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Building Moldova, Being Moldovan:
Discursive and Institutional Entanglements of
'Development,' 'Citizenship,' and 'Cultural Propriety'

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Abstract

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Moldova is one of many new, multiethnic, sovereign states struggling to maintain its borders and generate enough loyalty to keep its population from rebelling, or at least keep its citizens from increasingly drifting away to richer countries. Moldova gained its independence 21 years ago, and the question of its citizens' allegiances has been important to the United States, the European Union, and Russia. Some scholars doubt that feelings of a cohesive society could exist in a Soviet state fashioned out of several historical regions in 1947, and containing many ethnolinguistic groups. Thus, the central questions guiding this dissertation are: What processes guide the creation of a "cohesive society"? How is social cohesion related to shared cultural experiences? And, How are Moldovans navigating the transition of their lives from one type of state (and one type of citizenship) to another?

This work investigates contemporary common experiences of Moldovans, more narrowly asking how a "citizen" identity is constructed, as opposed to an ethnic or ethnonational identity. Drawing on literature from linguistic anthropology and critical discourse analysis, I hold that identities are formed through the mutually constituting relationship between discourse and culture. The majority of data was collected through ethnographic research with the Moldova Social Investment Fund (MSIF). By a close examination of the process by which applicants obtain an MSIF grant, I show one way in which Moldovans become exposed to Western ideologies and practices of participatory democracy and community development. I also demonstrate how the ideologies constitute powerful discursive formations that frame these new practices as appropriate means of building community cohesion. The relatively new discursive formations were compared to Moldovans' pre-existing ideas about development and citizenship, which intersect with, overlap, and challenge more contemporary discourses of development and citizenship. All of these are integrated, to varying degrees, into what Moldovans consider "proper" ways of being, or what makes an acceptable member of Moldovan culture and society. Through examination of the discursive formations of development, citizenship, and cultural propriety, my dissertation shows *how* Western ideals of civic behavior and social cohesion are being integrated into Moldovan life via MSIF development projects.

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Chapter 1:

Introduction

“Who knows what Moldova is?”

Tucked away in an essay by Clifford Geertz about the anthropology of multiethnic states is the question, “And who knows what Moldova is?” (2004, p. 579). For most Americans, Moldova is simply unknown. Some may have heard that it was classified the poorest country in Europe in 2003; others may know of its reputation as a transit point for human trafficking between East and West. What Geertz referred to, and what many scholars know about Moldova, is that it is one among many small, multiethnic sovereign states struggling to maintain its borders and generate enough loyalty to the state to keep its population from rebelling, or at least keep its citizens from slowly drifting away to richer countries. It might have been better had he asked, “And who knows who Moldovans are?” since Moldova is made up of its people and their points of view, history, daily life, and interactions with others. Charles King, a historian and political scientist known for his monograph on the country’s political history and early years of independence, concluded that no government has successfully conducted nation-building there:

> Moldova remained, even a decade after independence, the only country in Eastern Europe in which major disputes existed among political and cultural elites over the fundamentals of national identity. Only in Moldova did a clear distinction exist between powerful groups whose members held divergent views on the basic

> question of what it means to be a member of the ethnic group for whom the country is named (2000, p. 229).

Conclusions such as King's led me to question what I had experienced while living among Moldovans in the mid-1990s and early 2000s. I found people who were consciously part of a diverse society, to be sure, but who also shared many parts of their lives in common and talked about their fellow countrymen and women as if they were all part of a larger whole. They were a bit of a puzzle, exhibiting a melange of traditions garnered from agricultural lifestyles, Russian and Romanian "high culture," industrial modes of production, and the Soviet sense of community. I began this research by questioning my own understanding of Moldovans' lives, and then by asking how Moldovans saw themselves in relation to their fellow citizens. Since King's conclusions were derived from interviews with political and cultural elites, were they applicable to the Moldovan population at large? Did Moldovans in general feel more allegiance to their ethnic brethren than to the new state? How could I account for the sense of common culture and society I had felt among them? And, what would make a person call him or herself a "Moldovan" and mean a citizen of the state, not a member of the ethnic group? King's account, while not inaccurate, is also firmly situated in the 1990s, when Moldovans themselves were deciding who they were. This work presents my research into how Moldovan citizens in the mid-2000s were enacting, negotiating, and reinforcing their "Moldovanness" through the sociolinguistic resources available to them and prominent in Moldovan society. I present three discursive formations as influential to Moldovans' negotiation of identity: development, citizenship, and cultural propriety. I conclude that the daily work of "being Moldovan" through these discursive formations

has reinforced common means of identification among the local people of this dynamic country.

This dissertation, entitled "Building Moldova, Being Moldovan," analyzes discursive processes that influence Moldovan culture and society and Moldovans' cultural identity(-ies). The first part of the title refers to the work of the Moldova Social Investment Fund (MSIF or more simply, SIF) and other development agencies to build new infrastructure or renovate existing infrastructure in the country. The second part alludes to people's identification with one another and with the state, as observed during my fieldwork with MSIF and in Moldovan society at large. By "culture," I follow an anthropological conception of the term, such as: "the learned, shared understandings among a group of people about how to behave and what everything means" (Omohundro, 2008, p. 27). "Identity" here is used in the sense of sociocultural identity, as in the process of identifying oneself as part of a group, which includes adherence to and even respect for the norms of a group (Deaux, 2001; Bergami and Bagozzi, 2000; Stets and Burke, 2000; Ellemers et al., 1999). Seeing identity as a process of identification (being Moldovan rather than having a Moldovan identity) also recognizes it as situated, constructed, and negotiated within specific contexts and at certain moments in history (Bucholtz and Hall, 2004; see also Eriksen, 2002). I examine these topics through the lens of the mutually constituting relationship between language, culture, and society. I prefer to focus on identity and the enactment of a "citizen" identity in this work because I believe it would be unfitting to the data presented to apply the terms "nation," "nationalism," and "national identity" here. Moldova is a multiethnic state, as are most states, and their identity cannot be equated to one ethnic group or another, nor can they

claim to have created a "new" national group in the traditional sense of an *ethnie* (Chapter Three here supports this claim). Rather, in what Billig calls the "banal nationalism" of daily "flagging the nation," or the state, in my opinion, a sense of common identity and citizenship is created among Moldovans (Billig, 1995)

The nature of this work has primarily been influenced by Foucault (1972), Fairclough (2001; Fairclough, Pardoe, and Szerszynski, 2006; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999), and Spitulnik (1997, 1998, 2000, 2002a, 2002b), though certainly many others' ideas have guided this work.[1] Following their guidelines, I describe the linguistic data herein in a number of ways. First, I discuss "language-in-use," which is actual instances of spoken or written communication, both embedded in and extracted from their contexts (the latter is also referred to as "text"). I also use more specific descriptions when talking about language-in-use, such as "talk," "document," and "interaction." Sometimes, the reader may read in this work other terms to refer to *groups* of instances of language-in-use, such as "semantic field" or "lexical items". Second, I discuss "communication genres" or "communication styles," which are types of communication, such as speech genres, registers, dialects, or sociolects. Examples include formal and informal talk, stories, speeches, meetings, local dialects, teachers' discourse, advertising discourse, and the like. The purpose of separating *types* of communication from instances of language-in-use allows me to inject analysis into the discussion, both from my own perspective and that of local actors. In addition, communication genres are often associated with specific contexts and nonverbal behaviors; identifying genres associated with specific contexts allows me to analyze

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[1] Here are only a few of those who have inspired and guided this research: Irvine and Gal, 2000; Silverstein and Urban, 1996; Bucholtz and Hall, 2004; Wodak, 2007; Wodak de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart, 2009; and Johnstone, 1995.

behavior as it relates to a context. The purpose of identifying and analyzing language-in-use and communication genres is to relate them to wider domains of thought and action. Such domains are lenses through which people represent and naturalize their way of viewing the world and their relationships with actors and social structures. Other authors have called these by a number of terms, such as "language ideologies" (Bourdieu, 1984) "regimes of discourse and representation," "social fields," "frames," "schemata" "patterns of culture," and simply "discourses." I could have chosen one of these, but since they all represent slightly different ways of organizing and analyzing the data we gather, I have opted to use the term "discursive formations" following Foucault's use of the term (1972). He states, "Whenever…between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations), we will say, for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive formation" (1972, p. 41). Using "discursive formations" as a way of talking about domains of thought and action allows me to highlight the idea that wider representations of reality, patterns of culture, and social groups are still discursively constructed between people at the level of language-in-use and through communication genres, and that people construct culture while interacting in accordance with (or outside the norms of) dominant discursive formations. Anthropological and sociolinguistic research indicates that the practice of constructing culture through discursive formations also allows for the construction of people's identification with those formations, social groups, patterns of culture, and representations of reality (Ochs, 1999; Bucholtz and Hall, 2003, 2004).[2] In short, when people interact, they do so within

[2] Claims about identity are also subject to interpretation. I acknowledge the fact that the data and conclusions I put forth are subject to the experiences I had in Moldova, to the points of view of the people

the framework of a sociocultural context, using certain types of communication and language that mark their belonging to and/or identification with (or lack thereof) that context and the people with whom they interact. More information about the relationships between language, culture, and society is presented in Chapter 2 of this work.

Three discursive formations I identify in this work as important to Moldovans' negotiations of identity concern development, citizenship, and cultural propriety. Each of these are "culturally specific and historically contingent domain[s] of knowledge and practice which establish[ ] relations of power and truth" that are not restricted to the Moldovan context, but are uniquely expressed in that context (Spitulnik, 2002, p. 197). I use examples of communication types and language-in-use that I gathered through fieldwork to support my assertion that these three are formations that shape what it means to "be Moldovan" in the current era. The choice of the three formations is further elaborated upon in a later section of this Introduction. Common examples of communication types and language-in-use that I encountered during fieldwork are have been grouped into twelve prominent themes that are explained throughout this dissertation. The themes illustrate the many ways that discursive formations are not bounded structures, totally distinct from one another, but that they intersect, overlap, and even contradict one another as they are used by Moldovans in everyday life.

Ideas about Moldovan identity and the extent to which a person performs according to the cultural norms known by most Moldovans are both contingent upon context. In this work, I show how elements of language-in-use, communication genres, and discursive formations are used to negotiate and exhibit sociocultural identity. I do not

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with whom I spoke, and to the *etic* framework I impose on the data. I endeavor to represent the Moldovan experience as faithfully as the data allow.

state: “This is Moldovan identity,” because identities represent processes of cultural negotiation (Stets and Burke, 2000). Nor do I state, “This is Moldovan culture,” for the same reason. The best an ethnographer can hope for is to present a snapshot of a culture, taken during the time of the ethnographer’s fieldwork, as seen partly through the eyes of the people with whom the ethnographer interacted, and as interpreted by the ethnographer herself. Therefore, one outcome of this work is to identify dominant cultural themes and interactive processes that I believe to have influenced Moldovan culture and identity during the time of my fieldwork. I present them in both -*emic* and -*etic* perspectives. Through the data presented, the reader can hopefully decide for him- or herself whether or not my conclusions are satisfactory.

I consider this research and the resulting dissertation to be both inductive and deductive. It is inductive in the sense that the themes of analysis emerged strongly from the data. However, it is deductive in the sense that I actively selected the field sites, chose the literature to review before and after fieldwork, and consciously focused on a particular kind of social institution, a development agency. The choices of sites and literatures undoubtedly influenced my attention to the themes that emerged from the data, yet I remained open to different topics during fieldwork; evidence of the latter is the addition of citizenship as one of the discursive formations highlighted in this work.

Why a discursive approach?

There are several reasons why interpreting culture and identity through language, communication, and discourse is important to the study of human life in anthropology. First, a discursive approach entails an understanding of culture as constituted through

interaction between people over time, as noted above. Since language is a key aspect of social interaction, one might say that in dialogue, people create culture. Moreover, theoretical and sociolinguistic literature shows that inter-linguistic interactions help to provide bases for constructions of the 'self' and the 'other' (Hill, 1995, 1998; Irvine & Gal, 2000), for group boundary-maintenance (Barth, 1969), and for the construction and maintenance of national identity despite linguistic differences (Spitulnik, 1998) and based on linguistic differences (Blommaert & Verschueren, 1998).

A second way that discursive practices are important to the study of identity is that language is central to processes of social and ethnic identification among people across the globe (B. R. O. G. Anderson, 1991; Errington, 1998, 2000; Spitulnik, 1998; Wardhaugh, 1987; Wodak, 1999), and has become central in new Eurasian states, as well (King, 2000; Laitin, 1998; Nazpary, 2002; Suny & Claus M. Halle Institute for Global Learning., 1999; Suny & Kennedy, 1999a, 1999b; Verdery, 1996). For example, Laitin describes how parents whose first language is Russian have decided to school their children in the national language of where they live rather than in Russian. I have observed this trend in Moldova, as well, where many parents are sending children to schools where the primary language of instruction is Moldovan (a mutually intelligible variant of Romanian), the state language of Moldova.[3] Such parental choices will undoubtedly impact family relationships and social lives, and thus, the ways people identify themselves with groups and communities over time.

[3] The Moldovan language is distinguished from the Romanian language only by a small number of vocabulary items, and some grammatical constructions borrowed from the Russian language. Most scholars consider Moldovan a dialect of Romanian. The idea of Moldovan as a separate language was created during the Soviet period (King, 2000). During fieldwork, I vacillated between calling the local language Romanian and Moldovan, just as most Moldovan citizens do.

The third rationale for studying language, communication, and discourse in Moldova is related to the second. Historical and current events relating to language policy in the region have influenced the languages used in educational and government settings, and have influenced nation-building movements, too. Parents choosing to school children in the national language do so for complex economic, political, and sociocultural reasons, all of which relate to both parents' and children's identities. For example, when the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) became part of the Soviet Union (USSR), Russian became the republic's official language. Russian speakers maintained higher status and better work positions in the region throughout the Soviet period, and Russian immigrants even held majority power in the State Soviet until the mid-1980s. The majority culture of the Soviet Union was the Russian culture. Participants have recounted numerous stories to me about their inability to obtain jobs in that period without adequate knowledge of Russian; these are substantiated by King (2000). However, Stalin's regime also instituted a local program of nation-building for speakers of the then-newly-named Moldavian language. The purpose of the program was to boost Moldavians' (as they were known then) allegiance to the MSSR and the Soviet Union. Since 1991, most of these policies about official language use have been reversed, and the Romanian language has taken precedence over Russian in nearly every institution of contemporary Moldova. The tensions over language policies, educational access, and the prospect of reuniting with Romania (although this idea has long lost favor with the majority of Moldovan citizens) have led to violence (one person told me he was beaten up by other young men for speaking Russian on the street in the early 1990s), and even influenced the Transnistrian conflict, in part. These days, hiring practices reflect liberal democratic ideologies of

equality and local practices of ethnolinguistic differentiation. People process and re-enact these historical and current events in their daily interactions, whether in the workplace, at the market, or on the mini-bus. Their interactions create their identification with others through language, because of the languages spoken, and because of the contexts in which they interact.

The fourth imperative to study language, communication, and discourse concerns means of discovering the discursive construction of identity. An emphasis on discursive processes illuminates relationships between identity and language-in-use, but how does one study those processes? In Moldova, daily communication evokes themes that people utilize to position themselves as more or less Moldovan, or generally more or less like the people with whom they interact at any particular moment. Examples of these themes that I will discuss in this work include: responsibility to one's social groups; hierarchy; equality; corruption; and foreign (usually European or Russian) models of everything from governance to standards of living to community values. Other scholars have shown how themes of "chaos", "East and West", "corruption," and "transition" are influential in former Soviet Eurasia (Gal & Kligman, 2000a, 2000b; Ledeneva, 1998; Mandel, 2002; Nazpary, 2002). These authors introduce, compare, and contrast linguistic data in use in their various contexts (by scholars, in development institutions, and by local people of different social strata, for example) in order to come to their conclusions about the importance of discursive themes. They also attend to the social and ideological effects of discursive practices that occur day-in and day-out. To date, no one has applied similar methods to Moldova, despite increased attention to Moldovan life by social scientists in

recent years (E. A. Anderson, 2005; Cash, 2007; Demirdirek, 2006; Dima, 1991; Kaneff & Heintz, 2006; Kauffman, 2009; Kennedy, 2007; Keough, 2003; King, 2000).

A fifth reason why studying language, communication, and discourse is important concerns the contexts I chose to focus on as important to Moldovan life. I primarily studied the operations of one particular development agency in Moldova, the language-in-use of the people involved in it, the communication styles common to this agency, and the discursive formation of development in general. Through participant observation with people involved in the arena of development, I learned for myself what many others had already stated before me, that neither discursive formations nor identities are bounded by limits, but are made up of series of individual moments and are never finalized. I learned that in addition to "being Moldovan" by identifying themselves as "developed" or "civilized," people also exhibited Moldovanness through their interactions as community members, and by maintaining continued respect for Moldovan cultural norms and traditions. All of these can occur within the same conversation, and people utilize linguistic resources associated with each type of "being" to exhibit the extent of their identification with those around them.

With these influences in mind, I must note that this study does not focus on language policy or language as seen from the national level, as Anderson and Errington do. Nor do I use a focus on language to study nationalism in the form of patriotic movements that define a people. Instead, I follow Wodak and Spitulnik in their attention to the everyday uses of language and how such use is integral to the processes of Moldovans' identification with each other, with the state, and with international institutions and the ideologies of "the West".

Why development, citizenship, and cultural propriety?

The previous section stated why I focus on discursive processes and their relationship to culture and identity. This section turns to the topic of why and how I have chosen to look at these three particular discursive formations. In preliminary research, I found that Moldovans associated anthropology with investigations into ethnic history, folk life, and rural traditions. When I explained to them that I was interested in identity, in everyday culture, in relationships between groups of people, a common response was, "Oh, you mean psychology," or "Like sociology?" People also seemed hesitant to respond to direct questions about issues of interethnic accord or discord. On the one hand, when I asked questions about how people of different ethnic groups get along, most of the responses were framed positively, as in "Moldovans are a tolerant people," which I heard from more than one person. On the other hand, people voiced negative opinions about others of different sociocultural groups in everyday conversation. I noticed the indexical function of language at work: talk referring to my topics of interest was happening all around me, in nearly every conversation.[4] There was a great deal of discussion about Moldovans' character, how hospitable, hardworking, tolerant, etc., they are or are not. I also noticed many references to concepts like transparency, democracy, and Europe, with positive value placed on those concepts and negative value placed on opposing concepts. I observed the fact that the government was being critiqued for the ways it provided (or did not provide) for the needs of its people, and that citizens were critiqued in general on their behavior toward one another as well as on their adherence to

[4] Indexicality refers to the ability of language to refer to other aspects of life, such as "speakers' social identity (class, gender, ethnicity), social situation, and linguistic behavior" (Gal, 1989, p. 347).

government laws and processes. All of these issues ultimately relate to who Moldovans think they are and who they want to be. The relationship between the three discursive formations is one of the outcomes of this research and will become clearer through the presentation of the data. The data shows that the discursive formations exist concurrently at the levels of language-in-use, genre, and as wider domains of thought, action, and power; that each has its own specific history in Soviet era discourse; that the formations have evolved in ways that intersect and diverge since independence due to a number of influences, such as the injection of Western development institutions in Moldovan space; and that together, they create a sense of Moldovanness in the new state, and their use results in the making of Moldovan citizens, as well. This interpretation not only follows the idea that discursive formations are constructed via people's interaction over time, and in relation to powerful institutions. It also conforms to and supports the theory that such formations emerge through interaction with one another, in relation to a culture's dialogic creation in general (as introduced by Bakhtin in The Problem of Speech Genres (1986)).

In addition, I needed a venue through which to study these topics, one where I could study naturally occurring discourse and then compare that to what people told me in response to direct questions in interviews or conversations. So, I kept my eyes and ears open for potential sites where I might observe as many of my topics of interest as possible. The fact that I have friends working in the development/non-governmental sector probably influenced my leaning toward participant observation in a development agency, and my focus on topics related to development, because I had seen and heard much about these friends' work in my visits.[5]

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[5] In the next section, "Why the Moldova Social Investment Fund," the reader will see how I chose MSIF as a primary fieldsite.

Development

A review of the literature shows that development as a discourse or discursive formation has been defined by such authors as Ferguson (1990) and Escobar (1995). Ferguson states, “Like ‘civilization’ in the nineteenth century, ‘development’ is the name not only for a value, but also for a dominant problematic or interpretive grid through which the impoverished regions of the world are known to us” (1990, p. xiii). Not only does it make the world known to “us,” however, but it “presupposes a central, unquestioned value, with respect to which the different legitimate positions may be arrayed, and in terms of which different world views can be articulated” (xiii). Development also makes the world known to “them,” the subjects of development. Escobar elaborates on this definition by describing three “axes” that make up this domain of thought and action:

> the forms of knowledge that refer to [development] and through which it comes into being and is elaborated into objects, concepts, theories, and the like; the system of power that regulates its practices; and the forms of subjectivity fostered by this discourse, those through which people come to recognize themselves as developed or underdeveloped (1995, p. 10).

I have applied this understanding of development to an ethnographic description of one particular type of development agency in Moldova in order to elucidate the subject positions created through the everyday enactment of development. Moldovans also encountered ideologies of development during the Soviet era, which formed a similar, but distinct, set of practices and subjectivities. This research shows how the Soviet ideologies

have merged with Western discourses of development in Moldovans' regular expressions of themselves and others as "developed." The discursive formation also influences the ways people understand their relationship to the state. In the past, the state was seen as the provider of development strategies and infrastructure, and the dominant Soviet Russian culture was deemed the pinnacle of cultural development. Since independence, this view has been changing toward Western models of development in which the state is the facilitator of development that originates at the grass-roots level. The choice of development as an overarching formation, a "domain of knowledge and practice" therefore emerges from my fieldwork experiences in Moldova, my investigation of the literature on development, my choice of the MSIF as a field site, and my treatment of the data collected while I have been writing this work (Spitulnik, 2002, p. 197).

No research concerning Moldova has studied the daily communicative practices used in the context of the daily work of a development institution. For instance, development institutions and ideologies have introduced new vocabulary and phrases into Moldovans' lives, such as "transparency", "focus-group", and "winning a project".[6] Furthermore, development in its current neoliberal economic form advocates holding "focus-groups" to ascertain common opinions; the offering of public tenders for work contracts; citizens' policing of local public officials' transparency; and the idea that governmental practices in Western Europe and the United States (US) are superior to those in the former USSR, to name a few. Such contemporary practices co-exist with Soviet era ideas of development, which similarly pronounced Moldovans as backward, in

[6] I observed that the first two of these were commonly borrowed directly from English into Romanian and Russian, even though a separate word for transparency exists in Russian (прозрачность). The third term is the literal translation from "a castiga un proiect" in Romanian. People use this phrase instead of something more common in English, such as "winning/receiving a grant."

need of modernization and industrialization, especially in contrast to the language and traditional customs of dominant Russia. All of these activities, which build into a local discursive formation, are accomplished through language use, through valuation of certain forms or variants of language(s) over others, and through language ideologies that uphold such values. Social interaction and the dialogical construction of reality should be a focus when examining culture and identity. Therefore, it is the combination of attention to language and communication produced in daily life, to tensions produced between international, national, and local discursive formations, and to the ways that words "taste of their many contexts", past and present, that make this study of Moldovan identity unique (Bakhtin & Holquist, 1981, p. 293).

Citizenship

Citizenship as a discursive formation of thought and action has been defined by a number of scholars. Abowitz and Harnish (2006) review the dominant types of citizenship[7] and the challenges to them by analyzing citizenship as an "invented concept that shifts with economic, political, and social changes" (p. 654). Additionally, citizenship has been treated as discourse in an entire volume, edited by Hausendorf and Bora (2006), in which Fairclough, Pardoe, and Szerszynski offer a description of how they conceptualize the phenomenon as a socially constructed object with "an iterative relationship between these fields [government, law, academic theory], and wider social practices (such as public participation) where citizenship is enacted" (2006, p. 100). In other words, citizenship as a discursive formation is informed by both theoretical and

[7] These are discussed in Chapter 2.

practical domains. Ideas about citizenship emanate from multiple fields and are acted out by individuals in social situations. I found this to be the case for the ways people enact citizenship in Moldova in the realm of development. Next, Fairclough et al. state that citizenship can be empirically investigated as a “relationship between governing and governed, …show[ing] the ways in which conceptions/pre-constructions of citizenship may be very implicit and highly embedded within social practices” (p. 100). The “discourses, practices and materialities of governance” constitute resources that people utilize to enact citizenship, and can be the target of empirical study (p. 100). This dissertation follows through on Fairclough et al.’s recommendation to investigate how conceptions and constructions of citizenship are embedded in social practices.

I decided on citizenship as a formation that matters to Moldovans *after* fieldwork ended, contrary to the case for development. That is not to say I had not observed citizenship in action, only that I did not recognize it as such until I conducted further analysis on the data. For a long time, I tried to make sense of what I was seeing from information gathered through SIF’s work and through other fieldwork experiences in terms of development alone. I knew that development projects worldwide have expanded their scopes in the last thirty or so years to include more attention to civil society as an end goal rather than an unintended “instrument effect” (Ferguson, 1990; Mandel, 2002; Mosse and Lewis, 2005; Mosse, 2005; Cooke and Kothari, 2001). Still, I had difficulty bringing what I had observed into focus by using *only* development as a formation, or only by drawing on development literature. Citizenship involves people in different roles with one another, and with the state, than their roles in the development arena; in other words, they have different subject positions. Development usually refers to

‘improvement,’ ‘change,’ and comparison to an ideal, and involves relationships of power that cross international boundaries or position people in roles of donor and recipient. Citizenship usually more narrowly concerns the relationships between people and the governments of the state(s) where they reside. Therefore, I concluded that citizenship deserves separate treatment from development as a discursive formation. The processes of choosing to focus on citizenship were similar to those I used to arrive at development as a central concept of research. I analyzed trends from daily interactions with Moldovans, which of course were influenced by my experiences, contacts, and interests, as noted above. Then, I conducted a review of literature to find out if some of my observations and assumptions fit with what others have written about citizenship. In the time since adding citizenship as a focus of research, I have analyzed data with the intent of learning where citizenship and development as formations of thought and action intersect and diverge in Moldova.

As is the case with development, citizenship as a discourse has its own history in Moldova. Being a citizen of the Soviet Union meant striving both individually and as a group for improvement and change toward a ‘better’ kind of life: more industrialized, more knowledgeable of the arts, more highly educated, etc. (Fitzpatrick, 1999; Humphrey, 1999; Verdery, 1996). (This is an example of intersection of development and citizenship that will become more apparent throughout this work.) People were encouraged to focus on serving the collective body of their fellow citizens. This participation in society was usually organized at the national (USSR) and local (republic, regional, local public administration) level, and was often required. In return, the government provided for citizens’ needs for shelter, food, employment, and recreation.

By contrast, in the United States, citizens are encouraged to serve the collective on a voluntary basis. Incentives for service and societal participation include status in society, identification of the self as one who serves (as one not focused exclusively on his or her own needs), and favor in applying to universities, for younger people. Being a citizen of the U.S. does not necessarily entail striving as a group for improvement of the living conditions of the collective, though that goal is not excluded; rather, our ideologies focus on the individual improving his or her own lot in life, and on individual initiative to serve society. In return, the government supports an economic, political, and social environment where individuals can fulfill their own needs for shelter, food, employment, and recreation. Each Western (North American and European) society differs in terms of the emphasis put on individual achievement and responsibility, and the degree to which the state provides for citizens' needs. These differences depend on the degree to which the government controls the economic, political, and social environment, and the ideologies that support such state-society relationships. Therefore, each society creates subject positions for its citizens with respect to the state, and these positions vary according to local history, the needs of the present, and of course, cultural beliefs and practices.

Since independence, people and their governments in the former Soviet Union have undergone a fundamental change in the relationship between citizens and the state, creating different subject positions in the society. This change has been influenced, or even enforced, by Western governments or international bodies set up based on Western ideologies of state-society relations and human rights (the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, United Nations, etc.). During fieldwork, I

observed people dealing with changes to their ways of interacting with the state in Moldova, even though this interaction was mediated through an internationally funded development project. Citizenship frames their understanding of themselves and their relationships with one another as much as development, and the two are interrelated, as this work will show. Focusing on both citizenship and development will allow a better understanding of their intersections and divergences in local practice. It will also enable better understanding of their power to shape people's identification with one another and the state.

Cultural Propriety

Talk about development and citizenship provides topics through which people can negotiate identity as well as contexts for indexing other forms of identification. However, there is more to Moldovanness than "just" identities negotiated through the formations of development and citizenship. Through inductive analysis of data, I noticed that some Moldovans' references to identity were related more to local "traditional" culture than to development or citizenship, and that these often intersected with development and citizenship discursive formations. I began calling this "cultural propriety" because people seemed to be referring to what Moldovans "are" and "are not", or "do" and "do not." Another person might simply call this "culture," but using the term "cultural propriety" highlights the dichotomous relationship between local enactments of Moldovanness and non-Moldovanness. Bucholtz and Hall follow a similar route of analyzing apparent dichotomies to describe how identity is discursively situated, defined, and negotiated

(2004). They propose using three tools, called "tactics of intersubjectivity,"[8] assist with analysis (p. 493). The tools are "continua along three intersecting dimensions: sameness versus difference, genuineness versus artifice, and institutional recognition versus structural marginalization" (2004, p. 494). These sociolinguistic tools can apply to understanding each of the discursive formations identified here. The first term in each pair, which the authors also call adequation (sameness), authentication (genuineness), and authorization (institutional recognition) are at one end of the continua; these are "the positive polarity of identity relations….Here a given identity is constructed through an affirmation of the qualities that ideologically constitute it." (p. 494). Then, "the second term in each pair – distinction [difference], denaturalization [artifice], and illegitimation [structural marginalization] – focuses on the negative polarity of identification. Here what is involved is the foregrounding of qualities perceived as remote from the self or other" (p. 494). In constructing these tools with binary opposites, Bucholtz and Hall recognize that people (social scientists included) widely theorize social identification in terms of dichotomies such as "ingroup/outgroup, self/other, and we/they" (p. 494). However, by constructing them as continua, Bucholtz and Hall allow for the reality that people position themselves at different points between the poles of each continuum. "Thus," they conclude, "despite the rigid binary logic within which ideologies of identity tend to operate, the multiplicity of potential positionings allows for the formation of complex identities in practice (2004, p. 494).

Bucholtz and Hall's tactics of intersubjectivity are worth exploring in more detail with respect to the present research. Adequation and distinction, or sameness versus

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[8] Bucholtz and Hall use the term "intersubjectivity" to describe what I am referring to as discursive identity negotiation.

difference, refers to the degree of similarity that is sufficient to call someone a member of one's group, versus an outsider. I use this dimension of discursive identity negotiation (intersubjectivity) to show how Moldovans enact sameness versus difference in various contexts, and at the everyday micro-level of interaction and analysis. According to Bucholtz and Hall, the processes of erasure (identified by Irvine and Gal (2000)) and highlighting are essential to marking sameness and/or eliminating difference. Both processes are linguistic resources for people as they negotiate their positionality. Authentication and denaturalization, or genuineness versus artifice, constitutes the means by which people indicate they are "authentically" Moldovan or how they denaturalize or challenge Moldovanness (in themselves or others). Authorization and illegitimation have to do with institutional recognition versus structural marginalization. In Bucholtz and Hall's words,

> Authorization is the use of power to legitimate certain social identities as culturally intelligible, while illegitimation is the revoking or withholding of such validation from particular identities. These tactics are often associated with large-scale or institutional workings of power, but they may also be more local (2004, p. 503).

Their last set of tactics is particularly important for this study because of my focus on an institution, MSIF; the relationship of people to that institution and to the state; and the influence of institutional, state, and international ideologies on identity. I find Bucholtz and Hall's tactics of intersubjectivity useful in supporting my assertion that Moldovans position themselves and others in relation to an ideal of Moldovanness, whether that

means the degree of sameness or authenticity they identify, or the degree to which they (or others) conform to institutional ideals of proper behavior.

Cultural propriety as a discursive formation has also arisen from data gathered for this research, from knowledge of the post-Soviet changes affecting this area of the world, and from anthropological and sociolinguistic theories about the nature of culture and identity. It narrows the scope of description to norms in name only, since both ideals and deviations from ideals are encompassed by it. Many examples come to mind, but a succinct one that relates to all three discursive formations involves the case of people from a predominantly Bulgarian-speaking village coming before the MSIF Executive Committee to present their grant proposal. The group spoke in Romanian, to the best extent they could, filling in Russian words when necessary. The Committee was very sympathetic to the group's efforts to speak the state language especially in the presence of a state-organized development institution. The members filled in Romanian words for the group, or finished the applicants' sentences in Russian. After the presentation was over, the MSIF Executive Director and one staff member commented first to each other, and then to me, on how impressed they were with the group's exertions,[9] saying, "Asa trebuie sa fie," or "That's the way it should be." The speakers marked the applicants' behavior as appropriate versus inappropriate. To these two MSIF staff members, Moldovans speaking in a semi-governmental environment and seeking to show they are prepared to take on a development project *should* speak the state language, or at least show they are trying to become a member of the larger group by learning the majority

[9] Minority groups in Soviet Moldavia usually studied their native language and Russian; Russian served as the lingua franca across Soviet populations.

language.[10] The applicants recognized the need to be institutionally recognized (by the state, by MSIF) as displaying characteristics necessary to be a Moldovan citizen, not to be structurally marginalized. They positioned themselves as closer to the Executive Committee through language, and the Committee members erased differences between them by supporting their efforts to identify with the larger body of citizens of the state. The discursive formations of citizenship and development framed this interaction not only through choice of language, but also through the environment (or context), the procedures followed, vocabulary used, and the degree of formality of the interaction between government employees and citizens. Cultural propriety infused the entire interaction, but was highlighted by the speakers themselves in their comment to me.

Ideas about cultural propriety influence the language spoken in any arena as much as the fact that Moldovan is the state's official language. Many Moldovans told me over time that they considered it polite to speak, or at least make an effort to speak, the language of the people with whom they interact. This was influenced by the Soviet social and political hierarchy; the language of public life during Soviet rule was Russian, and other ethnolinguistic groups were taught that it was polite to speak with others in Russian, especially if the interlocutor did not speak your own language. After independence, Moldovans drew attention to the fact that most Russian-speakers and ethnic Russian immigrants to the Moldavian S.S.R. had not learned the local language(s) during the entire period of Soviet rule. The Russians could thus be described as "impolite," as "disrespectful" of the ethnolinguistic majority population. These behaviors

[10] Moldovan was the language of the statistical majority in the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, even though Russian was dominant ideologically.

are some of the many factors that lead me to assert that cultural propriety is as important as citizenship and development to the Moldovan context.

It should be noted from the reasons and the example given in previous paragraphs that an understanding of all three of these formations depends upon recognition of the role that performance plays in daily life. People perform procedures of development, model such procedures to others, perform roles as citizens, act like a respectable member of the culture (or not), and judge others' performances in these roles. Tactics of intersubjectivity support describing identification as performance, since people position themselves in relation to others in external acts that mark sameness and difference, authenticity and artifice, and institutional authority or illegitimation.

Why the Moldova Social Investment Fund?

MSIF (or more simply, SIF) is one of many multilaterally funded[11] development projects[12] operating in the former Soviet state of Moldova, now independent for twenty years. MSIF is one institution through which discourses, communication genres, and forms of language circulate, yet it is unique for several reasons. It is a development agency funded by the World Bank and the governments of many "Western," democratic, and industrialized countries. As a result, SIF's operating procedures are heavily influenced by the World Bank and donor countries. However, MSIF is attached to the Moldovan government, making it a GONGO, or government-organized non-governmental organization, which makes it a hybrid-type of institution that must take

[11] Definition: funded by several international agencies, foreign governments, and the national government of Moldova

[12] I variably use the terms "project," "agency," "institution," and "organization" to describe SIF, because it is a World Bank project, but its operations (buildings, staff, operating procedures, etc.) make it seem like an organization in the local context.

input from both the foreign funders and the local government. Therefore, it is both Western and Moldovan, to varying degrees. MSIF is also staffed entirely by Moldovans, a fact that distinguishes it from the majority of development organizations that have foreign, usually Western, leadership. Examples of the latter include the United Nations development Program (UNDP); the former Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program associated with the European Union (active 1991-2006); and the U.S. Agency for International development (USAID) and its subsidiary organizations, such as the Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs (CNFA). MSIF operates in every district in the country, and focuses on providing assistance to communities wishing to build new or renovate existing infrastructure. Therefore, I found MSIF to be an opportune site through which to study the contemporary activities of the development sector in Moldova from Moldovans' perspectives.

What I did not expect when beginning this research was that MSIF's work would also give me an opportunity to learn how ideas and practices of citizenship are changing in Moldova. Unlike many other aid or development projects that serve specific sectors or particular groups of people, MSIF's goals are to change the ways whole communities interact with one another through local public administration. It gave me a window into how development projects in general, and SIF projects in particular, have affected the ways Moldovans interact with each other and co-construct their culture and cultural identity. In turn, the choice of MSIF as one site of ethnographic fieldwork has influenced the talk, interactions, documents, and discursive formations I have studied. Everyday talk that invokes responsibility to family and community, patriotism, corruption, the market economy, and European lifestyles, are only a few of those I identify. I examine the

variable ways that people relate everyday themes and events to the formations, thus not only demonstrating the complexity and fluidity of Moldovan culture and identity, but also elucidating the relationship of discourse to culture and identity in general.

The first time I heard about the project was in 2004, when I met an old friend, "Dorin,"[13] for coffee during my second visit to Moldova to conduct preliminary field research.[14] I was explaining my proposed research in Moldova, which at the time, included a focus on views on what constituted corruption in the country. He said that corruption was indeed a great problem in Moldova, and we talked about the climate of bureaucratic and petty corruption that is known to pervade several public sectors, such as medicine, education, and telecommunications. Then, Dorin started to tell me about his work at the Social Investment Fund. With great enthusiasm, he described the types of work that SIF does, and the ways the staff had labored to counteract various illegal practices common to Moldovan life. (Examples included people having to pay bribes to obtain approval for construction, and construction contracts being awarded based on personal relations.) When I asked more about the organization, Dorin told of SIF's success in the subprojects of more than 300 villages and 30 regions, at the time. He was proud of the fact that communities wishing to obtain SIF funding for a subproject must include women, young people, and the elderly in the decision-making and implementation processes, which elevated those groups' participation in community

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[13] All personal and place names have been changed except those representing information in the public domain, such as the name of the Moldovan President or the capital city when those have been used in the press.

[14] I taught English in Moldova from 1994-96, through the U.S. Information Service English Teaching Fellows Program.

governance.[15] Moreover, he related that SIF's real contribution was in "changing the attitudes" of people, getting them to believe that public works and buildings in their communities could be planned, built, and maintained based on local initiative.

Intrigued, I thought about SIF over the next week, imagining how it would be an ideal institution through which to observe not only talk related to corruption, but also talk about development. I had seen that the latter often intersects with ideas about what constitutes corrupt practices, because of the amount of money at stake in development projects, and because of the different bureaucratic procedures being instituted to overcome corrupt practices. It would also offer an opportunity to observe the negotiation of Moldovan identity and culture in a hybrid context in which local and international ideologies vied for supremacy. It would also give me the chance to meet people from all over the country and learn about their lives. I met with Dorin again the next week to propose conducting fieldwork with SIF. He was in favor of it, but stated that I needed to apply to the Director for permission. Within a few days, I had met the Director and explained my proposal. A stern man, he asked several questions concerning my research and the role I suggested playing while observing the organization. In the end, he approved the proposal, and my association with SIF began when I returned in 2005.

I learned over the next two years how decisions to build public facilities had been made in the Soviet era: bureaucrats and Party leaders from the capital of the republic or from as far away as Moscow would determine what would be built, where, and when. Outsiders would decide what kind of facility was appropriate, who would construct it, where materials would come from and how they would be transported to the area, and in

[15] I have little academically documented information regarding the inclusion or exclusion of these groups of people during the Soviet era. Here, I am relying on Moldovans' accounts of practices in pre- and post-Soviet Moldova.

what manner the workers would be paid. Local people were involved in some of the decision-making, but only as secondary participants. Through SIF, citizens are now offered tools and incentives for making infrastructure decisions locally. There is still a good deal of “advice” and “consultations” (using local terminology, translated from Romanian) from SIF staff and independent contractors, but the subprojects are implemented by local public administration.

Furthermore, talk of development at the SIF offices sometimes seems similar to the ways development is discussed in the economies of the European Union (EU) or United States of America (US, USA) . At other times, talk is dominated by ways of speaking and acting that were more common during the Soviet era or even earlier. It is always unique to the Moldovan context. These are social practices enacted through language as much as through behavior. Therefore, this study also focuses on how the practice of being Moldovan on a daily basis is negotiated through discourses of development, identity, and citizenship.

An important step in the implementation of a SIF development project is the Executive Committee meeting, held in the SIF Director’s office in the capital city, Chisinau. Each week, the Executive Committee meets subproject proposal teams, for projects concerning infrastructure and community rebuilding. Every community group asking for funds must come before the Committee and present its case. While most of the subproject proposals to SIF are for works such as rebuilding or constructing roads, introducing gas lines, creating water and sewage systems, or renovating schools, there are also social and cultural projects implemented with funds from the Social Investment

Fund. To date, SIF has helped communities implement hundreds of subprojects in villages, towns, and cities in every part of Moldova.

Much more happens at these meetings of SIF's Executive Committee than simply talk of infrastructure and building materials. These are discussions that draw upon discourses concerning development, citizenship, and cultural propriety. Development discourse emerges most prominently in the ways of talking about the projects and in the procedures instituted to gain access to development funds. Citizenship discourse concerns the ways of thinking about and describing responsibility to one's community and to the state. Cultural propriety discourse involves ideas about what constitutes appropriate behavior for Moldovans in the post-Soviet era. All of these refer to the performance of "being Moldovan" at this time in Moldova's history, about the *habitus*[16] of understanding and practicing Moldovanness.

The meetings may also be considered small steps in the building of a state, and in building a citizenry who are both loyal to the state and to the state's project of developing a modern, market economy. The Executive Committee meetings, the SIF staff's daily interactions with people in communities, and the work and meetings SIF sponsors in communities can all be examined from various theoretical and topical perspectives. Those I have considered include the influence of Western ideas and standards of development on local life, processes of re/building community ties and their influence on identity, tensions between ethnic groups that emerge in daily life and in SIF meetings, talk of corruption that arises in those same locations, and the relative success or failure of

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[16] *Habitus*, according to Bourdieu, can be "understood as a system of durable and transposable dispositions which, integrating all past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions, and make it possible to accomplish infinitely differentiated tasks, thanks to the analogical transfer of schemata acquired in prior practice" (1972/1977: 261)

the SIF project according to international standards. There are certainly others. Here, in addition to identifying discourses that are important to Moldovan culture, I also tease out how the work done through SIF is re/building a sense of citizenship among Moldovans, and therefore, building a feeling of belonging to the state.

The Researcher's Positionality

The meeting with the Director and my fieldwork at SIF brings me to a discussion of my own positionality in this research. The Director, and most other SIF employees, thought for several months that I was there to monitor them for instances of corruption. I explained participant observation methods and discussed the nature of my research with anyone who asked or would listen, but I could never quite shake the position of observer. There was little for me to participate in. Perhaps that is the nature of ethnography within institutions rather than communities. Actually, at our first meeting and upon my return to Moldova, the Director suggested that I participate by telling employees and subproject participants how things work in the U.S. "To serve as a model," he told me. That made me uncomfortable, because I did not want to replicate the hierarchical system of which I knew I was a part (that of the powerful Westerner), especially when I wanted to study the influence of Western-generated discourses and their intersection with Moldovan daily life and the practices of development and citizenship. So, I tried to eschew that role by stating that I was no expert. I did end up talking to people a great deal about life in the U.S. and the ways people participate in their communities, how things are bought and sold, the level of corruption in our own system, comparisons between types of poverty in the U.S. and Moldova, comparisons between ethnic group relations in the U.S. and Moldova, and

even topics such as how people use lines of credit. Perhaps I fulfilled the Director's initial idea about my participation, though on a less formal basis.

Unfortunately, my decision not to take on a conventional role in the organization meant I had no true position in the institution. People did not know how to categorize or identify me with something that was already known to them: Was I from the World Bank? Was I from the American government? Was I from some other international, regional, or local organization? No, no, and no. That left me as an outsider, one with no connections, apart from my friend who had helped me gain access. (The latter was not insignificant, however, since my friend was a supervisor within the institution; no one wanted me to report improper behavior to him, either.) Furthermore, the mention of the word "corruption" in my initial explanation and introduction to the staff, and even its inclusion on my research information sheet[17] (a decision I regret), led people to assume I was looking for corrupt behavior. As a result, they felt the need to tiptoe around me with care. This supposition lessened with time and my interaction with the staff on a regular basis, but it never completely disappeared. My role as an outsider and an American influenced how people treated me as much as my own perspectives and experiences influenced this entire project. Therefore, the research data and findings presented in this dissertation reflect the fact that I was given access to and encouraged to observe certain projects and aspects of SIF's work more than others. I try to note and account for my biases and the limitations of my information throughout this dissertation, but certainly cannot escape them.

[17] This was required by the Emory Institutional Review Board for protection of human research subjects, in lieu of a signed document of informed consent from each participant.

Methods

The discussion about my own positionality actually can be related to the multi-sited nature of the fieldwork I conducted, including its benefits and drawbacks. I carried out fieldwork for this dissertation in a variety of contexts: the offices of MSIF in the capital city of Chisinau, sites (villages, towns, kindergartens, culture houses, etc.) that MSIF workers visited, public celebrations of national holidays, dinners in private homes, volunteer English conversation groups, and many others. Through these sites, I obtained the points of view of people of different ages, social classes, ethnic backgrounds, and from different regions of the country. The work was also multi-sited in the sense that I collected different forms of data, such as institutional documents, mass media content (radio, television, newspapers, online media), fieldnotes, and audio and video recordings. In keeping with the anthropological goal of learning about life from a local person's point of view, I conducted participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and unstructured conversations. Interviews and conversations focused on common experiences of living in Moldova, practices associated with development, ethnic group relations, and differences between past and present-day Moldova. Wright particularly notes that fieldwork located in multiple physical and ideological sites (organizations, the state, the public sphere) necessitates the collection of multiple types of data to illustrate the relationships between the physical/ideological sites and the types of data, as well as the subjectivities these relations produce (2011).

Many of the methods and types of data named above are no different than those used by other anthropologists. However, conducting fieldwork in an institution of which I was not a part posed challenges that may have led to my broadening "the field" to include

sites outside that institution (see the previous section). I never had office space in the organization from which I could conduct participant observation, interviews, and the like. This may have been because space was limited (there were no free desks in any office; some even shared desks) and because my position was not funded by the World Bank loans that supported SIF. On the one hand, I was invited to the weekly Executive Committee meetings and on site visits out to the countryside, for which I am very grateful. These gave me the chance to begin to understand SIF's work and to see some of the processes that participants go through to obtain a grant. On the other hand, when I was not in the meetings or on site visits, I could not just observe people at work or take part in their work. In addition, they were very busy! Many worked ten and twelve hours a day. The best time to talk to employees was on the long car trips to site visits, so I tried to make the most of those opportunities without tagging along too often or making them or their trip uncomfortable by crowding into the middle of the back seat. After a few months, I asked if I could see some of the documents that the subproject applicants turned in, so as to see firsthand the documents that SIF employees had described to applicants and to learn how the applicants had actually completed them. That request led to my introduction to the woman who kept all the records, "Doamna Elena" (Doamna is the equivalent of Mrs., and it is common to use this title with a first name to communicate both respect and familiarity.) She had a little table in her office where I ended up sitting for at least a few minutes whenever I came in. From that place, I delved into the records of different project sites where I had traveled, and she explained to me all the different types of projects and documents I was perusing. She also served as a cultural insider who helped me make sense of things I had seen and heard while on site visits or in SIF

meetings of various kinds. Others played that role, too: sociologists and engineers whom I accompanied on site visits; my friend Dorin, whom I could always go to with questions; and even the Director himself, who regularly chatted with me about what I was learning, and suggested specific sites to visit or meetings to attend. However, I specifically mention Doamna Elena because I interacted with her more often than with anyone else, and because people who saw us talking and saw me regularly sitting in her office came to trust me more over time, I believe. Nevertheless, I always felt that people's busy schedules, the fact that I interacted with them at their workplace, and perhaps their initial impression that I wanted to know more about corrupt practices in Moldova all kept me from building closer relationships with most SIF employees. I only interacted with three people outside the office, and then only a few times. One was Dorin, mentioned above; another was Elena, with whom I ate lunch occasionally; and the third was the youngest sociologist on staff, who spoke English well and whom I had briefly met by chance on a previous visit to Moldova. Other Moldovans I met outside of their workplace (in conversation groups or through common friends, for example) would often invite me to their homes, or we would go out to cafes, concerts, or other social events in town.

I did not know it at the time, but these difficulties of fieldwork (time needed to build trust, lack of defined role, interactions confined to work environments) are similar to those experienced by others conducting ethnographies of both international and local aid organizations (Mosse, 2008; Mosse and Lewis, 2006; Nauta, 2006). In addition, Mosse notes that the topics of study that researchers choose when looking at international organizations are similar to those that arose in this research; examples include "the performative power of texts," relationships and processes embedded in and reproduced

by the institutions, and the "wider context and effects of international institutions" (2008, p. 25). Each of these is addressed to a certain extent in the present work. One significant difference between my position and Mosse's is that he worked at the development institution which became the focus of his research for 10 years (2005). He used that experience to discuss the insider-outsider roles that ethnographers of institutions play, whereas my position as a non-employee kept me an outsider to many MSIF discussions about policy and "problems" with the organization.

Chapter descriptions

Chapter Two lays out the theoretical framework for this dissertation and reviews others' work that influenced my research. The chapter expands on language-in-use, communication genres, and discourse; the language—culture—society dialectic. Next, I introduce theories and practices of development that have been prevalent since the end of World War II. The section on development is followed by a review of studies of identity (social, ethnolinguistic, national). The chapter wraps up with theories concerning citizenship, and why focusing on citizenship as a discursive formation adds to the present research.

Chapter Three goes into more detail on the Moldovan context. Information for this chapter comes both from ethnographic participant observation and from review of the extant literature concerning Moldova. This information focused on context has been made into a chapter and placed here in the dissertation, instead of spreading the included topics out alongside more ethnographic data throughout other chapters, so the reader can come to understand how situated histories of discourse (in the general sense of everyday

talk, communication genres, and discourses) are part of Moldovans' understanding of their lives, part of their cultural knowledge. In this chapter, I discuss the history of Moldova and the prevalent ways of being Moldovan that I encountered and that influence my conclusions in this work. These latter will be examined in further detail in the following chapters. I also introduce examples of development, citizenship, and cultural propriety in thematic groups that relate to the contexts described. The discussion shows that these three discursive formations both intersect with and diverge from one another, depending on the topic of discussion, and reflect the complexity of Moldovan perspectives on being Moldovan in the contemporary era.

In Chapter Four, I use corruption as one extended example of the intersections of discursive formations concerning cultural propriety, development, and citizenship. Since corruption is a hot-button topic in many countries, the information included here lends itself to wide application to different contexts. To illustrate these intersections, I compare official and unofficial communication about corruption, which emanates both from international and local Moldovan sources. The latter is divided into the voices of people speaking for the state or transnational institutions, and the voices of people speaking as private citizens, although the private citizens are also connected to those transnational institutions. Local and international usage differs in the parties each invokes as "corrupt" and "not corrupt". In the local Moldovan context, I show that state-level politics, traditional kin connections, and the economy (internal and transnational) all influence language-in-use concerning corruption and cultural propriety. The same issues (official and unofficial genres; international, national, and local contexts) will be explored further in the succeeding chapters.

Chapter Five focuses on aspects of the discursive formation concerning development that I encountered in Moldova. I examine samples of texts produced primarily by the World Bank and MSIF as institutions, and the language-in-use of their representatives to illustrate how the formation reproduces relations of power, or attempts to erase power differences. The examples are also used to explain how talk about development evokes citizenship and cultural propriety in Moldova. Chapter Five sets up Chapters Six and Seven, which discuss types of SIF subprojects, SIF procedures, and interactions between SIF staff and other Moldovan citizens.

Chapter Six looks more broadly at the general array of infrastructure subprojects that SIF supports and details the procedures that each community must go through to obtain the grant to implement their subproject. I argue that SIF procedures influence the discursive formation of citizenship in Moldova. SIF accomplishes this by applying affirmative practices and ideas associated development and citizenship to the affirmative ways of being Moldovan that constitute cultural propriety. For example, the latter is used to connect ideas about responsibility to one's family and community, community development, and democratic modes of citizenship to the shared cultural experiences of Moldovan citizens.

In Chapter Seven, I examine divergences between the three formations through cases of MSIF-supported subprojects to renovate "culture houses." Culture house subprojects are contrasted to the general infrastructure subprojects presented in Chapter Six because the former are supported and funded by the Moldovan government, not by the World Bank. The data reveal the influence of Moldova's history in the performance of citizenship and development in these projects, and show the strong ties people feel to

their ethnonational identity/-ies, national culture and the Soviet institution that coordinated culture for the masses. The chapter also highlights the MSIF staff's frustration with project participants who do not "follow the rules" of what they deem "proper" citizen behavior, which lowers their respect for the participants' as Moldovans. Therefore, MSIF staff and project participants exhibit the complex interactions that occur when newer discourses, such as those that frame ideas about citizenship and development, cross paths with more "traditional" performances of citizenship, development, and Moldovanness, all in the context of talk about the cultural institutions associated with the Soviet past.

Chapter 2:

Theoretical Framework

Introduction

This research investigates what it means to be Moldovan in the post-Soviet era of the mid-2000s. In investigating this question, I have identified three discursive formations through which people commonly represent and shape their reality, and which influence the meaning people attribute to being Moldovan. These are development, citizenship, and cultural propriety. By analyzing these formations, I illustrate the intersections between the language-in-use of daily life, styles or genres of communication used by people in recurring contexts, and the constituting or challenging of the formations themselves. The present chapter reviews pertinent literature concerning the topics of language and culture, development, identity, and citizenship, with specific focus on studies that have also utilized discourse analysis or linguistic fieldwork. By bringing these sets of literature together, I lay out a theoretical model for studying the ways people dialogically construct Moldovan life and culture. We learn through the application of this model that the "natural histories of discourse" influence Moldovans' sense of identification with each another and with their country (Silverstein & Urban, 1996, p. 2).

Three discursive formations that are commonly utilized to denote Moldovanness are development, citizenship, and cultural propriety. Development as a discursive formation is made up of the rationale for and practices of institutions of development; the daily language-in-use of the staff of those institutions and their clients; and language-in-use of members of the general populace who are affected by the realm of development.

The discursive formation also consists of standard routines and texts that evoke development and the constantly varying daily practices of people that dialogically influence and are influenced by this formation.

To elaborate further, development agencies are social institutions that serve many functions in Moldovan society, from modeling governance practices and allocating funds, to supporting the needs of certain social groups, such as youth or victims of human trafficking. Development agencies' work generally intersects the spheres of state government, local government, international institutions, and more generally, the public domain and Moldovan culture. The institutional practices (which include standard routines and texts) of the Moldova Social Investment Fund (MSIF or SIF) include meetings, teaching and training sessions, record keeping, and reporting to funders. Types of communication or communication genres are comprised of means of collecting information (surveys, forms, standard practices of counting and measuring) and ways of speaking that convey information in a certain manner, as well as manners of showing interest, agreement, uncertainty, or authority. Furthermore, communication in the realm of development evokes several common themes: Western models of civil society and living standards, capitalism and market economies, community participation, and progress, for example. The themes emerge from the Moldovan context as well as are noted widely in development literature, which will be elaborated on below. The themes also become an essential part of the exposition and analysis of Moldovanness throughout this work.

The second discursive formation presented here concerns the arena of citizenship. It includes the ideologies about what citizenship means to different states, the laws

concerning citizenship in Moldova, as well as the means of practicing and talking about citizenship in daily life. For example, citizenship governs and is governed by communication relating to allegiance to the state, patriotism, responsibility to one's community, laws concerning diversity, democratic values, civil society, treatment of people from different ethnic groups, and activities that endorse the use of one language over another. These common themes intersect with those in the previous paragraph for development, to a certain extent, although the focus is not necessarily on progress, but on responsibility. The themes became apparent to me through fieldwork and have been substantiated as common to citizenship through a review of the literature. As mentioned above, these themes will be discussed throughout this dissertation as important to the enactment of Moldovanness.

The third discursive formation discussed in this dissertation concerns interpretations of cultural propriety in Moldova. When a person acts "appropriately" in society, meaning he or she follows cultural norms, then that person supports and perpetuates the dominant culture. Likewise, the same person can behave outside of cultural norms and thus challenge the dominant culture. Through interaction with others, he or she also serves to define what the dominant culture includes and where the boundaries lie between acceptable and unacceptable behavior (cf. Barth, 1969). Cultural propriety in Moldova governs and is governed by themes of communication and activity relating to ethnic identity; self-presentation (bodily posture, voice, appearance, ways of speaking); responsibility to one's family and community; and the charges of nepotism, cronyism, or illegal activities that emerge from a focus on cultural relationships or self-enrichment. The influence of ideas about cultural propriety from Europe, the U.S., and

Russia also play a part in this discursive formation. The literature tells us that people tend to categorize behaviors into affirmative and negative opposites when speaking of ideals. However, in practice, people act along a continuum between the polar opposites, varying their behavior according to the context of their interactions (Bucholtz and Hall, 2004). The literature on the discursive negotiation of identity sheds light on these complex processes. Exploring and defining the relationship between the three discursive formations is one goal of this research. I will return to this point in each of the chapters and in the conclusion.

Language, Culture, and Society

In order to understand the links between the literatures that support this research, it is necessary to discuss first the relationship between language, culture, and society. I understand this relationship to be mutually constituting, following the works of Bakhtin (1981, 1986), Bourdieu (1977), Fairclough (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 2001, 2003a),[18] Foucault (1972, 1995) and Spitulnik (1998a, 1998b, 2002a, 2002b, 2003). These authors focus on the analysis of language and communication as elements of culture and society. Bakhtin would say language and culture are in dialogue with one another, or dialogic (1981, 1986). Most of those cited above also use the term "discourse" to refer to different forms and practices of communication. The term discourse can refer to particular speech acts and instances of behavior, to habitual ways of speaking or habitual actions, or to linguistic ideologies and conventions of

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[18] I draw on Fairclough (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 2001, 2003a) for the use of terms common to linguistic anthropology and critical discourse analysis.

sociocultural activity (Fairclough, 2001, p. 18).[19] As stated in Chapter 1, I use the terms "language-in-use," "communication genres," and "discursive formations" to refer to these forms of communication. In addition, I use the term "discursive" to refer to various forms of discursive activities, or the dialogic negotiations that people undertake in everyday life that ultimately construct culture and society. This approach enables me to view culture as constructed between people over time, not as a static entity to be studied and put on display.[20] Attention to the mutually constituting relationship between language, culture, and society allows me to: 1) generate a sense of what it meant to be Moldovan to citizens during the time of my fieldwork; 2) make claims about the effects of powerful discursive formations on Moldovan culture; and 3) propose how those formations may be influential in Moldova's future.

Development theory and development as a discursive formation

In this section, I briefly review theories related to the ideologies, uses, and effects of development. The literature documents the history of 20th century development as well as current critiques of development. A central premise of development was (and continues to be) that leaders in richer states have a duty to help people in poorer states achieve a higher standard of living (Isbister, 2001). There are political and economic reasons behind what is described as a moral imperative. Reducing poverty in other states

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[19] Foucault distinguishes between everyday discourses (language in use and social practices) and the grander view of discourse as overarching sets of linguistic forms and behavioral practices that influence and are influenced by the everyday (Foucault, 1972). I use the term in both of these senses in the present work.

[20] A number of authors share a view similar to the one I describe above of the mutually constituting nature of discourse, practice, culture, and society; and they use that framework to illuminate constructions of social and political identity (Blommaert & Verschueren, 1998; Errington, 2000; Fairhead, 1994; Gal, 1989; Hester, Housley, & University of Wales Cardiff. School of Social Sciences, 2002; Hill, 1998, 2001; Wodak, 1999).

will help richer states grow their wealth through other investment and may reduce the conflicts (and population displacements) that arise from disputes over resources in poorer economies. Escobar writes of the emergence of poverty as a dominant discourse within the sphere of development after World War II, and the characterization of the "Third World"[21] by its levels of poverty: "That the essential trait of the Third World was its poverty and that the solution was economic growth and development became self-evident, necessary, and universal truths" (1995, p. 24). Poverty became a problem that needed to be solved. The solutions should be "modern", using "new mechanisms of control" and "new ways of intervention," such as through the areas of "education, health, hygiene, morality, and employment and the instilment [sic] of good habits of association, savings, child rearing, and so on" (1995, pp. 22, 23). These solutions constitute the world of development, and Escobar calls the discourses associated with that world "development discourse" or "discourse of development."

Many theorists have studied the ways that development as a discursive formation "colonizes reality" and produces "regimes of…representation" (Escobar, 1995, pp. 5, 10; Ferguson, 1990; Pigg, 1992). Such regimes influence the ways people see the world and act within it, including the relations of power that people construct using different versions of "reality." Due to the rising power of international development institutions and ideologies since the mid-20th century, poorer people around the world have tended to construct or re-construct their understanding of their own economic situation as well as their own identity based on the standards of those in richer countries (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1990).

[21] The Third World included states that had recently emerged from under colonial rule, and states with relatively low levels of industrialization and high levels of poverty. The so-called "First World" was made up of North America and Western Europe, while the "Second World" consisted of the Soviet Union.

Another premise of development is this: encouraging democratic governance and a capitalist market economy in poorer countries or those with non-democratic governance will enact social and economic transformation and ensure political stability. With fewer political problems, so the argument goes, more economic investment should be possible, thus reducing poverty in a different manner (Escobar 1995). However, numerous critics of Western-led development argue that policies instituted by the World Bank, IMF, and other international economic organizations often lead poorer countries into a *losing* economic relationship with richer states, rather than economic independence or even economic stability (Baran, 1957; Isbister, 2001; Wilk, 1997).

Development theories and programs took on their contemporary forms after World War II (Baran, 1957; Escobar, 1995; Isbister, 2001). A number of political, economic, and social issues provided the impetus: the success of the Marshall Plan in aiding Europe after the war; the desire to continue economic relations with former colonies and protectorates of Europe and the U.S.; the desire to standardize international finance and trade regimes and bolster worldwide economic growth; the need to strengthen Western influence in smaller countries against the Communist bloc during the Cold War; and the recognition of the extreme conditions of poverty that existed in many foreign states (Escobar, 1995; Leys, 2005). Toward these ends, the U.S. economic elite and representatives of forty-four other governments created the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944.

By the end of the 1950s, it became clear that many development projects in the "Third World" were not successful at reducing poverty and generating economic

investment in the ways Western experts had expected. One dominant theory to explain the differences between the largely positive results achieved by the Marshall Plan and the less-than-stellar results in non-European development projects concerned "modernization". It was thought that people in "traditional" societies had not made the transition to "modern" forms of social organization, and therefore needed a different kind of developmental help in the form of education about government and updated forms of technology (Isbister, 2001; Leys, 2005). Modernization theory's focus on capitalism and democracy as "modern" ways of being are a continuing influence on development policies and practices (Leys, 2005).[22] Thus, modernization is a key element of the discursive formation of development.

The 1960s saw development programs faltering even more in Latin American countries, even though most states there had been independent for a hundred years or more, and many had had democratic forms of government during that period. Experts were surprised because their theory that modern forms of social organization would lead to reduced poverty did not hold true. Dependency theory is one explanation that arose in academia to account for this discovery. According to dependency theory scholars, countries in the "center" (Western industrialized countries and the Soviet Union) exploit countries in the "periphery" (everyone else) for labor, natural resources, and investment opportunities. This material exploitation, along with interest due on loans offered by the IMF and IBRD, causes capital to flow out of needy countries rather than being invested at home. In response to the rise of dependency theory, development agencies proposed solutions in tune with ideals of the civil rights' movements and indigenous movements of

[22] Moldova's apparent transition from Second World to Third World status (as evidenced by its dealings with the IMF and World Bank, and the multitude of development programs that have resulted) has not been lost on its citizens.

the 1960s: treat people with equal human rights and allow them to be self-determining. The World Bank and other institutions made certain changes to their policies and practices, such as emphasizing more locally-produced solutions to poverty. However, they did not abandon what Leys calls "the short-term, ahistorical and uncritical perspectives of Western-produced, state-orientated development discourse" (Leys, 2005, p. 112; Isbister, 2001; Wilk, 1997).

The most important change in development to come out of the 1960s and '70s was the increased emphasis on participation (cf. Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Hickey & Mohan, 2004; Mosse, 2005). One theory concerning development's failure in poorer countries held that citizens had no voice in governance affairs, and must be included in order for development projects to succeed. Hence, agencies instituted a bottom-up series of processes to foster that participation. The focus on citizen participation surprisingly came out of the "institutional turn": the move toward encouraging institutional change in governance cultures of poorer countries. Better managing of money and gaining citizens' trust were supposed to make loans and grants more effective (Evans, 2005). Institution- and capacity-building included support for civil society and efforts toward sustainability. If people have a strong civil society and a strong and transparent governance system that they can participate in, so the theory goes, then there will be less corruption[23] in government affairs and capital will move more freely through the local markets. Correspondingly, governments' role in development projects changed from being merely a recipient of aid, to being described as a "partner" with the development agencies, and supposedly shared Western goals for a strong civil society and citizen participation

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[23] Corruption is constructed as an enemy, or even the antithesis, of development; it is the focus of Chapter 4 in this dissertation.

(Closser, 2010). Participation, partnership, and anti-corruption all became integral parts of development's discursive formation.

However, critiques of the participatory model of development are numerous. Many authors assert that projects claiming to espouse participation and empowerment usually accomplish very little of either (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Hickey & Mohan, 2004). Development agencies tend to ignore relative power differences between development professionals, community leaders and community members as long as the investment produces the desired material results. Moreover, the penetration of development discourses into people's daily lives often serves to subjugate citizens to development agencies and national governments rather than to develop their democratic participation in the community (Cleaver, 2001; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Ferguson, 1990; Kothari, 2001). Because of these trends, the participatory approach has been criticized for "globalizing" Western forms of civil society and citizenship, and for attempting to supplant states' powers with international governance (Cooke and Kothari 2001). Ferguson names these (usually) unintended effects of development projects "instrument-effects" (1990).

The influence of development on other discursive formations, or intersection between development and other discursive formations, such as citizenship, is rarely discussed or approached. Most authors concern themselves with critiquing development in general or evaluating particular development projects. One study that merges the effects of development with people's identities in civil society is Mandel's work on Kazakhstan (2002). She found that development agencies created a new social class of the workers hired to staff the agencies. The staff found ways to move easily between the

culture of international development and their home culture. In the process, they learned how to leverage discourses of development to create more social capital for themselves. The workers' new identity marks them as hybrid citizens of the international development world and their home state. Her conclusions could easily be applied to the case of Moldovans employed at the Social Investment Fund, too.

The ideologies that have dominated the last 60 years of development: modernization, dependency, participation, partnership, and transparency are important to this research because they have influenced, and actually constitute, the forms of development that operate in Moldova today via Moldova's SIF. Certain ideas about citizenship and cultural propriety *could* be called instrument effects of the MSIF projects. However, development, citizenship, and cultural propriety all have their own histories in Moldova. The intersection of these three formations and the ways they mutually constitute each other (rather than seeing any as an instrument effect of the other) are a main focus of this dissertation. This approach is my addition to the literature: a focus on how development, citizenship, and cultural propriety work together in the production of culture and identity in the new state.

Identities

The study of what it means to be Moldovan necessitates addressing the literature on different forms of social and cultural identity. The identities of people in the region have been under debate for more than one hundred years (a topic I develop further in Chapter 3). In this section, I assert that a study concerning national, ethnic, and other social identities gains depth when it includes ethnographic data gathered from people's

everyday lives. Moreover, by examining the everyday, one may understand how social identities are created, maintained, and reinforced over time.

Most social scientists agree that identities are formed socially, that is, between people and according to cultural norms (Castells, 2010; Eriksen, 2002; Geertz, 1973; M. Rosaldo, 1984). A person's identity is a particular source of meaning in his or her life, and is usually related to a particular culture or set of cultural attributes (Castells, 2010). Many who study national and ethnic identity examine the "feature cluster" that people and sociocultural institutions draw upon to construct their own forms of cultural propriety: language, "descent, history, culture, [and] religion" (Anderson, 1991; Blommaert & Verschueren, 1998, p. 192; see also Connor, 1994; Di Leonardo, 1984; Eriksen, 2002; Geertz, 1994; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1998). Among these authors, Anderson and Smith include as important the aggregate effects of standard languages and nationalized education systems on people's feelings of national identity. While valuable, the majority of these works concerning national, ethnic, and civic identities do not illustrate their theories with data from current daily practices (Di Leonardo is the notable exception). That was not their scope, so they can hardly be faulted for it. They have not addressed the *everyday* processes by which "particular cultural artefacts", such as nationality and shared culture "have aroused such deep attachments" in individuals (Anderson, 1991, p. 4). If all communities (not only nations) are imagined, as Anderson claims, then we need to offer support for *how* ethnic groups, social classes, a citizenry and other sociocultural groups may be imagined and developed differently from nations. In the process, we will discover how people are drawn into those groups, and we may

define the circumstances in which loyalty to one group (or the dominance of one identity) supersedes another, and why.

For example, Brubaker offers the following advice on how scholars can hone in on ethnic and other social identities. He states that we should focus on:

> how people and organizations do things with, and to, ethnic and national [and other] categories; how such categories are used to channel and organize processes and relations; and how categories get institutionalized, and with what consequences;…to ask how, why, and in what contexts…categories are used—or not used—to make sense of problems and predicaments, to articulate affinities and affiliations, to identify commonalities and connections, to frame stories and self-understandings (Brubaker, 2004, p. 25) (see also Barth 1969).

Such an approach attends to interpersonal relations as well as the hegemony associated with certain categories and patterns of behavior. To that end, one of the discursive formations that I identify in this work relates more to identity *in general* than the other two: cultural propriety. Culturally appropriate behavior transcends categories of ethnic, regional, and political affiliations to indicate appropriate actions and the morals that support appropriate action for all Moldovans. Although there is certainly variation in everyday behavior and variation between different ethnolinguistic groups, the history and current sociocultural context of Moldova allows for prominent discourses of cultural propriety to be recognized (if not always performed) by the majority of citizens.

This work also draws upon the work of a number of authors who use the study of language to illustrate identity formation and maintenance. Foster (2002), Day and Thompson (2004), Herzfeld (1997), Billig (1995), Smith (1998), and Gal (1998), for

example, investigate the ways people manipulate language and representation to reproduce a sense of belonging to a place and/or a group of people. Herzfeld in particular writes that a study of the appeal of nationalism to citizens should be grounded "in the details of everyday life—symbolism, commensality, family, and friendship—that would make it convincing for each specific case or that might call for the recognition of the cultural specificity of each nationalism" (as Anderson claims is necessary in the opening of his book) (Herzfeld, 1997, p. 6). Billig, Foster, and Smith argue that these daily moments that engender "collective attachment and sentiment" actually produce and reproduce imagined communities (Smith, 1998, p. 137). In addition, identity formation is understood as integrally connected to both historical and current societal circumstances, as necessarily invented and grounded in society and culture, and even as able to vary in different contexts. To borrow from Foster, whose work builds on Anderson (1991) and Hobsbawm and Ranger (1992), among others, "the nation, as narrative, is always in process, often contested by multiple agents with competing agendas" (2002, p. 5).

However, I also maintain attention to the aggregated actions of elites and powerful institutions in my focus on the interactions of people at the Moldova Social Investment Fund, and through my use of participant observation and conversations with citizens as another primary source of data.[24] Therefore, I also use as inspiration a number of anthropological and sociolinguistic studies that analyze the formation of national identity by looking at the work of elites, institutions, and powerful discourses in society (e.g. Anderson, 1991; Billig, 1995; Blommaert & Verschueren, 1998; Foster, 2002). For

[24] Although they are not concerned with nationalism or national identity directly, Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991), Gramsci (Gramsci & Forgacs, 2000), Foucault (Foucault, 1995; Foucault & Gordon, 1980) and Hall (Hall, 1996a, 1996b; Hall, Morley, & Chen, 1996) explain how institutions within states maintain and reproduce hegemonic relations that may include a sense of duty toward the ideals of the naturalized state and the dominant groups within a state.

example, Foster's study of Papua New Guinea examines public service campaigns, government publications, popular advertisements, and national news stories (2002). The present study incorporates their approach to studying identities through institutions and relations of power, yet official public speech, advertisements, national celebrations, and stories in mass media are among the data that serve as the backdrop to daily negotiations of identity between citizens.

Spitulnik (1997, 1998, 2000, 2002a, 2002b) and Wodak (2007, 1999), in particular, have influenced the current research; they study the interplay between language used by individuals and institutions by examining the circulation and recontextualization of discourses from one sphere to another. To do so, they triangulate among diverse sources and genres, such as analysis of: a) the meanings and evaluations of linguistic forms that people inject in their language and practice in different contexts, both spoken and written; b) the daily practices of national and supranational institutions and how those practices serve certain ideologies; and c) the symbols individuals and institutions employ in the public sphere. The focus on institutions in conjunction with other sources is particularly "crucial in establishing some of the terms in which the politics of language gets played out," states Spitulnik, because of the researchers' ability to compare the medium of discourse circulation (meetings, pamphlets, announcements, radio), the structural power of the institutions, and the recontextualization of discourses in other spheres of social life (Spitulnik, 1997, p. 181)(see also Wodak, 2007).

Spitulnik's work emphasizes how the everyday practices of state institutions, such as Zambian radio networks, enact powerful ideologies (1998). Therefore, the state reproduces itself not only through *explicit* discourse aimed at naturalizing its power, but

also through *implicitly* influential discourse.[25] The latter may be overlooked if one attends 'only' to policy or the function of an institution in society. Wodak similarly triangulates between diverse sources, both institutional and popular, to investigate how "Europe" is being redefined as the European Union (EU) matures (2007), and how Austrians define themselves (1999). The current work expands on the approaches of Spitulnik and Wodak by adding development institutions as means of reproducing the state, and by examining development's discursive formation alongside those of citizenship and cultural propriety.

Furthermore, the data I present require focus on citizenship or a civic *identity* within a state.[26] Therefore, I draw upon Schopflin's work in this vein, who looks at "civil society, the state and ethnicity…[as] in a continuous, interactive relationship" (2000, p. 35). Civil society is not a theoretical topic I delve into directly; instead I focus on development and citizenship as representative of both civil society and the state. While it

[25] Foster and Errington look more at the state's attempts to promote itself. For example, in Errington's study of the development of various manifestations of authority in the Indonesian language since it became the national language of Indonesia in 1928, the author found that certain linguistic forms in both Indonesian and Javanese (spoken by the most powerful ethnic group) covertly index higher status for their users (Errington, 1998; Foster, 2002). He attends to vocabulary, to nonlexical ways of showing status (nonreferential functions of language) and to how the state co-opted the higher status of the Javanese elites in order to mediate ethnic and national identity. Errington's work complements models by Habermas, Bourdieu, and Weber, who look at language use as constitutive of individuals' applications of power relationships in daily life and representative of their relationships to the state.

[26] To avoid confusion between the terms *state* and *nation*, I will use the word *state* rather than *nation* when referring to the Republic of Moldova, and *ethnic group* or *ethnolinguistic group* rather than *nation* in the sense of people bound together by a shared culture. I make this distinction because of the mixed use of the words *state* and *nation* in other texts, specifically those that deal with nationalism (such as Anderson (Anderson, 1991)1991, Smith (Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1998)1998 and Gellner 1983). Part of my problem in using the word *nation* stems from the terms "nationalism" and "nation-building"; there is no "statism" to mean allegiance to the state or "state-building" to describe post-colonial political and ideological processes. Anderson's descriptions of how "national" movements grew into states tell how such movements were generally aligned with groups who spoke the same vernacular or minority language (within an empire). This initially follows Smith's discussion of a nation as distinct from both a state and an ethnic group in its determination of itself as a political entity, as deserving of allegiance that is more important than an ethnic group (Smith, 1998). However, as both works proceed, the boundaries between nation and state seem blurred. This may be because the idea of a monoethnic nation is simply not feasible in a world where migration and intermarriage between groups happens regularly, even if it is not presented as the "ideal" version of cultural practices (this point is supported by Billig (1995; 2004; 2000).

is acceptable to think about ethnicity as an identity, some may believe that "citizen" is more of a role.[27] In a new state like Moldova, it is entirely possible that people may treat "citizen" solely as a role, since people's roles as citizens have shifted with the change in governance and the influence of Western and international ideals of democratic participation and citizens' responsibility in society. However, other research defines roles as part of one's identity, and identity as negotiated over time and in relation to context (Bucholtz and Hall 2004; Bergami and Bagozzi, 2000; Stets and Burke, 2000; Ellemers et al., 1999). Therefore, I hold that a person's participation in new practices of citizenship may become part of their identity, even their "national identity," over time and in relation to the contexts in which they interact.

Citizenship

The data presented here lend themselves to using citizenship as a powerful organizing principle for two reasons. First, the data concern people's interaction with an agency sponsored by foreign states and international agencies *through* the Moldovan state. People's interaction with this agency supports their role as citizens, and I argue that it helps build their identity as citizens. The data support more than the generation of national feeling, national identity, or group identity, though the work of the development agency may affect all of those secondarily. There is something else at work here that has been missing since the end of the Soviet era: people's self-identification as part of the Moldovan state.

[27] Definition: a function in society people perform without internalizing as part of their identity (Castells, 2010, pp. 6-7).

Second, the current non-violent/non-conflictual relationship between people of different ethnic groups in Moldova lends itself to a framework of citizenship. People seem to understand that the decades of interaction between people of different groups has led to a common experience, and perhaps a common future. The data presented here will support this assertion. The definition of citizenship in the new Moldovan state has always been inclusive, rather than excluding certain groups (as did the Baltic states after independence) (Kaneff & Heintz, 2006; Kolstø, 2002). That inclusivity may be part of the reason why, according to King, the Romanian/Moldovan elites in the country have failed to enact a common "national" (ethnic) identity (2000). On the contrary, I hold that the history and current daily practices of Moldovans constitute reference points that Moldovans use to enact their identification with one another and with the state.

What is citizenship?

Citizenship is a category of belonging, similar to other ethnic, linguistic, community, and "national" groupings. Two commonly defined types of "belonging in a nation" (Craith, 2004, p. 289) are civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism (Abowitz and Harnish, 2006; Day and Thompson, 2004; Smith, 2001; Eriksen, 2002; Gellner, 1983). These overlap with (but are not equal to) contemporary definitions of citizenship. Civic nationalism has its roots in the French Revolution, and emphasizes individual freedom and belonging to the nation as more important than other social allegiances. A pitfall in the civic model is that the majority culture is taken as the norm for the identity of an ideal citizen (Craith, 2004). Ethnic nationalism, originated as a school of thought in mid-19th century Germany. Ethnic origins defined belonging in the new state. The ethnic model

allows for membership in a group to extend beyond the boundaries of the state, i.e. Germans in Poland and Hungary, (and may serve as justification for extending the boundaries of the nation-state by force to include all members of "the nation" in one state). However, this latter model does not allow new groups to be integrated into the ideal of a citizen. Kymlicka states that the difference between civic and ethnic nationalism is that, with the former, all people may become citizens, but they must assimilate to the majority group; with the latter, people may not assimilate to the majority group, but their citizenship is not guaranteed (1995).

In my opinion, nationalism as a concept is muddy, since a "nation" in the sense of an ethnic group does not equate to a state in most parts of the contemporary world, yet people often use the words *nation* and *nation-state* to indicate a state. Many also use the terms *nationalism* and *national identity* to refer to people's sense of belonging to a state. In some cases, *citizenship* and *nationalism* are taken to mean nearly the same thing. Citizenship is a more specific concept, referring to the relationship between people and a state. "People" includes citizens and non-citizens; a person's very classification into one of those two groups defines his or her obligations to and expectations of support from a state. A state can be more clearly defined in the contemporary world than a nation; a state has internationally recognized boundaries, a set of institutions ranging from large governing bodies to local schools, and specifically defined categories of belonging. However, citizenship is not an uncontested concept. Ideals of who is and is not a citizen have been evolving since Greek city-states defined citizens as only the elite male members of the community. The Greek male elites defined one aspect of citizenship that is important here: that "citizens are who they are by virtue of participating in the life of

their political community and by identifying with its characteristics" (Shafir, 1998, pp. 10-11) (see also Oldfield, 1998). Thus, the *practice* of citizenship is as important as the *status* of citizen. The Greek definition is especially pertinent to states like Moldova, where any Soviet citizen living in Moldova at the fall of the Soviet Union was granted Moldovan citizenship. I argue in this work that any citizen who seeks support from the state or participates in processes organized by the state is practicing a civic role and perhaps has internalized a civic identity, whether or not they identify with their fellow citizens in a cultural sense. Civic identity, or a citizen identity, is not the same as civic nationalism, if we are to use Craith's definition. Therefore, one can move past the idea that the majority culture is taken as ideal and focus on the many behaviors of people that illustrate their multiple, and sometimes competing, identities in their everyday lives.

Sociologist T. H. Marshall defined citizenship according to the types of rights and obligations it creates between citizens and their state (1998). Civic, political, and socioeconomic rights began to be extended to lower and working classes along with the rise of democratic governments and nation-states in the late 18th and 19th centuries (Giesen & Eder, 2001; Shafir, 1998). These were described as rights, not privileges, as was previously the case. Legal/civil rights enable the state to protect citizens via the legal system, but citizens must also adhere to the laws of the state. Political rights empower citizens to vote, to represent others and themselves in the democratic process, but they must practice that power in order to maintain it. Social rights allow citizens to claim benefits from the state , yet the people also must authorize the state to provide benefits to other citizens and must provide the funds to do so.[28] Giesen and Eder discuss three

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[28] Common definitions of citizenship overlap with the description of activities in the public sphere in Habermas (1991). While debates on the public sphere are important, they are not the focus of this work.

perspectives from which states may approach citizenship: the individualist, political and collective identity paradigms (2001). The first is based on liberal ideals of freedom and rights within the state. The second views citizenship as practiced through active participation. The third refers to "cultural ideas of virtue, icons of good membership, and myths of defending a sense of commonness against some outside enemy" (p. 6). In this work, I show that all three of these approaches are important within the context of Moldova.

Anthropological critiques of debates on citizenship assert the necessity of including attention to *culture* in any definition of citizenship or citizen, and in studying the practice of citizenship (Craith, 2004; R. Rosaldo, 1994). Culture influences the way the state operates, the ways laws are created and enacted, the ways people treat each other as citizens, and who is defined as an outsider or non-citizen (and thus each person's civic, political, and socioeconomic rights). It is impossible to divorce culture from citizenship, and vice versa (Craith, 2004, p. 294) Some assert that cultural rights and obligations are a part of citizenship: citizens must have the freedom to practice their own culture(s), yet they must also allow others to do so and maintain an inclusive state (Kymlicka, 1995; R. Rosaldo, 1994).[29]

I use the concept of citizenship to help me describe people's participation in state processes, the effects of their participation on their role as citizens, and the development of their identities as citizens of their communities and their state. The drawbacks of

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Rather, I see the public sphere as one site in which discourses about citizenship, identity, and development play out (cf. Somers (1993, 1995); and Soysal (2000) for more discussion on the public sphere as a site of analysis.)

[29] I will not deal with non-citizens (such as refugee and denaturalized populations) here, since Moldova maintains an inclusive state for those who were citizens there at the end of the Soviet era, and the laws concerning naturalization for non-citizens are similar to those in the US (Diacov, 2000)

approaching the topic in this way are that I may be critiqued for not paying enough attention to ethnic identity and tensions between ethnic groups, differential access of ethnic group members to state services, and "national" identity.[30] These topics will appear in my work, but are not my main focus. Rather, I examine common experiences of Moldovan people as they participate in processes as citizens of the state; I ask how people's participation encourages them to become more fully integrated with the state; and I describe the methods through which the World Bank (among other entities) encourages that participation in order to grow a more stable government and a Western ally in the region.

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the literatures that support my theoretical framework for studying development, citizenship, and "proper" behavior as discursive formations through which people negotiate and enact their identities in daily life in the Republic of Moldova. The relationship between language, culture, and society forms the basis for this research, as the lens through which I examine the topics I see as pertinent to Moldovan life. I utilize literature concerning development to inform my understanding and analysis of the work of the Moldova Social Investment Fund. Development's discursive formation also influences local ideals and practices of citizenship, as this work will show. My perspective on identity emerges based on literature on the ways identities are formed, and how they are shaped by institutional and individual practices. What I perceive as the nascent negotiation of a Moldovan citizen identity has been guided by

[30] Soysal (2000) and Closa (2001) note that ethnic identity may impede cohesion in civil society.

literature concerning the practices and ideologies of citizenship within the sociocultural context of Moldova. By examining the literatures that inspire my theoretical framework, we begin to see that the three discursive formations that I highlight have theoretical and academic histories. The formations' practical histories in the Moldovan context will be further elaborated as this work proceeds.

Chapter Three:

The Moldovan Context

Introduction

Following on the heels of the theoretical framework, this chapter lays out foundational information about Moldova's history and contemporary context. At the end of the chapter, I introduce several thematic groups common to both pre- and post-independence Moldovan culture that contribute to the discursive formations of development, citizenship, and cultural propriety. Along the way, I tell more of the story of how I became interested in Moldova and these topics of research, as well as provide ethnographic data and bibliographic sources to support the theoretical points.

Why Moldova?

I traveled to Moldova for the first time in 1994 as a teacher of English as a Foreign Language,[31] and stayed for two years. I naively[32] embarked with a typical North American vision of belonging and identity, that is, one linked to a majority culture in a state. My cultural experiences up to that point had led me to assume that the official description of the state found in the CIA Factbook at my local library would be fairly accurate. I thought the majority of people in the new country would consider themselves

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[31] Through the English Teaching Fellows program of the US Information Agency

[32] I say naively because I had access to very little information about the country before going to work there. The internet was not widely available and the only facts I could find were from a pre-1989 encyclopedia and a post-independence CIA Factbook. The latter provided a little information about economic, demographic, and local political conditions, but practically nothing about the culture and daily life of the people who live there. Among other official data, I learned that the local people were called Moldovans and that the national language was Romanian or Moldovan, depending on the date of publication.

citizens of that country; would speak the national language (officially called Moldovan, but widely recognized as a variant of Romanian);[33] and would call themselves "Moldovans," adopting the name of the new state. What I found there during the two years I taught English to public servants was much different. In the mid-1990s, Moldova had barely gotten on its feet after the Soviet Union crumbled. Although the majority spoke the national language, thirty to forty percent of the population did not speak it at all, or only rudimentarily.[34] People who used Romanian as their native language often mixed it with Russian words, and had adopted Russian syntax. Impersonal interactions in public, at least in the capital and other major cities, were largely conducted in Russian (asking someone a question on the street, buying items in a shop); and events, such as outdoor festivals, and concerts at national venues, were most often led by emcees speaking Russian. Despite the fact that Russian dominated the public sphere, ethnic Moldovans[35] were (and are) fiercely proud of their language and culture. Nevertheless, ethnic Moldovans whom I did *not* know nearly always addressed me first in Russian. In their experience, Russian remained the *lingua franca* with foreigners and unknown fellow citizens, and for official interaction with governing bodies. I studied the basics of both Russian and Romanian in an effort to integrate into my workplace and surroundings. Since I had previously studied French and Spanish, I made more progress

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[33] Moldovan was named the "state language" of the MSSR in 1989; the 1991 Declaration of Independence called the "official language" Romanian; the 1994 Constitution named Moldovan as the "national language". Russian is granted official language status in the Gagauz-Yeri independent region, while in the rest of the country, Russian is a de facto lingua franca (R. Moldova, 2003).

[34] The Moldovan language is distinguished from the Romanian language only by a small number of vocabulary items, and some grammatical constructions borrowed from the Russian language. Most scholars consider Moldovan a dialect of Romanian. The idea of Moldovan as a separate language was created during the Soviet period (King, 2000). During fieldwork, I vacillated between calling the local language Romanian and Moldovan, just as most Moldovan citizens do.

[35] The term "ethnic Moldovans" will become clear over the course of this chapter.

in Romanian since it is in the Latin language family.[36] As time went on, I found that ethnic Moldovans were very pleased that a foreigner had learned their native language. I regularly heard (and this was still true in 2003-6) the complaint that 'Russians were here for forty years and never learned a word of Romanian.'

Moreover, in those early years of independence, I witnessed the beginnings of what would become major changes in the power structure in the society. Ethnic Moldovans rose to higher positions in government (and other workplaces) than they had during Soviet rule, and the new leaders felt increasingly comfortable speaking their language in all arenas (King, 2000). Russian speakers held fewer positions of power and began to see their language relegated to second in society. Russophones were more likely to be urbanites and wealthier than other citizens, so they still maintained the cultural superiority that accompanies city life. This superiority also manifested itself in dissatisfaction with new inequalities and the new government; and in outrage at the dissonance between the supposed benefits of democratic governance and the inability of the government to serve citizens' basic needs. One English teacher who had not been paid for eight months asked me, "Is this democracy?" All of these behaviors and beliefs, and the history and structural changes that influenced them, piqued my interest and served as the basis for my desire to return to Moldova for my dissertation research.

Moldovans' identity in question

Scholarly works published in the 1990s in English concerning Moldova consisted entirely of studies by political scientists, economists, development agencies, and linguists

[36] All are related in the Italic language family (International, 2011).

(Bank, 1999; Chinn, 1997; Crowther, 1997, 1998; Dima, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1999, 2001; King, 2000). The country's political fluctuations since 1991, especially the election of the Communist Party to power in 2001, the Transnistrian conflict, the Gagauz autonomous region, and debates over Moldova's national language, are topics that generally intrigue foreign observers (Chinn, 1997; Ciscel, 2005; Crowther, 1998). These topics tend to lead scholars toward questions about the ethnolinguistic and political identities of citizens of Moldova, since political leanings have played a large part in the country's internal conflicts since 1991.

Part of outsiders' curiosity may stem from Moldova's history. Since the Middle Ages, the region has held different names, has lived under several different ruling bodies, and has seen its borders shift regularly. Because of this, talking about the "history of Moldova" means also incorporating information about lands that are now part of Romania and Ukraine, and may have been called (concurrently and/or chronologically, from about the year 1350) the principality of Moldavia, Bukovina, Moldavia, the Ottoman Empire, Bessarabia, the Russian Empire, Austria-Hungary, the Kingdom of Romania, the Moldavian Democratic Republic (which lasted 3 months in 1918), Greater Romania, the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR), the Bessarabian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR), and the Republic of Moldova.[37] In two of the most recent, the MASSR and the MSSR, Soviet governments concerned themselves in various ways with manipulating identity in the largely failed attempts at nation-building that King (2000) referred to in the quote that opened this work. The MASSR was set up in 1924 on the left bank of the Nistru River,

[37] This list necessarily collapses a great period of history, which reduces the detail offered about the history of the area. Many texts exist that cover this subject in great depth, such as those by King (2000), Bruchis (1992), Dima (1991), and Stati (2002).

in an area slightly larger than, but still incorporating, what is currently the separatist Transnistrian republic. The lands there had previously been under the administration of the Ukrainian SSR. Moldavian identity was promoted and people were encouraged to use the Moldavian (Romanian) language, even though only about 32% of the population claimed Moldavian ethnolinguistic heritage (King, 2000). During that same inter-war period, the parts of Moldavia/Bessarabia/Bukovina that now make up the Republic of Moldova on the right bank of the Nistru became part of "Greater Romania" (it is locally called "*Romania Mare*"; *mare* means big or great or grand). In 1940, the Soviet Union annexed those regions as a result of secret agreements about Soviet "spheres of influence" made in the Molotov-Ribbentrov Pact with Nazi Germany, signed in 1939. Thus, the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) was born, which included the more ethnically Moldavian parts of the MASSR and the lands on the right bank of the Nistru that had been part of Greater Romania. When Romania joined the German side in World War II, Axis forces re-invaded those lands. Local people were conscripted into both the Romanian and Soviet armies. The national cemetery in Chisinau shows markers side by side with the two flags. When the dust settled after World War II, the Soviet Union controlled the region up to the left bank of the Prut River, which had been the western border of that region during its period in the Russian Empire. Contentious areas, such as the Bukovinan lands in the northern part of the area and the access to the Danube in the southern lands, were transferred to Ukraine to maintain political stability, according to King (2000). The Soviet-Romanian peace treaty of 1947 stabilized relations and solidified the borders for the next 52 years. To further reinforce the Moldavian SSR's place in the USSR, Stalin's social scientists worked to distinguish a Moldavian identity

separate from that of other Romanian speakers across the western border (King, 2000).[38] Not coincidentally, a condensed period of dekulakization removed many dissidents and elites from the area.[39]

Scholars and diplomats are among those who wonder how well Stalin's project worked, and whether a common identity can even exist in a country that has changed regimes so often. Another reason for outsiders' interest is geopolitical. The Transnistrian conflict[40], the involvement of Russia in Moldovan geopolitical space, the secession and then and and the expansion of the European Union to Moldova's western

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[38] See the section of this chapter entitled "A Brief Political History."

[39] See the section of this chapter entitled "People's new relationship to the state".

[40] The Transnistrian separatist conflict resulted from a number of factors, which are summarized here from the following sources: Fedor, 1995; and Batt, Ishaq, and Batt, 1999. In the late 1980s, the Popular Front of Moldova gained multi-ethnic support based on its proposals for democratic reforms of the Soviet government and rights for ethnic Moldovans/Romanians. Among its successes was the "Grand National Assembly" of August 1989, a public demonstration by approximately 300,000 of its supporters. This was followed by the Moldavian Supreme Soviet's declaration in August 1989 that Moldovan be named the state language and that it be written in Latin script instead of Cyrillic. Russian was declared a language of interethnic communication. Upon its members' election to the Moldavian Supreme Soviet in early 1990, the party's platform was taken in a more nationalist direction by a pro-Romanian minority. One influential symbolic achievement was the issue of a new Moldovan state flag, which emulated the Romanian flag (a tricolor of blue, yellow, and red, with the Moldovan state seal superimposed over the middle yellow stripe). Members of minority ethnic groups felt threatened by this series of actions, among others. Notably, the Popular Front did not hold wide support outside the capital in rural areas, where the Communist Party apparatus maintained its strength. More vocal resistance to the Front began across the country, but especially in the eastern cities of Tiraspol, Bender, and Ribnita, the largest cities in the Transnistrian region. Following a series of political and physical clashes across the country, the turmoil continued in the Supreme Soviet, and100 anti-Popular Front members withdrew from the governing body in May 1990. In June, following the official proclamation of Moldova's sovereignty within the Soviet Union, the Popular Front proposed controversial motions to change the name of the republic to "the Romanian Republic of Moldova, for its citizens to be called 'Romanians,' and for the Romanian language to be designated the language of the republic" (Fedor, 1995, "The 1990 Elections"). Not long after, both the Gagauz minority in the South and the factions in Transnistria announced their respective independence, with the latter choosing to remain a part of the Soviet Union. Sporadic organized violence among local militias broke out in the fall of that year and continued through Moldova's official independence in 1991 and into 1992. In the meantime, the Soviet government in Moscow tried to put down internal rebellion in Moldova by assigning General Alexander Lebed to lead the Soviet/Russian 14th Army (formerly stationed in Chisinau, but garrisoned in Transnistria after 1991) in its support of the Tiraspol factions. General Lebed had famously led troops in the suppressing of nationalist uprisings in Azerbaijan (1988, 1990) and Georgia (1989). More than 300 were killed and 1000 wounded in the fighting. The Popular Front lost most of its support; a new, more moderate, Prime Minister was named; and a less extreme national agenda was enacted. By the 1994 Parliamentary elections, the mainstream Democratic Agrarian Party won a majority of votes. Gagauz-Yeri became an autonomous region within Moldova, with representatives in the Moldovan Parliament. Transnistria's separatism has never been resolved, Russia has never honored agreements to remove the 14th Army from Tiraspol, and political tensions couched in ethnicity and language rights remain to this day.

border are important factors in the stability of the Eastern Europe and the Black Sea area (Chinn, 1997; Kennedy, 2007; King, 2000). Studies focused on these topics tend to highlight historical conditions, current trends in the operation of the government, general ethnolinguistic divisions in Moldova, and the influence of all these on national and foreign policy. Their emphasis on history, geopolitics, nationalism, and ethnolinguistic difference is not unfounded, and indeed, all of these influence the present study.

Within those concerned with politics is a subset of people interested in governance and how the state's internal politics affects its foreign policy (E. A. Anderson, 2005; Kauffman, 2009; King, 2000). They investigate how the new Moldovan state classified its populace after 1991, the role of nationalism in the new state, whether ethnic minority groups are treated equally, and what standards are in place to ensure citizens' equality. They also ask how the state interprets its legacy of Soviet rule into new policies concerning the rights of minority groups; and how state policies are enacted by institutions, such as schools, universities, the court system, and non-state entities (such as NGOs), on a daily basis. A secondary question of such works is whether or not one can glean any inkling of Moldovan identity from policy decisions. Thus, identity is always a subtext to any concern with Moldova's governance and even its statehood.

Moldova as a crossroads

One metaphor that often arises when discussing Moldova's history or its people's identity is Moldova as a crossroads between Europe and Eurasia, and between Latin and Slavic cultures (Kennedy, 2007; R. o. Moldova, 2009; Nations, 2009). Without a doubt, the history of the region, having been conquered or annexed a number of times, and the

ethnolinguistic groups coexisting in Moldova, representing all neighboring states and even some farther away, make it hard to deny Moldova's hybrid heritage (cf. Kaneff & Heintz, 2006; School, 2009). However, Moldova-as-a-crossroads is not always a positive metaphor. The state is well-known as a transition point for East-to-West human trafficking and weapons smuggling (Patt, 2011; United Nations, 2011). Outsiders would like to categorize Moldova according to its government, but power fluctuates between parties who hold strong allegiances either to the West (Europe, US) or to the East (Russia, former Soviet states). In addition, Moldova's geographic location makes it difficult to pin down which regions are influencing the people as much as the local government. Politically, Moldova has consistently "pursued a dual policy promoting good relations with the West while maintaining close ties with Moscow" (King, 2000, p. 2). The historical case of Macedonia may be instructive to understanding the source of confusion over Moldova's loyalties.

During the 1800s, the area surrounding the region of Macedonia was a borderland between Europe and the Ottoman lands to the East, much as Moldova is a borderland today between the EU and the CIS (Chira-Pascanut & Schmidtke, 2009). Western Europeans used the term "Balkan" to describe the region that divided Europe from the Ottoman Empire; by the 20th century, the word "had become a general pejorative meaning backward, and, especially, subject to political disorder and disintegration" (p. 63). Considering that Moldovans have often been described to me as "simple," "criminal," "dangerous," "backward," "uncivilized," and "peasants" by people from

Russia, Romania, France, the US, and even by Moldovans,[41] this case bears further comparison.

The people living in the Macedonian region were a heterogeneous mixture of ethnic groups speaking a number of languages and dialects of Slavic, Balkan, Turkish, and other origins (Irvine & Gal, 2000). Western Europeans were not able to easily categorize the population either by language or by territory. They perceived the people as disordered and uncivilized, in implicit contrast to their "orderly" world in Western Europe (which they failed to recognize was equally heterogeneous). The disorder of languages and territory was projected onto the people of the region, who Western Europeans came to consider as having loyalties to multiple political and ethnic groups, and therefore, untrustworthy. The outsiders "missed--and their representations erased--the local logic by which the inhabitants of Macedonia understood categories of language and identity" (p. 65). As noted, many have described Moldovans as having mixed allegiances and being unable to decide on the future of their country. Western organizations adopt the crossroads narrative, but then some Moldovans have even come to believe this about themselves, rather than recognizing the strengths of their position.

Riding Three Horses

To give an example of how the Moldovan state's indecision between East and West is portrayed in Moldova, I can describe the visit to Moldova of an American foreign

[41] Of course, there are different contextual reasons for using such descriptions. Moldovans describing people from the countryside, from a different region of Moldova, or from different ethnic groups in a negative light are likely to compare themselves positively to "Others" within their own country. My goal in this section is to focus on foreign views of Moldovans, and how international linguistic ideologies place Moldovans with respect to Europe and Russia, which many consider more "developed" and "cultured." These descriptions and beliefs also circulate among Moldovans, who adapt them to contexts and situations closer to home.

policy advisor and lobbyist in 2006. This person had traveled to Moldova for meetings with several Moldovan government officials, including President Voronin, and had agreed to stop by the State University to speak to about fifteen students and professors from the American Studies Program. The topic arranged beforehand was Moldova's place in relation to the European Union, and the possibility of Moldova joining the EU. During his lecture, the speaker described several foreign policy strategies that Moldova had been lately following: leaders had met with Balkan states concerning joining the EU, with the Black Sea states concerning energy policy, and with Russia concerning the conflict in Transnistria. Moldova is "riding three horses" as he put it, which is "a hard way to get into Europe".

The prospect of Moldova joining the EU is a common topic at policy discussions such as these, as well as at NGO and donor country conferences, in my experience. In fact, the speaker did not raise the possibility that Moldova would not want to join the EU, which may have arisen from his position as an American working in the foreign policy arena, or from his actual discussions with Moldovan government leaders. Nevertheless, he noted several actions that Moldova would have to take before the EU would consider admitting the former Soviet state: a) stop electing the Communist Party (or elect them under a different name, he suggested); b) raise defense and security spending ("Moldova has a conflict over an interior border and still has the lowest defense spending [in the region]"); c) become a member of NATO (no other country has recently joined the EU without first joining NATO); and d) improve Moldova's "economic conversion" in order to raise gross domestic product significantly to match that of other EU states.

First, by referring to Moldovans' election of the Communist Party into power, the speaker suggested that they may not really want to shed the Soviet past and/or move away from Russia; their allegiances are unclear. Second, he suggests that the Moldovan government does not share the same ideas about solving and preventing conflict that Western governments do, since Moldova's defense and security spending is lower than Westerners expect. Then, he directly recommends that Moldova follow a prescribed economic path to join the EU. He did not raise the possibility of other futures for Moldova, and considered the "three horse" strategy as too scattered to be taken seriously as a means of joining the EU.

After commenting on some areas in which Moldova is performing well, such as working toward the UN's Millennium Challenge goals, the policy advisor turned to the cultural meaning of joining Europe:

> And finally, because we have the opposition…of essentially very scared Western Europeans, we[42] do need to make the case that this is a European country. And it's very hard, um, I don't know how to explain this in an academic setting. [inaudible word] A lot of people think that Lithuania got into NATO and the EU because they play such good basketball, and you'd be surprised how…important these shared cultural things are, you know, the voices of poets, playwrights, students, how much more important they are than hearing [inaudible word] from the foreign ministry.… We[43] often say this, memberships in Europe and NATO and all these things are not really treaties between foreign ministries. They are marriages between cultures and civilizations. They're permanent, so they want to

[42] The speaker seems to include himself with Moldovans in this phrase.
[43] The speaker positions himself as an outsider in this phrase.

> know people, and I would not underestimate how important the social contexts that sustain this are. It will inevitably come up in the next five to seven years.[44]

The speaker called these the "intangibles of Europe": shared cultures and civilizations, poets, playwrights, students, and basketball teams. It would be hard to argue that Moldova does not share these very tangible items with other European countries. In fact, Moldovan citizens believe they share a "cluster" of cultural markers with Europeans, including their "language, descent, history… and religion" (Irvine & Gal, 2000, p. 194). If not for the approximately fifty years of Sovietization, the region at least on the right bank of the Nistru River[45] could already be a part of the EU. Therein lies the problem. Despite the invited speaker's declaration that cultural factors are often more important than treaties, the speaker referred several times in other parts of the lecture to Moldova's economy, the problem of corruption, and the re-election of the Communist Party to power. In spite of sharing cultural features such as language, ethnicity, and religion in common with many people considered "European" and with countries that are already part of the EU, Moldovan citizens are currently more associated with the economic and political difficulties of the post-socialist transition. Their governance largely negates the speaker's point that cultural identity matters.[46]

Attendees of the small discussion responded with questions for the speaker about Moldova's best approach to foreign policy (i.e. which of the three horses to choose), how to deal with the wine embargo, the speaker's opinion of the President and government and his confidence in their abilities, and about the possible dangers of joining the

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[44] Transcription conventions are noted in Appendix G.

[45] This part of Moldova was annexed into the USSR later than the region on the left bank of the Nistru and more ethnic Moldovans inhabit the area than people of Ukrainian or Russian descent.

[46] Irvine and Gal (2000) describe such part-to-whole characterizations using the interrelated semiotic processes of iconization, fractal recursivity, and erasure.

EU. The questions show us the foremost problem on Moldovans' minds: survival. They were wary of Russia, interested in regional alliances, and yet also cautious of the EU and what becoming a member might imply for the future of their state and people. There was not one clear path, and the discussion in the room reflected that fact.[47]

The crossroads as a strong point

Kaneff and Heintz note that Moldovans' position as a crossroads could be seen as a strength:

> If borders and boundaries are a resource to be used strategically, then in Bessarabia,[48] the power of this resource resides in its ambiguity…. Competing loyalties and multiple identities, the historically based connections tying the region to various powers at various periods in the past mean that there is no one centre of economic and political domination (2007, p. 15).

Europeans, Americans, Russians, and many others have difficulties understanding the people of the region because of their seemingly ambiguous identities. Moldovans may be strategically managing the three horses without realizing it, since culturally and politically, they have been doing so for a very long time.

Thus, foreigners see Moldova as disordered and malleable, much like they perceived Macedonia in the 1800s. The trend shows that more established states do not trust areas and peoples they cannot easily identify. It makes sense that superpower states, donors, and international organizations consider these qualities weaknesses, and therefore

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[47] Other authors who give relevant examples of similar behavior in Moldova are Anderson (1998) and Cash (2005).

[48] Bessarabia, or Basarabia, is the term for the region bounded by the Nistru and Prut Rivers. The Republic of Moldova contains most of Bessarabia within its political borders.

try to mold, shape, and influence the Moldovan state in the way they see fit. As Kaneff and Heintz point out, however, the ambiguity of Moldovan identities can be a source of power to the people in the region, able to be drawn upon in different situations, with different interlocutors (2006). In a way, the U.S. visitor used the three horses metaphor similar to the way others use the idea of Moldova as a crossroads: Moldova's history is defined by being a crossroads, but now people must direct their future along the correct path toward democratization; Moldovans are riding three horses, do not know which one will be the strongest, but must choose one to lead. I concur that hybrid identities are the norm in this region, but on the other hand, I assert that Moldovans' shared history within the boundaries of this republic, their shared hybridity, and common daily experiences, give them a more cohesive sense of belonging to this place and to each other.

A Brief Political History

Inhabitants of the region where the sovereign state of Moldova now exists have been the target of territorial disputes for several hundred years, and the object of identity speculation and dispute since at least the late 1800s. Until 1991, the area had not been autonomously ruled since the late 15th century. At that time, Bessarabia became part of the Ottoman empire. It changed hands from the Ottomans to the Hapsburgs to the Russians several times in the 18th century before becoming a part of the Russian empire in 1812. The latter move split Bessarabia from the Romanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia at the boundary of the Prut River, Moldova's current western border.

Illustration 1: Map of Bessarabia prior to World War I (Clark, 1922)

Between the two World Wars, and more precisely, after the Russian Revolution, Bessarabia became part of “Greater Romania.” Also during the inter-war period, in 1924, Stalin ordered the establishment of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) in a small section of southwestern Ukraine to the east of the Nistru River, an area populated by (ethnic) Ukrainians, Russians, and Moldovans. That creation set the stage for the next Soviet expansion in the region. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1940 allowed the Soviet Union to annex the Bessarabian areas that had previously been part of the Russian empire, and part of the Romanian province of Bucovina. On August 15,

1940, the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) was proclaimed, merging the MASSR with the Bessarabian/Bucovinan land west of the Nistru (Brezianu & Spanu, 2007)

However, during World War II, Bessarabia again became a battleground, this time between the Axis armies (Germany and Romania) and the Soviets. People in the region were conscripted into military service on both sides. As an enduring reminder, the WWII memorial in Chisinau contains the graves of local soldiers who served in the two warring armies; headstones marked by Romanian and Soviet flags lie side by side. The Paris Peace Treaties of early 1947 reduced Romanian territorial gains and ordered the Soviet-Romanian border back to its 1940 position. In May 1947, the first Supreme Soviet of the MSSR took place in Kishinev, the Russian name for the new MSSR capital city.[49] Thus, the current state of Moldova was carved out of three regions (defined as such at the time), and has long been an area of contested sovereignty.

With such a political history, one can understand why the people of the region are quite diverse, representing the following ethnolinguistic groups: Romanians/Moldovans, Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgarians, Gagauz, Roma, and Jews. The first four of these share a heritage with the titular nationality of a foreign state, and all have links with and possible allegiances to other national and transnational populations.[50] The locally used term, "nationality," has historical associations with the "nationalities policy" of the Soviet Union, which promoted safe forms of ethnic difference, as long as these did not

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[49] It had been known as Kishinev during the days as part of Russian empire, too.

[50] Cross-border interactions with fellow group members in states to the west have become commonplace since independence, and states like Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey have invested heavily in cultural projects in Moldova.

17 See the section entitled Discourses of Development and Citizenship in the Soviet Era for more information about deportations in the Soviet Union in general.

challenge Soviet state hegemony (Kaneff and Heintz, 2006). In recent documents, both "nationality" and "ethnic and linguistic communities" have appeared as terms referring to this concept (Moldova, 2003)

During the Soviet period, Moldovans were taught to be proud of their rural, agricultural heritage, at the same time that many of their wealthy or influential neighbors were sent to Siberia, Kazakhstan, and other central Asian regions in the mass deportations of 1940-41 and 1949.[51] Notably, the local people were exiled from the territory due to their ethnicity as much as to their class status (Martin, 2001, p. 329). People from other Soviet republics, especially Russia, were encouraged to immigrate to Moldova, where they often took positions of leadership (Bruchis, 1984; Dima, 1991b, 1991c; Kaneff & Heintz, 2006). The Soviet "nationalities policy" promoted identification with one's descent group ("nationality"),[52] which people themselves noted on Line 6 in their passports. One's nationality was a source of symbolic cultural identification. It was acceptable to show pride in heritage through song, dance, and other cultural events; it was not acceptable to use one's heritage as a basis for nationalist movements (Dima, 1999).

However, many people in the region, especially city dwellers and those who moved to cities from the countryside, were and are from ethnically mixed families. In Soviet times, children normally took the nationality of their father, but even "Moldavian" people living in cities became "Russified" by their education in the Russian language and through the influence of the dominant Soviet culture. Children of mixed marriages grew

[51] I do not have specific numbers of exiles from 1940-41 (it could be up to 300,000, according to Brezianu and Spanu (2007, see also (Moldova.org, 2010)), but the 1949 deportation amounted to just over 40,000 people (Werth, 2008).

[52] A word used in Moldovan (nationalitatea) and Russian (национальность) in a way similar to how North Americans use "ethnicity" and the academic use of "nation".

up primarily speaking Russian at home and were educated in Russian schools.[53] Bruchis notes that people could remake and manipulate their identity, usually for social or political gains (2004b).

Despite efforts to Russify the local population (or perhaps because of those efforts), the 1970s and 1980s saw a revival of Romanian nationalism in Moldova. Romanian identity became a rallying point for many Moldovans when they gained independence from the Soviet Union (Bruchis, 1984; Cash, 2004b). Indeed, many Moldavian Soviet leaders reclaimed their Moldovan ethnic identity after 1991, or began to exhibit it in more politically nationalistic ways, which gained them power in the wake of the Soviet Union's dissolution.

Early Years of Independence

In the days of early independence, the nationalistic fervor associated with the election to power in 1990 of the opposition political party, the Popular Front of Moldova, led to a set of actions that promoted the position of ethnic Moldovans within the country. On the one hand, the state flag was modeled after that of Romania, the state language was changed to Moldovan in the Latin alphabet, and ethnic Moldovans were placed in prominent positions of power (Fedor, 1995; Hare, Ishaq, Batt, 1999). On the other hand, there was also talk of changing the name of the country to "the Romanian Republic of Moldova, for its citizens to be called 'Romanians,' and for the Romanian language to be

[53] During the late Soviet period, there was only one high school in Chisinau that taught all courses in the Moldovan language. Elementary schools taught either Russian or Moldovan as a native or foreign language, depending on the orientation of the school. High school students may have been taught Moldovan as a foreign language. University education was and is still divided into language groups, in which students receive the majority of their courses in the target language. In the Soviet era, Russian language groups outnumbered Moldovan language groups. Now, that trend has reversed.

designated the language of the republic" (Fedor, 1995, "The 1990 Elections"). People who may have viewed the former moves as nationalistic and appropriate to forming a new state considered the latter initiatives too extreme. Ethnic minorities felt very threatened by such activities and proposals. The Popular Front alienated all but the most pro-Romanian of its supporters. Even the majority ethnic Moldovan population in the rural areas did not (openly) support Popular Front candidates (the Soviet Communist Party machine was still active). When the Gagauz minority in the south and the majority Slavic (Russian and Ukrainian) population in Transnistria held referenda on autonomy, militias formed and traveled to those areas to prevent people from voting. One young Gagauz woman described the terror she and her family had felt when they were told to gather with other women and children and hide from the militias. They feared for the lives of their father and other male family members who set out to defend the town's main roads. Groups of armed men had driven into towns to their north and started beating up people on the street. Nevertheless, the referenda passed. The Russian 14th Army garrisoned in the Transnistrian region supported the secessionists with arms and the might of Russia. After a brief intensification of the conflict in 1992, resulting in at least 300 dead and 1000 injured (including both sides of the battle), a stalemate ensued that has lasted to this day. Talk of reunification with Romania slowed to a trickle that is still voiced by a small minority. Many people of Russian and Ukrainian people have either emigrated or changed ethnic affiliation to fit in.[54] Most Moldovans did not consider seriously the idea of unification with Romania by the mid-1990s, by which time people had become more realistic about what a merger would mean for their country and

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[54] The 1989 Census recorded 26% of the population claimed Ukrainian and Russian heritage (13% each). In the 2004 Census, that number had reduced to 8.3 and 5.9%, respectively, whether by emigration or people changing affiliation (N. B. o. S. o. t. R. o. Moldova, 2004).

for their ethnically mixed population. For one thing, they were worried about getting drawn into internal political divisions in Romania and about the lower social and political status that Moldovans have experienced there since independence. For another, they had already seen firsthand the effects of such talk on the people in their fragile republic.

In 1994-96, I noticed that citizens of the new nation did not refer to themselves as "Moldovans" unless they belonged to the Moldovan ethnolinguistic group, a term associated with the Moldavian region and culture of eastern Romania.[55] Even then, not all people of Moldovan ethnolinguistic descent used the term. Some identified themselves as Romanians, others as Moldavians, and even some used the term Bessarabian. Their use usually depended on their age, geographic location, social class, political beliefs, and conversational context, although people often employed more than one of the terms to describe themselves or others like them. Accordingly, citizens whose parents or grandparents migrated to the region during the Soviet period (or even earlier) often called themselves Russian, Georgian, or Armenian, for example, or were named as such by others. People of other ethnolinguistic descent whose families had also long co-habited the region were known as Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Gagauz, and Jews. Thus, the Soviet nationalities policy still held sway in post-independence Moldova.[56]

People I encountered in 1994-6 who spoke Russian as their first or primary language and identified themselves culturally with Russian (they may have been Russified people of Moldovan descent or descendants of Russian immigrants) had begun

[55] As noted, part of Moldova that lies to the west of the Nistru River was historically called Bessarabia. The majority of people living in Bessarabia shared (and still share) linguistic and cultural ties to Romanian Moldavia.
[56] To my knowledge, Jewish people were referred to as an ethnic category during the Soviet period and until today, regardless of any family history that might lead them to call themselves Ukrainian or Russian, for example. Such use seems to be specifically ascribed to Jewish people, since people of other ethnolinguistic groups could strategically change their alliance by playing up one or another part of their history (see the section above on comparison with the Macedonian historical example.)

to lose political power, although they still held economic power and leadership positions in many institutions throughout Moldova. The *de facto* language of the government changed only very slowly from Russian to Romanian. This may have been due to the sheer necessity of keeping the country running, and also related to pre-existing sociopolitical networks. For example, a respected former Communist Party member, whose family name is ethnically Moldovan, but who spoke only Russian in public, was named Rector of the newly formed Academy of Public Administration of Moldova, the institution where I worked.[57] His Vice-Rectors were both former Party members, too, both with Moldovan surnames; one spoke Romanian and Russian, while the other spoke mostly Russian in public. All used local dialectical phrases in Moldovan (which typically mixed Moldovan and Russian vocabulary and syntax). By contrast, the staff members of the Academy were nearly all of ethnic Moldovan descent and spoke Romanian as their primary language; only a few were from self-identified Russian families in Moldova. The students reflected the demographic makeup of the country, being primarily ethnic Moldovans, with some Russians, Ukrainians, and Gagauz. However, since most had been educated in the Russian language at the university (or had gone to university in Moscow), and since the *de jure* language of most workplaces until 1991 had been Russian, these accountants, professors, public servants, mayors, administrative assistants, librarians, cooks, cleaning staff, and other workers all spoke a mixture of the Romanian and Russian languages. It was common to hear people code-switching within sentences for vocabulary items or stock phrases in Russian, or switching languages depending on the speakers' language in common. A significant behavior carried over

[57] The very creation of this institution could be considered a state-building project, since they were educating public servants (or public servants-to-be).

from the Soviet period was that Romanian speakers always changed to the Russian language when any person in a group did not speak Romanian. Sometimes, this was out of deference to a person's rank; at other times, it was attributed to politeness. In many ways, it was due to the ingrained habit of subsuming one's own language to Russian during the Soviet cultural domination. Many Romanian speakers privately brought this fact to my attention as a long-standing source of discord.

In addition, the civil war over the secession of the Transnistrian sector of Moldova, where many Russians and Ukrainians reside, was still fresh in people's memories during the mid-1990s. Civil confrontations, such as protest marches and political power struggles, were being waged over national sovereignty, the national and official language(s), and the primary allegiance of the new state to either Romania and Europe or Russia. Simmering beneath daily interactions in the capital city were long-standing resentments for ill treatment of (ethnic) Moldovan people during the Soviet period by "foreigners" (Russians, other foreign Party members, or even Russified Moldovans); and recently-raised anger between ethnolinguistic groups brought on by the Transnistrian war. I mostly heard about and saw examples from ethnic Moldovans' perspectives, since they were the majority of people with whom I interacted at that time.[58]

The mid-1990s were also times of Romanian nationalist sentiment revival.[59] When my friends and colleagues of Moldovan heritage invited me to their homes, or to their parents' homes in villages, many evenings were spent talking about how "Russians" had taken their land and how Moldovans had been prevented from speaking their native language in schools (they never talked about how the "Soviets" did

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[58] Most likely this was the case because of a combination of demography and the population of students at the government-run Academy of Public Administration where I worked.

[59] This movement had begun in the 1980s.

this or that; since they were also Soviet during that time, it would be like damning themselves). It was popular to sing sentimental songs in Romanian that referred to the pastoral and farming lifestyles of their ancestors. There was also renewed interest in the Romanian language as it was spoken in Romania. Wealthier people sent children to high schools and universities in Romania, where it was said they would learn the "pure" language. Very few Moldovan schools had Romanian-language textbooks for subjects like history, mathematics, and science, so students were still learning basic subjects in both languages (E. A. Anderson, 2005, 2006; Cash, 2004a; King, 2000).

Russian speakers maintained their linguistic identity in the early years of independence, resisting free government programs to teach the state language to non-Romanian speakers. The government initially required all government documents to be issued in Romanian (in Latin script instead of Cyrillic) and for all government workers to speak Romanian. However, government work ground to a halt when they realized that the country could not function without the Russian speakers who occupied the majority of civil service jobs in the capital. Russian was then given the status of "language of interethnic communication" (Cash, 2004b). This move negated any movement toward total Romanization of the country. However, in recent years, Russian-speaking parents have begun sending their children to Romanian language schools, either because there are fewer Russian language schools available, or because they wish their children to be competitive in the local job market and at ease in the context of the new state.

It took more than ten years for the new government to issue passports to most citizens, which at first only took place when people could prove they were traveling west to Romania or other countries (although Romania allowed Moldovan citizens to travel

within its borders without a visa or international passport for a number of years). Until the late 1990s, Moldovan citizens could still even use their old internal Soviet passports to travel to other former Soviet states. Therefore, because of the shifting preferences of successive state governments, Romanian language revival, and general post-Soviet readjustment, people's "nationality" and loyalties were still fluid during the 1990s. The variety of ideologies about family, community, and state allegiances that held sway in public and private reflected that fluidity.

By the early 2000s, talk of reunification was relegated to "national extremists." The majority of Moldovans had elected a Communist government with a president who displayed preference for Moscow over Bucuresti.[60] The Communist party achieved some of the stability that was sought after in the 1990s. Two important changes were that government employees began to get paid on time, and pensions were raised and regularly distributed. Disputes still existed over how to treat the state's history that held importance for everyday interactions: how much credit or villainy to attribute to the Soviet government, whether Moldovans were a separate ethnic group from Romanians, and who were the "first" inhabitants of the region. This study highlights how such topics, among others, influenced everyday discourse during the time of my research.

Development and Citizenship in the Soviet Era

Long before Moldova's independence and the introduction of Western development agencies, Soviet governments introduced their own ideologies of

[60] President Voronin's pro-Russian stance changed by the mid-2000s to be more neutral, but Romanian nationalists were still considered a fringe group.

development and citizenship to people under their reign.[61] Fitzpatrick identifies three of these as instrumental to every Soviet citizen's life: the transformation of people's relationships to the state through the process of "sovietization"; the "life is better" mantra, which reinforced sovietization as positive; and the ideal of bringing people "out of backwardness" as a reason for development. Reviewing these is instrumental to understanding the ways they influence contemporary Moldova.

People's new relationship to the state

Soviet-era development centered on modernization and redefining social relationships, especially people's relationship to the state. On the left bank of the Nistru river, in the MASSR,[62] the modernization project known as "sovietization" began in the 1920s (Bruchis, 1984; Dima, 1991a; United States, 1995). Sovietization entailed confiscation and collectivization of nearly all enterprises; the large-scale industrialization of the region along the Nistru river; and the deportation of most local elites, bourgeoisie, peasant landowners (kulaks), priests and their families to eastern regions of the USSR (in a process known as dekulakization) (King, 2000) (Fitzpatrick, 1999; Humphrey, 1983; King, 2000; Verdery, 1996). Approximately 300,000 people were deported from the western Ukrainian/MASSR/MSSR region in 1940-41 (Wanner, 1995, p. 151), with

[61] Certainly, ideologies of progress had been introduced to the region earlier, but this discussion focuses on 20th century development discourses. Russia annexed part of the region in 1812 and instituted policies of Russification. These policies were primarily aimed at improving the education sector, but also initiated settlements of foreign populations in the area, promoted development of cities and foreign populations over rural populations (who were primarily of Moldavian or Romanian ethnic origin), and eventually purged the Romanian language from the education system (Nistor 2002).

[62] Most of the former MASSR is now in Transnistria, the separatist region of Moldova. The borders of the MASSR changed during the 1930s and 1940s. The MSSR was officially formed in 1939 with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but its borders also changed during the war, until they were fixed in 1947 (Mitrasca, 2002, p. 140). The borders of the former MSSR are the internationally recognized borders of present-day Moldova.

approximately 80,000 of those being of Moldovan ethnolinguistic identity, according to a different source (Arbatov, 1997, p. 189). After World War II, during which the USSR annexed Bessarabia and the northern part of the Bukovinian province of Romania, the Soviet leaders repeated the processes of sovietization, dekulakization, and collectivization in these lands, and did so in a compressed period of time (Minahan, 1998).

The era of early Stalinism in the USSR (before the right bank of Moldova became part of the USSR) was marked by new social and political classes and hierarchies, new ideologies, and new conceptions of people in relation to the state (King, 2000). The late Stalin period (during which the MSSR experienced sovietization) maintained many of these ideologies and practices (see Humphrey 1983, who describes similar activities still in place in Siberia in the 1960s and 1970s). First, leaders instituted a vertical hierarchy. Each work group in a farm or factory, for example, was responsible to a local leader, who was responsible to a regional leader, then a state leader and so on (this is simplified here for the sake of clarity) (Fitzpatrick, 1999). Local people who had not been deported were promoted through a kind of affirmative action system. However, most newly promoted proletarian leaders initially had few skills to manage their local cadres.[63] That lacuna left the way open for Soviet leaders to appoint loyal Communist Party members, who were usually Russians or Russified local people, to regional positions of power. Local level personnel had to be Party members to enjoy the benefits of the affirmative action system. Through time, this new political class and the local leaders who answered to them "constituted a remarkably long-lasting political elite—the

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[63] The deportations targeted more people with higher education, people who were already in positions of power, and people of Romanian/Moldovan ethnicity (Arbatov, 1997, p. 151).

'Brezhnev generation'—whose tenure in power started in the immediate prewar years and continued for almost half a century" (Humphrey, 1983, p. 6).

The culminating effect of changing social relationships and ideological shifts during the Stalinist era was the redefinition of people's relationship to the state in terms of social class and social organization (Fitzpatrick, 1999). Class position during the Soviet era became less significant as a relation of people to one another, but more importantly defined the rights and privileges that a person might receive from the state—"in particular, the state as an allocator of goods in an economy of chronic scarcity" (Fitzpatrick, 1999, p. 12). Depending on one's class, which was written in the passport along with ethnic group (nationality),[64] people could access kolkhoz markets if they were collective farm workers, or could gain privileges in the urban context, such as access to restricted stores, chauffeur-driven government cars, or even apartments. Alternately, class status officially restricted people's movement from place to place, and their possibilities for advancement. Thus, "for *Homo Sovieticus*, the state was a central and ubiquitous presence," regulating everyday aspects of citizens' lives from birth to death (p. 3). In seeking professional careers, for example, rural Moldovan students had to perform well on state exams, be accepted to a high school or university program in the capital, and then obtain permission to travel from one place to another. A person's job and living location was then assigned by state. I heard from many participants that they were "sent" to certain areas of Moldova or other Soviet republics for work, where they often married a local man or woman and stayed.

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[64] Nationality was and is the preferred term in Moldova for what people in the U.S. commonly call an ethnic group. It more closely follows the definition of "nation" as in most academic works (B. R. O. G. Anderson, 1991; Fitzpatrick, 1999; Smith, 2001)

Older forms of social relationships still existed, those based on clan or family groups, and the Soviet system merged with those in many ways. For example, the state farms (*sovkhozy*) that were owned by the Soviet government (not by a local group of farmers, as collective farms were) were built on the former lands of landowning nobles or minor landowners. The collective farm (*kolkhoz*) system also mirrored older patterns of serfdom, in that children born to workers of the collective were bound to return to the collective and work there as adults (until 1969, when this restrictive law was lifted) (Fitzpatrick, 1999). In Moldova, traditional family relationships usually included choosing couples from one's family to be godparents to a newly married couple and then to their children. Soviet-influenced social relationships, focused on work groups, affected fictive kin relations in that godparents came to be drawn from one's work group as well as from the extended family, especially in rural areas where religious practice was less heavily policed than in cities. Over time, the numbers of godparents for children grew from one or two couples to several. In towns and cities, people baptized their children in secret with much smaller numbers in attendance. These days, however, one effect of the end of state socialism is the revival and widespread acceptance of an active religious life and the social life that is sanctioned by the church. Residents of rural and urban areas are expected to choose a number of godparents for their children, and these are based on a variety of social relationships: from work, university, community, or family. The state has become less important in people's lives, or more accurately less present in terms of how they access goods and services and their class status.

On the other hand, it is important to remember that all forms of sociality and the values of socialist life that were initially imposed by the state eventually became important to people in the Soviet Union:

> An undeniable constitutive part of today's phenomenon of 'post-Soviet nostalgia,' which is a complex post-Soviet construct, is the longing for the very real humane values, ethics, friendships, and creative possibilities that the reality of socialism afforded—often in spite of the state's proclaimed goals—and that were as irreducibly part of the everyday life of socialism as were the feelings of dullness and alienation (Humphrey, 1983, p. 8).

Even social rules (ideals of cultural propriety) that people usually transgressed were sources of identity with the state, since the state promoted them. Although the state was ubiquitous, perhaps people's most meaningful relationships were not with the state but with other Soviet citizens. Yurchak, who describes Soviet and post-Soviet life during the 1980s and 90s describes it thus:

> For great numbers of Soviet citizens, many of the fundamental values, ideals, and realities of socialist life (such as equality, community, selflessness, altruism, friendship, ethical relations, safety, education, work, creativity, and concern for the future) were of genuine importance, despite the fact that many of their everyday practices routinely transgressed, reinterpreted, or refused certain norms and rules represented in the official ideology of the socialist state. For many, "socialism" as a system of human values and as an everyday reality of "normal life" (*normal'naia zhizn'*) was not necessarily equivalent to "the state" or "ideology"; indeed, living socialism to them often meant something quite

different from the official interpretations provided by state rhetoric (Yurchak, 2005, p. 8).

Such "normal life" provided the basis for systems of cooperation and collusion, as in cases where a person's personal contacts would help her get passes to special government shops, or where a factory manager's professional networks would assist him in getting the required materials to meet his production plan (Humphrey, 1999; Yurchak, 2005).

"Life is Better"

A second set of ideologies arose during the early Soviet period via tightly controlled media and state-supported violence. In the 1930s, slogans of "Life is Better" permeated the USSR, and "The Radiant Future," embodied in film and music, promised rewards in return for the difficulties people were enduring. At the same time, secret police could name anyone an "enemy of the people", famines occurred due to regional droughts and poor harvests combined with the change to collective farming, shortages of consumer goods became a way of life, and strict labor laws were enacted that enforced criminal penalties on those missing or late to work (Ledeneva, 1998, pp. 6-10).

The MSSR's early experience as part of the Soviet Union was not particularly positive. Immediately following the war, the region experienced a historic drought and then a famine. Many now believe that the latter was induced in part by the Soviet government's actions (such as forced collectivization and confiscating meager harvests to feed the Soviet army) (Timpul.md, 2010; Zima, 1999). Estimates of local deaths range from 36,000 (the official Soviet number) to 216,000 in a post-independence commission report (Zima, 1999; Dobrincu, 2007; Timpul.md, 2010). Most Moldovans who lived

through that time know someone who died, including my landlord, who lost a brother to the effects of malnutrition. A friend's grandmother kept their only cow (at times, its milk was their sole source of sustenance) inside the house for protection against thieves and soldiers. The same woman's mother remembers seeing other children her age die from eating spring hay meant for animals.

In 1949, two days of political terror ensued. Approximately 36,000 people ("kulaks") were rounded up and put on trains to Siberia (Fitzpatrick, 1999; Pasat, 1994, p. 324).[65] I met several people whose parents and grandparents had been exiled for "rehabilitation." Stories of disruption and reintegration abound in post-independence Moldova, and can finally be told. Nevertheless, most children of exiles became "productive" members of Soviet society, and continued to remain so after independence.[66] Life was not necessarily better for Moldovans at the beginning of their incorporation into the Soviet Union. However, as Soviet policies became the norm, many people remember that life improved over time and even have fond memories of growing up in the prosperous USSR of the 1960s and 1970s.

Most Moldovans also expected democracy to make their lives better after independence. At least the ideal of freedom and politicians' speeches led them to believe life would improve (King, 2000). Unfortunately, freedom and democracy did not bring prosperity, and people became disillusioned with democracy as the face of their economic woes. I noticed this in the mid-1990s; Anderson notes that it came to a head in the late 1990s' financial crisis (2005). The 2001 elections, which returned the

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[65] A U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer in Moldova has produced a book containing many Moldovan survivors' memoirs of the deportations (Lamphear, 2006).

[66] Personal communication from two survivors who described the role they were expected to play (by the government) once they returned to the MSSR.

Communist Party to power, show further evidence of punishing the ideal of democracy for hard times. Even though people freely elected the Communist government, it was widely seen as a call for more central guidance of the economy and social support systems. The resulting government fulfilled some of those needs, yet restricted common democratic freedoms, such as freedom of speech and the press. By the mid-2000s, citizens of the capital exercised their right to refrain from voting in mayoral elections as a protest against constant poor city management and the list of candidates, none of whom seemed to convince voters of his ability to enact change. Thus, the "life is better" idea has survived, but still maintains a contentious relationship to economic and political realities.

"Out of Backwardness"

Along with slogans and propaganda campaigns promising better lives, another ideology used to implement change during this era is what Fitzpatrick calls "out of backwardness" (Martin, 2001). Tsarist Russia, with its imperial class system and unindustrialized countryside, was seen as backward, and one of the goals of the Socialist revolution was to propel Soviet citizens toward a modern future. Some were more "backward" than others, such as peasants, women, and non-Russian peoples. For example, the peoples of Central Asia and Siberian native populations were "regarded as the most backward in the Union, [and] were the archetypal beneficiaries of the Soviet civilizing mission" (Fitzpatrick, 1999, p. 10). Ethnic Moldovans and other residents in the region may have not born the entire brunt of the civilizing mission, since they were of

European genetic heritage, yet they were subject to discrimination based on the fact that the majority of them were rural-dwelling peasants and non-Russians (Fitzpatrick, 1999).

Part of the indoctrination of people to the progressive Socialist cause was enacted through the Russian language. This was both practical and ideologically motivated. As noted, there was a need to have people in power who could command locals and interact with superiors in Moscow, so there was a practical need for a lingua franca. On the other hand, the Russian language and Russian culture were ideologically equated with the identity of all Soviet people. Russian had more prestige in public life—at work and in national celebrations of the Soviet Union, and Russian was the only language of government and the sciences. Moldovans studied Romanian using the Cyrillic alphabet in primary school; some were able to study in Romanian during secondary and higher education, but there were notably fewer groups admitted to study in Romanian than in Russian.[67] Moreover, through widespread elementary education in Russian, it became a language of communication in daily activities, taking on wider social functions than even local native languages (King, 2000).[68]

By the 1980s, references to the "out of backwardness" ideology in the Soviet Union drew on Western, capitalist notions of progress (Bruchis, 1982). Gorbachev

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[67] Students are admitted to universities in "groups." They study with the same group of students in every course, toward a specific degree. People reported to me that during the Soviet period, they were unable to enter the university in a Romanian/Moldovan group, since there were so few groups allowed overall. They were forced to study in Russian, and had to make up for their lack of linguistic knowledge at the same time that they were learning subject materials. In certain subjects, there were no Romanian language groups at all. Since independence, the situation has reversed, with only a few groups of students admitted each year to study subjects in the Russian language. Native speakers of Russian must study Romanian in their spare time in order to keep up with their classes.

[68] This had the effect of "squeezing out" local languages, almost to the point of extinction. Local peoples were often bilingual in Russian and their native languages (although they may not have been fluent in Russian), but Russians were more likely to be monolingual, leading to the phenomenon of "one-sided bilingualism" (Bruchis, 1982, p. 15). In efforts to avoid assimilation, local intelligentsia in different republics and regions linked their languages to anti-Russian nationalist feelings, causing "a deeper and wider phenomenon" of naming local languages as "state" languages of different republics across the Soviet Union (Bruchis, 1982, p. 11).

recognized the drawbacks to the Soviet socialist system and drew on a "time-space compression" idiom:

> Gorbachev's rhetoric from the mid-1980s is full of words about time: the Soviet Union needs to "catch up," to "accelerate" its development, to shed its "sluggishness," and "inertia" and leave behind the "era of stagnation" (p. 36) (see also Verdery, 1996).

One could argue that the Soviet ideology of accelerated progress in the 1980s developed on its own, *sui generis*, after the decades of focus on the future and competition with capitalist societies. It is also possible, as Verdery suggests, that Gorbachev and his contemporaries were taking part in the burgeoning discursive formation of development, considering the changes in communications, media, and travel during the 1970s and 1980s. It is not important here to suggest that one version of the circulation of development ideologies in the Soviet Union is correct. I merely want to draw attention to the public presentation of ideas and the use of specific terms related to development or progress during the Soviet period. These seem very similar to those in use in non-Soviet countries at the time and may be related to the quick acceptance of the validity of development's discursive formation in the post-Soviet independence years.

Therefore, the particular aspects of Soviet life discussed here: the strong relationship to the state and changing interpersonal relationships, the strong vertical hierarchy, the naming of certain people and languages as backward, and the overt commitment to progress and a brighter future have had lasting effects on contemporary post-independence discursive formations of cultural propriety, development, and citizenship.

Post-Independence Development And Citizenship

Development in Moldova since 1991

Moldova declared its independence from the Soviet Union on Aug. 27, 1991, but the U.S. and other countries waited until the Soviet Union officially disbanded at the end of 1991 to recognize Moldova as a sovereign state. Within a few years, foreign embassies had begun to open, and many affiliated advisory, aid, and development agencies had set up shop. By March 1992, the U.S. embassy opened in Chisinau, the capital of Moldova, complete with an office of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Peace Corps Volunteers, officially invited by the Moldovan government, began arriving in 1993. Romania, Russia, and Turkey were three other foreign states to set up embassies on Moldovan soil in the early 1990s. By 2005, the number of foreign embassies in Moldova had grown to more than fifteen.

The rise in focus on development seems similar to that in Europe after World War II in many African countries after they gained independence from colonization. The drastic governmental and economic change brought about by the end of the Soviet Union opened the door to Western development organizations and their ideologies in Moldova and other socialist states in Eurasia. Offices of several multi- and bi-lateral[69] aid and policy organizations were opened by 1994, such as TACIS (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States—now a part of the EuropeAid program), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Soros Foundation, the World Trade

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[69] Multilateral organizations represent many countries working together on one issue (or usually a set of issues), such as the UNDP. Bilateral organizations represent two countries, such as Sweden and Moldova, working together on a set of issues.

Organization (WTO), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The number of aid/policy organizations representing individual countries or multinational movements had also proliferated; two of those relevant to MSIF work are the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and Transparency International (TI).

Foreign governments and international development agencies brought with them distinct ideas about the role of government, state-citizen and citizen-citizen relations, and citizens' relationship to the economy. Among these, democracy, equality, and participation in the market economy were most important at that time. Western governments seemed interested in ensuring that former Soviet bloc nations joined the league of democratic states, and were understandably concerned about stability and security in the region. Advisors, often called "experts"[70] came to the new state from the organizations, states, and international institutions mentioned above. For example, visitors from the U.S. Treasury department advised Moldovans on transforming the National Bank to a Central Bank and on setting up a taxation system in the mid-1990s. Literally every aspect of political and economic life in Moldova has been reorganized since 1991: the means of property ownership and paying taxes; the introduction of a credit system in banking; standards for voting and possibilities for civic participation; import and export regimes between Moldova other former Soviet countries (including a change in migration possibilities); the means of finding a job and accessing one's pension; and the change from Russian to Romanian as the official language in nearly all state institutions. The latter transformation also affected most educational

[70] This term fit some people well, those with years of experience and high positions. When it was applied to me, a relatively new teacher, by Moldovans with years of experience, it made me very uncomfortable to be considered to have more knowledge than my counterparts.

programs, making it necessary for the state to produce or procure new textbooks in every subject. It is likely that there have been foreign advisors involved in the decisions made in each of these areas. All of these affect the citizenship regime, too, although the effects of those changes are harder to measure than economic metamorphosis.

The foreign organizations, institutions, and diplomatic missions in Moldova all introduced agendas revolving around Moldova's development into a democratic state with a self-sustaining market economy. While some practices may have changed since 1992, many mission statements of these representative organizations are still filled with words that index development, even if development is not described directly: "assistance," "democracy," "market economy," "reform," "access," "needs," "transition," "sustainable," "poverty," and "progress." Several examples will illustrate this point:

- The U.S. Embassy in Moldova: "protects and promotes American interests and develops relations with Moldova through contacts with Moldovan government, business, labor, agriculture, media and education leaders…[and] carries out a wide-ranging assistance program designed to help promote democracy and a strong market economy in Moldova" (among other goals and projects) (United States Embassy, 2007)
- USAID: "Since 1993, USAID has delivered more than $300 million in technical assistance, focused primarily on land and energy sector privatization, health and humanitarian needs, rule of law programs, business development, and financial sector reform" (U. S. A. f. I. D. i. Moldova, 2012).

- Peace Corps: “In 1993, the government of Moldova invited Peace Corps Volunteers to come to Moldova. The government representatives believed that well-developed English language skills would help Moldovans participate in the international community and global economy by helping them gain access to a wealth of information, resources, and markets. Current English education Volunteers also incorporate environmental issues into the curriculum. Recently, Peace Corps/Moldova added projects in organizational development, and agriculture and agrobusiness to assist the Moldovan government in addressing the country’s economic and social development needs” (Corps, 2008)
- TACIS: “Launched by the EC [European Commission] in 1991, the Tacis Programme provides grant-financed technical assistance to 12 countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan), and mainly aims at enhancing the transition process in these countries” (Commission, 2007).
- UNDP: “Active in Moldova since 1992, shortly after the country joined the extensive United Nations family, UNDP works tirelessly through its projects for the eradication of poverty and for sustainable development” (D. P. United Nations, Moldova, 2007).
- SIDA: “Swedish support began in 1996 with the dispatch of an advisor to the government under the democracy project arranged by the UNDP…. Moldova is still the poorest country in Europe, despite the progress the country is currently making. The overall goal of Sweden’s development cooperation with

Moldova is to help poor people improve their living conditions. This it does through contributions to poverty-reduction programmes and, as of this year, to the country's efforts to gain accession to the EU" (Agency, 2007).

- Soros Foundation: "The Soros Foundation - Moldova (SFM) is a non-governmental, non-for-profit and non-political organization which was established in 1992 by the financier and the philanthropist George Soros to promote the development of an open society in Moldova by developing and implementing a range of programs and activities that address specific areas of needs including cultural policy, education policy, legal reform and public administration, media and information, civil society, public health and European integration" (Soros Foundation, Moldova, Home Page).
- World Bank: Similarly, "The World Bank's mission in Moldova is to help fight poverty and promote economic growth through project financing, research and advice. It helps the country improve social services, protect the environment, and help lay the foundations for better living standards" (World Bank, Moldova, Mission 2007).

There are differences in the goals of some of these organizations, as in the focus on poverty versus promoting democracy and a market economy, and more could be said about each of their missions. However, there are certain phrases and syntax within these statements that imply shared ideas across development organizations. Along with the practices that correspond to their policies, these linguistic cues indicate the influence of development's discursive formation. Most focus on their own agendas to "promote", "deliver," "assist," "develop" and "implement." Only the Peace Corps notes that the

Moldovan government invited them and helped to set their goals. Three organizations mention poverty as a key problem they are trying to solve, and imply that eradicating poverty will improve people's lives. All share the belief that there are problems ("needs") in Moldova and that foreign organizations have the means to help Moldovans solve those problems.

Moldovan Citizenship

Soviet citizenship entailed different forms of civic, political, and social rights than people share today in Moldova. Citizens of the Soviet Union were subject to the law, but some were persecuted for ideological reasons as "enemies of the state" (Bruchis, 1984; Harvey, 1990). People were able to vote, but their choices were limited to members of the Communist Party. A more extended set of social benefits (than in Western states) were accorded all citizens (except perhaps those in prison camps), and people paid into the system through work and products. However, individual taxes were not collected, so people experienced their role of providing benefits for other citizens through work, reinforced by Soviet propaganda. In an ironic twist on Marx's alienation of worker from product, the Soviet system encouraged theft and free-riding (King, 2000).

Referring back to the prominent Soviet ideologies described by Fitzpatrick and Verdery, the majority of Soviet citizens were encouraged to think of themselves as workers in the service of the state and the people. Those who did not fit this ideal were sent away, deemed backward and in need of modernization, or, in the case of artists, constrained to produce material that supported Soviet ideals. People who had outstanding academic or athletic talent also served the state. Personhood was redefined

when the state collectivized property, since land ownership was a strong element of identity for most citizens (Verdery, 1996). In sum, the state limited all forms of social organization that might compete with its supremacy. The one exception was ethnonational organization, which was "constitutionally enshrined," though experienced in 'safe' ways, primarily through the arts (p. 293). This fact predisposed the people of the new states to organize themselves based on ethnicity after independence, writes Verdery, and Western ideals of democracy and citizenship joined that charged atmosphere of ethnolinguistic renaissance.

In contrast to the Baltic states' new constitutions, which immediately excluded most Russians from citizenship based on ethnicity and language, citizenship in the new Moldovan state was accorded to all Soviet citizens residing in Moldova at the time of independence. There was a movement similar to that of the Baltics to require all citizens to speak Romanian, but it soon subsided when the work of the government ground to a halt because so few of the staff could conduct government business in the state language (Nantoi, personal communication, 2003). Citizens currently are encouraged to learn Romanian and there is less support for Russian speakers at state schools and universities, but Russian maintains a de facto status of lingua franca between most citizens.

The Transnistrian conflict affected the status of citizens in that breakaway region: they may hold dual citizenship, so in addition to being de facto citizens of the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic, they may also hold passports from another country, such as Moldova, Ukraine, or Russia (Moldova Azi, 16 July 2007). However, their voting rights in Moldovan elections are limited because many lack access to polling stations; and they do not pay taxes to Moldova, nor do they receive social benefits from

the Moldovan state (Chamberlain-Creanga, personal communication 2010; Moldova Azi, 16 July 2007). Even their cultural identity seems to be evolving differently from that of right-bank Moldovan citizens. At least two scholars have suggested that citizens of the Transnistrian region feel a stronger sense of allegiance to their state and social cohesion in their communities than do their counterparts on the western side of the Nistru river (Chamberlain-Creanga; Romanchuk). Such feelings may be the result of successful Transnistrian state propaganda and work programs, but may also have arisen from (most) people's feelings of isolation and defense from outsiders and therefore, connection to their local compatriots.[71]

Fueling the "muddy" vision of citizens' loyalties is the fact that people in the region engage in cross-border interactions with fellow ethnic group members in another state. Those networks to the east of Moldova may have existed prior to 1991 (Keough, 2003; Verdery, 1996). Others developed during the intervening twenty years of independence. For example, Gagauz and Bulgarians in the south and southeastern parts of Moldova regularly cross the border to visit relatives or other contacts in villages in southwestern Ukraine (Boneva, 2006; Kaneff & Heintz, 2006). The Gagauz language is closely related to Turkish; many Gagauz travel to Turkey looking for work, citing the language similarity as one factor in favor of Turkey over other countries (Demirdirek, 2006; Keough, 2003). Turkey has also invested in schools and businesses in Moldova, especially in Gagauz regions, which has led to increased contact between Moldovans and Turks.

[71] Extra attention is paid to Transnistrian citizens who speak the Moldovan language, since the government uses them as a claim to govern the area, and wishes to protect them from further Russification enforced by Transnistria. This is a sensitive topic, and also outside the scope of this work.

After independence, ethnic Moldovans and Bulgarians gained the opportunity to travel to meet their brethren to the west. These days, Moldovan citizens have special reason to claim Romanian and Bulgarian heritage, if possible: the accession of both states to the European Union in 2007 means citizens of those two countries have access to legal employment opportunities across the EU. Moldovans who can show a grandparent was a citizen of Romania prior to 1940 can claim Romanian citizenship. Moldovans' applications for Romanian citizenship trickled in during the late 1990s and early 2000s, but when the EU announced Romania's entry to its borders, a flood of applications ensued. By early 2007, approximately 800,000 people had applied for Romanian citizenship (Mediafax.ro, 2009). According to Kaneff and Heintz, not all ethnic Moldovans and Bulgarians who apply for foreign citizenship do so for reasons of possible employment (2006). In a survey of 100 households in a Moldovan village, Heintz found five with family members who had obtained a Romanian passport. Only two of those claimed to have applied for the passport for trade or employment. The others, like many in Moldova, assert their rights to Romanian citizenship as an affirmation of their identity and a protest against fifty years of Soviet rule.[72]

Demography and Geography

[72] The experiences of transition in other former Soviet republics widely vary. All experienced the economic shocks of the 1990s (Hare, Batt, and Estrin, 1999). Some, like the Baltic countries, took an extreme position on ethnic Russians within their borders, expelling them or forcing them to flee because of political policies (Kolsto, 2002). Central Asian republics experienced a renaissance of the practice of Islam and tribal traditions of the region (Heyat, 2002). Still others, such as Georgia, Moldova, and areas that claim independence but are frozen in unresolved conflicts (Abhazia, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria), have experienced turmoil that threatens their borders. Russia remains a power player in the region, economically, politically, and socioculturally.

Within Moldova, some divisions between groups exist geographically. Regions are locally known to be "Bulgarian" and "Gagauz", depending on the majority ethnic group in the area, and people often call a specific locale "a Ukrainian village" or "a Moldovan village." The key characteristic of such naming customs is language, with heritage second, since intergroup marriage is common. As Cash notes, "with the exception of Jews, all ethnic groups in Moldova are defined first and foremost through language" (Keough, 2003, p. 11). Cross-village contact regularly takes place, with Russian as the lingua franca (Cash, 2004a).

Towns and cities are melting pots, both ethnically and linguistically, and have seen the biggest flux of immigration from rural areas. Soviet rules kept rural Moldovans from living in cities unless they had official permission (though many did so illegally). The Soviet governments promoted migration of ethnic Russians to all parts of the Soviet Union, so cities were primarily occupied by Russians. Ethnic Moldovan city dwellers (and others) usually became "Russified" by the second generation after urbanization, through education, intermarriage, and daily life. Children of interethnic marriages routinely spoke Russian at home and went to schools where the curriculum was taught exclusively in Russian. I met several people in Chisinau of (ethnic) Moldovan and Ukrainian heritage whose parents had moved to the capital from rural towns or villages. They grew up speaking only Russian, and knew very little of the Romanian language at independence. Even in 2003-6, many could understand Romanian speech, but had difficulty responding, so they would respond to queries in Russian. After 1991, however, people were free to move to Moldovan cities to look for jobs and other opportunities. A more recent demographic shift is out-migration from villages and cities

to work abroad. As many as one-third of Moldovan citizens have worked or still work in other countries, ranging from Russia to Turkey to many countries of Western Europe. This shift spiked in the late 1990s, when the most severe economic troubles hit Moldova.

Continuing Tensions

Although the majority of Moldovan citizens have managed to live peacefully together since independence, tensions between people of different ethnic groups still exist, and are pertinent to the ongoing question of identity in the state. Evidence of strained relationships include the following conditions that I observed:

- many workplaces contain only Russian-speaking or Romanian-speaking peoples, indicating that hiring practices may be based on ethnic or linguistic difference or language ability;
- most of my contacts had few close friends of a different ethnic group, if any;
- there was discussion of people voting in blocs according to ethnicity;
- many contacts frowned on marriages between people of different ethnic groups; and
- people of various ethnic backgrounds still often recounted negative incidents that they or their families had experienced during the Soviet regime or since Moldovan independence, and they used ethnic or racial terms as primary descriptors of the people and incidents involved (such as: "During the Soviet era,

those Russians came here and …," or "That man, that Gagauz, accused me of being corrupt", versus what might have been "those soldiers" or "that politician"); this trend indicates that people within Moldova still distinguish each other along the same ethnolinguistic lines that were dominant during the Soviet era, and have even been reinforced by Western ideologies and practices that emphasize demographic equality.

These tensions emerge from several conditions. The demographic movement noted above is one. One elderly Chisinau resident of Moldovan ethnicity, but who is a retired Russian teacher and devotee of Russian culture, told me of how she and her son were attacked outside their apartment door and robbed in the late-1990s. "They'll let anyone move to the city now," she exclaimed, showing her lack of understanding that the government no longer has a role in regulating citizens' movement after independence (perhaps also indicating her desire for government control in this arena to be the same as prior to independence).

Furthermore, certain post-independence political events and decisions have influenced continued tensions along ethnolinguistic lines. The events particularly lend themselves to discussion about the identity of the people and the direction of the country. In 2000, after several years of economic hardship, the people elected a Communist government that walked a fine line between Moldovan nationalism and Russian partnership. From 2001-2004, there was national and international debate concerning a multilateral proposal to solve the Transnistrian conflict by federalizing the Moldovan state, in essence dividing the state in two. Most of the population was against the proposal and came out to protest over and over. They framed the protests around the

involvement of Russia in Moldovan political affairs, since Russia had originated the federalization proposal, and Russian troops still occupy Transnistria. In 2001, the Communist government made it obligatory for primary school students to learn Russian as a foreign language. While the state intended the measure to improve interethnic relations in the country, the population interpreted it as a contemporary move toward Russification.

While not exactly a source of discord, Russian media is still very influential in Moldova.[73] In the early-mid 1990s, there were three television stations widely available in Moldova: one Russian, one Romanian, and one Moldovan, which made language programming about 50/50 in terms of language dominance.[74] According to a 2003 study (Corghencea, 2004), Russian television stations' programming was preferred nearly 2 to 1 over programming from Romania or Moldova. One factor in Russia's media presence is simply the comparative wealth of that state and its stations' ability to develop higher quality programs. Accounting for the popularity of Russian programs may be as easy as saying that they are more interesting. However, underlying the Russian media presence is the ideology that Russian culture represents a "higher," "more sophisticated" lifestyle, whether that means the arts (ballet, poetry, music, etc.), national spectacles, fashion trends, or mass consumerism.

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[73] Local print and broadcast media exists in both Romanian and Russian languages. This paragraph focuses on television broadcast media from Russia, some of which is widely available via public airwaves.

[74] The Moldovan state station (TVM, Teleradio Moldova) played programs in both Romanian and Russian (65% should be in Romanian, according to a 1995 broadcasting law (BBC, 2003); the Russian state station (Channel One, formerly ORT or "Ostankino") broadcast completely in Russian; the national Romanian station (TVR), in addition to Romanian programming, showed many foreign serials in their original language (usually Western European languages, not Russian) with Romanian subtitles.

Identity Shift

Despite the low-level and ongoing animosity between ethnic groups described above, I argue that Moldovan citizens experienced an identity shift toward a more cohesive identity in the 2000s. First, the majority of citizens finally had Moldovan passports, a visible marker of their belonging to the state, at least from the state's point of view. People working or traveling abroad now had more than 10 years of experience interacting with foreigners as "Moldovans", a term defined according to context. In Italy, for example, construction workers, housekeepers, businesspeople, and students from Moldova are all known as Moldovans, whether they are Russian speakers, ethnic Romanians, Gagauz, or Ukrainian. They see each other as "Moldovan" as much as the foreigners see them as a group. Within their home state is where the differences matter. Comparing the Moldovan situation to our own, one could assert based on experience that outside the US, we are all "American"; but within the US, we tend to identify with different groups according to our heritage, socioeconomic class, occupation, and favorite pastimes. Second, the country witnessed its first graduating class of students who had gone through primary and secondary schooling administered entirely by the new Moldovan state. My contacts from this generation were among the most tolerant thinkers in terms of interethnic relations, and did not hesitate to identify with the Moldovan state, regardless of their ethnolinguistic group.

In 2003 and 2004, the most important social issues that concerned people I spoke to did not concern ethnolinguistic issues, but poverty and corruption. The April 2003 Barometer of Public Opinion issued by the Institute for Public Policy (IPP) in Moldova supported what I heard: 46% of those polled ranked "fighting criminality in the country"

as one of the top three ways to improve the social-economic situation in Moldova (Dima, 1991a, p. 12). "But what about differences or tensions between ethnic groups?" I would ask. "How do people get along with each other these days?" Few people with whom I spoke listed problems between ethnolinguistic groups as the most urgent social issue facing the country.

On the other hand, the Moldovans whom I directly asked about ethnicity or language differences acknowledged these issues as ongoing sources of discord, albeit minor in the face of the many other socioeconomic problems that Moldova now faces. Many people used a similar turn of phrase to dismiss the notion that ethnolinguistic conflict is a major problem in their society: "Moldovans/We are a tolerant people." The fact that they used the word "Moldovans" or "We" to encompass all people in the republic is telling. Their phrase resonates with Moldova's constitution, which promises that:

> All citizens of the Republic of Moldova are equal before the law and the public authorities, without any discrimination as to race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, political choice, personal property or social origin (Moldova, 1994)

The description above also echoes the conscious efforts of the current government to refashion national identity with inclusive proclamations referring more to citizenship, such as, "Everybody here is both 'native-born' and 'migrant' with one common Motherland now" (Institute, 2003, p. 3)(High Anthropological School 2003, p. 3).

In defense of Moldovans' professed culture of tolerance, people have lived in relative peace in Moldova since the violent months of the Transnistrian conflict in 1992,

and since the autonomous district of Gagauz-Yeri was created in 1995. Moreover, I met many citizens between 2003 and 2006 who had effectively changed their ethnicity, in the U.S. sense of the word: they had adopted their mother's ethnicity when talking about themselves (rather than using their father's, from their Soviet passport), had changed their ethnicity to one they felt closer to, and even had changed their Ukrainian last names to "be patriotic"—to make them sound more Moldovan/Romanian. One woman, "Natalia," with an ethnic Ukrainian last name, like "Yuschenko" (the name of the former Ukrainian president), told me that her neighbor had recently (in the early 2000s) changed her own name to sound more "Moldovan," and asked if Natalia was going to do the same. This would have meant changing "Yuschenko" to "Yuschencu" in her case.[75] Natalia is the daughter of a marriage between an ethnic Ukrainian and ethnic Moldovan. Natalia asked why she should change her name, and the neighbor replied, "Well, it's the patriotic thing to do" (note she did not say she would do it to avoid ridicule or because she was being singled out as different, etc.). Natalia did not change her name, but her neighbor had enacted the reverse process from what had taken place under Soviet rule: people's names were often changed, forcibly or voluntarily, to match Russian spelling conventions. It seemed plausible to the woman to do the same to fit in with the newer Moldovan political environment.[76]

With these examples of tensions and conciliation efforts in mind, I contend that ethnicity and "nationality" are both fluid and restricted now, in similar but reverse ways

[75] Many Romanian surnames end in -cu, -ic, -i (Dubencu, Cilic, Stati), while many Ukrainian surnames end in -ko, -uk, -o.

[76] A negative side of this practice is that people whose names were spelled slightly differently in the Cyrillic alphabet than in the Latin alphabet (and so were spelled differently on their passports and other legal documents) had trouble post-independence in proving their relationship to parents and grandparents for the purposes of obtaining a Romanian passport. Dubencu might have been changed to Dubenkov, for example.

as they were under Soviet rule. People could become Russified before, could choose to be known by their father's or mother's nationality, but their "roots" conditioned their position in society even though a select few made it to universities and became successful in the Soviet system. In the independent state of Moldova, people can become "Romanized" by learning the Romanian language, and can choose their ethnicity by emphasizing one or other line of heritage, or simply by changing their name. Some can claim Romanian citizenship, if the right genealogy can be proven (this is restricted by government records), some can gain Bulgarian, Ukrainian or Russian citizenship, yet others are "stuck" with Moldovan citizenship, which currently has few advantages. Governmentality and the effects of poor governance influence their lives even more, in my contacts' opinions. For example, parents looking to get their children ahead in the education system are forced[77] to offer bribes for entry to the university, and economic adversity and poorly enforced rules of conduct lead university officials to ask for and accept bribes. Today's Moldovan citizens are able to make choices about their ethnicity and citizenship, but are constrained by governmentality and economic conditions. As in the past, they make choices for their own survival as much as for ideological reasons.

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[77] Others would argue that people are not forced to offer bribes, but from the perspective of one parent who didn't have the means to offer one, she was distraught for months about the prospect of her daughter not gaining entry to the arts department at the state university. In her eyes, she was being forced to take part in the bribery system in order to ensure her child's educational possibilities in the subject of her choice. If even one person offers a bribe, others see it as necessary to comply in order to gain preferred treatment (which they recognize ideally would be equal treatment).

These demographic shifts, the struggles over self-determination and lingua franca, and the high level of interaction with foreign states and economies have undoubtedly had an influence on Moldovans' identity(-ies) and overall ideals of proper citizenship in Moldova. In the 2000s, several anthropologists and two researchers focused on education began to take up and build on the identity questions raised by earlier social scientists. Rather than keeping to a macro-social view of topics, they have examined questions of identity and social organization from the perspective of Moldovan people, such as those rooted in: everyday practices of village life (Cash, 2004a; School, 2009); perceptions of and performance of ethnic difference (Cash, 2004a; Kaneff & Heintz, 2006); the lives of people traveling abroad to work (Demirdirek, 2006; Polese, 2006); the ongoing dispute over how to teach Moldovan history (Keough, 2003); and the ways changes to the education system have produced post-Soviet citizens influenced by Western ideologies of democracy and citizenship (E. A. Anderson, 2006). On the whole, these authors question the ways people are commonly categorized by one another and foreigners, thereby challenging the meaning of ethnic identity and interethnic relations. They also demonstrate the influence of the economic crises of the 1990s and 2000s on Moldovans and therefore show how people's lives are entwined with geopolitical situations beyond Moldova, perhaps challenging Moldovans' (and others') views of themselves as isolated or powerless. Nearly all allude to people's contentious relationship to the Moldovan state. I take their data as illustrative of the many influences on daily life in Moldova. This study identifies those influences and and analyzes them as part of three discursive formations. The analysis produces an understanding of Moldovan

culture in general and illustrates how the intersection of the formations influences Moldovan culture and identity.

What is Moldovanness?

At the beginning of Chapter 2, I noted several common themes related to Moldovanness that help to make up the discursive formations of cultural propriety, citizenship, and development. In addition to describing the three discursive formations, the identification of these themes is a significant contribution of this work. Over the next three chapters, I will discuss each of these in more detail. These themes emerged from this research, and they influence and are influenced by the discursive formations of development, citizenship, and cultural propriety. The varying ways that the themes intersect with and contribute to the three discursive formations provide information about how historical and everyday uses of language contribute to what it means to be Moldovan. I have organized the themes into four groups based on their similarities and how they arise in context. The first two groups are presented next, to correspond to much of the data offered in this third chapter. I introduce the third group at the beginning of Chapter 4, and the fourth group at the beginning of Chapter 5, for similar reasons. Each of the themes arose in a wide variety of contexts in Moldovan life, but for this dissertation, I chose to associate them with certain pieces of ethnographic data in order to draw out their significance.

The first of the four thematic groups revolves around responsibility and allegiance to one's family, community, and state. I also include references to speaking the state language in this first group. The second group regards the social ideals of hierarchy,

equality, and respect for diversity in society. The third group addresses themes about cronyism, nepotism, bribery, and illegal use of public funds. Finally, the fourth group refers to participation in the market economy, Europe as a model for civil society, and overt allegiance to democratic values. I categorize the fourth group as separate from the first because it more specifically relates to development, while the first group relates more to state-society relations. All of the themes are interrelated, as further discussion will show. Their division into groups is a formation I impose for two reasons: because those in each group commonly appear together or in similar contexts, and because I believe they are more easily related to the reader in this way. All of these themes have been used, in my experience, to varying degrees and in various contexts, to describe what it means to be Moldovan.

The key to reading the tables is as follows: The title of each table is the theme. The first row of each table lists the three discursive formations (cultural propriety, development, citizenship). The second row shows what I interpret as the *affirmative ideal* of behavior associated with that theme that the majority of participants think should guide their daily lives, based on data gathered through fieldwork (see Chapter 1 for discussion of affirming and negating forms of identification: actual behaviors do not always match the ideals, but exist along a continuum that people negotiate in practice. Actual behaviors demonstrate how ideals are reaffirmed, modified to fit the context, and contested.) The third row compares the contemporary use with the use of this theme in the period of Soviet rule of Moldova. Below the table, I offer example from fieldwork data to illustrate the example in use. I also describe the ways the theme varies in practice across the three discursive formations as well as how this

example sheds light on pertinent aspects of the history and contemporary use of language in defining what it means to "be Moldovan."

One might question the utility of presenting each theme in this tabular format. I do so in order to succinctly present to the reader the affirmative ideals of Moldovanness as I observed them during fieldwork, for a range of different themes, and across the discursive frameworks. The format allows me to highlight the themes in typical Moldovan contexts in the text that follows the tables. It also provides the opportunity to illustrate divergences and intersections between the discursive formations. For example, in the group that follows, the theme of family/family-community-state relations shows that Moldovans generally adhere to one of the most basic human "rules" about kinship: people should be responsible to and for their families. Evidence for the presence of this theme is provided in the following chapter and throughout the dissertation. The same theme arises in the realm of development. SIF staff were often heard to describe the community like a family, and that people's responsibilities to community were akin to responsibilities to family. In the realm of citizenship discourse, this theme is also present. The frame of reference broadens to incorporate the whole state as similar to family, and metaphors that evoke family *and* community *and* state are used to provide affirmative ideals of behavior for citizens. A subtext to this particular theme shows differences between *how* one is expected to support the family, community, and state. For the family, economic activity can trump other forms of responsibility; family members can be encouraged, even expected, to work abroad in order to help support the family or, for young single adults, to find a "better" life. In the discursive formations of development and citizenship, on the other hand, the ideal behavior is to stay in Moldova

and work toward the betterment of the community and the state. One modification to this ideal in its enactment in the realm of development appears in the behavior of SIF workers: they understand the realities of life in Moldova (and the need to go abroad to earn enough to support a family) and have been known to encourage communities to ask their family members working outside Moldova to help support community projects instead of (or in addition to) contributing to family finances. <u>Therefore, the tables presented here draw out and draw attention to subtleties in the enactment of Moldovanness in different realms of society</u>.

There are many things that bring Moldovans together; these themes illustrate those common bonds of everyday life, but the ways the themes are put into practice across different realms of society also illustrates the tensions in Moldovan culture and society. Through tensions, we come to understand the points of contention and change in cultural behaviors, as well as the aspects of life most important to people, those they are willing to defend and those they find useful enough to apply to a variety of sociocultural contexts. Merely relating one theme to one discursive formation at a time would not illustrate the use of a particular theme in different contexts. The themes are categories that emerged from coding of the data (fieldnotes, SIF documents, audio recordings). I included those that appear most often and most important in the data. Each illustrates a different aspect of Moldovan culture, identity, and citizen behavior that influences everyday life. The tables provide a succinct granularity that is difficult to achieve in prose.

Thematic Group 1: Responsibility and allegiance to family, community, state; state-society relations

Moldova's political and geneaological history has moderated the allegiances people feel toward their state, community, and family; people's ideal concepts of state, community, and family; and their own roles within those entities. This chapter has shown that during most of the 20th century, the USSR stimulated allegiance to the state through a combination of fear, control, providing basic needs, and creation of the collective conscious. In addition, responsibility to community and family were encouraged as part of allegiance to the state. Under that regime, allegiance to the community took the form of collective farms and the community-oriented practices they organized. Allegiance to one's family was influenced by ethnic group alliances, village demography, and local traditions. However, family ties also filled in the gaps of the Soviet system, allowing people to survive, especially during the lean 1980s. Ethnic Moldovans expanded the tradition of godparenthood to increase their social networks (see Chapter 4). Urban citizens of Russian descent had smaller extended family networks, but developed social networks through the workplace. Allegiance to one's community and family sometimes formed a shadow social organization that flourished alongside the state-promoted forms of social organization. In contemporary examples, one sees continuity between past and present means of identifying with the state, community, and family. Here is the first theme:

Theme 1: Allegiance to the state, patriotism

Cultural Propriety	Development	Citizenship
There is no	Institutional	Dominant discourse:

dominant discourse about allegiance to state or patriotism; people do not have strong reasons for giving the state their allegiance. However, some people encourage others to show allegiance to the state over one's own needs (rather than work abroad, for ex.). Some people (primarily ethnic Moldovans) are expected to have more allegiance to the state than others, while minorities' behavior is often policed for its degree of allegiance and patriotism.	perspective: There is no dominant institutional discourse about allegiance to state or patriotism. More concern is shown for allegiance to one's community. Dominant perspective of development institution staff: Investing time and resources in one's community and its people shows patriotism and allegiance.	People should hold allegiance to the state, and even show patriotism. They can show patriotism by participating in state and community-sponsored events and projects, by learning the state language, by participating in democracy, and by upholding allegiance to Moldova rather than to other states (with whom people share a relationship to the titular ethnic group), among other activities.
Soviet era: People could not publicly display contempt for the state throughout most of the	Soviet era: Ideals were similar to those held by people, above. A prominent communication	Soviet era: Ideals were similar, but the Soviet state put a higher degree of emphasis on patriotism and

Soviet era.	genre was "out of backwardness"—interpreted as for the good of all.	allegiance than in the post-independence period. Also, dissent was not encouraged.

Example from data:

One evening while walking in the park, I saw an old friend, one I hadn't seen in ten years. In the mid-1990s, his parents had sent him to Romania for his high school and college education. After we greeted each other, I said, "I'm surprised you're not working abroad somewhere." So many people were, and it was common to *assume* that people were working abroad if one hadn't seen them in a long time. He replied (this is paraphrased), "I decided to stay home and do something for my country."

Discussion:

Currently, affirmative ideals of cultural behavior concerning allegiance to the state are mixed, meaning there is not one ideal that all people can agree on. This is reflected in the three discursive formations. Regarding cultural propriety, people's opinions differ based on the means they choose to support their family, community, and state. In some examples, like the one above, the person aligns his choice to stay in Moldova with supporting his country. In other examples, people working abroad send remittances back to support their families and their communities (and thereby the state) by contributing to SIF subprojects. Because of the varying personal choices regarding proper ways to support one's family and community, the principal tensions lie between

cultural propriety and the other two discursive formations. People in the development arena in Moldova consistently encourage development as part of allegiance to the state. In the texts they produce, development institutions profess neutrality toward supporting the state, since most are funded by foreign governments and international organizations. They focus on supporting one's community instead. This releases them, to some extent, from affiliation with political parties in power at the moment. For its part, the state encourages citizens' allegiance in more democratic and pluralistic ways than it did during the Soviet era, although many of the mechanisms are the same: community-sponsored events, holiday celebrations, state holidays, speaking the state language.

Theme 2: Responsibility to community; community - state relations

Cultural Propriety	Development	Citizenship
Dominant discourse: People have a responsibility to their community, but the family comes first.	Dominant discourse: Community development helps civil society grow and poverty decrease. There is no direct mention of the state in institutional texts.	Dominant discourse: People have a responsibility to their state, their community, and other citizens.
Soviet era: The dominant discourse was similar, but there was more	Soviet era: Community development was seen as	Soviet era: The dominant discourse was similar to that above.

official emphasis on community than on the family.	helping the state grow.	

Example from data:

The application to SIF for paving a central road in one town states the following (translated from Romanian; the original text is in Appendix A):

> "[The street] intersects the oldest part of the city, being the principal access road of many streets, including the one that leads to the cemetery. Each day, hundreds of citizens walk along this road as they go to work, school, and kindergarten, or in the evening when they return home. When it rains or is dark, it become dangerous to walk along this street, because hidden holes and ditches carved by rain can lead to trauma. Autos also deteriorate as a result of these holes. Because in this sector the land is steep, rainwater accumulates and runs quickly down the street, destroying everything in its path, forming deep ravines (cuts), which need to be cleared systematically, since the street becomes unpassable. This complicates the work of emergency services, firefighters, police, telecommunication workers, and Union Fenosa [electrical company] workers. Inhabitants of the sector and the mayor's office have repeatedly covered the street with rock and sand, but rains take it all down the hill, leaving the street deteriorated, and often leaves people's yards full of rocks and sand. The situation repeats itself systematically and the problem can be solved only by constructing a main asphalted road. A good road will improve the access of people to their

houses, to the businesses and services in the sector, and to the cemetery. Cases of trauma and accidents will be reduced, technology and autos will deteriorate less, [and] peoples lives will be better."

Discussion:

In the example above, we see the citizens putting forth an application to rebuild a main road in their town. The reasons given include improvements to public services, which of course serve the community; and improvements to the lives and property of citizens in the community. In completing this application for road reconstruction, the city's residents show that they see the road as a public good, one that everyone shares, and that everyone will benefit from if it is repaired. The applicants even give special attention to the road's access to the cemetery, highlighting the connection and importance of local burial traditions to contemporary city life.

In general, within this theme of responsibility to community, we see more tension between citizenship and the other two discursive formations. The dominant discourse related to citizenship is that people have a responsibility to the state, their community, and other citizens. However, critics of community development programs say that such programs weaken the state by emphasizing intra-community responsibilities and connections and isolating citizen-state connections. MSIF counters that tension by framing community development and responsibility to community as also developing the state in general and being responsible to fellow citizens (see Chapter 6).

Theme 3: Responsibility to family; family - community - state relations

Cultural Propriety	Development	Citizenship
Dominant discourse: People have a responsibility to their family, to support the family culturally (through cultural roles, traditions, everyday activities, etc.) and economically (economic activity is certainly part of culture, but separated here for emphasis). Subtheme: When necessary, they must leave Moldova to find work.	Dominant discourse from institutional perspective: People should work toward the betterment of their communities. Communities should be treated like family. Dominant discourse from development institution staff: Subtheme: People must have money to improve their lives <u>and</u> their community, which sometimes means working abroad.	Dominant discourse: The state (patrimony, heritage, land, other metaphors) should be like one's family. Subtheme: People should not leave Moldova, but should work to make it better.
Soviet era: similar, but family also meant the state and citizens, and proper behavior meant that a person did not desert	Soviet era: Being developed included bringing "modern" accoutrements to one's family; it also meant being	Soviet era: no information

either one.	a good mother, one dedicated to both state and family; and being a child obedient to the state and one's parents.	

Examples from data:

- Quote from the state-run High Anthropological School's brochure (in English): "Everybody here is both 'native-born' and 'migrant' with one common Motherland now." This quote illustrates the idea that the state and its citizens have one Motherland, one Mother, therefore are all brothers and sisters, part of one family.
- When meeting with former students, I asked if anyone knew what had happened to a certain person. "*Probabil a plecat*," ("He probably left") was the response, one I heard many times about other people. Moldovans became accustomed to the fact that many fellow citizens had to leave the country to earn enough money to live, to support their families, or simply to escape poverty. Many of those who leave send remittances to family members, so this example shows people displaying responsibility to their families as a mark of cultural propriety, despite the sadness those remaining express about the dispersal of members of society.

Discussion:

The current principal tension within this theme lies between cultural propriety and the other two discursive formations. The economic reality of supporting a family often clashes with the ideal of supporting one's community and state. Development organizations' employees' opinions reflect this tension, since the language they often use draws on both formations of cultural propriety and responsibility to community/state. Remittances from people working abroad usually support the family more than the community or the state, since families use the money to build or renovate houses, send children to school in other countries, buy better food, bribe officials, etc. SIF employees encourage communities to channel parts of remittances from abroad toward community projects, such as better kindergartens and schools, water systems, roads, etc. However, remittances from abroad have skewed Moldova's economy toward conspicuous consumption and higher prices, which may undermine state and community allegiances.

The Soviet ideals of state-community-family operating as parts of a whole have broken down in post-independence years. People built on the family and community ties that had fueled the Soviet era shadow economy to get through the lean years of the 1990s. Now, development ideologies are beginning to fill in for the "lost" community sentiment, building a bridge between responsibility to the family and allegiance to the state.

Theme 4: Speaking the state language

Cultural Propriety	Development	Citizenship
Dominant discourse:	Dominant discourse	Dominant discourse:

People should speak the state language or should try to learn it. If they do not speak it well, they should acknowledge it as the state language by explaining that they do not speak it, apologizing for not speaking it, or asking permission to speak Russian instead.	from institutional perspective: People should be able to speak Moldovan or Russian to interact with the development agency. Dominant discourse from development institution staff: People should speak the state language or acknowledge it as the state language by one or more of the following: explaining that they do not speak it, apologizing for not speaking it, or asking permission to speak Russian instead.	Citizens should speak the state language. The state preserves the Russian language as a *lingua franca* for those who speak other languages.
Soviet era: People should learn Russian to communicate with people in positions of power and to get ahead in society. People should try to maintain their	Soviet era: In order for people to develop into Soviet citizens, they should speak Russian.	Soviet era: Speaking Russian was not required, but there were benefits offered to those who did, such as more opportunities for higher

native language, if different than Russian, and should be proud of their heritage.		education, more career fields, and career advancement.

Example from data:

"*Asa trebuie sa fie*"—stated about Bulgarian-speaking applicants for SIF grant when they made great efforts to speak Romanian. The SIF staff recognized the applicants' efforts during the meeting, then most of the staff members spoke to the applicants in Russian for the rest of the meeting.

Discussion:

The tension that exists in this example across the three discursive formations occurs between cultural propriety and the others, or rather from the point of view of individuals instead of institutions. The majority of ethnic Moldovans and many people from minority ethnic groups believe everyone should speak the state language ("Moldovan", linguistically a dialect of Romanian), but there is division along some lines, and people give leeway to certain kinds of speakers: elderly are considered too old to learn; young people may not have been educated in both languages; ethnic minorities who learned Russian as their *lingua franca* but did not participate in domination of ethnic Moldovans are sometimes seen as sharing the same plight as ethnic Moldovans (and so are given the chance to learn or are given leeway in actual situations. MSIF staff have exhibited these perspectives in their interactions with project applicants and participants.

Currently, the majority of people understand Moldovan, even if they hesitate to speak it. People have told me they hesitate to speak Moldovan because they fear others will make fun of them; this often happened to non-native speakers of Russian in Soviet times. Many ethnic Moldovans are still angry that Russians/Russian speakers never learned the language of the majority of people in the MSSR, that Moldovan speakers were forced to speak Russian, and that ethnic Moldovans were even kept from speaking their language, at times. Some participants recounted that, during Soviet times, native Russian speakers would ridicule them for not speaking Russian as well as they "should," and commented on non-native speakers' lack of "culture" and intelligence. That behavior reinforced the ideas that non-Russian speakers were "backward" or "undeveloped." Such ideas still influence people's conduct, whether the ideas are expressed in favor of speaking Russian or Moldovan, in retaliation against Russian speakers, or in fear of speaking a language imperfectly. Therefore, infused into the ideals of cultural propriety are more negative feelings about speaking the state language than appear within ideals of development and citizenship, which more closely follow the state laws.

Thematic Group 2: Power and diversity

The second group concerns matters of status and the ways identity is negotiated (or the ways processes of identification take place) through relations of power. This includes beliefs about equality, multiculturalism, and ideas about who proper citizens are based on ethnic identity as much as civic identity.

Theme 5: Hierarchy and equality

Cultural Propriety	Development	Citizenship
Dominant discourse: Social hierarchy should be maintained by according respect to elders and senior family members, as well as to those in positions of power.	Dominant discourse: People should have equal say in development projects and equal access to them. However, poorer communities are accorded more access to projects due to the determination that they have greater need.	Dominant discourse: Citizens are equal and should have equal access to state services.
Soviet era: Similar, but some deserved more in society (such as material goods) because of their position or status.	Soviet era: Non-Russians and rural people were considered backward and in need of development. Poorer communities were accorded state assistance for development of their communities and people.	Soviet era: Similar in ideology.

Discussion:

There is an overlap between the formations of development and citizenship, above, and some tension with cultural propriety. Equality usually takes a back seat to

hierarchy when it comes to proper behavior between individuals. Development and citizenship maintain equality as a primary source of identification in people's relationships with their communities and the state.

Soviet era ideologies mirrored the current ones to a great extent. The former maintained that Soviet citizens should be treated equally. In reality, many were treated unequally, looked down upon, kept from positions of power, or accorded more access to goods and services. Poorer or less "developed" groups were offered more access to development assistance. Currently, respect for those in positions of power has been maintained, but the powerful are not offered more access to goods and services as a policy of the state; poorer communities are offered more assistance to improve their standard of living.

Theme 6: Respect for diversity; acceptance/promotion of multicultural society

Cultural Propriety	Development	Citizenship
Dominant discourse: People should be accepting of other ethnic groups and nationalities, if all respect each other.	Dominant discourses: Community development projects should benefit all equally. Projects targeted at certain groups (poor, minorities, victims of trafficking, unemployed, etc.) are acceptable, since people in	Dominant discourse: Citizens should accept and treat other ethnic groups and nationalities as equal members of the state.

	those groups need assistance either in reaching the living standards of the rest of society or in getting their specific needs met in a democratic system because they are minorities.	
Soviet era: similar in ideology, if not always in practice.	Soviet era: some were privileged (either because they were “backward” and needed “help” or because they had higher status based on civic position)	Soviet era: similar in ideology, if not always in practice.

Discussion:

There is some overlap in the ideals presented in the three discursive formations above. All hold that equality is ideal, but the spectrum of behaviors that people enact on an interpersonal and intergroup level runs the gamut from acceptance to denial of any status, personhood, or place in the state. Now, backwardness is less associated with ethnic identity and more with socioeconomic standards applied to everyone. If anything, minority ethnic identity may be associated with targeted programs of assistance or promotion of ethnic heritage.

Soviet era ideologies also encouraged interethnic equality and called for respect for other ethnic groups. At the same time, some groups were deemed “backward” and in need of development. Ethnolinguistic identity could be maintained as long as it did not challenge the dominant Soviet identity.[78]

Summary

Through examining these themes and examples as they construct and co-occur within discursive formations, one may see the stress and harmony expressed concerning Moldovan culture, identity, and citizenship. Examples show that, in practice, these ideals are not always carried out or enforced, but are still held as points of comparison to everyday life. Ideals of development institutions vary in that their focus is nearly always on the community, while ideals of citizenship nearly always focus on the state. The expressions of these ideals depend upon the Moldovan context and do not merely reproduce Western subject positions, although they do mirror the latter, due to Western influence. Ideals of cultural propriety, on the one hand, indicate that a Moldovan should hold family above all else, exhibit allegiance to the state, and treat all people equally; on the other hand, a Moldovan should also speak the state language and show deference to people in positions of power or authority. Each of the themes is expressed in the three discursive formations in slightly different ways, and yet the themes provide continuity (reference points) of Moldovan experiences across the different realms of thought and interaction.

[78] I eliminated the theme of self-presentation, since arguably, self-presentation exists in each instance of language-in-use. Performance is an important part of Moldovan culture, but is not represented here as a theme that crosses all three of the discursive formations.

Chapter 4:

"We All Do It, and We All Think It's Bad!":

Communication about corruption as a marker of identity

Introduction

Chapter Three introduced several themes that contribute to the discursive formations of cultural propriety, development, and citizenship. The themes concerned people's relationship to the state, their community, and their family, as well as hierarchy and diversity. These were presented in the context of Moldova's history and Moldovans' experience of transition to a democratic state after 1991. One aspect of their post-independence experience has been a rise in focus on corruption and poverty, which corresponds to people's experiences of development, citizenship, and culture. Corruption in its many forms is not a new phenomenon in Moldova, and neither are inequality and poverty. During the Soviet era, shadow economy activities arose as work-arounds to shortages and red tape, and informal exchange networks became survival mechanisms (Ledeneva, 2000). Then, in the 1990s and 2000s, people's social networks arguably became even more important than ever in the chaos of decollectivization, economic crisis, and decreased government funding for social support programs. Concurrently, Western institutions have targeted people's social networks as promoting corruption when the networks were used to influence activities in the public sphere. I argue in this chapter that because of these post-1991 trends, corruption has become an important part of the discursive formations of development, citizenship, and cultural propriety in Moldova. The first two summers when I returned to Moldova in 2003 and 2004 (after a

seven-year absence) provide most of the data on communication about corruption in this chapter; it was then that I noticed a shift from discussions about the past and ethnic strife (though they still existed) toward discussions about poverty, inequality, and corruption. The following section introduces the third thematic group, which the data in this and subsequent chapters will support.[79]

Thematic Group 3: Corruption

The tables below organize communication about corruption that I commonly heard during fieldwork into three themes. Following the format introduced in Chapter 3, the theme is the title of the table. The first row of each table lists the discursive formation, and the second row shows people's and institutions' ideal attitudes toward corruption, as they relate to the discursive formation. The third row presents information about this discursive formation/theme nexus during the Soviet era. The intersections and tensions between the themes and the discursive formations are described in the text that follows each table.

Theme 7: Cronyism

Cultural Propriety	Development	Citizenship
People should not participate in Communist-	(Ppl & Inst): People should not participate in	People should not participate in Communist-

[79] As noted in Chapter 3, these discourse orders reflect influences from pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet culture in the region of Moldova. (I say 'region' since Moldova was not always the state it is now, and borders have changed.) The ways people *index*, or refer to, those historical eras of Moldovan culture dialogically shape the current culture.

style cronyism because it often favors those who are not qualified, making everyone suffer. It is immoral.	Communist-style cronyism because it runs counter to democratic principles of fairness and equality. "Developed" people do not do this.	style cronyism because it runs counter to democratic principles of fairness and equality. "Good" citizens do not do this.
Soviet era: similar, in ideal form, though practiced widely and reinforced through the Communist Party hierarchy	(No information)	(No information)

Discussion:

Cronyism is used here as favoring one's personal contacts (whether family, work colleagues, or former schoolmates) above others in activities that Western democratic principles deem should be open to equal competition based on merit. Examples of such activities are hiring and promoting employees, making political appointments, and granting entry to public universities. The three discursive formations are similar in that all denounce cronyism, but those speaking of "proper" behavior associate cronyism with effects on individuals and immorality. This is because people likely think of incidents from their own lives when recounting instances of cronyism. The other two formations associate crony favoritism with the broader ideology of democratic equality. Note the connection between anti-cronyism and Western democratic ideology.

Theme 8: Bribery, illegal use of public funds

Cultural Propriety	Development	Citizenship
People should not take bribes but sometimes they must offer them to survive; some people who take bribes are paid so little they cannot survive without bribes; people should not illegally use public funds because it is immoral.	(Ppl & Inst) People should not take or offer bribes, or illegally use public funds, because these practices damage civic trust and cause inequality. "Developed" people do not do this.	People should not take or offer bribes, or illegally use public funds, because these practices damage civic trust and cause inequality. "Good" and patriotic citizens should not do this.
Soviet era: similar in ideal form	(No information)	(No information)

Discussion:

Bribery and illegal use of public funds are separated from other behaviors because people more clearly acknowledge them as corruption. These activities are the ones most targeted by international and local anti-corruption initiatives. The three discursive formations are similar in that all denounce illegal use of money and especially public funds. Those speaking of "proper" behavior recognize bribery as negative and illegal, but often offer bribes for a variety of reasons: to make their own lives easier or their

business run smoother; to help survive (gain police protection for a store, for example, or stay out of jail); or often to gain access to university for their children. The two institutional points of view replicate international and local ideas about corruption, namely that corruption erodes trust in government, leads to more illegal activities, and ultimately causes inequality and poverty among people.

Theme 9: Family ties, nepotism, use of family for advancement

Cultural Propriety	Development	Citizenship
People should maintain family ties and help family whenever possible, even if it means sometimes participating in cronyism or offering a bribe. People should accept the help of family members in order to maintain the relationship and to get ahead, provided it does not hurt others ("hurt" is a relative term, defined in context).	(Ppl & Inst) People should not participate in any sort of favoritism in the public sphere because these practices damage civic trust and cause inequality. People can help family in private ways, not in public sphere.	People should not participate in any sort of favoritism in the public sphere because these practices damage civic trust and cause inequality. People can help family in private ways, since this is part of Moldovan culture, but not in public sphere.

Soviet era: similar in ideal form, though work relationships often superseded family relationships	(No information)	(No information)

Discussion:

This theme is similar to the previous two, but focuses more on one's responsibility to the family than on public sphere activities. Communication about cultural propriety suggests family ties are stronger than citizen ties and people often have described to me dilemmas of having family members apply to them for favoritism in hiring them for a position. Communication referring to development and citizenship eschews this behavior. Development discourse does not address the cultural associations with people's behavior, while the state acknowledges them. Development and citizenship formations focus on negative *public impacts*, while people discussing cultural propriety describe *private benefits*, such as maintaining relationships within the family.

This chapter illustrates these three themes through examples and analysis. In it, I define corruption from international and local points of view, introduce how corruption is talked about in both local and international contexts, and discuss some people's experiences with what they define as corruption. I also introduce official and unofficial examples of communication via three sets of data: 1) the language-in-use of representatives of international, regional, and Moldovan institutions, acting in *official*

capacities; 2) *unofficial* language-in-use of communication produced by people of different social positions within Moldova, who are not official representatives of any particular institution; and 3) *unofficial* language-in-use produced by people who work in *official* capacities, but also must decide how to behave in the Moldovan cultural context in the private sphere. The ways different groups of people index[80] tensions that go beyond corruption will be highlighted throughout. This chapter leads to a better understanding of the multiple *meanings* that people in Moldova have for the term "corruption," as well as the multiple *uses* to which people put these ideals as they use them to identify with or distance themselves from others. Moreover, through this data, we begin to see the overlaps and divisions between the discursive formations of citizenship, development, and cultural propriety.

What is Corruption?

Corruption is generally defined as illegal and/or unethical acts in the public sphere that include behaviors ranging from gift-giving to bribery to theft of international funds; it is behavior through which people gain economically and/or politically (Kramer, 1977; Scott 1972; Friedrich 1972; Bardhan 1997). In international financial organizations (i.e. the World Bank and IMF) and in internationally or nationally funded aid organizations (such as UNICEF or USAID), corrupt acts are seen to undermine state power and inhibit business growth by encouraging allegiances to non-official actors or social groups, or by diverting state resources to local non-official leaders (World Bank 2004a; United Nations

[80] Indexicality is one means by which people indirectly refer to corruption, a sensitive topic. Inversely, people may (consciously or unconsciously) use the indexical function of language to indirectly refer to other aspects of their lives, such as proper behavior in society or ethnic group tensions, while ostensibly speaking about corruption.

2004a). However, these organizations and their representatives leave little room in their policies and programs for the ways in which corruption is perceived, talked about, fought against, and even perpetuated in local social interactions (cf. Girling, 1997; Grodeland, Koshechkina, & Miller, 1998).

International definitions of corruption rarely connect corrupt acts to social practices, such as those based on ties of ethnicity, kinship, or work associations. However, most researchers and theorists accede that some illegal practices may have the positive effect of supporting and enhancing local social systems, since those systems often fulfill important functions in cases where the state's power may be lacking or its agencies slow to respond to society's needs (Grodeland, et al., 1998; Handelman, 2003; Kagarlitsky, 2003; Kramer, 1977; Ledeneva, 1998; Sajó, 2002; Twigg & Schecter, 2003) Rimashevskaya 2003;. On the other hand, a potentially negative effect of corruption on local social systems is that the illegal practices may become institutionalized when associated with sociality and local culture. Locally produced definitions of corruption, and the continuum of social practices that *may or may not be* locally defined as corruption, reflect the geographic, historic, political, and socioeconomic contexts of a state or region[81] Comparing local language-in-use referring to corruption to the prevalent international uses of corruption may be instructive in discovering how international language-in-use on this topic is understood and utilized in the Moldovan local contexts.

In Moldova, internationally supported ideologies about corruption are circulated by international institutions and organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations; various foreign embassies and consulates; and

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[81] See these authors for studies that support this assertion: (Grodeland, et al., 1998; Joseph, 1998; Ledeneva, 1998; Sajó, 2002).

NGOs with foreign funding, such as Transparency International. Moldovans work with non-Moldovans in these organizations, which helps to spread the ideologies beyond the international community, as do public advertising campaigns sponsored by the organizations. The Moldovan government produces its share of anti-corruption legislation, public service announcements, and has an anti-corruption department in one of the Ministries. These governmental initiatives have likely been influenced by international actors. Moldovans who have worked or traveled abroad also contribute to the dissemination of international language-in-use and their corresponding ideologies about corruption and corrupt acts.

However, ideas about corruption do not always emanate from international or government sources, and are not always referred to as corruption. They often take the form of talk about moral and immoral activities.[82] Widespread and well-known use of *blat*, or influence, in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet regions (Ledeneva, 1998) has continued to play a part in the lives of Moldovan citizens today. One difference in the post-Soviet era is the reference point for comparisons of "good" and "bad" behavior. Whereas use of connections and *blat* may have been more-or-less accepted in the Soviet era as one of the only ways of getting things done (see the charts that begin this chapter), Moldovans increasingly consider those practices as corrupt, or at least of questionable morality. The influence of Western and international organizations has contributed to this changing view, as has dialogue within the state about rights and access to

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[82] In the Moldovan variant of Romanian, such talk usually includes reference to the terms *conectie* (connections, in Romania, these may be referred to as *legature*), *corruptie* (corruption), or other terms that are described later in this chapter. In the Russian language, the term *blat* is still used, as well as references to family ties.

government services. Increasingly, Western European states and the U.S. are held up as standards for proper behavior in the public sphere.

Examples from international and regional official sources

Internationally accepted official definitions of corruption come from a variety of sources, including those produced by academic scholarship as noted above. International groups most commonly discuss corruption in terms of its detrimental effects to the growth of democracies and business interests, rather than in terms of its causes. Their statements on corruption and transparency fall within the discursive formations of development, citizenship, democracy, and cultural propriety (the latter through their focus on morality).

For example, Transparency International (TI), an organization founded in Germany in 1993, has built a transnational movement to fight against corruption based on local initiatives in individual countries. Their website offers the following definition: "Corruption is operationally defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain" (Transparency, 2004). However, the term "misuse" is not clearly defined here with examples, and neither are the types of "entrusted power" nor the kinds of "private gain" that may result. The definition is next supported by a more extensive discussion of the *costs* of corruption to "political, economic, social, and environmental" sectors of a society. Included under social costs is the statement that corruption:

> undermines people's trust in the political system, in its institutions and its leadership. Frustration and general apathy among a disillusioned public result in a weak civil society. That in turn clears the way for despots as well as

democratically elected yet unscrupulous leaders to turn national assets into personal wealth (Transparency, 2004).

The terms "trust," "leadership," "civil society," "democratically elected," and "national assets" call for a set of behaviors and principles that Western democratic states expect from other states and their citizens. "Apathy," "disillusioned," "weak," "despots," "unscrupulous," and "personal wealth" imply both causes and effects of corruption in society, but fail to define these terms in ways that help ordinary citizens clearly identify corruption or its direct effects when they see it. The definition thus allows for wide interpretation for terms like "frustration" and "unscrupulous." Later, I will show that political parties and members of different ethnic groups have used the terms offered to further agendas not necessarily intended by the anti-corruption initiative.

The Compact of the Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative for Southeastern Europe, to which Moldova has sent representatives, closely repeats the effects of corruption outlined by Transparency International:

> We, the members of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, …acknowledge that corruption and other fraudulent and criminal activities,
>
> -are highly detrimental to the stability of all democratic institutions, erode the rule of law, breach fundamental rights and freedoms…, and undermine the trust and confidence of citizens in the fairness and impartiality of public administration;
>
> -undermine the business climate,…and hamper economic growth, and, therefore,
>
> -threaten the very objective of the Stability Pact (Stability, 2001, p. 1).

These leading regional and international bodies leave the definition of corruption very vague, if they define it at all. They focus instead on the public, political and economic influences and impacts of corruption, and characterize corruption as a criminal activity, with no other possible interpretations. The United Nations' Convention Against Corruption similarly asserts concerns about corruption's effects, "about the seriousness of problems and threats posed by corruption to the stability and security of societies, undermining the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and the rule of law" (United Nations, 2004). Thus, the overall message of these organizations is that corruption is antithetical to democracy.

The World Bank, whose "mission is to fight poverty and improve the living standards of people in the developing world," also does not explicitly define corruption. The Bank acknowledges that corruption encompasses "a broad range of behaviors;" this decision could have been designed to leave the definition open to local interpretation and implementation. Nevertheless, corruption is still only defined on the Bank's public web pages through corruption's *effects* (Bank, 2004):

> The Bank has identified corruption as among the greatest obstacles to economic and social development. It undermines development by distorting the rule of law and weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth depends. The harmful effects of corruption are especially severe on the poor, who are hardest hit by economic decline, are most reliant on the provision of public services, and are least capable of paying the extra costs associated with bribery, fraud, and the misappropriation of economic privileges. Corruption sabotages

policies and programs that aim to reduce poverty, so attacking corruption is critical to the achievement of the Bank's overarching mission of poverty reduction (Bank, 2011).

The primary difference between the World Bank's use of the concept of corruption and that of the other institutions cited above is the Bank's focus on poverty. Great attention is paid to the effects of corruption on the poor, which links anti-corruption measures to the Bank's mission of fighting poverty and supporting development (World Bank 2004a). This focus on poverty has been key aspect of the discursive framework of development since the development of the IBRD and the IMF after World War II (see Chapter 2).

While the websites of all these organizations seem designed to provide general information about their ideologies and practices to the world, they leave the definition of corruption very vague. Instead, they focus on general political, economic, and governance impacts of corruption, and characterize corruption as a criminal (illegal), anti-democratic (immoral) activity. They offer few, if any, cases of how corruption impacts people in actual contexts. TI is the only organization to post news stories about corruption from around the world. The information on each organization's site appears aimed at an audience that is already familiar with the meanings of corruption, or those who already share Western democratic values. As such, the organizations naturalize their definition of corruption through their authority and thus enhance the power of the discursive formation of development. Furthermore, the organizations have influenced the public sphere in Moldova enough to have their perspectives reproduced through the positions of the the state and local development organizations, as the following sections illustrate.

Examples from Moldovan official sources

Examples from Moldovans speaking about corruption in both official capacities can shed light on how Moldovans might see prominent examples of use of corruption to index other aspects of Moldovan life, and might be encouraged to identify with (or distance themselves from, in this case) those examples. I define "official" discourse as that produced by people acting as representatives of the government, NGOs, or other institutions. Official types of communication often follow particular styles, such as more formal presentation in writing, or declarations made by government institutions or politicians. It also carries more power because of the people and institutions that produce it (Fairclough, 2001).

Within Moldova, official communication about corruption comes from a variety of sources in addition to the World Bank and TI. Internationally funded agencies and groups reiterate similar definitions to those described as most common in the section above, by speaking about corruption in terms of its detrimental effects to the growth of democracies and business interests. One local official interpretation of corruption in Moldova is "The Law of the Republic of Moldova on Combating Corruption and Protectionism" of June 27, 1996. It defines corruption as

> an anti-social phenomenon implying illegal collusion entered by two parties one of which is offering or promising illegitimate benefits while the other, making part of public service, agreeing or accepting such in exchange of executing or non executing certain functional actions, which comprise elements of defiance stipulated by the Criminal Code (Moldova, 1996).

Here, corruption is defined as illegal and involving public servants (in concert with definitions cited in Kramer (1977) and Transparency International), and some concreteness is added to the definition: the promising of benefits or executing of functional actions, for instance. The inclusion of "protectionism" in the law relates to the nepotism and cronyism from the themes outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Protectionism is not necessarily associated with immediate monetary benefit, but with favoritism of any kind. An interesting supplement is the naming of corrupt activities as "anti-social." This may refer to the weakening of civil society, the erosion of rule of law, or trust in the government that corruption is said to breed in other definitions. In another way, it may refer to interpersonal anti-sociality, eroding trust in one another or excluding people in society who cannot participate in the behavior. The latter interpretation of anti-sociality speaks to the subjective experience of citizenship. In Moldova, behavior called "anti-social" may refer to strong kin networks and work associations that play a more prominent role in some people's lives than their allegiance to the state and the rule of law that comes with good citizenship. It seems as though the added concreteness in this local definition was intended to better apply the international statutes to the cultural context of Moldova.

It is likely that international organizations or foreign advisors had some input on the writing of the Moldovan Criminal Code, though this would be difficult to substantiate without knowledge of who was advising Moldovans in that branch of government during the particular period in which this law was written.[83] There were already many foreign

[83] It is also likely that, foreign advisors or not, the Moldovan government felt influenced to create this law from the rise in prominence of international anti-corruption discourses during the mid-1990s. Transparency International was founded in 1993; several world regional bodies (Organization of American States,

advisors in Moldova in the mid-1990s. The United Nations offices and the U.S. Embassy with USAID were in place in Moldova by 1992. I personally knew several American advisors during my 1994-96 stay in Moldova. They were heavily involved in the creation of Moldova's national bank, many of its economic policies, and its land privatization program. In 2005-6, I met a person whose 2-year job was to advise the Moldovan government on creation of new laws and the operation of its legal system. Academics support these observations. Hungarian legal theorist Sajo holds that "the [Eastern European] public's understanding of corruption is conditioned, even warped by Western categories" (2002, p. 1). His opinion is a strong one, but is reinforced by Wedel's more moderate argument that "aid-funded exchange and training eventually played an important and positive role in setting standards of transparency" for nations in transition (Wedel, 1998, p. 118).

Further evidence of the long-term influence of foreign ideologies about corruption in Moldovan governmental or non-governmental bodies is in changes that have occurred in the ways corruption is measured and talked about. First, the State Program of Combating Crime and Corruption adopted an amendment to the Law of State Security in 2003, "with the scope of recognizing corruption as one of the most dangerous phenomenon [sic] undermining state security" (Moldova, 2002). Second, again in 2003, the Institute for Public Policy (IPP) added questions to their yearly Barometer of Public Opinion survey about respondents' appraisal of the level of corruption in society and the principle causes for corruption in Moldova (Institute, 2003). On the other hand, the IPP public opinion surveys indicate falling concern over corruption between 1998 and 2002;

European Union, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) adopted anti-corruption conventions in 1996 and 1997 (United, 2004).

and show that the number of people who felt they needed to offer money, gifts, or services in exchange for resolving problems with public officials dropped an average of four percent in nearly every sector of public services from November 2001 to the 2003 Barometer. This may point to tensions between official (governmental, institutional) and unofficial (everyday, private) *attention* to corruption.

The President's Speech

In 2002, in a speech given at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin described the four greatest "problems" in Moldova:[84] 1) "internal division and high level of regional instability"; 2) "poverty and a repressive economic system"; 3) "corruption and interpolitical instability"; and 4) "uncertainty of foreign policy of Moldova" (CSIS 2002:4-6). Speaking in his capacity as President, Voronin highlights the interconnectedness of internal politics, foreign policy, and perceptions of corruption, thus setting a model for linking these topics together, or perhaps illustrating a common thread of everyday communication in Moldova. Corruption is a topic in all four sections of the President's speech, and the President uses talk about corruption to position himself and his government apart from previous regimes.[85] The full text of his speech is included in Appendix B.

Problem 1: "Internal division and instability"

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[84] Voronin took office in April 2001. This meeting took place during his first visit to Washington, D.C. The transcript was available only in English, although Voronin's words were originally spoken in Russian.

[85] I am not necessary analyzing the truth in the President's statements, merely the ways he positions himself and his party vis-a-vis the political, economic, and social problems he describes, and the ways other groups are characterized as corrupt.

Pres. Voronin describes the issues leading to the 1992 Transnistrian War and the resulting frozen conflict as "a conflict of elites." One group of elites, the one on the western side of the Nistru, was "oriented toward integration with Romania by conducting intolerable policies with respect to ethnic minorities in the country." The group on the Transnistrian side was "oriented towards Russia," toward "the nationalistic political segment of Russian politics." After the war, the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic (PMR, from the acronym in Russian) that resulted "became…a totalitarian enclave, which guaranteed international criminal structures by means of legalizing transit contraband [and] export of arms….This criminal and political system enabled, for one of them [the Transnistrian side], to exploit the idea of unity with Russia and defending from Romanization, and to the others [the Moldovan side] by using the Russia threat to make declarations on European integration." The President characterizes the PMR as upholding criminal structures and supporting Russian political integration, and characterizes Moldovan political elites as oriented toward integration with Romania and the EU. This statement sets up the idea that others (not Voronin's party) exploited the uncertainty after independence to support either Romanian or Russian integration. Both Romanization and Russian integration are deemed unacceptable, and both are described as overly (even intolerably) favorable toward the titular ethnic groups of those other states. Each side took part in criminal (corrupt) activities and associated its activities with promotion of nationalist policies.

Problem 2: "Poverty and a repressive economic system"

It is a bit shocking that President Voronin makes the following statement in a speech made in Washington, D.C.: "by following the recommendations of authoritative

international financial institutions, the Moldovan Congress and government have been conducting the anti-social and anti-market policies." He is talking about privatization, which in his words, "was not for efficiency of management, not for making profits, but for the benefit of political slogans and in the interest of bureaucrats." Ostensibly, the international institutions recommended privatization to promote free market activity, but Voronin states that "in nine out of ten cases there were no investments after privatization, while the enterprises as real estate, land and equipment were objects of quick multi-reselling and destruction….In the social area…most of the hospitals were closed, the expensive equipment was sold, and the buildings often were just brought apart as construction parts." This relates not to the economic policies, but to their interpretation by "bureaucrats," who reappear as negative figures later in the President's narrative. In fact, this predatory reselling and destruction of the infrastructure did happen in Moldova, and many people in the public and (newly) private sectors were implicated, including Voronin's own son (Ciufu, 2009). However, Voronin relates the "anti-market atmosphere in the country" to "police arbitrary measures," a code for corrupt activities.

Problem number 3: Corruption and interpolitical instability.

In the next section of the speech, President Voronin describes a district in the capital, Chisinau, populated by some of the richest people in Moldova.

> It's a big district, about 1,000 plots. The cheapest in these district are the houses of $100,000 and up. We have conducted a study on the owners of this real estate. Of all those owners only 18 persons out of 1,000…are businessmen. All the others are members of the governments that were replacing one after another, ten of them in all…. Also officers of various ministries, departments, customs,

> judges, prosecutors, former officers of the police, former deputies of the parliament and cabinet ministers. This is the visual apex of the criminal pyramid which was created basically by unresolved Dniester issue…. No doubt, corruption is the second of its importance of the political problems of the country.
>
> ….About 80 percent in this -- they have control, management, et cetera…related to corruption. The abundance of various permissive and forbidding authorities of our bureaucracy, lack of liberal climate created a situation of fighting between various bureaucratic clans in order to grab those of the other's administrative and other beneficial posts.… This dictatorship of corruption has created the situation of lack of trust to courts and discrediting the law and its possibility of opportunity to defend the rights of people in Moldova. Paradoxically, the creators of the system were the former Soviet nomenclature that quickly mastered the pseudo-democratic and pseudo-market rhetoric.

Voronin assigns corrupt activity to every ruling government of Moldova, up until his own. The criminals are named "authorities of our bureaucracy," "various bureaucratic clans," and "former Soviet nomenclature," despite the fact that the President was a part of the bureaucracy and *nomenklatura.* He rose to Minister of the Interior prior to Moldova's independence and revived the Communist Party in 1994, remaining its leader until the present day. In this section, Voronin also relates others' corruption to the ongoing Transnistrian conflict. When one adds this description to those statements related to nationalist politics in the previous two sections of the speech, it seems that Voronin is walking the line between East and West more than his predecessors. On the one hand, he

supported the expansion of Western development projects, like MSIF, and enacted the Moldova-EU Action Plan in 2004 (which led to a series of economic and social reforms). On the other hand, his Communist government promoted stronger ties with Russia and re-instituted mandatory Russian language education by the end of 2001 (Lam, 2007).

Problem number 4: Uncertainty of foreign policy of Moldova.

Moldova's President describes the previous ten years of foreign policy as a primitive, clumsy balancing act, continuing his own tight-rope walking from earlier in the speech:

> For many years the political class of Moldova tried to clumsily balance between the West and the East, between Europe and Russia, by primitively interpreting global interests of both Russia and the West. The international cooperation was more of a kind of imitational nature, and diplomacy was limited to protocol, systematical tasting of wonderful Moldovan wines. This disoriented not only the great powers, but the citizens of Moldova, as well, and deprived the country of a good stable program of actions. Relations with Russia were cool, but the Russian troops were in Moldova. The relations with Moldova were of a high priority, fraternal, et cetera, but the country did not get any investments from Romania. The impression has been developed that there was no future for the country. These were the problems which ultimately determined the results of the elections of February 25th, 2001.

Next, Voronin outlines his solutions to the problems above:

> First, reunite the country, solving the Dniester issue. Secondly, fighting the corruption, de-bureaucratizing and economic liberalization. And third, a course towards European integration. Only these measures will bring my country to the conditions of a normal investment climate and stable development to resolving most of the social problems.

His words imply that solving these internal problems will straighten out Moldova's uncertain foreign policy and its problems with poverty. In a part not quoted here, Voronin describes how he has Vladimir Putin's support on de-militarizing Transnistria, and the support of the U.S., EU, and OSCE for reintegration of Transnistria into the Republic of Moldova.[86] He is attempting to balance between the two sides, or drive two of the horses more skillfully than his predecessors. Along the way, Pres. Voronin weaves corruption and nationalist politics (Problems 1 and 3) back into the discussion, which I have emphasized in the quote that follows:

> The next impulse was the draft decision on Dniester suggested to OSCE in July of this year. The essence of this draft is that the basis of reintegration depends on *high, contemporary legal standards and guarantees*. *Moldova gets away from the positions of unitarial state and becomes a country state of all the ethnic groups that constitute the people of Moldova*.… Conflictless reintegration of Moldova is the main prerequisite for true economic and political modernization of our country to resolve all the four problems I mentioned a little earlier…. The start of actions in this area became the prologue to the *war to corruption and bureaucracy*. *We have liquidated the dual standards in customs, politics, we've created a special structure to fight*

[86] Over the next few years, the negotiations deteriorated and the issue is still unresolved.

corruption, money laundering and contraband. We have passed laws which enable to control issues of money laundering and contraband….

The measures on de-bureaucratization and liberalization of the economy is the next step in fighting the corruption. We have reduced the number of licensing kinds of activities, stabilized the rules for licensing by making the bureaucrats -- giving them less opportunities to change them as they wish. We simplified the registration of economic agents, who had to pass 22 different agencies when they wanted to do their business, and now it's done within 2 hours in one agency. Thus, we got the floor out from under the feet of the bureaucrats.

Nevertheless, we came to a conclusion that the tasks, the problems that the country is facing needs the maximum support from the public. *The track of party battles is too narrow for real democratic reforms.*_ That is why I have initiated the so-called "Social Treaty."… I'm sure that this social treaty…*will become the nonpolitical integration for the society* and an additional mechanism for making very important state decisions. Among these important decisions, a special place is played by issue of European integration of Moldova…. Nevertheless, it's obvious that the fact of European integration for Moldova is and always will be the highest priority. There's no more competitive idea in *modernizing economic systems* in the European continent except European integration.

Voronin's words show how these themes are brought together, at least in official government discourse in this instance. They also illustrate the tensions in the different uses of corruption and the points along the continuum between corruption and non-corruption that the President identifies and positions himself against. The rest of the chapter will elaborate on the three themes (cronyism, bribery/illegal activity, nepotism) in a variety of contexts, with the goal of demonstrating how corruption is a key topic in the discursive formations of development, citizenship, and cultural propriety.

More examples from the NGO Sector

Other Moldovan citizens who speak as representatives of international or local NGOs may reiterate ideologies about corruption as they are presented by international bodies. Similar to President Voronin, these people speak from positions embedded in the context of Moldovan political and social life. Their official communication about corruption overlaps with local and unofficial *meanings* of corruption. For example, Margareta,[87] a woman who works for a local organization that combats corruption in Moldova, told me that her definition of corruption is "using public position for personal gain," a stance that closely replicates Transparency International's official statement. However, she has noticed a recent shift in Moldovan meanings of corruption. Three years ago, she stated, there was common consensus that poverty causes corruption (note the difference here from the international ideology, which holds that corruption causes poverty). She was referring to the many stories circulating in the news and between people about how poorly paid public servants must ask for and accept bribes just to put

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[87] All names are pseudonyms unless the information presented about a person is available in public records. Information that could identify participants has been altered to protect their privacy and safety.

food on their tables. Now, people see corruption in Moldova and say, "it's traditional," implying that it is something about Moldovan life and culture that is ingrained and, perhaps, natural.[88]

Margareta added that she had experienced "problems" that amounted to corrupt behavior when registering the NGO with a government functionary at the proper ministry. She perceived these problems as due to her organization's partial focus on anti-corruption initiatives and to the government's opposition to the NGO operating within Moldova. Margareta even claimed to have received direct threats to her family if she reported the behavior to the government authorities responsible for combating corruption. Here, it is important for the reader to know that Margareta is of Romanian ethnic origin, and that the NGO where she works is funded exclusively by Western institutions. Such NGOs are often, but not always, considered opposed to the current Communist government, in part because most of their workers are of Romanian ethnic origin, and in part due to Western governments' wariness of President Voronin's close ties to Russia. Thus, Margareta's claims of being the target of corrupt behavior by government workers also *might* have been a way of indicating to me her position as opposed to the Communist government and its policies. If her allegations were true, the government authorities may have been betraying bias against pro-Western organizations.

During the course of my research, it became apparent that perceptions about corruption, acts of corruption, and talk about corruption crosscut most aspects of Moldovan society. However, the ways that Moldovans define and use the term do not

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[88] This trend resounds with Harrison's (2004) reminder that modernization discourse roots problems such as corruption within a government and a society, rather in an economic situation or international relationships; and with Sedlenieks' (2004) contention that the circulation of discourses on corruption by the media may contribute to people's perceptions that corruption is endemic.

always coincide with the definitions of corruption provided by international organizations or other foreign representatives. Acts that Moldovans may define as corrupt seem to fall along a continuum between those involving bribery or monetary influence on the one hand (the most negative), and those that use social connections (cronyism, nepotism) to influence different public and private interactions on the other hand (the least negative, since they are the more entrenched in practices common throughout the 20th century).

Many examples of corruption along the bribery end of the continuum occur in interactions with civil servants: students are asked to give money to teachers for extra lessons after school, or to improve their chances of being accepted to a certain university (cf. Moldova Azi, 7 July 2000); people often mention instances of needing to pay bribes to city officials, functionaries at government ministries, police officers, judges or court officials, and doctors. Civil servants' salaries are low, and in the past, salaries have been suspended for months at a time, a fact sometimes used to maintain that taking bribes is necessary for civil servants' survival (King 2000:xxviii; Anderson 2003; Institute for Public Policy 2003:24-25). In 2003, one participant estimated that his salary as a manager at a foreign-funded NGO was three times that of most government officials working in similar capacities. Another told me that his mother, a retired nurse, receives 222 lei per month in her pension; a 1998 report by the Red Cross estimated that the minimum food basket required approximately 600 lei per month (ICRC 1998). Such conditions lead to perceptions that NGO workers are "on the take," as we will see below; and lead to the mass emigration of Moldovan citizens to work in other countries for higher wages.[89]

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[89] Remittances from citizens working abroad have equaled as much as one-third of the national budget (Cardais, 2008), and usually go to support other family members still in the country, or toward building and

On the other end of the spectrum, there is the ability to exert influence using social connections based on family or business ties. These activities are often left out of official *definitions* of corruption in Moldova, but they form an important part of examples from official *language-in-use* (as evidenced in the President's speech). They also appear frequently in examples of unofficial language-in-use on unethical and/or corrupt practices in Moldova and in other Eurasian nations.[90] The spectrum of acts that Moldovans may call corruption has instrumental connections to the social and ethnic divisions that Moldovans perceive as influencing minority rights legislation, political party divisions, voting behavior, the Transnistrian conflict, and even daily interactions. Some see the use of family and professional ties as relatively benign and even as positive aspects of their culture, as in paying a family member to watch over one's home construction site, or calling on a colleague for information about a potential job candidate. On the other hand, some Moldovans are also able to use family connections to make the difficulties of daily life move more quickly and smoothly: one person had me move to the front of the departures line at the airport because her godson worked there (I felt embarrassed); another used his position as a civil servant to expedite paperwork for a friend at a local government office. Most Moldovans I know would still not consider these latter examples acts of "real" corruption, despite the inequalities of access that may result from their actions. Those who get pushed aside because of favoritism harbor negative feelings about the experience, which sometimes overflow later into talk about interethnic relations

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exhibiting personal wealth (such as in constructing new houses, buying foreign cars or other "non-Moldovan" consumer items). Some have used remittances to bolster their citizen contributions to public works projects, like MSIF projects.

[90] See, for example: Blankenburg 2002; Humphrey 2002; Kaneff 2002; Karklins 2005; Ledeneva 2000; Patico 2002; Prato 2004; Ries 2002; Rigi 2004; Sedlenieks 2004; Spiridonov 2000.

or about status differences based on other characteristics.[91] Transparency International and other international organizations also tend to overlook such activities, perhaps to the detriment of addressing people's frustrations with their own "cultural" practices.

Public Opinion Surveys

A study undertaken by the Moldovan chapter of Transparency International in 2000 surveyed people's opinions on incidences, effects, and perceptions of corruption (Carasciuc, 2000). The study distinguished between bribes with money and influence achieved through contacts, thus officially opening the door in the Moldovan context to the possibility for different interpretations of corruption and activities that may be perceived as corrupt. The framework of the questionnaire and the focus of the findings revolve around respondents' experiences with types of corruption and the sectors where the most corruption occurs. In addition, the target population was divided into households and businessmen, in order to gauge how corruption affects each group. The survey and interview data from the study are instructive because they examine local perceptions of the criminality versus "normality" of bribery and people's participation in bribery. The table reproduced in Appendix C shows the results of the question that measured participants' beliefs about the activities that constitute corruption, or more simply, their definition of corruption. A majority of people believed that all instances of bribery could be considered corruption, with the notable exception of a "gift" to a doctor. Gift giving is common among colleagues in Moldova, and it seems the practice has extended to the medical sector, though we are not told why. In my participants'

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[91] See Chapter 3 for examples.

experiences, the “gift” was usually less of a “thank-you” and more of a payment in advance for extra attention or full service. Gifts for extra services were also common in the education sector, both from what I heard from Moldovans and in this survey’s results. The term “gift” has remained part of the transaction, however, perhaps as a means to lessen the immorality of the exchange of money for services that formerly were taken care of by the state, or to allow people on either or both sides of the exchange to erase their status differences and focus on building relationships. Businessmen seemed to hold stricter definitions of corruption throughout. They are more likely to be familiar with the law than other citizens because of their need to interact frequently with public officials. On the other hand, they may have been self-policing in order to counter the widely held belief that businessmen are in league with the government or the mafia. Only in the cases where the words “bribery” and/or “cash” were invoked did more than 75% of the respondents agree that these were instances of corruption. The instances in which money was not mentioned were least often rated as constituting corruption. Here, again, we see the tension between practices of corruption as they transition from Soviet to post-Soviet use. As the study’s author notes:

> In contrast to planned economies, where corruption was based mostly on informal clan-type of relations, the transition to a market economy brought a relatively new form of unofficial relations - bribe in cash. Almost two third of Moldovan respondents think that the main form of unofficially solving problems with public officials is the one by offering cash, however, personal contacts do not disappear completely. They remain in the second place of the ranking (p.25)

Throughout the report, respondents associate activities linked with "culture", i.e. gift-giving and personal contacts (methods frequently used during Communism to make life easier), less often to corruption than activities linked clearly with monetary exchange. In other words, they identify more closely with the activities linked with culture than to those strictly associated with money. Not coincidentally, practices related to the market economy and monetary exchange are also those targeted more recently by Western-influenced anti-corruption campaigns.

Even though the survey is about corruption in Moldova in general, most of the questions in the report revolve around bribery. This makes one wonder whether bribery is just the most targeted, the most costly, or the most visible form of corruption, or some mixture of reasons. No matter the reason, the focus on bribes leads the reader to understand that this is the worst practice of corruption in Moldova. By extension, people who take and offer bribes should be corrupt, should they not? In this case, those who take and ask for bribes are more demonized, are less identified as ideally "Moldovan", since they work as public servants and should uphold the law. People who *offer* bribes are just "trying to make their lives easier." There are two exceptions, however, as noted above. Educators and medical professionals are notoriously low paid. Even though citizens dislike making regular payments to their child's school to augment the teachers' salary, or offering gifts to medical staff in advance of a surgery to gain special care, they sometimes justify the doctors' and teachers' actions by noting their low salaries (though not always; I know of two examples where the life of the patient was in jeopardy and doctors asked for additional money in advance of giving treatment. One patient's friends paid the money, but the other's family had few resources; the latter patient died in

childbirth). The government was faulted most of all for educators' corruption in the TI survey. The second most cited possible cause for teachers' and doctors' taking bribes was lack of administrative control. This points to *individuals'* ethical choices; if there were more oversight, the public servants in question would have less leeway to exercise their power to request bribes for normal, and even life-saving, services. Thus, ideas about who *might* take part in corruption, and who should absolutely *not* be corrupt are mediated by actual circumstances, not only by ideologies.

Unofficial perspectives from NGO employees

All of the people whom I interviewed, a group perhaps over-represented by workers in NGOs, hybrid NGO/government organizations like MSIF, and private businesses, maintained negative opinions toward corruption in government and NGO activities. However, in their personal lives, all were faced with the choice of paying bribes when asked, with voluntarily offering bribes, *and* with the decision to call on social connections and social obligations in ways that could be deemed unethical by others.[92] In the personal examples about corruption and connections that they recounted, there was less direct evidence concerning the relationship between corruption and politics, as we saw in the President's speech, but much more discussion of security, protection, morality, and trust.[93] All of these intersect not only with development, proper behavior, and citizenship, but with people's personal networks, those whom they trust, those with whom they identify as fellow Moldovans.

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[92] Most people volunteered the information that they had not *taken* bribes.

[93] Their examples could be related to a number of factors, such as the discourses they utilize and that envelop them in their workplaces, their upper-middle and upper class standing (most NGO and hybrid organization employees are paid very highly by local standards), their political leanings, and of course, their own unique experiences.

Speaking with participants about hiring practices brought out nuances between decisions people make based on official ideologies about corruption, on personal security, and on social pressures from one's family or social networks. Three people described the process of hiring home improvement contractors through known contacts. Such contractors are usually paid under the table in order to avoid government taxes of up to 30% and to avoid obtaining permits from government offices (which usually involve bribery or a long waiting period). One of these was Margareta. Because she works at an NGO that promotes anti-corruption activities, she was aware of the criticism that could arise if she hired someone only through a contact, so she hired a painter she found through Chisinau's then-new telephone directory. However, according to Margareta, the contractor did a poor job, did not reliably show up to work, and in the end, did not even finish the job. She stated that she had no recourse to sue him ("there were no guarantees") because they had not signed a contract in order to avoid taxes.[94] She ended up contacting someone to finish the job through a friend, someone she "could rely on." For her, hiring people through contacts or without paying taxes to the government *borders on* corruption (though she did not name her behavior as corruption), since she considered the special repercussions she might experience as a result of her position as an anti-corruption NGO employee. The fact that she first chose to avoid taxes rather than hire someone through a known contact indicates that public charges of nepotism would be more dangerous to her position as an anti-corruption campaigner than tax evasion. For the other participants who hired contractors through their social networks, security, reliability, and helping one's family and friends were the most important aspects of their decision, not the influence of anti-corruption official ideologies.

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[94] (this was not framed as corruption, only as trying to save money and avoid bureaucracy)

Additional examples show how aspects of social connections can affect decisions about the distribution of scarce resources in Moldova. Ileana, who works for a U.S.-funded NGO that helps entrepreneurs gain start-up loans for small businesses, is careful to ensure transparency in approving people for entry into the program. However, she talked about helping certain people fill out their paperwork correctly during the course of the application process, and then in a somewhat cynical tone asked me, "Is that corruption?" She qualified her behavior by saying that she had come to know the people she helped over the many months it takes to become approved, and considered them "good people" (one might interpret this as 'good fellow citizens,' 'morally upstanding Moldovans,' or otherwise). She claimed never to have impeded someone's application, only to have helped some more than others. In one case, she supported the application of a woman with whom she had been dealing for several months, although her superiors were unlikely to approve the woman's application because she had never run a business before.[95] For Ileana, her knowledge of the woman's business sense, dedication to the project, and moral character ("a good person") allowed her to put her own reputation on the line for the other person. She was not willing to support every person's application in the same manner, especially if they had shown any indication of corrupt business practices. Ileana made her own judgments about a person's character and then showed some favoritism based on her Western-influenced ideals of what constitutes corrupt behavior. Nevertheless, this participant, who works alongside foreigners at the NGO, *still* wanted to know my Western, American opinion about her actions ("Is that corruption?"). Perhaps she wondered if I would condemn her for her actions, but I refused to make a judgment. In hindsight, now I interpret her comment as demonstrating

[95] Decisions for awarding funds are made by a committee, of which she was not the chair.

ambivalence in the application of the term "corruption" to practices based on personal relationships that support moral standing, or cultural propriety, or people she sees as most like herself, in the face of others who may be corrupt or less moral or less like herself.

Another participant, Tatiana, who was born in the Ukraine, but lives in Moldova, claims to have only a small social support network in Moldova. When looking to hire new employees for the firm where she works, Tatiana noted that she puts public advertisements in local newspapers in both Romanian and Russian languages. However, she also asks former colleagues and friends for their recommendations for likely candidates, and is more likely to interview candidates based on those recommendations. It is necessary to find good workers, with adequate experience and qualifications, she added. Since there is no commonly used system of recommendations or references for job interviews, people who are known to the employer or to a trusted acquaintance or family member of the employer are more likely to be trustworthy and good workers, in her opinion. However, they must also have the right qualifications to be hired, and be good workers to maintain their jobs. Tatiana's behavior is very similar to that of many businesspeople and companies in the U.S. Most openly advertise, but also consider candidates recommended by a trusted party. Trusting relationships indicate a degree of sameness that one can identify with as similar to oneself. In this way, people tend to hire those who can be identified as morally "good", as upstanding citizens, as "developed" people who can be trusted to perform according to accepted practices of the workplace.

Given the lack of regulation of hiring practices to protect either workers or employers, and the unpleasant thought of dealing with government bureaucracy, the practices of Margareta, Ileana, and Tatiana reflect their ideas of security, protection, and

morality. They are interested in protecting their assets, their jobs, and their reputations as trustworthy workers, friends, and family members. They see the use of social connections as a social insurance policy to enforce payment, good work habits, or even fair treatment on the part of the employer. Others, those whom these three women would consider corrupt, would see the use of social connections as a way of hiring and promoting one's family members, or to prevent a poor worker from being fired. The women's interpretation of corruption is mediated not only by their need for social security in an environment laden with uncertainty, but also by the ideals of proper behavior that their positions in NGOs and the business community have reinforced.

Kin and "Corruption"

Although the Transparency International study and many other references talk about social connections, none mentions who is likely to make up a person's social network. Certainly, the response is varied, and personal connections are generated through one's family, workplace, neighborhood, village, and ethnic group. Hiring those who are known, or hiring employees through a trusted third party intersect more with cultural propriety in Moldova than with the discursive formations of development and citizenship.

The institution of godparenthood[96] in Moldova is one important way that ethnolinguistic connections and divisions are built. Most Moldovans (98%) are Orthodox Christians. Religiously practicing people of Moldovan and Russian ethnic origins both

[96] Known as *cumatria* in Romanian, with крестная мать and крестный отец, meaning godmother and godfather in Russian, respectively. There are many kinship terms in Romanian to describe the relationships created by godparenthood, including *nanii* (godparents at one's birth), *cumatrii* (the godparents of one's children, but a term that can also apply to members of one's age set), and *nanasi* (godparents at one's wedding). Each has a masculine and feminine singular variant.

name a set of godparents for the baptism of a baby.[97] The godparents must also be Orthodox, though their ethnicity does not matter, according to participants. The role of godparents, people told me, is to serve as an extra set of parents, usually younger than one's own parents; they are also expected to provide financial assistance at least in conjunction with the baptism ceremony, but they often give money and other forms of assistance like advice to their godchildren over their lifetimes.

However, the traditions of godparenthood diverge in weddings of people of Moldovan ethnicity, when the bride and groom ask a slightly older married couple to be *their* godparents, and this couple most often serves as the godparents to the couple's first child. Furthermore, in the ethnic Moldovan tradition, babies can have more than one set of godparents. To illustrate this in practice, one ethnic Moldovan participant has two children; the older has eight sets of godparents and the younger has thirteen. Only one set of these godparents is not ethnically Moldovan. These traditions can greatly extend people's social and family networks, but such relationships come with responsibilities. How is one to say no to helping a godchild when you have sworn in church to do all you can to guide the person through life? Naming people as godparents to one's children also cements social relationships into something beyond friendship, into named family members, but also include expectations of assistance between the parties (which one would expect from a family member). At times, people have been known to assist their godchildren and *cumatrii* into work positions or to use their influence to open doors in a variety of ways. Because of such activities, when family relationships intersect with the public sphere, ethnic Moldovans have been the target of more accusations of nepotism

[97] I do not have data on Orthodox Christians of other ethnic origins in Moldova, such as Ukrainians and Gagauz.

and corruption than people of other ethnic groups (Carasciuc, 2000)(cf. Johannsen, 2004).

Furthermore, I found it common that families where the adults of Moldovan ethnicity had migrated to the capital city after reaching adulthood had social networks and kinship ties that were almost exclusively made up of others of Moldovan ethnicity. The families I know whose adults grew up in the capital were more likely to have heterogeneous social networks and kin ties (urban areas are more ethnically diverse). These social networks built on family and honorary family ties have tangible consequences on how unfair or corrupt behavior is perceived to fall along ethnic and linguistic lines (or along people more like oneself and less like oneself).

To illustrate the last point, several participants related perceptions about acts of nepotism or preferential treatment that impacted them personally. Three told me that they did not have the right "connections" to get the kind of job they wanted. When I asked for more information about "connections," the participants invariably reframed their statements in terms of familial, ethnic, and professional ties. More than one person of Russian ethnicity claimed that jobs at NGOs were difficult to find, because they are not advertised publicly, but open only to those who "know the right people." Two NGO workers assured me that job openings in their organizations were publicly announced, yet I noticed that many NGOs are staffed almost exclusively by people of ethnic Moldovan background. This could be because more workers of Moldovan ethnicity are trilingual in Romanian, Russian, and English, while many Russian speakers do not speak the national language. On the other hand, it could be perceived as evidence of nepotism or at least favoritism.

It should be noted that the notion of connections and their use should not be strictly associated with those of Romanian or Moldovan ethnicity and their kin groups, as the historical exposition of networks of *blat* in Soviet Russia shows (Ledeneva, 1998). Nevertheless, the *perception* of unfairness in relation to one's social circles is significant here, regardless of the truth of hiring practices or the structure of networks of influence, or the benignity of one's godparent relations. People's perceptions of and talk about connections as related to ethnicity or language group help to perpetuate the circulation of ideas that divide the population of Moldova. Nearly everyone can tell a story about being personally affected by this type of cronyism or nepotism.[98] Therefore, the very *existence* of extensive social ties are likely to be suspected as sources of corrupt behavior, since social relations are at the heart of power and stratification in any society, and especially in the charged atmosphere of ethnolinguistic division of Moldova (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991; King, 2000).

A final example shows that other Moldovans argue that ethnicity and political views are not always a factor in acts of corruption or preferential treatment. Sometimes, as was shown in the TI study, corruption is just about money and getting things done. Yevgenii, a man of Jewish ethnicity and a native speaker of Russian, experienced discrimination of various types in his life in Moldova, including what he perceived as religious and ethnic discrimination, acts of violence against him as a Russian speaker, *and* difficulties finding a job because he had not learned the Romanian language very well: "without Romanian [language] and without connections, you can't find jobs," he stated flatly. However, in his job with a private firm that imported goods from Russia

[98] In 1994-96, connections based on party affiliation and old-boy networks kept inactive or low-quality workers on the payroll at the academy where I worked.

and Turkey, Yevgenii was responsible for getting shipments of goods passed through customs in Chisinau. In his words, "which language is spoken" in this work environment "is not a problem"; "only money" solves problems. He recounted how he regularly offered bribes to customs officers, and explained the ways in which he decided how much money to give to which officers and why. He felt he had the power in the relationship with the officers, since their salaries are notoriously low. As he put it, "more money means more respect." Moreover, his boss at the firm expected the imported goods to arrive quickly, and gave Yevgenii the money for the bribes himself.

Yevgenii's wife, Vera, is of Moldovan ethnicity and was raised with Orthodox Christian traditions, but they are raising their son in the Jewish faith. When I asked if their son has any godparents (probing for other social relationships from which they might draw support), they replied that babies with Jewish fathers cannot be baptised; both parents must be Christian. Nevertheless, Yevgenii said it is always possible to "talk to a priest," and he made the gesture of handing over money as he said this. Unlike some participants of non-Moldovan ethnicity, Yevgenii did not feel envious of Moldovans who can draw upon extended social relations based on godparenthood or ethnicity. His understanding of corrupt acts was that people like the customs agents are "poor," yet "envious" and "greedy," so they are likely to accept bribes. Yevgenii and his boss, who have offered bribes, see no guarantees that laws will be respected on either side of an economic exchange, and no regular enforcement of laws against corruption, so they "do things to benefit themselves." Their interpretation of "proper" behavior as related to family does not enter into business dealings, at least it did not in our conversations, though family connections are likely very important in other parts of their lives.

Yevgenii's telling of his experiences in the workplace show how he used monetary power to act corruptly, but in doing so, he overcame the ethnic and linguistic discrimination that had plagued him throughout the 1990s and found a way to identify with his co-workers through monetary exchange, with people who acted as he did. His use of the topic of corruption ranges from repeating the common theme that poverty causes corruption; to relating experiences of corrupt acts against him as experiences that must be true for the general population ("without connections, you can't find jobs"); to seeing money as a solution to most problems, albeit a corrupt solution. Yevgenii felt little reason to identify with most Moldovans; he had been beaten up for being a native speaker of Russian in the early 1990s, and his Jewish heritage meant his ancestors had likely been the object of pogroms, Nazi killings, and Stalin's deportations throughout the twentieth century. He found a sense of belonging through activities even he identified as illegal, but because he was among of group of peers and under the wing of a powerful boss, he did not profess a sense of shame in performing them.

Conclusions

The examples given in this chapter show that, in daily life, Moldovans talk about corruption in ways that sometimes resemble and sometimes challenge international and national official statements about corruption. That is, their references to corruption reflect the ideal patterns in the discursive formations concerning development and citizenship, and *also* those in the formation of cultural propriety. The tensions lie in people's competing allegiances: to the state, to the community, and/or to the family,

especially when family obligations created by traditional and religious ties interfere with the practice of equal opportunity in the public sphere.

Although only a few individual cases have been explained here, the experiences, words, and actions of participants followed two principal patterns over the entire period of my fieldwork. First, most people could reiterate common official definitions of corruption as an abstract term, but found it difficult to navigate the responsibilities and economic difficulties of Moldovan life in ways that completely eschewed corruption in its narrow definition. Second, all participants, at one time or another, used talk about corruption (related to cronyism, bribery, illegal activity, and/or nepotism) to index other aspects of Moldovan life. Talk of corruption overlapped with talk of social connections and obligations, which intersected with discussions of equitable hiring =practices, which was usually interwoven with the themes of language and history in Moldova. All of the participants mentioned here discussed corrupt and illegal practices in concert with the desire for security and protection for their livelihoods and their reputations, and along with issues of trust and morality. Even President Voronin and Margareta shared the use of corruption to index their political and ideological differences. NGO workers, on the other hand, walked a fine line between maintaining ideal behavior in both their public and private lives.

In a society still in the midst of defining itself and still trying to manage grand transitions of power from imperialism and Communist socialism to democracy and a neo-liberal market economy, talk about corruption bridges the past with the present. Most people in the Soviet era knew how to obtain shoes when the stores were empty, one participant told me, and those same types of social connections *and* economic

relationships are being enacted when trying to obtain a permit for apartment renovation today. Behaviors and beliefs about the use of social connections and the protection of one's family or kin group have now been mapped onto common ideologies about ethics and morals in civil society and people's roles as citizens in the new state. As one Moldovan woman said to me about corruption, "We all do it and we all think it's bad!"

Chapter Five:

The World Bank and MSIF

Introduction

In this chapter, I introduce the work of SIF and the role of the World Bank (SIF's primary funder) in Moldova. The discussion is guided by the final thematic group presented in this dissertation, democracy and capitalism, which includes the three themes *participation in the market economy, Europe as a model of political and civic life,* and *democratic values and participation in civil society.* Through examples of texts and talk, I relate these themes to the discursive formations of cultural propriety, development, and citizenship. After introducing the themes, I present information about SIF and the type of development project it represents, the social fund. I also focus more specifically on the concept of development as put forth by the World Bank in Moldova. As introduced in Chapters 1 and 2, development as a discursive formation centers on ideas of modernization and participation. Here, I add the idea that it naturalizes Western models as the most appropriate for Moldovans. I then turn to data from participant observation of SIF's work in Moldova, and describe the interactions between World Bank representatives and Moldovan SIF staff during an evaluation visit conducted by the former. Along the way, I highlight the connection that SIF's work has to concepts of citizenship in Moldova. One result is a better understanding of how SIF's work contributes to the dominance of the discursive formation of development in Moldova. Another result is the data that illustrates how the discursive formations of cultural

propriety and citizenship intersect with that of development. All three together are used to index Moldovanness.

Thematic Group 4: democracy and capitalism

The tables below list three themes that arise frequently in association with development: *participation in the market economy*, *Europe as a model of political and civic life,* and *democratic values and participation in civil society*. Following the format introduced in Chapter 3, the title of the table is the theme. The first row of each table lists the discursive formation, and the second row shows people's and institutions' ideal attitudes toward the theme, as they relate to the discursive formation. The third row presents information about the nexus of the theme and discursive formations in the Soviet period. The intersections and tensions between the themes and the formations are described in the text that follows each table.

Theme 10: Participation in market economy

Cultural Propriety	Development	Citizenship
People should be suspicious of those who rapidly change their social positions, since they may be engaged in immoral behavior.	People should participate in the capitalist market economy for personal and community benefit; community should avoid stagnation;	People should follow the national laws on legal economic exchange and market participation.

	development means change in accordance with market principles.	
Soviet era: similar; people were not encouraged to change their social standing; everyone was supposed to be equal, in ideal form; there was no individual participation in market economy, in ideal form.	Soviet era: community should avoid stagnation, but not through market principles; development means change in accordance with state and community leaders' plan.	Soviet era: citizens should not participate individually in the market economy; to do so was to challenge the ideals of the socialist state.

Discussion:

There is a tension between the discursive formations of cultural propriety and development, but some similarity between cultural propriety and citizenship. Development invokes participation in the market as positive, as a move toward economic improvement, while cultural propriety eschews and suspects change, looking for more social stability. In the mid-1990s, people who were engaged in what Westerners would consider lawful business and trade activities were suspected by many Moldovans of conducting illegal activities. The laws were very lax at that time, so businesspeople could have been following the law, but may have still been behaving immorally, in

Moldovans' eyes, i.e. taking advantage of others and putting their own profit before the good of the group. For example, Moldovans took overnight bus trips to Turkey with large, empty suitcases and returned in a few days with the suitcases full of goods. These were sold on street corners or in the open-air markets around the country. The traders most likely had to bribe customs officials in each country of transit, but they made money on these ventures. If one asked what a particular person did for a living, another would whisper "business," and then describe different forms of import and export that were taking place, and what so-and-so was buying or building with his/her new income. Most Moldovans still held closely to Soviet ideals of social equality. In the mid-2000s, this had changed; people suspected others of immoral behavior regarding market economy participation *only* when they quickly gained large sums of money and flaunted their wealth. Honest businesspeople were admired. Finally, within the discursive formation of citizenship, market-driven behavior is seen as appropriate when it is guided by the rule of law.

Theme 11: Europe as a model of political, community, and domestic life

Cultural Propriety	Development	Citizenship
No dominant discourse on the political matter of EU accession. People should look at Europe as an example of "civilized" society and	Moldova should look to the EU as an economic and political model of democratic, capitalist society and civic participation. People	Moldova should look to the EU as an economic and political model of democratic society and civic participation; mixed discourse about

“correct” behavior.	should also look to the EU as a model of “civilized” living conditions and community cohesion.	capitalism in the 2000s with Communist government in power. People should also look to the EU as a model of “civilized” living conditions.
Soviet era: similar to ‘out of backwardness’; not ‘life is better’ but ‘life will be better’ (if we do this).	Soviet era: similar to ‘out of backwardness’; not ‘life is better’ but ‘life will be better’ (if we do this).	Soviet era: similar to ‘out of backwardness’; not ‘life is better’ but ‘life will be better’ (if we do this).

Discussion:

When Moldovans talk about Europe as a model for different aspects of their lives, they usually relate it to the discursive formations of citizenship and development through the themes of civic participation and democracy. In talk about cultural propriety, Europe is nearly always a model, though *civic* aspects of citizenship and *democratic* aspects of development do not usually play a role in those examples (although standard of living and city life does). For example, cultural propriety dictates that Europeans are more “civilized” (in general, in behavior and living conditions) than Moldovans. Development institutions and their employees support the idea that European community development is an ideal, and that European living conditions are possible for all Moldovans. Citizenship as a discursive formation indicates that European models of democratic

participation and civil society should be aspired to, but perhaps not European-style protectionist capitalism nor American-style neo-liberal capitalism. Tension exists in what is *not* stated above: Russia has also been a model of political, civic, and cultural life for the last two hundred years of the region's history. However, Russia has been receding as a model of political and civic life, especially with President Putin's concentration of power in recent years, with the several high-profile cases of Russians suspected of murder and intimidation of journalists and former intelligence agents, with the Russian embargo of Moldovan wines, and with many Moldovans experiencing discrimination while working in Russia or trying to obtain work there. Russia still maintains heavy *cultural* influence in Moldova, primarily enacted through media and movement of people.

Theme 12: Democratic values and participation in civil society

Cultural Propriety	Development	Citizenship
People should obey the laws of the state, support the community, and treat others relatively equally, as noted above; democracy as a concept is not often discussed.	People should espouse democratic values of equality, personal freedoms, rule of law, and citizen participation in government; and they should participate in activities that strengthen community and civil	People should espouse democratic values of equality, personal freedoms, rule of law, and citizen participation in government; and they should participate in state political processes and in civil society activities that

	society.	strengthen the state.
Soviet era: similar to values of participation in society for benefit of all.	Soviet era: similar to values of participation in society for benefit of all.	Soviet era: similar to values of participation in society for benefit of all.

Discussion:

Democratic values are explicitly part of the discursive formations of development and citizenship, but not that of cultural propriety. Tensions come in small degrees between the discursive formations in this case. Within cultural propriety, democratic values and participation in civil society are not usually an explicit part of any discussion, but many democratic and community values are nevertheless important to speakers in other contexts. Rather, democracy as a concept is often confused with participation in the market economy. Within talk about development, democracy and civic participation are discussed as concepts and held up as ideal values for strengthening communities. Citizenship goes the furthest, incorporating the idea that democratic values should be focused on strengthening the state, not only communities. MSIF moves between the latter two formations: its employees see civic participation as strengthening communities, which also strengthens the state and society. Taken on its own, this theme has the most potential for unifying the society as a common topic of identification for Moldovans. Other ideologies often interfere, however, as we have previously seen, and as further exposition of the data will show.

SIF's Beginnings

The Moldova Social Investment Fund is a multi-faceted project funded by the World Bank and other Western donor nations in this former Soviet republic. Between October 2005 and December 2006, I observed SIF's many activities, which ranged from different types of community visits, to instructional sessions on choosing and hiring contractors, to Executive Committee meetings where community members had their subprojects approved or returned for revisions. This was the second five-year MSIF project, meaning it was funded by a separate set of grants and loans than the first, and that the first had been deemed successful enough to continue the project. MSIF 1 began 1999, and MSIF 2 in 2004. As noted earlier in the dissertation, SIF is primarily funded through a loan awarded to the Moldovan government by the World Bank. The goals of SIF are to reduce poverty by "empowering communities and their institutions to administer to their most important needs" and to "contribute to the implementation of Moldova's Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy by empowering poor communities and vulnerable population groups to manage their priority development needs" (M. S. I. Fund, 2008d, 2008e). Namely, SIF subprojects[99] improve social services by renovating or building items of infrastructure, such as schools, kindergartens, roads, roofs for public buildings, sewage or garbage management systems, and water and natural gas systems. Eighty percent of the funding for subprojects comes from external sources: the World Bank loans to the Moldovan government noted above, plus other loans and grants from several donor countries. The Moldovan government provides 5% of the local financing, while 15% of the cost of each subproject comes directly from the

[99] Subprojects are the works that SIF finances. They are so named because SIF is a "project"; hence, projects under its auspices are "subprojects".

local public administration and citizens of the community that implements it (M. S. I. Fund, 2008b).

A brief introduction to MSIF's beginnings in Moldova will illustrate the conditions that structure examples of official SIF communication about development as I came to know it. In 1992, when Moldova joined the World Bank group, the country was seen as an early model for the transition to a market economy (Bank, 1999). However, the country experienced steady declines in agricultural and industrial output over the course of the 1990s, which were worsened by the unresolved conflict over the separatist region of Transnistria,[100] where most of Moldova's industrial firms and factories are located. Moldova still has not reached the levels of agricultural and industrial output that it enjoyed prior to independence. In addition, during the years of instability and uncertainty after independence, community- and state-owned property, such as schools, roads, collective farms, etc., were subject to neglect, vandalism, and theft. People seemed to think, one man related to me, that it was "the state's responsibility to take care of these things," but the new state had neither the funds, nor the institutional ability to oversee many parts of the country's crumbling infrastructure. The mid- and late-1990s saw little progress in terms of privatization in Moldova, and the country was hit hard by the Russian ruble crisis, resulting in dire economic circumstances. These deteriorating conditions at home led to extensive out-migration; by 2005, conservative estimates suggested that one-third of the population of Moldova was working abroad (Fund, 2006).

[100] The Transnistrian conflict began after independence over cultural and economic differences between the people on the left and right banks of the Nistru (Dniester) River. When politicians and news media on the right bank talked of reuniting with Romania, an armed conflict broke out, backed by the Russian army on the Transnistrian side, and approximately 1000 people were killed in the fighting. No peace agreement was ever arrived at; the United Nations, Russia, and Moldova maintain peacekeeping troops at the border. However, local people are able to move across the border checkpoints with proper documents and invitations. The Transnistrian Moldavian Republic has not been recognized by the U.N., but prints its own money and postage stamps. See King (2000) for a detailed account of the conflict, its causes and effects.

By 1999, the World Bank Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) named Moldova "the poorest country in Europe," a label that has been repeated in nearly every foreign press article and foreign aid report concerning Moldova since then (Bank, 1999). (The reader should note the comparison to European standards, not Eurasia, of which Moldova could arguably be a part.) Therefore, Moldovans and the Moldovan government were in desperate need of assistance from outside institutions like the IMF and World Bank.

This set of circumstances, combined with the Bank's focus on poverty alleviation, led the Moldovan government and the World Bank to initiate the Moldova Social Investment Fund in 1998.[101] The Moldova SIF began in 1999 with its first five-year project (MSIF 1, US$15 million loan). A second five-year project (MSIF 2, US$20 million loan) began in 2004 and will finish in 2009. The SIF projects are two of the fifty-four World Bank projects and loans (which became known as "credits" by the late 1990s) that have been awarded to Moldova since 1992.

The staff members of SIF's Executive Office, who were the primary participants in the research presented here, are officially employed by the Moldovan government. The SIF Executive Office is not a World Bank agency, but a multilaterally-monitored project implementation agency. There is a:

> National Board that is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of social sectors with ten voting members representing government (including representatives from MOF [Ministry of Finance], MOE [Ministry of Education], Parliament, State Chancellery etc.), academia, and nongovernment organizations (including representatives from the Soros

[101] A survey of conditions in poor localities was begun in 1997, in advance of beginning the SIF project. The project was actually in place in 1998, but did not start offering grants to communities until 1999.

Foundation, UNICEF, national and international NGOs, and civil society), and bilateral donors (USAID) (M. S. I. Fund, 2004b, p. 3).

All of these members of the Board have a say in the operations of the Social Investment Fund, making it a multilateral project instead of solely a World Bank project. Thus, SIF is a hybrid type of organization between a DONGO (Donor Organized Non-Governmental Organization) and a GONGO (Government Operated NGO).[102] In spite of this, SIF employees consistently say in site visits that the Fund is a Moldovan government project with funds coming primarily from the World Bank. The Executive Office, responsible for the day-to-day activities of SIF administration, is staffed exclusively by Moldovan citizens, who are chosen as the result of nation-wide hiring competitions. The Executive Director is a man with a considerable amount of previous experience implementing social assistance programs. There are four departments under the Director, each with its own Department Director. These are: the Department of Finance and Administration; the Department of Information Systems, Monitoring, and Management; the Department of Assistance in Technical Issues; and the Department of Social and Community Development (M. S. I. Fund, 2008c). I spent the bulk of my time with the Executive Director and people from the latter two departments, who are primarily engineers and sociologists, respectively. Each person I met at SIF seemed dedicated, in thought and action, to improving the people's lives and communities in their country. Furthermore, they were very clear that their allegiances lie with *Moldova*, despite any political or ethnic connections they personally may have felt toward other states, such as Romania, Russia, or Ukraine. Therefore, SIF can be considered as an in-

[102] No one uses these terms in Moldova, in my experience. I introduce them here to help the reader classify the organization in terms of conventional NGO terms, and to illustrate the site as one ripe for intersection between local and international discourses on development and citizenship.

between entity that fits neither state nor civil society, though it operates with the power and prestige of the World Bank behind it. SIF uses its power to insert itself into local decision-making processes by providing the organizational framework, support, training, and external evaluation that people may draw upon to change their communities.

Social Funds

MSIF falls into a group of projects more commonly known as social funds, which the World Bank supports in poorer countries. Social funds began in the late 1980s in Latin America, and have since spread to 58 countries across Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Eastern Europe (Bank, 2008). In Eurasia, social funds operate or have operated in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Moldova (M. S. I. Fund, 2004b, p. 2). According to World Bank sources, social funds have grown in popularity "because they use a grassroots approach to fund local improvements and because they're proven to be relatively quick and agile at getting development seed money to poor and vulnerable groups", an approach otherwise known as "community-driven development" (Bank, 2008).

A 2004 World Bank-commissioned comparative evaluation of six social funds found that, as development tools, social funds are effective in delivering improved social services to poor people, improving living standards of the poor, are as sustainable as other investment projects, and are cost-efficient (Rawlings, Sherburne-Benz, & Van Domelen, 2004). However, the authors noted that social funds have the reputation of undermining or weakening *national* governments' efforts to alleviate poverty, while they were achieving the goals of strengthening *local* governments and increasing community

participation. Their study found that social funds and community efforts were most effective when paired with complementary government policies and programs that support hiring the required personnel and continuing funding to local infrastructure.

Other evaluations of the efficacy of social funds have been conducted under the direction of the World Bank, and changes to the Bank-determined operational procedures of social funds have been added over time (Babajanian, 2005; Fumo, Hann, Holland, & Kanji, 2000; Narayan & Ebbe, 1997; Owen & Domelen, 1998; Rawlings et al., 2004).[103] Nevertheless, most evaluations still show mixed results in social funds' abilities to empower poor communities and reduce poverty. One reason postulated for the varied "success"[104] rates of social funds is the differing institutional frameworks present in social fund countries, which condition the amount of civic participation and state-society collaboration possible for citizens, as noted by Rawlings et al. (2004).

From these studies, one can conclude that social funds seem to focus on democratizing community practices from the bottom-up, but in fact, cannot operate successfully without corresponding support from the top-down. This assertion is supported by the case of the Moldova SIF, which as noted, is officially part of the Moldovan government. By the late 1990s, when the Moldova SIF began, the methods employed in implementing social funds and development projects in general had begun to shift. Social funds implemented earlier had focused on empowering poor and/or rural citizens by organizing opportunities for their civic participation in demand-driven (community-driven, or "bottom-up") subprojects.

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[103] See Babajanian (2005) for a more extensive review of social funds.

[104] I have placed the word "success" in quotes to remind readers that the idea of success varies by institution and the goals set for the projects. Some projects aim at one outcome, but may actually produce another, as shown by Ferguson (1990).

The World Bank

The World Bank is a powerful institution that evolved from its beginnings as a post-World War II reconstruction fund into its present form as a "source of financial and technical assistance to developing countries" (Bank, 2008a). The Bank's overarching mission is "global poverty reduction and the improvement of living standards;" to that end, it provides "low-interest loans, interest-free credit and grants to developing countries for education, health, infrastructure, communications and many other purposes" (Bank, 2008a). The Bank is made up of two institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). The IBRD was created along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944. It was the first of five institutions that now make up the World Bank group. Founded in 1960, the IDA works solely with the world's poorest countries, aiming "to reduce poverty by providing interest-free credits and grants for programs that boost economic growth, reduce inequalities and improve people's living conditions" (World Bank, IDA 2007). Moldova is a member of the IBRD and receives aid through the IDA.[105]

While much could be said about the World Bank, I focus here on its most basic goals and subsequent programs. As the founding institution and the basis for all the others, the IBRD drew up a set of Articles of Agreement in 1944. An amended (1989) version of Article I states,

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[105] Three other institutions are associated with the World Bank in the World Bank Group: the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). In this dissertation, I refer to the World Bank as one entity, much as the Bank describes itself (Bank, 2008).

> The purposes of the Bank are:
>
> (i) To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries (World Bank, Articles of Agreement, Article I 2007)

The other four points refer more specifically to financial purposes of the IBRD, such as promoting foreign investment and long-term growth. These actions are meant to raise productivity, standards of living, and labor conditions in member countries. A full text of the five points in Article I is included in Appendix D.

It is interesting that Article I does not mention poverty directly, yet all the other literature and web resources from the World Bank forefront the alleviation, even eradication, of poverty as its primary mission. For example, a colorful brochure giving introductory information about the Bank states on its title page that the World Bank Group is "working for a world free of poverty". This is ostensibly for an audience who knows little about the World Bank and what it does. It goes on to say:

> The World Bank is one of the world's largest sources of funding for the developing world. Its primary focus is on helping the poorest people and the poorest countries. It uses its financial resources, its staff, and extensive experience to help developing countries reduce poverty, increase economic growth, and improve their quality of life (Bank, 2012).

From these texts, one can see that the Bank's current approach to its goals of encouraging and assisting countries to be productive members of the world economic community is articulated to its donors and beneficiaries primarily through the ideology of poverty alleviation, which takes the forms of providing aid and collaborating with poorer countries toward development. If poverty can be eliminated, the argument indicates, then other economic and social problems will be easier to address. The key terms that the Bank uses, such as *poverty*, *growth*, *assistance*, and *improve*, are part of a larger set of relations that make up the discursive formation of development (Escobar, 1995; Fairclough, 2001). As described in Chapter 2, development as a discursive formation has been constructed over time from the colonial period of Europe, to the post-World War II period and the Bretton Woods system, to the present day (Birdsall & de la Torre, 2001; Edelman & Haugerud, 2005; Escobar, 1995; Evans, 2005; Leys, 2005; Preston, 1996)(cf. Bank, 2008b). The history of the World Bank and development theory are part of the social conditions of production of this formation, but the formation is also produced in the context of Moldova. The next section focuses on three texts generated by the World Bank staff about its role in Moldova and its vision for Moldova.

World Bank documents: What do they tell us about the role of the Bank in Moldova?

A closer look at World Bank documents specifically concerning its funded programs in Moldova will illustrate development in practice and will begin to demonstrate how the World Bank programs relate to citizenship. It will also show the relations of power between the Bank and Moldova, at least at the level of text. The total

effect of the texts is to reinforce the Bank's power over Moldova, and to model proper development discourse and activities. The three texts analyzed here and included are: "Bank Mission in Moldova" from the World Bank's Moldova country information page (dated 2004, since updated); "Moldova: World Bank Continues Its Support To Poor And Vulnerable Communities," a news release concerning the launching of the MSIF 2 project, from 2004; and a portion of the IDA Country Assistance Evaluation, Executive Summary, from 2004. I will examine the following aspects of the texts: speakers and addressees, verb forms and agency, key vocabulary terms, and the figure-ground relationship between what is said and what is left unsaid (Fairclough, 2001, 2003; Foucault, 1972, 1995). For each area, I will note how the writers' choices of using certain grammatical forms and vocabulary may affect readers' conclusions and assumptions when reading the texts.

Bank Mission in Moldova (2004)

An in-depth look at the first text will serve as an example. "Bank Mission in Moldova" written in 2004 and appearing on the World Bank's country web page for Moldova until sometime in 2007, begins with the statement: "Our Dream is Moldova Free of Poverty: The central objective of the World Bank in Moldova is to contribute to poverty alleviation and sustainable economic growth" (Bank, 2004). A three-pronged approach is suggested: 1) to "maintain macroeconomic stability and generate sustainable economic growth that generates productive employment and higher incomes;" 2) "an

affordable social protection system targeted to the really needed [sic];"[106] and 3) to "improve access to social services by the poor."

1-"Bank Mission in Moldova

2-Our Dream is Moldova Free of Poverty

3-The central objective of the World Bank in Moldova is to contribute to poverty

4-alleviation and sustainable economic growth. With this objective in mind, we

5-are very please to be associated with the authorities in the design and

6-production of the Interim- Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP). The

7-Interim PRSP will lead to the production of a "final" PRSP in conjunction with

8-civil society, NGOs, donors, the Moldovan society at large.

9- We believe that poverty is a multi-dimensional phenomenon and, as such, requires a multi-

10-pillar strategy to fight against it. The international experience and the

11-prevailing situation in Moldova both suggest that poverty reduction in the

12-country could be based on three basic pillars:

13-Maintain macroeconomic stability and generate sustainable economic

14-growth that generates productive employment and higher incomes. A

15-prudent macroeconomic and fiscal program must be followed to avoid

16-macroeconomic imbalances that lead to instability. The business

17-environment needs to be improved, legal and judicial infrastructure

18-modernized, and corruption minimized. Public services should be efficiently

[106] This type of error suggests that the writer is a non-native speaker of English.

19-provided through proven commercial entities. An efficient, client-oriented
20-public administration must be attained to facilitate development of the
21-private sector. Potential sources of growth are: agro-industry, information
22-technology, services, small and medium size business in all areas.
23-Attracting of foreign direct investment is a key to success.

24-An affordable social protection system targeted to the really needed.
25-Present systems to protect the most vulnerable, particularly parts of the
26-older population and the children, need to be reviewed. In order to channel
27-limited resources to the really needy, remaining untargeted or unfunded
28-benefits need to be eliminated. Targeting will require comprehensive and
29-reliable information as well as proper administration mechanisms. A
30-gradual approach may be required in many cases. Self-targeted assistance
31-programs may need to be created to assist the very poor. Over the medium
32-to longer term, sustainable and comprehensive targeting mechanisms
33-would allow the expansion of a safety net to cover more eligible people.

34-Improve access to social services by the poor. Reforms in the social
35-sectors are needed urgently, particularly in the health and education
36-sectors. The focus of the health sector reform should be on improving
37-primary health care and providing access to basic health packages by the
38-poor, especially in rural areas. Reform measures may include: restructuring
39-of the over-sized infrastructure to release resources from tertiary level health

40-care to primary level, redefining the basic health care package in line with

41-available resources and focusing on primary care; and formalizing the

42-existing informal payments to avoid abuses which are specially

43-burdensome for the poor. Public spending on education should concentrate

44-on primary education. Reallocation of expenditures from tertiary to primary

45-education will be needed to make this possible, measures to improve

46-efficiency and reduce unit costs should be taken, and formalization of

47-unofficial charges may be also needed. Emphasis should be placed in

48-improving the quality of water, sanitation and heating in schools.

49-The World Bank emphasizes projects and the activities connected with

50-these three pillars to fight poverty in Moldova. This is pursued through

51-support to the budget by policy-based operations (Structural Adjustment

52-Credits), projects in agriculture, energy, education, health, community

53-development, and supporting the private sector in general. We also

54-expect to play a central role in donor coordination and assistance."

55-[World Bank webpage: Bank Mission in Moldova]

The voice of the speaker is clearly denoted only four times in the 560-word text. A mixture of first person plural subject and adjectival forms, "we" and "our," occurs to mark the World Bank as the subject or possessor of thoughts and policies. However, since the World Bank has an office in Moldova, staffed by many Moldovan citizens who may have written this text, the use of these first person plural forms could possibly

include Moldovan citizens. The use of plural subject and adjectival forms to refer to the Bank, which is a singular noun, serves two possible purposes: to denote the many people and governments who work with and make up the World Bank; and to imply that the Bank is not an impersonal, a-human institution, but an organization constituted of people. This implication also fits with the World Bank's ideal of being a partner with the countries where it offers development assistance (Bank, 2012). The idea of collaboration is further emphasized at the beginning and end of this text with the use of phrases such as "contribute to," "be associated with," "support," "coordination," and "assistance."

By contrast, imperative verb forms are used in two of the three boldfaced section headlines that outline the three pillars of the Bank's poverty reduction strategy for Moldova. These imperative forms have the effect of the Bank telling Moldovan citizens what to do, since the Bank is the named author. One may assume that the recommendations are for Moldovan government offices, civil society organizations, and their workers. However, when the text mentions Moldovans at all, it is in general terms, such as: authorities, Moldovan society, civil society, etc. No group is directly named. The effects of this generality will be examined later in this section.

The bulk of the text uses verbs in the passive voice, or constructs sentences so that they have no human agent. For example, lines 10-12 state, "The international experience and the prevailing situation in Moldova both suggest that poverty reduction in the country could be based on three basic pillars." Here, "international experience" implies that a person or institution has experienced it, but *whose* experience is unknown and can be assumed to be the experience of those (foreign or local Moldovan) people working with the World Bank, since most Moldovan citizens do not have experience in the arena of

international development and economics. "The prevailing situation" is the second subject of the sentence, and has no human agency connected to it; this type of phrasing is repeated in line 16 ("macroeconomic imbalances…lead to instability").

Furthermore, there are many instances where human agents implied, but not directly identified. These examples occur where recommendations or directions are given to the Moldovan government and its civil servants.[107] Only in line 8 is the Moldovan government or civil society mentioned directly, and then the text still leaves the agents vague; they are referred to as "donors," "civil society," "authorities," and "society." The text focuses on the changes recommended. Such phrases are the subject of most sentences, putting them at the beginning of the sentences, while the Moldovan government or civil society organizations (and their workers) are assumed to be the unnamed agents of the changes or reforms. Certain examples are in line 28 ("Targeting will require"), 30 ("a gradual approach will be required"), 32-33 ("comprehensive targeting mechanisms would allow"), 38 ("Reform measures may include"), and 43 ("Public spending on education should concentrate on").

Despite the strong recommendations and imperatives in the verb forms (*should* be, *may* need to be, *may* include, need to be, must be, require) the recommendation modes of the verbs leave parts of the text open to the possibility for interpretation and even error. On the one hand, the Bank strongly recommends or requires that certain actions be taken. On the other hand, leaving room for interpretation gives Moldovan agents the ability to decide for themselves, or perhaps merely gives them the impression of agency. Furthermore, the interplay between recommendations, requirements, and

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[107] Note that I use the passive voice here, too, since I cannot say with certainty who has given the recommendations.

conditionalities may leave the Bank less liable in the case that the actions taken are not successful.

In terms of the vocabulary used in the mission statement, certain terms have militaristic or religious connotations, such as “mission,” “fight,” “eliminated” (which could mean ‘killed’ or ‘destroyed’) and “targeted.” While the goal may be to target or eliminate poverty, these terms connote an active battle, where perhaps the Moldovan actors are the foot soldiers. Next, the bulk of vocabulary items relate to monetary, economic, business and social sectors, much as one would expect from an economic- and development-centered institution such as the World Bank. Some of the items pointing to this association in this text are: growth, reduction, macroeconomic, generate, productive, employment, fiscal, commercial entities, client-oriented, services, enterprises, private sector, investment, affordable, systems, resources, expansion, infrastructure, formalizing, reallocation, expenditures, efficiency, charges, and credits.

Certain vocabulary items used in the text are specific to the development sector [also dominated by neoliberalism?], such as: economic growth, alleviation, sustainable, donors, reforms, access, basic, projects and activities, structural adjustment, policy-based, support, credits, coordination, and assistance. However, many terms used in this text have specific meanings that may not be known to those outside the fields of development and economics, such as: productive employment, macroeconomic, macroeconomic imbalances, direct investment, self-targeted programs, primary level vs. tertiary level, health care package, projects vs. activities, support to the budget, policy-based operations, sustainable/sustainability, structural adjustment, credits, donors, projects, and community development. These constitute “insider information,” and serve to draw a

boundary between those who know and understand the meanings and uses of the terms, and those who do not. In this way, the writers of the text limit their intended addressees to those readers who possess insider knowledge of the development arena or of national social services, or to those who have the means to gain understanding of the terms (such as internet access, or knowledge of how to find definitions and uses of such terms on the internet or in national libraries).

In addition to an imagined dialogue with intended recipients of the text, the text displays dialogicality in other ways. According to Bakhtin, an utterance can be in dialogue with another (imagined) utterance on the part of its intended addressees, and in its relation to any utterances that may have preceded it (Bakhtin & Holquist, 1981). One concrete example in this text is in the references to the phenomenon of corruption. In lines 16-18, corruption is mentioned directly: "The business environment needs to be improved, legal and judicial infrastructure modernized, and corruption minimized." In two other instances, corruption is referenced indirectly: in lines 41-42 and 46-47, the writer speaks of informal payments and unofficial charges. The words "informal" and "unofficial" bring to mind illegality, since their opposites would be "formal" and "official" payments. Furthermore, people with the "international experience" and knowledge of the "prevailing situation" noted above, will know that informal and unofficial payments are used worldwide to subvert legal proceedings, speed up social and economic services, and generally gain access to various benefits over fellow citizens. Those people with knowledge of Moldova will know that Moldova has a strong anti-corruption campaign, led by the World Bank, Transparency International, and many foreign embassies and development agencies. The writer(s) of this text may assume that

readers will have prior knowledge of the Moldovan or international context, and do not need such references explained to them. The text is therefore in dialogue with past texts or utterances concerning Moldova and international development contexts.

The text's dialogicality can be examined more generally by thinking about the writer's choices in a figure-ground comparison. First, one might ask why certain sectors are highlighted for improvement, such as health and education. What is excluded from this recommendation and why? Perhaps other areas might be better targeted for reform, such as agricultural production or road/transportation repair. Why should tertiary-level education and health care services be ignored, to the advancement of primary-level services? The World Bank and the writer(s) of the text make assumptions, based on prior knowledge, about the 'best' paths to alleviating poverty. In doing so, the writer(s) bring the readers along with them. The text naturalizes these paths to alleviating poverty merely by stating them, along with the power of being associated with the World Bank, with being printed on the internet, and with being printed in the English language.

Second, many words in the text show value judgments, especially when compared to what is unsaid in the text. For example, in lines 28-9, the following statement is made: "Targeting will require comprehensive and reliable information as well as proper administration mechanisms." The statement that "comprehensive and reliable information" is required implies that thus far, information concerning the Moldovan context has been partial and unreliable. Even worse, "proper administration mechanisms" implies that previous administration has been improper or of low quality. Other modifiers in the text serve to naturalize the existence of the nouns they modify (Yurchak, 2003). In lines 3-4, the opening statement reads, "The central objective of the

World Bank in Moldova is to contribute to poverty alleviation and *sustainable economic* growth" (emphasis added). Growth is a given, since if it is to be sustainable and economic, growth must exist. The adjectives show that one can measure growth and compare it to other kinds of growth in terms of its positive or negative amount, and in its depth of sustainability. The use of modifying adjectives masks the naturalization of "growth," and even may impede a reader's ability to question the need for growth. Likewise, verbs such as "reduce" and "improve" (lines 45-6) imply that costs are too high and services are poor. The text responds dialogically to previous research or assumptions about the Moldovan and international development context without actually giving the reader this data to support the claims. Moreover, the text implies that the course of action recommended is best, since the World Bank's knowledge and power is behind the suggested actions.

Press release to announce SIF 2 (2004)

The second text is a press release written in 2004 when the World Bank confirmed that it would fund a second SIF project from 2005 to 2009 (Bank, 2004). Contrary to the "Bank Mission in Moldova," the speaker of the text is unclear. The World Bank is the subject of the title and the first sentence in lines 1-4. The Bank is also the agent in these phrases, and is an implied agent in two sentences in the last paragraph of the text (lines 50-51, 53-54). The speaker position is null, and the press release maintains a journalistic style of offering information as objective facts.

Press release

1-Moldova: World Bank Continues Its Support To Poor

2-And Vulnerable Communities

…[contact information for Bank employees omitted]

3-WASHINGTON, June 17, 2004 – The World Bank today approved a

4-US$20.0 million equivalent credit for the Moldova Social

5-Investment Fund 2 Project (SIF 2). This project is a continuation of the

6-first Social Investment Fund project, which was successfully

7-implemented in rural areas over the last 5 years.

8-The objective of the project is to provide access to better quality of basic

9-social and economic services in education, environment, water, roads

10-and other services in poor rural communities and small towns. The

11-project will also contribute to the development of capacity of community

12-organizations, and to strengthening social capital. The project is closely

13-linked to, and supports the objectives outlined in Moldova's Economic

14-Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, and will help in

15-establishing a regular feedback mechanism to reflect community

16-experiences in changing national policies.

17-"This is a very important project that supports local level development

18-and helps the poorest communities to help themselves," said Anush

19-Bezhanyan, head of the World Bank team that designed the

20-project. *"The results of the first project were very encouraging,*

21-particularly in terms of supporting community organizations and

22-networks, and introducing transparent mechanisms of implementation

23-and accountability. With the second project, every effort should be

24-made to have this good example continue at the village level, but also

25-to expand it to small towns that had the sharpest decline in living

26-standards in recent years. It is important to learn systematic lessons

27-from the implementation which should help to make the project

28-approach more sustainable."

29-The project will provide funding for implementation of activities under the

30-four main components:

31-The Community Development component will finance activities for

32-rural community development, small town community

33-development and community capacity building.

34-The Social Care Services Development component will finance

35-activities for the social care services sub-projects and for the

36-capacity building of local government and service providers.

37-The Communication, Monitoring and Evaluation and Capacity

38-Building component will finance activities for capacity building of

39-governmental institutions and learning of policy lessons, for

40-communication, dissemination and replication of best practices,

41-and for monitoring and evaluation.

42-The Project Management component will finance activities to

43-support project implementation and will mainly support the SIF 2

44-Executive Office operations.

45-The total amount of the SIF 2 Project is US$ 29.17 million, out of which

46-the IDA credit is US$20.0 million, US$1.53 million represents the

47-Government's contribution and US$3.73 million will be covered by local

48-communities. The remainder is expected to be covered by donor co-

49-financing grants. The project will be implemented over the period of five

50-years: October 2004 to September 2009.

The World Bank credit will

51-be disbursed on standard IDA terms, with no interest rate, and will be

52-repayable in 40 years, including a 10-year grace period.

Moldova joined

53-the World Bank in 1992. Since then, commitments to the country total

54-approximately US$572 million for 24 operations.

The focus of this text is "the project." The project or its subcomponents are attributed agency in several sentences: "the project will also contribute…," "the project…will help in establishing…," "the community development component will finance…," etc. The

Executive Office staff that manages and implements the project is mentioned once, but is not associated with any actions (lines 43-44: "Project Management Component…will mainly support the SIF 2 Executive Office operations"). Rather, the project itself is attributed the action of supporting main office operations. The local communities who implement subprojects are generally referred to indirectly (lines 7, 10, 15, 17, 21-2, 24, 25, 32, 33, 36, 39, 47-8) and *only once* as the agents of implementation (line 18: "helps the poorest communities help themselves"). In fact, the country in which this project takes place, "Moldova," is only overtly named four times, including once in the title, once in the name of the project, and once in the name of the Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.[108]

In two ways, the text is similar to the first one discussed: there are many specialized vocabulary items, and the construction of the sentences naturalizes the need for the project. "Capacity building" of communities or local governments is a part of three of the four components of the project; the use of the term assumes that communities' abilities to meet citizens' needs are in need of improvement, without giving any data to support the claims. However, the lack of concentration on the agents of implementation leads me to look more closely at the writers' use of gerunds in both texts.

One phrase in "Bank Mission in Moldova" states, "Reform measures may include: *restructuring* of the over-sized infrastructure to release resources from tertiary level health care to primary level, *redefining* the basic health care package in line with available resources and *focusing* on primary care; and *formalizing* the existing informal

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[108] If Moldova's name were removed, one might be able to identify the country from the focus of the project, but the similarity of this project to many others exemplifies the World Bank strategy of applying to a new country the successful project models from other countries. It also supports the contention that there is a discursive framework of development that carries with it common vocabulary, ways of speaking, and ideologies.

payments to avoid abuses which are specially burdensome for the poor" (lines 38-43, emphasis added). Another is: "*Attracting* of foreign direct investment is a key to success" (line 23, emphasis added). In the press release, the writer describes one component thus: "The Communication, Monitoring and Evaluation and Capacity Building component will finance activities for capacity *building* of governmental institutions and *learning* of policy lessons, for communication, dissemination and replication of best practices, and for *monitoring* and evaluation (lines 37-41, emphasis added).[109] Gerunds generally express actions or states of being. The use of gerunds may also suggest that the actions they denote are part of a process or in a state of continued activity and effort (Hall 1987). That leads the reader to question whether there is a finishing point for the activities (Shoemaker 1952). Finally, the agents of the gerunds are only implied, but readers can understand that the agents must be people in Moldova, most likely not Bank employees. In this way, the Bank is able to suggest activities to local people without using direct imperatives, and to avoid destroying the idea of partnership and collaboration.

One more way that the press release differs from the other texts here is that it includes a quote from a World Bank representative. Anush Bezhanyan is identified as the "head of the World Bank team that designed the project" (lines 19-20). This automatically gives Ms. Bezhanyan the authority to comment on the extension of the SIF project for five more years. On the other hand, the fact that a World Bank employee and a team of World Bank people (we do not know if there were Moldovans on this team) designed the project takes away any semblance of collaboration with the Moldovan

[109] Each of these phrases uses gerunds as different parts of the sentence: as a subject complement, as the subject of the sentence, and as the object of a preposition.

government or the SIF Executive Staff in Moldova.[110] According to certain SIF staff members, they were very much involved in the planning of the SIF-2 project. Perhaps Moldovans are not identified in the press release as having input in the project because the intended recipients of this notice may be other donors. These other foreigners share a status level with the World Bank, and may not trust the planning capabilities of Moldovans despite the indication in lines 6-7 that the first SIF project was "successfully implemented."

The vocabulary used by Ms. Bezhanyan fits into the discursive formation of development as much as the rest of the written text. She notes that the SIF-1 project "introduc[ed] transparent mechanisms of implementation and accountability" (lines 22-3). This marks the project as achieving some success in combating corruption, yet the use of "introduce" shows that these activities can now be extended in the second project. Next, she compliments the SIF-1 project on creating a "good example" while at the same time cautions them "to learn systematic lessons from the implementation which should help to make the project approach more sustainable" (lines 24, 26-8). One could argue that the Bank's continuance of the SIF project for five more years shows that the project has already achieved sustainable results. Supporting this idea is a report the SIF Executive Staff produced in May-June 2004 (the first draft of which was begun before this press release was made public) that summarizes their "lessons learned" from their own perspectives; these lessons were elaborated on for the 2004 Annual Report (Fund, 2004). I wish to highlight the fact that the staff has already learned many lessons during the project's implementation, and they have recognized their learning curve. Thus, it

[110] An internet search reveals that Ms. Bezhanyan is most likely a native of Armenia, not Moldova, since she attended the State Technical University in Yerevan and worked for the Armenian government before working for the World Bank (Bank, 2012).

seems paternalistic of Ms. Bezhanyan, and by extension, the World Bank, to caution the staff to learn systematic lessons.

Country Assistance Evaluation (2004)

The final document presented in this chapter is The World Bank's Moldova Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) of 2004 (Bank, 2004). This extensive document shares many characteristics with the two documents already discussed, thus adding support to my assertions about development as a discursive framework in Moldova. The CAE is important because it provides a long-term evaluation of the Bank's assistance to Moldova between 1992 and 2004, and touches upon the corresponding Moldovan economic and political environment during those years. The three-page Executive Summary of the 68-page document continues to display a style of writing that lacks evident agents and hides addressivity.[111] It is clearly directed toward people with knowledge of the economy of Moldova and the knowledge to understand the "insider" vocabulary used in most World Bank documents.

Moreover, this document (and most World Bank documents regarding Moldova) seems to erase all forms of life beyond the economic and the actions of the government. There are absolutely no cultural considerations mentioned in any document, such as, 'in Moldova, cultural tradition leads people to give gifts,' etc., and no indications of the non-economic motivations that lead people to work abroad, for example. Such writing suggests that if the economy is stabilized, privatized, and democratized, then the rest of the country and its people will be fine. This type of erasure (Irvine & Gal, 2000) seems

[111] The Executive Summary is included in Appendix E.

to lead to, or play into, ways of thinking that deem all economies the same, and that prescribed actions taken by the Bank and the government will result in success, according to Bank standards.

Granted, the CAE admits that the Bank's representatives made mistakes. They overestimated the effects of early Bank efforts and neglected to perform follow-up evaluations in the late 1990s:

> A carefully done CEM [Country Economic Memorandum] in the mid-to-late 1990s might have shown that the Bank's optimism about Moldova's prospects needed to be tempered and would have highlighted the fundamental reasons for the country's economic decline, as well as the implications for reform deferral (Bank, 2004, p. 8)

Nevertheless, the Moldovan government receives the bulk of criticism throughout the evaluation, which parallels its relationship as the recipient of World Bank aid and loans. Four points concerning the linguistic structure of this document highlight the power relationships that exist between the World Bank and the Moldovan government. The first two points illustrate how the writers consistently use grammatical structures that effectively hide Moldovans' agency: first, the passive voice and second, attribution of agency to inanimate objects or situations. Third, the Bank is given the active voice more often than the passive. Fourth, the vocabulary used to describe the Bank and its actions is overwhelming positive, while vocabulary concerning the Moldovans is overwhelming negative. The effect of the linguistic structure is to give an overall negative impression of the economic situation and the governments of Moldova, while resisting as much as possible the direct assignment of blame to Moldova.

Consider the following sentences from the CAE. These nine sentences (out of seventy-three sentences in all) are the only ones in the CAE that connect Moldova, its government, or its people directly with an active verb (in my italics):[112]

"[Moldova] *joined* the Bank and [International Monetary] Fund in 1992, and has received strong Bank advisory and financial support since" (lines 2-3)

"Moldova also *encountered* debt problems; the present value of debt-to-GDP ratio reached 90 percent in 2000" (lines 12-13).

"In 2001, the voters *elected* a Government led by the Communist Party of Moldova that had campaigned on a strong anti-reform platform" (lines 14-16).

"Moldova…*remains* highly indebted" (lines 70-72).

"The Government is reluctant to apply market-based policies, and *has treated* some major foreign investors with hostility" (lines 74-75).

"[The Government] *has reversed* some privatizations" (lines 75-76).

"[Moldova] *has made* little progress towards the Millennium Development Goals" (lines 76-77).

"Yet, without such action, Moldova *found* its capacity to sustain social services in continuous decline" (lines 97-98).

Even in these eight sentences, three use verbs that do not show action when contextual meaning is considered: encountered, remains, and found. To remain does not imply any motion at all, to encounter something in this sense means 'to be faced with' or 'to come up against' in a figurative way, and to find one's capacity does not mean that one had to actively search for it. Rather, these situations seem to have happened *to* the Government.

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[112] I did not count sentences as having active voice if they contain the verbs "to be" or "to have" used to describe a state of being (usually with an adjective or noun phrase). The second and third examples listed use "to have" in the sense of ownership, so they are included as active.

Furthermore, the actions taken in three of the other sentences show negative results: "has treated" investors with hostility, "has reversed" privatizations, and "has made little progress." That leaves two sentences containing verbs in the active voice, with actual action attributed to the agent, *and* with positive connotations: "Moldova joined the Bank," and "the voters elected a Government." The latter could be argued to have a negative result, since the Bank does not seem to approve of the anti-reform platform of the Communist Party (why else would the writers have mentioned it?). Following this reasoning, the only positive action attributed directly to Moldova in the entire Executive Summary is the moment when Moldova joined the World Bank.

To be fair, aspects or parts of Moldova's infrastructure or economy are mentioned positively, but these examples form part of the second linguistic structure that weakens Moldova in the CAE: the attribution of agency to inanimate objects or situations. The second paragraph provides of number of examples:

> Moldova's *dependence* on agriculture underlined the need for rapid agrarian reform. Unfortunately, *this* did not begin until 1997, and was not completed until 1999. The *reform delay* and the *lack of direct foreign investment* contributed to the stubborn economic decline. *Frequent governmental changes, increasing corruption, and weak institutions* exacerbated the country's problems (lines 20-23, emphasis added).

On the one hand, stating existing situations as subjects of active verbs rather than as the object of the verb, makes the nouns seem stable and concrete things, which themselves create other effects (Yurchak, 2003). This naturalizes the situations mentioned and makes it difficult for readers to argue against them. What's more, Moldova seems to own

or be the agents of increasing corruption and weak institutions without directly assigning that ownership to Moldovan people. On the other hand, it masks who is involved in causing the dire situations, which alleviates and even erases blame. The agency that is given to an inanimate object or situation cannot be given to a person, Moldovan people, or the government. Phrases like "reform delay…contributed to" masks the responsibility for the delay, thus alleviating blame, but it also has the effect of erasing the people involved.

What could be the purposes of writing in this way? Are there other, better ways of writing such an evaluation? I will defer the second question to future research and analysis, but address the first. The Bank wants to retain a relationship with the Moldovan government for reasons of market stability and international security. If the Bank appears too tough by blaming people involved in corruption or reform delays, it will not likely retain the partnership for long, or may cause internal political problems in Moldova. More than usual strife between political parties would cause even more delays and even less investment. Moreover, the Bank does not want its policies and initiatives blamed for any role in Moldova's economic crisis. It is to the Bank's double advantage to remain vague in describing the situation. The Bank protects itself from blame by throwing cause to the Moldovans and to situations apparently beyond the Bank's control; at the same time, the Bank does not anger national leaders by directly indicating which administration and which ministries were involved. The blame falls on all the post-independence Presidents and Prime Ministers more than anyone else, since they should be controlling all governmental actions during their terms in office. They and their

governments have clearly not exhibited the good citizenship (read: development according to Bank recommendations) that the Bank and its donors expect.

The thematic structure and use of the passive voice of the World Bank CAE provides more support for my assertion that the Bank asserts power in its texts by indirectly laying blame on the Moldovan government, while applauding Bank efforts. This makes the Bank's work seem valid/valuable and justifies their continued work (see Ferguson (1990), Mosse (2005), and Closser (2010) who make similar findings). The total effect of the text is to state that the Bank's actions and activities have been in earnest and somewhat useful, but that Moldovans' actions (government or otherwise) have kept Moldova from gaining the benefits, or improving their economic and social systems to the full extent possible. In addition, these findings illustrate that the Bank contradicts its ideology of partnership (perhaps intentionally, perhaps not) by distancing the Moldovan government from the Bank.

The World Bank evaluation visit

During one week in May 2006, I noticed that the SIF staff were not preparing for the weekly Executive Committee meeting, but for the visit of a World Bank representative to the SIF offices. Twice a year, a regional World Bank supervisor comes to Moldova to review SIF's work and address any problems that might have come up in the recent months. For days before the World Bank representative, a person of Middle Eastern descent named "Amun,"[113] arrived in Moldova, all of SIF's staff seemed tense

[113] All names are pseudonyms. Identifying information for SIF employees and field sites has been changed to protect participants' anonymity according to their requests. The only person who can be clearly

and were hurrying to complete all their reports before Amun's arrival. Amun was replacing a World Bank official whose last visit to monitor SIF work had been six months before, and this was Amun's first visit to Moldova. He had exchanged emails and phone calls with SIF executives, but I still felt that the mood in SIF offices was one of uncertainty.

I was interested in seeing how SIF carries out World Bank policies and how the international and local staff interact, so I asked for and obtained permission to observe their discussions during the week. The meetings dealt with SIF's relationships with Moldovan government offices and officials, and with local NGO offices and their staff; and also dealt with the progress of SIF's work in different parts of the country, and any procedural difficulties that SIF in Moldova encounters.[114] The meetings were conducted in English as the common language, but a World Bank-hired translator was present and participated when necessary (the SIF Director spoke halting English at that time, but understood quite a bit).[115]

The meetings took place on Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and the following Monday; Tuesday was a national holiday, May 9th: Victory Day, celebrating the end of World War II in Europe. However, most Moldovan civil servants had Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday off for the holiday. Initially, the Executive Director told the Moldovan SIF staff that they would have to work on all three days, to their dismay. When Amun found out it was a national holiday, he apologized and proposed to

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identified by someone who is not familiar with the organization is the Executive Director. I have his permission to use his title and his words for the purposes of this project.

[114] At that time, I was not recording interactions at the SIF offices, but I sat in on 3 days of meetings between World Bank representatives and SIF staff, and took copious notes.

[115] Romanian language utterances are not reproduced in this transcript. There was no usage of Russian or any other local languages, which is an issue that needs to be addressed, but is not done so here, for considerations of space and focus.

the Director to let the SIF staff off. “I have some questions I would like to go over [today] and [then I] want you to all go happily to your families,” he stated. “On Wednesday morning, we'll start again.” To this, an executive staff member responded, “It will be a very good surprise. It will look like a big *cadou* [gift] from you to our families.” Already, from these introductory interactions, Amun asserts his authority by allowing workers to have Tuesday off, and by giving a “gift” that is received graciously by a Moldovan interlocutor.

The first part of Monday’s meeting was spent arranging the schedule for the week. Moldovan government officials would be invited to take part in certain discussions, but Moldovan SIF staff had to work around the Parliament’s meeting day (Wednesday). NGO and donor organization staff would also be invited to some of the meetings, so another person was put in charge of coordinating their visits to fit within the week’s time frame. SIF changed the Executive Committee meeting from Wednesday to Friday, which meant calling the participating village mayors to reschedule the meeting to Friday.

The limited interactions on the first meeting day reflected the structure of power relations between SIF staff members, between SIF as an organization and the communities it serves, and likewise, the relations between SIF and the Moldovan government, the World Bank, and other international organizations. The World Bank holds the most influence in this situation, as SIF’s chief donor, and especially since Amun was only in Moldova for one week. Likewise, Moldovan World Bank officers (named “Adrian” in the transcript below) have a respectful relationship with SIF executive staff, but the World Bank employees hold more power due to their institutional

affiliation. Within the SIF offices, the SIF Director is the supreme authority; I rarely saw staff (executive or otherwise) question his decisions or opinions. During Amun's visit, nearly everything had been put on hold for the World Bank visit, except the weekly Executive Committee meeting.

An excerpt from my fieldnotes from the Monday morning session with SIF executive staff and Amun may illustrate better the complicated negotiations of schedules, as well as the relations of power between Amun, SIF staff, and others. The other members of the Executive Staff who were present at the meeting were "Cristina," "Dorin," "Nina," and "Iurie," the directors of SIF's internal departments.[116]

AMUN:[117] OK, we will discuss the past 3 subcomponents. They are all under Component 1; (we will) update and focus on issues and problems.

DIRECTOR: Toata ziua? [All day?]

AMUN: Yes

DIRECTOR: Until 5 or 6?

AMUN: Let's keep it flexible. Let's agree to start at 9.

ADRIAN: 12 is lunch

AMUN: [That's a] nice reminder. [We'll] start again at 1:15 [laughing by all about the reminder needed for lunch]

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[116] Again, I was not able to audio record this meeting, so my notes did not capture every utterance. The greater gist is preserved in terms of speakers' turns and the content of their utterances. I was aided by the time it took for the translator to relate phrases back and forth between Amun and the Director. For abbreviations and transcription marks, please see note 9, below.

[117] Transcript conventions: Words or phrases in brackets [ ] are my own, added to fill in utterances to make sense to the reader here, and to give information on intonation, tone, extra-linguistic movement, etc. Words or phrases in parentheses ( ) are the *meanings* of the utterances spoken, not the actual words, since I was unable to write everything verbatim. All other words and phrases were written in fieldnotes as faithfully as possible to record the actual utterances of speakers; ellipses (…) denote places where a new utterance or continued utterance likely was, but I was not able to record it.

UNIDENTIFIED: [jokingly] (someone says that he doesn't eat lunch, so he doesn’t need the break).

AMUN: Those who exercise[118] can, those who eat...

UNIDENTIFIED: (Someone asks to work in the morning from 10-1, and have lunch from 1-2:15, because some (offices) don't start office work until 10).

AMUN: If no one has a problem?

…

AMUN: Thursday I want to make good use of time. Thursday, maybe [we should have] parallel sessions. Adrian (will spend) the whole day on Component 2 and will invite SIDA.

CRISTINA: Do you need to invite representatives of [the] companies who work on these components?

AMUN: Yes. Let's do this. [to Director] He will start with you in the morning.

…

AMUN: Other representatives will join in the afternoon. Not all the issues (do) you want to share with the consulting firm.

CRISTINA: (has a meeting at 4)

AMUN: Parallel to Adrian’s work. Most of Component 3 is with you, Cristina.

CRISTINA: Not all. (Tells what she is responsible for--community building, plus communication strategy and etc.

AMUN: A good day for me to talk to Nina [would be the] 10th, Thursday

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[118] Very few people in Moldova take their lunchtime to exercise. Exercising as its own end is not common, in fact. Amun’s remark regarding exercise was probably considered puzzling to most of those present.

DIRECTOR: Nina will be assisted by the staff from the dept. [Nina was new to her position at the time of Amun's visit]

AMUN: [Is there] anybody else you think should join?

…

AMUN: Friday [will be out] field visit, ok. Monday, [I will] sit with you, Cristina, for the rest of Component 3. Going back to Thursday, will you be ready to discuss monitoring and evaluation and other issues?

…[Throughout, the people Amun is addressing nod, say yes, etc., but I was unable to write it all.]

AMUN: So, Monday then we'll discuss capacity building and community foundations, and maybe late in the day on Monday, I will want to sit with Victor, and post-review, sit with you. She [another World Bank official?] will be coming in June [i.e. post-review] and want to get your feedback. Let's say 4 pm, Monday?

…

AMUN: Yes, and for now, let's just leave Tuesday through Thursday for outside meetings and for issues that will arise as we discuss, and because I'm sure there will be issues to discuss.

DIRECTOR: [Will you have] only one day for a field visit?

AMUN: Yes

AMUN: Stefan Voda is in which part of the country?

CRISTINA: South East

DIRECTOR: (Do you need to see something) from the last mission or from this one?

AMUN: I don't see the difference. We will discuss where you stand at this moment.

…

DIRECTOR: Just government [projects] or just financing from the World Bank?

AMUN: [Do] you mean in terms of reporting?

DIRECTOR: Yes

AMUN: Then if you can report it separately it would be better. We want to update...

DIRECTOR: It would be good to have an overall review and then [a review] on all separate resources.

DORIN: We worked a lot on all the separate components.

AMUN: [I] hope you didn't work only on them [laughs]

DORIN: No, of course.

One can see that most of the conversational exchanges are initiated and ended by Amun. He asks six out of the twelve questions in this section of the discussion; the Director asks the second largest number of questions (five), while the rest of the staff only asks one. This pattern was repeated throughout the morning's meeting. Of the ninety-one times that I recorded separate utterances by Amun, fifty-five of them were in question format. Thus, he initiates the flow of information, and the other interlocutors are put into the positions of responding. To compare, I recorded seventy-five utterances by the Director, but only nine of them were in question format. Amun is treated as more powerful by SIF staff, and they put themselves lower than him in the ways they respond

and accede to his requests: "I hope you didn't work only on them." –"No, of course." There are not significant instances of the vocabulary or foci of development in the interactions, yet the question and answer format and agenda-setting focus of the first day's meeting seem to be typical of international business interactions, and follow both local and Western styles of communication in terms of seniority and power, as noted above.

The power relations are delineated between the International/Western person (even though Amun is Egyptian), the Moldovan state representatives (in the form of the Executive Director and the Executive Staff members), and the citizens of Moldova (the rest of the staff and the people with whom SIF interacts in villages and towns outside the capital city). In their interactions with citizens, SIF staff reproduce this relationship, as evidence presented in the next chapter will show. With SIF as the authority operating with the Moldovan government and the World Bank behind it, SIF is in a position of great coercive and economic power. SIF employees use that power to promote the democratic process and promote an identity of common citizenship that articulates with democratic and liberal economic principles, yet they have not reached the point of resistance or questioning of the collaboration and partnership paradigm. Therefore, we see that the ideal of collaboration between international actors and Moldovans exists and is attended to by both parties, but in action, there is not equal collaboration or an equal partnership.

Conclusions

This chapter has supported the assertion of an intersection of the three discursive formations in an environment that institutionally falls within the realm of development. I have offered information concerning the relationship between the international World Bank and the state-level institution of MSIF, presented through texts generated at the international and local levels, and through an exchange between representatives of both institutions. One (perhaps?) unintended effect of even a limited collaborative relationship between the international and local institutions is the sponsoring of long-term interactions between citizens, a state entity, and an international entity. One can say that the Moldovan state legitimizes itself by associating with prestigious and wealthy international bodies, which in return, legitimates those international organizations. By seeking and obtaining the approval of organizations such as the World Bank, the Moldovan state reinforces its identity as a state and therefore, its citizens' identities as members of the state. Moreover, SIF staff and subproject participants become united internally as citizens of their "developing" state through the bureaucratic procedures of SIF and the WB, whether they are aware of the state's hand in the process or not. Chapter 6 addresses those bureaucratic procedures from my field experience.

Chapter Six:

Participation and Procedure in SIF Subprojects

Introduction

"It was the first time in my life I voted like that in front of other people," stated Vasile Grosu[119] with wonder and pride. Grosu, 57 years old, is the mayor of two small villages located not far from Chisinau, the capital city. He was speaking of his participation in one of the many activities that SIF requires before it will grant money to a community. As Mayor, Grosu had successfully aided in the implementation of a SIF subproject in one of the two villages, "Campenesti" and was beginning the process in the second village, "Strugureni". His remark exemplifies the effects that SIF's democratic procedures have on people and their communities in Moldova. He had been a tractor operator by trade, and evidently, had been involved very little in the political system or civil society during the Soviet era. However, fifteen years after independence, he marveled at his own participation in an open democratic process. Mayor Grosu represents a model citizen, in SIF's eyes. Not only does he participate in community life as a mayor and a citizen, but he is an active leader in spreading democratic principles and the value of Western-influenced development by initiating a second SIF-funded subproject. This chapter provides more data to support the dialogic construction and intersections of discursive frameworks concerning proper behavior, development, and citizenship within the context of Moldova. To do this, the chapter describes examples of textual and verbal interchanges between SIF staff and members of several communities

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[119] all names are pseudonyms

that take place as the latter prepare their applications for a subproject. The interchanges illustrate the modeling, correction, and reinforcement by SIF staff of the principles that Mayor Grosu exhibits so well: active participation in community life, transparency, and dedication to democratic change.

Of the four thematic groups previously introduced, the first and fourth are most overtly prominent in regular interactions between SIF staff and subproject applicants. Group 1 includes the themes *allegiance to the state and patriotism*, *responsibility to the community and community-state relations*, and *responsibility to the family and family-community-state relations*. Group 4 is made up of the following themes: *participation in the market economy*, *Europe as a model of political and civic life*, and *democratic values and participation in civil society*. Groups 2 and 3, having to do with *power, status, and diversity*; and *cronyism, illegal activity, and nepotism*, respectively, are less overtly referred to in the interactions that are described here. On the other hand, the latter themes are still a part of the procedures and conversations simply because they co-exist in people's everyday realities within Moldovan culture. As such, themes within the latter two groups also play an important role in defining and reinforcing cultural propriety, and ideals citizenship and development. The following sections will demonstrate how people's use of the themes evokes their history, recreates their present meaning, and in doing so, serve as a means of identification for the speakers with the values with which they align themselves.

SIF Components and Subcomponents

Before going on, it is necessary to offer a bit more information about SIF's work. SIF channels funds to several kinds of subprojects, organized into three Components with different foci and different funding chains: 1. Community Development, 2. Social Care Services Development, and 3. Capacity Development, Monitoring and Evaluation. I was exposed mainly to Component 1 and its subprojects, so I limit my discussion here to that Component (although nearly all of SIF-funded subprojects could also fall under the label of capacity development in Component 3). Here is a list of the *sub*components of Component 1 and their scope, quoted from SIF's website:

> The following sub-components are financed within the **Component 1**:
>
> 1.1.Rural community development (for poor rural communities that haven't previously benefited from MSIF 1 Project's support);
>
> 1.2. Rural community development with the delegation of financial self-management responsibilities (CDD - Community Driven Development) – for the communities that have previously benefited from MSIF 1 Project's support and have reached high performances in community development;
>
> 1.3. Small towns community development (for towns with population of up to 20 000 persons);
>
> 1.4. Community development for localities facing water supply and sewerage problems;
>
> 1.5. Community development for localities that renovates Culture Houses (Fund, 2011).

During the first five year mandate of MSIF, called MSIF 1, only Component 1, subcomponent 1.1 (rural community development) existed. As previously described, the organization coordinated with the government to identify the poorest districts (*raione*), then held competitions within those districts to fund subprojects to build or renovate objects of social and economic infrastructure. By the end of MSIF 1, the project had met its original goals; the staff was holding information sessions and initial competitions in the last of the identified districts, in rolling fashion to reduce workload, when I arrived for an extended visit in the fall of 2005.

The MSIF 2 project added subcomponents 1.2 and 1.3: funding for rural communities that had already successfully implemented a SIF-funded subproject, and funding for small towns, respectively. Mayor Grosu's community had completed its first subproject under subcomponent 1.1, for example, and was now applying for a grant through subcomponent 1.2. The World Bank directly funded and monitored subcomponents 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. Then, by the middle of 2006, SIF's assignments grew to support two more types of subprojects. Subcomponent 1.4 was funded by the European Union (not the World Bank) with the specific goal of addressing water supply and sewage problems. Subcomponent 1.5 instituted a Moldovan government-funded plan to renovate the crumbling Culture Houses across Moldova. The latter two subcomponents were added to SIF's work by the government as the result of SIF's success in the MSIF 1 project, particularly their ability to enforce transparency and good management of community funds. No other organization had reached so many communities and created a network of public administrators and active community

members as SIF had.[120] Thus, World Bank and SIF operating procedures seem to have had an impact on individual recipients, like Mayor Grosu, as well as an effect on the ways the national government goes about its work. Therefore, in addition to the circulation of talk between SIF staff and grant recipients, this chapter also discusses SIF's operating procedures in the World Bank-funded subcomponents 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. The next chapter focuses on the similarities and differences between the implementation of these infrastructure projects and the ones in subcomponent 1.5, the Culture House renovation subproject.

SIF operating procedures

The purpose of all social funds is to improve social services and social infrastructure in the poorest communities. The majority of financing for social funds comes from external sources, giving the donor organizations and donor states a great deal of power to influence the goals and operations of each social fund. For example, each fund must follow certain operating procedures set by the World Bank: such procedures require projects to follow the Bank's guidelines for competition in bidding and hiring practices, effective monitoring and evaluation, passing on of "best practices," and "transparency" in all interactions. They reinforce many of the themes outlined here, such

[120] Their success was both a blessing and a curse. Of course, they were happy to have gained the opportunity to distribute more money to their fellow citizens, but they were overwhelmed with work. Mobile consulting teams would typically visit from 1 to 3 communities per day, and teams were sent out 2-3 times per week. The trips could involve up to a 6-hour round trip on extremely bumpy roads; teams did not stop to eat during the day (some brought crackers in the car), and often did not return to the capital until late in the evening. Keeping straight the different funding requirements of each subcomponent became an added burden. One required 15% contribution from the community in cash funds from citizens, another mandated 5% cash contribution and 20% contribution [check this] from the community budget. The workload and the subcomponent funding requirements are not especially pertinent to my discussion, but are included here as background information.

as *responsibility to the community*, *respect for diversity*, *participation in the market economy*, *democratic values*, and working against *illegal activity* (by invoking transparency). Their power is indicated in the fact that the Bank's operating procedures are deferred to by other donor organizations in the case of the Moldova SIF.[121] One example is the procedure for hiring contractors. To hire contractors, public administrators and members of implementation agencies must first place announcements of open tenders in the national government publication, *Monitorul Oficial*, which prints laws adopted, government decisions, and other official documents. The announcements are also carried on the SIF website. Contractors then must submit their bids in sealed folders to the Mayor's office that represents each subproject. The implementation agency members open the bids at a public meeting in the community on a named day. Contractors' representatives may be present at the meeting, in case questions arise. At least three bids must be received or the tender process must start over with a new announcement. Community members debate the merits of the bids and choose one. Because these are new experiences for most villagers and townspeople, SIF staff are careful to teach people in communities not to blindly accept the lowest bid, but to ask for references, find out about a company's previous work, ask about the materials to be used, etc. They discuss these procedures with each community at several points in the application process. In addition, the procedures are listed in the contract, and are made public on SIF's website.[122]

[121] This occurred for money donated by the Swedish, German, and Japanese development agencies.
[122] Implementation agencies must put an ad for a contractor in the national newspaper, *"Monitorul Oficial,"* and can advertise in local newspapers, and on local radio or television stations. They must wait one month, and on a specific day, if they have received at least three bids, they must open all of the bids in a public meeting at an advertised time (they should invite village residents to take part, and contractors may be present, too). If any bids arrive late on that day, they must not be included. The leaders must read all

Even though the World Bank procedures guide the entire grant process, national governments and social fund staff in each recipient country have a certain amount of leeway to designate the kinds of projects that the fund will finance, and even the flexibility to adapt certain standard World Bank operating procedures to local conditions. This interplay between international standard operating procedures and local modifications allows each social fund to be unique, and therefore follows principles of "ownership" and "partnership" espoused by international development organizations (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2001; Pritchett & Woolcock, 2003; Uquillas & Larreamendy, 2006; Van Domelen, 2003). The Moldova SIF staff made some of these procedural adjustments during the time of the SIF 1 project between 1999 and 2005. The staff was in a unique position to observe the implementation of a subproject from start to finish, and to monitor how subprojects are implemented. They noticed that at certain times when the standard prescribed procedures did not quite match Moldovans' usual experiences (from either the pre- or post-independence period), people were tempted into illegal or unethical activity. In response, the staff suggested changes to the approval and implementation procedures for subprojects.

For example, at a certain point in the implementation process, communities need to obtain the approval of regional inspectors for their subproject. SIF heard many reports that people had been asked to pay bribes to inspectors to obtain the necessary stamps to proceed. In response, SIF modified the process so that any paperwork travels between SIF and the inspectors rather than between the inspectors and the community members. Inspectors learned that "SIF doesn't pay," in the words of one SIF employee, and the

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the bids aloud, then propose a discussion on which bid to accept. If the villagers have not received three bids, they must follow another process for readvertising and rebidding.

opportunity for bribery in that part of the process was dramatically reduced. One might argue that this procedure does not set communities up for future success without SIF in the picture, and therefore is not sustainable. On the other hand, with this new system in place, both the communities and the inspectors experience the process of implementing change without bribery. Contractors, communities, and consultants have a more secure, more transparent climate in which to operate. Such an experience may have a lasting effect on local beliefs about proper behavior and how those beliefs are put into practice (what *should* happen and what *does* happen). These types of changes have influenced the national climate of business and development in Moldova, to a certain extent, since SIF-funded sub-projects have been implemented in hundreds of communities across the country and in every district. In this example, all three discursive formations: cultural propriety, development, and citizenship, are drawn upon to create local realities.

According to certain SIF employees, another reason why they refined the procedures was that community members where subprojects were implemented were not "internalizing change" (an example of the theme *democratic values and participation in civil society*). SIF would often receive application materials copied from other communities' approved grant proposals, indicating that they were only using the "right" language to obtain grant monies, and doing a minimum amount of work. They were learning the system, but not demonstrating an independent grasp of the underpinning ideology. This is still a method of change, but one that would act more slowly or not become etched as deeply into their *habitus* as SIF would like.

In addition, people were slow to believe that they could or should take charge of their communities. In an earlier chapter, I described the upheaval of the first post-Soviet

decade when people began to learn how to govern themselves locally at the same time that they observed the lawlessness around them and watched their standard of living deteriorate into extreme poverty. SIF staff noted that many citizens did not see the benefit of trying to change their communities, or did not believe their actions could make a difference. At the same time, most rural citizens lamented the loss of young people to cities and nearly every Moldovan had a family member working abroad, either legally or illegally (Institute, 2004). I observed SIF staff work against this lack of motivation to change local conditions in each interchange they had with participants, which will become clearer as this chapter progresses through the revised SIF procedures. Due to all of these factors, SIF staff became consultants, trainers, and technical advisors for each step in the process.

By the time of the 2004 annual report, the staff had already implemented new steps in planning and evaluation, designed to make it more difficult to obtain a grant without intensive community involvement. The revised procedures involve several site visits by SIF staff to the communities making subproject applications. At these meetings, the SIF staff and technical consultants advise local leaders regarding the application process and the feasibility of their intended subproject. Their improved procedures are designed to help communities succeed through extensive front-end training and consultation; their goals are to enable the communities to submit successful applications, but not to the point of doing the applications for them. The staff embodies the affirmative aspects of development, citizenship, and proper behavior in that they see themselves as advisors and consultants in the post-independence order, and they endeavor to be seen as such in the eyes of community members, too.

One of the most important new measures implemented was requiring community representatives to appear before the Executive Committee in the capital city to defend their subproject applications. Prior to this measure, applications were revised by the Executive Committee, and were either approved or denied based on the strength of the *written* proposals in terms of economic and social preparations for the subprojects, and in terms of the intended outcomes for beneficiaries of the subprojects. The Director related to me that when they tried having community members come and answer questions regarding *their* subproject, the participants could not rely on others' words, or the expertise of consultants, but had to prove their own knowledge about:

- their communities' needs,
- participation in the market economy (with regard to prices and the changing nature of the economy),
- the procedures they had used to ensure transparency in collection of citizens' contributions, and
- the steps they had taken to inform the population of the progress of the implementation agency.

As one SIF employee said, having communities defend their proposals before the Executive Committee "makes them more conscientious and is good for transparency. We introduced this measure, and the World Bank appreciates us for that."[123] Consequently, the improved planning and evaluation procedures allow the communities in question to become more familiar with the language common to SIF, international development

[123] All direct quotes attributed to SIF staff or Moldovan citizens are translated here from Romanian into English. Most of my interactions in connection with SIF took place in Romanian (or Moldovan, as the national language is officially called); some were in Russian. I sometimes spoke English with certain people who wanted to practice their skills.

agencies, and Western countries in general. The procedures also have the effect of bringing only well-prepared groups as far as the Executive Committee and implementation stages. According to SIF staff and World Bank representatives, this series of steps is unique among Social Investment Funds in the former Soviet region. The staff credits the exhaustive process for their success in Moldova, defined by subprojects completed and communities serviced.[124]

An evaluation of the Armenian SIF, which started operating in 1996, reminds us that the communities in target areas that are *likely* to submit a subproject proposal are already self-selected groups (Chase, 2002). Any study of these communities should take into consideration the existing social organization and interpersonal relationships that make community members want to take advantage of a social fund. In Moldova, this holds true for communities once they are preselected for participation. Proposals are considered from a list of the poorest communities on a first-come, first-served basis, by regions,[125] so communities that are more active in any particular region will benefit the most. This fits with the World Bank emphasis on participation in the market economy, by rewarding active communities and therefore (hopefully) promoting activism in other communities.

[124] Some studies have concluded that the success of a development project can be defined by its continued existence or by its co-implementation of democratization and civil society (Ferguson, 1990; Mandel, 2002). This work does not deny those conclusions, but approaches the question of how the activities of democratization and citizenship are melded with "cultural" notions of proper behavior, and how those processes define success from the perspective of the participants in the process.

[125] Region="*raion*," an administrative unit of the Moldovan state. There are 32 regions in Moldova. SIF opens the possibility to apply for subproject grants to regions on a rolling basis, to manage the workload.

The First step: Consultation and laying the groundwork for community action

In the first step of the application process, SIF staff members (or contracted staff who are familiar with SIF procedures) conduct regional seminars, to which leaders are invited from the already identified villages. At the seminars, they explain what SIF is, who funds it, what kinds of subprojects it funds, and the first steps in the application process. Most of the villagers who participate in these seminars have not implemented subprojects through other donors. Even if they are aware of development aid, they typically know little about the SIF procedures of creating an implementation agency, holding village meetings, going to the Executive Committee, hiring a contractor, monitoring the work themselves, and the idea of maintaining the subproject with local funds ("sustainability").[126]

Much of the information specific to SIF's application process that participants need is passed on at seminars. However, more of the general information the staff impart about community development over time is also available through published guides and case studies (Fund, 2008; Fund, 2002-2008). These are distributed in print format, as books and newsletters published by SIF and its partners, and also made available on the Internet.[127] Around 2005, corresponding with the time of my fieldwork, many of these were newly published and were being circulated at the seminars. They range from primers for community development to proceedings from local conferences, and from reports on study visits to other countries to the SIF newsletter. They are instructive, both

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[126] This information comes from SIF staff. I did not attend any seminars of this kind, but did attend others that explained the tender process and the ways to create a sustainability plan.
[127] The current list of available resources can be found at www.msif.md, on the pages for reports and publications.

to the participants and to this study, since they exhibit many of the themes introduced earlier.

Prominent among what I call the primers is the *Ghidul liderului comunitar*, or *Guide for the Community Leader* (Marin, CONTACT, and Fund, 2004). Its eight chapters define the components of a successful community, i.e. one focused on development; it teaches readers about the different parts of a community and along the way, describes the steps that citizens may take to improve their lives. For example, Chapter 1 answers the basic questions: "what is a community?" and "who is a community leader?" It also tells how "the community leader act[s] as a mobilizer" and what "the missions [are] of the community leader". These clearly fall under the theme *responsibility to community*. However, a more subtle message can be found in the preface, related to *speaking well* and self-presentation. The author of the preface adds that, "the status of a formal or an informal leader is attributed to a person capable of speaking coherently and convincingly and of taking action toward that end" (Marin 2004, p. 3). Not only is it important to be a person of action, but a leader should exhibit qualities consistent with someone who knows how to present his or her ideas to others in a way that wins over public opinion. A leader should exhibit the proper behavior of a leader, as well as the pertinent attitudes toward development and citizenship.

Subsequent chapters run through similar basic topics, such as "who are elected officials?", "what is a budget?", "what is civil society?", and "what is a business?" In addition, the Guide tackles more advanced questions, such as "how do we make a business plan?" and "what are the characteristics of civil society in the Republic of Moldova?" Finally, the Guide advises readers how to work with community partners,

how to identify strategic problems within the community, and how to generate funds from a variety of sources. Moldova is directly referred to throughout, so this is not simply a generic guide. There are even sections that explain the laws that support the creation of NGOs in Moldova and the steps to registering a community organization. A second primer is designed as a civics course for school students, teaching the same topics as those above at an appropriate level (Goras-Postica, Sclifos, and Uzikov, 2005). A third describes the means and methods for building schools that sustain communities at the same time that they are structurally sound (Fund, 2002). This latter reports what a SIF team learned on a study visit to Sweden.[128] Its existence supports the claim that the lifestyle and culture of European countries to Moldova's west constitute models for Moldovan life.[129]

Following[130] the best practices observed on study visits to other countries and the guidance collected from various sources and presented in the Guide for Community Leaders, the SIF staff began to encourage communities to motivate citizens toward participation and change even before beginning their SIF application materials. They judged that communities that had created a charter document or community organization beforehand were better prepared to participate in SIF procedures, and were more active during the application process (M. S. I. Fund, 2004a). Depending on the size of the community, these advance preparations take different forms.

Towns now complete a "strategic plan" before applying for SIF funding. The plan identifies weaknesses, strengths, and goals for the local area, and how local leaders

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[128] Funded by the Swedish International Development Agency.

[129] The fact that this and other study visits are funded by Western states reinforces this trend.

[130] The guides are described here to illustrate how they support my argument. Each of them could be analyzed in depth, but I have chosen not to do so.

foresee budget funds being spent over the next few years. I have little information about how the town strategic plans were completed. From the similarity of format in the plans of three towns in different parts of the country, they appear to have been created based on consultations with SIF or other development agency contracted staff at regional workshops.

Village participants must create an association or organization to implement changes in the community, called an "*organizatie obstesti*" or "*asociatie obstesti*" ("public/community organization/association"). They are also likely the result of following a set format and/or consultation with SIF-contracted advisors from outside the community. Some are nearly exact copies, with only the locality changed. Others are more specific to the groups that created them. They are the result of meetings held, where minutes are taken and people elected to the committee. They must also register these organizations at their local mayor's office, much as a new non-profit or non-governmental organization must do in the United States.

Overt language in these preparatory documents accords in large part with the first and last thematic groups previously introduced: concerning *responsibility to the community /community-state relations*; and *participation in the market economy / participation in civil society*. In fact, in *most* of the documents that participants produced throughout the application process, their overt focus is on the same two thematic groups.[131] One example comes from the Mayor Grosu's village that implemented the road-paving subproject. In the charter for its community organization, the group describes itself as:

[131] Possible reasons for this phenomenon will be discussed later in the chapter.

> A non-governmental, non-commercial organization, constituted in the form of a public organization that carries out activity in conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, with legislation operating in the Republic of Moldova, and with the present statute; and which pursues the benefit of the public.[132]

All Moldovan community association charters (that I have seen) open with a similar paragraph as the one above. They clearly state their adherence to the laws of the land and to their communities. Next, the charters declare their objectives and scope. Another example, from a village that went on to install gas lines through a SIF subproject gives the following list of objectives:

> 2.1 Sustainable development and the eradication of poverty in the community of ___:
>
> 2.2 To reach the proposed scope, the Association will undertake the following activities:
>
> -The organization of actions and projects to gasify [the community], and the provision of potable water.
>
> -Social assistance to [lower socio—economic levels—is understood, even though can't read the words]
>
> -Ecological activities
>
> -Assurance of an open means of communicating and informing the community's members [about community activities].
>
> -The creation of local volunteer networks to solve the stringent problems of the community.

[132] Original texts of documents that I translated are included in Appendix F.

-The promotion of advanced technologies in rural management [farming, I believe]

-The development of rural tourism.

-The promotion of cultural-historic values.

-The assurance of equal opportunity [to inhabitants]

-The creation of favorable conditions for the physical and intellectual development of inhabitants.

-The organization of [summer] camps and instruction for different categories of citizens.

I include the list of objectives because they generally go beyond the scope of the single SIF subproject, to include the group's ideas about *many* of the community's needs and how to meet them. In this one, the association first notes the goal of providing gas lines and drinking water to villagers, in line with its SIF subproject application for gasification. They go on to state further objectives of improving the lives of local inhabitants through open communication, volunteerism, promotion of the local economy, the development of a favorable and equitable climate for each person's welfare and improvement, and the promotion of cultural values. Each of these appeals to one or more of the themes discussed previously: *allegiance to the state*, *responsibility to the community*, *hierarchy and equality*, *against inequality and illegal behavior* (in advocating transparent communication), *participation in the market economy*, and *democratic participation in society*. Even though I do not have first-hand knowledge about the creation of these these particular documents, I can infer from their similarity in form and content that the writers were following a format that was distributed at consultation seminars or found in such

publications as the Guide for Community Leaders[133] or another development primer. The existence of the charters and strategic plans illustrates the influence of development organizations, if not SIF directly, on the participating communities. At this particular stage, however, we see a great deal of copying from general examples. Nevertheless, they illustrate the coexistence in locally produced documents of the themes identified herein as important to the evolving discursive formations of cultural propriety, development, and citizenship. Furthermore, we begin to see a micro-history of these themes that will change as these communities move through the SIF application and implementation process.

Examples from towns' Strategic Plans more broadly address the strengths and weaknesses of the area, identify internal and external actors that may affect local development, identify problems in the community, and propose ways of solving those problems through local activity. The values identified illustrate what local people themselves hold in high esteem, and thus these values influence their efforts to improve their communities. In one document, from a town that implemented a gas line project through MSIF, the writers begin the document with the "Mission and Values" section, (the first section of the document after the introduction and description of the process by which the strategic plan was created), the following text appears:

2.1 Mission

The mission of the community of ___ is:

The preservation and development of traditions, the promotion of sustainable strategies in the resolution of the problems of the community

[133] Chapter VII contains sections entitled, "How can we identify and describe the strategic problems of the community?" and "What is a community plan and how can we make a program of action?"

through the rational, professional, and responsible administration of existing resources for the improvement of the standard of living.

2.2 Values

The entire community of the city of ___ considers that all citizens of the city should impart certain common values; therefore, their activity and strategic development should be governed with:

- responsibility,
- professionalism,
- competence,
- intelligence,
- receptivity,
- transparency,
- honesty,
- collegiality,
- joint interest,
- good manners,
- sociableness/friendliness,
- hospitality,
- patriotism,
- consecutiveness,
- cultural traditions,
- historical traditions.

The majority of the participants supported the idea that responsibility and professionalism should take priority. The participants considered that competence and intelligence are always necessary to promote an efficient mode of administration with the goal of a thriving locality."

Note that traditions are mentioned first, followed by improvement of the community's standard of living. Then, a good citizen should share values with other community members, such as responsibility, patriotism, and transparency. These reflect several themes, but are used *together* as a description of an ideal community member.

Another town's strategic plan takes a different approach. It lists values not in terms of *qualities*, as in the example above, but as a table of substantive general things matched with their more specific manifestations:

Values	**Manifestation of values**
traditions and customs	In art and culture, sport, education and learning
the city's human potential	The contribution of each community member to the development of the city, the spirit of thriftiness/hospitality [?], reciprocal esteem and respect, love for the city in which we live, remarkable people of the region
heraldry [implying genealogy and	The respect for the historic past of

display of such] and historical monuments	the city, the patriotism of the citizens
fertile lands	The well-being of the farmer
economic actors	The formation of the budget, helping people of lower socioeconomic categories, the development of commerce and services
clean ecological environment	Forested areas, squares, recreation areas of the city
the health of the people	Locations designed for treatment and strengthening of health
mass media	Local and cable TV, local radio, independent and state press
children	Care and love for growing generations
the elderly	Respect and care for the elderly
educational potential	Family, kindergarten, school, extracurricular institutions
un-utilized economic potential	Factories: "___," of canned goods, of milk (buildings and equipment)

Among the important parts of a community to this city are its people; its history, traditions, and customs; the health of the environment and the people; and economic

reproduction. The column on the right may reflect what they have *and* what they wish to have. These are also much more than infrastructure; they are the results of strong social and civic institutions. In my opinion, these strategic plans and charters put to paper many of the grievances people have had about their communities for years. Perhaps the people are demonstrating that they have found an outlet for both expressing their desires for the community and changing it.

All of this is part of the consultation and preparation for applying for a SIF grant, and is similar to the preparation for the application for any grant offered by organizations such as USAID, DFID, or the Soros Foundation. In other words, this is a common experience for Moldovans wishing to take part in "development" activities in post-independence Moldova. The first-hand account from a school director who participated in a study visit to France with SIF staff will give a final impression of the knowledge and state of mind of applicants for SIF aid at the beginning of the grant process:

> From everything that I saw in France, I learned that, without education and civic culture (cultivation), no effort will be justified. Absolutely new and interesting for me were the structure and model of organization and activity of local public administration. At the same time, I was curious to discover the level of involvement of the citizens in community activities. The cleanliness and the way roads were decorated, as well as the lands around the public places and the locality in general, made me understand that to give a sign/expression/impression of esthetic care and to maintain the cleanliness of our villages, we do not need important financial infusions as much as good taste and education (Odobescu, 2005).

The second step: Focus Groups

After completing the first preparatory steps of setting up their association and attending educational workshops on the SIF application process, town and village leaders must begin talking with citizens beyond those who contributed to the strategic planning process about the possibility of conducting a subproject in their communities. This involves holding at least three focus groups (the foreign term is borrowed from English into Romanian--"*focus grupuri*") to discuss the principal problems of the community (ideally, those that were previously noted in the charter documents), at the end of which the group members vote on the most critical issue that should be addressed in a subproject grant proposal.[134]

I did not observe focus groups and SIF workers are not present when focus groups are held in communities, but SIF requires documentation that they were held. The minutes of these meetings follow a standard format, whether they are sent to SIF as copies of handwritten pages, pages produced on a typewriter, or ones printed from a computer. Sessions are held with different representatives from the local population, such as homeowners, youth, teachers, parents of school age children, and the elderly. The minutes tell how many participants were present, who led the meeting, and the agenda. Then, they go on to report the highlights of the meeting: the leader's statements, the statements of the focus group members, what they decided, and how many people

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[134] SIF provides its basic paperwork to communities in Romanian (Moldovan) and Russian, in accordance with Moldovan state laws, and conducts meetings in both languages. Despite the limited evidence presented here from communities with other language groups, I hold that the claims I make here regarding cultural practices and identity still apply, as further presentation of data from this research will show.

voted for and against the proposal. Here is an example from a focus group of teachers in "Pomidorova" a village that ended up introducing gas lines as its subproject:

Agenda:

1. The MSIF 2 Project: objectives, types of subprojects, procedures of financing.

2. Identification of the priority problems in the community.

1. Examined: The MSIF 2 Project

Adriana Filat informed the members of the focus group about the projects supported by MSIF, oriented toward the improvement of social services, especially: renovation of schools, kindergartens, roads, roofs, gas and water systems, building waste collection centers, etc.

2. Examined: the principal problems of the village.

Adriana Filat informed [the group] that the principal problems of Pomidorova are: gasification of the village, provision of drinking water, repair of the kindergarten, [and] repair of the club. We need to identify the 3 principal problems.

[The following people] took the floor:

Valentina Trestianu proposed that the principal problem of the village can be reckoned as gasification of the village and social institutions [kindergarten, club, school, etc.]; in second place is the aqueduct [running water lines to the village]; in third place, repairing the roads.

Eugenia Trestianu proposed that the priority problem in the village remains gasification; in second place - repairing the roads, and in third [place] - [repairing] the kindergarten.

Decided: the priority problems of Pomidorova village:

1. The gasification of the village
2. The aqueduct
3. The repair of the roads

Voted:

For - 1-, Against - , Abstained -

Corina Munteanu proposed that the results of the discussion in this focus group should be taken to the General Meeting by Valentina Trestianu.

It was a unanimous vote!

[Signed by the president and secretary of the session]

In this village, each focus group report looks much the same, with the same 3-4 problems discussed. Having been to meetings at later stages in the SIF process and seen the results reported on paper, I can assume there was much more discussion than what is given in these documents. Of the twenty-odd meeting minutes examined, only two indicated participants voting against, and one reported that people abstained. One village pre-

printed the topics to be discussed, rather than allowing them to generate organically, and then left a blank space where people wrote in their names at the focus group. Those from another village only indicated one possible problem, as though the meetings were simply a formality that had to be fulfilled. These examples show a trend toward public demonstrations of consensus, one marker of a good citizen in Soviet times that still seems to be important to present-day Moldovan citizens (Fitzpatrick, 1999). Villages that had never implemented a subproject were more likely to show consensus than villages implementing their second subproject, or towns, where a larger number of people are usually present at the focus group meetings.

Based on my observations of SIF staff at work and the documentation, I believe focus groups are the procedural activities least monitored by SIF in the application process. Consequently, the focus groups seem dominated more heavily by the less democratic principles of *hierarchy and deference to authority*, both of which correspond to discursive formations of citizenship and cultural propriety common to the Soviet era of Moldova's history. They may also reflect attention to cultural propriety through the *presentation* of a cohesive and organized community (no matter the reality). Nevertheless, the focus group stage of the application process shows that citizens are participating in the more recently introduced practices of development and citizenship, at least in the letter of the process, if not completely in the development spirit.

The third step: the General Meeting

The third step in the application process is for the community to hold a "General Meeting" (*adunare generală*) that all local inhabitants are invited to attend. A SIF staff

member, usually a sociologist by training, comes to observe the General Meeting, at which there are three-to-four orders of business: a) the mayor and the SIF representative introduce the process of obtaining a grant to all those present, especially those who did not take part in a focus group; b) the results of the focus groups are announced; c) the people vote on the subproject that the community will undertake to implement; and d) in villages, they vote to elect a local steering committee, called an "implementation agency," ("*agenţia de implementare*") that will be responsible for the subproject's implementation.[135] In towns, the group is proposed and voted on at a prior meeting of the town council. The implementation agency must include the mayor; the community's accountant, similar to a comptroller in the U.S., who maintains the community's budget and finances; and at least three other people, who are frequently engineers, school principals, and other active citizens. Therefore, the agency frequently consists of the same people who created the community association and/or wrote the community's strategic plan.. The mayor cannot be the head of the agency, according to SIF rules, so the person who fills that position is also elected at the General Meeting. Finally, the SIF representative verifies that the community has maintained certain procedures required by the World Bank. For example, for subprojects proposed in villages, 40% of the population must be present at the General Meeting; 30% of those present must be women; and the mayor's office must certify that the object of renovation/construction will not be privatized for 15 years, which ensures it will remain community property for the near future. Once again, with these procedures, the World Bank and SIF are promoting *responsibility to one's community*, *equality*, *democratic values and*

[135] The types of discourse employed during the four orders of business are speeches, vote-taking and making, congratulations, and group meetings (marked by raising hands, making motions, etc.).

participation in civil society, and transparency (the inverse of *illegal use of public funds*). An example will illustrate these as well as other, less overt, themes at play.

On one autumn day, I traveled with Victoria,[136] a SIF sociologist, to observe a General Meeting in Pomidorova. It is the same village introduced above in the focus groups example, and is situated about 1.5 hours north of the capital. When we arrived, we found nearly 200 people gathered in a field behind the building that serves as both the village primary school and the mayor's office/town hall (*primăria*). Victoria was pleased to see that the setting was well-organized: there was a table with chairs for the speakers, extra chairs for the elderly, and even a microphone set up on the wide landing leading to the building, which served as a speaker's platform. People had already arrived and were signing in. This was another positive point in the village's favor, since in some other villages, Victoria had needed to wait while the mayor and others rounded up enough residents to hold the meeting. One person was sitting at a table, neatly inscribing each attendant's name in the left-hand column of a register sheet, and asking people to sign their names in the right-hand column. The mayor began the meeting, telling of the process the village had followed thus far. Then he gave the microphone to Victoria, who explained that SIF is funded by the World Bank and foreign governments for renovation of social and economic infrastructure in Moldova. When she stated that the grant amount could reach US$70,000, a collective gasp arose from the crowd. "But," she added and smiled, "I don't have it here in my briefcase with me." People laughed, but Victoria returned to serious demeanor, continuing to explain the participation and monetary contribution that villagers would have to provide in order to qualify for and win the grant. Her joke served to divert attention away from SIF staff and the grant itself, and

[136] All names are pseudonyms, and I have altered village information to protect anonymity.

back onto the need for local residents' participation in the process. It is often assumed that staff in development agencies are enriching themselves at Moldovans' expense, an assumption also made of government employees at all levels.[137] Victoria's remark acknowledged that stereotype and redirected it to villagers' activities and *their* need for action and transparency.

Next, the mayor put to a vote the subproject to be undertaken. The focus groups (made up of landowners, schoolteachers, and the residents of the newer half of the village) had all suggested that bringing gas lines to the village was their number one priority. The mayor reported their results and asked if there was any discussion or dissent for this proposal. Most people in the large crowd murmured support, but two middle-aged men off to one side raised their voices, saying they did not like the proposal. "Be quiet," shouted one woman in the front of the audience. "You don't know what's best," said another, and the group proceeded to vote in favor of the gas subproject. Later in the meeting, I surmised that the men were probably drunk, based on their continued haphazard actions and slurred speech, and the fact that they wandered off into the trees to sit down before the meeting concluded. This is telling in that the only people to voice dissent were essentially not productive members of the community, on that day, at least.

After the business with residents had been concluded, the mayor thanked the crowd and let them return to their homes. Victoria asked if there was a place she and the mayor could go to talk with the newly elected implementation agency, so we all adjourned to a room inside the school to discuss the paperwork for the proposal. Victoria

[137] Development agency employees are usually paid much higher salaries than most Moldovans. A friend at a different agency was paid about $1000 a month. Moldovans' average monthly salary in the mid-2000s was about $200/month. On the other hand, most government employees are paid much less. This fact is a reason often given to justify embezzlement, fraud, and bribe-taking.

passed out the necessary paperwork, which is also available online[138] for participants, and the group went through the points of the application, one by one. The group made a point of noting that this would only be a draft; they should get someone with good handwriting ("like a teacher," someone said), to prepare the final version. It would be more beautiful ("*mai frumos*", also having the connotation of good form) that way. SIF workers encourage villagers to type the forms, if possible, but most are handwritten.

The first question was what to call the subproject. Because SIF will only sponsor building gas lines if they are connected to some piece of social infrastructure as part of the subproject, Victoria suggested that they connect the school/mayor's office. There was some discussion of other buildings that might be included, such as the "club" (a café/community center) and the local library, which shares a building with the medical station. Victoria then brought up the cost involved in connecting more than one building, the distance of the other buildings from the main road (and thus the main gas line), and the resulting need to gather more money from local residents. It did not seem that the committee members had considered the cost of such public works before; if the mayor and the comptroller knew, they were not speaking up. It became clear to them that only one building could be connected, but not which building. In order to save time and encourage residents to take this question to the community, Victoria said, "We'll just write, 'Construction of a gas line with connection of social items,'" referring to the title of the subproject on the application form, "And you can make the final decision after consulting with local residents, the village council, etc." In fact, this is what appears on the final version of the application, with the specific building to be connected mentioned

[138] Most towns and many larger villages have a public computer station with internet access.

in the text of the application. The residents later told me they agreed to begin with the school and then add other buildings over time, as funds would allow.

In addition, Victoria advised the group on certain aspects of SIF policy that impact the application forms. One example is who to name as beneficiaries of the proposed subproject. When Victoria asked the implementation agency members who would benefit from the subproject, they initially said, "students of the school and their parents." Victoria pointed out that the application form asks for the number of direct *and* indirect beneficiaries, so they needed to think about who else would gain from the subproject. She then suggested any children, aged 0-7, who would be future beneficiaries, young people who might be convinced to stay in the village (marry, have children, and send them to the kindergarten) if the living conditions were better, and the teachers and staff of the kindergarten. People perked up when she said this, as if realizing their own potential. You might even, she added, consider the whole village as indirect beneficiaries, since the growth of the village depends on attracting and keeping people here with the quality of life. When the group turned in their application form, all the village's residents were counted as either direct or indirect beneficiaries.

The SIF representative, such as the sociologist in this case, fills out a form back at the office each time she or he meets with them. The form includes the sociologist's evaluation of the community's preparation and initiative. Copies of these forms are kept in each village's file in the SIF office in Chisinau, and each village receives copies of its various evaluations. Victoria also gave this group one of the SIF publications referenced above, called "Local Participation: Innovative Approaches," which was published with the help of the British Department for International Development (DFID) (CONTACT

and Fund, 2005).[139] It is the book that describes the study visits abroad and offers some of the success stories that SIF collects from participants.

Before we left, the mayor and the head of the implementation agency asked us to join them for some refreshments. This was a common occurrence on site visits, but Victoria and all the other SIF employees hated this part of the visit. They do not like to accept the hospitality of the villagers, because it *could* be construed as an exchange that might imply the need to return a favor, as in giving extra attention or care to the village's application. On the other hand, it is considered impolite in Moldovan culture to refuse an invitation, even for a cup of coffee, and even *more* impolite *not* to offer one's hospitality to a visitor (and there was even more pressure to do this when I was present, as a foreigner). This conundrum puts the SIF employees in the uncomfortable position of saying no to villagers, over and over. Sometimes, however, they accede and accept a cup of tea and a cookie (or even a small glass of wine, which is more likely to be offered to guests), especially when prepared trays are whisked in to the room just as the meeting is ending. Avoiding the appearance of impropriety is one more way that SIF workers attempt to model "appropriate" behavior for other Moldovan citizens. For villagers, it is a way to maintain respect for themselves and for Moldovan culture.

In terms of development, one may notice at this step in the application process that villagers are encouraged to do several things that correspond to affirmative ideologies within this discursive formation, such as:

a) to use foreign terms for group meetings ("*focus grupuri*") and common development terminology, such as "beneficiary," "implementation agency," and

[139] This is also the book from which a school director was quoted, above.

"contribution". This follows the themes of *speaking the state language*, and *following Western models of political and civic life*.

b) to act in what is considered a democratic and business-like manner (being on time, prepared, etc.). *Self-presentation* as democratic and efficient also follows Western models of political and civic participation.

c) to think about the needs of the village in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. At these moments, villagers are expected to follow market economy principles as well as equality and democratic values, and

d) make decisions for themselves as a community. Once again, democratic values and participation in civil society are the overt themes within the discursive frameworks of citizenship and development that SIF and the villagers appeal to during this stage of the application process.

At the same time, certain themes with heavy overtones of the past are still prominent. The local and national hierarchy is preserved, with the mayor and the SIF representative (as a person traveling from the capital, representing an agency with the power of money) indirectly asking for and receiving the most respect. Village residents in locally powerful positions are also likely to be nominated to serve in the implementation agency. Responsibility to community takes the form of community members' professed cohesion, more than any evident respect for diversity or democratic values. People enforce the Soviet-era principle that dissenters are not to be supported, especially when the good of the collective is at stake. Finally, there is attention to detail and propriety in the presentation of the village: from aspects as seemingly insignificant as neat handwriting; to preparation and presentation of village as prepared and ready to receive a

guest; to not showing any negativity or weakness in their resolve to move forward, as when the dissenters were not allowed to speak.

The fourth step: Preparation of the application forms

After continuing with the rest of the forms, Victoria explained that the group had only eight days to finish the application packet and turn it in to the SIF office in Chisinau. This is the next step in the application process of the subproject. In addition to the type of subproject and its beneficiaries, the SIF staff has designed the application form to ask local committees to: a) "argue the community's need to realize this subproject;" b) "indicate the problems that will be solved if this project is implemented;" c) tell "the objectives of the subproject;" and d) tell "the strategies and methods of realizing these objectives" (M. S. I. Fund, 2008a). This step-by-step approach to describing the community and the issues it needs to address, then designing objectives and the means of achieving the objectives is already a means of educating applicants in ways to approach community improvement. It reframes the community's problems as something they have control over fixing, not the state or an outside entity. In effect, the application form sets applicants up for success by putting their approach into the proper discursive format from the beginning.

Along with the application forms, the villagers must submit a "*plan asigurarii durabilitatii.*" This is a plan to ensure the sustainability of the subproject in both qualitative (service-related) and quantitative (monetary/budgetary) ways. Rather than assume that an outside entity, such as the state, or even the World Bank, will provide for the upkeep of major community property (as it did during Soviet times), the citizens are

forced to take on this responsibility themselves. Thus, through their application forms, the community must show its preparedness by: being able to justify the need for the subproject, putting together an estimated budget, and thinking forward to how they will mobilize the community to maintain the community's investment (also the World Bank's and the Moldovan government's investment) once the subproject is completed.

Villages that apply for a second SIF grant are evaluated on how well they follow their sustainability plan, and preserve or improve on their community's investment. Mayor Grosu's village had repaired its kindergarten as its first SIF subproject. When I visited the village as part of the SIF evaluation team for the road subproject (to be explained in the next section), the mayor told us that SIF's biggest accomplishment is to completely change the minds of the people. At this, he put his thumb and forefingers to his temple and turned them, as one would turn a key. When they contribute their money, it's not for others, but for themselves," the mayor continued. "Since we repaired the kindergarten, we haven't had to change out a single window," meaning none were broken by vandals, a common occurrence in the post-Soviet years of disillusionment and disorder. "Never in my life have I seen a single flower in the windows, and now there are many." SIF will consider how regular citizens treat the renovated kindergarten, as well as the budgeted measures for its upkeep by school leaders and local public administration, when considering the community for a second SIF grant.

The Fifth Step: evaluation visits

The fifth step in the subproject application process is the "evaluation stage," for which a SIF team comes again to visit the town or village. Since these involve mostly

verbal interactions, they offer the opportunity to observe the dialogic production of discursive formations between SIF staff and subproject participants on a more interpersonal and spontaneous level. Once again, the interactions most overtly reproduce the themes in groups 1 and 4, those related to community and Western principles of democracy and participation.   The team usually consists of a sociologist, an engineer, and sometimes a knowledgeable contractor. After introductions are made and the agenda for the meeting is announced, the engineer and the contractor go with certain members of the implementation agency to survey the project's territory (school building, road, terrain for water or gas lines, etc.), while the sociologist speaks with the remaining members. Usually, the sociologist asks questions of the group to gauge their preparedness and ability to talk about SIF procedure in language I consider common to group 4, such as: Have you registered your beneficiaries' association?[140] Did you hold focus groups? Who made up the focus groups? How did people decide what to do? The sociologist's goal is not only to make sure that the SIF requirements have been met, but to remind the people of the steps they have already taken by verbally reinforcing the value of those requirements through repetition. If they do not immediately answer, the sociologist prompts them with simpler questions, such as "Did you *vote* on the subproject?" and will call explicitly on the leader of the implementation agency, who *should* know all the answers. The sociologist also wants to see that the community is "active," i.e. involved in the process, and that they understand the reasons why they are completing these tasks. Just as after the general meeting, the sociologist will fill out another form with his or her perceptions of the group, commenting on whether the

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[140] Associations are registered with the government as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Sometimes, implementation agencies are synonymous with the local Beneficiaries' Association.

implementation agency is ready to move forward to the Executive Committee meeting. The sociologist gauges this by the readiness with which the group answers questions, the knowledge the people show of SIF procedures, and whether more than one person is answering the questions. In addition to the theme of *democratic values and participation*, the quality of being active and the able to iterate the subproject development process also evokes the theme of *responsibility to one's community and the state*. In SIF's eyes, the goal of implementing a subproject is not only development for its own sake, but improving the community and the state at large.

Another example of a site visit will exhibit how the evaluation stage often happens in practice for a village implementing its first subproject. On a cold fall day, a SIF team and I arrived at a village near the River Prut, which constitutes much of the border between Romania and Moldova. Victoria was once again the sociologist on the team, partnered with Alexei, a SIF engineer, and Ivan, a contractor who was serving as a consultant for certain projects. When the men left to survey the site, a kindergarten that was proposed to be renovated, Victoria spent about a half an hour reviewing SIF procedures and asking the people present (the local implementation agency members and other interested villagers) questions to see how much they understood. This group, unlike many others I observed, was almost completely silent. The director of the implementation agency should be an "active" person, dynamic and effective, according to SIF practicing standards. In this case the director, who was also the director of the kindergarten, was very timid. Victoria grew agitated and concerned, until the mayor joined the group. The latter is an outspoken, strong-willed woman, who had clearly taken charge of the subproject application process. She answered nearly all of Victoria's

questions, and prodded the other villagers present to show their knowledge, too. The villagers were very quiet during the meeting: only the mayor answered questions without being cajoled into talking. Victoria later told me that the reaction of these villagers was common for people who had not experienced contact with development agencies: they followed "old ways" of keeping quiet and doing what they were told by people who were in obvious positions of power. That is, despite the tradition of adept public speaking, this group deferred to the theme of respecting *hierarchy*. They exhibited their *responsibility to the community and family* by attending and being part of the implementation agency, yet they hesitated to show what SIF staff would call *democratic participation*. The reasons for this are likely varied and complex. Perhaps they did not know the answers; it is not common for Moldovans to offer tentative responses in this type of forum. Being incorrect in public would cause embarrassment and reduce their public standing, not to mention reflect badly on the mayor and the director of the implementation agency. It is considered better to remain silent than to be incorrect. Another possibility is the villagers were waiting for the director of the agency and the mayor to speak for them, thus respecting the local hierarchy in addition to the social status of the SIF visitors.

After the time spent reviewing what the villagers had already done, Victoria began explaining the next steps in the process. She talked first about how they should present themselves at the Executive Committee meeting, which would take place about a week after the evaluation visit. First, they must arrive by 9 a.m., to arrange a few things before the beginning of the meeting at 10 a.m. "What will happen next?" asked Victoria. "The mayor will introduce the project team, and then the director of the beneficiaries' association will present the subproject," she said, answering her own query. Victoria's

style of interaction, and indeed the style of other sociologists I observed, was to ask questions, rhetorical and otherwise, in tones and rhythms reminiscent of a schoolteacher. She went on to pose more questions to the people present, to give an example of what they should expect from the members of the SIF Executive Committee, such as:

"How much does a house cost in your village?"

"How will you secure the contribution of the local population?"

"Regarding transparency, how do you work with people, how do you inform people [about the project]?"

Since this village was "not very active" in Victoria's words, she tried to show them how they should answer some of the questions.

"Say, '(This is) what we have, what we want to have.'"

"Tell them, 'This is how will we maintain this building.'"

At other times, Victoria gave the group direct advice, in her own words:

"It shouldn't be said like that, in a general way; say it concretely."

"Don't stand and read from the paper—that's not appealing."

Here, not only does Victoria coach them on appropriate responses related to the subproject application procedure, but also suggests ways they can impress the committee by *speaking well* in a manner appropriate to those who know how to invoke the discursive formation of development without being vague or reading from their notes.

With this group, Victoria spent about another half hour running through several other steps of the implementation process, assuming they would be approved for the grant. Initially, they talked of advertising for and hiring a contractor for the work. She

felt she needed to tell them that a cheaper offer by a contractor is not necessarily a better or worse offer; they must look at the reference letters of the contractors, must examine where contractors get their materials and how much contractors propose for the cost of all the items. They also discussed the market: not their local open-air market or the large markets of Chisinau, but the market economy. The villagers need to act quickly, she told them, because prices are always rising, especially for building materials. The prices they accept in the contract with the contractor at the end of November will be for work that will not begin until the end of January.[141] If they wait too long to implement their subproject, the grant they receive will not cover the costs of their project, and they will be left paying more from their own pockets to finish the work.

At this point in the discussion, the mayor asked, “I know some people; I worked with them last year on renovating our school. Can we work with them?”

“That doesn’t mean that they will win the contract,” Victoria replied, and she went on to say more about what will happen on the day the contractors’ bids will be opened.

Next, Victoria explained that part of the money collected for the subproject goes toward paying operating fees to SIF. She assured them that the fees were not simply for SIF to make money from villages; their 5000 lei is put into a bank to collect interest, used to pay SIF workers’ salaries and to support the project’s expansion into other regions of Moldova. Victoria’s justification is an example of another way that SIF workers try to ensure their own transparency and accountability to other Moldovans, in an atmosphere rife with public and private allegations of corruption. In this way, reference to

[141] Construction is restricted in winter months because concrete will not cure correctly in cold weather.

accountability and transparency is part of the theme of *illegal use of public funds*, although Victoria does not blatantly refer to bribery or other forms of corruption.

Finally, Victoria talked about how the villagers should monitor the implementation of the subproject. The procedures she described represent practices SIF considers part of *responsibility toward the community*, and preventing and protecting against *illegal activities*. -Among her recommendations were the following: They should hire one person with part of the grant money to supervise the contractors. Villagers should be prepared to take all the furniture out of the building to be renovated. This is not only for the building to be empty for construction to proceed, but also so their items do not get stolen, she noted. Then, the supervisor they hire should check each worker on the site to see that he or she has a work contract, and therefore can be paid according to the law. Most importantly, someone from the village, if not the aforementioned supervisor, should supervise each aspect of the work as it is undertaken and completed. Villagers should check to make sure that the materials used are the same ones denoted in the contract, and that everything is done as it should be, not sloppily or cheaply. They need to protect themselves, because no one else can or will do it, she emphasized. This is the kind of information that people still are not very familiar with, fifteen years after their separation from the Soviet Union. This is proper behavior for citizens implementing development projects.

During the second half of the evaluation meetings, the engineer and the contractor come in from surveying the property or the terrain that will be developed to give their opinions about the viability of the subproject and what the villagers should include in their final proposal. In this case, as mentioned above, the subproject proposed was to

renovate the village's kindergarten. The outside of the building looked typical for small Moldovan schools: the site was bordered by a short wooden fence; inside the courtyard there were several stone statues of animals, painted in what might have once been bright colors; the toilet, essentially an outhouse, was located in the back of the building; and the water for the building was drawn from a well located in the courtyard just outside the front door. Inside, the kindergarten had a kitchen where the children's meals were prepared, and a nap room filled with small wrought-iron bunk beds, two classrooms, and an office for the director. Other than that, the conditions were *much* worse than in other schools I had visited. There was no concrete foundation; the wooden floors were built directly above the ground, which meant they had no insulation from the freezing ground temperatures. In one of the three principal rooms, half the floorboards were missing and the dirt was exposed, allowing cold air to come directly inside, too. In the other rooms, the floorboards were deteriorating, and some even would flip up if a person stood on the wrong end (I found this out the hard way). The building's windows had only one pane, not two for better heat insulation, as is common in well-built Moldovan buildings. There was only one furnace working in the building, a traditional "*soba*."[142] The children were playing in the main classroom, but due to the poor insulation, all wore heavy knitted clothing from head to foot: tights, sweaters, and hats. Since it is customary for people to remove their shoes indoors, the children wore socks and slippers instead of boots. The people who came to the meeting all wore their boots, coats and hats inside; most did not have gloves, and held their hands tightly together to keep themselves warm. On the other hand, there were elements of cheeriness about the building. There were lacy curtains

[142] A *soba* is a stove fueled by coal or wood, usually built of brick and covered in tile, that takes up a wall between two rooms, to heat both rooms at once. In rural Moldovan homes, people often cook on the *soba*, too.

hanging in the windows, woven rugs lying on the floors, artwork by the kids put up on the walls, and crocheted doilies adorning many of the shelves and windows.

The engineer on this site visit, Alexei, is usually very serious when he visits villages. He does not adopt the cajoling “schoolteacher” tone or the Socratic question-and-answer interactive pattern, but speaks more matter-of-factly, more in terms of directives and recommendations. On this day, he re-entered the room where Victoria was speaking to the villagers and, when she turned the meeting over to him, immediately began to give his opinion on how the work should proceed. The roof, windows, doors, and floors should be taken out entirely, he said, leaving only the shell of the building, and they should start from there. Because the village is small (about 600 people), and because of out-migration, there are only a few children at the kindergarten.[143] They had only eleven children enrolled the previous year, but had eighteen in the year that we visited, which Alexei noted as something positive in their favor. However, he considered the small number of direct beneficiaries of the subproject as a negative point. Since the villagers would like to have a library in the village, and had been speaking earlier in the meeting about taking over the bar nearby to turn it into a library or youth center, Alexei suggested incorporating the library into an extension to the kindergarten building. That way, the whole village would benefit, and people without children would be more likely to contribute money for such a project. He was giving them advice about how to serve the community at large and not just the families with young children.

Alexei next went down the list of items he and the contractor considered necessary for the renovation: two coal-fed boiler heaters, which would also pump water

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[143] In addition to rural-to-urban migration, this village is very close to a Romanian-Moldovan border crossing, so many residents had found ways to work across the international boundary.

from the outdoor well; one electric boiler for producing hot water in the kitchen; new doors and windows; paint for the floors and walls; roofing; new interior lights, etc. He estimated the entire project cost at 950,000 Moldovan lei (MDL), or about US$75,000.[144] This is commonly the point at which villagers become more involved in the meetings, because they are concerned about the amount of money they will have to contribute and raise. In this particular village, those present wanted to know if they could contribute something besides money. SIF allows non-monetary contributions, up to a certain percentage of their required contribution. Someone suggested sand, which they have a lot of in this area, being next to the river. Alexei had to explain that they need a special quality of sand for making concrete and building foundations, if they want the building to meet construction codes and last a long time. He suggested that instead, they could contribute labor, wood for the new doors, and materials for redecorating the interior of the building.

Alexei couched his talk in phrases such as, "you have to decide" and "it's your project." Despite using these phrases, which are intended to induce a feeling of ownership and power in the villagers, Alexei is essentially giving them his best advice on how to use their money and produce a good, sustainable result. SIF has found over time that to make efficient and durable buildings, renovations should start with making the roof sound and waterproof, then renewing doors and windows as necessary, and then the heating system. Otherwise, heat will escape, and precipitation will seep in and ruin ceilings and walls. This is the model that all engineers propose to subproject groups. In

[144] This amount is also the upper limit of SIF-funded subprojects. SIF engineers maintain knowledge of current market prices for the technical equipment, supplies, and labor that are used in SIF-sponsored subprojects, to prevent artificially high bids or collusion by contractors. It is possible that Alexei's estimate came in at that amount because he knew that is what the village could afford with the grant amount.

my experience, the villagers usually take the engineer's advice, even if there is a great deal of discussion on the details of the subproject.

At this step in the process, in addition to continuing to instill use of development terminologies, ownership in their locality, and transparent practices, the SIF workers attempt to make villagers more conscious of their situation as participants in a rapidly changing market economy within the state of Moldova. Villagers are faced with the real cost of their proposed subproject, and must think how they are to come up with the village's contribution. In this case, 15% of $75,000 is $11,250, or $18.75 per person, assuming all 600 residents contribute (some are children and elderly and are not likely to contribute) and that they all contribute equally. In a country where the average salary reaches about $30 per week, and rural citizens earn much less, this is a substantial sum for villagers to pay.[145] In addition, SIF employees are highly aware of the amount of corruption, fraud, and graft in their country; they have more than a lay person's exposure to contracts, hiring practices, and the like (word of illegal practices gets around quickly in NGO and government circles) and SIF executive staff are often called upon to arbitrate between contractors and villages when misunderstandings happen or contracts are breached. The knowledge Victoria and Alexei passed on to these villagers did not only pertain to "development agency approved" practices, but was based on their experience and observations from the implementation of hundreds of other subprojects. Therefore, when they cautioned villagers on taking care to monitor closely the work done in their kindergarten, it was not only to instill a sense of ownership in the local people, but I believe it was meant to protect them. Consequently, not only would the village's

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[145] Villagers earned even less on average. The average monthly salary of agricultural workers in 2006 was approximately $59 (Moldpres, 2007).

investment be protected, but also SIF's, the World Bank's, and the state's investment in this community would be sustainable, as well.

Consultation: another site visit

Sometimes, a SIF engineer goes back to consult with the community on the logistics of the project before they can turn in their final application. In the visit to the kindergarten that badly needed renovating, described above, a contractor went along with the team to help the SIF engineer and the villagers estimate the steps that should be taken to ensure a sound building. In other cases, a separate visit is planned. Mayor Grosu's community, which is made up of two villages, one of which had already implemented a SIF grant, received a consultation visit on a very cold January day. I rode there with Alexei the engineer and a different contracting consultant, Vasile, who spoke only Russian, but understood Romanian a little. The implementation agency and community members had decided they wanted to build a road between the two villages. We arrived at the village nearest the main road, picked up the Mayor and the head of the implementation agency, a woman named Vera, then drove along a bumpy frozen dirt road for about 1.5 kilometers to the second village. While Alexei, Vasile, Mayor Grosu, and one other man went out to examine the area where the road would be put in, the head of the implementation agency and I waited for the other people to arrive for the meeting that would take place in the village's four-room primary school. Vera told me how people walked back and forth between villages every day, since the institutions that served the community: post office, secondary school, and the two stores, were all in the first village. When the budget allowed, the mayor rented a mini-bus to take the students

to school in the morning, but they would have to walk home in the afternoon. She herself had been born in the newer of the two villages, but moved to the older one when she married her husband.

When Alexei and the others came in, about five people were present from the village. They waited until a couple more came, then started the meeting. Alexei reminded them a little about the process of applying for their second SIF grant, and then set the agenda for the day. He and Vasile were there today to help them decide what could be done within the scope of this subproject: how long and how wide they could build the road, and how they could make it last. Some murmurs arose from the villagers when he uttered "how long" and "how wide." Alexei was undeterred by the slight interruption and went on to advise them to take minutes from the day's meeting and sign them as a committee to finalize their decisions.

This meeting took a different turn than others I had observed. It was participatory, but in a more argumentative way. The villagers openly challenged the advice of the SIF employee and the contractor as the meeting progressed. It started when Alexei explained that the grant would not cover the costs of building the road entirely from one village to another. People were disappointed and a little astonished when they heard the news. So, Alexei told them, they had to decide where to begin the road, how long to make it, and how wide. "Should it begin in __ and go toward __, or vice versa?" asked Alexei. The group unanimously voiced that it should begin on *their* end of the 1.5 kilometer stretch. Next, Alexei told them that the length of road would be determined by how wide they wanted it to be. He spoke succinctly, stating the many variants, and what he thought would be the best option: 4.5 meters wide, with asphalt on the right side for

vehicles, and gravel on the left side for pedestrians and as a passing lane. The asphalted part would be a little wider than a local dump truck (my estimate). Whereas normally, a group listens politely when Alexei talks, this group became agitated and began to voice their concern.

"Why can't the road be wider?" someone asked, and proposed a 7 meter-wide thoroughfare. Alexei responded that they only get a little transport on this road, so if they built a narrower road, they could build it farther. An elderly woman complained that he did not know what kind of people use the road, that there are often big trucks going through. She challenged his authority *not* based on his professional expertise, but on his knowledge of the local area and what might be best for them.

Next,[146] the group spent a lot of time discussing how to build the road. One of the older men stated that a lot of water flows onto this road, so it would be better to construct it out of cement. Everyone joined in at this point. Evidently, the residents had rebuilt this road before, but the rushing water after rains and snow melt-off had washed it all away, leaving deep tracks difficult to navigate with regular cars. Alexei described how they should build a "*cuvet*", or a small trough on the side of the road for water evacuation, and how they should construct pipes under the road for water drainage. Then, they discussed where the pipes would go, based on a debate between where Alexei suggested and local residents' knowledge of the flow of water. At one point, the most elderly man asked Vasile, the Russian speaking contractor, a question in Russian about asphalt. When Vasile answered, backing up Alexei's suggestions about asphalt versus concrete, the villager asked about Vasile's qualifications. Vasile responded with his list

[146] These topics did not arise in sequential order, but were all jumbled together. I write them sequentially here for clarity.

of degrees and work experience, which seemed to satisfy the participants. Yet, they challenged both Alexei and Vasile this time on their technical knowledge combined with their local knowledge. Were they challenging Vasile because he is a Russian speaker, I wondered? It could have been an implicit reference to the theme of *speaking the state language*. Did they trust neither Alexei nor Vasile because they were outsiders to their small community? They could also have been invoking personal connections (a part of both *cronyism* and *family ties*). Because Romanian speaking Moldovans rarely admit to discriminating against others based on language (since it was done to them for many years), an *emic* view would likely be the latter. My *etic* perspective tends toward a combination of the two, at least when referring to Vasile.

The mistrust of outsiders, or one might see it as the trust in personal connections, came up again when the most elderly man spoke again. He wondered where Victoria, the SIF sociologist was: "We started the project with Victoria, and this new person is sending us in a different direction." She had attended their General Meeting and consulted with the implementation agency on their initial paperwork, but perhaps a sociologist did not attend this evaluation visit because the community had already implemented one subproject successfully. In Victoria's notes about her site visit, she called the community "active" and complemented the Mayor on the way he led the General Meeting. With SIF staff constantly stretched thin, they may have decided a sociologist was more urgently needed elsewhere. The elderly man then demanded to speak to a Deputy of Parliament (this was probably considered outrageous in such a local community meeting, since the man's fellow villagers laughed at him). In what I consider

an admirable display of patience, Alexei simply replied that he is not a Parliament member, but a representative of MSIF.

The Mayor then took the lead in the meeting at the suggestion of Vera, the head of the implementation agency. She may have recognized that a local authority, a known person, might fare better with the contrary group. He reminded the group that they were there to make some necessary decisions today, that Alexei from SIF had come "*sa sfatuiesc cu noi*", to counsel them (literally to counsel *with* us), and that Vasile the contracting consultant could not come to visit them another time. He deferred to both of their expertise, stating, "I'm just a tractor operator, not a school teacher." On the other hand (and upon the arrival of some new attendees to the meeting), Mayor Grosu reminded the group about SIF's operating principles, in which 85% of the money comes from a grant, and 15% comes from the population. If he went to the Parliamentarian for money, he said, directing his comments to everyone, not only to the elderly man, the Deputy would ask for 100% [of the renovation funds to come from the population].[147] "But," he went on, "let's take it from the beginning." They could start over with the General Meeting and decide on a different subproject, he suggested. Or, they could do the best they could on the road with the money they had available. This was the point at which the group quieted down. By the end of the meeting, they decided to go with the SIF engineer's and the contractor's advice. In addition to the potential for mistrusting outsiders, I wondered whether residents knew how much capital reconstruction cost

[147] Interestingly, he used Russian to say "100%," (sto porsent), not Romanian. His secondary and/or higher education in mathematics may have been in Russian. This common experience leads Moldovans to code-switch frequently. The fact that he used Russian in this sentence to indicate a less than desirable practice by a Parliamentarian may be a significant deictic moment pointing toward an association between Russian language—Russian speakers—corrupt activities, but I have little corroborating data to support such a hypothesis. On the contrary, the Mayor said later that local people elected him because he was a "nachal'nik," an energetic, self-starting leader, which he also said in Russian.

during Soviet times and afterwards, if they had no direct experience with it. There were not only the costs for the materials discussed, but for the labor, the inspection, and the upkeep of the road. Their surprise at how little the grant could achieve probably led to the suspicion that they were being cheated somehow.

Later, I hypothesized that the group could have been more vocal and active (even though contrarily) in the meeting because they felt more comfortable doing so after having implemented a first SIF subproject. Another reason could be that mostly elderly residents had come to the meeting. Did the respect shown toward the elderly in general enable this group to feel they could speak out without fear of embarrassment or retribution? Perhaps they felt more invested in this subproject than other groups had felt about their gas lines or schoolhouses. Whatever the reason, the group's behavior still reinforced locally important themes in both their "traditional" (Soviet) and post-Soviet variants.

Appraisal and Negotiation: the Executive Committee meeting

On the day that the villagers come before the Executive Committee, the last step in the appraisal process, they arrive in Chisinau before 10:00 a.m. on the designated day (usually a Wednesday). This means they must get up very early in the morning and travel between 1 and 6 hours to arrive on time, depending on how far they are from the capital and their mode of transportation.[148] When they enter the SIF offices, the villagers report to the engineer or sociologist assigned to them and that person checks over their

[148] Travel by public transportation or minibus can be very uncomfortable; people often stand for their entire journey and are crammed together in stifling conditions. Most members of implementation agencies seemed to have arranged one or two private cars for their transportation to the Executive Committee meeting, since they were on important community business.

documents and the items they have prepared to elaborate on before the Committee. The SIF representative again goes over the plan for the day: who will speak, what facts and numbers they will present, and what to expect when they enter the Director's office.[149] The SIF advisor emphasizes to the community members that they should focus on the process of development in their community, and how to present that to the Committee in an acceptable way. Some less well-prepared groups, or those who did not follow advice, would come to the Executive Committee meeting and talk about how poor they were, essentially begging for money. That did not indicate to SIF executive staff that the groups had internalized the language and ideologies common to the world of development.

The physical setting of the meetings has the Executive Committee members sitting along both sides of a conference table about 2 meters long, with the Executive Director at the end of the table, facing the door. When people from subproject proposal committees are formally invited to enter the room, they are directed to sit along the wall facing the conference table, but they are never invited to sit at the table, even though it is only about two feet away. The Director welcomes the group to the room with pleasantries. Then, in a more formal tone, he asks, "Who will present this team?" Almost without fail, the leader of the group, usually the mayor or director of the village implementation agency, stands up, introduces the people present, then sits down. Most of the people who come before the Executive Committee for the first time enter the room with nervous energy. Their hands and voices tremble despite the fact that

[149] One SIF sociologist noted that she always encouraged subproject participants to present the social value of their projects first, which not all subproject participants did. She felt that the community's use for the subproject should be highlighted before the committee, not merely the facts and figures of their proposal.

they are leaders in their communities and have all of their materials prepared and in front of them. These behaviors recall the fear of and respect for the Soviet *hierarchy*.

Next, the Director asks a member of the Executive Committee to present a short scripted piece of information about the subproject. The person quickly reads aloud that this subproject proposal, this team of people, and the village they represent, are ready from a technical, ecological, financial, and social point of view, to pass to the next stage of implementation of the subproject. They have been officially deemed ready for the Executive Committee.

The Director then formally addresses the group again, “Who among you is going to defend this proposal?” At this, the subproject leader usually stands again. Often, the Director will interrupt and ask the person to sit down, saying gently, “We are partners here, there is no need to stand up.” In most cases, the villagers remain standing. I observed one person respond with, “I can’t do otherwise; this is how I was taught.” When the next member of the implementation agency rises to speak, the Director might repeat his entreaty and remind them of their partnership, but he usually gives up asking them to sit, and lets them continue in the way that is comfortable to them. Such interchanges exhibit the continued power of the theme of *hierarchy* on people’s everyday behaviors, despite the introduction of contrasting themes that call for *democracy*, *equality*, and partnership.

Two aspects of the Executive Committee meetings are important for this discussion. The first is the substance of the meetings, in other words, the information presented. The second is the style of the interactions, which has been introduced above. Concerning the substance, it involves a presentation of the subproject and an

evaluation of the community's readiness to move forward. The village representatives' presentation usually consists of the need for the subproject, the materials they will use, the costs of various materials, the total budget, and the villagers' contribution to the budget. The Director and other members of the Committee then ask questions of the group, touching upon areas where the group seems uncertain, or where the presentation was missing some bits of information. The Committee also asks questions that directly concern SIF procedures consistent with development ideologies of transparency, sustainability, and community involvement, such as:

"How have you decided how much each citizen should contribute?"

"Have you been giving citizens receipts for their contributions?"

"Who will be in charge of monitoring the work of the contractors?" and

"In what ways will you maintain the work of the subproject after it is finished?"

To a certain extent, the Executive Committee meeting involves a repetition of all of the instruction, advice, and consultations made with the villagers up to this point. It is a final chance for the SIF executive staff to appraise the progress of the village, and also an opportunity to appraise the work of their own employees as consultants. Sometimes, when a community seems unprepared, the Director asks the engineer or sociologist who worked with them to come in to the meeting, and asks that person to help clarify any questions.

Second, the style of the interactions is very formal. Despite the Director's call to partnership, which would imply to me a more collegial, relaxed style of interaction, he conducts the Executive Committee meetings with a firm hand, in a very authoritative style of speaking and acting. This is a leadership style common to the Soviet hierarchy,

one I observed frequently in 1994-6 when I worked in Moldova. He is the first to ask questions of the group, and then formally invites other Committee members to ask questions. Sometimes, he directs an assistant to bring in the sociologist or engineer who has worked with the group, to clarify a question. At least two of those long-time SIF employees told me they were very nervous to go in front of the Committee. The Director's stern attitude made them tremble sometimes, too. At times, his tone, manner, and style of questioning participants also reminded me of a schoolteacher or a university professor. He and the other Committee members commonly scold groups who are unprepared, and praise groups who make solid presentations.

For example, when the implementation agency for the village hoping to renovate its kindergarten came to the Executive Committee, the head of the agency was so nervous that she forgot to tell some of the budgetary figures important to the Committee. In addition, when the Committee asked about certain aspects of the building renovation plans, the women who made up the agency could not answer. This led to even more questions by the Committee, such as why the village planned to add a library/community center to the kindergarten building, and how local residents would use the building. He became frustrated with the women's inability to speak with authority on the subproject, the same frustration that Victoria had shown when she first visited the village.

"We need to know what we are investing in. Why did you present things so modestly?" he said to the head of the agency. "You're supposed to be in charge. You're supposed to be the one telling people why they are saving and contributing money! Didn't you have the building plans [to prepare for today's meeting in advance]?" In other words, the group's ignorance of the construction details of the project translated to a lack

of initiative and ownership in the eyes of the Committee. They had not mastered the ideals of *community responsibility*, *democratic participation*, and the *market economy* that the Committee was looking for. In the end, the Committee decided to approve the subproject only on a conditional basis. The implementation agency had to reappear before the Committee before they could hire a contractor, in order to demonstrate their improved knowledge of their subproject proposal and of SIF procedures.

The transcript in Appendix G contains excerpts from one Executive Committee meeting. For the two implementation agencies from the neighboring villages of Nucareni and Alexeevca,[150] which are subsumed under one mayor's office, this day was much awaited. They had worked for more than six months to arrive at this stage of the process, hoping to implement a subproject to run gas lines through their villages. The transcript shows that the common procedures described above were observed: the Executive Director directs the flow of the meeting from beginning to end; subproject participants are asked to introduce their teams; Committee members make a formal opening statement; and then the teams are invited to present their subproject proposals. Then, the Director asks questions of the implementation agency, and solicits questions from his staff members for the villagers. The questions pertain to how well the participants have thought through their proposal, how they have planned for the project's implementation and its durability. At the end, the Director makes the final decision whether or not to approve the proposal.[151]

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[150] Both village names are changed. I have never been to the actual villages of Nucareni and Alexeevca.
[151] Most proposals are approved; if not approved, they are usually sent for revisions, to be brought again before the Committee. Complete denials for funding are rare and usually indicate that a village has egregiously violated SIF's required operational procedures.

This particular meeting took place in June 2006, as tensions were escalating between Russia and Moldova: the wine embargo had begun in March, and natural gas prices were on the rise. Gas prices went up from US$80 per 1,000 cubic meters to $110 by the time of this meeting, and were set to go to $160 by the end of 2006 (Socor, 01/04/2007). During the summer months, I observed the Executive Director and Committee becoming more and more stringent with the approval of gas subproject proposals. He questioned the villagers for longer periods of time concerning their village's commitment and ability to paying higher gas prices in the future. He wanted to make sure that SIF's and the villagers' investment would not be lost. In addition, the Director used these meetings as platforms to educate villagers on alternative types of fuel and heating systems. For example, he often informed those present that SIF had helped implement one heating-system subproject in the southern part of the country that used new technology from Germany to extract long-lasting heat from straw. He asked the committee members if they had researched any other technologies or types of heating systems. Most had not looked beyond the three common types of heating materials: coal, wood, and natural gas, a fact that dismayed the Director.

The central negotiation over the subproject is between the Director, who speaks more than any other SIF staff member in this meeting, and the village leaders. The negotiation concerns the feasibility of the gas subproject, and whether or not the village will be able to pay for gas in the long run. The Director's argument revolves around the fact that gas prices have gone up and may rise astronomically in the future, whereas the prices for resources inside Moldova (such as wood and coal) are more stable. His talk

focuses on knowledge of the market economy in Moldova, the geopolitical circumstances of the region, and responsibility to the community and the state (lines 23-35).

The Director mentions Gazprom by name twice (lines 160, 221), both times in a disparaging way: once concerning gas prices and a second time along with a reference to corrupt relationships between Gazprom, local Moldovan gas companies, and their staff. What is left unsaid in the exchanges is that Moldova's relationship with Russia is also tenuous, and that the gas prices are a symptom of the shaky ground between the two countries. For the Director, therefore, gas subprojects represent participation in the international market economy beyond Moldova's borders, Moldova's wavering relationship with Russia, and Moldova's resulting unstable future. In other words, he brings the state into the discussion; he wants the villagers to think beyond the boundaries of their village and recognize the notion of Moldova as a political, economic, and cultural entity that exists in a complex international arena.

On a more practical market-focused level, instability and risk are not sound bases on which to invest money. Twice the Director asks for the villagers' calculations and estimates for other types of heating systems, claiming that their appeals for gas are based on emotions, not on reason (lines 80-1, 124). He shows concern, however, in the Moldovans before him (lines 68-74, 92-3, 103-9)--how will they be able to pay for gas that will become more and more expensive? His concern may be with these villagers, but in a way, his concern is for hundreds of thousands of other citizens just like them.

For the villagers, the gas subproject has less to do with the national economy and their compatriots in other regions, and more to do with improved living conditions. Gas is easier to access, easier and cleaner to work with (they simply turn it on and off versus

obtaining wood or coal, and building, stoking, maintaining fires in stoves), and better for their health. As one woman states, "with gas, at least one can rest" (lines 156-7). The Director provokes them repeatedly as in:

- "Ok, that's emotions, emotions, what you're saying, but your calculations/estimates, where are they? (lines 80-82);
- "Now you, you don't see any risks at all? (lines 162-163);
- "We will invest, we will spend money, you, for you to begin to have gas in your houses, and it could happen that you lose, that you won't use the gas (lines 165-169); and
- "So, furthermore- - -How will people make the connection [of the gas line] to each house? Have you studied, do you have a strategy, a concept measured/gauged - - -[for] those who will connect?" (Lines 178-183).

At each point, the villagers attempt to show that they have, in fact, estimated the costs and weighed the risks versus the benefits of bringing gas to their community. One of their counterarguments is that other fuel prices have gone up, too, and there is much discussion of these factors (lines 137-164). The villagers needed to prove their knowledge of the *market* and their *responsibility to the community and one's family* according to the Director's (SIF's, the Bank's) understanding of those discursive themes. Their discussion revolves around expertise of prices and local living conditions, but also have to do with the influence of Gazprom and Russia on local prices. To come to an agreement, the villagers must show that they are aware of the expense and are ready for it. They have planned for their future by growing crops that sell for higher prices (lines 117-120) and by setting the gas subproject in motion two years before (lines 125-131).

They would like to convince the Director that they are not simply asking for a better life based on their emotional irrationality, but that they have also taken the *market economy* and Moldova's precarious geopolitical position into consideration. For his part, the Director shows that he is willing to accept their expertise on the local population and its abilities as more than just their opinion.

From the transcript, we can also see the dialogic process of identifying oneself with different parts of society, and with world powers outside Moldova. First, and most simply, we see people relating to those around them by using "we/our" vs. people not considered part of their group ("you/your"), thereby creating relational in-groups and out-groups (lines 8 and 33, for ex.). Most of the time, the Director puts himself in an out-group to the villagers. Three times, however, he puts himself and the villagers in similar groups: when he brings up the median salary of all Moldovans and their likely expenses (lines 98-109), when he speaks of Auntie Iliana (lines 70-74), and when he honestly wonders at the villagers' ability to pay (line 239). In introducing Auntie Iliana, the Director perhaps is calling upon all Moldovans' knowledge of elderly people in their country, of the small government pensions the elderly receive, and of the knowledge people share of pensions not being paid on time throughout the 1990s. These three instances call upon common knowledge of recent economic conditions in their country.

Second, larger geopolitical comparisons and the theme of *participation in the market economy* are at work. To begin, there is an implied comparison between Moldova and Russia, and Moldovan and Russian companies serve as proxies for their respective states (lines 24-28, 160, 221). Moldovans as citizens of Moldova are not part of Russia any longer, a point made clear by Gazprom's gradual price increase for Moldova, which

will be equal to the price paid by the rest of Europe by 2011. This allows the people present (who are all native speakers of Moldovan/Romanian, by the way) to see themselves as one group, with the "others" being Russia.[152] The price comparison even allows the Moldovans to envision themselves as part of *Europe*.

In addition, the SIF Director repeatedly asks the villagers to show their familiarity with SIF procedures (bidding, hiring of contractors, transparency--lines 178-87, 212-38), as well as their knowledge of international and local economic market conditions (lines 55-58, 86-94). Together, this body of knowledge, as well as their preparation for this moment through the SIF and World Bank procedures, allows the villagers to prove their familiarity with development and the economic market in the new Moldova. Their knowledge draws them in to a shared world of focus groups, tendered contracts, and project ownership, even if they do so unwillingly or only in order to receive their grant.

Third, by participating in SIF (and thus Moldovan government) development projects, the villagers are taking part in daily activities of citizenship and becoming more familiar with the state. All of the SIF procedures reinforce a democratic process, values of community building, the participation of less powerful community members, and obeisance to the state: from meeting and voting as groups, to choosing items of social infrastructure as objects of renewal, to following the bureaucratic procedures of a government agency. The village implementation agencies include local public administration, and must register their agencies with the government, reinforcing a hierarchy of state administrative power. The villagers must interact with local companies in the marketplace according to legal ways of hiring contractors and paying workers.

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[152] I should note that the Executive Director did not vary his stance on gas subprojects if the villagers present belonged to other ethnolinguistic groups and the Committee meeting was conducted in Russian.

Moreover, they are able argue their case before a body of people who represent the state (and multilateral donors), which gives the villagers a chance to see the state as people interested in their welfare, not merely a heavy bureaucracy that asks them to fill out forms and hands down decisions from above. According to the principle of *habitus*, following such daily practices and procedures over time may reinforce and generate notions of citizenship even in people who do not feel especially tied to their state or its government (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984).

As for the SIF employees, they are also acting as Moldovan citizens. I saw in their daily work that their main concerns are for Moldovans and the betterment of Moldova. SIF workers as citizens are subject to the same influences of the political and economic situation of Moldova, but they are more entrenched in the official and international ideologies about development and citizenship than are villagers. Because they live in the capital city and their salaries are higher, they have wider awareness of foreign ideals and influences, and they can interact in the market in different ways than other Moldovans. Still, they are also enmeshed in local networks of family and social connections that give them something in common with the villagers beyond residing within the same state boundaries.

However, SIF employees symbolically represent the Moldovan state. They use their positions as intermediaries between international, national, and local worlds (which are not bounded, by any means) to educate other Moldovans on community development, on participation in the market economy, and on ways to conduct themselves transparently in their interactions with each other and with local businesses. The SIF employees model

citizenship behaviors for other Moldovans, and the ways they question the villagers' knowledge of the business and development environment reinforces that modeling.

Therefore, the two groups in this exchange are talking about the same subproject proposal from different perspectives that are couched in their past experiences, their socioeconomic status, and their current daily life. The villagers focus on their obligations to their locality and its residents, while the SIF Director favors the nation as a whole. By invoking Auntie Iliana, family obligations, Moldova, and Moldova Gas, the Director seems to see the village and its inhabitants as representative of *and* responsible to the nation. If the villagers cannot pay for their gas, the nation will suffer along with these particular residents, since Moldova will be further indebted to Gazprom and further subject to Russian displeasure. Both Russia and the EU are silent interlocutors in the conversation. Russia is not only represented by Gazprom, but also by the themes more reminiscent of Soviet hierarchy, notably the communication styles of the more powerful and less powerful participants in the meeting. The EU is represented by the host of practices, vocabulary items, and expectations of proper economic dealings that the SIF procedures embody.

With SIF as an authority operating with the Moldovan government and the World Bank behind it, SIF is in a position of great coercive and economic power. SIF employees use that power to promote the democratic process and promote an identity of common citizenship that articulates with democratic and liberal economic principles. The villagers and the SIF staff presented in this dialogue know they are a part of the state of Moldova; they act within the state and its boundaries, whether with patriotism or without. The principle of *habitus* allows that their self-identification exists partly through

participation, through their subjection to/by the market economy that acts within the state boundaries, and through their subjection to business entities such as Gazprom and Moldova Gas and their representatives (who are citizens/registered entities of states and therefore subject to state laws). As we have seen from the villagers' perspective, the ties to localities and the people within them are still strong and influential in Moldova. Nevertheless, SIF is sponsoring long-term interactions that encourage linking local identities to legitimate national government processes at the same time that community ties are strengthened through people's interactions as citizens and community members.

The concepts illustrated through SIF's daily interactions with villagers connect Moldovan development to Russian power, Westernized living conditions, international development ideologies, and the regional and global market economy. Common talk about Moldova's prospects of joining the European Union, and the influence of Russia on the Moldovan economy and peace talks with Transnistria seem to direct Moldovans' focus toward comparing themselves to others: what they need to do to meet others' standards, what they should do to appease Russia and stay alive next winter, who they should imitate and who they should not be like. However, the work done daily by institutions such as SIF, its staff, and the citizens with whom they interact is also a positive way of building awareness of what citizens can do (and are doing) about Moldova's geopolitical situation. Finally, talk and ideas concerning development also form a set of practices melded with what are understood as proper ways of behaving, and accepted ways of being a citizen.

Chapter Seven:

SIF, Culture Houses, and Culture

Introduction

About midway through my fieldwork, SIF started working on a government-funded project to assist communities in renovating their culture houses.[153] One particular case came to illustrate much about the transfer of SIF procedures to a set of projects outside World Bank influence. It also serves as a catalyst to discuss aspects of Moldovan culture and identity that I observed during my fieldwork, and the relationship of culture to the discursive formations described in this work (development, citizenship, proper behavior). The case involves the local implementation agency of a town, "Struguri Mare," that applied to renovate its culture house. SIF staff found it particularly difficult to work with this group because, unlike the implementation agencies of other subproject types (gas, roads, schools, etc.), and even others who renovated their culture houses, the Moldovan government had pre-approved Struguri Mare's application for SIF funding. The local leaders knew before they turned in their paperwork that they would receive the grant. This led to resistance to SIF procedures on the part of the community implementation agency, and frustration with the group and the government on the part of SIF staff.

My experience with this community began after I had ridden along on SIF site visits to other culture house applicant communities. In those instances, as in the meetings

[153] *Case de cultura/domy kultury,* sometimes also called a House of Culture, depending on the translation, or a Palace of Culture, depending on the size of the institution. I use the term "culture house" instead of "house of culture" because that is the term that SIF currently uses in its English publications.

described previously, most people followed the guidelines for the meeting laid out by the SIF team; they were quick to show respect for SIF by their relative silence during the meetings and their ready adherence to SIF staff members' advice about the renovation and application materials. During this meeting, however, a bit of chaos ensued. It all began as usual. The mayor and regional government leader began the introductions, and then the SIF engineer and sociologist told the group the plan for the day. They would work in parallel, beginning with the engineer outside and the sociologist inside, each carrying out certain tasks separately in order to finish more quickly and save townspeople's and SIF's time. The engineer on this visit was Yurie, the distinguished and straightforward person I described in Chapter X who worked with the kindergarten renovation. Alina, the sociologist, was a junior member of the SIF team, but she had been assigned to conduct all the SIF culture house site visits. She was slight of build and usually quiet-spoken.

After the introductions, Yurie rose to go outside, and asked for two or three knowledgeable people to assist him in surveying the site. Alina then stood up, ready to carry out her part of the meeting. However, as Yurie neared the door, nearly the whole room arose and started to leave. Alina tried to call them back: "*Oameni buni*!"—"Good people!" she said loudly. "Not everyone!" The engineer stopped and quickly reiterated the plan, reinforcing Alina's directive. He then left with a small group of men, which included the director of the culture house, the mayor and the government official. Nonetheless, some people ignored the two SIF employees and continued to leave. Alina tried to calm the room and get them to sit back down, pleading, "Good people, stay here a little longer." Then, becoming agitated, she raised her voice further and cried out, "Do

you want a House of Culture or don't you?…We're going to be taking roll, doing everything necessary [for the next steps of the process]; if you don't want it, just say so, and we won't stay any longer." I thought her reaction was a little severe; I assumed the group had simply misunderstood. However, Alina and Yurie told me on the way home that they took the townpeople's actions as a lack of initiative, a lack of dedication to the process. Perhaps those present thought the town leaders would take care of the rest of the meeting, or they simply had not been listening. Either way, their actions were suspect, in SIF's eyes.

At the time, the people still in the room regained their seats and made light of the situation. They challenged Alina's interpretation and reaction, saying, "we just didn't understand," and "we've been working here with our gloves on," the latter implying their dedication to the subproject shown in their willingness to suffer in the cold while conducting and preserving cultural activities. Alina was not to be placated, and further used the situation to try to reinforce SIF's operating principles:

> You are the ones who are making the House of Culture. I'm saying again what we've said from the start: You are doing this, not SIF, not the contractor, not the regional government. You're doing it and it's all for you. Why did we call you here today? Not simply for you to waste your time….You're the ones who can…make decisions, who discuss [this work] together, and so on. We only orient you.

Before moving to the other business of the meeting, she added,

> Are you ready for this, or aren't you? …All of your reactions, participation, and involvement, all of it is measured…and we take this information to the Executive

> Committee….We see the situation here in the field, and we tell them whether the town wants to move forward, [and] has the capacity or not….Then, the Executive Committee decides to approve the funding or not….Is that clear? Because of this, today is a very important meeting.

The townspeople present may have noticed the contradiction between the phrases "You're doing it and it's all <u>for</u> you" and "Why did we call you here today?…we tell them whether the town wants to move forward, [and] has the capacity or not." Whether they did or not, their knowledge of the pre-authorization of their application surely influenced the mood of the day. The rest of the meeting proceeded with much more lively and contradictory discussion than I observed at any other culture house meeting and indeed, any other site visit. Nearly every point was argued, from the expansion of the building's purpose and usage, to the best way to repair the leaking ceiling, and to the estimated cost of repairs to the gymnasium on the second floor.

Throughout this meeting and in a subsequent interview I conducted with two of the senior staff of the culture house, the people of Struguri Mare spoke very proudly of their work, their town, and the local and national culture they supported. In other words, they focused on culture and proper behavior toward cultural traditions and practices, as well as the kind of patriotism that evokes pride in the achievements of one's community and country. All of these tendencies are not surprising considering applicants' positions at the culture house. This was a common result of discussions with most of the culture house applicants whom I met. Unlike subprojects for gas lines, roads, schools, and sewer systems, subprojects for culture houses generated less talk about the SIF grants,

international development, civic life, and democratic participation. The talk about culture conflicted more with the discursive formation of development, but resounded with citizenship and proper behavior in a way that called Moldovan culture to the forefront.

Such observations as these with the applicants from Struguri Mare lead me in this chapter to compare SIF-supported culture house subprojects to the other infrastructure renewal subprojects presented in the previous chapter. The chapter will show that the first year of implementation of this type of subproject, one that is specifically focused on "culture," more convincingly evoked ideologies and talk in the realms of thematic groups 2 and 3 (defined earlier in this work) that were not heavily present in the examples presented in Chapter 6. Group 2 includes the themes *hierarchy and equality,* and *respect for diversity.* Group 3 covers *cronyism, bribery/illegal use of public funds,* and *family ties, nepotism, and inequality*. The other two groups, those focused on *allegiance to the state, patriotism, responsibility to one's community and family, speaking the state language*, and the *market economy, Western models of civic life,* and *democratic participation* were still present. The focus on culture, as well as the ways some of these projects were described and implemented, made culture house subprojects different in a way that returns us to the discussion of identity that is less rooted in civic life and democracy and more centered on cultural practices and national identity. More than anything, the language utilized by participants focused on both the history of their culture and the further development of culture as an end in itself (for which the building is only a shell).

Culture Houses as Infrastructure Development

> Culture houses were introduced by Soviet government as a:
> key institution for cultural activities and implementation of state cultural policies in all socialist states. The House of Culture was officially responsible for cultural enlightenment, moral edification and personal cultivation, in short, for implementing the socialist state's program of 'bringing culture to the masses' (Donahoe and Habeck, 2011).

Culture houses fulfilled educational roles, teaching Soviet values to children and adults alike, as well as served to transmit information to the community (White, 1990, 2004; O'Dell, 1978).[154] They fell into the category of social development introduced in Chapter 3 of this work: culture houses helped people become Soviet citizens through presentations and hands-on education. On the marquis were demonstrations of Soviet-defined "high" culture (classical music, ballet, theater), the many "folk" cultures in the Soviet Union, Soviet films, and presentations of community awards for service. Beyond the events on the big stage that every culture house had, classes were held for people to "develop" themselves by improving their knowledge and practice in any number of activities, subjects, and arts, specifically those that had a "work-related application" (culture houses were attached to factories and other collectivized work groups) (O'Dell 1987, p. 85). Being cultured (*culturat*/*kulturny*) in the Soviet Union meant not only knowing about high culture, but knowing how to act in public, what one's *responsibility to one's community and family* was, as well as one's *responsibility to the state.* Cultural topics were usually decided on and presented to citizens by the state and local

[154] Pioneer houses/palaces had similar goals but only served children.

governments as well as specialized culture workers, such as orchestra leaders, stage directors, and dance coordinators.

Several authors suggest that these days, culture houses' "main function…is not so much in entertainment or culture but in resolving and preventing social problems, such as alcoholism and drug abuse. Idleness and associated drug abuse are said to stem from the municipalities' incapacity to provide *leisure facilities*" (Kulmala 2010, p. 173, emphasis added; cf. White 1990, 2004; Donahoe and Habeck, 2011). Current-day culture houses still serve a role of regulating social behavior, although now they have become more overtly focused on leisure rather than on social responsibility.[155] The current model of a culture house seems to fall along the line of a community center that generates activities based more on community interest and local leadership than on state funding or direction. This shift was supported by development agencies such as SIF and others that did not want to be seen as promoting any particular cultural group, or as supporting a government agenda that did so. However, based on the Council of Europe's review of Moldova's cultural policies in 2000, the Moldovan government was encouraged to more openly support cultural activities with the intent of engendering multicultural and artistic diversity state-wide (Cash 2004).

In 2004, the Moldovan government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) issued their Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (EGPRSP) (2004). The paper lays out a long-term plan for growth and improvement in Moldova's governance and the quality of life of Moldovan citizens. All of the changes that the strategy proposes would follow "new principles, tools and mechanisms" (Fund, 2004, p.

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[155] More research in this area is necessary to flesh out this topic. A forthcoming book on culture houses in the Siberian region may better illuminate the functions of culture houses as social institutions(Donahoe and Habeck, 2011).

97). These new principles are based on the following: efficiency, equal access, decentralization, sustainability, strategic planning, vertical coordination through levels of the government; partnership between government, private sector, and civil society; and transparency (p. 95). Each of these falls into the many themes outlined earlier, such as *democratic participation* (equal access, partnership), avoidance of *illegal activities* and *misuse of public funds* (transparency), and *hierarchy* (subsidiary to the national government; every government operates as a hierarchy and the acknowledgment and respect of that principle means stability of the democratic government, similar to respect of the rule of law).

The EGPRSP also reflects the growth of the Moldovan government's interest in matters of culture. In it, no section specifically addresses culture and culture houses, but culture appears in several parts, such as "Agri-food and rural development," "Regional development," "Tourism," and "Youth development."[156] From the section on "overall strategy for rural and agricultural development," for example, one finds the following: "social services and infrastructure provision" and "preservation of the culture and heritage of rural areas and protection of the environment" (Fund, 2004, p. 95). Certainly, culture houses constitute part of the infrastructure of the community as people came to know it under Soviet rule. They promoted, or came to promote after 1989, the heritage of the surrounding area and the preservation of the local culture of the communities they served.

Under the EGPRSP's section for "regional development," it is noted that "all citizens, irrespective of their residence, have equal rights of access to economic, social

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[156] Included in the appendices are the full sections from the EGPRSP where culture is mentioned. Here, I will only reiterate the specific sentences that include culture or are directly related to the argument of this chapter.

and *cultural* goods;" (p. 95, emphasis added). Here, cultural goods are included as the property of citizens. Next, the EGPRSP states:

> regional development measures and programs will be mainly oriented towards:
> i) improvement and development of infrastructure and localities (transport and telecommunications networks, communal services);
> …
> iii) development of services and sectors alternative to the agriculture [sic];
> … [And]
> v) facilitating production growth and promotion of exports from regions (2004, pp. 95-96).

As noted, culture houses constitute part of a community's infrastructure and services (part i. above), especially if those services include preventing social problems. Development of local abilities in arts and other cultural knowledge are an alternative to agriculture (part iii.), and facilitate the promotion of exports (part v.), such as handicrafts, Moldovan wines, and even exports of Moldovan culture in the form of dance troupes or orchestras that travel abroad.

In the section of the EGPRSP on "tourism," emphasis on culture is clearly stated: "There is significant potential for the sustainable development of tourism in Moldova. The country's tourist route combines sites of natural beauty (including natural and sightseeing reserves and interesting elements of flora and fauna) with archeological (monuments and sites, museums, interesting examples of folklore and popular art, etc)" (2004, p. 96).

While not mentioned directly, and while folklore and popular art are included under "archeological" sites, culture houses are certainly protectors and purveyors of local arts, and some serve as local museums, too (I visited one culture house in southern Moldova that had an exhibit on local history).

Finally, under "youth development," the use and status of culture houses in the community are invoked most explicitly in the objectives of

- "develop[ing] human and institutional capacities in working with the youth;"
- "stimulat[ing] the involvement of young people in the decision-making process in the areas of social, economic, cultural and political development of the country, by creating local youth councils and other forms of participation;" and
- "facilitat[ing] access to information, to services and quality leisure time" (2004, p. 120).

Decision-making processes; social, economic, and political development; youth councils and other forms of participation; and access to information all can be called part of the discursive formations of development and citizenship proposed earlier in this dissertation. The fact that youth are to be "developed" in this area supports the ideology of development toward changing attitudes and the future of the country. It also lends itself toward sustainability by teaching young people the approved ways of being citizens in the new country.

In 2005, to fulfill the regional growth plan of the IMF-approved Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy described above, the government initiated the

program *Satul Moldovenesc*, or "The Moldovan Village." One part of the Moldovan Village program is dedicated to infrastructure construction and repair. It includes funding for the renovation of 32 culture houses throughout Moldova, alongside repairs to roads, water and sewer systems, gas pipelines, hospitals and clinics, schools, telephone and internet installation, and anti-erosion initiatives (Moldova, 2005*)* The government also appealed to the authority of UNESCO to support this project. The authors of one report state that renovation of culture houses is a direct part of the state's ratification process for two separate UNESCO conventions:

> The activity in the domain of culture was focused on fulfilling the objectives stipulated in the Action Plan 'Republic of Moldova — European Union,' and concerned the improvement of legislation, the realization of internal procedures to ratify the UNESCO conventions on the safeguarding of cultural patrimony (2003) and on the protection and promotion of diversity of cultural expression (2005)….[Several other initiatives are mentioned.]…For the development and consolidation of the technical-material bases of culture houses in 2006 the state budget allocated 23 million lei.

These sources show that the state uses language common to international development as well as those focused on human rights to justify the need to support cultural institutions and activities. Their language especially fits thematic groups 2 and 4 in my classification.

SIF's work with culture houses

Until early 2006, the World Bank and thus, SIF, did not favor culture houses as subprojects for infrastructure renovation. In keeping with SIF's and the Bank's focus on community development, if a town wanted to renovate its crumbling culture house, it needed to address the building's purpose as a community center, social club, or library, NOT its use to promote local or national cultural activities. Since SIF is a part of the government, leaders were able to charge SIF with the management of a project outside its initial mandate. SIF had gained a reputation for success in helping communities implement construction and renewal subprojects through its guided procedures. The culture house renovation subprojects would not be funded by the World Bank, but by the Moldovan government, so this was the first expansion of SIF's procedures and expertise into other government programs. Initially, the government wanted to approve projects for 32 culture houses, all to be finished within one year. That number would have added substantially to SIF's workload, and would have been impossible to carry out, according to one staff member. Not only would SIF have had to organize and carry out the regional workshops to educate localities about the new grant and how to apply for it, they would have also had to make all the site visits described in previous chapters. In addition, the culture house grant had an additional pool of money available for renovating the interiors: for seating in the auditoriums, curtains for the stages, costumes, and even musical instruments. SIF workers would need to master knowledge of the requirements for culture houses of different sizes, understand the prices of the materials, etc., to make sure that applications they received were realistic. SIF convinced the government that it would not be feasible to implement so many projects in one year. They were also

concerned that committing to 32 culture houses the first year might backfire if they and the communities could not deliver, thus causing a public relations problem and possibly an accounting issue. So, they negotiated with the government and decided together that 12 subprojects would be approved and begun in 2006. Once the announcements and educational seminars were finished, SIF followed the same principle of "first-come, first-served," that it did for its other subprojects. With this new type of subproject, SIF began to openly address the validity of cultural activities as important to the state and to local communities. It also began to accommodate the traditional definition and purpose of culture houses, albeit with some modifications toward a community center model.

SIF maintained its focus on community development, infrastructure improvement, and democratic participation in its work with the subproject applicants. For example, in its annual report covering 2006, the year the culture house subprojects were added, SIF described the objective thus:

> The proposed objective is to contribute to the improvement of *work conditions* of the cultural institutions in Moldova. The results expected after implementation of the Subcomponent are: *developed capacities of participants* to subprojects' implementation; [and] improved quality of services offered for *youth centers* (p. 17, 2006 emphasis added).

Furthermore, the report states:

> in order to ensure quality *social services* offered in the renovated culture houses, special attention was paid to the *social design* of the subproject. Based on this, the lists of goods to be procured in each subproject were developed and coordinated with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The

rehabilitation of the Cultural houses will result in their *transformation into community cultural Centers* (p. 18, emphasis added).

In these statements, SIF frames the culture houses as institutions that offer social services; it describes the projects as contributing to citizens' abilities to improve their own working and community conditions through the help of the available funds. SIF very much adheres to its past use of discursive formations of citizenship and development.

Communities' applications

In subprojects focused on other types of infrastructure renewal, such as gas lines, school repairs, or water systems, community members phrase the need for the subproject (on their application) in terms of construction needs and human benefits. The latter are certainly related to sociocultural life, but are not usually overtly described as such. For example, two different applications for school repair subprojects, one in Russian and one in Romanian, address problems to be solved such as improving the health of students and teachers, the access of children to a quality education, and the benefits to the community that will come from solving problems together. These seem more closely related to state-building, to instilling a sense of community through state institutions and participating in democratic processes.

Culture house subproject applications are noticeably different, but part of the difference is a factor of the sociocultural purpose of culture houses. Maintaining and extending cultural knowledge and practice is an end with different social and political connotations than the goals of gas line or road subprojects, and even school subprojects.

The listed results of gas and road subprojects range from improving the business opportunities for the area, reducing erosion or natural resource depletion, and improving residents' daily lives, while informally, citizens state their desires to become more "civilized" or "like the rest of Europe." Schoolhouses, libraries, or community centers are somewhat similar to culture houses, especially since many renovated culture houses incorporate libraries and community activities within their new operating models. However, while other infrastructure subprojects connect citizens to the "civilized" world, to capital, to the world of learning or to Europe via improved living conditions, the primary purpose of culture houses is to connect them socioculturally to one another and to their fellow Moldovans across the country. The difference is in the specific focus on identity and sociocultural life. With water, gas, and road projects, culture is not explicitly a focal point; it is there, but is understood as the praxis that accompanies the infrastructure, not the purpose of of the infrastructure. On the other hand, applications from culture houses incorporate language overtly describing the importance of the institution to maintaining the culture in the area, and how the subproject will improve people's practice of cultural activities. Furthermore, culture is contested in a different way than the associations people have with gas, water, roads, and schools. (See Chapter 6.) The latter are talked about as amenities people need to have to consider themselves "modern," "European," or living in "good conditions". On the other hand, cultural arts reinforce their identity as a group in a different, locally-centered way.

Three different applications for culture house subprojects, two in Romanian and one in Russian, will serve as examples for this section. The application materials are similar to those described in the previous chapters. They ask that applicants describe the

subproject and make an argument for its necessity by telling the problems with the infrastructure and how this subproject will solve those problems. The two Romanian applications both describe the *status* of their cultural institution in the region as part of their rationale for applying for this subproject. One group writes:

> The Palace of Culture is the only cultural institution in the village. In it work 11 artistic groups, 6 of which bear the title of "model" group. Only here can children and villagers find comfort; here they relax, entertain themselves, and can spend their free time. After the renovation the situation will improve. The heat in the palace will attract the population all through the year. After the renovation, new groups will appear, such as an ensemble of modern dance, a vocal-instrumental ensemble, a choir, an informational-touristic center, a (lending library?) of books, [and] audio and video cassettes.

Another states:

> a) ___ is a city with rich cultural traditions. Each year are organized artistic activities at the local, regional, national, and international levels. The majority of activities [unknown word], are organized in the Palace of Culture. In the ranks of permanent spectators there are all categories of citizens of the city, starting with children who celebrate at the Palace the [unknown word], International Children's Day, Remembrance Day, and those who watch plays for children at the republican theater. Continuing with young people, there are studios in the Palace where take place [unknown word], beauty pageants, literary circles, musical concerts of both contemporary and popular (folk)

songs. Finishing with the elderly, there are those who participate in the "Veterans" choir. All who frequent the Palace see it as a chance to to escape the problems of daily life at least for the time of the rehearsals and concerts. We regret that this locale does not correspond to the desires/demands of an institution of culture that dreams of fulfilling important objectives in the development of culture, or to one that would permit [unknown word] a new cultural [unknown word], one both dynamic and durable. [To reach these goals,] it is necessary to implement capital repairs of the roof, of the building, and to add necessary equipment.

b) The implementation of this project, through its value-laden and physical dimensions, will stimulate the [valuing?] of available resources, in order to define the major objectives of the community and the region. Through the implementation of the project, we will:

-Stop the process of degrading of the Palace of Culture, and make up for our lack of insufficient resources to make certain substantial repairs;

-Eliminate totally or partially the [unthankfulness] of those who work in the Palace of Culture, which has been generated by unfavorable work conditions and lowering their motivation for professional activity;

-Permit the optimal utilization of certain spaces in the Palace of Culture for diversifying the cultural and artistic services;

> The repair and restructuring of the concept of activities of the Palace of Culture, along with the fact that citizens will revise their perceptions about the role of culture and this institution in an unusual (remarkable, unique) region, and the factors of heterogeneity generated by cultural values [??], will especially contribute to:
>
> -The enlargement of the access of the population of the region to better socio-cultural services;
>
> -The promotion of local cultural values in a [unknown word] mode, with the possibility of training different community actors in this process;
>
> -The stimulation of the formation of new cultural group collectives, as well as the strengthening of the capacity of those that already exist, through the creation of conditions favorable for creation and through the ensuring of those conditions with: musical instruments, costumes, rooms devoted to specific activities that will be organized. With these, people can carry out activities with success.

In these two examples, we see something that did not appear in applications for gas, road, or school repairs: pride. The people are proud to describe their successes in the cultural arena, and they use their many accomplished collectives as reasons to perpetuate and renovate the institutions that support them.

The Russian-speaking applicants use an approach more common to other SIF documents, that of focusing on the structure itself and its need for repair:

a) The building Dom Kultura of ___ began to operate in 1960. In these 46 years were conducted only routine cosmetic repairs in 1977 and the recovering of the corrugated asbestos roofing in 1983. In these years, the roofing in some places is cracked and swollen, which, with changes in temperature and humidity, damages the building. With цельюдолговечности) and the ecological necessity to replace the roofing with metal tiles. Because of absence of gutters and drain pipes, all the entrance doors have become unfit, the windows have rotted through, (отмоска) of the building have been destroyed, and the facade of the building has become unsuitable. Capital repair to the three floors is an urgent necessity and this problem emerged more than 5 years ago: because of (образующегося) condensed and low temperatures, the paint on the walls and ceilings has entirely gone. There has emerged the sharper the need to renew the material-technical foundation (of the building).

b) After the introduction of the subproject to improve the technical state of the building, its esthetic appearance will also improve. [Its] energy efficiency will increase. The expense on maintenance/upkeep of the premises of the DK will decrease. The working conditions will improve. The material-technical foundation will be renewed. The qualitative and quantitative indices of work will improve. The cultural, spiritual, moral-esthetic, intellectual level of the population will improve. The network of amateur artistic circles will expand. The possibility of higher quality discoveries/expositions, and support and formation of talented youth will emerge.

The Russian language example takes an approach similar to that of the previously mentioned other infrastructure projects—the applicants begin by elaborating on the building's deficiencies and problems rather than expounding on the cultural value of the institution. Only in the second paragraph do they describe the benefits of the renovation on local cultural activities. There are several reasons this could be the case. The Russian speakers, part of an ethnic minority group, could have felt the need to approach the subject of renovation using technical reasons before bringing up sociocultural reasons for the subproject. This would imply that the minority group feels its cultural status as less important than that of the majority group, those who identify with Romanian or Moldovan ethnicity. Another reason could be that the SIF staff proposed that they present their problem in this way. However, the same SIF sociologist worked with this group and one of the Romanian speaking groups, so the second reason is not likely true. A third reason could be that the group has some better understanding of SIF's goals and ideologies, namely its focus on infrastructure renewal and democratic citizenship over other concerns. The Russian speaking group eventually gets to the topic of culture, referring to the improvement of the "cultural, spiritual, moral-esthetic, [and] intellectual level of the population", the "network of amateur artistic circles," and the possibility for development of "talented youth."

Therefore, in applications for government funds for renovations to culture houses, applicants take the opportunity to describe their subproject in terms of the benefits of the institution to local culture and cultural activities. In most of the applications, and particularly those in the majority Romanian language, appeal to culture takes precedence over appeal to the need for the building's renovation. The building is merely the vehicle

of culture, and support for the building means supporting and valuing local people's traditions and ways of life. Other SIF subprojects that I have discussed did not accomplish this. After an object had been repaired or built, it became a source of pride, but it was not so before. The sad state of other types of infrastructure reinforced Moldovans' sense of backwardness. Their applications for SIF grants focused on the need to have such enhancements in order to improve human life and let Moldovans feel closer to what they consider modern European standards of living. Culture house applications allowed Moldovans to put their best feet forward.

SIF-Community Interactions: SIF procedures take precedence

When SIF consultants come to visit prospective subproject sites on evaluation visits, SIF procedures take precedence, as do affirmative ideas about development and citizenship. Even in most culture house subprojects, talk during evaluation visits followed the discursive formations of development and citizenship based on the principles mentioned earlier. In the case of one specific Culture House site, however, SIF's authority, and so the authority of the state and international development agencies was challenged. Ironically, this challenge was brought about by the state itself, and in a manner reminiscent of Soviet-era nepotism. The location that subverted SIF's procedures, to some extent, was a town told by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism that it would be among the 12 funded in the pilot year, due to its location and size. Therefore, the town's leaders knew when they put forth their application that they would receive funding. SIF personnel were leery of this situation, since it subverted their paradigms of community responsibility and participation, and the "first-come—first-served" approach to funding

applications. The staff became frustrated with the town's behavior—it was the last of the 32 to turn in its application, townspeople were late to meetings when SIF conducted site visits, and SIF staff told me more than once that town leaders acted over-confident and unconcerned about adhering to their procedures.

Conclusion and Reflections on the Roles of SIF in Moldova

These data are part of a larger set that illustrate how more a more traditional kind of nation-building (focusing on local or traditional culture, language, practices of those outside urban areas) is being merged with state-building in the inclusion of Culture Houses as objects of infrastructure redevelopment projects in Moldova. The state chose to support Culture Houses as institutions, as vehicles of local and national culture, but they chose to do so using principles of international development. SIF employees held to their focus on the importance of World Bank procedures, and on aspects related to the renovation of the building more than on the activities within. On the other hand, the townspeople and villagers directly appeal to the importance of culture and Houses of Culture in their applications, and they seem to use discursive frames related to citizenship and development when necessary in order to gain their own ends. Therefore, the culture house subprojects subvert international development models by changing standard procedures and by calling on a sense of nation-building, yet in the process of rebuilding the infrastructure, people practice being part of the state just as much as they practice being part of an ethnic or minority language group. These junctions make SIF and culture houses interesting sites through which we can examine the ways that international

development principles and an emerging sense of identification with the Moldovan state both intersect with more traditional notions of ethnic national identity.

Now I will turn to a more general reflection on SIF's role in Moldova. The Executive Committee meeting is the capstone of the application process for a SIF grant. Once a subproject is approved, the implementing agency must continue with a series of steps to implement the project, which include collecting the remainder of the community's monetary contributions, advertising for contractors' bids, deciding as a group on which bid offer to accept, monitoring the contractors' work, and obtaining the necessary inspections for the site. The time from the first planning meetings to the completion of a subproject can be up to two years.[157] The extended, repeated exposure to SIF and Bank procedures and the discursive formation of development instills the importance of contemporary development ideologies into villagers' practices. Those groups who can master the discourse are more successful at getting grant monies from SIF *and* other donor organizations. Their leaders maintain or extend their power in the village by their expertise in navigating the new national development culture.

It has been argued that this approach to development subverts the state, yet this research shows how implementation agencies operate closely with local public administration and representatives of the national government, a point to which I will return shortly. Equally important to the influence of development ideologies on SIF practices in Moldova is the positive role that Moldovan culture has played in the development of the SIF project.

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[157] Interestingly, after all of their work, SIF staff members are rarely present at the unveiling of a new or renovated facility. Their point of view is that the community and local public administration have implemented the subproject and should receive the accolades, not SIF or the World Bank.

Through discursive themes of democratic community participation and ownership, local people may re-envision themselves in relation to their community and the state. Citizens are offered the assistance of the state, through SIF and the World Bank, which seems to have two effects. First, citizens become accustomed to the ideologies and practices of development common to international donors and western countries. Second, the subprojects connect people in villages and towns with the government and Moldovan private industry in distinctly different ways than they were connected prior to independence—each has a set of *instituted*[158] horizontal responsibilities (to other citizens and to industry) as well as a set of vertical responsibilities (to the state). Villagers may have *their* attention focused on local development subprojects, but their participation in the market economy and their roles as citizens of the state are enhanced and reinforced by the procedures instituted by the World Bank and SIF, and by interacting regularly with SIF staff who are their Moldovan compatriots. The SIF project links local communities to the re-emerging Moldovan state through SIF staff members, who lose no opportunities to make community members aware of the important place of their communities within the state, of citizens' responsibilities to their community, and of each community's contribution to the market economy.

The changes SIF staff made to Bank procedures and the ways people interact during SIF-related meetings are all closely related to the historic Soviet discursive formation of development that are part of the culture of Moldova. As members of Moldovan society, SIF workers were able to build upon their knowledge of their culture

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[158] Officially instituted horizontal responsibilities may be set in opposition to unofficial horizontal responsibilities that operate in between people in shadow economies or according to patron-client relationships (Ledeneva, 1998, 2000a, 2000b; Ledeneva & Seabright, 2000)

in suggesting changes to SIF procedures. They knew that public presentations before authority figures would not only have a beneficial effect on people's *understanding* of development principles and activities, but would also embed these new development practices in existing Moldovan frameworks of cultural propriety, hierarchy and equality, and responsibility to the community and state. They also knew that directing villagers through procedural steps would be more effective at ensuring transparency and consistency than allowing them to follow pre-existing procedures based on the Soviet bureaucratic system.

In terms of cultural structures and practices, hierarchies still exert considerable influence on Moldovans' social interactions. In accordance with Soviet era habits, most Moldovan citizens share the idea that people in positions of power should be respected and sometimes feared.[159] One should accede to the wishes of those in power, despite one's reservations or independent ideas. SIF workers encourage villagers to modify this cultural expectation by "making their own decisions," yet SIF employees use their influence to guide villagers toward more informed decisions. They are playing an authoritative role, rather than an authoritarian one. They see themselves as local experts offering their best advice. This is a subtle shift, but worth mentioning. The power relations involve more subtle coercion than overt force, a characteristic of most Western-funded contemporary development projects (Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1990). Further research with villagers will explore the extent to which they perceive this power shift, and the relations between SIF employees and villagers from the latters' perspectives. For their part, SIF employees seem to unquestioningly accept World Bank procedures and

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[159] Obviously, not all Moldovans feel this way; certain younger members of the society exhibit these behaviors less often than do their elders.

safeguards as "best practices" (although they may have been more skeptical in the earlier years of the Fund's operation). Thus, they take part in perpetuating the power relations between richer and poorer states even though they are not at the top of the hierarchy. Their role may be described positively as a conduit of information and access to development and government agencies, and to the market economy procedures that villagers can use to become more successful in the new era; the same actions could be described negatively, as allowing the government and international development agencies to govern from afar by imposing strict procedures that enforce contemporary development ideologies. I noted during fieldwork that the former, more positive, position holds sway from most Moldovans' perspectives.

The style of interactions between SIF staff and community members mirrors the hierarchical relationships that were instilled into Soviet Moldovan culture and that continue to influence everyday interactions. The hierarchies sometimes reflect Soviet ideals of who was "developed" and how "uncivilized" peoples could become better members of Soviet society. Other times, the interactions refer to formations of development that span both eras: those that illustrate how to be "good" members of society, although the paths to that goal are not always parallel. The deferential behaviors that we observed in this work are common to classrooms, work groups, family relations, and public administration. Likewise, similar actions are encouraged across Moldovan society: it is common for teachers to ask students to recite texts from memory, and to praise students for their ability to speak eloquently; family and community members also value the ability to speak well and with authority; and children enter competitions on national holidays for reciting poems, singing, and dancing in their native language. In the

site visits described herein, we saw examples of the importance of public presentation in the ways people endeavored to write and speak beautifully, without mistakes; when villagers regularly rise to their feet when speaking to people in higher positions of power; and in instances where direction from authority figures is accepted without public challenge. Methods of showing respect, dominance, and submissiveness have been maintained in post-Soviet Moldova, but have been mapped onto the new social hierarchies of wealth and power.

Nevertheless, both SIF staff and Moldovan villagers make the most out of their interactions. Hierarchies are respected at SIF meetings, both those that stem from the past and the present development context. As in the past, villagers who can follow "the rules" (by successfully utilizing and internalizing contemporary forms of language associated with the discursive framework of development) will gain access to more powerful positions within the new Moldovan order. Therefore, community leaders nearly always defer to SIF workers, who are assumed to have more knowledge and power in the development context. The deference is not always cosmetic. Due to the perceived imbalance of power, Moldovan community leaders arrive at SIF meetings anxious to make a good impression, and at times, even paralyzed with fear. SIF employees use these perceptions to institute better practices, while denying explicit overtures to their higher status. Thus, SIF workers try to institute the international development paradigm of collaboration and partnership in development, but whether they consciously recognize it or not, the influence of historical ideologies of development cannot be completely erased.

Over time, the SIF staff designed and modified the procedures leading up to the Executive Committee meeting to ensure that communities submitting subproject proposals are prepared and ready to take part fully in the business of development. Initially, the procedures were meant to make people more accountable and participative, and to reduce opportunities for bribery and corruption, in line with ideals of successful development programs. However, from a cultural standpoint, the changes that SIF staff made to the operating procedures, and the ways that people interact during SIF-related meetings are all inseparable from the culture of Moldova. The shared history of the people living in this state; the common bodies of knowledge introduced in families, schools, and the media; and the experiences of daily social exchanges make up the culture common to nearly all people in this multiethnic and multilingual state. As members of Moldovan society, SIF workers were able to build upon their intuitive knowledge of their culture in suggesting changes to SIF procedures. The SIF staff members regularly combine their cultural knowledge with the methods of training and consultation that are common to development circles in their interactions with villagers.

In terms of cultural structures and practices, hierarchies still exert considerable influence on Moldovans' social interactions, as was previously noted. In accordance with Soviet era habits, most Moldovan citizens share the idea that people in positions of power should be respected and sometimes feared.[160] One should accede to the wishes of those in power, despite one's reservations or independent ideas. It is perhaps paradoxical that SIF workers encourage villagers to "make their own decisions," when in fact the SIF employees are guiding villagers toward more informed decisions. Nevertheless, both

[160] Obviously, not all Moldovans feel this way; certain younger members of the society exhibit these behaviors less often than do their elders.

parties make the most out of these interactions. In SIF meetings, hierarchies are respected, both in language and action. Community leaders nearly always defer to SIF workers, who are assumed to have more knowledge and power in the development context. SIF workers, even though they are not mayors or school directors, have the experience of dealing with international development concepts and projects, of working with foreign advisors, and even of working with Moldovan employees of the World Bank in the capital city. More importantly, the SIF staff has the proven skill of helping communities gain grant monies. Due to this perceived imbalance of power, Moldovan community leaders arrive at SIF meetings anxious to make a good impression, full of nervousness, and at times, even paralyzed with fear. SIF employees use these perceptions to institute better practices, while denying explicit overtures to their higher status. Thus, SIF's workers try to institute the international development paradigm of collaboration and partnership in development, but they seem to recognize that the influence of their culture cannot be completely denied.

Hierarchies are replicated in SIF offices between lower-level staff members and their superiors, especially the SIF Director. On yet another level, SIF staff members are very respectful to World Bank employees (even Moldovan World Bank employees), members of Parliament, and representatives of donor organizations and governments. These relationships underline the continuing culture of hierarchy in Moldova that was instituted during the Soviet Union, or even earlier in the region's history. In terms of the three discursive frameworks presented earlier, that of cultural propriety seems most powerful here, since people were observed to reproduce their past experiences more than adopt the collaborative stance encouraged by the World Bank.

Linguistically and behaviorally, the style of interactions between SIF staff and community members mirror the relationships between students and teachers in Soviet and post-Soviet classrooms in Moldova, and thus evoke ideals of cultural propriety. It is common for teachers to ask students to recite texts from memory, and to praise students for their ability to speak eloquently. Community members also value eloquence and the ability to speak well and with authority. Furthermore, Moldovans consider tidy appearance and proper behavior in public to be essential for all respectable people. These beliefs that are taught during childhood are carried into adult life, where all instances of self-presentation in public are considered important to one's self-respect and identity. National holidays have become exhibitions for local talent. Young people all over the republic are expected to perform in their local festivities, and if they exhibit talent, they are invited to the capital to perform. Such holidays are usually marked by exhibitions of dance, song, and poetry, all of which reflect the ideal national character (cf. Cash, 2002, 2007). Spectators often comment on how well a person speaks, and they enthusiastically applaud children with these skills, or encourage those who seem nervous. Even when a foreigner such as the U.S. ambassador speaks in public, it is common for people to observe and remark upon the person's ability to speak Romanian (a skill highly esteemed among people of Moldovan ethnicity), and the person's capacity for performance and eloquence. In the site visits described above, we saw examples of the importance of public presentation in the ways people endeavored to write and speak beautifully, and without mistakes; and in the ways villagers regularly rise to their feet when speaking to people in higher positions of power. Therefore, SIF maintains and supports aspects of

Moldovan culture, to a certain extent, in the culturally common ways of acting and speaking that are actively used in SIF procedures.

One effect of combining local culture and international procedures is to institute a feeling of "ownership" among subproject participants. Many collective farms and state-owned enterprises were looted or illegally sold during the 1990s precisely because local people did not feel that the enterprises belonged to the community, or perhaps because the people no longer felt that *they* were citizens of a wider community. The idea of ownership has fostered a post-Soviet kind of development by empowering local people to re-envision themselves in relation to the state. This is where we see more correlation to the discursive framework of citizenship concerning democratization and civil society. Citizens are offered the assistance of the state, through SIF and the World Bank, which seems to have two effects. First, as I have described, citizens become accustomed to the practices of development common to international donors and western countries. Second, the subprojects connect people in villages and towns with the government and Moldovan private industry in distinctly different ways than they were connected prior to independence—each has a set of *instituted*[161] horizontal responsibilities (to other citizens and to industry) as well as a set of vertical responsibilities (to the state). Villagers may have their attention focused on local development subprojects, but their participation in the market economy and their roles as citizens of the state are enhanced by the procedures instituted by SIF.

Moldova's SIF does not evade or subvert government, as certain critiques have suggested; it involves people in their local governments and communities and helps them

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[161] Officially instituted horizontal responsibilities may be set in opposition to unofficial horizontal responsibilities that operate in between people in shadow economies or according to patron-client relationships (Ledeneva, 1998, 2000)

conduct legal interactions with their national government. Where the Soviet state was omnipresent, the post-independence Moldovan state became relatively invisible during the 1990s. The SIF project links local communities to the state through MSIF staff members, who lose no opportunities to make community members aware of the important place of their communities within the state, of citizens' responsibilities to their community, and of each community's contribution to the market economy. Participation in SIF-sponsored subprojects also requires community implementation agencies to interact frequently with other state government representatives, such as at offices where they register their beneficiaries' association as an NGO, or on work sites where they meet construction inspectors. With SIF 2, the project has extended its reach to towns and to other elements of social infrastructure, such as "houses of culture" and orphanages, offering even more potential ways for Moldovan citizens to connect with their government. The state therefore becomes stronger as it strengthens local communities and as the SIF project encourages citizens to think nationally but act locally.

The Moldova SIF helps to spread practices of international development and democratic citizenship, but these are mixed with and added to Moldova's historical understandings of development, citizenship, and culture. The SIF staff sees what they consider their success as Moldova's success at building its economy, public administration, and citizenry. More than anything, SIF staff members' belief that they are working for Moldova illustrates the influence that SIF has on local and national identity. SIF's redesigned procedures insist that local people be more active in decision-making processes, but these local voices are refracted through the prism of international- and state-sponsored development. The fact that more than 850 communities have

implemented SIF-sponsored subprojects makes collaboration with SIF and other state offices an experience shared by hundreds of thousands of citizens. In this country where a cohesive *national* identity (in its definition as allegiance to a state) has been difficult to achieve because of Moldova's peculiar history, the structures and practices introduced or reinforced by SIF procedures have proven to be important building blocks for Moldovans' everyday processes of identification with one another and the state, and thus may constitute a framework for a Moldovan national identity.

Chapter 8:

Conclusions

"Who knows what Moldova is?" This question began the present work, as did questions from others about who Moldova's multiethnic citizens consider themselves to be, where their allegiances lie, and what may be holding them together in their relatively new state. My research has primarily addressed the latter of those topics as a means of answering the former ones. I have approached this subject through the theoretical framework of the language-culture dialectic; that is, I understand language and culture as mutually constituting. There cannot be one without the other. In this conclusion, I reflect on the contributions that my work makes to an understanding of Moldovan culture and identity, and culture in general.

Through this research, I have explored three discursive formations and twelve common themes that dominate many aspects of Moldovan daily life and the multitude of development projects operating in Moldova. The twelve themes consolidate many instances of language-in-use into threads of meaning that I contend are part of the enactment of Moldovanness. Their ideal and real expressions are common to Moldovan daily life and to an understanding of what it means to be Moldovan. The uses of themes as I have described them are examples of how discursive formations are built up at the level of language. The discursive formations are cultural propriety, citizenship, and development. The themes are: allegiance to the state/patriotism, responsibility to the community; responsibility to the family; speaking the state language; hierarchy and equality; respect for/acceptance of multicultural society; cronyism; bribery/illegal use of public funds; nepotism; participation in the market economy; Europe as a model of

political, community, domestic life; and democratic values/participation in civil society. The discursive formations emerged as I began to put together the many ways that Moldovans refer to similar topics in slightly different senses, according to the contexts in which they are speaking, writing, and acting. They are not isolated formations, but have been developed theoretically and sociolinguistically in other works. I have illustrated the discursive formations using the themes listed above, which represent common ways Moldovans utilize and interact with the formations and relate them to their own lives. Through the themes, one can see how the formations intersect in daily practice.

The chapters in this work have purposely proceeded from the more historic or generally descriptive to the more ethnographic. In order to describe and illustrate the discursive formations of cultural propriety, development, and citizenship in the Moldovan context, I felt it necessary to provide some of the history of the people in the region. The culture and society of the Soviet Union has influenced Moldovans' perspectives on their identity and their everyday interactions as much as the period from the Great Depression to the Reagan era has influenced U.S. citizens' ways of seeing the world and themselves within it. Following the setting of the linguistic "scene" in Moldova through a review of historical themes (such as "life is better") that contributed to Soviet linguaculture, I added my impressions of Moldovans' identity negotiations in the mid-1990s, just a few years after they gained independence from the Soviet Union. In the mid-2000s, the period in which I conducted my dissertation research, the influence of the international development realm had permeated Moldovan life and had become institutionalized to an extent I had not witnessed in the 1990s. Such observations fueled my choice of the Moldova Social Investment Fund as a primary field site, and my tendency to focus on the

influence of discourse associated with development in the present work. While trying to tease out the relationship of development as a discursive framework to Moldovan life, I found that ideals about progress and the improvement of life were not the only topics that seemed important to Moldovans' daily lives and and their interactions with SIF. Through a similar chain of thought, citizenship and cultural propriety became complementary foci of this work.

In Chapter Three, I explained the histories of development, citizenship, and cultural propriety in Moldova. These intersected in Soviet times in a number of ways. Being a proper citizen meant striving for progress (development) in one's own life and in society, being a proper person, in other words. Responsibility to the state and one's community were paramount. Cultural propriety, in its ideal forms, could be interpreted as being a good citizen *or* as being a person whom family, friends, and colleagues could rely upon in times of need. People paid respect to those in more powerful or more respectable positions than theirs, and in return, often received assistance of various sorts. Alternatively, they were able to provide assistance to others within their social networks, whether or not it was considered legal or illegal. Furthermore, the state expected respect for the multicultural Soviet society, at least in a ceremonial way, and enforced the speaking of Russian through legislation and cultural domination. Europe was not the model for high culture, civil society, or domestic life, however. Participation in a market economy was not valued, nor was Western-style organic civil society. In sum, discursive formations relating to development, citizenship, and cultural propriety existed in Soviet Moldavia, but in slightly different relationships to one another than this study has shown for post-Soviet Moldova.

Chapter Four focused on the wider phenomenon of corruption in separate themes, which I have categorized as cronyism; bribery and the illegal use of public funds; and nepotism, or the use of family relations for advancement. Data from President Voronin's speech, from various international institutions, and from local non-governmental organizations and Moldovan citizens showed that corruption, and specifically cronyism and bribery, are the antithesis to development and to being a good citizen. Conversely, nepotism can represent a form of cultural propriety, since one is supporting one's family and maintaining culturally appropriate social relationships. Ideas about cultural propriety, citizenship, and development came into play when a friend related that she had paid closer attention to a person's application because she knew that person to be "good," not corrupt, and eager to participate in the market economy as a business owner.

In Chapter Five, I showed the many ways that development as a discursive formation in the Moldovan context is informed by international discourses that shape ideas about who and what can be developed. Data included texts produced by the World Bank about Moldova and an exchange between a foreign World Bank representative and SIF executive staff. In these examples, the Bank reproduces itself as the more powerful partner, despite its claims to collaborative development; it also depicts Moldova as deserving of aid and sometimes at fault for not developing in approved ways. Appropriate forms of citizenship become embedded in talk about development, such as in the Bank's admonition of Moldova's "frequent government changes, increasing corruption, and weak institutions", all activities carried out by voting citizens as much as by governing bodies. In the texts, Moldovans are indirectly accused of not being responsible citizens, community members, or family members; they do not live up to

Western standards of multiculturalism, free market participation, or participation in civil society. The visit of Amun to SIF tempered the stronger language of the World Bank printed texts with positive feedback on the work that SIF fosters in communities in Moldova. However, Amun's overall authoritative interactional style allowed the Moldovans to play their accustomed roles as subordinate partners in a hierarchical relationship. The dynamic between the Moldovans and Amun played into Moldovans' accustomed beliefs about the deference one should pay to people in positions of power, as well as their accepted and habitual practice of maintaining responsibility to their own social groups by demonstrating the best SIF had to offer in the examples they proffered and the communities they visited.

Chapter Six continued the idea of intersection and division between the discursive formations by focusing on interactions between SIF staff members and Moldovan citizens who were in the process of applying for SIF grants, and the effects of standardized development procedures on their interactions and expressions of identity. I illustrated ways that SIF staff members encourage Western-style participatory citizenship and local cultural propriety through appealing to citizens' sense of responsibility to family, community, and state; and through advising them to beware of unscrupulous local and foreign actors (poor citizens) who might try to collude against them. These activities took place in the state language, Moldovan, for the most part, and citizens were praised when they conducted business and community development in Moldovan in the presence of SIF staff, who represent the state government. Citizens also demonstrated their own sense of cultural propriety by rising to their feet to speak and by showing respect and deference in their words and actions (such as following SIF's recommendations for

development activities). All the while, citizens were taking part in participatory community development, whether "just" to receive a grant, or based on their own valuing of the activities themselves. In the previous chapters, talk and other activities that could be associated with the more Western-influenced contemporary Moldovan discursive formations of citizenship and development were often put at odds with behaviors that evoked the Soviet ways of life or more rural, kinship-based systems of cultural exchange and reproduction. Chapter Six illustrated more of the complex ways that Moldovans express their identities and relationships to the state, the community, and one another in their naturally occurring dialogues.

Chapter Seven followed the same line of thinking, but returned to the point that more entrenched ways of being Moldovan still hold great importance for local people. By focusing on the culture house renovations, the topic of culture and proper means of cultural reproduction seemed to move to the forefront of participants' minds when they interacted with SIF representatives and with me. Some people followed behaviors I had observed in other subprojects (for gas lines, roads, schools, etc.) that marked them as "good" citizens, upstanding members of Moldovan culture, and people focused on bettering their community. Here I am thinking of examples offered from smaller, regional cultural houses, and from one closer to the capital. However, in a larger regional culture house, farther from the capital, participants displayed more regard and concern for their own respected positions within their community as culture producers than deference toward SIF staff or attention to standard procedures of development. The examples presented in these chapters show that being Moldovan differs according to context, but that it still is negotiated through a set of well-known and differentially manipulated set of

themes related to position in society, treatment of others, Moldovans' place in the geopolitical landscape, and internationally hegemonic ideals about citizenship and development.

Reflections on Moldovan culture and identity

Taking language-in-use, communication genres, and discursive formations all together as objects of study allows me to focus on the importance of their interrelationships in this particular context. As we know from Bakhtin's work (1981), language is not created in a vacuum; all utterances have links to many instances of their use in prior situations, and yet each utterance is unique to a specific cultural context, including the time, place, speaker, audience, intended and received meanings, etc., of its expression. Therefore, studying language means studying culture. *This* study of language-in-use and its many genres and discursive formations helps to explain aspects of Moldovan culture as much as it requires knowledge of Moldovan culture to interpret the data. However, a focus only on language-in-use or genre or formation would not have revealed as detailed a picture of Moldovan culture as the combination of communication forms presented here. Communication genres and discursive formations help to constitute "frame spaces" that help to shape people's utterances and interactions (Hanks, 1996, p. 170; see also Goffman, 1979). The frames shape activity by being drawn from genres common to certain contexts and from influential overarching discursive formations. However, frames do not overdetermine possible utterances. Together, the relationships between instances of language-in-use, communication genres, discursive

formations, and the contexts within which they occur represent the mutually constituting nature of language, culture, and society.

In pointing out the relationships between language, culture, and society, this work supports three theoretical points: 1) discursive formations, as wider domains of thought and action, are the means and ends with which people naturalize their way of interacting with others and with social structures within their cultural contexts; this naturalization of relationships constructs culture; 2) discursive formations are built up at the level of language, and can be understood through detailed study of language-in-use and communication genres as they occur within specific contexts; and 3) when people build relationships based on both everyday sociolinguistic interaction and wider domains of thought and action, they are building identities. Identities can be relational to contexts. The theoretical points have been applied here to data from the Moldovan context, and the result is an interpretation of the data that reflects the diversity and unity of Moldovan experience. There is a diverse range of cultural contexts within Moldova, as well as many externally-originating sources of influence on Moldovan life, such as the World Bank, Western European countries, and the U.S.

First, concerning discursive formations and the naturalization of culture, one may return to the ways that such formations represent power and truth, or at least different forms of power and various versions of truth. Institutions like the World Bank, SIF, and the Moldovan government are sites of reproduction of power. They wield great influence through their day-to-day operations as much as through occasional products, such as reports and news releases. The audiences for products and operations *may* be different, but the effects of any social institution's activities include the perpetuation of power

structures and versions of reality. Foucault's work teaches us this point about prisons, mental institutions, and discursive formations; the latter may not be physical institutions, but they are represented via many such institutions and are an institution of sociocultural life as a domain of thought and action. Even if institutions or discursive formations are challenged by members of society, the challenges usually occur within the framework or frame space that the institution or discursive formation has created. The work done here to describe and analyze citizenship, development, and cultural propriety supports Foucault's concept of the discursive formation, but also extends his concept to operationalize the study of discursive formations via close attention to language-in-use and genres of communication. This study has also drawn upon the fields of linguistic anthropology and critical discourse analysis in order to study the reproduction of discursive formations. One result of the present research has been to reveal the intersections and divergences between prominent discursive formations in Moldovan life. At times, in the context of talk about development, for example, participants draw upon elements of discursive formations of development and citizenship that correspond closely to what is considered "natural" in Western contexts; at other times, the similar talk about development can evoke elements of the discursive formation of cultural propriety. In general, this research has shown that thoughts and actions relating to cultural propriety in Moldova are held in more tension with Western elements of development and citizenship than the latter two exhibit toward each other. I mean that, in the context of these research findings, development and citizenship ideals are often more similar to one another than either of them is to cultural propriety.

Second, concerning the importance of language-in-use to the study of culture and identity, this research has illustrated how a close reading of many different forms of language (written texts, naturally occurring discourse, speeches, etc.) can be used to discover aspects of life that are important to people within a culture, and their processes of creating their culture on a day-to-day basis. This approach, part of the ethnography of communication tradition within linguistic anthropology, shows that tensions and similarities between discursive formations described above can only be found by studying language in its many forms and then by associating language with history and people's activities within a given context (Hymes, 1962; Gumperz and Hymes, 1972; Sherzer, 1983). This triangulation makes it possible to describe processes that contribute to an *-emic* understanding of Moldovan culture. The -etic point of view comes through in the description of the processes and elements of Moldovanness themselves, but the understanding of what it means to be Moldovan occurs on an interactive basis, when one person says or does something in the Moldovan context, and that activity makes sense to the people around him or her (whether it makes sense as a challenge to the norms or as a reproduction of the norms makes no difference). Identity formation is a process, and this study of language-in-use and discursive formations helps to illuminate that process and its results.

Third, concerning the bigger picture of what it means to be Moldovan in a state/civic sense, this research has led me to conclude that the process of identifying with the state has begun in association with the realm of development, influenced by Western ideals of development and citizenship. A snapshot of contemporary Moldovan culture, particularly civic culture, can be gleaned from examining the interconnected themes and

examples that I present. This assertion is consistent with the practice of other scholars who approach culture and identity using a discursive framework. Where some have wondered how Moldovans see themselves as members of a nation, or as citizens of a state, I have shown that Moldovans share not only ethnic culture that others have pointed out, but also the culture of daily life that they have experienced by using the same cultural "rules" to govern their lives for a long period of time. Ethnic culture is strong in Moldova, but my research has shown that the majority of people with whom I interacted feel a sense of camaraderie with all other Moldovan citizens regardless of ethnic heritage. Part of that sense of Moldovanness is a civic culture with historical roots in the strong Soviet state. With the contemporary state a less intrusive part of their daily lives, and with a new sense of citizenship based on personal responsibility and voluntary participation, Moldovans have been redefining themselves since independence in relation to their fellow community members and local and national public administration.

Along with their renegotiation of civic identity, practices common to international development have made their way into Moldovans' daily lives and their civic culture. However, development has been a part of Moldovan history for more than one hundred years. Moldovans utilize a discursive formation of development that exhibits a mixture of their historical and contemporary experiences in that realm. Some might say that these conclusions are what one would expect from a state in transition. What does this work tell us about culture in general, however? We know that culture changes over time, due to people adapting to various influences or striking out in new directions on their own. We have seen evidence to show that internationally powerful discursive formations can alter aspects of Moldovan culture, and that, nevertheless, some practices

remain strongly embedded in everyday life due to their importance to local forms of relationship-building and processes of identification with what is seen as proper or unacceptable according to group norms. One point that this study makes about culture is that it can be studied through a focus on the use of language to indicate, forge, or split apart relationships, and social relations are at the heart of culture. By relationships, I mean not only the inter-relations between single individuals, but also the relation of individuals to contexts, to groups, to ideologies, to hierarchical systems, and to beliefs. So, one advantage the language-culture dialectic offers is the chance to understand the way culture and identity are negotiated at the micro-level of interaction. More than that, it offers the chance to examine wider relations between institutions, groups of people, and processes of society.

What's next?

What could be next for this researcher? To what uses could this research be applied? One possibility is to develop new foci for evaluating development projects. Certainly, assessments of projects' success occur frequently. In SIF's case, the World Bank representative, Amun, saw for himself the financial records and the progress of certain subprojects. However, he also let Moldovans speak for themselves about the impact of the project on the populace through the SIF staff's willingness to adapt to World Bank procedures and Western discursive formations of development and citizenship, and their ability to translate that knowledge to subproject participants and other local stakeholders. Success was implicitly measured through Amun's interactions with SIF staff. A new focus of evaluation would be to look more specifically at these

"middle men" in the development cycle. What are they doing to make the development project appeal to local cultural values? How are they enacting change through their own behavior? These sorts of questions beg for more monitoring of local people by foreigners, which I am not comfortable with recommending, even though I have taken part in such activities. Perhaps this sort of evaluation would offer a better trajectory of the ultimate "success" or "failure" of certain projects. I heard many times that the social fund that was set up in Ukraine "failed" within its first five years, whereas Moldova's SIF has had its funding extended until the present day. Why did that happen? Could it be related to the kinds of relationships the SIF middle men in Ukraine set up between themselves and the population, or in the direction that international development has taken in that state? MSIF has been called a regional success based on the great number of subprojects it has helped communities implement, the policing MSIF conducts against corrupt activities, and the trust MSIF has engendered between itself and the population it serves. MSIF has even been made a model for Moldovan government-initiated programs, such as the Culture House renovation program. One possible next step for this research is to advocate for similar long-term qualitative data gathering on projects in jeopardy (from an international perspective), or on projects that are unnecessarily changing local life (from a local perspective). Such an approach could serve the needs of local people and state governments as much as international organizations and foreign donor states. Anthropologically, we would learn more about how cultures change, what aspects of culture are important to people as they encounter international development processes, and the hybrid practices that emerge from long-term interaction.

The latter point leads to a second potential application of this research. This use would be to look at other states in transition to see if similar processes of identification have taken place, and what aspects of culture (what themes, practices, types of relations) make each context unique. Personally, I would like to know more about post-Soviet (now called Eurasian) culture change as compared to the Moldovan case. Why did the Ukraine SIF fail, for example? The Armenian SIF is thriving; what about their practices have made it thus? How do people's diverse experiences under communism influence their current cultural practices? What aspects of Soviet culture are still important to local life? Another case could be that of both Iraq and Afghanistan in their post-war states. International development and citizenship ideals have likely invaded people's daily lives, but to what extent? How are the discursive formations expressed in those contexts? To what extents are Western formations compatible with locally or regionally valued cultural practices? Certainly, others have already broached these subjects, but to my knowledge, not in terms of examining the micro-level processes of negotiating culture and identity on a daily basis through language and communication.

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Appendix A:

Original text in Romanian from town application to SIF for funds for repaving a main road

"Str. ___[162] din or. ___ este numita strada central a vetrei orasului. Ea intretaie in doua partea veche a localitatii, fiind drumul principal de acces la multe stradele, inclusive la cele care duc spre cimitir. In fiecare zi sute de cetatani merg pe acest drum plecind la serviciu, scoala, gradinita, iar seara se intorc acasa. Atunci cind ploua sau este intuneric devine periculos sa mergi pe aceasta strada, deoarece gropile adinci si santurile sapate de ploii pot adduce la traumatism. Tot din aceasta cauza se deterioreaza si autovehicolele. Deoarece in acest sector terenului este abrupt, apele de ploaie se acumuleaza de pe stradele pe strada ___ si cu mare viteza curg la vale, distrugind totul in cale, formind ripi adinci, care trebuie lichidate systematic, deoarece strada devine necarosabila. Aceasta complica munca medicilor salvarii, pompiewrilor, politiei, lucratorilor serviciilor de telecomunicatii si Union Fenosa. Locuitorii sectorului si primaria in repetate rinduri au acoperit strada cu petris si nisip, insa ploile au dus totul la vale, lasind strada deteriorate si deseori gradinile oamenilor inundate cu petris si nisip. Situatia se repeat systematic si problema poate fi solutionata numai construind un drum capital asfaltat. Un drum bun va imbunatati accesul oamenilor la casele lor, la obiectele din sector, la cimitir. Se vor reduce cazurile de traumatism si accedente, mai putin se va deteriora tehnica, autovehicolele, viata oamenilor va devein mai buna.

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[162] This convention used to preserve the anonymity of the town

Appendix B: The President's Speech

Text reproduced from Federal News Service transcription of speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Statesmen's Forum, "The Republic of Moldova: The New Path of Reforms":

http://www.secretary.state.nc.us/partnership/reforms.htm

PRESIDENT VLADIMIR VORONIN: Dear friends, it's a great honor to me to speak in front of you today. I'm grateful for the organization of this opportunity for me, and I'm very happy to see in the hall, along with the people of an older age, there're many young people here who want to know as much as possible about my country, about our problems, about the state of affairs.

I will try, as the president of the CSIS introduced me, to speak frankly and openly about what's happening in Moldova today. Indeed, it's a great honor for me to speak in front of this highly reputable, worldly renowned center, such a think tank that is your center.

My presentation is called "Republic of Moldova: Ways for Reforms, the Path of Reforms." On the one hand, I believe it is a presentation of the current trends, intentions of the powers of Moldova. On the other hand, this is inviting you and other business circles, politicians, officials in the United States to cooperation in developing a successful economic model that my country is in great need of. I'm the third president of the Republic of Moldova, and apparently I'm the first one to face the issues of modernizing my country.

However, after 10 years of independence, our country is still one of the problematic countries of Southeast [Europe]. That's why I will speak not about the

continuity of the political course, but, rather, new approaches in resolving the problems accumulated during this time. At the same time, I want to note that some of the problems are universal and may be chronical, and here not only to Moldova, but to most of the countries of Eastern Europe. But in Moldova especially, they have been revealed more in a greater contrast than anywhere else.

So what are these problems? Problem number one, internal division and high level of regional instability. After the conflict of 1992, our country is still broken up into two points. To a certain extent, the 1992 conflict which started this division was not an international but, rather, a political conflict, or, more frankly, a conflict of elites. Some of those political elites considered Moldovan statehood as a temporary phenomenon and were oriented towards integration with Romania by conducting intolerable policies with respect to ethnic minorities in the country. The other part tried to conserve the economic and political principles of the old Soviet system by being oriented towards Russia, but, to be more exact, on the nationalistic political segment of Russian politics.

The division of the country, lack of single customs, fiscal currency space, determined not only the halfway nature of the reforms, but also formed quite a cynical and dangerous philosophy of Moldovan sovereignty. Its essence was, and unfortunately still continues to be, that, in principle, never try to resolve the Dniester issue. This approach had its own economic and political reasoning. The economical one was that while Transdniester Republic, while not being recognized, became an offshore, or black offshore, and the interests in it were expressed not only by international criminal structures, but a great number of Moldovan officials and bureaucrats, including from the government of Moldova and Transdniester. This republic became then a totalitarian

enclave, which guaranteed international criminal structures by means of legalizing transit contraband, export of arms, and dual-use commodities.

So, de facto, a consensus occurred between the politicians on left and right shores of the Nistru River, which was a source of their fantastic enrichment unthought of for most of the representatives of legal business. The political benefit of this consensus was that it removed the problem of real economic and political possession of the country for the politicians of Tiraspol and Chisinau. In other words, the necessity to undertake radical steps in democratic renewal of the country on the basis of true market instruments, mechanics and standards, on the basis of a new compromise model of state government.

This criminal and political system enabled, for one of them, to exploit the idea of unity with Russia and defending from Romanization, and to the others by using the Russia threat to make declarations on European integration. The apogee of the cynicism relationship was transferring of customs seals of Moldova to customs officers of Dniester Republic. In other words, legally, one side or the other one, Chisinau and Tiraspol, I mean, they legalized this black offshore. This happened six years ago. That's why I always considered and still consider that the problem of the Dniester Republic is not a geopolitical problem, it's not a problem of Russian military presence or real threat of Moldova being swallowed by Romania. It's first of all the problem of interpolitical. During the ten years of opposition between Chisinau and Tiraspol, in cities and centers a whole generation of new politicians, bureaucrats and officials was developed who are benefiting from this opposition by doing everything that never Moldova would become one and single, united again.

Problem number two: poverty and a repressive economic system. Moldova is

called one of the poorest countries in Europe. No doubt, having the resources and energy dependence, lack of mineral deposits aggravated the negative consequences of transferring to a market economy, especially in the social area. The most vivid example of the social catastrophe is the labor immigration. We are not arguing against the fact that outside Moldova today, in Russia, in Portugal, Turkey, Italy, Greece, Germany and other countries, they are about one-third of the adult population of our country, which is about 600,000 people, and this is usually illegal immigrants who are in a very bad, dire strait. They are not protected neither by the laws of that country nor by the laws of our country. The immigration happens from villages and from cities covering all sorts of professions, computer programmers, doctors, teachers and unqualified, unskilled workers. The reason of this is de-industrialization of our country and a repressive economic system.

I must admit here that under most respectable markets, mantles or slogans formally … by formally following the recommendations of authoritative international financial institutions, the Moldovan Congress and government have been conducting the anti-social and anti-market policies. A lot here is in common with other republics of the former Soviet Union. But nowhere the privatization took place in such an anti-market atmosphere, which reminded of Stalinist repressions directed against enterprises, against industries from science consuming to agriculture. This was, in fact, political privatization, where the change of the ownership was not for efficiency of management, not for making profits, but for the benefit of political slogans and in the interest of bureaucrats.

Moldova has just a few examples when the privatized enterprises were coming into the hands of international investors or Moldovan businessmen. In nine out of ten cases there were no investments after privatization, while the enterprises as real estate,

land and equipment were objects of quick multi-reselling and destruction.

Behind each of these transactions there were the interests of not business, but of bureaucracy. This was the main business, and they were doing this for ten years. Interestingly enough, the same way the bureaucracy was related in reform in the social area. In the country most of the hospitals were closed, the expensive equipment was sold, and the buildings often were just brought apart as construction parts. This cannot be explained by actions of rational forces of the market. No. These are the consequences of some other terms and some other instincts. This created a special anti-market atmosphere in the country, from repressive taxing to police arbitrary measures. This became the reason that Moldova did not have a middle class being born there, which is the basis of social and political stability in any society. Poverty in Moldova is not a disease which many suffer from. It is a real disease from which peasants, teachers, and unfortunately businessmen as well.

Problem number three: corruption and interpolitical instability. In Chisinau there is one region, district which the inhabitants call our Beverly Hills. This strip is a district of expensive villas. They're impressing by their richness and architecture. It's a big district, about 1,000 plots. The cheapest in these district are the houses of $100,000 and up. We have conducted a study on the owners of this real estate. Of all those owners only 18 persons out of 1,000, 18 persons of 1,000 are businessmen. All the others are members of the governments that were replacing one after another, ten of them in all. This is the tenth government after independence. Also officers of various ministries, departments, customs, judges, prosecutors, former officers of the police, former deputies of the parliament and cabinet ministers. This is the visual apex of the criminal pyramid which

was created basically by unresolved Dniester issue. This is the visual and lasting demonstration of corruption which has affected the entire state system and supplanted it. No doubt, corruption is the second of its importance of the political problems of the country.

I made some calculations. About 80 percent in this … they have control, management, et cetera, et cetera, related to corruption. The abundance of various permissive and forbidding authorities of our bureaucracy, lack of liberal climate created a situation of fighting between various bureaucratic clans in order to grab those of the other's administrative and other beneficial posts. So this reflects … the facts reflect this. The partisan that wins the elections gets great gain in their membership, because everyone tries to be a member of the winning party. This division, this whole power mad bureaucracy were the basis of chronical instability in the country and lack for many years of favorable investment climate and normal functioning of market legislation. This dictatorship of corruption has created the situation of lack of trust to courts and discrediting the law and its possibility of opportunity to defend the rights of people in Moldova.

Paradoxically, the creators of the system were the former Soviet nomenclature that quickly mastered the pseudo-democratic and pseudo-market rhetoric. This nomenclature has caused the gigantic foreign debt and poverty of the Republic. Currently all the former party secretaries and reformers are "at the steering wheel of our opposition." I believe this is a very, very demonstrative evolution, to be always on top, always on the very top.

Problem number four: uncertainty of foreign policy of Moldova. Moldova is a

member of various prestigious international organizations, like CIS, GOAM, Organization for Stability for Southeastern Europe, WTO and others. However, Moldova was outside of those positive integrational processes that were happening and happened in Europe all these years. We're speaking first of all on European integration. For many years the political class of Moldova tried to clumsily balance between the West and the East, between Europe and Russia, by primitively interpreting global interests of both Russia and the West. The international cooperation was more of a kind of imitational nature, and diplomacy was limited to protocol, systematical tasting of wonderful Moldovan wines. This disoriented not only the great powers, but the citizens of Moldova, as well, and deprived the country of a good stable program of actions. Relations with Russia were cool, but the Russian troops were in Moldova. The relations with Moldova were of a high priority, fraternal, et cetera, but the country did not get any investments from Romania. The impression has been developed that there was no future for the country. These were the problems which ultimately determined the results of the elections of February 25th, 2001.

The party of Communists, which I am heading, has gained 71 out of 101 seats in the parliament. This is more than a constitutional majority. But this majority had to resolve all these problems, to resolve them independently of political tastes or views which we had during the times when we were in opposition in the parliament. We have no right to neglect the trust of the people for the benefit of our own abstract doctrines. We realize that we were voted for mainly because and maybe primarily because people hoped to get the prospective of decent life in Moldova, and they see the biggest chance, even those voters for whom the word "communist" until recently was related or linked to

gulag, with dictatorship, with Brezhnev, plutocracy and chauvinism. It was obvious that the country definitely needed real market reforms, and we knew that it was important to offer the algorithm of the reforms which would enable to reach the long awaited success. This algorithm was determined as following.

First, reunite the country, solving the Dniester issue. Secondly, fighting the corruption, de-bureaucratizing and economic liberalization. And third, a course towards European integration. Only these measures will bring my country to the conditions of a normal investment climate and stable development to resolving most of the social problems. Also true is the fact that all these measures would be impossible to be resolved today all at the same time. We started, naturally, with the Dniester issue. By establishing a stable, strategic partnership with Russia has got the trumps out of the hands of the separatist regime. The support of Vladimir Putin of our course on reuniting Moldova, on de-militarization of the Dniester region created unprecedented conditions for the integration of the country. A strategic partnership between Moldova and Russia, along with the actions on fighting Dniester contraband, movement of financial flows of mafias created real prerequisites for optimistic -- optimistical view towards perspective reuniting of Moldova.

The next impulse was the draft decision on Dniester suggested to OSCE in July of this year. The essence of this draft is that the basis of reintegration depends on high, contemporary legal standards and guarantees. Moldova gets away from the positions of unitarial state and becomes a country state of all the ethnic groups that constitute the people of Moldova. The leadership of the Republic immediately supported this draft, and we linked it to the real perspective of reunification of our Republic. We trusted the

support of this draft from the United States, the EU, and after the summit in early December and by 55 countries of OSCE became the important moment in the history of Moldova.

Despite the fact that the Dniester Republic, Dniester separatists tried to block the negotiations, we are sure that we have passed more than half of the way towards reintegration. It's extremely important to us, and that's the reason why we're here today, that the United States government shares our optimism and our goals. Conflictless reintegration of Moldova is the main prerequisite for true economic and political modernization of our country to resolve all the four problems I mentioned a little earlier, creating the new legal area for reforms, and socioeconomic development, and resolving the problems of regional stability in the center of Europe. The start of actions in this area became the prologue to the war to corruption and bureaucracy. We have liquidated the dual standards in customs, politics, we've created a special structure to fight corruption, money laundering and contraband. We have passed laws which enable to control issues of money laundering and contraband, and I can admit here that some of our actions against our own bureaucrats were misinterpreted by themselves.

First of all, like they said, we were fighting investors, investments, trying to make a step back. But to the contrary, indeed, we're trying to make both our investors and the foreign investors not be dependable on the bureaucrats, but make their decisions in accordance with the law and economic interests of the country, and the investors. The ownership that was acquired legally is sacred to us, and the condition of developing true market relations and free actions of the market. The measures on de-bureaucratization and liberalization of the economy is the next step in fighting the corruption. We have

reduced the number of licensing kinds of activities, stabilized the rules for licensing by making the bureaucrats … giving them less opportunities to change them as they wish. We simplified the registration of economic agents, who had to pass 22 different agencies when they wanted to do their business, and now it's done within 2 hours in one agency. Thus, we got the floor out from under the feet of the bureaucrats.

We fully understand and are aware that the investment climate is characterized by stable laws, equality, equal conditions for participants and free access to justice. This immediately has enlivened the economic life in Moldova, predetermining the economic development. Up until 2001, if we take as 100 percent the GNP of 1991, every year we had a decrease compared to '91. In 2000 we had only 34 percent of the level of 1991 in our GDP. Last year for the first time we got an increase on GDP by 6.1 percent. This year we expect a 7 percent increase more. I must emphasize here, and it's very important, that 75 percent of this economic development was from the small and medium sized businesses, in other words, private enterprises. It's their action. Moldova quickly reanimates the traditional areas of economy, agriculture, winery, industry. It's important that due to the measures taken only last year, investments in the basic funds were increased 30 percent, and we expect the same increases. However, we are preparing serious legal basis for stimulating the new high technology areas of economy oriented toward export and attracting a high qualified work force.

Another important task is creating incentives for developing small and medium sized business. We're developing a special program for tourism development. These are all the problems of next year, and we are preparing to resolve them next year.

The measures on de-bureaucratization and liberalization enabled us to resolve the

chronical social debts which no one resolved in the past. Today we're not just paying the pensions and wages in time. Last year we have increased the retirement pensions by 60 percent, and this year we have increased them up to 20 percent more. Also, those who work in the cultural area, in education and healthcare, we have increased their wages by 80 percent, as well as scholarships in the universities and high schools. These scholarships increased twice. So this way we're trying to resolve the issues of social integration and solvency.

I could not say that all these changes are going smoothly, that everything is so smooth and with a good schedule. No, the experience practically shows that we need to reform our state construction. We need to improve the democratic mechanism. And we have seen severe opposition which opposes Moldovan statehood. The loud actions were in the Moldovan capital, but they did not get support from the population. Nevertheless, we came to a conclusion that the tasks, the problems that the country is facing needs the maximum support from the public. The track of party battles is too narrow for real democratic reforms. That is why I have initiated the so-called "Social Treaty." In other words, continual dialogue with the public, trying to attract the public to prepare the legislative bills using the expert evaluations, and the parliament has passed on the first reading the present initiative on these issues.

I'm sure that this social treaty or -- well, social treaty, as we'll call it, will become the nonpolitical integration for the society and an additional mechanism for making very important state decisions. Among these important decisions, a special place is played by issue of European integration of Moldova. We understand how tough this is, and this is related not only to Moldova, though we need it first of all, but it is an issue of EU,

whether they want to move eastward. Nevertheless, it's obvious that the fact of European integration for Moldova is and always will be the highest priority. There's no more competitive idea in modernizing economic systems in the European continent except European integration. In the recent summit of the heads of state of CIS in Chisinau, I spoke for the initiative last October, an initiative on reforming the legal standards of CIS on the basis of the European Union. I'm happy to admit that this was supported by Vladimir Putin. However, it did not get support from other nation members of CIS.

Nevertheless, by comparing ourselves to those of my colleagues in CIS, Moldova is moving towards European standards. We have established a state commission on European integration. And shortly we will adopt a concept of Moldova joining the EU. So we are coming to the specific actions. Soon, Moldova will be granted chairmanship in the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which is very important, as well as an active role in the pact's stability.

As you know, most of the mentioned problems cannot be resolved by Moldova without the political support from the United States. Yesterday when I had a meeting with U.S. President, Mr. George Bush, we practically received that political support. We will always remember that the United States from the very beginning supported Moldova in its not easy movement towards the reforms. More than 50 percent of all the foreign aid comes from the United States. I'm happy that our relations are becoming more constructive and developing on the basis of improving our trade cooperation. The trading increased by 73 percent during the last nine months, and that's only the beginning. I believe that in due time, the neutral, demilitarized, stable Moldova will become very attractive for large American investment, as well as for banks, and world-known

companies.

Today, the American-Moldovan partnership is a factor in our most important problem, reunification of Moldova. My meeting with President Bush just warmed up my optimism in this area. I'm sure that the decisive support from the United States and President Bush on the process of reintegration of Moldova will become the basis of those specific relations between the states which prove frankness, friendship and mutual understanding.

Thank you very much.

Appendix C: Table reproduced from Carasciuc, 2000, p. 24.

Report was funded by the U.S. government and United Nations Development Program.

"Table 2.3.4 General understanding of the meaning of corruption
'As you see it, which of the acts enlisted below fall under the phenomenon of 'corruption'?'
Fig. 2.10

	Businessmen %			Households %		
	es	o	D o not know	Y es	N o	D o not know
1. Gift to a doctor to take special care of the patient	1.0	5.2	3. 8	2 6.7	6 3.8	9. 1
2. Using connections to exempt somebody close from military service	2.2	7.9	9. 9	6 9.9	1 9.2	10 .3
3. To pay a bribe in order to employ a relative of yours	3.7	.7	6. 3	8 6.1	6. 9	6. 3
4. Extending cash to policeman not to revoke your license	0.3	.3	3. 2	8 6.1	8. 7	4. 8
5. Abuse of official position in order to perform private business	5.0	1.5	13 .5	7 4.9	1 4.7	10 .1
6. Providing official information to people you know for the purpose of personal benefit	7.7	2.1	20 .2	6 5.0	1 9.2	15 .4
7. Accepting cash by officials for the purpose of tax concealment or reduction	1.5	.8	4. 6	9 3.7	2. 6	3. 0
8. Additional reimbursement for a lawyer who assists a suspect in terminating his case	5.2	.0	2. 2	9 5.0	2. 2	2. 4

Appendix D: IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article 1: Purposes

"Purposes

The purposes of the Bank are:

(i) To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries.

(ii) To promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or participations in loans and other investments made by private investors; and when private capital is not available on reasonable terms, to supplement private investment by providing, on suitable conditions, finance for productive purposes out of its own capital, funds raised by it and its other resources.

(iii) To promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging international investment for the development of the productive resources of members, thereby assisting in raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labor in their territories.

(iv) To arrange the loans made or guaranteed by it in relation to international loans through other channels so that the more useful and urgent projects, large and small alike, will be dealt with first.

(v) To conduct its operations with due regard to the effect of international investment on business conditions in the territories of members and, in the immediate

postwar years, to assist in bringing about a smooth transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy.

The Bank shall be guided in all its decisions by the purposes set forth above."

Appendix E: Executive Summary from the Moldova Country Assistance Evaluation, produced by the World Bank

"Summary

Moldova, a Soviet Republic created out of territory once controlled by Romania and Russia in the last century, became independent in 1991. It joined the Bank and Fund in 1992, and has received strong Bank advisory and financial support since. Unlike many Former Soviet Union (FSU) republics, it had no history of prior independence, and was ethnically quite diverse. Moreover, its middle-income status was only achieved by massive Soviet energy subsidies as well as guaranteed markets for a variety of horticultural and livestock products. Independence ended the subsidies as well as Moldova's relatively sophisticated defense industries and livestock production. Soon after independence a de facto partition of the country took place after a brief conflict. World Bank research indicated that Moldova would be the FSU republic most affected by the move to world prices. It was. By 2000, per capita GNP was only 40 percent that of 1990, and most Moldovan households had incomes less than half the subsistence level. Moldova also encountered debt problems; the present value of debt-to-GDP ratio reached 90 percent in 2000. Its once effective social systems were rife with bribery and inconsistent with the nation's much more limited fiscal resources. In 2001, the voters elected a Government led by the Communist Party of Moldova that had campaigned on a strong anti-reform platform.

The poor economic performance occurred despite the country's initial rapid stabilization. It was among the first FSU republics to control inflation and liberalize trade and price regimes. But other structural reforms were delayed. In particular, Moldova's

dependence on agriculture underlined the need for rapid agrarian reform. Unfortunately, this did not begin until 1997, and was not completed until 1999. The reform delay and the lack of direct foreign investment contributed to the stubborn economic decline. Frequent governmental changes, increasing corruption, and weak institutions exacerbated the country's problems. Moldova was among the last of the FSU republics to begin economic recovery, and even today this buoyant recovery—based on Russian economic growth and the effect of the initial reforms—looks difficult to sustain, given the poor investment climate and uncertain economic policies.

The Bank had relatively consistent and appropriate goals for its Moldovan program. These were to recover positive economic growth, private sector development and public sector reform, and to ameliorate the effect of the transition on Moldova's poor. High case lending scenarios would involve substantial (one-third) program lending, support for private sector (particularly agricultural) development, and public sector reform. Analytic and Advisory Activities (AAA) would be used to identify lending interventions in social safety nets and the social sectors. The massive distortions in energy were to be addressed through AAA as well as lending. The Bank's country assistance strategies (CASs) were well designed and relevant with one exception; the FY02 CAS Progress Report did not reflect the Government's minimal ownership of the interim poverty reduction strategy and the reform program.

The thrust of the strategies was followed, but the detailed implementation was at variance. Program lending rose to 60 percent of the total, which was well above the levels in the approved strategies; investment lending was much below expectations. Follow-on energy projects were deferred in 1997 when it became clear that no commitment to

reform could be assured. Public sector reform loans were also deferred. Some agricultural projects were either dropped or delayed when agrarian reform lingered. The Bank took risks through generous policy loans to push stalled reforms while deferring investment loans because of this same stagnation. The anticipated impact of the policy loans was not achieved. Unfortunately, until recently there was little dialogue on Moldova's growing corruption, nor was it addressed via projects.

The Bank's AAA was generally relevant and had an impact on government and donor decisions. The first (and only) Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) in the early 1990s contributed to a good understanding of the economy. The Bank's poverty work has been deemed useful by donors and government, and had a direct impact on social reforms. A Public Expenditure Review (PER) in the mid-1990s was among the first to focus on the growing payment arrears and underlined the unsustainability of Moldova's expensive social systems. The Bank also used its AAA to guide and coordinate with other donors, although its proposal to organize a consultative group encountered a lack of bilateral donor interest. However, there was no CEM between 1993 and 2003. A carefully done CEM in the mid-to-late 1990s might have shown that the Bank's optimism about Moldova's prospects needed to be tempered and would have highlighted the fundamental reasons for the country's economic decline, as well as the implications of reform deferral.

The Bank's assistance program translated into substantial financial transfers. Encouraged by major shareholders, per capita IBRD lending by the Bank during FY1993–98 (before Moldova became eligible for IDA) was more than twice the average for other small countries. During 1993–96 the Bank provided a third of Moldova's net

official receipts; during 1997–01, IDA provided a quarter, in spite of growing amortization payments from prior loans. Only recently has Bank financial support declined. Limited bilateral support and substantial lending by multilaterals meant that by the end of 2001 half of the public long term external debt was owed to multilateral creditors, and 38 percent of it to the Bank Group.

Given the Bank's assistance program objectives—recovery of self-sustaining growth, development of an efficient, private sector-led market economy, and poverty alleviation—the outcome of the Bank's assistance program to support Moldova's 1992-02 development effort must be defined as unsatisfactory. Moldova was among the last of the FSU economies to return to positive GDP growth; it is now the poorest country in Europe and remains highly indebted, rescheduling debts in an environment of severe payments problems. While its privatization progress as measured by Bank indices is only slightly below FSU averages, its governance remains weak and opaque. The Government is reluctant to apply market-based policies, and has treated some major foreign investors with hostility. It has reversed some privatizations. Moldova's poverty has led to significant emigration. It has made little progress towards the Millennium Development

Goals. The country was neither able to comply with its IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) nor some of the Bank's major SAC III conditions; both have now lapsed. As a result of this track record and some recent fiscal laxity and erratic privatization policies—which have made private investment and multilateral support hesitant—the sustainability of its recent economic recovery is unlikely. The institutional development impact of the Bank's Moldovan projects has been mixed. The banking system and some other systems have done well, but social institutions remain weak and

may be unviable fiscally. The country's acute and worsening corruption indicates that the legal framework is not being effectively implemented. All these lead to a conclusion that the institutional impact of the Bank's program has been modest.

The Bank was not alone in underestimating the difficulty of Moldova's transition. The process required to transform a command economy into a market one can be lengthy and chaotic, particularly when the citizens lack consensus and the institutions are dysfunctional. The lesson is that the Bank needs to assess the economic outlook and the country's problems and prospects through such instruments as CEMs. A second lesson concerns governance. Moldova's corruption is not unique, but has proven especially harmful because it seems to have worsened. Yet the Bank has not addressed this issue until recently. A clear expression of the Bank's position on governance issues is likely to be more productive. A final lesson is the importance of quickly addressing the sustainability of social programs in middle-income countries suffering massive falls in income. The Bank correctly diagnosed the issue but found it difficult to convince the authorities to take the necessary drastic steps. Yet, without such action, Moldova found its capacity to sustain social services in continuous decline.

This CAE recommends:

- Undertaking a Country Economic Memorandum or a Development Policy Review to analyze and prioritize key development priorities, including governance issues, especially in the energy and social sectors, and factors constraining the investment climate.
- Avoid further adjustment lending until a stronger Government commitment to reform is evidenced.

- Focus project interventions in the social sectors and take concrete steps in each lending operation to guard against corruption and use civil society to monitor effectiveness.

Gregory K. Ingram Director-General Operations Evaluation

Appendix F: Excerpts in Romanian from SIF application materials from Mayor Grosu's village

"1. Dispozitii Generale

1.1 Asociatia obsteasca ___ este o organizatie neguvernamentala, necomerciala, constituita in forma de organizatie obsteasca ce isi desfasoara activitatea in conformitate cu Constitutia Republicii Moldova, cu legislatia in vigoare a Republicii Moldova, cu prezentul statut si care urmareste benificiul public.

1.2 Asociatia ___ est asociatie locala, si isi desfasoara activitatea pe teritoriul comunei ___ raionul ___ R. Moldova. Asociatia se constituie pentru un termen nelimitat.

1.3 Asociatia isi desfasoara activitatea in strinsa colaborare cu organizatiile de stat si cele publice, cu asociatiile obstesti din tara si de peste hotare ale caror scopuri nu contravin cu scopurile asociatiei.

1.4 Asociatia poate fi membru a diferitor institutii, precum si partener plenipotentiary in societati publice sau neguvernamentale internationale, sa stabileasca contracte sis a intretina legaturi irecte cu ele, incheind acorduri respective.

1.5 Asociatia este in drept sa posede mijloace de mass media, sa difuzeze informatii privind scopurile si activitatea sa, alta informative.

1.6 Asociatia este in drept sa desfasoare activitatea economica pentru satisfacere necesitatilor statuare in conformitate cu legislatia in vigoare.

1.7 Asociatia este persoana juridical, dispune de conturi bancare, are stampila proprie si simbolica.

1.8 Sediul Asociaciei se afla in cladirea primariei ___.

Appendix G: Transcript from SIF Executive Committee Meeting

TRANSCRIPT (See below for Key)[163]

English language:

1-Director [D]: Thank you. Who will defend [this village]?
- - -
2-President of Association [PA]: [I am the]

3-President of the Association, "the Future of

4-Nucareni- - -I am presenting project - - -

5-number 325, of the village of Nucareni

6-named Construction of the Gas Line with

7-Introduction of Gas to Social Objects. The

8-social objects in our village ["la noi"] are

9-the kindergarten- - - and the community

10-center. In order to introduce gas- - - to the

11-social objects partially…in the village of

12-Nucareni, we need a conduit 2,378 meters

13-long. To- - -dig…a distance, a distance-of-

14-- -2 km, 2,378 meters, the cost of the

15-object…8 lei 96, we need 21,000…lei- - -

16- D [interrupts]: Mr. Mayor, I have a

17-proposal- - - Can I, please, enter in the

---

[163] KEY: - - - denotes data cut from transcript for length
Ö denotes indiscernible audio
[brackets] denote contextual information, or words inserted in transcript to make sense in English or because of data cut out.
People: D=SIF Exec. Director; PA=President of the Association/Implementing Agency; M=Mayor of the two villages; AM=female member of Association/Implementing Agency

18-discussion? So, it's known that the price of

19-gas is rising…since the stage when- - -you

20-began to prepare the project, a cubic meter

21-of gas rose from 80 dollars to how much,

22-now?

23-Many respond: 160

- - -

24-D: 160. This is- - -for how much

25-Moldova receives it. But- - -at Moldova

26-Gaz and further on [to consumers], it will

27-arrive at an enormously large sum. Are the

28-local residents ready

29-   PA [interrupts]: yes

30-D: to pay this amount of money? That is

31-an enormous sum of money; perhaps by

32-the end of the year, the amount will rise

33-from 160 to 240 dollars. Will our

34-investment …in you be successful in this

35-project?

36-PA: Yes, it will be successful.

37-D: Why?

38-PA: Why? I will tell you

39- D [interrupts]: that is your opinion

40-PA: in the first place- - -up to now, the

41-conditions were very difficult in the

42-village. [People?] lit fires with…of

43-sunflower seeds, with wood from the

44-forest. Wood from the forest has- - -gotten

45-more expensive- - -. It doesn't cover our

46-needs… [for] a peasant- - -. Introducing

47-gas, that is, that is a small relief/alleviation

48-for a peasant, because in the countryside it

49-is very difficult to work, I mean it is

50-difficult

51- D [interrupts]: That's clear, it [gas] is

53-easier, more ecologic, but

54- PA [interrupts]: We are a…

55- D [interrupts]: But to heat a house

56-today? About how much would a

57-homeowner need to have for gas, each

58-month?

59-PA: …lei

60-Mayor [M]: We were talking about it,

61-even at the meeting, in this way: If gas

62-[for automobiles] were 2 lei, we said that if

63-it [the price] rose to 2.50, it would be over,

64-people would stop driving their cars.

- - -

65-Now in the village, we have seen a growth

66-in the number of cars, in each year we can

67-see this- - -

68- D (interrupts): Maybe let's, let's

69-resolve the problem.

- - -There will be gas

70-in the village, but later, Auntie Iliana, who

71-today receives a pension of 20 dollars (per

72-month), will she be able to pay for gas

73-tomorrow, and after tomorrow? At this

74-amount…

75-[Many voices discuss at once]

76-PA: …everyone has understood that there

77-will be gas, that altogether it is easier, one

78-person has a car, another doesn't… we

79-work with our hands- - -

80-D: ok, that's emotions, emotions, what

81-you're saying…but your

82-calculations/estimates, where are they?

83-PA: calculations…per, per month we

84-calculated that to be enough for, for each

85-house

86-D: 300? Yes? [this is in cubic meters of

87-gas, not price in lei]

88-PA:…

89-D: But yesterday it cost how much? 600

90-lei?

91-PA: 600

92-D: Today, are you ready [to pay] 600 lei?

93-…50 dollars?

94-PA: We, we are ready

95-Many speak: …

96-PA: Let us tell what we are doing in our

97-villages

98-D: OK, today we can see, here in

99-Moldova (la noi), the salary…reaches

100-about 100 dollars per month, right?

101-Woman, Association Member [AM]: on

102-average

103-D: You are average. - - - it's 100 dollars

104-per month. But one still needs to buy

105-food products, children still need

106-clothing, we still need to buy something

107-to… [wear?] to a meeting. How do we

108-escape/emerge from this situation?

109-…need, of hunger, this is all…

- - -

110-PA: food…some products we sell in the

111-countryside- - -

112-D: Do you want to convince us that 100

113-[dollars per month], that for people in

114-your villages, 100 dollars is not, …not a

115-lot?

116-AM: Nooo

- - -

117-Mayor: Our villages are specific; people

118-are occupied with strawberries and early

119-potatoes. Therefore in our village, it's a

120-little…

- - -

121-PA: We don't have a road, we don't have

122-drinking water - - - we don't have a

123-sewage system, we don't have gas

124-D: that's emotions

- - -

125-PA: two years ago, we…from the

126-contributions of the population, two years

127-ago, we did a project to get higher [gas]

128-pressure,- - - but we want gas, to be more,

129-I mean…we did the project to get higher

130-[gas] pressure, which now we have in the

131-village.

132-D: When I asked about

133-calculations/estimates, you said that the

134-calculation of gas, the consumption of

135-gas [is] 300…cubic meters.

136-AM: yes

137-D: But I'm interested, have you

138-estimated [the cost] for other heating

139-technologies?

- - -

140-D: for coal, let's suppose…

141-[discussion of price of coal]

- - -

142-AM: we are a locality/place with very

143-little woods, do you understand?

- - -

144-PA: We have a lack of coal (?), coal

145-damages our health, that is the main

146-thing, with gas, with gas the system is

147-more

- - -

148-D: And [bringing coal to the village]

149-with your car, each month, is there

150-enough?

- - -

151-M: but- - -besides that brought to the

152-house, there is work.

153-D: …the gas will be paid for?

154-PA: Yes

155-AM: Yes, but with gas it's clean, gas is

156-ecologic, with gas, people feel like…at

157-least one can rest

158-D: But, 150 we see…, but at 260…

159-M: and wood is getting more expensive

- - -

160-D: But wood is not from Gazprom

- - -

161-PA?: Each year, the price rises

162-D: Now you, you don't see any risks at

163-all?

164-M: No

165-D: …[in] you we will invest, we will

166-spend money…you…for you to begin to

167-have gas in your houses, and it could

168-happen that you lose, that you won't use

169-the gas

- - -

170-D: OK, good, so, until then, from the

171-point of view of risk, you don't see any

172-risks at all,

173-AM: No

174-D: and the investment that we will make

175-in you, will be successful, and welcomed,

176-and used. Is that right?

177-Many respond: yes

178-D: So, furthermore- - -…How will

179-people make the connection [of the gas

180-line] to each house? Have you studied,

181-do you have a strategy, a concept

182-measured/gauged - - -[for] those who will

183-connect?

184-PA: We do

185-D: You do?

186-PA: We do

187-D: How?

188-PA: Ialoveni [gas company]

189-D: Ialoveni gas…say, costs 15

190-thousand…

191-M: currently

192-PA: currently, currently Criuleni Gaz,

193-Criuleni gas, …at Criuleni, they don't

194-give us the right to connect…[with]

195-polyethylene [pipes] from the ground.

196-D: Yes

197-PA: Now, we have succeeded, they gave

198-us permission, up to the village, to go

199-with metal, and we want to go only with

200-metal, we have the experience that it

201-costs less,- - - and [with] polyethylene,

202-gas [pressure] is higher. And so- - - now

203-it's done, all is normal, and the first gas

204-line will be like that and we will go on

205-with the introduction of gas to Nucareni   - - -

206-D: OK, yes, polyethylene- - -

207-M: - - - currently, we have about 8

208-companies, that now have been selected-

209-- - that's why we have some choice, …

210-D: We know Ialoveni Gaz, and …

211-AM: …

- - -

212-D: …[when you] do the tender/bidding

213-process, the competition, for individual

214-connections, neither Ialoveni Gas, nor

215-Criuleni Gas, will have the right to put

216-conditions on you; - - -any company with

217-a license for individual connections can

218-participate in the competition- - -and

219-what's more- - -[at the local gas

220-companies] there are 2-3 people that are

221-closer there to Gazprom- - -and

222-look…they try to - - -to have a

223-monopoly…you should be careful

224-M: we, we even from the beginning, and

225-up to [our involvement with] the

226-Investment Fund, all the work that we

227-have done, - - - [has been through]

228-tenders.

- - -

229-D: and, be transparent, don't leave…

230-a…and some [people] consider that

231-people from the village, well, they're

232-more lazy/slow, well they don't

233-understand, let's…they don't know about

234-that, and- - -once…a construction

235-company, [can come] and say, look, we

236-are ecologic…if you hire us…with

237-gas…if there are projects…with us…with

238-any money…

\- - -

239-D: but…the prices I don't know how

\- - -

240-D: …yes, I thank you, I thank you for the

241-discussion…. So, we have here a project

242-of…high [stage of preparation] …does

243-anyone wish to say anything?

\- - -

244-M: actually in the village of Nucareni…

245-more than 50 percent of the population…

246-53 percent [were] for introduction of gas

247-lines- - -. In the village of Alexeevca, the

248-percent is a little smaller, but- - - but the

249-contribution from both villages has been

250-collected.

- - -

251-D: So, I thank you; thank you; - - - So, it

252-has come out…that we observe here, the

253-stage of preparation [is high]… therefore

254-financing is approved for …

- - -

255-D: Keep track/be aware, the risks that

256-await you, the price [will rise]…but we

257-need to change, once and for all, to other

258-sources of energy, of energy, - - -

[They go on to sign the official paperwork.]