks, encounter danger, and suffer personal loss/sacrifice: the virtue of anger can “becoming consuming.”⁸⁹

I argue that hundreds of political martyrs, specifically suicide protesters, who offered their lives as living sacrifices on the altar of social justice and democratization, were the bearers of the burdened virtues. Their passionate and self-sacrificial resistance is worthy of being honored as a *virtuous* action. As examined above, their sacrifices unto death were made out of their virtuous characters in the context of political resistance: they were rightfully angry at social injustice, they were committed to social justice, and they were courageous in standing on the front line of resistance. More importantly, their sacrifices served as a constant reminder of the Park and Chun regimes’ terror, which in turn awakened ordinary citizens’ moral sensibilities and commitment to democratization and social justice. In other words, their sacrifices were not in vain, but significantly contributed to social transformation. Nevertheless, tragically, they had to totally sacrifice their bodies. They had to totally forgo the possibility of their own flourishing. Their total sacrifices were attributed to the internal tragic nature of the burdened virtues in political resistance in general and at the same time the tragic internalization of the totalitarian ideology in particular. In other words, they were doubly burdened, and the flame of heavy burdens consumed their lives.

⁸⁷ Tessman, 124.

⁸⁸ Tessman, 124

⁸⁹ Tessman, 125.

While they were engaging political resistance against the Park and Chun regimes, the mothers and wives were also vulnerable to the tragic force of burdens of self-sacrifice. However, I argue that they wisely managed the tragic burdens in political resistance by weaving a *community that communally shares the burdens*. Their communal sharing of the burdens functions as what Aristotle calls “practical wisdom.” According to Aristotle, practical wisdom (phronesis) cannot be separable from all the moral virtues (*NE VI 12*).⁹⁰ For him, a moral virtue is a disposition of choosing the mean between the two extremes of excess and defect, and more importantly a virtue upon which one has to deliberate to find the mean *relative to a particular context* (*NE II 6*).⁹¹ Then, for this task of deliberation, practical wisdom is necessary to “discern what in the circumstances would be appropriate and neither excessive nor deficient.”⁹² By applying this Aristotelian account of practical wisdom in the context of political resistance, practical wisdom would help the protesters to deliberate the appropriate amount of self-sacrifice and practically manage the extent of self-sacrifice in order at least to secure the possibility of their own flourishing, and specifically to affirm their own lives over against the costly burdens. The mothers and wives exemplified this kind of practical wisdom: they wisely managed the extent of their sacrifices and affirmed their own lives through the communal sharing of the burdens. In this chapter, I name this particular form of practical wisdom as “burden-sharing practical wisdom.”

For the mothers and wives, their burden-sharing practical wisdom, like their virtuous creativity, is part of the character that they have cultivated and exercised it over the life-long

⁹⁰ Aristotle, 186-187.

⁹¹ Aristotle, 116.

⁹² It is what Aristotle defines as “right reason,” but he takes practical wisdom to be “the same thing as right reason” (*NE vi 13.1144b25–30*). Here, I am following Daniel C. Russell’s argument. See Daniel C. Russell, “Phronesis and the Virtues (*NE vi 12–13*),” in *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. Ronald Polansky (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 203–20.

course of practicing *salim*. Their primarily responsibilities for *salim* in the domestic sphere forced them to sacrifice many aspects of and opportunities for their own flourishing. Even though they were not able to transform the oppressive gendered social structures as a whole, they wisely found some ways of sharing the heavy burdens with one another. The communal sharing of the burdens goes beyond a mere mathematical calculation. The total sum of the burdens placed on an individual person might be the same or even bigger when they share their burdens with one another. Nevertheless, the communal sharing made it possible for an individual person to bear *the appropriate amount of self-sacrifice at each particular time* so that she could affirm and preserve her own life and her fellows' lives as well.

One of the key examples of *salim* practices which represent the Korean women's burden-sharing practical wisdom is *pumashi*. As explored in chapter 3, *pumashi* is a system of labor reciprocation that originated in the traditional agricultural society of Korea, and that consists of "the activity of giving, receiving, and repaying" either "material or non-material" gifts as "the form of the favor, benefit or benevolence" between two different parties.⁹³ Traditionally, *pumashi* as a labor exchange system in the agricultural society "contribute[d] directly and indirectly to the initiation and maintenance of interpersonal relationship": *pumashi* performed among members of community serves as a "clear indication of the existence between them of a social network."⁹⁴ Although this cultural practice had originally been performed in a rural and agricultural context (e.g., multiple households reciprocate labor to harvest crops at each farm), *pumashi* has been practiced in an urban context as well by mothers for certain labor-intensive domestic work. Earlier, I gave the example of a group of mothers creating *kimjang*, the collective practice for producing large pies of *kimchi*. *Pumashi* also goes beyond a mere mathematical

⁹³ Kim, "P'UMASSI," 42.

⁹⁴ Kim, 42–43.

calculation. The total sum of the burdens (in terms of labor) placed on an individual mother could be increased as more individuals participate in the labor exchange system. However, through *pumashi*, they form a burden-sharing community that distributes the burdens, which in turn secures and affirms each individual mother's flourishing in a communal form.

The mothers and wives of political victims then creatively cited this traditional practice in the context of political resistance and wisely re-signified it as a medium of practical wisdom. As explored in chapter 4, interestingly they understood their communal practices of resistance in terms of *pumashi*. For example, they always went to the court trials of each political prisoner as a group, and they called this communal practice of accompaniment and resistance *jaepan* [court trial] *pumashi*. The communal practice of *jaepan pumashi* contributed internally to consolidating the collective identity of the mothers and wives as *one family*. By communally and repeatedly exchanging *pumash* for one another, they were able to strengthen emotional intimacy, specifically a feeling of *jeong*, a Korean emotional term for one's "attachment to somebody" in interpersonal relationships, "the pattern of affect that is associated with" *pumashi*.⁹⁵ With this deep sense of *jeong* for one another, they were able to develop and strengthen their collective identity as a community of "strong mothers" who shared suffering, sorrow, anger, tears, and laughter together in the journey toward democratization.⁹⁶ In other words, reflecting its original values and functions, the communal trial-watching exchange practice helped the mothers and wives to formulate a *burden-sharing community* through which they shared each person's heavy burdens in the prolonged course of political resistance and in turn practiced the appropriate extent of self-sacrifice.

⁹⁵ Minkahyup, *O, eomony, dangshineui-noonmuleun*, 11; for the definition of *jeong*, see Kim, "P'UMASSI," 54.

⁹⁶ Minkahyup, *O, eomony, dangshineui-noonmuleun*, 11–12.

Although the members of Kukahyup did not explicitly identify their Victory Shawl project as a kind of *pumashi*, this project was originally designed as a *communal spiritual practice* to heal their wounded and worn-out souls. After their exhausting public protest in the streets or after *jaepan pumashi*, they gathered in the Christian Building and knitted the shawls together. Each small unit of the shawl was made up of four stiches, and as they sat down together and stitched each unit, they said outwardly or inwardly the four syllables, “*min-ju-hoe-bok*” (which literally means the restoration of democracy) corresponding to each stitch. I argue that this communal spiritual practice served as an extension of *pumashi*: as they communally knitted their yarn into shawls, the Kukahyup members were constructing the social fabric of the burden-sharing community and knitting the fibers of an alternative life-affirming/flourishing path rather than a life-consuming/sacrificial path in the course of political resistance.

III.4 Holistic Flourishing

The virtue of *salim*, acquired by habituated practices of *salim*, that displays virtuous creativity and burden-sharing practical wisdom as the internal good of the *salim* practice, contributed to the achievement of holistic flourishing consisting of both individual and social flourishing. Much as G. E. M. Anscombe calls for *descriptive* accounts of “human nature, human action, the type of characteristic a virtue is, and above all of ‘human flourishing,’”⁹⁷ here in this chapter I also provide a descriptive account of human flourishing, particularly in relation to the root cause of Korean citizens’ suffering and tragic death: the culture of *jukim*. For this task, I ask

⁹⁷ G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” in *Virtue Ethics*, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 44. In her article, I found that there is an inseparable relationship between a descriptive account of human nature and experiences, including human flourishing, and moral philosophy: the continuum between *is* and *ought*. Unless we have an adequate description of what is good for us, we cannot reconstruct a set of salutary norms for how we should live. And I argue that unless we have an adequate description of human suffering that often impedes human flourishing, we cannot fully describe what is good for us. In other words, for the reconstruction of moral philosophy, we may need to begin with a descriptive project on human suffering: what human suffering *is*.

myself: “What is good for Korean citizens under the Park and Chun regime, specifically under the culture of *jukim*?” Addressing this question, I suggest the original value of *salim* as the particular notion of human flourishing in this chapter: *restoring the power of life*, including (1) *saving the jeopardized lives*, and (2) *affirming and restoring the dignity of life*, and (3) *overcoming the vicious power of whatever is against life, jukim*.

With this particular notion of human flourishing, now I explore how the mothers and wives exercised the virtue of *salim* in the course of achieving the ultimate *telos*, human flourishing, and how they did it holistically at both the individual and societal level. First, through their life-giving practices of *salim* as part of their family movements, the mothers and wives literally saved the jeopardized lives of political prisoners who were tortured and violently abused. When I interviewed one of key leaders of Minkahyup, she said that “without the (protesting) presence of the mothers of Minkahyup, all the political prisoners who were tortured in the ‘human slaughterhouse’ (Namyong-dong) could have been killed there.”⁹⁸ As discussed in chapter 3, in the 1980s, political prisoners were often illegally confined in a secret place by the Chun regime’s coercive apparatus, such as the anti-communist section of the National Police and the National Security Council (the successor of the Park regime’s KCIA) and cruelly tortured during the interrogation in order for the regime to fabricate the charge of violating the National Security Law.⁹⁹ It was Minkahyup, as the representative of the family organizations, that devoted itself to urgently and persistently searching out these secret torture rooms and that mobilized a sit-in-demonstration in front of the discovered torture rooms.¹⁰⁰ The protesting presence of the family members imposed a formidable pressure on the torturers and the officials, and this in turn contributed to preserving the lives of the political prisoners in the torture rooms.

⁹⁸ Seol-ju Kim, interview.

⁹⁹ Shin and Sohn, *6wol Hangjaengeul Kirokhada*, 161.

¹⁰⁰ Shin and Sohn, 162.

Second, through their living-affirming moral exhortation to young protesters, the mothers and wives strived to affirm the dignity of their lives from their vulnerability to the tragic internalization of totalitarian ideology. A series of suicide protest by four young college students in the spring of 1986 broke the hearts of the Minkayup members. Nevertheless, they did not merely remain in sorrow, they actively intervened in this issue and morally exhorted young protesters to preserve their own lives and affirm the dignity of their lives. Specifically, Kim Choon-ok, one of co-chairs of Minkahyup, delivered a passionate and life-affirming message to young college students in the space where Lee Dong-soo, a student of the Seoul National University, had immolated his body. In her heartfelt speech, she declared, “You have the right to be loved and the duty to preserve your life. Do not forsake this right and this duty.”¹⁰¹ As her moral exhortation showed, Minkahyup emphasized the moral duty of preserving the dignity of life rather than the moral duty of totally sacrificing one’s body for the sake of “democracy” or “justice.” Minkahyup strived to affirm the dignity of young protesters’ lives and save them from the tragic internalization of totalitarian ideology.

Third, through their practices of public lamentation, the mothers and wives also contributed to restoring the totally negated dignity of the political martyrs’ life. The Park and Chun regimes denied and even prohibited public mourning for the deaths of the political martyrs, specifically those who offered themselves as living sacrifices on the altar of democracy. Both regimes were afraid of the power of their sacrifices to galvanize the citizens’ aspiration for democratization and the following political resistance of the citizens. In order to undervalue their noble sacrifices, as discussed above, the Park and Chun regimes harshly condemned the suicide protests as an immoral act that totally negated the protestors filial duty as son and daughters. The denial of public mourning and the condemnation of the martyrs showed how the Park and Chun

¹⁰¹ Association of Families for Human Rights, *Minjuhwaewi-kilmookae-sun-eomony*, 79.

regimes totally negated the dignity of the martyrs' lives as human beings. Mourning a person's death is the most decent way of recognizing the dignity of a person's life. As a human being, everyone deserves their death to be mourned. Against the regimes' total negation of the dignity of the martyrs' life, the mothers and wives passionately mourned the tragic deaths of the martyrs, which in turn contributed to restoring the negated dignity of the martyrs. As explored in chapter 3, Yukahyup (with Minkahyup) took the leading role in organizing commemoration rallies for the martyrs. Right after the death of Park Jong-cheol, Yukahyup mobilized mass commemoration and bitterly lamented with the Minkahyup members and citizens: "Ah! Who killed our Jong-cheol? We look up to Heaven, cry, pound the ground, and wail, but the bitterness wounding our *han*-ridden hearts does not go away."¹⁰² In this commemoration rally, they passionately declared: "the life of a human being weighs more than earth. In order to honor Jong-cheol's noble sacrifice, our mourning for his death and our struggle for democracy should not be a one-time event."¹⁰³ As their firm commitment testified, the mothers and wives passionately strived to restore the negated dignity of the martyrs through the most decent but powerful way of recognizing the ineliminable worth of their lives as human beings.

Through the practices of *salim* that were part of their family movements, the mothers and wives strived to affirm and restore the dignity of individual citizens. In other words, they contributed to the flourishing—*salim*—of each individual. However, their contribution to human flourishing did not remain at the individual level. It also occurred at the socio-cultural level. As discussed throughout this chapter, the mother and wives exemplified an alternative form of political resistance, which was life-affirming and non-violent. Specifically, through their burden-sharing practical wisdom, they wisely managed the extent of self-sacrifice in the course of

¹⁰² Yukahyup, *Neoeui-sarang, Naeui-tujaeng: Yukahyup 30nyuneui Kirok* [Your Love, My Struggle: 30 Years of History of Yukahyup] (Seoul: Sseolmul-kwa-Milmul, 2016), 459.

¹⁰³ Yukahyup, 459.

political resistance and demonstrated the possibility of affirming their own lives and others' at the same time. Their life-affirming and non-violent political resistance, their family movements, were all a *moral protest* that presented an alternative moral discourse, specifically an alternative moral virtue, to the wider society. As the poet Do Jong-hwan succinctly describes, they artfully wrote the virtue of *salim* with their bodies, through their distinctive family movement. The embodiment of an alternative moral virtue of *salim* was a life-giving gift to society, which facilitated a counterculture to the culture of *jukim*. Social movement theorist James M. Jasper argued: "The Nazis, the Khmer Rouge, and the Taliban of Afghanistan not only aimed at destroying certain cultures, but prevented many people from creating their own culture"¹⁰⁴ Likewise, the Park and Chun regimes dominated the moral discourses—as totalitarian ideology is wont to do—and disseminated the life-denying and dehumanizing culture of *jukim*. Under this cultural sickness, which I called a *totalitarian sickness* in chapter 2, Korean citizens suffered greatly and were forced to totally and tragically sacrifice their own lives in the name of "national resurrection," "realization of social justice," and even "democratization." In the midst of this cultural sickness, the mothers and wives healed the sickened culture and the suffering citizens with their "healing hands."¹⁰⁵ The embodied moral virtue of *salim* that they wrote through the family movements came about through their healing hands. With their healing hands, they passionately embraced "the wounds and suffering" of Korean society and "those who long for their warm hands."¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Yukahyup, 14.

¹⁰⁵ Yukahyup, 308.

¹⁰⁶ Yukahyup, 308.

CHAPTER 6

***BUHWAL* (RESURRECTION)**

I. Introduction

Knowing that *buhwal* is a Korean word that refers to resurrection, when I first told my wife that I planned to reflect theologically on the virtue of *salim* in light of the resurrection of Christ in this chapter, she asked, “Isn’t *salim* the same word as *buhwal*?” Since *buhwal* is a theologically-loaded term, I would hesitate to associate this “holy” term with the colloquial term *salim*. However, as my wife recognized, the original meaning of *salim* etymologically comes from the verb *salida*, which could be translated as *restore to life* or *bring back to life*, that is, *to resurrect*.

As explored in chapter 3, for the mothers and wives of political victims, a theological commitment to the resurrection of Christ was the central tenet of their Christian belief. They lived out this theological commitment through their family movements, specifically their artful and symbolic public protests, such as Kukahyup’s “Resurrection Songs” protest in the early dawn of Easter in April of 1976 and its Victory Shawls project. As noted in the conclusion of chapter 3, in the 1980s, neither Minkahyup nor Yukahyup in the 1980s explicitly employed Christian language and practices in their public protests, but they lived out their underlying theological commitments by creatively resignifying cultural values and practices.

In this chapter, I examine their faithfulness and explore how they lived out their theological commitments in the public sphere. Then I focus on analogical affinities between the mothers and wives of political victims who faithfully lived out their theological commitment to the resurrection of Christ and the women in the Gospel of Matthew who became the first witness

to the resurrection of Christ. This chapter explores those analogical affinities between the two groups of women and then re-reads the resurrection narrative in the Gospel of Matthew through the stories of the mothers and wives uncovered throughout this dissertation. For this task, I employ a *liberative* hermeneutic, which reads Scripture from the perspective of marginalized communities emphasizing “the preferential option for the oppressed” and more importantly focusing on “orthopraxis, the correct actions [practices] required to bring about liberation.”¹ This re-reading of the resurrection narrative through the stories of the mothers and wives is also informed by historical-critical studies of Scripture and contemporary Christian ethicists’ reconstructive accounts of the resurrection of Christ, particularly Kelly Brown Douglas’ book *Stand Your Ground*.

Re-reading the Matthean resurrection narrative through the stories of the mothers and wives of political victims suggests an alternative Christian virtue discourse to the conventional discourses that are primarily and perhaps exclusively focus on imitating Jesus’ self-sacrifice unto death. This chapter concludes by suggesting the biblical women’s *faithful public witness to God’s resurrecting power* as an alternative theological virtue for an oppressed Christian community that is suffering under the crucifying power of *jukim* manifested through multiple forms of structural and cultural violence.

II. The Mothers’ and Wives’ Faithful Public Witness to the Power of *Salim*

Throughout this dissertation, I have examined how *the culture of jukim* inhumanely negated the dignity of human life and destructively consumed countless citizens’ lives for the sake of the “glory” of the nation. Under the totalitarian ideology, the culmination of this cultural

¹ Miguel A. De La Torre, ed., *Ethics: A Liberative Approach* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2013), 3–6.

manifestation of evil by the Park and Chun regimes, the total sacrifices of individuals were falsely and tragically moralized as embodying the prime moral virtue. Their bodies were “virtuously” offered as living sacrifices on the altars of “national resurrection,” “social justice,” or “democratization.” As Park Chung-hee himself noted, they shed blood and tears for their nation, and their sacrifices became the fuel that accelerated their nation’s “resurrection.” The nation itself could be “resurrected” from the death called “poverty,” the Park regime claimed, but ironically it ruled out the possibility for individual citizens to experience the genuine life-giving power of resurrection. The culture of *jukim*—through the evil hands of the Park and Chun regimes—dictated citizens’ daily lives and viciously exerted its indiscriminate violence against them. Too many “small christs”² suffered, were tortured, and/or were dead on crosses inscribed “*Sanop-jeonsa*” (industrial warriors), “*Hyunmo-yangcheo*” (wise mother and good wife), “*Ppalgaengi*” (literally meaning the Reds, referring to communists or North Korean sympathizers), or “*Yeolsa*” (political martyrs).

As argued in chapter 5, the mothers and wives of political victims exemplified the embodied moral virtue of *salim* that they brought to pass through their “healing hands” and their family movements, for these contributed to creating an alternative moral discourse to the totalitarian ideology. Put differently, through their life-giving and non-violent—that is, *salim*—forms of political resistance, the mothers and wives publicly witnessed the life-giving power of *salim* that (1) saved jeopardized lives, (2) affirmed and restored the dignity of human life, and (3) overcame the evil power of *jukim*. For their public witness to the power of *salim* against the evil power of *jukim*, specifically, they virtuously resignified the practices of *salim*: they creatively unearthed the power of *salim*, already embedded in their daily practices of household

² Jong-sook Lee, interview; in that interview, I learned that the Kukahyup members identified their imprisoned sons, daughters, and husbands as “small christs” who bore their own crosses on the path to democracy and justice.

management, but now in the public sphere. More importantly, their unwavering faith in God, specifically their theological commitment to the resurrection of Christ, anchored them in their unyielding commitment to the public witness of the power of *salim*, restoring the power of life against the evil power of *jukim*. They lived out their theological commitment to the resurrection of Christ and the ensuing commitment to the public witness to the power of *salim* through their resignified practices of *salim*, particularly their communal practices of lamentation.

For the members of Kukahyup, their belief in the resurrection of Christ was what ultimately sustained their political resistance. They often explicitly enacted their theological beliefs through their practices of political resistance. For example, as we saw in chapter 3, in wearing the purple *hanbok* (Korean traditional costume), they were intentionally adopted the color from the Christian Lenten liturgical tradition in order to embrace the passion of their family members and symbolically represent their unyielding hope of God's final victory over evil. In spite of their robust theological conviction, the evil culture of *jukim*, manifested in the riot police's violent suppression, the deprivation of their rights to observe their family members' trials, etc., attacked their bodies and minds. To counter this attack and the harm it did them, they started a collective spiritual practice for healing their wounded souls by resignifying a gendered domestic practices: knitting Victory Shawls. As with the *hanbok*, so too with this practice they intentionally adopted its purple color, V-shape, and even its name as ways live out their theological commitment to mourning for God's suffering on the cross and their conviction of God's final victory over evil realized through the resurrection of Christ.

More importantly, this collective spiritual practice was also part of their communal lamentation for the suffering of their family members. From my interview with a key leader of Kukahyup, I found that while its members identified their imprisoned sons, daughters, and

husbands as “small christs” who bore their own crosses on the path to democracy and justice, they identified themselves as “women on the path” who passionately embrace their family members’ agony and suffering.³ After the March 1st incident, in suite 301 of the Christian Building, the birth place of Kukahyup, around the big cross on the wall they had drawn eighteen small crosses with the names of convicted family members. In the presence of these crosses, they sat down and knitted the shawls together. The space where they knitted together was indeed the space of mourning for the suffering of their family members who were crucified on the crosses of *jukim*. Although this collective spiritual practice rarely entailed explicit crying or sobbing, in knitting the shawls silently, they passionately embraced their family members’ crosses.

In this space of mourning, the members of Kukahyup strangely found “deep peace and joy” while they knitted together in silence.⁴ This inner joy is also the kind of transcendental joy examined in chapter 4. Transcendental joy mysteriously broke into the space of communal lamentation, and it was infused into the mourning members of Kukahyup. Thanks to this transcendental joy, their wounded souls were mysteriously healed and restored in the course of their struggles against the evil power of *jukim*. In other words, in the space of communal lamentation, they themselves experienced the power of *salim*. This life-giving power was embodied by their embodied practice of knitting, specifically in the form of a physical object—the Victory Shawl. This shawl consists of numerous small units, and each small unit is made up of four stiches. As they knitted each stich, the Kukahyp members would say silently or out loud “the four syllables, *min-ju-hoe-bok*, meaning ‘restore democracy.’”⁵ This knitting practice was

³ Jong-sook Lee, interview.

⁴ Jong-sook Lee, interview.

⁵ Stentzel, *More Than Witnesses: How a Small Group of Missionaries Aided Korea’s Democratic Revolution*, 174.

indeed “their chant and their prayer.”⁶ Since it took more than “10,000 stitches to complete one shawl,”⁷ this meant they were continually invoking the power of *salim* to restore their hope for democratization and their power for political resistance.

As the Kukahyup members healed and restored their own worn-out souls through the *salim* practices that enacted their theological commitment to the resurrection of Christ, they also helped political victims, specifically political prisoners, to experience the power of *salim* that they believed could save them from the menacing attacks of the culture of *jukim*. As explored in chapter 3, following the arrest of their family members, the Kukahyup members and specifically the wives of the imprisoned leaders of the March 1st Declaration, had not been allowed to visit their family members confined in the Seodaemun Prison for more than a month. In other words, the Park regime had prevented them from *okbaraji* or taking care of the imprisoned family members, including visiting them in prison. The political prisoners had been isolated within their small prison cells. They were uncertain about their fate. Isolated and uncertain, their bodies and souls became fragile. Their commitment to and hope for democratization were significantly weakened. Lacking hope, the small prison cells felt more like tombs.⁸ Their souls were suffocating under the evil power of *jukim*. Spiritually, they were becoming “dead” and were locked inside of the tomb of *jukim*.

Nevertheless, the Kukahyup members did not give up, as they firmly believed in the resurrection of Christ, the final victory of God over evil. As Easter was approaching, some of them had a burning desire to share the good news of the resurrection of Christ with their imprisoned family members. Since they were not allowed to meet their imprisoned family members in person, they planned another way to deliver the good news: through what they called

⁶ Stentzel, 174.

⁷ Stentzel, 174.

⁸ Lee and Lee, *Duri Georeun Han Gil*, 153.

“Resurrection Songs.” Interestingly, all imprisoned the leaders in the March 1st Declaration and their family members were Christians. Most of them were members of the Church of Galilee that had been established on August 17, 1975 in order to support the families of political prisoners. Indeed, the church served as the birthplace of Korean *minjung* theology. In this church, the *minjung* of *minjung* suffered under the Park regime’s oppression gathered, mourned, and worshipped together. In light of their shared Christian practices, in the early morning of Easter Sunday on April 18, 1976, the Kukahyup members climbed up the hill next to the prison and there loudly sang familiar hymns and songs that joyfully declared the resurrection of Christ.⁹

One of the hymns was “Low in the Grave He Lay,” and its lyrics goes:

Low in the grave He lay; Jesus my Savior
 Waiting the coming day; Jesus my Lord
 Up from the grave He arose, He arose
 With a mighty triumph o’er His foes, He arose!
 He arose a victor from the dark domain
 And He lives forever with His saints to reign
 He arose! He arose! Hallelujah Christ arose!

The joyful and powerful noise proclaiming the resurrection of Christ was heard in the prison.

The Kukahyup members’ proclamation of the resurrection shook the tomb of *jukim* like a great earthquake. As Christ arose, the political prisoners whose souls had become half-dead were quickened. One of the prisoners, Rev. Lee Hae-dong testified:

I was certain that my families were there. It was certain that our families sang the hymns on the resurrection for the imprisoned. Each face of the members was visualized in my heart as if they were standing right next to me. Suddenly, the lonely and cold prison room was filled with the warm and comforting presence of the families. I could not lie down but knelt down on the holy ground and prayed. “Lord, come and be present here. Come to this place like a tomb. Come and break the door of this tomb with your power of resurrection!”¹⁰

⁹ Lee and Lee, 112.

¹⁰ Lee and Lee, 153.

Even though the Kukahyup members were not able to meet their imprisoned family members in person, they presented the perfect *obaraji* for the prisoners by declaring the good news of resurrection. For the prisoners, the joyful sound of the hymns itself embodied the presence of their beloved family members. More importantly, as the prison cell, the tomb of *jukim*, was surrounded by the sacred sound, this space of *jukim* was transcendentally transformed into a space of *salim*. In this life-giving space, the prisoners encountered the risen Christ. They were no longer prisoners but worshippers of the resurrected Christ. Their devastated bodies and souls were restored to full life and given renewed hope in God's final victory over evil. Through the "Resurrection Songs" as a creative extension of their *okbaraji*, the Kukahyup members faithfully witnessed the resurrecting power of God in public and creatively delivered the life-giving *salim* message to the "small christs" who were suffering in the tomb of *jukim*.

Minkahyup upheld the rich legacies of Kukahyup and Yangkahyup, particularly, their theological commitment to witnessing the power of *salim* in the public sphere. However, Minkahyup appropriately adopted these legacies to a more pluralistic context, as it served as a representative organization that had consolidated four different family groups.¹¹ Even though the majority of Minkahyup members were Christians, the members of Minkahyup lived out their underlying theological commitment by creatively resignifying cultural values and practices rather than explicitly utilizing Christian languages and practices. Nevertheless, like the members of Kukahyup, they also faithfully fulfilled their public mission to deliver the resurrecting power of *salim* to many small christs tortured and/or sacrificed on the crosses of *jukim*.

As explored in chapter 3, the spring of 1986 was filled with tragic deaths of young college students. Four Seoul National University students consecutively offered their bodies as

¹¹ Please go back to check the conclusion of chapter 3 for the major differences between the family movements in the 1970s and those in the 1980s.

living sacrifices on the altar of democracy. As critically examined in chapter 4, their noble sacrifices should be remembered and properly honored, but I argued there that these sacrifices were attributed to the students' tragic internalization of the totalitarian ideology that prevailed within the culture of *jukim*. Indeed, these young suicide protesters were the particular targets of the culture of *jukim*. With the inscription "*yeolsa* (political martyrs)" written over these heads, as it were, they were tragically crucified on the crosses of *jukim*. The dignity of the martyr's life was totally negated by the governing authorities. The Chun regime completely denied public lamentation for these martyrs. Indeed, it harshly criticized their deaths as reflecting filial vice. These crucified martyrs were inhumanely abandoned on the crosses of *jukim*.

Against the crucifying power of the culture of *jukim*, the Minkahyup members faithfully witnessed to the power of *salim* by properly mourning the martyrs and delivering the life-affirming message to young protesters. For this public witness, the Minkahyup members creatively resignified one of their cultural roles as mothers in the domestic sphere: the moral education of their children. They radically extended the boundary of those they should educate morally to include the government officials and political leaders of the ruling party and young protesters beyond their own children. This they did first, by morally rebuking the government officials and political leaders of the ruling Democratic Justice Party for their complete lack of mourning for the deaths of young students: "Are this nation's officials and politicians cold-blooded animals who does not have any tears for the death of our people?"¹² They also morally challenged the Chun regime's selective, partial, and exclusive "tears and sorrow" for those who represented and enacted their political power, such as the wounded riot policemen.¹³ Then,

¹² Association of Families for Human Rights, *Minjuhwaewi-kilmookae-sun-eomony*, 72.

¹³ Association of Families for Human Rights, 72–73.

through a public statement, they declared the martyrs' lives to be "part of our lives."¹⁴ With this declaration of inclusion, they gathered and mourned together for the tragic deaths of their young children. As the *mothers* of these young martyrs, their courageous moral challenge to the Chun regime and their faithful mourning contributed to restoring the negated dignity of the martyrs' lives.

As mothers, the Minkahyup members taught the young protesters another moral lesson. Kim Choon-ok, a co-chair of Minkahyup, delivered a life-affirming message to young college students and workers in the very space where Lee Dong-soo had immolated his body:

Now this mother's heart is broken and filled with full of pain. So I have come here again. I have not only come, but have come to scold you. I have come here to say that your life is not yours. Your life is dignified. You have only one life, and yours is for this generation and this nation. No one can take away this life. *You have the right to be loved and the duty to preserve your life.* Do not forsake this right and this duty. This mother has come to scold you but at the same time to scold our older generation.¹⁵

Within a month, the culture of *jukim* tragically consumed the lives of four young college students. As *minjung* poet Kim Chi-ha critically said later, "the *kut* (Korean indigenous shamanistic ritual) of death was performed by young protesters at that time. The cultural sickness unto death was pandemic. Young students and workers desired "the noble death." They yearned for the will to have a "virtuous death" rather than a "cowardly life." Framed as a virtue, the culture of *jukim* forced them to become virtuous *yeolsa* whose life would be totally burned up on the altar of "democracy" or "eternal social justice." In the midst of this pandemic cultural sickness, the Minkahyup members in their role as mothers strongly affirmed the dignity of human life and declared it to be every citizen's moral duty to affirm and preserve the dignity of their own life. The mothers of Minkahyup morally rebuked young protesters for their individual-centric view of life and morally instructed them about the communal understanding of life based on the

¹⁴ Association of Families for Human Rights, 72.

¹⁵ Emphasis added; see Association of Families for Human Rights, 79.

interconnection of all lives. Through this moral lesson and with their “healing hands (*yak-son*)” the mothers of Minkahyup embraced their children who were suffering from the cultural sickness and restored their children’s will to life, life with full dignity.

Nevertheless, the life-negating power of the culture of *jukim* was formidable. It was manifested in the form of inhumane and brutal state violence. In January of 1987, Park Jong-cheol was inhumanely killed by torturers in “the human slaughterhouse” of Namyoung-dong. Several months later, during the mass protest against the inhumane use of torture, Lee Han-yeol was brutally killed by riot police who fired a tear gas canister directly at Han-yeol’s head. The Chun regime again denied public lamentation for these martyrs. In the case of Park’s death, it even absurdly covered up his death by torture and alleged he had died from a sudden heart attack. These two innocent little christs were brutally crucified on the crosses of *jukim*. Moreover, their dead bodies were mocked by the absurd lies told about them. They were left dead on their crosses and inhumanely reduced to mere *things* to display the power and terror of the governing authorities, the executioners of the culture of *jukim*.

Again, the Minkahyup members faithfully and courageously fought against the terrifying force of the culture of *jukim*. By resignifying the cultural symbols, they honorably mourned the deaths of the two young martyrs, restored the negated dignity of the martyrs’ lives, and witnessed the power of *salim* in a public sphere. As public protest against the “absurd” lie of the Chun regime dishonoring Park’s life, the Minkahyup members mobilized a commemoration rally in the streets of Namyoung-dong, “the human slaughterhouse” where Park was killed. At this rally, they wore white hemp headscarves for the first time to symbolize their genuine lamentation as the mothers of the deceased children. This symbol of mourning was the result of their creative resignification of two cultural symbols: (1) white hemp clothing conventionally worn as

mourning dress of the immediate family of the deceased, and (2) headscarves commonly worn by ordinary mothers when doing household work. Wearing the white hemp headscarves, the mothers of Minkahyup marched through the streets of Namyoun-dong. As they walked through the streets crying, the space of *jukim* that had been filled with dehumanizing terror was transformed into the space of *salim* became with sanctifying mourning. In this transformed space, Park's dignity was resurrected from the cross of *jukim*, as his dignified life was reaffirmed in the hearts of the mothers.¹⁶

The mothers of Minkahyup again wore their white hemp headscarves for the funeral of Lee Han-yeol. Since Lee's death had galvanized Korean citizens' public anger and their burning thirst for democracy and justice. Over one million people had gathered at Yonsei University to participate in his funeral. In this massive gathering, the mothers of Minkahyup took the leading role, specifically taking care of Lee's mother Bae Eun-sim. They accompanied her and shed tears together when Rev. Moon Ik-hwan called out the names of the martyrs, beginning with Jeon Tae-il and reciting their names all the way to that of Lee Han-yeol. These persons marched in front of the funeral procession as it wound its way from the university where Lee was brutally hit by a tear gas canister to City Hall. Throughout the procession, the mothers of Minkahyup mourned with Lee's mother for the death of her (and by extension their) son. They walked through the space of *jukim* where the life-negating power of *jukim* had brutally taken Lee's life and transformed it into a space of *salim* with their sanctifying tears which restored the negated dignity of Lee's life, and with the resurrecting power of *salim* enacted through their loud and repeated chant, "*Han-yeol-yireul-salryonaera* (Resurrect Han-yeol)!" By wearing the mourning

¹⁶ As explored in chapter 2, in the Thursday Prayer Meeting on February 22, Kim Choon-ok, a co-chiar of Minkahyup, delivered her letter to Park Jong-cheol, shed tears with the fellow mothers, and declared the mothers' commitment to "letting you [Park Jong-cheol] live in our hearts and our history forever to guide us in the journey to the bright dawn." See Association of Families for Human Rights, 136.

headscarves, by lamenting together for the deceased son, by chanting the prayer invoking Lee's resurrection, the mothers of Minkahyup faithfully and publicly witnessed to the power of *salim*, which overcame the vicious power of *jukim*.

III. Biblical Women's Witness to the Resurrecting Power of God

The Gospel of Matthew testifies to the story of a group of women who were the first witnesses to the resurrection of Jesus. This Gospel narrative shines a bright light on these women's excellent character in contrast to all the male disciples' unfaithfulness in the midst of Jesus' terrifying death. Recall that Judas betrayed Jesus for thirty pieces of silver (Matthew 26:15);¹⁷ that when Jesus was arrested, "all the disciples deserted him and fled" out of fear (26:56); and that though Peter, one of the disciples, promised not to deny Jesus (26:35), as Jesus said he would, he denied him three times after the arrest (26:75). Throughout the Gospel narratives of the crucifixion, death, and burial of Jesus, all the male disciples' names and even their presence are never mentioned. While Jesus was suffering unto death and then was left dead on the cross, they unfaithfully abandoned their master.

However, when Jesus was suffering unto death on the cross there was a group of women who faithfully accompanied him. These "many women" had followed Jesus from the beginning of his ministry in Galilee and had provided for him (27:55). While all the male disciples fled, these women looked at Jesus from a distance. Some may argue that watching "from a distance" connotes "a lack of courage or identification," but this posture merely represents "the practical reality" that only the soldiers who were executing the crucifixion had direct access to the cross.¹⁸

The Gospel narratives of Jesus' death, burial, and eventually resurrection coherently and

¹⁷ From now on, all biblical references in this chapter follow the New Revised Standard Version.

¹⁸R. T. France, *New International Commentary on the New Testament: The Gospel of Matthew* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2007), 1086.

continually testify to the presence of these women.¹⁹ This continuity strengthens credibility of the women “eyewitnesses to the kerygmatic triad: [that] Jesus died, was buried, [and] was raised.”²⁰ In addition, this continuity testifies to the women’s virtuous character: their repeated faithful actions of accompanying Jesus throughout his life and even after his death reflect their excellent character trait.

As argued at the beginning of this chapter, there are analogical affinities between the women in the Gospel of Matthew and the mothers and wives of political victims in South Korea. Both groups of women lost their beloved family members. Both groups of women communally lamented the deaths of their family members. Both groups of women were joyfully empowered to witness the life-giving message to society as a whole. Both groups of women exemplified their excellent character traits.

Based on these analogical affinities, for the rest of this chapter I re-read the resurrection narrative in the Gospel of Matthew through the stories of the mothers and wives uncovered in this dissertation. For this task, I employ a particular *liberative* hermeneutic and draw on historical-critical studies of Scripture and contemporary Christian ethicists’ reconstructive accounts of the resurrection of Christ, particularly Kelly Brown Douglas’ *Stand Your Ground*.²¹

¹⁹ In the Gospel of Matthew, among the group of women, Mary Magdalene and Mary the mother of James and Joseph are specifically mentioned as witnesses to the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus. Biblical scholars vary in their interpretations of who the two women were at that time. Given the nature of this dissertation, this chapter does not pay attention to this question. However, this chapter argues that the two women at least represent the group of women who exemplified faith.

²⁰ W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, Jr., *Matthew 19-28*, vol. 3, International Critical Commentary (New York: T&T Clark, 2004), 637.

²¹ A womanist ethicist Kelly Brown Douglass reconstructs and/or re-contextualizes the traditional account of the power of resurrection in the midst of the current American culture of “death,” a culture that normalizes the negation of black bodies’ integrity and sanctity through gun violence and police brutality. Against this culture of death, what she calls “the stand-your-ground culture” (which culminated in the unjust murder of Trayvon Martin), God’s resurrecting power is life-affirming in nature and restores the integrity of all human bodies and the sanctity of all life. I found deep resonance with my work here in terms of reconstructing the theological meaning of the resurrection against the culture of *jukim*. See *Stand Your Ground: Black Bodies and the Justice of God* (New York: Orbis Books, 2015).

First of all, it is important to note that the relationship between Jesus and the group of “many women” (Matthew 27:55) goes beyond a mere master-disciple relationship. Jesus resignified family relationships as going beyond kinship—“For whoever does the will of my Father in heaven is my brother and sister and mother” (Matthew 12:50). Thus we can understand the relationship between him and his followers, including many female followers and male disciples, as a *family* relationship. It was no coincidence that the risen Jesus called the male disciples “my brothers” (28:10). After unfaithfully deserting their beloved family member, Jesus, the male disciples must surely have thought that their family relationship with Jesus and other followers “had come to an end in Gethsemane.”²² Given this context, “the description of the male disciples as ‘my brothers’” entails “one significant new element,” that is, restoration of the broken *family* relationship.²³ The new boundaries of family drawn by Jesus radically embraced all his followers regardless of their gender, social status, ethnicity, etc. Even the unfaithful male disciples were again included in the family circle. The group of “many women” who had followed Jesus from the beginning of his ministry in Galilee was an inseparable part of this all-embracing family.

The Gospel of Matthew narrates that the group of women, represented as “Mary Magdalene and the other Mary,” went to “see the tomb” on the third day after the death of Jesus (28:1). Although there are different opinions on the motives of women for “seeing the tomb” of Jesus, I argue that they went to “see the tomb” and to mourn together for death of their beloved family member, Jesus. If we consider the family relationship between the women and Jesus, it is natural to imagine the bereaved family coming to the tomb and lamenting together, just as the mothers and wives of political victims, specifically political martyrs, lamented together for the

²² France, *New International Commentary on the New Testament: The Gospel of Matthew*, 1103.

²³ France, 1103.

tragic deaths of their family members. My argument is also supported by considering the importance of the *continuity* of the women's presence and actions in the Gospel narratives. Even though the Gospel of Matthew does not explicitly narrate that the women mourned and lamented together at the tomb, I argue that they mourned together there just as they did at the death and burial of Jesus.

Matthew describes that the women “were there, sitting opposite the tomb,”²⁴ during the burial of Jesus (27:61). Their bodily posture signals their communal mourning for Jesus' death. In general, sitting or lying on the ground is one of the common “mourning behaviors” in the Old Testament, along with tearing one's garments, putting on sackcloth, tossing ashes or dust on one's head, and rolling in ashes or dust.²⁵ Specifically, according to the Jewish burial customs practiced in the first century of early Roman Palestine, Jews set a “‘mourning enclosure’ around the entrance to the tomb,” a space for “public lamentation and eulogizing of the deceased” as part of the procession to the tomb.²⁶ Members of the procession, including members of the immediate family, could “seat” themselves on “bench seats” in this enclosure and mourn for the deceased.²⁷

Given these Jewish burial customs, the women—as members of Jesus' immediate family who had followed him from the beginning of his ministry—could sit on the mourning benches near the tomb and lament the death of Jesus together. More importantly, for the members of the immediate family of the dead, their communal mourning and lamentation did not “come to end, however, with the funeral procession and the ceremony of primary burial” but “unfolded over the

²⁴ At that time, in the Jewish culture, sitting was often “a gesture of grief,” so the women's posture could be a literary device to symbolize their mourning for Jesus. See Davies and Allison, Jr., *Matthew 19-28*, 652.

²⁵ Saul M. Olyan, *Biblical Mourning: Ritual and Social Dimensions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 30.

²⁶ Byron R. McCane, *Roll Back the Stone: Death and Burial in the World of Jesus* (New York: Trinity Press International, 2003), 37.

²⁷ McCane, 37.

following weeks and months.”²⁸ For the first week after the death, called “*shiv’ah* (seven),” they were expected to “abstain from working, bathing, wearing shoes, and most forms of social participation” and to “visit the tomb” in order to *mourn* there. Following these customs, just as they mourned during the burial, it is probably that the women went to “see the tomb” in order to lament the death of Jesus.

Interestingly, the women’s communal lamentation for Jesus could be regarded as a kind of *gendered domestic* practice. For Jews, the funeral and burial rituals that honor the dead were domestic practices: the immediate family members of the deceased were responsible for commemorating and honoring their loved one. Although male family members participated in mourning the dead, female family members were “certainly central to the mourning side of funerals.”²⁹ Throughout the funeral and burial processes, the immediate family members were expected to carry out the “lamentations,” and this task became “*the particular task of women*, who would then teach their daughters,” as this task became more formalized.³⁰ This gendered dimension of lamentation could be further extended to a context of collective deaths, that is, beyond the death of an individual. As Jeremiah 9:20–21 says:

Hear, O Women, the word of the LORD,
and let your ears receive the word of his mouth;
teach to your daughters a dirge,
and teach to her neighbor a lament.
“Death has come up into our windows,
it has entered our palaces,
to cut off the children from the streets
and the young men from the squares.”

This biblical text as “the word of the LORD” authoritatively orders women “to teach other women lamentation and dirge on account of the widespread death [the menacing attacks of the

²⁸ McCane, 37–38.

²⁹ Jon Davies, *Death, Burial and Rebirth in the Religions of Antiquity* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 107.

³⁰ Davies, 106.

evil culture of death] among the populace of Jerusalem at the time of its collapse.”³¹ To sum up, Jewish women in general were culturally and socially assigned to a leading role in mourning deaths, particularly at a domestic level.

The Gospel of Matthew first introduces the women who lamented the death of Jesus as those who “had followed Jesus from Galilee and had provided for (*diakoneo* in Greek) him” (27:55). Biblical scholars vary in interpreting this Greek word *diakoneo*, but “the sense of *practical, domestic service*” for Jesus and his followers (i.e., preparing a communal meal for the group of disciples and followers) seems most prominent considering the conventional gendered roles assigned to women in general.³² From the beginning of Jesus’ ministry, the women had faithfully followed him and had actively participated in his ministry through their repeated and habitual domestic practices. In this regard, the women continued their active participation in Jesus’ ministry even after the death of Jesus by faithfully and communally fulfilling their domestic practice of lamentation. Their faithful domestic practices culminated in their communal lament practice.

Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the women’s communal lamentation for Jesus entails a deeper meaning beyond mere observance of the Jewish burial customs at that time. In the case of Jesus’ death, his terrifying death on the cross, I suggest that their lament practice was an extension of *salim* practices that reflected the original value of *salim*—that of restoring the power of life and overcoming the vicious power of *jukim*. In order to understand the life-giving value of the women’s communal lamentation, it is necessary to examine how the evil power of *jukim* was manifested through the hands of Roman Empire in the case of Jesus’ terrifying death on the cross.

³¹ Olyan, *Biblical Mourning*, 50.

³² France, 1085.

Under the Roman Empire, crucifixion was a kind of political terror executed by the governing authorities. However, this political terror was more like the *totalitarian terror* examined in chapter 2, as it was not executed arbitrarily by a tyrant but exerted for specific purposes: sacrificing individuals for the sake of “peace” or “law and order.”³³ Crucifixion was reserved not just for anyone, but specifically for those who are (possibly falsely) accused of threatening “the ‘peace’ of the day” or of “the treasonous offense of violating the rule of Roman ‘law and order.’”³⁴ Also, as a form of terror, crucifixion entails a theatrical dimension intended to maintain and reinforce established power. This torturous death was designed to send a symbolic message: “Disrupt the Roman order in any way [and] this ... will happen to you [too].”³⁵

In the case of Jesus, he was sacrificed on the cross in order to avoid a riot by the mob, in order to secure the “peace” of the empire (Matthew 27:24–26). On the cross, his suffering body became a mere theatre of horrifying terror. In other words, Jesus was inhumanely and violently reduced to a mere *part* (or *thing*) for the “glory” of the Roman Empire. This terrifying life-negation/destruction and dehumanization/thingification is the internal logic of crucifixion as a form of totalitarian terror. This life-consuming violence includes “not simply the physical brutality meant to harm bodies, but also the *systems, structures, narratives, and constructs* that do harm.”³⁶ In other words, Jesus’ crucifixion was a deadly manifestation of a life-negating and dehumanizing culture, the culture of *jukim*. It enacted the power of the evil culture that “denigrates human bodies, destroys life, and preys on the most vulnerable in society.”³⁷

The evil culture of *jukim* was manifested through the hands of the Roman Empire even after the terrifying death of Jesus. The Roman Empire often denied even a “decent burial” and

³³ Douglas, *Stand Your Ground*, 174.

³⁴ Douglas, 174.

³⁵ Douglas, 174.

³⁶ Douglas, 184.

³⁷ Douglas, 183.

mourning for “condemned criminals.”³⁸ In particular, victims of crucifixion were often intentionally “left on their crosses for days.”³⁹ The burial and mourning of the dead is the most decent way of recognizing the dignity of one’s life: “By burying the dead and mourning their absence, members of a society *affirm* that *someone significant* [someone worthy as a fellow human being] has been lost.”⁴⁰ In this regard, through the denial of burial and mourning, the Roman Empire declared that the deaths of crucified criminals as “opponents and enemies” of the Empire “were not a loss to Roman society.”⁴¹ In other words, the Roman Empire totally negated the dignity of the victims as fellow human beings. Their dead bodies on the crosses were reduced to a political device of the Roman Empire by which to display “the might of Rome,” a device intended to evoke fear and terror rather than mourning and lamentation.⁴² In other words, the denial of burial and mourning for the dead is a state-sanctioned manifestation of the evil culture of *jukim* that inhumanely dishonors the dignity of human life.

Under these circumstances, Jesus’ dead body could be left on the cross as a vehicle of the Roman Empire’s theater of terror. But in the Gospel of Matthew we read that his body was honorably taken, wrapped in “a clean linen cloth,” and buried in “his own new tomb” (27:59–60). Thanks to this proper burial that followed the conventional Jewish burial customs, the women who had followed Jesus from Galilee mourned and lamented together for him throughout and even after the burial processes. Their communal lamentation radically challenged the evil culture of *jukim*—enacted by the Roman Empire’s inhumane treatment of the dead—and reflected the original value of *salim* in affirming and restoring the dignity of Jesus’ life and body. In other

³⁸ McCane, *Roll Back the Stone*, 90.

³⁹ McCane, 90.

⁴⁰ McCane, 91.

⁴¹ McCane, 91.

⁴² McCane, 91.

words, by mourning together for Jesus, they virtuously prepared the space of *salim* in which the totally negated dignity of Jesus's life and body was instead fully reaffirmed and restored.

In this space of communal lamentation, at the tomb, the group of women, represented as “Mary Magdalene and the other Mary” in the Gospel of Matthew, mysteriously encountered “an angel of the Lord” who suddenly appeared in front of them with a “great earthquake” (28:2–3). The angel invited them to become the first eyewitnesses to the resurrection of Jesus: “Come, see the place where he lay” (28:6). By becoming the first eyewitnesses, they were commissioned to deliver this good news—“He has been raised from the dead”—to Jesus' disciples who fled to Galilee (28:7). More strikingly, on the way of Galilee, they actually encountered the resurrected Jesus and first “worshipped” him by taking hold of his feet (28:10).

Considering the oppressive shackles of sexism in first-century Palestine that undermined women's self-worth and restrained their moral agency in the public sphere, this Gospel narrative is quite radical. In first-century Judaism, women were not qualified to “testify in trials as witnesses.”⁴³ This restriction of public role for women in the Jewish religious-legal system was based on gendered prejudices against women: “From women let no evidence be accepted, because of *the levity and temerity of their sex*.”⁴⁴ Indeed, disqualification of women as a trustworthy witness is merely one example of the widespread oppressive socio-cultural structures at that time. Given the socio-cultural status of women in general, the resurrection narrative in the Gospel of Matthew is striking and perhaps even scandalous as it places the women at the forefront.

⁴³ Gerald O'Collins and Daniel Kendall, “Mary Magdalene As Major Witness to Jesus' Resurrection,” *Theological Studies* 48 (1984): 631.

⁴⁴ Emphasis added. See O'Collins and Kendall, 631. For the original source, see Flavius Josephus, *Antiquities* (4, 8, 15), tr. H. St. J. Thackeray (New York: Putnam, 1930), 580–81.

Against this status quo, the women were empowered to break the oppressive constraints on their public leadership and become *the first eyewitnesses* to the empty tomb (28:6). The angel's last words to the women—"This is my message for you" (28:7)—are resonant with the formula frequently used in the Old Testament, marking "an authoritative pronouncement" and functioning as "a call to action."⁴⁵ In other words, the women were elevated to be *the first authorized preachers* of the good news to the public, and specifically to the male disciples. They restored their self-worth that had long been devalued by the oppressive socio-cultural structures and faithfully accepted their holy mission. On the way to fulfilling their mission, they were triply empowered to be *the first worshippers* of the risen Jesus (28:10). The triple empowerments constituted the women's flourishing in the oppressive gendered structures, which enabled them to restore their self-worth and dignity and at least defy the oppressive constraints on their public leadership.

More importantly, the women's radical empowerment was mediated through the women's experience of *transcendental joy*, specifically the *joy of empowerment*, discussed in chapter 4. Jesus' terrifying death on the cross could simply have brought them to despair and sorrow. They could simply have mourned the presence of their beloved family member, Jesus, at the tomb. And yet, in the midst of their hopelessness and sorrow, the transcendental reality—represented as "an angel of the Lord" (28:2)—unexpectedly broke into their life. The resurrection narrative in the Gospel of Mark dramatically contrasts the women's response to this transcendental reality with that of the Roman guards. When they encountered the angel, the women felt "fear," as the guards did too. Yet while the guards, whose powers were bestowed on them by and on behalf of the Roman Empire, were overwhelmed by fear, becoming like "dead

⁴⁵ Some examples of this formula are "The LORD has spoken" (Isa 1:2; Joel 3:8, etc.) and "I, the LORD, have spoken" (Num 14:35; Ezek 5:15, etc.). See France, 1101.

men” (28:4), the women overcame their fear in “great joy” (28:8). The term “great joy” here is very important to signify the ultimate source of their empowerment and the following fulfillment of their mission—that of delivering the good news of the resurrection of Jesus. The Gospel of Mark also testifies that the women’s mission was commissioned by the transcendental being—represented as a “young man” (16:5–7). However, Mark’s account says that fear overwhelmed and paralyzed them, and the women said nothing to anyone (16:8). I suggest that the women’s great joy is *transcendental joy*, examined in chapter 4, that mysteriously breaks into their lives and contributes them to achieve their own flourishing in transcending and transforming their hopeless sorrow. This transcendental joy revived their shattered hope and restored their power, so they were able to leave the tomb immediately and run to deliver the joyful news of the resurrection to the public, particularly the male disciples.

The empowered women in the Gospel of Matthew who mysteriously experienced transcendental joy in the space of mourning publicly witnessed to the *life-giving* force, the power of *God the Life*, that liberates *all* people, specifically the most vulnerable in society, “from the clutches of death and returns them to a full life.”⁴⁶ Put differently, what they witnessed was the resurrecting power of life, the power of *salim*, that restores the negated dignity of human life and overcomes the crucifying power of *jukim*. The Gospel of Matthew distinctively captures this “cosmic importance” of Jesus’ resurrection.⁴⁷ When the women first encountered God’s angel, there was a “great earthquake” (28:2), as Matthew also describes it in the passion narrative (27:51). The raising of the dead, including Jesus himself, and “many bodies of the saints who had fallen asleep (27:52),” followed. The great earthquake before the resurrection of the dead has a symbolic meaning of “shaking the foundations of the world,” specifically the evil culture of

⁴⁶ Douglas, *Stand Your Ground*, 181.

⁴⁷ Raymond E. Brown, “The Resurrection in Matthew,” *Worship* 64, no. 2 (1990): 162.

jukim, that had powerfully dictated all of life.⁴⁸ The life-giving—*salim*—power of God embodied in the resurrected body of Jesus not only shakes or challenges the evil culture but ultimately defeats its crucifying power that had violently consumed the body of Jesus on the cross.

The women in the Gospel narrative then faithfully stood as the first witnesses to the ultimate victory of God's resurrecting power, the power of *salim*, over the crucifying power of *jukim*. More strikingly, God's ultimate "triumph over crucifying violence and death" was concretely enacted by the public mission of the women—directly commissioned by the risen Jesus—to "go to *Galilee*" and declare the good news of the resurrection (28:10).⁴⁹ The specific location itself as both "the place of the poor and the despised" and "the site where Jesus' life-affirming ministry began" reveals the preferential option of God's *salim* power for the oppressed communities.⁵⁰ Through the women's public mission in Galilee, God's life-giving power restored the dignity of life for the "crucified class" of people whose bodies are "the particular targets of the world's violence" and whose lives are totally sacrificed by the evil culture of *jukim* in the name of ostensibly higher and noble causes such as "peace" or "law and order."⁵¹ The women themselves who had followed Jesus from Galilee were indeed among the crucified class of people. God's resurrecting power serves as the ultimate source of their transcendental joy, a joy that empowered them to break the oppressive shackles of the evil culture and to become the first public witnesses to God's victory over evil. They faithfully declared the *salim* message from God, the full restoration of dignity of all life, to the failed male disciples and all the crucified people who suffered from the menacing attacks of the evil culture of *jukim*.

⁴⁸ Brown, 162.

⁴⁹ Douglas, *Stand Your Ground*, 188.

⁵⁰ Douglas, 188.

⁵¹ Douglas, 188.

IV. Toward a Resurrecting Discourse of Theological Virtues

Re-reading of the resurrection narrative in the Gospel of Matthew through the stories of the mothers and wives of political victims presents us with a new way to construct an alternative discourse of theological virtues—the virtues of Christian community—to the conventional discourses that are primarily and perhaps exclusively focused on imitating Jesus’ self-sacrifice unto death on the cross. The stories of the mothers and wives are unique contributions that shift the focal point of Christian virtue discourses from Jesus’ virtuous self-sacrifice to the biblical women’s virtuous faithfulness as being the witnesses to God’s resurrecting power. Their stories reveal the danger of the conventional Christian virtue discourses for a particular Christian community, specifically those who suffer under the evil culture of *jukim* that forced them to sacrifice themselves entirely for the sake of a higher and noble cause. More importantly, by identifying themselves with “the women on the path” rather than many the “small christs,” by mourning together for the suffering christs and witnessing the life-giving power of *salim* in a public sphere, they offered us an alternative path for reconstructing a *resurrecting* discourse of theological virtues that highlights the biblical women’s virtue of being the faithful witness to God’s resurrecting power exemplified in the resurrection narrative, rather than Jesus’ virtues of “hope, obedience, courage, and patience” exemplified in the passion narrative.⁵²

Based on the re-reading of the resurrection narrative in the Gospel of Matthew, I suggest the biblical women’s faithful public witness to God’s resurrecting power as an alternative theological virtue for an oppressed Christian community that is suffering under the crucifying power of *jukim* manifested through multiple forms of structural and cultural violence. This particular theological virtue would enable the oppressed to embrace fully God’s resurrecting power manifested in the resurrection of Christ so that their negated dignity and their deprived

⁵² Hauerwas and Pinches, *Christians Among the Virtues*, xv.

power of life would be fully restored. In other words, through this theological virtue, by witnessing God's life-giving power, they would attain the fullness of human flourishing, the fullness of *salim*, against the crucifying power of *jukim*.

As argued throughout the Christian traditions, their theological virtue is indeed a *gift* from God. Put differently, this theological virtue is *infused* in them by God. In the Gospel of Matthew, without the living presence of the risen Jesus radiating God's resurrecting power, the women were not able to be faithful witnesses and consequently not able to achieve their theological virtue. In other words, the women's theological virtue depended on the presence of the risen Jesus and flowed from the life-giving power of God.

Apparently, however, not everyone (the male disciples, for example) is qualified to receive this gift from God. I suggest that the women had at least one qualification for receiving God's gift, for encountering with the risen Jesus, and for witnessing God's resurrecting power: the fact that they gathered and lamented together the suffering and death of Jesus. They became the first witnesses to the resurrecting power of God in the space where they mourned together. In other words, the key practice by which to infuse this theological virtue of being and bearing witness to God's resurrecting power is *communal lamentation*. The lamenting community constitutes the space and environment in which the gift from God is received.

Even though God's resurrecting power witnessed through the theological virtue is surely sufficiently powerful to overcome the vicious power of *jukim*, we have to be cautious of glorifying the resurrection, of merely equating God's resurrecting power with God's glorious triumph over evil. This glorification is dangerous because it glosses over the burden placed on the bearers of the theological virtue. This is what Shelly Rambo calls "surfacing [the] wounds"

of their hearts.⁵³ When I interviewed one of Yukahyup's members, my heart broke to hear that she was struggling to accept an invitation to a premiere of a new movie that depicts the tragic lives of the political martyrs (*yeolsa*), including her own son whose life was consumed on the altar of "democracy." On the one hand, she was grateful for this movie and wanted to commemorate her son's death. On the other hand, it was likely to be tremendously painful for her to resurface the *han*-ridden wounds that had clung so deeply to her heart in remembrance of her son's tragic death by watching the movie. Her story presented me with a new vantage point from which to re-read the resurrection narrative in the Gospel of Matthew, specifically the story of the women holding the risen Jesus' feet. I imagine that the women could surface the *wounds* on Jesus' feet, the mark of the nails, while they were holding the risen Jesus' feet, much as Thomas touched the mark of the nails on the risen Jesus' hands (John 20:24–28). Even the women who bore the theological virtue of being witnesses to God's resurrecting power had to remember the terror of crucifixion, the culmination of the vicious power of *jukim*, and to resurface their traumatic wounds, the terrifying death of their beloved family member, Jesus.

Nevertheless, the burden of resurfacing the traumatic wounds of hearts was not able to stop their faithful commitment to bear the theological virtue of witnessing God's resurrecting power to the wider society. In the end, the Yukahyup member tightly held the hands of other Yukahyup members as they watched the movie. At the end of the premiere, she went up the front and gave a moving speech: "As long as we remember and call my son's name, he is resurrected and alive forever in our hearts."⁵⁴ For her, it is still painful to resurface the traumatic wounds of the heart, but she is faithfully committed to resurrecting the negated dignity of human life "amid

⁵³ Shelly Rambo, *Resurrecting Wounds: Living in the Afterlife of Trauma* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2017), 11.


⁵⁴ Bae Sook-ja, interviewed by author, Seoul, Korea, December 13, 2017.

the ongoingness of death.”⁵⁵ Likewise, in the Gospel of Matthew, even after resurfacing the terrifying wounds of crucifixion, they ran to deliver the life-giving message of the resurrection of Jesus and to bear witness to God’s resurrecting power against the ongoing attacks of the crucifying power of *jukim*. The theological virtue of bearing witness to God’s resurrecting power does not gloss over the ongoingness of *jukim* in this broken world, but it does empower its bearer to fulfill the holy mission toward *buhwal, salim* of all of life against the crucifying power of *jukim*.

⁵⁵ Rambo, *Resurrecting Wounds*, 7.

Appendix A. Plan for the In-Depth Interviews with the South Korean Women

In order to successfully gather meaningful qualitative data on the abstract concepts, I plan to construct a “life graph” with each interviewee. The graph aims to chronically trace major events (significant changes/challenges) in their lifetime and hear their personal stories, evaluations, and emotions related to the major events. And I will provide a list of emotional expressions and the interviewees will choose relevant emotion-states when they are asked.



Phase 1: Understanding Structural Constrains (Before their participation in the social movement)

Initiating Question: Can you mark some major events before you participate in the social movement and evaluate each event (how much was it positive or negative)? And could you tell me more about each event and how did you felt about them?

Examples interview questions (some demographic questionnaire)

- 1) Have you attended an university or college?
 - a) If not, why?
 - b) Did you want to study further (i.e. attending an university or college)? If so, why?
- 2) Have you ever been employed?
 - a) If so, what you did you do?
 - b) If not, why?

- 3) Have you ever engaged any kind of political activities? (Organizing or participating in a NGO, street demonstration, etc.)
- 4) Can you describe the ideal model of motherhood or wifehood in Korean society?
- 5) Have ever felt “unfair” or “frustrated” as being born a “daughter/female” in your family?
- 6) When did you have your Christian/religious faith? How was important in your early life stages?

Phase 2: Understanding Dynamics of Emotions, Desires, and Actions (During their participation in the social movement)

Examples of interview questions

- 1) When/why/how did you first involve in the social movement?
- 2) Have you attended the Thursday Prayer Meetings?
 - a) If so, could you choose relevant emotion-states from the list of emotional expressions and please explain further how and why you felt so?
 - b) Have you ever experienced the presence of God while you were participating in the prayer meetings?
- 3) What as your role in a political organization (i.e. Kukahyup or Minkahyup) and what kind of political activities you engaged?
 - a) Could you choose relevant emotion-states from the list of emotional expressions and please explain further how and why you felt so?
 - b) Have you ever experienced the presence of God while you were engaging political activities?
- 4) Have you ever thought of self-harming protests (ritual suicide)?
 - a) If so, when and why?
 - b) If not, why?
- 5) Kukahyup and Minkahyup explicitly utilized Christian symbols (purple-colored cross in their clothes or purple-colored scarf on their heads). Do these symbols have special meanings to you?
 - a) If so, how do you understand these symbols? Is there any biblical story you might associate with?

Phase 3: Understanding Implications of Social Movement (After their participation in the social movement)

Examples of interview questions

- 1) How did your political/social engagement change your life?
- 2) Are you still engaging any kind of political activities these days?

Appendix B. Minkahyup's Emblem

(Photo taken by author with permission from Minkahyup)



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