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The Transformation of the U.S. Feminist Movement, 1910-2005

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The Transformation of the U.S. Feminist Movement, 1910-2005

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An abstract of  
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the  
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
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## Abstract

### The Transformation of the U.S. Feminist Movement, 1910-2005

By Alison Faupel

The transformation of the U.S. women's movement after its peaks in the 1920s and 1970s remains largely understudied by both historians and sociologists, who often postulate that the movement dissipated after these initial gains. This oversight is unfortunate, considering these periods are a rich source of information in understanding how and why movements evolve. I draw on the women's movement as a case study to explore the conditions under which movements shift from collectivist to individualist ideology, discontinue the identification of opponents, and replace political goals with cultural goals. Two theories offer competing explanations for these phenomena. The New Social Movement paradigm argues that movement individualization, depoliticization, and lack of opponents are unique to movements of the late twentieth century, which have responded to a historically unique environment that has seen the rise of postmodernism and poststructuralism, neoliberalism, globalization, and increasing bureaucratization and rationalization. Political process theory, by contrast, argues that such trends are the result of periodic changes within the political and cultural opportunity structures; that is, these characteristics are likely to surface in movements that confront a hostile political and cultural climate.

I conduct a combined qualitative and quantitative content analysis of 4,900 articles published in six feminist periodicals spanning the years 1910 to 2005. I supplement these data with public records, archival material, and secondary datasets to get at key theoretical concepts embedded in both traditions. Analyses indicate that the women's movement did generally individualize and depoliticize during periods of decline, as the political and cultural environments turned increasingly hostile to organized feminism in the 1920s and again in the 1980s. Although the findings point to certain nuances in political process theory, overall they support the framework, suggesting that such trends are not recent, but rather emerge during periods when movements witness diminishing political and cultural opportunities, challenging their ability to muster widespread collective mobilization, vie with the state, and confront opponents.

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*To Joey and Jack, my favorite feminist and feminist-to-be.*

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## **CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION**

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“I am not a post-feminist feminist. I am the Third Wave,” Rebecca Walker declared in 1992, sparking a resounding response from young women across the country who were discouraged by the current state of affairs and dissatisfied with the response of an older generation of feminists (Walker 1992). Raised by feminist writer and activist, Alice Walker, Rebecca explained that she was simultaneously indoctrinated into the 1970s feminist philosophy of her mother's generation while struggling with the unique challenges posed by the conservative, anti-feminist 1980s, which made it difficult for her to reconcile her feminist upbringing with anti-feminist behaviors and attitudes. This period gave rise to a generation of feminists who characterize their movement as messy, disunited, and contradictory. Yet rather than deem these characteristics a drawback, Walker and others have argued that such messiness and diversity within the movement “pave the way for more openness and communication from young women and men.” These principles underlie what has become known today as third-wave feminism, a response to a unique period in U.S. history when, paradoxically, the major feminist battles appear to have been fought and won, yet anti-feminist conservatism is making a political and social comeback. Today's generation of young feminists are building a movement that they conceive of as innovative and different, given these distinctive historical conditions.

Seventy years earlier, however, Harriot Stanton Blatch—the daughter of another famous feminist, Elizabeth Cady Stanton—similarly struggled to move the women's movement forward in a period when a major hurdle had been cleared—winning the vote—while an anti-feminist backlash was gaining strength. Cady Stanton had instilled

in her daughter the importance of fighting for women's rights, but Blatch struggled to reconcile her mother's traditional suffragist goals and ideology with a newer generation of feminists in the 1920s, who rejected much of the conventional and dogmatic feminism of their mothers. Like Walker, Blatch recognized that she stood at an unusual period in history, which necessitated new leadership and a new direction for the women's movement (DuBois 1997). The post-suffrage feminist movement, which Blatch helped usher in, bears remarkable similarities to the third wave of the feminist movement, despite the century separating the two.

Bearing these similarities in mind, this project examines the historical contours of the women's movement in the United States, from its early phases during the fight for suffrage to its most recent emergence as "third-wave" feminism, demonstrating that a closer examination of the movement's history can provide a better understanding of its current state. Third-wave feminists argue that their movement is marked by a number of distinctive characteristics, three of which I examine in depth. First is the claim that this wave is more individualistic than preceding waves, focusing on self-esteem and personal empowerment, for example (Baumgardner and Richards 2000; Curry-Johnson 1995; Manzano 2000). Second, this wave is less contentious than earlier waves, avoiding the antagonization of opponents (Katzenstein 1990). Finally, third-wave feminists claim that their generation is unique in promoting cultural goals, to the exclusion of political or economic goals (Bailey 2003; Smith 1997).

These claims resonate with the observations made by social movement theorists in recent years, coalescing into what has become known as New Social Movement Theory (NSMT). These often apolitical and individually-oriented movements, NSM

scholars argue, are an adaptation to a historically unique environment that has seen the rise of postmodernism and poststructuralism, neoliberalism, globalization, and increasing bureaucratization and rationalization (Habermas 1973; Inglehart 1977; 1990; Touraine 1988). Drawing on Political Process Theory (PPT), however, I propose a competing argument that these trends of movement individualization, depoliticization, and shift from conflict to consensus, are the result of periodic changes in political and cultural opportunities; in other words, these characteristics are likely to surface in movements that confront a hostile political and cultural climate, making them too weak to challenge opponents, confront the state, and inspire collective mobilization. Formally stated, I ask: (1) Under what conditions does movement ideology shift from collectivist to individualist?; (2) Under what conditions do movement tactics shift from contention to consensus?; and (3) Under what conditions do movement goals shift from political to cultural?

Should the PPT hypotheses hold, several additional questions follow. Perhaps most importantly is the mechanisms through which these shifts occur. Critics of PPT have pointed out that the model does not adequately specify how the opportunity structure affects movements (for an overview, see Goodwin and Jasper 1999), with some scholars arguing that these structures work independently to shape movements (e.g., Gamson and Meyer 1996), while others argue that activists' perceptions of those opportunities are more important in explaining movement outcomes (e.g., Meyer and Minkoff 2004). In the chapters that follow, I examine both structural opportunities as well as activists' perceptions of opportunities in order to tease out their effects on the movement's frames, tactics, and goals.



An additional issue concerns opportunity structures that exist at multiple levels. More specifically, the vast majority of literature in PPT tradition focuses on opportunities that exist at the state or national level, although a small but growing body of scholarship has begun to explore opportunities at the global level. Yet few scholars conceptualize movements as simultaneously embedded in both domestic and global structures, and thus little research exists on whether and how domestic and global opportunities work together to influence movements. Though it varied considerably by organization and time period, the women's movement was involved in international organizing from its inception, making it a good case study for exploring such questions.

#### THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT AS CASE STUDY

---

In many ways, the U.S. women's movement offers both a difficult and excellent case study for exploring issues in the field of social movements. Over the past 150 years, the movement has grown, undulated, mutated, splintered, and in some cases became defunct. A single dissertation simply cannot cover this entire history—or even most of it—and by necessity must exclude many branches, issues, and groups of feminists. This study explores what may best be termed “mainstream” feminism, which, given the development of American feminism, represents a predominately white, middle-class, and heteronormative movement. In part, this hinges on issues of data availability. The organizations that have the greatest longevity, accessible records, and continuously published periodicals tend to be mainstream organizations. Moreover, a comparative historical study that aims for breadth necessarily sacrifices depth, including alternative organizations and branches. Nevertheless, I recognize that offering a presentation of the

women's movement which includes only a small slice of organized feminism is inherently problematic and serves to reinscribe notions of what "counts" as feminism.<sup>1</sup>

In other ways, the longevity and scope of the movement is one of its greatest strengths. What has allowed the movement to persist through waves and troughs for one and a half centuries—an unparalleled feat in American history—should be an intriguing question for scholars and activists alike. Indeed, the movement has been studied extensively by sociologists, historians, political scientists, and others, but the vast majority of this research focuses on the emergence and peaks of the movement, leaving much of its history understudied. Social movement scholars, however, are beginning to call for more focus on movements in decline and abeyance, pointing out that the overwhelming focus on movement emergence and peaks tells only half the story of a movement, and overlooks how movements in abeyance contribute to the emergence of later waves (see Rupp and Taylor 1987; Taylor 1989).

In seeking to explain the persistence and success of American feminism, the movement's longevity becomes particularly useful. I examine all three waves of the movement, but focus particular attention on the decades during which the movement peaked and declined. This study explores how and why the movement transformed when confronted with political and cultural hostility, ultimately in the interest of better understanding how organized feminism has persisted and changed in the face of enormous obstacles and constraints.

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<sup>1</sup> For more on the diversity of the feminist movement, see Springer (2005), Echols (1989), Moraga and Anzuldúa (1983), and Taylor and Whittier (1992).

## OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

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The following chapter (Chapter 2) presents the relevant empirical and theoretical literature in social movements, paying particular attention to political process theory and new social movement theory. Because political process theory has not been specifically used to examine individualization, depoliticization, and use of consensus tactics, I focus in this chapter on specifying the components of the political and cultural opportunity structures and the mechanisms through which they affect movements.

In Chapter 3, I discuss my data sources and methods, including my hypotheses and operationalization of key variables and concepts. In particular, I specify the concepts of individualization and collectivization, consensus and conflict movements, political and cultural goals, and political and cultural opportunity structures.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 examine the contours of the first, second, and third waves of the women's movement, respectively. Chapter 4 provides a brief history of the political and social factors that gave rise to first-wave feminism, beginning with the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848 and leading up to the peak of the movement in the 1910s. I give a more extensive analysis of the key decades surrounding the suffrage victory in 1920, exploring how the political and social forces that facilitated the movement in its early years turned against it during the 1920s. In particular, the Red Scare following World War I, the decline of the Progressive Party, and the apathy—and at times, hostility—from a younger generation of “flappers,” presented serious challenges to organized feminism. I explore how and why the women's movement changed in response to these political and social conditions.

Chapter 5 is structured similarly to the previous chapter, providing a brief history of the roots of second-wave feminism in the 1950s and 1960s and highlighting some of the important political and social developments that contributed to its rise. Again, however, this chapter focuses on the period surrounding the peak and decline of the second wave in the 1970s and 1980s. I discuss the rise of the New Right, legislation and court decisions that weakened or overturned feminist gains, the negative or altogether absent representations of women and feminism in news media and popular culture; and the turn in public opinion away from feminist positions. I present findings on the effects of this political and cultural hostility on organized feminism.

Chapter 6 explains the third wave of the feminist movement, beginning with an historical overview of the period and the external environment in which the movement emerged. The case of the third wave differs from that of the first and second waves in several ways. Given that the third wave is still very much underway, and in light of the scant attention it has received from academics, this chapter is more exploratory than the previous two and its history is less neatly packaged. Nevertheless, the chapter pieces together the important developments surrounding the rise of third-wave feminism and its historical context, including the complicated relationship between the Clinton administration and feminist leaders, the less complicated but altogether antagonistic relationship between feminists and the Bush administration, the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. and consequential erosion of civil liberties, and growing cultural abhorrence of the term “feminist.” This context sets the stage for the third wave, a messy, fragmented, and contradictory movement (by its own acknowledgement). This wave is particularly intriguing because it arose at a time when

second-wave feminists and periodicals were still very active, providing an opportunity to assess coterminous differences in second- and third-wave goals, tactics, and rhetoric.

Pulling back from the historical detail of previous chapters, Chapter 7 emphasizes the themes common to three feminist waves. Returning to the theoretical questions guiding the research, I offer general conclusions about why the women's movement has periodically demobilized and changed its repertoire of tactics, goals, and frames during these periods of flux. The chapter also looks toward the future. If individualized, depoliticized, and consensus movements are indeed signs of troughs rather than waves, a fundamentally new understanding of third-wave feminism is in order. I explore the limitations of contemporary feminism in its current state with regard to social and political change, closing with a discussion of the long-term implications for the movement.

## **CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

---

I analyze the women's movement in light of two theoretical perspectives: New Social Movement Theory (NSMT) and Political Process Theory (PPT), which offer very different explanations for the rise of individualist, depoliticized, consensus movements. NSM theorists contend that these movements have arisen only recently due to broad, historically-specific changes, while PPT suggests that such movements are a reaction to periodic fluctuations in the opportunity structure and thus are not "new" but rather are recurring patterns over a movement's life course. Drawing on these two theoretical perspectives, my research addresses the following questions: (1) *Under what conditions do movement tactics shift from conflict to consensus?*; (2) *Under what conditions do movement goals shift from political to cultural?*; and (3) *Under what conditions do movement frames shift from collectivist to individualist?* Have these shifts occurred as a result of recent politico-economic changes, as suggested by NSMT, or do they instead correspond to shifts in the opportunity structure, as PPT would lead us to expect? If the PPT hypothesis holds, this case study offers the opportunity to better specify the theoretical model underlying this perspective. The burgeoning literature on political opportunity structures has become a "winding, snarling vine," as some critics have termed it (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). Scholars have conceptualized and operationalized political opportunity components differently, producing a body of research with little synthesis or coherence (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). I seek not only to ascertain whether movement tactics, goals, and frames shift with the opportunity structure, but also to better specify the types of opportunities influencing movements and the mechanisms through which that occurs.

## I. NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

---

The term “new social movement” has been applied to a host of movements that have emerged in Western nations since the 1960s. Scholars argue that post-WWII movements, such as the environmental, peace, and youth movements, differ significantly from movements of earlier eras. In particular, NSM scholars identify three specific characteristics that distinguish these movements from their predecessors: they utilize consensus tactics, focus on cultural goals and issues, and turn to individualist ideology and frames. See Figure 2.1 for an outline of the theoretical argument laid out below.

***Consensus Tactics.*** Some have argued that new social movements tend to be organized as “consensus movements,” that is, movements that frame their position in a way to downplay opposition and build widespread support for their cause both within and outside the movement (Lofland 1989; McCarthy and Wolfson 1992). These movements typically take the form of “‘nonpolitical,’ ‘educational,’ ‘nonpartisan,’ or ‘humanitarian’” movements (Lofland 1989: 164) Lofland (1989) argues that such consensus movements proliferated in the 1980s, citing as examples USA for Africa, Live Aid, Band Aid, Hands Across America, Citizen Diplomacy and City Twinning movements.

Lofland is critical of consensus movements, doubting their ability to effect real social change. He pointedly argues:


Consensus movements are disguised or timid politics (as politics are classically understood) as a way of safely posturing as social movements without the problems of real conflict that genuine—that is, conflict movements—engender. Consensus movements are subterfuge conflict movements; they are derailed dissent and the disguised rebellions of timid rebels. (1989: 165)

Lofland attributes their rise in the 1980s to the Reagan administration's military build-up and the failure of antinuclear activists to slow or stop nuclear proliferation. The citizen diplomacy movements, and consensus movements more generally, are a result of the failures of conflict movements in the 1960s and 70s. An additional factor he cites is the psychological toll taken by liberal activists' participation in conflict movements in previous decades. Conflict movements rely on anger and fear to motivate activists and demobilize opposition, eventually resulting in weariness and disillusionment. The consensus movements of the 1980s, Lofland argues, emphasized the "feel good" nature of their causes, allowing activists to assuage their sense of social injustice without the accompanying feelings of anger and fear.

While Lofland attributes the rise of consensus movements to the failures of conflict movements in preceding decades, other theorists more firmly embedded in the NSMT tradition understand their proliferation as a consequence of broader (and mostly positive) structural changes in the postindustrial era. Inglehart (1977) locates this change in the "silent revolution" in advanced industrial societies, which has given rise to post-material values in the place of traditional economic concerns. He argues that economic development, as well as cultural and political changes, has led to a basic shift in values, placing a premium on post-material values—such as individual improvement and personal freedom—above materialist values. Relatedly, the instrumental rationality associated with industrial society has given way to a concern for autonomy and self-expression in a post-industrial era. Inglehart bases his theory on Maslow's (1943) "hierarchy of needs," consisting of physiological needs, safety needs, belongingness and



**Figure 2.1: New Social Movement Theoretical Model**



\* Relationships are hypothesized to be positive, unless otherwise denoted by “-.”

love needs, and the need for self actualization. Individuals seek to satisfy their needs in this order; once more basic physiological needs are met, one moves upward to fulfilling “advanced” needs, such as creative, aesthetic, ethical, and intellectual goals. Inglehart contends that the postwar generation has advanced so far along this hierarchy that individuals no longer concern themselves with meeting material needs. For this generation, he argues, “economic security may be taken for granted, as the supply of the water or the air we breathe once could” (1971: 991). Consequently, the postwar era has witnessed the rise of post-materialist values and goals in the place of strictly economic or political goals.

For Inglehart (1977; 1990), then, the material security of postwar Americans preempts the need for movements to target labor and property relations. Consensus movements, from this perspective, are not the result of conflict movements’ inability to effect change, but rather a consequence of increasing prosperity. Postwar Americans have advanced along the hierarchy of needs to the pursuit of “self-actualization” (see also Klaus 1991).

Others understand consensus movements, particularly self-help movements, as a reaction to the bureaucratization of the welfare state. As the welfare state becomes increasingly bureaucratized and unable to effectively meet the needs of its citizens, local self-help groups have cropped up to fill this void (Grunow 1986). Scholars have pointed to both the decline of traditional support mechanisms, such as the family and local community organizations, and the rise of the bureaucratic welfare state, which is too centralized, rigid, distant, and inefficient to adequately meet citizens’ needs (Badura 1980; Grunow 1986). Self-help and mutual aid groups attempt to avoid these pitfalls by

developing local organizations, cultivating personal relationships, and forming egalitarian structures (Badura 1980).

*Cultural Goals.* Another key distinction between “new” and “old” social movements is their shift in focus from political or economic sources of oppression to cultural sources of oppression. These movements are thought to operate in and direct their focus toward civil society rather than the state, opening up new terrain to contestation (Melucci 1985). As above, Inglehart (1990) argues that the move from a materialist to postmaterialist society preempted the need for movements to work for a redistribution of power and resources. Touraine (1988) argues similarly that the transition from an industrial to postindustrial economy has eroded traditional identities and freed the middle class of immediate material concerns. Key for Touraine is the concept of historicity, or the capacity of modern society to be self-reflexive and intervene in its own functioning. Historicity refers to “the set of cultural, cognitive, economic, and ethical models by means of which a collectivity sets up relations with its environment; in other words, produces [...] a culture” (Touraine 1988: 40). Culture in postindustrial societies, then, is more than a framework for social behavior; it has become an object of contestation. New social movements emerge as sites of resistance to those who control the production of culture (i.e., the technocrats, to use Touraine’s terminology). Thus, while the major conflict in industrial societies centered around the production of material goods, the major conflict in postindustrial societies centers around the appropriation of historicity. New movements are rooted in the cultural realm, rather than the political or economic realms, as the struggle over historicity is an explicitly cultural struggle, seeking control over the production of meaning and culture (Touraine 1988).

*Individualist Framing.* In addition to being depoliticized and consensus-oriented, NSMs also tend to be more individualized than earlier movements. This trend is distinct from but complementary to depoliticization and consensus dynamics. As movements direct their focus away from the redistribution of power and resources, new concerns arise, often revolving around issues of identity, life-style, personal autonomy, and self-realization.

For Habermas (1973; 1984-1987), a distinctive and troubling feature of modern life is the state's extended reach into citizens' private lives. He argues the "lifeworld," or a community's shared beliefs, values, and understandings, is increasingly intruded upon by the state and market, resulting in a "colonization of the lifeworld." The instrumental rationality associated with the logic of the state and market, Habermas and others argue, now regulates the activities of the lifeworld, such as identity formation, transmission of cultural values, and establishing a sense of community and social solidarity (Habermas 1973; 1984-1987; Laclau 1985; Melucci 1985; Mouffe 1988; Touraine 1971). Similar to Weber's prediction of an increasingly constrictive "iron cage" of rationalization, Habermas warns of the growing dominance of bureaucracy and instrumental rationality in everyday life. Yet unlike Weber, Habermas remains more optimistic regarding the ability to reverse these trends, primarily through new social movements that seek to reestablish personal autonomy and self-realization.

Similarly, as mentioned above, some scholars of self-help movements attribute their proliferation to the inability of the bureaucratized welfare state to effectively meet citizens' needs. Self-help groups, according to this perspective, have developed as an extra-institutional mechanism to cope with the inadequacies of the welfare state (Badura

1980; Grunow 1986). Personal problems ranging from alcoholism to osteoporosis are increasingly addressed through civil society social movement organizations. Inglehart (1990) also notes the proliferation of self-help groups but understands their development as a reaction to largely positive trends. He contends that the post-materialist generation's growing affluence and ability to meet lower-level needs has given rise to new movements that espouse goals of autonomy and self-expression in order to fulfill more "advanced" needs.

NSMT scholars argue that the changes associated with the shift from an industrial to postindustrial society have had direct implications for the form and focus of social movements in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century—third-wave feminism among these—including their tendency to be consensus-based, depoliticized, and individualized. Recently, however, scholars have begun to call into question the assumption made by NSM theorists that these movements are, in fact, new. In particular, critics point to the lack of empirical research testing these hypotheses directly. Werum and Winders (2001) offer one of the few empirical studies of a quintessential new social movement—the gay rights movement—and find that both proponents and opponents of gay rights focus overwhelmingly on classical civil rights issues and engage in direct confrontation with the state. Calhoun (1993) takes a different approach by focusing on elements of "new" social movements found in earlier eras. He cites, for example, the socialist movement's affirmation of a new non-class-based identity, the abolitionist movement's politicization of formerly non-political terrain, and the communal movement's commitment to non-hierarchical structures and direct participatory democracy, all of which exemplify characteristics of "new" social movements.

While Calhoun (*ibid.*) challenges the notion that NSMs are historically unique, however, he endorses the central tenet of the theory which suggests that social movements are fundamentally shaped by the broad economic structure. He contends that the economic structure was particularly conducive to the rise of NSMs in the early years of industrialization, but argues that “if [NSMs] were ever really in abeyance for long, it was in the more industrialized later nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth century” (*ibid.*: 392-93). We can extend this challenge to NSMT further by drawing on insights from the political process tradition, which suggests that the characteristics associated with “new” social movements have appeared not only in pre- and post-industrial societies, but even at the peak of the industrial era, depending upon the more volatile makeup of the opportunity structure.

## II. POLITICAL PROCESS THEORY

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Political process theory (PPT) offers fundamentally different explanations and foci from those of NSMT. Rather than explaining movement forms and outcomes as shaped by recent broad societal changes, such as the bureaucratization of the state (Habermas 1973) or the increasing affluence of the middle class (Inglehart 1990), PPT explains movement growth and decline as a consequence of fluctuation in movement resources, both material and political. Challenging NSMT’s claim that movements individualize, depoliticize, and shift from conflict to consensus tactics only in the late 20th century, a PPT-based approach suggests that such shifts occur whenever a movement is in decline and is therefore unable to mount effective challenges against the state, confront opponents, or encourage collective mobilization.

Resource mobilization theory, out of which the political opportunity perspective emerged, attributes the rise and success of movements to an influx of resources to an aggrieved group, typically conceived as financial or labor contributions to social movement organizations (McCarthy and Zald 1977; 1973). Later theorists in this tradition expanded the definition of resources to include political opportunities and constraints. Tilly (1978) introduced a “polity model” of collective action, posing two questions: under what conditions does collective action happen?; and under what conditions does collective action grow or decline, succeed or fail? In answering the former question, Tilly points to factors considered by earlier resource mobilization theorists, including the strength of a group’s organizational infrastructure and its collective control over resources. His second question considers the role of external factors rooted in the polity. Specifically, he considers the degree to which the state facilitates or represses contenders, and the availability of political opportunities or threats facing contenders.

Tarrow (1998) builds on Tilly’s polity model by expanding the conceptual role of the state. He asks why social movements emerge in some political contexts but not others. Like Tilly, Tarrow considers state repression or facilitation of social movements, arguing that representative democracies facilitate collective action while authoritarian states discourage it. Other elements also facilitate or hinder social movements, including the degree to which new actors have access to the state, the relative stability of political alignments, and the presence or absence of influential allies. Tarrow argues that these factors make up the “political opportunity structure” (POS) within which social movements operate.

Scholars have found the concept of POS useful in explaining the rise and success of the women's movement (cf. McCammon, Campbell, Grandberg, and Mowery 2001; Rupp and Taylor 1987; Soule and Olzak 2004). Costain (1992), for example, explains the emergence of second-wave feminism by pointing to the federal government's willingness to tolerate and even encourage the movement by such actions as Congress's passage of the Equal Rights Amendment. Yet the eventual failure to ratify the ERA, the Supreme Court's attack on abortion rights, and the Reagan administration's strong opposition to the ERA and abortion rights in the 1980s, played a large role in the demobilization of the movement.

More recently, scholars have considered effects of the cultural opportunity structure (COS), constituted, for example, by the media, entertainment industries, religion, advertising, and the arts. Frank and McEneaney (1999: 915) define the cultural opportunity structure as "the distributions of meaning in and across societies." In this sense, culture is not only equated with a movement frame or strategy--something deliberately manipulated by social movement actors--but also comprises "the constituent materials of actors themselves" (*ibid.*). McCammon et al. (2001) also consider the role of culture in social movement success through their concept of "gendered opportunity structures." They suggest that political decision-makers are often affected by circumstances beyond formal political dynamics, including gender relations. In their study of the women's suffrage movement, they find that "changing gender relations altered expectations about women's participation in the polity, and these changes in gendered expectations increased the willingness of political decision-makers to support suffrage" (51). These changing gender relations--such as the rise of the "new woman,"



blurring of the public/private distinction, and passage of suffrage in neighboring states-- encouraged political decision-makers to change their views about the appropriate roles for women, thus making the gendered opportunity structure more favorable for the movement and providing tools that the suffrage movement successfully utilized.

Research in this tradition focuses overwhelmingly on movement emergence and growth. My concern is about movement decline, which has received much less attention. Might the shift from conflict to consensus tactics, political to cultural goals, and collectivist to individualist framing be the result of an atrophied opportunity structure rather than the broad-based politico-economic changes that NSMT emphasizes? The limited research that does focus on movement decline and abeyance lends credence to the PPT hypotheses. (See Table 2.1 for a list of formal hypotheses and indicators.)

***Consensus Tactics.*** As discussed above, scholarship on consensus movements originally attributed their rise to the conservative backlash in the 1980s, including among other factors, the Reagan administration's military build-up and the failure of antinuclear activists to slow or stop nuclear proliferation (Lofland 1989). Replacing conflict with consensus tactics, then, may help a movement avoid inciting the hostility of opponents at a time when it is too weak to effectively combat it. Given this, I hypothesize that the women's movement will be more likely to use consensus tactics when the political and cultural opportunity structures become more closed, and conversely, more likely to use conflict tactics when the political and cultural opportunity structures become more open.

**Table 2.1: Hypotheses and Measures (Political Process Theory)**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables
<i>I. Political Opportunity Structure</i>	
<p>1. During periods of <b>political stability</b> (political instability), the women's movement will be more likely to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Use consensus tactics (dissensus tactics)</li> <li>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	<p>Third party strength Margin of victory for political candidates Number of congressional seats that change party Strength of political coalitions</p>
<p>2. During periods in which women's <b>access to the polity</b> is restricted (broadened), the women's movement will be more likely to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Use consensus tactics (dissensus tactics)</li> <li>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	<p>Women's voting rights Women's voting registration rates</p>
<p>3. During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>political allies</b>, it will be more likely to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Use consensus tactics (dissensus tactics)</li> <li>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	<p>Presidential support for women's rights EEOC funding Rates of women in political positions</p>
<i>II. Cultural Opportunity Structure</i>	
<p>4. During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>cultural allies</b>, it will be more likely to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Use consensus tactics (dissensus tactics)</li> <li>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	<p>Employment of women in the arts, media, and clergy Media coverage of the women's movement</p>
<p>5. During periods in which women's <b>access to cultural spaces</b> is restricted (broadened), the women's movement will be more likely to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Use consensus tactics (dissensus tactics)</li> <li>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	<p>Participation in Olympics Female Nobel Prize laureates Cultural consecration of female artists</p>
<p>6. During periods of <b>cultural instability</b> (cultural stability), the women's movement will be more likely to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Use consensus tactics (dissensus tactics)</li> <li>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	<p>Wars Panics Terrorist attacks Economic depressions</p>
<p>7. During periods of <b>congruity (contradiction) between cultural values and conventional social practices</b>, the women's movement will be more likely to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Use consensus tactics (dissensus tactics)</li> <li>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	<p>Wars Holidays (e.g., Fourth of July, Christmas, Mother's Day) Anniversaries of major movement events</p>

8. During periods in which women's **employment, earnings, and education decreases (increases) and marital and fertility rates increase (decrease)**, the women's movement will be more likely to:
- A. Use consensus tactics (dissensus tactics)
  - B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)
  - C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)

Employment rates  
Earning rates  
Education rates  
Marital rates  
Fertility rates

### *III. General versus Issue-Specific Opportunity Structure*

9. During periods of decreasing (increasing) **general opportunities**, the women's movement will be more likely to:
- A. Use consensus tactics (dissensus tactics)
  - B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)
  - C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)

Third party strength  
Margin of victory for political candidates  
Number of congressional seats that change party  
Strength of political coalitions  
Wars  
Panics  
Economic depressions  
Holidays (e.g., Fourth of July, Christmas)

10. During periods of decreasing (increasing) **issue-specific opportunities**, the women's movement will be more likely to:
- A. Use consensus tactics (dissensus tactics)
  - B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)
  - C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)

Women's voting rights  
Women's voting registration rates  
Presidential support for women's rights  
EEOC funding  
Rates of women in political positions  
Employment of women in the arts, media, and clergy  
Media coverage of the women's movement  
Women's participation in cultural events  
Cultural consecration of female artists  
Anniversaries of major movement events  
Employment rates  
Earning rates  
Education rates  
Marital rates  
Fertility rates

### *IV. Structural versus Perceived Opportunities*

11. During periods of decreasing (increasing) **structural opportunities**, the women's movement will be more likely to:
- A. Use consensus tactics (dissensus tactics)
  - B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)
  - C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)

(see above)

<p>12. During periods of decreasing (increasing) <b>perceived opportunities</b>, the women's movement will be more likely to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Use consensus tactics (dissensus tactics)</li> <li>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	<p>Perceptions coded in feminist publications</p>
<p><i>V. Domestic versus Global Opportunity Structure</i></p>	
<p>13. During periods of decreasing (increasing) <b>domestic opportunities</b>, the women's movement will be more likely to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Use consensus tactics (dissensus tactics)</li> <li>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	<p>(see above)</p>
<p>14. During periods of decreasing (increasing) <b>global opportunities</b>, the women's movement will be more likely to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Use consensus tactics (dissensus tactics)</li> <li>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	<p>Number of countries with women's suffrage          NGO access to the UN          Degree of political party competition across countries          Number of countries with official agencies for women's affairs          Number of countries with female heads of state          Number of CEDAW signatories          Rate of female participation in the Olympics</p>

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*Cultural Goals.* Others have argued that movements in decline or abeyance are likely to depoliticize, replacing overtly political goals with cultural goals. In the case of the nuclear freeze movement, for example, Meyer (1993) finds that, as the movement declined in the mid-1980s, activists chose “expressive” tactics over political tactics, looking to win broad-based support for a peace campaign divorced from specific political goals. Similarly, Taylor (1989) argues that the National Woman's Party, in its interwar abeyance phase, largely abstained from explicitly political issues, focusing instead on creating an alternative feminist framework that proved to be essential for supporting and sustaining members who rejected the traditional cultural framework. Cultural goals are often more palatable to those outside the movement, as they tend to be vaguer and less

threatening than overtly political goals, which involve direct confrontation with the state (Meyer 1993). I hypothesize that the women's movement will adopt cultural goals when the political and cultural opportunity structures become closed, and conversely, adopt political goals when the political and cultural opportunity structures open.

*Individualist Framing.* Finally, some have theorized that movements in abeyance are likely to individualize, often retreating from collectivist action and rhetoric. Katzenstein (1990) demonstrates, for example, that while the public and collective face of the feminist movement may have retreated in the 1980s, feminist consciousness nevertheless survived—even thrived—on an individual level. Rather than collective confrontation, feminists today engage in “unobtrusive mobilization” within institutions such as the military and the Catholic Church, challenging them from the inside. This more private form of activism, she argues, “now drives second-wave feminism ahead into the 1990s” (p. 28) in the absence of a collective movement. Kauffman (2001) offers a more critical analysis of the same dynamic. While leftist movements' concern with identity politics, for example within consciousness-raising groups, was initially considered a necessary precondition for collective action and social change, as it diffused throughout the New Left this concern with forging one's identity became the sole focus of the movement, transformed into a goal in itself rather than as an instrument of broader social change. Kaufmann thus argues that “identity politics' emphasis on self-transformation as a prelude to political change has frequently been replaced by a vision of self-transformation as political change” (30-31), resulting in what she disparagingly labels the “anti-politics” of identity. In other words, the political has again become personal. Kauffman traces the rise of this identity “anti-politics” to the conservative

backlash of the 1980s, arguing that its appeal stems from the fact that it “holds out the promise of politicizing *oneself*, one’s choices about self-presentation, self-conception, and lifestyle, projecting a sense of ‘being’ political at a time when the options for *doing* politics may seem limited” (31). Following these findings, I hypothesize that the women’s movement will use individualist rhetoric when the political and cultural opportunity structures become more closed, and conversely, use collectivist rhetoric when the political and cultural opportunity structures become more open.

### *Components of the Political Opportunity Structure*

If these hypotheses hold—and movement individualization, depoliticization, and use of consensus tactics are a response to declining opportunities—a better specification of this theoretical model is in order. Gamson and Meyer (1996: 275) argue that the concept of the opportunity structure is in danger of becoming a “sponge” which “threatens to become an all-encompassing fudge factor for all the conditions and circumstances that form the context for collective action.” Critics have pointed out that the model does not adequately specify components of the opportunity structure, contending that most conceptualizations are fuzzy and ambiguous (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). Moreover, most models have left large “black boxes” by not explaining how opportunities work. Given these critiques, I aim to distinguish distinct components of the opportunity structure and specify the mechanisms through which they operate.

Figure 2.2 provides an outline of this theoretical model. Given its complexity, I do not test the entire model in this dissertation. Nevertheless, I present the diagram in its entirety in order to provide a full overview of the argument, noting with asterisks the

variables that measured directly. Refer to Chapter Three for a more detailed discussion of how these variables are measured.

***Political Instability.*** Under ordinary circumstances, political parties have relatively stable bases of support. At times, however, the political system becomes unstable when, for instance, old political coalitions break down, voting patterns shift sharply, elections become particularly closely contested, or third parties gain strength. Instability of political alignments often encourages parties and politicians to search for support from new constituencies, making them open to hearing challengers' demands and improving the bargaining position of these groups (McAdam 1982; Piven and Cloward 1977). As challenging groups gain political leverage, I expect a number of outcomes to result. First, the support they receive from political allies, whether direct or indirect, should legitimize the challengers' positions, increasing their ability to effectively resist opposition. I expect that the greater the group's ability to combat an opposition group, the more likely they will be to engage in direct confrontation with that opposition. Conversely, decreased ability to combat an opposition group will result in a movement's use of consensus tactics.


Moreover, increased political support should signal to movement participants the efficacy of collective action. I expect that as movement participants gain a greater sense of efficacy in their collective action, the more likely they will be to push for goals that directly alter existing power relations. Conversely, a decreased sense of efficacy will lead to the adoption of cultural goals that are more vague and less threatening to existing power relations.

Finally, as challengers' political leverage increases, the government's cost of repressing their protest also increases. The decreased likelihood of government repression reduces the risks associated with movement participation (McAdam 1982), which in turn lowers the costs of collective action. I expect that the lower the costs associated with collective action, the more likely a movement will be to promote collectivist ideology and rhetoric. Conversely, the greater the cost of collective action, the more likely a movement will be to promote individualist ideology and rhetoric.

*Access to the Polity.* Political opportunities also emerge when a challenging group has greater access to the polity, for example through newly won voting rights or the enforcement of existing voting rights, with greater voter registration rates of the group's constituency, or with greater procedural ease for shaping legislative agendas (e.g., the ease or difficulty of placing referenda on the ballot) (McCammon, Campbell, Grandberg, and Mowery 2001; Tarrow 1998). Some have argued that access to the polity has a curvilinear relationship to the level of protest: i.e., totally closed political systems make protest unviable, while totally open systems make protest unnecessary. Partial access to the polity, however, encourages protest by providing the means but not the end for addressing grievances—thus, protest is a both viable and necessary option (Eisinger 1973). A group's increasing access to the polity raises the government's cost of repressing protesters, which in turn lowers the risk of movement participation. As above, I expect that this decreased risk to challengers lowers the cost of collective action, which should lead to the movement's promotion of collectivist ideology and rhetoric. Further, I expect that increased access to the polity improves the group's political leverage, which ultimately gives them a greater sense of efficacy in their collective action and leads them



**Figure 2.2: Political Process Theoretical Model**



Note: Relationships are hypothesized to be positive unless otherwise denoted by “-”; Variables that are directly measured are denoted with an asterisk (\*)

to adopt overtly political goals. Finally, increased access improves a challenger's ability to combat opposition groups, encouraging their use of conflict tactics.

*Political Allies.* The presence of political allies (whether individual politicians, political parties, or entire states) can facilitate movements as well (Tarrow 1998), by providing publicity for a movement or its issues, lending inside information or specialized expertise, and pushing for favorable legislation, for instance (Costain 1992; Tilly 1978). In providing these material resources to a movement, support from political allies reduces the costs associated with collective action, which I expect will encourage the movement to adopt more collectivist ideology and rhetoric. Further, the assistance provided by influential political allies endows a movement with symbolic resources—in addition to standard material resources—by helping to legitimize a challenger's positions and goals. These resources provide movement participants with a sense of efficacy in their collective action, which I expect will encourage it to push for more overtly political goals. It should also aid in the movement's ability to combat opposition groups, which should encourage its use of conflict tactics.

#### *Components of the Cultural Opportunity Structure*

Several critics of political process theory argue that the model does not adequately address the role of culture in movement mobilization (for an overview of this critique, see Goodwin and Jasper 1999). According to these critics, culture plays an important, if overlooked, function in social movements by building a collective identity among members and framing movement messages in a culturally resonant way. In this sense, incorporating culture into social movement models allows theorists to accord a certain

degree of agency to movement actors. Yet in equating culture with the instrumental actions of movement activists, these models overlook the ways in which culture independently structures social action (Sewell 1992). As discussed above, some recent work has sought to overcome this narrow understanding of culture by introducing the concept of the cultural opportunity structure (COS) (Frank and McEneaney 1999). Yet as with much of the work on the POS, conceptualizations of the COS are often quite broad (e.g., the spread of individualism (Frank and McEneaney 1999)) or overly narrow (e.g., the rise of the “new woman” in late-19<sup>th</sup> century America (McCammon, Campbell, Grandberg, and Mowery 2001)). The concept of the COS remains rather underdeveloped, necessitating additional theoretical refinement. Below I identify several potential components of the cultural opportunity structure and specify the mechanisms through which they likely affect movement tactics, frames, and goals. For a more detailed discussion of measurement of these variables, see Chapter Three.

*Cultural Allies.* Just as political allies provide material resources to a movement, I expect that the presence of cultural allies should provide symbolic resources to a movement by encouraging positive cultural representations of women and feminism. Existing research indicates that representations of women and men in film, television, advertising, and other media outlets affect broader public opinion about gender roles (Signorelli 1989; Signorelli and Lears 1992). As Bielby and Bielby (1996: 267) argue: “Mass cultural industries are sites where symbolic representations are literally produced.” Given this, I expect that positive media representations of women will increase public support and garner broader legitimacy for the movement, in turn encouraging movement activists to adopt conflict tactics, political goals, and collectivist rhetoric.

***Access to Culture.*** In the same way that a challenging group's access to the polity provides it with political resources, I expect that access to cultural spaces will provide the movement with symbolic resources. Particularly pertinent for the feminist movement, women's increased participation in cultural spaces—which are by definition public—undermines the notion of the public sphere as a male domain, thereby challenging traditional gender roles (McCammon, Campbell, Grandberg, and Mowery 2001). I expect that where traditional gender ideology is undermined and attitudes toward gender become more egalitarian, the women's movement will more likely adopt conflict tactics, political goals, and collectivist rhetoric.

A more specific form of cultural participation includes the cultural consecration of female artists (e.g., in music, film, television). The practice of setting certain artists or art apart as “sacred” endows that work with greater legitimacy. While women have traditionally been excluded in many art worlds, those periods in which greater number of female artists are consecrated should open a cultural opportunity to the women's movement by legitimizing women's work. Moreover, the inclusion of women among the “great” artists expands the public sphere of art to include women, similarly challenging traditional gender roles. As above, when traditional gender ideology is undermined and the women's movement has greater symbolic resources at its disposal, we should expect that it will likely adopt conflict tactics, political goals, and collectivist rhetoric.

***Cultural Instability.*** While periods of political instability should facilitate social movements, I hypothesize that periods of *cultural* instability will hinder movements (particularly left-wing movements). During periods of cultural instability, which may be brought on by wars or panics for instance, societies often place a higher value on

traditional social arrangements of the past, whether real or imagined (see e.g., Coontz 1992). Valuing traditional social arrangements will legitimize conservative movements but delegitimize left-wing movements, including those seeking gender equality. I expect that the delegitimation of feminism, and hence a decrease in the availability of its symbolic resources, will likely lead to individualization, depoliticization, and use of consensus tactics.

***Cultural Contradictions.*** McAdams (1996) argues that any event which brings into focus a contradiction between highly resonant cultural values and conventional social practices should facilitate a social movement by legitimizing protest activity. Many movements in the U.S. that have sought equality of various types (e.g., racial equality, class equality) received a boost in support during wartime, when democratic rhetoric was especially pronounced. Research has documented such processes at play during World War I, which drew support for the women's suffrage movement (McCammon, Campbell, Grandberg, and Mowery 2001) and during World War II, which helped to plant the seeds of the Civil Rights movement (McAdam 1982). I expect that periods during which such contradictions are spotlighted—which may include wartime, as well as periodic events such as Fourth of July holidays, for example—will provide a cultural opportunity for the women's movement, encouraging collectivization, politicization, and use of conflict tactics.

***Sociodemographic Shifts.*** A final potential source of cultural opportunities for social movements includes shifts in sociodemographic trends. In McAdam's (1982) seminal research on the civil rights movement, he notes that increasing employment and educational opportunities for blacks after World War II endowed civil rights

organizations with new resources. Further, the migration of blacks from rural southern areas to northern urban centers in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century—or in other words, from disenfranchised to enfranchised areas of the country—established the black vote as a significant political force. For McAdam, then, this demographic shift translates into a political opportunity for the movement. Others, however, have identified similar trends as *cultural* opportunities. In her work on the women's movement, for example, Klein (1984) attributes the rise of second-wave feminism in the mid-1960s to three primary factors: a decline in fertility rates, a decline in marital rates (and a rise in divorce rates), and women's increasing labor force participation. Like McAdam, Klein argues that women's greater earning power provided feminist organizations with new material resources. But more importantly, she contends, these shifts challenged traditional gender arrangements and undermined the notion that a woman's place is in the home. In this sense, these sociodemographic trends provided a symbolic resource to the women's movement, which ultimately helped to legitimize feminist activism.

Given these findings, I expect such trends will influence movements through two separate mechanisms. First, as a group's constituency experiences increasing rates of employment, earnings, and access to education, they have more material resources at their disposal, such as money, labor, and expertise, to donate to the movement. An endowment of resources should make the movement better able to realize its goals, combat opposition groups, and mobilize constituents, resulting in the adoption of political goals, conflict tactics, and collectivist rhetoric (McAdam 1982).

Second, for the feminist movement in particular, as women's rates of marriage and fertility decrease and rates of employment and education increase, traditional gender

arrangements become weakened and undermined, and the anti-feminist argument that women's natural duty is to their home and children begins to lose its cultural resonance. The movement should be in a better position to oppose anti-feminist forces, mobilize constituents, and effectively campaign for their issues, which I expect will encourage activists to adopt conflict tactics, collectivist rhetoric, and political goals (Klein 1984; McCammon, Campbell, Grandberg, and Mowery 2001).

### *Categories of Opportunities*

I have sought above to distinguish particular components of the opportunity structure and specify potential mechanisms through which they operate. Below I categorize these opportunities along three dimensions: (1) general opportunities versus issue-specific opportunities, (2) structural aspects of opportunities versus activists' perceptions of those opportunities, and (3) domestic-level versus global-level opportunities.

***General versus Issue-Specific Opportunities.*** Seminal work on political opportunities focuses on the general openness of the polity, that is, features of the state that facilitate or inhibit all social movements. Tilly (1978), for example, points out that movements tend to flourish in representative democracies and are stifled in authoritarian states. Tarrow (1998) similarly argues that stronger and more centralized states hinder collective mobilization, as they give challengers fewer targets and have greater capacity to suppress movements. More recent work in this vein focuses on issue-specific openings in the POS that can encourage mobilization by one constituency while suppressing or being immaterial to others. Changing gender relations in the 1910s may have provided

opportunities for the first wave of the feminist movement while simultaneously stifling the anti-suffrage movement (McCammon, Campbell, Grandberg, and Mowery 2001); John F. Kennedy's appointment of a Presidential Commission on the Status of Women may have facilitated second-wave feminism but likely had little effect on other movements of the 1960s (Costain 1992). In their study of the civil rights movement, Meyer and Minkoff (2004) assess the relative weight of general and issue-specific openings in the POS, and they find that the type of opportunity operates differently depending on the outcome of interest. For example, the level of civil rights protest is better explained through issue-specific elements of the POS, while general opportunities have a more significant effect on the rate of social movement organizational formation. With respect to the women's movement, I differentiate between general and issue-specific opportunities in order to assess their relative influence on movement individualization, depoliticization, and shift from conflict to consensus tactics.

*Structural versus Perceived Opportunities.* In addition to examining issue-specific versus general opportunities, Meyer and Minkoff (2004) also ask whether formal structural openings in the system, or movement participants' *perceptions* of those opportunities, are more important to movement mobilization. Much of the literature conceives activists as rational actors awaiting signals from the state before engaging in collective action (e.g., Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). Gamson and Meyer (1996) argue, however, that activists are rarely fully cognizant of the opportunity structure and tend to overestimate their chances for success; according to their model, movements are always trying to mobilize constituents and achieve their goals, and only sometimes do they happen to succeed, depending upon structural openings in the polity. I make use of this



distinction between structural and perceived openings to assess how changes in the POS affect the women's movement's framing, tactics, and goals. Meyer and Minkoff (2004), however, use only proxy measures of perceptions of the opportunity structure, such as media attention paid to a movement, assuming that media coverage automatically translates into optimistic perceptions of the opportunity structure. As I elaborate in the following chapter, I use a more direct measure of activists' perceptions of the opportunity structure by examining their assessments of the political and cultural environments in movement publications, which allows for a comparison of perceptions of the opportunity structure with measures of structural openings independent of activists' perceptions.

*Domestic versus Global Opportunities.* To date there has been little dialogue between the literature on political process theory and theories of global structures or processes. Much of the political process literature operationalizes the POS at the state or national level, disregarding opportunities that may exist at the global level. Conversely, much of the literature on global structures that addresses social movements (e.g., world-polity theory, world-systems theory) overlooks insights from PPT.

World-systems theory rightly criticizes much social movement scholarship for considering only Western movements; yet in explaining Third World rebellion, world-system scholars tend to fall back on outdated notions of relative deprivation. Chase-Dunn (1998), for example, argues that revolution and rebellion will most likely occur in semi-peripheral states, where the gap between rich and poor is greatest. Another limitation of world-systems theory is its model of global structures working indirectly through national institutions. Boswell and Dixon (1990), for example, argue that international dependency encourages rebellion by polarizing classes, but only in states with mildly repressive

regimes. Highly repressive regimes are able to prevent rebellion more effectively, while mildly repressive regimes create grievances in their populations but lack the means to suppress protest. Social movements in this perspective respond to opportunities at the global level only insofar as they are filtered through domestic structures.

World-polity theory offers an alternative by emphasizing global opportunities that work independently of domestic-level opportunities. Frank and McEneaney (1999) examine the effect of the global COS—specifically, the expansion of individualism to include women along with men—on the rise and success of lesbian and gay social movements, arguing that this cultural opportunity legitimated new actors and goals. Yet their consideration of the POS relies on more traditional measures at the national level, such as state policies regarding same-sex sexual regulations and states' commitment to women's rights. The role of the political opportunity structure beyond the national level is not considered.

Berkovitch (1999a; 1999b) does, however, take into account the global political opportunity structure's effects on the international women's movement in the early twentieth century. The creation of a new international political space through the founding of the League of Nations in 1919, she argues, proved positive for the movement, despite the League's initial resistance to women's issues. The postwar era ushered in a period of even greater opportunities through the creation of the United Nations and a number of accompanying intergovernmental organizations, many of which took up the cause of human (including women's) rights. This new global discourse on human rights helped to redirect the international women's movement from a focus on moral reform and "protection" of women to a frame of women's rights as human rights.

The world polity and its changing opportunity structure, Berkovitch argues, had a significant impact on the issues addressed by the international women's movement and the way in which they were framed.<sup>2</sup>

Despite some recent convergence, there is still much room for development in linking the literatures on political process and global structures. As social movements become more global in orientation, the PPT perspective needs to take into account the effects of both national and global contexts. At the same time, the literature on global structures tends to overlook key insights from PPT. Questions that have not been well addressed include: How do both cultural opportunities and political opportunities work together at the global level to shape movements? More basically, what *is* the global political opportunity structure? Can we identify the standard features of the domestic POS (e.g., political instability, elite allies, access to the polity) at the global level? Distinguishing between national- and global-level opportunities is particularly important in studying the women's movement, as it varied considerably by wave and by branch in its focus on and engagement with international issues, goals, organizations, and actors. The global environment has generally offered a facilitative opportunity structure to the women's movement. The League of Nations (and later, United Nations) has been largely supportive of women's rights, sponsoring several World Conferences for Women, establishing a Decade for Women in 1975-85, and adopting the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979, which most nation-states have since ratified (Berkovitch 1999b; Joachim 1999; 2007; Meyer 1999; West 1999). Given the relative openness of the global opportunity structure, I

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<sup>2</sup> See also Berkovitch and Bradley (1999), on the effect of the world polity on the issues of women's education and female genital cutting.

expect that the effects of a negative domestic opportunity structure on the women's movement may be mitigated in part by the global opportunity structure if and when the movement focuses on the global environment.

To summarize, my project seeks to answer the questions above not only by examining whether the changing opportunity structure evokes changes in movement tactics, goals, and frames, but also by clarifying the specific components of the opportunity structure that produce specific types of change. I focus on the women's movement, from the peak of the first wave in the early 1900s to its most recent coalescence into a third wave, to examine patterns of fluctuation in the degree of collectivization, politicization, and conflict, and whether these fluctuations correspond to fluctuations in the POS and COS. Following Meyer and Minkoff (2004), I also attempt to better specify how types political and cultural opportunities operate, examining both issue-specific and general opportunities as well as structural opportunities and perceptions of opportunities. Finally, I also take into account both domestic and global opportunities to assess under what conditions and how the opportunity structure at these two levels affects the women's movement.

## **CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS**

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The key question guiding this research concerns the conditions under which movements shift in tactics, goals, and ideology. In order to obtain answers to the research question in its various parts, and test the hypotheses suggested by NSMT and PPT, I use a variety of data sources. My dependent variables are drawn from a qualitative and quantitative content analysis of various feminist publications from the first, second, and third waves of the movement. My sampling strategy and coding scheme are discussed more fully below and in Appendix A.

My independent variables, measuring various aspects of the political and cultural opportunity structures, were drawn from a variety of sources and datasets and include both quantitative and qualitative measures. I discuss these more fully below and in the chapters that follow.

Finally, in seeking to present a coherent picture of feminist mobilization in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, I have drawn extensively on a rich secondary literature on the U.S. women's movement in sociology, history, political science, and other popular accounts.

### **I. DEPENDENT VARIABLES**

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#### **A. DATA AND SAMPLING**

To get systematic data on shifts in movement rhetoric, my primary method of investigation is a content-based coding of first-, second-, and third-wave feminist publications. This method offers two advantages. First, it allows for consistency in comparison between historical periods of the women's movement. Given the longitudinal approach of this research, no other single method can be employed for every

wave of the movement. Second, this method provides valuable data on the *public* face put forward by the movement, that is, the expressions of goals, tactics, and ideology deliberately constructed for a wide-ranging public. In this way, the journals should provide a more robust test of the hypotheses; that is, the public face of the movement should be the least likely to individualize and depoliticize following downturns in the opportunity structure, as the journals were intended as mobilizing agents. Thus should these trends still appear in public forms, the theory holds under more stringent of circumstances.

I draw on two publications from each of the three periods. For the first wave of the movement, I rely on the *Woman Citizen* and *Equal Rights*. The *Woman Citizen*<sup>3</sup> was the official publication of the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), one of two primary suffrage organizations. NAWSA was a progressive feminist organization, advocating women's suffrage as a means of "feminizing" politics, that is, injecting women's proclaimed "natural" maternal influence into the public sphere to bring about progressive goals, such as protective legislation, labor rights, and child protection. *Equal Rights*<sup>4</sup> was the official publication of the second primary suffrage organization, the National Woman Party (NWP). NWP, in contrast to NAWSA, was a liberal feminist organization aiming to eliminate gender distinctions, primarily by pushing for the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment.

These two particular journals were chosen for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Their publishers, NAWSA and NWP respectively, were the flag-bearers of first-

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<sup>3</sup> NAWSA originally titled their periodical *The Woman's Journal*. It switched to *The Woman Citizen* in 1916, and briefly returned to the title *The Woman's Journal* from 1928-1931. I refer to the publication as *The Woman Citizen* throughout the paper for purposes of consistency.

<sup>4</sup> The publication was originally titled *The Suffragist*, but NWP renamed it as *Equal Rights* in 1923. I refer to the publication as *Equal Rights* throughout the paper for purposes of consistency.

wave feminism (Buechler 1990, Cott 1987, Rupp and Taylor 1987). While other social movement organizations certainly overlapped to some extent with the women's movement (e.g., the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the National Consumer's League, the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, the American Birth Control League), they were not feminist organizations per se. Moreover, NAWSA and NWP each offered a regularly published periodical during this time frame, providing consistent and long-term data sources.

For *The Woman Citizen*, I sampled articles between the years 1910 and 1930, spanning ten years before and ten years after the 19<sup>th</sup> Amendment was ratified in 1920. This sample period enabled me to focus on the key years surrounding ratification and a period when the movement witnessed a significant shift in its political and cultural opportunity structures. I sampled 10% of articles during this 21-year period, giving me a final count of 1,735 articles. I used two sampling methods. For the years 1910-1920, the *Citizen* was published weekly, but the majority of these weekly issues did not contain a table of contents. I took a stratified random sample of articles from these first eleven years, stratifying on the basis of year and week. I randomly sampled twelve weeks within each year<sup>5</sup>, and randomly sampled articles within each selected week. For these years I have a sample size of 1,473 articles. For the years 1921-1924, the *Citizen* switched from a weekly to biweekly format, and in 1925, it switched again to a monthly format. Because every issue in these ten years included a table of contents, I did not

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<sup>5</sup> With the exception of 1919, for which I sampled only eleven weeks, as six issues were not printed due to a strike by New York City pressmen.

stratify the sample by week, but rather took a random sample of the entire population of articles within each year. For these years I have a sample size of 262 articles.<sup>6, 7, 8</sup>

For *Equal Rights*, I sampled issues from November 1913 (the first issue of the journal) to January/February 1921, and February 1923 to December 1930. The journal suspended publication between 1921 and 1923, during which time the National Woman's Party reorganized following their suffrage victory. The journal resumed publication in 1923 with a focus on the campaign for the Equal Rights Amendment, and was published continuously until 1954. I ended the sample period at 1930 to match as closely as possible the sample for *The Woman Citizen*. For the years 1913-1919, and 1923-1930, I took a 10% random sample of articles, stratified by week. For those years, I have a sample size of 1,543 articles. Because the journal switched from a weekly to monthly format in 1920-21, and because the issues became considerably shorter during this two-year period, I took a 20% random sample stratified by month for these issues, yielding a sample size of 53 articles. The total sample size of *Equal Rights* is 1,596 articles.<sup>9</sup>

For the second wave of the movement, I sampled articles from *Ms.* magazine and *off our backs*, representing the liberal and radical branches of the movement, respectively. In addition to covering both branches of the movement, these magazines offer the advantage of being two of the most widely circulated second-wave publications. In addition, both magazines were consistently published during my sample period and

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<sup>6</sup> For the entire *Woman Citizen* sample, I excluded from selection: literary reviews, poetry, fictional stories, personal eulogies, "Notes and News," advertisements, and anecdotal material.

<sup>7</sup> When the data were aggregated by quarter, two quarters had no data: Winter 1917 and Summer 1925. For these two quarters, I linearly interpolated between the quarters available.

<sup>8</sup> While some may read the declining number of issues and articles itself as an indication of the movement's decline, we should note that the declining number of articles was counterbalanced by the length of the articles. For example, the average length of articles in 1910 was seven paragraphs, while the average length in 1928 expanded to nearly 28 paragraphs.

<sup>9</sup> For the entire *Equal Rights* sample, I excluded from selection: literary reviews, poetry, fictional stories, advertisements, cartoons and comics, corrections, and announcements.



continue to be published today, allowing for an historical comparison, as well as a cross-sectional comparison with third-wave publications.

For *off our backs*, I sampled from the years 1970-1985 and 1995-2005. A 10% random sample stratified by month yielded a sample size of 675 articles. For *Ms.*, I sampled from the years 1972<sup>10</sup>-1985 and 1995-2005. A 10% random sample yielded 595 articles.<sup>11</sup> The earlier period (1970-1985) allows us to assess changes in rhetoric between the peak and subsequent decline of the second wave, and the latter sample period allows for a coterminous comparison between second- and third-wave publications.

For the third wave of the movement, I sampled articles from two third-wave “zines,” *Bitch* and *BUST*. While there has been a proliferation of third-wave zines in recent years, *BUST* and *Bitch* were two of the earliest zines published and have some of the largest circulation rates. In addition, they can be considered general third-wave zines, compared to, for example, *Rebel Song* (aimed at Southern feminists), *Bamboo Girl* (aimed at women-of-color), *hip mama* (aimed at feminist mothers), and *New Moon* (aimed at young girls).

For *BUST*, I sampled issues from 1995-2005, and for *Bitch* I sampled issues from 1996<sup>12</sup>-2005. Because both zines are published less frequently than the other journals in my sample (often quarterly, and sometimes semi-annually), I doubled my sample size to include a 20% random sample of each issue. This yielded a sample size of 176 articles for *BUST*<sup>13</sup> and 123 articles for *Bitch*.<sup>14,15</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> *Ms.* began publication in 1972.

<sup>11</sup> For both journals, I excluded from selection fictional stories, letters to the editor, corrections, and advertisements.

<sup>12</sup> *Bitch* began publication in 1996.

<sup>13</sup> I was not able to locate four issues of *BUST*, through the publisher, libraries, or alternative methods such as EBay. For missing issues (nos. 9, 13, 17, and 19), I linearly interpolated between the quarters available.

Unless otherwise noted, for each publication I collapsed individual articles into yearly quarters, providing a total sample size of 436 quarters.

## B. CODING AND MEASURES

Following Altheide's (1996) model, I coded the texts using a combination of quantitative and qualitative content analysis. Because both types of analysis reveal different aspects of movement framing and foci, a combined approach may produce a more complete understanding of these phenomena than a qualitative or quantitative study alone. Quantitative analysis proves useful for charting general trends over time, while qualitative analysis provides deeper insight into the meaning behind those trends. Enumerative content analysis often makes the problematic assumption that meaning is readily available at the surface of texts, yet it does yield the systematic data necessary for longitudinal analysis. Qualitative content analysis, by contrast, produces data that are rich in meaning and interpretation, but weak in systematic documentation. Used in conjunction, these two approaches provide both a broad picture of trends in the women's movement over time, as well as an in-depth understanding of the meaning behind these trends.

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<sup>14</sup> For both journals, I excluded from selection fictional stories, cartoons and comics, letters to the editor, and advertisements.

<sup>15</sup> Both *Bitch* and *BUST* were not always published consistently, leaving several quarters with no issues published. For these periods, I linearly interpolated between the quarters available. Missing quarters for *Bitch* include: Summer 1996, Winter 1997, Winter 1998, Summer 1998, Spring 1999, Fall 1999, Spring 2000, Fall 2000, Spring 2001, and Fall 2001. Missing quarters for *BUST* include: Spring 1995, Fall 1995, Winter 1996, Summer 1996, Winter 1997 – Fall 1997, Spring 1998, Fall 1998, Winter 1999, Summer 1999 – Winter 2000, Summer 2000 – Spring 2001, Fall 2001, Spring 2003, and Winter 2004 – Spring 2004.

### ***1. Conflict versus Consensus Tactics.***

The first set of dependent variable measures whether an author clearly identifies external antagonists. NSMT suggests that only in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century do we see the rise of “consensus movements” which shy away from opponent identification (Schwartz and Paul 1992). PPT, by contrast, points to a movement’s broader environment, suggesting that as a movement’s opportunities diminish, it will be less likely to provoke the opposition (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Staggenborg 1991). These antagonists may come in the form of individuals, such as a single political opponent; organizational-level opponents, such as the liquor industry; or the public as a whole, such as general anti-feminist sentiment. I coded each article “0” if the author fails to identify an antagonist, and “1” if the author does clearly identify antagonists. See Appendix A for further coding details and illustrative examples.

### ***2. Political versus Cultural Goals***

The second set of dependent variables measures whether the overall subject of the article pertains to political issues—such as the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, political tactics such as lobbying legislators, and court decisions regarding reproductive rights—or cultural issues—such as the role of women in religious institutions, rewriting marriage vows to reflect more gender equity, and the representations of women and sexuality in film. Here again NSMT and PPT offer different predictions. NSMT theory argues that new social movements are unique in their predominately cultural foci (Calhoun 1993; Klandermans 1991), while PPT would predict that a movement’s turn toward cultural goals is a response to diminishing opportunities, as cultural issues are

more easily tackled during periods of depleted opportunity structures. I measure both variables dichotomously, coding an article “1” if the subject of the article pertains to politics or culture, respectively, and “0” if it does not. In this way, political and cultural goals are not treated as mutually exclusive. Indeed, several articles discussed issues that could be considered both political and cultural, such as the Red Scare in the 1920s, or FCC regulations that affected media content. In such cases, articles were coded “1” for both political and cultural issues. See Appendix A for examples and further coding details.

### ***3. Collectivist versus Individualist Frames***<sup>16</sup>

My third set of dependent variables explores whether, and if so to what degree, the movement (through its feminist publications) employs collectivist or individualist frames, and how these frames change over time. That is, to what degree do publications encourage their readers to engage in collective action versus more introspective or individually-based action. Because a single code cannot capture the concepts of individualism and collectivism, I combine a series of 16 related, but non-mutally exclusive, codes in an index. A frame is coded collectivist if the article: (1) focuses primarily on an organization, campaign, or movement event, (2) identifies a leader of the movement, (3) discusses tactics, (4) encourages readers to work on behalf of women as a group, (5) recognizes structural barriers to women’s equality, (6) attributes women’s achievements to the gains made by the movement, (7) the author or protagonist self-

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<sup>16</sup> As some have noted, the concept of frame has been both overused and under-developed in the social movement literature (see Benford 1997). I do not seek here to contribute to this extensive literature on framing, but rather use the term simply to denote the rhetorical strategy of the women’s movement to win support and minimize opposition. For an overview of the framing literature, see Benford and Snow (2000).

identifies as a suffragist or feminist, and (8) discusses organizational issues. For each of these individual variables, an article was coded “0” if the variable is absent, and “1” if the variable present. See Appendix A for examples and further coding details.

A frame is coded individualist if the article: (1) identifies the author by name, (2) focuses primarily on a single individual, without reference to organizational affiliation, (3) attributes achievements of the author or other women to personal qualities, such as hard work, (4) actively denies the existence of structural barriers to women’s equality, (5) focuses on issues related to the self, such as self-esteem and personal empowerment, (6) encourages women to work on behalf of themselves only, (7) the author or protagonist actively rejects the label of suffragist or feminist, and (8) uses the first-person voice. An article was coded “0” if the variable is absent, “-1” if the variable was present. See Appendix A for examples and further coding details.

The individual variables were collapsed into one index ranging from -8 - +8, in which a high positive score indicates a high degree of collectivism (and low degree of individualism), and a low negative score indicates a high degree of individualism (and low degree of collectivism). The scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.88, indicating a high degree of internal reliability.

## II. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

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Broadly speaking, the explanatory variable is the external opportunity structure. Within this, I explore several sets of opportunities: the political opportunity structure (POS) versus cultural opportunity structure (COS); domestic opportunity structure (DOS) versus global opportunity structure (GOS); and the objective opportunity structure versus activist perceptions of the opportunity structure. Table 3.1 includes further details

regarding data sources, measurements, and availability. Because most data are in the form of years, unless otherwise noted, I linearly interpolated between years to generate quarter-annual data.

## A. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE

Tarrow (1998) offers one of the most widely drawn upon conceptualizations of the political opportunity structure. He argues that three critical components of the political opportunity structure include: (1) instability of political alignments; (2) increasing access to the state; and (3) the presence of political allies. I discuss each component below.

### *1. Political Instability*

To reiterate from Chapter Two, instability in the political system should facilitate social movements as parties and politicians search for new bases of support. I operationalize political instability in several ways: (1) the emergence and strength of third parties, measured as the percentage of U.S. Senate and House seats held by third parties as well as the number of third party presidential candidates per election (Stanley and Niemi 2009a, CB Presidential Research Services 2009); (2) the margin of victory for U.S. presidential and House candidates, measured as the percent difference in the popular vote averaged across candidates (Stanley and Niemi 2009a, 2009c); (3) the number of U.S. Senate and House seats that change party per election cycle (Stanley and Niemi 2009d; United States Senate Historical Office 2009a; U.S. House of Representatives Office of the Clerk 2009); (4) presidential victories on votes in Congress, measured as the number

**Table 3.1: Contextual Factors for years 1910-30, 1970-85, 1995-2005, Data Sources, Metric, Means, and Standard Deviations**

Variable	Data Source	Metric	Mean (S.D.)
<i>Components of the Political Opportunity Structure (Domestic Only)</i>			
Percentage of all U.S. House and Senate seats held by third parties	United States Senate Historical Office (2009a), U.S. House of Representatives Office of the Clerk (2009), Stanley and Niemi (2009c)	Percent	0.946 (0.707)
Number of third-party presidential candidates per election	CB Presidential Research Services (2009)	Count	4.667 (2.462)
Percent difference in popular vote for all Democratic and Republican House candidates per election year	Stanley and Niemi (2009c)	Percent	8.058 (6.303)
Percent difference in popular vote for Democratic and Republican presidential candidates per election year	Stanley and Niemi (2009a)	Percent	12.542 (9.139)
Number of U.S. House and Senate seats that changed party per election year	United States Senate Historical Office (2009a), U.S. House of Representatives Office of the Clerk (2009), Stanley and Niemi (2009d)	Count	39.583 (19.213)
Presidential victories on votes in Congress	Stanley and Niemi (2009f)	Percent of all Congressional votes on which president took position	66.226 (13.911)
Strength of Conservative Coalition	Stanley and Niemi (2001a)	Percent of votes won among measures in which Republicans and southern Democrats opposed stand taken by northern Democrats	74.056 (15.764)
Size of gender voting gap	Stanley and Niemi (2009e)	Percent difference in male vote (vs. female) won by winning presidential candidate	3.571 (6.161)
Percent of women registered to vote	Stanley and Niemi (1988, 2006)	Percent	65.985 (2.822)

Percent of registered women who voted	Stanley and Neimi (1988, 2006)	Percent	52.908 (7.511)
Percent of Senate seats held by women	United States Senate Historical Office (2009a)	Percent	3.104 (4.746)
Percent of House seats held by women	U.S. House of Representatives Office of the Clerk (2007)	Percent	4.665 (5.229)
Percent of state governors who are women	Center for American Women and Politics (2009a)	Percent	2.882 (4.650)
Number of women in presidential cabinet	Center for American Women and Politics (2009b)	Count	2.250 (3.265)
Positive mention of women's rights/issues in Presidential State of the Union address	Public Papers of the President (various years)	Proportion of all words	0.619 (1.060)
Level of EEOC funding	Budget of the United States Government (various years)	Constant dollars	394,344,000 (106,838,000)

*Components of the Cultural Opportunity Structure (Domestic Only)*

Female employment in arts occupations (actors, musicians, authors, and other artists), as percentage of total employed in arts occupations	U.S. Census (various years)	Percent	36.843 (15.500)
Number of articles addressing feminism and/or women's suffrage in <i>New York Times</i> per year	<i>New York Times</i> archive	Count	421.417 (209.337)
Number of periodical article addressing feminism and/or women's suffrage per year	<i>Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature</i>	Count	26.676 (22.396)
Number of television news stories addressing feminism per year	<i>Vanderbilt Television News Archive</i>	Count	4.296 (2.643)
Percent of Oscar nominations of female artists in major non-gender-specific categories	Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences (2009)	Percent	7.778 (4.237)
Percent of Emmy nominations of female artists in major non-gender-specific categories	Los Angeles Times Emmy Award Database (2009)	Percent	7.342 (4.696)
Percent of Grammy nominations of female artists in major non-gender-specific categories	Recording Academy GRAMMY Search Database (2009)	Percent	28.037 (13.867)
Female employment, as percentage of total employed	U.S. Census (various years)	Percent	38.950 (13.235)



Female employment in professional occupations, as percentage of total employed in professional occupations	U.S. Census (various years)	Percent	42.495 (16.123)
Mean earnings of employed women as percentage of men's mean earnings	U.S. Census (various years)	Percent	64.710 (7.947)
Percent of undergraduate students who are female	U.S. Census (various years)	Percent	47.756 (5.530)
Percent women married	U.S. Census (various years)	Percent	55.567 (2.325)
Median age at first marriage for women	U.S. Census (various years)	Median	23.122 (1.952)
Fertility rate	U.S. Census (various years)	Rate of births per 1,000 women	15.056 (1.104)
Percent of Americans who strongly agree in equality for women	American National Election Studies (2005)	Percent	40.727 (10.622)
Percent of American college freshmen who believe that abortion should be legal under any circumstances	Bureau of Justice Statistics (2006)	Percent	55.110 (1.629)
Percent of Americans that favor Equal Rights Amendment	Stanley and Niemi (2001b)	Percent	59.000 (2.828)

*Components of the Global Opportunity Structure*

Mean levels of political competition worldwide	Vanhanen et al. (2007)	100-(Percent of votes won by largest party)	26.702 (6.460)
Mean levels of political participation worldwide	Vanhanen et al. (2007)	Percent of population voting	19.665 (8.844)
NGO access to United Nations	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2009); Willetts (1996, 2002)	Count	1136.333 (735.933)
Number of countries with female heads of state	Christensen (2008)	Count	6.519 (3.936)
Average percent of parliamentary seats held by women	Paxton, Green, and Hughes (2008)	Percent	14.500 (0.707)
Number of countries with ministries of women's affairs	Berkovitch (1999b)	Count	16.238 (13.368)
Cumulative number of countries ratifying CEDAW	UN Division for the Advancement of Women (2009)	Count	123.824 (61.378)
Olympic athletes, percent women	International Olympic Committee (2006)	Percent	21.268 (13.739)

of congressional votes supporting the president as a percent of the total number of votes on which the president had taken a position (Stanley and Niemi 2009f); and (5) the strength of the Conservative coalition, measured as a percentage of votes won among measures in which a majority of voting southern Democrats and a majority of voting Republicans—the Conservative Coalition—opposed the stand taken by a majority of voting northern Democrats (Stanley and Niemi 2001a).<sup>17</sup>

I also examine the size and direction of the gender voting gap in presidential elections (Stanley and Niemi 2009e).<sup>18</sup> While political instability should encourage politicians to seek out new bases of support, the gender gap should indicate whether women voters specifically are sought out as a constituency.

*Worldwide Political Instability.* While the above measures of political instability are conceptualized and operationalized at the national level, I also examine worldwide political instability by drawing on Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy (Vanhanen et al. 2007; see also Vanhanen 2000). He calculates the degree of competition in all independent countries over time, by subtracting from 100 the percentage of votes won by the largest party in each respective country. I aggregated these values across countries per year.

## ***2. Access to the State***

A second critical component of the political opportunity structure is access to the state. Challengers that lack access to the state clearly have difficulty getting their

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<sup>17</sup> The above five variables are not linearly interpolated between available data points; rather, the value from the previous data points holds until the next available data point.

<sup>18</sup> This variable is not linearly interpolated between election year; rather, the gender gap from the previous election holds until the following election.

concerns addressed. For the first wave of the women's movement, I measure political access as the number of states that pass suffrage measures as well as a dichotomous measure for the ratification of the federal suffrage amendment, coded 1 for the years 1920-1930. For the second and third waves, I measure political access as the percentage of eligible women registered to vote as well as the percentage of registered women who actually vote in national elections (Stanley and Neimi 1988, 2006).<sup>19,20</sup>

*Worldwide Access to States, and Access to World Polity.* I examine several measures of political access beyond the national level. First, I include a measure of the cumulative number of countries worldwide that granted women's suffrage. Also included is the degree of political participation worldwide, a measure drawn from Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. This variable is measured as the percentage of the adult population that voted in elections, aggregated across countries per year (Vanhanen et al. 2007; see also Vanhanen 2000). Finally, in order to gauge access to the world governance bodies, I include a measure of NGO access to the United Nations, measured as the number of NGOs per year in consultative status with the U.N.'s Department of Economic and Social Affairs (ECOSOC) (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2009; Willetts 1996, 2002).<sup>21</sup>

### ***3. Presence of Political Allies***

The presence of political allies is a third component of the political opportunity structure, potentially facilitating movements through their public support for the cause,

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<sup>19</sup> This variable is not linearly interpolated between election year; rather the value from the previous election holds until the following election year.

<sup>20</sup> These data are not available for the first-wave period.

<sup>21</sup> These data are not available for the first-wave period.

providing insider information or specialized expertise, or helping to push through legislation, among other types of support (Costain 1992; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). I measure the presence and strength of political allies in several ways. First, some recent research indicates that women in political positions tend to support women-friendly policies (Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007; O'Regan 2000). Thus I include measures of the rate of women in politics. Specifically, these measures include: (1) the levels of women holding federal-level legislative seats, measured specifically as the percentage of Senate and House seats held by women (United States Senate Historical Office 2009a; U.S. House of Representatives Office of the Clerk 2007); (2) the levels of women in state-level executive seats, measured as the percentage of state governors who are women (Center for American Women and Politics 2009a); and (3) the number of women in presidential cabinets (Center for American Women and Politics 2009b). Second, as a measure of executive support for movement goals, I examine the rate of positive mentions of women's issues in the annual President's State of the Union address, measured as the number of words dealing with women's issues as percent of the total number of words in the address (Public Papers of the President, various years). Finally, I also examine the level of funding for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission—the agency charged with enforcing anti-discrimination laws—measured as the total funding allocated to the agency (calculated in 2005 constant dollars) (*Budget of the United States Government*, various years).<sup>22</sup>

*Global and Worldwide Political Allies.* I include several measures of global and worldwide political allies. Worldwide political allies are measured as (1) the number of

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<sup>22</sup> The above three variables are not linearly interpolated between available data points; rather, the value from the previous data points holds until the next available data point.

countries with female heads of state (Christensen 2008), calculated as a simple count; (2) the percent of parliamentary seats held by women worldwide (Paxton, Green, and Hughes 2008); and (3) the number of countries with ministries of women's affairs (Berkovitch 1999b), also calculated as a simple count. Global political allies are measured as (1) the cumulative number of countries that have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women 2009); (2) a dichotomous measure for the years in which the United Nations held World Conferences on Women (1975, 1980, 1985, and 1995); and (3) a dichotomous measure for the year 1975 which the United Nations designated as International Women's Year.

## B. CULTURAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE

As discussed in the previous chapter, a small but growing body of scholarship has begun to address the role of cultural opportunities in addition to strictly political opportunities. Drawing on work by Frank and McEneaney (1999), Klein (1984), McAdam (1996), and McCammon et al. (2001), I examine six types of cultural opportunities: (1) the presence of cultural allies; (2) access to cultural spaces; (3) degree of cultural instability; (4) the presence of cultural contradictions; (5) sociodemographic shifts; and (6) public opinion.

### *1. Presence of Cultural Allies*

To reiterate from Chapter Two, the presence of cultural allies should theoretically provide more positive representations of women in cultural media and ultimately help to

shape public opinion regarding appropriate roles for women and men. I operationalize cultural allies as the rates of women employed as actors, musicians, artists, authors, news reporters, and clergy, measured as the percentage of the total employed in these respective occupations (U.S. Census Bureau 1970-2008; U.S. Women's Bureau 1940). I also examine the media space devoted to the women's movement. I used a word search in the Vanderbilt Television News Archive, *New York Times* Article Archive, and Reader's Guide periodical database to arrive at a simple count of the number of stories in which the terms "feminist/feminism" and/or "suffragist" appeared per year.

## ***2. Access to Cultural Spaces***

In the same way that women's access to the state should facilitate the women's movement by providing it with more political muscle, I expect that women's access to cultural spaces will provide the movement will symbolic resources. Specifically, I examine the level of cultural consecration of female artists, measured as the percentage of Oscar, Emmy, and Grammy nominations by female artists in major non-gender-specific categories (Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences 2009, *Los Angeles Times* 2009, Recording Academy 2009).<sup>23</sup> At the global level, I also examine the rate of women's participation in the Olympic Games, measured as the percentage of all athletes competing (International Olympic Committee 2006). This offers one indicator of changing gender ideologies, as organized sports "serve as a primary institutional means for bolstering a challenged and faltering ideology of male superiority in the 20<sup>th</sup> century," and women's

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<sup>23</sup> These variables are not linearly interpolated between available data points; rather, the value from the previous data points holds until the next available data point.

inclusion in these sports challenges “the ideological basis of male domination” (Messner 1988: 197).

### ***3. Cultural Instability***

Unlike periods of political instability which often facilitate social movements, I expect that periods of cultural instability will hinder progressive movements by encouraging a return to tradition and conservatism. I include two dummy measures of cultural instability: (1) the Red Scare of the 1920s, coded “0” in the years before the release of the Spiderweb chart in 1923, and “1” for the years 1923-1930; and (2) the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, coded “0” in the years prior to the attacks in 2001, and “1” for the years 2001-2005.

### ***4. Cultural Contradictions***

McAdam (1996) argues that cultural contradictions can facilitate movements by bringing into focus the gap between cultural values and cultural practices. Two events in particular highlighted such cultural contradictions and elevated rhetoric of democracy and equal rights: (1) World War I, coded “1” for the years 1917 and 1918, the years during which the U.S. was involved in the war, and “0” for all other years; and (2) the United States Bicentennial celebration, coded “1” for the year 1976, and “0” for all other years.

### ***5. Sociodemographic Shifts***

I also examine sociodemographic shifts that may have facilitated the women’s movement (see Klein 1984; McAdam 1982). I examine several sociodemographic trends,

including: (1) the rate of women's employment, measured as their percentage of the total workforce (U.S. Census Bureau 1924, 1933, 1970-1987,1995-2009; U.S. Women's Bureau 1940); (2) the rate of women employed in professional fields specifically (U.S. Census Bureau 1924, 1933, 1970-1987,1995-2009; U.S. Women's Bureau 1940); (3) women's earnings, measured as women's median weekly earnings as a percentage of men's median weekly earnings (U.S. Census Bureau 1924, 1933, 1970-1987,1995-2009; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2007); (4) rates of higher education among women, measured as the percentage of women enrolled in higher education as a percentage of total enrolled (U.S. Census Bureau 1933, 1970-1987,1995-2009; U.S. Women's Bureau 1940); (5) marital rates, measured as the percent of all women married, as well as the women's median age at first marriage (U.S. Census Bureau 1920, 1935, 1970-1987,1995-2009); and (6) fertility rates, measured as the rate of births per 1,000 women (U.S. Census Bureau 1924, 1931, 2008).

## ***6. Public Opinion***

Finally, I include measures of public opinion on issues related to the women's movement. As I argue in Chapter Two, I expect that many of the aforementioned components of the cultural opportunity structure influence public opinion, which in turns influences the ability of the movement to mobilize. While public opinion measures are not available for the first-wave period, I am able to include such measures for the second- and third-wave periods, including: (1) the percent of Americans who strongly agree and strongly disagree with equality for women (American National Election Studies 2005); (2) the percent of American college freshmen who believe that abortion should be legal



under any circumstances (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006); and (3) the percent of Americans that favor and oppose the Equal Rights Amendment (Stanley and Niemi 2001b).

### C. STRUCTURAL VERSUS PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITIES

A growing debate in the scholarship on social movements concerns whether political and cultural opportunities work independently to shape movement outcomes, or whether these opportunities must be perceived by movement participants in order to have any effect on the movement (see Meyer and Minkoff 2004). To that end, in addition to measures of the objective opportunity structure mentioned above, I use suffrage and feminist publications to code for the degree to which activists recognize opportunities (or the lack thereof). I measure perceptions of the opportunity structure as the general sense of optimism or pessimism an author expresses regarding progress of the movement, as well as extending more traditional measures of the concept, such as recognition of major splits among political and cultural elites, identification of influential allies, perceptions regarding legislation and court decisions, perceptions of the cultural representations of women (e.g., in film and television), and attitudes toward broad social and political changes such as the first Red Scare in the 1920s and the emergence of the New Right in the 1980s (see Appendix A for examples and further coding details). I distinguish between perceptions of political and cultural opportunities, as well as perceptions of domestic and global opportunities, although these categories are not mutually exclusive. For each type of opportunity, I coded an article “1” if it mentioned positive developments in the opportunity structure, “-1” if it mentioned negative developments in the

opportunity structure, and “0” if it failed to mention any developments in the opportunity structure or mentioned both positive and negative developments.

### III. ANALYSIS

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I use various analytic approaches throughout the dissertation to capture the trends discussed above. Chapters Four through Six each begin with an historical overview of the movement, for the first, second, and third waves respectively. I present descriptive quantitative data detailing changes in political and cultural opportunities and corresponding changes in tactics, rhetoric, and goals. These descriptive findings are complimented with illustrative qualitative data. Finally, I present correlation coefficients between dependent and key independent variables for each wave. Given the relatively small sample size of yearly quarters and general lack of consistent quantitative measures across historical periods, a more rigorous quantitative test is not feasible. However basic, correlations help to triangulate the qualitative data and provide a more standardized means of weighing the effects of various types of opportunities.

#### **CHAPTER 4: FIRST-WAVE FEMINISM**

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As discussed in Chapter Two, the new social movement perspective specifies a number of characteristics unique to movements of the postindustrial late 20<sup>th</sup> century, including their focus on individualist issues and rhetoric, use of consensus tactics, and adoption of cultural goals (Habermas 1973; 1984-1987; Inglehart 1990; Lofland 1989; Melucci 1985; Touraine 1971). While some have argued that these purportedly “new” movements continue to exhibit characteristics of “old” movements (Werum and Winders 2001), I examine in this chapter whether an “old” movement exhibited characteristics of a “new” movement. That is, does a movement operating at the peak of the industrial era also employ individualist rhetoric, utilize consensus tactics, and adopt cultural goals? If so, can we explain the emergence of these attributes as a result of declining political and cultural opportunities for movement mobilization?

In this and the following two chapters I describe the historical context of the women’s movement, focusing particularly on the political and cultural environments that at times facilitated and other times hindered collective action. In this chapter, I present descriptive findings on the changes in tactics, goals, and frames of first-wave feminism between 1910 and 1930, drawn from the Progressive feminist journal *Woman Citizen*, published by the National American Woman Suffrage Association, and the liberal feminist journal *Equal Rights*, published by the National Woman’s Party. I begin with a discussion of the opportunity structure as it facilitated the emergence of first-wave feminism. Because scholars have documented this period of the movement extensively (see Bolt 1993; Cott 1987; Wellman 2004) and explained the movement’s emergence through the political opportunity perspective (Buechler 1990), I draw on these secondary

sources to provide the historical grounding for the movement. Using a mix of primary and secondary data, I turn next to a description of the political and cultural environment in the decade leading up to and following the suffrage victory in 1920, and ask whether the opportunity structure can explain shifts in the movement's framing, tactics, and goals. I also present correlation coefficients between these dependent variables and select independent variables. Because of the lack of consistent quantitative data across all three historical periods, a pooled time-series analysis is unfeasible for the entire dataset. Moreover, the relatively small sample size for each historical period (ranging between 11 and 21 years) is unlikely to produce statistically significant findings. Thus, a more rigorous multivariate test of my hypotheses is unfeasible. However, in presenting bivariate correlations and significance levels, I aim to triangulate the historical and qualitative findings and offer a more succinct discussion of findings.

In short, I find that the opportunity structure does indeed appear to have affected choices in framing, tactics, and goals, though with some additional specifications. As the opportunity structure increasingly opened in the 1910s, leading up to the suffrage victory in 1920, both branches of the movement adopted high levels of collectivist rhetoric, relied on conflict tactics, and advocated political goals. Conversely, as the opportunity structure closed over the course of the next decade, the movement more often used individualist rhetoric, consensus tactics, and cultural goals. More specifically, I find that the cultural opportunity structure—which generally fluctuates more gradually than the political opportunity structure—exerted an independent influence on the movement's goals. Only after *both* political and cultural opportunity structures turned decidedly negative did the women's movement relinquish its political goals in favor of broader

cultural goals. In addition, findings indicate the global opportunity structure may help to mitigate the effects of the domestic opportunity structure under certain circumstances. Finally, these findings suggest that movements are likely to collectivize, politicize, and utilize conflict tactics after partial—but not total—success. Interestingly, defeats as well as major victories affect movement framing, tactics, and goals in similar ways.

## I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

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### **A. EMERGENCE**

In July 1848, one hundred women and men met in Seneca Falls, New York to hold the first women’s rights convention in the United States. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, the convention’s main organizer, rose to speak. Struck with stage fright, she later recounted how she considered “suddenly abandoning all her principles and running away” (quoted in Wellman 2004: 197). Yet calming herself, Stanton uttered the words that launched what she later called “the greatest revolution the world has ever seen” (quoted in Wellman 2004: 10):

We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Modeled on the Declaration of Independence, Stanton’s “Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions” outlined injustices suffered by American women at the hands of their government, and called upon the country to apply its egalitarian principles to men *and* women. Convention delegates proposed a series of resolutions calling for (among other things) women’s right to an education and employment, the right to own property, the

right to divorce, and the right to vote. Interestingly, while eleven of the twelve proposed resolutions passed unanimously, the resolution calling for the right to vote caused a great deal of controversy, and passed only after the well-respected abolitionist leader Frederick Douglass threw his support behind it. Yet, of course, the issue of suffrage came to singularly define the first wave of the women's movement, while the other demands fell by the wayside, only to be reclaimed by later generations of feminist activists.

The Seneca Falls Convention, and the feminist movement it sparked, could not have occurred without a constellation of precipitating factors. No movement emerges spontaneously, especially one of the magnitude and duration of first-wave feminism. Political process theory is widely employed to explain movement emergence, and in this case in particular the theory offers a fruitful lens through which to explore the rise of the women's movement. Scholars in this vein have pointed in particular to the vast social, political, and economic changes in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century that fundamentally altered gender relations and offered a bundle of material and symbolic resources to the embryonic movement.

#### *THE STRUCTURE OF OPPORTUNITIES, 1800 – 1848*

A number of structural transformations opened opportunities for first-wave feminism, as well as organizational developments that provided suffragists with crucial resources. Most widely noted, perhaps, is the Industrial Revolution and the changes in women's economic and familial roles that accompanied it. Prior to industrialization, households were largely self-contained productive units, in which all members of the family contributed to its survival. A gender hierarchy existed in the family, to be sure,

but “[w]omen’s economic dependency was one strand in a web of interdependence of men’s and women’s typical work” (Cott 1978: 22). As the centers of production moved out of the family and into the capitalist market, however, the distinction between the public and private spheres rigidified. Accompanying this separation of economic roles was a stark separation of gender roles; as men moved out of the private sphere of the home and into the public sphere of work, women were expected to be “angels of the hearth,” maintaining the household, rearing children, and providing emotional support to their husbands (Buechler 1990). The “web of interdependence” that characterized the pre-industrial family was replaced with a structure in which “women’s economic role appeared singular [and] their dependency prominent” (Cott 1978: 22)

On one hand, this new Victorian gender ideology placed greater restrictions on women by prescribing narrow standards of female behavior; yet on the other hand, this transformation offered some unexpected advantages to a budding feminist movement. The formation of an exclusively female sphere gave rise to a sense of gender identity and solidarity among women (Cott 1978). Victorianism also gave rise to novel forms of female association, particularly through women’s educational academies, religious institutions, and benevolent societies (Buechler 1990; Cott 1978; Skocpol 1992). While on the surface, women’s schools appeared to serve a conservative function by training women to “know their place” as wives and mothers, it reinforced gender solidarity. As Cott (1978: 123) points out, “If, as educators said, womanhood prescribed for all the same duty, the same station, and therefore the same kind of education, it united them, dissolving class and regional lines.” It also unwittingly provided women with the tools to challenge gender roles. Education encouraged serious study and raised literacy rates

among women, allowing them to turn to interests outside of the domestic sphere (Buechler 1990). Cott insists, “From the sense among women that they shared a collective destiny it was but another step (though a steep one) to sense that they might shape that destiny with their own minds and hands” (1978: 125).

In a similar fashion, religious institutions offered women a space to network with other women and develop a sense of collective identity, at the same time that it constrained their behavior. Victorian gender ideology prescribed women as the keepers of morality, thus naturalizing their participation in religious activities. Women’s benevolent societies grew rapidly throughout the nineteenth century, providing them with a public space for coming together. “It remained one of the few socially acceptable means for women to participate in the larger public world because it was one of the few public institutions that could be reconciled with women’s domestic role,” Buechler (1990: 14) points out. Quakerism in particular, with its conviction that “God is in every person,” endorsed the belief the all human beings are equal before God (Cott 1987; Wellman 2004). Alice Paul, who emerged as a leader in the movement in the early twentieth century, was raised as a Quaker, and attributed her feminist beliefs to her religious upbringing. As she noted in one interview: “When the Quakers were founded [...] one of their principles was and is equality of the sexes. So I never had any other idea [...] the principle was always there” (1975). Quakerism and other more liberal varieties of Protestantism provided then not only the space, but also the philosophical seedbed for a nascent women’s rights movement.

The changes associated with industrialization, including the separation of the public and private spheres, the establishment of women’s schools, and women’s



increasing participation in religious life, both constrained and enabled Victorian women. While embracing their roles as moral compasses, these women found spaces to build a feminist movement. As Buechler (1990: 14) argues: “Such networks, themselves the product of gender segregation, fostered some of the collective identity and group solidarity essential in the latter mobilization of the women’s movement.” The structural changes associated with the Industrial Revolution provided opportunities for the women’s movement to emerge, but it was through their participation in other social movements—in particular, the temperance and abolitionist movements—that provided feminists with the necessary resources to act on these opportunities. Women were involved in the temperance and abolitionist movements from their earliest phases—not in spite of—but because of their roles as Victorian women. Temperance activists objected to alcohol on the grounds that it destroyed the family, and indeed the very fabric of society. Their activism in the temperance movement was simply an extension of their roles as defenders of the home and guardians of morality. Buechler (1990: 14) argues: “The attack on alcohol was doubtless seen by some women as an indirect challenge to male power, but a challenge that was culturally safe and morally grounded by the appeal to domestic values” (Buechler 1990: 14; see also Skocpol 1992). Similarly, the abolitionist movement initially grew out of religious convictions regarding the evils of slavery, allowing women to participate in the cause without violating prescribed gender roles. Through their involvement in these movements, women acquired skills such as public speaking and organizing, and became involved in an organizational network sympathetic to women’s rights. Not surprisingly, many of the early leaders of the women’s movement—including Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Lucretia Mott—

had been ardently involved in the temperance and abolitionist causes, and they successfully transferred the skills and resources they had learned to the cause of women's rights (Bolt 1993; Buechler 1990; Wellman 2004).

## **B. PEAK**

The decades following the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention witnessed a surge in suffrage organizations, creating competition and conflict around goals, ideology, and tactics. In 1887, the two major competing organizations—the National Woman Suffrage Association and the American Woman Suffrage Association—merged to become the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA). By the early 1900s, however, another major schism had occurred between the more moderate NAWSA and the younger, more militant Congressional Union (later the National Women's Party), a clash that marked the movement well into the post-suffrage years (Buechler 1990).

NAWSA, under the leadership of Carrie Chapman Catt, pursued a restrained approach to women's suffrage, relying on quiet lobbying of legislators on a state-by-state basis. While they had seen some success, winning the vote in a handful of Western states, their progress was slow. Alice Paul, a young American who had trained under the militant British suffragettes Emmeline and Christabel Pankhurst, returned to the states in 1910 and quickly became frustrated with the slow pace and conservative ideology of NAWSA. She broke away from NAWSA in 1914, taking with her the younger and more radical suffragists to form the National Women's Party (Buechler 1990). While NAWSA pursued its slow but methodological state-by-state strategy and used conventional and quiet tactics such as petitioning and lobbying legislators, NWP sought to gain support for

a national constitutional amendment by staging massive publicity events, including an elaborate parade during Wilson's presidential inauguration and picketing the White House with banners bearing incendiary phrases<sup>24</sup>.

In 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment was finally ratified, federally guaranteeing the right of women to vote. The fight for women's suffrage spanned nearly 75 years. Of the 68 women who signed the Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions, only one lived to enjoy the right to vote.<sup>25</sup> Rhoda Palmer, who attended the Seneca Falls Convention at the age of 32, cast her ballot in a 1919 New York election. She died less than a year later, at 103 years old (Wellman 2004).

NAWSA and NWP were both quick to claim credit for the victory. Both organizations certainly deserve some credit, but equally important was the opening up of a number of political and cultural opportunities on which the movement drew. In the section that follows, I specify those opportunities, drawing on qualitative data derived from historical sources and primary and secondary quantitative data where available.

#### *THE STRUCTURE OF OPPORTUNITIES, 1848-1920*

**Political Opportunity Structure.** Shifting political conditions in the early twentieth century provided positive developments for women's suffrage. One significant development was the passage of Prohibition. The alcohol industry had been a formidable opponent of women's suffrage, fearing women would use their voting power to outlaw

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
<sup>24</sup> Some of the more radical banners included: "Kaiser Wilson. Have you forgotten how you sympathized with the poor Germans because they were not self-governed? 20,000,000 American women are not self-governed. Take the beam out of your own eye" and "Germany has established 'Equal, universal, secret direct franchise,' the senate has denied equal universal suffrage to America. Which is more of a Democracy, Germany or America?" (quoted in Stevens 1996).

<sup>25</sup> Charlotte L. Woodward Pierce was also still living when the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified, but at age 92, was too ill to make it to the polls (Wellman 2004).

alcohol. With the passage of several state-level prohibition laws throughout the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, and later the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919, the alcohol industry withdrew its opposition to women's suffrage, thereby opening up space for politicians—no longer constrained by alcohol interests—to support the movement (McCammon, Campbell, Grandberg, and Mowery 2001).

As discussed in Chapter Two, another factor traditionally included in measures of the political opportunity structure is instability of political alignments. Political realignments provide favorable opportunities to challengers in that formerly entrenched parties are forced to search for support from new constituencies (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1998). Such a development is likely to occur when third parties gain power. The growing strength of third parties certainly accelerated the pace of the suffrage movement and helped to keep it afloat in the immediate years following suffrage. In the late 1910s and early 1920s, a number of third parties cropped up centering around labor, pacifism, and other Progressive issues (see Figure 4.1).

**Figure 4.1: Third-Party Strength, 1910-1930**




Sources: CB Presidential Research Services (2009); Stanley and Niemi (2009c)

In this case, a related dimension of the POS is a movement's ties to influential allies, who can facilitate the achievement of movement goals (Tarrow 1998). Both types of opportunities culminated for the women's movement in the 1924 presidential election, when Wisconsin senator Robert La Follette ran on the Progressive Party ticket. His platform endorsed many of the issues central to the women's movement, including his opposition to World War I, his support of Progressive labor legislation, and his sponsorship of an Equal Rights bill. While La Follette was ultimately defeated, he garnered the largest vote of any genuinely independent third party presidential candidate in U.S. history, until Ross Perot's run in 1992 (Cott 1987; DuBois 1997). The fleeting hope that La Follette brought the feminist movement, however, was followed by disappointments. His strong showing, which demonstrated the potential power of feminist activism, sounded the alarm for conservatives and sparked countermobilization efforts that severely impeded subsequent feminist efforts, a point to which I will return below (Cott 1987).

While some have used third-party strength as an indicator of political instability, given the relatively low rates of third parties in U.S. politics, many scholars of American movements have turned to other indicators such as the number of congressional seats that change party and the degree to which elections are closely contested (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). When incumbents' seats are secure, they will likely be less open to hearing challengers' demands; conversely, when large numbers of incumbents are unseated and those positions become vulnerable, politicians will be more likely to court new blocs of voters. With regard to first-wave feminism, the greatest turnover in federal congressional seats during this period occurred in 1922, with 83 seats changing party. The lowest

turnover occurred just four years later, with only 16 seats changing party in 1926, indicating a short window of opportunity. The margin of victory for political candidates should also affect movements; politicians winning by only a small margin will likely seek support from new constituencies, thereby opening potential opportunities for movements. U.S. House candidates won their seats by an average of only 1% in 1914, while in 1920 they won by an average of 23%. While their margin of victory dipped to an average of 7% in 1922, it quickly increased in the following elections. In the realm of presidential politics, Woodrow Wilson won the 1916 election by a narrow margin of only 3%, surprising considering that Wilson was an incumbent. The 1920 and 1924 presidential elections, however, were won by fairly wide margins, at 21.6% and 25.2% respectively (see Figure 4.2).

**Figure 4.2: Margin of Victory for Presidential and House Candidates**



Sources: Stanley and Niemi (2009a, 2009c)

These measures taken together suggest that the political structure oscillated frequently between more and less stable in the 1910s and 20s. The year 1914 seems to have been particularly volatile, both in terms of congressional seat turnover and closely

contested federal elections; thus we should expect this period to be particularly open to challengers. By contrast, 1926 appears particularly stable with regard to these two measures, presenting a political constraint to challengers. Other years either fall somewhere in the middle, or the volatility measures present mixed findings (such as 1916, which shows low congressional seat turnover, but closely contested elections).

A final measure of the strength of elite allies I include is whether there is positive mention of women's issues in the State of the Union address by the president (*Public Papers of the President, 1910-1930*). As Meyer and Minkoff argue, "this address, as an annual ritual statement of the president's agenda, sends a message about executive priorities" (2004: 1470). I tallied the total number of words making positive reference to women's issues (including both domestic and international), and divided by the total number of words in the speech (see Chapter 3). By far the greatest support for women's rights came with President Wilson's 1918 address, with over 4% of his entire speech addressing the topic. In particular, Wilson pushed for suffrage on the grounds that women deserved to be rewarded for their loyalty and service during wartime. He urged:

The least tribute we can pay them is to make them the equals of men in political rights as they have proved themselves their equals in every field of practical work they have entered, whether for themselves or for their country. These great days of completed achievement would be sadly marred were we to omit that act of justice. Besides the immense practical services they have rendered the women of the country have been the moving spirits in the systematic economies by which our people have voluntarily assisted to supply the suffering peoples of the world and the armies upon every front with food and everything else that we had that might serve the common cause. The details of such a story can never be fully

written, but we carry them at our hearts and thank God that we can say that we are the kinsmen of such. (*Public Papers of the President 1918*)

No other State of the Union address came close to matching Wilson's support for women's rights. Some very brief mentions of women's issues appeared in Coolidge's and Hoover's addresses in the mid- and late-1920s, although these generally concerned protective labor issues for women and children.

President Wilson did not suddenly choose to support women's suffrage in 1918, however. A longtime and vocal opponent of suffrage, Wilson's change of heart is difficult to understand if devoid of political context. While NAWSA temporarily stopped its suffrage campaign when the U.S. entered the war, NWP stepped up their efforts by picketing daily at the White House. While they were widely criticized for their anti-patriotism during wartime, NWP used the opportunity to highlight the hypocrisy of fighting for democracy abroad while denying women the vote at home. McCammon et al. (2001) find that states were indeed more likely to enact suffrage laws during or immediately after WWI, concluding that the war generated a political opportunity for the movement by prompting legislators to support suffrage in order make their position compatible with their pro-war stand. These empirical findings resonate with McAdam's (1996) theoretical work on the cultural opportunity structure, in which he identifies a primary source of cultural opportunities for movements are events that spotlight contradictions or inconsistencies between conventional social practices and deeply held cultural values. As democratic rhetoric is stepped up during wartime, movements pushing for an expansion of democratic rights should benefit.



Indeed evidence suggests that the NWP war-time picketers were responsible for winning some political support for the cause. For example, the Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage came out in favor of suffrage in September 1917, following the committee chairman's visit with imprisoned NWP picketers, and a House Committee on Woman Suffrage was appointed a week later. When Congress reconvened the following January, President Wilson, despite his former opposition to the suffrage amendment, announced his support for women's suffrage as a "war measure," and took an active role in pushing it through Congress (Flexner 1975). World War I does appear to have played a significant role in enlisting allies for the movement.

In a number of ways, then, the political opportunity structure became quite open to the women's movement in the decades leading up to suffrage in 1920. Following the hypotheses laid out in Chapter Two (see Table 4.1 below, reprinted from full list in Table 2.1), I expect that these political opportunities encouraged the movement's use of collectivist rhetoric, conflict tactics, and political goals. Of particular importance, the liquor industry—a powerful opponent of suffrage—gradually withdrew its opposition during the late-19<sup>th</sup> and early-20<sup>th</sup> centuries, and bowed out completely with the passage of Prohibition amendment in 1919, freeing up politicians previously beholden to liquor interests to support suffrage (H3). While measures of political instability do not present a completely consistent picture, generally the late-1910s and early-1920s experienced greater volatility, in terms of third-party strength, Congressional seat turnover, and closely contested elections (H1). These developments opened up a number of opportunities for the women's movement, as politicians were eager to court this new—and potentially powerful—bloc of voters (H3). Finally, World War I proved

advantageous to the movement as legislators recognized the need to make their position on democracy consistent (H7). President Wilson backed women's suffrage as a war measure in 1918, and Congress passed the amendment the following year.

**Table 4.1: Partial List of Hypotheses and Measures**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables
<b>1.</b> During periods of <b>political stability</b> (political instability), the women's movement will be more likely to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>A.</b> Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</li> <li><b>B.</b> Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li><b>C.</b> Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	Third party strength Margin of victory for political candidates Number of congressional seats that change party
<b>2.</b> During periods in which women's <b>access to the polity</b> is restricted (broadened), the women's movement will be more likely to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>A.</b> Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</li> <li><b>B.</b> Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li><b>C.</b> Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	Women's voting rights
<b>3.</b> During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>A.</b> Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</li> <li><b>B.</b> Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li><b>C.</b> Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	Presidential support for women's rights
<b>7.</b> During periods of <b>congruity (contradiction) between cultural values and conventional social practices</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>A.</b> Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</li> <li><b>B.</b> Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li><b>C.</b> Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	Wars  Anniversaries of major movement events


**Cultural Opportunity Structure.** While the political opportunity structure became more open to the movement in the 1910s, cultural opportunities facilitated it as well, particularly changing gender roles. The Victorian gender ideology that marked the earliest phases of the movement gave way to the "new woman" at the turn of the century. Women were entering the traditionally male public sphere in greater numbers and in various capacities, challenging the separate sphere ideology that sought to keep women in the home and out of politics (Cott 1987; McCammon, Campbell, Grandberg, and

Mowery 2001). Women entered college in greater numbers than ever before, reaching near parity with men in 1920. Women's employment in the paid labor force also steadily increased during the early twentieth century, and later peaked during World War I. Particularly striking are the trends among married women, whose rates doubled between 1910 and 1930, and women in white-collar professions. Between 1900 and 1920, the proportion of women in clerical, managerial, sales, and professional areas more than doubled, increasing from 18 to 44 percent (Cott 1987). Women's numbers increased significantly in the arts as well, including actors, artists, writers, and musicians. While women made up only 38% of these occupations in 1900, they reached near parity with men just ten years later. As discussed in Chapter Two, the influx of women into cultural industries offers greater opportunities for the production of positive cultural representations of women.

Not only were women entering the paid labor market in higher numbers, but their earnings increased as well. As Figure 4.3 shows, while women's mean earnings were about 56% of men's between 1914 and 1920, they jumped to 62% in 1921, within just one year. This shift in the makeup of the labor force served to undermine the notion of separate spheres so prevalent in the decades prior. Cott (1987: 22) argues these two generations of women "now collided, those who had been brought up in 'woman's sphere' (of varying cultural traditions) and those whose experience was just as much shaped by factory or office, coeducational schooling, urban social life, municipal reform efforts, or political action in clubs, unions, temperance or socialist associations." The "new woman," shaped through her participation in various public activities, produced a cultural opportunity on which the women's movement drew. Not only did women have

greater material resources at their disposal, but by simply participating in the paid labor market and higher educational institutions, they began undermining the notion of separate gender spheres and legitimized women's participation in public life.

**Figure 4.3: Female Mean Earnings, as Proportion of Male Mean Earnings**



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1920-1935)


There is also some evidence to suggest that success begets success. McCammon et al. (2001) find that as women won the right to vote at the local and state levels in some states, neighboring states were more likely to support suffrage. Not only did these state-level suffrage victories provide women with increasing access to the state (a political opportunity), but as McCammon et al. (2001: 54) argue, it led to changing views about women's participation in politics: "As the public witnessed women voting in minor elections locally or in major elections in neighboring states with competence and good results, views towards women's political participation liberalized and acceptance of suffrage rights grew."

McCammon et al. (2001) also argue that WWI provided not only a political opportunity for the movement (by urging legislators to make their pro-democracy positions consistent), but a cultural opportunity as well. The war brought women out of

the home in even greater numbers, employed in traditionally male occupations such as working in “blast furnaces, in the manufacture of steel plate, high explosives, armaments, machine tools, agricultural implements, electrical apparatus, railway, automobile, and airplane parts; they worked in brass and copper smelting and refining, in foundries, in oil refining, in the production of chemicals, fertilizers, and leather goods” (Flexner 1975: 298). In this way, WWI accelerated many of the changes in women’s employment, and gender ideology more generally, that were already taking place.

Finally, the news media also facilitated the women’s movement during this period. While Tarrow (1998) conceptualizes elite allies primarily as those holding political power, others following his tradition point to the media as a potentially powerful cultural ally for movements (see Joachim 2007; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; but see also Gitlin 1980). As discussed in Chapter Three, I measure news coverage of women’s issues as the raw number of articles appearing each year in the *New York Times* and *Readers’ Guide to Periodical Literature* databases that address feminism or suffrage.

**Figure 4.4: Media Coverage of Women's Issues**



Sources: *New York Times Index* 1910-1930, *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature* 1910-1930

Figure 4.4 shows the number of articles appearing in each for the years 1910-1930. *NYT* coverage peaked between 1913 and 1915, with 815 and 760 articles respectively; *Readers' Guide* peaked in 1914 with 50 articles addressing feminist issues. While newspaper and periodical coverage declined throughout the second half of the 1910s, it nevertheless remained considerably higher than in the post-suffrage 1920s. While this basic measure of media coverage does not offer information regarding the tone of the coverage, it does suggest that the movement and its goals were deemed legitimate enough to receive coverage at all. In this sense, the increased media space devoted to first-wave feminism and its goals offered a symbolic resource to the movement.

In sum, at the same time that the political opportunity structure opened to the women's movement in the decades leading up to suffrage, the cultural opportunity structure offered a number of advantages as well (see Table 4.2 below, reprinted from full list in Table 2.1). Gender roles at the turn of the century were shifting dramatically. Women—particularly white, middle-class, and married women—were entering the paid labor market in greater numbers and with greater earning power (H8). While perhaps more appropriately characterized as a political opportunity (albeit with broader cultural implications), women were also participating in politics in unprecedented numbers as they won state-level voting rights. In short, these social and political changes began breaking down the “separate spheres” ideology on which the anti-suffragists' position had been based. Finally, the movement had more cultural allies at their disposal as women found employment in cultural industries in greater numbers and the news media offered more coverage of the movement and its issues (H4).

With these political and cultural resources at their disposal, after nearly a century of struggle the women's movement secured the right to vote in 1920. For many historians, the story of the movement ends here. Yet neither the National American Woman Suffrage Association nor the National Woman's Party rested on their laurels. Below I offer a brief history of the movement in the post-suffrage years and discuss the rather dramatic changes in the political and cultural opportunity structure over the course of the 1920s.

**Table 4.2: Partial List of Hypotheses and Measures**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables
<p>4. During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>cultural allies</b>, it will be more likely to:</p> <p>A. Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</p> <p>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</p> <p>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</p>	<p>Employment of women in the arts, media, and clergy</p> <p>Media coverage of the women's movement</p>
<p>8. During periods in which women's <b>employment, earnings, and education decreases (increases) and marital and fertility rates increase (decrease)</b>, the women's movement will be more likely to:</p> <p>A. Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</p> <p>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</p> <p>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</p>	<p>Employment rates</p>

### C. POST-SUFFRAGE TRANSFORMATION

While women's suffrage had become the predominant issue of the first wave of feminism, activists repeatedly declared that the vote was a way station on the road to other reforms. For NAWSA and the Progressive branch of the movement, this included primarily social reform measures, such as reforming working conditions for women, prohibiting child labor, and providing health and welfare benefits for women and children. NWP and the liberal branch of the movement, on the other hand, focused exclusively on suffrage. Following the ratification of the 19<sup>th</sup> amendment in 1920, NWP

recessed for a number of years until unveiling its campaign for Equal Rights Amendment in 1923 (Lunardini 1986). In the years following the suffrage victory both groups launched new campaigns at a rate that paralleled suffrage activity.

Yet as the 1920s progressed, both branches struggled in an increasingly hostile political and cultural climate, which had a profound effect on the form and focus of the movement in the post-suffrage years. Given this paucity of scholarship on social movement decline, my description of post-suffrage feminism that follows pulls together the secondary historical sources that do exist, supplemented with primary enumerative data where available.

#### *THE STRUCTURE OF OPPORTUNITIES, 1920-1930*

**Political Opportunity Structure.** A number of developments hindered the women's movement in the 1920s. The fate of the Progressive branch of the women's movement had been closely tied to the fate of the Progressive party, which was clearly waning by the mid-1920s. Postwar economic problems initiated "a period of remarkable industrial development in which Progressive economic regulations were moderated and the businessmen again took center stage" (Bolt 1993: 260). Consequently, the vast strides made by Progressive feminists in the first half of the 1920s had been reversed, or were in danger of being reversed, by the end of the decade. NAWSA secured the passage of the Sheppard-Towner Act in 1921, which provided federal funds for maternity and infancy health programs, but it was terminated in 1929 when Congress allowed funding for the program to expire. The Progressive campaign against child labor succeeded with the passage of the Keating-Owen Act in 1916, but was overturned by the Supreme Court



with its 1922 *Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company* decision. Throughout the 1910s, a number of states passed minimum wage laws for women, a central focus in the Progressive feminist agenda, yet these laws too were overturned by the Supreme Court in 1923 with the *Adkins v. Children's Hospital* decision. And state-level efforts to remove married women from the workforce gained considerable force by the early 1930s (Cott 1987; Lemons 1973).

Particularly troublesome for Progressive feminists were accusations that they were “soft on Bolshevism.” While the Red Scare dates from the end of World War I, feminists largely escaped initial persecution, despite many of their ties to socialism. Not until the War Department’s release of its “Spider Web” chart in 1923 did red-baiting attacks on feminists gain some legitimacy. Due largely to the efforts of women peace activists, Congress cut military appropriations following World War I. In response, President Harding’s secretary of war, and an avowed anti-suffragist, John D. Weeks, launched a propaganda campaign in which he attacked “‘silly pacifists’—especially those caught up ‘in the enthusiasm of newly conferred suffrage’” (Cott 1987: 247). In 1923, the Chemical Warfare Service of the War Department, closely tied to the division of military intelligence that kept an eye on domestic subversion, published the now infamous Spider Web chart. The chart graphically linked prominent leaders in the women’s movement, along with summaries of their radical views, to various feminist and pacifist groups thought to be engaging in subversive activities, including the Girls’ Friendly Society (an Episcopalian Church group), the American Home Economics Association, the Young Women’s Christian Association, the Parent-Teachers Association, the American Association of University Women, and the Women’s

Christian Temperance Union. At the top in large letters, it declared “THE SOCIALIST-PACIFIST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA IS AN ABSOLUTELY FUNDAMENTAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM.”

Over the next year, the chart began circulating more widely and was later published in March 1924 in the reactionary newspaper, the *Dearborn Independent*. While the War Department eventually retracted the chart, it continued to be circulated by right-wing groups. The real danger to the women’s movement, as Cott (1987: 260) highlights, was that right-wing “agitations about Bolshevism and subversion affected the meaning and practice of feminism, by association and by analogy. The inculcated the very notion of women as a political group or class as un-American, a ‘Bolshevik’ notion.” The chart was used with some success to discredit virtually all feminist efforts, not merely those smacking of socialism (Cott 1987; Nielsen 2001). Red Scare backers were particularly alarmed by the Progressive agenda, which they interpreted as a feminization of the state. The fundamental problem with communism, they argued, was the abolition of private property; the heart of the patriarchal family lay with men’s control over their property (including women and children), and without this control, “like dominoes, all the bulwarks of social order subsequently were falling” (Nielsen 2001: 29). Thus Progressive feminists roused the ire of social conservatives, who were alarmed over their support for the expansion of the state, and in particular, their use of the state to “protect” women and children from harsh working conditions, public health problems, and other social crises—a job, conservatives argued, best left to patriarchs.

While the National Woman’s Party was initially included on the Spider Web chart in 1923, they managed ultimately to “keep their skirts clear” of red baiting, as NWP

leader Doris Stevens urged her members (quoted in Nielsen 2001: 137). They did so in part because the organization publicly disavowed the Progressive agenda, and in part because their single-minded focus on the Equal Rights Amendment allowed them to adopt the laissez-faire rhetoric of Progressive opponents. On one hand then, liberal feminists, including the NWP, were largely able to escape Red Scare persecution; on the other hand, all feminists were disadvantaged by the Red Scare, either directly or indirectly, because of social conservatives' ability to link un-American politics with un-American gender roles. Any political movement, then, promoting non-traditional gender roles became suspect (Nielsen 2001). As the Red Scare panic swept the country during the 1920s, there was a renewed interest in a return to traditional social arrangements. Because the suffrage movement brought about some of the most dramatic social changes in the years prior, gender relations became a particularly salient target during this period.

Other political developments hampered feminist efforts in the 1920s as well. Political allies were scarce, due in part to their reluctance to associate with anything that resembled communism, but also their realization that a woman's voting bloc failed to materialize following suffrage. While the number of female candidates running for national political office did increase in the 1920s, most of these candidates lost, blocked by the same kinds of political machinery they had faced as suffragists. Female candidates did fare marginally better at the state and local levels. The number of female state legislators rose from 33 in 1921 to 149 in 1929, but even at their best remained 1.5% of the legislature (Cott 1987). Further, having more women in political positions did little to advance feminist causes. As Cott points out, "Women's efforts to enter partisan politics were suffused with the irony that the dominant parties were only

interested in women who were ‘loyal,’ and yet for women to become loyal meant they had to give up any pretense of staking out an independent women’s stance” (1987: 110). In fact many female politicians were openly hostile of feminist campaigns. Alice Robertson, a Republican congresswoman from Oklahoma, for example, was one of the few representatives to oppose the Sheppard-Towner bill in 1921, dismissing the statistics on infant and maternal mortality as “sob stuff” (quoted in Cott 1987: 111).

This rather sudden shift in political fortunes between 1910-1930 offers a good case study for exploring the effects of domestic-level political opportunities on movement framing, tactics, and goals (see Table 4.3 below, reprinted from full list in Table 2.1). The Red Scare in particular stripped away much of the remaining support for feminist causes in the 1920s, as political allies disappeared and opponents became increasingly vocal and powerful (H3). Moreover, the series of anti-feminist (particularly anti-Progressive) legislation and court decisions reversed much of the progress made by the movement in previous decades. Aside from these political ramifications, the Red Scare affected the women’s movement through cultural mechanisms as well by forcing a return to traditional gender roles and encouraging women’s retreat from politics (H6).

**Table 4.3: Partial List of Hypotheses and Measures**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables
<p>3. During periods in which the women’s movement loses (gains) <b>political allies</b>, it will be more likely to:</p> <p>A. Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</p> <p>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</p> <p>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</p>	<p>Presidential support for women’s rights</p>
<p>6. During periods of <b>cultural instability</b> (cultural stability), the women’s movement will be more likely to:</p> <p>A. Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</p> <p>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</p> <p>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</p>	<p>Red Scare</p>

**Cultural Opportunity Structure.** Organized feminism was not faring much better outside the political realm either. The “new woman” that emerged in the 1890s evolved into the flapper in the 1920s. At a time when the previous gains of the women’s movement were receding, the flapper was convinced that her freedom was secured and efforts to join with collective feminism were unnecessary. As one older feminist observed about this younger generation of women: “If they fought for no causes, marched to no slogans, it was because they did not need to. They did not need to with the old idols smacked in the face, not with ferocity or hate, but as a child flicks at something with a whip—absently” (quoted in Sochen 1973: 149).

The rise of consumer capitalism no doubt encouraged this feminist individualism. Advertising became big business in the 1920s, with the advent of professional advertising agencies and a growing national market, and they set their sights on female consumers. In her study of anti-feminist backlashes, Susan Faludi argues that while antifeminism cropped up in periods prior to the 1920s, the rise of mass market advertising made this particular backlash more potent than those preceding it. She contends: “The Victorian era gave rise to mass media and mass marketing—two institutions that have since proved more effective devices for constraining women’s aspirations than coercive laws and punishments. They rule with the club of conformity, not censure, and claim to speak for female public opinion, not powerful male interests” (Faludi 1991: 48). Indeed marketers repackaged women’s political power into consumer choices. One advertisement, for example, exclaimed: “Today’s woman gets what she wants. The vote. Slim sheaths of silk to replace voluminous petticoats. Glassware in sapphire blue or glowing amber. The right to a career. Soap to match her bathroom’s color scheme” (quoted in Cott 1987:

172). Women were encouraged to find personal fulfillment through individual consumerism, and exercise their new freedom not at the voting booth but in the shopping line. Feminism, then, was “not ignored, but appropriated,” as Cott remarks (1987: 174). The beauty industry in particular was big business, spending more on advertising in 1929 than the seventeen-billion dollar food industry and the six-and-a-half-billion dollar auto industry (Lynd 1933). It was no coincidence, Faludi (1991) points out, that the Miss America pageant was established in the same year that women won the right to vote. The sexual conservatism of the previous generation of women was replaced by the sexual liberation of the flapper, and fueled by an industry with billions of dollars riding on women’s desire for sex appeal.

The flapper is indicative of a more widespread liberalizing sexual ideology in the 1920s, with more women engaging in a range of premarital sexual behavior. With advances in birth control technology, greater availability of family planning clinics, and the breakdown of many sexual taboos, women’s sexual rights were greatly advanced in the 1920s (Bolt 1993). Yet this was not an altogether positive development for organized feminism. As discussed above, this sexual ideology was in large part fostered by the beauty industry, and was consequently limiting in many ways (Cott 1987; Peiss 1998).

Also problematic was that when women’s sexual drives were acknowledged, so too was the possibility that they could be engaging in lesbianism. Now women’s solidarity was seen as motivated by sexual rather than political reasons, and any type of feminist organizing was often labeled lesbianism (Cott 1987). This lavender scare likely contributed to the surge in marital rates as well. Of the preceding generation, 10% never married, and the median age at first marriage for those who did was twenty-six for men

and twenty-four for women. Of the flapper generation, however, only six percent remained unmarried, and the median age at first marriage dropped to twenty-five for men and twenty-two and a half for women (Cott 1987). The rise in marital rates in the 1920s indicates a return to more traditional gender arrangements, which again linked women to the home and helped to delegitimize the efforts of the feminist movement to break down the barrier between public and private spheres.

In short, the political hostility facing feminism in the 1920s was matched by cultural hostility (see Table 4.4 below, reprinted from full list of hypotheses in Table 2.1). The “new woman” that emerged in the first decades of the twentieth century was replaced by the self-consumed flapper of the 1920s that was largely indifferent to the feminist cause. The rise of marital rates—and its encouragement of domesticity and heteronormativity—further undermined feminist efforts to break down the separate spheres ideology (H8). To what extent the closing of the cultural opportunity structure affected the movement’s use of frames, tactics, and goals is a question I will take up below, following a discussion of global-level opportunities and constraints.

**Table 4.4: Partial List of Hypotheses and Measures**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables
<p>8. During periods in which women’s <b>employment, earnings, and education decreases (increases) and marital and fertility rates increase (decrease)</b>, the women’s movement will be more likely to:</p> <p>A. Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</p> <p>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</p> <p>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</p>	<p>Employment rates</p> <p>Earning rates</p> <p>Education rates</p> <p>Marital rates</p> <p>Fertility rates</p>

**Global Opportunity Structure.** While the state of American feminism in the 1920s was vulnerable, the international movement fared much better. As I will discuss in more detail below, while the primary goal of first-wave feminism was federally-

guaranteed suffrage for women, the movement turned increasingly to international women's rights, particularly after 1920. Given the movement's international concerns and arena of action, some consideration of the global opportunity structure is necessary. To what extent the global opportunity structure mitigated the effects of the domestic opportunity structure on movement frames, tactics, and goals is a question that I address later in this chapter (see Table 2.1, hypotheses 13-14).

Borrowing from Tarrow (1998), I adapt two of his measures of political opportunity—access to the state and political instability—applied at the global level. As I discuss in more detail in Chapter Three, I draw on Vanhanen's index of democracy which measures two variables: the degree of democratic participation and the degree of competition in a state. He measures participation as the percentage of a population which voted during an election year. Competition is measured as the share of votes cast for smaller parties in an election, calculated by subtracting the percentage of votes won by the largest party by 100 (Vanhanen 2000). Figure 4.5 shows that participation and competition both increased in the post-WWI period. Both variables increase noticeably after 1918, and peak between 1920 and 1925. In a general sense, then, the POS appears favorable to international social movements in the 1920s: greater competition should prove advantageous to any challenging group. At the same time, much of the increase in Vanhanen's measure of participation comes from women's increasing enfranchisement. World War I had provided the impetus not only for women's suffrage in the U.S., but for much of Europe as well. While only five countries had granted women the right to vote in 1917, that number jumped to 28 by 1921, and increased slowly but steadily thereafter.



In other words, the early 1920s was a politically advantageous time for social movements generally, and especially so for women's movements specifically.

**Figure 4.5: Vanhanen's Index of Democracy**



Source: Vanhanen and The International Peace Research Institute (2007)

World War I produced other fortuitous advantages for the burgeoning international feminist movement. The League of Nations, created at the end of WWI in 1919, opened up a global political space for groups to agitate for their agendas. Though these groups were not always received favorably, the League – and the series of conferences it organized – created a focal point for many formerly uncoordinated international women's groups (Berkovitch 1999b). In particular, the League's 1930 International Conference for the Codification of International Law, organized to address among other areas the issue of nationality, caught the attention of movement leaders. The International Alliance of Women (IAW) and the International Council of Women (ICW) seized the opportunity to submit a draft convention to the conference on equal rights for married women. The issue had become particularly problematic in post-WWI years, as women who had married foreigners during the war were facing exile and property confiscation. The IAW and ICW gained access to the conference after much opposition,

though their proposal for women's independent nationality was ultimately defeated (Joachim 2007). Interestingly, however, a number of countries voiced support for these feminist groups and their proposal, including the United States and other North, Central, and South American countries (*ibid.*).

The support that the international movement received from the countries of the Americas encouraged activists to turn their focus to the Pan-American conferences, the predecessor to the Organization of American States. As early as 1923, suffragists were pressuring conference diplomats to protect women's political and economic rights through legally binding conventions. While these activists did not achieve full success at the 1923 conference, they did succeed in passing a largely symbolic resolution that called for placing women's issues on the program of future conferences, recommending the study by each country of the status of its women, and encouraging the inclusion of women in future diplomatic delegations.

A similar gathering of feminist activists pressured the next conference in 1928 to fulfill the 1923 resolution. Led by Doris Stevens (of the National Women's Party), the women pressed for the following equal rights treaty: "The contracting parties agree that with the ratification of this Treaty men and women have equal rights in the territories subject to their respective jurisdictions" (quoted in Meyer 1999: 62). While most diplomats were reluctant to fully support the treaty, they responded by creating the Inter-American Commission on Women (known by its Spanish acronym CIM), charged with putting together a report so that the next Inter-American conference could better evaluate the civil and political issues facing women (Meyer 1999). Despite their failure to adopt the full equal rights treaty proposed by the feminist delegates, Joachim (2007)

characterizes this conference as a “turning point” (61) for the movement, not only because of the creation of the CIM – a group dominated by liberal feminists (primarily associated with the NWP) – but also because it demonstrated that the women had become more strategic in their organizing efforts and better able to attract the support of influential allies. Indeed, the next conference (in 1933) formally adopted the Convention on the Nationality of Women, which barred discrimination of nationality status based on sex (Joachim 2007; Meyer 1999). The League of Nations also moved in 1931 to establish a consultative women’s committee, created to make proposals to the legal committee of the League. A number of international women’s organizations were asked to join, ranging from CIM to the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, signaling finally some openness by the League towards women’s issues (Joachim 2007; Stienstra 1994).

The global COS, like the global POS, appears largely favorable to feminism in the 1920s. Because the organizational foundation of world culture was not firmly established until after World War II (Boli and Thomas 1999), measures of a global COS are sparse. One proxy, however, may be the rate of women’s access to and participation in international cultural spaces such as the Olympics. While the number of female Olympians increased only marginally between 1908 and 1920 (from about 2 to 3 percent), they increased more rapidly in the 1920s, making up nearly 9 percent of athletes in the 1932 Olympic Games. Thus the global POS—including general increased political competition and participation, women’s increased access to the nation-state and world polity, and support from influential international allies in the Americas—and global COS—measured here as women’s increasing participation in international cultural

spaces—remained largely favorable to feminism in the 1920s, despite the domestic backlash affecting the American movement. The divergence of the domestic and global opportunity structures offers a good case study for exploring the effects of both on the American women’s movement. In particular, I examine whether the global opportunity structure affected the movement at all, and if so, whether it affected both branches of the movement equally. I also offer some consideration of the interplay between the global and domestic opportunity structures.

**Table 4.5: Partial List of Hypotheses and Measures**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables
<p>14. During periods of decreasing (increasing) <b>global opportunities</b>, the women’s movement will be more likely to:</p> <p>A. Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</p> <p>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</p> <p>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</p>	<p>Number of countries with women’s suffrage</p> <p>Degree of political party competition across countries</p> <p>Degree of political participation across countries</p> <p>Rate of female participation in the Olympics</p>

*PERCEPTIONS OF THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE, 1910-1930*

As Meyer and Minkoff (2004) point out, scholarship is unclear regarding the mechanisms through which the opportunity structure operates. Are movements affected by formal structural openings in the system, or is it activists’ *perceptions* of the political and cultural environments that matter (see Table 2.1, H11-H12)? In testing this question, however, Meyer and Minkoff (2004) use rather indirect measures of activists’ perceptions (e.g., amount of media coverage an issue receives). I code for mentions of the POS and COS in the Progressive feminist journal, *Woman Citizen*, and the liberal feminist journal, *Equal Rights*, in an attempt to more directly gauge feminists’ perceptions of the political and cultural environments. Refer to Chapter Three for more details regarding the coding scheme.

Figure 4.6 shows changes in the perceptions of the political opportunity structure evident in both journals. In many ways the two patterns are similar, both peaking in the years immediately leading up to the suffrage victory in 1920 and declining during the second decade. Optimism about the POS ranged from general exclamations that “the woman’s hour has struck!” (*Woman Citizen*, Sep. 23, 1916, p. 308) to more concrete recognitions regarding favorable legislation and court decisions:

Never before did a County Judge order such a vote of opinion. Never before did the whole election machinery seem so graciously oiled for our benefit. Never before did 6,700 election officials co-operate so courteously. Never before did any judge issue 1,000 permits to women as his Special Deputies to watch the casting of the vote within the polling places and the count afterwards. (*Woman Citizen*, April 20, 1912, p. 125)

**Figure 4.6: Perceptions of Political Opportunities in *Woman Citizen* and *Equal Rights*, 1910-1930**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages

Sources: *Woman Citizen* (1910-1930), *Equal Rights* (1913-1921, 1923-1930)

Early suffrage victories at the state level were also celebrated, often over multiple issues, and touted as evidence of positive changes in the opportunity structure. Western states were some of the first to grant suffrage, and suffragists were optimistic these gains were a sign of victories to come: “A few drops of water do not make a monsoon, but they presage it. In like manner do the free states of the West presage the freedom of the nation and the world” (*Equal Rights* May 29, 1915, p. 3). Not only did state-level suffrage victories suggest a turning tide, but they offered tangible benefits in the form of women’s increasing access to the state (Tarrow 1998). *Equal Rights* was especially eager to point out this fact: “The movement for the national enfranchisement of women derives its main strength from the enfranchised women, numbering nearly four million, who can, if they will, affect fortunes of national parties” (*Equal Rights*, January 8, 1916, p. 4). The National Woman’s Party went so far as to threaten entire political parties with the opposition of a women’s voting bloc if they failed to support national suffrage in the party plank. When one senator warned, “You must remember that the same power which has given you the vote can take it away again,” *Equal Rights* shot back with this editorial:

Senator Lewis and his leaders have not grasped the present status of the suffrage movement. Women need not be alarmed over the danger of antagonizing the Democratic party. The Democratic party ought to be very much more alarmed over the danger of antagonizing women. A deliberate policy of opposition to woman's enfranchisement would mean the arraying of nearly one hundred electoral votes permanently against the Democratic party. It would mean, too, that every state in the Union which extended suffrage to women in the future would be aligned against the Democratic party; and in every other state all the moral and social influence of women, all their devoted and intelligent labor, would oppose the Democratic party in

every election. The time has gone by when politicians could frighten women into a timid policy by announcing that they would be 'antagonized' by any resentment of their own injustice. Women are a political power today. That power is growing, not diminishing. Democratic leaders must adjust themselves to these facts. (*Equal Rights*, August 19, 1916, p. 6)

As the suffrage movement gained strength and made early inroads at the state level, their confidence clearly grew with it. A particular boon to the movement was the help they received from political allies (Tarrow 1998):

The suffragists have good friends in both House and Senate. They are peculiarly fortunate in that the chairman of the Senate Woman Suffrage Committee, who will preside at the hearings, is Senator Frederick A. Johnson of New London. Mrs. Johnson is an enthusiastic worker in the Connecticut W.S.A. [Women's Suffrage Association], and is chairman of New London county, in which position she has done excellent organization work. Senator Johnson is quite in sympathy with his wife, and in consequence the suffragists are sure of most courteous treatment. (*Woman Citizen*, March 1, 1913, p. 70)

World War I, as discussed previously, facilitated the movement in many ways, not least of which was the way it underscored the hypocrisy of the U.S. government in fighting for democracy abroad while denying it to half of their population at home (McCammon, Campbell, Grandberg, and Mowery 2001). *Equal Rights* was especially forceful on this point, remarking for example: "And may we hope that our Senate will pass the Susan B. Anthony amendment before the Kaiser grants suffrage to frau and fraulein? To be beaten to this reform by the House of Lords is bad enough. The humiliation of having to fall in behind Wilhelm II would be intolerable" (*Equal Rights* Feb. 16, 1918, p. 14). The NWP undertook a picketing campaign at the White House at

the outbreak of WWI in which they seized on this double standard. They earned the ire of President Wilson by picketing the White House with banners bearing quotes from his speeches and writings, and justified their position by arguing: "It is an awful thing in these war times to make the populace laugh at the inconsistencies of the President. And yet one is forced to laugh at the President on reading his pre-election speeches, his books of previous years, in the light of his present opposition to the liberty of American women" (*Equal Rights*, Sep. 1, 1917, p. 7). Even NAWSA, who agreed to a recess in campaigning during the war, made similar arguments, albeit less harshly:

Again and again the point has been made in recent weeks by no less an authority than President Wilson--that the world is at war today for an ideal. And from time immemorial the point has been made that it is a good plan to practice what you preach. The ideal for which the world fights is the right of self-government. The point of application for America to practice what it preaches lies in granting the right of self-government to American women. (August 17, 1918, p. 225)

Ultimately their tactics paid off. Wilson agreed to back the federal suffrage amendment as a "war measure," and threw his support behind it. Both journals cheered the decision: "With the head of the nation and the leader of his party declaring unequivocally for the passage of the amendment, it would appear that nothing could stop it" (*Equal Rights*, Jan. 19, 1918, p. 15).

The journals also recognized broader cultural changes that provided favorable opportunities for the movement, including the rising number of women in the paid labor market, women's increasing levels of education, and general changes in gender relations. These activists sought to take advantage of their expanding "female sphere" that had formerly confined them to their home. Remarkably the *Woman Citizen*: "Our homes have



expanded, and take into account the public streets, the playgrounds, the theatres, the dance halls, and the workshops of the world, where the youth of the country spend the larger part of their time (March 1, 1913, p. 67). Again, much of this change in gender roles can be directly attributed to WWI, as more women—particularly white, middle-class, and married women—left the home for the paid labor market. Even at the very start of the European conflict, *Equal Rights* made note of its significance for women: “With the French lawyers, for the most part fighting with the army, the women lawyers of France have found unlimited work cut out for them, and are reaping a harvest [...] The routine business of the courts is now falling largely to women, whereas in the past they secured only cases involving women clients” (*Equal Rights*, July 24, 1915, p. 2). As McCammon et al. (2001) point out, politicians are often influenced by factors other than those which are strictly political. Suffragists echoed this claim when they suggested that England’s Labor Party pushed for women’s suffrage after “seeing that the increased entry of women into the labor market imperatively necessitates woman's influence in the government of the nation” (*Equal Rights*, May 27, 1916, p. 3). Women’s involvement in wartime work also eroded one of the anti-suffragists’ arguments that only citizens who are able to help defend the country should be given the vote. “But,” argued *Equal Rights*, “we could not carry on the war without [women]. They are running many of our industries and their services may justly be compared with those of the soldier” (Oct. 14, 1916, p. 3).

The news media seem to have played an important role as well in shifting public perceptions about suffrage and the appropriate roles and activities of women. Both *Equal Rights* and the *Woman Citizen* commonly pointed out the facilitative role of newspaper

editors and journalists who endorsed women's suffrage, offered coverage of their events, and wrote favorably of the movement. *Equal Rights* suggested that the change in the media's tone was indicative of impending victory, remarking: "A very interesting change of front was at once observable in the American press reports of this incident [an English suffragette hunger strike], which was narrated with all respect, without any of the usual references to 'furies' or 'wild women.' Signs of approaching victory make a marvelous difference in the journalistic point of view" (June 27, 1914, p. 2).

Both journals recognize the confluence of political and cultural opportunities in the late 1910s that expedited the suffrage victory. After 1920, both journals also recognized relatively similar political opportunities (see Figure 4.6), but diverge in their perceptions of the cultural opportunity structure (see Figure 4.7). The *Woman Citizen* fluctuated in its perceptions but remained generally positive until 1923, after which it began pointing out negative cultural developments more often than positive developments. For *Equal Rights*, by contrast, perceptions of the COS declined quickly after WWI, but when the journal resumed publication in 1923 they offered an overwhelmingly positive outlook on the movement's cultural opportunities, returning to pre-WWI levels of optimism by the end of the decade.

For the *Woman Citizen*, the diminishment of opportunities in the 1920s is not surprising. The gains that Progressive feminists had made in the 1910s with protective labor and related issues were gradually being stripped away. The journal recognized as much when it remarked:

Then consider carefully the whole record of state legislation during the past decade. Here are the years when Uncle Sam had his finger in the pie. During these years there was a national minimum child labor standard. There were state

labor officials and United States Government officials working together to enforce it. There was teamwork on behalf of the children. During those years, state standards went up by leaps and bounds--in one year, forty-four advances--in another, twenty-nine. Then came the period after the Federal laws had been declared unconstitutional [in 1922]. With no national law, state laws improved much less rapidly. The advances made in single years dropped to eighteen, then to eleven. (*Woman Citizen*, January, 1928, p. 8)

**Figure 4.7: Perceptions of Cultural Opportunities in *Woman Citizen* and *Equal Rights*, 1910-1930**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages

Sources: *Woman Citizen* (1910-1930), *Equal Rights* (1913-1921, 1923-1930)

Also regularly noted by the mid-1920s were Red Scare attacks against women's organizations. Particularly alarming to Progressive feminists was the circulation of the "Spider Web chart." This attack prompted Carrie Chapman Catt, a prominent feminist leader, to publish an article entitled "The Lie Factory," in which she projected the long-term ramifications of the chart:

The apology of Secretary Weeks to the Joint Congressional Committee for the false charges disseminated by the Chemical Warfare Bureau (Chief Brigadier General Fries), and the promise to order the destruction of the offending 'spider web chart' connecting all the best-known women's organizations with red propaganda, did not close the matter. It is not easy to catch nor to stop a lie when it has once started on its course. (*Woman Citizen*, September 20, 1924, p. 10)

The *Woman Citizen* also highlighted cultural, economic, and socio-demographic shifts that retarded the progress of feminism in the 1920s. Some, for example, lamented the increase in marital rates as a roadblock to professional success, warning: "I don't want to be unduly pessimistic, but I believe in facing facts, and the facts do seem to indicate that for many skilled women workers marriage is a hindrance to professional and business advancement" (*Woman Citizen*, June 1929, p. 44). Others pointed to women's decreased earnings as an example of continuing inequality (Jan. 28, 1922), increasingly restrictive women's fashion in the 1920s (Aug. 12, 1922), and the apathy of the flapper generation to feminist issues and goals (April 1928). The *Woman Citizen's* recognitions of negative shifts in the political and cultural climates became more commonplace by the mid-1920s, as mentions of opportunities sharply declined and mentions of constraints increased.

*Equal Rights*, by contrast, evaluated the movement's prospects for success differently during the 1920s. The years immediately following suffrage stand out in stark contrast to the *Citizen*. The low dip in 1921, however, is slightly misleading. By 1920, as suffrage seemed imminent, the journal scaled back its publication to monthly issues, and suspended publication entirely between February 1921 and February 1923. Only a footnote is provided in explanation in the February 1923 issue, accounting for the two

year recess as a time to regroup after the suffrage victory. What appears to be a significantly negative shift in perceptions of the opportunity structure in 1921 is actually only a small number of articles that offer slightly pessimistic assessments of the movement's future. This dip more accurately indicates a virtual cessation of commentary of the opportunity structure.

When *Equal Rights* returned in 1923 launching its new campaign for an Equal Rights Amendment, it wasted no time in picking up where it left off. The journal continued remarking on many of the same issues it had in the pre-suffrage years: women's growing employment in the paid labor market, female inroads into politics, academia, and the media, and increasing educational opportunities for women. Even those women who chose to work in the home, they argued, were validated for their work when the government decided to include "housewife" as an occupation on the 1930 Census (*Equal Rights*, Feb. 8, 1929). They seemed especially energized over scientific advancements that "ha[ve] done much to dispel the notion of the vast differences between the physical and mental potentialities of the two sexes" (*Equal Rights*, June 7, 1924, p. 132). One writer rejoiced:

Womanhood has so long been regarded as a congenital disease that anyone maintaining that women were even approximately as healthy as men would until recently have been considered as more or less of a fanatic [...] It is a great comfort nowadays to see the new physiology coming into vogue, with its concept of woman as a healthy human being. Hats off, we say, to the women doctors who do not confuse normal function with insidious disease! (*Equal Rights*, March 10, 1928, p. 36)

In an interesting analysis of shifting gender roles, another writer predicted women's increasing athleticism could lead to more equitable domestic relationships:

Speakers [at the convention of the Midwest Society of Physical Education] pointed out that woman is the athletic member of the modern family, while the men, eschewing vigorous exercise, are steadily becoming enfeebled, anemic, sallow and a lot of other pathetic adjectives as they sit wearily in their offices, slowly fading away. The practice of wife-beating, unless the trend is corrected, may entirely disappear, the educators suggested, because man in time won't be man enough to exercise any cave man prerogatives. (*Equal Rights*, May 4, 1929, p. 98)

The journal was especially successful at using major holidays and anniversaries as opportunities to highlight the ERA campaign. The anniversaries of the Seneca Falls convention and the passage of the suffrage amendment were used to emphasize both the progress of the movement and women's lingering inequalities. The journal stepped up its rhetoric of equality and freedom during the July 4<sup>th</sup> holidays, and often used their Christmas issue to frame their struggle as one of bestowing a gift to future generations of women:


From time to time individuals and groups appear that desire to infuse reason and justice into the social order. Always they are derided, always they are scorned in the beginning by their compatriots, but by the same token always they are the ones that make gifts to the children that last beyond the single day of Christmas. Such were the women who went forth and gave to the daughters of mankind the splendid gift of political liberty. Such are the women who now spend themselves to secure the greater blessing of Equal Rights for the children of the future. (Dec. 20, 1924, p. 256)

Despite the lack of substantive political progress with the ERA during the 1920s, one of the reasons *Equal Rights* was able to remain generally positive during the decade was because it largely avoided being caught up in the Red Scare mania of the mid-1920s. While *Woman Citizen* and the Progressive branch of the movement suffered serious setbacks by red-baiting attacks, *Equal Rights* made no mention at all of these trends. Their only acknowledgement of the backlash against progressivism were occasional references to the Supreme Court decisions that overturned Progressive legislation during the 1920s, a development that the liberal branch lauded as unequivocally positive (e.g., *Equal Rights*, May 12, 1923).

Another reason for the optimistic outlook of *Equal Rights* was its focus on the international movement during the 1920s. While neither journal discussed international feminist issues to a noticeable degree in the pre-suffrage period, *Equal Rights* shifted considerably to the international arena after suffrage, with almost 60% of articles in 1930 addressing international issues (see Figure 4.8). Consequently, despite their lack of noticeable progress on the home front, the progress of the international movement helped to overcome domestic defeats. Figure 4.9 shows fairly similar trends in perceptions of domestic opportunities between *Woman Citizen* and *Equal Rights*; Figure 4.10, however, explains some of their divergence. NWP's growing involvement with the increasingly successful international movement produced generally positive perceptions of the opportunity structure in the 1920s. The League of Nation's 1930 conference on the Codification of International Law presented one opportunity for the international movement to push for equal right for women, and NWP was especially pleased with the inclusion of American women among the delegates to the conference:

When President Hoover appointed Ruth B. Shipley as delegate to the International Conference on the Codification of International Law and Dr. Emma Wold as technical advisor, he set a new precedent for the United States of America in relation to its women citizens [...] With women themselves present at the approaching conference there would seem to be good reason to hope that justice for women in nationality laws may at last find an entrance. (*Equal Rights*, March 8, 1930, p. 34)


**Figure 4.8: Percentage of Articles with International Focus in *Woman Citizen* and *Equal Rights*, 1910-1930**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages  
 Sources: *Woman Citizen* (1910-1930), *Equal Rights* (1913-1921, 1923-1930)




**Figure 4.9: Perceptions of Domestic Opportunities in *Woman Citizen* and *Equal Rights*, 1910-1930**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages  
Sources: *Woman Citizen* (1910-1930), *Equal Rights* (1913-1921, 1923-1930)

**Figure 4.10: Perceptions of International Opportunities in *Woman Citizen* and *Equal Rights*, 1910-1930**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages  
Sources: *Woman Citizen* (1910-1930), *Equal Rights* (1913-1921, 1923-1930)

*Equal Rights* also made regular mention of growing rights for women around the world, especially equal rights provisions in the new European constitutions following WWI (e.g., April 14, 1923, p. 67). Such developments prompted the journal to proclaim, “In all corners of the world, women are awakening like sleepy children and looking about

them with great, wide eyes, marveling at the brightness of the sunshine and the many things the sunshine reveals” (*Equal Rights*, Nov. 11, 1924, p. 328).

In short, *Woman Citizen* and *Equal Rights* offered fairly different perceptions of the POS and COS, especially in the decade following suffrage. While the *Woman Citizen* became gradually more pessimistic during the 1920s regarding the Progressive feminist movement’s prospects, *Equal Rights* remained largely positive. Much of the optimism of NWP and the liberal branch came from their avoidance of Red Scare persecution, which persistently plagued the Progressive branch from 1923 on, as well as their focus on the international arena in which feminism was faring much better. The considerable variation in the opportunity structure over time and between journals offers a good case study for exploring whether and how the opportunity structure affects the movement’s frames, tactics, and goals. I explore each of these movement outcomes below, paying particular attention to differential effects of the political and cultural opportunity structures, and domestic and global opportunity structures.

## II. CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS TACTICS, 1910-1930


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Given the considerable variation in the opportunity structure over time, and between journals, I turn now to the question of how the political and cultural opportunity structures shaped the frames, tactics, and goals of the women’s movement. A core disagreement between NSMT and PPT concerns the rise of movements that avoid the antagonization of opponents. Are consensus movements unique to the late-20<sup>th</sup> century, as NSMT posits, or alternately are movements more likely to utilize consensus tactics when they confront a hostile opportunity structure? The first wave of the women’s

movement offers a good case study for exploring this question. First-wave feminism is a classical “old” movement, allowing us to examine the NSMT hypothesis that consensus tactics should be absent during this period. As discussed above, the political and cultural opportunity structure varied considerably between 1910-1930, which lends itself well to examining the PPT hypothesis that the movement will employ consensus tactics when the opportunity structure closes (see Table 2.1, hypothesis series A).

Figure 4.11 shows that both journals exhibit generally similar rates of opponent identification. The *Woman Citizen* in the pre-suffrage period ranges from a low of 26% of articles identifying opponents in 1916 to a high of 55% in 1920. *Equal Rights* fluctuates more dramatically during this period, ranging from 72% of articles identifying opponents in 1920, to just 26% the following year. In the post-suffrage years, especially the second half of the decade, however, opponent identification remains relatively low for both journals.

**Figure 4.11: Rate of Opponent Identification in *Woman Citizen* and *Equal Rights*, 1910-1930**




Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages

Sources: *Woman Citizen* (1910-1930), *Equal Rights* (1913-1921, 1923-1930)

### *Woman Citizen*

Figure 4.12 shows the covariance of opportunities and the rate of opponent identification for the *Woman Citizen*. Between 1910 and 1921, the number of articles addressing opponents ranged from 30-50% of the total number of articles per year. After 1921, however, number of articles identifying opponents declined sharply, until virtually none was mentioned by 1930. The decline in opponent identification follows closely on the heels of the shift in perceptions of opportunities, particularly political opportunities. Perceptions of the political climate quickly turned negative between 1918 and 1919; while over 40% of articles identify positive political opportunities in 1918, within three years it dips to just 11%, and by 1925 articles are more likely to identify political constraints than opportunities. This trend closely mirrors the rate of opponent identification (with a one-year lag), suggesting that the movement responded quickly to diminishing political opportunities by shifting from conflict to consensus tactics.

**Figure 4.12: Rate of Opponent Identification in *Woman Citizen*, 1910-1930**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages  
 Source: *Woman Citizen* (1910-1930)

A close reading of the texts enhances these quantitative findings. Early articles regularly named those who were on the movement's side and those who were not, and in this way, firmly established the boundaries of the movement by identifying an "out-group." The following passage regarding police brutality towards British suffragettes illustrates how solidarity was produced through the identification of a common enemy: "Such suffering is victorious. It is a witness of the faith that is in us. It proves to the world that we are ready to suffer everything for our belief, while at the same time it focuses attention towards, and not away from, the thing we suffer for" (*Woman Citizen*, June 14, 1913, p. 191). Similarly, the following author expressed optimism regarding the potential for opponents to undermine their own cause, and hence strengthen the suffrage movement:

And if Mrs. Goodwin uses the money to spread anti-suffrage literature, as she probably will, it is bound to make converts to the cause of votes for women. The oftener the arguments against equal suffrage are brought out and aired, the more apparent their flimsiness becomes. (*Woman Citizen*, October 4, 1913, p. 316)

The ritual identification of opponents served in many ways to provide the groundwork on which to build movement solidarity.

These opponents appeared in a number of forms. Some opponents identified were individuals—usually politicians—who were actively working to block feminist campaigns. Frequently cited was Herbert Asquith, the British Prime Minister from 1908-1916, a longtime opponent of the suffrage movement in England: "Mr. Asquith is an avowed opponent of woman suffrage in any form, and his object evidently is to stave it off as long as possible" (*Woman Citizen*, Jan. 15, 1910, p. 10). Antagonists also took the

form of organizations, such as the liquor industry, which opposed women's suffrage on the grounds that it would advance the prohibition cause: "The New Jersey liquor interests have come out into the open. They have openly decided to fight the equal suffrage amendment" (*Woman Citizen*, April 24, 1915, p. 127). In some instances, opponents were much more diffuse but no less branded by the movement. The following quote, for example, acknowledges systemic injustice despite the lack of a particular individual or group on which to pin the blame:

We command your action in ordering investigation of treatment of Miss Zelig Emerson [a British suffragette]. We complain that England is torturing women prisoners for offenses far less serious than those committed by men political offenders in the past. (*Woman Citizen*, April 12, 1913, p. 120).

This identification of opponents did not end with the end of the suffrage struggle, however, but continued into the early 1920s. The National American Women's Suffrage Association, reorganized as the League of Women Voters in 1920, was especially vigilant about identifying opponents seeking to exploit women's newly won voting rights:

It [the League of Women Voters] has been opposed, and is being opposed by the professional politicians who are determined to keep their power and have some reason to believe that they may succeed, fighting desperately as they are doing to induct women into the parties in blind obedience to the powers that be and in complete surrender to the system that they find. To do this they raise the cry of party loyalty and party regularity, by which they mean machine loyalty and machine regularity and they are rallying about them deluded women, some of them real victims to the hypnotism of the rallying cry, others dazzled by illusory power and position. The machine politicians are determined that the new voters

when they come into the parties shall subject themselves to authority and surrender conscience and judgment. (*Woman Citizen*, Jan. 1, 1921, p. 848)

While pointing out opponents was relatively commonplace throughout the 1910s, systematic analysis of the entire period shows it declined fairly steadily throughout the 1920s until by 1930 it was not discussed at all. These later articles either failed to mention opponents or in some cases actively denied their existence. Consider, for example, the following passage on the subject of tariff reform:

A situation has arisen before the American people which it behooves housewives to investigate for themselves--not for the benefit of any Senate subcommittee or club paper but for their own personal pocketbooks [...] *It is not a question of who is to blame* that the housewife must determine. It is not a question of whether the present bill favors manufacturer or importer. The bill before Congress moves in a direct, unchallenged line to the family pocketbook. (*Woman Citizen*, Aug., 1929, p. 20, emphasis added)


Other articles commented on former opponents who were now left toothless, no longer posing threats to the movement: “We used to get excited over him because he was part of the opposition, but now it isn't opposition he portrays; it is sour grief muddied with resentment because human society has moved and he can't” (*Woman Citizen*, Oct., 1928, p. 16). This passage, while optimistic, suggests the movement no longer faced serious challenges. Such assertions undermined the foundation on which movement solidarity had formerly been built.

### ***Equal Rights***

Figure 4.13 shows the covariance of opportunities and the rate of opponent identification for *Equal Rights*. As in the case of the *Woman Citizen*, the rate at which

opponents are identified is tightly coupled with perceptions of the political opportunity structure. Positive perceptions peak for the journal in 1918, and show a steep decline in 1920. Allowing for a one- to two-year lag, this trend mirrors the rate of conflict tactics; *Equal Rights* names opponents in 65% of its articles in late 1918, and over 72% in early 1920. Over the course of the next year, however, positive perceptions of the POS quickly decline, as does the rate of opponent identification. Only 21% of articles utilize conflict tactics in 1921, a 51-point decline in just one year. When the journal resumed publication in 1923, it was generally less likely to identify both political opportunities and movement opponents than in its pre-suffrage years. Both vary at similar rates throughout the 1920s.

**Figure 4.13: Rate of Opponent Identification in *Equal Rights*, 1913-1930**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages

Source: *Equal Rights* (1913-1921, 1923-1930)

Many of the opponents the journal identified were the same as those mentioned by *Woman Citizen*, including British Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, President Wilson before he came out in support of suffrage in 1918, and the liquor industry. Unlike NAWSA and the *Woman Citizen*, the National Woman's Party chose the unique tactic of



opposing entire political parties rather than individual politicians. Despite President Wilson's endorsement of suffrage and many Democratic senators voting for the measure, NWP held the entire Democratic Party responsible for the amendment's failure to pass Congress in 1918: "The President and the Democratic Party must bear responsibility for the closing of the Senate with suffrage still denied to the American people. The Democrats are in control of the Senate and are responsible for its inaction on suffrage" (*Equal Rights*, Nov. 23, 1918, p. 6). While this strategy earned the ire of many politicians and even other suffrage organizations which deemed the tactic too radical, it does point to the confidence of NWP in its ability to effectively combat an opponent as formidable as the Democratic Party. Consider, for example, the following passage regarding the campaign to get the Democratic Party to endorse the federal amendment at their national convention:

The siege of St. Louis began on the morning of June 10th, when the first line battalion went into action in the Democratic convention city. Within an hour after arriving we had captured the finest strategic base in the city and had established headquarters there. We seized, without resistance on the manager's part, a conspicuous corner of the lobby of the Jefferson Hotel [...] (*Equal Rights*, June 4, 1916, p. 7)

The militaristic rhetoric of this passage clearly pits the movement against the Democratic Party, establishes a line of demarcation between "us" and "them," and provides a source of solidarity for suffragists.

As with the *Woman Citizen*, however, these conflict tactics appeared less often by the late 1920s. Interesting to note is that as both journals recognized increasing constraints and setbacks for the movement, they surprisingly became *less* likely to pin the

blame on any group or person. This suggests, then, that the movement's shift from conflict to consensus is not the result of widespread acceptance of feminism following suffrage, but rather a tactical choice of movement activists to avoid inciting the opposition at a time when the movement was too weak to effectively combat it.

### ***Correlations***

Table 4.6 presents correlation coefficients between the rates of opponent identification and select independent variables (lagged one year) for the *Woman Citizen* and *Equal Rights*. See Appendix C for full table of correlations. Of course, bivariate correlations do not permit the establishment of causality, nor do they allow one to control for other variables. Nevertheless, certain patterns emerge here.

First, *political instability* measures are moderately well-correlated with use of conflict tactics. Generally, the greater the political instability, the more likely the movement was to identify opponents, as hypothesized. The exception to this pattern is *Equal Rights*, which becomes less likely to identify opponents after greater turnover in House seats.

Measures of *political allies*, however, do not conform to my hypotheses. Presidential support for women's rights has a low and nonsignificant correlation with opponent identification in both journals, and the elimination of liquor industry opponents of women's suffrage (with the passage of Prohibition) actually shows negative correlations with use conflict tactics.

I find mixed support for the *cultural contradictions* hypothesis. World War I has a positive effect on opponent identification, but it only reaches significance for *Equal*

**Table 4.6: Correlation Coefficients between Conflict Tactics and Select Independent Variables**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables	Correlation Coefficients		
		<i>Woman Citizen</i>	<i>Equal Rights</i>	<i>Combined</i>
1. During periods of <b>political instability</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Percent of congressional seats held by third parties	0.0841	0.4304*	0.2321*
	Margin of victory for congressional candidates	-0.3112*	-0.6314*	-0.4587*
	Number of Congressional House seats that change party	0.2300*	-0.2892*	-0.0131
3. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Presidential support for women's rights (% of words in State of Union in support of women's rights)	-0.0125	0.2361	0.1062
	Prohibition (1=1919-1930)	-0.4694*	-0.6540*	-0.5486*
4. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Rate of women's employment in the arts, media, and clergy	0.6825*	0.5861*	0.6335*
	Media coverage of the women's movement	<i>NY Times</i> index 0.4472*	0.4367*	0.4415*
		<i>Reader's Guide</i> 0.2260*	0.2135	0.2210*
6. During periods of <b>cultural stability</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Red Scare (1=1923-30)	-0.6900*	-0.4411*	-0.5730*
7. During periods of <b>contradiction between cultural values and conventional social practices</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	World War I (1=1917-1918)	0.1288	0.4679*	0.2912*
12. During periods of increasing <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Perceptions of political opportunities	0.5598*	0.6339*	0.5885*
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities	0.3147*	0.2963*	0.2726*
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities	0.5714*	0.6106*	0.5761*
	Perceptions of global opportunities	0.0346	0.1644	0.0896

<b>14.</b> During periods of increasing <b>global opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Number of countries passing full women's suffrage measures	-0.5984*	-0.6755*	-0.6264*
	Rate of political party competition across countries	-0.2225*	-0.5866*	-0.3762*
	Rate of political participation across countries	-0.5731*	-0.7193*	-0.6287*
<i>Social Movement Success</i>	19 <sup>th</sup> Amendment (1=1920)	0.2005	-0.3161*	-0.0499
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>		<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>		<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>		<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>

\* p<.05

*Note:* All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).

*Rights*. This finding resonates with the historical record on the two organizations (discussed more fully above): NAWSA (and the *Woman Citizen*) made the decision to back off of direct confrontation during wartime in the spirit of patriotic unanimity, but NWP (and *Equal Rights*) used the war as an opportunity to vamp up mobilization efforts. Thus, the differential effect of the war on the two journals is not surprising.

All measures of *cultural allies* have significant positive relationships with opponent identification for both journals, as hypothesized. Women's employment in cultural occupations, as well as media coverage of the movement has moderately high correlations with rates of opponent identification. Not surprisingly, the Red Scare (a measure of *cultural instability*) is significantly negatively correlated with the rate of opponent identification for both journals ( $r$  ranges between -0.44 and -0.69), suggesting that the censorship and intimidation of organized feminism during this period was effective.

*Perceptions of opportunities* – particularly political, cultural, and domestic (overall) – all show significant positive correlations with rates of opponent identification, as expected. While perceptions of cultural opportunities are only moderately correlated with conflict tactics ( $r=0.27$  combined), perceptions of political and domestic opportunities show much stronger correlations ( $r = 0.59$  and  $0.58$ , respectively). In fact, these correlations are some of the strongest for this period. Perceptions of global opportunities, however, occur in the theoretically predicted direction, but are not well correlated and fail to reach significance for either journal.

Objective *global opportunities*, while all are significantly correlated with conflict tactics, seem to produce counterintuitive effects. Growing levels of women's suffrage

around the world, as well as more general political competition and participation, are negatively correlated with the use of conflict tactics. These unexpected findings may be the result of several factors. First, it is unlikely that any of these variables alone can account for fluctuations in tactics, and of course bivariate correlations do not allow us to control for other variables (or, as the qualitative data suggest, to test for interactions between domestic- and global-level variables). Also, the events that likely exerted a more profound influence on the movement (such as the actions of intergovernmental organizations), can not be easily quantified, and thus do not lend themselves well to quantitative analysis.

Finally, the suffrage victory in 1920 has no significant correlation with the use of conflict tactics in the *Woman Citizen*, but has a significant negative correlation with *Equal Rights'* use of consensus tactics ( $r = -0.32$ ). As the qualitative and historical data suggest, this is largely a function of the organization's single-issue focus before 1920, making opponent identification after 1920 irrelevant.


### III. POLITICAL AND CULTURAL GOALS, 1910-1930

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My second research question asks whether and under what conditions the women's movement shifted from political to cultural goals. This question again points to a core disagreement between NSMT and PPT; the former argues that cultural goals are characteristic of "new" social movements, while for the latter, cultural goals are indicative of movements in decline. If the PPT hypothesis holds, we should expect to see the women's movement turn to cultural issues in the post-suffrage period when the opportunity structure began to close (see Table 2.1, hypothesis series B).

Both journals maintained a clear focus on political goals, in addition to strictly suffrage, throughout much of the period (Figure 4.14). For the *Woman Citizen*, their rates of politicization peak in 1924, four years after suffrage, with over 92% of all articles addressing political issues. After 1924, however, politics sharply declines, showing up in only 20% of the articles by 1930.

**Figure 4.14: Percentage of Articles Identifying Political and Cultural Goals in *Woman Citizen* and *Equal Rights*: 1910-1930**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages

Sources: *Woman Citizen* (1910-1930), *Equal Rights* (1913-1921, 1923-1930)

*Equal Rights* shows a slightly different pattern. It too has high rates of politicization in the 1910s, but depoliticizes immediately after suffrage; 83% of articles address political issues in the spring of 1920, dropping to only 44% by the fall. When the journal reemerged in 1923, however, it returned to a rather high level of politicization (77% in spring 1923) and while rates gradually declined throughout the rest of the decade, they remained considerably higher than rates of cultural discussions.

Articles addressing political issues range in topic from debates over the best political tactics in furthering the movement's agenda, to discussions of the goings-on in Washington. These articles often spoke to the importance of maintaining the movement's political eye, advocating for example, "The national capital is without question the logical place for work along suffrage lines that will influence not only the United States but the nations of the world" (*Woman Citizen*, Jan. 25, 1913, p. 27).


The rates of discussion of cultural issues are generally, but not always, inversely related to political issues. I use "culture" in this sense as a broad term that captures a range of subjects, including the arts (e.g., fashion, music, theater) but also topics such as the generational discord between flappers and their parents, a push to rewrite marriage vows to reflect more gender equality, and concerns about pro-military history lessons taught in schools. In one article, for example, *Equal Rights* pushes for an alternative feminist magazine to counter the negative representations of women in mainstream media (Jan/Feb. 1921). Elsewhere they tout the benefits of modern fashion (see *Equal Rights*, Jan/Feb1921), and the importance of woman-centered art (see *Equal Rights*, Jan/Feb1921).

For the *Woman Citizen*, culturally-oriented articles are rare or absent until 1924, but peak in spring 1929 with over 65% of articles addressing cultural issues. *Equal Rights*, by contrast, briefly turns to cultural issues in the year after suffrage (nearly 40% of articles in fall 1920), but pay little attention to these issues after the journal was re-launched in 1923. Cultural issues never comprised more than 18% of *Equal Rights* articles in the 1920s.




Figure 4.15 presents the covariance of perceptions of opportunities and levels of political and cultural foci in *Woman Citizen*. Unlike in the case of tactics and frames, the goals of the movement did not shift immediately with a change in perceptions of political opportunities. Political opportunities declined sharply in 1919, but the shift away from political goals did not occur until 1924, five years later. Yet a closer examination of how activists perceived cultural opportunities may shed light on this delay. While those do not show the drastic shift that appears in terms of political opportunities, we can discern some patterned variation. In the 1910s, positive perceptions of the cultural climate appear in 10-20% of all articles, with a notable increase in 1917 and 1918 due largely to the U.S. involvement in WWI. Yet beginning in the fall of 1922, this positive outlook becomes more rare, and articles are nearly equally likely to point out negative cultural developments. The movement's shift in focus from political to cultural issues, then, follows the convergence of declining cultural opportunities with declining political opportunities. Within one and half years of growing pessimism about the cultural climate, and following five years of diminished political opportunities, the *Woman Citizen* largely depoliticized, adopting instead cultural goals. However, unlike in the case of movement tactics and frames, which shifted quickly with the first signs of diminishing opportunities, movement goals respond much more slowly to the political and cultural environments. Given that goals are more central to a movement than its strategies for achieving those goals (i.e., its tactics and frames), it is not surprising that movement activists relinquish their original goals only when both the political and cultural climates offer little hope for success.

**Figure 4.15: Percentage of Articles Identifying Political and Cultural Goals in *Woman Citizen*, 1910-1930**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages  
Sources: *Woman Citizen* (1910-1930)

**Figure 4.16: Percentage of Articles Identifying Political and Cultural Goals in *Equal Rights*, 1913-1930**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages  
Source: *Equal Rights* (1913-1921, 1923-1930)

The depoliticization trends in *Equal Rights* are perhaps more puzzling. The immediate shift from political to cultural goals after the suffrage victory in 1920 differs significantly from the trends in *Woman Citizen*, which became even more strongly focused on political issues in five years after suffrage. One reason for this difference, however, may be NWP's failure to articulate additional goals to suffrage. While NAWSA and the *Citizen* regularly advocated suffrage as a means of achieving their ultimate goals of peace and protective labor legislation, NWP and *Equal Rights* articulated no such additional agenda until 1923, when the organization launched its ERA campaign. Thus while suffrage for NAWSA represented a partial victory, it constituted a total victory for NWP. This finding is consistent with other research which finds that some degree of hostility actually mobilizes activists (Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone 2003; Meyer 1993; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Santoro and Townsend 2006; Werum and Winders 2001). Staggenborg (1991), for example, contends that the relationship between movement success and mobilization is curvilinear; that is, partial success or defeat encourages mobilization, while both total success and total defeat demobilizes a movement. The *Woman Citizen* and *Equal Rights* data taken together support this finding, suggesting that both serious defeats and total success may lead to movement depoliticization.

After NWP's launch of the ERA campaign in 1923, however, the journal returned to a relatively high level of political focus and minimal focus on cultural issues. This too differs significantly from the trends found in *Woman Citizen*, which quickly depoliticized after 1924; however, we can explain this pattern through our existing theoretical framework. While both the COS and POS became soundly anti-feminist by the mid-

1920s, *Equal Rights* continued to enjoy relatively high rates of cultural opportunities throughout this later period (due in large part to their avoidance of Red Scare persecution). This pattern coincides with earlier findings that movement organizations turn to cultural goals only after *both* the political and cultural opportunity structures offer no hope for success.

### ***Correlations***

Table 4.7 presents correlation coefficients between the rates of cultural and political foci and select independent variables (lagged one year) for the *Woman Citizen* and *Equal Rights*. See Appendix C for full table of correlations. Because cultural and political goals are not measured as mutually exclusive, I include correlation coefficients for each separately, with correlation coefficients for political goals shown in parentheses below those for cultural goals. Again, these findings are not intended to show causality, but simply offer an alternate way to examine the data.

Most measures of *political instability* have significant correlations with choice of goals, and in the expected direction: as the political environment becomes more unstable, the movement is more likely to promote political goals, and as it becomes more stable, the movement is more likely to turn to cultural goals. This relationship tends to be stronger in *Equal Rights* (with correlations as high as -0.72), than in the *Woman Citizen* (with correlation coefficients closer to 0.30).

As with opponent identification, I find little support for the *political allies* hypothesis. As the president becomes more supportive of women's rights, the movement does not show significant signs of turning toward political goals. Moreover, with the

**Table 4.7: Correlation Coefficients between Movement Goals and Select Independent Variables**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables	Correlation Coefficients		
		<i>Woman Citizen</i>	<i>Equal Rights</i>	<i>Combined</i>
1. During periods of <b>political stability</b> (political instability), the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Percent of congressional seats held by third parties	-0.0298 (0.0860)	-0.5111* (0.4682*)	-0.1884* (0.2445*)
	Margin of victory for congressional candidates	0.3350* (-0.2643*)	0.6751* (-0.7220*)	0.4487* (-0.4427*)
	Number of Congressional House seats that change party	-0.3463* (0.3775*)	0.2080 (-0.0621)	-0.1404 (0.1791*)
3. During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Presidential support for women's rights (% of words in State of Union in support of women's rights)	-0.0266 (0.1323)	-0.1376 (0.2127)	-0.0666 (0.1721*)
	Prohibition (1=1919-1930)	0.3609* (-0.2743*)	0.4863* (-0.6496*)	0.3969* (-0.4003*)
4. During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Rates of women's employment in the arts, media, and clergy	-0.4771* (0.4920*)	-0.1600 (0.5567*)	-0.3697* (0.4770*)
	Media coverage of the women's movement	<i>NY Times</i> index -0.3036* (0.2341*)	-0.2392 (0.3678*)	-0.2780* (0.2673*)
		<i>Reader's Guide</i> -0.1609 (0.0922)	-0.3275* (0.2611*)	-0.2156* (0.1485)
6. During periods of <b>cultural instability</b> (cultural stability), the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Red Scare (1=1923-30)	0.5299* (-0.5932*)	-0.0358 (-0.4187*)	0.3156* (-0.4940*)
7. During periods of <b>congruity (contradiction) between cultural values and conventional social practices</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	World War I (1=1917-1918)	-0.1314 (0.2143)	-0.2389 (0.4512*)	-0.1675* (0.3221*)
12. During periods of decreasing (increasing) <b>perceived opportunities</b> ,	Perceptions of political opportunities	-0.4874* (0.5031*)	-0.0210 (0.2707*)	-0.2793* (0.3967*)

the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Perceptions of cultural opportunities	-0.3556* (0.3244*)	-0.2214 (0.0348)	-0.2646* (0.2284*)
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities	-0.5007* (0.4434*)	-0.1107 (0.2537*)	-0.3269* (0.3700*)
	Perceptions of global opportunities	-0.2984* (0.2225*)	-0.0856 (0.0447)	-0.1682* (0.1742*)
<b>14.</b> During periods of decreasing (increasing) <b>global opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Number of countries passing full women's suffrage measures	0.4414* (-0.3846*)	0.3444* (-0.6144*)	0.4022* (-0.4432*)
	Rate of political party competition across countries	0.1200 (0.0907)	0.5232* (-0.4486*)	0.2493* (-0.0984)
	Rate of political participation across countries	0.3968* (-0.3530*)	0.3998* (-0.6562*)	0.3914* (-0.4373*)
	<i>Social Movement Success</i>	19 <sup>th</sup> Amendment (1=1920)	-0.1003 (0.1042)	0.7983* (-0.5697*)
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>		<b>9</b> <b>(9)</b>	<b>6</b> <b>(10)</b>	<b>12</b> <b>(13)</b>
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>		<b>3</b> <b>(3)</b>	<b>4</b> <b>(4)</b>	<b>4</b> <b>(3)</b>
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>		<b>6</b> <b>(6)</b>	<b>8</b> <b>(4)</b>	<b>2</b> <b>(2)</b>

\* p&lt;.05

*Note:* All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).

Because cultural and political goals are not measured as mutually exclusive, I include correlation coefficients for each (political goals shown in parentheses)

elimination of liquor industry opponents (with the passage of the Prohibition amendment), the movement actually becomes more likely to turn toward cultural goals, away from political goals, contrary to the political process hypothesis.

Again, I find partial support for the *cultural contradictions* hypothesis: World War I generally has a positive and significant relationship with politicization (though the correlation is smaller and nonsignificant for the *Woman Citizen*). For the most part, measures of *cultural allies* have significant positive relationships with political foci (and significant negative relationships with cultural foci) for both journals, as expected. Specifically, women's employment in cultural occupations is moderately well-correlated with movement goals in the expected direction, and media coverage of the movement has small to moderate positive correlations with political goals, as expected.

Again, the Red Scare (a measure of *cultural instability*) shows moderate to high negative correlations with the rate of political foci, particularly for the *Woman Citizen* ( $r=-0.59$ ). Interestingly, the Red Scare appears to have made *Equal Rights* turn away from political issues, but not necessarily towards cultural issues (the coefficient is nearly zero and non-significant). As the qualitative data indicate, this was the same time at which *Equal Rights* began heavily focusing on international issues, as well as a wider range of domestic issues.

*Perceptions of opportunities* produce more consistent results with regard to choice of goals: in almost every case, more positive perceptions about opportunities – political and cultural, as well as domestic and global – are significantly correlated with higher rates of political foci, and lower rates of cultural foci. Correlation coefficients for the *Woman Citizen* range from 0.22 to 0.50. Perceptions of opportunities are less well-

correlated with goals in *Equal Rights*, however, particularly cultural and global opportunities, which have small and nonsignificant correlation coefficients. In every case, however, the relationship occurs in the hypothesized direction.

While most measures of objective *global opportunities* reach significance, they again occur in the opposite direction of that hypothesized. Growing levels of women's suffrage around the world, as well as more general political competition and participation, are negatively correlated with political foci and positively correlated with cultural foci. Again, while these findings do not conform to my hypotheses, this may potentially be a measurement issue. As I discuss above, these variables alone are not particularly good measures of global opportunities, and bivariate correlations do not allow us to gauge the overall effect of such opportunities. Moreover, the qualitative and historical data point to the importance of events that are not easily quantified, and thus are not captured in this analysis. Of course, it may also simply be the case that the movement during this period was simply not well attuned to global processes and events.


Finally, as expected the *suffrage victory* in 1920 has a very small and non-significant relationship with goals in the *Woman Citizen*, but it is highly correlated with cultural foci ( $r = 0.80$ ) and political foci ( $r = -0.57$ ) in *Equal Rights*. Again, the qualitative and descriptive data suggest this is largely a function of the organization's single-issue focus, making its political agenda obsolete in the few years following suffrage.



#### IV. COLLECTIVIST AND INDIVIDUALIST FRAMING, 1910-1930


A third core disagreement between NSMT and PPT concerns the conditions under which movements replace collectivist with individualist rhetoric. If NSMT is correct in arguing that individualism is unique to movements of the postindustrial late-20<sup>th</sup> century, we should not expect to find this characteristic in the first wave of the women's movement, a quintessential "old" movement. If the PPT hypothesis holds, however, we should expect to see the movement turn to more individualist rhetoric as its opportunities wane, regardless of historical era (see Table 2.1, hypothesis series C).

**Figure 4.17: Levels of Collectivist and Individualist Frames in *Woman Citizen*, 1910-30**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages  
 Collectivist index ranges from -7 to 7; positive scores represent collectivist frames,  
 negative scores represent individualist frames  
 Source: *Woman Citizen* (1910-1930)

**Figure 4.18: Levels of Collectivist and Individualist Frames in *Equal Rights*, 1913-1930**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages

Collectivist index ranges from -7 to 7; positive scores represent collectivist frames, negative scores represent individualist frames

Source: *Equal Rights* (1913-1921, 1923-1930)

Figures 4.17 and 4.18 show the changes in the two journals' employment of collectivist and individualist frames. As discussed in Chapter Three, this composite measure is based on 16 items measuring individualism and collectivism. These items are combined into one index ranging from -8 to 8, such that high positive scores indicate a higher level of collectivist frames employed, low negative scores indicate stronger individualist frames, and zero indicates equal levels of individualism and collectivism. The two journals' patterns in the pre-suffrage period are relatively similar, with both employing collectivist rhetoric rather frequently. They diverge in the post-suffrage period, however; the *Woman Citizen* gradually moves away from collectivist rhetoric throughout the 1920s. *Equal Rights* rapidly individualizes in the one year after suffrage, however, but resumes its pre-suffrage levels of collectivism in 1923. I explore both trends in more depth below, and offer some explanation for their divergence.

### *Woman Citizen*

While the *Citizen's* use of the collectivist frame was far more predominant than the individualist frame in the pre-suffrage years, by the early 1920s this trend began to reverse as more individualist frames marked the rhetoric. The line first dips below zero in the 1923, indicating that frames were more likely to be individualist, and by the end of 1924 individualist frames consistently appear more frequently than collectivist frames. The rate of collectivism is tightly coupled with perceptions of political opportunities, allowing just a one-year lag for collectivism. Both decrease, and at similar rates, between 1918 and 1930.

A detailed look at the rhetoric employed reinforces these quantitative findings and elaborates the ways in which the journal expressed collectivism and individualism. One component of the collectivist frame frequently found in pre-suffrage period was the encouragement of gender-based solidarity. One author, for example, simply states: "The woman voter was a suffragist first. She cannot repudiate the suffragist" (*Woman Citizen*, Dec.13, 1919, p. 558). Even as late as 1923, writers expressed similar sentiments:

I have found, however, that because of the newness of the experience, women who are alive to political interests are aware of the value of sex solidarity. This is a common psychological phenomenon to be found in all newly developed groups. (*Woman Citizen*, Jan.13, 1923, p. 16)

This "psychological phenomenon" was not to last long, however. By the mid-1920s, women were much less likely to identify on the basis of their gender, and the *Citizen* often even admonished them for doing so:

Women are ceasing to demand odds because of their sex. Competition today is not so much between the sexes as between individuals. For efficient work of any sort a kind of sexlessness is necessary: one becomes primarily a capable human being, not a member of a sex. (*Woman Citizen*, Dec. 1928, p. 11)

Collectivism also frequently took the form of encouraging readers to act on behalf of women as a group. One author reminded readers: “If workers for the suffrage cause would always have the personal secondary to the main issue, there would be little to block the progress within the ranks” (*Woman Citizen*, July 22, 1911, p. 226). These calls to action dwindled over time, until by the mid-1920s they were replaced by suggestions to put the personal first:

It was the first sign of change. No longer were they [the Junior League] graciously pledging support to an established institution well outside their own lives. They now wished to ‘promote interest of members’ in other words, to educate themselves. (*Woman Citizen*, Sep. 1929, p. 13)

Similarly, by the mid-1920s articles began appearing with greater frequency addressing issues of self-esteem, personal empowerment, and mental health. In 1923, the *Citizen* launched a regular column written by a medical doctor, which specifically addressed these types of questions, frequently urging readers to attend first and foremost to their personal health:

What each wants to know is, how much of that headache, fatigue, indigestion is produced by a tangible cause, as lobster, and how much by an intangible cause, as an attack of anger externalizing itself through the subconscious as indigestion. (*Woman Citizen*, Oct. 1925, p. 40)

Moreover, the *Citizen* often included highlights of women's achievements throughout the sample period, although authors shifted from collectivist to individualist frames over time. Consider for example the following passage that explicitly acknowledges the efforts of the movement in securing gender equality for women:

The world owes so much to its suffrage leaders that every woman who today is earning a fair salary, practising a profession, protecting her own home and children, is doing so, not alone by merits of her own, however great these things may be, but by the daily sacrifice, the heroic fortitude, the flaming vision of hundreds of brave leaders and thousands of inconspicuous followers in the fight for women's equality. (*Woman Citizen*, Feb. 14, 1920, p. 835)

Five years later, women were much more hesitant to attribute their personal successes to the movement, instead ascribing their success to their own virtues, declaring for example: "I am not a politician," she continued with a hearty smile. "I had never taken the slightest interest in politics, not even in woman suffrage until four years ago. I believe that my experience and training in business won the election for me" (*Woman Citizen*, Feb. 7, 1925, p. 14). While the journal highlighted women's achievements throughout the sample period, by the mid-1920s they were suggesting that women's positions were based solely their own merit.

Often, the *Citizen* encouraged collectivism by reminding women that structural barriers prevented them from achieving full equality. In early years, the most frequently mentioned barrier was of course women's disenfranchisement; yet in the years following suffrage, the *Citizen* often made mention of continuing structural inequalities. In justifying the League of Women Voter's continued vigilance, its leaders reminded readers, "We have won political equality but we must not be so flushed with success that

we forget women are not yet on an equal footing with men in industry or the civil service” (*Woman Citizen*, Jan. 1, 1921, p. 848). Gradually, however, writers for the *Citizen* began to suggest that these structural impediments were diminishing or had been already overcome. One female architect, for example, acknowledged some discrimination in her line of work, but denied any systematic discrimination in the industry:

Once inside the profession a woman encounters very little prejudice. I remember at the outset of my career feeling heartbroken because I was not allowed to build a house for a relative. I thought at the time that it was only because I was a woman. Now I think that it was because I was so young. For every person who eliminates a woman as an architect because she is a woman--there is another person who employs her because she is a woman. The two balance. (*Woman Citizen*, July 14, 1923, p. 9)

Others suggested that women themselves were to blame for any disadvantage they may face. The *Citizen* reprinted the following interview without any critical commentary:

Dr. Marie Farnsworth, of New York University, believes, however, that where prejudice exists it is usually deserved. “A woman,” she explains, “is not as serious about her work. She is usually not willing to apply herself as long and patiently to study as chemistry requires.” (May 1930, p. 47)

By arguing that structural barriers to women’s full equality had been overcome, the *Citizen* squandered one of the primary ways to mobilize their readers.

### ***Equal Rights***

The *Equal Rights* data offer some surprising results. Rather than a more gradual individualization during the 1920s, as was the case with the *Woman Citizen*, the journal

rapidly individualized in the immediate aftermath of suffrage, falling from a score of 1.33 in the spring of 1920 to -0.31 the following fall. Again, this figure may reflect in part the small sample size in 1920-21 (an average of 11 articles per quarter). Yet unlike in the case of perceptions of the opportunity structure, in which the journal simply ceased discussing it in the limited space in 1920-21, here the writers actively adopted stronger individualist rhetoric. In other words, the rapid shift in this index is not merely the result of a lack of collectivist rhetoric, but also an increase in individualist rhetoric. When the journal resumed publication in 1923, however, the level of collectivism matched—and even exceeded—much of the pre-suffrage levels. While this rate decreased gradually over the course of the decade, it consistently remained in the positive range, indicating higher levels of collectivism than individualism.

Findings from the qualitative content analysis support and contextualize these enumerative findings. As was the case with the *Woman Citizen*, *Equal Rights* commonly encouraged sex-based solidarity, employing terms such as “sisters,” “fellow suffragists,” and later appropriated the newly coined term “Feminist” to identify activists in the post-suffrage period. Writers often invoked the metaphor, “in union there is strength,” to remind readers of the necessity of identifying with the suffrage (and later feminist) cause. The following writer, for example, encouraged: “Let all women stand together as sisters, shoulder to shoulder, in one great united effort. Then will we realize our goal. ‘In Union There is Strength’” (*Equal Rights*, Oct. 17, 1914, p. 7). Yet unlike the *Woman Citizen*, *Equal Rights* continued to promote sex-based solidarity in the post-suffrage years:

She soon realizes that she alone cannot remake the world into a fair and just place for her to work in. That is when she becomes a Feminist--when she knows

that she must unite with other women to destroy forever the barriers which have stopped or delayed her progress. (*Equal Rights*, Aug. 27, 1927, p. 228)

This and other similar passages reminded readers that the struggle for women's equality was far from over, and only a collective movement could bring about such reforms.

In a similar vein, the journal encouraged women not only to identify with the cause, but actively work toward its achievement. Pleas of this sort ranged from urging readers to donate financially to the journal and the National Woman's Party (even designating a "Self-Sacrifice Day" for financial donations (see *Equal Rights*, Aug. 22, 1914)) to reminding the women of enfranchised states to continue working for the suffrage cause: "Use your power, now that you have it. Make known your demand, if you wish to help other women" (*Equal Rights*, Apr. 2, 1916, p. 9). Elsewhere, even drawing on the revolutionary rhetoric of the *Communist Manifesto*, the journal exclaimed: "Women of these states unite! We have only our chains to lose, and a whole nation to gain" (*Equal Rights*, Oct. 4, 1916, p. 9). *Equal Rights* also frequently highlighted the contributions of individual women who had sacrificed for the cause, perhaps no one as much as Inez Milholland, who died while campaigning for suffrage. While her cause of death was officially ruled an anemic deficiency, the journal suggested to readers that she died from over-exhaustion, literally giving her life to the suffrage cause:

In the cause of equal suffrage, [Inez Milholland] worked until she died--laboring with an earnestness, enthusiasm and intensity that exhausted even her superb vitality. She gave all she had to the cause, and having given all else, at last she gave her life. (*Equal Rights*, Dec. 9, 1916, p. 10)

After suffrage, the encouragement for collective efforts continued. The journal often argued that women in privileged positions (as many of its readers were) had an obligation



to work for the Equal Rights Amendment on behalf of those less fortunate: "We are working for the working woman, for the weak woman, for the burdened woman" (*Equal Rights*, Sep. 1, 1923, p. 231). And unlike the *Woman Citizen* which in its later years resorted to appeals to individual self-interest to motivate women, *Equal Rights* unequivocally promoted feminist activism for the greater good, arguing for example: "Those who would join in the pilgrimage towards Equal Rights must leave behind ambition, self-interest, and egotism" (*Equal Rights*, Aug. 4, 1923, p. 194).

In part, *Equal Rights* was able to maintain a high level of collectivism because it acknowledged continuing structural barriers to women's equality. Women's disenfranchisement was not surprisingly the most frequently mentioned form of structural inequality in the pre-suffrage period, but at times *Equal Rights* noted more widespread problems. In the following passage, for example, the author recounts an allegory of a woman who petitions her local judge for the right to vote:

The judge was sorry for Jane, for he thought Jane was a mighty attractive woman, and a smart woman too, in spite of her queer ideas, so he talked to some of the men in the county and they clubbed together and bought Jane a nice little Kentucky pedestal. The judge made a splendid speech and Jane thanked them all and said she would try it, and she did, but she found it very tiresome climbing up and down so much. (*Equal Rights*, June 27, 1914, p. 8)

The author not only recognized the political inequalities faced by women, but also the more insidious and culturally-embedded forms of discrimination.

With the federal suffrage amendment ratified in 1920, the journal virtually ceased discussing structural inequalities until after it launched its campaign for an Equal Rights Amendment in 1923. The ERA was explicitly billed as legislation for the "removal of

discrimination against women" (*Equal Rights*, Feb. 17, 1923, p. 2), and the journal was direct about needing such legislation to overcome the remaining inequalities faced by women:

Women are now free in the narrow political sense, they may cast their ballots and if they have the wisdom, exert a profound influence of government affairs. But in the deeper meaning of the word Liberty they are still in much the same position as they were before the suffrage bill passed. (*Equal Rights*, Feb. 2, 1923, p. 8)

Because the ERA remained a central focus for NWP throughout the 1920s, the journal continued justifying its need on the basis of continuing structural inequality faced by women.

Also in contrast to the *Citizen*, *Equal Rights* rarely addressed issues of self-esteem, personal expression, or mental health. The only quarters in which issues related to the self comprised more than 10% of articles was in the 1920-21 period, in which the rate climbed to as high as 75% of articles. Articles in this period ranged from discussing the liberatory potential of art which gives women an outlet for emotional expression (see *Equal Rights*, May 1920, p. 62), to the mental health problems faced by the "modern housewife" (see *Equal Rights*, Jan/Feb. 1921, p. 359). Elsewhere, the journal touted fashion as a means to express oneself:

But the modern tendency is marked, and it will continue in spite of all the resistance that its various enemies can devise. This tendency is to recognize dress as an art, and one of the greatest arts, for its province is that of liberating the expression of individuality. (*Equal Rights*, Jan/Feb. 1921, p. 354)

When *Equal Rights* resumed publication in 1923, however, mention of such issues virtually ceased. At a time when the *Citizen* became increasingly focused "the self,"

*Equal Rights* turned their attention almost exclusively to the collective position of women.

These findings present a challenge to the claims made by NSMT. Clearly individualistic rhetoric is not a characteristic unique to recent social movements, as shown in the post-suffrage period of the feminist movement. In the 1920s *Woman Citizen* articles contained a high level of individualistic rhetoric, and this transition to individualism was tightly coupled with a negative shift in perceptions of political opportunities, suggesting that the movement had increasing difficulty inspiring collective mobilization as political opportunities atrophied. *Equal Rights*, by contrast, held considerably more positive perceptions of the POS throughout the 1920s, largely because of their focus on the international arena, an area in which organized feminism was faring much better. Consequently, their rates of collectivism remained considerably higher during this period than that of the *Woman Citizen*.

The exception to this pattern occurred in 1920-21, during which *Equal Rights* rapidly individualized. Contrary to the *Citizen*, individualization in this case may have resulted from success rather than defeat. As discussed above, NWP focused exclusively on the vote; once the suffrage amendment was ratified in 1920, the organization had no alternate agenda until it launched its campaign for the ERA in 1923. In other words, winning the vote represented a partial victory for NAWSA, while it constituted a total victory for NWP. Drawing on previous research that finds some opposition can actually be healthy for social movements (Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone 2003; Meyer 1993; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Santoro and Townsend 2006; Staggenborg 1991; Werum and

Winders 2001), these data similarly suggest that individualization, like depoliticization, may result from both defeats and success.

### ***Correlations***

Table 4.8 presents correlation coefficients between the rates of collectivism and select independent variables (lagged one year) for the *Woman Citizen* and *Equal Rights*. See Appendix C for full table of correlations.

Most measures of *political instability* are significantly correlated with individualization, and the relationship occurs in the hypothesized direction. That is, as the political environment became more stable by returning to two-party rule, with low turnover and wide margins of victory for political candidates, the movement's frames became more individualistic.

On the other hand, the presence of *political allies* shows low or negative correlations with use of collectivism, contrary to my hypothesis. Presidential support for women's rights has little to no relationship with movement collectivism, and the passage of Prohibition is actually negatively correlated with collectivism.

I again find little support for the *cultural contradictions* hypothesis. As expected, World War I has a positive and significant relationship with collectivism (particularly for the *Woman Citizen*), but the correlation coefficients are relatively small.

**Table 4.8: Correlation Coefficients between Collectivism and Select Independent Variables**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables	Correlation Coefficients		
		<i>Woman Citizen</i>	<i>Equal Rights</i>	<i>Combined</i>
1. During periods of <b>political instability</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Percent of congressional seats held by third parties	0.2635*	0.4694*	0.3097*
	Margin of victory for congressional candidates	-0.5598*	-0.6982*	-0.5410*
	Number of Congressional House seats that change party	0.2455*	0.0323	0.1658*
3. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Presidential support for women's rights (% of words in State of Union in support of women's rights)	0.0521	0.0406	0.0526
	Prohibition (1=1919-1930)	-0.7635*	-0.5104*	-0.6192*
4. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Rates of women's employment in the arts, media, and clergy	0.8949*	0.3890*	0.6861*
	Media coverage of the women's movement	<i>NY Times</i> index 0.6525*	0.3356*	0.5087*
		<i>Reader's Guide</i> 0.4038*	0.3147*	0.3402*
6. During periods of <b>cultural stability</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Red Scare (1=1923-30)	-0.8576*	-0.2310	-0.6028*
7. During periods of <b>contradiction between cultural values and conventional social practices</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	World War I (1=1917=1918)	0.2554*	0.1800	0.2202*
12. During periods of increasing <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Perceptions of political opportunities	0.6277*	-0.0151	0.3882*
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities	0.5281*	-0.0337	0.3625*
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities	0.6820*	0.0205	0.4530*
	Perceptions of global opportunities	0.1974	-0.0383	0.1648*

<b>14.</b> During periods of increasing <b>global opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Number of countries passing full women's suffrage measures	-0.8560*	-0.4660*	-0.6730*
	Rate of political party competition across countries	-0.5042*	-0.3486*	-0.4030*
	Rate of political participation across countries	-0.8513*	-0.4982*	-0.6794*
<i>Social Movement Success</i>	19 <sup>th</sup> Amendment (1=1920)	0.0386	-0.6922*	-0.1644*
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>		<b>11</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>		<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>

\* p<.05

*Note:* All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).

All measures of *cultural allies* have significant positive correlations with collectivism for both journals, as expected. Women's employment in cultural occupations is highly correlated with collectivism in the *Woman Citizen* ( $r = 0.89$ ), and slightly less correlated for *Equal Rights* ( $r = 0.39$ ). Media coverage of the movement is also positively correlated with higher rates of collectivism ( $r$  ranges from 0.31 to 0.65).

Also as expected, *cultural instability* –in this case the Red Scare – has a significant negative relationship with collectivism in the *Woman Citizen* ( $r = -0.86$ ), but no significant relationship with *Equal Rights*. As discussed above, this finding is not particularly surprising, as *Equal Rights* and the National Woman's Party were able to avoid the red-baiting that so severely hindered Progressive feminist organizing.

*Perceptions of opportunities* produce mixed findings. Generally, rates of collectivism in the *Woman Citizen* are moderately to highly correlated with positive perceptions of opportunities (especially political and domestic opportunities, with correlation coefficients between 0.63 and 0.68). The same is not true of *Equal Rights*, however, for which perceptions of opportunities and rates of collectivism are almost entirely uncorrelated. This may be an effect of the anomalous period between 1920 and 1921, in which the movement demobilized following the suffrage victory. These bivariate correlations also do not take into account the complex interrelationships between domestic and global opportunities, which the qualitative data suggest are significant developments for *Equal Rights* in the 1920s.

Across the board, objective *global opportunities* do not conform to the hypotheses. As women gained voting rights, and as political competition and participation more generally increased, both journals became more individualist.

However, as discussed above, this may potentially be the result of poor quantitative measures. The global factors highlighted by historians, sociologists, and the journals themselves as having a significant impact on the movement are not easily quantified, and thus are not captured in this analysis (see Berkovitch 1999b; Joachim 1999; Joachim 2007; Meyer 1999; Stienstra 1994). Of course, this may also suggest that the movement was not particularly affected by global events and changes.

Finally, the *suffrage victory* with the ratification of the 19<sup>th</sup> amendment affected the two journals differently, in line with the qualitative findings presented above. It had virtually no relationship with collectivism in the *Woman Citizen*, but shows a significant negative correlation with collectivism in *Equal Rights* ( $r = -0.69$ ). Again, qualitative and historical data suggest this is likely an effect of the single-issue focus of the National Woman's Party, which resulted in immediate individualization in 1920-21, following the fulfillment of the organization's agenda. By contrast, the multi-issue agenda of NAWSA (and the *Woman Citizen*) allowed the organization to remain mobilized around ongoing campaigns.

## V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

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We can draw a number of conclusions from the data presented here. Most obvious, perhaps, is the weak explanatory power of NSMT in accounting for the rise of an individualized, depoliticized, and consensus-oriented feminist movement. Because first-wave feminism, a movement at the height of the industrial era, showed clear signs of these three characteristics, it becomes difficult to attribute them—at least solely—to postwar rationalization (Habermas 1973), the growth of the middle class (Inglehart 1977;



1990), or post-industrialism (Touraine 1988). Yet does PPT offer a better account of these trends? With some qualifications, the answer appears to be yes.

The *Woman Citizen* shows clear signs of individualization and turning to consensus tactics within one year of perceptions of decreasing political opportunities. While political opportunities clearly had an impact on the tactics and frames used by the *Woman Citizen*, when used alone the POS offers less explanatory power for the shift in the journal's goals. The conservative backlash against suffrage, the indifference of the younger generation to feminist goals, and the first Red Scare presented serious obstacles to Progressive feminism, but these developments tend to be overlooked when considering strictly political opportunities. Cultural opportunities, considered together with political opportunities, offer a better explanation for the change in the movement's focus from political to cultural issues in the mid-1920s. Only when the movement faced soundly negative opportunity structures, in *both* the political and cultural realms, did it depoliticize. This is in many ways a logical finding; because goals are more central to a movement than its strategy, and by definition are broader and oriented towards long-term gains, a movement should be unlikely to relinquish its original goals until after both political and cultural opportunities have been thoroughly exhausted.

The data from *Equal Rights* offer some unexpected results. First, this branch of the movement rapidly individualized, depoliticized, and turned to consensus tactics immediately after winning suffrage in 1920. Yet drawing on research by Staggenborg (1991) and others, we can explain this brief trend as a consequence of a total victory in winning suffrage. These findings suggest that the relationship between the movements and its opportunity structure is curvilinear, such that crushing defeats *and* total success

demobilizes a movement, while partial victories mobilize activists. Because the NWP failed to articulate an alternate agenda in the year after suffrage, winning the vote constituted a total success. When the organization launched its ERA campaign in 1923, we see a return to pre-suffrage levels of collectivism, politicization, and use of conflict tactics.

The second surprising result concerns *Equal Rights'* unexpectedly high levels of collectivism and politicization (compared to *Woman Citizen*) in the later 1920s. We can explain this trend in part through the generally more positive COS enjoyed by the liberal branch of the movement. As discussed above, the NWP largely escaped the Red Scare persecution that plagued the Progressive branch, and as a result *Equal Rights* maintained more positive perceptions of the COS. Distinguishing between domestic- and global-level opportunities can also shed light on these discrepancies. *Equal Rights* was considerably more focused on international issues than *Woman Citizen* in the late 1920s. This difference in focus is significant because international feminism fared much better in the late 1920s than American feminism. While both journals had similar perceptions about the domestic opportunity structure, *Equal Rights* offered a much more positive assessment about global opportunities for success. Distinguishing between the domestic and global opportunity structure is important, then, particularly for movements that become more embedded in global structures and processes. *Equal Rights'* focus on the generally positive international arena, as well as its enjoyment of a more positive domestic COS, allowed it to maintain fairly high levels of collectivism and continue advocating its political agenda throughout the 1920s.

Finally, an examination of correlations between the three dependent variables and various types of movement opportunities provides another way of assessing these relationships, albeit in a rather basic sense. Generally, measures of political instability, World War I, the presence of cultural allies, and the Red Scare are moderately to highly correlated with consensus tactics, depoliticization, and individualization trends. By contrast, the presence of political allies and objective global opportunities either have low correlations with the dependent variables, or the relationship does not occur in the expected direction.

In most cases, perceptions of opportunities are significantly correlated with changes in goals, tactics, and rhetoric. A few exceptions to this pattern stand out. First, perceptions of global opportunities are not particularly well correlated with any of the dependent variables, despite the historical and qualitative findings presented above. Second, *Equal Rights'* perceptions of opportunities—domestic and global, as well as political and cultural—are also not well correlated with movement outcomes. Again, this may be a reflection of the single-issue focus of NWP, leading to demobilization in the 2 years after suffrage. For instance, when examining only 1913-1919 and 1923-1930 (i.e., removing the anomalous period of 1920-23), correlations between levels of collectivism and perceptions of opportunities range from 0.30 to 0.40, much higher than when including the years following suffrage. These findings reinforce the qualitative data that suggest the single-issue focus of the National Woman's Party and *Equal Rights* made the organization susceptible to defeat as well as the victory in 1920.

## **CHAPTER 5: SECOND-WAVE FEMINISM**

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As the previous chapter demonstrated, the first wave of the women's movement strongly and consistently exhibited characteristics of "new" social movements—including the use of individualist rhetoric, the employment of consensus tactics, and the adoption of cultural goals—but only after it experienced a significant decline in its political and cultural opportunities for mobilization in the 1920s. The second wave of the movement offers another opportunity to evaluate claims made by NSMT and PPT. However, unlike the first and third waves of the women's movement, which NSMT scholars have unequivocally characterized as "old" and "new" movements, respectively, there exists disagreement with regard to the second wave, which has been characterized by some as a new social movement (e.g., Byrne 1996; Taylor and Whittier 1992), and by others as an "old" movement (e.g., Lotz 2003). In either case, according to NSMT we should expect to see the second wave exhibit consistent levels of "new" or "old" movement characteristics, respectively. Alternately, I ask whether the movement fluctuated in its use of conflict and consensus tactics, political and cultural goals, and collectivist and individualist frames, and whether such fluctuations correspond to variation in the opportunity structure.

Here, as in the previous chapter, I provide an overview of this wave of the movement, focusing specifically on the makeup of the opportunity structure. Given the bias in historical and social movement literatures on the movement's emergence and peak, scholars have documented this period extensively, including the effects of the opportunity structure on this emergent stage of the movement (see for example, Buechler 1990; Costain 1992; Klein 1984). I make use of these sources to provide necessary

context for the emergence second-wave feminism. I draw on the few secondary sources available to measure changes in the political and cultural environments during the decline of the movement, supplemented with primary data where gaps exist. I then document changes in the movement's framing, tactics, and goals between 1970 and 1985, and examine whether the fluctuations in the opportunity structures can explain these trends. Finally, I present correlation coefficients between these dependent variables and select independent variables. Again, because of the relatively small sample size (16 years for *off our backs* and 14 years for *Ms.*) and a lack of consistent quantitative data across all three historical periods, a more rigorous multivariate test of my hypotheses is unfeasible. However, in presenting bivariate correlations and their significance levels, I seek to triangulate the qualitative and descriptive findings.

In short, the findings presented here lend credence to the PPT hypothesis that movements turn to consensus tactics, cultural goals, and individualist frames when political and cultural opportunity structures atrophy. Many of the same problems and prospects that faced the first wave were present in the second wave as well. Specifically, I find that declining opportunities sometimes – but not always – lead to movement decline. Just as the liberal branch of the first wave maintained high levels of collectivism and politicization despite domestic hostility in the later 1920s, the radical branch of the second wave also maintained high levels of collectivism and politicization in the 1980s. In both cases, domestic constraints were offset by a favorable global opportunity structure. In other words, some degree of hostility can encourage movement mobilization, but only when coupled with positive opportunities elsewhere.

## I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

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### A. EMERGENCE

In July 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, a landmark piece of legislation designed to bar racial discrimination. In an effort to defeat the legislation, Sen. Howard Smith amended the bill just prior to passage to prohibit discrimination on account of sex as well.<sup>26</sup> The bill passed nevertheless, but it soon became apparent that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, charged with enforcing the provisions of the bill, would not treat the sex provision seriously. Frustrated with the EEOC's lack of action, a small pro-feminist contingent began agitating for an "NAACP for women." In 1966, the National Organization for Women was founded, and within a year it had grown into a broadly focused liberal feminist organization agitating for women's rights in politics, employment, and education (Buechler 1990).

Disappointed with NOW's focus on incremental legal reform as well as the sexism of New Left, a growing number of women began identifying and organizing as radical feminists. Radical feminist groups proliferated around the country in cities such as Chicago, New York, Washington D.C., Boston, Cleveland, and San Francisco (Echols 1989). While NOW generally worked behind the scenes to implement reform measures, radical feminists borrowed attention-grabbing tactics from the New Left. Perhaps their most infamous stunt was staging a theatrical protest outside the 1968 Miss America pageant. They crowned a live sheep Miss America in a mock pageant, and created a

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<sup>26</sup> Rupp and Taylor (1989), however, offer an alternative explanation. They argue that this popular interpretation downplays the efforts of the National Woman's Party in the process, who had lobbied extensively for the inclusion of a sex provision, and overlooks Senator Smith's longtime support of (white) women's rights.

“freedom can” into which they threw artifacts of women’s oppression (such as high heeled shoes, mascara, and bras).<sup>27</sup> The enormous media attention that the protest garnered launched radical feminism onto a national stage (Freeman 1975).

Neither liberal nor radical feminism emerged spontaneously. To some degree, both were aided by their ties to previous social movements. Radical feminists, many of whom had been involved in the Civil Rights and New Left movements, learned techniques for attracting media attention and connected easily with other feminists through these pre-existing networks (Freeman 1983). Liberal feminism similarly benefited from the ongoing efforts of the National Woman’s Party throughout the 1940s and 1950s. NWP provided crucial resources to liberal feminists—NOW in particular—including a preexisting network of feminists and political allies that facilitated their agenda. Four of the ten individuals who signed NOW’s original statement of purpose, for example, were members of NWP. Through the efforts of NWP, liberal feminists were also handed a well-developed repertoire of goals and tactics. While the Equal Rights Amendment is most closely associated with the second wave, the NWP had been campaigning for the amendment for nearly 45 years when NOW endorsed it in 1967. NOW also adopted many of the tactics of NWP, including lobbying, letter writing campaigns, and pressuring political parties (Freeman 1983; Taylor 1989). These resources that had been cultivated by National Women’s Party and others social movements of the 1960s jumpstarted the second wave of the movement when the opportunity structure again became conducive to organized feminism (Rupp and Taylor 1987; Taylor 1989).

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<sup>27</sup> Incidentally, a proposal to burn the can’s contents was overruled by local police, but the media nevertheless ran stories of “bra-burning feminists,” an image that plagued feminists long after the 1968 protest.

*THE STRUCTURE OF OPPORTUNITIES, POST-WWII TO 1960s*

***Political Opportunity Structure.*** Just as the political and cultural structures provided openings for the first wave of the movement, a similar set of circumstances arrayed to produce a climate conducive to a feminist revival in the early 1960s. Like the political shakeup in the late 1910s, political alignments began shifting again in the 1960s with the dissolution of the New Deal electoral coalition. Neither political party had a solid majority support, forcing them to look to untapped blocs of voters. This electoral shift has been a well-documented contributor to the Civil Rights movement (see for example, McAdam 1982; Piven and Cloward 1977), and worked similarly for the women's movement, as politicians began seriously courting women voters for the first time since the early 1920s (Costain 1992). Eisenhower, having made campaign promises to organized women's groups, was elected to two terms in the White House with a sizeable gender gap (winning 58% of the female vote in 1952, and 61% in 1956). Among his concessions to women's interests was his endorsement of the Equal Rights Amendment, a pledge to support an equal pay bill in his 1956 State of the Union address, and his appointment of over 400 women to government posts (*ibid.*).

The gender gap enjoyed by Eisenhower did not materialize in the 1960 election, however, and having been elected by only a slim margin, Kennedy immediately recognized the need to court women voters. Esther Peterson, the director of the Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor, proposed the formation of a Presidential Commission on the Status of Women in an attempt to appeal to two constituencies. She argued that the commission would build support among women's groups, while at the



same time co-opting the ERA campaign, which was opposed by organized labor. In the end, the commission not only failed to thwart the burgeoning ERA campaign, but also played a significant role in contributing to the emergence of a full-fledged feminist movement. The mere presence of the commission signaled to women's groups that the executive branch was willing to take seriously their concerns (Costain 1992). More importantly, perhaps, by advocating the addition of sex to other categories covered by the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the commission reconciled the long-standing feud between Progressive feminists seeking protective labor legislation and liberal feminists campaigning for the ERA. In doing so, the courts quickly overturned protective labor laws even in the absence of an ERA, and the issue that had so long divided feminist ranks was no longer a problem (*ibid.*).


A significant gender voting gap emerged again in the 1964 election of Johnson, due in large part to the perception among women that Goldwater was a hawk candidate while Johnson was a dove candidate (Sochen 1973). While their belief in Johnson as peacemaker was ultimately misguided, he did more to further feminist causes than perhaps any previous president. The 1964 Civil Rights Act passed under Johnson's watch reinforced the political progress laid during Kennedy's administration, including the appointment of the Commission on the Status of Women and the Equal Pay Act. Johnson also outstripped his predecessors in the numbers of women appointed to government positions. Declaring that "a woman's place is not only in the home, but in the House, Senate and throughout government service," he appointed 730 women into jobs paying more than \$10,000 in just his first year (quoted in Sochen 1973: 248).

The legislative branch also indicated its willingness to address women's concerns by the early 1960s. Costain (1992) found that the number of bills introduced by members of the eighty-seventh Congress in 1961 nearly doubled those of the previous Congress, including ERA introductions, equal pay bills, and legislation to protect the health benefits of married female federal employees. She contends that the activity in the legislative and executive branches fed off of each other, as both the president and legislators "sensed that politically the women's hour was approaching" (*ibid.*: 38). The Equal Pay Act of 1963 was particularly significant, as the first piece of legislation passed in over twenty years that extended the rights of women. While neither the Equal Pay Act nor the Civil Rights Act had much substantive effect on women's wages and employment, they "represented a significant first step toward winning the government's commitment to eliminating gender-based discrimination [...and] focused attention on women's issues and brought together women from government, labor, and women's organizations" (Rupp and Taylor 1987: 176).

A final source of political opportunities for the burgeoning women's movement was the increase of women in elected office and other government positions, or what Freeman (2000) has labeled "woodwork feminists." After the publication of *The Feminine Mystique*, Betty Friedan was urged to formally organize a group representing women's interests by many of these political insiders, including Richard Graham and Sonia Pressman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Mary Eastwood of the Justice Department, and Catherine East of the Citizen's Advisory Council on the Status of Women. Feminist members of Congress were also quietly working to amass support for their legislative agenda, including Martha Griffiths (D-MI), Katharine St.

George (R-NY), Edith Green (D-OR), and Margaret Heckler (R-MA). While these “woodwork feminists” had been working behind the scenes on women’s issues for years, with the emergence of a mass movement they were able to begin making public challenges (*ibid.*). In interviews with congressional staff and feminist activists, for example, Costain (1992) found frequent mention of political insiders giving information and support to feminist groups. She argues, “These types of under-the-table assistance frequently allowed organized women’s groups to achieve a political impact much more quickly than would otherwise have been possible” ( 40).

**Figure 5.1: Percent Women in Political Positions, 1970-1985**



Source: Center for American Women in Politics 2009a; United States Senate Historical Office 2009a; U.S. House of Representatives Office of the Clerk 2007

Figure 5.1 shows changes in the percentage of women in political positions between 1970-1985. While their overall percentages remain small, there is a noticeable increase in women’s representation in the U.S. House and Senate in the mid-1970s. The numbers of women holding seats in Congress and as state governors all decrease in the late-1970s, although U.S. representatives and governors both increase again in the 1980s. The election of women to public office and appointment of women to government positions in the late 1960s and early 1970s played an important symbolic function by

challenging appropriate political roles for women, as well as making a direct and practical contribution to women's groups.

*Cultural Opportunity Structure.* At the same time that the political structure began opening to the women's movement, cultural opportunities facilitated it as well. A number of sociodemographic trends in the mid-1960s mirrored those of the 1910s and early 1920s. Fertility and marital rates were declining, women's participation in the paid labor market increased, and the numbers of women attaining college degrees rose (Buechler 1990; Klein 1984). Like the "new woman" of the 1910s, these changes in the labor force and in private households undermined the prevailing gender ideology in the 1950s that sought to keep (white, middle-class) women in the home.

Coupled with these sociodemographic changes, the Presidential Commission on the Status of Women publicized many of the problems women faced on the job, making their personal experiences political. Costain (1992: 41) argues: "These difficulties, which had seemed individual and inevitable, such as lower wages than men, sexual harassment on the job, and inadequate day care for the children of working mothers, came to be seen as patterns amenable to change through government action." Thus, not only did women come to recognize that their personal experiences with sex-based discrimination were part of a larger pattern among American women, but they also began to lay responsibility for its remedy with the government.

## **B. PEAK AND DECLINE**

By many measures, the peak of the second wave came in the mid-1970s, shortly after the USSC *Roe v. Wade* (1973) decision legalized abortion and as the campaign for

the Equal Rights Amendment was picking up speed. The number of protests skyrocketed during this year, as did government-initiated events (Costain 1992). Costain finds that the ERA eclipsed all other issues on the feminist agenda during the 1970s, and as the women's movement became tied exclusively to this issue, its "fortunes [...] seemed to rise and fall along with the ERA during [the 1970s]" (1992: 79). The sudden growth of the movement in the mid-1970s can be attributed in part to the particular makeup of the opportunity structure, which facilitated the women's movement in a number of ways. Yet as Tarrow (1998) points out, the opportunity structure is a "fickle friend," shifting easily from challengers to opponents, a lesson that feminists ultimately learned.

*THE STRUCTURE OF OPPORTUNITIES, 1970-1985*

***Political Opportunity Structure.*** Both executive and legislative branches were strongly supportive of women's equality issues in the 1970s. President Ford frequently expressed his support for the ERA in the early days of his presidency, issuing Presidential Proclamation 4383: "In this Land of the Free, it is right, and by nature it ought to be, that all men and all women are equal before the law" (Public Papers of the President 1975). He was also an outspoken supporter of federal affirmative action policies and stronger enforcement of existing policies. Betty Ford also actively campaigned for the ERA, making it one of "her issues" during her tenure as first lady (Costain 1992).

Ford's public support of the ERA became more cautious after faced with a serious challenge for his party's presidential nomination from Ronald Reagan in 1976, marking the beginning of the Republican Party's retreat from gender equality issues. Yet Carter's presidency from 1976 to 1980 temporarily staved off this opposition. Costain argues that

Carter's term was "characterized by an unprecedented level of presidential commitment to equality for women" (1992: 93), in part because unlike his predecessors who supported women's issues largely to curry favor with women voters, Carter's support stemmed from his concern for human rights more broadly, a cornerstone of his presidency. Carter met every few weeks with women's groups and lobbied extensively on their behalf for the ERA, including offering frequent public remarks in support of the amendment, calling legislators and governors to request their support, and coordinating pro-ERA campaigns.

Ultimately the political opportunities provided by Carter's enthusiastic support for the ERA - and women's issues more generally - could not be sustained. His defeat for reelection in 1980 by conservative and outspoken ERA opponent Ronald Reagan changed the tide for the women's movement. Unlike Carter's work on women's issues, which he linked to his central campaign for human rights, these issues were peripheral at best to Reagan's presidency. He appointed a Task Force on Legal Equality for Women to find and root out instances of sex-based discrimination in federal laws; however women's groups such as NOW denounced the task force as an attempt to co-opt and derail the ERA campaign.<sup>28</sup> When questioned about his record on women's rights, Reagan frequently promoted his appointment of Sandra Day O'Connor to the Supreme Court as evidence of his commitment to women, although this too was dismissed by women's groups as little more than a token gesture (Costain 1992). Indeed the number of female appointees decreased substantially under Reagan. Female judicial appointments fell from 15 percent under Carter to 8 percent under Reagan; the number of women appointed to

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<sup>28</sup> Reagan himself referred to the task force as an ER (equal rights) project without the A (amendment) (Costain 1992).

White House staff fell from 123 to 62<sup>29</sup>; and Reagan became the first president in more than a decade to appoint fewer women requiring Senate confirmation than his predecessor. “Known feminists” were purged from Reagan’s administration, such as Leslie Wolf, director of the Women’s Educational Equity Act program, who despite her stellar civil service record, was replaced by Charles Heatherly of the Heritage Foundation (Faludi 1991).

While Reagan’s commitment to issues of women’s equality was weak, his stance on abortion rights was openly hostile. He publicly urged the reversal of *Roe v. Wade*, and took a number of steps to undercut abortion rights, including endorsing the Hyde amendments to bar federal funding of abortions and denying foreign aid to family planning clinics that provided abortion services. And while he denied using a “litmus test” in making federal judicial appointments, his nominees for the Supreme Court—including Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia—began to chip away at *Roe*.

The 1989 *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services* decision, which upheld states’ rights to impose restrictions on abortion, was a significant setback to the pro-choice movement. Two years later, the Court upheld the federal government’s right to withhold funds from women’s health clinics that so much as discussed abortion with patients. The backlash against reproductive rights was evident outside the federal government as well. The American Bar Association voted to withdraw its pro-choice endorsement in 1990, and various moderate religious denominations—once pro-choice supporters—retreated from their positions throughout the 1980s (Faludi 1991). A group of doctors in 1982 drafted a “fetal declaration of independence,” according the same rights to the fetus as

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<sup>29</sup> And, in fact, this gap is understated, as Reagan reclassified many low-ranking government jobs as “political appointments” (*ibid.*)

any other patient. Politicians followed suit with a series of laws designed to protect the rights of the fetus, most notably state and federal campaigns to apply child abuse laws to negligent mothers. Recognizing an opportunity to demote the female workers they had been pressured by the EEOC to hire in the previous decade, a number of large corporations jumped on the “fetal protection” bandwagon by adopting policies that would ban women from traditionally male (i.e., higher paying) jobs that involved exposure to chemicals or radiation that could cause harm to a fetus. (Interestingly, neither the federal government nor corporate leaders sought to limit women’s work in traditionally female occupations that might pose reproductive risk—such as garment sweatshops, dry cleaners, and beauty parlors.) In other words, the antiabortion backlash had moved from protecting fetuses to protecting *potential* fetuses (*ibid.*).


The closing of the political opportunity structure begun during Reagan’s administration continued under George H.W. Bush’s presidency. He vetoed congressional bills that would have strengthened anti-discrimination laws and provide publicly funded abortions to poor women. He disapproved of proposed legislation regarding parental and child care issues. Bush’s appointment of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court was particularly troubling to feminist groups, given Thomas’ strong anti-abortion and anti-affirmative action stances and his personal history marred by accusations of sexual harassment.

The 1988 elections were disheartening to feminists for other reasons as well. The number of women running for elected office declined significantly, from the U.S. Congress to statewide races. The Women’s Campaign Fund, a bipartisan organization dedicated to putting women in office, had difficulty giving away donations. Those



women who did make it onto the ballot had a more difficult time getting elected in 1988 than in previous years. And despite recognizing a sizable gender voting gap, neither political party did much to court women voters. The GOP, for the first time since 1940, failed to endorse the ERA, and Republican leaders refused to even discuss abortion, birth control, and the ERA with journalists, dismissing them as trivial “women’s issues.” Their only nod to women voters was when Republican leaders told journalists that Dan Quayle would win their votes with his good looks. While the Republican party was working to drum up support among men, however, the Democrats failed to capitalize on women’s disenchantment with Republicans. Instead, Democratic candidates accepted the New Right agenda and worked to prove their own “pro-family” position. The Democratic Party announced that the ERA and abortion rights were too narrow for the party platform, and Dukakis omitted most references to women’s rights during his campaign speeches (Faludi 1991). Barbara Ehrenreich reported in *Ms.* that formerly pro-feminist politicians had rejected her pitch for a bill on women’s economic rights, telling her “We’re not doing ‘women’s issues’ anymore. We’re doing family issues” (quoted in Faludi 1991: 275).

**Figure 5.2: Presidential State of the Union Address**



Source: Public Papers of the President of the United States (1970-1985)

The content of the annual presidential State of the Union address offers a good enumerative measure of support for the movement among allies in the executive branch (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Figure 5.2 shows the amount of attention paid to women's issues in each speech, measured as the number of words addressing women's issues as a percentage of total words. No mention of women's issues was made until Carter offered brief endorsements of the ERA in 1977 and 1978. Carter's 1979 and 1980 speeches, however, focused heavily on women's issues as part of his broader civil rights and human rights agendas. In his 1980 speech, in fact, he offered 1,202 words on women's issues—by far the most in this sample period—though because the overall speech is longer (33,667 words), the percentage remains at only 3.5%. President Reagan, by contrast, devoted considerably less space in his speeches to women's issues, and the little mention he did make of such issues often referred to his token appointments of women to federal positions, such as his nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor to the Supreme Court.


The amount of federal funding allocated to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is one method of measuring whether the President is willing to put his money where his mouth is (literally speaking). As the agency charged with enforcing anti-discrimination employment laws, the level of funding received by the EEOC indirectly indicates an availability of resources for the women's movement (in that it facilitates women's hiring, promotion, and job security), as well as symbolically indicates federal priorities. Figure 5.3 shows changes in federal EEOC spending between 1970-1985.<sup>30</sup> Spending increased rather sharply in the first half of the 1970s, and while it slowed in the

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<sup>30</sup> Numbers are adjusted for inflation, measured in 2005 dollars. Inflation is calculated by the relative share of GDP Officer, Lawrence H. and Samuel H. Williamson. 2007, "Measures of Worth", Retrieved June 3, 2008, (MeasuringWorth.com).

second half of the decade, funding nevertheless continued to increase each year until 1981. This year marked the first time that funding actually decreased, and it continued to decline over the next few years. The material consequences of this decreased spending may not have been felt immediately (although I discuss women's employment patterns below), it did send a signal a less supportive political environment for feminist issues.

**Figure 5.3: EEOC funding**




Source: *Budget of the United States Government (1970-1985)*

Note: Funding adjusted for inflation, in 2005 dollars

Another commonly used indicator of political opportunity is the degree of stability of political alignments (Tarrow 1998). When partisan divisions are deeply entrenched, political parties often have stable bases of support; when those parties realign, however, they often scramble for new constituencies and become more willing to consider the demands of social movements. Here I operationalize political (in)stability in five ways: (1) the number of congressional seats that change political party; (2) the degree to which elections are closely contested; (3) the strength of the Conservative Coalition; (4) the degree to which legislative and executive branches support the same agenda; and (5) the size of the gender voting gap (Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Werum and Winders 2001).

First, the greatest amount of Congressional turnover during this period occurred in 1974, with 61 seats changing party (see Figure 5.4). The 1980 election also resulted in a high turnover of 53 seats, but the next two elections witnessed considerably fewer turnovers (35 seats in 1982 and 26 in 1984).

**Figure 5.4: Number of Congressional Seats that Changed Party, 1970-1985**



Source: Stanley and Niemi 2009d

A second measure of political stability is the degree to which elections are closely contested, since candidates who win by small margins are likely to seek out broader support. Presidential election results show considerable variation during this period. Richard Nixon squeaked out a victory in 1968 with a difference of only 0.7% of the popular vote, but defeated candidate George McGovern in the following election with a sound 23.2% majority. The 1976 presidential election was also fairly close, with Jimmy Carter winning by only 2.1%. Reagan, however, won by fairly wide margins in the next two elections, winning by 9.7% and 18.2% in 1980 and 1984, respectively. U.S. House races tell a slightly different story: candidates won by their most comfortable margins in the 1974 election (17% on average), but won by an average of only 2% in 1980.


These data offer fairly mixed results. The 1972 election suggests relative stability with regard to low levels of Congressional seat turnover and a substantial margin of

victory for the presidential candidate. Yet, House races were quite closely contested. The 1976 election also indicates relative stability, with a low level of Congressional turnover and fairly wide margins of victory for House candidates; but on the other hand, the presidential election was very closely contested. The 1980 election resulted in greater instability, both in terms of high Congressional seat turnover and closely contested House races, although the 1984 election was a particularly stable one, in terms of low congressional seat turnover as well as a large margin of victory for the presidential candidate.

A third measure of political stability concerns the strength of political coalitions, the most notable of which was the Conservative Coalition. Its strength is measured as a percentage of votes won among measures in which a majority of voting southern Democrats and a majority of voting Republicans—the Conservative Coalition—opposed the stand taken by a majority of voting northern Democrats. The Conservative Coalition constitutes both a general political constraint to movements, in that it contributed to greater political stability during its heyday, as well as an issue-specific political constraint for the women's movement, since it opposed many of the issues central to the women's movement, most notably abortion rights. Figure 5.5 shows that the Conservative Coalition during this period was at its weakest in the mid-1970s, winning in 1975 only 52% of their backed measures in the House and 48% in the Senate. The coalition regained much of its strength in the 1980s, however; in 1981, for example, they won 88% of their backed measure in the House and 95% in the Senate. Beginning in the early 1980s, then, the greater entrenchment of a political coalition—especially a coalition

opposing much of the feminist agenda—represents a closing of the political opportunity structure for the women’s movement.

**Figure 5.5: Conservative Coalition Victories**



Source: Stanley and Niemi 2001a

A fourth measure of the stability of political alignments is the degree to which the legislative and executive branches support the same agendas. We should expect that the more disagreement between the two branches would offer a positive opportunity to movements in that they would have multiple sites of access to the state (Werum and Winders 2001). The least overlap between the two branches occurred between 1973 and 1976, with Congress passing only 50-60% of the measures backed by the President. The late 1970s through 1985 showed fairly high overlap, peaking in 1981 with Congress passing 82.4% of the measures backed by the President. This greater degree of overlap in the late 1970s-1985 represents a closing of the general POS (as neither branch of the federal government would be likely looking for support from new constituencies); moreover, it represents a closing of the issue-specific POS for the women’s movement as well, as the president and majority party were conservative Republicans.

While the above four indicators of political instability represent general political opportunities (in that any social movement should theoretically benefit from such instability), I include a fifth measure of the gender voting gap for winning presidential candidates as an indicator of whether leaders will be likely to specifically turn to women voters during periods of instability. Richard Nixon won by nearly equal numbers of male and female voters in 1968 and enjoyed only slightly more support by male voters in the 1972 election. By contrast, Reagan was elected by a large majority of male voters in 1984, winning 64% of male voters and 55% of female voters – a nine point difference. As discussed above, the 1984 election was a relatively stable one (compared to previous years); even more, Reagan's base of support clearly lay with men, making him less likely to court women voters. And this, as it turned out, translated directly into open attacks on the abortion rights and ERA campaigns, reversing much of the progress made by organized feminism in the 1970s.

In short, the domestic political opportunity structure was turning soundly anti-feminist by the mid-1980s. The realignments that destabilized political coalitions in the early 1960s had stabilized again by most measures in the 1980s. This stabilization particularly disadvantaged women, as the Republican Party found a solid base of support among male voters. In all branches of government, politicians turned away from gender equality issues, evidenced by the string of anti-feminist legislation and court decisions, a lack of funding for existing anti-discrimination programs, and an overall decline of women in public office. This variation in the political opportunity structure over the course of the 1970s and 80s provides a good case study for exploring its effect on the women's movement's use of frames, tactics, and goals (see Table 5.1 below, reprinted

from full list of hypotheses in Table 2.1). In particular, it allows us to examine the effects of political instability (H1) and presence of political allies and opponents (H3) on the movement, as well as issue-specific opportunities (e.g., the rates of women in public office) and general opportunities (e.g., political instability) (H9-H10). I will take up these questions below, following additional discussion of the opportunity structure.

**Table 5.1: Partial List of Hypotheses and Measures**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables
<b>1.</b> During periods of <b>political stability</b> (political instability), the women's movement will be more likely to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>A.</b> Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</li> <li><b>B.</b> Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li><b>C.</b> Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	Third party strength Margin of victory for political candidates Number of congressional seats that change party Strength of political coalitions
<b>3.</b> During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>A.</b> Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</li> <li><b>B.</b> Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li><b>C.</b> Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	Presidential support for women's rights EEOC funding Rates of women in political positions

*Cultural Opportunity Structure.* As seen in the previous chapter, the cultural opportunity structure does not always follow in lock-step with the political opportunity structure.


While the POS was certainly closing for the women's movement by the early- to mid-1980s, we cannot assume that the COS followed. To what degree, then, did the cultural opportunity structure facilitate or impede second-wave feminism?

One basic indicator of the cultural opportunity structure that I include here is public opinion on two issues central to second-wave feminism: the percentage of Americans who "agree strongly" with "equality for women," and the percentage who believe abortion should be legal under any circumstances. Public opinion regarding women's equality peaked in 1978, with 38% of American supporting women's equality.



Although public opinion decreased after 1978, it nevertheless remained higher than the first part of the decade (American National Election Studies 2005). Public opinion regarding the legalization of abortion reached its peak in 1980, with 25% of the population supporting abortion rights under all circumstances. By 1985, however, this percentage decreased to 21%, the same rate as that in 1974 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006).

**Figure 5.6: Media Coverage of Women's Issues**



Sources: *New York Times* Index 1970-1985, Vanderbilt Television News Archive, 1970-1985

I also examine the extent of media coverage on the women's movement and women's issues more generally. As discussed in the previous chapter, the news media can serve as an influential ally for social movements by offering positive representation of the movement and its claims, or even simply deeming it significant enough to cover at all (but see Gitlin 1980; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Figure 5.6 shows the number of stories appearing in the *New York Times* database and Vanderbilt Television News archive that address feminism between 1970 and 1985. *New York Times* coverage peaked in 1975 with 651 articles, although it remained fairly high throughout the rest of the

sample period. Television news coverage peaked clearly in 1977 with 12 stories focusing on feminism, declining in the years following.


Susan Faludi (1991) argues that one of the best measures of women's social standing is their rates of paid employment, since a paycheck "can't help but mitigate women's secondary standing" ( 55). Yet while the numbers of women in the paid labor force has been increasing fairly steadily, she argues "the culture simply redoubles its resistance, if not by returning women to the kitchen, then by making the hours spent away from their stoves as inequitable and intolerable as possible: pushing women into the worst occupations, paying them the lowest wages, laying them off first and promoting them last, refusing to offer child care or family leave, and subjecting them to harassment" (*ibid*).

While the pay gap slowly but steadily improved in the 1970s, progress stalled – and by some measures reversed – in the 1980s. Full-time working women in 1986 made 64 cents to every dollar earned by men, worse than the preceding year and the same gap they faced in 1955. College-educated women fared even worse, earning 59 cents to the comparable male dollar. The pay gap was widest in the fields that saw an increase in women, such as food and service jobs. And where the pay gap narrowed, this progress was due more to men's falling wages than women's improved earnings.

One factor contributing to the gender pay gap was occupational segregation, which also worsened during the 1980s, despite the progress made in the decade prior. The numbers of women in pink-collar jobs—such as secretarial work, bookkeeping, salesclerking, cleaning services, and food preparation—climbed throughout the '80s, and in the traditionally male professions in which women did make inroads—including the

insurance and pharmaceutical industries—they did so only because men were leaving these fields after their pay and status had declined (*ibid*). As Figure 5.7 indicates, the mean proportion of women employed in all occupations rose steadily between 1970-1985. Women's employment in white-collar professional occupations, however, shows more variation. Their rates peaked in 1980, reaching near parity with men, but after 1980 for the first time their rates declined. In 1984, women comprised only 41% of professional workers.

**Figure 5.7: Women's Employment, 1970-1985**



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1970-1987)

Reports of sexual harassment and discrimination also jumped during the 1980s; complaints filed to the EEOC increased by 25 percent in the first half of the decade, and by 40 percent among federal employees. One of the biggest sex discrimination lawsuits was brought against Sears, Roebuck & Company after the EEOC had received hundreds of complaints against the corporation. In the end, the case was dismissed by a Reagan-appointed judge, who publicly questioned whether American women had ever faced employment discrimination (Faludi 1991).

Fertility rates among U.S. women provide another indicator of the cultural opportunity structure. Because childcare duties disproportionately fall to women, often negatively affecting their career opportunities, earnings, and time to devote to causes, we should expect that the lower the fertility rates, the greater the opportunities for feminist mobilization (Klein 1984). Birth rates have generally decreased since the 1960s, falling dramatically from 18.4 births per 1,000 women in 1970 to 14.8 births per 1,000 women in 1973. Yet beginning in 1976 fertility rates reverse, increasing to 16 births per 1,000 women in 1980.


The representation of women in popular culture offers another indicator of the cultural opportunity structure, both affected by and effecting broader cultural notions of appropriate gender roles. Hoping to capitalize on women's liberation, the film industry released a series of films in the 1970s that showcased single and successful career women. *My Brilliant Career* features a female character who turns down a marriage proposal in order to live her own life; Goldie Hawn's character in *Private Benjamin*, upon the death of her husband, enlists in the Army and pursues a career in Europe; and films such as *Diary of a Mad Housewife* and *A Woman Under the Influence* portray the strain faced by suburban housewives and depict madness as a reasonable form of feminist resistance to domestic inequality. The backlash of the 1980s, however, launched a new trend in filmmaking. Faludi writes, "it is as if Hollywood has taken the feminist films and run the reels backward" (1991: 126). Goldie Hawn shifts from the independent career woman in *Private Benjamin* to an uppity woman who learns her place during a bout of amnesia in *Overboard*. Perhaps most representative of this trend is 1987's *Fatal Attraction*. The film focuses on Alex Forrester, a single and successful career woman,

who, after a weekend fling with happily-married Dan Gallagher, continues to pursue him. While producers initially ended the film with Alex committing suicide over her unrequited love, focus groups found the ending disappointing. The film's ending was remade at the last minute with the wholesome wife Beth shooting the deranged Alex. The good housewife triumphed over the single woman (Faludi 1991).

Female actors were lucky if they could find roles at all in the late 1980s. The Screen Actors Guild reported that female film roles dropped sharply during this time, outranked two to one by male roles. Women had no better luck with television roles either, virtually disappearing from primetime programming. Situation comedies featured bachelors and single dads in shows like "My Two Dads" and "Full House." Of the 22 new primetime dramas in the 1987-88 season, only three included female leads (and only two of those featured adult women). The few shows that did feature strong female characters—such as "Roseanne" and "Murphy Brown"—were widely criticized by everyone from the mainstream press to Washington politicians. Perhaps the most iconic single career woman of the 1970s, Mary Tyler Moore, returned to television in 1986 in "Mary" as an unhappy divorcee in a dead-end job. Independent female characters were replaced by more "traditional" roles. *TV Guide* proclaimed that the in 1988 season, "Nesting will be a crucial theme..." (quoted in Faludi 1991: 152). Women were rushing to the altar and delivery rooms, on primetime shows such as "Cheers," "Designing Women," and "L.A. Law," to name only a few. The nesting syndrome was so pervasive, even, that the men on the "Cosby" show were fantasizing that they were pregnant (Faludi 1991; McEachern 1999; on the turn toward traditionalism in women's magazines, see

Peirce 1997; Schlenker, Caron, and Halteman 1998) (in comics, see Brabant and Mooney 1997).

**Figure 5.8: Oscar, Emmy, and Grammy Award Nominees, Percent Women, 1970-1985**



Sources: Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences Awards Database (2009); *Los Angeles Times* Emmy Awards Database (2009); Recording Academy GRAMMY Search Database (2009)

Even with traditionally feminine roles, female artists were much less likely to receive critical recognition for their work in the 1980s. I calculated the percentage of women nominated for Grammy, Emmy, and Academy Awards in the major non-gender specific categories as a measure of cultural consecration of female artists (see Chapter 3 for more detail regarding measurement issues). Figure 5.8 shows that women received the greatest critical recognition in film in 1976, comprising 15% of nominees in the major non-gender specific categories. In television, women's peak came in 1974 (19% of nominees), and in music women received the greatest critical recognition in 1973-75 and again in 1981 and 1984. In the late 1970s and 80s, however, women were generally less likely to be nominated for Oscar and Emmy Awards in comparison to the mid-1970s.

And with the exception of a brief comeback in 1984, female musicians were also much less likely to receive Grammy nominations in the 1980s.

Others have looked to the fashion and beauty industries to gauge women's social standing, arguing that clothing becomes increasingly restrictive and beauty standards become unnatural and unhealthy during periods of backlash (Faludi 1991; Malkin, Wornian, and Chrisler 1999). While the 1970s fashion industry offered "dress-for-success" business suits for the career woman, they disappeared from the pages of fashion magazines and store shelves the following decade, despite an increase in sales. The business suit was replaced in the 1980s with miniskirts, corsets, and baby doll dresses (often advertised on models clutching teddy bears). While the fashion industry was promoting prepubescent girlhood, the beauty industry followed suit in the 1980s by marketing anti-aging products to women, whose youthful looks were being destroyed by career "stress," marketers insisted. Plastic surgeons especially benefited from women's mounting anxieties about their appearance, launching a successful "body sculpturing" campaign in 1983. Media outlets as varied as *Ladies Home Journal* to *Ms.* touted the benefits of plastic surgery, promoting it as a means for women to "reinvent" themselves and take control of their lives. By the end of the 1980s, their caseload had more than doubled; more than two million women received breast implants, and more than one hundred thousand underwent liposuction surgery. Unfortunately, the sudden increase in women seeking plastic surgery—and the huge profits that resulted—attracted untrained practitioners to the field. Studies found serious postoperative problems, including hemorrhaging, facial nerve damage, and complications from anesthesia, that caused

follow-up surgery, painful recoveries, and in at least twenty documented cases, death (Faludi 1991).

One of the most insidious forms that the anti-feminist backlash took was the pop-psychology/self-help movement. Therapy books and self-help manuals flooded the shelves in the '80s, blaming the feminist movement for women's unhappiness and placing the onus of change on the individual (Cowlshaw 2001; Faludi 1991; Zimmerman, Holm, and Haddock 2001). Faludi (1991: 337) argues: "Instead of asserting women to override the backlash, the advice experts helped to lock it in female minds and hearts—by urging women to interpret all of the backlash's pressures as simply 'their' problem." If women had trouble finding a man, it was because the feminist movement encouraged them to be too assertive and unfeminine. If women were feeling too stressed, it was because feminism told them they could "have it all" with motherhood *and* a career. In other words, the political had again become personal.

The American Psychiatric Association echoed the claims of pop psychologists. In 1985, they voted to add three new diagnoses to the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* that affected women. The first was "premenstrual dysphoric disorder," by which the APA determined that PMS was now a mental illness, no longer simply a matter of endocrinology. "Paraphiliac rapism disorder" was the second, a problem affecting men who had repeated fantasies about rape and acted on, or were distressed by these urges. This diagnosis was alarming to feminists, and even the U.S. Attorney General's office, who issued an objection arguing that such a vague definition could easily be used by rapists to plead insanity (see also (Enns 1996 on the rise of "rape hype"). The third new mental illness considered by the APA was masochism, a diagnosis



first formulated in the Victorian era as an individual (predominately women) who derive pleasure from pain. It was resurrected by the APA as “masochistic personality disorder,” and they identified nine characteristics associated with it, including one who “rejects help, gifts, or favors so as not to be a burden on others,” one who “worries excessively” about troubling others, and one who “responds to success or positive events by feeling undeserving.” As Faludi (1991: 357) points out, “The APA panel had neatly summed up female socialization—and stamped it a private, psychiatric malfunction.” Even further, by categorizing masochism a personality disorder, the APA determined it was a type of mental illness *least* caused by social conditions and most rooted in an individual’s personality from early childhood (*ibid.*). In the end the decision on the rapism disorder was postponed pending further study, but both the PMS and masochism disorders were written into the *DSM*. This particular manifestation of the antifeminist backlash was more powerful than others in many ways. Faludi (1991: 358) argues, “while the pop psychology books that told women to blame themselves would come and go in bookstores during the ‘80s, the *DSM* was a permanent fixture.” That is to say, the backlash had become institutionalized (Cowlshaw 2001; Faludi 1991; Figert 1996).

In sum, unlike the case of first-wave feminism, the domestic cultural opportunity structure began closing to the second wave roughly simultaneously with the political opportunity structure. Despite women’s advances in employment and education in the early 1970s, their progress stalled and in some cases reversed in the 1980s. One industry in which women particularly struggled to find employment in the 1980s was television and film, which reduced the number of roles available to female actors, and transformed those that were left into traditionally feminine characters. This pattern held across

cultural arenas in the 1980s, depicting women in stereotypically feminine ways or not at all. Negative representations of women extended far beyond the big and small screens to such organizations as the American Psychiatric Association which characterized traditional femininity as deviant. Whether caused by or spuriously associated with these cultural representations, public opinion began turning against feminist causes by the late 1970s and early 1980s. As with the political opportunity structure, this variation in the cultural opportunity structure between 1970 and 1985 allows for an opportunity to explore its effects on the women's movement (see Table 5.2 below, reprinted from full list of hypotheses in Table 2.1). In particular, I examine the role of cultural allies (H4), women's access to cultural spaces (H5), and sociodemographic trends (H8) on whether and to what degree the movement shifted from collectivist to individualist frames, conflict to consensus tactics, and political to cultural goals. I address these questions below, following a discussion of the global opportunity structure.

**Table 5.2: Partial List of Hypotheses and Measures**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables
<p>4. During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>cultural allies</b>, it will be more likely to:</p> <p>A. Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</p> <p>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</p> <p>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</p>	<p>Employment of women in the arts, media, and clergy</p> <p>Media coverage of the women's movement</p>
<p>5. During periods in which women's <b>access to cultural spaces</b> is restricted (broadened), the women's movement will be more likely to:</p> <p>A. Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</p> <p>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</p> <p>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</p>	<p>Participation in Olympics</p> <p>Female Nobel Prize laureates</p> <p>Cultural consecration of female artists</p>
<p>8. During periods in which women's <b>employment, earnings, and education decreases (increases) and marital and fertility rates increase (decrease)</b>, the women's movement will be more likely to:</p> <p>A. Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</p> <p>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</p> <p>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</p>	<p>Employment rates</p> <p>Earning rates</p> <p>Education rates</p> <p>Marital rates</p> <p>Fertility rates</p>

*Global Opportunity Structure.* As evidenced by the case of first-wave feminism, anti-feminist backlashes at the national level do not necessarily translate into a broader transnational or global hostility to feminism. Indeed, by most measures the global opportunity structure increasingly opened to feminism throughout the 1970s and 80s, and organized feminism demonstrated greater ability to capitalize on those opportunities.

In the same way that World War I and its aftermath opened up space for international organizing in the late 1910s and 1920s, the founding of the United Nations following World War II similarly provided a new global space for groups to agitate for their agendas. As Prügl and Meyer (1999: 16) argue, “international economic and political crises destabilize entrenched institutions, including institutions of gender, thus opening up opportunities for emancipatory politics.” As with political instability at the national level, the enormous instability caused by two world wars caused the world polity

to become deinstitutionalized for a time, and created avenues of access for outsiders.

Existing international women's organizations, such as the Inter-American Commission of Women (CIM), took advantage of this opening and played a crucial role in establishing women's rights as part of the UN agenda. As early as 1946, the CIM began agitating for an official United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) and played an active role in drafting future UN conventions on political and civil rights for women (Meyer 1999).

In response to the ongoing efforts of the CIM and other international women's organizations, the United Nations declared 1975-85 as the Decade for Women and organized a series of World Conferences for Women in conjunction with the decade: in Mexico City in 1975, in Copenhagen in 1980, and in Nairobi in 1985. The first two conferences suffered from internal schisms, particularly tensions and rivalries between the West/North, East, and South blocs, which hampered efforts to settle on a common agenda (Joachim 1999). But the third conference in Nairobi proved much more successful for several reasons. Joachim (1999) argues that the first two conferences served as learning opportunity for women's organizations, and through their experiences, feminist activists and organizations learned lobbying skills, gained procedural knowledge about the UN, and found better methods of uniting disparate feminist groups (see also Chen 1996). Moreover, the spread of what Lechner and Boli (2005) refer to as the "hardware" of world culture, such as communication technology, allowed for the development and spread of global networks of feminist organizations and facilitated the coordination of groups and their strategies much more effectively by the 1985 conference (West 1999).

One of the most important accomplishments to come out of these conferences was the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979. The Convention is recognized as the most comprehensive gender-based treaty to date, and unlike previously negotiated non-binding plans of action, CEDAW is a binding treaty compelling signatory countries to end gender-based discrimination. The Convention is significant because it provides women with a legal instrument to fight discrimination, but just as importantly, its adoption helped to legitimize feminism and its goals (Berkovitch 1999b; West 1999). Given its binding nature and intrusiveness into nation-states' activities, the rate at which it was ratified is rather remarkable. By 1985, 81 countries had ratified the treaty, and two decades later nearly one hundred additional countries had ratified. The Convention's visibility, its political power, and its rapid adoption among nation-states has endowed the feminist movement with a greater degree of both political and symbolic resources. Its influence in garnering attention for women's rights was noted by one analyst who argues: "Many countries that had focused little if any attention on women's rights in the past do so today in large part because of the treaty (quoted in Berkovitch 1999b: 107).

Examining the level of support for international feminist treaties is one indicator of the global opportunity structure for the women's movement; in a similar vein, the number of nation-states that have created official state agencies for the advancement and promotion of women provides another way to gauge worldwide support for feminist goals. According to Berkovitch (1999b), the number of countries that had created women's ministries increased considerably during the 1970s and 80s. While no such agencies existed in 1970, just ten years later 16 countries had created official agencies,

and as many as 24 existed by 1985. The number of female heads of state also increased between 1970-1985<sup>31</sup> (Christensen 2008). While increasing numbers of female heads of state does not necessarily translate into direct support for feminist issues, it does signal a greater tolerance for women in the highest realm of politics and contributes to a weakening of traditional gender stereotypes. In this sense, the number of women in heads of state positions may be more appropriately considered a symbolic resource for the women's movement. Aside from a dip in 1978, the numbers of female heads of state increases fairly steadily throughout the sample period, peaking in 1984 with eight women in such positions. Considered together, these two indicators—the number of women's ministries and the number of female heads of state—suggest growing symbolic challenges to traditional gender norms as well as official support from an increasing number of state agencies.

The above measures of the global opportunity structure indicate a number of issue-specific openings for the women's movement over the course of the 1970s and 80s. Growing support from the United Nations and other international agencies, which led directly to three very visible world conferences and an influential, broad-based treaty to prevent gender discrimination, as well as increasing numbers of women and women's agencies in politics across the globe, all helped to facilitate organized feminism. Interestingly, while the domestic opportunity structure—both political and cultural—began closing in the 1980s, global opportunities were much more readily available to the feminist movement. Recall a similar dynamic in the 1920s, in which global structures largely supported feminist aims while the domestic opportunity structure turned hostile to the movement (see Chapter 4). In the case of the National Woman's Party, the favorable

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
<sup>31</sup> These numbers do not include temporary presidencies.

reception liberal feminists enjoyed in international forums helped to mitigate the effects of domestic-level hostilities, and they were able to maintain relatively high rates of collectivism, confrontation with opponents, and adherence to political goals. This divergence between domestic and global opportunity structures allows us to assess the conditions under which each might influence second-wave feminism (see Table 2.1, H13-H14). I take up this question below, following a discussion of how radical and liberal feminists perceived their opportunities for success.

*PERCEPTIONS OF THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE, 1970-1985*

In many ways, both the political and cultural climates in the U.S. became increasingly hostile to feminist aims by the early 1980s, while globally the movement enjoyed greater support. Yet objective opportunities and constraints facing social movements do not necessarily match activists' subjective perceptions regarding their chances for success (Gamson and Meyer 1996). Rather than assume that structural and perceived opportunities are congruent, I follow Meyer and Minkoff (2004) by turning this issue into an empirical question: How did feminists perceive the opportunity structure between 1970-1985, and to what degree did those perceptions affect their choices in frames, tactics, and goals? (See Table 2.1, H11-H12.)

**Figure 5.9: Perceptions of Political Opportunities in *off our backs* and *Ms.*, 1970-1985**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages  
Sources: *off our backs* (1970-1985), *Ms.* (1972-1985)

Figure 5.9 shows how both *off our backs* and *Ms.* perceived the movement's political opportunity structure between 1970-1985. As discussed in the earlier methods chapter, this measure was derived by calculating the proportion of articles per quarter that discussed a positive political climate minus the proportion of articles per quarter that discussed a negative political climate. Numbers in the positive range suggest the journal was overall optimistic regarding the movement's political chances for success, while numbers in the negative range indicate overall pessimism regarding the political environment.

With the exception of 1971 to early 1972, *off our backs* was generally more likely to recognize political constraints than opportunities. For a brief time in 1982, it again returns to a positive range (0.8% of articles in summer 1982 and 2.2% in fall 1982), but declines rather rapidly over the next three years. *Ms.* magazine offered a more positive assessment overall during this period. The journal peaks in 1978 with 16.7% of articles



offering an optimistic outlook on the political environment, after which point its perceptions turn more negative, dipping to a low in 1982 and early 1983 with 21.4% of articles addressing political constraints to feminism.


In many ways, second-wave feminism faced the same problems and prospects faced by the first wave. While major federal-level legislative victories were scarce, feminists were quick to tout their accomplishments at the state level, particularly the rapid early success of states' ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. Similar to the first wave's celebration of successive suffrage victories at the state level, the second wave publicized state-level ERA ratifications as indicative of impending victory. *Ms.* gloated: "ERA Alert – Only three more states to go. (Maybe fewer by the time you read this.)" (*Ms.* Apr. 1977, p. 78).<sup>32</sup> The movement also drew excitement from several court decisions throughout the 1970s, most notably the 1973 USSC *Roe v. Wade* decision, as well as various issues ranging from pay equity to enforcement of Title IX.

Considerably more attention was paid to cultural opportunities in both journals (see Figure 5.10). As was the case with POS perceptions, *off our backs* was more pessimistic than *Ms.* regarding cultural opportunities, but both journals showed generally more positive assessments of the COS than POS. *Ms.* remained more positive than *off our backs* throughout the 1970s. The journal experienced a sharp decline in positive perceptions of opportunities in early 1980 (falling from 0.167 to -0.167 between winter and spring 1980), and although it returned again to the positive range, perceptions remained more pessimistic in the 1980s than those of the previous decade. *Off our backs* followed a similar trajectory, peaking in the summer of 1979 and declining thereafter.

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<sup>32</sup> For the record, this was as far as the ERA campaign progressed – three states short of ratification.

**Figure 5.10: Perceptions of Cultural Opportunities in *off our backs* and *Ms.*, 1970-1985**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages  
Sources: *off our backs* (1970-1985), *Ms.* (1972-1985)

Activists were particularly cognizant of the mainstream media's role in focusing public attention on feminist issues. *Off our backs*, for instance, explained: "The subject of wife abuse or more so woman abuse has recently come to the attention of the public, because women abuse, like rape, has finally become a feminist issue and therefore, eventually a media issue" (*oob* Dec. 31, 1976). In a later issue, they continued: "Since the media has seen fit to acknowledge that wife-beating is an issue, perhaps some reform may result" (*oob* Feb. 28, 1977). Writers were also enthused about the greater availability of alternative media and accessibility of media technologies that provided feminists with their own media outlets. *Ms.* writers in 1975 exclaimed that the introduction of a portable video camera offered feminists the opportunity to record and broadcast their own television programming, a possibility realized by the Memphis Women's Cable Television Channel, the first cable television channel launched for and by women (*Ms.* Oct. 1975).

Outside the news media too, feminists championed the representation of women and feminism in a variety of media from film to television to theater. Writers noted the increasing number of women portrayed on television and in film, especially in leading roles (*Ms.* Oct. 1974). Even more importantly, many of those women were taking up explicitly feminist causes and in media as unlikely as soap operas. Following television's first legal abortion shown on *One Life to Live*, *Ms.* asserted: "...soap operas have come a long way. The organ music, the convoluted and pathetic plots persist—but with a twist. Soap writers are increasingly using the serial form—as Charles Dickens once did—to educate audiences or lead them to question their insular attitudes in ways that little else in their lives may do" (*Ms.* Aug. 1974, p. 42). Not only were women appearing in more positive roles in the mid-1970s, but they were achieving critical recognition for doing so (see Figure 5.8 above). Feminists celebrated this trend: "In 1974 category after category [of Emmy awards] was swept by women [...] The clubhouse has been invaded and the Hollywood trade papers are calling the influx the 'Year of the Woman'" (*Ms.* Dec. 1974, p. 84). Not only were women appearing in television and elsewhere in greater numbers by the 1970s, their roles were regarded more seriously, at least for a time.

The journals pointed to women breaking barriers in other realms as well. The appointment of Sandra Day O'Connor to the Supreme Court sparked a great deal of interest among feminists, despite her conservative record. *Ms.* explained:

The appointment of the first woman justice is, of course, an event of momentous symbolic importance. The Supreme Court is the preeminent symbol of justice in our nation, and the 191-year exclusion of women from the ranks of 'the brethren' speaks volumes about the history of women in our society. Though women still constitute less than 7 percent of the federal judiciary and tokenism is as much a

danger on the Supreme Court as elsewhere, we may nonetheless take great pleasure in this historic and long overdue appointment. (*Ms.* Oct. 1981, pp. 71-2)

While this breakthrough occurred in a political institution and may be ostensibly considered a political opportunity, *Ms.* writers made clear that the significance of O'Connor's appointment was not the political advantages she might offer the feminist movement, but rather the broader cultural importance of a woman breaking through the judicial glass ceiling.

The journals celebrated women's inroads in other areas as well. *Ms.* remarked in 1979 that for the first time women were enrolling in college at a rate proportionate to their numbers in the general population (*Ms.* May 1979, Sep. 1979), and more women were entering traditionally male fields (*Ms.* May 1979). They took note of other sociodemographic trends as well, including marital and fertility rates, as these have a direct impact on women's employment. A sign of increasing cultural opportunities, *Ms.* pointed out: "Today's young women marry later and have fewer children. Perhaps most significant of all, 41 percent of all the mothers with children under six are working—and that figure would probably be higher if we had an adequate program of child care" (*Ms.* May 1979, p. 116).

Using a strategy similar to first-wave feminism, the second wave capitalized on cultural inconsistencies to create greater resonance for their positions. *Ms.* magazine ran special Christmas issues in which they wished for peace and goodwill to all people and encouraged reflection during "a time to plan a new year of work informed by respect for individual worth and love for one another" (*Ms.* Dec. 1972, p. 39). Feminists also took advantage of the opportunity that the 1976 U.S. Bicentennial offered, a period in which democratic rhetoric was particularly pronounced. The journal reminded readers:

In this Bicentennial Year, it falls to our generation to carry on the work of our feminist predecessors and to establish at long last the full implications of the memorable words proclaimed at Seneca Falls: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal..." (*Ms.* June 1976, p. 84)

Much of the focus in both journals lay with keeping tabs on public opinion regarding the movement and its issues. As other political and cultural opportunities were disappearing by the 1980s, the journals clung to public opinion polls as some evidence of remaining support for feminism. In a 1979 article on the political victories of the anti-choice movement, *Ms.* reminded readers that public opinion was still on the side of choice (Aug. 1979). Three years later, the magazine persisted:

In fact, public opinion polls and the political climate have grown so far apart that even some usually dispassionate researchers are getting frustrated. The Harris Survey, one of the most respected of national public opinion polls, recently published a report under the banner headline: AMERICA IS NOT TURNING TO THE RIGHT. (*Ms.* May 1982, p. 108)

Yet by most indications, the movement was fighting an uphill battle. Hard-fought abortion rights were being undermined, the ERA campaign was stalling, and feminists began to recognize that despite the Harris Survey's reassurances, America did in fact appear to be turning to the right.

Particularly disheartening for feminists was the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Immediate concerns arose regarding his position on the Equal Rights Amendment. *Ms.* explained his standpoint: "I'm for the 'E' and the 'R'; I'm just not for the 'A.'" Sound familiar? Over the past several years, Ronald Reagan has often voiced his opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment, while cheerfully telling women that he

supports equal rights” (*Ms.*, June 1982, p. 106). The article went on to discuss Reagan's “50 States Project” in which he asked states to voluntarily review their laws for sex discrimination, in lieu of a federal amendment. The program was problematic, feminist pointed out, because it was completely voluntary, it established no criteria for states to meet, offered no standard definition of sex discrimination, and threatened no penalties for lack of action. The article concluded, “It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 50 States Project is merely a ruse by the Reagan Administration to defuse efforts to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment” (*ibid.*).

Second-wave feminists also expressed early concerns with Reagan’s drastic budget cuts to social welfare programs. While Reagan argued his proposal froze spending in an effort to curb excessive spending, an *off our backs* contributor notes: “This freeze applies only to total spending; defense will have a \$35 billion budget authority increase, while most domestic programs will face substantial cuts” (*oob*, Mar. 31, 1983). In another article entitled “Women and Children Hardest Hit by Reagan's Budget Axe,” *off our backs* pointed out how those cuts disproportionately disadvantaged women: “The Reagan administration's proposed \$48.6 billion budget cuts are callously aimed at the nation's workers and poor, especially women and children, while lining the pockets of the rich” (*oob*, Apr. 30, 1981).

Another cause for concern was increasing government intimidation of political activists, including feminists. As McAdam (1982) argues, when a movement’s political opportunity structure closes, the government’s cost of repression decreases. This seems to be the case during the second wave’s decline, as activists in the movement expressed apprehension about police roundups and FBI harassment. One writer asserted:

“Whatever their stated reasons, the recent history of FBI harassment and abuse of grand juries makes clear that the government is not only interested in the prosecution of people for real crimes; it is trying to stop the Movement any way it can” (*oob*, May 31, 1975). When the government itself was not intimidating activists, it allowed others to fill this function. The Reagan Justice Department insisted that bombing an abortion clinic did not constitute a terrorist act, and “unless [clinic patients’] harassers are on the payroll of state, local, or federal government, victims of harassment cannot expect the department to defend them on the basis of civil rights violations” (*oob*, May 31, 1985).

Disappointments in the executive branch were matched by disappointments in the legislature and courts, particularly with regard to reproductive rights. State and federal legislatures passed a series of laws that restricted abortion rights, including denying coverage under Medicaid (*oob*, July 31, 1978), mandating counseling and instituting a 24-hour waiting period (*oob*, Nov. 30, 1972), and holding hearings on fetal pain (*oob*, July 31, 1985). Feminists did not find much solace in the courts, who upheld much of this legislation and instated restrictions of their own, including allowing husbands the right to veto their wives’ decision to terminate pregnancies and applying child abuse laws to fetuses (*oob*, Nov. 30, 1982).

Feminists sought to gain ground in the 1982 midterm elections, and were temporarily hopeful when they proclaimed that “Politicians and the media have discovered ‘The Women’s Vote’” (*Ms.*, Nov. 1982, p. 108). Yet the second wave ultimately fell victim to the same problem faced by the first wave: despite the hype surrounding a women’s voting bloc, when it did not materialize politicians withdrew their concessions to women’s groups. The 1984 election was overwhelmingly disappointing to

feminists. As one *off our backs* contributor remarked: “Reporting on the elections of 1984 is like presiding at a wake. The horror of 1984 was not ‘Big Brother’ but the lack of brotherhood, sisterhood or any other hood but selfhood on the part of those who voted for Ronald Reagan” (*oob*, Dec. 31. 1984). Voters defeated equal rights and abortion rights referenda; female politicians had an especially difficult time winning elections; and the Mondale-Ferraro vote was “disastrous,” in the words of one *off our backs* writer (Dec. 31. 1984). The 1984 election was disastrous not only for political reasons, but also because it marked a conservative turn in American society generally. *Off our backs* resigned itself to this reality when it remarked: “I think this election means that most white, middle-class Americans—and the majority of Americans probably are white and middle-class—don't give a damn about ‘fairness,’ the rallying cry of Walter Mondale. They could care less about the ‘boats stuck on the bottom’ that Jesse Jackson invoked [...] This is a conservative country” (*oob*, Dec. 31. 1984).

One writer hypothesized that this conservative turn was sparked by the economic recession in the late 1970s and early 1980s, arguing:

Not surprisingly, prevailing attitudes about social behavior reflect this economic reality. In a period of recession, we receive messages of narrowly defined social behavior as acceptable and a push for the return to traditional values and lifestyles. Media portrayals, educational and religious institutions, the courts, and more recently psychologists and sociologists flood us with these appropriate messages [...] We also see active repression of nontraditional lifestyles and ideologies as well as attacks on civil rights [...] As people become more and more economically insecure, Conservatives push for return to traditional values. Conservatives say that failure to maintain these values is at the heart of the decay



of the standard of living. In this atmosphere, popular figures such as Anita Bryant rise to defend these values. The economic issue suddenly becomes clouded in a question of morality. (*oob* July 31, 1978)

At the same time that the country was facing an economic recession, “the United States is being whipped into a war fever,” remarked another *off our backs* contributor, and “creating a Red Scare has been an effective tool contributing to this development” (*oob* June 30, 1981). Moreover, the 1979 oil crisis sparked concern among feminists that it would result in “more stirring up of nationalism as confrontations over oil increase” (*oob* Feb. 28, 1980). Economic hardship coupled with Cold War panic and increased militarism, the journal argued, forced a return to conservatism and a turn against feminism.

This conservatism extended far beyond the political realm. Some writers echoed Faludi’s (1991) assertions that fashion is indicative of the broader cultural climate, and the fashions of the 1980s did not bode well for women:

“The country is moving to the right,” announces *Time* magazine. Women will be fired. The fashion industry has taken its cue. The clothes for 1980 are going to make us look unemployable. The avant-garde designers are offering a choice of S or M next year. The M is the clownish, starlet look of the fifties; cinched waists, tight skirts with slits, spike heels, can-can stockings, funny little hats, strapless tops, uplifted 'busts,' and lots of polka dots. The S is leather from head to toe: padded shoulders, zippers everywhere there is an orifice, zombie makeup, neon-colored hair, and even leather swimsuits. (*Ms.* April 1970, p. 75)

Similar representations of women and feminism appeared in other cultural media. The disappearance of women from film was noted by a *Ms.* writer who warned: “Bad news

for those of you who hoped that 'Kramer vs. Kramer' would not become a trend: 'Carbon Copy' and 'Paternity' have arrived to glorify daddies at the expense of mommies" (Jan. 1981, p. 37). In the realm of music, major recording labels were turning away from "women's music" (*oob* Nov. 30, 1983), and the launch of MTV gave a new platform for sexism and violence. *Off our backs* complained: "Now, instead of just suggesting in words such blatant images of oppression, rock performers can act them out so people can see the violence and misogyny for themselves instead of having to use their imaginations" (*oob* Apr. 30, 1984). The magazine also expressed concern over advertisers fueling these conservative trends by romanticizing domesticity:

Millions of college educated women trapped in suburbia with little creative outlet also support the cookbook boom. Cooking fancy foods with a foreign flair helps relieve the boredom of housework and gives a woman a feeling of accomplishment and worth. Advertisers, pandering to the twentieth-century image of the middle-class housewife, promise her degrees of success which far surpass the necessary problem of filling one's stomach. Pillsbury tells her 'nothin' says lovin' like somethin' from the oven...' Hunt sells tomato sauce with their 'Wednesday night special' commercial. The beautiful and pregnant young housewife spends all day Wednesday planning dinner for her husband because Wednesday is the one night in the week when he doesn't have to study or go to school after working all day. We are not supposed to be surprised that it takes all day to plan a meal which consists of throwing canned tomato sauce over a pan of frying chicken. (*oob*, May 30, 1970)

Whether a cause or consequence, women's fertility rates began increasing again for the first time since the postwar baby boom. Especially interesting was that many of these new mothers were women over 30 who had concentrated on their careers—many of the

women who had been active in and benefited by the feminist movement. As a befuddled *off our backs* writer said: “Why women who have more or less shed society's injunctions that they must be mothers are nonetheless seeking motherhood is up for grabs” (*oob*, Feb. 28, 1980).


The political reality of the Reagan administration—including its domestic and international policies—as well as the cultural manifestations of the feminist backlash created a grim future for the women’s movement as the 1980s unfolded. The courts and legislatures destroyed or presented serious challenges to the ERA and reproductive rights. The Reagan administration drastically reduced social welfare spending at the same time that it strengthened the military. In fact, the disaster of the 1984 election was in many ways the political nail in the coffin of organized feminism. Finally, the negative portrayals of women in film, television, music, advertising, and fashion offered very little hope for the movement.

## II. CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS TACTICS, 1970-1985

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
Having situated second-wave feminism in its broader political and cultural environment, and established activists’ perceptions of that environment, I turn to my first research question regarding whether and under what conditions the movement shifts from conflict to consensus tactics, a core divergence between NSMT and PPT. Disagreement exists over whether to characterize the second wave as a “new” or “old” movement, so I leave the NSMT hypothesis open: second-wave feminism should display rather consistent rates of either conflict or consensus tactics over time. Alternatively, the PPT hypothesis would suggest that the movement turns from conflict to consensus tactics when its

**Figure 5.11: Rate of Opponent Identification in *off our backs*, 1970-1985**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages  
 Source: *off our backs* (1970-1985)

**Figure 5.12: Rate of Opponent Identification in *Ms.*, 1972-1985**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages  
 Source: *Ms.* (1972-1985)

opportunity structure wanes. As was the case with first-wave feminism, the second wave experienced considerable variation in its opportunity structure, which allows for a good test of these hypotheses (see Table 2.1, hypothesis series A).

Figures 5.11 and 5.12 show the covariance of opponent identification and opportunities for *off our backs* and *Ms.* magazine, respectively. While a lower proportion of *Ms.* articles identify opponents relative to *off our backs*, both journals vary at relatively similar rates. Aside from a brief dip in opponent identification in 1973 (from 78% in fall 1972 to 15% in fall 1973), *off our backs* generally backed off of opponents over the course of the 1970s. Beginning in the spring of 1982, the journal reversed this trend by becoming increasingly likely to identify opponents (peaking at 68% by the beginning of 1984), but retreated quickly again over the next year and a half. Allowing a one-year lag in political opportunities, changes in the rate of opponent identification and perceptions of the political opportunity structure are tightly coupled for *off our backs*. The rate of opponent identification in *Ms.* has more fluctuation, but like *off our backs*, it peaks in the early- to mid-1970s (with 42% of articles in 1972 and 50% in 1975 identifying opponents), and decreases during the 1980s, bottoming out at only 5% in spring 1985, following lower rates of political opportunities.

Both journals criticized a wide variety of actors, from politicians to cultural institutions to even other feminist organizations. *Off our backs* in particular did not shy away from using incendiary language to describe anti-feminist antagonists. Opponents of various types were often referred to as “pigs” and “male supremacists.” One *off our backs* writer referred to the Supreme Court as the “men’s geriatric clinic,” underscoring the point that the justices “are so incredibly isolated from women who need abortions that

it makes us angry to think we must waste our time asking them to change their laws” (*oob* Aug. 31, 1971). Another article offered the alternative spelling “AmeriKKKa” in a scathing critic of the racial biases of the American criminal justice system (*oob* Sep. 30, 1979).

Much of the early criticism in *off our backs* was directed at other feminist and leftist organizations. Radical feminists vented their frustrations over their marginalization in the New Left, and what they considered to be a selling out of liberal feminism. Writes an *off our backs* contributor: “One area that consistently escapes this seemingly open, human and radical vision is the place women are to take in the revolutionary society. This is one area in which the straight world and the counter culture converge: women are to be trained and fucked” (*oob*, Mar. 31, 1972). In defense of an independent feminist newspaper, another *off our backs* writer argued:

Up against the wall hip revolutionaries! We're onto you now. We know your so-called radical underground press doesn't include us. For women, working on an underground paper is like working for the *New York Times*--only worse, since we naively believe there is hope for change. There is no hope since sexism runs in the blood of male freaks. They are sons of capitalism and not born of any revolution yet. (*oob* Apr. 25, 1970)

As the 1970s progressed, however, both journals turned their attention toward outside opponents, particularly President Reagan and the burgeoning New Right movement that supported his administration. Cutbacks in social welfare spending, opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment, military buildup, government intimidation of radical activists, and opposition to gay rights were just some of the causes for concern among feminists. Activists were particularly alarmed about setbacks to abortion rights,

explaining: “Since the 1980 election, the New Right has pinned its hopes for anti-abortion legislation on conservative senators backed by a conservative president” (*oob*, Oct. 31, 1982). They highlighted for readers the direct links between the Religious Right and the Reagan administration and other conservative politicians. In an article covering a Christian fundamentalist rally at the Washington monument (“that huge phallic symbol”), the journal argues: “Despite what WFJ [Washington for Jesus] leaders say, the rally represents an attempt to mask extreme right political aims with religious language” (*oob*, June 30, 1980).

While Reagan’s election in 1980 focused feminists’ attention on the support he received from conservative Christians, the problems posed by the Religious Right were on feminists’ radar screen much earlier. An *off our backs* writer asserted in the early 1970s:

The church needs suffering and slavery...That's the reason the church is so strongly against all things that can liberate women, like birth control and abortion... We have to fight every church. If you look at what they're teaching about relationships between men and women, between workers - all are very dangerous. Each time women want to make something for themselves, you see how the church says don't do it. (*oob*, Oct. 31, 1972)

Feminists targeted other cultural institutions as well. The promotion of consumerism was considered problematic by both magazines. A critic of advertising directed at children asks, “Who’s to blame? The manufacturers, advertising agencies, or the broadcasters?” (*Ms.* Sept. 1975, p. 96). She ultimately concludes that all three are at fault, as is the Federal Communications Commission for not imposing stricter standards on children’s advertising. An *off our backs* writer takes aim at multinational corporations and the mass

media, arguing: “At the same time new culture of consumerism which the multinationals direct through the media toward women, creates artificial needs, distorts the female image and legitimises pornography and brings about a mystification and fragmentation of women's consciousness” (*oob*, Dec. 31, 1982).

Feminists did not reserve their ire solely for conservative cultural institutions, however. Both magazines derided cultural producers that offered problematic representations of feminism. *Ms.* devoted the last page of the magazine to a section called “No Comment,” in which they posted advertisements that degraded women. *Off our backs* was especially critical of pornographers, regularly taking aim at magazines such as *Playboy* and *Hustler*. Elsewhere, they condemned the Counterculture’s representation of women in, among other areas, musical lyrics: “...the music of the Rolling Stones most openly expresses contempt for and hostility towards women. Even though their lyrics are blatantly sexist, the attitudes they express are disturbingly representative [of the counter culture]” (*oob*, Mar. 31, 1972).

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, both magazines became less likely to target specific opponents, identifying instead “patriarchy” or “sexist structures” as the problem. One *off our backs* contributor, for instance, declared: “The revolution is to smash that which is putting the ‘screws’ to all of us...In this country, this means we must smash the power structure. His power/death machines are still raping Mother Earth and Grandmother Moon as well as ourselves” (*oob*, Dec. 31, 1978). Compare this enemy to those identified seven years earlier: “We have learned to hate those who count on creating alienation and despair among us as the fuel for their deadly power. The enemy is not abstract—Nixon, Mitchell, Laird, the CIA, the Pentagon—they are responsible” (*oob*



Mar. 25, 1971). If not blaming such abstract opponents as “patriarchy,” writers placed the onus of change on individual men. In a *Ms.* article, Alan Alda argues tongue-in-cheek that men suffer from “testosterone poisoning.” He points out some warning signs of the disease (such as “Are you easily triggered into competition?” and “Do you have an intense need to reduce every difficult situation to charts and figures?”), and offers four simple steps to recovery (*Ms.* Oct. 1975).

By the end of the sample period, even problematizing male psyche appeared confrontational. Despite recognized troubles with the Reagan administration, the Religious Right, and others in the 1980s, both journals did considerably less finger-pointing. Instead, feminists championed the increasingly popular view “that men as well as women are victims--of sex roles and of feminist-inspired social changes” (*Ms.* Aug. 1984, p. 91). *Ms.* did offer one surprisingly direct attack during this period—not against a political opponent or countermovement, but hairdressers:

Why in the world do so many otherwise self-possessed women feel tyrannized and terrorized by hairdressers? We've gotten doctors off their pedestals in the last few years, but hairstylists are still up there, and we are quailing below, afraid that if we say the wrong thing before we put our heads in their hands we will emerge from the salon looking like a Shih tzu. (*Ms.*, Mar. 1980, p. 34)

The direct strikes against opponents that characterized the peak of the second wave had been replaced in the 1980s with general lamentations against “the system” and hollow critiques of scissor-wielding bullies.

### ***Correlations***

Table 5.3 presents correlation coefficients between the rates of opponent identification and select independent variables (lagged one year) for *off our backs* and *Ms.* See Appendix C for full table of correlations. Of course, bivariate correlations do not

permit the establishment of causality, nor do they allow for controlling other variables. I simply use correlation coefficients as an alternate means of examining otherwise largely qualitative data. In short, the journals' rate of opponent identification is rather weakly correlated with most measures of political and cultural opportunities.

Measures of *political instability* are not well-correlated with the rate of opponent identification. For both magazines, coefficients are quite small and remain non-significant. *Access to the state* (operationalized here as women's voting registration rates) also appears to have small and non-significant correlations with conflict tactics.

The presence of *political allies* also shows little relationship to conflict tactics for nearly all variables. Presidential support for women's rights, as well as rates of women in political positions, have generally small and non-significant coefficients. The rates of women in the U.S. House and presidential cabinet posts in fact are negatively correlated with the use of conflict tactics, although the coefficients are fairly small. The level of EEOC funding is also significantly negatively correlated with conflict tactics, contrary to my hypothesis.

Measures of *cultural allies* are nearly all negative and non-significant. In fact, the only variable that reaches significance is *New York Times* coverage of the movement, which is actually negatively correlated with conflict tactics, contrary to my hypothesis.

Measures of *public opinion* do not show particularly strong correlations with use of conflict tactics. One exception, however, is public support for abortion rights, which is positively and significantly correlated with use of conflict tactics for *off our backs* and the two journals combined, as expected.

**Table 5.3: Correlation Coefficients between Conflict Tactics and Select Independent Variables**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables	Correlation Coefficients			
		<i>off our backs</i>	<i>Ms.</i>	<i>Combined</i>	
1. During periods of <b>political instability</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Number of congressional seats that change party	-0.0942	0.2307	-0.0349	
	Margin of victory for political candidates	0.1392	0.1432	0.0880	
	Strength of Conservative Coalition	-0.0728	-0.1291	-0.0375	
	Presidential victories on votes in Congress	-0.0943	0.0461	-0.0046	
	Size of gender voting gap	-0.1810	-0.0871	-0.1575	
2. During periods in which women's <b>access to the polity</b> broadens, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Women's voter registration rates	-0.0453	-0.1511	-0.0336	
3. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Presidential support for women's rights (% of words in State of Union in support of women's rights)	-0.1806	-0.0449	-0.1454	
	EEOC funding	-0.2806*	-0.1630	-0.3107*	
	Rates of women in political positions	U.S. Senate	-0.1705	0.0037	-0.0807
		U.S. House	-0.1960	-0.2030	-0.2621*
		Governors	-0.1584	-0.0715	-0.1567
Presidential Cabinets	-0.2411	-0.2298	-0.2703*		
4. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Rates of women's employment in the arts, media, and clergy	-0.1567	-0.2622	-0.1789	
	Media coverage of the women's movement	<i>NY Times</i>	-0.3041*	-0.1804	-0.3472*
		Periodicals	0.1296	-0.0632	0.1771
	Television news	-0.1346	-0.0729	-0.1556	

<b>4a.</b> During periods in which <b>public opinion</b> is supportive of feminist issues, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Equality for women	-0.0130	0.2004	0.0451
	Legalization of abortion	0.3030*	0.1770	0.3381*
	Favor ERA	-0.2176	-0.2876	-0.1947
<b>12.</b> During periods of increasing <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Perceptions of political opportunities	0.3769*	0.1876	0.1246
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities	-0.1584	0.0927	-0.2557*
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities	0.0812	0.1767	-0.1499
	Perceptions of global opportunities	0.1173	0.0407	-0.0711
<b>14.</b> During periods of increasing <b>global opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	NGO access to the UN (number granted consultative status)	-0.2740*	-0.2303	-0.3024*
	Rate of political party competition across countries	-0.0908	-0.2368	-0.1126
	Rate of political participation across countries	-0.1834	-0.2437	-0.1956*
	Number of countries with official agencies for women's affairs	-0.2278	-0.2340	-0.2464*
	Number of countries with female heads of state	-0.1513	-0.3004*	-0.1854
	Number of CEDAW signatories	0.0714	-0.2465	-0.0562
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>		<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>		<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>		<b>23</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>20</b>

\* p<.05

Note: All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).

*Perceptions of opportunities* show mixed results. For *off our backs*, perceptions of political opportunities are positively and significantly correlated with use of conflict tactic ( $r = 0.38$ ), as hypothesized, but for *Ms.* this relationship does not reach significance. Perceptions of cultural opportunities do reach significance for the two magazines combined, but it is negatively correlated with conflict tactics, contrary to my hypothesis. Neither domestic nor global opportunities show strong relationships to the journals' use of conflict tactics.

As with the first wave, measures of objective *global opportunities* generally show small and non-significant correlations with use of conflict tactics. Moreover, when these correlations do reach significance, they generally occur in the opposite direction of that hypothesized. For instance, as NGOs gain access to the United Nations in greater numbers, the rate of conflict tactics in these journals decreases, rather than increases, as I expected. The correlations call into question the effect of global opportunities on the women's movement. However, simple bivariate correlations do not allow us to control for other variables, including interactions between domestic- and global-level opportunities. Again, *Ms.* and *off our backs* varied considerably over time in the degree to which they were globally focused, and these analyses do not let us gauge this variation.

In sum, despite the descriptive and qualitative findings presented above, the bivariate correlations suggest overall fairly weak relationships between opportunities and use of conflict tactics.

### III. POLITICAL AND CULTURAL GOALS, 1970-1985

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
A second fundamental disagreement between NSMT and PPT concerns the conditions under which social movements depoliticize, replacing in many cases overtly political goals with cultural goals. Is second-wave feminism a “new” social movement that focuses primarily on cultural goals, an “old” social movement that focuses on political goals, or is there fluctuation between the two? If the latter is the case, are activists more likely to advocate political goals during periods of elevated political and cultural opportunities? (See Table 2.1, hypothesis series B.) While the tactics of second-wave feminism became less confrontational as the 1970s and 80s progressed, goals do not always shift in lockstep with tactics. Results from the first wave indicated that goals changed more slowly than tactics and only after both political and cultural opportunity structures were depleted. Below I describe changes in both journals’ endorsement of political and cultural goals from 1970-1985 and compare these patterns with those of the opportunity structure in order to assess the strength of the PPT hypothesis.

#### *Off our backs*

*Off our backs* fluctuated widely during the sample period between political and cultural foci (see Figure 5.13). The journal offered the most politically-oriented articles between 1974 and 1976 (peaking at 64% in the fall of 1974), and interestingly nearly matched this level at the end of 1985 with 62.5% of articles addressing political issues. The summer of 1970 witnessed the lowest rate of culturally-oriented articles (0%), but cultural issues occupied a greater deal of space between 1972 and 1973 (ranging from 36-53%) and peaked again in the fall of 1981 with 54.8% of articles addressing cultural

issues. After this point, however, politically-oriented articles generally appeared more frequently than culturally-oriented articles.

**Figure 5.13: Percentage of Articles Identifying Political and Cultural Goals in *off our backs*, 1970-1985**




Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages

Source: *off our backs* (1970-1985)

Given the fluctuations, what role if any did the political and cultural opportunity structures play in these journals' foci? For *off our backs*, the answer is not immediately apparent. Examining solely the POS, there are some periods for which political coverage changes closely with the political opportunities (allowing for a 3-4 quarter lag), but other periods during which they diverge. For example, perceptions of political opportunities are most favorable in 1971, the same year that political coverage was at its lowest. Similarly, political coverage peaked in 1985, while political opportunities were rapidly diminishing. Some of this variation may be explained through perceptions of the cultural opportunity structure, which were particularly unfavorable in 1971, a year in which politicization began to decline. However, both political and cultural opportunities were at

a low point in 1984-1985, which makes the high levels of politicization during these years difficult to explain.

**Figure 5.14: Rate of Political Goals and Perceptions of Domestic and Global Opportunity Structures in *off our backs*, 1970-1985**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages  
Source: *off our backs* (1970-1985)

Figure 5.14 may shed some light on this puzzle. While domestic opportunities were at an ultimate low point in 1985, global opportunities were more readily available throughout the 1980s, offering some hope to radical feminists battered by the domestic constraints of the 1980s. *Off our backs* writers throughout the 1980s commented regularly on the movement's strengthening and success in other Western nations and its spread to such unlikely places as China (*oob* Jan. 31, 1983), Colombia (*oob*, Mar. 31, 1982), and the Middle East (*oob*, Mar. 31, 1983).

Additionally, the high degree of politicization in the later years of this sample period likely occurred not despite but because of the growing concerns about the domestic opportunity structure. As discussed above, the election of Reagan in 1980 and even more so his reelection in 1984 were particularly alarming to feminists, as they



witnessed the ERA campaign stalling in the states and the reversal of abortion rights. In the same way that the first wave relied on some degree of opposition to mobilize constituents (see Staggeborg 1991), this growing domestic hostility in the mid-1980s, along with favorable international opportunities, may have encouraged feminists to turn their focus again to political causes. Additional data for the years following 1985 would be necessary to determine for how long activists were able to sustain this increased level of politicization.


*Ms.*

*Ms.* magazine had less variation in political and cultural foci relative to *off our backs* (see Figure 5.15). *Ms.* was much more likely to cover cultural subjects throughout the sample period, peaking at 72.2% in the spring and summer of 1972, and reaching nearly this same level in late 1982 and early 1983 with 69.8%. The exception to this pattern occurred in 1979 and 1980, when the magazine reached its lowest level of cultural coverage (only 11.1% in the summer of 1980). Political subjects did not necessarily receive greater coverage as cultural coverage declined, however. Only 5.5% of articles in the winter and spring of 1980, for example, discussed political issues. Political coverage peaked in 1978 at 33.3%, and despite its nadir in early 1980, political coverage climbed again to 27.8% in the fall of 1980 and steadily decreased throughout the rest of the 1980s.

The findings from *Ms.* present a more consistent picture than those of *off our backs*. The period during which *Ms.* most frequently covered political issues was 1978 through mid-1981, the same period for which cultural issues were least likely to be discussed. This was also the same period that experienced the most positive perceptions

of the political opportunity structure as well as particularly positive perceptions of the cultural opportunity structure. Both POS and

**Figure 5.15: Percentage of Articles Identifying Political and Cultural Goals in *Ms.*, 1972-1985**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages  
Source: *Ms.* (1972-1985)

COS turned more negative after 1981, remaining more often than not in the negative range; at the same time, cultural foci remained quite high while political foci steadily decreased, bottoming out at just 7% by the end of 1985. Unlike *off our backs*, *Ms.* devoted little to no space to the international movement. As the domestic opportunity structure turned decidedly negative in the 1980s, then, the magazine did not turn to the global scene to bolster activists' sense of optimism for movement success. Instead, the rate of politicization was tied closely to perceptions of the domestic opportunity structure.

These findings from *off our backs* and *Ms.* regarding rates of politicization offer some interesting results. The NSMT hypothesis that the second wave should be consistently political (according to those that characterize it as an "old" movement) or

consistently cultural (according to those that characterize it as a “new” movement) is not supported by either journal, both of which experienced considerable changes in political and cultural coverage during this period. The PPT hypothesis that movements turn to cultural goals when the opportunity structure atrophies is supported by the findings from *Ms.*, which shows a tight coupling of politicization and opportunities. *Off our backs* does not present such a coherent picture, however. Rates of politicization vary widely during this period, and not always in conjunction with perceptions of the opportunity structure. To some extent, politicization may be tied to perceptions of hostility, rather than opportunity; that is, as the journal grew alarmed about the political and social conservative turn in the 1980s, it accelerated its efforts to maintain political rights. But if this is the case that hostility encourages politicization, why did the same phenomenon not occur for *Ms.*, which also perceived declining opportunities, or for the *Woman Citizen* in the 1920s? In part, the answer may lie with *off our backs*’ turn to the international arena, which offered greater hope for success (unlike *Ms.* and *Woman Citizen*, which remained focused on the domestic movement). This explanation fits with earlier findings that movement goals change more slowly than tactics or frames, and only after it has exhausted all avenues of opportunities. In other words, domestic hostility may encourage movement politicization, but only when coupled with a positive opportunity structure elsewhere.

### ***Correlations***

Table 5.4 presents correlation coefficients between the rates of cultural and political foci and select independent variables (lagged one year) for *off our backs* and *Ms.*

See Appendix C for full table of correlations. Because cultural and political goals are not measured as mutually exclusive, I include correlation coefficients for each separately, with correlation coefficients for political goals shown in parentheses below those for cultural goals.

Generally speaking, measures of *political instability* show small and statistically non-significant correlations with choice of goals (although the relationships generally occur in the hypothesized direction). An exception is the amount of overlap between executive and legislative branches (operationalized as presidential victories on votes in Congress), which is negatively correlated with cultural foci, contrary to my hypothesis. *Access to the state* also has small correlation coefficients. It does reach significance for *off our backs*, but the relationship does not occur in the hypothesized direction (i.e., the higher women's voter registration rates, the more likely the magazine is to turn to cultural goals).

The presence of *political allies* shows some of the strongest correlations among these variables, and generally the relationship occurs in the hypothesized direction. In particular, among articles in *Ms.* magazine, presidential support for women's rights, level of EEOC funding, and rates of women in political positions (especially state governors and presidential cabinet posts) are significantly and negatively correlated with cultural foci, ranging between -0.29 to -0.43. Interestingly, however, a turn toward cultural goals did not necessarily result in a turn away from political goals, as coefficients for political goals remain close to zero.

Measures of *cultural allies* also hold up relatively well. In particular, greater media coverage of feminism tends to be positively correlated with political goals and

**Table 5.4: Correlation Coefficients between Movement Goals and Select Independent Variables**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables	Correlation Coefficients			
		<i>off our backs</i>	<i>Ms.</i>	<i>Combined</i>	
1. During periods of <b>political stability</b> (political instability), the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Number of congressional seats that change party	-0.1096 (0.1200)	-0.1009 (0.2199)	-0.0690 (0.0839)	
	Margin of victory for political candidates	-0.2945* (0.1623)	0.1931 (0.0680)	-0.0450 (0.0868)	
	Strength of Conservative Coalition	0.1624 (-0.1862)	0.0245 (-0.0403)	0.0708 (-0.0817)	
	Presidential victories on votes in Congress	0.0263 (-0.0045)	-0.2942* (0.1837)	-0.1345 (0.0772)	
	Size of gender voting gap	-0.0747 (0.0802)	-0.1188 (-0.0111)	-0.0653 (0.0047)	
2. During periods in which women's <b>access to the polity</b> is restricted (broadened), the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Women's voter registration rates	0.2556* (-0.2101)	0.1446 (-0.1117)	0.1724 (-0.1189)	
3. During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Presidential support for women's rights (% of words in State of Union in support of women's rights)	-0.0044 (0.0254)	-0.4112* (0.0452)	-0.1583 (-0.0091)	
	EEOC funding	-0.0375 (0.0885)	-0.2907* (0.0330)	-0.0526 (-0.0360)	
	Rates of women in political positions	U.S. Senate	0.0624 (-0.0648)	-0.2526 (0.1013)	-0.0845 (-0.0018)
		U.S. House	-0.0233 (0.0646)	0.1038 (-0.0400)	0.0844 (-0.0605)
	Governors	0.0148 (0.1042)	-0.4266* (0.0231)	-0.1423 (0.0160)	
	Presidential Cabinets	0.0334 (0.0333)	-0.4303* (-0.0209)	-0.1049 (-0.0571)	
	4. During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Rates of women's employment in the arts, media, and clergy	0.0137 (0.0753)	-0.2672 (-0.0692)	-0.1046 (0.0018)
Media coverage of the women's movement		<i>NY Times</i> (0.1100)	-0.1551 (0.1303)	0.0263 (-0.0169)	
Periodicals		-0.1206 (0.0639)	-0.2496 (0.0171)	-0.2095* (0.1397)	
Television news		-0.1382 (0.1462)	-0.2731 (0.1257)	-0.1457 (0.0608)	

<b>4a.</b> During periods in which <b>public opinion</b> is unsupportive (supportive) of feminist issues, the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Equality for women	-0.1073 (0.0177)	-0.1393 (0.1377)	-0.1070 (0.0391)
	Legalization of abortion	0.0194 (-0.0847)	0.3535* (-0.0334)	0.0478 (0.0461)
	Favor ERA	0.3267* (-0.0118)	-0.0645 (-0.1061)	0.1124 (-0.0409)
<b>12.</b> During periods of decreasing (increasing) <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Perceptions of political opportunities	-0.1907 (-0.0412)	0.0717 (-0.0800)	-0.0050 (-0.1595)
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities	-0.0218 (-0.0024)	-0.1699 (-0.1527)	0.0411 (-0.2127*)
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities	-0.1852 (0.0558)	-0.2795* (-0.0687)	-0.0613 (-0.2001*)
	Perceptions of global opportunities	-0.1212 (-0.0414)	0.1765 (-0.0561)	0.0659 (-0.1682)
<b>14.</b> During periods of decreasing (increasing) <b>global opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	NGO access to the UN (number granted consultative status)	-0.0271 (0.0907)	-0.2532 (-0.0156)	-0.0540 (-0.0323)
	Rate of political party competition across countries	-0.0456 (0.0164)	-0.1014 (-0.0942)	-0.0687 (-0.0178)
	Rate of political participation across countries	-0.0433 (0.0461)	-0.1466 (-0.0734)	-0.0666 (-0.0258)
	Number of countries with official agencies for women's affairs	-0.0584 (0.0544)	-0.1523 (-0.0587)	-0.0562 (-0.0413)
	Number of countries with female heads of state	-0.0134 (0.0616)	0.0463 (-0.0737)	0.0277 (-0.0088)
	Number of CEDAW signatories	-0.0696 (0.0165)	0.2907 (-0.2653)	0.1189 (-0.0758)
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>		<b>0</b> <b>(0)</b>	<b>5</b> <b>(0)</b>	<b>1</b> <b>(0)</b>
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>		<b>3</b> <b>(0)</b>	<b>2</b> <b>(0)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(2)</b>
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>		<b>26</b> <b>(29)</b>	<b>22</b> <b>(29)</b>	<b>28</b> <b>(27)</b>

\* p&lt;.05

*Note:* All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).

Because cultural and political goals are not measured as mutually exclusive, I include correlation coefficients for each (political goals shown in parentheses).

negatively correlated with cultural goals (although the coefficient only reaches significance for periodical coverage in the *Readers' Guide* database). The rates of women employed in cultural fields also generally are weakly correlated with goals, although the relationship does occur in the hypothesized direction.

*Public opinion* measures show mixed results. Support for women's equality is positively correlated with political foci and negatively correlated with cultural foci for both magazines, as hypothesized, although the correlation coefficients are relatively small and non-significant. Support for the Equal Rights Amendment, however, is significantly and positively correlated with cultural foci for *off our backs*, contrary to my hypothesis. Similarly, support for abortion rights is positively and significantly correlated with cultural foci for *Ms.*, contrary to my hypothesis.

*Perceptions of opportunities* also show mixed results. Both political and cultural opportunities are weakly correlated with goals for both journals (and often in the opposite direction of my hypothesis). Perceptions of all domestic opportunities combined do show relatively stronger correlations with cultural goals ( $r = -.19$  for *oob* and  $-0.28$  for *Ms.*), and in the hypothesized direction, but the relationship does not hold for political goals. Perceptions of global opportunities also show little relationship to goal choice.

Measures of objective *global opportunities* have quite small correlation coefficients (generally  $r < 0.10$ ), and none reaches significance.

In sum, these bivariate correlations show little support for the qualitative and descriptive findings presented above. Without dismissing these findings, however, it is important to emphasize that the qualitative findings point to a fairly complex relationship

between opportunities and movement goals, such as the interplay between global and domestic opportunities, which bivariate correlations alone cannot capture.

#### IV. COLLECTIVIST AND INDIVIDUALIST FRAMING, 1970-1985

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As discussed in the previous two sections, the movement's degree of confrontation was tightly coupled with the political opportunity structure, but goals shifted more slowly and were influenced by multiple sources of opportunities. My last question concerns the conditions under which the movement chose individualist and collectivist frames. Again, this question points to a primary disagreement between NSMT and PPT, the former arguing that new social movements more often than not take up individualist concerns while the latter argues individualism is a sign of a movement in decline (Table 2.1, hypothesis series C). Figure 5.16 shows the range of collectivist and individualist frames employed by *off our backs* and *Ms.* between 1970-1985. As discussed in Chapter Three, this measure is a 16-point scale based on eight indicators each of collectivism and individualism. Individualist indicators are subtracted from collectivist indicators, such that positive scores denote a greater proportion of collectivist frames, negative scores denote a greater proportion of individualist frames, and zero denotes equal use of both.

With few exceptions, *off our backs* was more likely than *Ms.* to employ collectivist frames. The journal reached a high score of 1.8 in spring 1975, and rose again to 1.6 in summer 1980. *Ms.* generally remained in the negative range, indicating a greater use of individualist frames. The only point at which the magazine employed more collectivist frames was during the year of 1979, after which it steadily declined to a low score of -3.7 in spring 1985. Below, I explore in more detail both journals' use of




individualist and collectivist rhetoric and assess whether political process theory adequately explains these trends.

### ***Off our backs***

For ease of analysis, Figure 5.17 compares the rates of collectivism with perceptions the domestic and global opportunity structures, which include both political and cultural opportunities. Allowing for a 3-4 quarter lag, rates of collectivism are tightly coupled with perceptions of domestic opportunities. Here again, the exception to this pattern is 1984-85, in which opportunities significantly diminish while collectivism remains relatively high.

**Figure 5.16: Levels of Collectivist and Individualist Frames in *off our backs* and *Ms.*, 1970-1985**




Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages  
Sources: *off our backs* (1970-1985), *Ms.* (1972-1985)

Perceptions of the global opportunity structure, however, remain much more positive than those of the domestic opportunity structure, particularly in the 1980s. Just as the liberal branch of the first wave was able to escape the domestic problems plaguing the movement by turning its focus to an increasingly hopeful domestic scene, *off our*

*backs* similarly overcame the negative turn of domestic events in the mid-1980s by looking to the international scene.

Qualitative data help to contextualize these enumerative findings. *Off our backs* throughout the sample period strongly encouraged gender-based solidarity by liberally using the term “feminist” to describe themselves or others, addressing their “sisters” and discussing a shared sisterhood, and employing alternative spellings of women that eliminated the letters “men,” including womyn, womon, and wimmin. One *off our backs* contributor declared the very future of the movement hinged on this feminist consciousness: “The entire success of the revolution does not depend on whether or not the male will ‘allow’ the woman her liberation, but rather on the woman freeing herself of all crippling male identities and realizing the strength that is found in solidarity with her sisters” (*oob*, Sep. 30, 1970). Recognizing the demise of the first wave, the journal argued as late as 1985: “Now more than ever we must struggle AS FEMINISTS both for ‘women's issues’ and in coalitions for peace and justice. Without that crucial feminist identity, we will disappear like the suffragettes in the 1920's, and the history of the last decade will be suppressed” (*oob*, June 30, 1985, emphasis in original). Of particular concern to the journal were racist, classist, and heterosexist biases that often prevented the movement’s embrace of all women. Advised one writer: “Feminists might begin by asking, ‘what is it about the structure of the women's movement that excludes these women? What characteristics of ours work to keep these women out? What is it in the nature of our theory, strategy, personality, and ideology that tells these women they need not apply, that we are not talking about them, that we are not ‘relevant’ to them, or interested in them?’” (*oob*, Nov. 30, 1979).

**Figure 5.17: Rate of Collectivist Frames and Perceptions of Domestic and Global Opportunities in *off our backs*, 1970-1985**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages

Source: *off our backs* (1970-1985)

The journal regularly evaluated how well the movement was meeting its goal of inclusiveness, and as the above quote indicates, one of the primary aspects it evaluated was the organizational structure of movement organizations and media. In describing and justifying their own organization, *off our backs* writes:

The *off our backs* collective has tried through the years to encourage women to think for ourselves. A non-hierarchical collective, everyone does almost everything. The chairing of our weekly meetings is rotated. Once we sit down for a meeting the agenda is put together with much discussion; topics are only tabled for future discussion in everyone agrees. We try to reach consensus, believing if one or two strongly disagree on an important matter then we are probably not looking at all the sides of the issue. With each having a veto power, we try to make room for differences, while simultaneously attempting to find workable solutions we can all live with. (*oob*, Oct. 31, 1977)

Entire articles were dedicated to discussing the benefits and drawbacks of various organizational structures, such as the *off our backs*-style collective as well as “non-centralized hierarchies” and coalitional arrangements that characterized other feminist publishers (*oob* Dec. 31, 1981). In all cases, the journal argued, “By avoiding a hierarchical structure, flexibility occurs which curtails burn-out and boredom [...and] each member has an equal voice in decision making. This surpasses the quality of top-down authority which creates power struggles (*ibid.*). Elsewhere, the journal questioned the wisdom of creating separate feminist institutions, or separate lesbian feminist groups, Black feminist groups, and differently-abled feminist groups, to name a few (e.g., *oob* Dec. 31, 1985).

In addition to organizational issues, the journal rarely shied away from discussing the systematic and deeply-rooted sources of women’s oppression. Given the radical feminist roots of the *off our backs*, the relatively high rates at which the journal discussed the structural roots of sexism is not particularly surprising. As discussed above, while the journal became less likely in later years to identify concrete opponents, it nevertheless continued to employ the term “patriarchy” to denote the structural basis of gender inequality. The journal also used these discussions as an opportunity to build a feminist solidarity, such as the following description of a feminist concert: “The extended 25 minute version started out like the album as Tillery steps from behind her drums, calling us, showing us, making us feel the weight and the wrong of oppression. She brought me and my sister to tears, sobbing at the pain of our collective experience and identification of that spoken oppression” (*oob* Jan. 31, 1979). The argument that structural oppression necessitates a collective commitment was not new to second-wave feminism, of course.

As discussed in Chapter Four, the same arguments were used by the liberal branch of the first wave, in which *Equal Rights* emphasized lingering post-suffrage inequalities that required continuing collective action. Calling attention to systematic and deeply-rooted forms of oppression helped to justify the need for ongoing commitment to the feminist movement.

A closely related trend was the *off our backs*' encouragement of action on behalf of women as a collective. Given the structural basis of women's oppression, *off our backs* suggested, the "pull yourself up by your own bootstraps" mentality that often characterized liberal feminism in the 1980s (as I discuss more fully below) was simply not feasible to the radical feminist writers of *off our backs*. The following article made this connection explicit:

Why then do you not stand with us and fight? For the chains that bound you 200 years ago still exist, i.e. sterilization, police brutality, unemployment, starvation, just to name a few [...] The white devil man-death-machine's spell is being broken. We must smash his power to ashes so that ALL SISTERS may live.

(*oob*, Dec. 31, 1978, emphasis in original)

Another writer simply stated: "Feminists, after all, are committed to freeing all women from male oppression" (*oob* Nov. 30, 1979). Also characteristic of radical feminism, *off our backs* argued that simply working on behalf of women is insufficient; feminists must also work to eradicate all forms of oppression:

Let's always, all of us, hold in mind the over-all nature of women's oppression, so that our particular contribution augments the total energy of the movement. Let's not forget that any unique problem is but a different manifestation of sexism, misogyny, inequality. Ageism is not my personal problem, not yours, just

because I am old and you are not. Ageism is OUR problem. (*oob*, Dec. 31, 1985, emphasis in original)

Note that these concerns for women's collective status extended well into the 1980s. For the same reason that feminists continued to focus on political goals after the conservative sweep in the 1980 and 1984 elections, radical feminists were alarmed over the neoliberal ideology that accompanied this conservatism. In an article appearing after the 1984 election, the journal implored:

We – all radicals who seek to end hierarchy – have something much better to offer than the idea of everyone being for themselves alone. To the extent that feminism has been presented in the straight world as individual women getting theirs, it's no wonder that more women haven't been inspired. The idea of working together for change may seem more abstract than the promise of a few extra dollars in lowered taxes (that mean fewer services – like less food – for others). But we know that it is better as clearly as we know that the promise of lower taxes is a lie. (*oob*, Dec. 31, 1984)

As with radical feminism's politicization, growing concern about the political and social climate in the 1980s actually encouraged—at least temporarily—continued collective action.

As discussed in the previous chapter, first-wave feminism (especially the progressive branch) simply reversed its earlier expressions of collectivism as political opportunities waned (e.g., acknowledging and later denying structural bases of gender inequality; accepting and later rejecting a feminist or suffragist label, encouraging and later discouraging readers to act on behalf of all women). This reversal was generally not the case with *off our backs* during this period. Again, radical feminists continued to

acknowledge structural inequalities and promote collective solutions to those problems well into the 1980s. Consequently, much of what makes up fluctuations in the collectivist index shown in Figure 5.17 were periodic increases in the number of articles discussing issues related to the “self.” The three periods during which individualist frames appeared most often (1973, 1977, and 1982) were the periods during which issues of self were at some of their highest rates (appearing in 58.3%, 35.4%, and 44.3% of all articles, respectively). Such issues varied widely between handling emotional experiences in traditionally male jobs (*oob*, Oct. 31, 1971), self-esteem of teenage girls (*oob*, Nov. 20, 1982), the emotional scars left by a Catholic upbringing (*oob*, Dec. 31, 1973), mental illness caused by domestic abuse (*oob*, Dec. 31, 1977), psychological strain caused by years of activism (*oob*, Dec. 31, 1981), and carving out an identity from multiple sources of oppression (*oob*, Dec. 31, 1978). Much of the discussions of self involved integrating personal and collective action. Indeed, making the personal political was a primary reason for holding “consciousness-raising” sessions, a central activity of second-wave feminism. Explained one participant: “Consciousness-raising tends to be a politicizing process. You develop an awareness of yourself as a woman and the problems you share with other women, in the sense of cultural conditioning” (*oob*, Sep. 30, 1973). In an interview with author Anais Nin, *off our backs* contributors explained her position on the relationship between the personal and political:

Some women are discovering themselves through collective rather than individual introspection. Anais Nin does not see these two approaches in opposition to one another. There is great value in collective action composed of individual contributions of experience and vision. But in order for it to be a creative collective life, it must be composed of individual who have some

semblance of clarity in their perceptions of themselves, of who they are, where they want to go, and where they want the group to go [...] [B]efore woman can change the external world in which she lives, she must change—begin to change—her internal world. Before she can come to the collective, the group, or any relationship that is to be a creative and growing one, she must first have at least begun the journey to herself. (*oob*, Nov. 30, 1971)

In other words, the personal was viewed as a precursor to the political. Yet in some cases, the political also turned personal. One author, for example, points out that the distinct personality types of individuals making up a C-R group can affect the interpersonal dynamics in the group for better or worse (*oob* Dec. 31, 1976).

Recognizing the problems of blurring personal and political, another writer admits: “Hopefully the distinction between the need for personal growth within a political movement and personal solutions without a social movement will be more clear in the future” (*oob* Dec. 31, 1976). Discussions of the role of the personal in a political movement that began to occupy space in second-wave publications became a central focal point for third-wave feminists, an issue to which I will return in the following chapter.

### *Ms.*

The link between the opportunity structure and collectivism in *Ms.* magazine is apparent. Again, for ease of analysis Figure 5.18 shows perceptions of the domestic opportunity structure<sup>33</sup> (including both political and cultural opportunities) and rates of collectivism. Allowing for a three-quarter lag, as perceptions of the domestic opportunity

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<sup>33</sup> *Ms.* perceptions of the global opportunity structure are not included here, as the number of articles discussing global issues are negligible.




structure became more optimistic, the magazine employed more collectivist frames, while pessimistic assessments were quickly followed by individualist frames. Unlike *off our backs*, which turned its focus increasingly to the international arena in the 1980s, *Ms.* remained focused on the domestic front, and consequently its fortunes rose and fell along with it.

Data from the qualitative content analysis supports and contextualizes these findings. While *Ms.* did not use the radical rhetoric of *off our backs*, the magazine did regularly encourage readers to identify as feminists. In some sense, *Ms.* achieved this task more easily than *off our backs*, as the magazine devoted considerably less space to discussing issues that divided women (such as race or sexuality). Instead, it asserted: “Diverse as we are, we are united by the deep and common experience of womanhood” (*Ms.* Dec. 1975, p. 109). Similar to other cases already discussed, a common enemy can also serve to encourage solidarity; for second-wave feminists, one such common enemy was unsurprisingly President Reagan: “Through her [Barbara Honegger's] stint in the Reagan Administration, she had changed from lukewarm feminist to zealot. ‘I am doing this for the cause,’ she said” (*Ms.* Nov. 1983, p. 86). Yet by the 1980s, overt expressions of feminist solidarity appeared less frequently, and in some cases writers were even directly questioning the appropriateness of the label:

The awful truth is that in some emotion sense, I remain something less than an award-winning feminist. I use the word 'emotional' for lack of a better one. I want to be a feminist (in my heart...) and when I think about matters, I can write like one. But in some emotional sense I am not. (*Ms.* Aug. 1984, p. 74)

**Figure 5.18: Rate of Collectivist Frames and Perceptions of Domestic Opportunities in *Ms.*, 1972-1985**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages  
Source: *Ms.* (1972-1985)

Choosing to identify with the movement was one way of encouraging collectivism; another was pointing out structural inequality that by its nature necessitated a collective movement. *Ms.* writers referred to the “social prison of sex” (*Ms.* Dec. 1972, p. 39), and compared sexism to a more widely recognized form of structural inequality – race: “Sexism and racism, to my way of thinking, are different intensities on the same wavelength. Being barred from medical school and doing compulsory time in the typing pool are some of the ways society sends its women to the back of the bus” (*Ms.* Spring 1972, p. 25). Reminiscent of *Equal Rights*’ efforts to demonstrate lingering post-suffrage inequality, *Ms.* linked the first and second waves of the movement in an interview with a former suffragist:

When [suffragist] Florence Luscomb meets with her younger counterparts now, she likes to give them a historical perspective of the Women's Movement--but she's hardly one to live in the past. “Although women won the right to vote,” she

points out, “we haven't finished the job until we have absolute equality and are full members of the human race.” (*Ms.* July 1973, p. 53)

*Ms.*, like *off our backs*, also drew connections between the personal and political, and explained why women so often failed to make the link themselves: “Most of all, not knowing your history really affects the way you think of what is possible. Because we have not been taught women's history, women have always thought that whatever problems we have are personal problems. In fact, the opposite is true” (*Ms.* June 1979, p. 109). While acknowledging the importance of recognizing the personal, the magazine maintained that the personal was a precursor to the political; that is, sharing personal stories helped to establish deeply-rooted structural gender inequality.

While acknowledgement of structural inequality did not disappear from the pages of *Ms.* in the 1980s, it did sharply decline after 1979. At the same time, writers began to suggest that sexism was on its way out. In an interview with Sissy Spacek, for example, the actress asks rhetorically:

“You know the one thing women have to do?” she asks. “Women have to stop being defensive because most people will treat us however we demand to be treated...Okay, so things aren't equal. In many ways, women do have advantages over men. And in other ways I don't think we should feel as powerless as we do. I love strong women and smart women and interesting women. I think we can do anything.” (*Ms.* Mar. 1982, p. 18)

Using military analogies, another writer argues in 1984 that “the army of women invading the business world” are at the “beachhead,” and she gleefully concludes this success means that women can wear more feminine attire to work (*Ms.* Apr. 1984, p. 36). In more subtle ways, the magazine simply ceased attributing women's personal problems

to structural barriers. Lack of adequate and affordable childcare was one issue that attracted a great deal of discussion in the earlier years of both *Ms.* and *off our backs*, identified as a major impediment to gender equality. In a 1985 article that appeared in *Ms.*, however, the solution to scarce childcare was learning “to be a little smarter and more organized” so that women could fit in their activities around their children (*Ms.* July 1985, p. 103). The author made no mention of collective solutions to the problem.

When the magazine placed a stronger emphasis on structural gender inequality, it was also more likely to advocate collective solutions to achieving equality for all women. For instance, growing political restrictions on abortion rights was one issue that *Ms.* used to mobilize readers, arguing that “Women who have assumed that their right to abortion was secure are realizing that they must mobilize for the struggle ahead” (*Ms.*, Aug. 1979, p. 96). But as the magazine became less likely to recognize structural barriers to equality, it began to suggest in direct and indirect terms that women put themselves first. These articles ranged from career planning (*Ms.*, Feb. 1978) to making lingerie purchases (*Ms.* Feb. 1983). In another 1985 article on childcare, the author acknowledged problems with existing childcare systems, but instead of mobilizing readers to find a collective solution, as previous articles had done, she offers tips to parents for choosing the best daycare (*Ms.*, Jan. 1985). The magazine implicitly suggested that with the disappearance of major hurdles to equality, women could now afford to make it on their own.

Issues of self also occupied increasing space in *Ms.* in the 1980s. Unlike *off our backs*, which waxed and waned over the sample period, *Ms.* experienced a rapid increase in discussions of the self between 1980 and 1985, beginning at only 16.7% of articles in summer 1980 and increasing to 80.2% in spring 1985. These issues ranged from

postpartum depression (*Ms.*, Mar. 1976) to hypochondria (*Ms.*, May 1977) to the “psychological trauma of mastectomy” (*Ms.*, Aug. 1983, p. 96). Issues of sexuality comprised many of these discussions, for instance:

No matter how well-adjusted we are, developing a self-identity and a sexual identity (and the two are intertwined) is tricky stuff. But college can be a great time to experiment with the options. It's an opportunity to discard those terrible self-doubts that so often plague sex and to learn how to deeply enjoy it. (*Ms.*, Oct. 1983, p. 69)

The magazine also increasingly focused on health—both physical and psychological—and at times, even, the connection between the two: “Start with the idea that the body and mind cannot be separated: if you are under pressure on the job or at home, it's almost inevitable that it will show up somewhere in your body. Then, if you have tension in your body, it will probably impair the functioning of your mind” (*Ms.* May 1983, p. 66). This increasing number of discussions of personal and often psychological issues in the 1980s, along with denials of sexism, rejection of the feminist identity, and encouraging women to turn their focus from collective efforts to self-advancement, contributed to framing that by 1985 was heavily individualistic.

As with tactics and goals, the journals’ use of individualist and collectivist framing present a challenge to the NSMT assertion that old social movements are consistently collectivist and new movement consistently individualist. Both journals fluctuated in their levels of individualism, and generally this individualism follows on the heels of negative turns in the opportunity structure. Again, *off our backs* presents an exception to this pattern when it become more collectivist in the increasingly hostile mid-

1980s. As with goals, some degree of hostility may encourage this collectivism (for example, when radical feminists united behind the common enemy of the Reagan administration), but only when coupled with a favorable opportunity structure elsewhere—in this case, the global opportunity structure.

### ***Correlations***

Table 5.5 presents correlation coefficients between the rates of collectivism and select independent variables (lagged one year) for *off our backs* and *Ms.* See Appendix C for full table of correlations.

Measures of *political instability* do not uniformly conform to my hypothesis and the correlation coefficients are relatively small, but generally the relationship does occur in the hypothesized direction. In particular, the strength of the Conservative Coalition is negatively and moderately well-correlated with levels of collectivism in *Ms.* ( $r = -0.42$ ). For the two journal combined, however, the coefficient becomes smaller and non-significant.

*Access to the state* (operationalized as women's voter registration rates) is not well-correlated with levels of collectivism, and in fact, the relationship is negative in both journals, contrary to my hypothesis.

Most measures of *political allies* show virtually no relationship to levels of collectivism. A few exceptions, including EEOC funding and rates of women elected to U.S. House positions, are actually negatively correlated with collectivism.

Measures of *cultural allies* also tend to not conform to my hypotheses. For instance, the rate of women's employment in cultural occupations and newspaper

**Table 5.5: Correlation Coefficients between Collectivism and Select Independent Variables**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables		Correlation Coefficients		
			<i>off our backs</i>	<i>Ms.</i>	<i>Combined</i>
1. During periods of <b>political instability</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Number of congressional seats that change party		-0.0057	0.2370	0.0487
	Margin of victory for political candidates		0.1507	0.2110	0.1294
	Strength of Conservative Coalition		-0.0013	-0.4154*	-0.1255
	Presidential victories on votes in Congress		0.0712	0.0012	0.0578
	Size of gender voting gap		-0.0448	-0.2494	-0.1629
2. During periods in which women's <b>access to the polity</b> broadens, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Women's voter registration rates		-0.2230	-0.1940	-0.1420
3. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Presidential support for women's rights (% of words in State of Union in support of women's rights)		-0.0208	-0.0570	-0.0716
	EEOC funding		-0.2451	-0.3136*	-0.3218*
	Rates of women in political positions	U.S. Senate	-0.0362	-0.0152	-0.0175
		U.S. House	-0.3099*	-0.3897*	-0.3719*
		Governors	-0.0530	0.2343	0.0230
Presidential Cabinets		-0.1239	-0.1751	-0.1975*	
4. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Rates of women's employment in the arts, media, and clergy		-0.0905	-0.4268*	-0.2479*
	Media coverage of the women's movement	<i>NY Times</i>	-0.3360*	-0.1974	-0.3386*
		Periodicals	0.3075*	-0.3064*	0.1834
		Television news	-0.1255	0.1067	-0.0724

<b>4a.</b> During periods in which <b>public opinion</b> is supportive of feminist issues, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Equality for women	0.1338	0.0938	0.0799
	Legalization of abortion	0.2435	0.1876	0.2872*
	Favor ERA	-0.1362	-0.3928*	-0.2408*
<b>12.</b> During periods of increasing <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Perceptions of political opportunities	0.2758*	0.2375	0.0768
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities	0.1038	0.2627	-0.0490
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities	0.4023*	0.4774*	0.1155
	Perceptions of global opportunities	-0.1341	-0.2089	-0.2632*
<b>14.</b> During periods of increasing <b>global opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	NGO access to the UN (number granted consultative status)	-0.2435	-0.3986*	-0.3418*
	Rate of political party competition across countries	-0.0197	-0.5295*	-0.2374*
	Rate of political participation across countries	-0.1121	-0.4778*	-0.2819*
	Number of countries with official agencies for women's affairs	-0.2150	-0.5327*	-0.3661*
	Number of countries with female heads of state	-0.1962	-0.6405*	-0.3780*
	Number of CEDAW signatories	0.2869	-0.3175	-0.0627
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>		<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>		<b>24</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>16</b>

\* p&lt;.05

*Note:* All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).



coverage of feminism are significantly and negatively correlated with levels of collectivism.

Measures of *public opinion* show small or negative correlations with levels of collectivism, contrary to my hypothesis, with the exception of support for abortion rights, which is positively and significantly correlated with collectivism for the two journals combined ( $r = 0.29$ ).

*Perceptions of opportunities* show positive and often significant correlations with levels of collectivism. Perceptions of political opportunities are correlated with levels of collectivism at 0.28 and 0.24 for *off our backs* and *Ms.*, respectively. Perceptions of cultural opportunities are positively correlated with collectivism in each journal, but at much smaller levels (although this relationship becomes negative when the two journals are combined). Perceptions of all domestic opportunities combined shows an even stronger relationship to levels of collectivism, at 0.40 and 0.48 in *off our backs* and *Ms.*, respectively. Perceptions of global opportunities, however, show small and negative correlations with collectivism.

Measures of objective *global opportunities* are almost entirely negatively correlated with levels of collectivism, contrary to my hypotheses.

In sum, these correlations overall show less support for the PPT hypotheses than the qualitative and descriptive quantitative findings suggest, particularly with regard to objective opportunities. Perceptions of opportunities do show stronger relationships to the journals' level of collectivism, however. Nonetheless, these data must be interpreted with some caution. In particular, the qualitative findings point to a complex interrelationship between global and domestic opportunities, a relationship that bivariate

correlations are not likely to capture. Moreover, the growing hostility in the 1980s served as a tool for mobilization under certain circumstances, which again is a phenomenon not easily captured with bivariate correlations.

## V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

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In many ways, the story of second-wave feminism mirrors that of the first wave. The movement did not show consistent rates of collectivism, politicization, or use of conflict tactics, as NSMT would lead us to believe. The alternative hypothesis grounded in PPT, by contrast, better explains fluctuations in tactics, goals, and frames with some additional specifications, which I lay out below.

The qualitative findings suggest that like first-wave feminism, the second wave's use of conflict and consensus tactics quickly follows changes in the political opportunity structure. Within one year of growing optimism about the opportunity structure, both journals increased their levels of direct confrontation with opponents; conversely, within a year of growing pessimism, the journals relied more often on consensus tactics.

Also like first-wave feminism, second-wave goals changed more slowly than tactics, and only after all opportunities were exhausted. Recall that the *Woman Citizen* replaced its original political goals with cultural goals long after political opportunities had declined. Rather, this shift occurred only after both political and cultural opportunity structures offered no hope for success. *Equal Rights* maintained a high level of politicization throughout the 1920s, due in large part to its focus on the international movement, which was faring much better than the post-suffrage domestic movement.

The journal did depoliticize briefly in the year after suffrage, however, when it faced no further serious opposition.

Similar circumstances faced the second wave of the movement. *Off our backs* was able to avoid the negative effects of the closing domestic opportunity structure to some degree by turning its focus to the global arena in the 1980s. At the same time, growing domestic hostility actually encouraged rather than discouraged politicization. Like *Equal Rights*, global opportunities coupled with domestic threats spurred *off our backs* to remain focused on political goals. Again, these findings fit with previous research that finds both major defeats and total success spell movement decline while partial defeats or successes encourage continued action (Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone 2003; Meyer 1993; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Santoro and Townsend 2006; Staggenborg 1991; Werum and Winders 2001). Radical feminists were clearly alarmed over the strengthening domestic backlash in the 1980s, but unlike liberal feminists who recognized the same problems, they turned to the international community for support and were consequently able to maintain their political agenda.

In a similar vein, *off our backs* sustained higher levels of collectivism in the 1980s (relative to *Ms.*) for the same reasons. The journal deliberately drew on the threats posed by the Reagan administration and others to mobilize feminists—again, indicating that hostility can be healthy for movements under certain circumstances—and unlike *Ms.*, which remained focused on the domestic landscape, *off our backs* drew more support from the global opportunity structure. These findings suggest that movements can capitalize on threats to mobilize and politicize their constituents, but only when coupled with other sources of opportunities.

Finally, the findings from the bivariate correlations offer an alternate way of assessing the qualitative data, although they generally present a more inconsistent picture of these phenomena. While certain categories of opportunities stood out as significant predictors of first-wave movement dynamics, this was not the case with the second wave, making it difficult to establish any general findings. To reiterate, however, the qualitative and descriptive findings point to a complicated relationship between different types of opportunities and different timing of movement outcomes. Basic bivariate correlations with standardized one-year lags simply cannot capture such relationships.

## **CHAPTER 6: THIRD-WAVE FEMINISM**

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This chapter traces the emergence and trajectory of the third wave of the feminist movement. As in the previous two chapters, I provide an historical overview of this period and offer some discussion of the external environment in which the movement emerged. The case of the third wave differs from that of the first and second waves in several ways, however. Given that the third wave is still very much ongoing, and because it has received scant attention from academics, this chapter is in many ways more exploratory than the previous two. Moreover, as I discuss throughout the chapter, despite the adoption by young feminists of the third-wave label, it is not entirely clear that this period in the feminist movement does in fact constitute a distinct wave. For these reasons, the history of the third wave is less neatly packaged and leaves a number of questions to be addressed. Chief among these are: What are the political and cultural conditions that produced this most recent form of feminist activity? Does this activity qualify as a movement wave? What are the implications of two waves -- that is, a third wave and a still very active second wave -- existing simultaneously, and how different are these two waves?

I draw on four magazines to assess change over time as well as differences between various branches and generations: *Ms.* and *off our backs*, a liberal and radical feminist magazine, respectively, whose roots are with the second wave in the 1970s, and *BUST* and *Bitch*, two quintessential third-wave “zines” who boast the highest circulation numbers and longest tenure among other third-wave publications. The findings presented here are similar to those presented in previous chapters, with some exceptions – that is, as perceptions of the opportunity structure become more pessimistic, the magazines in this

period shift to consensus tactics, cultural goals, and individualistic frames. In line with previous findings, tactics and frames generally shift quickly with the first sign of changing opportunities – whether political or cultural. Contrary to earlier findings, however, the shift in goals for *BUST* and *Bitch* occurred much more quickly than in past waves. Also in line with previous findings, the magazines which were more focused on international concerns were better able to withstand domestic setbacks. Perhaps most surprising, however, is the similarity in tactics, frames, and goals between *Bitch* – a third-wave magazine – and *off our backs* and *Ms.* – the second-wave magazines, suggesting that the oft-cited generational differences between the two waves have been exaggerated. Instead, all three magazines show similar levels of collectivism, politicization, and use of conflict tactics, and all shift at similar times in conjunction with shifts in the opportunity structure.

## I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

*So I write this as a plea to all women, especially women of my generation: Let Thomas' confirmation serve to remind you, as it did me, that the fight is far from over. Let this dismissal of a woman's experience move you to anger. Turn that outrage into political power. Do not vote for them unless they work for us. Do not have sex them with them, do not break bread with them, do not nurture them if they don't prioritize our freedom to control our bodies and our lives. I am not a post-feminist feminist. I am the Third Wave. (Walker 1992: 41)*

The anti-feminist backlash that marked the 1980s did not go unnoticed by an emerging generation of young feminists. Amid Clarence Thomas' contentious Supreme Court confirmation following allegations of sexual harassment, increasing restrictions on reproductive rights, and media claims that feminism was dead, Rebecca Walker published an article entitled "Becoming the Third Wave" in *Ms.* magazine in 1992 (Walker 1992). The magazine was inundated with letters from young women (and men) who shared Walker's outrage about the current state of affairs and dissatisfaction with the response of an older generation of feminists. Buoyed by this enthusiasm, Walker and her colleague Shannon Liss organized the Third Wave Direct Action Corporation in the following months and set to work organizing young feminists for voter registration drives, reproductive rights campaigns, and public education initiatives, among other activities (Orr 1997; Third Wave Foundation n.d.)

Despite Walker's declaration that the third wave had emerged by 1992, the roots of the movement can be traced earlier. In fact, the use of the term "third wave" first appeared in the mid-1980s in an unpublished anthology entitled *The Third Wave: Feminist Perspectives on Racism*, a project which grew out of feminist-of-color critiques of the second wave that the movement was elitist and addressed only the concerns of white, middle-class, Western, heterosexual women (Orr 1997). Throughout the second wave, women of color were publishing important critical texts, including "A Black Feminist Statement" (Combahee River Collective [1977] 1983), *This Bridge Called My Back* (Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983), *All the Women are White, All the Blacks are Men, but Some of Us are Brave* (Hull, Bell-Scott, and Smith 1982), and *Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism* (hooks 1981). While they addressed a range of problems

with second-wave feminism, a common concern was the notion of universal sisterhood, and the implicit assumption that all women experienced sexism in the same way. This assumption, feminists of color argued, centered the experiences of white women and rendered invisible those of women of color. Instead they advocated building a movement based on diversity and difference. In the words of Audre Lorde, feminists must “learn how to take our differences and make them our strengths” (1983: 99). As I discuss below, this emphasis on difference has had important implications for the form and focus of third-wave feminism.

Another early influence on the third wave was the Riot Grrrl movement of the late 1980s and early 1990s (Whittier 2006). Initially a loose network of underground punk rock feminists in Washington, D.C., and Olympia, Washington, Riot Grrrls combined the feminist message of self-empowerment with the “Do It Yourself” (DIY) ethic of the punk-rock subculture that produced garage bands and handmade fanzines (Rosenberg and Garofalo 1998). They became known for their attempts to reclaim derogatory words for women, including the word “grrrl” in an effort to replace the perceived passivity of the word “girl” with a growl (*ibid*). As one *Newsweek* article described, Riot Grrrls “apply a kind of linguistic jujitsu against their enemies. Instead of downplaying the negative stereotypes used against them, they exaggerate them” (Chideya, Rossi, and Hannah 1992: 84). Tobi Vail, drummer for the band Bikini Kill, explained: “For girls to pick up guitars and scream their heads off in a totally oppressive, fucked up, male dominated culture is to seize power [...] we recognize this as a political act” (quoted in Krolokke and Sorensen 2005: 16).



Indeed, the use of cultural sites of resistance has become a defining characteristic of third-wave feminism (Bailey 2003; Baumgardner and Richards 2000). With its roots in cultural feminism, these third-wavers are “primarily engaging with cultural images of women, both in the critique of such images and in the creation of new ones” (Bailey 2003). Although Bailey (*ibid.*) notes that such activism is not new to feminism, “What is different today is that many young feminists almost exclusively focus on culture rather than political life.”

Another defining characteristic that many third-wavers often anecdotally acknowledge is a shift from collective to individual action. Harde and Harde (2003), for example, posit: “I think that whereas the second wave was more of a collective political movement, the third wave helps women work on a personal level. I may never lobby my child’s school for nonbiased gender practices, as [my mother] did, but I can draw self-confidence from third wave examples and role models as I enter the job market” ( 119-20; see also Pollitt and Baumgardner 2003). Katzenstein (1990) terms post-second wave feminist activism “unobtrusive mobilization,” explaining that while feminists are no longer protesting in the streets, they have been quietly infiltrating institutions such as the Catholic Church and armed services. Many third-wave feminists understand this shift towards individualist activism as a direct result of critiques made by women of color, lesbian feminists, and Third World feminists (among others) that the second wave whitewashed the movement by applying the experiences of white, middle-class, Western, and heterosexual women to *all* women (Darraj 2003; Delombard 1995; Diaz 2003; Moraga and Anzuldúa 1983). These critiques, coupled with the spread and adoption of postmodernism, highlight multiple and constantly shifting axes of identity, and

demonstrate the existence of difference between women (Guess 1997; Herrup 1995; Walker 1995).

Thus, third-wave feminists typically point to internal dynamics of the women's movement that gave rise to their unique brand of feminism, such as racial and class schisms among second-wave feminists, or a new network of younger feminists. Less often discussed are the political and cultural conditions that shaped this wave. Below I provide an overview of the external opportunity structure leading up to the emergence of third-wave feminism.

#### *THE STRUCTURE OF OPPORTUNITIES*

Popular accounts of the third wave attributes its rise and form either to internal movement dynamics at the close of the second wave, or to the conservative constraints of the 1980s (e.g., Baumgardner and Richards 2000; Walker 1995). Yet the political process tradition makes the case that neither internal dynamics nor external constraints alone are sufficient condition to give rise to social movements. Rather, they but must be coupled with openings in the political opportunity structure (see Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). Given this, did the feminist movement experience an upsurge in opportunities in the 1990s that would enable it to overcome these constraints? The findings presented below suggest that the 1980s and 90s offered a mix of opportunities and constraints. I begin with a discussion of the political opportunity structure, followed by discussions of cultural and global opportunity structures, drawing on both primary and secondary data.

***Political Opportunity Structure.*** Bean (2007) argues that the election of Clinton in 1992 represented a reversal of the anti-feminist backlash of the 1980s, arguing: "In

helping to stall the momentum of Reaganesque conservatism and elect Bill Clinton, women demonstrated feminism's promise as a political movement" (54). Certainly to some extent, the Clinton administration provided an opening in the political opportunity structure, although not necessarily in terms of real political gain, as Whittier (2006) points out, but because it provided feminists with a new sense of optimism:

Under Clinton and sympathetic appointees, feminist activists of both generations gained access to decision makers, funding, and a sense of possibility. Although policy changes under Clinton went against feminists at least as often as they went for them (witness the Welfare Reform Act, the "don't ask don't tell" policy on gays in the military, and the antigay Defense of Marriage Act), feminists' sense of being beleaguered or under siege was replaced by a sense of efficacy. (63)

In addition to the symbolic victory of Clinton's election, however, his presidency advanced women's issues in a number of ways. Following the 1995 U.N. World Conference on Women, Clinton formed the President's Interagency Council on Women to implement recommendations in the Beijing Platform for Action to eliminate gender-based discrimination. The agency released a series of reports over the next several years, which highlighted the progress made towards improving the status of women in the U.S. and reiterated the federal government's commitment to fighting gender inequality. That same year, Clinton created the Office for Women's Initiatives and Outreach to serve as a liaison between the White House and women's organizations. These initiatives granted women's groups access to the highest levels of government and real input into policymaking (Finlay 2006). This access resulted in several policy gains, including the Equal Pay Matters Initiative (1999), which provided extra funds to promote pay equity,


and the Family and Medical Leave Act (1993), which mandated that certain eligible workers be given twelve weeks' unpaid leave after childbirth.

The support that Clinton provided for feminist causes virtually disappeared during Bush's presidency. On his first day in office, Bush reinstated the global gag rule, barring foreign NGOs that receive federal aid from so much as discussing abortion. He also eliminated both the Interagency Council on Women and the Office on Women's Initiatives and Outreach, severely curtailing women's organizations' access to the White House. In their place, Bush appointed the conservative anti-feminist Tim Goeglein as deputy director of the Office of Public Liason, who, in the words of one *Washington Post* reporter, "operates as a virtual middleman between the White House and conservatives of all stripes seeking to shape its policies" (quoted in Finlay 2006: 17). Not surprisingly, this conservative shift resulted in the elimination or weakening of several feminist policies created during the Clinton administration, including doing away with the Equal Pay Matters Initiative, weakening the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, removing funding set aside by Clinton for paid family leave plans, and challenging Title IX protections (Finlay 2006).

Despite his record on women's issues, Bush frequently touted his support for women in rhetorical and tokenistic ways. His appointment of highly visible women in his campaign and administration was used to demonstrate his commitment to women's issues, but, as discussed more fully below, these token appointments did little to advance women's rights. References to women's rights in his public speeches most often concerned his "liberation" of Afghan and Iraqi women (Finlay 2006). To use an enumerative measure of presidential support for women's issues, I compare mentions of

such issues in annual State of the Union addresses. Support was considerably lower in both Clinton and Bush addresses than it had been during the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Figure 6.1), but interestingly Bush's first speech contained the most references to women's rights during this period. On closer reading, however, nearly all mentions of women's issues during Bush's speeches between 2001 and 2005 concerned women's rights in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2001, for instance, Bush celebrated the intervention in Afghanistan by arguing: "The last time we met in this Chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to school. Today women are free and are part of Afghanistan's new government" (Public Papers of the President 2001). While he paid lip service to women's rights abroad, however, he was vehemently undermining them at home.

**Figure 6.1: Presidential State of the Union Address**




Source: Public Papers of the President 1995-2005

In addition to public statements, another indicator of federal support for women's rights is the amount of funding allocated to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. As discussed in the previous chapter, the level of funding allocated to the EEOC is an indication of federal priorities, as well as availability of resources for the

women's movement (i.e., a stronger EEOC should lead to more hiring and promotions of women). Adjusted for inflation, the level of EEOC funding was considerably lower between 1995 and 2005 than it was during its peak in 1981 (see Figure 6.2). Within this time period, however, funding was slightly higher under Clinton (averaging \$366 million from 1995-2000) than Bush (\$359 million from 2001-2005), and 2001 marked the beginning of a consistent decline during the Bush years. By these indicators, then, the lack of public attention paid to women's issues was matched by a lack of funding for those causes.

**Figure 6.2: EEOC funding**




Source: *Budget of the United States Government (1995-2005)*

Note: Funding adjusted for inflation, in 2005 dollars

Another potential source of political opportunity was the growing numbers of women in state and federal political positions. The number of Congressional seats held by women slowly increased during the 1990s, and increased more quickly after the 2000 elections. The number of female governors increased much more rapidly, from a low of 2% in 1995 to a high of 18% in 2005 (see Figure 6.3). Of course, increasing numbers of women in politics does not necessarily translate into substantive support for feminist

causes, but just as President Clinton offered symbolic hope to feminists despite his often anti-feminist policy stance, growing numbers of women in political positions may serve as a symbolic victory.

**Figure 6.3: Number of Women in Political Positions, 1995-2005**



Sources: Center for American Women and Politics (2009a, 2009b); United States Senate Historical Office (2009a); U.S. House of Representatives Office of the Clerk (2007)

While the number of women in elected office increased between 1995-2005, the number of women in Cabinet and White House staff posts declined considerably under Bush. Although he appointed a handful of women to highly visible positions, the overall percentage of women declined (see Figure 6.3). Aside from an abnormally high number of women in 2001, the Bush cabinet included an average of only 4 women, less than half the rate during the Clinton administration. Among the nominees requiring Senate confirmation in Bush's first year, only about 25 percent were women (compared to 37 percent under Clinton) – roughly the same percentage as that of Reagan and George H.W. Bush during the 1980s (Finlay 2006). Advocates for women appointees expressed outrage that they were being excluded from the appointment process for the first time since the Nixon presidency (Tessier 2002). As Roselyn O'Connell, president of the

National Women's Political Caucus, articulated: "What's disheartening to me is what [the data] reflects about the access of women to the White House, especially when we see who does get access--i.e., Enron [...] We would be seeing different policies and priorities if there were women in more of these key positions" (quoted in Tessier 2002). Despite the "showcasing" of a small number of women and minorities – as the Black Leadership Forum termed it – the overall lack of female representation in the Bush administration sent "a signal that we're just not that important," argued O'Connell (quoted in Tessier 2002).

While the above discussion has centered on political opportunities specific to the women's movement, political process theory also directs our attention to general components of the opportunity structure applicable to all movements (Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Tarrow 1998). One commonly used measure of the general opportunity structure is the degree of stability in the political system, since greater volatility indicates more openings for new challengers. I operationalize political (in)stability in four ways: (1) the number of congressional seats that change political party; (2) the degree to which legislative and executive branches support the same agenda; (3) the degree to which elections are closely contested; and (4) the size of the gender voting gap (Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Werum and Winders 2001).

First, there was a great deal of Congressional volatility early on in this period, with 69 seats in both chambers changing party in 1994 and another 39 in the following election. Yet this volatility did not likely benefit organized feminism, as much of that change was the result of the "Republican Revolution" and its conservative shift in the House and Senate. Moreover, with the exception of the anomalous 1994 elections,



congressional seats during this period were considerably more stable than they had been during the 1970s and 80s, averaging a change of only 24 seats between 1995-2005, compared to 40 seats between 1970-1985. Thus, what little volatility did exist during this period largely benefited conservative efforts.

A second measure of political stability is the degree to which the executive and legislative branches support the same agendas, since disagreement between branches should produce more potential avenues of access to the state for challenging groups (Werum and Winders 2001). Not surprisingly, there was a great deal of disagreement between Clinton and Congress after the 1994 elections, with the president supporting only 48% of measures passed by Congress. The Bush years, however, showed some of the highest overlap, peaking at 88% in 2002. This figure too should not be particularly surprising, given the legislature's post-9/11 willingness to delegate more power to the executive branch (see Farrier 2005).

A third measure of political stability includes the degree to which elections are closely contested, as the smaller the margin of victory, the more likely a candidate will be to seek out new constituencies. In terms of House races, candidates' average margin of victory ranged from a high of 7% in the Republican sweep of 1994 to a low of just 0.4% in the next election. In terms of presidential politics, Clinton won by some of the widest margins in the sample period (5.6% and 8.5% of the popular vote in 1992 and 1996 respectively), indicating greater stability; on the other hand, Bush won by much slimmer margins, even losing the popular vote in 2000, indicating greater instability.

While the above three measures of political (in)stability constitute a general opportunity structure that should benefit any social movement, I include a fourth

indicator specific to the women's movement: the size of the gender voting gap in presidential elections. If politicians are willing to look for new constituencies during periods of instability, how likely are they to turn to women voters specifically? Clinton clearly enjoyed greater support among female constituents, winning five points more than male voters in 1992 and nine points in 1996. Manza and Brooks (1998) find that in fact the 1992 election represented the first time that feminists coalesced into a visible and influential voting force (see also Bean 2007). This trend was reversed during the 2000 and 2004 elections, however, with Bush winning a greater proportion of male votes (7 and 8 points respectively), despite his "compassionate conservative" attempt to appeal to women voters (Finlay 2006). With Bush's small (or nonexistent) margin of victory in the 2000 election, and his base of support among male voters, feminist voters had little chance for influence in the executive realm.

In short, while the political opportunity structure may have opened in some respects during the Clinton administration in the 1990s, most of these openings closed again after 2000. The female voting bloc that helped to elect Clinton in 1992 was ineffective in the 2000 and 2004 elections. What political volatility existed during this period rarely benefited women constituents. Substantive policy gains during the Clinton administration, such as pay equity and family leave, suffered severe setbacks under Bush. And while women were gaining some ground in state and federal congressional positions, they had little access to the White House during the Bush administration. These mixed indicators allow for the examination of several hypotheses regarding the effect of the POS on the women's movement (see Table 6.1 below, reprinted from full list in Table 2.1). In particular, we can address what effect political stability has on movement

**Table 6.1: Partial List of Hypotheses and Measures**

Hypotheses	Measures of independent variables
<i>I. Political Opportunity Structure</i>	
<b>1.</b> During periods of <b>political stability</b> (political instability), the women's movement will be more likely to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>A.</b> Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</li> <li><b>B.</b> Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li><b>C.</b> Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	Overlap between executive and legislative branches Margin of victory for political candidates Number of congressional seats that change party Gender voting gap
<b>3.</b> During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>A.</b> Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</li> <li><b>B.</b> Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</li> <li><b>C.</b> Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</li> </ul>	Presidential support for women's rights EEOC funding Rates of women in political positions


outcomes (H1), as well as the presence of political allies (H3). Moreover, we can also distinguish between general opportunities (e.g., change in congressional seats, percent agreement between executive and legislative branches) and issue-specific opportunities (e.g., gender voting gap, presidential support for women's issues). I take up these questions below, following a discussion of the cultural and global opportunity structures.

***Cultural Opportunity Structure.*** As discussed in the previous two chapters, the cultural opportunity structure often moves independently of the political opportunity structure. While political opportunities were intermittent during the Clinton years and nearly disappeared under Bush, cultural opportunities did not necessarily shift evenly with the POS.

One basic indicator of the cultural opportunity structure is public opinion polls on two issues central to the women's movement: general equality for women and abortion rights. For comparison purposes, Figure 6.4 shows changes in public opinion on both issues between 1970-2005. Those who strongly agree in equality for women increased


considerably between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, reaching as high as 57% in 2004. The issue of abortion shows more variation, however. Interestingly, nearly 60% of college freshmen in 1995 believed abortion should be legal, considerably higher than the rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s; yet, support for abortion among college freshmen dropped precipitously over the next couple of years, reaching 52.3% in 1999, the lowest rate in this sample period.

**Figure 6.4: Public Opinion on Women's Equality and Abortion Rights, 1995-2005**



Sources: American National Election Study (2005); Bureau of Justice Statistics (2006)


**Figure 6.5: Media Coverage of Feminism**



Sources: *New York Times* Index (1995-2005); Vanderbilt Television News Archive (1995-2005)

Another component of the cultural opportunity structure includes the degree of media attention to the women's movement. As discussed previously, the news media can serve as an important ally for movements in that they have the power to bring the movement and its issues to the attention of the public (Meyer and Minkoff 2004; but see Gitlin 1980 and Bean 2007). Figure 6.5 shows the number of stories appearing in the *New York Times* database and Vanderbilt Television News archive that address feminism between 1970 and 1985, and 1995 to 2005. While television coverage is relatively low during this later period, newspaper coverage is relatively high, even exceeding rates during the peak of the second wave. However, coinciding with the conservative social and political turn by the late 1990s, newspaper coverage of feminism dropped from a high of 715 stories in 1998 to a low of 431 by 2004.

**Figure 6.6: Oscar, Emmy, and Grammy Award Nominees, Percent Women, 1995-2005**



Sources: Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences Awards Database (2009); *Los Angeles Times* Emmy Awards Database (2009); Recording Academy GRAMMY Search Database (2009)

Finally, I include the cultural consecration of female artists as an indicator of cultural opportunities for the women's movement. I calculated the percent of women nominated for Oscar, Emmy, and Grammy awards in major non-gender-specific categories. Figure 6.6 compares the rates of female nominations for these awards from 1970-1985 and 1995-2005. While Oscar and Emmy award nominations do not show a great deal of variation, women were significantly more likely to be nominated for Grammy awards between 1995-2002, relative to their nomination rates in the earlier period and after 2002.

In sum, indicators of the cultural opportunity structure show mixed results. The mid-1990s witnessed some forms of cultural opportunities for feminism (such as media attention, fairly favorable public opinion, and valorization of female artists). Yet the conservative political turn in 2000 seems to coincide with a conservative cultural turn: public opinion turned against abortion rights and became more conservative in general, and media attention quickly dropped off after 2000. Again, this variation offers an opportunity to examine several hypotheses regarding the effect of the cultural opportunity structure on the women's movement (see Table 6.2, reprinted from full list in Table 2.1), particularly the availability of cultural allies (H4), and women's access to cultural spaces (H5).

**Table 6.2: Partial List of Hypotheses and Measures**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables
<p>4. During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>cultural allies</b>, it will be more likely to:</p> <p>A. Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</p> <p>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</p> <p>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</p>	<p>Employment of women in the arts, media, and clergy</p> <p>Media coverage of the women's movement</p>
<p>5. During periods in which women's <b>access to cultural spaces</b> is restricted (broadened), the women's movement will be more likely to:</p> <p>A. Use consensus tactics (conflict tactics)</p> <p>B. Adopt cultural goals (political goals)</p> <p>C. Use individualist rhetoric (collectivist rhetoric)</p>	<p>Participation in Olympics</p> <p>Female Nobel Prize laureates</p> <p>Cultural consecration of female artists</p>

*Global Opportunity Structure.* The previous two chapters suggested that domestic and global opportunities do not shift in lock step. Moreover, opportunities at the domestic and global levels can exert independent influences on movements, such that global opportunities can mitigate domestic constraints to some extent and under some conditions. For that reason, a consideration of the global opportunity structure is also necessary.


Prügl and Meyer claim that “opportunity structures and feminist strategies [...] coalesced in the 1990s to advance the international causes of feminists who were able to shape the political agendas of multilateral institutions in effective ways” (1999: 12). Their framework for understanding international feminist activity involves both opportunity structures and feminists’ ability to take advantage of those opportunities. Both of these came together, Prügl and Meyer argue, to result in substantial international gains for feminists in the 1990s.

Tarrow (1998) argues that a primary source of opportunity for movements is political instability, which leads political actors to consider the demands of new

constituents. While political instability is typically conceptualized at the national level, I have argued in earlier chapters already that it can play a similar role at the global level. As Prügl and Meyer (1999: 16) contend: “international economic and political crises destabilize entrenched institutions, including institutions of gender, thus opening up opportunities for emancipatory politics” (Prügl and Meyer 1999: 16). For instance, as discussed earlier, World War I and II fundamentally altered political and social structures, opening up new opportunities for first- and second-wave feminism, respectively.

In many ways, the end of the Cold War functioned similarly for third-wave feminism. Perhaps most importantly, it freed up “agenda space,” shifting the focus from the East-West conflict to new issues (Joachim 1999; 2007). In seeking to outline new agendas, the UN launched a series of conferences in the early 1990s, including the UN Conference on Environment and Degradation (Rio de Janeiro, 1993), the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993), the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994), the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995), and the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995). These conferences were notable for their involvement of women’s organizations and women-centered approach to policy recommendations (Higer 1999; Joachim 1999; Prügl and Meyer 1999). Prügl and Meyer (1999: 12) argue that “perhaps the most significant outcome of international conferencing for women has been that governments and international organizations have begun to take steps to mainstream, or integrate, a gender perspective into various politics, programs, and bureaucratic procedures.”



**Figure 6.7: Number of NGOs Granted Consultative Status to U.N., 1995-2005**

Sources: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2009); Willetts (1996, 2002)

Another significant development in the post-Cold War period concerned a redefinition of “security,” moving away from defense and military strength and towards a greater emphasis on individual rights and well-being (Joachim 1999; 2007). As Joachim (2007) points out, this new focus allowed for greater involvement of NGOs, as the “discourse of individual rights was more in alignment with the issues promoted by these nonstate actors who represent civil society and claim to speak for the weak and voiceless” (25). At the same time, the UN began to become more accessible to NGOs by relaxing its standards for accreditation. Consultative status was granted not only to international NGOs, but also to regional and grassroots NGOs. As Figure 6.7 indicates, the number of NGOs granted consultative status more than tripled between 1995 and 2005, increasing from 886 to 2719. The UN also expanded the prerogatives of NGOs with consultative status; previously relegated to the visitor balconies and corridors, these NGOs were now allowed onto the negotiation floors, where they could actively try to shape policy (Joachim 1999; 2007). Just as Tarrow (1998) argues that an actor’s access to the nation-

state comprises a political opportunity, NGO access to central world governance bodies should function similarly by enabling them to set and shape the international agenda (Joachim 2007).

Finally, the end of the Cold War also spelled an end to the factionalism that had divided women's organizations and nearly derailed the 1980 Women's Conference in Copenhagen (West 1999). As women's groups strengthened coalitions and improved their lobbying skills, they were able to accomplish remarkable success, including strengthening the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, passing the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, and incorporating gender issues into the major UN conferences of the 1990s. To return to Prügl and Meyer's (1999) contention above, the success of international feminism in the 1990s was due not only to these openings in the opportunity structure, but also the increasing ability of the organizations themselves to take advantage of those opportunities. International activists learned how to better prepare for and participate in the conferences, became knowledgeable about UN procedures, and learned the importance of building consensus and coalitions among feminist groups (Chen 1996). Perhaps most important was the development of the Women's Caucus in 1992, which coordinated the efforts of women's NGOs and became a permanent fixture at UN conferences (Chen 1996; Higer 1999).

The positive developments at the global level offer an interesting contrast to the negative developments at home. Again, this dynamic is similar to the environments faced by the first and second waves, in which domestic constraints were coupled with global opportunities. Based on the trajectories of the first and second waves, we should

generally expect that during this period, the feminist organizations which focused more heavily on global issues should be able to more easily remain mobilized in the face of domestic constraints.

*PERCEPTIONS OF THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE, 1995-2005*

In many ways, the domestic POS and COS were relatively closed to feminism during the rise of the third wave, particularly after 2000, although the global opportunity structure was more receptive. Yet perceptions of the opportunity structure do not necessarily reflect reality; some research suggests, for instance, that activists tend to overestimate their chances for success (Gamson and Meyer 1996), and others have argued that certain components of the opportunity structure are more visible (and therefore more influential) to activists (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). There is an empirical question, then, as to whether and in what ways perceptions independently shape movement outcomes. (See Table 2.1, hypotheses 11-12.)


Figure 6.8 compares the four magazines' perceptions of the POS between 1995 and 2005. *Ms.* and *off our backs* show fairly similar trends, expressing the greatest optimism about the political environment in late 2000 and early 2001, but shifting dramatically over the next year, showing the most pessimism in late 2001 and early 2002. The magazines' perceptions of the COS also show somewhat similar trends (see Figure 6.9): positive perceptions peak for both *Ms.* and *off our backs* in early 2000, but quickly turn more negative over the next two years.

*BUST* rarely discussed political issues at all (a point that I will return to in section III below), and consequently the magazine's perceptions of the POS remain at the neutral

mark, with the exception of a brief and small dip in 2002. *Bitch* shows more variation (though not to the levels of *Ms.* and *off our backs*), fluctuating between neutral and negative assessments of the POS. Like *Ms.* and *off our backs*, *Bitch* becomes more pessimistic in 2001 and 2002, following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks and the first few years of the Bush presidency. Unlike these two magazines, however, *Bitch* remains in the negative range over the next few years, ending the sample period at even greater levels of pessimism. Both magazines show more variation in their perceptions of the COS, although they generally remain in the negative range. Again, *BUST* shows less variation than *Bitch*, often remaining neutral but making small periodic dips, with the exception of turning briefly more optimistic in early 2003. *Bitch* also offers more negative assessments of the COS, reaching a low in fall 2000 with over two-thirds of articles offering pessimistic outlooks. Over the next year and a half, it returns to positive levels, but drops off sharply again in early 2003 to become soundly pessimistic through the end of the sample period.


While the quantitative patterns of the four magazines are similar in many ways, the issues that comprised the political and cultural opportunity structures are starkly different. Below I explore the qualitative data that help to contextualize these quantitative patterns, turning first to the two second-wave magazines, *Ms.* and *off our backs*, followed by the two third-wave magazines, *Bitch* and *BUST*.

**Figure 6.8: Perceptions of Political Opportunities in *off our backs*, *Ms.*, *Bitch*, and *BUST*, 1995-2005**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages; Scale ranges from -1 - +1  
Sources: *off our backs* (1995-2005), *Ms.* (1995-2005), *BUST* (1995-2005), *Bitch* (1996-2005)

**Figure 6.9: Perceptions of Cultural Opportunities in *off our backs*, *Ms.*, *Bitch*, and *BUST*, 1995-2005**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages; Scale ranges from -1 - +1  
Sources: *off our backs* (1995-2005), *Ms.* (1995-2005), *BUST* (1995-2005), *Bitch* (1996-2005)

### ***Ms. and off our backs***

In both *off our backs* and *Ms.*, positive mentions of the domestic POS were generally limited to profiles of individual women in politics, such as Carol Moseley Braun's run for president in 2004 (*Ms.*, Summer 2003), and Hillary Clinton's run for U.S. Senate in 2000, which the magazine considered to be a "landmark" in "making partnered and other female experience a source of talent, honor, and credit" (*Ms.* June/July 2000). Aside from these individual profiles, the domestic POS was discussed in largely negative terms in both magazines. The international movement and agenda, however, offered a source of greater optimism. The magazines highlighted, for instance, the growing women's movement in Yugoslavia (*oob*, Oct. 1995), the legalization of gay civil unions in England (*oob*, Nov. 2005), women's role in rebuilding Rwanda (*Ms.*, Summer 2005), criminalizing domestic violence in the Dominican Republic (*oob*, March 1998), and the election of the first woman president in Liberia (*Ms.*, Winter 2005). They also focused on advances made by the international community, such as the U.N.'s inclusion of women's rights with human rights, particularly the Platform for Action which came out of the Fourth World Conference on Women, committing governments to "take urgent action to combat and eliminate all forms of violence against women" (*oob* Oct. 1997).

While the international space offered some hope of promoting a feminist agenda, on average both *Ms.* and *off our backs* more often held pessimistic assessments of the political opportunity structure. Both *Ms.* and *off our backs* focused heavily on the policies of the Republican-controlled Congress in the mid-1990s, and later the Bush administration, which significantly "rolled back [women's] rights" (*oob*, April 1996). In a 1995 *Ms.* article entitled "Newt's Not Who You Think He Is--He's Worse," the writer

lambasted the Speaker of the House for “selling out” to the Religious Right and promoting his “Contract for America” which clothed a radical right agenda in “mainstream” rhetoric. The writer argued:

It was a triumph of mainstreaming—a brilliant, backhanded channeling of the agenda of the radical right into the center of congressional politics. It was the most significant act in a congressional career that has produced no important legislation. And only Newt Gingrich, a man with no real beliefs and millions of dollars in play, could have known how to pull it off so perfectly. (*Ms.*, Sept. 1995)

*Off our backs*, in fact, quoted Congresswoman Carol Maloney as referring to the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress (1995-96) as the “the most anti-woman conference I can remember” (*oob*, April 1996).

The magazines’ criticisms were not confined to Congress, however. While they had occasionally praised President Clinton for his support for various women’s issues, both magazines expressed particular dismay over the Lewinsky scandal. Not surprisingly, the subsequent Bush administration sparked even more outrage, ranging from budget cuts that eliminated several regional offices of the Women’s Bureau (*oob* Jan. 2002), to restrictions on abortion and reproductive rights (*Ms.*, Winter 2002, Summer 2004), to shutting women’s groups out of the White House (*Ms.*, Winter 2002). The magazines especially expressed concern over post-9/11 militarization and suppression of dissent. *Ms.* wrote: “[Militarization] is really a process of loss. Even though something seems to gain value by adopting an association with military goals, it actually surrenders control and gives up the claim to its own worthiness” (*Ms.*, Dec 2001/Jan 2002). The article went on to criticize Bush’s newfound concern for Afghan women’s rights,

contending: “Women's rights in the U.S. and Afghanistan are in danger if they become mere by-products of some other cause. Militarization, in all its seductiveness and subtlety, deserves to be bedecked with flags wherever it thrives—fluorescent flags of warning” (*ibid.*).

In many ways, in fact, the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks mirrored the Red Scare of the 1920s, in which a national threat (real or imagined) allowed the state to curb civil rights and liberties and suppress dissent in the name of national defense. Compare, for instance, the concerns expressed by *Ms.* to those of the *Woman Citizen* in 1923:

When this curious incomprehensible terror which now sweeps the countries dies—because it is found that there is no real menace for it to feed upon—then, we shall wonder why in 1920, we wanted to suppress extreme doctrines that for a century past have flourished freely in this land of ours without in any way preventing its growth to greater prosperity, or to greater freedom. (*Woman Citizen*, Jan. 13, 1923, p. 29)

The date 1920 could easily be replaced with 2001, and the sentiment remains the same. Further, *Ms.* and *off our backs*, like the *Woman Citizen* eighty years earlier, urgently pointed out that the years following the 9/11 attacks made feminist organizing much more difficult.

The two magazines' assessment of the cultural opportunity structure followed a similar pattern. Discussions of domestic cultural opportunities were limited to fairly narrow topics, such as excitement over a primetime television portrayal of a female president (*Ms.*, Winter 2005), and the *New York Times* decision to include same-sex unions in its wedding announcement pages (*Ms.*, Winter 2002). Elsewhere, the magazines noted women's progress in other countries, such as the inclusion of women in



Afghanistan's police force (*oob*, March 2004), a growing women's movement in post-Communist Russia (*Ms.*, Nov. 1995), and a Rwandan mandate for equality in employment, education, and family affairs (*Ms.*, Summer 2005).

Generally, however, both *Ms.* and *off our backs* offered more pessimistic judgments of the cultural opportunity structure. They frequently took issue with the mainstream media's treatment of women and feminism. They noted, for instance, the lack of media coverage of violence against women (*oob*, Oct. 1996), and the "discovery" of feminism's war against boys. "The backlash chorus—the cultural right as well as the authors of some of these books—chant 'feminism,'" wrote one author. "Because of feminism, they say, America has been so focused on girls that we've forgotten about the boys" (*Ms.*, Oct/Nov 1996). And while alternative media, such as zines and the internet, could offer some substitutes for the mainstream media, feminists also noted the danger posed by these new media which are easily accessible and allow for anonymity, leading to more outlets for pornography, "cyber-rape" and harassment (*Ms.*, Mar/Apr 1997).

Elsewhere *Ms.* and *off our backs* writers raised red flags about women's lack of progress in the paid labor market. They noted, for instance, the underrepresentation of women in law, politics, science, and film and television (*Ms.*, Winter 2002, Fall 2003). Even more troubling was the invisibility of the problem. One *Ms.* writer argued: "The nation's most talented women are getting welts from bouncing off glass ceilings, yet only a minority of people recognize it's a problem" (*Ms.*, Winter 2002).

Also troubling to *Ms.* and *off our backs* contributors was increasingly conservative public opinion on a host of issues from reproductive rights to the acceptance

of religion in politics. A United Church of Christ minister was quoted as saying that this conservative trend extends to the clergy as well:

The younger clergy are more conservative. Even in an organization of liberal Protestants, liberal Catholic bishops, and liberal Jews, like the Interfaith Alliance, which was formed to fight the religious right and the Christian Coalition, the price of unity is that they can't comment on issues related to women because that would divide them. It's as though women's issues are outside the picture. (quoted in *Ms.*, Apr/May 1999)

In response to this conservatism, a former president of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America urged: “We have to move women from the thought, 'I don't want to be a feminist' to an understanding that feminism is not about defining who you are but about giving you choices to be who you need to be. And that's a major transition” (*ibid.*)

Yet this issue of choice became a controversial one for *Ms.* and *off our backs*, who recognized it as problematic – but increasingly characteristic of younger feminists. Framing more and more anti-feminist issues as “empowering choices,” writers lamented the growing number of younger women who opt for plastic surgery (*oob*, Nov. 2004) and support the “free speech” of *Playboy* (*oob*, Dec. 1995). A college student writing for *off our backs* explicitly addressed this generational divide, explaining that in her experience, “to be called a ‘70s feminist’ was to be accused of simplistic, irrelevant, naive ideas--too stupid to understand the complexities of postmodern theory.” Underlying this third-wave critique, however, she argues:

Perhaps we're feeling a little guilty about embracing consumerism and mainstream femininity in the name of postmodern-deconstructionalist-subjective irony? Perhaps we have become so invested in postmodern notions of

subjectivity and fears of generalizing because we don't know how to begin to pull ourselves together as a movement. Deep down we still crave the connections with other women, the idea that we are part of something larger than just us, but by saying those connections are impossible, we are shielding ourselves from the pain we feel at not having them. Maybe we are scared, too, of taking that leap, of coming together in such an emotionally charged and uncertain venture. (*oob*, Sep. 2003)

Recognizing the problems posed by postmodernism and third-wave feminism, and the illusions of individual choice embedded within the philosophy, *Ms.* and *off our backs* contributors expressed a growing pessimism about the potential for a revitalized feminist movement in the 1990s.

### ***Bitch* and *BUST***

As representatives of third-wave feminism and proponents of the postmodern “choice” philosophy of this younger generation, how did *BUST* and *Bitch* assess the political and cultural climate of the 1990s and 2000s?

Positive assessments of the political opportunity structure were virtually absent from both *BUST* and *Bitch*. Instead, where the third-wave zines did offer hope for the feminist movement, it tended to involve cultural opportunities, such as growing numbers of women in sports (*BUST*, Summer 2002), the normalization of homosexuality on television (*Bitch*, Fall 1996), and feminist messages in country music (*Bitch*, Summer 2001) and rap (*BUST*, Summer 1998). At times, the magazines argued that these cultural opportunities could translate into political opportunities. In exploring the representation of political women in television and film, for instance, a *Bitch* writer argues:

[I]t's important to recognize the potential of these representations—as fun fantasy spaces, compelling dramas, or useful historical narratives—to generate pleasurable responses that may lead women to engage in political mobilization, and to challenge the ways in which dominant media outlets portray women's political struggles and involvement in national politics. In a time in which the political and the pop cultural are not easily separated (the careers of Jesse 'The Body' Ventura and Arnold "The Governator" Schwarzenegger are evidence enough of this), we may not want to dismiss the possibility that popular entertainment can influence our political investments and realities. (*Bitch*, Summer 2004)

Another source of optimism for third-wavers was new opportunities to define feminism for themselves, often throwing around words like “choice” and “freedom.” As mentioned above, this emphasis on “choice” was frequently discussed in *Ms.* and *off our backs*, though with negative undertones, fearing that individual choice was undermining the potential for a collective movement. For *Bitch* and *BUST*, however, the notion of choice was an overwhelmingly positive development. Most often, the magazines discussed choice in the context of sexual freedom, such as the “choice” of women to engage in prostitution or consume pornography. One *Bitch* writer, for example, argued: “As a culture, we have indeed come a long way since the 1980s: Our sexual freedom has increased, as have our ability and willingness to insist on access to erotic materials that include and affirm our sexuality regardless of gender, sex, or sexual orientation. That expansion can be measured at least in part by the number of square feet of shelf space devoted to smut” (*Bitch*, Fall 2002). Elsewhere *BUST* writers criticized the social pressures to engage in monogamous relationships, arguing that monogamy is too

restrictive and “sends otherwise strong, independent women running to the self-help aisle at the local bookstore to pay \$9.95 for salvation” (*BUST*, Winter 1998). Epitomizing the postmodern perspective, *Bitch* excitedly announced:

Metagenderism is here, morphing and manifesting in myriad personalities on television, characters in film, primitive avatars on the Internet, the crowd at your local bar, and the naked body lying next to you in bed. It exists. Like it or not, lots of people are playing with their conceptions of themselves and their gender, and with other people's perceptions of them. The infiltration of this play is evident in all our media, its impact profound. (*Bitch*, Spring 1998)

The writer goes on to declare: “We're coming up on a (non)gender revolution. It's about damn time!” (*ibid.*). Undermining the very notion of gender, *Bitch* argued that this trend in American culture is opening new opportunities to women (and people of all genders), while *off our backs* and *Ms.* bemoaned the loss of collective identity that this development entailed.

It was not entirely a rose-colored world for third-wave zines, however. In fact, both *BUST* and *Bitch* more often recognized hindrances to the movement than opportunities. Tarrow (1998) argues that the political opportunity structure is a “fickle friend,” and in many ways the cultural opportunity structure fluctuates even more. The cultural sources of optimism for the third wave, such as positive depictions of women and feminism in television and music, can easily turn more negative. Indeed, the magazines lamented the negative portrayals of feminism on television (e.g., *Bitch*, Spring 1996), the limited and stereotypical roles available for female actors (e.g., *BUST*, Spring 1996), women's lack of critical recognition by the Academy of Motion Pictures (*Bitch*, Winter 2005), MTV's replacement of strong, independent women with “nameless inflato-

breasted bimbos” (*Bitch*, Winter 1996), and even increasingly gender stereotypical toys (*Bitch*, Summer 2003).

One development that garnered considerable concern among the third-wave zines was the takeover of *Sassy* magazine by Peterson Publishing. The content of the former feminist-friendly magazine changed noticeably under Peterson. One *Bitch* writer heavily criticized the new *Sassy*, arguing:

[I]nstead of a publication for young women that admits that its readers have sex, that some of them have sex with other girls, that not everyone is white and that racism is a reality and needs to change, we now have one that is chock full of pernicious, regressive advice and the message that feminism is bad, no one is ready for sex, and boys are only good for one thing: taking you to dinner and a movie. It's the same shit that's in *YM* and *Teen* and all the others, but here it's worse because they've kept the feminist rhetoric. The language holds out the promise of being girl-friendly, and then the content hits you over the head with misogyny. (*Bitch*, Summer 1999)

Because third-wave zines – *Bitch* and *BUST* included – were inspired by *Sassy*, its loss was keenly felt by these magazines. Moreover, anti-feminist and conservative media biases were hardly confined to teen magazines, they argued. In an interview with *Bitch*, Janeane Garofalo, host of *The Majority Report* on liberal Air America Radio, discussed the difficulties faced by liberal media:

Well, the Fairness Doctrine, before Reagan did away with it, [dictated] that if you had an hour of conservative talk, you also had to have an hour of liberal talk. Then Clinton further deregulated [the airwaves] in 1996 and all was lost. But even though [radio] is supposed to be the public's airwaves, when radio advanced its technologies and developed what were called clear channels, which have

better reach and a clearer signal, people had to pay for it. Now, the right has always had more money, because the right represents corporate America, and so they started buying up all the clear channels. [...] So, it's where the money is.

And the money has always been on the right. (*Bitch*, Fall 2004)

Garofalo went on to criticize the general anti-intellectual climate of the country, which has helped right-wing radio – and the conservative movement more generally – dominate political discourse. This anti-intellectualism was noted in several third-wave articles. “Once upon a time, politics was serious business,” argued one *Bitch* writer, “[But] these days presidential merit is measured as much by frat house standards as by traditional approval ratings (apparently American voters would rather have a beer with Bush than Kerry)” (*Bitch*, Fall 2005).

Not surprisingly, the Bush administration provided frequent fodder for third-wave critics, who grew increasingly concerned over his neoliberal economics (*Bitch*, Fall 2004) and cuts in unemployment and welfare funding, particularly problematic during the post-9/11 recession (*Bitch*, Spring 2003). Perhaps most alarming to *Bitch* and *BUST* contributors were the restrictions placed on reproductive rights. In fact, one of the few political issues about which *BUST* spoke out was the Bush administration’s push for abstinence-only sex education, coupled with restrictions on birth control and abortion (*BUST* Aug/Sep 2005). The magazine offered a tongue-in-cheek article entitled “Bush Administration Defines Fetus as ‘Unborn Child’: Next: Corpses to be Defined as Unborn Zombies” (*BUST*, Spring 2002). Yet, in an uncharacteristically serious tone, the article went on to argue: “Pro-choice advocates have long suspected that Bush would try to redefine fetuses as human beings in order to criminalize abortion, but the hypocrisy of framing the move as a boon for women's health is exceptionally staggering. If Bush

thinks we're sit quietly while he makes laws protecting 'unborn children,' then he is truly an 'undead moron'" (*ibid.*).

Reproductive rights was one of the few areas of concerns shared by both second- and third-wave feminists, particularly as these rights began to be undermined by the Bush administration. In other ways, however, the two sets of magazines differ quite considerably. For instance, *BUST* and *Bitch* paid much more attention to cultural developments, such as the representation of women in popular culture, which led to more fluctuation in their perceptions of the opportunity structure; whether and how positively women are represented in various media vary widely over time, across media, and according to individual interpreters. Another major difference concerns how second- and third-wave magazines evaluated the rise of postmodernism and "choice feminism"; while all four magazines recognized this trend, second-wavers evaluated it in unequivocally negative terms, while the third wave tended to be generally positive regarding its possibilities for the movement. Finally, the third-wave zines almost entirely neglected any recognition of global opportunities (in fact, only four articles in a sample of almost 300 mentioned any international developments, positive or negative). Given the findings of the previous two chapters, we might expect that this lack of attention to global opportunities and constraints should make the third wave more vulnerable to domestic setbacks.

## II. CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS TACTICS, 1995-2005

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My first research question concerns the conditions under which movements utilize conflict and consensus tactics. Conflict tactics refer to those in which a movement




explicitly identifies and antagonizes movement opponents, while consensus tactics downplay such opposition. To reiterate, NSMT and PPT offer competing predictions – the former arguing consensus tactics are characteristic of late-20<sup>th</sup> century movements, while the latter argues that these tactics are more often used by both “old” and “new” movements in decline, regardless of historical period. Given these differing predictions, to what extent do *off our backs*, *Ms.*, *Bitch*, and *BUST* draw on consensus rhetoric? Are third-wave publications – as the voice of a “new” movement – more likely to use consensus rhetoric, or do they fluctuate corresponding to shifts in the opportunity structure? (See Table 2.1, hypothesis series A)

### ***Ms.* and *off our backs***

Figures 6.10 and 6.11 compare *Ms.* and *off our backs* in terms of their perceptions of the political opportunity structure and their rates of opponent identification. Both journals show similar patterns in their use of conflict tactics, with relatively low opponent identification in 1996-97, much higher rates between 2000-02, and returning to lower rates again in 2004-05. Allowing for a one-year lag, it appears that as perceptions of the POS become more pessimistic, both magazines are more likely to draw on consensus tactics.


*Ms.* and *off our backs* during this period in many ways echoed their conflict rhetoric of the 1970s, using terms such as “patriarchy,” “the capitalist system,” and “male supremacy,” though to a considerably lesser degree in the third-wave period. The two magazines during this period did, however, make several references to the anti-feminist “right wing,” particularly after 2000. One *Ms.* article, for instance, discussed in very general terms “the oppressor,” later linking this oppression specifically to Bush: “Now I

**Figure 6.10: Rate of Opponent Identification and Perceptions of Political Opportunities in *off our backs*, 1995-2005**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages; POS scale ranges from -1 - +1  
Source: *off our backs* (1995-2005)

**Figure 6.11: Rate of Opponent Identification and Perceptions of Political Opportunities in *Ms.*, 1995-2005**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages; POS scale ranges from -1 - +1  
Source: *Ms.* (1995-2005)

look at President Bush and his cosmetically diverse but politically homogeneous cabinet and think of Flo's [Kennedy] words: 'Ass-kicking should be undertaken regardless of the sex, ethnicity, or the charm of the oppressor's agent. As the struggles intensify, the oppressor tends to select more attractive agents, frequently from among the oppressed'" (*Ms.*, Apr/May 2001). In this case, the writer not only identified the source of

oppression, but explicitly urged readers to engage in “ass-kicking” as a means of combating their oppression.

In fact, Bush was targeted strongly by both *Ms.* and *off our backs*, for reasons ranging from his anti-abortion stance (e.g., *Ms.* Winter 2003) to his eagerness to wage war (e.g., *Ms.* Dec. 2001). Coupled with Bush’s anti-feminist record, the magazines were concerned about the conservative turn in the courts and legislature, which risked rolling back “the hard-fought rights of women [...] decades, if not centuries” (*Ms.*, Summer 2005). They argued this conservative turn was in part the responsibility of right-wing groups such as Promise Keepers, Focus on the Family, and the Christian Coalition, and supported by the mainstream media, which uncritically gave voice to noted “feminist bashers” like Christina Hoff Summers (see *Ms.*, July 1995). Fox News especially earned the ire of feminists: one writer suggested that a Planned Parenthood representative “deserved a purple heart for appearing on The O’Reilly Factor, hosted by one of the most self-righteous leaders in the army of conservative Christians” (*Ms.* Winter 2002). Note the use of militaristic rhetoric and symbolism peppering the comment.

### ***BUST and Bitch***

Figures 6.12 and 6.13 compare *Bitch* and *BUST* perceptions of the opportunity structure and their rates of antagonist identification. *BUST* shows relatively low rates of conflict tactics (peaking at only 28% in spring 2000). Because the magazine rarely discussed developments in the opportunity structure, however, assessing its effect on antagonist identification is difficult. On the other hand, *Bitch* perceptions of the opportunity structure fluctuate widely between 1995 and 2005, as does its rate of


opponent identification. The zine reached its highest levels of opponent identification in summer 2002, with two-thirds of all articles, but declined over the next three years, reaching a low of 22% in summer 2005, two quarters after the domestic opportunity structure reached one its lowest points.

Unlike *Ms.* and *off our backs*, *BUST* and *Bitch* reserved much of their ire for cultural figures, including the restaurant chain Hooters, Mary Kay cosmetics, and Abercrombie & Fitch (for a line of t-shirts drawing on racial stereotypes). While both zines occasionally targeted President Bush and other conservative politicians, they most often took aim at American media. A *Bitch* editorial stated explicitly: “At Bitch HQ, we recognize that TV is our enemy” (*Bitch*, Summer 1999). And earlier, the zine contended the media were responsible for problems in their readers’ interpersonal relationships, arguing: “I can't lay everything at the door of the media, but it's true that men see images of women who want love and don't really care about sex. They're just as conditioned by this bullshit as we are, and so it's hard for them to see women as sexual agents” (*Bitch*, Spring 1997).

Yet at other times, the third-wave zines backed away from assigning blame to any specific source. A sexual assault prevention program was lauded for its emphasis on working with rather than against men, as they “make a point of being male-positive. A lot of men are defensive about the issue: Even though the majority of men don't commit rape, they tend to feel blamed for it [as a whole].” (*Bitch*, Spring 2005). The article goes on to argue that the problem of rape lies not with men, but in how they have been socialized. Another article quoted feminist writer bell hooks as saying:


That's one of the reasons I called my new book *Feminism Is for Everybody*, because so much of how our traditional radical and revolutionary feminism was structured with the idea that feminism was really about women, and not a politic

**Figure 6.12: Rate of Opponent Identification and Perceptions of Political Opportunities in *Bitch*, 1995-2005**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages; DOS scale ranges from -1 - +1  
 Source: *Bitch* (1996-2005)

**Figure 6.13: Rate of Opponent Identification and Perceptions of Political Opportunities in *BUST*, 1995-2005**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages; DOS scale ranges from -1 - +1  
 Source: *BUST* (1995-2005)

that was about everybody—about ending sexism and sexist domination and oppression, which is a definition that I think is so simple and useful because it says that the target may not be men, it has to be all of us (*Bitch*, Winter 2000).

Again, the emphasis here on changing personal attitudes removes responsibility from particular individuals or groups. A *BUST* article goes even further than hooks in arguing that women must look within themselves to target their problems, in this case reproductive difficulties:

There is certainly no question that [Eleanor] Smeal and [Kim] Gandy have valid points. Moreover, it's especially important to acknowledge, as Gandy points out, that "it would make a big difference if our workplaces didn't make life so difficult for mothers." But there should be nothing controversial about the truth: fertility takes a nosedive at 35. Too many women don't know this, and feminists should be the last people to object to their finding out. (*BUST*, Summer 2002)

Here *BUST* not only places the blame for women's childbearing problems with their own aging reproductive systems, but dismisses remarks by Eleanor Smeal and Kim Gandy (two prominent second-wave feminists) for suggesting that these problems might be structural rather than personal, such as lack of employer support for parents.

In sum, these qualitative and descriptive findings suggest that while the types of opponents identified by the second- and third-wave magazines are quite different, their rates of antagonist identification exhibit relatively similar patterns, especially among *off our backs*, *Ms.*, and *Bitch*. For these three magazines, their highest rates of opponent identification generally occurred between 2000 and 2002 but returned to lower levels in the following three years. In line with the hypotheses suggested by political process

theory, the magazines drew more often on conflict tactics within a year of increasing optimism regarding opportunities, and drew more often on consensus tactics within a year of growing pessimism. *BUST*, however, is different; not only did the magazine exhibit relatively low rates of opponent identification throughout the sample period, it offered very little discussion of the opportunity structure, making it difficult to assess the relationship between the tactics and opportunities.

### ***Correlations***

Table 6.3 presents correlation coefficients between the rates of opponent identification and select independent variables (lagged one year) for the all four magazines. See Appendix C for full table of correlations. Of course, bivariate correlations do not permit the establishment of causality, nor do they allow one to control for other variables, but they do provide an alternate means of examining the data.

Measures of *political instability* show mixed results. Generally, correlation coefficients are small and non-significant, but cases in which they do reach significance, the relationship occurs in the hypothesized direction (such as the margin of victory for congressional candidates, presidential victories on votes in Congress, and the size of the gender voting gap).

*Access to the state* (operationalized as women's voter registration rates) shows very weak correlations with rate of opponent identification in all magazines. Measures of *political allies* generally show small to moderate correlations with conflict tactics. In particular, mentions of women's rights in the State of the Union, and rates of women in presidential cabinet positions show

**Table 6.3: Correlation Coefficients between Conflict Tactics and Select Independent Variables**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables	Correlation Coefficients					
		<i>off our backs</i>	<i>Ms.</i>	<i>BUST</i>	<i>Bitch</i>	<i>Combined</i>	
1. During periods of <b>political instability</b> (political instability), the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Number of congressional seats that change party	-0.0063	-0.1869	-0.0573	0.1969	-0.0505	
	Margin of victory for political candidates	-0.0883	-0.3712*	-0.0079	-0.3720*	-0.1557	
	Presidential victories on votes in Congress	0.0645	0.2408	0.0473	-0.4588*	0.0408	
	Size of gender voting gap	0.0528	0.1074	0.0799	-0.5273*	0.0030	
2. During periods in which women's <b>access to the polity</b> broadens, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Women's voter registration rates	0.0485	0.2544	-0.0948	0.0391	0.0543	
3. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Presidential support for women's rights	0.1503	0.5401*	0.1609	0.0981	0.2039*	
	(% of words in State of Union in support of women's rights)						
	EEOC funding	0.1760	0.1523	0.1905	0.2170	0.1250	
	Rates of women in political positions	U.S. Senate	0.0510	0.1434	0.0873	-0.4888*	0.0182
		U.S. House	0.0681	0.1123	0.1491	-0.4344*	0.0376
	Governors	-0.0147	0.0188	0.0626	-0.4637*	-0.0247	
	Presidential Cabinets	0.2060	0.2917	0.1828	0.3173*	0.1830*	
4. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Rates of women's employment in the arts, media, and clergy	-0.0473	-0.1046	0.1246	-0.4077*	-0.0446	
	Media coverage of the women's movement	<i>NY Times</i>	-0.1418	-0.2711	-0.0399	0.4357*	-0.0636
		Television news	-0.0576	-0.3871*	0.1094	0.1463	-0.0766



<b>4a.</b> During periods in which <b>public opinion</b> is supportive of feminist issues, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Equality for women	0.0705	0.2192	0.1461	-0.3233*	0.0733
	Legalization of abortion	-0.0097	-0.1481	-0.0372	-0.0364	-0.0657
<b>12.</b> During periods of increasing <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Perceptions of political opportunities	0.0736	0.1375	-0.1041	0.1934	0.0041
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities	0.1493	0.1171	0.2736	-0.4063*	-0.0141
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities	0.2483	0.1079	0.1799	-0.3601*	-0.0029
	Perceptions of global opportunities	-0.1455	-0.0448	--	0.1127	-0.0980
<b>14.</b> During periods of increasing <b>global opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	NGO access to the UN (number granted consultative status)	0.0897	0.2005	0.0865	-0.4144*	0.0531
	Rate of political party competition across countries	-0.3906	-0.0342	-0.2286	0.2268	-0.1333
	Rate of political participation across countries	-0.5059*	0.1904	-0.1027	0.2514	-0.0893
	Number of countries with female heads of state	-0.0051	-0.0247	0.1201	-0.2214	0.0031
	Rate of women in parliament	0.0481	0.1169	0.1049	-0.4532*	0.0229
	Number of CEDAW signatories	0.0148	0.0795	0.0439	-0.5653*	-0.0209
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>		<b>25</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>24</b>

\* p&lt;.05

*Note:* All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).

some significant correlations with conflict tactics, and in the expected direction. The main exception is *Bitch* magazine, which shows in some cases negative correlations between political allies and conflict tactics.

The presence of *cultural allies* generally has negative or non-significant correlations with conflict tactics. *Public opinion* measures are also not well-correlated with conflict tactics. In only one case does the coefficient reach significance (support for women's equality and conflict tactics in *Bitch*), but the relationship is negative, contrary to my hypothesis.

Unlike the first and second waves, *perceptions of opportunities* show only small, and in some cases negative relationships to rate of opponent identification, contrary to my hypotheses.

Objective *global opportunities* also show little relationship to conflict tactics. Again, the few cases in which the correlation coefficient reaches significance, the relationship is in the opposite direction of that hypothesized.

In sum, only a handful of opportunities, such as some measures of political instability and political allies, show significant correlations with the journals' use of conflict tactics. Overall, there appears to be weak or non-existent bivariate relationships between the dependent and independent variables, challenging the qualitative and descriptive findings presented above.

### III. POLITICAL AND CULTURAL GOALS, 1995-2005

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My second research question concerns the conditions under which movements depoliticize, relinquishing overtly political goals and turning to cultural goals. Again,


this question points to a fundamental disagreement between NSMT and PPT: NSMT argues that a primary characteristic of new social movements is their cultural orientation, while PPT suggests that cultural goals are more often adopted by movements confronted by a hostile opportunity structure. Given this theoretical disagreement, are we more likely to see the third wave – a “new” social movement – adopt cultural goals, or will both second- and third-wave publications vary in their rates of politicization following changes in the opportunity structure, as hypothesized by PPT? (See Table 2.1, hypothesis series B.)

Figures 6.14 and 6.15 compare rates of political and cultural foci among *off our backs* and *Ms.* between 1995 and 2005. Both magazines fluctuate widely during this period in the percentage of articles addressing political issues, reaching lows in summer 1996 (0% for *off our backs*) and winter-summer 1999 (0% for *Ms.*), and peaking in 2002 at 64% for *off our backs* and as high as 81% for *Ms.* Yet the dramatic downturn in the opportunity structure after 2001 was matched by equally dramatic depoliticization in both magazines over the next few years.

Interestingly, however, political and cultural foci were not always inversely related. *Ms.* was most likely to discuss cultural issues in fall 1998 (72% of articles), decreasing to a low of 23% just one year later. However, as the magazine began to depoliticize in 2003, it held fairly stable rates of cultural discussions (averaging between 30 and 40%). *Off our backs* showed a slightly different pattern. Like *Ms.*, *off our backs* also peaked in the mid-1990s (with 67% of articles discussing cultural issues in spring 1995), and also like *Ms.*, it too backed away from cultural issues in early 2000. Yet as


the magazine depoliticized in 2003, it did turn its focus again to cultural concerns, nearly matching its earlier levels by 2004.

**Figure 6.14: Percentage of Articles Identifying Political and Cultural Goals in *off our backs*, 1995-2005**




Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages; DOS scale ranges from -1 - +1  
 Source: *off our backs* (1995-2005)

**Figure 6.15: Percentage of Articles Identifying Political and Cultural Goals in *Ms.*, 1995-2005**




Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages; DOS scale ranges from -1 - +1  
 Source: *Ms.* (1995-2005)

**Figure 6.16: Percentage of Articles Identifying Political and Cultural Goals in *Bitch*, 1995-2005**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages; DOS scale ranges from -1 - +1  
 Source: *Bitch* (1996-2005)

**Figure 6.17: Percentage of Articles Identifying Political and Cultural Goals in *BUST*, 1995-2005**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages; DOS scale ranges from -1 - +1  
 Source: *BUST* (1995-2005)

Figures 6.16 and 6.17 compare rates of political coverage in *Bitch* and *BUST*. Most striking, perhaps, is the very low level of political discussion in both zines relative to the second-wave magazines. In fact, political discussions never rise beyond 30% of *Bitch* articles and only 10% of *BUST* articles, and from 1995-2001, both magazines remained at 0%. Again, because *BUST* shows very little variation in its perceptions of the opportunity structure, it is difficult to make a causal link between external opportunities and change in goals. It is interesting to note, however, that from 1995-1998, when cultural goals were prominent, perceptions of the opportunity structure fell entirely in the negative range (with only one exception in spring 1995, when it was neutral). After then backing off slightly from cultural discussions, the number of articles dealing with cultural issues began to increase again in 2002, at the same time that perceptions of the opportunity structure nosedived. *Bitch* shows a similar pattern: as perceptions of the opportunity structure became most negative (roughly the mid-point of the sample period), rates of cultural discussions were at their highest. Conversely, when perceptions reversed in 2000 to become more positive, the number of culturally focused articles fell off, and for the first time, politically focused articles appeared (though never matching the rates of cultural articles).

There are some important caveats to note in the *BUST* and *Bitch* findings, however. While the shifts in goals occur in the hypothesized direction, they happen almost simultaneously with shifts in the opportunity structure. Not only does this make it difficult to establish causality, but it also does not fit with previous findings that shifts in goals occur much more slowly than shifts in tactics and frames. In part, however, this

rapid shift may be due to the third wave's lack of a coherent movement agenda, leading them to more easily relinquish goals when the opportunity structures shifts.

Also again, in the case of *BUST*, there is simply little variation in perceptions of the opportunity structure, due mostly to the fact that the zine paid very little attention to the external political and cultural environments. This general lack of attention to the opportunity structure also makes it difficult to establish a case that the perceived POS and COS affect goals.

While political process theory does not have the same degree of explanatory power for this wave (at least with regard to *BUST* and *Bitch*) that it does for previous waves, the new social movement hypothesis does not hold up particularly well either. Not only do rates of political and cultural discussions fluctuate widely over this ten-year period, earlier periods in the movement exhibited equally high or higher rates of cultural issues. Moreover, in the case of *Ms.*, the magazine was considerably more politicized in the third-wave period than it had been during the second wave, even at its peak. In short, NSMT does not provide an adequate account of why the third wave has chosen this particular agenda.

### ***Correlations***

Table 6.4 presents correlation coefficients between the rates of cultural and political foci and select independent variables (lagged one year) for all four magazines. See Appendix C for full table of correlations. Because cultural and political goals are not measured as mutually exclusive, I include correlation coefficients for each separately,

**Table 6.4: Correlation Coefficients between Movement Goals and Select Independent Variables**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables		Correlation Coefficients				
			<i>off our backs</i>	<i>Ms.</i>	<i>BUST</i>	<i>Bitch</i>	<i>Combined</i>
1. During periods of <b>political stability</b> (political instability), the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Number of congressional seats that change party		-0.2893 (-0.1429)	0.2618 (0.3179*)	-0.0083 (-0.3314*)	-0.1277 (-0.1700)	-0.0973 (-0.1282)
	Margin of victory for political candidates		0.1560 (-0.2520)	0.0522 (0.3056)	-0.0440 (0.3366*)	0.4593* (0.0565)	0.0633 (0.0863)
	Presidential victories on votes in Congress		0.3721* (-0.0215)	-0.3080 (0.6842*)	-0.2377 (0.4540*)	0.5024* (0.4375*)	0.0907 (0.2380*)
	Size of gender voting gap		0.3264* (-0.0301)	-0.2300 (0.6654*)	-0.2321 (0.5224*)	0.6418* (0.3349*)	0.0879 (0.2511*)
	Women's voter registration rates		-0.0419 (0.0200)	-0.1495 (0.0165)	-0.1684 (-0.0384)	0.0592 (-0.0679)	-0.0348 (-0.0073)
3. During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Presidential support for women's rights		-0.0302 (0.2969)	-0.0396 (0.0579)	-0.1972 (0.1390)	-0.1231 (0.2450)	-0.0348 (0.1024)
	EEOC funding		-0.0474 (0.0393)	-0.1085 (0.1392)	-0.0041 (0.1241)	0.0368 (0.2598)	-0.0343 (0.0949)
	Rates of women in political positions	U.S. Senate	0.3585* (-0.0105)	-0.2617 (0.6739*)	-0.2349 (0.5203*)	0.6160* (0.3483*)	0.0957 (0.2524*)
		U.S. House	0.2806 (0.1752)	-0.2711 (0.4622*)	-0.0575 (0.4492*)	0.3680* (0.2283)	0.0975 (0.2118*)
		Governors	0.2924 (0.0595)	-0.2401 (0.4624*)	-0.1653 (0.4478*)	0.4996* (0.1229)	0.0984 (0.1858*)
	Presidential Cabinets	-0.3048 (0.3205*)	0.1149 (-0.3240*)	0.0911 (-0.2167)	-0.4981* (0.1251)	-0.0998 (-0.0329)	
4. During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Rates of women's employment in the arts, media, and clergy		0.1721 (-0.0148)	0.0088 (0.0952)	-0.1397 (0.3960*)	0.3078 (-0.1038)	0.0685 (0.0687)
	Media coverage of the women's movement	<i>NY Times</i>	-0.3087 (-0.0414)	0.3132* (-0.6443*)	0.1007 (-0.4549*)	-0.4983* (-0.3381*)	-0.0810 (-0.2471*)
		Television news	-0.2258 (-0.0138)	0.2446 (-0.4323*)	0.1331 (-0.1781)	-0.1428 (-0.3391*)	-0.0449 (-0.1346)



<b>4a.</b> During periods in which <b>public opinion</b> is unsupportive (supportive) of feminist issues, the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Equality for women	0.2659 (0.1936)	-0.2636 (0.4002*)	0.0577 (0.3905*)	0.1679 (0.2572)	0.0899 (0.1860*)
	Legalization of abortion	-0.1453 (-0.2024)	0.2998 (-0.1226)	-0.1858 (0.0123)	0.0357 (-0.0651)	-0.0492 (-0.0555)
<b>12.</b> During periods of decreasing (increasing) <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Perceptions of political opportunities	-0.1501 (-0.1213)	-0.0969 (-0.1489)	0.0233 (-0.0397)	-0.2312 (-0.0981)	-0.0124 (-0.1671*)
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities	-0.3595* (0.1016)	0.0044 (-0.0809)	-0.1870 (-0.2659)	0.3308* (-0.0030)	-0.1067 (-0.0714)
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities	-0.3335* (-0.1281)	-0.1200 (-0.0653)	-0.2466 (-0.2746)	0.3642* (0.0304)	-0.1424 (-0.1260)
	Perceptions of global opportunities	-0.2970 (0.1915)	-0.0148 (0.0022)	-- (--)	-0.2988 (-0.1483)	-0.0356 (0.0212)
<b>14.</b> During periods of decreasing (increasing) <b>global opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	NGO access to the UN (number granted consultative status)	0.2777 (0.1644)	-0.2758 (0.4833*)	-0.0066 (0.4233*)	0.3004 (0.2789)	0.0934 (0.2128*)
	Rate of political party competition across countries	0.3306 (-0.5643*)	0.0757 (0.3591)	-0.6466* (-0.1594)	0.1884 (-0.1664)	0.0143 (-0.0758)
	Rate of political participation across countries	0.4902* (-0.4462*)	0.0388 (0.3333)	-0.6642* (-0.1317)	-0.2168 (-0.0702)	0.0568 (-0.0848)
	Number of countries with female heads of state	0.3841* (0.0098)	-0.2449 (0.5001*)	-0.1020 (0.4529*)	0.5690* (0.0812)	0.1194 (0.1905*)
	Rate of women in parliament	0.3326* (0.0846)	-0.2776 (0.5207*)	-0.0533 (0.4993*)	0.4142* (0.2279)	0.1098 (0.2135*)
	Number of CEDAW signatories	0.3519* (-0.0046)	-0.2337 (0.5276*)	-0.1258 (0.5212*)	0.5541* (0.1380)	0.1095 (0.2058*)
	<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>	<b>4</b> <b>(1)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(9)</b>	<b>2</b> <b>(9)</b>	<b>5</b> <b>(1)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(7)</b>
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>	<b>5</b> <b>(2)</b>	<b>1</b> <b>(5)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(5)</b>	<b>8</b> <b>(4)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(5)</b>	
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>	<b>17</b> <b>(23)</b>	<b>25</b> <b>(12)</b>	<b>23</b> <b>(11)</b>	<b>13</b> <b>(21)</b>	<b>26</b> <b>(14)</b>	

\* p&lt;.05

*Note:* All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).

Because cultural and political goals are not measured as mutually exclusive, I include correlation coefficients for each (political goals shown in parentheses)

with correlation coefficients for political goals shown in parentheses below those for cultural goals.

Measures of *political instability* show fairly mixed results. For some magazines (e.g., *off our backs*), political instability is positively correlated with political foci and negatively correlated with cultural foci, as hypothesized. For other magazines, however, (e.g., *BUST*), correlations occur in the opposite direction. Some variables, such as presidential victories on votes in Congress and the size of the gender voting gap, show significant correlations in the predicted direction for cultural goals, but not political goals.

Women's *access to the state* has little correlation with either political or cultural foci, with most coefficients remaining under 0.10. Measures of *political allies* show stronger correlations to political and cultural foci (although for most measures, *Bitch* tends to be an exception). In particular, rates of women in political positions are moderately to highly correlated with goals, with coefficients reaching as high as 0.67.

The presence of *cultural allies* shows more mixed results, with generally smaller correlation coefficients and often occurring the opposite direction hypothesized. *Public opinion* measures have small to moderate correlations with goals, and generally the relationship occurs in the expected direction.

*Perceptions of opportunities* show little relationship to goals. Correlation coefficients generally remain below 0.30, and in the few cases in which the coefficients reach significance, the relationship occurs in the opposite direction of that hypothesized.

Objective *global opportunities* are more strongly correlated with goals, but not always in the hypothesized direction. NGO access to the UN shows significant positive correlations with political foci for most journals (although not necessarily negative

correlations with cultural foci). The rates of female heads of state and in parliamentary seats also show significant positive correlations with political goals in many cases, but again, not necessarily negative correlations with cultural foci.


In sum, while the qualitative and descriptive findings were in some ways unclear regarding the relationship between opportunities and goals, these correlations suggest in some instances fairly strong relationships between the two. For instance, measures of political instability, political allies, public opinion, and select global opportunities show moderately strong and significant relationships with goals. By contrast, the journals' perceptions of these opportunities have only weak correlations, at best.

#### IV. COLLECTIVIST AND INDIVIDUALIST FRAMING, 1995-2005

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My third research question asks under what conditions movements employ collectivist and individualist frames. NSMT and PPT again offer competing predictions: the former argues that individualist movements are unique to the late-20<sup>th</sup> century, while the former argues that movements become more individualist during periods of declining political and cultural opportunities. If NSMT is correct in arguing that individualism is characteristic of "new" movements, regardless of external context, we should expect to see the third-wave zines exhibiting uniformly higher levels of individualism relative to the second-wave magazines. By contrast, if the PPT hypothesis holds and movements exhibit higher rates of individualism during periods of decline, we should expect to see all four magazines fluctuate in their levels of individualism in accordance with the opportunity structure.

**Figure 6.18: Rates of Collectivist Frames in *off our backs*, *Ms.*, *Bitch*, and *BUST*: 1995-2005**




Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages; Collectivist scale ranges from -8 - +8  
Sources: *off our backs* (1995-2005), *Ms.* (1995-2005), *BUST* (1995-2005), *Bitch* (1996-2005)

Figure 6.18 compares rates of collectivism and individualism among *off our backs*, *Ms.*, *Bitch*, and *BUST*. To reiterate, measures of collectivism and individualism are based on a 16-point scale ranging from -8 to +8, with higher positive numbers indicating higher levels of collectivism, lower negative numbers indicating higher levels of individualism, and zero representing equal degrees of both. *BUST* clearly shows the highest levels of individualism, generally ranging between -3 and -4 on the scale. Interestingly, the zine's lowest rates of individualism (or highest rates of collectivism) occur in 2002 and 2003, at approximately -2.5 on the scale, the same period in which the other three magazines show a marked decline in collectivism. *Off our backs*, by contrast, shows the highest rates of collectivism, particularly during the first half of the sample period (1995-2000). *Ms.* and *Bitch* generally fall in between these other two magazines. Again with the exception of *BUST*, all three magazines experience a noticeable decline in

collectivism (or inversely, an increase in individualism) beginning in summer 2002 and continuing over the next year.


To what degree do these fluctuations in collectivism correspond to changes in the opportunity structure? Figures 6.19 and 6.20 compare levels of collectivism in *off our backs* and *Ms.* with their respective perceptions of the opportunity structure. With regard to *off our backs*, its level of collectivism and perceptions of the domestic opportunity structure are fairly tightly coupled, allowing for a one-year lag in rates of collectivism. The trends found in *Ms.* are initially more puzzling. Generally collectivism decreases as domestic opportunities decrease, but these shifts often either happen simultaneously, or shifts in collectivism slightly precede shifts in the opportunity structure. Examining the magazine's perceptions of cultural and global opportunities, however, may help to shed light on this puzzle. As Figure 6.21 indicates, shifts in perceptions of the COS typically occurred one to two quarters earlier than shifts in perceptions of the POS, suggesting that

**Figure 6.19: Level of Collectivist Frames and Perceptions of Domestic Opportunity Structure in *off our backs*, 1995-2005**




Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages; Collectivist scale ranges from -8 - +8, DOS scale ranges from -1 - +1  
Source: *off our backs* (1995-2005)

**Figure 6.20: Levels of Collectivist Frames and Perceptions of the Opportunity Structure in Ms., 1995-2005**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages; Collectivist scale ranges from -8 - +8, DOS scale ranges from -1 - +1  
 Source: Ms. (1995-2005)

**Figure 6.21: Levels of Collectivist Frames and Perceptions of the Cultural and Global Opportunity Structure in Ms., 1995-2005**




Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages; Collectivist scale ranges from -8 - +8, DOS scale ranges from -1 - +1  
 Source: Ms. (1995-2005)

the magazine shifted in its framing with the first signs of opportunity or setback, whether cultural or political. Figure 6.21 also includes *Ms.*' perceptions of the global opportunity structure, important to consider given that the magazine was heavily focused on international issues (for example, as many as three-quarters of *Ms.* articles focused on international concerns during one quarter in this sample period). One of the biggest disjunctures between the domestic and global opportunity structures occurred in 2000 and 2001, when domestic opportunities were sharply declining and global opportunities held steady around the neutral or slightly positive range. Interestingly, rates of collectivism initially declined in spring 2000, as domestic opportunities declined, but over the next two years the magazine remained only mildly individualistic, despite an overwhelmingly negative domestic opportunity structure. The global opportunity structure may have helped to mitigate a downturn in the domestic opportunity structure, mirroring previous findings that social movement organizations more heavily embedded in global structures are better able to withstand ebbs and flows in the domestic opportunity structure.


Given *BUST*'s relative lack of variation both in perceptions of the opportunity structure and rates of collectivism, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the influence of the opportunity structure on collectivism (see Figure 6.22). Generally, however, in the variation that does exist, the magazine appears to draw on more individualist rhetoric as the opportunity structure becomes more negative, allowing for a 1- to 1.5-year lag. The *Bitch* data show clearer patterns (Figure 6.23), and with relatively few exceptions conform to the PPT hypothesis. That is, within a year of declining domestic opportunities, the zine drew increasingly on individualist rhetoric. Conversely, as opportunities improved, the zine turned more to collectivist rhetoric.

**Figure 6.22: Levels of Collectivist Frames and Perceptions of Domestic Opportunity Structure in *BUST*, 1995-2005**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages; Collectivist scale ranges from -8 - +8, DOS scale ranges from -1 - +1  
 Source: *BUST* (1995-2005)

**Figure 6.23: Levels of Collectivist Frames and Perceptions of the Opportunity Structure in *Bitch*, 1995-2005**



Note: Figures based on three-quarter moving averages; Collectivist scale ranges from -8 - +8, DOS scale ranges from -1 - +1  
 Source: *Bitch* (1996-2005)



Qualitative data help to flesh out these quantitative findings, revealing the ways in which the four magazines drew on collectivist and individualist frames. One component of the collectivist frame includes whether and to what degree the magazines recognized the structural nature of gender inequality. The two second-wave magazines – *off our backs* and *Ms.* – much more often acknowledged structural impediments to gender equality, readily using words such as “patriarchy,” “sexism,” and “homophobia.” While recognizing the achievements of the second-wave, *off our backs* continued to assert: “More than thirty years after the second-wave feminists lobbied for workplace equality, we still have a long way to go” (*oob*, Jan. 2004). *Ms.* likewise acknowledged continuing structural barriers to equality: “Although the social conditions [*The Yellow Wallpaper*] depicts no longer obtain, this extraordinary 1892 novella feels keenly immediate because women still experience being smothered and shackled” (*Ms.*, Fall 2005).

Similarly, the second-wave magazines more often recognized women’s successes as a consequence of the work done by their feminist predecessors. In an interview with *Ms.*, for instance, self-help author Susan Powter explained how she discusses her career with high school students: “And then I get into this discussion about how I couldn't have done this ten years ago. And they don't have a clue. I ask, ‘Have you ever read about Susan B. Anthony, do you have any clue who this woman is?’ And they don't. We're dropping the ball” (*Ms.*, July/Aug. 1996). Elsewhere Eileen Marie Collins, the first woman space shuttle commander, asserted: “It's important that I point out that I didn't get here alone. There are so many women throughout this century that have gone before me and have taken to the skies” (*Ms.*, Dec. 1999/Jan. 2000).

By contrast, *BUST*, and to some extent *Bitch*, when discussing similar success stories focused much more heavily on the efforts of individual women to pull themselves up by their bootstraps, largely ignoring ways in which feminists predecessors paved the way for them. *Bitch*, for instance, profiled Camryn Manheim on her “journey from victim to victor” following her 1998 Emmy win, focusing particularly on her hard work and perseverance (*Bitch*, Winter 1999). In part, these zines attributed women’s success to their personal attributes because they less often acknowledged structural gender inequality. In one book review, for example, *Bitch* argues that the author’s “insistence that women often have more power in many arenas than people of both genders like to admit is welcome” (*Bitch* Fall 1996). Similarly, in an interview with *BUST*, singer-songwriter Bjork was asked why so few women are involved in music. She replied: “I think it's insecurity. You could write a whole book about that, you know? I know a lot of women who would love to make music. I've spent long nights drinking lots of glasses of wine, trying to boost the confidence of some ladies, saying, ‘Do it! Yeah! You have a dream? Just do it!’ Unfortunately, not many of them do it, and it's a bit of a shame” (*BUST*, Feb/Mar. 2005). She frames the issue as one of women’s personal insecurity rather than structural inequality.

Another measure of collectivism included here is whether writers are willing to identify as feminists or otherwise promote gender solidarity. Generally *off our backs* and *Ms.* more readily used the word “feminist” to describe themselves or others, though noticeably absent were discussions of “sisterhood” or “womyn” that characterized the magazines in the 1970s. Not only did the magazines frequently use the descriptor “feminist,” they did so without qualification or apology. Scientist Alice Stewart was

quoted in *Ms.*: “‘I am strongly a feminist. Oh, yes, yes,’ Stewart says, banging her fist on the desk” (*Ms.*, July/Aug. 1996). Another *Ms.* writer recounted:

Recently, a very hostile man said, “You’re such a feminist,” and I said, “absolutely.” All feminism really means is that just because you have a penis and I have a vagina, there is no difference between us. We are equal. That’s all it really means. All the other nitpickies, abortion/no abortion, that’s personal. You’re either a feminist or you’re an idiot. (*Ms.*, July/Aug. 1996)

The magazine was also outspoken in its criticism of women who shied away from the feminist label. In a profile of the all-female concert tour Lilith Fair, *Ms.* objected to founder Sarah McLachlan’s reluctance to define it as a feminist tour:

Although the Lilith Fair is steeped in feminist sensibilities, McLachlan seems to be uncomfortable with the “f” word. She stresses that this “isn’t a soapbox for extremist feminism” (whatever that means). She also claims that while Lilith “is a huge step in the right direction for women’s rights, it isn’t about dissing men. This is not by any stretch a manhating tour.” [...] Still, when pushed, McLachlan concedes that “by nature, the tour is a feminist event. You cannot get around that.” Ah, maybe next year she’ll say it loud, clear, and proud. (*Ms.*, July/Aug. 1997)

Both *BUST* and *Bitch*, by contrast, reflected a third-wave ambivalence towards feminism. One *BUST* writer described herself as “schizophrenic,” trying to combine her “feminist leanings” with her interest in traditional “girly” things (*BUST*, Winter 1995). In the same issue, the zine profiled musician Thalia Zadek, who discussed her relationship with feminism: “I consider myself a feminist and stuff but I’m definitely not like one of those people—I mean, I like the Rolling Stones and I don’t care if Mick Jagger is or is not a misogynist. But I do hate Camille Paglia. I think she’s a total fucking

idiot and if she hates feminists then I'm a feminist" (*BUST*, Winter 1995). And *Bitch* offered an article proclaiming the rise of "metagenderism":

It is the unlimited superset of all possible (non)genders and gender (non)identities, of individual and cultural existence free from binaristic categorization and definition. Be a girly-girl, a grrl, a goddess, a boy, a man, a woman, a she-male, a he-male, an FTM, a warrior prince or princess, an androgyne, an asexual, or as many as you damn well want, whenever you damn well please. (*Bitch*, Spring 1998)

At other times, the zines expressed outright hostility towards the feminist label. Quoting indie filmmaker Sarah Jacobson:

I wanna feel like I don't have to support every single woman filmmaker out there, or every single girl-powered film out there. That's the true meaning of success, when it's so varied that you don't have to be totally unified. Women are so different, and there are a lot of problems in modern feminism, because it's like, "God, we all have to pretend that we all like each other." Well, there's a lot of women I don't like, and there's a lot of women who don't like me. I don't want to have to feel guilty about it. (*Bitch*, Spring 1997)

Even *Ms.* reflected this feminist ambivalence at times. In a review of Elizabeth Fox-Genovese's book *Feminism is Not the Story of My Life*, the magazine was critical of Fox-Genovese's negative portrayal of feminism, but ended the review by noting: "In the 'real' world, feminism is a toolbox -- we can take what we need and leave the rest" (*Ms.*, March 1996). This definition of feminism resonates with the third wave's opposition to dogmatic feminism, but makes a collective commitment to feminist goals difficult. Interestingly, this problem was noted in *Bitch*—during an interview with *second-wave* feminist Barbara Ehrenreich: "the radical conception of feminism in the '70s was as a

collective movement, and I think we've lost a lot of that. It's much more individual today: 'Well, I won't put up with this or that,' [There's] very little sense of, How do we act together?'" (*Bitch*, Spring 2003).

Ehrenreich's comment touches on a related issue of whether and to what degree the magazines encouraged their readers to act on behalf of women as a collective, or conversely, whether readers should prioritize their own concerns. Here again, clear differences emerge between *BUST* (and to some extent *Bitch*), and *Ms.* and *off our backs*. The latter pushed for a myriad of social reforms, including increasing women's access to reproductive health care, safeguarding Title IX, pushing for pay equity, and protecting women from sex trafficking. Given that these two magazines were steeped in the feminist movement of the 1970s, they often referred to collective struggles of the past to encourage their readers to engage in collective action today. In its coverage of the ERA campaign, *Ms.* argued: "Longer-term, we need to fan the still-burning flame that was first lit by Alice Paul. [The ERA] is the overarching value that brings us together, offering a vision larger than any one issue, and a chance to bequeath the strongest possible legacy to the next generation" (*Ms.*, Summer 2005).

By contrast, *BUST*, and to a lesser extent *Bitch*, adopted the "toolbox" approach to feminism, encouraging readers to use feminism when it furthered their personal goals, but reminding them not to be bound by it. A *Bitch* writer, for instance, reminded women: "Most of all, we have to keep in mind one primary lesson of feminist sexual liberation: There's nothing wrong with being demanding, and nothing wrong with a girl who wants more" (*Bitch*, Fall 2002). In this case, feminist principles are touted as helping women in the bedroom. Other articles dealt with issues such as how to make the best career choice,

where to find good bargains on clothing, and how to manage credit card debt. One *BUST* article offered a 10-point list on “How to Get Rich,” and “How to Stay Poor.” Topping their list of financial advice included “Inherit it,” and “Marry it.” Interestingly, included among their list of “how to stay poor” was this warning: “Believe that shit you read in *Ms. magazine*” (*BUST*, Spring 1999). Not only did the zine encourage women to act on their own behalf, it actively condemned other feminist magazines, like *Ms.*, that failed to do so.

In short, these findings show the four magazines generally individualized within a year of growing pessimism about the opportunity structure, as political process theory predicts. These fluctuations in the levels of collectivism and individualism counter the expectation of new social movement theory, which predicted uniformly high levels of individualism during the third-wave period, and instead follow patterns more similar to the first and second waves. To reiterate, the major exception here is *Ms. magazine*, which did not individualize to the extent one would expect, given its overall pessimism about the opportunity structure. Yet this case can be explained within the existing PPT framework: as the domestic environment became increasingly hostile to feminism after 2000, *Ms.* turned its focus increasingly to the generally positive international environment, helping to buffer against these domestic setbacks and maintain higher levels of collectivism.

### ***Correlations***

Table 6.5 presents correlation coefficients between the rates of collectivism and select independent variables (lagged one year) for all four magazines. See Appendix C for full table of correlations.

Measures of *political instability* show mixed results. Correlation coefficients show moderate relationships with collectivism in many cases, but quite often in the opposite direction of that hypothesized (especially for *BUST* and *Bitch* magazines). Women's *access to the state* has very little correlation with rates of collectivism ( $r < 0.22$ ).

The presence of *political allies* has small to moderate correlation coefficients, many of which reach significance. The exception to this pattern is *off our backs*, which for the most part has negative correlations between political allies and collectivism.

The presence of *cultural allies*, by contrast, has either small or negative correlation coefficients. In particular, media coverage tends to be strongly and negatively correlated with collectivism, contrary to the hypothesis. *Public opinion* measures show some small to moderate correlations with collectivism, particularly support for women's rights (although *off our backs* is an exception).

*Perceptions of opportunities* have little relationship to collectivism, and in the very few cases in which the correlation coefficient reaches significance, the relationship occurs in the opposite direction of that hypothesized.

Finally, some measures of *global opportunities* show small to moderate correlations with collectivism, and with the exception of *off our backs*, the relationships generally occur in the expected direction (with significant correlation coefficients ranging from 0.32 to 0.43). NGO access to the U.N., rates of women in parliamentary positions, number of female heads of state, and number of CEDAW signatories show the strongest relationships with collectivism.

**Table 6.5: Correlation Coefficients between Collectivism and Select Independent Variables**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables		Correlation Coefficients				
			<i>off our backs</i>	<i>Ms.</i>	<i>BUST</i>	<i>Bitch</i>	<i>Combined</i>
1. During periods of <b>political instability</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist</b> rhetoric.	Number of congressional seats that change party		0.5727*	-0.3084	-0.2143	-0.2302	0.0453
	Margin of victory for political candidates		-0.1312	-0.2891	0.2468	0.3128*	0.0098
	Presidential victories on votes in Congress		-0.4905*	0.2369	0.3424*	0.6633*	0.0369
	Size of gender voting gap		-0.4583*	0.1868	0.3534*	0.6260*	0.0476
2. During periods in which women's <b>access to the polity</b> broadens, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist</b> rhetoric.	Women's voter registration rates		0.0679	0.2015	-0.2217	-0.1006	-0.0072
3. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>collectivist</b> rhetoric.	Presidential support for women's rights (% of words in State of Union in support of women's rights)		0.0268	0.3897*	0.2040	0.2205	0.0938
	EEOC funding		0.3206*	0.0986	0.4790*	0.2634	0.1652*
	Rates of women in political positions	U.S. Senate	-0.5065*	0.2275	0.3631*	0.6185*	0.0408
		U.S. House	-0.6447*	0.3241*	0.2759	0.3397*	-0.0189
		Governors	-0.6207*	0.2189	0.1575	0.3168*	-0.0397
	Presidential Cabinets	0.3435*	0.1814	0.0377	-0.1756	0.0734	
4. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>collectivist</b> rhetoric.	Rate of women's employment in the arts, media, and clergy		-0.2649	0.0429	-0.0384	-0.0592	-0.0515
	Media coverage of the women's movement	<i>NY Times</i>	0.3929*	-0.3567*	-0.3673*	-0.5734*	-0.0733
		Television news	0.2585	-0.2879	-0.1672	-0.5064*	-0.0428



<b>4a.</b> During periods in which <b>public opinion</b> is supportive of feminist issues, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist</b> rhetoric.	Equality for women	-0.6132*	0.3696*	0.3375*	0.3441*	-0.0084
	Legalization of abortion	0.5886*	-0.3233*	0.0563	-0.0350	0.0852
	Conservatism	0.2921	-0.2728	0.0893	0.1608	0.0553
<b>12.</b> During periods of increasing <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist</b> rhetoric.	Perceptions of political opportunities	-0.1153	0.1211	0.2490	-0.4208*	-0.0835
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities	0.1566	0.2032	0.1712	-0.0295	-0.0173
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities	0.1997	0.1134	0.2049	0.0389	-0.0042
	Perceptions of global opportunities	0.0703	0.1322	--	-0.4796*	-0.0319
<b>14.</b> During periods of increasing <b>global opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist</b> rhetoric.	NGO access to the UN (number granted consultative status)	-0.5788*	0.3532*	0.3142	0.4253*	0.0072
	Rate of political party competition across countries	0.2147	-0.1583	-0.1943	0.3619	0.0158
	Rate of political participation across countries	-0.1639	0.0636	-0.2124	0.3037	-0.0351
	Number of countries with female heads of state	-0.5411*	0.2527	0.3395*	0.2728	0.0059
	Rate of women in parliament	-0.6295*	0.2933	0.3411*	0.4310*	-0.0026
	Number of CEDAW signatories	-0.4989*	0.1992	0.2939	0.4189*	0.0113
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>		<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>		<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>		<b>11</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>25</b>

\* p&lt;.05

*Note:* All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).

In sum, despite the qualitative and descriptive findings that showed a more straightforward relationship between opportunities and collectivism, these correlations are more ambiguous. In particular, measures of political allies, public support for women's rights, and select global opportunities show moderate relationships with the journals' level of collectivism. However, *off our backs* tends to be weakly correlated with opportunities, at best. Moreover, perceptions of opportunities again show virtually no relationship levels of collectivism, and in the few cases where correlation coefficients reach significance, the relationship occurs in the opposite direction of that hypothesized. In short, these correlations do not clearly match the qualitative findings presented above.

## V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

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The third-wave data offer an opportunity to compare third-wave magazines with the still active second-wave magazines. Interestingly, the biggest differences seem to occur between *BUST* and the other three magazines, rather than splitting along second- and third-wave lines, suggesting that there is less of a generational difference between the second and third waves than what activists on both sides often argue. Yet how well does political process theory explain these differences?

Generally speaking, as perceptions of the opportunity structure became more pessimistic, all four magazines were more likely to use on consensus tactics, adopt cultural goals, and draw on individualist rhetoric. Admittedly, however, these patterns are less clear-cut than those found with the first- and second-wave data, and do not hold up equally well across magazines. In particular, *BUST*'s general disregard for the

opportunity structure makes it difficult to argue that the magazine's perception of opportunities had much of an effect on its tactics, goals, or rhetoric.

A cross-magazine comparison of *Bitch*, *off our backs*, and *Ms.* shows that among the three magazines, *Bitch* generally held the most pessimistic assessments of the opportunity structure, and it also generally offered lower rates of antagonist identification, political goals, and collectivist rhetoric. Moreover for each of the magazines, periods of declining opportunities were generally followed by growing individualization, depoliticization, and use of consensus tactics. Two major exceptions to this pattern stand out. First, *Bitch* and *BUST* depoliticize immediately with negative shifts in the opportunity structure. While the shift occurs in the hypothesized direction, that it happens simultaneously with the independent variable makes it difficult to establish causality. Moreover, the pattern does not fit with previous findings that suggest that the movement's change in goals happened much more slowly (over a period of several years) after declining opportunities.

The second major exception to this pattern is *Ms.*' levels of collectivism. In looking solely at the magazine's perceptions of the domestic opportunity structure, a similar problem emerges, in that shifts in collectivism happen simultaneously – or even precede – shifts in the opportunity structure. Yet distinguishing between political and cultural opportunities may help solve this puzzle. Shifts in cultural opportunities occurred earlier than shifts in political opportunities, such that levels of collectivism decreased shortly after decreasing cultural opportunities, but preceding or simultaneous with decreasing political opportunities. This finding fits with previous findings (particularly from the first wave) which suggest that the short-term nature of tactics and

frames allows movements to shift quickly with the first signs of change in the opportunity structure, to take advantage of new opportunities or change course with declining opportunities.

A second puzzle emerges with the *Ms.* data: the dramatic downturns in the opportunity structure (particularly between 2000-2003) are not matched by equally dramatic decreases in collectivism. Again, previous findings from the first and second waves may help to explain this pattern. *Ms.* was heavily focused on international issues during this period, a significant consideration given that global opportunities were more readily available than domestic opportunities. While the presence of global opportunities was not able to entirely compensate for the major domestic constraints, they do seem to have a mitigating effect on these domestic problems – that is, while the magazine did slightly individualize during this period, it did not individualize to the same extent as other magazines. In the same way that *Equal Rights* during the 1920s and *off our backs* during the 1980s were able to generally remain more collectivist than their counterparts, it appears that *Ms.* magazine's focus on the more positive global structures in early 2000s similarly allowed it to maintain higher levels of collectivism.

To return to the original theoretical hypotheses guiding this study, the New Social Movement prediction that the third wave should exhibit consistently higher levels of consensus tactics, cultural goals, and individualist rhetoric compared to previous waves is clearly not the case, according to these findings. Not only do the third-wave magazines show fluctuations in these attributes, they also do not differ considerably from earlier waves. For instance, the *Woman Citizen* showed higher levels of individualism during the 1920s than most of the third-wave magazines during the “new” social movement

period. Similarly, *Ms.* was more heavily focused on cultural issues during the second wave than third. Not only do these trends fail to follow the NSMT predictions, they tend to match fairly closely the PPT hypotheses with few exceptions. Within a year of diminishing opportunities, the magazines were more likely to turn to consensus tactics, cultural goals, and individualist rhetoric.

A few caveats are important to reiterate, so as not to overemphasize the significance of these findings. First, the lack of variation in *BUST*'s perceptions of the opportunity structure leaves us with fewer explanatory variables to make sense of the data. The second major problem with these findings concerns the timing of *BUST*'s and *Bitch*'s shift in goals, which occurred simultaneously with shifts in the opportunity structure; while this change occurred in the hypothesized direction, its timing makes it difficult to establish causality. These few exceptions notwithstanding, however, the findings suggest an overall pattern that supports the expectations of political process theory.

Finally, the findings from the bivariate correlations offer an alternate way of assessing these data. Generally speaking, certain categories of opportunities stand out as significant predictors of tactics, goals, and frames. For instance, most measures of political allies show on balance decent correlations with the three dependent variables, and in the expected direction. For the first time, this wave showed moderate correlations between some types of global opportunities and movement outcomes, particularly rising rates of women in governments worldwide and increasing state receptiveness to women's rights. By contrast, with the third wave, perceptions of opportunities show some of the weakest relationships to movement outcomes. To reiterate, however, the qualitative and

descriptive findings from all three waves, the third wave included, point to an intricate relationship between various types of opportunities, and basic bivariate correlations may be too simple to capture such relationships.

## **CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION**

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When Rebecca Walker proclaimed a new third wave of feminism in the early 1990s, she signaled both a continuity with and independence from the waves of feminism that came before her. As other third-wave feminists emerged from the woodwork, however, the separation from the second wave became emphasized over any connections to it. This separation often played out in mother-daughter metaphors. Baumgardner and Richards (2000), for instance, in their chapter entitled “Thou Shalt Not Become Thy Mother,” insisted: “To do feminism differently from one’s mother, to make choices that are our own, and not simply a reaction or rejection, is the task of our generation” (215). Second-wave feminists, in turn, have accused the third wave of committing “psychological matricide” (see e.g., Chesler 1999). Soon third-wave feminism became about *difference*: difference from the second wave, difference from their mothers (real or metaphorical), and difference from what they perceived as dogmatic feminism.

Second-wave feminists, not surprisingly, decried third-wavers for their failure to appreciate feminist history and the gains made by earlier generations. I share this critique, but for different reasons. Less about the generational discord between the second and third waves per se, my concern rests with the failure to appreciate the entire trajectory of American feminism, a history stretching back far before the 1960s. In short, I argue that placing the third wave in this larger historical context can offer a better understanding of the state of feminism today and better indications of where to go from here.

I use this chapter as an opportunity to pull together findings from earlier chapters into a more coherent picture of demobilization dynamics in the women’s movement. I

discuss potential implications for individualized, depoliticized, and consensus-oriented movements, and end with suggestions for future research.

#### MAIN FINDINGS

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Perhaps most obviously, the empirical findings presented in previous chapters point to the overall weakness of new social movement theory (NSMT) in explaining changes in movement goals, tactics, and ideology. Contrary to the theory's predictions, the first wave of the feminist movement does show high levels of individualist rhetoric, cultural goals, and consensus tactics under certain circumstances, well before the so-called "new" social movement period. And conversely, contemporary feminism shows high levels of collectivism and politicization, in certain cases.

But these findings also add some complexity to the argument made by Political Process Theory (PPT) that declining opportunities lead to individualized, depoliticized, and consensus-oriented movements. In some cases, this relationship was indeed fairly straightforward. Both Progressive feminism (i.e., the *Woman's Citizen*) in the 1920s and liberal feminism (i.e., *Ms.*) in the early 1980s do change towards individualized rhetoric, consensus tactics, and cultural goals soon after opportunities begin to decline. But in other cases, this relationship is more complex.

#### ***Goals versus Frames and Tactics***

First, these findings raise issues regarding the timing of changes in movement goals, tactics, and rhetoric. In particular, political opportunities and cultural opportunities do not always shift in lockstep. As Tarrow (1998) argues, political opportunities are "fickle friends," which shift easily from challenger to opponent. Cultural opportunities,



by contrast, are often more institutionalized and change more slowly than political opportunities. This disjuncture has implications for the timing of movement demobilization. As evidenced by the *Woman Citizen* in the 1920s and *off our backs* in the 1980s, goals change more slowly than rhetoric and tactics and in response to declining opportunities on all fronts. By contrast, tactics and frames tend to shift at the first sign of changing opportunities. For instance, in the 1990s and 2000s *Ms.* showed declining levels of collectivist rhetoric immediately after declining cultural opportunities, but before noticeable changes in political opportunities. Of course, goals are more central to a movement than its strategies for achieving those goals (i.e., its tactics and frames). As these cases suggest, the short-term nature of tactics and frames prompted the women's movement to shift quickly with the initial changes in the opportunity structure, in order to take advantage of new opportunities and re-strategize after declining opportunities. Conversely, given the longer-term nature of goals, the movement appeared more reluctant to relinquish their original goals, and did so only when both the political and cultural climates offered little hope for success.

### ***Domestic versus Global Opportunities***

The second way in which these findings lead to a more nuanced political process model is by distinguishing between domestic- and global-level opportunities. Various branches of the movement varied considerably in degree to which they were domestically or globally focused, a distinction which is important to point out, given that the transnational feminist movement has generally enjoyed greater political and cultural opportunities. For instance, *Equal Rights* during the 1920s, *off our backs* during the early

1980s, and *Ms.* during the 1990s and 2000s, all maintained higher levels of collectivism, political coverage, and conflict tactics than their counterparts during these fairly hostile periods. Yet in each case, these magazines turned their focus to the global arena at a time in which transnational feminism was experiencing an upswing in political and cultural opportunities. It is important to point out that in most of these cases, the organizations were not able to completely avoid domestic constraints, as they individualized, depoliticized, and turned to consensus tactics to a limited extent. While the presence of global opportunities did not entirely compensate for domestic setbacks, however, they do seem to have a mitigating effect on domestic constraints for these organizations. In short, these findings suggest that movement organizations which become more embedded in global structures and processes are better able to withstand domestic-level setbacks.

### ***Perceptions versus Objective Opportunities***

These findings also point to the importance of distinguishing between formal openings in political and cultural structures and movement participants' perceptions of those openings. Few studies have directly assessed how opportunities work – i.e., whether opportunities work independently of participants' recognition of them (but for an exception, see Meyer and Minkoff 2004).

In the case of the women's movement, while several measures of objective opportunities have high correlations with movement outcomes, rarely do the same types of opportunities have consistent effects on movement outcomes across all three waves and all movement publications. By contrast, measures of perceived opportunities are more consistently correlated with movement outcomes. While they do not hold equally

well in all circumstances – for instance, perceived opportunities have much stronger effects on the movement during the first wave than third wave – in comparison to objective opportunities of the same time period, perceived opportunities as a whole tend to produce better results. Of course, a multivariate analysis would offer better insight into the relative effects of objective and perceived opportunities.

### ***The Pitfalls of Victory and Opportunities in Defeat***

Finally, these findings suggest that under certain circumstances, defeats may offer hidden opportunities, and conversely, victories may present stumbling blocks. First, single-issue organizations appear particularly vulnerable to success. The case of *Equal Rights* (representing the single-issue National Woman's Party), for instance, demonstrates that individualization, depoliticization, and a turn toward consensus tactics followed immediately on the heels of the suffrage victory in 1920. However, in 1923 the National Woman's Party returned to launch a campaign for the Equal Rights Amendment, and the magazine quickly returned to pre-suffrage levels of collectivism, politicization, and use of conflict tactics. The flipside of this dynamic was found with *our backs* during the second wave. Although faced with a soundly negative opportunity structure in the 1980s, the magazine maintained fairly high levels of collectivism and politicization. Not only did the magazine simply overcome this hostility, it actively drew on threats posed by the Reagan administration and other opponents to create an impetus for feminist mobilization. Yet, as discussed above, the magazine was also able to draw support from a largely supportive international community, unlike *Ms.* during this same period. This case suggests that movements can capitalize on threats to mobilize and

politicize constituents, when coupled with other sources of opportunities. Thus taken together, these findings suggest that the relationship between the movement and its opportunity structure is curvilinear, such that both major defeats and victories demobilize movement, while partial victories and defeats can act to mobilize activists (see Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone 2003; Meyer 1993; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Santoro and Townsend 2006; Staggenborg 1991; Werum and Winders 2001).

#### BROADER IMPLICATIONS

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In addition to the implications for social movement research outlined above, my interest in this project extends beyond theoretical concerns. In particular, these findings provide a better understanding of the contemporary feminist movement and offers suggestions for its future direction. Third-wave feminists are working today to build an effective women's movement and promote feminist goals and ideology. If individualized, depoliticized, and consensus movements are indeed a sign of movement troughs rather than waves, as I have argued here, we need to reconsider the "wave" terminology adopted by third-wave feminists. This issue is not merely one of semantics, however. As Rupp and Taylor (1987; Taylor 1989) point out about post-suffrage feminism, activity in the "doldrums" can prove essential for setting the stage for the reemergence of feminism. The period between the first and second waves served as a "movement halfway house" (Morris 1984) for the second wave, "whose members are working to promote change that lacks broad-based support but provides important resources, such as skilled activists, media contacts, specialized knowledge, experience with past movements, and a vision of the future" (Taylor 1990: 297). The potential danger, however, in accepting this new stage of feminism as a third wave is that attention may be diverted away from developing

resources, building an organization base, and putting together a feminist network.

Recognizing this so-called "third wave" as a halfway house rather than a wave can better facilitate feminism's revival when the political and cultural opportunities are ripe.

Moreover, others have raised concern over the ability of individualist, cultural, and consensus movements to effect real social change. I discuss each in turn.

*Limitations of Consensus Movements.* The term "consensus movement" was first used by John Lofland in a 1989 essay criticizing the "derailed dissent" of leftist movements in the 1980s. Yet in scholarship that followed, consensus movements came to be touted as a benign form of new movements that offered the potential for effecting greater social and political change than traditional conflict movements (see e.g., McCarthy and Wolfson 1992). Indeed, NSMT scholars view these movements as an outgrowth of "advanced" societies, filling real and important needs for their constituents (see Chapter 2).

But in reality, how successful are these movements in effecting social change? Schwartz and Paul (1992) demonstrate that consensus movements suffer from low membership rates (and lower commitment levels among those who are members), as well as bureaucratization and susceptibility to outside cooptation. Despite the resources and institutional support available to consensus movements, they often have difficulty mobilizing constituents. For instance, Mothers Against Drunk Driving recruited only about 25,000 members in the five years after its emergence, compared to hundreds of thousands, even millions, mobilized by comparable conflict movements. Moreover, consensus movements tend to operate under tight structural constraints that prevent their adaptability to changing circumstances and increase the likelihood of cooptation.

Forgoing power in numbers for power in outside support, as MADD and other consensus movements typically do, leaves these movements vulnerable to the demands and interests of outside institutions (*ibid.*).

In fact, Schwartz's and Paul's (1992) research resonates with other scholarship on successful mobilizing efforts of conflict movements. This project, as well as other research, finds that some degree of hostility and presence of opponents mobilize activists (see Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone 2003; Meyer 1993; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Santoro and Townsend 2006; Werum and Winders 2001). Drawing on the pro-choice movement, for instance, Staggenborg (Staggenborg 1989; 1991) finds that the 1973 court victory with the *Roe v. Wade* decision would have likely demobilized the movement had it not been for the immediate emergence of a countermovement which sought to overturn the ruling. The pro-choice movement has enjoyed such longevity in part because of fluctuating political victories and defeats and a continual interplay between the pro-choice movement and pro-life countermovement. In fact, we find the reverse scenario with the National Woman's Party following suffrage: securing the right to vote (and effectively demobilizing the anti-suffrage opposition) essentially took the wind out of NWP's sails. The organization demobilized until launching a new conflict-oriented campaign in 1923. While turning to consensus tactics may offer weak movements the opportunity to avoid organized opposition, this line of research suggests it also limits their long-term options for mass mobilization.

***Limitations of Cultural Movements.*** Like consensus movements, NSMT scholars suggest cultural and apolitical movements are a response to shifting social conditions that open up new areas for contestation and make political issues obsolete.

Third-wave feminists themselves argue that the policy gains made by the second wave have now “freed up” the movement to pursue cultural goals. But here again, the broader history of the movement can offer certain lessons to third-wave feminism. Rupp and Taylor (1987; Taylor 1989) document the retrenchment and abeyance strategies of the National Woman’s Party in the interwar years, which included a renewed emphasis on creating a feminist culture and community. This community was particularly important at a time when the movement was faced with political and social hostility. Yet the NWP was able to combine its efforts to create a supportive feminist community with its broader political agenda (particularly the ERA campaign).

On one hand, the movement made similar choices in the 1980s, turning inward to focus on the creation and maintenance of a feminist community, which could support and retain activists during this anti-feminist time. On the other hand, however, movement organizations chose to largely disengage from political campaigns. As Sawyers and Meyer (1999) argue, this choice helped to sustain the movement by promoting feminist values and a collective identity, but it ultimately cost them in terms of long-term policy influence. When political opportunities again became available to the movement, inwardly-focused organizations failed to take advantage of them. Thus while cultural goals and concerns may offer some merit for social movements, particularly in terms of sustaining them during downward cycles, in the absence of a broader political agenda, it may also result in setbacks long after the political and cultural opportunities reappear.

***Limitations of Individualist Movements.*** Finally, despite the ways in which third-wave feminists (and NSM theorists) tout the “innovativeness” and liberatory aspects of individualism as a feminist strategy, others have expressed concerns over the limitations

of such a strategy. As historian Susan Ware points out about post-suffrage feminism in the 1920s, change enacted at the individual level is difficult to institutionalize. She cautions:

Because this very appealing vision of personal autonomy and independence put such a high premium on individual rather than collective achievement, it presented no real challenge to the more complex structural problems of inequality and discrimination. When women did succeed (and many did), it proved very difficult to pass these highly fragile and historically specific gains on to the next generation. (Ware 1993: 139)

Individualism as a third-wave strategy, like the post-suffrage feminist activism that preceded it, largely fails to challenge structural inequality, and consequently fails to institutionalize gains that *are* made individually.

In addition to institutional support, social movement scholars have long recognized the necessity of a collective base of support for individual activism. Gamson (1995), for example, argues: “All social movements have the task of bridging individual and sociocultural levels. This is accomplished by enlarging the personal identities of constituents to include the relevant collective identities as part of their definition of self” (100). The lack of a collective action mentality, what Gamson refers to as an “aggregate frame,” fails to transform individuals working individually for change into collective actors. The limitations of such aggregate action, in which actors work independently of a social movement, is clearly evidenced by the failures of post-suffrage feminism, in which women sought to be “self-conscious” rather than “sex-conscious” (to borrow a phrase from Bromley ([1927] 1999)). The adoption of social movement ideology and collective identity is necessary to fuse the personal with the political. As Filene (1998) explains,



“Without a sense that other women were also contending with similar problems and toward similar goals, women easily lost hope” (144). Third-wavers themselves have made note of similar frustrations: “So, although there is a wealth of personal experience in much of this [zine] material, the intentional informality of the process...can permit one to avoid making connections between her voice and those of others” (Bailey 2003). Thus, foregoing a commitment to *collective* action and lacking institutional support, third-wave feminism, like post-suffrage feminism before it, runs the risk of early exhaustion.

*Exclusivity of Individualist and Cultural Movements.* A final note about the homogeneity of the contemporary movement: third-wave feminists have long argued that the movement individualized in an effort to be more welcoming of diverse women. In fact, many claim that the third wave directly grew out of women-of-color and third world feminism in the 1980s. These branches advocated a feminism based on difference and multiple identities, in response to the second wave’s exclusion of women of color (see Heywood and Drake 1997).

Yet the diversity and accessibility of third-wave feminism has been challenged on several grounds. Sorisio (1997) explains that the problem with individualism as a feminist strategy is that “they want to race into the (not quite) top echelon of society, grab the booty, and bask in their newfound power” (146), yet this option is available only to relatively privileged women and obscures racial, class, and other impediments to achieving individual success. Susan Ware (1993) notes this same problem with Amelia Earhart’s approach to feminism in the 1920s, who lacked “any awareness that there might be women who for reasons of race, class, sexual orientation, or other ‘differences’ would

not be able to make the free choices and implement them the way that Earhart had. Far too often a model based on, and mainly available to, privileged members of the white middle class was held up as a universally attainable ideal” (135).

In addition, despite widespread third-wave claims that they have created a space that allows for “do-it-yourself” feminist activism (Bail 1996) and provided “democratized” technologies that are accessible to all interested feminists to pursue their own activism (Garrison 2000), these third wavers ignore a number of restrictions on this form of activism. Kearney (1998), for instance, points out that it is important “to problematize which girls are given access to and training in the means of cultural production (that is, which girls are allowed to participate in the ‘politics of representation’)” (305). Creating a zine, for instance, requires a certain amount of financial investment (Rosenberg and Garofalo 1998). Moreover, third-wavers are increasingly turning to the Internet as a site of activism, which brings up an additional set of limitations. DiMaggio and Cohen (2003) argue that the “digital divide” is growing, separating those who have access to the Internet from those who do not, particularly the poor, less educated, rural residents, and racial/ethnic minorities. Most third-wavers tout the Internet as a truly egalitarian site of feminist activity, and only a handful have recognized its potential limitations, among them Catherine Orr (1997), who argues: “the assertion that the Internet is democracy incarnate is far-fetched. After all, it still requires access to computers, software, and a specific set of language skills, along with the inclination and leisure to sit in front of a monitor for hours at a time.”

Finally, not only is access to the sites of feminist activism problematic, but also the acquisition of the requisite skills to participate in such a movement. In his study of an

environmental justice organization, for instance, Lichterman (1995a) found that despite (predominately white) group members' genuine desire and effort to create a racially diverse movement, they had a difficult time recruiting minorities. The movement was one which relied on a strategy of "personalism," that is "ways of speaking and acting which highlight a unique, personal self...(which) gets discovered by reflecting on individual biography and by developing the preferences that establish one's own individuality" (1995b: 276-77). Lichterman goes on to argue that "a political group that uses this individualistic tradition to create leaderless groups of articulate, intensively participating individuals is also one that assumes specific cultural skills—individual verbal ability and confidence in self-presentation, for instance. Scholars have associated these skills with highly educated middle-class groups more than others" (1995a: 527). Despite the group's best intention to diversify, its reliance on personalized self-expression and individual initiative created a culturally limiting organization. The similarities to third-wave feminism should be apparent. The individualist form of the movement – one that places a premium on self-expression and personal communication – problematically assumes an equal distribution of cultural capital. Moreover, the individualist goals of the movement – pushing individual self-fulfillment and downplaying structural inequality – isolate already marginalized groups of women.

The insights made by Rupp and Taylor (1987; Taylor 1990) about the movement in the interwar years can be brought to bear here. Taylor (1990) explicitly refers to this abeyance period as an "elite-sustained stage," one in which the movement was comprised of a small group of white, well-educated, economically privileged women. During the antifeminist climate of the period, activists relied on personal bonds of friendship and

romance to maintain their commitment and ultimately sustain the movement in the long run. Yet this strategy, albeit one that allowed the movement to persevere, created “a homogenous community that did not and could not attract women of color, working-class women, or young women” (Taylor and Rupp 1993: 50). Fifty years later, history seems to be repeating itself.

#### FUTURE RESEARCH

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A single dissertation necessarily leaves certain questions and issues unaddressed, and this one is no exception. First, my analysis employs magazine articles to capture the “public face” of the movement, which is directly tied to mass mobilization efforts. In contrast, archival sources (such as diaries, letters, organizational records) containing in-depth records of discussions among movement participants about whether and why to change movement rhetoric might provide invaluable insights into what these shifting opportunities meant to movement activists. Some scholars and feminists have raised the question of whether movement individualization is, in fact, a rational choice employed by activists in response to external hostility, or whether it is an unconscious absorption of backlash rhetoric (see e.g., Bean 2007). By the end of the 1970s, for instance, *off our backs* was arguing, “This decade's cooptation turns us back into atomized individuals cut off from any history of collective action, scrambling for a piece of the pie” (Brooke 1980). Similarly, Bailey (2003) cautions: “It is one of the most insidious strategies of patriarchy to acknowledge feminist insights only to reinscribe them as individual women’s problems to solve rather than as societal ones.” Data on the private face of the movement would allow us to better understand whether a shift to individualist goals and

ideology is a deliberate strategy of the movement or a consequence of being culturally “duped.”

Second, given the historical breadth of this project, it is necessarily limited to some extent in depth. In particular, I focus here on “mainstream” feminism, a choice made for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Yet this focus excludes alternative organizations and feminisms, and downplays the immense diversity of the women’s movement, which has seen in the past several decades the proliferation of Black feminism, lesbian feminism, postcolonial feminism, Third World feminism, and transfeminism, among others.<sup>34</sup> I recognize that this focus on “mainstream” feminism contributes to a master narrative that presents white, heteronormative, and Western feminism as the norm. Moreover, this selective focus may be problematic for theoretical reasons as well. The trends I have described in the preceding chapters may not necessarily hold for other branches of the movement. Future research should pursue this matter further. On the other hand, of course, this focus on difference, diversity, and identity politics that has served to divide the women’s movement – for better and worse – since the 1980s is part and parcel of the individualizing trend of the movement that I have attempted to document here. Taken to its logical extreme, as the third wave has done, has resulted in a brand of feminism so consumed by difference that it fails to band together as a collective.

As Cherrie Moraga argues, “to fail to move out from [the personal] will only isolate us in our own oppression—will only insulate rather than radicalize us” (1983: 29). This concern with identity politics and focus on differences among women has been used

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<sup>34</sup> For more on the diversity of the feminist movement, see Springer (2005), Echols (1989), Moraga and Anzuldúa (1983), and Taylor and Whittier (1992).

constructively by marginalized groups to fight various forms of oppression, but it “[comes at a] price,” argues Bonnie Zimmerman. “The power of diversity has as its mirror image and companion the powerlessness of fragmentation” (1985: 268). The balance between diversity and collectivism is indeed a difficult one to strike.

## **APPENDIX A: CODING MANUAL**

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### **I. Categories and Codes:**

1. Source
  0. *Woman Citizen*
  1. *Equal Rights*
  2. *off our backs*
  3. *Ms.*
  4. *Bitch*
  5. *BUST*
2. Year
3. Length of article (in paragraphs)
4. Author of article
  0. Anonymous
  1. Initials or pseudonym
  2. Full name
5. Focus of article on individual(s)
  0. Not at all
  1. Somewhat
  2. Mostly
6. Focus of article on a movement organization, campaign, or movement-initiated event
  0. Not at all
  1. Somewhat
  2. Mostly
    - 6B. Focus of article is *feminist* organization, campaign, event or movement
      0. Not at all
      1. Somewhat
      2. Mostly
    - 6B. Focus of article is *allied* organization, campaign, event or movement
      0. Not at all
      1. Somewhat
      2. Mostly
7. Organizational issues (e.g., internal dissent, separatism, etc.)
  0. Discussed not at all
  1. Discussed somewhat
  2. Discussed fully
8. Focus on historical events or issues
  0. Not at all, or somewhat
  1. Mostly
9. Movement leaders
  0. Discussed not at all
  1. Discussed somewhat
  2. Discussed fully

10. Movement ally(ies)
  0. Discussed not at all
  1. Discussed somewhat
  2. Discussed fully
11. Movement tactics
  0. Discussed not at all
  1. Discussed somewhat
  2. Discussed fully
12. Movement opponents (any)
  0. Discussed not at all
  1. Discussed somewhat
  2. Discussed fully
    - 12A. Organizational opponents
      0. Discussed not at all
      1. Discussed somewhat
      2. Discussed fully
    - 12B. Individual opponents
      0. Discussed not at all
      1. Discussed somewhat
      2. Discussed fully
    - 12C. General opposition
      0. Discussed not at all
      1. Discussed somewhat
      2. Discussed fully
13. Author or protagonist self-identifies as suffragist or feminist
  0. Not at all
  1. Qualified or ambiguous
  2. Strongly
14. Author or protagonist rejects suffragist or feminist label
  0. Not at all
  1. Qualified or ambiguous
  2. Strongly
15. Structural barriers to women's equality
  0. Discussed not at all
  1. Discussed somewhat
  2. Discussed fully
16. Denies structural barriers to women's equality
  0. Discussed not at all
  1. Discussed somewhat
  2. Discussed fully
17. Women should work on behalf of women as a group
  0. Discussed not at all
  1. Discussed somewhat
  2. Discussed fully
18. Women should work on behalf of other groups
  0. Discussed not at all



- 1. Discussed somewhat
- 2. Discussed fully
- 19. Women should work on behalf of self only
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat
  - 2. Discussed fully
- 20. Consequences of the women's movement for women as a group
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat
  - 2. Discussed fully
- 21. Consequences of the women's movement for other groups, or society
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat
  - 2. Discussed fully
- 22. Consequences of the women's movement for individual
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat
  - 2. Discussed fully
- 23. Achievement of woman(en) attributed to the movement
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat
  - 2. Discussed fully
- 24. Achievement of woman(en) attributed to individual attributes
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat
  - 2. Discussed fully
- 25. Issues related to "self"
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat
  - 2. Discussed fully
- 26. Issues related to "choice"
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat
  - 2. Discussed fully
- 27. International campaigns
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat or fully
- 28. International issues
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat or fully
- 29. Specific nations/regions mentioned (non-U.S.)

*Subject of article:*

- 30. Women's movement
  - 0. No
  - 1. Yes

- 31. Politics
  - 0. No
  - 1. Yes
- 32. Culture
  - 0. No
  - 1. Yes
- 33. Economy/work/labor issues
  - 0. No
  - 1. Yes
- 34. Sexuality
  - 0. No
  - 1. Yes
- 35. Domesticity
  - 0. No
  - 1. Yes
- 36. Motherhood
  - 0. No
  - 1. Yes
- 37. Profile of individual
  - 0. No
  - 1. Yes
- 38. Personal finances
  - 0. No
  - 1. Yes
- 39. International issues
  - 0. No
  - 1. Yes
- 40. Spirituality/religion
  - 0. No
  - 1. Yes
- 41. Health
  - 0. No
  - 1. Yes
- 42. Other
  - 0. No
  - 1. Yes

*Perceived Opportunity Structure:*

- 43. Positive political opportunity structure
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat
  - 2. Discussed fully
- 44. Negative political opportunity structure
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat
  - 2. Discussed fully

- 45. Positive cultural opportunity structure
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat
  - 2. Discussed fully
- 46. Negative cultural opportunity structure
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat
  - 2. Discussed fully
- 47. Positive domestic opportunity structure
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat
  - 2. Discussed fully
- 48. Negative domestic opportunity structure
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat
  - 2. Discussed fully
- 49. Positive global opportunity structure
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat
  - 2. Discussed fully
- 50. Negative global opportunity structure
  - 0. Discussed not at all
  - 1. Discussed somewhat
  - 2. Discussed fully

## II. Explanation of Code Categories:

(Listed below are explanations for those code categories that may not be self-explanatory. The categories are listed by column number corresponding to the outline above.)

5. *Focus of article on an individual*—refers to an individual only when s/he is not explicitly connected to a feminist or allied organization
6. *Focus of article on a movement organization, campaign, or movement-initiated event*—this category includes organizations that are not explicitly feminist, but allied with the movement (e.g., Amnesty International); it does not include opponent organizations.
  - 6A. *Focus of article on feminist organization, campaign, events, or movement*—following Olzak and Uhrig’s (2001) lead, I defined feminist organizations as those with “claims, demands, or issues that are (predominantly) ‘women’s movement issues,’” including “the improvement of women’s economic conditions (especially in employment and promotion opportunities), liberalization of abortion, support for women’s initiatives (e.g., shelters, clinics, daycare), equal pay for women, gender quotas, equal rights for women, anti-sexual violence, and anti-symbolic discrimination against women” (703).
  - 6B. *Focus of article on allied organization, campaign, events, or movement*—this category includes those organizations, campaigns, etc. that are related to or allied with the women’s movement, but not included in category 6A. Examples include, but are not limited to, human rights, LGBT, environmental, and peace movements.
7. *Organizational issues*—refers to any discussion of organizational issues in the women’s movement, including schisms in the movement, reference to other branches (e.g., liberal, radical), organizational structure (e.g., decentralized), and leadership issues.
9. *Movement leaders*—includes individuals specifically referred to as “leaders,” or mentions leaders by name (e.g., Lucy Stone, Susan B. Anthony, Carrie Chapman Catt, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Henry Blackwell, Rita Mae Brown, Angela Davis)
10. *Movement ally(ies)*—refers to anyone outside of the movement who offers aid or support to the cause; may include individuals, organizations, or the general public.
11. *Movement tactics*—refers only to explicit discussion of tactics, and includes only tactics related to the feminist movement (see 6A for what is considered “feminist”). For example:
 

“LDEF tries to establish legal rights for women through the courts while NOW focuses on legislation and elections.”
12. *Movement opponent*
  - 12A. *Organizational opponent*—includes any organization identified as an opponent of women generally or the feminist movement specifically. Presidential administrations mentioned as opponents were coded as an organizational opponent (although a president mentioned alone was coded as an individual opponent).  
Examples include corporations:

“Thank you, Discover Card, for finding a way to diminish highly accomplished women and accentuate the machismo of male celebs.”

Countermovement organizations:

“Women of Faith's arena events represent a political endeavor by the religious right to change the cultural climate in the US by co-opting feminism.”

12B. *Individual opponent*—includes any individual identified as an opponent of women generally or the feminist movement specifically. For example:

“In stating that he has not the power to initiate policies for his party or its representatives in Congress--the excuse he gave for not recommending Woman Suffrage--President Wilson is creating for the occasion a self-imposed rule.”

12C *General opposition*—includes identification of opposition in a general sense. Examples include patriarchy, the capitalist system, or general antifeminist sentiment. For example:

“The problems go on and on because the problem is the existence of the AmeriKKKan prison system. AmeriKKKa and all its prisons and zoos keep trying to kill the spirit of the people.”

13. *Author or protagonist self-identifies as suffragist or feminist*—includes use of the terms “sisters,” “we women,” “grrrls,” and “womyn.” The category also includes subgroups of women (e.g, Black feminists, lesbian feminists), and reference to organization or objects as “feminist” (e.g., a feminist magazine)

14. *Author or protagonist rejects suffragist or feminist label*—refers to any active rejection of the feminist or suffragist label (e.g., “ex-suffragist”), or declares other identities more important. For example:

“Occasionally, Steel said, the question becomes one of either solidarity with feminism or the sovereignty of the tribe. It's vital to keep the tribes and the nations together. Sometimes a tribe will decide that the women should not have abortions, in order to keep the tribe going. Women must support the tribe to insure sovereignty.”

15. *Structural barriers to women's equality*—refers to active recognition of structural impediments to women's equality, including political or economic barriers, discrimination, double standards, and reference to “patriarchy.”

16. *Denial of structural barriers to women's equality*—refers to active denial of structural impediments to women's equality, or argues that such barriers are diminishing. For example:

“Her insistence that women often have more power in many arenas than people of both genders like to admit is welcome.”

17. *Women should work on behalf of women as a group*—refers to women working (or advocates that women should be working) on behalf of all women (or subgroups of women, such as lesbians). For example:

“One woman said, ‘I am accepted at my university, but other lesbians, especially those who look the stereotype, wouldn't be. We have to fight to make sure that all lesbians are accepted.’”

18. *Women should work on behalf of other groups*—refers to women working (or advocates that they should be working) on behalf of society or marginalized groups other than women. For example:  
 “Cypress' love for justice for poor people, people of color and the renewal of the goddess nature earth will live on it the hearts of those who continue it.”
19. *Women should work on behalf of self only*—refers to women working (or advocates that they should be working) on behalf of oneself. For example:  
 “Keeping emotionally healthy means doing whatever I can myself: making sure the environment in which I have laser treatment is as pleasant as possible, coming to the treatments as relaxed as possible, asking for what I need from doctors, finding the most pleasant way of recording my blood sugar readings. The more I do for myself, the less helpless I feel.”
20. *Consequences of the women's movement for women as a group*—refers to the efficacy of the movement in bringing about change in women's social, political, or economic positions; includes potential or predicted consequences. For example:  
 “Yet feminism has literally transformed this society in the past 10 years. In 1974, who had ever heard of "battered wives" or "househusbands"? Who ever gave a thought to such issues as sexism, rape, incest, child abuse, or equal pay for equal work? Who could have predicted in 1974 that a woman would be nominated for vice president in 1984?”
21. *Consequences of the women's movement for other groups, or society*—refers to the efficacy of the movement in bringing about broad social change affecting those other than women; includes potential or predicted consequences. For example:  
 “The feminist agenda should be not only to create a world where are women and men paid and valued equally, but more than that, we should work to create a radical transformation of the very structure of work itself, so that the welfare and well being of people-all people-is at its core.”
22. *Consequences of the women's movement for the individual*—refers to the impact of the movement on an individual, without reference to broader social, political, or economic impacts. For example:  
 “Mrs. Claire Brown, an obstetric technician, who went to jail with several of her five children tells us what it meant to her; ‘It helped me to realized how important I am as a person, which I'm afraid I didn't quite realize before.’”
23. *Achievement of woman(en) attributed to the movement*—attributes the achievement of individual women to the movement or organizational efforts. For example:  
 “I know that I've gotten where I've gotten just through having a lot of help from a lot of other people, especially other women, especially older women. My greatest asset, as a woman, is that I can rely on older women to help me.”

24. *Achievement of woman(en) attributed to individual attributes*—attributes the achievement of individual women to attributes such as hard work, experience, and dedication.
25. *Issues related to “self”*—refers to issues such as self-esteem, identity, personal empowerment, health, lifestyle, or spirituality. Examples include:  
 “It reflects my progress as a poet. I'm trying to be a little more outward. It reflects where my life is. Although I'm a very personal person, I also have a rock and roll side that's very outward, the performer side.”  
 “As a side note, where do some males get such a good body image from and can women attend these seminars? I want to believe, as they do, that everyone wants me sexually, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary”  
 “Womanspirit grew of the needs of thousands of feminists and pre-feminists to integrate politics and spirit, inner and outer, minds and body, reflection and action, theory and practice.”
26. *Issues related to “choice”*—refers to discussion of women’s agency and freedom to make personal choices. For example:  
 “The value judgments imposed by the subjective division between porn and erotica mean, in essence, "What I like is erotica; what you like is porn." They create a destructive dualism that hinders women in their freedom to find what they like.”
31. *Politics*—the subject of the article pertains to political issues; this category includes discussion of the women’s movement only if political aspects are specifically mentioned.
41. *Health*—the subject of the article pertains to either personal health or public health issues
- 43, 45, 47, 49. *Positive opportunity structure*—refers to political or cultural, domestic or global developments that have facilitated or will likely facilitate the women’s movement
- 44, 45, 47, 49. *Negative opportunity structure*—refers to political or cultural, domestic or global developments that have hindered or will likely hinder the women’s movement.

### III. Examples of Code Categories

#### *Examples of Collectivist and Individualist Frames*

	<b>Collectivist Frame</b>	<b>Individualist Frame</b>
<b>Focus of article</b>	<p><i>Focus is suffrage organization, event, campaign, or movement:</i></p> <p>"...the power of the Mississippi Valley Suffrage Conference in the suffrage world was demonstrated beyond question, and this annual convention is an assured event so long as there is any State struggling for freedom. For surely nineteen States united in purpose, harmonious in action, meeting similar problems and conditions in the fight for woman's emancipation, have already given the cause the impetus and assurance needed to bring speedy victory to every State in the Union" (<i>Woman Citizen</i> 1913).</p>	<p><i>Focus is single individual, without reference to organizational affiliation:</i></p> <p>"Pagan Kennedy's prolific writing career has often seemed split into several distinctive parts" (<i>Bitch</i> 2003).</p>
<b>Self-identification of author or protagonist</b>	<p><i>Identifies as a suffragist or feminist, or expresses gender-based solidarity:</i></p> <p>"If you say you're not a feminist, you're almost denying your own existence. To be a feminist is to be alive" (<i>Ms.</i> 2003).</p>	<p><i>Rejects the label of feminist or suffragist, or gender-based solidarity:</i></p> <p>"Then I got [an email] addressed to women and women's groups, calling for women to speak out in a unified voice against the war [...] Generalizations about women as a category reinforce biological determinism and would stamp all women from the same mold" (<i>Bitch</i> 2003).</p>
<b>Women working on behalf of:</b>	<p><i>Women as a group:</i></p> <p>"Since Congress and the Bush administration continue to ignore the millions of Americans living below the poverty line, it is essential that the women's movement make the eradication of chronic poverty a top priority [...] Women's voices should lead this debate since the burdens of poverty fall unevenly on us" (<i>Ms.</i> 2006).</p>	<p><i>Herself:</i></p> <p>"A situation has arisen before the American people which it behooves housewives to investigate for themselves--not for the benefit of any Senate subcommittee or club paper but for their own personal pocketbooks" (<i>Woman Citizen</i> 1929).</p>



<b>Structural barriers to women's equality</b>	<p><i>Recognized:</i></p> <p>“Although tradeswomen made inroads in the seventies—jobs opened up in 1978 following a National Women’s Law Center suit against the Department of Labor demanding goals and timetables for hiring women in construction—the promise of continued progress dimmed as enforcement of the laws diminished during the Reagan Administration. Today, women represent only 2.4 percent of all trades workers throughout the U.S.” (<i>Ms.</i> 2002).</p>	<p><i>Denied or downplayed:</i></p> <p>'Dr. Marie Farnsworth, of New York University, believes, however, that where prejudice exists it is usually deserved. 'A woman,' she explains, 'is not as serious about her work. She is usually not willing to apply herself as long and patiently to study as chemistry requires'" (<i>Woman Citizen</i> 1930).</p>
<b>Women's achievements attributed to:</b>	<p><i>The movement:</i></p> <p>"The world owes so much to its suffrage leaders that every woman who today is earning a fair salary, practising a profession, protecting her own home and children, is doing so, not alone by merits of her own, however great these things may be, but by the daily sacrifice, the heroic fortitude, the flaming vision of hundreds of brave leaders and thousands of inconspicuous followers in the fight for women's equality" (<i>Woman Citizen</i> 1920).</p>	<p><i>Individual attributes:</i></p> <p>"'I am not a politician,' she continued with a hearty smile. 'I had never taken the slightest interest in politics, not even in woman suffrage until four years ago. I believe that my experience and training in business won the election for me'" (<i>Woman Citizen</i> 1925).</p>
<b>Consequences of movement for:</b>	<p><i>The betterment of women as a group or society:</i></p> <p>Consider the changes made by women’s movements here and around the world in just a few decades. Historians say they are wider and deeper than the Industrial Revolution. Now project that same degree of transformation into the future. Imagining change is the first step toward creating it” (<i>Ms.</i> 2003).</p>	<p><i>Individuals:</i></p> <p>"But it is interesting to observe that such rights as the old feminist movement has already won for the females of the species, the young accept as a matter of course. Especially when these rights mean personal and individual privilege" (<i>Woman Citizen</i> 1928).</p>
<b>Discussion of issues related to self</b>	<p>-----</p>	<p>“This recognition led to a childhood spent pondering life’s questions (albeit in a random, kidlike way) and, when the answers proved impossible to come by, to an uncharacteristically optimistic halfhearted belief in fate. I’ve never been religious in the traditional sense, but in an attempt to give my life a greater sense of certainty, I devised a complicated romantic set of superstitions, little rituals guaranteed to bring me good luck—or at least tell my future” (<i>Bitch</i> 2003).</p>

<b>Identifies movement leaders</b>	<p>"For forty years, Moses led the people of Israel through the wilderness toward a promised land. For forty years Mrs. Catt mobilized her people into a vast army for true democracy. He was guided by a pillar of fire by night and cloud by day. She by a belief in her cause. For him the seas divided that he might lead on his hosts. For her no miracle. She waded through water and mud undefiled. For him a rain of manna. For her years of fifty-fifty substitutes during the reign of the Hooverites. He allowed his anger to wax hot and broke the ten commandments in one vexatious moment. She was not only a law-maker but a law-keeper, marching into the midst of her foes and out of their stronghold with her banner of conquest unsullied. At the end of two score years he was not permitted to enter the promised country, his, only to see the land which the Lord had given the children of Israel. She enters into the land of freedom. Unfurling the emblem of democracy, she comes into her rightful heritage, the peace and joy that passeth all understanding. Blessed be Moses. Thrice blessed be Carrie Chapman Catt" (<i>Woman Citizen</i> 1920).</p>	<p>-----</p>
<b>Identifies movement allies</b>	<p>"Besides scores of citizen volunteers, the campaign has attracted a number of prominent South Dakota leaders, including such unexpected supporters as former state Republican lawmaker Jan Nicolay and Maria Bell, a Catholic obstetrician" (<i>Ms.</i> 2006).</p>	<p>-----</p>
<b>Identifies movement tactics</b>	<p>"We continue to find innovative ways to fuck with heteronormativity from within the sex industry. This holds more promise for effecting real change than radical feminist tactics such as censoring porn or prosecuting johns ever could" (<i>Bitch</i> 1999).</p>	<p>-----</p>

*Examples of identification of opponents*

	<b>Presence of opponents</b>	<b>Absence of opponents</b>
<b>Examples</b>	“As expected, a resounding majority of scientific reviewers voted in favor of OTC status in the winter of 2003. But Steven Galson, acting director of the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, rejected their advice in May 2004, calling OTC status ‘not approvable.’ He expressed concern that the drug wouldn’t be safe for women under 16 without a doctor’s consultation, an opinion which seemed to echo the sentiments of right-wing pro-anstinence-only, anti-abortion groups such as Concerned Women for America and Human Life International” (Ms. 2006).	"We used to get excited over him because he was part of the opposition, but now it isn't opposition he portrays; it is sour grief muddled with resentment because human society has moved and he can't" ( <i>Woman Citizen</i> 1928).

*Examples of political and cultural foci*

	<b>Political Focus</b>	<b>Cultural Focus</b>
<b>Examples</b>	“Surprisingly good, if modest, news on the status of women in elected office came out of two states last fall” (Ms. 2006).	"Having long admired the British penchant for sweets, I was thoroughly annoyed to learn that I, long with the rest of my sex, have been excluded from eating a particular U.K. chocolate bar” ( <i>Bitch</i> 2003).


*Examples of positive and negative perceptions of the POS/COS*

	<b>Perceived Positive Opportunities</b>	<b>Perceived Negative Opportunities</b>

<b>Examples</b>	<p>"From the redwood forests of California to the New York island to the Gulf Stream waters, a feminist tide is sweeping over America" (<i>Ms.</i> 2003).</p>	<p>"Then consider carefully the whole record of state legislation during the past decade. Here are the years when Uncle Sam had his finger in the pie. During these years there was a national minimum child labor standard. There were state labor officials and United States Government officials working together to enforce it. There was teamwork on behalf of the children. During those years, state standards went up by leaps and bounds--in one year, forty-four advances--in another, twenty-nine. Then came the period after the Federal laws had been declared unconstitutional. With no national law, state laws improved much less rapidly. The advances made in single years dropped to eighteen, then to eleven" (<i>Woman Citizen</i> 1928).</p>
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
**APPENDIX B: HISTORICALLY-SPECIFIC MODELS**

**Model of Domestic Factors Contributing to Context for First-Wave Decline, 1920-1930**




Note: Relationships are hypothesized to be positive unless otherwise denoted by "-".

### Model of Domestic Factors Contributing to Context for Second-Wave Decline, late 1970s - late 1980s



Note: Relationships are hypothesized to be positive unless otherwise denoted by “-”.

### Model of Domestic Factors Contributing to Context for Third-Wave, early 1990s – 2005



Note: Relationships are hypothesized to be positive unless otherwise denoted by “-”.

**APPENDIX C: FULL CORRELATION TABLES****Table C.1: Correlation Coefficients between Conflict Tactics and Independent Variables, First Wave**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables	Correlation Coefficients			
		<i>Woman Citizen</i>	<i>Equal Rights</i>	<i>Combined</i>	
1. During periods of <b>political instability</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Percent of congressional seats held by third parties	0.0841	0.4304*	0.2321*	
	Margin of victory for congressional candidates	-0.3112*	-0.6314*	-0.4587*	
	Number of Congressional House seats that change party	0.2300*	-0.2892*	-0.0131	
2. During periods in which women's <b>access to the polity</b> is broadened, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Women's voting rights (1=1920-30)	-0.6174*	-0.7204*	-0.6623*	
3. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Presidential support for women's rights (% of words in State of Union in support of women's rights)	-0.0125	0.2361	0.1062	
	Prohibition (1=1919-1930)	-0.4694*	-0.6540*	-0.5486*	
4. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Employment rate of women in the arts, media, and clergy	0.6825*	0.5861*	0.6335*	
	Media coverage of the women's movement	<i>NY Times</i> index	0.4472*	0.4367*	0.4415*
		<i>Reader's Guide</i>	0.2260*	0.2135	0.2210*
6. During periods of <b>cultural stability</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Red Scare (1=1923-30)	-0.6900*	-0.4411*	-0.5730*	



7. During periods of <b>contradiction between cultural values and conventional social practices</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	World War I (1=1917-1918)	0.1288	0.4679*	0.2912*
	75 <sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Seneca Falls convention (1=1923)	0.0241	-0.0914	-0.0323
8. During periods in which women's <b>employment, earnings, and education rates increase and marital and fertility rates decrease</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Overall employment rate of women	-0.6833*	-0.4453*	-0.5677*
	Employment rate of women in professional occupations	-0.4495*	-0.5512*	-0.4593*
	Women's earning rates (as ratio of men's earnings)	-0.2256	-0.6287*	-0.4282*
	Women's college education rates	-0.6261*	-0.6067*	-0.6040*
	Women's marital rates	-0.5494*	-0.5957*	-0.5454*
	Women's fertility rates	0.7118*	0.5663*	0.6435*
12. During periods of increasing <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Perceptions of political opportunities	0.5598*	0.6339*	0.5885*
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities	0.3147*	0.2963*	0.2726*
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities	0.5714*	0.6106*	0.5761*
	Perceptions of global opportunities	0.0346	0.1644	0.0896

<b>14.</b> During periods of increasing <b>global opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Number of countries passing full women's suffrage measures	-0.5984*	-0.6755*	-0.6264*
	Rate of political party competition across countries	-0.2225*	-0.5866*	-0.3762*
	Rate of political participation across countries	-0.5731*	-0.7193*	-0.6287*
	Rate of female participation in Olympic Games	-0.6918*	-0.4937*	-0.5989*
<i>Control</i>	19 <sup>th</sup> Amendment (1=1920)	0.2005	-0.3161*	-0.0499
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>		<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>

\* p<.05

*Note:* All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).

**Table C.2: Correlation Coefficients between Movement Goals and Independent Variables, First Wave**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables	Correlation Coefficients		
		<i>Woman Citizen</i>	<i>Equal Rights</i>	<i>Combined</i>
1. During periods of <b>political stability</b> (political instability), the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Percent of congressional seats held by third parties	-0.0298 (0.0860)	-0.5111* (0.4682*)	-0.1884* (0.2445*)
	Margin of victory for congressional candidates	0.3350* (-0.2643*)	0.6751* (-0.7220*)	0.4487* (-0.4427*)
	Number of Congressional House seats that change party	-0.3463* (0.3775*)	0.2080 (-0.0621)	-0.1404 (-0.1791*)
2. During periods in which women's <b>access to the polity</b> is restricted (broadened), the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Women's voting rights (1=1920-30)	0.4199* (-0.4119*)	0.1611 (-0.4861*)	0.3218* (-0.4175*)
3. During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Presidential support for women's rights (% of words in State of Union in support of women's rights)	-0.0266 (0.1323)	-0.1376 (0.2127)	-0.0666 (0.1721*)
	Prohibition (1=1919-1930)	0.3609* (-0.2743*)	0.4863* (-0.6496*)	0.3969* (-0.4003*)
4. During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Employment rate of women in the arts, media, and clergy	-0.4771* (0.4920*)	-0.1600 (0.5567*)	-0.3697* (0.4770*)
	Media coverage of the women's movement <i>NY Times</i> index	-0.3036* (0.2341*)	-0.2392 (0.3678*)	-0.2780* (0.2673*)
	Media coverage of the women's movement <i>Reader's Guide</i>	-0.1609 (0.0922)	-0.3275* (0.2611*)	-0.2156* (0.1485)
6. During periods of <b>cultural instability</b> (cultural stability), the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Red Scare (1=1923-30)	0.5299* (-0.5932*)	-0.0358 (-0.4187*)	0.3156* (-0.4940*)

7. During periods of <b>congruity (contradiction) between cultural values and conventional social practices</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	World War I (1=1917-1918)	-0.1314 (0.2143)	-0.2389 (0.4512*)	-0.1675* (0.3221*)
	75 <sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Seneca Falls convention (1=1923)	-0.1023 (0.2676*)	-0.0655 (0.0053)	-0.0858 (0.1498)
8. During periods in which women's <b>employment, earnings, and education decreases (increases) and marital and fertility rates increase (decrease)</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Overall employment rate of women	0.4793* (-0.7480*)	-0.1218 (-0.3979*)	0.2434* (-0.5783*)
	Employment rate of women in professional occupations	0.3132* (-0.1594)	0.4419* (-0.5536*)	0.3367* (-0.2282*)
	Women's earning rates (as ratio of men's earnings)	0.0889 (-0.0162)	0.1573 (-0.2603*)	0.1123 (-0.1268)
	Women's college education rates	0.4661* (-0.3842*)	0.2351 (-0.5653*)	0.3908* (-0.4044*)
	Women's marital rates	0.3834* (-0.2877*)	0.3328* (-0.5834*)	0.3624* (-0.3352*)
	Women's fertility rates	-0.4966* (0.5737*)	-0.1283 (0.5492*)	-0.3633* (0.5310*)
12. During periods of decreasing (increasing) <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Perceptions of political opportunities	-0.4874* (0.5031*)	-0.0210 (0.2707*)	-0.2793* (0.3967*)
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities	-0.3556* (0.3244*)	-0.2214 (0.0348)	-0.2646* (0.2284*)
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities	-0.5007* (0.4434*)	-0.1107 (0.2537*)	-0.3269* (0.3700*)
	Perceptions of global opportunities	-0.2984* (0.2225*)	-0.0856 (0.0447)	-0.1682* (0.1742*)
14. During periods of decreasing (increasing) <b>global opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Number of countries passing full women's suffrage measures	0.4414* (-0.3846*)	0.3444* (-0.6144*)	0.4022* (-0.4432*)
	Rate of political party competition across countries	0.1200 (0.0907)	0.5232* (-0.4486*)	0.2493* (-0.0984)
	Rate of political participation across countries	0.3968* (-0.3530*)	0.3998* (-0.6562*)	0.3914* (-0.4373*)
	Rate of female participation in Olympic Games	0.4973* (-0.6811*)	0.0791 (-0.5078*)	0.3379* (-0.5803*)

<i>Control</i>	19 <sup>th</sup> Amendment (1=1920)	-0.1003 (0.1042)	0.7983* (-0.5697*)	0.2356* (-0.1948*)
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>		<b>10</b> <b>(11)</b>	<b>7</b> <b>(11)</b>	<b>13</b> <b>(14)</b>
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>		<b>9</b> <b>(8)</b>	<b>5</b> <b>(11)</b>	<b>10</b> <b>(9)</b>
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>		<b>8</b> <b>(8)</b>	<b>15</b> <b>(5)</b>	<b>4</b> <b>(4)</b>

\* p<.05

*Note:* All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).

Because cultural and political goals are not measured as mutually exclusive, I include correlation coefficients for each (political goals shown in parentheses)

**Table C.3: Correlation Coefficients between Collectivism and Independent Variables, First Wave**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables	Correlation Coefficients		
		<i>Woman Citizen</i>	<i>Equal Rights</i>	<i>Combined</i>
1. During periods of <b>political instability</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Percent of congressional seats held by third parties	0.2635*	0.4694*	0.3097*
	Margin of victory for congressional candidates	-0.5598*	-0.6982*	-0.5410*
	Number of Congressional House seats that change party	0.2455*	0.0323	0.1658*
2. During periods in which women's <b>access to the polity</b> broadens, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Women's voting rights (1=1920-30)	-0.8344*	-0.2499*	-0.5965*
3. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Presidential support for women's rights (% of words in State of Union in support of women's rights)	0.0521	0.0406	0.0526
	Prohibition (1=1919-1930)	-0.7635*	-0.5104*	-0.6192*
4. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Employment rate of women in the arts, media, and clergy	0.8949*	0.3890*	0.6861*
	Media coverage of the women's movement	<i>NY Times</i> index 0.6525*	0.3356*	0.5087*
		<i>Reader's Guide</i> 0.4038*	0.3147*	0.3402*
6. During periods of <b>cultural stability</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Red Scare (1=1923-30)	-0.8576*	-0.2310	-0.6028*
7. During periods of <b>contradiction between cultural values and conventional social practices</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	World War I (1=1917-1918)	0.2554*	0.1800	0.2202*
	75 <sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Seneca Falls convention (1=1923)	-0.0638	0.0839	-0.0116

<b>8.</b> During periods in which women's <b>employment, earnings, and education decreases increases and marital and fertility rates decrease</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Overall employment rate of women	0.7479*	-0.1760	-0.5219*
	Employment rate of women in professional occupations	-0.6849*	-0.5088*	-0.5700*
	Women's earning rates (as ratio of men's earnings)	-0.3875*	-0.0348	-0.2415*
	Women's college education rates	-0.8480*	-0.4187*	-0.6668*
	Women's marital rates	-0.8560*	-0.4788*	-0.6373*
	Women's fertility rates	0.9108*	0.3760*	0.6843*
<b>12.</b> During periods of increasing <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Perceptions of political opportunities	0.6277*	-0.0151	0.3882*
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities	0.5281*	-0.0337	0.3625*
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities	0.6820*	0.0205	0.4530*
	Perceptions of global opportunities	0.1974	-0.0383	0.1648*
<b>14.</b> During periods of increasing <b>global opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Number of countries passing full women's suffrage measures	-0.8560*	-0.4660*	-0.6730*
	Rate of political party competition across countries	-0.5042*	-0.3486*	-0.4030*
	Rate of political participation across countries	-0.8513*	-0.4982*	-0.6794*
	Rate of female participation in Olympic Games	-0.8482*	-0.3406*	-0.6272*
<i>Control</i>	19 <sup>th</sup> Amendment (1=1920)	0.0386	-0.6922*	-0.1644*
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>		<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>		<b>11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>		<b>4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>2</b>

\* p&lt;.05

*Note:* All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).

**Table C.4: Correlation Coefficients between Conflict Tactics and Independent Variables, Second Wave**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables	Correlation Coefficients			
		<i>off our backs</i>	<i>Ms.</i>	<i>Combined</i>	
1. During periods of <b>political instability</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Number of congressional seats that change party	-0.0942	0.2307	-0.0349	
	Margin of victory for political candidates	0.1392	0.1432	0.0880	
	Strength of Conservative Coalition	-0.0728	-0.1291	-0.0375	
	Presidential victories on votes in Congress	-0.0943	0.0461	-0.0046	
	Size of gender voting gap	-0.1810	-0.0871	-0.1575	
2. During periods in which women's <b>access to the polity</b> broadens, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Women's voter registration rates	-0.0453	-0.1511	-0.0336	
3. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Presidential support for women's rights (% of words in State of Union in support of women's rights)	-0.1806	-0.0449	-0.1454	
	EEOC funding	-0.2806*	-0.1630	-0.3107*	
	Rates of women in political positions	U.S. Senate	-0.1705	0.0037	-0.0807
	U.S. House	-0.1960	-0.2030	-0.2621*	
	Governors	-0.1584	-0.0715	-0.1567	
Presidential Cabinets	-0.2411	-0.2298	-0.2703*		
4. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Employment rate of women in the arts, media, and clergy	-0.1567	-0.2622	-0.1789	
	Media coverage of the women's movement	<i>NY Times</i>	-0.3041*	-0.1804	-0.3472*
	Periodicals	0.1296	-0.0632	0.1771	
Television news	-0.1346	-0.0729	-0.1556		



<b>4a.</b> During periods in which <b>public opinion</b> is supportive of feminist issues, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Equality for women		-0.0130	0.2004	0.0451
	Legalization of abortion		0.3030*	0.1770	0.3381*
	Favor ERA		-0.2176	-0.2876	-0.1947
<b>5.</b> During periods in which women's <b>access to cultural spaces</b> broadens, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Cultural consecration of female artists	Rate of Oscar nominations	0.0502	-0.2488	-0.0532
		Rate of Emmy nominations	0.0027	0.1198	-0.0461
		Rate of Grammy nominations	0.0397	-0.0384	-0.0084
<b>8.</b> During periods in which women's <b>employment, earnings, and education increases and marital and fertility rates decrease</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Overall employment rate of women		-0.2664*	-0.2600	-0.2996*
	Employment rate of women in professional occupations		-0.2945*	-0.2652	-0.3111*
	Women's earning rates (as ratio of men's earnings)		-0.1267	-0.2641	-0.1636
	Women's college education rates		-0.2939*	-0.2193	-0.0443
	Women's marital rates		0.2943*	0.2055	0.3177*
	Women's fertility rates		0.1962	-0.1416	0.2047*
<b>12.</b> During periods of increasing <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Perceptions of political opportunities		0.3769*	0.1876	0.1246
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities		-0.1584	0.0927	-0.2557*
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities		0.0812	0.1767	-0.1499
	Perceptions of global opportunities		0.1173	0.0407	-0.0711

<b>14. During periods of increasing global opportunities, the women's movement will be more likely to use conflict tactics.</b>	NGO access to the UN (number granted consultative status)	-0.2740*	-0.2303	-0.3024*
	Rate of political party competition across countries	-0.0908	-0.2368	-0.1126
	Rate of political participation across countries	-0.1834	-0.2437	-0.1956*
	Number of countries with official agencies for women's affairs	-0.2278	-0.2340	-0.2464*
	Number of countries with female heads of state	-0.1513	-0.3004*	-0.1854
	Number of CEDAW signatories	0.0714	-0.2465	-0.0562
	Rate of female participation in Olympic Games	-0.2995*	-0.2483	-0.3210*
	Female Nobel Prize laureates	-0.0533	-0.1363	-0.1027
	UN World Conferences (1=1975; 1980; 1985; 1995)	-0.0667	0.0719	-0.0344
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>		<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>		<b>9</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>		<b>30</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>27</b>

\* p<.05

Note: All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).

**Table C. 5: Correlation Coefficients between Movement Goals and Independent Variables, Second Wave**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables		Correlation Coefficients		
			<i>off our backs</i>	<i>Ms.</i>	<i>Combined</i>
1. During periods of <b>political stability</b> (political instability), the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Number of congressional seats that change party		-0.1096 (0.1200)	-0.1009 (0.2199)	-0.0690 (0.0839)
	Margin of victory for political candidates		-0.2945* (0.1623)	0.1931 (0.0680)	-0.0450 (0.0868)
	Strength of Conservative Coalition		0.1624 (-0.1862)	0.0245 (-0.0403)	0.0708 (-0.0817)
	Presidential victories on votes in Congress		0.0263 (-0.0045)	-0.2942* (0.1837)	-0.1345 (0.0772)
	Size of gender voting gap		-0.0747 (0.0802)	-0.1188 (-0.0111)	-0.0653 (0.0047)
	Women's voter registration rates		0.2556* (-0.2101)	0.1446 (-0.1117)	0.1724 (-0.1189)
3. During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Presidential support for women's rights (% of words in State of Union in support of women's rights)		-0.0044 (0.0254)	-0.4112* (0.0452)	-0.1583 (-0.0091)
	EEOC funding		-0.0375 (0.0885)	-0.2907* (0.0330)	-0.0526 (-0.0360)
	Rates of women in political positions	U.S. Senate	0.0624 (-0.0648)	-0.2526 (0.1013)	-0.0845 (-0.0018)
		U.S. House	-0.0233 (0.0646)	0.1038 (-0.0400)	0.0844 (-0.0605)
		Governors	0.0148 (0.1042)	-0.4266* (0.0231)	-0.1423 (0.0160)
		Presidential Cabinets	0.0334 (0.0333)	-0.4303* (-0.0209)	-0.1049 (-0.0571)

4. During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Employment rate of women in the arts, media, and clergy		0.0137 (0.0753)	-0.2672 (-0.0692)	-0.1046 (0.0018)
	Media coverage of the women's movement	<i>NY Times</i>	-0.0111 (0.1100)	-0.1551 (0.1303)	0.0263 (-0.0169)
		Periodicals	-0.1206 (0.0639)	-0.2496 (0.0171)	-0.2095* (0.1397)
		Television news	-0.1382 (0.1462)	-0.2731 (0.1257)	-0.1457 (0.0608)
4a. During periods in which <b>public opinion</b> is unsupportive (supportive) of feminist issues, the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Equality for women		-0.1073 (0.0177)	-0.1393 (0.1377)	-0.1070 (0.0391)
	Legalization of abortion		0.0194 (-0.0847)	0.3535* (-0.0334)	0.0478 (0.0461)
	Favor ERA		0.3267* (-0.0118)	-0.0645 (-0.1061)	0.1124 (-0.0409)
5. During periods in which women's <b>access to cultural spaces</b> is restricted (broadened), the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Cultural consecration of female artists	Rate of Oscar nominations	-0.0389 (0.1501)	-0.1315 (-0.1341)	-0.0708 (0.0364)
		Rate of Emmy nominations	-0.1609 (0.0610)	-0.0114 (-0.0895)	-0.0434 (-0.0571)
		Rate of Grammy nominations	0.0906 (0.0793)	-0.0297 (-0.0048)	0.0418 (0.0261)
	Overall employment rate of women		-0.0497 (0.0827)	-0.2181 (-0.0440)	-0.0583 (-0.0400)
8. During periods in which women's <b>employment, earnings, and education decreases (increases) and marital and fertility rates increase (decrease)</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Employment rate of women in professional occupations		0.0584 (0.0690)	-0.3785* (-0.1060)	-0.0667 (-0.0597)
	Women's earning rates (as ratio of men's earnings)		-0.0767 (0.0445)	-0.0591 (-0.1058)	-0.0499 (-0.0282)
	Women's college education rates		-0.0367 (0.0802)	-0.2860* (-0.0123)	0.2882* (-0.2880*)
	Women's marital rates		0.0301 (-0.0741)	0.2953* (0.0009)	0.0611 (0.0454)
	Women's fertility rates		-0.0416 (-0.0322)	-0.2609 (-0.0161)	-0.1638 (0.0722)

<b>12.</b> During periods of decreasing (increasing) <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Perceptions of political opportunities	-0.1907 (-0.0412)	0.0717 (-0.0800)	-0.0050 (-0.1595)
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities	-0.0218 (-0.0024)	-0.1699 (-0.1527)	0.0411 (-0.2127*)
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities	-0.1852 (0.0558)	-0.2795* (-0.0687)	-0.0613 (-0.2001*)
	Perceptions of global opportunities	-0.1212 (-0.0414)	0.1765 (-0.0561)	0.0659 (-0.1682)
<b>14.</b> During periods of decreasing (increasing) <b>global opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	NGO access to the UN (number granted consultative status)	-0.0271 (0.0907)	-0.2532 (-0.0156)	-0.0540 (-0.0323)
	Rate of political party competition across countries	-0.0456 (0.0164)	-0.1014 (-0.0942)	-0.0687 (-0.0178)
	Rate of political participation across countries	-0.0433 (0.0461)	-0.1466 (-0.0734)	-0.0666 (-0.0258)
	Number of countries with official agencies for women's affairs	-0.0584 (0.0544)	-0.1523 (-0.0587)	-0.0562 (-0.0413)
	Number of countries with female heads of state	-0.0134 (0.0616)	0.0463 (-0.0737)	0.0277 (-0.0088)
	Number of CEDAW signatories	-0.0696 (0.0165)	0.2907 (-0.2653)	0.1189 (-0.0758)
	Rate of female participation in Olympic Games	0.0170 (0.0361)	-0.2815* (-0.0515)	-0.0400 (-0.0734)
	Female Nobel Prize laureates	0.0030 (-0.0179)	-0.1058 (-0.0578)	-0.0233 (-0.0589)
	UN World Conferences (1=1975; 1980; 1985; 1995)	-0.0462 (0.1550)	-0.0258 (0.1788)	-0.0213 (0.1163)
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(0)</b>	<b>8</b> <b>(0)</b>	<b>1</b> <b>(0)</b>	
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>	<b>3</b> <b>(0)</b>	<b>3</b> <b>(0)</b>	<b>1</b> <b>(3)</b>	
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>	<b>38</b> <b>(41)</b>	<b>30</b> <b>(41)</b>	<b>39</b> <b>(38)</b>	

\* p&lt;.05

Note: All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters). Because cultural and political goals are not measured as mutually exclusive, I include correlation coefficients for each (political goals shown in parentheses)

**Table C. 6: Correlation Coefficients between Collectivism and Independent Variables, Second Wave**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables	Correlation Coefficients			
		<i>off our backs</i>	<i>Ms.</i>	<i>Combined</i>	
1. During periods of <b>political instability</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Number of congressional seats that change party	-0.0057	0.2370	0.0487	
	Margin of victory for political candidates	0.1507	0.2110	0.1294	
	Strength of Conservative Coalition	-0.0013	-0.4154*	-0.1255	
	Presidential victories on votes in Congress	0.0712	0.0012	0.0578	
	Size of gender voting gap	-0.0448	-0.2494	-0.1629	
2. During periods in which women's <b>access to the polity</b> broadens, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Women's voter registration rates	-0.2230	-0.1940	-0.1420	
3. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Presidential support for women's rights (% of words in State of Union in support of women's rights)	-0.0208	-0.0570	-0.0716	
	EEOC funding	-0.2451	-0.3136*	-0.3218*	
	Rates of women in political positions	U.S. Senate	-0.0362	-0.0152	-0.0175
	U.S. House	-0.3099*	-0.3897*	-0.3719*	
	Governors	-0.0530	0.2343	0.0230	
Presidential Cabinets	-0.1239	-0.1751	-0.1975*		
4. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Employment rate of women in the arts, media, and clergy	-0.0905	-0.4268*	-0.2479*	
	Media coverage of the women's movement	<i>NY Times</i>	-0.3360*	-0.1974	-0.3386*
	Periodicals	0.3075*	-0.3064*	0.1834	
Television news	-0.1255	0.1067	-0.0724		

<b>4a.</b> During periods in which <b>public opinion</b> is supportive of feminist issues, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Equality for women		0.1338	0.0938	0.0799
	Legalization of abortion		0.2435	0.1876	0.2872*
	Favor ERA		-0.1362	-0.3928*	-0.2408*
<b>5.</b> During periods in which women's <b>access to cultural spaces</b> broadens the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Cultural consecration of female artists	Rate of Oscar nominations	-0.1092	-0.2761	-0.1699
		Rate of Emmy nominations	0.1170	0.1415	0.0303
		Rate of Grammy nominations	-0.0194	0.0132	-0.0186
<b>8.</b> During periods in which women's <b>employment, earnings, and education increases and marital and fertility rates decrease</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Overall employment rate of women		-0.2170	-0.4502*	-0.3467*
	Employment rate of women in professional occupations		-0.2015	-0.2614	-0.2654*
	Women's earning rates (as ratio of men's earnings)		-0.1518	-0.5159*	-0.3067*
	Women's college education rates		-0.2341	-0.3856*	-0.4416*
	Women's marital rates		0.2289	0.3581*	0.3249*
	Women's fertility rates		0.2145	-0.3846*	0.1034
<b>12.</b> During periods of increasing <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist rhetoric</b> .	Perceptions of political opportunities		0.2758*	0.2375	0.0768
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities		0.1038	0.2627	-0.0490
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities		0.4023*	0.4774*	0.1155
	Perceptions of global opportunities		-0.1341	-0.2089	-0.2632*

<b>14. During periods of increasing global opportunities, the women's movement will be more likely to use collectivist rhetoric.</b>	NGO access to the UN (number granted consultative status)	-0.2435	-0.3986*	-0.3418*
	Rate of political party competition across countries	-0.0197	-0.5295*	-0.2374*
	Rate of political participation across countries	-0.1121	-0.4778*	-0.2819*
	Number of countries with official agencies for women's affairs	-0.2150	-0.5327*	-0.3661*
	Number of countries with female heads of state	-0.1962	-0.6405*	-0.3780*
	Number of CEDAW signatories	0.2869	-0.3175	-0.0627
	Rate of female participation in Olympic Games	-0.2853*	-0.3643*	-0.3474*
	Female Nobel Prize laureates	-0.0861	-0.0090	-0.0736
	UN World Conferences (1=1975; 1980; 1985; 1995)	-0.2298	0.0198	-0.1032
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>18</b>	
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>22</b>	

\* p<.05

Note: All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).



**Table C. 7: Correlation Coefficients between Conflict Tactics and Independent Variables, Third Wave**

Hypothesis		Measures of independent variables		Correlation Coefficients				
				<i>off our backs</i>	<i>Ms.</i>	<i>BUST</i>	<i>Bitch</i>	<i>Combined</i>
<b>1.</b>	During periods of <b>political instability</b> (political instability), the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Number of congressional seats that change party	-0.0063	-0.1869	-0.0573	0.1969	-0.0505	
		Margin of victory for political candidates	-0.0883	-0.3712*	-0.0079	-0.3720*	-0.1557	
		Presidential victories on votes in Congress	0.0645	0.2408	0.0473	-0.4588*	0.0408	
		Size of gender voting gap	0.0528	0.1074	0.0799	-0.5273*	0.0030	
<b>2.</b>	During periods in which women's <b>access to the polity</b> broadens, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Women's voter registration rates	0.0485	0.2544	-0.0948	0.0391	0.0543	
<b>3.</b>	During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Presidential support for women's rights	0.1503	0.5401*	0.1609	0.0981	0.2039*	
		(% of words in State of Union in support of women's rights)						
		EEOC funding	0.1760	0.1523	0.1905	0.2170	0.1250	
		Rates of women in political positions	U.S. Senate	0.0510	0.1434	0.0873	-0.4888*	0.0182
			U.S. House	0.0681	0.1123	0.1491	-0.4344*	0.0376
Governors	-0.0147	0.0188	0.0626	-0.4637*	-0.0247			
Presidential Cabinets	0.2060	0.2917	0.1828	0.3173*	0.1830*			
<b>4.</b>	During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Employment rate of women in the arts, media, and clergy	-0.0473	-0.1046	0.1246	-0.4077*	-0.0446	
		Media coverage of the women's movement	<i>NY Times</i>	-0.1418	-0.2711	-0.0399	0.4357*	-0.0636
			Television news	-0.0576	-0.3871*	0.1094	0.1463	-0.0766

<b>4a.</b> During periods in which <b>public opinion</b> is supportive of feminist issues, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Equality for women	0.0705	0.2192	0.1461	-0.3233*	0.0733	
	Legalization of abortion	-0.0097	-0.1481	-0.0372	-0.0364	-0.0657	
<b>5.</b> During periods in which women's <b>access to cultural spaces</b> broadens, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Cultural consecration of female artists	Rate of Oscar nominations	-0.0207	0.0596	0.1148	-0.3891*	-0.0012
		Rate of Emmy nominations	0.1369	-0.0414	0.1100	0.1696	0.0644
		Rate of Grammy nominations	0.0451	-0.0618	0.0236	0.2438	0.0244
<b>8.</b> During periods in which women's <b>employment, earnings, and education increases and marital and fertility rates decrease</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Overall employment rate of women	-0.0881	0.3075	0.0880	0.0499	0.0815	
	Employment rate of women in professional occupations	-0.0753	-0.0934	0.0649	-0.4604*	-0.0646	
	Women's earning rates (as ratio of men's earnings)	-0.0329	-0.0994	0.1145	-0.5093*	-0.0500	
	Women's college education rates	-0.0526	0.2329	0.0953	-0.4573*	0.0187	
	Women's marital rates	0.0062	-0.1235	-0.1067	0.3600*	-0.0212	
	Women's fertility rates	-0.0341	-0.1666	0.0021	0.3373*	-0.0238	
<b>12.</b> During periods of increasing <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>conflict tactics</b> .	Perceptions of political opportunities	0.0736	0.1375	-0.1041	0.1934	0.0041	
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities	0.1493	0.1171	0.2736	-0.4063*	-0.0141	
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities	0.2483	0.1079	0.1799	-0.3601*	-0.0029	
	Perceptions of global opportunities	-0.1455	-0.0448	--	0.1127	-0.0980	

<b>14. During periods of increasing global opportunities, the women's movement will be more likely to use conflict tactics.</b>	NGO access to the UN (number granted consultative status)	0.0897	0.2005	0.0865	-0.4144*	0.0531
	Rate of political party competition across countries	-0.3906	-0.0342	-0.2286	0.2268	-0.1333
	Rate of political participation across countries	-0.5059*	0.1904	-0.1027	0.2514	-0.0893
	Number of countries with official agencies for women's affairs	-0.0051	-0.0247	0.1201	-0.2214	0.0031
	Number of countries with female heads of state	0.0481	0.1169	0.1049	-0.4532*	0.0229
	Number of CEDAW signatories	0.0148	0.0795	0.0439	-0.5653*	-0.0209
	Rate of female participation in Olympic Games	0.0836	0.3262*	0.0323	-0.3129*	0.0850
	Female Nobel Prize laureates	-0.1435	-0.1846	-0.0998	-0.2148	-0.1202
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>		<b>36</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>35</b>

\* p<.05

Note: All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).

**Table C. 8: Correlation Coefficients between Movement Goals and Independent Variables, Third Wave**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables	Correlation Coefficients				
		<i>off our backs</i>	<i>Ms.</i>	<i>BUST</i>	<i>Bitch</i>	<i>Combined</i>
<b>1.</b> During periods of <b>political stability</b> (political instability), the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Number of congressional seats that change party	-0.2893 (-0.1429)	0.2618 (0.3179*)	-0.0083 (-0.3314*)	-0.1277 (-0.1700)	-0.0973 (-0.1282)
	Margin of victory for political candidates	0.1560 (-0.2520)	0.0522 (0.3056)	-0.0440 (0.3366*)	0.4593* (0.0565)	0.0633 (0.0863)
	Presidential victories on votes in Congress	0.3721* (-0.0215)	-0.3080 (0.6842*)	-0.2377 (0.4540*)	0.5024* (0.4375*)	0.0907 (0.2380*)
	Size of gender voting gap	0.3264* (-0.0301)	-0.2300 (0.6654*)	-0.2321 (0.5224*)	0.6418* (0.3349*)	0.0879 (0.2511*)
	Women's voter registration rates	-0.0419 (0.0200)	-0.1495 (0.0165)	-0.1684 (-0.0384)	0.0592 (-0.0679)	-0.0348 (-0.0073)
<b>2.</b> During periods in which women's <b>access to the polity</b> is restricted (broadened), the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Presidential support for women's rights (% of words in State of Union in support of women's rights)	-0.0302 (0.2969)	-0.0396 (0.0579)	-0.1972 (0.1390)	-0.1231 (0.2450)	-0.0348 (0.1024)
	EEOC funding	-0.0474 (0.0393)	-0.1085 (0.1392)	-0.0041 (0.1241)	0.0368 (0.2598)	-0.0343 (0.0949)
	Rates of women in political positions	U.S. Senate 0.3585* (-0.0105)	-0.2617 (0.6739*)	-0.2349 (0.5203*)	0.6160* (0.3483*)	0.0957 (0.2524*)
	U.S. House	0.2806 (0.1752)	-0.2711 (0.4622*)	-0.0575 (0.4492*)	0.3680* (0.2283)	0.0975 (0.2118*)
	Governors	0.2924 (0.0595)	-0.2401 (0.4624*)	-0.1653 (0.4478*)	0.4996* (0.1229)	0.0984 (0.1858*)
Presidential Cabinets	-0.3048 (0.3205*)	0.1149 (-0.3240*)	0.0911 (-0.2167)	-0.4981* (0.1251)	-0.0998 (-0.0329)	

4. During periods in which the women's movement loses (gains) <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Employment rate of women in the arts, media, and clergy		0.1721 (-0.0148)	0.0088 (0.0952)	-0.1397 (0.3960*)	0.3078 (-0.1038)	0.0685 (0.0687)
	Media coverage of the women's movement	<i>NY Times</i>	-0.3087 (-0.0414)	0.3132* (-0.6443*)	0.1007 (-0.4549*)	-0.4983* (-0.3381*)	-0.0810 (-0.2471*)
		Television news	-0.2258 (-0.0138)	0.2446 (-0.4323*)	0.1331 (-0.1781)	-0.1428 (-0.3391*)	-0.0449 (-0.1346)
4a. During periods in which <b>public opinion</b> is unsupportive (supportive) of feminist issues, the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Equality for women		0.2659 (0.1936)	-0.2636 (0.4002*)	0.0577 (0.3905*)	0.1679 (0.2572)	0.0899 (0.1860*)
	Legalization of abortion		-0.1453 (-0.2024)	0.2998 (-0.1226)	-0.1858 (0.0123)	0.0357 (-0.0651)	-0.0492 (-0.0555)
5. During periods in which women's <b>access to cultural spaces</b> is restricted (broadened), the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Cultural consecration of female artists	Rate of Oscar nominations	0.1358 (0.1107)	0.0504 (0.0472)	0.0473 (0.2032)	-0.0704 (0.1380)	0.0533 (0.0609)
		Rate of Emmy nominations	0.0826 (0.0924)	-0.1643 (0.2527)	0.1267 (0.1127)	0.2333 (0.0706)	0.0329 (0.1122)
		Rate of Grammy nominations	-0.4094* (0.1608)	0.1987 (-0.4707*)	0.1142 (-0.4146*)	-0.5255* (-0.0347)	-0.1117 (-0.1401)
8. During periods in which women's <b>employment, earnings, and education decreases (increases) and marital and fertility rates increase (decrease)</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Overall employment rate of women		0.3486* (0.0806)	-0.3047 (0.3386*)	0.0558 (0.2251)	-0.1019 (0.2005)	0.0667 (0.1042)
	Employment rate of women in professional occupations		0.3668* (-0.1206)	-0.2382 (0.5432*)	-0.1301 (0.4525*)	0.5882* (0.0522)	0.1195 (0.1675*)
	Women's earning rates (as ratio of men's earnings)		0.3160* (-0.0299)	-0.1681 (0.4235*)	-0.0986 (0.4667*)	0.5094* (0.0080)	0.1143 (0.1587*)
	Women's college education rates		0.3092 (-0.0038)	-0.1671 (0.6055*)	-0.1069 (0.4168*)	0.4181* (0.3469*)	0.1114 (0.2133*)
	Women's marital rates		-0.3332* (-0.0894)	0.3207* (-0.4956*)	0.0888 (-0.4816*)	-0.3641* (-0.1912)	-0.1061 (-0.1934*)
	Women's fertility rates		-0.3619* (-0.0814)	0.4127* (-0.5947*)	0.2555 (-0.5068*)	-0.4685* (-0.2970)	-0.0795 (-0.2318*)

<b>12.</b> During periods of decreasing (increasing) <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	Perceptions of political opportunities	-0.1501 (-0.1213)	-0.0969 (-0.1489)	0.0233 (-0.0397)	-0.2312 (-0.0981)	-0.0124 (-0.1671*)
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities	-0.3595* (0.1016)	0.0044 (-0.0809)	-0.1870 (-0.2659)	0.3308* (-0.0030)	-0.1067 (-0.0714)
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities	-0.3335* (-0.1281)	-0.1200 (-0.0653)	-0.2466 (-0.2746)	0.3642* (0.0304)	-0.1424 (-0.1260)
	Perceptions of global opportunities	-0.2970 (0.1915)	-0.0148 (0.0022)	-- (--)	-0.2988 (-0.1483)	-0.0356 (0.0212)
<b>14.</b> During periods of decreasing (increasing) <b>global opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to adopt <b>cultural goals (political goals)</b> .	NGO access to the UN (number granted consultative status)	0.2777 (0.1644)	-0.2758 (0.4833*)	-0.0066 (0.4233*)	0.3004 (0.2789)	0.0934 (0.2128*)
	Rate of political party competition across countries	0.3306 (-0.5643*)	0.0757 (0.3591)	-0.6466* (-0.1594)	0.1884 (-0.1664)	0.0143 (-0.0758)
	Rate of political participation across countries	0.4902* (-0.4462*)	0.0388 (0.3333)	-0.6642* (-0.1317)	-0.2168 (-0.0702)	0.0568 (-0.0848)
	Number of countries with official agencies for women's affairs	0.3841* (0.0098)	-0.2449 (0.5001*)	-0.1020 (0.4529*)	0.5690* (0.0812)	0.1194 (0.1905*)
	Number of countries with female heads of state	0.3326* (0.0846)	-0.2776 (0.5207*)	-0.0533 (0.4993*)	0.4142* (0.2279)	0.1098 (0.2135*)
	Number of CEDAW signatories	0.3519* (-0.0046)	-0.2337 (0.5276*)	-0.1258 (0.5212*)	0.5541* (0.1380)	0.1095 (0.2058*)
	Rate of female participation in Olympic Games	0.2096 (0.2020)	-0.2845 (0.3500*)	-0.0858 (0.3690*)	0.1704 (0.1993)	0.0657 (0.1648*)
	Female Nobel Prize laureates	0.1305 (-0.2069)	-0.0785 (0.1372)	-0.2500 (0.2208)	0.5026* (-0.2794)	0.0384 (0.0120)
	<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>	<b>5</b> <b>(1)</b>	<b>2</b> <b>(16)</b>	<b>2</b> <b>(15)</b>	<b>6</b> <b>(2)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(13)</b>
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>	<b>10</b> <b>(2)</b>	<b>1</b> <b>(6)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(6)</b>	<b>14</b> <b>(4)</b>	<b>0</b> <b>(5)</b>	
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>	<b>22</b> <b>(34)</b>	<b>34</b> <b>(15)</b>	<b>34</b> <b>(15)</b>	<b>17</b> <b>(31)</b>	<b>37</b> <b>(19)</b>	

\* p&lt;.05

Note: All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).

Because cultural and political goals are not measured as mutually exclusive, I include correlation coefficients for each (political goals in parentheses)

**Table C.9: Correlation Coefficients between Collectivism and Independent Variables, Third Wave**

Hypothesis	Measures of independent variables		Correlation Coefficients				
			<i>off our backs</i>	<i>Ms.</i>	<i>BUST</i>	<i>Bitch</i>	<i>Combined</i>
1. During periods of <b>political instability</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist</b> rhetoric.	Number of congressional seats that change party		0.5727*	-0.3084	-0.2143	-0.2302	0.0453
	Margin of victory for political candidates		-0.1312	-0.2891	0.2468	0.3128*	0.0098
	Presidential victories on votes in Congress		-0.4905*	0.2369	0.3424*	0.6633*	0.0369
	Size of gender voting gap		-0.4583*	0.1868	0.3534*	0.6260*	0.0476
2. During periods in which women's <b>access to the polity</b> broadens, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist</b> rhetoric.	Women's voter registration rates		0.0679	0.2015	-0.2217	-0.1006	-0.0072
3. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>political allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>collectivist</b> rhetoric.	Presidential support for women's rights		0.0268	0.3897*	0.2040	0.2205	0.0938
	EEOC funding		0.3206*	0.0986	0.4790*	0.2634	0.1652*
	Rates of women in political positions	U.S. Senate	-0.5065*	0.2275	0.3631*	0.6185*	0.0408
		U.S. House	-0.6447*	0.3241*	0.2759	0.3397*	-0.0189
		Governors	-0.6207*	0.2189	0.1575	0.3168*	-0.0397
Presidential Cabinets		0.3435*	0.1814	0.0377	-0.1756	0.0734	
4. During periods in which the women's movement gains <b>cultural allies</b> , it will be more likely to use <b>collectivist</b> rhetoric.	Employment rate of women in the arts, media, and clergy		-0.2649	0.0429	-0.0384	-0.0592	-0.0515
	Media coverage of the women's movement	<i>NY Times</i>	0.3929*	-0.3567*	-0.3673*	-0.5734*	-0.0733
		Television news	0.2585	-0.2879	-0.1672	-0.5064*	-0.0428

<b>4a.</b> During periods in which <b>public opinion</b> is supportive of feminist issues, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist</b> rhetoric.	Equality for women	-0.6132*	0.3696*	0.3375*	0.3441*	-0.0084	
	Legalization of abortion	0.5886*	-0.3233*	0.0563	-0.0350	0.0852	
<b>5.</b> During periods in which women's <b>access to cultural spaces</b> broadens, the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist</b> rhetoric.	Cultural consecration of female artists	Rate of Oscar nominations	-0.2400	-0.0429	0.2200	0.2163	-0.0057
		Rate of Emmy nominations	-0.1634	0.2871	0.2388	0.0421	0.0522
		Rate of Grammy nominations	0.2812	-0.1294	-0.3184	-0.3375*	-0.0394
<b>8.</b> During periods in which women's <b>employment, earnings, and education increases and marital and fertility rates decrease</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist</b> rhetoric.	Overall employment rate of women	-0.5810*	0.4466*	0.4680*	0.2439	-0.0225	
	Employment rate of women in professional occupations	-0.5787*	0.1167	0.3098	0.3390*	-0.0191	
	Women's earning rates (as ratio of men's earnings)	-0.5394*	0.1172	0.2341	0.2958	-0.0256	
	Women's college education rates	-0.4600*	0.2279	0.2104	0.5285*	0.0127	
	Women's marital rates	0.6974*	-0.3205*	-0.2780	-0.3506*	0.0360	
	Women's fertility rates	0.6817*	-0.3439*	-0.2008	-0.5197*	0.0188	
<b>12.</b> During periods of increasing <b>perceived opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist</b> rhetoric.	Perceptions of political opportunities	-0.1153	0.1211	0.2490	-0.4208*	-0.0835	
	Perceptions of cultural opportunities	0.1566	0.2032	0.1712	-0.0295	-0.0173	
	Perceptions of domestic opportunities	0.1997	0.1134	0.2049	0.0389	-0.0042	
	Perceptions of global opportunities	0.0703	0.1322	--	-0.4796*	-0.0319	



<b>14.</b> During periods of increasing <b>global opportunities</b> , the women's movement will be more likely to use <b>collectivist</b> rhetoric.	NGO access to the UN (number granted consultative status)	-0.5788*	0.3532*	0.3142	0.4253*	0.0072
	Rate of political party competition across countries	0.2147	-0.1583	-0.1943	0.3619	0.0158
	Rate of political participation across countries	-0.1639	0.0636	-0.2124	0.3037	-0.0351
	Number of countries with official agencies for women's affairs	-0.5411*	0.2527	0.3395*	0.2728	0.0059
	Number of countries with female heads of state	-0.6295*	0.2933	0.3411*	0.4310*	-0.0026
	Number of CEDAW signatories	-0.4989*	0.1992	0.2939	0.4189*	0.0113
	Rate of female participation in Olympic Games	-0.4965*	0.4097*	0.1460	0.2856	-0.0116
	Female Nobel Prize laureates	-0.1427	-0.0792	-0.1597	-0.0934	-0.0613
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Support Hypotheses</b>		<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Total Significant Coefficients that Disconfirm Hypotheses</b>		<b>15</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Total Nonsignificant Coefficients</b>		<b>15</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>36</b>

\* p<.05

Note: All independent variables are lagged one year (4 quarters).

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