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**Kant's Theory of Judgment:
The Concept of Judgment in Kant's Logic and Metaphysics**

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M.A., Emory University, 2007
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An abstract of
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
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2013

Abstract

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This dissertation traces the development of Kant's conception of judgment, starting with the logic of German rationalism, or *Schulphilosophie*, and concluding with his third *Critique*. I begin by summarizing the theory of judgment that was widely accepted by German *Schulphilosophie*. I focus primarily on the work of two figures: Christian Wolff and Georg Friedrich Meier. These philosophers initially informed Kant's views about logic and judgment. I argue that Kant adopts a new theory of judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It differs from his earlier views, as well as those of his predecessors, in two important respects. First, Kant broadens his definition of judgment, and second, he begins to describe judgments in a new way. He characterizes them as a *cognitive* relationship between a concept and an object, as opposed to a merely *logical* relationship between concepts. I examine this new theory of judgment and its role in Kant's critical philosophy. I address Kant's published works, as well as his *Nachlass* and *Vorlesungen*, i.e. Kant's notes and notes taken by students in his lectures. I show that Kant's *Nachlass* actually contains two competing accounts of judgment, a distinction that has previously gone unrecognized by scholars. Only one of these two accounts is compatible with Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. I also attempt to solve some of the questions and interpretative problems that are raised by Kant's new theory of judgment. For example, I explain the difference between two key expressions, *Vermögen zu urtheilen* and *Urtheilskraft*, or the "capacity to judge" and the "power of judgment." I also explain the possibility of subjective judgments. Kant appears to rule out such judgments in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* when he asserts that all judgments, by definition, are objectively valid, i.e. representative of objects. In both cases, I answer these questions by drawing a distinction between two senses of judgment: a judgment regarded as a thought or representation and a judgment regarded as an act.

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Acknowledgments

This dissertation would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of a number of key people. First among them is my director, Rudolf Makkreel. I would like to thank him for patiently reading the numerous drafts that I sent to him. His feedback was instrumental in helping me to clarify and refine my ideas. I have learned a great deal from him and my reading of Kant is indebted to his work. I would also like to thank Ursula Goldenbaum for our many discussions about Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten. She inspired my interest in Kant's German predecessors. She also showed me a great deal of hospitality during the summer of 2010, when I traveled to Berlin on a research fellowship. I have fond memories of the special tours of the city that she gave my wife and me. I want to thank my committee members, David Carr and David Pacini, and my readers, Ursula Goldenbaum and Mark Risjord, for reading my work and for their insightful questions at my defense. I also want to thank my friends: Alex Cooper, Colin McQuillan, Kelly Arenson, Tanya Randle, John Hagar, Jennifer Meeks, and Chris Edelman. Alex and Colin read drafts of my work and have consistently served as a sounding-board for my ideas. My work has also benefited from the weekly *Stammtisch* that I shared with them. I owe a special debt of gratitude to my parents, Tom and Deborah McAndrew, for their unwavering love and encouragement over the years. My mother also helped me to finish this dissertation by caring for my young son, Jack, as I wrote the final chapter. As this entailed traveling across the country, this was no small gesture on her part. My wife and I greatly enjoyed her stay with us, and it allowed me to complete this project. Finally, I want to express my love and gratitude to my wife, Jamie. I could not have written this dissertation without her support. I dedicate it to her.

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Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter One: The Standard Theory of Judgment: Wolff, Meier, and the Early Kant	17
Chapter Two: The Power of Judgment	69
Chapter Three: Kant's Definition of Judgment in the Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories (A 68-69/B 92-94)	96
Chapter Four: Kant's Account of Judgment in his <i>Nachlass</i>	141
Chapter Five: Judgment and Objectivity	177
Chapter Six: Judgment and the Application of Rules	234
Chapter Seven: The Reflecting Power of Judgment	271
Bibliography	312

Introduction

Kant famously argues that our most fundamental metaphysical concepts, the categories, correspond with the logical functions of judgments. These functions are Kant's term for the basic mental acts that are required to formulate any judgment or thought. They generate what Kant describes as a judgment's form. The form of a judgment consists of the indispensable features that are shared by all judgments, regardless of their matter or content. According to Kant, all judgments exhibit a quality, a quantity, a relation, and a modality. These basic features, or forms of judgment, are described by general logic. Kant claims that the categories correspond with the logical functions of judgment, which are the mental acts that constitute a judgment's form.

Kant presents this argument in the so-called "metaphysical deduction" of the categories. He argues that we use the very same functions of the mind to form judgments that we use to unite the manifold of intuition through the synthesis of recognition. The logical functions of judgment are different ways of bringing together and uniting representations within consciousness.¹ The representations that serve as a judgment's terms, e.g. the subject and predicate of a categorical judgment, are united into a single cognition: the judgment itself. According to Kant, we use these same functions to unite the manifold of representations that are contained in an intuition.² He claims that each of the categories correspond with one of the logical functions of judgment. Kant argues that there are exactly twelve of each. The categories are essentially representations of these

¹ "The logical moments of all judgments are so many possible ways of uniting representations in a consciousness" (Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*, in *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*, trans. Gary Hatfield [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 4:305).

² "The same function that gives unity to the different representations **in a judgment** also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations **in an intuition**" (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], A79/B104-105).

functions of the mind. Just as empirical concepts represent objects, the categories represent acts of “pure synthesis.”³ Kant explains that an act of synthesis is “pure” if it is applied to a manifold of representations that are not derived from experience, but are rather *a priori*.⁴ Thus, the categories are representations of acts of pure synthesis, or the synthesis of *a priori* representations. Specifically, they represent the figurative synthesis of our pure intuitions of space and time. Since we use the very same functions of the mind to unite these intuitions, through the synthesis of recognition, that we use to form judgments, we can infer the categories from the logical functions of judgment. This is precisely what Kant does in the metaphysical deduction. He infers the table of categories from his table of judgment.

This argument is probably familiar to many of my readers. I am reviewing it here simply to underscore the fact that the concept of judgment is of great importance to Kant’s philosophy, particularly in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the opening section of the metaphysical deduction, Kant defines the understanding, or higher faculty of cognition, as a capacity for judgment [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*].⁵ Sensibility intuits and the understanding judges.

However, what does Kant mean by a judgment? He offers no less than three definitions of judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. None of them resemble the logic textbooks of his day. Nor do they resemble Kant’s own explanations of judgment in his logic lectures from the 1770s – *Logik Blomberg* and *Logik Philippi*. Does this mean that Kant is advancing a new conception of judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason*? If so,

³ “Now **pure synthesis, generally represented**, yields the pure concept of the understanding” (ibid., A78/B104).

⁴ “Such a synthesis is **pure** if the manifold is given not empirically but *a priori* (as is that in space and time)” (ibid., A77/B103).

⁵ Ibid., A69/B94.

how does it differ from his earlier views and those of his predecessors? The logic of German rationalism, or *Schulphilosophie*, is largely forgotten today. While this obscurity is perhaps understandable, even deserved, it is impossible to assess how Kant's views about judgment differ from those of his predecessors without some understanding of what these predecessors actually believed.

This dissertation traces the development of Kant's views about judgment. I start with the logic of German *Schulphilosophie*, which initially informed Kant's understanding of this subject. I then show how he moves beyond this position, developing his own theory of judgment. I also address some of the questions and problems that are related to this new theory. For example, in the B-Deduction, Kant asserts that all judgments, by definition, are objectively valid. This means that they are always representative of objects. However, in both the *Prolegomena* and the third *Critique*, Kant discusses judgments that are merely subjectively valid. I will explain how Kant's account of judgment in the B-Deduction is compatible with the possibility of subjective judgments. Another question that I consider concerns the difference between two faculties of the mind: the understanding and the power of judgment. Kant defines the understanding as the "capacity to judge" [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*]. When he offers this definition, Kant construes the term, "understanding," broadly. It is a synonym for the higher faculty of cognition. According to Kant, the higher faculty of cognition consists of three sub-faculties, one of which is the power of judgment [*Urtheilskraft*]. This raises an obvious question: what is the difference between a "capacity to judge" and the "power of judgment?" These two expressions cannot be equivalent because the power of judgment belongs to the higher faculty of cognition – the former is a part of the latter.

Kant defines the higher faculty of cognition as our capacity to judge. The *power* of judgment [*Urtheilskraft*] must therefore have a different meaning than the *capacity* or *faculty* for judgment [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*]. I will clarify the relationship between these two faculties.

Before we begin, there are three points that I would like to address. The first concerns Kant's *Logic*, a work that I will largely avoid in this dissertation. The second concerns the sources that I will use in its place: Kant's notes and the notes of his students, i.e. his *Nachlass* and *Vorlesungen*. Finally, I will present a brief outline of the dissertation and its chapters.

I. Jäsche's *Logic*

Although Kant's *Logic* is included in volume nine of the *Akademie Ausgabe*, he is not actually the author of this work. This honor belongs to one of his students, Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche. For this reason, the text is often referred to as the "Jäsche Logic." In 1799, Kant asked Jäsche to compile the lecture notes from his logic course into a textbook.⁶ Kant had performed the same task with the notes from his anthropology lectures two years earlier. The result was *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798).⁷ However, Kant could not continue this project, due to his increasing infirmity. He asked Jäsche to take over and transform his logic notes into a text that was suitable for publication.

⁶ I arrive at 1799, as the year that Kant turned over his lecture notes to Jäsche, on the basis of Jäsche's preface to the *Logic*. The preface is dated September 1800. Jäsche claims that Kant had commissioned him "a year and a half" earlier. If this is correct, then Jäsche would have begun work on this project in the spring of 1799. See Immanuel Kant, *Jäsche Logic*, in *Lectures on Logic*, trans. J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 9:10.

⁷ According to Manfred Kuehn's biography, Kant spent most of 1797 working on *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. See Manfred Kuehn, *Kant: A Biography*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 406.

Kant prepared his lectures in an interesting manner. He would take his copy of the textbook for the course and interleave it with blank pages.⁸ He would then write his lecture notes on these pages. Kant used Georg Friedrich Meier's *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre* as the textbook for his logic lectures.⁹ It was an abridged version of a much longer work by Meier, which was simply titled the *Vernunftlehre*, or "Doctrine of Reason." Kant's logic notes are contained in the blank pages and margins of his personal copy, or *Handexemplar*, of this textbook. These were the notes that he turned over to Jäsche in 1799.¹⁰

There are three problems with the textbook that Jäsche wrote for Kant. First, although Jäsche, is described as the "editor" [*herausgebener*] of the *Logic*, we know that he did far more than just edit Kant's notes. Kant's logic notes are not written lectures. They are not even a continuous text. Instead, they are a loose collection of notes and remarks that Kant wrote over a period of forty years. They range in length from a single sentence or phrase to several pages, and most of them have the fragmentary quality that one would expect from a hastily jotted note or outline. When Kant's notes on a topic were detailed and complete, Jäsche would transcribe them almost word for word.

⁸ Professors at Prussian universities were required to base their lectures on a textbook of their choice. See *ibid.*, 106.

⁹ Kant did not vary his courses much. He always assigned Meier's *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre* in his logic lectures and Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* in his metaphysics lectures. He later used the third part of the *Metaphysica*, which is devoted to psychology, as the textbook for his lectures on anthropology. Baumgarten's *Ethica* was his preferred textbook for ethics. For mathematics, he either assigned Meier's *Anfangsgründe aller mathematischen Wissenschaften* or an abridged version of this text, entitled, *Auszug aus der Anfangsgründe aller mathematischen Wissenschaften*. Kant chose Johann Peter Eberhard's – not the same Eberhard that he would later debate during the 1780s – *Erste Gründe der Naturlehre* as the textbook for his lectures on physics and natural science. See *ibid.*, 108-109.

¹⁰ Jäsche describes Kant's notes in the preface to the *Logic*. He writes, "The copy of the mentioned compendium that he himself used in his lectures, like all the other textbooks he used for the same purpose, is interleaved with paper; his general remarks and elucidations, as well as the more special ones that relate in the first instance to the text of the compendium in its individual sections, are found partly on the interleaved paper, partly on the empty margin of the textbook itself. And what has been written by hand here and there in scattered remarks and elucidations, taken together, constitute now the *storehouse of materials* which Kant built up in his lectures here" (Kant, *Jäsche Logic*, 9:3-4).

However, this was rarely possible and, in many cases, he had to interpolate a great deal. He often assembles a passage out of parts or phrases taken from several different notes. He would sometimes alter or revise these parts in order to combine them as he wished. Moreover, if he could not find an appropriate passage from Kant's notes, Jäsche would sometimes fill this gap himself with his own explanation of Kant's position. Consequently, we are not always reading Kant's words in the *Logic*, but rather Jäsche's exposition of them.¹¹

Second, Jäsche did not consider the crucial question of *when* Kant wrote his notes. Kant gradually accumulated his notes over the course of his teaching career, which lasted four decades. Hence, they include notes that he made at the very beginning of his career in 1755 as well towards its end in 1796. We know from the student notes from Kant's lectures that these lectures changed over time, in accordance with Kant's intellectual development. For example, there are significant differences between Kant's logic lectures during the early 1770s, as documented in *Logik Blomberg* and *Logik Philippi*, and his lectures during the 1780s, after he had published the first *Critique*. The latter are described in *Logik Pölitz*, *Logik Busolt*, *Logik Heschel*, and the *Wiener Logik*. Jäsche takes no account of these changes. He freely combines early notes with later ones.

Finally, it is now generally accepted that Jäsche consulted at least one set of student notes from Kant's lectures. In 1879, Benno Erdmann announced that passages from the *Logic* corresponded with a set of student notes, known as *Logik Hoffmann*, almost word for word. He concluded that these student notes were actually Jäsche's main source for the *Logic*. If Jäsche consulted Kant's own notes, it was primarily to confirm

¹¹ Terry Boswell, "On the Textual Authenticity of Kant's *Logic*," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 9 (1988): 196-197.

the accuracy of the student ones.¹² Erdmann's hypothesis probably goes too far. When Eric Adickes, the editor of Kant's *handschriftliche Nachlass*, transcribed Kant's logic notes, he discovered many phrases, sentences, and even whole passages that later appeared in the *Logic*. Jäsche probably attempted to combine Kant's notes into a publishable text and used the student notes to fill in gaps where Kant's own notes were too fragmentary or incomplete. Unfortunately, we cannot compare Jäsche's *Logic* with *Logik Hoffman*, the text that Erdmann claimed "agrees" with Jäsche's text "in all essential points almost word for word."¹³ This manuscript was lost during World War II. Nonetheless, we can reasonably assume that Jäsche drew upon at least two sources: Kant's own notes and the notes of his students.¹⁴

Thus, there are three main problems with the *Logic*. First, Jäsche did not just edit and combine Kant's notes. He also interpolated them a great deal. Second, he anachronistically combined early notes with later ones. Finally, he secretly consulted at

¹² Werner Stark, "Neue Kant-Logiken. Zu gedruckten und ungedruckten Kollegeften nach Kants Vorlesungen über die Logik," in *Neue Autographen und Dokumente zu Kants Leben, Schriften Und Vorlesungen*, ed. Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987), 127.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 127.

¹⁴ Max Heinze, the editor of the *Logic* for volume nine of the *Akademie Ausgabe*, was aware that Jäsche had other sources. He had discovered similarities between the *Logic* and *Logik Pölitz*, which led him to share Erdmann's conclusion about Jäsche's reliance on student notes. See *ibid.*, 127. Nonetheless, in his own introduction to the *Logic*, Heinze defends its inclusion among Kant's published works. He acknowledges that Jäsche consulted at least one set of student notes. However, he also proposes that Jäsche was actually the author of these notes. Heinze writes, "It is also likely that he transcribed these lectures, and thus it is at least likely that he used his own transcript for the production of the Compendium" (Max Heinze, "Einleitung," in *Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-], 9:504). Erdmann had originally suggested this possibility. At the very least, Jäsche was a student in Kant's lectures. If he was not the actual author of the student notes that he consulted, he was at least qualified to assess their accuracy. Hence, Heinze concluded that the *Logic* could still be trusted as an accurate presentation of Kant's views. Werner Stark has since demonstrated that Jäsche did not attend Kant's logic lectures. According to Jäsche's friend and biographer, Karl Morgenstern, Jäsche only visited Königsberg twice. He attended Kant's lectures on anthropology and metaphysics during the winter semester of 1791-1792. Kant did not offer lectures on logic during that semester. Jäsche later returned to Königsberg in February of 1799 and stayed until July of 1801. However, this was after Kant had retired from lecturing. Thus, Jäsche could not have attended Kant's logic lectures. See Stark, "Neue Kant-Logiken," 128. He could not be the author of any student notes, nor was he in a position to assess their accuracy. The assumptions that led Heinze to defend the *Logic* are both false.

least one set of student notes. For these reasons, the *Logic* is not a reliable source for historically minded Kant research.¹⁵ We have access to essentially the same the sources that Jäsche used to write the *Logic*. Kant's own logic notes are published in volume sixteen of the *Akademie Ausgabe*. Although we have lost most of *Logik Hoffman*, many of the surviving sets of student notes from Kant logic lectures are published in volume twenty-four. Werner Stark has proved that Jäsche had no first-hand knowledge of Kant's lectures. Consequently, there is no reason to rely on Jäsche's interpretation of Kant's views. He was in essentially the same position as the scholar today. He had Kant's own notes and the notes of his students. Like the modern scholar, he had to work out Kant's position on basis of these difficult and imperfect sources. There is no reason to assume that Jäsche's interpretation is correct. It is certainly more convenient to cite the *Logic*, since it often explains Kant's position more clearly and succinctly than Kant's own notes, which are often fragmentary, and the notes of his students, which are numerous and sometimes inconsistent. However, if we cannot find a corresponding passage in Kant's own notes or the notes of his students, then we should be very cautious about attributing a view that is expressed in the *Logic* to Kant. The fact that we cannot find a precedent for this view in either Kant's *Nachlass* or his *Vorlesungen* is strong evidence against such an assumption. The scholar must do the hard work of interpreting Kant's own notes and lectures, rather than simply availing him or herself of Jäsche's past labors.¹⁶

¹⁵ My own suspicions about the reliability of the *Logic* were confirmed by Werner Stark, who shares a similar view.

¹⁶ Norbert Hinske offers a more positive assessment of the *Logic*. He argues that the many critics of this work forget or misunderstand the nature of Jäsche's assignment. He was asked to produce a textbook, or *Logikkompandium*. He did not need to consider when Kant might have written his notes in order to produce such a work. This question is important to a scholar who is interested in the *Entwicklungsgeschichte* of Kant's philosophy. However, Jäsche was not doing this kind of research. He was writing a textbook for students. Indeed, it is anachronistic to expect him to have performed the same philological and historical analysis as a modern scholar. We should regard the *Logic* as a textbook on

II. Kant's notes

Kant's notes, which are known as *Reflexionen*, are published in volumes fourteen through nineteen of the *Akademie Ausgabe*. They are individually numbered and organized by subject, e.g. volume sixteen contains Kant's notes on logic. Erich Adickes, the editor of Kant's *Nachlass*, also attempted to determine when each note was written. Kant did not date any of his notes himself. Adickes attempted to solve this problem by identifying subtle variations in Kant's handwriting, as well as the color of his ink – Kant mixed his own. He also paid close attention to where each note was located on the page. In the case of notes that were written on the blank pages of Kant's textbook or on the backs of letters, the notes that were written at the top of the page must have preceded the ones that followed them and were found closer to the bottom. In the case of marginalia, if two notes addressed the same topic, Adickes assumed that the note that was closer to the passage of the main text, which they both commented upon, was written first. On the basis of these criteria, Adickes identified thirty-three distinct "strata" [*Schichten*] within Kant's notes. This was his term for a group of notes that were written at roughly the same time. He assigned each stratum a Greek letter to identify it. Since there are only twenty-four Greek letters and thirty-three strata, some closely related strata share the same letter and are distinguished by exponents, e.g. ψ^1, ψ^2 , etc. Adickes also assigned a time period to each of the strata. This period was his estimate for when the notes in a

Kantian logic. Judged on these terms, Hinske argues that the *Logic* is an important and valuable source. It reveals a side of Kant that is rarely glimpsed in his published works: Kant as a teacher and member of the enlightenment, rather than the stern critic of metaphysics. Nonetheless, Hinske also acknowledges that the *Logic* is not sufficient for historical research on Kant's logic. This textbook can give us a general sense of Kant's lectures. However, we must supplement it with Kant's own *Nachlass* and *Vorlesungen*. See Norbert Hinske, "Die Jäsche-Logik und ihr besonderes Schicksal im Rahmen der Akademie-Ausgabe," *Kant-Studien* 91, Sonderheft (2000): 92-93.

stratum were written.¹⁷ For example, the strata identified by the letter κ dates from the year 1769. The strata identified by the letter λ dates from period between the end of 1769 and the fall of 1770.¹⁸

Unfortunately, we cannot rely on Adickes' dates because we cannot assess or confirm their accuracy. Adickes intended to write a detailed explanation of his method. It would describe each stratum and justify the dates that he assigned to them. It was to appear in the final volume of the *handschriftlicher Nachlass*. Unfortunately, Adickes died before he completed his work on the volumes in this series. He never wrote his promised account of his method.¹⁹ Volume fourteen, which contains Kant's notes on mathematics, physics and chemistry, and physical geography, includes a lengthy introduction to the third division of the *Akademie Ausgabe*, Kant's *Nachlass*. Adickes explains his approach to these materials, including his plan to order them chronologically. He lists the thirty-three strata with their approximate dates.²⁰ The introduction sheds valuable light on Adickes' method; however, we still do not know enough to assess its validity. We cannot confirm whether a *Reflexion* actually belongs to the stratum that Adickes assigns to it, or whether the timeframe for this stratum is correct. Consequently, the validity of Adickes' dates rests entirely on his authority as a scholar. We must trust solely in his ability to distinguish subtle changes in Kant's handwriting, shorthand, and ink. No matter how highly we may rate his contribution to Kant scholarship, this is not a sufficient ground for historical research. In order to draw conclusions about the history

¹⁷ Paul Guyer, "Introduction," in *Notes and Fragments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), xxiii-xxiv. See also Erich Adickes, "Einleitung in die Abtheilung des handschriftlichen Nachlasses," *Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-), 14:xxviii-xxxv.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 14:xxxviii-xxxix.

¹⁹ Guyer, "Introduction," xxii-xxiii.

²⁰ Adickes, "Einleitung in die Abtheilung des handschriftlichen Nachlasses," 14:xxxvi-xliii.

of the development of Kant's philosophy, we need stronger evidence. We should not rely on Adickes' dates alone.

III. The student notes

We also possess notes that were taken by students in Kant's lectures. These student notes are published in volumes of twenty-four through twenty-nine of the *Akademie Aufgabe*. They are often referred to as "transcripts" [*Nachschriften*]; however, this term is somewhat misleading. They are not literal transcriptions of Kant's words. Instead, with the exception of Herder's notes, which I will discuss later, the various student notebooks and manuscripts that we possess from Kant's lectures were essentially study guides. They were produced by hand and sold to students for this purpose. A small cottage industry existed around German universities of the eighteenth century to produce these guides. The notes from several different students would be gathered together and then compiled into a single text. This text was a summary of the lecture's content, rather than a stenographic record of the lecturer's words. It was then copied by hand and these copies were sold to students. Most of the student notes from Kant's lectures that we possess are copies [*Abschriften*] that were prepared in this way.²¹

Herder's notes are a notable exception. They differ from the other sets of student notes in two important respects. First, they are older than the other notes. They date from Herder's time as a student in Kant's lectures. Herder was a student at the *Albertina* from 1762-1764. The other sets of notes are all from after 1770. Second, Herder's notes differ stylistically from the others. Herder's notes are short and fragmentary. The other sets of notes are hardly free from errors and misspelling, but they are far more polished

²¹ Werner Stark, "Historical Notes and Interpretative Questions about Kant's Lectures on Anthropology," in *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*, ed. Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 17-18.

than Herder's notes and more closely resemble a composed text. This reflects the fact that Herder actually took his notes during Kant's lectures. The others were produced outside the lecture hall in the manner that I described above. There is also a simple explanation for why, with the exception of Herder notes, all of the surviving student notes from Kant's lectures date from after 1770. This was the year that Kant became a full professor. As I explained earlier, the notes were compiled, copied, and sold to students. Until Kant received his chair in philosophy, there would not have been sufficient demand for notes from his lectures to make this production process profitable.²²

The student notes have two main drawbacks as sources. First, they were not written by Kant and, with a few exceptions, we do not know the identity of their authors. The name on the cover of these manuscripts is typically the owner, who purchased them, rather than their actual author. Second, the notes almost certainly contain errors and corruptions. It would be surprising if the original note-takers did not make some mistakes. They may have misheard or misunderstood Kant's words. They may have written down these words incorrectly. The notes were then copied again and again by hand. Each time they were re-copied, further transcription errors could occur. Most of the student notes that we possess are copies. Thus, they are flawed sources.

Nonetheless, the student notes have one very important advantage: we know when they were written. In some cases, we can even trace them to a specific semester. If we use the student notes from Kant's lectures in conjunction with Kant's own lecture notes, then we can mitigate the weaknesses of both sources. The problem with Kant's own notes is that we cannot be certain about when he wrote them. The problem with the student notes is that Kant was not their author and they contain some errors. However,

²² Ibid., 17.

we do know roughly when these notes were written. We can use Kant's notes to confirm the accuracy of the student notes. Incidentally, this was the method that Erdmann attributed to Jäsche: he relied primarily on the student notes and used Kant's notes to check their accuracy. Although it is unlikely that Jäsche actually followed this method – the many correlations between Jäsche's text and Kant's *Reflexionen* suggest otherwise – it is the best approach to these two sources. We should start with the student notes, which are more complete and can be dated with relative confidence. We should then compare them with Kant's notes to confirm their accuracy.

III. An outline of the dissertation

This dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter one explains Kant's earliest views about judgment, which are found in his 1762 essay, *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures*, and his logic lectures from the early 1770s – *Logik Blomberg* and *Logik Philippi*. It also provides some of the historical context for Kant's views on this subject. I explain the theory of judgment that was widely accepted by German *Schulphilosophie*. I consider two examples of this theory: the logic of Christian Wolff and the logic of Georg Friedrich Meier. Both of these philosophers influenced Kant's conception of judgment.

Chapter two is concerned with the power of judgment [*Urtheilskraft*]. This faculty was not part of the psychology of either Wolff or Baumgarten. It is Kant's own innovation. In this chapter, I trace the development of this concept. I argue that Kant introduced this faculty during the mid-1770s. I also argue that it had an antecedent within his philosophy. Kant defines the power of judgment as the capacity to apply rules. Prior to the introduction of this faculty, this same function was performed by a capacity

that he calls the “healthy understanding” [*gesunder Verstand*]. I explain the meaning of this expression, which is often equated with common sense, and its similarity to the power of judgment.

Chapter three examines Kant’s account of judgment in the metaphysical deduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. I argue that he adopts a new theory of judgment in this work. It differs from his earlier views, as well as those of his predecessors, in two important respects. First, Kant describes judgment in a new way. He no longer describes it as a *logical* relationship between concepts. Instead, he presents a judgment as a *cognitive* relationship between concepts and objects. Second, Kant broadens his definition of judgment to include any mental act that unites representations within the mind. He had previously equated judgments with *propositional judgments*. These are the forms of judgment that are studied by general logic. Starting in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant conceives of judgment more broadly. Both of these new positions can be found in the first chapter of the analytic of concepts, the so-called “guiding-thread chapter” [*Leitfadenkapitel*] or the metaphysical deduction.

Chapter four addresses Kant’s *Nachlass*. I survey the notes, or *Reflexionen*, which pertain to judgment. I argue that these notes contain two competing accounts of judgment. Some of Kant’s notes state that judgments are based on the *subordination* of concepts. Others indicate that judgments are actually based on the *subsumption* of objects under these concepts. There is a very important difference between these two positions. Only the latter can accommodate synthetic judgments. I show that the terms of an *analytic* judgment can be subordinated to each other – the subject-term is contained under the predicate. However, this is not true of *synthetic* judgments. For this reason, the

notes that explain judgment in terms of the subordination of concepts are superseded by the ones that base it on the subsumption of objects. Only the latter position can accommodate Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments.

Chapter five examines Kant's well-known definition of judgment in the B-Deduction of the first *Critique*. Here he asserts that all judgments, by definition, are objectively valid. I argue that this definition of judgment only pertains to *propositional* judgments. Subjective judgments are possible, but they are merely *acts* of judgments. These acts do not result in the formation of propositional judgments. They are acts without corresponding thoughts or representations. I also compare Kant's account of judgment in the B-Deduction with the *Prolegomena* and his distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience. I argue that this distinction is *not* compatible with his definition of judgment in the B-Deduction because judgments of perception are propositional judgments. They therefore ought to be objectively valid.

I return to the power of judgment in chapter six and explain the role of this faculty in cognition. The power of judgment is the capacity to apply rules concretely. I explain how this activity is constitutive of propositional judgments. According to Kant, we form these judgments by applying rules to particular cases.

Chapter seven serves as an appendix to this dissertation. It addresses two questions related to the *reflecting power of judgment*. The first concerns the place of the reflecting power of judgment in Kant's *Logic*. This textbook mentions Kant's distinction between the determining and reflecting power of judgment. However, it does not address the distinction in the section devoted to judgment, as we might expect. Instead, we find it in the following section, which is about inferences. I explain why this is so. The second

question concerns the role of the reflecting power of judgment in the formation of empirical concepts.

Chapter One

The Standard Theory of Judgment: Wolff, Meier, and the early Kant

Kant's earliest views about judgment were informed by his contemporaries. He accepted what I describe as the "standard theory of judgment." This standard theory was widely accepted by German *Schulphilosophie* and was taught in most of the major textbooks of Kant's day. It had two basic features. First, it defined judgment as an act of predication. This meant that a judgment either affirmed that something had a certain property or mark or denied that this was the case. Second, the standard theory held that a judgment was formed by connecting concepts in the mind. In other words, judgments consisted of conceptual relationships. These two basic features of the standard theory describe different aspects of judgment. The first one describes what we would call the semantic content of a judgment; the second describes its syntactical structure. A judgment represents whether or not something is characterized by a certain property. This can be regarded as the judgment's semantic content. It is the meaning that is intended by a judgment. This meaning is represented by relating concepts to each other. These conceptual relationships constitute the syntactical structure of a judgment.

In this chapter, I will examine how the standard theory of judgment is exhibited in the work of two of Kant's predecessors, Christian Wolff and Georg Friedrich Meier. I will also explain Kant's own early adherence to this theory. The chapter consists of three parts. Part one concerns the account of judgment in Wolff's *Deutsche Logik*. Part two considers Meier's account of judgment in his *Vernunftlehre*. Finally, in part three, I turn to Kant's early theory of judgment. Kant presents his view on this subject in his essay,

The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures. I will examine the account of judgment found in this essay, as well as the notes from Kant's early lectures on logic.

1.1 Wolff's theory of judgment

Christian Wolff is arguably the most important German philosopher during the first half of the eighteenth century. He was the most influential and successful expositor of Leibniz's philosophy. Wolff first made Leibniz's acquaintance shortly after he defended his dissertation in 1703. Leibniz had read Wolff's dissertation and was impressed by it.¹ He wrote a letter to Wolff and they remained in correspondence until Leibniz's death in 1716. Unlike his mentor, Wolff published widely during his lifetime. He wrote a successful series of textbooks in both German and Latin. In 1712, he published his first philosophical title – he had already written several works on mathematics –, a treatise on logic, entitled *Vernünfftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit*. It is often referred to simply as the *Deutsche Logik*, in order to distinguish it from a second logic text that Wolff later wrote in Latin and perhaps to abbreviate its somewhat unwieldy title. In 1720, he wrote an extensive treatise on metaphysics, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*. It is usually known as the *Deutsche Metaphysik* to distinguish it from the

¹ Wolff defended his dissertation, *Philosophia practica universalis mathematica methodo conscripta*, in 1703 in Leipzig. Shortly thereafter, he was invited to join the staff of the journal, *Acta Eruditorum*. This was the first scholarly journal published in Germany and one of the most prestigious periodicals in all of Europe. Leibniz published some of his most important essays in *Acta Eruditorum*, including, "Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas," "A Specimen of Dynamics," and "On Nature Itself." The editor, Otto Menke, praised Wolff's dissertation and invited him to join the journal based on its strength. He also sent a copy of it to Leibniz who was similarly impressed. Leibniz then sent Wolff a letter commending him on his work. This was the beginning of an ongoing correspondence between the two philosophers. Leibniz helped Wolff to attain his first professorship in Halle by writing a letter of recommendation to the minister of universities in Berlin. See Johann Christoph Gottsched, *Historische Lobschrift des weiland hoch- und wohlgebohren Herrn Christians, des H.R.R. Freyherrn von Wolf, in Biographie*, ed. Hans Werner Arndt (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1980), 20-22; 28-29.

Wolff's metaphysical works in Latin, and it is arguably Wolff's most important work in German. This was followed by similarly titled "Rational Thoughts" on ethics (1720), politics (1721), physics (1723), and teleology (1724). Wolff's textbooks became incredibly popular, because they were the first systematic works of their kind to be written in German rather than Latin. In 1720, he became rector of the University of Halle, over the protests of the theology faculty, who regarded him as a crypto-Spinozist.² Wolff was on his way to becoming the foremost German-speaking philosopher, when he was dealt a crushing setback in 1723. The man who succeeded Wolff as rector in Halle, the Pietist theologian, Joachim Lange, successfully lobbied King Friedrich Wilhelm I, to suppress Wolff's philosophy.³ On November 8, 1723, he was dismissed from the university and exiled from Prussia. He was given forty-eight hours to leave the kingdom or risk being hanged.⁴ Wolff's books and the teaching of his philosophy were banned throughout Prussia. Wolff fled to Marburg where he accepted a chair at the university. He remained in exile until 1740, when the new king, Frederick II, invited him to return. During this time, he published a steady stream of polemics against his Pietist critics and a

² Ibid., 50-51.

³ Wolff had clashed with the theology faculty in Halle, which was dominated by Pietists, since he arrived. This simmering conflict came to a head when he concluded his term as rector in 1721. As his final rectoral address to the university, he delivered a lecture, "On the Practical Philosophy of the Chinese," which favorably compared Confucianism with Christianity and argued that there was a rational basis for both. This incensed the Halle Pietists. They had long suspected that Wolff was a secret atheist. His provocative rector address seemed to confirm these fears. Joachim Lange, who succeeded Wolff as rector, asked the theology faculty of the university to censure him for heresy. Wolff responded that the theology faculty had no authority over faculty of philosophy, to which he belonged. As such, they lacked the power to censure him. Both sides appealed to Berlin for vindication. However, the Pietists won this battle. The King sided with Lange and Wolff was exiled from Prussia. According to one much repeated anecdote, Friedrich Wilhelm I was finally persuaded to expel Wolff after he was told that the doctrine of pre-established harmony, advocated by Wolff, entailed determinism. This meant that the King's soldiers could not be legitimately punished, even if they deserted, since their actions were compelled. It was this supposed threat to military discipline that convinced the Soldier King of the subversive nature of Wolff's philosophy. See *ibid.*, 55-67. See also Lewis White Beck, *Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors*, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969), 258-259.

⁴ Ibid., 259.

second series of textbooks in Latin. Through these Latin works, Wolff became known to a wider European audience. The controversy with the Pietists, and his expulsion from Prussia, made him famous across the continent. Rather than suppressing Wolff's philosophy in Prussia, Lange actually succeeded in spreading it even further across Europe.

Wolff offers a threefold account of judgment in the *Deutsche Logik*. He explains it in terms of the relationship between 1) concepts, 2) the things and properties that are represented by these concepts, and finally 3) the words through which these concepts are expressed. Like most philosophers of his day, Wolff closely associates judgments with propositions [*Sätzen*]. According to him, a judgment constitutes the thought or mental content that is expressed through a proposition. Judgments are a kind of thought or cognition.⁵ Propositions, on the other hand, consist of words. A proposition is the linguistic expression of a judgment; it is a judgment that is signified through words. Consequently, Wolff's theory of judgment is primarily a theory of propositional logic. He actually titles the chapter of his *Deutsche Logik*, which is devoted to judgment, "On propositions."

⁵ Wolff does draw a distinction between cognition and thought. Cognition, for him, is synonymous with representation. To cognize something means to form a mental representation of it. He writes in his *Deutsche Metaphysik*, "As soon as we can represent a thing then we cognize it" (Christian Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt* [Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1983], 9, §16). Thus, a cognition is nothing other than a representation. Wolff defines a thought somewhat more narrowly. A thought is a conscious representation. Like Leibniz, Wolff thinks that the soul contains many representations that exist below the threshold of consciousness. Leibniz famously describes these unconscious representations as *petites perceptions*. According to Wolff, those representations that we are conscious of are *thoughts*. He writes, "I have recalled above the first thing that we perceive about soul if we pay attention to it; namely, that we are conscious of many things as outside us. When this occurs, we say that we **think**, and we accordingly call **thoughts** alterations of the souls, of which we are conscious" (ibid., 108, §194).

Wolff explains judgments from three different, but nonetheless complementary, perspectives. He describes them semantically, syntactically, and finally grammatically. I will now briefly explain each of these three aspects of judgment.

1.1.1 The Semantic Content of a Judgment

According to Wolff, judgments are thoughts. He begins his account of judgment in the *Deutsche Logik* by defining what specific type of thought qualifies as a judgment.

Wolff writes,

If we think that a thing has something in itself [*ein Ding etwas an sich habe*], or could have it in itself, or that something could arise from it [*von ihm etwas herrühren könne*], or conversely that it does not have something in itself, or that something could not arise from it, then we **judge** about it.⁶

In this passage, Wolff enumerates the different ways in which something can possess a certain property or accident. First, the property may be a consistent feature of the object in question. In this case, it is an essential characteristic of the object. Second, the property may belong to the object under certain circumstances. For example, iron melts, if it is heated to a sufficiently high temperature. Being in a liquid or melted state is clearly not a property that belongs to all iron. However, it does belong to iron under certain conditions. Finally, the property may not actually belong to the object at all; instead, the object is the ground or reason for its occurrence in something else. For example, medicine can be healthful. This does not mean that health is a property of the medicine itself. We describe it as healthful because it can produce this property in other things. If a sick person takes the proper medicine then she can become healthy. Hence, we judge that the medicine is healthful because it can be a source of health. When Wolff writes that “a thing has something in itself,” he means that this “something” [*etwas*] is a

⁶ Christian Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit*, (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1983), 156, §1, c. 3.

property of the “thing” [*Ding*] that possesses it.⁷ Moreover, the property is contained in the object or thing that it characterizes. This is what Wolff means when he writes that it “has” this property “in itself” [*an sich*]. For example, having three sides is a property of all triangles. Since it actually pertains to these objects, we could say that they contain this property. Conversely, health is not a property of medicine per se. Medicine can cause this property to exist in other things. Hence, health is not one of the properties that medicine possesses “in itself,” or put another way, medicine does not contain this property.

According to Wolff, a judgment is a thought that something is characterized by a certain property in any of the three senses that I just outlined – the property either belongs to the object inherently, or under certain circumstances, or the object causes the property to exist in other things. It can also be a thought that something does not have a certain property in any of these three senses. Thus, a judgment is a thought that either ascribes a property to an object or excludes one from it. Wolff writes, “Suffice to say, we judge when we think that a thing either belongs to something or does not belong to it [*einer Sache etwas zukomme, oder nicht*].”⁸

He muddies what is otherwise a very simple and straightforward point by referring to both objects and their properties as “things.” Wolff has a reason for doing

⁷ Wolff’s use of the terms “thing” [*Ding*] and “something” [*etwas*] in this passage is vague and somewhat confusing, because he refers to both objects and their properties as things. What is clear, however, is that a thing, in this context, is not necessarily a mind-independent or “weighty” object. This term can denote any possible object of thought. Hence, abstract predicates like “healthy” or “beautiful” qualify as things for Wolff. In the *Deutsche Metaphysik*, he defines a thing [*Ding*] as anything “that can be.” He adds that “it may be actual or not.” In other words, anything that is possible qualifies as a thing. The only entities that are not things are those that are impossible because they entail logical contradictions. Thus, the term “thing,” for Wolff, entails no ontological presuppositions. It merely denotes logical possibility. See Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 9, §16.

⁸ Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit*, 156, §1, c. 3.

this. The terms “subject” and “predicate” refer to the words that we use to express a judgment. Wolff’s account of judgment has three levels. He starts by defining the basic meaning of a judgment, i.e. its semantic content. He then explains the structure of this thought, or how it is formed in the mind. Finally, he turns to the words through which these thoughts are expressed, i.e. propositions. When he begins his account of judgment, Wolff does not want to presuppose the terminology of propositional logic because these words derive their meaning from the thoughts that they signify. He wants to define the nature of these thoughts in a non-circular manner. According to Wolff, words refer to concepts and concepts represent things. He cannot define a judgment as a thought that ascribes a predicate to a subject, because these terms are defined in relation to the thoughts that they signify. He would simply be presupposing their meaning. Wolff avoids this circularity by defining a judgment as a thought about the relationship between things. The term, “thing,” in this case, denotes any object of thought. It can refer to actual objects or substances as well as their properties or accidents. For example, both “fire” and “heat” would qualify as things in this context. A judgment is the thought that one of these things either belongs [*zukommt*] to the other or is excluded from it. This means that one of these things – the thing that belongs or does not belong to the other – is a property. If it belongs to the other thing, then it is a property of this thing. For example, heat belongs to fire. If it does not belong to the other thing, then it is not one of the thing’s properties. For example, simplicity does not belong to a body. Wolff’s definition of judgment, with its vague references to things, can be confusing, but his meaning is simple. A judgment is a thought about something’s properties.

1.1.2 The syntactical structure of a judgment

After defining what type of thought is a judgment – it is one that concerns whether or not something has a certain property – Wolff next explains how these thoughts are formed. According to Wolff, a judgment consists in a conceptual relationship. He writes, “Therefore, when we judge we either connect two concepts with each other or separate them from each other; namely, the concept of thing, of which we judge, and the concept of that which either belongs to it or does not belong to it.”⁹ A judgment is a thought that something – namely a property – either belongs or does not belong to something else, i.e. the object of the judgment. These two things are each represented by concepts. If a judgment represents that a property belongs to an object, then it connects their corresponding concepts. If it represents that a property does not belong to an object, or is excluded from it, then it separates their concepts. Thus, a judgment consists of a conceptual relationship, which represents the relationship between things and their properties. It ascribes a property to an object by connecting their concepts and excludes a property by separating them.

1.1.3 Propositional Logic

In the introduction of this chapter, I outlined what I termed the “standard theory of judgment.” This was the view of judgment that was widely accepted by German *Schulphilosophie*. The standard theory considers judgment in two ways. It describes their semantic content and their syntactical structure. The former concerns what is meant through a judgment. All judgments, in general, either ascribe a property to something or exclude one from it. These things and properties are represented within the mind by concepts. A judgment consists of a relationship between these concepts. This is what I have termed its syntactical structure. All judgments consist of conceptual relationships.

⁹ Ibid., 69, §2, c. 3.

It should be clear from the previous two sections (1.1.2 and 3) that Wolff accepts both of these positions. He explains judgments in terms of the relationship between things and their properties as well as the concepts that represent these things. He adds an additional level of complexity to his account of judgment by also referring to the words through which a judgment is expressed, i.e. to propositions. Wolff regards words as spoken or written signs that are used to signify concepts.¹⁰ A proposition is a judgment that is expressed through words. Every proposition consists of a subject [*Förderglied*] and a predicate [*Hinterglied*].¹¹ The subject is the word that stands for the concept of the thing that is judged. The predicate is the word that signifies the other concept that is either connected with the subject-concept or separated from it. Curiously, Wolff does not mention the copula in the *Deutsche Logik*. He claims that a proposition can consist of just two words: its subject and its predicate.¹² Wolff later corrects this omission in his Latin logic.

Wolff defines propositions in terms of their quality and quantity. Propositions are either affirmative [*bekräftigend*] or negative [*verneinend*] depending upon whether they ascribe their predicate to their subject-term or exclude their predicate from it.¹³ Wolff's explanation of a proposition's quantity is a bit more complicated. According to him, a judgment represents the relationship between two things. One of these things is the

¹⁰ "We usually make our thoughts known to others through words. And thus they are nothing other than signs of our thoughts" (ibid., 151, §1, c. 3). See also Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 160, §291.

¹¹ Wolff use of the terms, *Föderglied* and *Hinterglied*, to describe the terms of a judgment is somewhat unusual. They are literally the judgment's "front" and "back" members. Most of Wolff's followers used the terms, *Subject* and *Prädicat*, instead.

¹² "A judgment must be expressed through at least two words, one of which indicates the thing that is spoken of and the other that which belongs to it. The former is called the subject, the latter is called the predicate, and the discourse [*Rede*], through which we convey that something belongs to a thing, is called a proposition" (Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit*, 157, §3, c. 3).

¹³ Ibid., 157, §3, c. 3.

object of the judgment; it is the denoted by the subject-term. The other is a potential property of this object; it is the signified by the predicate. The relationship between these two things must have a sufficient reason. Wolff claims that this ground or reason determines the logical quantity of a proposition or judgment. If the sufficient reason for the relationship between the subject and predicate is contained in the subject-term itself, then the proposition is universal. However, if this reason is not implicit in the concept that serves as the subject-term, then the proposition is a particular one. Wolff reasons that a universal proposition either affirms or denies something about an entire class of objects. This is not true of particular propositions, which apply to some members of a class but not to others. If the sufficient reason for the relationship between the subject and predicate is contained in the subject-term, this means that their relationship is explained by one of the properties of this concept. Furthermore, this relationship will hold in all cases. Conversely, if this relationship is grounded in something outside the subject, then its validity will be limited to only certain cases. This is because a further condition is required to establish the relationship between the subject and predicate. For example, three-sidedness belongs to triangles because it is one of the essential properties of a triangle. Consequently, all triangles are three-sided. On the other hand, the state of being melted or liquid belongs to iron because the iron has been heated to 2797 °F. A further condition is required for this property to belong to iron. Hence, only some iron is melted; namely those pieces that are heated to a sufficient temperature.¹⁴

Wolff does not define the logical quantity of a proposition or judgment in terms of the extent to which it applies to the extension of the subject, i.e. the things and concepts that are represented by this concept. This is how most logicians define the quantity of a

¹⁴ Ibid., 158, §5, c. 3.

proposition. A universal proposition applies to the entire extension of the subject-term, while a particular proposition applies to only part of its extension. Wolff, on the other hand, defines the quantity of a proposition in terms of the *content* of the subject-term. If the sufficient reason for the relation between the subject and the predicate is included among the properties of this concept, then the proposition is a universal one. If, on the other hand, the sufficient reason for this relationship is not contained in the subject-term, then the proposition is particular in its scope.¹⁵

In addition to defining propositions in terms of their logical quality and quantity, Wolff claims that every proposition consists of two basic elements. Every proposition has both an *assertion* [*Aussage*] and a *condition* [*Bedingung*]. Its assertion is the relationship – either positive or negative – that it posits between its subject and predicate. A proposition either asserts that the predicate belongs to the subject-term or it asserts that the predicate is excluded from this concept. The condition of a proposition is the sufficient reason for its assertion. It explains or justifies why the predicate either belongs or does not belong to the subject.¹⁶ The logical quantity of a proposition depends on whether or not its condition is one of the properties of its subject-term. Wolff illustrates the meaning of these two terms with an example. He claims that in the proposition, “the warm stone warms [*der warme Stein machet warm*],” the assertion is that *the stone*

¹⁵ This position is not unique to Wolff. Gottsched also defines the logical quantity of propositions in this way. He writes, “Since nothing occurs without **sufficient reason**, there must also be a cause for why a predicate either belongs to the subject or does not. If this reason is in the subject or main point [*Hauptsache*] itself, then the predicate will always belong to all things of this kind . . . Now such a proposition as this . . . is a **universal proposition**” (Johann Christoph Gottsched, *Erste Gründe der gesamten Weltweisheit, darinn alle philosophische Wissenschaften in ihrer natürlichen Verknüpfung abgehandelt werden* [Frankfurt am Main: Minerva G.M.B.H., 1965], 34, §59).

¹⁶ “However, one sees from this that every proposition can very easily be analyzed into two parts. The first is the condition under which something belongs or cannot belong to a thing . . . The other part is the assertion, which contains what belongs or cannot belong to a thing” (Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit*, 159, §6, c. 3).

warms or radiates heat. The condition of this proposition is that *the stone itself is warm.*

¹⁷ Stones are not naturally warm. They can only serve as a source heat if they themselves have already been sufficiently heated. The reason that that stone emits warmth, as is asserted, is that the stone itself is warm. This is condition of the proposition. Thus, the assertion of a proposition concerns the relationship between its subject and predicate and its condition is the ground for this relationship.

1.1.4 Judgment in the *Deutsche Metaphysik*

Kant is often credited with recognizing that concepts cannot be employed without judgments. Traditional logic taught that the mind is capable of three basic acts: concepts, judgments, and inferences. Concepts are combined to form judgments, judgments are combined to form inferences, and these inferences are ultimately combined to form entire proofs or arguments. Most logic textbooks during Kant's time, including Wolff's logic, were organized according to this principle. They began with a doctrine of concepts, which taught how to form clear and distinct ideas, followed by a doctrine of judgments and a doctrine of inferences. The former was an account of propositional logic; the latter addressed syllogistics. Kant challenged this model by arguing that the higher faculty of cognition is essentially a capacity for judgment. Moreover, concepts and judgments are actually inseparable from each other, since the former cannot be employed without the latter.

However, Wolff already anticipates Kant's insight about the inseparability of concepts and judgments in the *Deutsche Metaphysik*. Wolff asserts in this work that both concepts and judgments are conceived through the faculty of the understanding.

¹⁷ "E.g. In the proposition, "the warm stone warms, the condition is that the stone is warm and the assertion is that it warms" (ibid., 159, §6, c. 3).

Furthermore, he claims that we cannot conceive of abstract concepts without also applying them to something and this application occurs through a judgment. Hence, concepts cannot be employed without judgments. These two forms of cognition require each other.

Wolff defines the understanding [*Verstand*] as the soul's capacity for distinct cognition.¹⁸ Conceptual clarity and distinctness were common philosophical terms of art during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Descartes famously writes about clear and distinct ideas, as do Malebranche, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Each of these philosophers understands these terms in a slightly different way, so it is important to specify in what sense they are intended. Wolff was a follower of Leibniz, and he accepted the definitions of clarity and distinctness that Leibniz set forth in *Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas*.

In this important essay, Leibniz clarifies some basic distinctions concerning the nature of knowledge or ideas. He claims that "knowledge is either obscure or *clear*, and again, clear knowledge is either confused or *distinct*, and distinct knowledge either inadequate or *adequate*, and adequate knowledge either symbolic or *intuitive*."¹⁹ Thus, according to Leibniz ideas can be classified in terms of clarity, distinctness, adequacy, and finally as either symbolic or intuitive. For our purposes, we only need to focus on the first two terms: clarity and distinctness.

According to Leibniz, the most basic distinction between ideas concerns their level of clarity. All ideas are either clear or obscure. An idea is clear if it represents its

¹⁸ "The **understanding** is the capacity to distinctly represent the possible" (Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 153, §277).

¹⁹ Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas," in *Philosophical Essays*, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 23.

object with enough detail to differentiate it from others. On the other hand, if it lacks this specificity then it is said to be obscure. For example, if I possess a clear idea of a birch tree, then I can recognize such trees when I see them and differentiate them from alders, beeches, and oaks. If I cannot differentiate between these trees then my knowledge of them is obscure. Thus, clarity consists in the degree to which an object can be differentiated from others. It is opposed to obscurity, which is a lack of differentiation. Things that are represented obscurely blend together because I cannot properly differentiate them from each other.²⁰

Leibniz claims that all clear ideas can be further divided into those that are confused and those that are distinct. An idea's clarity consists in the degree to which it differentiates its object from others; an idea that fails to do so is obscure. Things are differentiated from each other by their properties. Leibniz refers to these distinguishing properties or characteristics as "marks." The term "mark" – *nota* in Latin, *Merkmal* in German – becomes an important concept in Wolffian logic. It denotes a property or predicate. An idea is distinct if it differentiates not only its object but its defining marks as well, i.e. the properties that distinguish it from others. On the other hand, an idea that only represents its object clearly but not the marks that distinguish it is confused.²¹ For example, if I can recognize a birch tree, but I cannot articulate the characteristics that distinguish it from beeches and oaks, then my knowledge of this species is *clear*, i.e. I can recognize birches and differentiate them from other trees, but *confused*, i.e. I do not

²⁰ "A notion which is not sufficient for recognizing the thing represented is *obscure* . . . Therefore, knowledge is *clear* when I have the means for recognizing the thing represented" (ibid., 23-24).

²¹ "Clear knowledge, again, is either confused or distinct. It is confused when I cannot enumerate one by one marks [*nota*] sufficient for differentiating a thing from others, even though the thing does indeed have such marks and requisites into which its notion can be resolved . . . But a *distinct notion* is like the notion an assayer has of gold, that is, a notion connected with marks and tests sufficient to distinguish a thing from all other similar bodies" (ibid., 24).

know the marks or properties that distinguish them in this way. However, if I can both recognize birch trees and identify the properties that distinguish them from other similar trees, then I possess an idea of birches that is both clear and distinct.²²

Wolff accepts Leibniz's definitions of clarity and distinctness as they are set forth in *Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas*. A concept or idea is clear if it depicts its object with enough precision to differentiate it from other similar objects. It is obscure, if it fails to differentiate its object from others. Wolff writes in the *Deutsche Logik*, "If the concept which we have is sufficient to recognize the thing if it appears, as when we know it is exactly that thing, that this or another name conveys, which we have seen it in this or that place, then it is clear. On the other hand, it is obscure, if it will not suffice to recognize the thing."²³ A concept is distinct if the marks that distinguish its object are also represented clearly. If these marks are not differentiated from each other, then our thinking is confused. Wolff writes, "If our concept is clear, then we are either able to recite to another the marks from which we recognize a thing, or at least represent them to ourselves particularly in succession, or we are unable to do this. In the first case, the clear concept is distinct, but in the second it is confused."²⁴

Now that we have clarified this basic vocabulary, let us return to Wolff's account of the understanding. He defines this faculty as the soul's capacity to represent or cognize things distinctly. He goes on to explain that distinct cognition involves two basic ingredients: abstract or universal concepts and judgments. The former are required to

²² Interestingly enough, Leibniz definitions of clarity and distinctness render the expression "clear and distinct," which is so common in the work of Descartes and Malebranche, redundant. Distinct ideas are a species of clear ones. There are ideas that are both clear and confused. However, all distinct ideas are by definition clear as well.

²³ Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedanken von des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit*, 126, §9, c 1.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 128, §13, c 1.

represent marks; the latter are required to apply these marks to objects. Consequently, Wolff claims that both concepts and judgments are conceived through the understanding.

In order to represent something distinctly, we must identify its marks. These marks or properties are represented by abstract concepts. Wolff defines concepts differently in his metaphysics than he does in his logic. In the *Deutsche Logik*, he essentially equates concepts with thoughts, or conscious representations. He writes, “I call **a concept** any representation of a thing in our thoughts.”²⁵ However, in the *Deutsche Metaphysik*, he defines concepts more narrowly. They are the representations of the “genera and species of things” [*Geschlechter und Arten der Dinge*]. This means that they do not represent specific individuals, but rather common properties that are shared by multiple objects. In other words, they represent marks. For example, a snub-nose is one of the marks of Socrates. However, he is hardly the only individual to bear this feature. “Snub-nosedness” is a general property that characterizes many different things, including Socrates. It is an example of what Wolff terms the “genera and species of things.” According to his metaphysics, concepts represent these common features. They are abstract or general representations. In order to represent something distinctly, we must clearly represent its marks. Marks are represented by concepts in the narrow sense that Wolff defines in his metaphysics. Therefore, distinct cognition entails the formation of abstract concepts.

Wolff then explains that we never simply conceive of these concepts in isolation. Concepts represent marks and we cannot think about a certain mark without also ascribing it to something. He writes,

²⁵ Ibid., 123, §4, c. 1.

As soon as we distinguish the kinds of things and their genera [*die Arten der Dinge und ihre Geschlechter*], as well as their attributes and alterations, and their behavior toward each other, then we cognize that this or that thing has this or that in itself, or at least could have it in itself, or also that something could be due to it, that is, that one could find in it the ground of an alteration in something else. And we call this activity [*Verrichtung*] of the understanding **judging**.²⁶

In this passage, Wolff first enumerates different kinds of properties or marks. When he refers to “the kinds of things and their genera, as well as their attributes and alterations, and their behavior toward each other” he is listing different kinds of marks. Something can be distinguished by belonging to a certain type or genera, by possessing certain attributes or alterations, or by producing certain effects. For example, Kant was a man, who was a professor of philosophy, and wrote the *Critique of Pure Reason*. These are all marks that distinguished Kant. His gender is a genus, his profession as a philosopher is an attribute, and his authorship of the first *Critique* is an effect that he produced. Wolff then explains that we cannot form a concept of a mark without also ascribing it to something. We never simply contemplate a mark or property in isolation. It is always a mark *of something*. As Wolff puts it, “as soon as we distinguish” a mark, i.e. form a clear concept of it, then we cognize that it either belongs to something or that it is excluded from something. We ascribe marks to things through judgments. Hence, we cannot conceive of marks without also applying them through judgments. To think of a mark entails applying it to something, which occurs through a judgment.

Wolff concludes that the understanding is responsible for conceiving of both concepts and judgments. Concepts are conceived through this faculty because it is the capacity for distinct cognition and in order to represent something distinctly we must form concepts of its marks. However, we never conceive of a concept without also

²⁶ Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 157, §287.

applying it and this occurs through a judgment. Thus, judgments are conceived through this same faculty as well.

Wolff's point here is an important one. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant describes concepts as "predicates of possible judgments."²⁷ In doing so, he indicates that these two forms of cognition are essentially inseparable. Wolff makes the same point in the *Deutsche Metaphysik*. He claims that we cannot conceive of a mark, which is represented by an abstract concept, without also applying it to something through judgment. Hence, the employment of concepts requires judgments. Kant will later take a very similar position in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He too will assert that concepts must be employed through judgments.²⁸

Kant and Wolff make this same point for different reasons. Kant wants to show that the higher faculty of cognition is a general capacity for judgment and that consequently it uses the same basic function to unite representation in a logical judgment that it uses to unite the pure manifold of intuitions. Wolff, on the other hand, wants to show that both concepts and judgments are formed through the faculty of the understanding. The understanding is the capacity for distinct cognition and distinct cognition requires the formation of both concepts and judgments. The former represent marks; the latter apply these marks to objects.

1.2 Meier's Theory of Judgment

Georg Friedrich Meier is often regarded as a minor figure in the history of philosophy; however, he was an important influence on Kant. He was a follower of Alexander Baumgarten, who is best known today for having founded a science of

²⁷ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 69/B 93.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, A 68/B 93.

aesthetics.²⁹ Meier was the author of the textbook that Kant used for all of his logic lectures, the *Vernunftlehre*. Kant typically assigned an abridged version of the *Vernunftlehre* to his students, entitled *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*. However, the notes from his lectures occasionally refer to passages that are only found in the full treatise. Thus, we know that Kant was familiar with the entire work.

Like Wolff, Meier accepts the standard theory of judgment. However, there are nonetheless two significant differences between their accounts. First, Meier abandons Wolff's three-tiered approach, which defines judgments in terms of the relationship between things, the concepts that represent these things, and the words through which these concepts are expressed. Meier is careful to distinguish between the objects of cognition and cognition itself. This is the difference between a representation and what it

²⁹ Baumgarten actually coined the term "aesthetics" in his 1735 dissertation, *Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus*. This work is translated in English under the more familiar title, *Reflections on Poetry*. Baumgarten argues in his dissertation that confused or sensuous cognition can be perfected. This claim, on its own, would be unremarkable. Wolff claims that the perfection of cognition is proportional to its level of distinctness. Hence, confused cognition can be perfected through conceptual analysis, i.e. by rendering it distinct. However, Baumgarten actually makes a different, more radical claim. He argues that confused or sensuous cognition can be perfect *in its own right*. In other words, it can be perfect without being made distinct. This idea is not consistent with the epistemology of either Leibniz or Wolff, because it means that confusion, i.e. a lack of distinctness, no longer counts as a defect of cognition. Indeed, it can actually serve as a basis for cognitive perfection. Baumgarten claims that logic is only concerned with the perfection of distinct cognition and that the perfection of confused cognition has been neglected. Consequently, an additional science is required to achieve the perfection of confused cognition. Baumgarten dubs this new science *aesthetics*. See Alexander Baumgarten, *Reflections on Poetry*, trans. Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), 77-78, §115-116. Although Baumgarten proposed a science of aesthetics in his dissertation, he did not deliver a treatise on this subject for another fifteen years. The first volume of the *Aesthetica* finally appeared in 1750. A second shorter volume was published two years in 1752. However, this was the last volume that Baumgarten managed to complete before his death in 1762. Judging by the outline for the entire work that Baumgarten includes in the first volume, it remains largely incomplete. He projected three parts but he never progressed beyond the first one. His two published volumes both belong to what was to be the first part of the *Aesthetica*. Meier was largely responsible for popularizing Baumgarten's aesthetics. With Baumgarten's permission, he wrote a three volume account of his friend's theories based on Baumgarten's own notes. Meier published the first volume of his *Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften* in 1748. It was a great success, far out selling the first volume of Baumgarten own *Aesthetica* when it appeared two years later. Meier had two advantages over his friend and mentor: he published first and he wrote in the vernacular. Baumgarten continued to write in Latin. During the eighteenth century, most people knew Baumgarten's aesthetics through the work of Meier.

represents.³⁰ The *Vernunftlehre* is primarily concerned with the former rather than the latter. Its aim is to prescribe the rules for what Meier terms “scholarly cognition” [*gelehrter Erkenntnis*]. Scholarly cognition consists of distinct cognition, which grasps the sufficient reason for its object, and that is also logically perfect.³¹ Since the *Vernunftlehre* is concerned with the perfection of cognition, it largely abstracts from the objects of cognition, i.e. what is represented or cognized. It focuses instead on the very nature of cognition itself.^{32,33} This bears on Meier’s account of judgment, because it leads him to explain judgments almost exclusively in terms of the relationship between concepts. Wolff refers to things when he describes a judgment’s semantic content and he refers to concepts when he describes its syntactical structure. Hence, he claims that judgments are thoughts about the relationship between things and that these thoughts

³⁰ Georg Friedrich Meier, *Vernunftlehre* (Halle: Johann Justinus Gebauer, 1752), 27, §26. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre* (Halle: Johann Justinus Gebauer, 1752), 4, §12.

³¹ Meier draws a distinction between “rational cognition” [*vernünftiger Erkenntnis*] and “scholarly cognition.” Rational cognition is distinct cognition that grasps the sufficient reason for its object. See Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 32, §31. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 6, §17. Scholarly cognition is perfect rational cognition. Meier emphasizes that rational thinking or cognition is not the exclusive province of scholars. He alleges that some scholars have made this assumption. Meier describes this view as the “pedantic arrogance of the learned” (idem, *Vernunftlehre*, §35, 37). He argues that all human beings have a faculty of a reason, which is the capacity to recognize the reasons for things. They are therefore all capable of rational cognition. However, in order to achieve perfect rational cognition, education is required. One must study the principles of logic. Thus, only scholars are capable of perfect rational cognition. For this reason, rational cognition that is also logically perfect is known as scholarly cognition. See *ibid.*, §35, 36-37. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 7, §21.

³² “With all our cognition and with all our representations, we must especially distinguish two things from each other: that which we represent and the representation itself, just as with a painting we distinguish the original from the painting itself. That, which we represent is the object of our cognition, and it would be of little use in the *Vernunftlehre* if we were to concern ourselves too much with the different kinds of these objects. Nothing is inimitable to the painterly skill [*malerischen Geschicklichkeit*] of our representational power; everything that is possible can be represented. The *Vernunftlehre*, just like aesthetics [*Malerkunst*], is concerned with setting forth the rules of cognition, and the remaining sciences must, through the help of the *Vernunftlehre*, investigate the different kinds of objects of human cognition” (Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 27, §26).

³³ Kant later adopts a similar approach in his own logic. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he claims that general logic is concerned with the mere form of cognition. It disregards the matter or content of cognition, in order to focus simply on the principles that govern all cognition in general, regardless of their object. These universal principles constitute what Kant terms the form of cognition or thought. He writes, “General logic abstracts, as we have shown, from all content of cognition, i.e. from any relation of it to the object, and considers only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to one another, i.e., the form of thinking in general” (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 55/B 79).

consist of conceptual relationships. Meier, on the other hand, abstracts from the objects of cognition and focuses solely on our representations or cognitions. He generally avoids referring to things or objects in the *Vernunftlehre*. Consequently, he explains both the semantic and syntactic aspects of judgment in terms of the relationship between concepts. He argues that judgments represent the logical relationship between concepts and that this relationship concerns whether a concept belongs to another as its mark. This means that judgments represent the relationship between marks and concepts. They either ascribe marks to concepts or exclude marks from them. By explaining judgments in this way, Meier manages to combine both the semantic and syntactic aspects of judgment into one definition. It expresses both the predicative function of judgment and the fact that they consist of conceptual relationships.

Although this approach is certainly simpler than the three-tiered account that Wolff offers in his logic, it also has a potential drawback. It effectively reduces all judgments to *analytic* propositions. According to Meier, judgments relate marks to concepts. If concept A is a mark of concept B, then A will contain B. For example, the concept of a dog consists of a set of marks. These marks are shared by all dogs. One of these marks is the concept of a mammal. Hence, the concept of a mammal is a mark of the concept of a dog. The concept of a dog also *contains* the concept of a mammal. When we say that one concept is “contained” within another, we mean that it is the mark of the other concept and hence that it belongs to the content of this concept. This is demonstrated by the relationship between the concepts of dogs and mammals. The concept of a mammal is a mark of the concept of a dog and the concept of a dog contains the concept of a mammal. If judgments actually related marks to concepts, as Meier

claims, then they would all be analytic. In an affirmative judgment, the predicate would be a mark of the concept that serves as its subject-term. Hence, the predicate would be contained within the subject-term. In a negative judgment, the predicate would be incompatible with the concept that serves as its subject-term. In both cases, the judgments would be analytic.

Thus, Meier's definition of judgment in the *Vernunftlehre* reduces all judgments to *analytic* ones. This is a consequence – perhaps, an unintended one – of the fact that his logic abstracts almost entirely from the objects of cognition. Kant invents the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.³⁴ Hence, Meier does not draw such a distinction in the *Vernunftlehre*. However, let us suppose that he was aware of this distinction. He still might not reject the charge that his definition of judgment treats all judgments as though they were analytic. Leibniz famously argued that all true affirmative propositions are essentially analytic. The predicate of these propositions is contained within their subject-term.³⁵ Meier may have held a similar view, in which case, he would be quite comfortable with the idea that all true judgments are analytic. I will return to this facet of Meier's logic in chapter four. There I argue that Meier shapes many of Kant's views about logic and that this influence is not always a positive one. Kant inherits an understanding of judgment from Meier that is not compatible with his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments.

³⁴ Ibid., A 6-8/B 10-12.

³⁵ “Now, I saw that it is common to every true affirmative proposition, universal and particular, necessary or contingent, that the predicate is in the subject, that is, that the notion of the predicate is involved somehow in the notion of the subject” (Leibniz, “On Freedom,” in *Philosophical Essays*, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989], 95). See also idem, *On Contingency*, in ibid., 28-29; idem, *Primary Truths*, in ibid., 30-31.

The second major difference between Meier's account of judgment and that of Wolff concerns the logical quantity of a judgment. Wolff defines the quantity of a proposition in terms of the content of the subject-term. If the condition for the proposition is contained in the subject, then the proposition is universal. If the condition is not contained in the subject, then the proposition is a particular one. Meier, on the other hand, defines the quantity of a judgment in terms of the extension of the subject-term. If a judgment applies to the entire extension of its subject, then it is universal in its scope. If it only applies to part of its extension, then it is a particular judgment.

According to Meier, judgments arise from the comparison [*Vergleichung*] of concepts with each other.³⁶ The purpose of this comparison is to determine whether one of these concepts is a mark of the other. Meier refers to this as their *logical relationship* [*logisches Verhältniß*]. The logical relationship between concepts concerns whether one of them belongs [*zukommt*] to the other. Meier explains that one concept belongs to another if it is contained in the other concept. This means that it is mark of the concept to which it belongs, and accordingly is part of that concept's content. For example, Meier claims that the concept of virtue is one of the marks of the concept of Christian virtue. This means that the concept of virtue in general belongs to the concept of Christian virtue – as well as the concepts of natural virtue, civic virtue [*bürgerliche Tugend*], piety,

³⁶ “After one has achieved a quantity of scholarly concepts, one usually compares them with each other, and judgments arise from this comparison” (Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 482, §324). Meier is essentially paraphrasing from *The Port-Royal Logic*, which states, “After conceiving things by our ideas, we compare these ideas and, find that some belong together and others do not, we unite or separate them. This is called *affirming* or *denying*, and in general *judging*” (Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, *Logic or the Art of Thinking, Logic, or, the Art of Thinking: Containing, Besides Common Rules, Several New Observations Appropriate for Forming Judgments*, trans. Jill Vance Buroker [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 82).

chastity, and generosity [*Großmuth*], which all contain this mark.³⁷ Meier chooses a tautology – “Christian virtue is a virtue” – as his example because it makes explicit that one of these concepts is a mark of the other one. The concept of Christian virtue consists of a set of marks. One of these marks is the concept of virtue in general. Hence, the concept of virtue belongs to the concept of Christian virtue. This example also clearly shows that the logical relationship between concepts, as it is defined by Meier, is always analytic. If concept A belongs to concept B, then A is a mark of B. This also means that concept B contains concept A as part of its content. Hence, the relationship between these concepts is analytic.

According to Meier’s terminology, a concept that does not belong to another concept is “contrary” [*zuwider*] to that concept. Moreover, a concept that belongs to another concept is said to “agree” with it, while a concept that is contrary to another “conflicts” [*streitet*] with the opposing concept. Meier writes, “one concept **belongs to another**, or **agrees with it**, if it can be represented in the other as a mark of that concept. Likewise, a concept is **contrary to another**, or **conflicts with it**, if it does not belong to it.”³⁸ The logical relationship between concepts concerns their agreement or conflict.³⁹

Meier defines judgments as the representations of this relationship. He writes, “a judgment consists in a representation of the relations between multiple concepts, or in the representation that one concept either belongs or does not belong to the other.”⁴⁰ This

³⁷ “Since one says that one concept belongs to another and is contained in it, if it can be represented in it, or if it can be regarded as a part and a mark of the other concept. The concept of virtue belongs to the concept of Christian virtue, and the latter concept contains the former and implies it [*schließt denselben in sich*]” (Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 429, §293). See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 71-72, §260.

³⁸ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 483, §325. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 81, §292.

³⁹ “The agreement and conflict of multiple concepts constitutes their logical relation to each other and we will simply call it the relation of concepts” (Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 484, §325). See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 81, §292.

⁴⁰ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 484, §325. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 81, §292.

means that judgments represent the relationship between concepts and potential marks. The logical relationship between concepts concerns whether one of them belongs to the other, which is equivalent to saying that one of them is a mark of the other. The agreement or conflict between concepts boils down to the question of whether one of these concepts is a mark of the other. Judgments represent this relationship.

Like Wolff, Meier's account of judgment is primarily concerned with propositional logic. He states that every judgment is composed of at least three concepts: the subject, the predicate, and either the copula [*Verbindungsbegriff*] or its negation [*Verneinung*].⁴¹ As we know, a judgment represents the logical relationship between two concepts. The predicate is the name for the concept that either belongs to the other concept or is excluded from it. It is a potential mark of the concept to which it is compared. The subject denotes the concept to which the predicate either belongs or is excluded from.⁴² The copula represents the relation between these two concepts. Alone, it represents the agreement of the predicate with the subject, i.e. the former belongs to the latter. The negation of the copula represents the incompatibility of these two concepts.

Meier's account of propositional logic is fairly unremarkable. He defines judgments in terms of their quality and quantity. This quality of a judgment is either affirmative or negative depending on whether its predicate belongs to its subject.⁴³ He defines the quantity of a judgment in terms of the extent to which it applies to the extension of the subject. Meier draws a distinction between singular and abstract

⁴¹ "Every judgment is always composed of at least three concepts: the subject, the predicate, and either the copula or the negation of this concept" (Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 485, §326). See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 81, §293.

⁴² "The subject of a judgment is that concept, of which we represent that the other either belongs to it or does not belong to it. And that concept, of which we represent that it either belongs or does not belong to subject, is called the predicate of a judgment" (Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 486, §326). See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 81, §293.

⁴³ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 487, §327. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 81-82, §294.

concepts. The former represent specific individuals, e.g. Kant or the city of Berlin. The latter are formed through abstraction and they are representative of multiple objects, e.g. the concepts of philosophers or cities.⁴⁴ If the subject of a judgment is a singular concept, i.e. it represents a single object, then the judgment is also singular. If, on the other hand, the subject-term is an abstract or general concept, then the judgment is known as a “common judgment” [*gemeines Urtheil*]. Common judgments are either universal or particular. Meier writes,

In a common judgment we either judge that the predicate belongs, or does not belong, to all of things and concepts that are contained under the subject, or we affirm and deny the predicate of some. If the former is the case, then we call it a **universal judgment**; however, in the other cases, it is a **particular judgment**.⁴⁵

This passage clearly shows that Meier defines the logical quantity of a judgment in relation to the extension of the subject-term, i.e. the “things and concepts that are contained under the subject.” As I pointed out earlier, Wolff explains logical quantity differently than Meier. He bases it on the *content* of the subject-term, rather than its extension.

Like Wolff, Meier states that every judgment has a condition [*Bedingung*]. However, he explains this concept in slightly different terms than his predecessor. According to Wolff, every proposition can be analyzed into two basic elements: its assertion and its condition. The assertion of a proposition refers to the relationship that it posits between its subject and predicate. An affirmative proposition asserts that its predicate belongs to its subject; a negative proposition denies that this is the case. The condition of a proposition is the sufficient ground or reason for this relationship. It explains or justifies why the predicate either belongs to the subject-term or is excluded

⁴⁴ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 428, §293. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 71, §260.

⁴⁵ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 498, §334. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 84, §301.

from it. Meier does not refer to a judgment's assertion; he abandons this concept.

However, he does discuss its condition.

According to Meier, the condition of a judgment is its *truth* condition. It is the sufficient reason for the judgment's truth. He writes,

Since everything that is possible and truth has a reason as well as a sufficient reason, the truth of all judgments must also have a reason. The reason for the truth of a judgment is called the condition of the judgment, and it is therefore undeniable that all true judgments must have a condition.⁴⁶

Meier defines truth as “the agreement of our cognition with things or with its object.”⁴⁷

Hence, he accepts a correspondence theory of truth. Meier continually compares mental representations or cognitions to paintings and he claims that we assess their accuracy in roughly the same way; namely, in terms of their similarity to their objects. A painting depicts its object correctly if it resembles this object. Likewise, our cognition is correct or true if it accurately represents its object.⁴⁸ Consequently, the truth of a judgment depends on its agreement with its object. A judgment is true if the relationship that it posits between its subject and predicate corresponds with reality. The condition of a judgment is the sufficient reason for its truth. In the case of an affirmative judgment, it is the reason that predicate belongs to the subject. In the case of a negative judgment, it is the reason that the predicate is excluded from the subject. For example, Meier explains that the condition of the judgment, “the soul is not corporeal,” is the fact that the soul can think. No corporeal things are capable of thought. Therefore, the soul cannot be corporeal.⁴⁹ The condition of this judgment explains why the predicate is necessarily

⁴⁶ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 490, §330. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 83, §297.

⁴⁷ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 138, §127. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 25, §99.

⁴⁸ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 138-139, §127.

⁴⁹ “If we judge that the soul is not corporeal, then the condition is that it can think, since no body can do this” (ibid., 491, §330).

excluded from the subject-term. It proves that the logical relationship represented by this judgment is correct. Thus, it is the ground for the judgment's truth.

This idea of a judgment's condition plays a crucial role in Meier account of syllogistics. According to Meier, the purpose of a syllogism is to exhibit how the truth of a certain judgment follows from its condition. He defines a syllogism [*Vernunftschluß*] as "a distinct representation of the connection of truths." Truths are connected according to the principle of sufficient reason. Two truths are connected because one of them serves as the ground for the other. A syllogism is a distinct representation of this connection. It shows how and why a certain truth follows from other truths as a necessary consequence. Meier explains that "in a syllogism we derive a truth from other truths."⁵⁰ Truths are represented through judgments.⁵¹ A syllogism consists of three judgments, each of which represents a certain truth or fact about the world. The truth of one of these judgments is derived from the other two. This judgment, whose truth is grounded in the others, constitutes the conclusion [*Schlußurtheil*] of the syllogism. The other two judgments serve as its premises [*Vorderurtheile*].⁵² All syllogisms consist of three judgments – two premises and a conclusion – and these three judgments are in turn composed of three concepts. Meier refers to these concepts as a syllogism's "main concepts" [*Hauptbegriffen*]. They are what we typically describe as a syllogism's "terms." According to Meier, the minor term [*kleinerer Hauptbegriff*] is the subject of the conclusion and the major term [*grösserer Hauptbegriff*] is the predicate of this

⁵⁰ Ibid., 561, §391. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 99, §355.

⁵¹ "Because one can represent all truths as true judgments, it is equivalent whether I say a truth or a true judgment. The connection of truths is thus a connection of true judgments. And the connection of truths consists in such a relation of true judgments to each other, by virtue of which some contain the sufficient reason of the truth of another" (Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 558, §389).

⁵² Ibid., 561-562, §392. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 99, §357.

judgment.⁵³ This of course is all very standard. He claims that the middle term [*mitlerer Hauptbegriff*] is *the condition of the conclusion*.⁵⁴ Meier observes that the conclusion of a syllogism is supposed to follow from the premises. The premises constitute the ground for the truth of the conclusion. The major and minor terms are contained in the conclusion. Hence, they cannot serve as the grounds for its truth. Otherwise, our reasoning would be circular. A syllogism consists of just three concepts – the major, minor, and middle terms. If the truth of the conclusion is not grounded in either the major or minor terms, then it must be grounded in the middle one. As we know, Meier defines the condition of a judgment as the ground of its truth. The middle term is the ground of the conclusion's truth. It is therefore the condition of this judgment. A syllogism distinctly represents how the truth of a judgment, i.e. its conclusion, follows from its condition.

For example, the condition of the judgment, “the soul is not corporeal,” is the fact that the soul can think. The soul cannot be corporeal because the soul can think and corporeal things are incapable of thought. Here we have a syllogism:

No corporeal things can think.
 The soul can think.
 ∴ The soul is not corporeal.

The middle term of this syllogism is the “capacity to think.” It relates the major term, “corporeality,” to the minor term, “the soul.” In other words, it shows why the conclusion's predicate cannot belong to the subject, or why the former is not a mark of

⁵³ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 562, §393. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 99, §357.

⁵⁴ “The middle term in a syllogism is always the demonstration [*Beweisthum*] of the conclusion. Now we have proven that the demonstration of any judgment is the condition of it. The condition of the conclusion is therefore the middle term. If one therefore wants to find this term [*Hauptbegriff*] in a syllogism, then one must look for the condition of the conclusion according to those rules, which have I presented” (Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 563, §394). See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 99-100, §358.

the latter. This is the function of a judgment's condition. A syllogism, according to Meier, represents precisely how the condition of a judgment establishes its truth.

1.3 Kant's Early Theory of Judgment

Kant explains his own early views about judgment in two places: a 1762 essay, entitled *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures*, and his lectures on logic from the beginning of the 1770s. *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* belongs to a series of short treatises and articles that Kant published early in his career, primarily in order to publicize his lecture courses. Until he joined the faculty of the *Albertina* in 1770 as the chair of logic and metaphysics, Kant drew no salary from the university. As a *Privatdozent*, a title roughly equivalent to that of an adjunct professor in today's university system, he was allowed to offer private lectures in a hall that he rented for himself. During these years, Kant supported himself almost entirely through the fees that he collected from the students who attended these courses.⁵⁵ He offered courses in logic, metaphysics, mathematics, physics, geography, and ethics. He always taught at least four courses per semester and sometimes offered as many as six.⁵⁶ Kant's livelihood depended on his ability to draw students to these lectures. In order to publicize his courses, he wrote short essays to give potential students a preview of their content. *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* is one such work.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ In 1766, Kant became the sublibrarian of the university library, the *Schloßbibliothek*, in order to supplement his income. He worked part-time in this position until 1770 when he finally became a full professor. See Kuehn, *Kant: A Biography*, 159.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 108.

⁵⁷ Others include *New Remarks toward an Elucidation of the Theory of Winds* (1756), *Outline and Announcement of a Course of Lectures on Physical Geography together with an Appendix . . . Whether the West Winds in our Regions are Humid because they have traversed a Great Sea* (1757), *An Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism* (1759), *New Theory of Motion and Rest and the Consequences that are Associated with it in the First Grounds of Natural Science* (1758), and *M. Immanuel Kant's Announcement of the Programme of his Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765-1766*.

Kant argues in this essay that all syllogistic forms can be reduced to those of the first figure. He demonstrates that the second, third, and fourth figures are derived from the first one. This was no longer a fresh thesis by the time Kant wrote *The False Subtlety* in 1762. Crusius had already shown how the other figures could be reduced to the first in his *Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntniß* (1747).⁵⁸ We know that Kant was familiar with this work because he actually refers to it in *The False Subtlety*. He criticizes Crusius for incorrectly deriving the fourth figure from the first.⁵⁹ *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* ranks as a very minor work in Kant's corpus. Nonetheless, it warrants our attention for two reasons. First, Kant offers clear definitions of judgments and syllogisms. It is our earliest record of his views on these topics. Second, Kant argues in the conclusion of this essay that both the faculties of reason and the understanding are exercised through acts of judgment. Consequently, the higher faculty of cognition in general, which consists of these two faculties, is a capacity to judge [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*]. This is significant because it anticipates Kant's position in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Besides *The False Subtlety*, the other source for our knowledge of Kant's early views about judgment is his lectures on logic, or more precisely the student notes from these lectures.⁶⁰ The earliest set of notes that we have from Kant's lecture were taken by

⁵⁸ Christian August Crusius, *Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntniß*, (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1965), 590-601, §§333-335.

⁵⁹ Immanuel Kant, *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures*, in *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770*, trans. David Walford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 2:55.

⁶⁰ We possess Kant's own notes from these lectures, which are collected in volume sixteen of Kant's *Gesammelte Schriften*. However, they are undated and it is impossible to determine when they were written with any certainty. Erich Adickes estimated the approximate date for each fragment or *Reflexion*. However, they are not reliable enough to serve as the basis for claims about the *Entwicklungsgeschichte* of Kant's philosophy. Fortunately, we do know when many of the surviving sets of student notes from Kant's lectures were created. In some cases, we even know the semester that they date from. Kant's own notes or

his most famous student, Johann Gottfried Herder. Herder was a student at the *Albertina* from 1762-1764. During this time he attended all of Kant's lectures. Herder's surviving notes from Kant's logic lectures are quite cursory – they only amount to four pages in the *Akademie Ausgabe*. Moreover, they say nothing about judgment. Judging by their content, they appear to be taken from the opening sessions of Kant's course. We get much more complete picture of the content of Kant's logic lectures in the student notes from his lectures at the beginning of the 1770s. The manuscripts known as *Logik Blomberg* and *Logik Philippi* are both believed to date from this period. After Herder's notes, they are the next earliest sets of student notes that we have. *Logik Blomberg* and *Philippi* both repeat the same theory of judgment that Kant advances in *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures*. This confirms that Kant continued to hold this view until at least the 1770s. As I will show, it is yet another variation on the standard theory that is accepted by both Wolff and Meier.

The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures actually begins with a definition of judgment. Kant writes, "To compare something as a mark with a thing is *to judge*."⁶¹ As we know, a mark signifies a distinguishing characteristic or feature. We recognize something and distinguish it from others through its marks. According to Kant, a judgment compares two things in order to determine whether one of them is a mark or determination of the other. The thing, with which the mark is compared, is the subject of the judgment. The mark itself is denoted by the predicate. The relationship between the subject and predicate is represented through the copula. On its own, the copula ascribes the predicate to the subject, or the mark to the thing that is judged. If the

Reflexionen can be employed to confirm the accuracy of the student notes, since the former were written by Kant, but the authors of the latter are, in most cases, unknown.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 2:47.

copula is negated, then the predicate is excluded from the subject. Such a judgment denies that its subject is characterized by a certain mark.⁶² Thus, judgments, according to Kant, relate marks and things. They either ascribe a mark to what is judged or exclude one from it.

Kant's definition of judgment is very similar to Meier's treatment of this topic in the *Vernunftlehre*. However, there is one important difference between their accounts: Kant claims that judgments compare *things* [*Dinge*] and marks; Meier claims that they compare *concepts*. There is a very important difference between these two positions; although, Kant, himself, may have failed to recognize it. I will explain why this may be the case at the end of this chapter, when we briefly turn to his early logic lectures. In the meantime, I want to simply emphasize the significance of this distinction. As I explained earlier, Meier's definition of judgment treats all judgments as though they were analytic. We compare concepts in order to analyze their *content*. The purpose of this comparison is to determine whether one of these concepts is a mark of the other. Hence, according to Meier, we can establish the relation between the subject and predicate of a judgment simply by analyzing the content of these concepts. Kant will later claim that this is only true of analytic judgments. For example, he writes,

if I say: "all bodies are extended," then this is an analytic judgment. For I do not need to go beyond the concept that I combine with the word body in order to find that extension is connected with it, but rather I need only to analyze that concept, i.e., become conscious of the manifold that I always think in it, in order to encounter this predicate therein.⁶³

⁶² "The thing itself is the subject; the mark is the predicate. The comparison is expressed by means of the copula *is* or *are*. When used absolutely, the copula designates the predicate as a mark of the subject. If, however, it is combined with the sign for negation, the copula then signifies that the predicate is a mark that is incompatible with the subject" (ibid., 2:47).

⁶³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 7/B 11.

Thus, according to Kant, we can form analytic judgments simply by analyzing the content of its subject-term and comparing it with the predicate. However, this is only true of analytic judgments; synthetic judgments require us to look beyond the concepts that are involved and consider the objects that are subsumed under them. They are based on the extensions of these concepts rather than their content. Meier's definition of judgment only applies to analytic ones. However, Kant's definition in *The False Subtlety* avoids this problem. He claims that judgments compare things with marks. This is true of both analytic and synthetic judgments, since they both involve predication.

Kant makes this conception of judgment – the comparison of something with a mark – the basis for his account of syllogistics in *The False Subtlety*. He argues that a syllogism [*Vernunftschluß*] is a kind of judgment. However, instead of comparing something with a mark, as in an ordinary judgment, a syllogism compares it with the mark of a mark, or what is known as a “mediate mark” [*mittelbares Merkmal*].

As I explained earlier, a mark is a distinguishing feature or characteristic. Marks are defined by their own set of characteristics or marks. Meier refers to these second-order marks – the marks of marks – as *mediate marks*.⁶⁴ For example, simplicity is a mark of the soul, and incorruptibility is a mark of simplicity. Thus, according to Meier, incorruptibility is a mediate mark of the soul. Kant adopts this terminology in *The False Subtlety*. He writes, “That which is a mark of a mark of a thing is called a *mediate* mark of that thing.”⁶⁵ Kant also introduces a logical term of his own. He describes the first-order mark that is characterized by a mediate mark as an *intermediate mark* [*Zwischenmerkmal*]. Kant writes, “Obviously, the immediate mark occupies the position

⁶⁴ “A mediate mark of a thing is a mark of another mark of just this same thing” (Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 172, §147). See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 29, §116.

⁶⁵ Kant, *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures*, 2:47.

of an *intermediate mark (nota intermedia)* between the remote mark and the thing itself, for it is only by its means that the remote mark is compared with the thing itself.”⁶⁶

Kant’s reasoning is that a so-called intermediate mark is in between the thing that it directly characterizes and the mediate mark that in turn characterizes it. For example, simplicity is in between the soul, which it distinguishes as a mark, and its own mark, incorruptibility.

According to Kant, a syllogism compares a thing with a mediate mark. It does not compare them directly, like an ordinary judgment, but rather by means of the intermediate mark that relates them. He writes, “*Every judgment which is made by means of a mediate mark is a syllogism.* In other words, a syllogism is the comparison of a mark with a thing by means of an intermediate mark.”⁶⁷ If we return to our example of the soul and its marks, a syllogism would compare the soul with its mediate mark, incorruptibility. This comparison would establish whether incorruptibility is a mediate mark of the soul, and it would result in the judgment that the soul is indeed incorruptible. Furthermore, this comparison is made on the basis of the intermediate mark, simplicity. Kant claims that the intermediate mark that facilitates a syllogism serves as its middle term [*mittlerer Hauptbegriff*]. The mediate mark is the major term and the thing that is compared with it is signified by the minor term.⁶⁸

A syllogism consists of three judgments, one of which compares something with a mark and another, which compares this mark with a potential mediate mark. On the basis of these two judgments, a third judgment is formed which compares the thing with the

⁶⁶ Ibid., 2:47.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 2:48.

⁶⁸ “This intermediate mark (*nota intermedia*) in a syllogism is also normally called the *middle term (terminus medius)*; what the other terms are is sufficiently well known” (ibid., 2:48).

mediate mark.⁶⁹ This is the syllogism's conclusion. In the case of our example, a syllogism would compare the soul with the mark, simplicity, and simplicity with the mediate mark, incorruptibility. These comparisons result in the following judgments: "the soul is simple" and "everything simple is incorruptible." We can then form a third judgment, which compares the soul to the mediate mark, incorruptibility: "the soul is incorruptible." These three judgments can be combined to form the following syllogism:

Everything simple is incorruptible.
The soul is simple.
∴ The soul is incorruptible.

In *The False Subtlety*, Kant makes judgment the model for all inferences, including syllogisms. A standard judgment compares something with a mark. A syllogism compares something with the mark of a mark, i.e. a mediate mark. For this reason, Kant actually describes a syllogism as a kind of judgment.

This account of syllogistics is very different from those of Kant's predecessors. *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* is often regarded as a derivative work, which merely repeats the views of Wolff, Meier, and Crusius. Most of the important theses that Kant advances in this essay are, at least, inspired by his predecessors. However, his position that syllogisms are actually a type of judgment counts as a legitimate innovation. For example, Wolff and Meier both explain a syllogism as a relation between judgments or propositions, not things and their marks.⁷⁰ According to

⁶⁹ "Three judgments are necessary because the comparison of a remote mark with the thing itself is only possible by means of these three operations" (ibid., 2:48).

⁷⁰ Wolff refers to syllogisms simply as *Schlüssen* or inferences. The fourth chapter of the *Deutsche Logik*, which is devoted to syllogistics, is entitled "On inferences and how we are assured of the truth through them." Wolff does not discuss immediate inferences in this work. The only inferences that he discusses are mediate ones, or syllogisms. In the *Deutsche Metaphysik*, Wolff also refers to syllogism in this way. However, he adds that it is perfectly appropriate to describe these inferences as *Vernunftschlüssen*, or inferences of reason, because they are conceived through the faculty of reason. See Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 228, §373. In

them, a syllogism derives the truth of a certain judgment – namely, the conclusion – from two others. Neither philosopher explains these inferences in terms of the relation between things and marks, as Kant does in *The False Subtlety*.

Kant defines a syllogism as a judgment that compares something with a mediate mark by means of an intermediate mark. On the basis of this idea, he argues that all valid syllogistic forms can be reduced to those of the first figure, i.e. syllogisms whose middle term is the subject of the major premise and the predicate of the minor premise. Kant claims that syllogistic reasoning is founded on two basic principles. Affirmative syllogisms are based on the principle that the marks of something's marks, i.e. its mediate marks, also characterize the thing itself. Negative syllogisms are based on the principle that what is contrary to something's marks is also contrary to the thing itself.⁷¹ In other words, the marks of something's marks can be attributed to the thing itself. Likewise, any marks that are excluded from something's marks are also excluded from the thing itself. The application of these two principles yields syllogisms in the form of the first figure.⁷² For example, suppose that B is a mark of A, and C is a mark of B. According to the principles that Kant sets forth, C can be attributed to A because it is the mark of one of A's marks (B). This results in the following syllogism:

B is C (or C is a mark of B)
A is B (or B is a mark of A)

any case, Wolff claims that an inference or syllogism derives a proposition from two others. He writes, "If we produce a proposition from two others, we call it **inferring** [*schliessen*], and the way of inferring, an **inference** [*die Art zu schliessen einen Schluß*]" (ibid., 194, §340). See also *Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit*, 165, §6, c. 4. I discuss Meier's theory of syllogistics in section 1.2 of this chapter.

⁷¹ "The considerations which have been adduced show that the first general rule of all affirmative syllogisms is this: *A mark of a mark is a mark of the thing itself*. And the first general rule of all negative syllogisms is this: *that which contradicts the mark of a thing, contradicts the thing itself*" (Kant, *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures*, 2:49).

⁷² "If a syllogism is constructed immediately in accordance with one of the two supreme rules which we have introduced above, then it is always in the first figure" (ibid., 2:51).

∴ A is C (or C is a mark of A)

Here we have a syllogism in the first figure. The middle term (B) is the subject of the major premise and the predicate of the minor premise. This example shows that if we merely apply the principles that Kant claims ground all syllogistic reasoning, then we will produce syllogisms that are in the form of the first figure. These syllogisms follow directly from the principles of syllogistics. They either attribute a mediate mark to something or exclude one from it.

According to Kant, we form the other three figures through the addition of further inferences. We can transform the premises of a syllogism, which is initially given in the form of the first figure, through immediate inferences. These inferences replace one or both of a syllogism's premises with logically equivalent judgments. Through these added inferences we arrive at the other figures. For example, he explains that the second figure, which consists of syllogisms whose middle terms are the predicate of both the major and minor premises, is formed by subjecting the major premise of a negative syllogism to conversion. We start with a negative syllogism in the form of the first figure. This inference follows directly from the rule governing all negative syllogisms: if a mark is excluded from something's marks, it also excluded from the thing itself.

No B is C (or C is not a mark of B)
 A is B (or B is a mark of C)
 ∴ No A is C (or C is not a mark of A)

Now if we convert the major premise of this syllogism, then the judgment "no B is C" becomes "no C is B." These two judgments are logically equivalent. This yields the following chain of inferences:

No B is C
 No C is B (through conversion)

A is B
 ∴ No A is C

Here the conversion of the major premise results in a syllogism that takes the form of the second figure. Its middle term (B) is the predicate of both the major and minor premise. Kant demonstrates how the second, third, and fourth figures are all derived from syllogisms of the first figure. His point is that syllogisms of the first figure immediately follow from one of the two basic principles that ground all syllogisms. The other figures involve additional inferences.

Consequently, Kant claims that these other figures are actually sorites. They consist of the two premises of a syllogism of the first figure *plus* whatever further inferences are necessary in order to transform it into one of the other figures. For example, as our example above shows, syllogisms in form of the second figure actually consist of *three* premises. The immediate inferences that are added to the second, third, and fourth figures are almost always suppressed when we describe their form. However, they are nonetheless necessary premises of these arguments because the principles of syllogistics that Kant prescribes only suffice to generate syllogisms in the form of the first figure. In order to cast a syllogism in the form of one of the other figures, additional premises are required. For this reason, Kant claims that only syllogisms of the first figure are what he terms a *pure syllogism* [*reiner Vernunftschluß*]. A pure syllogism consists of just three judgments – two premises and a conclusion. If a syllogism consists of more than three judgments then it is a *mixed syllogism* [*vermengter Vernunftschluß*].⁷³ The

⁷³ “Now, if a syllogism is the product of three propositions only, and if it is in accordance with the rules which have just been explained and which are valid of every syllogism, then I call it a pure syllogism (*ratiocinium purum*). If, however, it is only possible by combining more than three judgments, it is a mixed syllogism (*ratiocinium hybridum*)” (ibid., 2:50).

second, third, and fourth figures are mixed syllogism because they contain more than two premises.

Kant argues that these other figures are derived from the first through immediate inferences. He does not deny that these syllogisms are valid; however, he does question their utility.⁷⁴ According to Kant, the second, third, and fourth figures are all enthymematic, i.e. they contain suppressed premises. Furthermore, these additional premises contribute nothing to our knowledge. They serve only to transform a syllogism from the first figure into the form of the other figures. The exact same conclusions can be proved through syllogisms in the first figure as through the other figures. Thus, the second, third, and fourth figures complicate our reasoning by introducing suppressed premises into our proofs but without any real benefit. They are both superfluous and pointless. This is the *false subtlety* of the four figures that Kant criticizes in this essay. He argues that all syllogisms should be presented in the form of the first figure. The other figures can be dispensed with entirely. They certainly have no place in logic because they are not pure syllogisms. Only syllogisms in the form of the first figure constitute pure syllogisms. The others are all mixed syllogisms.

Perhaps the most philosophically interesting part of *The False Subtlety* occurs at the very end of this essay, after Kant has finished arguing that all syllogistic forms can be reduced to those of the first figure. In what seems almost like an afterthought, Kant discusses the role of judgment in cognition. He argues that the faculties of reason and the understanding are both exercised through acts of judgment. Together these two faculties

⁷⁴ “One cannot deny that valid inferences may be drawn in all these four figures. But it is indisputable that all four figures, with the exception of the first, determine the conclusion only indirectly by means of interpolated intermediate inferences. It is further indisputable that exactly the same conclusion can be inferred, in pure and undiluted form, from the same middle term employing the first figure” (ibid., 2:55).

compose the higher faculty of cognition. Since they both involve judgments, Kant claims that the higher faculty of cognition in general is a *capacity to judge* [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*].

Kant begins by asserting that distinct concepts are formed through judgments. He observes that in order to represent something distinctly we must identify its defining marks. A distinct concept is one that enumerates the marks of its object. However, we attribute marks to things through judgments. Consequently, distinct concepts are formed through judgments. Kant writes, “A distinct concept demands, namely that I clearly recognize something as a mark of a thing [*daß ich etwas als ein Merkmal eines Dinges klar erkenne*]; but this is a judgment.”⁷⁵ Kant explains this idea with an example. Impenetrability is one of the marks of a body. In order to form a distinct concept of a body we must recognize its marks, including impenetrability. We represent that impenetrability is one of the marks of a body through the thought, “a body is impenetrable.” This thought is a judgment. Distinct concepts are formed through judgments, because they are the means through which we recognize something’s marks.⁷⁶

Kant is careful to emphasize that judgments are not equivalent to distinct concepts. Instead, the former are the ground for the latter. As he puts it, “this judgment is not the distinct concept itself, but rather the action, by means of which the distinct concept is actualized.”⁷⁷ Distinct concepts are formed through judgments, but they are not the same as judgments.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Ibid., 2:58.

⁷⁶ “In order to have a distinct concept of a body, I clearly represent to myself impenetrability as a mark of it. This representation, however, is nothing other than the thought: *a body is impenetrable*” (ibid., 2:58).

⁷⁷ Ibid., 2:58.

⁷⁸ In both *Logik Blomberg* and *Logik Philippi*, Kant repeats his thesis that distinct concepts are formed through judgments. However, *Logik Philippi* does not differentiate between judgments and the distinct concepts that result from them. Instead, it explicitly equates the two. It states: “Only through this action –

Kant claims that syllogisms perform a similar function. They are the means through which complete [*vollständig*] concepts are formed. A so-called “complete concept” is one that distinctly represents not only its object, but also the marks of its object. Marks are distinguished by their own sets of marks. Kant and Meier both refer to these second-order marks as “mediate marks.” A complete concept clearly represents its mediate marks. This means that its mediate marks can be identified and enumerated along with the first-order marks that they define. As a result, the first-order marks are represented distinctly. There are varying degrees of conceptual completeness. Something’s second-order marks can also be represented distinctly. Such a concept clearly represents the marks of the marks of its marks, i.e. its third-order marks. It is more complete than one that only represents its first-order marks distinctly. Likewise, a concept that distinctly represents its third-order marks is more complete than concepts that only contain distinct representations of their second-order marks. The more thoroughly or deeply that a concept is analyzed, the more complete it will be. The most complete concept would be one that is completely analyzed. It would be equivalent to what Leibniz defines as an “adequate idea.”⁷⁹ Completeness is not part of the

through judgments – do concepts become distinct. A distinct concept is nothing other than a judgment” (Immanuel Kant, *Logik Philippi*, in *Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-], 24:461). This is most likely an error on the part of the note-taker, who was responsible for *Logik Philippi*. He overstated Kant’s position. *Logik Blomberg*, which dates from roughly the same period as *Philippi*, does not equate judgments with distinct concepts, nor does it make sense to do so.

⁷⁹ According to Leibniz, all distinct ideas are either *adequate* or *inadequate*. An adequate idea is one that has been completely analyzed into its most basic properties or marks. Its marks have all been analyzed into their mediate marks until one reaches what Leibniz calls “primitive notions.” Primitive notions cannot be defined or subjected to further analysis because they serve as their own marks. Once all of something’s marks have been analyzed into primitive notions, then its marks have been exhaustively enumerated. Its analysis cannot be carried any further and one has achieved an adequate idea. An idea is inadequate if it can still be rendered more distinct through the analysis of its marks. This process of conceptual analysis has not yet terminated in primitive notions. Leibniz writes, “When everything that enters into a distinct notion is, again, distinctly known, or when analysis has been carried to completion, then knowledge *adequate*” (Leibniz, “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas,” 24). An adequate idea is completely

terminology of conceptual analysis that Leibniz introduces in *Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas*; although, it somewhat resembles his notion of adequacy.⁸⁰ Instead, this term is coined by Wolff in the *Deutsche Logik*⁸¹ and it is later adopted by some of his followers, such as Gottsched⁸² and Meier.⁸³

Kant argues that complete concepts are formed through syllogisms. He writes, “It is easy to show that a complete concept is only possible by means of a syllogism; one needs only to look at the first numbered section of this treatise.”⁸⁴ In the first section of Kant’s essay, he defines syllogisms as a kind of judgment. Specifically, it is a judgment that compares something with a mediate mark. Ordinary judgments compare their objects with marks in order to determine whether the former is characterized by the latter. Syllogisms also compare things with marks; however, they compare their objects with the marks of marks, or mediate marks. In order to form a complete concept, we must identify its mediate marks. By identifying these mediate marks, we can form distinct

distinct. Not only is the object of such an idea represented distinctly, all of its marks are represented distinctly as well. This is what Leibniz means when he claims that “everything that enters into” an adequate idea is “distinctly known.” Leibniz’s definition of adequacy is an exceedingly high standard, since it requires us to completely analyze a concept into its primitive notions. Consequently, most, if not all, of our knowledge remains inadequate. Leibniz acknowledges this fact. He claims that adequate knowledge is presently limited to the field of mathematics. See *ibid.*, 24.

⁸⁰ The difference between Leibniz’s definition of an adequate idea and Wolff’s notion of a complete concept is that the former must be completely analyzed into its most fundamental marks, but the latter does not. According to Wolff, a concept only needs to distinctly represent its first-order or immediate marks in order to qualify as complete. However, Leibniz states that an idea is not truly adequate until the analysis of its marks terminates in what he calls “primitive notions.” Leibnizian adequacy is a far more exacting standard than Wolffian completeness.

⁸¹ “Finally, a distinct concept is either complete or incomplete. Our concept is complete if we have clear and distinct concepts of the marks through which the thing is recognized. On the other hand, it is incomplete, if we only have confused concepts of the marks through which the thing is recognized” (Wolff, *Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit*, 24, §16, c. 1).

⁸² “Finally concepts are either **complete** or **incomplete**. They are **complete** if we also have distinct concepts of the marks of a thing . . . On the other hand, a concept is **incomplete**, if I cannot make distinct concepts of the marks of a distinct concept” (Gottsched, *Erste Gründe der gesamten Weltweisheit*, 20, §31).

⁸³ “The marks of a distinct cognition are clear. Thus, they are either distinct or confused. In the first case, we have a **complete cognition**, but in the other case, an **incomplete cognition**” (Meier, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 39, §147). See also *idem*, *Vernunftlehre*, 235, §179.

⁸⁴ Kant, *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures*, 2:58.

conceptions of the first-order marks that they characterize, and as a result we can achieve a complete concept. We attribute mediate marks to something through syllogisms.

Therefore, complete concepts are formed through syllogisms.

Kant argues that distinct concepts are formed through judgments and complete concepts are formed through syllogisms. He writes, “a *distinct concept* is only possible by means of a judgment, while a *complete concept* is only possible by means of a *syllogism*.”⁸⁵ In doing so, he makes both judgments and syllogisms into tools for conceptual analysis. Kant takes this idea and uses it to draw a further conclusion about the nature of our cognitive faculties. He argues that the higher faculty of cognition is essentially a capacity for judgment. He writes, “it can be concluded from the above considerations that the higher faculty of cognition rests absolutely and simply on the capacity to judge. Accordingly, if a being can judge, then it possesses the higher faculty of cognition.”⁸⁶

During the 1760s, when Kant wrote *The False Subtlety*, he thought that the higher faculty of cognition consisted of two main sub-faculties: reason and the understanding. He would later add a third higher faculty of cognition, the power of judgment [*Urtheilskraft*], during the mid-1770s. I discuss this development in chapter two. However, when Kant wrote *The False Subtlety of Four Syllogistic Figures*, he was still committed to the idea that the higher faculty of cognition was composed of just reason and the understanding. He defines the understanding as the capacity for distinct cognition and reason as the capacity to make syllogistic inferences [*Vernunftschlüsse zu*

⁸⁵ Ibid., 2:58.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 2:59.

machen].⁸⁷ Kant models his faculty psychology on the theories of Wolff and especially Baumgarten, whose *Metaphysica* served as the textbook for Kant's metaphysics and anthropology lectures. Kant's definitions of reason and the understanding in this essay are entirely consistent with the views of these philosophers.⁸⁸ They are the standard definitions of these faculties accepted by German *Schulphilosophie*.

Kant argues that both the faculties of reason and the understanding are exercised through acts of judgment. The understanding is exercised through judgments because this faculty consists in the capacity for distinct cognition. According to Kant, distinct concepts are formed through judgments. Therefore, the cognition of the understanding must involve judgment. Reason, the other higher cognitive faculty, is the capacity to make syllogistic inferences. Kant defines syllogisms as a kind of judgment. Thus,

⁸⁷ "It is equally obvious that *understanding* and *reason*, that is to say, the faculty of cognizing distinctly and the faculty of syllogistic reasoning [*das Vermögen, deutlich zu erkennen und dasjenige, Vernunftschlüsse zu machen*], are not different *fundamental faculties* [*Grundfähigkeiten*]" (ibid., 2:59)

⁸⁸ Wolff defines the understanding as "the capacity to distinctly represent the possible" (Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 153, §277). He defines reason as "the capacity to understand the connection of truths" (ibid., 224, §368). What Wolff means is that reason is the soul's capacity to grasp the ground or reason for something. It distinctly represents the relationship between grounds and their consequences. Truths are connected according to the principle of sufficient reason. For example, the earth rotates in a particular orbit around the sun. It is also true that outside the polar latitudes the sun rises in the east each morning. The first truth – the sun's orbit – is the ground for second. It explains why the sun rises each morning. This is the connection between these truths: one serves as the ground for the other. Reason is the capacity to grasp this connection. Another way to put this would be to say that it is the capacity to grasp the ground or reason for something. Wolff's definition of reason may appear different from Kant's definition of this faculty in *The False Subtlety* – the capacity to make syllogistic inferences. However, they are actually quite similar. According to Wolff, reason represents the connections between truths, or grounds and their consequences, through syllogisms. See ibid., 228, §373. Hence, he agrees with Kant that syllogisms are conceived through the faculty of reason. Baumgarten defines the faculties of reason and the understanding in essentially the same manner as Wolff. Baumgarten sometimes refers to the higher faculty of cognition as the understanding. He defines this faculty as the capacity to cognize or represent things *distinctly*. He writes, "My soul cognizes some things distinctly. Consequently, it has a faculty of distinct cognition, which is the understanding, and is called **the higher faculty of cognition**" (Alexander Baumgarten, *Metaphysik*, trans. Georg Friedrich Meier [Jena: Dietrich Scheglmann Reprints, 2004], 143, §462). Baumgarten defines reason as the capacity "to understand the connections of things" (ibid., 146, §468). Like Wolff, he means that reason is the capacity to distinctly cognize the relation between grounds and their consequences – this is the so-called "connection of things." He also maintains that this relationship is represented or cognized through syllogisms. See ibid., 148, §473. Thus, both Wolff and Baumgarten agree that the understanding is the capacity for distinct cognition and that syllogisms are conceived through the faculty of reason.

distinct cognition is derived from judgments and syllogisms actually are judgments. Distinct cognition and syllogistic reasoning are the respective functions of the understanding and reason. Since the cognition of these two faculties both involve judgment, Kant concludes that the higher faculty of cognition in general must be a capacity to judge [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*]. It consists of these two sub-faculties, which are both exercised through acts of judgment. Reason and the understanding are united by this shared activity. Thus, the higher faculty of cognition in general, to which they both belong, is a faculty of judgment.

This thesis about the nature of the higher faculty of cognition is significant, because it anticipates Kant's subsequent claim in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that the understanding is a "capacity to judge."⁸⁹ The term "understanding" is not univocal in Kant's philosophy. It actually has two distinct meanings: a broad sense and a more narrow sense. Construed broadly, the understanding refers to the higher faculty of cognition in general. However, it also denotes a specific faculty, which belongs to the higher faculty of cognition. This is the narrow sense of the understanding. When Kant opposes the understanding to sensibility, which is a synonym for the lower faculty of cognition, he intends it in the broad sense. When he refers to the understanding, along with the power of judgment and reason, as one of the three higher faculties of cognition he intends it in the narrow sense. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant claims that the understanding is a "capacity to judge." Here the term "understanding" is construed broadly, which means that it refers to the higher faculty of cognition in general. Thus, Kant is actually repeating his view that the higher faculty of cognition consists in a

⁸⁹ "We can, however, trace all actions of the understanding back to judgment so that the **understanding** in general can be represented as a **faculty for judging** [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*]" (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 69/B 94).

capacity for judgment. He first introduces this position in 1762 in *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures*. I discuss its significance for the first *Critique* in chapter three. It is the “clue” or “guiding-thread” [*Leitfaden*] that first allows Kant to deduce the table of categories.

Logik Blomberg and *Logik Philippi* both repeat the same account of judgment and syllogistics that Kant advances in *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures*, with one crucial exception. According to these lectures, Kant followed Meier’s example and defined a judgment as the comparison of two concepts. As I explained earlier, both Kant and Meier agree that judgments are acts of comparison. However, in *The False Subtlety*, Kant claims that judgments compare *things* with marks. Meier, on the other hand, taught that judgments compare *concepts* with each other. There is a very important difference between comparing things and comparing concepts: the comparison of concepts can only yield analytic judgments. For this reason, Meier’s account of judgment in the *Vernunftlehre* only applies to analytic ones. Kant manages to avoid this problem in *The False Subtlety* by stating that judgments compare things with marks, rather than concepts.

However, as I mentioned earlier, I am skeptical that Kant did this deliberately. Kant first introduces his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments in the introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In his *Preisschrift* (1764), he argued that the method of philosophy is different from that of mathematics. The former is analytic; the latter is synthetic. However, this is not the same as his distinction between analytic and synthetic *judgments*. He is contrasting the *methods* of these two disciplines and the definitions of their concepts. There is no reason to suspect that he already distinguished between analytic and synthetic judgments when he wrote *The False Subtlety* (1762). It is

even more unlikely that he tailored his definition of judgment in that work to accommodate a distinction that he had not yet made. I suspect that Kant saw no meaningful difference between stating that a judgment compares things and stating that it compares concepts. He assumed that the relationship between things and their properties corresponded exactly with the relationship between concepts. Wolff's three-tiered account of judgment is predicated on the same assumption. According to him, judgments represent the relationship between things and their properties and they also consist of a relationship between concepts. The former relationship is represented in the mind by the latter.

Logik Blomberg and *Logik Philippi* further support the idea that when Kant wrote *The False Subtlety* he assumed that there was no real difference between comparing things with marks and comparing the concepts that represent these things and marks. Hence, he did not regard his definition of judgment in that work to be fundamentally different from that of Meier. *Blomberg* and *Philippi* both state that judgments compare concepts with each other. The purpose of this comparison is to determine whether one of these concepts is a mark of the other. For example, *Logik Philippi* states: "If I judge then I compare one concept with others and investigate whether they belong to it or are opposed to it, i.e. whether or not they are marks of it."⁹⁰ This, of course, is Meier's position in the *Vernunftlehre*. Even in his early lectures, Kant never followed Meier so slavishly that he would repeat a position that was at odds with his own. The surviving student notes from these lectures show that he would sometimes disagree with his

⁹⁰ Kant, *Logik Philippi*, 24:461. See also idem, *Blomberg Logic*, in *Lectures on Logic*, trans. J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 24:273-274.

textbook, the *Vernunftlehre*. The fact that Kant taught that judgments compare concepts is a good indication that he accepted this definition himself.

Furthermore, *Logik Blomberg* and *Logik Philippi* otherwise repeat Kant's views from *The False Subtlety*. This includes his idiosyncratic explanation of a syllogism. Both sets of notes define a syllogism as a type of judgment, which compares a concept with a mediate mark. It does not compare them directly, like ordinary judgments. Instead, it relates the mediate mark to another mark, which, in turn, characterizes the concept. The mediate mark is related to the concept by means of an intermediate mark. This intermediate mark serves as the middle term of the syllogism. For example, *Logik Philippi* states: "The understanding judges; reason infers, which means it judges mediately. The understanding immediately cognizes that a predicate belongs to a certain subject. However, reason cognizes it only by means of a certain mark (*nota intermedia*) [intermediate mark]." ⁹¹

These lectures also repeat Kant's thesis that distinct concepts are formed through judgments. For example, *Logik Blomberg* states:

From the previous section we are already acquainted with judgments, actually, because we dealt with distinct concepts, which can only arise by means of a judgment[;] for to cognize distinctly is *to cognize everything by means of a clear mark*. But to cognize something by means of a clear mark is also just to judge. Thus, we can also say that distinct concepts are ones that are cognized by means of a judgment. ⁹²

⁹¹ Kant, *Logik Philippi*, 24:470. See also idem, *Blomberg Logic*, 24:282.

⁹² Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, 24:273. See also idem, *Logik Philippi*, 24:461.

Kant also claims that judgments are the basis for distinct cognition in *Logik Dohna-Wundlacken*.⁹³ These notes date from the early 1790s. This suggests that Kant may have continued to hold this view throughout his career.

Logik Blomberg and *Logik Philippi* also shed light on some features of Kant's early theory of judgment that are not addressed in *The False Subtlety*. For example, in this essay, Kant does not discuss the logical quantity of a judgment; he refers only to its quality. This is understandable given that his aim is to show that the second, third, and fourth syllogistic figures are superfluous. His account of judgment is merely intended to serve as the background for his account of syllogistics. *Logik Blomberg* and *Logik Philippi* both state that the logical quantity of a judgment is based on the extensions, or spheres, of its concepts.⁹⁴ It depends on the degree to which the extension of the judgment's subject-term overlaps with the extension of its predicate. If the extension of the subject-term is completely encompassed in the extension of the predicate, then everything that is contained under this concept will also be contained under the predicate. Likewise, if the extension of the subject-term shares nothing with the extension of the predicate, then nothing that is contained under this concept is contained under the predicate. Finally, if there is some overlap between their two spheres then some of the objects that are contained under the subject-term are also contained under the predicate.

⁹³ "If a concept is to become distinct, then one must always make a *judicium*. The mark becomes at once the predicate of the judgment, e.g., a man is an animal. This distinct concept comes to be only through a judgment" (Immanuel Kant, *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*, in *Lectures on Logic*, trans. J. Michael Young [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 24:763).

⁹⁴ In the notes from his early lectures, Kant refers to the extension of a concept as its sphere [*sphaera*]. The extension of a concept denotes the set of things or concepts that are collectively represented by it. *Logik Blomberg* and *Philippi* both describe this set as a concept's sphere. For example, *Logik Blomberg* states: "The *sphaera notionis* [sphere of a notion] means actually the multitude of things that are comprehended under a concept as a *nota communis* [common mark]" (Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, 24:258). See also idem, *Logik Philippi*, 24:451.

In the first two cases, the judgments are universal. In the last case, it is particular.⁹⁵ Both *Blomberg* and *Philippi* describe singular judgments as a kind of universal judgment, since the subject-term is either contained entirely within the extension of the predicate or entirely excluded from it.⁹⁶ This is an entirely conventional account of logical quantity. It is worth mentioning only because it confirms that Kant does not follow Wolff's example and explain the quantity of a judgment solely in terms of the content of its subject-term. Like Meier, he considers its extension.

Logik Blomberg and *Logik Philippi* establish that Kant continued to accept the theory of judgment that he set forth in *The False Subtlety* until at least the early 1770s. They also confirm that he accepted Meier's account of judgment in the *Vernunftlehre*. We should not read too much into the fact that, in *The False Subtlety*, Kant writes that judgments compare *things* with marks. In his logic lectures, he teaches that they compare concepts. It is very likely that he did not see a significant difference between these two propositions. We compare things with marks by comparing their corresponding concepts. As a matter of fact, there is an important difference between comparing a mark with a thing or object and comparing concepts. The comparison of concepts can only yield analytic judgments. However, Kant could not have been aware of this problem when he wrote *The False Subtlety* in 1762.

* * * * *

At the outset of this chapter, I set forth the two defining features of what I termed the standard theory of judgment, which was accepted by German *Schulphilosophie*. First, judgments concern the relationship between things and properties or marks. They are

⁹⁵ Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, 24:275. See also idem, *Logik Philippi*, 24:463.

⁹⁶ Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, 24:275-276. See also idem, *Logik Philippi*, 24:463.

acts of predication, which either ascribe a property to something or exclude one from it. Second, judgments consist of conceptual relationships. Kant initially accepted a version of this standard theory. The account of judgment that we find in his essay, *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures*, and the student notes from his early logic lectures correspond with this position. Kant defines a judgment as the comparison of something, or its corresponding concept, with a mark. The purpose of this comparison is to determine whether the former is characterized by the latter. In subsequent chapters, I will explain how Kant expands upon this standard conception of judgment.

Chapter Two

The Power of Judgment

In the previous chapter, I explained Kant's earliest views about judgment. He regarded a judgment as a conceptual relationship that related a mark or property to an object. Furthermore, in *The False Subtlety of Four Syllogistic*, he argues that judgment is the basis for both distinct cognition and syllogistic reasoning. Distinct concepts are formed through judgments and syllogisms are actually a kind of judgment – they relate an object to a mediate mark. The understanding is the capacity for distinct cognition and reason is the capacity to make syllogistic inferences. Together these two faculties constitute the higher faculty of cognition. They are both exercised through judgments. Thus, Kant concludes that the higher faculty of cognition in general is a capacity for judgment [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*].

According to *The False Subtlety*, the higher faculty of cognition consists of just two faculties: the understanding and reason. This is different from what we find in Kant's later critical works. The *Critique of Pure Reason* posits *three* higher cognitive faculties: the understanding, reason, and the power of judgment [*Urtheilskraft*].¹ The *Critique of Judgment* also divides the higher faculty of cognition in this way,² as does *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*.³ In these later writings, Kant adds a third

¹ “General logic is constructed on a plan that corresponds quite precisely with the division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are: **understanding, the power of judgment, and reason**” (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 130/B 169).

² “But in the family of the higher faculties of cognition there is still an intermediary between the understanding and reason. This is the **power of judgment**” (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006], 5:177). See also idem, “First Introduction,” in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 20:202.

³ Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. Robert B. Loudon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 7:196-197.

faculty to the higher faculty of cognition, the power of judgment, which is absent from *The False Subtlety*.

This raises two important questions. First, when does Kant introduce the power of judgment as a third higher cognitive faculty, alongside the understanding and reason? Second, prior to the introduction of this faculty, what faculty, if any, performed the cognitive function that Kant would later assign to the power of judgment: the application of rules? In this chapter, I will answer both of these questions.

2.1 Kant's faculty psychology

Before we proceed any further, an overview of the faculty psychology that underlies Kant's critical philosophy is perhaps in order. According to Kant, the soul or mind is endowed with three fundamental faculties [*Grundvermögen*]: the faculty of cognition [*Erkenntnißvermögen*], the feeling of pleasure and displeasure [*Gefühl der Lust und Unlust*], and the faculty of desire [*Begehrungsvermögen*].⁴ Kant follows Baumgarten's example and divides the faculties of cognition and desire into two parts: a lower faculty and a higher one.⁵

Baumgarten defined his lower and higher faculties in terms of the distinctness of their representations. The lower faculty of cognition is the soul's capacity for confused

⁴ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5:177. See also idem, "First Introduction," 20:205-206.

⁵ The Pölitz *Metaphysics* states that the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is also divided into a lower and a higher faculty. These notes state the following: "The faculty of pleasure and displeasure is also a higher or lower faculty. The lower faculty of pleasure and displeasure is a power to find satisfaction or dissatisfaction in the objects which affect us. The higher faculty of pleasure and displeasure is a power to sense a pleasure and displeasure in ourselves, independently of objects" (Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysik L₁*, in *Lectures on Metaphysics*, trans. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001], 28:228-229). See also *ibid.*, 28:252. Kant does not draw this distinction in any of his anthropology lectures. In *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, he distinguishes between two basic types of pleasure: sensuous pleasures and intellectual ones. However, he does not describe them as being either lower or higher. See idem, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 8:230.

cognition.^{6,7,8} The higher faculty of cognition, or understanding, is the soul's capacity for distinct cognition.⁹ The same holds for the faculty of desire. The lower faculty of desire is based on the lower faculty of cognition. It either desires or is repulsed by things that are represented confusedly, or without distinctness.¹⁰ Similarly, the higher faculty of desire, or will, is based on the distinct representations of the higher faculty of cognition.¹¹

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant proposes a new distinction between the lower and higher faculties of cognition. In his *Inaugural Dissertation*, he denied that the lower faculty of cognition is exclusively a capacity for confused cognition. He also denied that the concepts of the higher faculty of cognition were always distinct. The difference between the cognition of these two faculties is not based on their level of

⁶ Baumgarten, *Metaphysik*, 115-116, §383.

⁷ Baumgarten describes confused representations as "sensitive." He writes, "An indistinct, i.e. an obscure or confused, representation is **sensitive**" (ibid., 115, §383). Thus, the lower faculty of cognition is the soul's capacity for sensitive cognition. Alfred Bäumler points out that Baumgarten is the first philosopher to use the term, "sensitive" [*sensitivus*], in this way. He introduces this term in his dissertation, *Reflections on Poetry*, as part of his definition of a poem. According to Baumgarten, a poem is an example of "perfect sensitive discourse" [*oratio sensitive perfecta*] (Baumgarten, *Reflections on Poetry*, 39, §9). Sensitive discourse consists of discourse or words that express sensitive cognition. Baumgarten defines sensitive cognition as "representations received through the lower part of the cognitive faculty" (ibid., 38, §3). This means that all cognition through the lower cognitive faculty is *sensitive*. Bäumler argues that this is a significant development because sensitive cognition is not equivalent to sensation. As he puts it: "sensitive does not mean sensual" (Alfred Bäumler, *Das Irrationalitätsproblem in der Ästhetik und Logik des 18. Jahrhunderts* [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967], 214). The lower faculty of cognition includes other faculties besides the senses. These include the imagination, foresight, and the lower faculties of judgment, memory, wit, and acuity. The cognition of any of these faculties, not just the senses, qualifies as sensitive cognition. Sensitive cognition encompasses more than just sensation. For this reason, Bäumler claims that it anticipates Kant's notion of sensibility in the *Inaugural Dissertation*. See ibid., 214-15.

⁸ Baumgarten presents his aesthetics as a logic for the lower faculty of cognition. The purpose of logic is the perfection of the higher faculty of cognition. It prescribes the rules for perfect intellectual cognition. Baumgarten claims that aesthetics performs a similar function for the lower faculty of cognition. It will set forth the rules for perfect *sensitive* cognition. He writes, "Therefore, *things known* are to be known by the superior faculty as the object of logic; *things perceived* [are to be known by the inferior faculty, as the object] of the science of perception, or **aesthetics**" (Baumgarten, *Reflections on Poetry*, 78, §116).

⁹ Baumgarten. *Metaphysik*, 143, §462.

¹⁰ Ibid., 159, §499.

¹¹ Ibid., 163, §510.

confusion or distinctness.¹² In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he claims that the lower faculty of cognition, or sensibility, is actually the faculty of cognition's *receptivity*. This means that it is the capacity to receive representations. These representations are caused by the presence of external object. The lower faculty of cognition is the capacity to be affected by these objects. Likewise, the higher faculty of cognition, or understanding, is the faculty of cognition's *spontaneity*. It is the capacity to actively conceive of representations, rather than receive them. Thus, the lower faculty of cognition is the receptivity of our faculty of cognition and the higher faculty is its spontaneity.¹³ The former functions more or less passively, since it receives representations by being affected. The latter is more active. Kant redefines the difference between the lower and higher faculties of cognition. It is no longer based on the distinctness of their representations, as it was for Baumgarten. Instead, it is based on the potency of these faculties; the lower faculty of cognition is relatively passive and the higher faculty is active.

In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant draws a similar distinction between the lower and higher faculties of desire. He argues that the difference between them is unrelated to the distinctness of our cognition. Instead, it is based on the determining ground of the will. The lower faculty of desire is determined by either pleasure or displeasure. The higher faculty of desire is determined by pure reason alone.¹⁴ This distinction is analogous to the one that Kant draws between the lower and higher faculties

¹² Immanuel Kant, *Inaugural Dissertation*, in *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770*, trans. David Walford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 2:395.

¹³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 51/B 75. See also idem, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 8:140-141

¹⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, in *Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5:22-25.

of cognition. Kant explains that pleasure is based on the soul's receptivity because these feelings express how a representation or cognition affects the subject. Hence, they are based on our capacity to be affected by the objects of our cognition.¹⁵ Since the lower faculty of desire is determined by either pleasure or displeasure, and these feelings are based on receptivity, the lower faculty of desire is passive in comparison with the higher one. It is based on one's capacity to be affected. The higher faculty of desire consists in the autonomy of the will. As such, it is based on the spontaneity of the mind or soul, rather than its receptivity.

To summarize: Kant posits three fundamental faculties of the soul: the faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire. The faculty of cognition and the faculty of desire are each divided into a higher and a lower faculty. The difference between these faculties is based on spontaneity rather than distinctness. The lower faculties all function passively; they are capacities to be affected. The higher faculties are distinguished by the fact that they are exercised through the subject's own power; they are active faculties. The lower and higher faculties of cognition each consist of a number of sub-faculties. For example, the lower faculty of cognition consists of the faculties of sense and imagination. The higher faculty of cognition consists of the understanding, the power of judgment, and reason.

¹⁵ In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant makes this point in a curious way. He writes, "Pleasure arising from the representation of the existence of a thing, insofar as it is to be a determining ground of desire for this thing, is based on the *receptivity* of the subject, since it *depends* upon the existence of an object" (ibid., 5:22). Kant claims that pleasure is based on the subject's receptivity *because it depends on the existence of the object of enjoyment*. This would presumably exclude the feeling of beauty, which is a disinterested pleasure, and the feeling of respect before the moral law. These pleasures do not presuppose the existence of an object. However, the feeling of beauty does express how a representation affects the subject. Following Kant's reasoning, it ought to be based on receptivity. Yet it does not depend on the existence of an object because it is disinterested. For this reason, the connection that Kant makes between a pleasure's dependence on the existence of an object and receptivity is confusing and requires further explication.

Like Baumgarten, Kant often refers to the higher faculty of cognition as the understanding. He refers to the lower faculty of cognition as sensibility. Hence, when Kant opposes the understanding to sensibility, he is distinguishing between the higher and lower faculties of cognition. However, this poses a small problem. As I just explained, the understanding is also one of the three sub-faculties that compose the higher faculty of cognition. The term understanding [*Verstand*] is not univocal in Kant's philosophy. It actually has two distinct meanings, which I will call its broad and its narrow senses. The broad sense of the understanding denotes the higher faculty of cognition in general. This is the sense that Kant contrasts with sensibility. The narrow sense of understanding refers to one of the three sub-faculties that make up the higher faculty of cognition. When Kant compares the understanding with the power of judgment and reason, he intends it in the narrow sense.¹⁶ Unfortunately, Kant is not always so careful to distinguish between these two senses of the understanding, and in the *Critique of Pure Reason* he actually equivocates between them.

2.2 *Urteilkraft*

In *The False Subtlety*, Kant claims that the entire higher faculty of cognition is essentially a "capacity to judge" [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*]. This is, perhaps, the most interesting conclusion that he draws in what is otherwise an unremarkable early essay about logic. As we will later see in chapter three, Kant reaffirms this position in the metaphysical deduction. He writes, "the **understanding** in general can be represented as

¹⁶ Kant acknowledges the dual meaning of the term "understanding" in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. He writes, "*Understanding*, as the faculty of *thinking* (representing something by means of *concepts*), is also called the *higher* cognitive faculty (as distinguished from sensibility, which is the *lower*). . . The word *understanding* is, however, also taken in a particular sense, namely when it is subordinated to understanding in a general sense as one member of a division with two other members; and then the higher cognitive faculty (materially, that is, considered not by itself, but rather in relation to the *cognition* of objects) consists of *understanding*, *the power of judgment*, and *reason*" (Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:196-197).

a **faculty for judging** [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*].”¹⁷ The term, “understanding,” in this context is construed broadly. Thus, Kant continues to claim in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that the higher faculty of cognition is a “capacity to judge.” We will consider the significance of this position in the next chapter. It is a crucial premise of the metaphysical deduction.

However, it also presents a puzzle. As I explained earlier, the higher faculty of cognition consists of three main sub-faculties: the understanding (in the narrow sense), reason, and the power of judgment. Yet the higher faculty of cognition in general, which consists of these three faculties, is itself a “capacity to judge.” This raises an obvious question: what is the difference between a “capacity to judge” or “faculty for judging” [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*] – these two expressions are equivalent – and a “power of judgment” [*Urtheilskraft*]. They cannot be synonyms, because the higher faculty of cognition, which is a capacity to judge, contains the power of judgment. The latter is a component of the former.

Béatrice Longuenesse offers a clever solution to this problem. She points out that Wolff draws a distinction between a faculty [*Vermögen*] and a power [*Kraft*]. A faculty is a potentiality. It is the possibility to act or do something. This potentiality is actualized through a power. For example, when I am seated, I have the potential to stand up. Consequently, I have a faculty for this motion. If I do in fact utilize this faculty and rise from my chair, then I exercise it through a power.¹⁸ Wolff thinks that the soul is

¹⁷ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 69/B 94.

¹⁸ “However, a power [*Kraft*] must not be conflated with a mere faculty, since a faculty is only a possibility to do something. On the other hand, since a power is a source of alterations, an endeavor [*Bemühung*] to do something must be found in it. E.g. When I sit, I have a faculty to stand up, since it is merely possible that I can stand up. However, when I actually want to stand up, and someone holds me back against my will, then a power to stand up manifests itself in me. An alteration is merely possible through a faculty; it

endowed with numerous faculties. These include the senses, the imagination, the understanding, reason, and the will. He also thinks that the soul is limited to a single power.¹⁹ All of its many faculties are actualized through this one basic power.²⁰ Wolff further claims that this power is essentially cognitive in nature. It is the power to represent the world. He writes, “Since the soul has only one single power, from which all its changes come, everything changeable that we perceive in it must arise from this power through which it represents the world.”²¹ Thus, Wolff argues that all of the soul’s faculties – including the will – are actualized through its power to represent or cognize the world.

Longuenesse argues that the power of judgment is a power in the Wolffian sense. It is the actualization of our faculty or capacity for judgment. The “capacity to judge” [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*] denotes one’s potential to render judgments. The “power of judgment” [*Urtheilskraft*] is the actualization of this potential. Thus, Kant’s distinction

becomes actual through a power” (Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 161-162, §117). See also Baumgarten, *Metaphysik*, 44, §144.

¹⁹ Wolff argues that the soul can only have one power because it is simple. The singularity of its power is a consequence of its simplicity. If the soul had multiple powers, then it would also have multiple parts. See Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 464, §745. Wolff is not arguing that the soul would need to have different parts for each of its powers. Rather, his point is that the existence of multiple powers in one thing would dissolve the unity of this individual. According to Wolff, a power is the expression of a certain endeavor [*Bemühung*] to do something. See *ibid.*, 61, §117. If something had two different powers, then it would endeavor to do two different things. Indeed, Wolff’s Pietist opponents, who argued that the soul possessed multiple powers, did so precisely because they wanted to oppose the power of the will to that of the understanding. Wolff’s point, however, is that this would split the soul into distinct individuals: the soul that endeavored to do one thing through one of its power and the soul that endeavored to do something through the other. Since the soul is a simple thing, it can only have one power. Wolff writes, “Thus, there is only one single power in the soul from which all its changes come, although we usually attribute different names to it because of the different changes” (*ibid.*, 464-465, §745).

²⁰ “Therefore, the senses, the imagination, memory, the faculty of reflection, the understanding, sensuous desire, the will, and whatever else that one could distinguish through the changes perceived in the soul cannot be different powers. Therefore, the single power of the soul produces at one moment sensations, at one moment images, at one moment distinct concepts, at one moment syllogisms, at one moment desires, at one moment willing and not willing, and at one moment still other changes” (*ibid.*, 465-466, §745). See also Baumgarten, *Metaphysik*, 180-182, §549.

²¹ Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 468, §754. See also Baumgarten, *Metaphysik*, 113, §377.

between these two expressions is based on the Wolffian distinction between a faculty [*Vermögen*] and a power [*Kraft*].²²

I am quite sympathetic to Longuenesse's explanation of the difference between a capacity to judge and the power of judgment. Wolff's distinction between a faculty and a power is important. It is often alleged that Wolff is committed to the position that the soul is endowed with a single faculty: the faculty of cognition.²³ However, he actually attributed numerous faculties to the soul. Wolff did think that the soul had only one *power* and that this power was essentially cognitive in nature. It was the power to represent the world. Thus, the relatively widespread view that Wolff reduced all of the soul's faculties to the faculty of cognition conflates faculties with powers. Wolff, himself, was careful to distinguish these two terms.²⁴ For this reason, I appreciate any scholar who recognizes the difference between them.

²² "The *Vermögen zu urteilen*, specified according to the different logical forms presented in Kant's table, can be considered as a *possibility* or *potentiality* of forming judgments. The *Urteilkraft* which Kant describes in the *Analytic of Principles* and in the *Critique of Judgment* (*Kritik der Urteilkraft*) is the actualizations of the *Vermögen zu urteilen* under sensory stimulation" (Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Charles T. Wolfe [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998], 7).

²³ See e.g. Beck, *Early German Philosophy*, 268-269.

²⁴ This is not just a quibble over terms or an error in translation. It often leads scholars to conflate two distinct questions that would have been separate in the minds of eighteenth century philosophers. First, there is the question of how many powers belong to the soul. Wolff argues that the soul has just one power, the power to represent the world. This was one of the most controversial aspects of Wolff's philosophy. His pietist critics feared that it undermined the freedom of will. Second, there is the question of the difference between sensations and thoughts. Wolff believes that all representations are essentially of one kind. They differ only in terms of clarity and distinctness. Kant famously rejects this position in his *Inaugural Dissertation*. He is not the first philosopher to posit two faculties of cognition, as is often alleged. Baumgarten divided the faculty of cognition into higher and lower faculties. As I explained earlier, sensibility is a synonym for the lower faculty of cognition. Likewise, the understanding (in the broad sense) is equivalent to the higher faculty of cognition. Kant's great innovation in the *Inaugural Dissertation* does not concern the number of faculties that he attributes to the soul. It concerns the representations or cognitions that are conceived through these faculties. Baumgarten claimed that the representations that arise from the lower faculty of cognition are always confused. He writes, "The faculty of confused or sensitive cognition is called the **lower faculty of cognition** and it belongs to my soul" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysik*, 116, §383). Likewise, he defines the higher faculty of cognition as the capacity for distinct cognition. See *ibid.*, 143, §462. In the *Inaugural Dissertation*, Kant argues that the difference between the cognitions of these two basic faculties does not concern their level of distinctness. There are different conditions for receiving a representation through sensibility than for conceiving it directly through

Nonetheless, I do not think that Longuenesse's explanation of the difference between a capacity to judge and the power of judgment is correct; although, it is an appealing solution to this problem. Kant's understanding of power [*Kraft*] or force [*vis*] is actually influenced more by Crusius than by Wolff.²⁵ Kant criticizes Baumgarten's, and by extension Wolff's, definition of power in his metaphysics lectures.²⁶

the understanding. The former must represent its object in space and time; the latter must only accord with formal rules of logic. The *Inaugural Dissertation* does not address the controversial question of whether the soul possessed more than one *power*. Kant sided with the Pietists against Wolff in this matter. However, he does not stake out this position in his *Dissertation*; it is found instead in his lectures on metaphysics.

²⁵ Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter, *Die Seele und ihre Vermögen. Kants Metaphysik des Mentalen in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Paderborn: mentis, 2004), 127-136.

²⁶ Baumgarten distinguishes between two senses of power: a broad and a more narrow sense. The former denotes any ground or reason for a substance's accidents. The latter is the *sufficient reason* for the accidents of a substance. He writes, "If in a substance accidents are actual, then this actuality must have 1) a ground and it is called **a power in the wider sense** and 2) a sufficient ground. The latter is **a power in the narrower sense**" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysik*, 41, §131). Kant rejects this definition of power. He claims that a power is not the actual *ground* of a substance's accidents, but rather the *relation* between the substance and its accidents. This may seem like a subtle, even trivial, distinction, but it has one very significant consequence. On the basis of his definition of power, Kant denies that the essence of a substance consists in its power. Wolff and Baumgarten both identified the soul's essence with its power. Wolff defines something's essence as the ground of all of its properties. See Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 18-19, §33. In the case of the soul, all of its properties – its sensations, images, concepts, etc. – are produced through its one basic power for representation. This power serves as their ground, since it is the reason for their existence. The soul's power is the ground of all of its properties. Thus, according to Wolff's definition, it is also the essence of the soul. The soul is nothing other than its power. Wolff writes, "Therefore because this power is the ground of everything changeable that happens in the soul, the essence of the soul consists in it" (*ibid.*, 469, §755). Kant denies that the essence of the soul, or any other substance, consists in its power. Since a power is only the relation between a substance and its accidents, rather than their ground, it does not fit Wolff's definition of something's essence. Therefore, Kant claims that substances have powers, but they are not actually powers themselves.

We can find this criticism in Herder's notes from his time as a student in Kant's lectures. Herder attended Kant's metaphysics lectures during the summer semester of 1762 and the winter semester of 1762-1763. He writes, "The author's definition of power is false: not what contains the ground, but rather the connection [*nexus*] to the ground. Consequently, the substance is no power, but rather has a power" (Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysik Herder*, in *Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-], 28:25). The author, which Herder refers to and that Kant criticizes, is Baumgarten. According to this passage, a power is not the ground of a substance's accidents. Otherwise, it would constitute the very essence of the substance. Instead, a power is the "connection" between an accident and its ground, i.e. a substance. This means that a power is a *property* of a substance, rather than its essence. As Herder puts it, "the substance is no power, but rather has a power."

Kant later repeats this criticism in the *Pölitiz Metaphysics*. Although there is some debate about when these notes were written, most scholars agree that they date from the mid to late 1770s. The *Pölitiz Metaphysics* states, "Wolff assumes one basic power and says: the soul itself is a basic power which represents the universe. It is already false when one says: the soul is a basic power. This arises because the soul is falsely defined, as the Ontology teaches. Power is not what contains in itself the ground of the

Kant does draw a distinction between a faculty and a power in these lectures. Longuenesse cites a passage from *Metaphysik Volckmann*, which states, “Faculty and power must be distinguished from each other. In a faculty, we represent the possibility of an action. It does not contain the sufficient reason for the action, which is the power, but rather its mere possibility.”²⁷ Here Kant explains the distinction between faculties and powers in essentially the same manner as Wolff and Baumgarten. A faculty is the potential to perform a certain kind of action. It is the action’s possibility. This potential is actualized through a power. *Metaphysik Volckmann* is not the only set of notes that addresses the distinction between a faculty and a power.²⁸ Kant consistently asserts that a faculty denotes the *possibility* of an action and that a power is the ground of its *actuality*. For example, he writes in *Reflexion* 3584, “Faculty and power, *potentia* – *actus*. The power acts, the faculty does not.”²⁹

actual representation, but rather the relation [*respectus*] of the substance to the accident, insofar as the ground of the actual representation is contained in it. *Power is thus not a separate principle, but rather a relation* [*respectus*]. Whoever thus says: the soul is power [*anima est vis*], maintains that the soul is no separate substance, but rather only a power, thus a phenomenon and accident” (Kant, *Metaphysik L₁*, 28:261). In this passage, Kant repeats his definition of power. A power is “the relation of the substance to the accident.” Since it is not actually the ground of a substance’s accidents, the substance’s power is not the essence of the substance. One interesting feature of this passage from the *Pölitiz Metaphysics* is that it implies that Wolff and Baumgarten, by identifying the soul with its power, collapsed the distinction between a substance and its accidents. It states, “Whoever thus says: the soul is power, maintains that the soul is no separate substance, but rather only a power, thus a phenomenon and accident.” Kant’s point is that a power is not actually a substance; it is a property of a substance, or an accident. Hence, when Wolff argues that the soul’s power constitutes its essence, he conflates an accident of a substance with the substance itself. See also Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysik Volckmann*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-), 28:431; idem, *Metaphysik von Schön*, in *ibid.*, 28:511; idem, *Metaphysik L₂*, in *ibid.*, 28:564; idem, *Metaphysik Mrongovius*, in *Lectures on Metaphysics*, trans. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 28:771.

²⁷ Kant, *Metaphysik Volckmann*, 28:434.

²⁸ See e.g. Kant, *Metaphysik Herder*, 28:27; idem, *Metaphysik von Schön*, 28:515; idem, *Metaphysik L₂*; idem, *Metaphysik Mrongovius*, 29:823.

²⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* 3584, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-), 17:72. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from between 1776 and 1779. See also idem, *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* 3582, 17:72; idem, *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* 3585, 17:73; idem, *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* 3586, 17:74; idem, *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* 3588, 17:75.

However, as Longuenesse herself acknowledges, Kant describes the power of judgment as a *faculty*, not a power. For example, he claims that it one of the three higher *faculties* of cognition. He also defines it as the “the faculty of subsuming under rules [*das Vermögen unter Regeln zu subsumiren*].”³⁰ We can assess the plausibility of Longuenesse’s interpretation with a simple test. Kant refers to the imagination as an *Einbildungskraft*. Following Longuenesse’s reasoning, Kant must have thought that the imagination was an actual power, in the Wolffian sense, and therefore the actualization of a potential or faculty. However, there is no reason to think that this was the case. *Einbildungskraft* is simply a term for the imagination, which was used by many philosophers. Indeed, Wolff, himself, refers to the imagination as an *Einbildungskraft*.³¹ Nonetheless, he did not think that the imagination was an actual power. We can be certain of this because Wolff was committed to the thesis that the soul had only one power: its power to represent the world. He regarded the imagination, despite its name, as a mere faculty. The same is likely true of the power of judgment. Kant did not coin the term, *Urtheilskraft*. It had been in circulation for more than half a century before it appears in Kant’s writings.³² Kant most likely chose it as an alternative to the expression, *Vermögen zu urtheilen*, since he had already used the latter to describe the higher faculty of cognition. It would be a mistake to read too much into the word, *Kraft*.

³⁰ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 132/B 171.

³¹ Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 130, §235.

³² According to the Brothers Grimm, this term first appears as a name for the capacity for judgment in 1708 in Barthold Feind’s *Deutsche Gedichte*. See Jakob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, Bd. XI, Abt. 3 (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1936), 2591. Feind writes, “If the thoughts hold present things together and distinguish them, one calls this a power of judgment or *Judicium*” (Barthold Feind, *Deutsche Gedichte. bestehend in musicalischen Schau-Spielen, lob-glückwünschungsverliebten und moralischen Gedichten, ernst- und schertzhafften Sinn- und Grabschriften, Satyren, Cantaten und allerhand Gattungen, sammt einer Vorrede von dem Temperament und Gemüthsbeschaffenheit eines Poeten und Gedancken von der Opera* [Stade: Hinrich Brummer, 1708], 13-14).

If we cannot appeal to Wolff's distinction between a *Vermögen* and *Kraft* to explain the difference between the *Vermögen zu urtheilen* and an *Urtheilskraft*, what is the difference between these two terms? As I explained earlier, they cannot be synonyms because Kant defines the higher faculty of cognition as the "capacity to judge" [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*]. The power of judgment [*Urtheilskraft*] is one of three main sub-faculties of the higher faculty of cognition. Hence, the former is a component of the latter. I would like to propose another explanation of their meanings. The term, judgment, actually has two distinct senses. It can denote a thought or representation. It can also denote an act: the act of rendering a judgment. The expressions, "faculty of judgment" and "capacity to judge" [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*], refer to a judgment as a representation. The term, "power of judgment" [*Urtheilskraft*], refers to a judgment as an act.

Kant would have been aware of this distinction because Meier draws a very similar distinction in regards to cognition. In the *Vernunftlehre*, he explains that the term, "cognition" [*Erkenntniß*], has two distinct senses. It can denote either the *representation* of an object or the *act* through which this representation is conceived. He writes, "We understand through cognition either a complete epitome [*Inbegrif*] of many representations or the action, through which a representation of a thing is effected."³³ When Meier refers to the "epitome of many representations" he is acknowledging that the representation of an object actually consists of a manifold of other more basic representations. Kant holds the same position. A cognition is the complete

³³ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 26, §25. See also idem, *Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1976), 44-45, §27.

representation that is formed by this manifold, i.e. the “epitome” of the manifold. Thus, according to Meier, the term, “cognition,” can denote either a representation or an act.

We can draw a similar distinction in regards to judgment. A judgment can refer to a thought or representation within the mind. It can also refer to the act through which this representation is conceived. It is the act of rendering a judgment. Thus, the term, “judgment,” like the word, “cognition,” has two distinct senses. It can denote either a representation or an act.

When Kant defines the higher faculty of cognition, or understanding (in the broad sense), as the “capacity to judge,” he is primarily referring to judgments as representations. In this case, Wolff can actually offer us some insight into the meaning of the term, *Vermögen*. According to Wolff, the soul’s cognitive faculties are capacities to conceive of different kinds of mental representations. For example, the senses are the soul’s capacity to conceive of sensations, the imagination is its capacity to conceive of images [*Einbildungen*], i.e. the representations of things that are not present, and the understanding is its capacity to form distinct representations. Thus, a cognitive faculty is always the capacity to generate a type of representation. This is how Kant understands the term, *Vermögen* or faculty, when he defines the higher faculty of cognition as our faculty of judgment [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*]. It is the capacity to conceive of a specific type of representation; namely, a judgment. In order to more easily distinguish between the two senses of judgment, I will refer to the representations that arise from our faculty or capacity for judgment as *propositional* judgments. I define a propositional judgment as a cognition that exhibits the *logical form* of a judgment. Kant defines the logical form of a judgment in the metaphysical deduction’s table of judgments. It consists of the four

basic features that characterize every (propositional) judgment: quantity, quality, relation, and modality. The expressions, “faculty of judgment” and “capacity to judge” [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*], denote the capacity to form propositional judgments.

The term, “power of judgment,” refers primarily to the other sense of judgment; it refers to judgments as acts. Kant defines the power of judgment as “the faculty of subsuming under rules [*das Vermögen unter Regeln zu subsumiren*].”³⁴ He means that it is the capacity to apply rules to particular cases. We determine that a particular case is an instance of a general rule by subsuming it under this rule. This is an act of judgment. We judge that the rule applies to the case in question.

Thus, the difference between the “capacity to judge” and the “power of judgment” can be explained in terms of the two senses of judgment. The former expression refers to judgments primarily as representations; the latter refers to judgments as acts. As we know, Kant defines the entire higher faculty of cognition as a capacity to judge. This means that it is the capacity to form propositional judgments. The power of judgment belongs to the higher faculty of cognition. It is the capacity to apply rules concretely.³⁵ These two capacities are integrally related. Propositional judgments are formed through the application of rules. I will explain precisely how this occurs in chapter six. For now, it will suffice if we say that judgments, insofar as they are regarded as representations, are produced by acts of judgment.

2.3 The introduction of the power of judgment

³⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 132/B 171.

³⁵ This definition only pertains to the *determining* power of judgment [*bestimmende Urtheilskraft*]. In the third *Critique*, Kant draws a distinction between the deductive use of the power of judgment and the inductive use of this faculty. He refers to the former as the determining power of judgment and the latter as the reflecting power of judgment [*reflectirende Urtheilskraft*].

Earlier, I raised the question of when Kant added the power of judgment to the higher faculty of cognition. There is strong evidence that Kant first introduced this faculty during the mid-1770s, most likely between 1773 and 1775. Kant does not refer to the power of judgment as a distinct cognitive faculty until the *Critique of Pure Reason*.³⁶ Here, for the first time, he asserts that the soul's higher faculty of cognition is composed of three basic capacities: the understanding, the power of judgment, and reason. Prior to this point, there is no mention of the power of judgment in Kant's *published* writings. *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* lists just two higher faculties of cognition: the understanding and reason. Thus, we can reasonably conclude that the power of judgment enters Kant's philosophy at some point between *The False Subtlety* (1762) and the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781).

This is a fairly wide span of time. However, we can narrow it substantially if we turn to Kant's anthropology lectures. Kant offered his first lectures in anthropology during the winter semester of 1772-1773. We possess two sets of student notes from these lectures: the manuscripts known as *Anthropologie Collins* and *Anthropologie Parow*. Both state that the higher faculty of cognition consists of just two faculties: the understanding and reason. For example, we read in *Anthropologie Collins*, "Understanding and reason are the higher powers of the soul. Understanding is the capacity to judge. Reason is the capacity to infer."³⁷ The next earliest set of anthropology notes that we possess is *Anthropologie Friedländer*, which is thought to date from the winter semester of 1775-1776. It contains the threefold view of the higher

³⁶ Ibid., A 130/B 169.

³⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Anthropologie Collins*, in *Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-), 25:147.

faculty of cognition that Kant later advances in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Anthropologie Friedländer states,

The higher faculty of cognition contains three things: understanding, insofar as it opposed to reason, power of judgment, and reason. Understanding is the faculty of concepts, power of judgment is the faculty of the application of concepts to particular cases, and reason is the faculty of concepts *a priori in abstracto*. The understanding is faculty of rules, power of judgment the faculty of the application of rules, and reason the application of rules *a priori*.³⁸

These passages show that, between the winter semesters of 1772 and 1775, Kant expands the higher faculty of cognition to include the power of judgment. He moved from two higher cognitive faculties to three. Thus, we can conclude that he introduced the power of judgment sometime during this period.

2.4 Healthy understanding

I have argued that the power of judgment is an innovation of the mid-1770s and that Kant first adds this faculty between the years 1773 and 1775. This raises another question: given that the power of judgment does not enter Kant's philosophy until the middle of the 1770s, what faculty, if any, was responsible for the application of rules and concepts prior to this point? This is the cognitive function that Kant assigns to the power of judgment in his critical philosophy.

We must, of course, consider the possibility that Kant did not assign this function to any particular faculty until he added the power of judgment. Wolf and Baumgarten never posited a specific faculty for the application of rules. One might assume that Kant followed their example as well and did not become interested in the application of rules until the middle of the 1770s, when he introduced the power of judgment. However, this hypothesis is refuted by *Anthropologie Collins* and *Parow*. These notes date from the

³⁸ Immanuel Kant, *Anthropologie Friedländer*, in *Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-), 25:537-538.

winter semester of 1772-1773. Yet here we find Kant discussing the skill required to apply rules correctly. He ascribes this talent to what he calls “healthy understanding” [*gesunder Verstand*]. Collins states, “only through the healthy understanding can we subsume a case under a universal rule.”³⁹ Likewise, Parow states, “The healthy understanding applies a rule to a *casum datum* [given case].”⁴⁰

The expression “healthy understanding” is often translated into English as “common sense.”⁴¹ Kant does associate it with the *sensus communis* in his early logic lectures.⁴² However, the healthy understanding also has a precise meaning in Kant’s philosophy, one that is not adequately captured by the fairly generic expression, “common sense.” Healthy understanding, for Kant, is the ability to correctly use common understanding. For example, Kant writes in the *Prolegomena*, “For what is the healthy understanding? It is the common understanding, insofar as it judges correctly.”⁴³ Kant distinguishes between the way that most people exercise their understanding and the method employed by professional scholars. He refers to the former approach as the *common understanding* [*gemeiner Verstand*] and the latter as either the *scholarly*

³⁹ Kant, *Anthropologie Collins*, 25:156.

⁴⁰ Immanuel Kant, *Anthropologie Parow*, in *Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-), 25:361.

⁴¹ The terms *gesunder Verstand* and *gesunder Vernunft* were originally theological concepts. Human reason is corrupted by original sin and therefore prone to error and deception. Insofar as we are able to overcome this corruption of our intellect, our reason is restored to health. Healthy understanding and healthy reason originally described the correct use of these faculties, as opposed to their otherwise natural state of sickness and corruption. See Manfred Kuehn, *Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768-1800: A Contribution to the History of Critical Philosophy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987), 258.

⁴² “This kind of understanding is called the *sensus communis* (*sens commun*) or the healthy understanding” (Kant, *Logik Philippi*, 24:312). See also Immanuel Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik 1579*, in *Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-), 16:18

⁴³ Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward As Science*, 4:369. I have slightly modified Gary Hatfield’s translation. He renders *gesunder Verstand* as “sound common understanding,” which I prefer to translate as “healthy understanding.” I also translate *gemeiner Verstand* as “common understanding” rather than Hatfield’s choice of “ordinary understanding.”

[*gelehrt*] or the *speculative understanding* [*speculativer Verstand*]. This distinction is a relatively unknown facet of Kant's philosophy; however, he mentions it in the

Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics,⁴⁴ the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*,⁴⁵ the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*,⁴⁶ and *Anthropology from a Pragmatic*

⁴⁴ The most significant discussion of the common understanding in Kant's published writings occurs in the *Prolegomena*. The final section of that work addresses the possibility of a scientific metaphysics. Kant famously concludes that such a science is only possible through a critique of pure reason. He declares that dogmatic metaphysics is doomed to founder on transcendental illusions. The only possible metaphysics is a critical one whose object is reason itself. As part of this provocative conclusion, Kant challenges his critics to demonstrate a single metaphysical proposition dogmatically, i.e. through analysis. He then rules out two other approaches, which he claims are similarly unsuitable for metaphysics: probabilistic arguments and healthy understanding [*gesunder Menschenverstand*].

Kant defines healthy understanding as the correct use of the common understanding. I quoted this definition above. He writes, "For what is the healthy understanding? It is the common understanding, insofar as it judges correctly" (ibid., 4:369). Kant then defines the common use of the understanding and contrasts it with the speculative use of this faculty. According to him, the common understanding cognizes rules concretely; the speculative understanding cognizes them abstractly. Kant writes, "And what now is the common understanding? It is the faculty of cognition and of the use of rules *in concreto*, as distinguished from the *speculative understanding*, which is a faculty of the cognition of rules *in abstracto*" (ibid., 4:369). In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant defines the understanding as the "faculty of rules" [*Vermögen der Regeln*]. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 126; A 132/B 171; A 158-159/B 197-198. According to the *Prolegomena*, we can exercise this faculty in either a common or a speculative way depending on whether we represent rules concretely or abstractly. The common understanding is the capacity to cognize rules concretely; the speculative understanding is the capacity to cognize them abstractly.

Consequently, the common understanding can only grasp rules and principles through examples. This is what it means to cognize a rule concretely: we represent the rule through a particular case or instance. Kant provides an example of this concrete cognition. He claims that the common understanding is incapable of conceiving of causality as a universal principle or rule. It only understands this concept through examples. These examples are instances in which one event clearly followed from another, e.g. a window breaking. The common understanding cannot think about causality more generally, as a necessary rule that governs all appearances. This requires the speculative use of the understanding. Thus, the common understanding can only represent rules concretely, or through examples. See Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward As Science*, 4:369-370.

The *Prolegomena* defines the common understanding as the capacity to cognize rules concretely. The speculative understanding is the capacity to cognize these same rules abstractly. Kant repeats this position in a number of his lectures from this period, including the *Wiener Logik*, *Logik Pölitz*, and *Logik Busolt*. See Immanuel Kant, *Vienna Logic*, in *Lectures on Logic*, trans. J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 24:795; idem, *Logik Pölitz*, in *Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-), 24:503-504; idem, *Logik Busolt*, in ibid., 24:612.

⁴⁵ In the *Groundwork*, Kant begins by examining the common use of the understanding. It is the manner in which most people exercise this faculty. Part one of the *Groundwork* is devoted to the common understanding, specifically insofar as it employed in moral reasoning. Kant concludes at the end of this section that the common understanding is more than adequate for this purpose. In the remainder of the work, he endeavors to articulate the principles that implicitly guide the moral judgments of the common understanding. See Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 4:403-404.

⁴⁶ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5:293-295.

Point of View.⁴⁷ He discusses it in even greater detail in his lectures on logic and anthropology. Thus, according to Kant, we can exercise our understanding in either a common or a scholarly way. The common approach is known as common understanding. The scholarly method for using this faculty is called the scholarly understanding or the speculative understanding.

Kant does not always explain the differences between these two approaches consistently. For example, there are significant differences between his explanation of this distinction in his early logic lectures and his anthropology lectures from this same period.⁴⁸ Fortunately, his account in *Anthropologie Collins* and *Parow* is fairly

⁴⁷ Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:139

⁴⁸ In *Logik Philippi*, Kant teaches that the common understanding is the inductive use of the understanding. It infers general rules from experience. The scholarly understanding is the deductive use of this faculty. It applies general rules to particular cases. See Kant, *Logik Philippi*, 24:312. See also idem, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 1578, 16:16; idem, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 1579, 16:18. However, in *Anthropologie Collins* and *Anthropologie Parow*, Kant teaches that the understanding in general is a capacity to judge. The difference between the common use of this faculty and its scholarly employment concerns whether our judgments are abstract or concrete. The scholarly understanding is the capacity to think and judge abstractly. The common understanding, on the other hand, is the capacity to render concrete judgments about particular cases. The scholarly understanding is able to formulate general rules because these rules are abstract judgments. However, it cannot apply these rules because in order to apply a rule we must make a concrete judgment about an individual. Thus, the formal application of a rule requires a combination of both scholarly and common understanding. The scholarly understanding formulates a rule and the common understanding applies it. See Kant, *Anthropologie Collins*, 25:157; idem, *Anthropologie Parow*, 25:359; 361. Kant's explanation of the difference between the common and the scholarly use of the understanding in *Logik Philippi* is not compatible with his explanation of this distinction in his anthropology lectures. In *Logik Philippi*, he defines the scholarly understanding as the deductive use of this faculty. This means that it starts with general rules and applies them to particular cases. However, in his anthropology lectures, Kant insists that the application of rules requires a combination of both scholarly and common understanding. Likewise, *Logik Philippi* defines the common understanding as the inductive use of this faculty. Induction also requires the ability to make both abstract and concrete judgments. We start with a series of concrete judgments about experience. On the basis of these initial judgments, we then infer a general rule that describes them all. This rule is an abstract judgment. Thus, according to *Logik Philippi*, the common understanding is capable of making at least some abstract judgments because it infers rules from experience. Yet according to *Anthropologie Collins* and *Parow*, abstract judgments are the exclusive province of the scholarly understanding. The common understanding only judges concretely.

Everything that we know about these texts indicates that they are roughly contemporaneous. They all date from the beginning of the 1770s. Yet Kant's definition of the common understanding in *Logik Philippi* is incompatible with the ones found in *Anthropologie Collins* and *Parow*. There is a potential explanation for this discrepancy. In *Logik Philippi*, the term "understanding" is construed broadly; it denotes the entire higher faculty of cognition. According to Kant, logic is concerned with the laws that govern the correct use of the understanding. The term "understanding," in this context is a synonym for the higher faculty of cognition. We can be certain of this because Kant's logic includes syllogistics. We know

straightforward. Both sets of notes define the understanding in the same way. It is the “capacity to judge.”^{49,50} We employ this faculty in either a common or scholarly way depending on whether our judgments are concrete or abstract. The common understanding judges concretely. The scholarly understanding, on the other hand, judges abstractly. This raises the question: what is a concrete judgment and how does it differ from an abstract one? Perhaps the simplest way to explain this distinction would be to say that concrete judgments concern specific objects. Abstract judgments, on the other hand, concern general concepts or principles. For example, the judgment, “Socrates is virtuous,” is a concrete judgment. It concerns a specific person. The judgment, “Honesty is a virtue,” is an abstract judgment. It concerns a general concept: the notion of honesty.

from *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* that syllogisms are formed through the faculty of reason. He later reaffirms this position in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Consequently, when Kant refers to the “laws of the understanding,” he cannot mean the understanding in the narrow sense. Otherwise, logic, which studies these laws, would exclude syllogistics. Logic is not only concerned with the understanding in the narrow sense; it is also clearly interested in the proper use of reason. Hence, it is concerned with the higher faculty of cognition in general. Conversely, in *Anthropologie Collins and Parow*, Kant refers to the understanding in the *narrow* sense. He actually distinguishes between the common use of the understanding and the common use of reason. Both of these faculties belong to the higher faculty of cognition. Thus, in his logic lectures, Kant refers to the understanding in the broad sense, but in his anthropology this term is intended narrowly. In *Logik Philippi*, the common understanding refers to how we use the entire higher faculty of cognition, but in *Anthropologie Collins and Parow*, it only describes how we use one of the sub-faculties that compose the higher faculty of cognition.

⁴⁹ Kant, *Anthropologie Collins*, 25:147. See also idem, *Anthropologie Parow*, 25:351.

⁵⁰ We may recall from the previous chapter that, in *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures*, Kant also defines the higher faculty of cognition as the “capacity to judge.” This is the same definition that he later gives to the understanding in *Anthropologie Collins and Parow*. As I explained earlier, the term “understanding” has two distinct meanings for Kant. He uses it to refer to both the higher faculty of cognition in general and one of the three sub-faculties of the higher faculty of cognition. I mentioned earlier that Kant defines the understanding as the “capacity to judge” in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. However, here the term “understanding” is construed broadly; it is a synonym for the higher faculty of cognition. Kant is actually repeating his conclusion from *The False Subtlety*. *Anthropologie Collins and Parow*, on the other hand, both refer to the understanding in the *narrow* sense. We can be certain of this because these notes oppose the understanding to the faculty of reason. They are both sub-faculties of the higher faculty of cognition. Thus, Kant defines both senses of the understanding in the same way. They are both capacities to judge. This is one example of Kant’s failure to consistently distinguish between the two senses of the understanding. He never formulates a clear definition of the narrow sense of the understanding. Kant sometimes describes it as the faculty of concepts. See e.g. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 130-131/B 169. However, he more often defines it in the exact same manner as the broad sense of the understanding.

The common understanding makes concrete judgments about specific things; the scholarly understanding makes abstract judgments about general concepts.

Kant illustrates the difference between these two kinds of judgments with an example. He asks us to consider a scenario in which a legal question is posed to both a jurist and an ordinary person with no special training in the law. According to him, both individuals are equally capable of coming to the right conclusion. However, they will arrive at this conclusion in different ways, depending on how they use their understanding.⁵¹ The ordinary person relies on healthy understanding. He approaches the question by considering it in relation to a specific case or example and then judging what would be right in this situation. The question that Kant poses is whether or not someone is obligated to pay for damage that is caused by their property, even if they, themselves, are not actually at fault. The ordinary person, who is a novice in legal matters, imagines that his ox has damaged his neighbor's property. He then judges what is owed to the victim in this situation. Thus, the common understanding answers the question by considering a specific case. The jurist, on the other hand, employs the understanding in a scholarly way. He knows the relevant legal principles and comes to a decision based upon the law.

What is this example meant to show? Both sets of notes define the understanding as the capacity to judge. We use this faculty in a common or healthy way by judging concretely. We employ it in a scholarly way by judging abstractly. In the example, the

⁵¹ "A question of law can be submitted to a jurist and also to the healthy understanding. E.g. am I obliged to repair the damage, which my property made to the property of another through no fault of my own? The healthy understanding needs a little time to think about it in order to represent a case *in concreto*, e.g. if the property was my ox. It does not judge *in abstracto* at all, but rather in a given case. This is the common understanding, and, insofar as it is correct, the healthy [understanding]" (Kant, *Anthropologie Collins*, 25:155). See also idem, *Anthropologie Parow*, 25:359.

person, who relies on healthy understanding, makes a concrete judgment about a particular case. The jurist, on the other hand, uses his understanding in a scholarly way. He makes an abstract judgment about the law in general.

According to both *Collins* and *Parow*, the understanding is the capacity to judge. The common understanding is the capacity to judge concretely. The scholarly understanding is the capacity to judge abstractly. Finally, the healthy understanding is the correct use of the common understanding. It is the ability to make *correct* concrete judgments. *Anthropologie Parow* states, “The capacity to judge *in concreto* is thus the common understanding. Now insofar as this is correct, one calls it healthy understanding.”⁵²

2.5 Healthy understanding and the application of rules

Anthropologie Collins and *Parow* also state that the healthy understanding is the capacity to apply rules. This is the same cognitive function that Kant later assigns to the power of judgment. There is a remarkable similarity between the account of the healthy understanding found in these lectures and what Kant will later say about the power of judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In order to show the correspondence between these two accounts, I will first briefly explain how Kant describes the power of judgment in the first *Critique*. I will then compare it with the description of the healthy understanding in the anthropology lectures.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant defines the power of judgment as the “faculty of subsuming under rules” [*Vermögen unter Regeln zu subsumiren*]. He writes, “If the understanding in general is explained as the faculty of rules, then the power of judgment is the faculty of subsuming under rules, i.e., of determining whether or not

⁵² *Ibid.*, 25:359.

something stands under a given rule (*casus date legis*) or not.”⁵³ As I explained earlier, the power of judgment is the capacity to apply rules. If we subsume something under a rule this means that we have determined that it is actually subject to this rule. We therefore apply the rule to the case in question. The power of judgment is responsible for applying the rules of the understanding by subsuming the appropriate representations under them. Kant goes on to claim that the application of rules by the power of judgment cannot itself be rule-governed. If it were, this would result in an infinite regress. Any rules that determined how the power of judgment should apply a rule would themselves need their own rules to prescribe their application. Hence, there are no rules that govern the correct use of the power of judgment. Logic prescribes rules for the correct or valid use of the understanding, but there are no such principles that govern how these rules are to be applied by the power of judgment. Kant concludes that “the power of judgment is a special talent that cannot be taught but only practiced.”⁵⁴ It is possible to learn a rule or concept, but not how to apply it correctly. The ability to correctly apply rules, which Kant identifies with the power of judgment, can only be a talent.

Let us now compare the power of judgment to what is said in *Anthropologie Collins* and *Parow* about the healthy understanding. Both sets of notes agree that the healthy understanding is responsible for applying rules to particular cases. As I explained earlier, according to *Collins* and *Parow*, we use the understanding in either a common or scholarly way depending on whether our judgments are concrete or abstract. The scholarly understanding is the capacity for abstract judgment. These notes also state that abstract judgments are rules. To judge abstractly is equivalent to thinking of a rule or

⁵³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 132/B 171.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, A 133/B 172.

principle. For example, the proposition, “All events are caused,” is an abstract judgment. It is also a general rule. Thus, the scholarly understanding is not only the capacity for abstract judgment it is also the capacity to form and conceive of rules. However, the scholarly understanding cannot apply these rules. It can only make abstract judgments. In order to correctly apply rules to particular cases, one must also possess healthy understanding. For example, *Anthropologie Collins* states,

The subtle or abstracting understanding cognizes a universal rule, which should be acted upon in particular cases. Every judgment *in abstracto* is merely to be regarded as a universal rule. Only through the healthy understanding can we subsume a case under a universal rule; no skillful [*geschickter*], no scholarly understanding can do this if it lacks the healthy [understanding].⁵⁵

The healthy understanding subsumes particular cases under universal rules. This is the same cognitive function that Kant later assigns to the power of judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Like the power of judgment, the healthy understanding is a talent, one that can be neither learned nor taught to others. It can only be acquired through practice. *Anthropologie Collins* states, “The healthy understanding is thus merely the capacity to judge *in concreto*. This capacity alone cannot be learned and it is impossible to teach it to someone.”⁵⁶ We find the same thing said in *Parow*: “One can teach no man to subsume a case under a rule.”⁵⁷ Thus, Kant’s early anthropology lectures describe the healthy understanding in much the same way that Kant later explains the power of judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Both faculties are responsible for the application of rules; they subsume particular cases under general rules. Both are talents that cannot be learned or taught to others. The healthy understanding is the precursor to

⁵⁵ Kant, *Anthropologie Collins*, 25:157. See also idem, *Anthropologie Parow*, 25:359.

⁵⁶ Kant, *Anthropologie Collins*, 25:156.

⁵⁷ Kant, *Anthropologie Parow*, 25:359.

the power of judgment. It performs the same cognitive function as the power of judgment in essentially the same way.

If one requires further evidence for this claim, consider that in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant claims that all three higher cognitive faculties – the understanding, the power of judgment, and reason – are involved in an inference of reason or syllogism [*Vernunftschluß*]. The understanding, which Kant defines as the faculty of rules, provides a rule that serves as the major premise. In the minor premise, the power of judgment applies this rule to a particular case. Finally, reason draws a conclusion about the particular case on the basis of the rule.⁵⁸ Compare this to the account of such inferences found in *Anthropologie Collins* and *Parow*. In both lectures, reason is given responsibility for a syllogism’s major premise. The understanding applies this rule to a particular case in the minor premise. Both faculties join together to yield the conclusion. For example, *Parow* states,

In every inference there is: 1.) A universal proposition, which is understood through reason. 2. The application of a case to the universal proposition and this occurs through the understanding. 3.) The conclusion, which occurs both through the understanding as well as through reason.⁵⁹

The anthropology lectures both assert that the understanding is responsible for the minor premise of a syllogism. It applies the rule to a particular case by subsuming it under the rule. However, this act of subsumption is not simply performed by the understanding; it is specifically an act of the healthy understanding. *Collins* states, “The healthy understanding serves for the application of reason, rules *ad casum datum* [to the given cases].”⁶⁰ Thus, the healthy understanding performs the same subsuming role in a

⁵⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 304/B 360-361.

⁵⁹ Kant, *Anthropologie Parow*, 25:360-361. See also idem, *Anthropologie Collins*, 25:158.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 25:158. See also idem, *Anthropologie Parow*, 25:361.

sylogism that Kant will later assign to the power of judgment. This further demonstrates that the healthy understanding is a precursor to the power of judgment. When Kant introduces this faculty in the mid-1770s, it takes over the task of applying rules, a function that he originally ascribed to the healthy understanding.

* * * * *

What I hope to have shown in this chapter is that the power of judgment is an innovation that Kant introduces sometime during the mid-1770s. There is no precedent for this faculty in the philosophy of Wolff or Baumgarten, and it is not part of Kant's own early faculty psychology. It develops out of the notion of healthy understanding. The healthy understanding is the ability to correctly employ the common understanding. The common understanding judges concretely, and Kant initially assigned it the function of applying rules to particular cases. It was responsible for taking the otherwise abstract judgments of the scholarly understanding and subsuming the appropriate representations under them. This is the same cognitive function that is later performed by the power of judgment. The healthy understanding is the precursor to this faculty.

Chapter Three

Kant's Definition of Judgment in the Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories: (A 68-69/B 92-94)

In chapter one, I explained how judgment was understood by most philosophers in Germany during Kant's time. I describe this position as the standard theory of judgment. Kant initially accepted a version of this theory, which is documented in *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* (1762) and his early logic lecture. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he adopts a new theory of judgment. It differs from the standard theory in two crucial respects. First, Kant expands his definition of judgment to encompass any mental act that unites representations within the mind. This is significant because it means that judgments, for Kant, are no longer synonymous with propositional judgments. He conceives of judgment in broader terms than his predecessors. Second, Kant describes judgments as a *cognitive* relationship between concepts and objects, as opposed to a merely *logical* one between concepts. His well-known claim in the B-Deduction that all judgments are, by definition, objectively valid is actually a reflection of this position. Kant discusses judgment in two places in the first *Critique*: section one of the metaphysical deduction and §19 of the B-Deduction. The former is the subject of this chapter. I examine the latter in chapter five.

The first part or book of the transcendental analytic, the analytic of concepts, consists of two chapters: the first chapter is titled "On the Guiding-thread to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding" [*Von dem Leitfaden der Entdeckung aller reinen Verstandesbegriff*]; it is followed by the well-known transcendental deduction. It is often referred to simply as the "guiding-thread chapter"

[*Leitfadenkapital*] or the metaphysical deduction.¹ Kant argues in this chapter that the logical forms of judgment can provide us with a clue to the pure concepts of the understanding, i.e. the categories. He claims that if we entirely abstract from the content of judgments, and examine just their form, we discover that there are four basic features that they all share. Every judgment has a quantity, a quality, a relation, and a modality. Each of these basic features of judgments can take three possible forms. For example, the quantity of a judgment is universal, particular, or singular. These are the logical forms of judgments. There are twelve logical forms of judgments, which are organized under the four headings of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. Kant argues that we can infer the categories from these basic forms of judgment. He derives the table of categories from the table of judgment. His reasoning is based on the idea that the faculty of the understanding is essentially a capacity for judgment. According to Kant, the understanding uses the same basic functions to unite representations in a logical judgment that it uses to unite the manifold of intuitions.² The forms of judgment and the categories are expressions of the same function of the understanding. Consequently, the former can shed light on the latter.

The metaphysical deduction of the categories is among the most criticized aspects of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant was quite proud that he had discovered a systematic method for enumerating the categories. They are deduced from the logical function of the understanding, which correspond with the logical forms of judgment. He

¹ Kant first coins the term, “metaphysical deduction,” in §26 of the B-Deduction. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B159. He uses it to refer to his argument in §§9-11, where he infers to the table of the categories from the table of judgment. I employ this expression more loosely to refer to the entire first chapter of the analytic of concepts (A 66-83/B 91-116).

² *Ibid.*, A 79/B 104-105.

contrasts his approach with Aristotle, who lacked such a principle.³ However, many philosophers have remained skeptical that Kant's list of the categories is any less arbitrary than his predecessors'. They have questioned the completeness of Kant's list of the logical forms of judgment and whether it can provide any insight into the categories. These debates exceed the modest scope of this dissertation. Hence, in this chapter, I will merely focus on the definition of judgment that underlies Kant's metaphysical deduction. I will bracket the question of whether this argument is actually successful.

Kant offers two complementary definitions of judgment in the metaphysical deduction. He describes a judgment as "the mediate cognition of an object." He also defines judgments as "functions of unity among our representations." These two definitions both belong to Kant's argument in the opening section of the metaphysical deduction and they can best understood within this context. The aim of this argument is to show that the understanding is a capacity for judgment [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*]. Both definitions are intended to advance this conclusion; they are premises in Kant's argument. Consequently, the best and simplest way to explicate Kant's account of judgment in the metaphysical deduction is to explain his argument in the first section of the deduction (A 68-69/B 92-94). The former is inseparable from the latter.

3.1 Discursive cognition

Kant begins by defining the understanding. The metaphysical deduction consists of three sections. The purpose of the first section, which is the primary focus of this chapter, is to establish that the understanding (in the broad sense) is a capacity for judgment. Kant initially defines the understanding in negative terms: it is the faculty of

³ Ibid., A 81/B 107.

non-sensible cognition.⁴ Kant's point is very simple. Like Baumgarten, he divides the soul's cognitive faculty into two parts: a lower faculty of cognition and a higher one. Kant refers to the former as sensibility and the latter as the understanding (in the broad sense). He has already defined sensibility in the transcendental aesthetic and now, in the first chapter of the transcendental analytic, he is going to turn to the other half of our cognitive faculty, the understanding. Since it is not sensibility, it must be a faculty of non-sensible cognition.

According to Kant, there are two basic species of cognition: intuition and concepts.⁵ He also denies that human beings are capable of intellectual intuitions, which is to say that they cannot conceive of intuitions through their own intellect or understanding. They must receive intuitions through sensibility. Since the human understanding is not capable of intuition, and there are just two kinds of cognition, intuitions and concepts, the cognition of the understanding must consist of concepts. Consequently, Kant describes it as a faculty of discursive cognition, which means that it represents objects with concepts, rather than intuitions.⁶

Kant first proves this point through a disjunctive syllogism. There are just two species of cognition: intuitions and concepts. Since the cognition of the understanding is not intuitive, it must therefore be discursive, or consist of concepts. He then offers a positive proof for this conclusion, which does not rely on a process of elimination. He claims that just as intuitions are received through the receptivity of sensibility, concepts

⁴ "The understanding has been explained above only negatively, as a non-sensible faculty of cognition" (ibid., A 67-68/B 92).

⁵ Ibid., A 320/B 376-377.

⁶ "Now we cannot partake of intuition independently of sensibility. The understanding is therefore not a faculty of intuition. But beside intuition there is no other kind of cognition than through concepts. Thus the cognition of every, at least human, understanding is a cognition through concepts, not intuitive but discursive" (ibid., A 68/B 92-93).

must be formed through the spontaneity of the understanding. Kant writes, “Concepts are therefore grounded on the spontaneity of thinking, as sensible intuitions are grounded on the receptivity of impressions.”⁷ The cognition of the understanding therefore consists of concepts. In order to understand Kant’s argument for this proposition, some background is helpful. We need to know how Kant distinguishes between the two basic types of cognition: intuitions and concepts.

3.1.1 Intuitions and concepts

Kant distinguishes between intuitions and concepts in two ways. Starting in his *Inaugural Dissertation*, he defines intuitions as singular representations. This means that they each represent a single, specific object. Concepts, on the other hand, are general or universal representations. They pertain to multiple objects. For example, the concept of the color red represents anything that happens to exhibit this color. An intuition of this color represents a particular thing that is red.⁸ In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant introduces a second distinction between intuitions and concepts: immediacy. Intuitions represent their objects directly. Concepts, on the other hand, do not.⁹ They either represent an intuition or another concept. Thus, intuitions are distinguished by the fact

⁷ Ibid., A 68/B 93.

⁸ Kant, *Inaugural Dissertation*, 2:396. See also idem, *Blomberg Logic*, 24:251; idem, *Logik Philippi*, 24:451.

⁹ Kant, of course, argues that neither intuitions nor concepts can cognize objects on their own. Cognition requires a combination of both intuitions and concepts. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 51/B 75. Nonetheless, there remains a sense in which we can still legitimately say that intuitions and concept represent their objects either directly or indirectly. Intuitions and concepts are both mental representations. The word, “representation,” [*Vorstellung*] is Kant’s most generic term for mental content. All representations are the representations of something. Since intuitions and concepts are representations, they have objects. Moreover, they can be said to represent their objects in a certain way, e.g. directly or indirectly. This does not alter the fact that individually intuition and concepts are merely elements of cognition.

that they are related immediately to their objects.¹⁰ In the first *Critique*, Kant defines intuitions almost entirely in terms of this second criterion of immediacy. However, he does not abandon his earlier view that intuitions are also distinguished by their singularity. It is presupposed in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* when Kant argues that space and time are intuitions by virtue of their own singularity. There is just one space and one time. All individual spaces and times are carved out from within these two fields. Consequently, our representations of space and time in general are singular, which means that they are also intuitions.¹¹ Kant also continues to assert that intuitions are singular representations in his logic lectures.¹²

So far we have focused primarily on the defining characteristics of intuitions: they are both immediate and singular representations. Kant defines concepts in terms of their lack of immediacy and their inherent generality. These two characteristics are integrally related. A concept represents other representations because of its generality, and vice

¹⁰ “Since no representations pertains to the object immediately except intuition alone, a concept is thus never immediately related to an object, but is always related to some other representation of it (whether that be an intuition or itself already a concept)” (ibid., A 68/B 93). See also ibid., A 19/B 33.

¹¹ Kant first debuts this argument in his *Inaugural Dissertation*. See Kant, *Inaugural Dissertation*, 2:399; 402. He then repeats it in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant writes, “Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. For, first, one can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would be possible), but rather are only thought **in it**. It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus also the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations. From this it follows that in respect to it an *a priori* intuition (which is not empirical) grounds all concepts of it” (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 24-25/B 39). In this passage, Kant does not actually claim that intuitions are singular representations. However, it is an implicit premise of his argument. He denies that space is a general concept because it is a singular representation. The implication is that singular representations are intuitions, not concepts. Kant makes this explicit in his discussion of time. He writes, “That representation, however, which can only be given through a single object, is an intuition” (ibid., A 31-32/B 47).

¹² “Cognition is either *intuitus* or *conceptus*; *intuitus*, if I have only singular representations, *conceptus*, if I have representations, which are common to many, or *repraesentatio communis*” (Kant, *Logik Pölitz*, 24:565). See also idem, *Logik Busolt*, 24:653; idem, *Vienna Logic*, 24:904.

versa. This is because a concept actually represents a mark.¹³ A mark denotes a characteristic or property. As such, it is, at least potentially, shared by multiple objects. This is the source of a concept's generality. Moreover, a mark not only characterizes certain things, it also characterizes their representations in the mind. For example, the concept of a body represents a mark that belongs to both our concept of a metal as well the actual metals themselves. Consequently, a concept, which represents a general property or mark, also represents other representations. For this reason, all concepts are mediate representations.

3.1.2 Concepts and the spontaneity of the understanding

According to Kant, the generality, which distinguishes concepts from intuitions, is produced by the understanding. We can receive sensations, but we must actively form concepts for ourselves. This is because we must abstract them from the content of other representations.¹⁴ All concepts are marks, but not all marks are concepts. In order to serve as a concept, a mark must be considered abstractly. We must differentiate it from the content of the representations, to which it belongs. This requires activity on the part of the understanding. This may seem like a fairly obvious, or even trivial, observation. However, a number of Kant's predecessors would not accept this idea. For example, Meier does not draw a strong distinction between intuitions and concept. He defines a

¹³ "All our concepts are marks and all thinking is representation through them" (Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik*, 2287, 16:300). See also idem, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 2277, 16:297; idem, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 2278, 16:297; idem, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 2281, 16:298.

¹⁴ Kant explains this process in his logic lectures. His account of concept formation is very similar to Locke's. He claims that we form concepts by comparing representations and identifying their similarities and differences. We then abstract or ignore – Kant understands abstraction as the deliberate withdrawal of one's attention – the differences between these representations. This leaves only the marks that they happen to share in common. These shared marks are combined into a new, general concept. See e.g. Kant, *Logik Philippi*, 24:452-453; idem, *Logik Pölitz*, 24:566; idem, *Logik Busolt*, 24:654-655; idem, *Vienna Logic*, 24:907-909; *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*, 24:753.

concept broadly as any representation that is conceived by a rational being.^{15,16}

Consequently, sensations, for Meier, qualify as a kind of concept.¹⁷ They are what he terms “concepts from experience” [*Erfahrungsbegriffen*]. According to Meier, we receive some concepts directly from experience. This is precisely what Kant denies. All concepts, for him, are formed through abstraction, which is the source of their generality.

Kant claims that concepts are “grounded on the spontaneity of thinking” because they are general representations and this generality is acquired through abstraction.

Hence, they cannot be received, like sensations, because the understanding must actively form them. This constitutes a second proof for the discursivity of the understanding.

Since concepts must be actively formed through this faculty, its cognition consists of concepts.

3.1.3 The function of the understanding

It should be acknowledged that the argument I have just presented is actually a reconstruction of Kant’s reasoning. Kant does offer his own justification for his claim that concepts are “grounded on the spontaneity of thinking.” Unfortunately, its meaning is far less clear. Kant writes,

¹⁵ “Through a concept we understand, any representation or cognition of thing [*Sache*] in a thing [*Dinge*], which possess the capacity to think” (Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 409, §282). See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 69, §249.

¹⁶ Wolff also defines concepts in this way in his *Deutsche Logik*: “I call **a concept** any representation of thing in our thoughts” (Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit*, 123, §4, c. 1). In his metaphysics, he defines concepts more narrowly as representations of the “genera and species of things” [*Geschlechter und Arten der Dinge*]. In other words, they are general representations. See Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 152, §273.

¹⁷ “Experience is the very first way through which we acquire concepts of things. In childhood, the senses are the first, among all of the cognitive faculties, to be actualized. Therefore, sensations, among all concepts, are the first concepts that we receive, and by means of which we little by little obtain all the rest. Through sensations we understand concepts of actual and present things, and the capacity to sense is called sense.” See Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 416, §288. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 70, §255.

All intuitions, as sensible, rest on affections, concepts therefore on functions. By a function, however, I understand the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one. Concepts are therefore grounded on the spontaneity of thinking, as sensible intuitions are grounded on the receptivity of impressions.¹⁸

According to Kant, intuitions are based on affections and concepts are based on “functions” [*Function*]. He defines a function as “the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one.” Finally, he concludes that the concepts are “grounded on the spontaneity of thinking,” while intuitions are “grounded on the receptivity of impressions.” Kant reasoning in this passage is difficult follow. His definition of a function is fairly inscrutable. Consequently, it does not illuminate what Kant means when he asserts that concepts are based on functions. Nor does it explain why this proposition should entail that concepts are grounded on the spontaneity of the understanding.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth, the term “function” was primarily understood in two senses. First, it denoted something’s distinctive or primary activity. This meaning was employed by physiology to describe the organs of the body. For example, the function of the eyes is sight. The word “function” acquired a second meaning during this period when it became a technical term in mathematics. Leibniz first used this term to refer to an abstract formula that described a curve in space. It consisted of the set of operations necessary to generate this line. This idea was further developed by Bernoulli and his student, Euler. The notion of a mathematical function was eventually abstracted from its initial application in calculus. It came to denote any fixed

¹⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 68/B 93.

relationship between two variables. Thus, there were two basic concepts of a function during Kant's time. One was associated with physiology; the other with mathematics.¹⁹

Kant's definition of a function does not correspond with either of these concepts. It concerns the ordering of mental representations. We do not need to fully understand Kant's definition in order to recognize that it cannot possibly describe a mathematical function. Its narrow focus on mental content also makes it too specific to serve as a definition of physiological functions. For example, it could not apply to the function of an eye, let alone a hand or a liver. Kant must have something much more specific in mind. When he claims that intuitions are based on affections, Kant does not mean the affections of just any substance. He is specifically referring to the affections of the mind, which belong to sensibility. Likewise, Kant's use of the term "function" pertains to the functions of the mind. It denotes a mental function. We can go even further and infer that Kant specifically intends the functions of the understanding. He concludes from the fact that concepts are based on functions that they are also "grounded on the spontaneity of thinking." The higher faculty of cognition, or understanding (in the broad sense), consists in the spontaneity of our cognitive faculty.²⁰ The functions in question must therefore belong to this same faculty; they are functions of the understanding.

With this in mind, we can better understand Kant's otherwise cryptic definition of a function. The key is to recognize that it pertains specifically to the functions of the understanding. The function of this faculty consists in "ordering different representations under a common one." This means that it uses general concepts to collectively represent

¹⁹ Peter Schulthess offers an excellent summary of the history of the development of this concept. See Peter Schulthess, *Relation und Funktion. Eine systematische und entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zur theoretischen Philosophie Kants* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1981), 219-231.

²⁰ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 51/B 75.

other more determinate representations. For example, the concepts of pines, spruces, and firs are all represented by the more general concept of a tree. The intuitions of various horses are represented by the general concept of a horse. According to Kant, representations are organized hierarchically within the mind, ascending from the concrete to the abstract. Intuitions, which represent individual objects, are grouped together under general concepts that represent them all. These concepts are in turn represented by other still more abstract or general concepts. They are organized in terms of genera and species.²¹ The function of the understanding consists in finding general concepts to represent the more particular ones and intuitions. It thereby establishes a systematic order among the representations that populate our mind. Sensibility receives intuitions; the understanding conceptualizes this data and organizes it systematically in terms of genera and species.²²

²¹ In the *Critique of Power of Judgment*, Kant claims that the capacity to systematically organize our concepts in this way is actually a necessary condition for the possibility of experience. It is conceivable that nature could be so diverse that we could not discover general rules or concepts. However, such a world would be incomprehensible to us. We must therefore always assume that there is a systematic order present within nature and that it can be classified in terms of genera and species. Kant argues that the “purposiveness of nature” is a transcendental principle. A transcendental principle is an *a priori* condition for the possibility of cognition. Kant writes, “A transcendental principle is one through which the universal *a priori* condition under which alone things can become objects at all is represented” (Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5:182). The so-called “purposiveness of nature” refers to the idea that nature is constituted in a way that is comprehensible to us. We form empirical concepts on the basis of this principle. We proceed under the assumption that nature can be classified in terms of genera and species and that the empirical laws that we discover are ultimately derivable from the categories. See *ibid.*, 5:181-186. See also *idem*, “First Introduction,” 20:213-216.

²² This idea can be traced back to Kant’s *Inaugural Dissertation*. In his dissertation, Kant claims that the higher faculty of cognition, which he refers to as the intellect [*intelligentia*] or understanding [*intellectualia*], can be employed in two different ways. On the one hand, it has the capacity to conceive of its own *a priori* concepts without drawing upon any input from sensibility. He calls this the “real use” of this faculty. On the other hand, the higher faculty of cognition can also be applied to existing representations within the mind. It can compare these representations, identify the marks that they share in common, and form abstract concepts of increasing generality. Kant calls this the “logical use” of this faculty. The logical use of the higher faculty of cognition organizes representations within the mind by ordering them hierarchically. It forms general concepts to collectively represent more concrete or particular representations. See Kant, *Inaugural Dissertation*, 2:393.

We now understand the meaning of at least part of Kant's definition of a function; namely, what it means to order "different representations under a common one." It means to collectively represent multiple representations – either intuitions or concepts – through a general concept. However, this is still only part of Kant's definition. What does he mean when he writes that a function is "the unity of the action" of conceptualizing representations in this way?

I would argue that this expression denotes a general form or type of activity. Kant describes a function as "the unity of the action" – as opposed to simply calling it an "action" or an "activity" – in order to emphasize that he is not referring to the actual performance of a specific act. Instead, he means a general type of activity. It is a form of activity rather than a particular act.²³ The "unity" of the activity refers to what is necessarily shared by all examples of this act. It consists of just the essential or defining features of this activity. For example, we can refer generally to the act of driving a car. In doing so, we are not indicating any one specific act of driving, but rather the idea of driving in general. This activity consists of a number of more basic acts, e.g. steering, accelerating, etc, which together constitute the act of driving a car. They distinguish it from other similar activities, e.g. riding in a car. These features are shared by all acts of

²³ Klaus Reich argues that the "unity of an action" refers to an action or activity, insofar as we abstract from the conditions of its performance. We consider the action without reference to the cause or agent that is responsible for it. See Klaus Reich, *The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments*, trans. Jane Kneller and Michael Losonsky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 27. Michael Wolff, on the other hand, claims that the unity of an action is not a temporally discrete event, and that this distinguishes it from individual actions. The same unity of an action can be manifested by multiple actions. Actions are unique events. The unity of an action is atemporal. See Michael Wolff, *Die Vollständigkeit der Kantischen Urteilstafel. Mit einem Essay über Freges Begriffsschrift* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1995), 22. Reich and Wolff both agree that the "unity of an action" is different from the performance of this action. I share this view as well. Kant uses this curious expression, in order to clarify that he is referring to a general mode or type of activity, as opposed to specific acts.

driving. They constitute the unity of this activity. Thus, the unity of an action consists of just its defining features. It is an abstract conception of this activity.

As I explained earlier, Kant's definition of a function refers specifically to the function of the understanding. We can divide this definition into two parts. The first part ("the unity of the action") serves as a definition of functions in general. According to this definition, a function is a general type or form of activity, e.g. running, driving, cooking, etc.²⁴ The distinctive activity of the understanding consists in the use and formation of general concepts. It is the function of this specific cognitive faculty. Kant explains this point in the second part of the definition ("ordering different representations under a common one"). Together the two parts of this definition combine to describe the function of the understanding. It states that the primary function or activity of this faculty consists in the use and formation of general concepts.

3.2 Mediate Cognition

Thus far, Kant has argued that the understanding is a faculty of discursive cognition, which means that it represents objects with concepts. He offers two arguments in support of this proposition. First, the cognition of the understanding must consist of

²⁴ If this is true, then Kant's definition of a "function" is ultimately in keeping with the physiological sense of this term. It denotes the distinctive activity performed by the understanding. The organs of the body each have specific functions; the same is true of the understanding. Most scholars have agreed that Kant intends the term "function" in this way. See e.g., Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: Revised and Enlarged Edition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 137; Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant on the Human Standpoint* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 92-93; Wolff, *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel*, 20-22.

Michael Wolff mounts what is perhaps the best defense of a physiological interpretation of this word. He points to passages from the *Critique of Pure Reason* where Kant compares pure reason to an organism. These passages all concern the systematic nature of Kant's philosophy. The parts of an organism can only be understood in relation to the organism as a whole. Kant claims that the principles of his philosophy form a similar unity. They can only be understood in relation to the complete system. Kant describes this arrangement as organic. Based on these passages, Wolff claims that Kant conceives of the understanding as akin to an organ and that his use of the term "function" is inspired by this analogy. See *ibid.*, 20-21.

concepts because there are only two basic species of cognition: intuitions and concepts. The cognition of the understanding cannot consist of intuitions because human beings are only capable of receiving intuitions through sensibility. The understanding must therefore be a faculty of conceptual or discursive cognition. Second, concepts cannot be received like intuitions. They must be actively formed through a process of abstraction. Consequently, concepts are conceived through the spontaneity of the understanding. They are based on the function of this faculty in much the same way that intuitions are based on the affections of sensibility. The understanding is therefore the source for our discursive cognition.

Kant then claims that we cannot employ concepts without judgments. He writes, “Now the understanding can make no other use of these concepts than that of judging by means of them.”²⁵ The idea that concepts require judgments is not actually an original thesis. As I explained in chapter one, Wolff makes a very similar claim in the *Deutsche Metaphysik*.²⁶ Wolff wanted to show that both concepts and judgments are conceived through the understanding, a faculty that he defines as the capacity for distinct cognition. Kant is making a somewhat different point in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He wants to argue that the understanding is essentially a capacity for judgment. He has already established that this faculty is a capacity for discursive cognition, or cognition through concepts. Since concepts cannot be employed without judgments, and the cognition of the understanding consists of concepts, this faculty must also be a capacity for judgment.

²⁵ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 68/B 93.

²⁶ Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 157, §287.

However, before Kant draws this conclusion, he first clarifies what he means by a judgment. He defines a judgment as “the mediate cognition of an object.”²⁷ This definition is based on Kant’s distinction between intuitions and concepts. As we know, Kant distinguishes between these two kinds of cognition in two ways. First, they differ in terms of their generality. All intuitions are singular representations, which means that they represent a specific individual. Concepts, on the other hand, are representative of multiple objects. This is because they represent marks and all marks or properties are, at least potentially, shared by multiple objects. They are therefore general representations. Second, intuitions and concepts also differ in terms of their immediacy. Intuitions are immediate representations, which means that they are immediately related to their objects. Concepts, on the other hand, represent other representations. They either represent intuitions or other concepts. Hence, they do not directly represent their objects. Instead, they represent a representation of these objects. They are mediate representations. Judgments consist of concepts. They relate these concepts to their respective objects. Consequently, judgments are also a kind of mediate representation. They represent objects with concepts, which means that they do not represent these objects directly. They represent other representations. Kant writes, “Judgment is therefore the mediate cognition of an object, hence the representation of a representation of it.”²⁸

Kant provides an example of this mediated cognition. He writes,

So in the judgment, e.g., “**All bodies are divisible,**” the concept of the divisible is related to various other concepts; among these, however, it is here particularly related to the concept of body, and this in turn is related to certain appearances

²⁷ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 68/B 93.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, A 68/B 93.

that come before us. These objects are therefore mediately represented by the concept of divisibility.²⁹

According to this passage, a judgment relates concepts to an object. It relates the predicate of the judgment to its subject-term, which is itself related – albeit indirectly – to an object. The predicate is thereby related transitively to this object. In the case of Kant’s example, the judgment, “all bodies are divisible,” the concept of divisibility is related to the general notion of a body. The notion of a body is in turn related to “certain appearances.” These appearances are the objects that are denoted by that concept; namely, the set of things that are bodies. The judgment relates the predicate “divisibility” to these objects.

This example of judgment is intended to illustrate the mediate cognition of an object. The objects, which are cognized through this judgment, are collectively represented by the general concept of a body. The judgment also represents these same objects as things that are divisible. As a result, “these objects are therefore mediately represented by the concept of divisibility.” The concept of divisibility represents the concept of a body, and this concept in turn represents a set of objects or appearances, i.e. actual bodies. Thus, the concept of divisibility represents a representation of these objects. In other words, it represents them mediately.

Kant repeats this definition of judgment in *Logik Busolt*. These notes are thought to date from the 1780s.³⁰ In the section devoted to judgment, they state: “We cognize

²⁹ Ibid., A 68-69/B 93-94.

³⁰ This manuscript takes its title from the name inscribed on its cover: Gotthilf Christoph Wilhelm Busolt. Busolt was theology student at the *Albertina*. He matriculated on September, 23 1788. Busolt was not the actual author of the notes that bear his name. We know this because his handwriting on the cover differs from that of the notes themselves. This indicates that he purchased these notes as a study guide. In addition to signing his name, Busolt wrote on the cover: “The Logic or Doctrine of Reason [*Vernunftlehre*] of Professor Kant. Königsberg, the 8th of September 1790.” The date presumably indicates the date that

something immediately or mediately, i.e. we cognize our cognition of objects. Such a mediate cognition of the cognition of objects is a judgment.”³¹ In this context, the term “cognition” [*Erkenntniß*] is equivalent to representation – *Schulphilosophie* typically defined cognition in this way. Hence, Kant is claiming in these notes that a judgment is a representation of a representation, or a mediate cognition, just as he does in the metaphysical deduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Logik Busolt adds that this definition of judgment is superior to others because it can accommodate hypothetical and disjunctive judgments. In the 1787 edition of the first *Critique*, Kant criticizes the standard definition of judgment accepted by German *Schulphilosophie*. According to this definition, judgments consist of a relationship between concepts. Kant, himself, had defined judgments in this way in *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* and his early logic lectures. The problem with this definition is that it only fits categorical judgments. Hypothetical judgments and disjunctive judgments both concern the relationship between entire judgments. Hence, it is a mistake to describe a judgment as a merely conceptual relationship.³² According to *Logik Busolt*, all judgments, including hypothetical and disjunctive ones, can be accurately characterized as mediate cognitions. A mediate cognition represents an object through concepts. This is true of all judgments regardless of whether they relate mere concepts to each other or entire judgments. They are all examples of mediate or

Busolt acquired the logic notes. We can be certain that the notes were not produced after this date. However, since their author remains a mystery, they could potentially date from any time before 1790. We can narrow this timeframe considerably by looking at their content. It roughly corresponds with Kant’s positions in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and his other logic lectures from the 1780s: *Logik Pölitz* and the *Wiener Logik*. Hence, we can reasonably assume that they also stem from this period. See Gerhard Lehman, “Einleitung,” in *Kant’s gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1966), 24:980-981.

³¹ Kant, *Logik Busolt*, 24:661. See also idem, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3047, 16:631.

³² Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 140-141.

discursive cognition. Consequently, this definition avoids the problem outlined above. It applies to all forms of judgment.³³

Logik Busolt reveals something important about Kant's explanation of judgment in the metaphysical deduction. He explains mediate cognition through the example of a categorical judgment. The predicate of such a judgment represents the subject-term, which in turn represents certain objects. These objects are thereby represented mediately by the predicate. *Logik Busolt* suggests that we should not understand mediate cognition exclusively in terms of this example. Kant explains mediate cognition in terms of the relation between the subject and predicate of a categorical judgment, but this definition ought to describe hypothetical and disjunctive judgments as well. We should not read too much into this one example. Mediate cognition consists in the representation or cognition of objects through concepts and it is a characteristic of all forms of judgments, not just categorical ones.

3.3 The relationship between concepts and objects

Kant's example of mediate cognition is significant for another reason. It reveals an important feature of Kant's theory of judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It depicts judgments in a new way: as a relationship between concepts and objects. Wolff described judgments both in terms of the relationship between things and their properties and the relationship between the concepts that correspond with these things and properties. The former relationship is represented in the mind by the latter. Meier defined judgments exclusively in terms of the relationship between concepts. In *The*

³³ "With this definition of judgment, I cannot just consider concepts, since there are judgments where the relation of two concepts is necessary, i.e. categorical, but in others the relation of two or more judgments is necessary, i.e. in hypothetical and disjunctive ones. The first definition, that a judgment is a cognition of a cognition, thus remains arguably the best" (Kant, *Logik Busolt*, 24:662).

False Subtlety, Kant defines judgment as the comparison between things and potential marks. In *Logik Blomberg* and *Logik Philippi*, he defines it as the comparison between concepts. These are all examples of what I have termed the standard theory of judgment. It either describes judgments as the relationship between things and properties or the relationship between their corresponding concepts. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant describes judgments in a new way: they are a cognitive relationship between concepts and objects. He explains his definition of judgment as a “mediate cognition” with the example, “all bodies are divisible.” According to Kant, this judgment relates the concept of divisibility to the concept of a body. The concept of a body is in turn related to certain objects; namely, actual bodies. Both of these concepts are thereby related to the objects of this judgment.

Kant expands on this idea in some of his notes or *Reflexionen*. For example, he writes in *Reflexion* 3920,

With all judgments of the understanding it is like this [*Mit allen Urtheilen des Verstandes hat es folgende Bewandtnis*] . . . If any something x , which is cognized by means of a representation a , is compared with another concept b , either that it includes or excludes this concept, then this relation is in the judgment. This judgment is thus either the cognition of agreement or of conflict, so that in the thing x , which I know by means of the concept a , either b is contained as a partial concept and thus x , which is cognized through a , can also be cognized through b , or x negates the concept of b .³⁴

It will be easier to explain the meaning of this complicated passage if we first clarify the meaning of the three variables that Kant employs: a , b , and x . The variables a and b are both concepts. The variable x is an object that is represented by concept a . For example, if a is the concept of extension, then x is something extended. According to Kant, a

³⁴ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* 3920, 17:344-345. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from 1769.

judgment compares x (an object), which is already represented by concept a , with the concept b . The purpose of this comparison is to determine whether this object either “includes” or “excludes” b . B is a concept. What does it mean to say that a thing or object includes a concept? Kant means that the *representation* of this object includes the concept as part of its content. In other words, the concept is implicit in the representation of this object. For example, the representation of a body contains the concept of extension. As we know, concepts represent marks. Hence, if the representation of an object includes a certain concept, then this concept represents a mark of the object in question. Kant’s odd expression that something includes a concept is equivalent to asserting that it is characterized by a certain mark, which is represented by the concept. A judgment compares an object with a concept in order to determine whether this concept represents one of the object’s marks. The concept, which is compared, is the judgment’s *predicate*. Kant claims that the object of the judgment (x) is represented by concept a . It is then compared with concept b . A is the subject-term of this judgment and b is its predicate.

This scenario is perhaps easier to envisage with the help of an example. Let us suppose that a is the concept of extension and b is the concept of divisibility. X is an object that is represented by a ; it is something extended, e.g. a body. A judgment compares b with x in order to determine whether b (the concept of divisibility) represents a mark of x (something extended). This comparison yields the judgment: extended things are divisible. Kant writes that a judgment represents the “agreement” or “conflict” between an object (x) and the judgment’s predicate (b). If they agree then the object is represented by both the subject and predicate terms of this judgment. Both of these

concepts represent marks of the object in question. Kant writes, “*x*, which is cognized through *a*, can also be cognized through *b*.” However, if the object conflicts with the predicate, then it is not represented by this concept. It is represented by the judgment’s subject-term alone.

In the *Reflexion* that I have quoted from above, Kant retains the same language from his earlier accounts of judgment in *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* and his logic lectures. He continues to describe judgments as acts of comparison. However, he no longer claims that they compare things, as he does in *The False Subtlety*, or concepts, as he does in *Logik Blomberg* and *Logik Philippi*. Instead, he now states that judgments compare *things* with *concepts*. Kant’s assertion that judgments represent “agreement” [*Übereinstimmung*] or “conflict” [*Widersteits*] is also reminiscent of Meier’s position in the *Vernunftlehre* that the logical relationship between concepts concerns their “agreement” or “conflict” [*Streit*].³⁵ However, Kant now states that a judgment represents the agreement or conflict between an object, which is represented by the judgment’s subject-term, with its predicate, rather than the agreement or conflict between these two concepts. This shows that Kant conceives of judgments in a new way. The standard theory of judgment accepted by Wolff, Meier, and the early Kant defines judgment as a conceptual relationship. However, in the *Reflexion* above, Kant describes it as cognitive relationship between concepts and objects.

The *Reflexion* that I have quoted from is not an exception or an outlier. Kant describes judgments as a relationship between concepts and objects in many of his

³⁵ Cf. Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 484, §325.

notes.³⁶ I examine some of these fragments in further detail in chapter four, which is devoted to Kant's *Reflexionen*.

Before moving on, we should clarify the meaning of the term "object," because it is ontologically imprecise. On the one hand, it can denote an actual mind independent object, what Strawson famously termed an object in the "weighty" sense.³⁷ It can also refer to an object of thought, a representational or intentional object. What kind of object is cognized or represented through a judgment? Kant does not specify which sense of objectivity he intends in the metaphysical deduction. Nonetheless, we can safely assume that when he writes about objects [*Gegenstände*] in this chapter, he is referring to objects of thought. It is unlikely that Kant would limit judgments solely to mind-independent objects. Moreover, thinking consists of judgments. Kant equates discursive cognition with thinking.³⁸ He also argues that discursive cognition consists of judgments, because discursive cognition consists of concepts and concepts can only be employed through judgments. We can therefore infer that thinking consists of judgments. Indeed, Kant equates thinking and judging in the *Prolegomena*.³⁹ Since thinking consists of judgments, the objects of these judgments must be objects of thoughts. Thus, when Kant defines a judgment as "the mediate cognition of an object" he is referring to an

³⁶ See e.g., Kant, *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* 3921, 17:345-346; idem, *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* 4634, 17:616-617; idem, *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* 4676, 17:657.

³⁷ In *The Bounds of Sense*, Strawson distinguishes between two senses of objectivity. The first one denotes objects of thought. Strawson describes such an object as "a particular instance of a general concept." Merely hypothetical objects fit this definition. Hence, anything that can be conceived in thought would qualify as an object in this loose sense. Strawson contrasts this broad definition of objectivity with what he famously terms the "weighty" sense of an object. A so-called "weighty" object exists independently of the mind. He writes, "To know something about an object . . . is to know something that holds irrespective of the occurrence of any particular state of consciousness" (P.F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1966), 73).

³⁸ "Thinking is cognition through concepts" (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 69/B 94).

³⁹ "Therefore, thinking is the same as judging or as relating representations to judgments in general" (Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*, 4:304).

intentional or representational object, rather than one that necessarily exists

independently of the mind.^{40,41}

⁴⁰ In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant employs two different words to denote objects: *Gegenstand* and *Object*. Henry Allison once argued that Kant used these two terms to distinguish between two different senses of objectivity. According to Allison, the word *Object* denotes an object of thought. It “encompasses anything that can serve as the subject in a judgment” (Henry Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983], 135). Hence, it includes mathematical objects, like the number π , intelligible objects, like the concept of justice, and even entirely hypothetical ones, like Cyclopes or Griffins. Anything that can be conceived in thought qualifies as an *Object*. Allison argues that the term *Gegenstand* is more restrictive. It denotes an “object of possible experience” (ibid., 135). It is akin to what Strawson termed objects in the “weighty” sense. Allison acknowledges this similarity but argues that his position is actually different from Strawson’s. He points out that Strawson comes very close to equating weighty objects with external ones. Allison denies that *Gegenstände* are necessarily objects of outer sense. See ibid., 136. In any case, according to Allison, the word *Object* denotes an intentional object or object of thought, but a *Gegenstand* actually exists independently of the mind. Hence, they signify two different conceptions of objectivity; the former is much broader than the latter. Allison drew his distinction between the meanings of these two terms in the first edition of *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, which was published in 1983. He has since abandoned it. When Allison published a revised edition of *Kant’s Transcendental Deduction* in 2004, he conceded that his distinction between a *Gegenstand* and an *Object* did not stand up to scrutiny. He writes, “This has been objected to on philological grounds by a number of critics, and as a result of further reflection on the matter I have come to realize that introducing these considerations was both misleading and unnecessary to my main goal of determining the relation between the two parts of the argument [the B-Deduction]” (Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism* [2004], 476n). The metaphysical deduction is one instance where Allison’s distinction between *Gegenstand* and *Object* breaks down. He uses the term *Gegenstand* to denote the object of a judgment. According to Allison, a *Gegenstand* is an object of possible experience. However, the objects of judgments are only intentional objects, or objects of thought. Otherwise, thinking would not be equivalent to judgment.

⁴¹ Rudolf Makkreel offers another explanation of the difference between an *Object* and a *Gegenstand*. He argues that Kant reserves the term, *Gegenstand*, for objects that have been schematized by the imagination. This means that the intuitions of these objects have been synthesized by the imagination in accordance with the categories. An *Object* is an object whose representation has not yet been subjected to this synthesis. Thus, the difference between a *Gegenstand* and an *Object* is based on the mediation of the imagination. The former is schematized; the latter is not. Makkreel writes, “The difference between *Objekt* and *Gegenstand* is between an unmediated object and an object mediated by the schemata of the imagination” (Rudolf Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994], 41). Makkreel points out that even in the B-Deduction, Kant refers to some mind-independent objects as *Objecte*. For example, in §21, Kant claims that intuitions are given to the understanding “through the object” [*durch Object*] (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 145). According to Allison, an *Object* is an intentional object, or object of thought. However, here Kant uses this term to refer to an object of outer sense. It is a mind-independent object and therefore ought to be a *Gegenstand*. Makkreel argues that Kant’s use of this term does not correspond with the distinction that Allison draws between an *Object* and a *Gegenstand*. The difference between them does not actually concern the ontological status of the objects themselves. Instead, it is based on the *meaning* that we attribute to them. An object can exist independently of the mind. However, if we perceive it as a merely subjective appearance, it remains an *Object*. A *Gegenstand* is an objective appearance, i.e. an appearance to which we attribute objectivity and take to be representative of an actual thing in itself. The appearance of an *Object* is transformed into the objective representation of a *Gegenstand* by the imagination. It synthesizes the manifold of intuition in accordance with the categories.

3.4 Functions of unity among our representations

Before we proceed any further, it is worth summarizing what we know so far. In the opening section of the metaphysical deduction, Kant argues that the understanding is a capacity for conceptual or discursive cognition. He then claims that concepts cannot be employed by the mind without judgments. Kant defines a judgment as “the mediate cognition of an object.” This means that judgments represent their objects with concepts. Concepts are mediate representations, which means that they do not represent their objects directly, like intuitions. They represent other mental representations, i.e. intuitions or other concepts. Kant illustrates what it means to represent an object mediately, through concepts with the example, “all bodies are divisible.” The concept of divisibility represents the concept of a body, which in turn represents certain objects: actual bodies. These objects are represented mediately by the concept of divisibility.

Let us now return our attention to Kant’s argument in section one of the metaphysical deduction. After defining a judgment as “the mediate cognition of an object,” he proposes a second, complementary definition. He writes that judgments are “functions of unity among our representations.” This definition is intentionally vague. Kant wants to argue that the understanding uses the same basic function or activity to unify the pure manifold of intuition that it uses to form logical judgments. He will claim

Makkreel recognizes a subtlety in how Kant uses the terms *Object* and *Gegenstand* that Allison ignores. However, it would still be a mistake to assume that Kant consistently observes a distinction between the meanings of these two terms. In the metaphysical deduction, Kant refers to the objects of a judgment as *Gegenstände*. He is not referring only to schematized objects. If this were the case, then we would have to intuit an object before we could form judgments about it. It is just as implausible that Kant would restrict his claims to schematized objects as that he would restrict them to mind-independent ones. It is possible that Kant draws a consistent distinction between *Objecte* and *Gegenstände* in the B-Deduction. However, even if this is true, the metaphysical deduction still predates this distinction by at least eight years. We should not attribute any significance to the fact that Kant refers to the object of a judgment as a *Gegenstand*, rather than an *Object*.

that this function or activity is judgment. Hence, he needs a definition of judgment that is loose enough to fit both transcendental apperception and more standard propositional judgments. Kant argues that all judgments bring together and unite mental representations. Insofar as we regard them as a kind of mental act, this act consists in the unification of representations within consciousness.⁴² Hence, they can be described as “functions of unity among our representations.” Judgments unite our representation in two basic ways.

First, it unites representations under general concepts. Representations can be united by collectively representing them with a single concept. We thereby grasp all of these representations together through this one concept. For example, the concepts of pines, spruces, and firs are all represented by the concept of a tree. We can grasp all three species through one general concept that represents them all. The represented concepts are united under the general one. As we know, judgments use concepts to represent their objects. This is what it means to describe them as mediate cognition. The act of representing or cognizing an object with concepts unites otherwise discrete representations within the mind.

Kant justifies his second definition of judgments as “functions of unity among our representations” by arguing that judgments unite representations in this way, i.e. under concepts. He writes,

⁴² In the B-Deduction, Kant adds that judgments unite representations in a way that is *objectively valid*. This objectivity distinguishes judgments from mere associations. The reproductive imagination brings together different representations in accordance with the law of association. However, associations are merely subjectively valid. This means that they merely express how different representations happen to be related in the mind of a particular individual. Judgments, on the other hand, are objectively valid. This means that they are representative of actual objects. See *ibid.*, B 141-142. I further discuss this distinction in chapter five, which is concerned with Kant’s account of judgment in the B-Deduction.

All judgments are accordingly functions of unity among our representations, since instead of an immediate representation a higher one, which comprehends this and other representations under itself, is used for the cognition of the object, and many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one.⁴³

As I explained earlier, Kant defines intuitions as “immediate representations.” One way of reading the above passage is to interpret this expression literally and treat it as a synonym for intuition. In this case, Kant is claiming that judgments represent their objects with general concepts rather than simply intuiting them directly. These concepts are representative of other mental representations, including our intuitions of the objects that are cognized through the judgments. As a result, “many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one.” Kant means that the many intuitions and concepts that are collectively represented by a single general concept are united under it. In this context, the term “cognition” is simply a generic term for intuitions and concepts.⁴⁴ According to Kant, a judgment represents its object with a general concept rather than an intuition. This concept represents the intuition along with other cognitions, i.e. intuitions and concepts. These cognitions are “thereby drawn together into one,” which is to say that they are united under the concept that represents them all.

It is also possible to interpret this passage in a slightly different way. The expression, “immediate representation,” can be taken, not as a definition of intuition, but rather as a relative term, which can be applied to concepts as well. In this case, the

⁴³ Ibid., A 69/B 94.

⁴⁴ In the so-called *Stufenleiter* passage, Kant claims that there are two species of cognitions: intuitions and concepts. Human cognition, of course, involves the combination of both intuitions and concepts. However, Kant is open to the possibility of non-human minds, which are not bound by these conditions, e.g. intuitive intellects. Moreover, both intuitions and concepts fit Kant’s definition of cognition: “an objective perception.” Kant defines a perception as a “representation with consciousness” – like Leibniz and Wolff, Kant believes that the mind or soul contains many representations that are entirely obscure and exist below the threshold of consciousness. Thus, a cognition, for Kant, is the conscious representation of an object. Both intuitions and concepts represent objects. Insofar as we are aware or conscious of them, they both qualify as cognitions. See *ibid.*, A 32/B 377.

representation within a judgment, which stands in the most direct or immediate relation to an object, is an immediate representation. For example, in a categorical judgment, the subject-term is related more immediately to the object of this judgment than the predicate. Hence, it can be described as an immediate representation in comparison with the predicate.⁴⁵ In some categorical judgments – namely, ones that are both analytic and affirmative – the predicate is representative of the concept that serves as the judgment’s subject-term. For example, in the judgment, “all bodies are divisible,” the concept of a body is represented by the concept of divisibility. The concept of a body consists of a manifold of different marks, one which is divisibility. However, this concept is not the only one to bear this mark. Other concepts contain the concept of divisibility as one of their marks as well, e.g. matter and extension. These concepts of various divisible things can all be collectively represented by the concept of divisibility of general. In the judgment, “all bodies are divisible,” the concept of a body can be regarded as an “immediate representation” in comparison to the concept of divisibility. It stands in a more immediate relation to the objects of this judgment than the predicate. The judgment unites this more “immediate representation” under a “higher one,” the concept of divisibility. The subject-term is united with other representations under the predicate.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ This interpretation is supported by *Reflexion* 3047. Kant writes, “Judgment is the mediate cognition of a representation through another representation. The relation of the mediate representation to the immediate one is (the relation in the judgment or) the form. [The] subject is the immediate representation, [the] predicate is the mediate one” (Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3047, 16:631). In the final sentence of this passage, Kant claims that the subject of a categorical judgment is an immediate representation and that the predicate is a mediate one. The subject-term of a judgment is a concept. However, it still stands in a more immediate relation to the object of the judgment than the predicate.

⁴⁶ Michael Wolff offers yet another explanation of explanation of how judgments “draw together” possible cognitions. He claims that they combine the cognitions of multiple objects into a single act. In order to see how this is possible, we need to reflect on how a judgment works. According to Kant, a judgment relates its predicate to its subject, which in turn is related to certain intuitions. These intuitions are immediately related to the actual objects of the judgment. Since the subject of a judgment is a concept, it can represent multiple intuitions at the same time. When we relate the predicate to the subject-term, we also relate it to

Thus, judgments can unite representations under concepts in two different ways. First, by representing an object with a general concept, in lieu of an intuition, a judgment can unite the intuitions of multiple objects under this one concept. It unites these intuitions under its *subject-term*. Second, a judgment can also unite its subject-term with other concepts under its *predicate*.

Kant argument can be summarized thusly. He first defines judgments as mediate cognitions. He then claims that mediate cognition, or the indirect representation of objects through concepts, results in the unification of representations under these concepts. This can occur in two ways: the subject of a categorical judgment can represent the intuitions of its objects or the predicate of these judgments can represent the subject-term (and by extension its objects). In both cases, the represented cognitions are united under the concepts that represent them. Consequently, judgments are mental acts that unite representations under concepts, or as Kant puts it, they are “functions of unity among our representations.” His second definition of judgment follows from his first one. The mediate cognition of objects with concepts results in the unification of representations under these concepts.

Earlier I mentioned that judgments unite representations in two ways. They can unite representations under concepts. They also unite the representations, which serve as the terms of a judgment, into a single cognition. Categorical judgments consist of concepts, i.e. the subject and predicate terms. Hypothetical and disjunctive judgments are

all of representations that are contained under this concept, including the intuitions. Thus, the judgment relates the predicate to each of the intuitions that are collectively represented by the subject-term, and by extension to their objects. Instead of relating the predicate to each of these objects individually, we relate it to the subject-term, which represents them all. According to Wolff, when Kant writes that in a judgment “many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one,” he means that it combines the cognitions of multiple objects into a single act. See Wolff, *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel*, 83.

both compounds of other judgments. In every judgment, regardless of its form, these representations are combined into one cognition; namely, the judgment itself. A judgment is a unity of more basic representations.

Kant emphasizes this form of unification in his logic lectures. For example, the *Wiener Logik* defines judgment as the “the representation of the unity in a relation of many cognitions.”⁴⁷ These notes subsequently explains exactly what this unity consists in: “If one thinks two representations as they are combined together and together constitute one cognition, this is a judgment. In every judgment, then, there is a certain relation of different representations insofar as they belong to *one* cognition.”⁴⁸ In other words, a judgment unites the representations, which constitute its terms, into a single cognition. Depending on its form, it unites its subject and predicate, its antecedent and consequent, or its pair of disjuncts. Kant also defines judgments in this way in the *Prolegomena*. He writes, “The unification of representations in a consciousness is judgment.”⁴⁹ He means that it represents the relationship between representations within the mind. In doing so, it unites these representations into a single cognition: the judgment itself.

Thus, judgments unite representations in two ways: they unite representations under general concepts and they unite the representations, which serve as their terms, into a single cognition. Kant emphasizes the former in the metaphysical deduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He justifies his definition of judgments as “functions of unity among our representations” by arguing that the mediate cognition of objects results in the

⁴⁷ Kant, *Vienna Logic*, 24:928. See also idem, *Logik Pölitz*, 24:577.

⁴⁸ Kant, *Vienna Logic*, 24:928.

⁴⁹ Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*, 4:304.

unification of representations under concepts. This supports his subsequent claim that the understanding unites the pure manifold of intuition through the same basic functions that it uses to form propositional judgments. The synthesis and unification of this pure manifold actually counts as a kind of judgment for Kant. It is an act of conceptual unification. It unites the manifold of representations, which are contained in our pure intuitions of space and time, under the pure concepts of the understanding. Nonetheless, this is clearly not the only way that judgments unite representations. They also unite the representations, which serve as their terms, into a single cognition, the judgment itself. Kant emphasizes this form of unification in the *Prolegomena* and his logic lectures from the 1780s. His definition of judgments as “functions of unity among our representations” is broad enough to encompass both of these forms of unification. The term “representation” can refer to both the extension of a general concept and the terms of a judgment. Judgments unite them both.

3.4 Judgment and the understanding

Kant first defines a judgment as “the mediate cognition of an object.” He then argues that mediate cognition results in the unification of representations under general concepts. This leads to his second definition of judgment: they are “functions of unity among our representations.” In other words, a judgment is a mental act that unites representations within the mind.⁵⁰ The purpose of these two definitions is to clarify precisely what Kant means by a judgment. He has already asserted that we cannot employ concepts without judgments and he will go on to argue that the understanding is actually a capacity for judgment. In order to understand these claims, we need to know

⁵⁰ Kant later adds in the B-Deduction that a judgment unites representations in an objectively valid manner. See n. 42.

what a judgment is. Having clarified the meaning of this term, Kant completes his argument in section one of the metaphysical deduction and draws his conclusion. He states that every “action” [*Handlung*] of the understanding involves judgments and that consequently this faculty must be a capacity for judgment.⁵¹ Kant writes, “We can, however, trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the **understanding** in general can be represented as a **faculty for judging** [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*].”⁵²

This is not actually a new or original thesis. Kant advanced this same idea almost twenty years earlier in *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* (1762). In the conclusion to this essay, he argued that the higher faculty of cognition was a capacity for

⁵¹ Reinhard Brandt has argued that the expression “actions of the understanding” [*Handlungen des Verstandes*] is actually a technical term with a very precise meaning, one that he assumed his readers would immediately recognize. Traditional logic focuses on three basic types of mental acts: concepts, judgments, and inferences. Concepts are combined to form propositions or judgments, judgments are combined to form inferences, and these inferences are ultimately combined to form entire proofs or arguments. The logic textbooks of German *Schulphilosophie* were organized according to this principle. They began with a doctrine of concepts, which taught how to form clear and distinct ideas, followed by a doctrine of judgments and a doctrine of inferences. The former was an account of propositional logic; the latter addressed syllogistics. Brandt argues that when Kant refers to “actions of the understanding” he has precisely these mental acts in mind. The “actions of the understanding” are concepts, judgments, and inferences. See Reinhard Brandt, *Die Urteilstafel. Kritik der reinen Vernunft A67-76; B92-201* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1991), 53-55. See also Wolff, *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel*, 23-24. Kant acknowledges this doctrine in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the introduction to the analytic of principles, he claims that the three higher cognitive faculties – the understanding (in the narrow sense), the power of judgment, and reason – correspond with the three species of mental activity that are studied by logic – concepts, judgments, and inferences. Brandt also points out two further passages from *Logik Busolt* (24:653) and *Logik Wien* (24:904), where Kant again endorses this threefold division. Brandt emphasizes the importance of this doctrine because his thesis that the “actions of the understanding” are concepts, judgments, and inferences is the basis for his interpretation of Kant’s table of judgment. He argues that three of its headings, quantity, quality, and relation, correspond to the functions responsible for the three basic mental acts studied by traditional logic: concepts, judgments, and inferences. The fourth heading, modality, corresponds with a special fourth act that Brandt adds to the list of the standard three. It is the capacity to situate a possible judgment within our thoughts; namely, by establishing whether its content is merely possible, actual, or even necessary. Brandt associates it with the fourth and final part of the Port-Royal Logic: the doctrine of method. Brandt’s thesis is that the table of judgments systematically enumerates the actions of the understanding. The logic of the seventeenth and eighteenth century taught that these actions fell under at least three basic headings: concepts, judgments, and inferences. The table of judgment’s fourth heading, modality, corresponds with the doctrine of method. See Brandt, *Die Urteilstafel*, 61-72.

⁵² Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 69/B 94.

judgment. The term “understanding” has two distinct meanings in Kant’s philosophy. It can denote the higher faculty of cognition. It can also refer to one of the three sub-faculties that compose the higher faculty of cognition. I describe the former as the broad sense of the understanding and the latter as its narrow sense. Unfortunately, Kant does not always clearly distinguish between these two senses in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Nonetheless, we can still be quite certain about how Kant uses this term in the metaphysical deduction: he intends it in the broad sense. Kant initially defines the understanding as “a non-sensible faculty of cognition.” He contrasts it with sensibility. Sensibility is a synonym for the lower faculty of cognition.⁵³ The understanding, in this context, must be equivalent to the higher faculty of cognition, since Kant opposes it to the lower faculty. On the basis of this initial definition, he then infers that the understanding is also a capacity for discursive cognition and finally that it is a capacity for judgment. These subsequent definitions follow from the first one. Since Kant initially defines the understanding in the broad sense, his subsequent definitions should also pertain to the broad sense of this word. Thus, when Kant claims that the understanding is a capacity for judgment, he is referring to the higher faculty of cognition. As we know from chapter one, he had already argued that the higher faculty of cognition was a “capacity to judge” [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*] in *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures*.

Although this thesis is not a new one, Kant does offer a new argument on its behalf. In *The False Subtlety*, he had demonstrated that each of the sub-faculties, which compose the higher faculty of cognition, was exercised through acts of judgment. When he wrote this essay, Kant still held that there were just two higher cognitive faculties: the

⁵³ Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:140-141; 196.

understanding and reason – the power of judgment is an innovation of the mid-1770s. He defined the understanding as the capacity for distinct cognition and reason as the capacity for syllogistic inferences. Kant argued that distinct concepts are formed through judgments and that syllogisms are actually a kind of judgment. Thus, both faculties are exercised through judgments. Since the higher faculty of cognition consists of the understanding and reason, it must be a general capacity for judgment.

Kant takes a different approach in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He argues that the entire higher faculty of cognition, or the understanding (in the broad sense), is a capacity for discursive or conceptual cognition. However, we cannot employ concepts without judgments. Therefore, the understanding must also be a capacity for judgment. Let us now take a close look at the details of this argument.

Kant writes, “For [*denn*] according to what has been said above it [the understanding] is a faculty for thinking. Thinking is cognition through concepts.”⁵⁴ Kant’s use of the word *denn* is significant. Guyer and Woods translate it as “for” but it could also be rendered as “because” or “since.” It indicates that what follows is intended to justify Kant’s previous claim that the understanding is a capacity for judgment. Kant refers back to his earlier statement that this faculty is a capacity for discursive cognition. He now states that it is a capacity for thinking. Thinking and discursive cognition are equivalent.⁵⁵ They both consist in “cognition through concepts.”⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 69/B 94.

⁵⁵ In §22 of the B-Deduction, Kant draws a distinction between thinking and cognition. Thinking consists of concepts alone, but cognition involves a combination of both intuitions and concepts. Kant writes, “To **think** of an object and to **cognize** an object are thus not the same. For two components belong to cognition: first, the concept, through which an object is thought at all (the category), and second, the intuition, through which it is given” (ibid., B 146). When Kant defines the understanding as the capacity for discursive cognition in the metaphysical deduction, he does not mean cognition in the strong sense that he later defines in the B-Deduction. Instead, he simply means the representation of an object. Discursive

Earlier Kant claimed that we cannot employ concepts without judgments.⁵⁷ At the time he offered no explanation for this idea. It was presented as a mere assertion. Having now clarified what he means by a judgment, Kant returns to this claim. He also finally explains why concepts require judgments. According to Kant, concepts do not represent their objects directly. They represent other representations. Kant argues that the indirect or mediated relationship between concepts and their objects takes the form of a judgment. Hence, concepts are related to their objects through judgments. He writes, “Concepts, however, as predicates of possible judgments, are related to some representation of a still undetermined object [*Gegenstand*].”⁵⁸ Here Kant asserts that all concepts are related to their objects through other representations. A concept is related to a representation – either an intuition or another concept –, which in turn represents an object. For this reason, it is a predicate of a possible judgment. The mediated relationship between the concept, the representation, and its object forms a judgment, in which the concept serves as the predicate. The more immediate representation of the object would serve as the subject-term of this judgment.

cognition represents objects with concepts, as opposed to intuitions. Kant’s predecessors equated cognition with representation. To represent something is to cognize it, and vice versa. For example, Wolff writes, “As soon as we can represent a thing then we cognize it” (Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 154, §278). In the metaphysical deduction, Kant uses the term, “cognition,” in this same broad sense, rather than the narrower sense that he later defines in the B-Deduction. Hence, he does not violate his distinction between thinking and cognition, when he equates thinking with discursive cognition. In the metaphysical deduction, the term, “cognition,” is equivalent to “representation.” When we think of an object, we represent it with concepts. Consequently, thinking is equivalent to discursive cognition. They both represent objects with concepts.

⁵⁶ Michael Wolff suggests that the reason that Kant switches his terminology, and describes the understanding as a capacity for *thinking* rather than *discursive cognition*, is to avoid a potential misunderstanding. In both cases, Kant means that the cognition of the understanding consists of concepts. Both discursive cognition and thinking are equivalent to “cognition through concepts.” However, Wolff points out the term *discursus* is closely associated with reasoning or *rationcinatio*. He speculates that Kant wanted to avoid any impression that he was referring to just the faculty of reason, when he is in fact referring to the entire higher faculty of cognition. He describes it as capacity for thinking, in order to avoid any confusion regarding this point. See Wolff, *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel*, 95.

⁵⁷ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 68/B 93.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, A 69/B 94.

Kant illustrates this point with an example. He writes,

The concept of body thus signifies something, e.g., metal, which can be cognized through that concept. It is therefore a concept only because other representations are contained under it by means of which it can be related to objects. It is therefore the predicate for a possible judgment, e.g. ‘every metal is a body.’”⁵⁹

The general concept of a body represents many things; its extension encompasses the entire world. However, in order to actually represent any of these things, this concept must be related to a more immediate representation. This is because concepts do not represent their objects directly. They must represent another mental representation of their object. Kant reiterates this point in the above passage. He claims that a representation is a concept “only because other representations are contained under it by means of which it can be related to objects.” In other words, it is general representation of a mark, which can pertain to multiple objects. The representations of these objects, as well as the objects themselves, “are contained under it,” which means that they belong to the concept’s extension. Hence, a concept not only represents its objects, it represents other representations; it is a mediate representation. Moreover, it is related to its objects through the representations that it represents. In the case of Kant’s example, the range of objects that are collectively represented by the concept of a body includes everything that is metal. These things are also represented by the concept of metal in general. The concept of a body is related to these specific objects, i.e. metals, through the concept of metal. The concept of a body represents the concept of metal, which in turn represents the actual metal objects. This mediated relationship constitutes a judgment, and, as Kant observes, the concept of a body is the predicate of this judgment.

⁵⁹ Ibid., A 69/B 94.

Since concepts cannot represent their objects directly, they must represent another mental representation, which in turn represents their objects. However, this relationship is a judgment. Thus, concepts are related to their objects through judgments. Since judgments are required to relate concepts to their objects, we cannot employ concepts without them, just as Kant asserted earlier.

Once Kant has established that the understanding cannot employ concepts without judgments his argument is complete. He has already defined this faculty as a capacity for discursive cognition or thinking. Discursive cognition consists of concepts. However, we cannot employ concepts without judgments. Therefore, discursive cognition must also consist of judgments. Since concepts cannot be employed without judgments and the understanding is a capacity for discursive cognition, Kant concludes that this faculty must also be a capacity for judgment.

This thesis plays a crucial role in the metaphysical deduction of the categories. Since the understanding is a capacity for judgment, Kant reasons that the basic functions of this faculty are the very same mental functions that unite representations through judgments. Consequently, we can discover the former by identifying the latter. An analysis of judgment can reveal the functions of the understanding. Kant writes, “The functions of the understanding can therefore all be found together if one can exhaustively exhibit the functions of unity in judgment.”⁶⁰ Kant is interested in the functions of the understanding because we use them to unite the manifold intuition. The understanding unites the representations in a judgment and it unites the manifold of representations in an intuition. It has both a logical and a transcendental use. Moreover, Kant argues that the

⁶⁰ Ibid., A 69/B 94.

understanding performs both of these roles with the same basic functions. It uses the same functions to unite the representations in a judgment and the manifold of representations that compose an intuition. He writes, “The same function that gives unity to the different representations **in a judgment** also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations **in an intuition.**”⁶¹ The categories are representations of the essential functions that the understanding uses to unite the manifold of intuition. Since the understanding uses these same functions to form logical judgments, we can infer the table of categories from the table of judgment. They are both expressions of the same functions of the understanding.

In the second section of the metaphysical deduction, which is entitled “On the logical function of the understanding in judgments,” Kant claims that we can discover the basic functions or mental acts, which are involved in judgment, by abstracting from their content and focusing only on their form. When we examine the form of a judgment in this way, we find that all judgments share four basic features in common. Every judgment has a quantity, a quality, a relation, and a modality. These four basic features are each the result of an action or function of the understanding. Kant writes, “If we abstract from all content of a judgment in general, and attend only to the mere form of the understanding in it, we find that the function of thinking in that can be brought under four titles, each of which contains under itself three moments.”⁶²

What Kant means when he claims that the “function of thinking,” which is involved in judgment, “can be brought under four titles” can be somewhat puzzling. Fortunately, the notes from his logic lectures clarify this otherwise cryptic expression. In

⁶¹ Ibid., A 79/B 104-105.

⁶² Ibid., A 70/B 95.

these lectures, Kant describes the four titles of the table judgment as the basic actions [*Handlungen*] of the understanding. For example, *Logik Pölitz* states, “We now turn to the actions of the understanding, which are in every judgment. They can be reduced to the following 4. Judgments can be regarded according to 1.) quality . . . 2.) quantity . . . 3.) relation . . . 4. modality”⁶³ Thus, every judgment involves a combination of four basic mental acts that are performed by the understanding. These actions are responsible for the quantity, quality, relation, and modality of a judgment. Each of these actions can, in turn, be performed in three possible ways. These are the “moments” that Kant claims are contained under each of the four titles. For example, depending on whether a judgment is categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive, it either relates concepts to each other, grounds to their consequences, or a pair of disjuncts. In each case, this relation is established through the same basic action of the understanding [*Verstandeshandlung*]. These actions are different ways of uniting representations in consciousness. If judgments are functions of unity, then these actions are the sub-functions that constitute this form of activity.

3.6 A new theory of judgment?

In the metaphysical deduction, Kant infers the categories from the logical functions of the understanding. He argues that these concepts are actually representations of the functions of the understanding that we employ to unite the manifold of intuition. Since the understanding is essentially a capacity for judgment. It must employ the same basic mental functions to unite the manifold of intuition that we also use to unite representations through an ordinary propositional judgment.

⁶³ Kant, *Logik Pölitz*, 24:577. See also idem, *Vienna Logic*, 24:929.

Kant's strategy in the metaphysical deduction is to derive the most fundamental metaphysical concepts, i.e. the categories, from a body of knowledge that is already certain and widely-accepted; namely, general logic. He writes in the preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* that this science "seems to all appearance to be finished and complete."⁶⁴ He also writes, "Since the time of Aristotle it has not had to go a single step backwards, unless we count the abolition of a few dispensable subtleties or the more distinct determination of its presentation."⁶⁵ The table of judgment, which enumerates the logical functions of the understanding, belongs to general logic. As I explained earlier, Kant infers the categories from these same functions of the mind. In doing so, he derives the categories, which belong to metaphysics, from general logic.

In order for this strategy to work, Kant's account of judgment must be uncontroversial to his readers. Otherwise, he could not appeal to the certitude of general logic to ground his argument. However, he must also broaden his definition of judgment so that it encompasses more than just propositional judgments. Kant wants to argue that the unification of the manifold of intuition also qualifies as a kind of judgment. This unity is achieved through the same basic functions of the understanding that are responsible for the formation of propositional judgments. His second definition of judgments, as "functions of unity among our representations," is calculated to be broad enough to fit both standard propositional judgments and the unification of the manifold of intuition. They are both mental acts that unite different representations within one's consciousness. Thus, there is a tension in the metaphysical deduction between Kant's

⁶⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B viii.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, B viii.

attempt to ground his argument in general logic and his redefinition of judgment. On the one hand, he claims that general logic was essentially completed by Aristotle and does not require further improvement. On the other hand, he expands his definition of judgment to include the unification of intuitions.

In chapter one, I outlined the basic features of what I termed the standard theory of judgment. This was the prevailing view of judgment accepted by German *Schulphilosophie*. I now want to clarify precisely how Kant's account of judgment in the metaphysical deduction differs from the standard theory. Kant himself is reluctant to emphasize these differences because he wants to ground his argument in the metaphysical deduction on the supposedly complete science of general logic. He cannot revise both logic and metaphysics, because he appeals to the stability of the former to support his critique of the latter. For this reason, his account of judgment, which should belong to general logic, is not intended to be controversial. Kant claims that his table of judgment only departs "from the customary technique of the logicians" [*von der gewohnten Technik der Logiker*] in non-essential ways.⁶⁶ Nonetheless, there are important differences between Kant's account of judgment and the standard theory accepted by German *Schulphilosophie*.

I will start by examining Kant's two definitions of judgment in the metaphysical deduction. Kant first defines a judgment as "the mediate cognition of an object." He means that judgments represent their objects through concepts. None of Kant's rationalist predecessors would disagree with this claim. He does define *concepts* differently than these other philosophers. This is worth noting because Kant's first

⁶⁶ Ibid., A 71/B 96.

definition of judgment in the metaphysical deduction follows from his definition of a concept. Judgments represent their objects mediately, because they consist of concepts. Wolff and Meier do not draw a strong distinction between intuitions and concepts. In their logic textbooks, they both simply equate concepts with mental representations. Hence, even sensations qualify as a kind of concept for them – Meier terms them “concepts from experience” [*Erfahrungsbegriffen*]. Kant, on the other hand, regards intuitions and concepts as two fundamentally different species of cognitions. Among their differences: intuitions are immediately related to their objects, while concepts represent other representations. The former are immediate representations; the latter are mediate ones. This is a significant difference between Kant and some of his rationalist predecessors. However, it is a disagreement about the nature of concepts, not judgments. If we set aside Kant’s distinction between intuitions and concepts, his definition of judgment as mediated cognition is essentially a claim that judgments represent their objects with concepts. This idea is uncontroversial and entirely compatible with the standard theory of judgment.

Assessing Kant’s second definition of judgment, which states that judgments are “functions of unity among our representations,” is more complicated. This is because judgments unite representation in two distinct ways: they unite representations under concepts and they unite the representations, which serve as the terms of a judgment, into a single cognition.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant emphasizes the former. There is actually very little difference between claiming that a concept unites representations and asserting that these representations contain this concept as a mark. These two expressions are

essentially equivalent. Representations are united under a certain concept because they are collectively represented by it. This concept represents a property or mark that is shared by all of the representations that it unites. Consequently, these representations contain the concept as one of their marks. For example, the concepts of pines, spruces, and firs are all represented by the general concept of a tree. The concept of a tree is also a mark of each of these concepts. They contain this mark as part of their content. Thus, we attribute marks to representations by uniting them under general concepts and vice versa. According to the standard theory of judgment, judgments relate marks either to things or to the corresponding concepts that represent these things. For example, Meier defines a judgment as a representation of the logical relationship between concepts.⁶⁷ This relationship concerns whether one of these concepts is a mark of the other. Meier's position is not actually very different than Kant's. According to Meier, an affirmative judgment ascribes a mark to a concept. Kant, on the other hand, would say that this concept is united with other representations under a more general concept that represents them all. However, these are equivalent expressions. They are simply two different ways of describing the very same mental act. Thus, Kant does not actually depart from the standard theory when he claims that judgments unite representations under concepts. It is just another way of describing predication.

Judgments also unite representations in a second way. They unite the representations that serve as their terms into a single cognition; namely, the judgment itself. This appears to contradict the views of Wolff and some of his followers. They maintain that judgments actually differentiate the concepts that serve as their terms.

⁶⁷ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 484, §325. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 81, §292.

Instead of uniting these representations, judgments perform the very opposite function. For example, in the *Deutsche Metaphysik*, Wolff insists that there is an important difference between perceiving that something is the case and judging that it is so. The latter requires us to distinguish between the object of the judgment and the mark that we either attribute to it or exclude from it. It is not enough to simply perceive them together. For example, we can perceive an orange cat. However, in order to actually judge that the cat is orange, we must first distinguish the color from the cat and then ascribe the former to the latter.^{68,69,70}

Yet, as Hegel points out, unity always presupposes difference. We could not unify representations unless they were already differentiated within our consciousness. When Kant writes in the *Prolegomena* and his logic lectures that judgments unite representations into a single cognition, he means that it represents the relationship between them. He makes this clear in one of his *Reflexionen* (3050). He writes,

Judgment is* the representations of the unity of different representations insofar as one of them belongs to the concept of the other.

⁶⁸ “We see from this that it is not enough for a judgment if one represents a thing with its attribute, or alteration, or its effects, but rather requires beyond this that we distinguish the property, or alteration, or effect from the thing and regard them as two different things, which exist simultaneously and one of them is connected with the other” (Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 157, §288).

⁶⁹ Gottsched writes, “If we perceive many things in a thing, which we represent as something different from it, but also either belongs or does not belong to it, then we **judge** about it” (Gottsched, *Erste Gründe der gesamten Weltweisheit*, 32, §55).

⁷⁰ Crusius, who has a very different conception of judgment than Wolff or Gottsched, also claims that it entails a capacity to differentiate among our ideas and their content. He writes, “it is the power to distinguish among ideas as well as the manifold in each of them. Now with us ‘to distinguish’ means to be conscious of the difference between two things. However, consciousness occurs through the inner sense [*innerliche Empfindung*]. Consequently, what is unique about the performance of a judgment [*Judicii*], insofar as it is regarded as a particular main power [*Hauptkraft*] of the understanding, consists in nothing other than the analysis of ideas and in their division” (Crusius, *Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverlässigkeit*, 164-165, §93).

*[later addition] (the consciousness of the relation of representations, insofar as they compose a concept.)⁷¹

Kant's subsequent addition to this note clarifies that the "unity of different representations" consists in the consciousness or awareness of the relationship between them. A judgment represents this relationship. Prior to the first *Critique*, Kant claimed that judgments "compared" concepts. He now states that they "unite" these representations. However, his meaning remains more or less the same.

Thus, neither of Kant's two definitions of judgment in the metaphysical deduction actually contradicts the standard theory. For this reason, he did not expect that his account of judgment in this chapter would be questioned by his readers. His definitions of judgment do not resemble the ones offered by Wolff or Meier in their logic textbooks. However, he does not make any claims specifically about the nature of judgments that these philosophers would have difficulty accepting.

Nonetheless, there are still two important differences between Kant's account of judgment in the metaphysical deduction and the standard theory of judgment. First, Kant broadens his definition of judgment to include the unification of the manifold of intuition. His rationalist predecessors equated all judgments with propositional ones. For example, the actual title of Wolff's chapter on judgment in the *Deutsche Logik* is "On Propositions." His three-fold account of judgment, which I explain in chapter one of this dissertation, describes judgments as the relationship between things and their properties, the concepts that we use to represent these things and properties, and finally the words that we use to express these concepts in language. The linguistic expression of a

⁷¹ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3050, 16:632. Adickes estimates that this note dates from the period between 1776 and 1789.

judgment is a proposition. This implies that all judgments are propositional ones, because the three tiers of Wolff's account describe different aspects of the same judgment. It suggests that all judgments, for Wolff, can be expressed in language as propositions. Kant offers a broader definition of judgment that encompasses more than just propositional judgments. Any mental act that unites representations within one's consciousness qualifies as a judgment for him. This definition is loose enough to fit the unification of the manifold of intuition. Thus, unlike his predecessors, Kant does not equate judgment with the formation of propositional judgments. He conceives of it more broadly as the unification of representations.

Second, in both the metaphysical deduction, as well as some of his notes, Kant describes judgments as a relationship between concepts and objects. The standard theory defines judgments as either a relationship between things and their properties or a relationship between concepts in the mind. The former relationship could be said to describe their semantic content; the latter relationship represents their syntactical structure. Rather than defining a judgment as either a relationship between marks and objects or a logical relationship between different concepts, Kant defines it as a cognitive relationship between concepts and objects. I will further explore the significance of this idea over the course of the next two chapters.

Chapter Four

Kant's Account of Judgment in his *Nachlass*

This chapter surveys Kant's personal notes or *Reflexionen* that pertain to judgment. These notes are primarily contained in the volumes of Kant's *Nachlass* devoted to logic and metaphysics: volumes sixteen and seventeen of the *Akademie Ausgabe*. We can divide the *Reflexionen*, in which Kant discusses judgment, into roughly three categories. First, there are fragments where Kant repeats claims that he makes in his published works.¹ For example, he writes in *Reflexion* 3047, "Judgment is the mediate cognition of a representation through another representation."² As I explained in the previous chapter, Kant defines a judgment as the "mediate cognition of an object" in the metaphysical deduction.³ Second, there are other *Reflexionen* where Kant claims that judgments are based on the *subordination of concepts*. Finally, there are still other notes where he explains that judgments are based on the *subsumption of objects under concepts*. In this chapter, I will focus on the last two groups of *Reflexionen*, which state that judgments either subordinate concepts to each other or subsume objects under these concepts. I will argue that they constitute two competing accounts of judgment and that the notes that explain judgment in terms of the subordination of concepts are actually superseded by the ones that base it on the subsumption of objects. The problem with the former is that they present a model of judgment that only fits analytic ones. It cannot accommodate synthetic judgments. The other *Reflexionen*, where Kant makes the

¹ For the purposes of this division, I do not include the *Logic* among these works. Although it was published under Kant's name and appears in volume nine of the *Akademie Ausgabe*, the *Logic* is actually a compilation of Kant's lecture notes, which was edited by his student, Jäsche. Many of Kant's *Reflexionen zur Logik* correspond with passages from this work because they were Jäsche's primary source.

² Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3047, 16:631. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from between 1776 and 1789.

³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 68/B 93.

subsumption of objects under concepts the basis for judgment, solve this problem. They offer a superior explanation of judgment. A central thesis of my argument in this chapter is the principle that if the relationship between concepts is hierarchical, i.e. in terms of genera and species, then this relationship will also be analytic.

Before we begin, we need to first briefly clarify the meaning of the term, “judgment,” in this chapter. In chapter three, I explained that Kant expands his definition of judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason* to include any mental act that unites representations within the mind. As a result, a judgment, for Kant, is no longer always synonymous with a *propositional* judgment. For example, the unification of the manifold intuition fits Kant’s definition of a judgment; although, it cannot be expressed in the form of a proposition. Hence, we should be careful when we refer to judgments generically because not all judgments are propositional ones. That said, in the notes that we will be considering, Kant is exclusively concerned with propositional judgments. Rather than constantly specifying that a judgment is propositional in form, we will simply stipulate at the outset that all of the judgments in this chapter are propositional. We are bracketing non-propositional judgments for the time being. We will examine some of these non-propositional judgments in the next chapter.

4.1 The subordination of concepts

There is a number of *Reflexionen* where Kant explains that judgments unite concepts by “subordinating” one these concepts under the other. For example, he writes in *Reflexion* 3044, “Judgment is the relation of the subordination [*Unterordnung*] of concepts under each other.”⁴

⁴ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3044, 16:629. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from between 1773 and 1777.

What does Kant mean when he refers to the “subordination” of concepts? In his logic lectures, Kant describes concepts as being comparatively “higher” or “lower.” A concept is higher in relation to another concept, insofar as this other concept is contained under it. Likewise, a concept is said to be lower than another concept, if it is contained under that concept.⁵ When Kant claims that a representation is “contained under” a concept, he means that it is represented by this concept. For example, the concepts of gold, silver, and bronze are all contained under the general concept of metal. They are all collectively represented by this one concept. In this case, metal is a higher concept in comparison with gold, silver, and bronze, which are lower concepts. “Higher” and “lower” concepts are roughly equivalent to the terms “genera” and “species.”⁶ Lower concepts or species are subordinated under higher concepts or genera. Thus, to subordinate concepts means *to order them hierarchically so that higher concepts stand over the lower ones*. It is equivalent to organizing them in terms of genera and species.⁷

In *Reflexion* 3044, which I quoted from above, Kant claims that judgments relate different concepts to each other by subordinating one of these concepts under the other. In another similar fragment, *Reflexion* 3053, he explains that all judgments – including hypothetical and disjunctive judgments – are essentially acts of conceptual subordination.

⁵ “A concept is called a higher one insofar as it contains another under it; a lower [concept] is one that is contained under another [concept]. E.g. human is a lower concept in regard to that of an animal. – We thus have higher concepts [*conceptus superiores*] and lower ones [*inferiores*] and they always stand in relation” (Kant, *Logik Pölitz*, 24:568). See also idem, *Logik Busolt*, 24:655; idem, *Vienna Logic*, 24:910-911; idem, *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*, 24:752.

⁶ “The *conceptus superior*, in regard to its *inferior*, we call a *genus*. When we compare many things with one another, then, we can call every concept the *genus* in regard to its *inferior*, *species* in regard to its *superior*” (Kant, *Vienna Logic*, 24:911).

⁷ In the *Inaugural Dissertation*, Kant claims that the logical use of the understanding consists of two basic activities or functions: the comparison and subordination of concepts. He writes, “By the second use, the concepts, no matter whence they are given, are merely subordinated [*subordinantur*] to each other, the lower, namely, to the higher (common characteristic marks), and compared [*conferuntur*] with one another in accordance with the principle of contradiction, and this is called the LOGICAL USE” (Kant, *Inaugural Dissertation*, 2:393).

He writes, “Judgment is the consciousness that one concept is contained under another. Either as its predicate, or its ground, or as a member of its division.”⁸ Kant does not actually use the term “subordination” in this passage. Instead, he claims that judgments consist in the “consciousness that one concept is contained under another.” However, if a concept is contained under another concept, then it is subordinated under this concept. If concept A is *contained* under concept B, then B is *subordinated* to A. Hence, Kant is actually asserting that a judgment consists in the subordination of concepts. He further indicates that this is not only true of categorical judgments, which subordinate the judgment’s subject under its predicate. Hypothetical judgments subordinate a consequence under its ground and disjunctive judgments subordinate a part under a whole. Kant repeats this idea in *Reflexion* 3060. He writes, “A judgment is the representation of the unity of given concepts insofar as one is subordinated to the other: 1. as under the sphere of the other; 2. as consequence to the ground; 3. as member of the division to the divided concept.”⁹ In this passage, Kant clearly states that judgments unite concepts through subordination. He claims that categorical judgments subordinate a concept “under the sphere of the other” concept. The “sphere” of a concept is a synonym for its extension. I take it that what Kant means is that the subordinated concept is contained under the concept to which it is subordinated. A concept’s extension is contained under it. Hence, if concept A is subordinated under concept B, then A belongs to the extension of B.

⁸ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3053, 16:633. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from between 1780 and 1804.

⁹ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3060, 16:635. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from between 1790 and 1804.

In the last two *Reflexionen* that I quoted from (3053 and 3060), Kant implies that the relationship between the terms of a judgment is established through subordination. A categorical judgment subordinates its subject under its predicate, a hypothetical judgment subordinates its consequent under its antecedent, and a disjunctive judgment subordinates one of its disjuncts under the concept of the whole disjunction to which it belongs. Kant does not explain in these notes what it means to subordinate a consequent under its antecedent or a disjunct under a complete disjunction. The terms of these judgments are themselves judgments and he only explains subordination in relation to concepts. However, it is at least clear what Kant means when he asserts that categorical judgments subordinate their subject under their predicate.

Before we move on, there is one final passage that I wish to consider. It does not come from Kant's own *Nachlass*, but rather from Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche's logic textbook. Although Kant endorsed this work and it appears in volume nine of the *Akademie Ausgabe* under the title, *Immanuel Kant's Logic*, I have avoided referring to this work thus far. I set out my reasons for doing so in the introduction to this dissertation. Nonetheless, Jäsche's definition of judgment in the *Logic* is worth discussing because it is frequently cited by scholars. Moreover, they often attribute it to Kant himself. As I will show, Jäsche bases his definition on one of the fragments from Kant's notes (*Reflexion 3050*), where Kant explains judgment as the subordination of concepts.

Jäsche writes, "A judgment is the representation of the unity of the consciousness of various representations, or the representation of their relation insofar as they constitute

a concept.”¹⁰ At first glance, Jäsche’s definition can appear to be rather complicated. However, its meaning is actually fairly straightforward. Jäsche is asserting that judgments unite other representations by subordinating them under concepts. This becomes clear if we consider the original *Reflexion* that served as the source for this definition.

Jäsche appears to have based his definition of judgment on *Reflexion* 3050. This note states: “Judgment is* the representation of the unity of different representations insofar as one of the concepts belongs to the other. *([later addition] the consciousness of the relation of representations, insofar as they constitute a concept).”¹¹ This *Reflexion* consists of Kant’s original statement about judgment plus an additional remark that he subsequently inserted. He originally wrote that a judgment represents the “unity of different representations.” He later added that a judgment is the “the consciousness of the relation of representations.” Jäsche simply combines these two statements into one definition. He writes, “A judgment is the representation of the unity of the consciousness of various representations, or the representation of their relation.”¹² The meanings of Kant’s two statements were both quite clear: a judgment represents the relationship between other representations. I leave it to the reader to decide whether Jäsche’s interpolation successfully conveys this meaning.

If we return our attention to Kant’s note, he explains that different representations are united in a judgment because “one of the concepts belongs to the other.”¹³ In his

¹⁰ Kant, *Jäsche Logic*, 9:101, §17.

¹¹ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3050, 16:632. Addickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from between 1776 and 1789. He estimates that Kant inserted his later remark between 1790 and 1804. Given that Jäsche’s *Logic* was published in 1800, Kant must have added it before this date.

¹² Kant, *Jäsche Logic*, 9:101, §17.

¹³ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3050, 16:632.

emendation, he makes a similar point. He claims that representations are related “insofar as they constitute a concept.”¹⁴ In both cases, Kant is describing the subordination of concepts. Thus, judgments unite or relate other representations by subordinating them under a concept. This is significant because, as I will show in part two of this chapter, conceptual subordination is a poor explanation of judgment. It only applies to analytic judgments. Moreover, it actually corresponds with Meier’s definition of judgment in the *Vernunftlehre*. Although Kant changes some of his terminology – e.g. he claims that judgments “unite” other representations, rather than “comparing” them or “relating” them to each other – these differences are actually superficial. Jäsche’s definition of judgment in the *Logic* is not substantially different from Meier’s definition. They both agree that judgments represent the relationship between concepts and that this relationship is essentially hierarchical.

4.2 Conceptual subordination and analytic judgments

Thus, there is ample evidence in Kant’s notes to support the thesis that judgments unite representations by subordinating them under concepts.¹⁵ Furthermore, some of his *Reflexionen* imply that *the terms of a judgment are related to each other through subordination*. For example, in a categorical judgment the subject is subordinated under the predicate. In chapter three, I explained that judgments actually unite representations in two distinct ways. First, they can unite representations under concepts. For example, the subject of a categorical judgment can represent the intuitions of multiple objects. As a result, these intuitions are united under the concept that serves as the judgment’s subject-term. Second, judgments unite the representations that serve as their terms into

¹⁴ Ibid., 16:632.

¹⁵ See also Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3045, 16:631; idem, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3049, 16:632; idem, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3050, 16:632; idem, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3051, 16:633.

one cognition. For example, the subject and predicate of a categorical judgment are concepts, which are united into a single cognition, the judgment itself. If the relationship between the terms of a judgment is established through subordination then these two modes of unification would be identical, or at least accomplished through the same act. The representations in a judgment would be united into a single cognition *because* they are united under a general concept. This double unity would be achieved by subordinating one of a judgment's two terms under the other. In the case of a categorical judgment, the subject-term would be subordinated under the predicate. As a result, this concept would be united with the other representations that are collectively represented by the predicate. They would all be united under this one concept. The subject and predicate would thereby be united into one cognition. I will henceforth refer to this position as the "double-unity thesis." It is the thesis that the representations in a judgment are united into a single cognition because they are united under a general concept and it is supported by the *Reflexionen* where Kant indicates that judgments are based on the subordination of concepts.

Although the double-unity thesis is supported by some of Kant's *Reflexionen*, it is also problematic. It only applies to analytic judgments. This can be easily demonstrated if we consider how the terms of a categorical judgment, i.e. its subject and predicate, are united into a single cognition. According to the double-unity thesis, these two concepts are united into one judgment because the subject is subordinated under the predicate.

This already raises a problem because it is only actually true of affirmative judgments. In negative judgments, the predicate is excluded from the subject-term. Hence, the subject is not subordinated to the predicate and this concept is not united with

other representations under the predicate. Nonetheless, the subject and predicate of even a negative judgment are still united into a single cognition. The judgment remains one cognition, which is composed of two concepts. Thus, the terms of a negative judgment are not united through the subordination of the subject under the predicate.

Furthermore, even if we focus narrowly on *affirmative* categorical judgments and regard them as somehow archetypal of all judgments – as Kant himself sometimes does – the double-unity thesis still cannot be defended because it would reduce all judgments to analytic ones. We only need to clarify what it means to subordinate one concept under another for this to become clear.

A concept is subordinated under another concept if it is contained under this concept. As we know, lower concepts are contained under higher ones and the former are also subordinated to the latter. Moreover, the representations that are contained under a concept *can themselves be said to contain this concept as part of their content*. If a representation is contained *under* a concept, then the concept is also contained *in* the representation. For example, the concept of a body is contained *under* the concept of divisibility. This means that the concept of divisibility represents one of the marks that define the concept of a body. However, if the concept of divisibility is a mark of the concept of a body, then the concept of a body contains this concept as part of its content. In other words, the concept of divisibility is contained *in* the concept of a body. The former belongs to content of the latter. Thus, if concept A is contained *under* concept B, then concept B is also contained *in* concept A. Kant writes in *Reflexion* 2896, “[A] mark [*nota*] contains things under itself and the things contain marks [*notam*] in themselves.”¹⁶

¹⁶ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 2896, 16:565. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from between 1776 and 1778. Cf. *Jäsche Logic*, 9:95, §7.

Although he discusses the relation between things and their marks in this passage, the same point could be made about the relationship between concepts. According to Kant, a mark or concept “contains things under itself.” These are the things that are distinguished by the mark or represented by the concept. These same things also contain the mark in themselves. The mark is one of their properties. The same will be true of any representations that are contained under a general concept. These representations are contained under the concept because it represents a mark that they all share. Consequently, they will contain this concept as part of their content. The representations are contained *under* the concept and the concept is contained *in* each of these representations.

Earlier I clarified that a concept is subordinated under another concept if it is contained *under* this concept. We now know that if a representation is contained *under* a concept, then the concept is also contained *in* the subordinated representation. We can therefore conclude that if one concept is subordinated under another, then the subordinated concept will contain the concept that it is subordinated to. If concept A is subordinated under concept B, then A will also contain B. This relationship is analytic. One concept is contained in another. If a categorical judgment subordinates its subject under its predicate, then the predicate will also be contained in the subject-term. Such a judgment would be analytic. Thus, the double-unity thesis is flawed because it only applies to a relatively narrow range of judgment – namely, ones that are affirmative and analytic. In a synthetic judgment, the subject-term is not subordinated or united under the concept that serves as its predicate. Otherwise, the predicate would be contained in the subject-term and the judgment would be analytic.

As I explained in part one (4.1), there is a significant number of *Reflexionen* where Kant claims that judgments are based on the subordination of concepts. Perhaps the easiest way to think about this idea is that in a categorical judgment the subject-term would be subordinated under the predicate. Kant also suggests that hypothetical and disjunctive judgments are formed through the subordination of their terms; although, he does not explain what this would entail. I have now shown that this theory, which I have labeled the “double-unity thesis,” only applies to analytic judgments. If these fragments were taken literally, then they would entail that all judgments are analytic. Since this is clearly not Kant’s position, what are we to make of these *Reflexionen* and his consistent assertion that judgments are formed through the subordination of concepts?

They reveal Meier’s enduring influence on Kant’s thinking about logic. The fact that Kant consistently assigned Meier’s *Vernunftlehre* as the textbook for his logic lectures was not without significance or consequence. The *Reflexionen* in question, with their problematic assertions about conceptual subordination, show Meier’s influence because he regarded all judgments as essentially analytic.

In chapter one, I explained Meier’s account of judgment in the *Vernunftlehre*. For the sake of clarity, I will now briefly review a few of its main features. According to Meier, we form judgments by comparing concepts with each other. The purpose of this comparison is to determine whether one of these concepts is a mark of the other.¹⁷ Meier refers to this as their logical relationship [*logisches Verhältnis*]. The logical relationship between concepts concerns whether one of them “belongs” [*zukommt*] to the other. If concept A “belongs” to concept B, then A is a mark of B. It also means that concept A is “contained” within concept B. These are all equivalent expressions. A concept contains

¹⁷ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 482, §324.

its marks. If one concept is a mark of the other, then the concept that is the mark will be contained within the other concept. Meier writes, “one says that one concept belongs to another and is contained in it, if it can be represented in it, or if it can be regarded as a part and a mark of the other concept.”¹⁸ Meier defines a judgment as a representation of the logical relationship between different concepts. He writes, “a judgment consists in a representation of the relations between multiple concepts, or in the representation that one concept either belongs or does not belong to the other.”¹⁹ The logical relationship between a pair of concepts fits Kant’s definition of an analytic judgment. It concerns whether one of these concepts “belongs” to the other, which is equivalent to asking whether one of these concepts is a mark of the other, or whether it is “contained” in the other concept. Since Meier defines a judgment as a representation of the logical relationship between concepts, all judgments – at least according to his definition – are analytic.

Kant is influenced by Meier’s understanding of the relationship between concepts. He writes in *Reflexion* 3051, “Concepts belong to one consciousness only because they are thought under one another, not next to one another (like sensations).”²⁰ The question of how concepts “belong to one consciousness” concerns their relationship. Kant explains that concepts are related to each other insofar as “they are thought under one another.” This is equivalent to asserting that one of these concepts is subordinated to the other. Kant contrasts the relationship between concepts, which is hierarchical and based on subordination, with the combination of sensations. Unlike concepts, sensations are

¹⁸ Ibid., 429, §293.

¹⁹ Ibid., 484, §325. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 81, §292.

²⁰ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3051, 16:633. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from between 1776 and 1789. The passage that I have quoted from above is actually a later addition to this note. Adickes estimates that Kant inserted it between 1780 and 1804.

thought “next to each other.” In other words, they are simply juxtaposed within consciousness. A manifold of sensations are combined by apprehending them simultaneously.²¹ They are thought or conceived in conjunction with each other. The relation between concepts is different; they are “thought under one another” or subordinated to one another.

This is also Meier’s understanding of the logical relationship between concepts. According to Meier, this relationship concerns whether one concept “belongs” to another as a mark. According to Kant, the relationship between concepts is hierarchical; lower concepts are subordinated or contained under higher ones. We should not be misled by the differences regarding how these two positions are expressed, *because they are essentially identical*. If concept A is contained under concept B then concept B belongs to concept A. We can say that A is subordinated to B or that B belongs to A as a mark. However, in both cases, we are describing the same relationship between these concepts. Both Kant and Meier agree that the relationship is hierarchical. They simply express this idea in slightly different ways. The problem, at least for Kant, is that this kind of relationship is always analytic. If concept A is contained *under* concept B then concept B is also contained *in* concept A. The terms of a synthetic judgment certainly “belong to one consciousness” – to use Kant’s expression from *Reflexion* 3051. However, the subject of a synthetic judgment is not subordinated or contained under its predicate. Otherwise, this judgment would be analytic. For example, the judgment, “some swans are black,” is synthetic. Yet the concept of a swan is not a species of the genus, black.

²¹ “Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another; for **as contained in one moment** no representation can ever be anything than absolute unity” (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 99).

The former is not contained under the latter. Therefore, not every judgment is united through the subordination of its terms.

4.3 The subsumption of objects

In the introduction to this chapter, I explained that Kant's *Reflexionen* contain two competing accounts of judgment. Some of Kant's notes state that judgments are based on the subordination of concepts. This position is actually problematic because it only applies to analytic judgments. If a concept is subordinated or contained under another more general concept, then it will also contain this other concept. For this reason, the concepts in a synthetic judgment are not subordinated to each other. The relationship between them is not hierarchical. Fortunately, this is not Kant's only explanation of judgment. There are other *Reflexionen* where he offers an alternate account. In these notes, he claims that judgments are based on the *subsumption* of objects under concepts.

I should acknowledge from the outset that Kant does not actually use the term, "subsumption," in any of the notes that we will be discussing. In order to clearly differentiate between the two competing accounts of judgment, which are found in his *Nachlass*, I contrast the *subordination* of concepts with the *subsumption* of objects. I borrow this distinction from Béatrice Longuenesse. In *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, she draws a distinction between subordination and subsumption. The former applies to concepts and the latter applies to objects. Concepts are *subordinated* to each other. Objects are *subsumed* under concepts.²² It is important to distinguish between these two activities. As I explained in part two of this chapter (4.2), a theory of judgment that is based only on the subordination of concepts will be limited to analytic judgments. For this reason, Longuenesse's distinction is a useful one. It is also important to recognize

²² Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 92n.

that this distinction belongs to Longuenesse, and not to Kant. Kant borrows the term, “subsumption,” from Crusius’s logic. Crusius uses it as a synonym for the subordination of concepts. He writes, “**to subsume** is equivalent to thinking a concept or its *individual* are contained under the *individuis* of another concept.”²³ There is no evidence that Kant reserved the term subordination for concepts. Nor did he oppose it to the subsumption of objects. Nonetheless, Longuenesse’s distinction remains a useful one. I am adopting it with the caveat that we are using these terms in accordance with her definitions rather than Kant’s.

Kant writes in *Reflexion* 3042, “Judgment is a cognition of the unity of given concepts: namely that *B* belongs with other things *x*, *y*, *z* under the same concept *A*, or also: that the manifold, which is under *B*, also belongs under *A*.”²⁴ It will be easier to explain the meaning of this complicated passage if we first clarify the meaning of the variables that Kant employs. *A* and *B* both designates concepts. The variables *x*, *y*, and *z* denote things that are represented by concept *B*. They constitute the extension of this concept. For example, if *B* is the concept of a body, then *x*, *y*, *z* would be actual bodies. They are the objects that are represented by concept *B*. According to Kant, concept *B* “belongs” with *x*, *y*, and *z* under concept *A*. In other words, *B* is included in the extension of *A*. It is contained under *A*, along with *x*, *y*, and *z*, i.e. the extension of *B*. This scenario is perhaps easier to envisage with the help of an example. Let us suppose that *B* is the concept of a body and that *A* is the concept of divisibility. The concept of a body (*B*) and its extension (*x*, *y*, and *z*) are all contained under the concept of divisibility (*A*).

²³ Crusius, *Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntnis*, 483, §267.

²⁴ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3042, 16:629. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from between 1773 and 1775.

At first glance, this explanation of judgment may not appear to differ substantially from the ones that we considered earlier. Concept *B* is contained under concept *A*. Hence, the former is subordinated to the latter. Kant uses these variables to illustrate how concepts are united in a judgment. He defines a judgment in this *Reflexion* as “a cognition of the unity of given concepts.” The concepts *B* and *A* are united in a judgment because *B* is contained or subordinated under *A*. Thus, Kant appears to be repeating his position that judgments are based on the subordination of concepts. They unite concepts by subordinating them to each other.

However, this is not actually Kant’s position in the passage above. He adds an important feature to his explanation of a judgment: the variables *x*, *y*, and *z*. These variables denote the objects that are contained under, or represented by, concept *B*. Kant explains that *B* belongs under *A* because these objects (*x*, *y*, and *z*) belong under *A*. As he puts it, “the manifold, which is under *B*, also belongs under *A*.” The “manifold” that Kant refers to here is the extension of *B*, i.e. the objects *x*, *y*, and *z*. What this shows is that the relationship between the concepts in a judgment is based on the objects that are contained under them, i.e. their extension. In an affirmative judgment, the extension of the subject-term overlaps with the extension of the predicate. Either some or all of the objects that are represented by the subject-term are also represented by the predicate. In a negative judgment, the extension of the subject-term is separate from the extension of the predicate. The predicate does not represent any of the objects that are represented by the judgment’s subject-term.

Although this might seem like a straightforward explanation of propositional logic, it was not actually Meier’s position. Meier thought that the relationship between

the concepts in a judgment was defined by their *content*. He claimed that judgments compared concepts for the purpose of determining whether one of them was a mark of the other. This comparison was concerned with the concept's content, i.e. their marks. A judgment, as it is understood by Meier, relates a mark – either positively or negatively – to a concept. It either ascribes a mark to a concept or excludes one from it. Kant initially held this position as well. We find it in *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* and his early logic lectures. For example, *Logik Philippi*, which is thought to date from the early 1770s, states: “If I judge then I compare one concept with others and investigate whether they belong to it or are opposed to it, i.e. whether or not they are marks of it.”²⁵ The *Reflexionen* that explain judgment as the subordination of concepts express a version of this position as well. They make the relationship between concepts a consequence of their content. A representation is contained under a concept because the concept represents one of its marks. Hence, there is no real difference between asserting that a judgment subordinates concepts to each other or that it relates a mark to a concept. These two expressions are essentially equivalent. The subordination of concepts is based entirely on their content.

Thus, Kant is actually advancing a new position when he explains that the relationship between the concepts in a judgment is based on the objects that are contained under them, i.e. their extension. In *Reflexion 3042*, he uses an analytic judgment as his example, because he claims that *B* is contained under *A* – I am assuming that *B* denotes the subject-term of a judgment and that *A* denotes its predicate. However, he could have just as easily have used a synthetic judgment to make this point. In that case, the extension of *B* (*x*, *y*, and *z*) would be at least partially contained under *A*; however, *B*

²⁵ Kant, *Logik Philippi*, 24:461. See also idem, *Blomberg Logic*, 24:273-274.

itself would not. For example, let us suppose that *B* is the concept of a body and that *A* is the concept of weight. At least some of the objects that are contained under the concept of a body (*B*) are contained under the concept of weight (*A*). However, Kant denies that weight is among the defining marks of a body. Hence, the concept of weight is not contained in the concept of a body. He writes in the first *Critique*, “if I say: ‘All bodies are heavy,’ then the predicate is something entirely different from that which I think in the mere concept of a body in general.”²⁶ Since the concept of a body does not contain the concept of weight as part of its content, it is not contained under the concept of weight. Thus, some of the objects that are contained under the concept of a body (*B*) are contained under the concept of weight (*A*), but the concept of a body itself is not contained under the concept of weight.

This last point regarding the form of synthetic judgments is confirmed by *Reflexion* 3738. Here Kant offers a succinct explanation of the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments. He writes,

All analytic judgments teach what is thought in concepts but confusedly; the synthetic ones [teach] what should be thought as combined with the concepts. In every judgment, the concept of the subject is something *a*, which I think in the object *x*, and the predicate is regarded as a mark of *a* in the analytic judgment or of *x* in the synthetic one.²⁷

I want to draw our attention to the final sentence of this passage. Kant claims that every judgment represents an object, which he designates with the variable *x*. The subject-term of this judgment, which is signified by the variable *a*, represents a mark of the object (*x*). Kant then claims that the judgment’s predicate either represents a mark of the subject-term (concept *a*) or it represents a mark of the object itself (*x*). In the first case, the

²⁶ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 7/B 11.

²⁷ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* 3738, 17:278. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from between 1764 and 1766.

judgment is analytic. In the second case, it is synthetic. If the predicate represents a mark of the actual concept that serves as the judgment's subject-term (a), then this concept will be contained or subordinated under the predicate. However, if the predicate only represents a mark of an object (x), as is the case in a synthetic judgment, then this object will be contained under the predicate, but the subject-term (a) will not also be subordinated to the predicate. This is precisely the point that I made about synthetic judgments in the previous paragraph.

Kant offers a similar explanation of his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments in *Reflexion* 4634. He writes,

If I say: a body is divisible, then it means the same as: something x , which I know [*kenne*] under the predicates, which together constitute the concept of a body, I also think through the predicate of divisibility: $x \textcircled{a} a$ is equivalent to $x b$. Now a as well as b belongs to x . Only in different ways: either b already lies in that which constitutes the concept a and thus can be found through the analysis of this concept, or b belongs to x without being contained in a and comprehended with it [*ohne in a eingeschlossen und mit begriffen zu sein*]. In the first case, the judgment is analytic; in the second, synthetic.²⁸

This passage is a bit more complicated than the previous one. Hence, we will begin by simply clarifying the meaning of the variables that Kant uses. A and b both signify concepts. Concept a is the concept of a body and concept b is the concept of divisibility. X is an object that is represented by concept a . In other words, it is an actual body. Kant uses these variables to symbolically represent the judgment, “a body is divisible.” This formula – “ $x \textcircled{a} a$ is equivalent to $x b$ ” – is rather cryptic. Fortunately, we can disregard it because Kant's point is actually quite simple. X (an object), which is represented by a (the concept of a body), is also represented by b (the concept of a body). According to

²⁸ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* 4634, 17:616-617. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from between and 1771 and 1776.

Kant, this is what we actually mean when we assert that “a body is divisible.” X is represented by both the concept of a body and the concept of divisibility, or as he puts it, “ a as well as b belongs to x .”

Kant then explains that these concepts can “belong” to the object x in two different ways. He writes, “Now a as well as b belongs to x . Only in different ways: either b already lies in that which constitutes the concept a and thus can be found through the analysis of this concept, or b belongs to x without being contained in a and comprehended with it.” When Kant writes that a concept “belongs” to an object, he means that it represents a mark of this object. Thus, there are two possible ways in which the concepts in a judgment can represent an object. First, the predicate can be “contained” within the subject-term. As I explained earlier, this means that the predicate represents a mark of the subject-term. Second, the predicate can represent the object of the judgment without being contained within its subject-term. As Kant puts it, “ b belongs to x without being contained in a .” In the first case, the judgment is analytic and in the second, it is synthetic. This is essentially the same explanation of the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments that Kant offered in the previous *Reflexion* (3738). A judgment is analytic if its predicate represents a mark of the concept that serves as its subject-term. It is synthetic if its predicate only represents a mark of the object of this judgment.

It is interesting to read the *Reflexion* that we have just considered (4634) in conjunction with another fragment from Kant’s notes: *Reflexion* 3127. They both explain the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments with the same example: “bodies are extended.” *Reflexion* 3127 is far more abbreviated than 4634 – or any of the notes

that I have quoted from so far. However, Kant finds a more effective way of symbolizing judgments that clearly illustrates the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments. He writes,

Example of an analytic proposition.

All bodies are extended:

To everything x , to which the concept of the body ($a + b$) belongs, extension (b) also belongs.

A synthetic [proposition]:

To everything x , to which the concept of the body ($a + b$) belongs, attraction (c) also belongs.²⁹

In all of the *Reflexionen* that we have examined so far, the variables, a and b , have consistently stood for concepts. However, in this passage, Kant uses them somewhat differently. Here the variables, a , b , and c , all signify marks or predicates. As I explained in chapter three, concepts actually represent marks. Hence, the difference between a concept and a mark is an extremely subtle one. In this case, it is useful to distinguish between them because Kant claims that the concept of a body consists of two marks, which are signified by the variables, a and b . These marks constitute the content of this concept. As a matter of fact, the concept of a body is defined by far more than just two marks. However, for the sake of simplicity, Kant limits its marks to just two: a and b . The concept of a body is the unity of these marks. For this reason, Kant refers to this concept as ($a + b$). Kant identifies the concept of divisibility with the mark that it represents: b . Thus, the concept of a body is signified by the expression ($a + b$), because it is the unity of these two marks. The variable b denotes both the mark of extension and the concept that represents this property. According to Kant, the judgment, “all bodies are extended,” asserts that anything that is represented by the concept of a body is also

²⁹ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3127, 16:671. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* originally dates from between 1764 and 1768. However, the passage that I have quoted above comes from a later addition to this note. Adickes estimates that it was added either during period 1769-1770 or during 1771.

represented by the concept of divisibility. He uses the variable x to stand for the objects of this judgment. If x is represented by the concept of a body ($a + b$), it will also be represented by the concept of divisibility (b). These variables clearly illustrate that this judgment is analytic. The predicate (b) is contained within the judgment's subject-term ($a + b$). Kant contrasts this judgment with one that is synthetic. He introduces a new variable, c , which signifies both the property of attraction and the concept that represents it. C stands for the concept of attraction and the mark that this concept represents. The judgment, "all bodies are attractive," asserts that anything that is represented by the concept of a body ($a + b$) is also represented by the concept of attraction (c). This judgment is synthetic. Its predicate (c) represents the object (x) without being contained within the subject ($a + b$).

Kant's use of these variables allows him to clearly illustrate the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments. He presents it as a difference in their form. All (affirmative) analytic judgments have the form: Any x , which is represented by concept ($a + b$), is also represented by concept (b). All (affirmative) synthetic judgments have the form: Any x , which is represented by concept ($a + b$), is also represented by concept (c).³⁰

We have now examined three different fragments from Kant's notes (3738, 4634, and 3127) that address his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. In each of these passages, Kant uses variables to describe the basic form of a judgment. He consistently presents a judgment as a relationship between concepts, which are signified

³⁰ Kant lacked a theory of quantification that would allow him to fully translate these propositions into symbolic language. With the benefit of modern logic, their form can be expressed as follows:

Analytic judgments: $\forall x[(Ax \ \& \ Bx) \supset Bx]$

Synthetic judgments: $\forall x[(Ax \ \& \ Bx) \supset Cx]$

by the letters *a*, *b*, and *c*, and an object, which is always denoted by the letter *x*. Moreover, Kant claims that a judgment asserts that an object *x*, which is represented by the judgment's subject-term, is also represented by its predicate. The difference between an analytic judgment and a synthetic judgment concerns whether the predicate is also representative of the concept that serves as the judgment's subject-term. This form only pertains to affirmative (categorical) judgments. A negative judgment asserts that an object *x*, which is represented by the judgment's subject-term, is *not* represented by its predicate. For example, in the judgment, "bodies are not simple," the set of objects, which are represented by the concept of a body, are not represented by the concept of simplicity. The predicate of this judgment does not represent a mark of these objects.

Thus, according to these *Reflexionen*, categorical judgments in general assess whether an object, which is represented by the judgment's subject-term, is also represented by its predicate. They either assert that this object is represented by the predicate or they deny that this is the case. We can express this idea in a slightly different way by stating that judgments *subsume objects under concepts*. If an object is represented by a concept, then it is contained under this concept. We think of an object as contained under a concept by subsuming it under this concept. Thus, categorical judgments subsume objects under the concepts that serve as their predicates.

4.4 Longuenesse's interpretation

Kant's *Reflexionen* contain two competing explanations of judgment. We have now considered both of these accounts. To review: some of Kant's notes state that judgments are based on the *subordination of concepts*. According to this theory, the relationship between concepts is hierarchical and determined by their content. As I

pointed out in part two of this chapter (4.2), this idea actually poses a problem because the terms of a judgment are not always related in this way. The concepts in an *analytic* judgment are related hierarchically so that the subject-term is contained under the predicate. However, this is not true of synthetic judgments. Thus, the *Reflexionen*, which state that judgments subordinate concepts to each other, only describe analytic judgments. There are other notes where Kant offers an alternate explanation of judgment. Here he claims that judgments are based on the *subsumption of objects under concepts*. According to this theory, the relationship between concepts is not determined by their content, but rather by the objects that are contained under them, i.e. their extension.³¹ As I showed in part three (4.3), this position can accommodate both analytic and synthetic judgments.

³¹ Peter Schulthess argues that Kant made an important contribution to the history of logic by developing a truly *extensional* logic. A system of logic is either *intentional* or *extensional* depending on how it explains the relationship between the terms of a categorical judgment or proposition. It is *intentional* if the relationship between a judgment's subject and predicate terms is based on their *content*. It is *extensional* if the relation between these concepts is based on their *extension*, i.e. the objects that are contained under them. See Schulthess, *Relation und Form*, 17. Schulthess argues that Kant initially accepted a purely intentional logic. However, in his critical philosophy, Kant adopted a new understanding of logic and judgment that was purely extensional in nature. See *ibid.*, 10. This was a major breakthrough in the history of logic. Modern logic is extensional. I agree with Schulthess that Kant originally accepted an intentional logic and that he later adopted an extensional one. In other words, he initially thought that the relationship between concepts is determined by their content and he later recognized that this relationship was based on the objects that are contained under the concepts, i.e. their extensions. This is reflected in the two competing accounts of judgment that we find in Kant's *Nachlass*. Kant's claim that judgments are based on the *subordination* of concepts presupposes an *intentional* logic. (For reasons, that I will subsequently explain, Schulthess would disagree with me on this point.) Kant's position that judgments are based on the *subsumption* of objects under concepts presupposes an *extensional* logic.

Nonetheless, I disagree with Schulthess over several key points. First, Schulthess accepts the dates that Adickes proposes for Kant's *Reflexionen*. As I explain in the introduction to this dissertation, I do not consider these estimates to be reliable enough to draw conclusions about the development of Kant's philosophy. Schulthess offers a detailed history of Kant's views about logic, starting with the *New Elucidation* (1755). For example, he pinpoints 1769 as the crucial year in which Kant shifted from an intentional logic to an extensional one. On the one hand, this thesis is not so surprising given that 1769 was a decisive year for the development of Kant's philosophy in general, and Schulthess argues that the *Inaugural Dissertation* (1770) commits Kant to an extensional logic. On the other hand, Schulthess examines the notes that Adickes attributes to the year 1769. He argues that these notes show Kant vacillating between an intentional view of logic and an extensional one. See *ibid.*, 78-86. I do not consider Adickes' dates to be reliable enough to draw this kind of precise conclusion. This is a methodological disagreement. I have a more substantial objection to Schulthess' account of conceptual subordination and

Béatrice Longuenesse tries to combine these two accounts of judgment. She argues that judgments subordinate concepts to each other by subsuming objects under these concepts. The subordination of concepts is based on the subsumption of objects under them. For example, Longuenesse writes, “In the *Logic*, Kant gives a novel expression to the idea that judgment – that is, subordination of concepts – is ultimately the subsumption of objects under the subordinated concepts.”³²

As this passage shows, Longuenesse thinks that all judgments subordinate concepts to each other. She equates judgment with the subordination of concepts. Longuenesse accepts what I have termed the “double-unity thesis.”³³ This is the view

its role in judgment. He argues that judgments acquire their form through the subordination of their terms. Hence, judgments, for Kant, are essentially acts of subordination. I have argued that this idea presupposes an intentional logic. However, Schulthess claims that concepts can be subordinated to each other on the basis of their extension, as well as their content. He distinguishes between two kinds of subordination: intentional subordination and extensional subordination. The former subordinates concepts on the basis of their content; the latter subordinates them on the basis of their extension. See *ibid.*, 16. According to Schulthess, Kant remains committed to the basic thesis that judgments are based on the subordination of concepts. The basis for this subordination simply changes when he shifts from an intentional logic to an extensional one. Longuenesse – perhaps, influenced by Schulthess – holds a similar position. She argues that the subordination of concepts is based on the subsumption of objects under these concepts. The problem with both of these positions is that Kant consistently explains subordination as the relation between *lower* concepts and *higher* ones, or *species* and *genera*. The former are subordinated to the later. This does not change once Kant adopts an extensional logic. For example, the *Wiener Logik* states, “All *conceptus* stand in relation to each other in such a way that a *conceptus* is always *superior* and *inferior* relative to the others, insofar as one is contained under another[;] and from this, finally there comes a series of subordinate concepts” (Kant, *Vienna Logic*, 24:910-911). It can be easily shown that the terms of a judgment are not always related in this way. If they were, then the subject-term of a judgment would always be a *species* of the predicate. Consider the judgment, “Some humans are philosophers.” Unless one is prepared to argue that human beings are a species of the genus, philosopher, the subject-term of this judgment is not subordinated to its predicate. In an affirmative *analytic* judgment, the subject-term is subordinated to the predicate. However, as our example clearly shows, this is not true of *synthetic* judgments.

³² Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 86.

³³ For example, she writes, “Therefore, to say that the *synthesis* of representations in a judgment is performed by means of *analytic* unity is to say that in judgment, various representations are combined in such a way as to be thought under one concept. This concurs with Kant’s explanation of the example from the Logical Use of the Understanding just quoted: in the judgment ‘All bodies are divisible,’ the concepts ‘body’ and ‘divisible’ are combined (*synthesized*) insofar as the concept of body, together with other concepts, is thought under the concept of the divisible (*analytic* unity)” (*ibid.*, 202). Longuenesse argues in this passage that a judgment combines or synthesizes representations by uniting them under a concept. In this case, the “representations” that she refers to are the judgment’s terms. She makes this clear with her explanation of Kant’s example: the judgment, “all bodies are divisible.” Longuenesse claims that in this judgment the concept of a body is combined with the concept of divisibility. These concepts are the

that judgments unite representations into one cognition by uniting them under one concept. For example, categorical judgments consist of two concepts – their subject and predicate terms. According to the “double-unity thesis,” a categorical judgment unites these two concepts into a single cognition, the judgment itself, by uniting the subject-term with other representations under the predicate. In other words, the subject is subordinated under the predicate. Longuenesse attributes this position to the metaphysical deduction and Kant’s second definition of judgment, which states that judgments are “functions of unity among our representations.” However, Longuenesse is also clearly familiar with the many *Reflexionen* where Kant claims that judgments are based on the subordination of concepts. She actually cites some of these *Reflexionen*. Moreover, the account of judgment that she attributes to Kant is stated more explicitly in his notes than in the metaphysical deduction.

Longuenesse claims that the *Logic* reveals that the subordination of concepts is a consequence of the subsumption of objects under them. Although she cites Jäsche’s *Logic*, the passage from the *Logic* that she refers to is based on *Reflexion* 3127. We considered this fragment earlier. It contains the passage where Kant explains the difference between analytic and synthetic in terms of their form. He claims that analytic judgments have the form: Any x , which is represented by concept $(a + b)$, is also represented by concept (b) . Conversely, synthetic judgments have the form: Any x , which is represented by concept $(a + b)$, is also represented by concept (c) .³⁴

judgment’s subject and predicate. Longuenesse explains that they are brought together in the judgment because the concept of a body, i.e. the subject-term, is united with other concepts under the concept of divisibility, i.e. the predicate. This is the “double-unity thesis.”

³⁴ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3127, 16:671.

Longuenesse thinks that this idea is important because it shows that all judgments – including analytic ones – are related to objects in an essential way.³⁵ We might assume that analytic judgments are merely conceptual relationships, since the relationship between their subject and predicate can be explained entirely in terms of the content of these concepts. The predicate is either contained within the subject-term or it is incompatible with this concept. However, Jäsche's *Logic* and *Reflexion* 3127 both tell a different story. They indicate that the relationship between the subject and predicate of even an analytic judgment is ultimately based on the objects that are contained under the subject-term, and not the content of this concept. This relationship depends on whether or not the predicate represents the same objects that are represented by the judgment's subject-term. The predicate is ascribed to the subject-term because it represents the same objects that are represented by that concept, i.e. its extension. Likewise, the predicate is negated because it does not represent these objects. Thus, even in the case of an analytic judgment, the relationship between its terms is determined by the *extensions* of these concepts. It depends on the degree to which the extension of the subject-term overlaps with that of the predicate.

Longuenesse continues to assume that judgments subordinate concepts to each other. She thinks that this position is entailed by Kant's second definition of judgment in the metaphysical deduction. However, the *Logic* indicates that the relationship between concepts is actually determined by their objects or extensions. Longuenesse concludes that judgments subordinate concepts to each other by subsuming objects under these concepts. According to her reading, a lower concept is subordinated to a higher one because the objects that are subsumed or contained under the lower concept are also

³⁵ Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 87.

subsumed under the higher one. For example, she writes, “To characterize judgment as Kant does in the section On the Logical Use of Understanding is to characterize it as a *subordination of concepts*, by means of which the objects subsumed under the subject-concept are also subsumed under the predicate-concept.”³⁶ Thus, Longuenesse accepts both of the positions that we contrasted in the first three parts of this chapter. She thinks that all judgments subordinate concepts to each other. She also thinks that they subsume objects under concepts. Longuenesse does not regard these two propositions as examples of competing positions. Instead, she considers them to be complementary. They describe different aspects of a single, consistent theory of judgment. The subsumption of objects under concepts is the basis for the subordination of these concepts to each other.

There is some textual evidence that supports Longuenesse’s interpretation. Kant writes in *Reflexion* 3095,

In a categorical judgment, the thing whose representation is regarded as a part of the *sphere* of another subordinated representation is regarded as contained under the higher concept of the latter. Thus, in the subordination of spheres, the part of the part is compared with the whole.³⁷

The fact that we know that Kant is describing a categorical judgment can help us to decipher this otherwise confusing passage. He is essentially asserting that an object or “thing,” which is contained under the judgment’s subject-term, is also contained under its predicate. He writes that the representation of this object “is regarded as a part of the sphere of another subordinated representation.” The word, “sphere” [*sphaera*], is the Latin term for a concept’s extension. The “subordinated representation” in this passage denotes the judgment’s subject-term. It is subordinated to the judgment’s predicate.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 86.

³⁷ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3095, 16:656. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from between 1769 and 1775.

Thus, when Kant writes that the representation of an object “is regarded as a part of the sphere of another subordinated representation,” he actually means that the representation of this object is regarded as part of the *extension of the judgment’s subject-term*. In other words, the object and its representation are contained under this concept. Kant then claims that the representation of the object is also “regarded as contained under the higher concept of the latter.” The “latter” in this case denotes the “subordinated representation,” i.e. the subject-term of the judgment. Its “higher concept” is the concept to which this representation is subordinated: the judgment’s predicate. Kant claims that the representation of the object is contained under this higher concept, i.e. the predicate. Thus, he is actually asserting in a rather complicated way that the representation of an object is contained under both the subject-term of a judgment (it is “regarded as a part of the *sphere* of another subordinated representation”) and the judgment’s predicate (it is “regarded as contained under the higher concept of the latter”). Although we have encountered this idea before in other *Reflexionen*, this particular fragment is significant because it combines elements of the two accounts of judgment that we find in Kant’s notes. On the one hand, it implies that the subject of a categorical judgment is subordinated to its predicate. On the other hand, it indicates that the extension of the judgment’s subject-term overlaps with that of the predicate. An object, which is subsumed under the subject-term, is also subsumed under the predicate. This could be taken to support Longuenesse’s thesis that judgments subordinate concepts to each other by subsuming objects under them. Subsumption is the basis for conceptual subordination.

Nonetheless, we can still distinguish between two questions: whether Kant held a certain position and whether this position is actually valid. In regards to the first question, the evidence is inconclusive at best, but a case can be made for Longuenesse's interpretation. According to this reading, Kant thought that all judgments subordinate concepts to each other *and* that the relationship between higher and lower concepts, i.e. genera and species, is ultimately grounded in the objects that are contained under these concepts, i.e. their extensions. Hence, we subordinate concepts to each other *by* subsuming objects under them. However, the second question, regarding the validity of this position, can be definitively answered in the negative.

Longuenesse assumes that the relationship between concepts is always hierarchical, i.e. based on subordination.³⁸ She cites *Reflexion* 3051, where Kant contrasts the relationship between concepts with the relationship between sensations. He claims that concepts are always "thought under one another" but that sensations are thought "next to one another."³⁹ He means that concepts are subordinated to each other but sensations are merely juxtaposed with each other within consciousness. Longuenesse describes the relationship between different sensations as "coordination." A manifold of sensations are coordinated with each other but concepts are subordinated to each other.⁴⁰

³⁸ Klaus Reich also argues that the logical relationship between concepts is essentially hierarchical. He writes, "I call this relation of concepts, which they have simply in virtue of their form, the relation of superordination and subordination of concepts" (Reich, *The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments*, 38). As this passage shows, Reich thinks that the hierarchical relationship between concepts is a consequence of their form, which is inherently general or abstract. Every concept represents other representations, which are contained under it. Moreover, with the exception of the concept of an object in general, which is the most abstract concept possible, every concept is represented by another more general notion. Thus, every concept has representations that are subordinated to it, and with one exception, every concept is in turn subordinated to other concepts. Consequently, the relationship between concepts is essentially hierarchical. See *ibid.*, 37-39. Cf. Wolff, *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel*, 66.

³⁹ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3051, 16:633.

⁴⁰ Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 89.

I have argued that this *Reflexion* actually reveals Meier's enduring influence on Kant's views about logic. Meier thought that the relationship between concepts was essentially hierarchical. For example, he writes, "Hence, if we regard several concepts as related to each other, then we must either represent that one of them belongs to the other or represent that it does not belong to the other."⁴¹ As I explained earlier, when Meier writes that one concept "belongs" to another, he means that it is a mark of the other concept. This is another way of saying that the concepts are subordinated to each other. A higher concept represents a mark of the lower concepts that are contained or subordinated under it. Thus, Meier thought that the relationship between concepts was hierarchical. This type of relationship is also inherently *analytic*. As I have explained, if a representation is contained or subordinated under a higher concept, then the subordinated representation will also contain this concept as part of its content. Lower concepts contain all of the higher concepts that stand over them. Therefore, the relationship between concepts, as it was understood by Meier, concerns whether one concept is contained in, or "belongs" to, another concept. He defines judgments as the representation of this relationship. For this reason, all judgments, for Meier, would be analytic.

Longuenesse assumes that the relationship between the concepts in a judgment is based on subordination. However, she does not recognize that this would entail that all judgments are analytic. This can be easily demonstrated by considering a few examples. In the judgment, "some dogs are rabid," the concept of a dog is related to, or united with, the concept of rabidity. However, the concept of a dog is not subordinated to the concept of rabies. This would mean that the concept of a dog is a species of the more general

⁴¹ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 484, §325.

concept of rabidity. Or put another way, this would mean that dogs are actually a kind of rabies, which is clearly absurd. Let us now consider a judgment, in which the subject-term is legitimately subordinated to the predicate: the judgment, “all bodies are divisible.” The concept of a body is subordinated or contained under the concept of divisibility. The former is a species of the latter, which means that bodies are a kind of divisible thing. It is worth noting that this judgment is also analytic. Not only is the subject-term contained *under* the predicate, the predicate is also contained *in* the subject-term. Analytic judgments subordinate their subject to their predicate. However, this is not true of synthetic judgments. The fact that Kant thought that the relationship between concepts was essentially hierarchical and that judgments therefore subordinated concepts to each other is evidence of Meier’s influence on his thinking. This position is not compatible with his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments.

Thus, Longuenesse’s interpretation would commit Kant to an understanding of judgment that only applied to analytic ones. All judgments subsume objects under concepts. However, not every judgment subordinates concepts to each other – at least not the concepts that serve as the terms of a categorical judgment.

The idea that judgments are based on the subordination of concepts is predicated on the assumption that the relationship between concepts is essentially hierarchical, i.e. lower concepts are contained or subordinated under higher ones. Moreover, a hierarchical relationship between a pair of concepts can be explained entirely in terms of the content of these concepts; we do not need to consider the objects that are contained under them, i.e. their extensions. A lower concept is subordinated under a higher one because the higher concept represents a mark of the lower concepts that are contained

under it. For example, the concept of a pine tree is subordinated under the more general concept of a tree. The former is a species of the latter. The concept of a tree represents a set of marks that are shared by all of the lower concepts that are contained under it, including the concept of a pine tree. These marks are the properties that define them as trees. Hence, we can determine whether a concept is subordinated under another more general concept, i.e. whether the former is a species of the later, simply by analyzing its content. We only need to determine whether the more general concept represents one its marks.

For this reason, the *Reflexionen* that make the subsumption of objects the basis for judgment should *supersede* the ones that state that judgments are based on the subordination of concepts. They offer a superior explanation of judgment. Judgments are based on the subsumption of objects under concepts because the relationship between concepts is ultimately determined by the objects that are contained or subsumed under these concepts. In other words, the relationship between the subject and predicate of a categorical judgment is determined by the *extensions* of these concepts, rather than their content. This position can accommodate both analytic and synthetic judgments. It ought to replace the view that judgments are based on the subordination of concepts. Concepts are subordinated to each other on the basis of their *content* alone, not their extensions. As I have now pointed out several times, this explanation of judgment can only be applied to analytic judgments.

4.5 Mediate cognition revisited

Kant's notes also point to a problem with Kant's explanation of mediate cognition in the metaphysical deduction. In the metaphysical deduction, Kant offers two

complementary definitions of judgment. He claims that judgments are “functions of unity among our representations”⁴² and he claims that a judgment is the “mediate cognition of an object”⁴³ He explains the meaning of the latter definition with the example of a categorical judgment. In a categorical judgment, the predicate supposedly represents the concept that serves as the judgment’s subject-term. This concept, in turn, represents certain objects or appearances. Consequently, the predicate is a mediate representation of these objects. It represents a representation of these objects, i.e. the judgment’s subject-term.⁴⁴

The problem with this position should be apparent: it is a model of judgment that only describes analytic ones. If a concept represents another concept, then the represented concept will be subordinated under the concept that represents it. Concept A represents concept B because *A represents a mark* of B. For example, the concept of divisibility represents the concept of a body because divisibility is one of the marks of a body. The concept of divisibility represents a mark of the concept of a body. Consequently, the latter is contained or subordinated under the former. However, we now know that if a representation is contained under a more general concept, then the subordinated representation will also contain this concept. It is contained under the concept because the concept represents one of its marks. This entails that the representation also contains the concept as part of its content. Its content consists of a set of marks and the concept represents one of them. Thus, if concept A represents concept B, then B will be contained *under* A. Moreover, concept A will also be contained *in* concept B. Therefore, the relationship between them will always be analytic.

⁴² Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 69/B 94.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, A 68/B 93.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, A 68-69/B 93-94.

For this reason, it is not surprising that the two examples that Kant offers in the first section of the metaphysical deduction are both analytic judgments. He illustrates his definition of judgment as the “mediate cognition of an object” with the judgment, “all bodies are divisible.”⁴⁵ He subsequently justifies his assertion that concepts can only be employed through judgments with the example, “every metal is a body.”⁴⁶ These are both analytic judgments. The predicate of the judgment, “all bodies are divisible,” represents the subject-term of this judgment. The subject-term also contains the predicate. The same is true of the judgment, “every metal is a body.” The concept of metal contains the concept of a body. Kant’s explanation of mediated cognition in the metaphysical deduction is predicated on the assumption that the relationship between concepts is hierarchical. However, as we know, this type of relationship is always analytic. This explains why Kant’s examples of judgment in the metaphysical deduction are all analytic.

In some of his notes, e.g. *Reflexion* 3738, 4634, and 3127, Kant recognizes that in a synthetic judgment, the predicate does *not* represent the concept that serves as the subject-term. Assuming that the judgment is an affirmative one, the predicate represents at least some of the objects that are contained under the subject-term, i.e. the extension of this concept. However, it does not represent the subject-term itself. Otherwise, this concept would contain the predicate and the judgment would be analytic. For example, in *Reflexion* 3738, Kant claims that a judgment is analytic if its predicate represents a mark of the concept that serves as its subject-term. In this case, the subject-term would be subordinated under the predicate and it would also contain the predicate as part of its

⁴⁵ Ibid., A 68/B 93.

⁴⁶ Ibid., A 69/B 94.

content. A judgment is synthetic if its predicate represents a mark of an object that is contained under the subject-term, rather than the subject-term itself. It represents a part of the *extension* of the subject-term rather than part of its *content*.⁴⁷

Kant's explanation of mediate cognition is another example of the influence of Meier's logic. Like Meier, he appears to assume, at least in the metaphysical deduction, that the relationship between concepts is essentially hierarchical. If the predicate of a judgment represents its subject-term, then the latter will be contained or subordinated under the former. Hence, the relationship between the subject and predicate of this judgment will be hierarchical. The subject-term will be a species of the predicate. As we know, this is only true of analytic judgments.

⁴⁷ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* 3738, 17:278.

Chapter Five

Judgment and Objectivity

In the metaphysical deduction, or “guiding-thread chapter” [*Leitfadenkapitel*], Kant offers two complementary definitions of judgment. He first defines a judgment as the “mediate cognition of an object.”¹ He also defines judgments as “functions of unity among our representations.”² I explained the meaning and significance of these definitions at some length in chapter three. They are part of the new theory of judgment that Kant puts forward in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. When Kant revised this work in 1787, he offered another definition of judgment. It is located in §19 of the B-Deduction, his revised presentation of the transcendental deduction. In this section, Kant claims that the definition of judgment accepted by most logicians is inadequate. They define a judgment as a representation of the relationship between concepts. Meier defines judgment in precisely this way.³ Wolff⁴ and the Port-Royal Logic⁵ also offer examples of this definition. In §19 of the B-Deduction, Kant argues that this definition is problematic for two reasons. First, he points out that it only fits categorical judgments. Hypothetical judgments and disjunctive judgments both concern the relationship between entire judgments. Hence, it is a mistake to describe judgment as a merely conceptual

¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 68/B 93.

² *Ibid.*, A 69/B 94.

³ “The agreement [*Übereinstimmung*] and the conflict [*Streit*] of multiple concepts are **the logical relations of concepts**. A **judgment** is a representation of logical relation of several concepts” (Meier, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 81).

⁴ “Therefore, when we judge we either connect two concepts with each other or separate them from each other; namely, the concept of thing, of which we judge, and the concept of that which either belongs to it or does not belong to it” (Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit*, 156, §1, c. 3).

⁵ “After conceiving things by our ideas, we compare these ideas and, finding that some belong together and others do not, we unite or separate them. This is called *affirming* or *denying*, and in general *judging*” (Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic, or, The Art of Thinking*, 82).

relationship.⁶ Second, the standard definition of judgment does not specify the nature of the relationship that it represents. This is actually the more pressing objection for Kant. He wants to draw a distinction between association and judgment. He argues that judgments are distinguished by the fact that they represent an objective relationship.

Before we turn to the details of this argument, we need to once again clarify the meaning of the term, “judgment.” I have drawn a distinction between two senses of judgment. A judgment can be regarded as a thought or representation. It can also be regarded as an act. In order to help distinguish between these two senses, I refer to judgments in the first sense as propositional judgments. I will argue in this chapter that Kant’s definition of judgment in §19 pertains exclusively to these propositional judgment, i.e. judgments as representation. It does not apply to all acts of judgment, some of which are merely subjective. However, until I actually demonstrate this conclusion in part four of this chapter (4.4), I will refer to judgments generically. This will allow me remain consistent with Kant’s text, which draws no distinction between judgments as representations and judgments as acts. In the meantime, if the reader is curious about which of these two senses I intend, I will stipulate at the outset that §19 defines *propositional* judgments.

4.1 The objective validity of judgment

Kant rejects the standard definition of judgment accepted by German *Schulphilosophie*. According to this definition, a judgment represents the relationship between concepts. He writes, “I have never been able to satisfy myself with the explanation that the logicians give of a judgment in general: it is, they say, the

⁶ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 140-141.

representation of a relation between two concepts.”⁷ Kant raises two objections to this definition. First, it only applies to categorical judgments and second, it does not specify the nature of relationship that it represents.

Kant devotes most of his attention in §19 to the second objection. He draws a distinction between association and judgment. The imagination and the understanding are both capacities to combine or synthesize representations in the mind.⁸ The understanding relates or unites representations through judgments. One of the functions of the imagination is the recollection of past intuitions. Kant terms this the reproductive

⁷ Ibid., B 140.

⁸ Rudolf Makkreel has traced the development of Kant’s concept of the imagination. He summarizes Kant’s pre-critical views about this faculty. According to Makkreel, Kant regarded the entire lower faculty of cognition as essentially a capacity to form images. It was a *Bildungsvermögen*, or formative faculty. See Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, 12. Makkreel identifies eight distinct modes of image formation, or *Bildung*, that are mentioned in Kant’s anthropology notes. He first contrasts *Bildungskraft* with *Einbildung*. *Bildungskraft* is applied to intuitions and forms them into images. It takes the manifold of sensations, which is contained in a given intuition, and forms this material into the image of an object. *Einbildung*, which is often translated as the “imagination,” invents new images. *Bildungskraft* forms the images of *given* objects, i.e. objects of perception. *Einbildung* forms the images of *non-given* objects, i.e. images that are invented rather than perceived. See *ibid.*, 13. Kant also distinguishes between three temporal modes of *Bildung*, or image formation: *Abbildung*, *Nachbildung*, and *Vorbildung*. Makkreel defines *Abbildung* as “direct image formation,” *Nachbildung* is “reproductive image formation,” and *Vorbildung* is “anticipatory image formation” (*ibid.*, 13). *Abbildung* forms the image of an object in the *present*. *Nachbildung* reproduces past images. Hence, it represents objects in the *past*. *Vorbildung* represents objects in the *future*. Makkreel claims that these three temporal modes of *Bildung* correspond with Baumgarten’s account of perception. Baumgarten posits three perceptual faculties: the senses, the imagination, and foresight. Like Kant’s temporal modes of *Bildung*, Baumgarten’s perceptual faculties are also defined temporally. The senses are the soul’s capacity to represent the *present* condition of the world. The imagination is the soul’s capacity to represent the *past* condition of the world. It is the capacity to reproduce past sensations. Foresight is the capacity to represent the *future* condition of the world. The three temporal modes of *Bildung* are related to the *Imagination*. Makkreel distinguishes between the Latin term, *Imagination*, and the German word, *Einbildung*. The former denotes the “storehouse” of images within the mind or soul. These images are formed through *Abbildung*, *Nachbildung*, and *Vorbildung*. As I explained earlier, *Einbildung* consists in the invention of new images. Thus, according to Makkreel, the Latin term, *Imagination*, denotes the role of the imagination in perception. Kant originally reserved the German term, *Einbildung*, for the creative or productive use of this faculty. Makkreel points out several further differences between Kant’s pre-critical views about the imagination and his account of this faculty in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. First, Kant did not originally regard the imagination as primarily a capacity for synthesis. Synthesis was just one of many functions that were performed by this faculty. See *ibid.*, 13; 25. Second, Kant thought that the imagination was only governed by the law of association. See *ibid.*, 14-15. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant argues that the empirical use of the imagination presupposes certain *a priori* acts of synthesis, which are themselves governed by the categories. However, he originally thought that this faculty was governed by merely empirical principles.

imagination.⁹ The reproductive imagination is governed by the law of association.¹⁰ In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he explains this law as the principle that representations that occur together regularly become linked or associated in the mind. Once this association is made, if we conceive of one of these representations then we will recall the others as well. The thought of one causes us to recall the rest.¹¹ The imagination reproduces past

⁹ In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant defines the imagination as “the faculty for representing an object **without its presence** in intuition” (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 151). This is the standard definition of this faculty accepted by German *Schulphilosophie*. For example, Wolff writes in the *Deutsche Metaphysik*, “One typically calls the representations of such things, which are not present, **images** [*Einbildungen*]. And one calls the power of the soul to produce these representations the **imagination** [*Einbildungs-Kraft*]” (Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 130, §235). See also Baumgarten, *Metaphysik*, 126, §414. Kant distinguishes between two ways of employing this faculty, which he terms the productive imagination and the reproductive imagination. The reproductive imagination is the capacity to reproduce past representations. The productive imagination is the capacity to generate new ones. In both cases, the imagination either recalls or invents representations without being affected by the presence of external objects. This distinguishes it from the senses, which receive representations directly. Kant’s distinction between the productive and reproductive syntheses of the imagination does not in itself count as an innovation. Both Wolff and Baumgarten grant the imagination the twofold capacity to recall past representations and to invent new ones. Wolff refers to the latter as the “power to invent” [*Kraft zu erdichten*]. See Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 134-135, §242. Kant’s innovation is to dramatically expand the role of the imagination. Its most important function becomes its role in perception. In the A-Deduction, he suggests that the imagination is responsible for both the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction. It combines the manifold of representations, which is contained in a given intuition. It also reproduces this manifold, which results in a continuous series of perceptions. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 120-121. Moreover, Kant claims that both the empirical synthesis of apprehension and the empirical synthesis of reproduction are based on prior *a priori* syntheses, which are also performed by the imagination. The forms of intuition, space and time, are themselves intuitions. These pure intuitions contain a manifold, which requires synthesis. Thus, there must be an *a priori* synthesis of this pure manifold of intuition. See *ibid.*, A 99-100. Furthermore, the empirical synthesis of reproduction is governed by the law of association. The law of association presupposes the regularity of appearances. Appearances must occur with a relative degree of consistency, in order for it to be possible to form associations between them. Kant calls this consistency the “affinity” of appearances. The affinity of appearances must be established through an act of synthesis that precedes the empirical synthesis of reproduction, since this empirical synthesis presupposes affinity. Kant claims that this prior synthesis must be *a priori* because even the pure intuitions of space and time require it. They must be combined in a way that allows for the affinity of their manifold. See *ibid.*, A 101-102; A 113-114. Thus, the empirical syntheses of apprehension and reproduction are both grounded on *a priori* ones. Kant identifies the *a priori* use of the imagination with the productive imagination. He explains that the reproductive imagination is dependent on experience – presumably because it recalls past intuitions, which have already been given through experience. The productive imagination alone is suited for the pure synthesis of the manifold of intuition. See *ibid.*, A 118; A 123. Kant assigns the productive imagination an essential transcendental function. It ceases it to be a mere capacity for invention, as is the case with Wolff and Baumgarten.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, A 121; B 141-142.

¹¹ “It is, to be sure, a merely empirical law in accordance with which representations that have often followed or accompanied one another are finally associated with each other and thereby placed in a connection in accordance with which, even without the presence of the object, one of these representations

intuitions in accordance with the law of association. In §19, Kant denies that the association between certain representations is equivalent to a judgment. Both relate representations to each other. However, a judgment necessarily represents an objective relationship. An association is merely subjective. He writes,

If, however, I investigate more closely the relation [*Beziehung*] of given cognitions in every judgment, and distinguish that relation, as something belonging to the understanding, from the relation [*Verhältnisse*] in accordance with laws of reproductive imagination (which has only subjective validity), then I find that a judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the **objective** unity of apperception.¹²

According to Kant, the relationship between the terms of a judgment is fundamentally different from “the relation in accordance with the laws of reproductive imagination.”

We know that the reproductive imagination is governed by the law of association. Kant is contrasting the kind of relationship that is represented by a judgment with one that is based on association. He claims that the latter “has only subjective validity.” A judgment, on the other hand, is objectively valid.

In the fifth part of this chapter (4.5), I examine the meaning of the expression “objective validity” [*objective Gültigkeit*]. However, for now, it will suffice to state that a relationship is objectively valid insofar as it corresponds with, or at least purports to correspond with, an object. Judgments are objectively valid because they are representative of objects. Kant contrasts the association between certain representations with the objective relationship that is represented by a judgment. He explains that the law of association only determines how representations happen to be related in an individual’s mind or consciousness. For example, the proposition, “If I carry a body, I

brings about a transition of the mind to the other in accordance with a constant rule” (ibid., A 100). See also Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:176.

¹² Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 141.

feel a pressure of weight,” expresses an association between the intuitions of bodies and weight. It expresses the relation between these representations within a person’s mind. However, it does not assert anything about actual bodies. Conversely, a judgment would relate these same representations to objects and assert that these “bodies are heavy.” Kant writes, “In accordance with the latter [the law of association] I could only say ‘If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight,’ but not ‘It, the body, **is** heavy,” which would be to say that these two representations are combined in the object.”¹³ Thus, association merely represents how representations happen to be related in an individual’s mind. It is a subjectively valid relationship. A judgment, on the other hand, represents an object. The relationship between its terms is objectively valid because this relationship pertains to, or is representative of, an object.

Kant defines a judgment in terms of this objectivity. He writes, “I find that a judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the **objective** unity of apperception.”¹⁴ The “objective unity of apperception” is an expression that Kant introduces in §18 of the B-Deduction. It denotes the unity of the manifold of intuition under the concept of an object.¹⁵ According to Kant, a judgment “brings” cognitions to this unity. He means that it relates representations to an object. It unites them in a way that is representative of an object. This is not actually a new position for Kant. It is already present in the metaphysical deduction, where he defines a judgment as “the mediate cognition of an object.”¹⁶ Kant reaffirms this definition in §19.

¹³ Ibid., B 142.

¹⁴ Ibid., B 141.

¹⁵ Ibid., B 139.

¹⁶ Ibid., A 68/B 93.

He also adds an important idea that does not appear in the metaphysical deduction. Kant explains the basis for the objective validity, which defines a judgment and distinguishes it from associations. He argues that it is grounded on the transcendental unity of apperception. The transcendental unity of apperception is Kant's term for the necessary unity of one's consciousness, which, according to him, is a consequence of self-consciousness. He claims that the contents of our consciousness are united by the fact they are all attributable to the same cognitive subject, which he famously terms the "I think." These representations are all necessarily related to this subject because we ought to be able to recognize each of them as a thought that is conceived by us. This shared relation to the "I think" unites our consciousness.¹⁷ Thus, self-consciousness, or the ability to relate each of our thoughts or perceptions to ourselves, entails a unified consciousness. Kant calls this unity the transcendental unity

¹⁷ I suspect that Kant's account of the unity of self-consciousness is at least partly inspired by Baumgarten's conception of perfection. Like many of his predecessors, e.g. Leibniz and Wolff, Baumgarten equates perfection with harmony. He explains that different things are in harmony with each other when they all serve as the sufficient reason for the same thing. This shared relation to one thing unites them and brings them into harmony with each other. Baumgarten writes, "If many things taken together contain the sufficient reason for something, then they **harmonize** in this something. The harmony itself is **the perfection**, and the something, in which they harmonize, is **the determining ground of the perfection**" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysik*, 24-25, §73. For example, according to this account, a clock would be perfect insofar as all of its parts were in harmony with each other. These parts would be in harmony if they all served as the sufficient reason for the same thing, e.g. the correct indication of time. Thus, the parts of a harmonious unity are united through their shared relation to a single thing. This one thing, the so-called "determining ground" of the perfection or harmony, follows from the parts as a necessary consequence. The parts constitute the sufficient ground or reason for this one consequence. Let us compare this idea with Kant's account of the necessary unity that is entailed by self-consciousness: the transcendental unity of apperception. The contents of one's consciousness are united through their shared relation to the transcendental ego, just as the parts of a harmonious unity are united through their shared relation to the determining ground of their perfection. Moreover, Kant claims that the "I think" is nothing more than the consciousness of the synthesis of the representations that are united through apperception. Hence, these representations, in a sense, serve as the ground for the representation "I think." The transcendental ego is a consequence of their synthesis. The contents of our consciousness are united through essentially the same type of relationship that unites the parts of a perfect or harmonious unity. Given Kant's close familiarity with Baumgarten's *Metaphysica*, it would be surprising if this similarity was accidental. Kant was certainly aware of Baumgarten's account of perfection and he may have drawn upon it when he explained the transcendental unity of apperception in the B-Deduction.

of apperception and in §19 he argues that it is the basis for the objective relationship, which is represented by a judgment.

As I explained earlier, Kant defines a judgment as “the way to bring given cognitions to the **objective** unity of apperception.”¹⁸ At the time, I explained that he meant that a judgment relates representations to an object. This remains true. However, the “objective unity of apperception” also denotes the transcendental unity of apperception. In §18, where Kant introduces this expression, he identifies it with the transcendental unity of apperception. He writes, “The **transcendental unity** of apperception is that unity through which all of the manifold in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is called **objective** on that account.”¹⁹ The objective unity of apperception and the transcendental unity of apperception are synonyms. The unity of the manifold of intuition under the concept of an object is the very same unity that is entailed by the necessary relation that every conscious representation must share to the transcendental ego. Thus, a judgment not only unites representations in a manner that is representative of an object. It also unites them in accordance with the transcendental unity of apperception. This means that it unites representations in such a way that they can all be related to the “I think.”

Kant claims that the purpose of the copula is to distinguish between association and judgment and to signify that a judgment, which utilizes a copula, represents an objectively valid relationship. He writes, “That is the aim of the copula **is** in them [judgments]: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. For this word designates the relation of the representations to the original

¹⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 141.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, B 141.

apperception and its **necessary unity**.”²⁰ According to this passage, the copula indicates that the representations, which are united by a judgment, are related to the “I think.” It denotes their relation to “the original apperception.” The expression “original apperception” is a synonym for transcendental self-consciousness. Kant claims that it generates the representation “I think.”²¹ The “necessary unity” that is entailed by this self-consciousness is, of course, the transcendental unity of apperception. A judgment unites representations in such a way that they can be related to the “I think.” It also unites them in a manner that is representative of an object. This is why Kant claims that the copula, which signifies a judgment’s objectivity, also refers to the shared relation of its representations to the “I think.”

Thus, the transcendental unity of apperception is the source for the objectivity that defines judgments. A judgment represents how different representations are united in the transcendental unity of apperception, and as a result, it relates these representations to an object. This allows Kant to conclude that the manifold of intuition is united under a concept through acts of judgment.²² He argues that the manifold of intuition must be combined in such a way that it can be united in one consciousness. Otherwise, our intuitions would not be representative of objects. According to Kant, this necessary unity is established through acts of judgment. His definition of judgment in §19 is intended to set up this conclusion. He writes that a judgment is “the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception.” Kant means that a judgment unites representations

²⁰ Ibid., B 141-142.

²¹ “I call it the **pure apperception**, in order to distinguish it from the **empirical** one, or also the **original apperception**, since it is that self-consciousness which, because it produces the representation **I think**, which must be able to accompany all others and which in all consciousness is one and the same, cannot be accompanied by any further representation” (ibid., B 132).

²² “That action of the understanding, however, through which the manifold of given representations (whether they be intuitions or concepts) is brought under an apperception in general, is the logical function of judgments” (ibid., B 143).

in a manner that is representative of an object. The objective unity of apperception is the unity of the manifold of intuition under the concept of an object. However, it is also a synonym for the transcendental unity of apperception. Consequently, when Kant claims that a judgment “brings” representations or cognition to this necessary unity of consciousness, he also means that it unites them in such a way that they can all be related to the transcendental ego. In the metaphysical deduction, Kant defines judgments as “functions of unity among our representations.”²³ He means that, insofar as we regard judgments as mental acts, they unite representations within one’s consciousness. In §19, Kant adds that judgments unite representations in accordance with the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. This is the source of their objectivity.

4.2 Kant’s account of judgment in the *Prolegomena*: universal validity and objectivity

Kant does not explain the connection between the transcendental unity of apperception and objectivity in the B-Deduction. He identifies the transcendental unity of apperception with the objective unity of apperception in §18. However, this is an assertion rather than an explanation. In §17, he writes that “the unity of consciousness is that which alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, thus their objective validity.”²⁴ But this passage again merely asserts what it ought to explain; namely, how the transcendental unity of apperception constitutes the objectivity of our cognition.

Kant does address this important question in the A-Deduction. He explains that we attribute objectivity to our representation, insofar as they are combined or synthesized

²³ Ibid., A 69/B 94.

²⁴ Ibid., B 137. Cf. *ibid.*, A 109.

in a necessary way. This necessary synthesis distinguishes objective representations from subjective ones, which are combined in a contingent or even arbitrary manner.²⁵ Kant later repeats this idea in the second analogy.²⁶ The manifold of intuition must always be combined in a necessary way, at least if it is to represent an object. A contingent synthesis will not suffice for cognition. Consequently, the objectivity of our cognition consists in the necessary unity of the manifold of intuition. This necessary unity constitutes the relationship between our, otherwise subjective, intuitions and their objects. Kant then asks about the source or ground for this necessity. He quickly concludes that it cannot come from the object, because we are only acquainted with appearances. Sensations are supposedly the effects of external objects, which exist independently of the mind.²⁷ However, Kant insists that these representations must be synthesized and united by the understanding. The necessary unity, which constitutes the objectivity of our cognitions, cannot be received with our sensations. It must come from ourselves. Kant infers that it must be the same necessary unity, which is entailed by self-consciousness: the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. He writes, “the unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the representations.”²⁸ The “formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold” is equivalent to the

²⁵ “We find, however, that our thought of the relation of all cognition to its object carries something of necessity with it, since namely the latter is regarded as that which is opposed to our cognitions being determined at pleasure or arbitrarily rather than being determined *a priori*, since insofar as they are to relate to an object our cognitions must also necessarily agree with each other in relation to it, i.e., they must have that unity that constitutes the concept of an object” (ibid., A 104-105).

²⁶ “If we investigate what new characteristic is given to our representations by the **relation to an object**, and what is the dignity that they thereby receive, we find that it does nothing beyond making the combination of representations necessary in a certain way, and subjecting them to a rule” (ibid., A 197/B 242-243).

²⁷ Ibid., A 19-20/B 34

²⁸ Ibid., A 105.

transcendental unity of apperception. It is a formal unity because it does not depend on the content of the representations that it unites.

Kant offers a more straightforward explanation for the objectivity of our cognition in the *Prolegomena*. In this work, Kant distinguishes between two kinds of judgment: judgments of perception [*Wahrnehmungsurtheile*] and judgments of experience [*Erfahrungsurtheile*]. The former are merely subjectively valid, but the latter are objectively valid.²⁹ Kant offers several examples of judgments of perceptions. He writes, “Let us provide examples: that the room is warm, the sugar sweet, the wormwood repugnant, are merely subjectively valid judgments.”³⁰ Each of these judgments represents the relation between concepts within a particular individual’s mind. However, there is no requirement that others must relate these same concepts in the same way. Judgments of perception represent a relationship between different mental representations that is merely subjectively valid. They represent how these representations are related within the consciousness of a particular individual. Conversely, a judgment of experience represents a relationship that is valid for everyone. It is objectively valid for this reason.

Kant explains in the *Prolegomena* that objective validity and universal validity are actually equivalent concepts. A judgment is objectively valid if it is representative of an object. It is universally valid if it is valid for everyone. According to Kant, if a judgment is objectively valid it will also be universally valid, and vice versa. He writes, “for if a judgment agrees with an object, then all judgments of the same object must also agree with one another, and hence the objective validity of a judgment of experience

²⁹ Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*, 4:298.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 4:299.

signifies nothing other than its necessary universal validity.”³¹ Here he claims that if a judgment “agrees with an object [*mit einem Gegenstand übereinstimmt*]” then it also ought to agree with the judgments made by others about this same object. A judgment “agrees with an object” if it accurately represents this object. An accurate or correct judgment about a certain object ought to be compatible with the judgments of others about this same object –assuming, of course, that they too are judging correctly. Kant is essentially making the point that if I correctly judge that something is the case then others ought to judge that this is the case as well. Consequently, he asserts that objective validity entails universal validity. If a judgment is objectively valid then it will be universally valid. Kant also claims that the inverse is the case: if a judgment is universally valid then it will be objectively valid. He writes,

if we find cause to deem a judgment necessarily, universally valid . . . we must then also deem it objective, i.e., as expressing not merely a relation of a perception to a subject, but a property of an object; for there would be no reason why other judgments necessarily would have to agree with mine, if there were not the unity of the object – an object to which they all refer, with which they all agree, and, for that reason, also must all harmonize among themselves.³²

Kant claims that if a judgment is universally valid, then there must be a reason for this consensus. There must be a reason why the judgments of others must agree or correspond with mine. Kant argues that the only possible reason for this agreement is that these judgments all represent the same object. Insofar as they all represent the same object, then these judgments ought to agree with each other. Thus, universal validity entails objective validity, because, according to Kant, the only basis for intersubjective agreement is a shared relation to an object. As he puts it, “there would be no reason why

³¹ Ibid., 4:298.

³² Ibid., 4:298.

other judgments necessarily would have to agree with mine, if there were not the unity of the object – an object to which they all refer, with which they all agree.”

Kant acknowledges that we are only acquainted with appearances and that we can never know objects as actual things in themselves. Nonetheless, he claims that if a judgment is universally valid, then we take it to be representative of such an object. He writes,

Objective validity and necessary universal validity (for everyone) are therefore interchangeable concepts, and although we do not know the object in itself, nonetheless, if we regard a judgment as universally valid and hence necessary, objective validity is understood to be included. Through this judgment we cognize the object (even if it otherwise remains unknown as it may be in itself) by means of the universally valid and necessary connection of the given perceptions.³³

A so-called “judgment of experience” is objectively valid because it represents a relationship between its terms that is universally valid. In other words, it does not just represent how these two representations happen to be related in the mind of the person making the judgment. This relationship ought to be valid for everyone, which means that any rational being in a similar position ought to relate them in precisely this way. Kant writes, “What experience teaches me under certain circumstances, it must teach me at every time and teach everyone else as well, and its validity is not limited to the subject or its state at the time. Therefore I express all such judgments as objectively valid.”³⁴

Thus, in the *Prolegomena*, Kant explains that universal validity entails objective validity, and vice versa. If a judgment is universally valid, i.e. it is valid for everyone, then it will also be objectively valid, i.e. it will be representative of an object.

³³ Ibid., 4:298.

³⁴ Ibid., 4:300.

This explains why Kant identifies the objective unity of apperception, i.e. the unity of the manifold of intuition under the concept of an object, with the transcendental unity of apperception.³⁵ The transcendental unity of apperception is universally valid. Any self-conscious being must necessarily unite the contents of their consciousness in this way. As we know, universal validity entails objective validity. Consequently, if a manifold of representation is united in accordance with transcendental unity of apperception, i.e. its representations can all be related to the “I think,” then it will also represent an object. If the unified manifold is universally valid, it will also be objectively valid.

Judgments are objectively valid because they represent a universally valid relationship. The relationship between their terms, e.g. the subject and predicate of a categorical judgment, is universally valid, which means that any rational being ought to relate these representations in exactly this way. A judgment represents a universally valid relationship between its terms, because it represents how these representations are united by transcendental apperception. Since the transcendental unity of apperception is universally valid, judgments are universally valid as well. They represent how different representations are related by this necessary unity. By representing how different

³⁵ Kant does not actually discuss the transcendental unity of apperception or self-consciousness in the *Prolegomena*. In this entire work, the word “apperception” is only mentioned twice in passing. See *ibid.*, 4:318; 335. Kant does refer to what he calls “consciousness in general.” He contrasts it with the consciousness of a particular individual. The former is universally valid; the latter is idiosyncratic and only subjectively valid. The expression “consciousness in general” is roughly equivalent to the transcendental unity of apperception. They both denote modes of consciousness that are universally valid. The expression “consciousness in general” appears once in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In §20 of the B-Deduction, Kant claims that an empirical intuition “is brought to a consciousness in general” through the logical functions of judgment (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 143). As we know, judgments bring representations to the objective or transcendental unity of apperception. This confirms that the transcendental unity of apperception and “consciousness in general” are equivalent expressions.

representations are united in the transcendental unity apperception, a judgment relates them to an object.

4.3 Can Kant account of judgment in the *Prolegomena* be harmonized with §19?

Kant's explanation of the link between universal validity and objective validity can help us to better understand the objectivity of judgments and how it is derived from the transcendental unity of apperception. However, there is also an important difference between Kant's account of judgment in the *Prolegomena* and his definition of judgment in the B-Deduction. In the B-Deduction, Kant claims that all judgments, by definition, are objectively valid. Yet in the *Prolegomena*, he claims that some judgments – namely, judgments of perception – are only subjectively valid. Consequently, these judgments do not meet Kant's definition of a judgment in the B-Deduction. This definition is not compatible with his distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience in the *Prolegomena*. In order to clarify the relationship between these two texts, and their differing accounts of judgment, we must first explain precisely what Kant means by a “judgment of perception.” As we will see, this is not an easy task, because Kant statements about these judgments are brief and often confusing. Sorting them out requires careful reading.

According to Kant, a judgment of perceptions compares perceptions, which means that it connects or relates these intuitions within the mind. He writes,

Now this judging can be of two types: first, when I merely compare the perceptions and connect them in a consciousness of my state, or, second, when I connect them in a consciousness in general. The first judgment is merely a judgment of perception and has thus far only subjective validity.³⁶

³⁶ Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*, 4:300.

Kant defines a perception as an “intuition of which I am conscious.”³⁷ Like Leibniz and Wolff, Kant believes that the mind or soul contains many representations that are entirely obscure and are below the threshold of consciousness. A perception is a conscious intuition and a judgment of perceptions compares these intuitions.

It is worth pointing out that this is actually a somewhat unusual position for Kant to take. It implies that judgments of perception consist of a relationship between *intuitions*. This is unusual because German *Schulphilosophie* taught that judgments were a conceptual relationship. For example, in the *Vernunftlehre*, Meier claims that judgments arise from the comparison of *concepts*.^{38,39} Moreover, in his own logic lectures from the early 1770s, Kant also taught that judgments compare concepts. The purpose of this comparison is to determine whether one of these concepts is a mark of the other, i.e. whether the predicate of the judgment can be ascribed to its subject-term.⁴⁰ We might expect that Kant would repeat this position in the *Prolegomena*. However, he instead asserts that judgments of perceptions compare perceptions or intuitions, not concepts.

Kant argues that all judgments of experience are derived from judgments of perception. He writes, “All of our judgments are at first mere judgments of perception; they hold only for us, i.e., for our subject, and only afterwards do we give them a new relation, namely to an object, and intend that the judgment should also be valid at all

³⁷ Ibid., 4:300.

³⁸ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 482, §324.

³⁹ The idea that judgments involve an act of comparison can be traced to the Port-Royal Logic, which taught that judgments compare ideas. See Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic, or, The Art of Thinking*, 82.

⁴⁰ “If I judge then I compare one concept with others and investigate whether they belong to it or are opposed to it, i.e. whether or not they are marks of it” (Kant, *Logik Philippi*, 24:461). See also idem, *Blomberg Logic*, 24:273-274.

times for us and for everyone else”⁴¹ Thus, we start with merely subjective judgments of perception and then transform them into objective judgments of experience. Kant explains that we form judgments of experience by applying the categories to our judgments of perception. Specifically, we subsume one of the intuitions that are compared through the initial judgment of perception under a pure concept of the understanding. This establishes a necessary relationship between the intuitions that are compared by this judgment. For example, Kant writes, “Now before a judgment of experience can arise from a judgment of perception, it is first required: that the perception be subsumed under a concept of the understanding of this kind [a pure concept of the understanding].”⁴² Judgments of perception can only establish a contingent relationship between perceptions. By applying one of the categories to such a judgment, this relationship becomes necessary because it is now determined by a rule. It is also universally valid. Any rational being ought to combine their intuitions in this way. Since the judgment is now universally valid, it also objectively valid, or representative of an object. Thus, judgments of perception become judgments of experience through the application of the categories.⁴³

We now know the following about judgments of perception. They involve an act of comparison and they compare intuitions rather than concepts. Moreover, judgments of perception are the source for all judgments of experience. They acquire objectivity and become judgments of experience through the application of the categories.

⁴¹ Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*, 4:298.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 4:300.

⁴³ Kant later argues in the B-Deduction that perception itself is governed by the categories. The pure intuitions of space and time contain a manifold of representations that must be synthesized in accordance with these concepts. Empirical intuitions are also conditioned by this synthesis by virtue of their spatiotemporal form. Thus, the categories are already applied to our perceptions. This is an apparent contradiction between the *Prolegomena* and the first *Critique*. I will subsequently explain this problem in more detail.

Kant's statement that judgments of perception compare perceptions suggests that these judgments actually consist in a relationship between intuitions. When Meier writes that judgments arise from the comparison of concepts, he means that judgments represent the relationship between these concepts. It is not unreasonable to assume that Kant has a similar meaning in mind when he claims that judgments of perception compare intuitions. This interpretation is also supported by the text. Kant explains that judgments of perceptions connect or relate intuitions within one's consciousness. For example, he writes that a judgment of perception is "merely a connection of *perceptions* within my mental state, without reference to the object."⁴⁴ If judgments of perception amount to nothing more than a relationship between intuitions, as Kant claims in this passage, then they differ from standard propositional judgments. Propositional judgments consist of concepts; they are conceptual relationships. Judgments of perception appear to be intuitive relationships, which would make them akin to associations. However, there are also several passages in the *Prolegomena* that imply that judgments of perception are actually ordinary propositional judgments.

First, Kant mentions that the intuitions, which are compared through a judgment of perception, have corresponding concepts. He writes, "they [judgments of experience] would not be possible if, *over and above the concepts drawn from intuition*, a pure concept of the understanding had not been added under which these concepts had been subsumed."⁴⁵ Kant claims that, in addition to "the concepts drawn from intuition," judgments of experience involve a pure concept of the understanding. This suggests that a judgment of perception consists only of "concepts drawn from intuition," since it is

⁴⁴ Ibid., 4:300. My italics.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 4:301. My italics.

transformed into a judgment of experience through the application of the categories.

What does Kant mean when he refers to these “concepts drawn from intuition?”

Presumably, they are concepts that represent the intuitions, which are compared through the judgment of perception. If this is true, then judgments of perception do not only consist of perceptions or intuitions, as we initially suspected. They consist of concepts that represent intuitions.

Kant’s passing reference to these concepts suggests a slightly different picture of a judgment of perception. Rather than actually consisting of a relationship between perceptions or intuitions, a judgment of perception merely *represents* this relationship. The judgment itself is a conceptual relationship, which represents the relationship between different intuitions within our consciousness. For example, the judgment, “the room is warm,” which Kant identifies as a judgment of perception, represents the relationship between our perception of the room and our sensations of warmth. However, the judgment itself consists of concepts; namely, the concept of the room and the concept of warmth. These are “the concepts drawn from intuition” that Kant mentions in the passage above. If this is true, then judgments of perception are judgments that are based entirely on our perceptions. We render them on the basis of how our intuitions happen to be combined within inner sense. For example, we judge that the room is warm because we simultaneously perceive the room and a feeling of warmth. Judgments of perception differ from judgments of experience because judgments of experience take the pure concepts of the understanding into account. They represent a relationship between our perceptions that is determined by the categories. Conversely, judgments of perception represent the contingent associations between intuitions within inner sense.

This interpretation is supported by a subsequent passage, where Kant also implies that the intuitions, which are compared through a judgment of perception, are represented by concepts. He writes,

The judgment of experience must still therefore, *beyond the sensory intuition and its logical connection* (in accordance with which the intuition has been rendered universal through comparison in a judgment), add something that determines the synthetic judgment as necessary, and thereby as universally valid.⁴⁶

Here Kant claims that a judgment of experience consists in more than just “the sensory intuition and its logical connection.” It requires an additional “something that determines the synthetic judgment as necessary, and thereby as universally valid.” This added “something” is a pure concept of the understanding. According to Kant, we transform a judgment of perception into a judgment of experience by subsuming one of the intuitions, which are compared by the judgment of perception, under one of the categories. This establishes a necessary relationship between the perceptions that are compared by this judgment. We can infer that a judgment of perception consists only of “the sensory intuition and its logical connection,” since the addition of the categories transforms these judgments into judgments of experience. It is not difficult to fathom what Kant means by a “sensory intuition” [*sinnliche Anschauung*]. It is an empirical intuition, or one that is received through the senses. However, what does he mean by the “logical connection” [*logische Verknüpfung*] between these intuitions? Kant’s parenthetical remark offers us a clue to his intentions. He claims that an intuition is “rendered universal” [*allgemein gemacht*] in accordance with its “logical connection” in a judgment. He means that the intuitions, which are compared by a judgment of perception, are represented by concepts. This universalizes the intuitions since concepts can represent multiple objects. Kant

⁴⁶ Ibid., 4:304. My italics.

defines concepts as general or universal representations. He contrasts them with intuitions, which he claims are always singular representations. This means that intuitions can only represent specific individuals. The intuitions that are compared by a judgment of perceptions are represented by concepts. They are “rendered universal” by these concepts.⁴⁷ The judgment represents the relationship between these concepts, and by extension the intuitions that they represent. This relationship is the “logical connection” between them. Thus, the intuitions, which are compared by a judgment of perception, are represented by concepts. These judgments do not consist of intuitions alone. Like all judgments, they are essentially conceptual relationships.

There is also a passage in the *Prolegomena* where Kant implies that judgments of perception exhibit the logical form of a judgment. He writes, “The logical moments of all judgments are so many possible ways of uniting representations in a consciousness.”⁴⁸ The “logical moments of all judgments” are equivalent to the logical *forms* of judgment that Kant identifies in the metaphysical deduction. According to Kant, if we entirely abstract from the content of our judgments, and examine just their form, we discover that there are four basic features that they all share. Every judgment has a quantity, a quality, a relation, and a modality. These are the logical forms or moments of judgment.⁴⁹ Kant claims that *all* judgments exhibit these moments. This presumably includes even

⁴⁷ Kant claims that the intuitions are “rendered universal” [*allgemein gemacht*]. This does not mean that the judgment of perception, which represents the relationship between these intuitions, is also universal. Kant means that an intuition, which is a singular representation, is itself represented by a universal representation, i.e. a concept. The intuition is thereby “rendered universal.”

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 4:305.

⁴⁹ In §9 of the metaphysical deduction, where Kant sets forth the table of judgment, Kant claims that logical functions of the understanding “can be brought under four titles, each of which contains under itself three moments” (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 70/B 95). The functions of the understanding are responsible for producing the forms of judgment. Hence, the table of judgment enumerates both the logical *functions* of the understanding and the logical *forms* of judgments. The functions produce the forms. The forms and their functions fall under four headings or titles: quantity, quality, relation, and modality. Each of these titles has three *moments*. These moments correspond with the forms of judgment. There are four titles with three moments each or twelve possible logical forms of judgment.

subjective judgments of perception. In the same section of the *Prolegomena* (§22), Kant defines judgment in general as “the unification of representations in a consciousness.”^{50,51} He claims that this unity can be subjective, in which case it is a judgment of perception, or it can be universally valid and objective, in which case it constitutes a judgment of experience. Thus, judgments of perception unite representations within consciousness, albeit in a way that is only subjectively valid. Kant claims that the logical moments or forms of judgment are different “possible ways of uniting representations in a consciousness.” Since judgments of perceptions unite representations, they would appear to have the logical form of a judgment. In chapter two, I defined a propositional judgment as a cognition that exhibited this form. Since judgments of perception have the logical form of a judgment, they would have to be regarded as propositional judgments.

Thus, judgments of perception consist of concepts and they have the logical form of a judgment. They are therefore standard propositional judgments. There is nothing unusual about these judgments, other than their lack of objectivity. Kant also claims that a judgment of perception is “merely a connection of perceptions within my mental state.” If judgments of perceptions actually consisted in a relationship between intuitions and nothing more, then this would make them akin to associations, rather than propositional judgments. However, this is not what Kant means. He means that judgments of perceptions only *represent* the contingent relationships between different intuitions within inner sense. Consequently, they are only subjectively valid. This does not

⁵⁰ Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*, 4:304.

⁵¹ This definition of judgment corresponds with one of the two definitions of judgment that Kant advances in the metaphysical deduction. He defines judgments as “functions of unity among our representations” (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 69/B 94). In other words, a judgment is a function or activity of the mind that unites representations within one’s consciousness.

preclude them from being propositional judgments. They are propositional judgments that represent the associations between different perceptions. A judgment of perception is the conceptual representation of an intuitive relationship.

We form a judgment of perception by reflecting on our inner sense and comparing different perceptions. By doing so, we become aware of the relationship between these intuitions. We then express this relationship through a propositional judgment. This propositional judgment is the actual judgment of perception. The judgment does not consist in the act of comparison and it would be a mistake to equate them. Instead, the judgment is merely based on the comparison. Kant would describe the comparison as the “determining ground” of the judgment. It is the basis for our judgment. We render a judgment of perception based on how our perceptions happen to be related within inner sense and we become aware of their relationship by comparing the intuitions in question.

A judgment of experience starts with the same act of comparison. In the *Prolegomena*, Kant insists that all judgments of experience were first subjective judgments of perception. After comparing two perceptions, and becoming aware of the relationship between them, we subsume one of these intuitions under a pure concept of the understanding. This establishes a necessary connection between the two perceptions. It ensures that the relationship between them is universally valid because any rational being must also connect them in this way. Kant writes,

A completely different judgment therefore occurs before experience can arise from perception. The given intuition must be subsumed under a concept that determines the form of judging in general with respect to the intuition, connects the empirical consciousness of the latter in a consciousness in general, and thereby furnishes empirical judgments with universal validity; a concept of this kind is a pure *a priori* concept of the understanding.⁵²

⁵² Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*, 4:300.

This passage is interesting because Kant indicates that a judgment of experience is preceded by two distinct acts of judgment. There is first the judgment of perception, which initially compares two intuitions. There is then a second judgment, which subsumes one of these intuitions under one of the categories. This is the “completely different judgment” that Kant mentions in the passage above. Since Kant claims that this other judgment must occur “before experience can arise from perception,” it is not a judgment of experience. A judgment of experience does not consist in the application of the categories. Instead, it is a third judgment, which represents the necessary relationship that results from the application of these pure concepts. Like judgments of perception, judgments of experience are propositional judgments. They both represent the relationship between perceptions. However, the relationship, which is represented by a judgment of perception, is contingent and idiosyncratic. The relationship, which is represented by a judgment experience, is determined by the categories. It is therefore necessary and universally valid.

Thus, judgments of perception are propositional judgment, which represent how different perceptions are combined within inner sense. The associations between these intuitions are idiosyncratic. Consequently, judgments of perception, which represent these associations, are only subjectively valid. If this interpretation is correct, then we *cannot* harmonize Kant’s account of judgment in the *Prolegomena* with his position in §19 of the B-Deduction. His notion of a completely subjective judgment of perception is incompatible with his definition of judgment in §19.

We could avoid this conclusion if we were able to show that Kant employs a broader conception of judgment in the *Prolegomena* than he subsequently does in the B-

Deduction. This would allow us to argue that judgments of perception simply fall outside his narrow definition of judgment in §19, rather than actually contradict it. In §19, Kant claims that he is dissatisfied with the definitions of judgment that are offered by logicians.⁵³ One could therefore argue that he is only discussing the logical definition of judgment in this section. Logic is primarily concerned with propositional judgment. Consequently, it could be argued that Kant's definition of judgment in §19 only pertains to propositional judgments. Indeed, I will make precisely this argument in the next part of this chapter (4.4). If we could show that judgments of perceptions are not actually propositional judgments, that they are mere acts of judgment without corresponding representations or propositions, then we could conclude that these judgments fall outside of Kant's definition of judgment in §19. Kant is only offering a definition of a propositional judgment in this section.

Unfortunately, this interpretation is not possible, because Kant's references to "the concepts drawn from intuition" and the "logical connection" between them indicate that judgments of perception are, in fact, ordinary propositional judgments. Even if his definition of judgment in §19 is narrowly focused on propositional judgments, it still ought to apply to judgments of perception. Since these judgments are only subjectively valid, they are incompatible with Kant's assertion that all judgments are objective.

Kant published his revised edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1787, four years after he published the *Prolegomena* (1783). It is possible that he simply changed his mind during this time. He is clearly open to the possibility of subjective judgments in the *Prolegomena*. He writes, "Judgments are therefore either merely subjective, if representations are related to one consciousness in one subject alone and are united in it,

⁵³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 140.

or they are objective, if they are united in a consciousness in general, i.e., are united necessarily therein.”⁵⁴ By 1787 he had changed his mind and argued that all judgments, by definition, are objectively valid. His distinction between judgments of perception and of judgments of experience in the *Prolegomena* is replaced by a new distinction between associations and judgments.

This is neither the only nor even the most significant difference between the *Prolegomena* and the *Critique of Pure Reason*. For example, Kant’s position that all judgments of experience are derived from judgments of perception appears to contradict one of the most crucial claims of the transcendental deduction; namely, that our pure intuitions of space and time must be synthesized in accordance with the categories. Kant argues that the forms of intuition, space and time, are themselves intuitions. These pure intuitions contain a manifold, which must be synthesized by the imagination. Moreover, this synthesis of the pure manifold of intuition is governed by the categories.⁵⁵ In the *Prolegomena*, Kant suggests that perception is possible without the categories, since judgments of experience are formed through the application of these concepts to judgments of perception. However, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he argues that perception itself is conditioned by the pure concepts of the understanding, since they prescribe the figurative synthesis of our pure intuitions of space and time.⁵⁶

Nonetheless, our conclusion that Kant’s account of judgment in the *Prolegomena* is incompatible with his position in the B-Deduction is particularly unsatisfying because it points to a potential weakness of the latter. Even if we accept that the *Prolegomena* is

⁵⁴ Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*, 4:304.

⁵⁵ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 160-161.

⁵⁶ “Consequently all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the categories” (ibid., B 161).

superseded by the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, we must still address this problem. Kant insists that all judgments are objectively valid. He even claims that the purpose of the copula is to signify this objectivity. However, the *Prolegomena* underscores the fact that this is not actually always the case. Some judgments are merely subjective. For example, the judgment, “wormwood is repugnant,” which is one of Kant’s own examples of a judgment of perception, is only subjectively valid. Not everyone is necessarily repulsed by wormwood. It is possible that some people, e.g. absinthe connoisseurs, even enjoy its bitter flavor. Hence, when we judge that “wormwood is repugnant” we are expressing a subjective preference. Moreover, despite appearances, we do not actually ascribe the predicate of this judgment to an object. The judgment appears to refer to an object, i.e. wormwood. However, “repugnance” is not actually a mark or property of wormwood. Insofar as it is a mark, this determination belongs to the subject who is repulsed by wormwood, not wormwood itself. Here we can clearly see the connection that Kant posits between universal validity and objectivity in the *Prolegomena*. A judgment is representative of an object, i.e. objectively valid, because it is universally valid. Conversely, a judgment that is not necessarily shared by others, e.g. our judgment about the repugnancy of wormwood, is not related to an object. It lacks an objective reference because it is not universally valid. In any case, according to Kant’s definition of judgment in the B-Deduction, the proposition, “wormwood is repugnant,” does not qualify as a judgment because it is only subjectively valid.

Moreover, in 1787, Kant began work on what would become the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. The first part of this work is devoted to a special class of judgments that he describes as “aesthetic judgments.” These judgments are only subjectively valid.

Rather than relating concepts to objects, as is typically the case, they relate representations or cognitions to feelings. These judgments do not fit Kant's definition of judgment in the B-Deduction. Fortunately, in this case, there is a clear explanation for this apparent discrepancy. While working on the third *Critique*, Kant drew a distinction between the deductive use of the power of judgment and the inductive use of this faculty, or what he termed the "determining power of judgment" [*bestimmende Urtheilskraft*] and the "reflecting power of judgment [*reflectirende Urtheilskraft*]." In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant had focused exclusively on the determining power of judgment. Consequently, his definition of judgment in the B-Deduction only describes so-called "determining judgments," i.e. judgments that are formed through the determining power of judgment. Aesthetic judgments are "reflecting judgments;" which means that they are rendered by the reflecting power of judgment. They are not incompatible with Kant's definition of judgment in B-Deduction, because this definition only pertains to determining judgments, but not to reflecting ones. Kant writes in his first, unpublished, introduction to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, "Every **determining** judgment is **logical** because its predicate is a given objective concept. A merely **reflecting** judgment about a given individual object, however, **can be aesthetic**."⁵⁷ A logical judgment is objectively valid because, as Kant explains, its predicate is an "objective concept." In other words, the judgment relates this concept to an object. Kant claims that all determining judgments are logical ones. Therefore, his definition of judgment in §19 of the B-Deduction describes determining judgments, since these judgments are all objectively valid. Aesthetic judgments are reflecting judgments. For this reason, they do not fall under Kant's definition in §19.

⁵⁷ Kant, "First Introduction," 20:223.

Kant's distinction between the determining and the reflecting power of judgment explains how the subjective nature of aesthetic judgments does not violate Kant's definition of judgment in the B-Deduction. This definition only applies to determining judgments. In the "First Introduction," Kant also indicates that aesthetic judgments are merely acts of judgment without corresponding representations. This means that they are not actually propositional judgments; although, they can be expressed in the form of a proposition. This is a subtle but important distinction, which I will explain in the next part of this chapter (4.4). Kant makes this point very briefly, almost in passing, in the "First Introduction." It requires careful reading in order to draw out the significance of this remark. However, it is an important point, because it further clarifies how subjective judgments are compatible with Kant's definition in the B-Deduction. It also explains a curious feature of aesthetic judgments that Kant otherwise ignores. The propositions that we use to express these judgments all refer to objects. Yet, according to Kant, they are related only to the subject; they lack an objective reference.

4.4 Subjective acts of judgment

Kant repeatedly denies that judgments of perception are related to objects. Instead, they relate their perceptions back to the subject. For example, he writes, "they [judgments of perception] express *only a relation of two sensations to the same subject, namely myself, and this only in my present state of perception, and are therefore not expected to be valid for the object: these I call judgments of perception.*"⁵⁸ Furthermore, when he claims that a judgment of perception is "merely a connection of perceptions, he adds that these judgments do not refer to objects. Kant writes, "It is merely a connection

⁵⁸ Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*, 4:299. My italics.

of perceptions within my mental state, *without reference to the object.*”⁵⁹ Thus, judgments of perception do *not* relate representations to objects. Instead, they relate these representations back to the subject.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Ibid., 4:300. My italics.

⁶⁰ Béatrice Longuenesse has argued that Kant’s distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience in the *Prolegomena* can be harmonized with his position in the B-Deduction. See Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 167-195. She claims that all judgments – including judgments of perception – relate representations to objects. This relationship can be either subjective, if it holds only for a particular individual, or it can be objective, if it is universally valid. Judgments of perception relate their representations to objects in a subjective manner, i.e. idiosyncratically. Judgments of experience relate them in a universally valid way. For example, Longuenesse writes, “From Kant’s distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience we can conclude that even though every judgment expresses the relation of representations to objects, this relation may remain “subjective” if it expresses connections holding only ‘for myself,’ ‘in the present state of my perception’” (ibid., 180). Longuenesse points to Kant’s assertion in §18 of the B-Deduction that the objective or transcendental unity of apperception underlies the subjective unity of consciousness and that the latter is actually derived from the former. She claims that the transcendental unity of apperception constitutes a necessary form, which is then “filled” by subjective content. She argues that the logical form of judgment can likewise be “filled” with content that is itself subjective and contingent. Indeed, Longuenesse claims that the logical form of judgment and the transcendental unity of apperception are actually two different aspects of the same fundamental unity of consciousness. The logical form of judgment is the “discursive (analytic) form” of this unity. The transcendental unity of apperception is its “intuitive (synthetic) form.” See ibid., 185. Just as the subjective unity of consciousness, i.e. the unity of inner sense, is derived from the transcendental unity of apperception, judgments of perception exhibit the logical form of a judgment. These judgments all refer to objects by virtue of this form. The logical form of judgment entails a relation to an object. However, the content of these judgments remains subjective and contingent. Consequently, they relate their representations to objects in a merely subjective manner.

The problem with Longuenesse’s interpretation is that she ignores the passages that I quoted in the main text above, where Kant clearly denies that judgments of perception are related to objects. According to Kant, these judgments “express only a relation of two sensations to the same subject” (Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*, 4:299). Hence, they do not relate representations to objects, even in a subjective way. Furthermore, Longuenesse’s notion of a subjective relation to an object entirely ignores everything that Kant writes about the connection between universal validity and objectivity. To be clear: to relate a representation to an object means to attribute objectivity to it. Judgments are objectively valid *because* they relate their representations to objects. Conversely, judgments are only subjectively valid if they do not relate representations to objects. These judgments are instead related back to the subject. Kant makes this clear in one of the passages where he explains that judgments of experience are derived from judgments of perception. He writes, “All of our judgments are at first mere judgments of perception; they hold only for us, i.e., for our subject, *and only afterwards do we give them a new relation, namely to an object*, and intend that the judgment should also be valid at all times for us and for everyone” (ibid., 4:298). My italics. Here Kant explains that objectively valid judgments acquire “a new relation, namely to an object.” Subjective judgments lack this relation. Moreover, a judgment’s objective validity, i.e. its relation to an object, is a consequence of its universal validity. The judgment is related to an object *because* we “intend that the judgment should also be valid at all times for us and for everyone.” In other words, we take the judgment to be representative of an object, as opposed to our own subjective mental states, precisely because it is universally valid. Thus, Kant’s position in the *Prolegomena* does not allow for a subjective or idiosyncratic relation to an object. A judgment cannot relate representations to an object in a merely subjective way, because their relation to an object is a consequence of the judgment’s universal validity.

Before we proceed further, it is worth clarifying what Kant means when he claims that a judgment relates representations to an object. He means that we attribute objectivity to these representations. They would otherwise be merely subjective determinations of the mind. However, we regard them as being representative of actual mind-independent objects. As Kant puts it, we relate these representations to objects. A judgment relates representations back to the subject if we regard them as merely subjective representations. We do not attribute objectivity to them. Instead, we attribute them merely to ourselves. We do not assume that these representations correspond with any objects.

Judgments of perceptions relate representations back to the subject. They are not related to any objects. I point this out because all of Kant's examples of these judgments refer to objects. He offers four examples of judgments of perception in the *Prolegomena*: "the room is warm," "sugar is sweet," "wormwood is repugnant,"⁶¹ and "if the sun shines on the stone, it becomes warm."^{62,63} Each of these propositions refers to an object. Yet

⁶¹ Ibid., 4:299.

⁶² Ibid., 4:301.

⁶³ In a footnote, Kant claims that the first three propositions that I listed above – "the room is warm," "sugar is sweet," and "wormwood is repugnant" – cannot become judgments of experience. Some, but not all, judgments of perception have the potential to become objective judgments of experience. Kant explains that some judgments are inherently subjective, and cannot acquire objectivity through the application of the categories, because their predicates are feelings. He writes, "I gladly admit that these examples do not present judgments of perception such as could ever become judgments of experience if a concept of the understanding were also added, because they refer merely to feeling – which everyone acknowledges to be merely subjective and which must therefore never be attributed to the object – and therefore can never become objective" (ibid., 4:299). At first glance, this claim can seem somewhat puzzling. Of the three judgments that Kant claims are inherently subjective, only one of their predicates – "repugnant" – actually denotes a feeling. "Warm" and "sweet" are both sensations, which would make them representations rather than feelings. According to Kant, the mind or soul is endowed with three basic faculties: the faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire. This division suggests that, insofar as we distinguish between representations and feelings, feelings are concerned with pleasure. All representations are conceived through the faculty of cognition. It is reasonable to assume that all feelings arise from the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and as such they are either pleasurable or unpleasant. As I pointed out, of the three predicates in question, only repugnance can be classified as a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Given that this is so, why does Kant describe warmth and sweetness as feelings?

Kant also clearly states that judgments of perception lack an objective reference. There is a difference between the propositions that he uses to express these judgments and the actual judgments themselves.⁶⁴ The propositions refer to objects, but the judgments are supposed to be without an objective reference.

In *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Kant divides the five senses into two classes, which he labels the senses of *perception* and the senses of *pleasure*. See Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:157. The senses of perception consist of touch, hearing, and sight. Taste and smell are senses of pleasure. Kant claims that the senses of perception are “more objective than subjective.” All sensations are at least somewhat subjective because they are received through sensibility. The soul must be affected by the presence of external objects in order to receive these representations. For this reason, Kant claims in his *Inaugural Dissertation* that sensitive cognition, i.e. representations that are derived from sensibility, can only represent objects as they *appear to us*. They represent *phenomena* rather than *noumena*. See Kant, *Inaugural Dissertation*, 2:392-393. Nonetheless, the senses of perception are “more objective than subjective” because they reveal more about their object than the subject who perceives them. As Kant puts it, “they contribute more to the *cognition* of the external object than they stir up the consciousness of the affected organ” (Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:154). This is not true of the senses of pleasure. Their affect on the subject outweighs their contribution to our knowledge. They reveal very little about their objects, but they easily evoke feelings of pleasure and displeasure. For this reason, Kant claims that these senses are “more subjective than objective” (*ibid.*, 7:154). Sweetness is perceived through the sense of taste. Consequently, these sensations are “more subjective than objective.” Compared to the more objective senses, the senses of perception, taste is a very poor source of knowledge or cognition. The fact that something tastes sweet does not reveal a great deal about an object, especially when compared to what we can learn through the senses of sight and touch. However, we are rarely indifferent to these sensations. We either enjoy the flavor of something sweet or we dislike it because it is too sweet – we find it cloying or syrupy. Thus, although sweetness is technically a sensation rather than a feeling, it is a highly subjective one, which is closely associated with feelings of pleasure and displeasure. In his *Anthropology*, Kant claims that it is “more a representation of *enjoyment* than of cognition of the external object” (*ibid.*, 7:154).

Warmth might appear to be a more objective sensation than sweetness, because it is perceived through the sense of touch, which is one of our senses of perception. However, in the *Anthropology*, Kant denies that this is the case. He actually denies that warmth is perceived through the sense of touch. See *ibid.*, 7:155. Instead, he claims that warm and cold are “vital sensations.” Kant distinguishes between “organic sensations” and “vital sensations.” The former are perceived through one of the five senses. They affect a specific set of nerves in the body, e.g. the eyes, ears, the nose, etc. The latter affect all of the body’s nerves simultaneously. They are perceived through the entire nervous system, as opposed to just one of the senses. See *ibid.*, 7:153-154. Vital sensations consist in an awareness or perception of one’s own body. For this reason, they are among the most subjective sensations. They are representative of one’s body rather than any external objects. Warmth is a vital sensation. Therefore, like sweetness, it is unusually subjective. Both of these sensations - warmth and sweetness – are highly subjective, more so than our senses of touch, hearing, or sight, i.e. the senses of perception. For this reason, Kant equates them with feelings, which are entirely subjective.

⁶⁴ I am using the term “proposition” [*Satz*] differently than Kant would. In chapter one, I explained that Wolffian logic distinguishes between judgments and propositions. The former are thoughts; the latter are the linguistic expressions of these thoughts. Judgments consist of concepts; propositions consist of words. Kant actually rejects this distinction. In *On a Discovery whereby Any New Critique of Pure Reason Is to Be Made Superfluous by an Older One*, his polemical response to Eberhardt, he claims that thinking always involves language. Our thoughts not only consist of concepts, they also consist of words. Consequently, judgments are always expressed in words, even if we do not speak them. For this reason, Kant rejects Wolff’s distinction between judgments and propositions. Since judgments involve the use of language,

There is a similar discrepancy between aesthetic judgments and the propositions that we use to express these judgments in language. Aesthetic judgments relate representations to our feelings of pleasure and displeasure. These judgments are not actually concerned with objects. Instead, they are concerned with our cognition and how it affects the subject. Cognition can evoke pleasure and displeasure. Aesthetic judgments are about these feelings. They relate the feelings to the representations that are their cause. For example, the judgment, “the flower is beautiful” relates our representation of the flower to the feeling of pleasure that we enjoy whenever we cognize it. Kant writes,

Given representations in a judgment can be empirical (hence aesthetic); however, the judgment that is made by means of them is logical if in the judgment they are related to the object. Conversely, however, even if the given representations were to be rational but related in a judgment solely to the subject (its feeling), then they are to that extent always aesthetic.⁶⁵

there is no meaningful difference between thoughts and their expression in words. He writes, “The logicians are by no means correct in defining a proposition as a judgment expressed *in words*; for we must also, in thought, use words in judgments which we do not regard as propositions” (Immanuel Kant, *On a Discovery whereby Any New Critique of Pure Reason Is to Be Made Superfluous by an Older One*, trans. Henry Allison [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 8:193-194). Kant proposes his own, alternate distinction between propositions and judgments. He claims that they differ in terms of modality. A proposition is an *assertoric* judgment. A judgment, insofar as it is distinguished from a proposition, is merely *problematic*. See *ibid.*, 8:193-194. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant explains that problematic judgments assert that something is possible. Assertoric judgments assert that something is actually the case. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 74/B 99.

When I compare judgments with their corresponding propositions in the main text above, I am using the term, “proposition,” in the Wolffian sense, rather than the Kantian one. Although Kant does not differentiate between judgments and their linguistic expressions, there is a real and meaningful difference between his examples of subjective judgments and his descriptions of these acts. He claims that judgments of perception are not related to objects and that they only relate their representations back to the subject. Nonetheless, his examples of these judgments all refer to objects. I will argue that this discrepancy pertains to the two senses of judgment that I defined in chapter two: judgments as representations or cognitions and judgments as acts. Hence, it is not actually a discrepancy between thought and language, but rather between acts of judgment and their corresponding representations. However, in the meantime, I will need to distinguish between Kant’s examples of subjective judgments and the actual judgments that they are intended to express. The Wolffian distinction between judgments and propositions is an easy way to articulate this difference. The examples are propositions in the Wolffian sense. They are the linguistic expressions of judgments. I will refer to these examples as propositions in this sense, having first acknowledged that Kant does not actually differentiate between thoughts and their expression in language, and that he has his own separate definition of a proposition: a proposition is an assertoric judgment.

⁶⁵ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5:204.

Thus, aesthetic judgments relate our representations to feelings, rather than to objects.⁶⁶

However, this relation to the subject is not reflected in the propositions that we use to express these judgments. The propositions all refer to objects. Consider, for example, the proposition, “the flower is beautiful.” It ascribes a predicate (beauty) to an object (the flower). However, beauty is not a mark or predicate of an object. It is a determination of the subject who enjoys this feeling. The flower has many properties, but the feeling of pleasure that we experience whenever we gaze upon it is not one of them. Insofar as this feeling is a mark, it is a mark of the subject who enjoys it. The proposition, “the flower is beautiful,” corresponds with a judgment that relates the *representation* of the flower to our feeling of pleasure. We might wonder whether this judgment is also related indirectly to an object, since the representation of the flower is presumably related to the flower itself. However, the representation is not necessarily an objective one. According to Kant, representations are inherently subjective; they are determinations of the mind or soul.⁶⁷ We attribute objectivity to some, but not all, of our representations, and take them to be representative of mind-independent objects. This means that we relate these representations to objects. Our representations do not need to correspond with objects in order to inspire pleasure or displeasure. Dreams and illusions can evoke just as much pleasure as actual cognitions. Aesthetic judgments are not

⁶⁶ In the “First Introduction” to the third *Critique*, Kant defines an aesthetic judgment as a judgment whose predicate cannot be ascribed to an object. He writes, “An aesthetic judgment in general can therefore be explicated as that judgment whose predicate can never be cognition (concept of an object) (although it may contain the subjective conditions for a cognition in general)” (Kant, “First Introduction,” 20:244). This is actually the closest that Kant comes to offering a formal definition of aesthetic judgments. Although these judgments are the subject of the first part of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant never actually defines them in the third *Critique*.

⁶⁷ “We have representations in us, of which we can also become conscious. But let this consciousness reach as far and be as exact and precise as one wants, still there always remain only representations, i.e., inner determinations of our mind in this or that temporal relation. Now how do we come to posit an object [*Object*] for these representations, or ascribe to their subjective reality, as modifications, some sort of objective reality?” (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 197/B 242).

concerned with objects. They are instead exclusively concerned with the representations themselves and their effect upon the subject. They do not relate representations to objects. Instead, they relate them back to the subject. Thus, there is a difference between the propositions that we use to express aesthetic judgments and the actual judgments themselves. The former refer to objects, but the latter are related only to the subject.

Kant acknowledges this discrepancy in the first introduction to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. He writes,

An **aesthetic judgment**, if one would use it for an objective determination, would be so patently contradictory that one is sufficiently insured against misinterpretation by this expression. For intuitions can certainly be sensible, but **judgments** belong absolutely only to the understanding (taken in a wider sense), and **to judge** aesthetically or sensibly, insofar as this is supposed to be **cognition** of an object, is itself a contradiction even if sensibility meddles in the business of the understanding and (through a *vitium subreptionis*) gives the understanding a false direction; rather, an **objective** judgment is always made by the understanding, and to that extent cannot be called aesthetic.⁶⁸

Kant claims that an aesthetic judgment that is also objectively valid, or that determines an object, is “patently contradictory.” The contradiction arises from the fact that objective judgments are formed exclusively through the understanding. In the metaphysical deduction, Kant defines the higher faculty of cognition, which is also known as the understanding, as the “capacity to judge” [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*].⁶⁹ Kant reaffirms this position here in the “First Introduction.”⁷⁰ The term “aesthetic” can be a synonym for sensible. For example, the transcendental aesthetic is devoted to the faculty of sensible representations, i.e. sensibility. The expression “aesthetic judgment” could denote a judgment that is formed through sensibility. Intuitions can be described as aesthetic

⁶⁸ Kant, “First Introduction,” 20:222.

⁶⁹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 69/B 94.

⁷⁰ Kant specifies that the understanding is “taken in a wider sense” [*in weiterer Bedeutung genommen*], in order to clarify that he intends the broad sense of this term. In other words, he is referring to the higher faculty of cognition in general.

representations because they are representations that arise from this faculty. We could interpret the phrase “aesthetic judgment” in a similar way: as a judgment that arises from sensibility. However, Kant claims that this interpretation is nonsensical because sensibility cannot form judgments. He explains that any judgments that arose from this faculty would have to be objective because sensibility is a faculty of cognition.⁷¹ However, all objective judgments are formed through the understanding. Therefore, sensibility cannot form its own judgments. Kant also concludes that aesthetic judgments cannot be objectively valid, i.e. representative of objects, because an objective judgment that was also aesthetic would arise from sensibility. Yet this is impossible because our lower faculty of cognition cannot form judgments. Consequently, objective aesthetic judgments are also impossible. Kant claims that the idea of such a judgment involves a contradiction because it attributes a capacity to sensibility that belongs only to the understanding, i.e. objective judgment.

In any case, I want to draw our attention to a specific remark that Kant makes in this passage. It pertains to the discrepancy that I noted earlier between the propositions that we use to express aesthetic judgments in language and the actual judgments themselves. Kant writes, “to judge aesthetically or sensibly, insofar as this is supposed to be cognition of an object, is itself a contradiction even if sensibility meddles in the business of the understanding and (through a *vitium subreptionis*) gives the *understanding a false direction.*”⁷² A judgment that cognizes or represents an object is objectively valid. Such a judgment cannot be aesthetic because an objective aesthetic

⁷¹ “Hence our transcendental aesthetic of the faculty of cognition could very well speak of sensible intuitions, but could nowhere speak of aesthetic judgments for since it has to do only with cognitive judgments, which determine the object, its judgments must all be logical” (Kant, “First Introduction, 20:223).

⁷² Ibid., 20:222. My italics.

judgment would be a judgment that was formed through sensibility. However, the lower faculty of cognition cannot form judgments. Therefore, an objective aesthetic judgment is impossible. This is the contradiction that Kant refers to in the passage above. The aspect of this passage that interests me is Kant's claim that the understanding can receive "a false direction." What does he mean by this expression? I would like to suggest that Kant is referring to the discrepancy between aesthetic judgments and the propositions that we use to express them. These judgments relate representations to feelings, which means that they relate the representations back to the subject, rather than to an object. They lack an objective reference. However, the propositions that we use to express these judgments all refer to objects. They appear to relate a predicate, e.g. beauty, ugly, agreeable, etc., to an object. Thus, the propositions refer to objects, but the judgments actually refer back to the subject. This is the "false direction" that Kant describes. The understanding forms propositions that do not correspond with the judgments that they are intended to express. The propositions are oriented towards objects, but the judgments are oriented exclusively towards the subject.

Kant also addresses this discrepancy in another passage. He writes, "By the designation 'an aesthetic judgment about an object' it is therefore immediately indicated that a given representation is certainly related to an object but that what is understood in the judgment is not the determination of the object but of the subject and its feeling."⁷³ Here Kant acknowledges that there is a difference between "what is understood in the judgment" and its expression in language. The judgment itself is concerned with "the subject and its feeling." It is about how a representation or cognition affects the subject. The judgment relates this representation to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure that it

⁷³ Ibid., 20:223.

evokes in the subject. Yet when we express this judgment in a proposition its orientation shifts away from the subject to an object. It is assumed that the representation, which is related to the subject's feeling, also corresponds with an object. This is why Kant claims that the representation is "certainly related to an object." However, the representation is *not* related to an object through an aesthetic judgment. Insofar as it is related to an object, this relationship must occur through another judgment, one that is objectively valid. The aesthetic judgment only relates the representation to a feeling, because it is concerned with how this representation affects the subject.

Both judgments of perception and aesthetic judgments exhibit the same discrepancy between the propositions that we use to express these judgments and the judgments themselves. Both of these types of judgment relate representations to the subject. They are concerned with the subject's mental states. However, their corresponding propositions refer to objects. Kant does not acknowledge this divergence between thought and expression in the *Prolegomena*, but he does briefly address it in the "First Introduction." He claims that the understanding receives a "false direction" when it formulates aesthetic judgments.

He also provides the basis for an explanation for this "false direction." Kant argues that neither intuitions nor the "representations of the understanding" should be described as "aesthetic." Only the "actions of the power of judgment" deserve to be described in this way. Kant writes, "However, this ambiguity can be removed if the expression 'aesthetic' is applied neither to intuition nor, *still less, to representations of the understanding*, but only to the actions of the **power of judgment**."⁷⁴ The key to understanding this passage is the meaning of the phrase "representations of the

⁷⁴ Ibid., 20:222. My italics.

understanding.” I argue that these representations are judgments. As we know, Kant defines the understanding in general as a capacity for judgment. Given that this is so, the representations of this faculty ought to be judgments. Kant denies that these representations can be aesthetic. Instead, he claims that only the *actions* of the power of judgment should be described in this way.

At this point, we need to reintroduce the distinction that I have drawn between the two senses of judgment. In chapter two, I argued that the term “judgment” has two distinct meanings and that this distinction can explain the difference between the expressions *Vermögen zu urtheilen* and *Urtheilskraft*, or the “capacity to judge” and the “power of judgment.” A judgment can denote a mental representation or cognition. It can also refer to a mental act, an act of judgment. Insofar as we regard a judgment as a representation or cognition, it is a propositional judgment. Propositional judgments are formed through acts of judgment. However, as I will show, not all acts of judgment result in propositional ones. There are acts of judgments without corresponding representations.

If I am correct, and the “representations of the understanding” are judgments, then Kant is distinguishing between the two senses of judgment that I outlined above. Insofar as we regard judgments as *representations*, they should not be characterized as aesthetic. However, *acts* of judgment, which are performed by the power of judgment, can be accurately described in this way.

Why are judgments as representations never deserving of the title “aesthetic?” Kant goes on to argue that objective judgments cannot be aesthetic, because an objective aesthetic judgment would be formed by sensibility. As we know, the lower faculty of

cognition does not include the capacity to form judgments. Hence, an objective aesthetic judgment is impossible. It is reasonable to assume that this is the same reason that Kant denies that the “representations of the understanding” can be aesthetic: these representations are inherently objective. If these representations are also judgments, as I have argued, then judgments, insofar as we regard them as representations, are always objectively valid. For this reason, they should not be characterized as aesthetic.

If my interpretation is correct, then *acts* of judgments can be aesthetic but judgments, insofar as we regard them as representations or cognitions, should not be described in this way, because they are always objective. Judgments as representations are propositional judgments. Therefore, all propositional judgments are objectively valid, i.e. they represent objects.

This conclusion is supported by the B-Deduction. The title of §19 is “The logical form of all judgments consist in the objective unity of the apperception of the concepts contained therein.”⁷⁵ As we know, Kant argues in this section that all judgments are objectively valid. The title implies that this objectivity is a consequence of their form and that the logical form of a judgment entails a reference to an object. Kant explicitly states this position in *Reflexion* 5923. He writes, “However, the form of every judgment consists in the objective unity of the consciousness of the given concepts, i.e., in the consciousness that these concepts must belong to each other, and thereby denote an object, in whose (complete) representation they are always found together.”⁷⁶ Thus, the logical form of a judgment necessarily entails an objective reference. Propositional

⁷⁵ Ibid., B 140.

⁷⁶ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* 5923, 18:386.

judgments exhibit this form. Therefore, all propositional judgments must be objectively valid.

This interpretation is also supported by the metaphysical deduction. As we know, Kant defines the understanding (in the broad sense) as the “faculty of judgment” or “capacity to judge” [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*]. I have argued that this expression primarily refers to judgments as representations. Hence, Kant means that the understanding (in the broad sense) is a capacity to formulate propositional judgments. When he defines this faculty as the capacity to judge, he is chiefly referring to its capacity to formulate propositional judgments and these judgments are all objective. Although he does not mention objectivity in the metaphysical deduction, Kant defines a judgment as “the mediate cognition of an object.”⁷⁷ This definition does not fit subjective judgments, which do not represent objects. Hence, it is likely that Kant was thinking only of objectively valid judgments in the metaphysical deduction.

This does not entail that the understanding (in the broad sense) is incapable of formulating subjective judgments. It means that subjective judgments are acts of judgment that do not result in the formation of propositional judgments. They are *acts* without corresponding *representations*. As we saw earlier, Kant contrasts the “representations of the understanding” with the “actions of the power of judgment.” He claims that the latter, but not the former, can be characterized as aesthetic. Kant also specifies that the term “understanding” is construed broadly in this context.⁷⁸ This means that it denotes the higher faculty of cognition in general. The power of judgment belongs to the higher faculty of cognition. Along with reason and the understanding (in the

⁷⁷ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 68/B 93.

⁷⁸ “Judging (that is, objectively) is an action of the understanding (as the higher cognitive faculty in general) and not of sensibility” (Kant, First Introduction, 20:223). See also *ibid.*, 20:222.


narrow sense), it is one of the three sub-faculties that compose the higher faculty of cognition. When Kant distinguishes between the power of judgment and the understanding (in the broad sense), he is distinguishing between a part and a whole. Consequently, the actions of the power of judgment also belong to the understanding. Kant asserts that the actions of the power of judgment, *and by extension the understanding*, can be described as aesthetic, but not the representations of the understanding. This implies that, at least in some cases, the actions of the power of judgment do not produce corresponding representations. Otherwise, an aesthetic act of judgment would result in an aesthetic representation. Thus, aesthetic judgments are *acts* of judgments but they are not propositional ones. The same must be true of all subjective judgments. All propositional judgments are objectively valid, i.e. they refer to objects. Therefore, subjective judgments can only be acts.

Nonetheless, it is evident that we can still express these judgments in the form of a proposition. Otherwise they would not be communicable. According to Kant, pure judgments of taste are universally communicable. Indeed, he argues that the basis for their communicability, the harmony of the imagination with the understanding, is also the source of their pleasure.⁷⁹ Thus, subjective judgments are *acts* of judgment that do not result in the formation of propositional judgments. Yet they can still be expressed in the form of propositions.

This distinction is, admittedly, a very subtle one. An example can help draw it into focus. We will first consider an act of judgment that results in the formation of a propositional judgment. We will then compare it with a subjective judgment. We form a propositional judgment by subsuming an object under a concept, which becomes the


⁷⁹ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5:217-218.

predicate of the resulting proposition. The subsumption of the object under the concept is an act of judgment and it produces a propositional judgment. For example, we form the judgment, “the flower is a rose,” by subsuming the flower in question under our general concept of a rose. The following diagram compares the act of judgment, which subsumes the rose under the concept, with the propositional judgment that results from this act.



This diagram describes the same judgment in two ways. It first depicts the judgment as an *act* that relates the concept of a rose to an object, i.e. an actual rose, by subsuming the latter under the former. Second, it depicts the judgment as a *representation*. It is a propositional judgment, which asserts that the rose is a flower. The point that I want to make with this diagram is that both of its levels present aspects *of the same judgment*. We can describe a judgment as an act or as a representation; however, in both cases we are ultimately describing the same judgment.

I will now compare our judgment about the rose with a subjective judgment, e.g. the rose is beautiful. We can depict it in the same way through the following diagram:



This second diagram shows that the act of judgment (Act₁) does not correspond with the representation that we associate with it. The representation is a propositional judgment,

which asserts that the rose is beautiful. This proposition ought to arise from an act of judgment that subsumes the rose under our concept of beauty. This act is depicted by the diagram's second line, which I label, "Act₂." However, an aesthetic judgment is supposed to relate a representation or cognition to a feeling of pleasure or displeasure, which is enjoyed by the subject. This act is depicted by the first line of the diagram, "Act₁." It relates the representation of the rose to a feeling of pleasure, and ultimately to the subject who enjoys this feeling. Thus, this act of judgment does not correspond with the representation that we associate with it. Unlike our first example, the act and the representation are not two different aspects of the same judgment. In this case, they are actually different judgments. The act relates a representation to the subject; the representation relates a concept to an object.

An act of judgment results in the formation of a propositional judgment if the act and resulting representation both pertain to *the same judgment*. We are simply regarding the same judgment in two different ways: as a mental act and as a mental representation. A subjective judgment is only an act of judgment. It cannot produce a representation because a judgment, insofar as we regard it as a representation or cognition, is a propositional judgment, and all propositional judgments are objectively valid. Nonetheless, we can still express a subjective judgment in the form of a proposition. This means that the act of judgment, which is subjective, and the propositional judgment, which is objective, do not pertain the same judgment. They are actually two separate judgments. The proposition is formed through a second, entirely distinct, act of judgment.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Paul Guyer has argued that pure judgments of taste involve two distinct acts of the reflecting power of judgment. There is first an act of judgment that compares a representation with the subject's faculties of

This explains the “false direction” of aesthetic judgments. Kant claims that acts of judgments are aesthetic, not their representations. An act of judgment is aesthetic if it relates a representation to the subject’s feelings of pleasure or displeasure. All propositional judgments are objectively valid, which means that they refer to objects. Consequently, when we express an aesthetic judgment in the form of a proposition, it acquires an objective reference that was not originally intended. The proposition refers to an object, but the act of judgment is directed towards the subject. The understanding receives a “false direction” when it formulates aesthetic judgments because all propositional judgments are objective. It expresses a subjective act of judgment through an objective proposition.

cognitions. This judgment generates a feeling of pleasure. A second act of judgment then assesses whether this pleasure is universally valid. This second judgment is the actual judgment of taste. It asserts that the pleasure in question ought to be enjoyed by everyone. Thus, the first judgment is responsible for the feeling of pleasure and the second one assesses its validity. See Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 97-105.

In the main text above, I have argued that subjective judgments are mere acts that do result in the formation of a representation, or propositional judgment. The representations that we associate with these acts must be formed through a second, distinct, act of judgment. My distinction between these two acts of judgment is not the same as the one that Guyer draws, but it is compatible with his position. We both agree that pure judgments of taste are complex acts, which involve more than one act of judgment. Furthermore, Guyer’s distinction posits acts of judgments that do not result in the formation of propositional ones. He does not state this directly, but it is an implication of his position. The initial act of judgment, which compares a representation with one’s cognitive faculties, does not result in a propositional judgment. It generates a feeling of pleasure rather than a representation. The second judgment, which concerns the validity of this feeling, is the actual judgment of taste, and it is expressed through a proposition. My distinction is different from the one that Guyer draws, because his second act of reflecting judgment, the one that he identifies with the actual judgment of taste, is still subjectively valid. Kant argues that pure judgments of taste are distinguished by the fact that they have subjective universal validity. In other words, they are not related to an object, but they are still universally valid. According to my reading of the “First Introduction,” subjective judgments – universal or otherwise – are mere acts of judgments. They do not produce corresponding representations, i.e. propositional judgments. Guyer distinguishes between two acts of reflecting judgment: one that produces the feeling of pleasure and one that assesses its validity. The second act of judgment, which assesses the validity of our feeling of pleasure, is itself subjectively valid. It relates a representation or cognition to a feeling of pleasure. The pleasure is universal, but the judgment is subjective because it is not related to an object. See Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5:215. Consequently, if my reading is correct, the proposition that we use to express this judgment must be generated through a third act of judgment – in this case a determining judgment, which subsumes an object under a concept. Guyer distinguishes between two acts of reflecting judgment that are both required to draw a pure judgment of taste. I distinguish between the judgment of taste, which is a subjective act of judgment, and the proposition that we use to express this act.

Kant makes objective validity a defining feature of judgment. It distinguishes judgments from associations. If my reading of the “First Introduction” is correct, then we can add the caveat that Kant is referring specifically to propositional judgments, or judgments insofar as they are regarded as representations or cognitions. Subjective *acts* of judgment are possible. However, these judgments are only acts. They are not representations or propositional judgments.

4.5 Objective validity and truth

Earlier, I offered an ad hoc explanation of the meaning of the expression “objective validity” [*objective Gültigkeit*]. A judgment is objectively valid if it is representative of an object. However, this presents a potential problem, because it appears to equate objective validity with truth. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant accepts what he describes as “the nominal definition of truth” [*die Namenerklärung der Wahrheit*], which consists in “the agreement of cognition with its object.”⁸¹ This is a nominal definition because it is sufficient to identify the concept of truth and to distinguish it from other notions. However, it does not completely enumerate the marks of this concept. Hence, it does not constitute a real definition.⁸² In any case, our definition of objective validity would seem to entail truth. If judgments are objectively valid because they are representative of objects, then they must also correspond with or agree with these objects. A representation corresponds with the thing that it represents.

⁸¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 58/B 82.

⁸² Kant draws a distinction between nominal definitions and real definitions. A nominal definition enumerates enough of something’s marks for us to identify it and to differentiate it from other similar things. It constitutes a clear concept of the object that is defined. A real definition, on the other hand, not only differentiates its object, it completely enumerates this object’s marks. As a result, it captures the very essence of what it defines.

However, if the judgment agrees with the object then it must also be true, since truth consists in the agreement between our cognitions and their objects.

It is generally agreed by scholars that Kant does not consider truth to be a defining feature of judgments. However, the idea that all judgments might be necessarily true is not actually as absurd as they assume. In the *Vernunftlehre*, Meier claims that all cognition is, by definition, true. This is because cognition consists in the representation of an object. A cognition that represents its object incorrectly is not actually representative of this object. This means that it is not actually a representation of an object, and therefore, that it is not a real cognition. Meier writes,

Me thinks therefore that I can explain a **false** or **incorrect** cognition through a cognition, which is no cognition, and yet appears to be a cognition. He who has a false cognition is of the opinion that he has a cognition, whereas he actually possesses no cognition because he has an incorrect cognition: like the idolator who actually worships no deity and still imagines that he worships the highest being. Therefore, it is said that he who has a false cognition is deceived, that he merely imagines something, and that his representations are a mere deception. Thus, one is led to understand that false cognition apes cognition, but it is actually no cognition.⁸³

According to Meier, a false cognition is not a cognition at all because it does not represent an object. He claims that a false cognition “appears to be a cognition” because the person who accepts it does not recognize that this representation does not actually correspond with its purported object. This person mistakes an illusion for cognition. Thus, Meier claims that all cognitions are true and that so-called false or incorrect cognitions are merely illusions that have been mistaken for actual cognitions.

I point this out in order to show that the idea that Kant might have regarded all judgments as true is not actually absurd. Meier taught in his *Vernunftlehre* that all cognition is, by definition, true. We know that Kant was well acquainted with this work,

⁸³ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 128-129, §118. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 23, §92.

since it was the textbook for his logic lectures. Nonetheless, we can still be certain that he did not adopt a similar position with regard to the verity of our judgments. If all judgments were necessarily true by virtue of their objective validity, then this would make the categories into sufficient conditions for the truth of a judgment or cognition. A judgment that is formulated in accordance with these concepts is objectively valid. However, in the introduction to the transcendental logic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant denies that there is a general or universal criterion of truth. He claims that logic teaches us the laws that govern the correct use of the understanding. These are the rules for thinking. Any true cognition must conform to these rules. Hence, the rules of logic are necessary conditions for truth. However, the truth of our cognition ultimately depends on its correspondence with an object and logic cannot determine whether this agreement exists. Indeed, it actually abstracts from the matter or content of our cognition and focuses merely on its form. It prescribes formal laws that apply to all thoughts or cognition, regardless of their objects or content.⁸⁴ Thus, there is a formal condition for truth because any true cognition must conform to the rules of logic. However, there are no universal truth conditions with regard to the matter or content of our cognition. This would not be the case if truth was equivalent to objective validity, because a judgment that is formulated in accordance with the categories is objectively valid, i.e. it is representative of an object. Yet this fact alone does not necessarily entail that it is true. Otherwise, Kant could claim that transcendental logic prescribed universal truth conditions for the matter or content of our cognition. Its rules, i.e. the categories, could actually determine whether a cognition corresponded with its object.

⁸⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 58-60/B 83-84.

Thus, we must distinguish between objective validity and truth. The problem is that Kant defines truth as “the agreement of cognition with its object.”⁸⁵ He also claims that all (propositional) judgments, by definition, are objectively valid. A judgment is objectively valid if it is representative of an object. However, a judgment that represents an object also agrees with this object. Therefore, it would appear that this judgment must also be true.

Most scholars have solved this problem by arguing that the expression “objective validity” only entails that a judgment or cognition has a truth-value, or that it is capable of being *either* true *or* false. Gerold Prauss takes this position.⁸⁶ He writes, “In order to understand Kant’s theory of experience, it is absolutely essential to keep in mind that with this ‘objective validity’ of empirical judgments he actually means only their objective-empirical truth-value [*Wahrheitsdifferenz*] and not their objective-empirical truth.”⁸⁷ In order for a judgment or proposition to be either true or false, it must have a reference to an object. For example, the judgment, “Whales are fish,” happens to be false. We can say that this judgment is false, because it makes an assertion about a class of objects; namely, whales. It asserts that these creatures are characterized by certain marks: the marks that define fish and distinguish them from other kinds of organisms. However, whales do not actually share these characteristics; they are mammals. Therefore, the judgment is false. What this example shows is that a judgment is capable of being false or incorrect because it refers to an object or objects. It asserts something

⁸⁵ Ibid., A 58/B 82.

⁸⁶ Gerold Prauss, *Erscheinung bei Kant. Ein Problem der Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1970), 86-87.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 86.

about these objects that is not true. Objective validity does not entail that a judgment is necessarily true. Instead, it makes it possible for the judgment to be false.

This fact becomes even clearer if we again contrast judgments with associations. According to Kant, associations, which are formed through the reproductive imagination, are only subjectively valid. This means that they are only representative of one's own subjective mental states. For this reason, they are actually incapable of being false. We cannot be deceived about our own empirical consciousness or inner sense. This means that we cannot be deceived about whether we are actually experiencing a perception or whether we have formed an association between certain perceptions. Insofar as we regard our perceptions as the subjective representations of appearances, we simply cannot err. We can only be deceived by our representations insofar as we attribute objectivity to them and take them to be representative of actual objects.

In Kant's logic lectures, he asks how error is possible. He denies that it arises from the understanding alone. The understanding is governed by certain laws. These laws are the subject of logic; they are the rules for thinking. Insofar as our cognitions conform to these laws, they will always be logically valid and free from contradiction. Nonetheless, this does not always occur. Kant asks how this is possible. He writes, "We can only become conscious of errors through our understanding, and we can only err if the understanding acts contrary to its own rules. However, this is impossible. No power can act contrary to its own rules if it acts alone."⁸⁸ How is it possible to misuse the understanding and exercise it in a manner that is contrary to its own laws? Kant answers this question with an analogy. He points out that the laws of physics describe the motion

⁸⁸ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 2244, 16:283. See also idem, *Logik Pölitz*, 24:527; idem, *Logik Busolt*, 24:632; idem, *Vienna Logic*, 24:824; idem, *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*, 24:720.

of falling bodies within a vacuum. However, the air offers resistance, which causes the movements of bodies to deviate from the neat paths predicted by these laws. Kant reasons that our thoughts depart from the laws of the understanding for a similar reason. The interactions between the understanding and our other cognitive faculties can cause us to err in our judgments. Just as the air can alter the velocity of a falling object, sensibility can divert our thoughts from the laws of the understanding. Kant writes,

However, just as bodies indeed fall in empty space according the laws of gravity or describe perfect parabolas but they deviate from these rules through the resistance of the air: so other activities of the soul are connected with the judgments of the understanding, e.g. pleasure [*Raiß*], imagination, etc., and one errs by being conscious of this mixed effect as a judgment of the understanding.⁸⁹

Thus, the understanding never errs on its own. This would require it to behave in a manner that is contrary to the laws that govern this faculty, which, according to Kant, is impossible. He denies that any “power can act contrary to its own rules” insofar as “*it acts alone.*” Errors enter into our thoughts and judgments through the interactions between the understanding and the faculties of sensibility.

Kant taught in his logic lectures that sensibility was responsible for all of our errors or false cognitions.⁹⁰ If we lacked a lower faculty of cognition, then we would always think and reason perfectly and our cognitions would always be true. However, Kant also acknowledges that sensibility by itself cannot be a source for error or falsehood. Errors arise from the interactions between sensibility and the understanding. Just as the understanding cannot err on its own, sensibility cannot do so either. For

⁸⁹ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 2244, 16:284. See also idem, *Logik Busolt*, 24:632; idem, *Vienna Logic*, 24:824-825.

⁹⁰ “[The] understanding does not deviate from its rules. The reasons for it [error] lie in what is not the understanding, thus in sensibility . . . Sensibility consists in the subjective grounds of cognition; error [consists] in the confusion of the subjective with the objective” (Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 2250, 16:286). See also idem, *Logik Pölitz*, 24:257; idem, *Vienna Logic*, 24:825; idem, *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*, 24:720.

example, the *Wiener Logik* states, “The ground for the fact that the senses do not judge erroneously is that they cannot judge at all. For only the understanding judges. Error is neither in the understanding alone, then, nor in the senses alone; instead it always lies in the influence of the senses on the understanding.”⁹¹ As this passage makes clear, sensibility by itself is incapable of error because it does not form judgments. Error and falsehood only characterize our judgments.

Kant does not elaborate on why this is the case in either the *Wiener Logik* or in any of the other notes from his logic lectures. However, it is not difficult to grasp his reasoning. We know that judgments (as representations) are always objectively valid, but this is not also true of intuitions. They are merely subjectively valid, which means that they are not representative of mind independent objects.⁹² Intuitions are merely the matter for cognition; they do not represent objects on their own. In order to represent an object, the manifold that they contain must be united under the concept of an object. Since intuitions, by themselves, do not represent objects, they do not affirm or deny anything. Consequently, intuitions are incapable of being either true or false. In order to err, we must first assert that something is the case. All judgments assert something about their objects. For example, a categorical judgment either affirms that its object is characterized by a certain mark, i.e. the judgment’s predicate, or denies that this is the case. This assertion is capable of being false.

⁹¹ Kant, *Vienna Logic*, 24:825. See also idem, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 2142, 16:250-251; idem, *Logik Pöhlitz*, 24:527; idem, *Logik Busolt*, 24:632, idem, *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*, 24:720.

⁹² We can be certain that intuitions are merely subjectively valid because of Kant’s account of cognition and the unity of consciousness in §17 of the B-Deduction. There he explains that cognition consists in the act of relating our, otherwise subjective, mental representations to objects. He also indicates, with his definition of an object, that cognition involves the unification of intuitions under concepts. In order to relate an intuition to an object, we must unite the manifold that it contains under the concept of this object. Thus, intuitions become representative of objects through the unification of their manifold under the concept of an object. We can infer that prior to this conceptual unification, our intuitions are not related to objects and they are therefore merely subjectively valid.

Kant denies that sensibility, on its own, can give rise to errors. This is because our intuitions, in themselves, are merely subjectively valid. Hence, they are incapable of being false. We can be fooled by our senses only insofar as we relate our intuitions to objects, i.e. attribute objectivity to them. This objectivization can only occur through a judgment. The judgment relates concepts to a given intuition, which in turn represents an appearance or object.⁹³ Thus, Kant concludes that neither sensibility nor the understanding can err on their own and that errors or false cognitions arise from the interactions between these two faculties. This is hardly surprising given that neither faculty is capable of cognition on its own. Cognition involves both sensibility and the understanding. False cognition is also the result of their collaboration.

Kant's explanation of error in his logic lectures is significant because it confirms two facts. First, despite their objective validity, not all judgments are true. Indeed, Kant claims that judgments are actually unique in that they are capable of being false. Neither intuitions nor concepts, on their own, can be false. Judgments alone have this property. Second, judgments can be false *because* they are objectively valid. In his logic lectures, Kant denies that the senses, by themselves, could ever err or deceive us because our senses do not judge. The implication is that only judgments are capable of falsehood. What distinguishes intuitions, which are received through sensibility, from judgments? Intuitions are merely subjectively valid until they are united under concepts. This means that, without concepts, they are not representative of objects. This inherent lack of objectivity also prevents our intuitions from ever being false. In order for our senses to deceive us, we must attribute objectivity to our perceptions and relate them to objects. This occurs through a judgment.

⁹³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 68-69/B 93-94.

Thus, the objective validity, which defines judgments for Kant and distinguishes them from mere associations, does not entail that all judgments must be true. Instead, it entails that they are capable of being either true or false. It entails that they have a truth-value. This thesis is supported by Kant's account of error in his logic lectures.

Unfortunately, it is not always supported by the text of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In this work, Kant often equates objective validity with truth. For example, he writes, in the A-Deduction, "Actual experience . . . contains in the last and highest (of the merely empirical elements of experience) concepts that make possible the formal unity of experience and with all objective validity (truth) of empirical cognition."^{94,95} Prauss argues that in each of these passages, one could substitute the word "falsehood" for "truth" and it would not significantly alter Kant's meaning. Objective validity does not actually entail that a judgment or cognition is true. It entails that this cognition has a truth-value.

Prauss explains that Kant associates truth with objective validity because we do not attribute objectivity to our representations without also assuming that this judgment is true. We may subsequently discover that our cognition of an object happens to be false. However, we generally form judgments under the presumption that they are indeed true. It is very rare for us to do otherwise and deliberately formulate a false judgment. The only reasonable motivation for doing so would be to describe or identify an error. The goal or aim of cognition is always truth. Prauss claims that truth is the "exemplary case"

⁹⁴ Ibid., A 125. See also *ibid.*, A 202/B 247.

⁹⁵ Prauss points to a passage from the Doctrine of Method where Kant does distinguish between objective validity and truth. Kant writes, "He [Hume] dwelt primarily on the principle of causality, and quite rightly remarked about that that one could not base its *truth (indeed not even the objective validity of the concept of an efficient cause in general)* on any insight at all" (*ibid.*, A 760/B 788). (My italics). However, Kant later writes in the same chapter, "Now this is also the only possible ground of proof; for only through the fact that an object is determined for the concept by means of the law of causality does the represented occurrence have *objective validity, i.e., truth*" (*ibid.*, A 788/B 816). (My italics).

[*ausgezeichneter Fall*] of objective validity.⁹⁶ He means that objectively valid cognitions are assumed to be true until they are revealed to be otherwise. False cognitions are also objectively valid, since they refer to objects. However, we attribute objectivity to representations, i.e. we relate them to an object, under the presumption that this judgment is true. Prauss argues that Kant associates truth with objective validity for this reason. I think that Prauss's explanation is basically correct. However, the fact that Kant regularly equivocates between objective validity and truth is revealing. It suggests that he had not thought deeply about the meaning of the expression, "objective validity."

* * * * *

In §19 of the B-Deduction, Kant draws a distinction between association and judgment. The former are formed through the imagination and they are only subjectively valid. This means that they can only express how different representations happen to be related in the consciousness of a particular individual. They are representative of our mental states and nothing more. Conversely, judgments are formed through the understanding and they are objectively valid. This means that they are representations of actual objects. Kant claims that the objectivity, which defines judgments and distinguishes them from associations, is grounded on the transcendental unity of apperception. Judgments unite representations in accordance with the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. This means that they unite representations in such a way that these representations can all be related to the "I think." The unity of these representations is universally valid, since any self-consciousness being must also unite them in this way. According to Kant, universal validity entails objective validity and vice versa. He explains this connection in the *Prolegomena*. Judgments are objectively valid

⁹⁶ Prauss, *Erscheinung bei Kant*, 86.

because they unite representations in a universally valid way. They relate their representations both to objects and to the transcendental ego. Kant's definition of judgment in §19 pertains specifically to propositional judgments, or judgments regarded as representations. Both the *Prolegomena* and the third *Critique* refer to subjective judgments. However, these judgments are mere acts of judgment without corresponding representations. They are not propositional judgments. Consequently, they do not violate Kant's definition of judgment in §19, which only applies to propositional judgments. Subjective judgments are merely acts.

Chapter Six

Judgment and the Application of Rules

In chapter three, I argued that Kant adopts a new theory of judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He broadens his definition of judgment to encompass more than just propositional judgments. Any mental act that unites representations within one's consciousness qualifies as a judgment for him. He also describes judgments in a new way. He describes them as a cognitive relationship between concepts and objects, as opposed to a merely logical one between concepts. Both of these new positions are introduced in the first section of the metaphysical deduction. Kant returns to the topic of judgment in the B-Deduction. In §19 of the deduction, he argues that all propositional judgments are, by definition, objectively valid. This means that they are representative of objects. Their objectivity distinguishes them from associations, which are formed by the reproductive imagination. Like judgments, associations connect other representations within the mind. However, unlike judgments, they are only subjectively valid. This means that an association can only express how two intuitions happen to be related within the mind of an individual. Propositional judgments, on the other hand, represent an object.

There is one final aspect of Kant's new or critical theory of judgment that we have yet to discuss. He posits a special mental faculty that is responsible for the application of rules. Kant calls it the power of judgment [*Urtheilskraft*]. In chapter two, I argued that Kant introduces this faculty during the mid-1770s. It is not part of the faculty psychology of either Wolff or Baumgarten. However, Kant claims that it is one of three main sub-faculties that belong to the higher faculty of cognition. According to

him, the higher faculty of cognition consists of the understanding, reason, and the power of judgment. In chapter two, I also explained the difference between two related expressions: *Vermögen zu urtheilen*, which I translate as either the “faculty of judgment” or the “capacity to judge,” and *Urtheilskraft*, the power of judgment. I argued that the difference between these two expressions could be explained by the two different senses of the word, “judgment.” A judgment can refer to a thought or mental representation. It can also refer to a mental act. The “capacity to judge” primarily refers to judgments as representations. It is the capacity to form propositional judgments. The “power of judgment” refers to judgments primarily as acts. Judgments as representations are formed through acts of judgments. When I first made this claim in chapter two, I was not prepared to explain precisely how acts of judgment, which are performed by the power of judgment and consist in the application of rules, produce propositional judgments, i.e. judgments as representations. I needed to explain Kant’s new theory of judgment. We are now ready to complete this account. In this chapter, I will explain how propositional judgments are formed through the concrete application of rules.

I will start by explaining Kant’s definition of a rule. I will then explain how rules are applied through syllogisms. Finally, I will turn to Kant’s definitions of the three higher cognitive faculties: the understanding, the power of judgment, and reason. This might sound like quite a leap, shifting suddenly from syllogistics to Kant’s faculty psychology. However, Kant claims that all three of the higher faculties of cognition are involved in syllogistic reasoning. The understanding formulates a general rule, the power of judgment applies this rule to a particular case, and reason draws a conclusion about this case on the basis of the rule. Kant actually defines these three faculties in terms of

their role in a syllogism. I will explain his definitions of each of these faculties, giving special attention to the power of judgment.

6.1 Kant's definition of a rule

Kant defines a rule in his lecture notes for his logic course. He writes, "A rule is an assertion under a universal condition."¹ Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche, the editor of Kant's logic textbook, repeats this definition word for word in §58 of the *Logic*.² Most scholars are acquainted with it from this context. At least at first glance, this definition can seem rather opaque. However, as I will show, Kant is actually making a simple point. He means nothing more than that a rule is a universal judgment.

The terms "assertion" and "condition" come from Wolffian logic. I explained their meaning in chapter one of this dissertation. To review: Wolff claimed that every proposition can be analyzed into two basic components: an assertion [*Aussage*] and its condition [*Bedingung*].³ A proposition expresses a certain relation between its subject and predicate terms: the predicate either belongs [*zukommt*] to the subject or it does not. This is the assertion of the proposition. It is the thesis, depending upon whether the proposition is affirmative or negative, that the predicate either belongs to the subject-term or is excluded from it. The condition of a proposition refers to the reason or ground for this relationship. It is the reason why the predicate either belongs or does not belong to the subject-term.

¹ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3202, 16:710.

² Kant, *Jäsche Logic*, 9:121. Unlike many passages of the *Logic*, which are the product of extensive interpolation and editing by Jäsche, the sections devoted to syllogisms or inferences of reason [*Vernunftschüsse*] (§§56-80) are taken almost directly from Kant's own notes. Kant's comments on this subject are unusually clear and complete. In many cases, Jäsche copies them nearly verbatim.

³ Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit*, 159.

Kant borrows the terms “assertion” and “condition” from Wolffian logic.

However, he understands the condition of a judgment differently than his predecessors. For Wolff, the condition of a proposition is the ground or reason for the logical relation between its subject and predicate. This is not how Kant employs the term. For the sake of simplicity, we will initially limit our discussion to categorical judgments. The assertion of a categorical judgment consists in either the affirmation or the negation of its predicate. For example, the assertion of the judgment, “bodies are composite,” is that *something* is composite. The condition of a categorical judgment is its subject-term. Insofar as an object is represented by this concept, or subsumed under it, it meets the judgment’s condition. We can therefore apply the assertion of the judgment to the object in question. The condition of a judgment is the condition for applying its assertion to an object. In the case of a categorical judgment, the condition is the judgment’s subject-term.

Given that this is so, we can reasonably infer that the universality of a judgment’s condition refers to the judgment’s *quantity*. A universal condition applies the judgment’s assertion to the entire class of objects that are represented by the subject-term. A more narrowly circumscribed condition, on the other hand, would extend its assertion to only some of these objects. Thus, “an assertion under a universal condition” must refer to a universal judgment. It is a judgment, which asserts that the predicate applies to either all or none of the subject-term’s extension. Thus, according to Kant’s definition, a universal judgment can serve as a rule.

So far, I have concentrated entirely on categorical judgments. This limited approach was sufficient to explicate the meaning of Kant’s definition of a rule. Kant,

himself, focuses primarily on judgments of this type; although, he insists that his account of judgment ought to apply to hypothetical and disjunctive judgments as well. These judgments can also be analyzed into their assertion and its condition. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant claims that there are three different kinds of syllogisms and that they are defined by “the relation between a cognition and its condition.”⁴ This relationship is represented by the syllogism’s major premise, which serves as a rule. What does Kant mean when he refers to “the relation between a cognition and its condition?” In his logic lectures, he clarifies that the three types of syllogisms – categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive – are defined by the form of the judgment that serves as their major premise. The major premise of a categorical syllogism is a categorical judgment, the major premise of a hypothetical syllogism is a hypothetical judgment, and the major premise of disjunctive syllogism is a disjunctive one.⁵ This tells us that each of the three forms of judgment represent a different relationship between a cognition and its condition. Moreover, we can assume that the term “cognition,” in this context, is a synonym for a judgment’s assertion. Understood in this sense, a cognition asserts something about an object by relating it to a concept. We know that the condition of a categorical judgment is its subject-term. What are the conditions for hypothetical and disjunctive judgments? Unfortunately, the student notes from Kant’s logic lectures do not answer this question. They only briefly address non-categorical judgments and they do not mention the conditions of these judgments.

The best clue to this question comes from Kant’s own lecture notes. In *Reflexion* 3199, he explains that there are actually three different kinds of conditions and that they

⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 304/B 361.

⁵ See e.g., Kant, *Logik Pölitz*, 24:587; idem, *Logik Busolt*, 24:672; idem, *Heschel Logic*, in *Lectures on Logic*, trans. J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 391.

correspond with the three different forms of judgments, i.e. categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments. He writes,

Since all rules (judgments) contain (objective) unity of the consciousness of the manifold of cognition, thus a condition under which a cognition belongs with another in one consciousness . . . There are only three conditions of this unity:
 Subject of the inherence of a mark
 Ground of the dependence of one cognition on another
 Combination of parts in one whole.⁶

In this passage, Kant claims that a judgment or rule unites representations within one's consciousness in an objectively valid way. He then explains there are three possible conditions for this unity. First, concepts can be united because one of them is the mark of the other. A categorical judgment unites representations in this way. According to Kant, the condition of this unity is the "subject of the inherence of a mark." This "subject" is the concept that is characterized by the mark. In a categorical judgment, it is the concept that serves as the subject-term.⁷ Second, two judgments can be united because one of them is a consequence of the other. This is the case in hypothetical judgments. According to Kant, the condition for this unity is the "ground of the dependence of one cognition on another [*Grund der dependenz eines Erkenntnisses von andern*]." This "ground" is represented by the antecedent of a hypothetical judgment. Third, representations can be united in one's consciousness because they all represent parts of a

⁶ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3199, 16:708. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from 1776-1789. This is another *Reflexion* that Jäsche reproduces almost verbatim in the *Logic*. Cf. idem, *Jäsche Logic*, 9:121.

⁷ Kant's explanation of the unity of categorical judgments is not entirely correct. It only applies to analytic judgments. All categorical judgments unite the concepts that serve as their terms. However, the predicate is not always a mark of the subject-term. This is only true of analytic judgments. If the predicate is a mark of the subject-term, then the subject will contain the predicate, and the judgment will be analytic. In a synthetic judgment, the predicate is a mark of at least some of the objects that are contained under the subject-term. However, it is not a mark of the subject-term itself. In chapter four, I explained that Kant's *Nachlass* contains two competing accounts of judgment. Some of his notes state that judgments are based on the subordination of concepts. Others claim that judgments are actually based on the subsumption of objects under these concepts. The *Reflexion* that we are considering belongs to the first category. It is in keeping with the notes that explain judgment as conceptual subordination.

single whole. A disjunctive judgment unites other judgments in this way. The condition of this unity is the whole whose parts are represented by the disjuncts. Thus, the condition of a categorical judgment is its subject-term, the condition of a hypothetical judgment is its antecedent-term, and the condition of a disjunctive judgment is the disjunction as a whole.

Before we proceed to the next part, I want to underscore the difference between Kant's use of the term condition [*Bedingung*] and its original meaning as defined by Wolff.⁸ Wolff's examples of a proposition's assertion and condition, in the *Deutsche Logik*, are rather poor. They are based on the tautological proposition, "the warm stone warms [*der warme Stein machet warm*]." He chooses this odd example because it makes both the condition and assertion of the proposition explicit. The assertion of the proposition is that *the stone warms or radiates heat*. The condition is that *the stone itself is warm*.⁹ We can find a much clearer explanation of these terms in the work of one of Wolff's followers: Meier. In the *Vernunftlehre*, Meier offers the following example of the condition of a judgment. He writes, "If we judge that the soul is not corporeal, then the condition is that it [the soul] can think, since no body can do this."¹⁰ According to Meier, the condition of a judgment is the ground for the logical relationship between its subject and predicate terms. Corporeality cannot be a mark of the soul because the soul can think and corporeal things are incapable of thought. Therefore, the condition of the judgment, "the soul is not corporeal," is the soul's ability to think. This is not how Kant

⁸ Béatrice Longuenesse acknowledges the Wolffian heritage of the term "condition." However, she does not recognize the important differences between how Kant uses this term and the way it is employed by Wolff. See Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 95-97.

⁹ Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit*, 159, §6, c. 3).

¹⁰ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 491, §330.

would divide the judgment into its assertion and condition. He would say that the condition of this same judgment is its subject-term: the concept of the soul.

6.2 Kant's new theory of syllogistics

According to Kant, rules are applied syllogistically. I have argued that Kant introduces a new theory of judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He also offers a new explanation of syllogistics in this work.

In chapter one, I examined Kant's early essay, *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* (1762). Kant argues in this essay that syllogisms are actually a kind of judgment. He defines a judgment as the comparison of something with a potential mark. A judgment relates a mark – either positively or negatively – to an object. Syllogisms fit this definition. They relate an object to the mark of a mark, or what he calls a “mediate mark.” Ordinary judgments directly compare things with marks. Syllogisms compare them indirectly through a so-called “intermediate mark.” The intermediate mark lies in-between the mediate mark and the thing to which it is compared. The mediate mark is a mark of the intermediate mark, which, in turn, is a mark of the thing or object. The intermediate mark serves as the crucial middle term of the syllogism. We can find versions of this theory in Kant's logic lectures from the early 1770s – *Logik Blomberg* and *Logik Philippi*. This proves that he continued to understand syllogisms in this way until at least that period.

However, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant offers a new explanation of a syllogism. He writes,

In every syllogism, I think first a **rule** (the *major*) through the understanding. Second, I **subsume** a cognition under the condition of the rule (the *minor*) by

means of the **power of judgment**. Finally, I determine my cognition through the predicate of the rule (the *conclusion*), hence *a priori*.¹¹

According to Kant, the major premise of a syllogism consists of a rule. The minor premise subsumes “a cognition under the condition” of this rule. As a result, the cognition is determined by the predicate of the rule, which yields the syllogism’s conclusion. An example can help illuminate what Kant means. Consider the following syllogism:

Everything simple is incorruptible.
The soul is simple.
∴ The soul is incorruptible.

Kant claims that a syllogism subsumes “a cognition” under the condition of a rule and as a result this cognition is determined by the rule’s predicate. The rule, in this syllogism, is the judgment, “everything simple is incorruptible.” Kant identifies the condition of a categorical judgment with its subject-term. Hence, the condition of our rule is the concept of simplicity. The predicate of the rule is the concept of incorruptibility. The cognition, which is subsumed under the condition of the rule, is the concept of the soul. The minor premise of this syllogism subsumes this cognition (the concept of the soul) under the concept of simplicity, i.e. the condition of the rule. The conclusion asserts that the soul is incorruptible. The subsumed cognition, i.e. the concept of the soul, is determined by the predicate of the rule, i.e. the concept of incorruptibility.

Kant’s explanation of the form of a syllogism is fairly conventional. He is essentially arguing that a syllogism applies a general rule to a particular case. The only real challenge posed by this account is Kant’s terminology, a problem that we have now

¹¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 304/B 360-361. See also *ibid.*, A 330/B 386-387.

resolved. Kant defines a rule as “an assertion under a universal condition.”¹² He means that a rule asserts something about an object insofar as it meets a certain condition. For example, the judgment, “everything simple is incorruptible,” is a rule. It asserts that an object is incorruptible *if* it is something simple. Kant claims that the assertion of a rule has a *universal* condition, because it applies to an entire class of objects. As I explained earlier, this definition of a rule is equivalent to a universal judgment. We apply a rule to a particular case by subsuming the case under the condition of the rule. In doing so, we establish that it meets the condition and that it is consequently subject to the rule’s assertion. Kant writes, “The rule says something universal under a certain condition. Now in a case that comes before us the condition of the rule obtains. Thus what is valid universally under that condition is also to be regarded as valid in the case before us.”¹³ For example, our syllogism above applies the rule, “everything simple is incorruptible,” to the soul. Its major premise consists of the rule itself. Its minor premise subsumes the soul under the condition of the rule, the concept of simplicity. This establishes that the soul is something simple, and hence meets the condition of the rule.

Kant acknowledges that we often start with the conclusion of a syllogism and then search for the premises that would demonstrate its verity. Although a syllogism is itself an example of deductive reasoning, i.e. it applies a general rule to a particular case, the process through which we form these inferences often involves induction. We assume the conclusion and then search for a rule that will justify it. Kant writes,

If, as happens for the most part, the conclusion is a judgment given as the problem, in order to see whether it flows from already given judgments [*die Conclusion als ein Urtheil aufgegeben worden, um zu sehen, ob es nicht aus schon gegebenen Urtheilen*], through which, namely, a wholly different object is

¹² Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3202, 16:710. See also idem, *Jäsche Logic*, 9:121.

¹³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 330/B 387.

thought, then I seek whether the assertion of this conclusion is not be found in the understanding under certain conditions according to a universal rule.¹⁴

We prove that a judgment follows from a rule by subsuming its condition under the condition of the rule. Kant writes in his logic notes, “[A] syllogism is an *a priori* judgment through the subsumption of its condition under the condition of a universal rule.”¹⁵ This might seem complicated because we are now distinguishing between two different conditions: the condition of the judgment, which is to be proved through the syllogism, and the condition of the rule. However, once again, Kant’s point is actually fairly simple. In both cases, the condition is synonymous with the subject-term of a judgment. Suppose that we want to prove that Socrates is rational. We can appeal to the general rule: All human beings are rational. As we know, Kant identifies the condition of a categorical judgment with its subject-term. Hence, the condition of the rule, “All human beings are rational,” is the concept of a human. The condition of the judgment, “Socrates is rational,” is the concept of Socrates. We prove that a judgment is true through a syllogism by subsuming the condition of the judgment under the condition of a rule. Thus, we subsume Socrates (the condition of the judgment, “Socrates is rational”) under the concept of a human being (the condition of our rule.) This yields the judgment, “Socrates is human.” We now have three judgments: the judgment we want to prove, “Socrates is rational,” the rule, “All humans are rational,” and a third judgment, “Socrates is human.” If we arrange these judgments according to the standard form of a syllogism, they form a valid argument:

All humans are rational.
Socrates is human.
∴ Socrates is rational.

¹⁴ Ibid., A 304/B 361.

¹⁵ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3198, 16:708. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from 1776-1789.

As this example shows, the minor premise of a syllogism subsumes the condition of a judgment (Socrates) under the condition of a rule (human). Kant writes, “The subsumption of the condition of another possible judgment under the condition of the rule is the minor premise (*minor*).”¹⁶

As I mentioned earlier, Kant’s brief account of syllogistics in the *Critique of Pure Reason* differs from his approach to this subject in *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* and his logic lectures from the early 1770s. Rather than defining a syllogism as a judgment about something’s mediate marks, i.e. the marks of its marks, Kant describes it as the application of a rule. Starting in the 1780s, Kant defines a syllogism in these new terms. For example, he writes, “[A] syllogism is the cognition of the necessity of a proposition through the subsumption of its condition under a given universal rule.”¹⁷ We can find variations of this definition in his logic lectures from this period.¹⁸ It is worth acknowledging that these two accounts are not incompatible. We can describe a syllogism both in terms of the relation between a concept and a mediate mark as well as in terms of the application of a rule to a particular case. In his logic lectures from the 1780s and -90s, Kant continues to define the terms of a categorical syllogism in terms of the model set forth in *The False Subtlety*. The middle term of a categorical syllogism is an intermediate mark. It relates a mediate mark (the major term) to a concept (the minor term).

6.3 The three higher faculties of cognition

¹⁶ Ibid., A 330/B 386.

¹⁷ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3201, 16:710. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from 1790-1804. Cf. idem, *Jäsche Logic*, 9:120.

¹⁸ See e.g., Kant, *Logik Pölitz*, 24:586; idem, *Logik Busolt*, 24:672; idem, *Heschel Logic*, 389.

According to Kant, all three of the higher cognitive faculties are involved in the formation of a syllogism. The understanding (in the narrow sense) provides the rule, which serves as the syllogism's major premise. The power of judgment subsumes a particular case under the condition of this rule. Finally, reason draws the syllogism's conclusion by applying the rule's assertion to the subsumed case.¹⁹ This outline of how the three cognitive faculties interact in a syllogism can help us to better understand Kant's faculty psychology.

For example, in his first, unpublished introduction, to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant defines each of the three higher faculties of cognition, i.e. the understanding (in the narrow sense), the power of judgment, and reason. His descriptions of these three faculties correspond with their roles in a syllogism. Kant writes,

The systematic representation of the faculty for thinking is tripartite: namely, first the faculty for the cognition of the **general** (of rules), **the understanding**; second, the faculty for the **subsumption of the particular** under the general, **the power of judgment**; and third, the faculty for the **determination** of the particular through the general (for the derivation from principles), i.e., **reason**.²⁰

These are Kant's standard definitions of the three higher faculties of cognition. He describes them in very similar terms in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* as well as his lectures on metaphysics and on anthropology. I will now clarify the meaning of each of these definitions.

6.3.1 The understanding

We will start with Kant's definition of the understanding. Kant describes this faculty as the "faculty for the cognition of the general" [*Vermögen der Erkenntniß des Allgemeinen*]. The main question raised by this definition is what Kant means by the

¹⁹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 304/B 360-361.

²⁰ Kant, "First Introduction," 20:201.

term “general” or “universal.” There are two species of universal cognition. Kant defines concepts as general or universal representations [*allgemeine Vorstellungen*], which means that they are capable of representing multiple objects. This fact distinguishes them from intuitions, which are singular representations. Thus, concepts, by definition, are universal cognitions. Kant could be defining the understanding as the capacity to form concepts. However, there is also another possibility. Kant could be referring to universal *judgments*. These judgments are another species of universal cognition.

Kant offers us one clue to what he means by the “universal.” He equates it with a rule. The understanding can be described as either the capacity to cognize the “universal” or the capacity to cognize rules. These two expressions are apparently equivalent. As we know, in his logic lectures, Kant defines a rule as a universal judgment or proposition.²¹ Consequently, we might assume that the term “universal” denotes universal judgments. If this is true then the understanding is the capacity to formulate these judgments, which can serve as general rules.

However, the term, “rule,” is unfortunately somewhat ambiguous. In his logic lectures, Kant defines a rule as a universal judgment because he is thinking of the major premise of a syllogism. According to Kant, this premise is always a universal proposition. But this is not his only conception of a rule. In the A-Deduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant claims that all concepts can serve as rule. He writes, “All cognition requires a concept, however imperfect or obscure it may be; but as far as its form is concerned the latter is always something general, and something that serves as a

²¹ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3202, 16:710.

rule.”²² Kant taught in his logic lectures that the form of a concept consists in its generality. For example, he writes in one of his notes, “The matter of every concept is the object, the form of every concept is universality [*Allgemeinheit*].”²³ In the above quotation from the A-Deduction, Kant claims that this same generality makes them suited to serve as rules. Hence, all concepts are also rules by virtue of their form.

The meaning of Kant’s definition of the understanding is once again in question. He defines it as the capacity to cognize the “universal,” or the capacity to cognize rules. Depending on how he conceives of a rule, this can either mean that the understanding is the capacity to formulate universal judgments or simply that it is the capacity to form concepts. It is also possible that Kant intended both of these meanings. This is perhaps the simplest solution to the problem before us. Concepts and universal judgments are both species of universal cognition, they are also both rules, and they are both conceived through the faculty of the understanding. If this is true, then Kant deliberately defines the understanding as a capacity for universal *cognition*, as opposed to a narrower capacity for either concepts or universal judgments. He wants to capture both of these meanings.²⁴

Kant defines the understanding as the “faculty of rules” [*Vermögen der Regeln*] in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.²⁵ He offers several definitions of the understanding in this work. For example, in the metaphysical deduction, Kant defines it as both a capacity for discursive cognition and the capacity for judgment. However, he ultimately decides that this faculty can be best described as the “faculty of rules.” He writes, “This designation

²² Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 106.

²³ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 2834, 16:536. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from between 1769 and 1770.

²⁴ “All cognitions of the understanding are universal cognitions [*allgemeine Erkenntniße*], and all universal cognitions are rules” (Kant, *Anthropologie Friedländer*, 25:538).

²⁵ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 126.

is more fruitful and comes closer to its essence.”²⁶ Kant explains that it is a fitting description for two reasons: first, we employ the understanding to discover empirical rules, and second, it prescribes the fundamental laws of nature. He writes,

It [the understanding] is always busy pouring through the appearances with the aim of finding some sort of rule in them. Rules, so far as they are objective (and thus necessarily pertain to the cognition of objects) are called laws. Although we learn many laws through experience, these are only particular determinations of yet higher laws, the highest of which (under which all others stand) come from the understanding itself *a priori*, and are not borrowed from experience, but rather must provide the appearances with their lawfulness and by that very means make experience possible. The understanding is thus not merely a faculty for making rules through the comparison of the appearances; it is itself the legislation for nature.²⁷

Kant indicates that the understanding can be described as a faculty of rules for two reasons. First, this faculty is “always busy pouring through the appearances with the aim of finding some sort of rule in them.” Kant does not specify whether these rules are concepts or judgments. However, we can safely assume that they take both forms. Kant argues in the metaphysical deduction that concepts can only be employed through judgments. Consequently, these two species of cognition – concepts and judgments – are actually inseparable. This means that any rules that are formulated through the understanding must ultimately take the form of judgments or propositions. Second, Kant claims that all of our rules – even those inferred from experience – can be derived from the pure concepts of the understanding. These concepts are the fundamental laws of nature and they are the ground for every other theoretical rule and law that we may discover. These further rules derive their necessity and normativity from the categories.²⁸

²⁶ *Ibid.*, A 126.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, A 126.

²⁸ Kant returns to this idea in the published introduction to the third *Critique*. He points out that empirical laws ought to be contingent. However, we do not regard them as such. We assume that they belong to a system of natural laws that is ultimately grounded in the categories. The universality and necessity that we

Thus, the understanding not only discovers empirical rules, it actually prescribes the most fundamental laws of nature. This is the second, and perhaps primary, reason that Kant describes it as the faculty of rules.

Kant also defines the understanding as a capacity to formulate rules in

Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. He writes,

If by the word “understanding” is meant the faculty of cognition of rules (and thus cognition through concepts) in general, so that the understanding composes the entire *higher* faculty of cognition in itself, then the rules are not to be understood as those according to which nature guides the human being in his conduct, as occurs with animals which are driven by natural instinct, but only those that he himself *makes*.²⁹

Here Kant identifies the capacity to formulate or cognize rules with the capacity for discursive cognition, i.e. “cognition through concepts.” He explains this connection in an

attribute to them as laws is not justified by experience. It is derived from the categories, which are their ultimate ground. In theory, we ought to be able to deduce every empirical law from these concepts. The fact that we are not able to practically do so does not prevent us from assuming that such a deduction must be theoretically possible. Every specific empirical law must be deducible from the *a priori* laws that are prescribed by the understanding. The normativity of the former is derived from the latter. One way to think about this idea is that the different branches of science do not study separate realities. There is very little overlap between biology and geology, and even less between both of these sciences and astronomy or theoretical physics. However, all of these sciences are thought to contribute to a single unified system of knowledge and they are all ultimately grounded on the same fundamental laws of nature. The laws of biology can be united with those of geology, astronomy, and physics. Kant writes, “the power of judgment must thus assume it as an *a priori* principle for its own use that what is contingent for human insight in the particular (empirical) laws of nature nevertheless contains a lawful unity, not fathomable by us but still thinkable, in the combination of its manifold into one experience possible in itself” (Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5:183). In this passage, Kant explains that we proceed under the assumption that all natural laws can be united into a single system of knowledge. If this assumption is correct, empirical laws are not actually contingent. They only appear to be contingent from our limited perspective, or “for human insight.” However, if we had a complete understanding of nature, and understood its entire system of laws, then we would see that rules, which we only know through experience, can actually be deduced from the fundamental laws of nature. Hence, these rules are true laws. They are not contingent, but rather universal and necessary. Kant argues that we discover empirical laws through the use of the *reflecting* power of judgment. This is his term for the inductive use of the power of judgment. Rather than applying rules to particular cases, it ascends from particular cases to the universal or rule. Kant claims that when we use the reflecting power of judgment to formulate empirical laws we always proceed under the assumption that any rules or laws that we discover belong to a single unified system, which is ultimately grounded in the categories. This assumption is actually an *a priori* principle that pertains specifically to the power of judgment. It is *a priori* because we do not actually cognize a systematic order within nature. It is not something that we discover through our investigations. Instead, we assume that this order exists and formulate rules with the expectation that they constitute a unified system.

²⁹ Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:197.

earlier passage. Kant claims that sensibility is only capable of cognizing individuals because it is a capacity for intuitive cognition. Kant defines intuitions as singular representations. Concepts are required to grasp more general or universal truths about the world. Consequently, rules can only be formulated through the understanding, our capacity for discursive cognition. Kant writes,

Understanding, as the faculty of *thinking* (representing something by means of *concepts*), is also called the *higher* cognitive faculty (as distinguished from sensibility, which is the *lower*), because the faculty of intuition (pure or empirical) contains only the singularity of objects, whereas the faculty of concepts contains the universality of representations, the *rule* to which the manifold of sensuous intuitions must be subordinated in order to bring unity to the cognition of the object.³⁰

In this passage, Kant appears to equate rules with concepts. He claims that a rule unites “the manifold of sensuous intuitions” in the cognition of an object. This function is performed by a concept through the synthesis of recognition. However, we can once again assume that the understanding’s capacity to formulate rules is not limited to the formation of general concepts. Since concepts can only be employed through judgments, any rules that are formed through the understanding must ultimately be expressed in the form of judgments or propositions. The formation of concepts and judgments, while not the same activity, are integrally related.

Thus, in both the *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Kant defines the understanding as a capacity to formulate rules. Moreover, we can safely assume that the rules that are formed through this faculty can take the form of both concepts and complete judgments or propositions. We can also assume that Kant repeats this same definition in the first introduction to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. There he defines the understanding as the faculty of universal

³⁰ Ibid., 7:196.

cognition or rules. If this interpretation is correct, then Kant means that this faculty is a capacity to formulate rules – either in the form of concepts or as complete judgments.³¹

³¹ There is one problem with this interpretation. As I have explained several times in this dissertation, the term “understanding” [*Verstand*] is not actually univocal for Kant. It has two distinct meanings. It can refer to both the higher faculty of cognition in general *and* one of the three principle sub-faculties that compose the higher faculty of cognition. When Kant defines the understanding as the faculty of rules in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he is referring to the *broad* sense of this term, i.e. the entire higher faculty of cognition. The same is true in the *Anthropology*. If we review the two passages from this work that I quoted above, we find that in both cases Kant specifies that he is describing the broad sense of the understanding, i.e. the higher faculty of cognition in general. For example, he writes, “If by the word ‘understanding’ is meant the faculty of cognition of rules (and thus cognition through concepts) in general, so that *the understanding composes the entire higher faculty of cognition* in itself . . .” (ibid., 7:197). (My italics.) This is a problem because when Kant defines the understanding as the faculty of universal cognition or rules, in the “First Introduction,” he is clearly referring to the *narrow* sense of this term. We can be absolutely certain of this fact because he opposes it to the power of judgment and the faculty of reason. These three faculties all belong to the higher faculty of cognition. Thus, in both the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Anthropology*, Kant defines the *broad* sense of the understanding as the faculty of rules. However, in the “First Introduction,” he defines the *narrow* sense of the understanding. Although these definitions are similar, they cannot have the same meaning because they pertain to different senses of the word “understanding.” In the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Anthropology*, Kant is defining the entire higher faculty of cognition. In the “First Introduction,” he is defining just one of the three sub-faculties of the higher faculty of cognition.

The *Critique of Pure Reason* offers a potential clue to the meaning of Kant’s definition in the “First Introduction.” We know that this definition describes the *narrow* sense of the understanding. Kant also defines the narrow sense of this term in the first *Critique*: it is the capacity to formulate concepts. In the introduction to the analytic of principles, he claims that the three higher faculties of cognition – the understanding, the power of judgment, and reason – correspond with the three branches of traditional logic, which are devoted to: concepts, judgments, and inferences. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 130-131/B 169. The narrow sense of the understanding corresponds with the branch of general logic that is devoted to concepts. Consequently, we can infer that this faculty is a capacity to form concepts. We might also assume that this is the meaning of Kant’s definition in the “First Introduction.” He defines the understanding (in the narrow sense) as both the faculty of universal cognition and the faculty of rules. We know that concepts are a kind of universal cognition. They are also capable of serving as rules. Thus, it is possible that Kant intended to define the understanding as the capacity to form concepts, just as he does in the first *Critique*.

However, there is also a problem with this interpretation. According to Kant, the understanding prescribes the rule that serves as the major premise of a syllogism. In this context, he must be referring to the *narrow* sense of the understanding because all three of the higher cognitive faculties are involved in the formation of a syllogism. The understanding (in the narrow sense) prescribes a rule. The power of judgment subsumes a particular case or cognition under the condition of this rule. Reason finally draws the conclusion of the syllogism by applying the assertion of the rule to the subsumed case. This poses a problem because the major premise of a syllogism is a universal *judgment*. Since the understanding is responsible for prescribing this rule, it cannot be limited to the formation of concepts. It must also be capable of forming complete judgments. The idea that judgments can arise from the *narrow* sense of the understanding is also supported by some of the student notes from Kant’s lectures on metaphysics and on anthropology. As I explained earlier, Kant defines all three of the higher faculties of cognition in these lectures. He describes them in essentially the same terms that he uses in the “First Introduction.” The understanding is a faculty of universal cognitions and rules. Some of the notes from these lectures indicate that it is capable of forming universal judgments. For example, the *Pölitz Metaphysics* states, “This higher faculty of cognition consists of thus: 1.) of a general judgment; 2.) of a subsumption under this judgment, and 3.) of a conclusion. The principle of the general judgment, or of the rule, is the *understanding* taken

6.3.2 Reason

I want to pass over Kant's definition of the power of judgment for the time being. I will address it in the next section (6.3.3). However, before doing so, I want to first briefly examine Kant's definition of reason in the "First Introduction." He defines reason as "the faculty for the **determination** of the particular through the general (for the derivation from principles)."³² He later repeats this definition in his *Anthropology*. There he writes, "*reason* is the faculty of deriving the particular from the universal and thus representing it according to principles and as necessary."³³ At least at first glance, this definition can seem rather obscure. However, its meaning is actually not difficult to decipher. We already know that when Kant refers to the "universal" or the "general" he means a rule and that this rule can take the form of either a concept or a universal judgment. Kant equates rules in general with universal *cognitions*. Kant claims that reason determines the *particular* through the *universal*. He means that reason renders a judgment about a particular case on the basis of a general rule. Rather than basing this judgment on experience, we appeal to a rule instead. The judgment is deduced from the rule.

Kant offers an example of this process in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He writes,

I can draw the proposition "Caius is mortal" from experience merely through the understanding. But I seek a concept containing the condition under which the predicate (the assertion in general) of this judgment is given (i.e., here, the concept "human"), and after I have subsumed [the predicate] under this condition,

strictly" (Kant, *Metaphysik L₁*, 28:241-242). Here Kant clearly asserts that the understanding in the narrow or "strict" sense forms judgments.

Thus, the narrow sense of the understanding is not limited to forming concepts. It is capable of both kinds of universal cognition. This would make it indistinguishable from the broad sense of the understanding. What this shows is that Kant does not consistently distinguish between the two senses of this term. He acknowledges that it denotes two different faculties of the mind. However, he often attributes the same capacities – universal cognition and the formation of rules – to them both.

³² Kant, "First Introduction," 20:201.

³³ Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:199.

taken in its whole domain (“all humans are mortal”), I determine the cognition of my object according to it (“Caius is mortal”).³⁴

As Kant observes, we can judge that “Caius is mortal” simply on the basis of experience. We do not need reason to draw this conclusion. Nonetheless, we can still ask why Caius is mortal, or as Kant puts it, what is the condition under which the predicate “mortal” is applied to Caius? Kant answers that this condition is the concept of a human being in general. Caius is mortal because he is human. Kant then explains that if we subsume this concept under the predicate, “mortal,” we have a rule. It states, “All humans are mortal.” Reason judges that “Caius is mortal” on the basis of this rule (All humans are mortal), rather than on the basis of experience.³⁵

When Kant writes that reason determines “the particular through the general” or universal, he means that it renders a judgment about a *particular* case on the basis of a *general* rule. He adds parenthetically that this judgment is derived from a principle. A principle is a rule for other judgments. This means that the principle determines the other judgments, or that we can deduce the judgments from this principle. It is literally a *Grundsatz*, or a proposition that serves as the ground for other judgments or propositions. In the analytic of principles [*Analytic der Grundsätze*], Kant sets forth the principles that ground all other synthetic judgments. These are the principles of pure understanding

³⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 322/B 378.

³⁵ Kant’s account of syllogistic reasoning in this passage resembles Meier’s theory of syllogistics in the *Vernunftlehre*. This is somewhat unusual because Kant typically explains the logic of syllogisms in his own unique terms. In both *The False Subtlety* and his early logic lectures, Kant explains a syllogism as a kind of judgment, which compares a concept with a mediate mark. Later, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and his logic lectures from 1780s, he claims that a syllogism applies a general rule to particular case or cognition. However, in the passage above, he adopts Meier’s position from the *Vernunftlehre*. According to Meier, the purpose of a syllogism is to exhibit how the truth of a certain judgment follows from its condition. It is a distinct representation of how and why the logical relationship between the subject and predicate terms of the conclusion follows from this judgment’s condition. I explain Meier’s account of syllogistics in part two of chapter one (1.2).

[*Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes*]. They prescribe how the pure concepts of the understanding are applied to appearances.³⁶

Later, in the introduction to the transcendental dialectic, Kant draws a distinction between two senses of the term “principle.” He explains that a principle can be broadly construed as a universal proposition or judgment. However, a true principle is able to derive synthetic cognitions from concepts alone.³⁷ Kant claims that a principle, in this strict sense, is grounded on concepts, because it does not derive its validity from experience or its conditions. He emphasizes the role of concepts in order to connote the absence of intuitions. Kant denies that the principles of pure understanding qualify as principles of this kind. They represent the conditions for any possible experience. Consequently, they are not based on concepts alone. Instead, they represent the way the imagination must synthesize the manifold of intuition. They are only principles in the broader sense of the word. The same is true of so-called mathematical principles because they are grounded on our pure intuitions of space and time. Kant writes,

But if we consider these principles of pure understanding in themselves as to their origin, then they are anything but cognitions from concepts. For they would not even be possible *a priori* if we did not bring in pure intuition (in mathematics) or the conditions of a possible experience in general.³⁸

Kant tries to differentiate between these two senses by referring to the principles of the pure understanding as *Grundsätze*. He reserves the Latin term, *Principien*, for the principles of reasons, which he argues are principles in the strictest sense.

³⁶ “These principles are nothing other than rules of the objective use of the categories,” (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 161/B 200).

³⁷ “Thus the understanding cannot yield synthetic cognitions from concepts at all, and it is properly these that I call principles absolutely; nevertheless, all universal propositions in general can be called propositions comparatively” (ibid., A 301/B 357-358).

³⁸ Ibid., A 301/B 357.

Kant regards syllogisms as cognitions that are derived from, or grounded on, principles. He writes, “Every syllogism is a form of derivation of a cognition from a principle.”³⁹ This is true in two senses. First, the major premise of any syllogism meets Kant’s definition of a principle in the broad sense. It is a universal proposition. Kant claims that the major premise of a syllogism is always a rule and he defines a rule as a universal judgment or proposition. His view that all valid syllogistic forms can be reduced to those of the first figure also commits him to this position. The first figure consists of five valid syllogistic forms. The major premise of each of these syllogisms is a universal proposition. The conclusion of a syllogism is deduced from its major premise, which is a principle. Hence, it derives a cognition, i.e. its conclusion, from a principle in the broad sense. Second, Kant thinks that all syllogisms are ultimately grounded in the principles of pure reason, which actually are principles in the strict sense that he defines.

If we return our attention to Kant’s “First Introduction,” he offers two complementary definitions of the faculty of reason. He first claims that this faculty determines “the particular through the general.” He means that it renders a judgment about a *particular* case on the basis of a *general* rule. Kant also adds in parentheses that it is a faculty “for the derivation from principles [*der Ableitung von Principien*].” He means that reason derives its cognitions from principles. It does so in both of the two senses that I have explained above. First, a syllogism derives its conclusion from the rule that serves as its major premise. This rule is a principle in the broad sense. Second, all syllogisms are ultimately grounded on the principles of pure reason, which are principles in the strict or narrow sense.

³⁹ Ibid., A 300/B 357.

6.3.3 The power of judgment

We can now address the third higher cognitive faculty: the power of judgment. In the “First Introduction,” Kant defines the power of judgment as “the faculty for the subsumption of the particular under the general.”⁴⁰ The meaning of this definition is fairly straightforward. We know that the “general” [*Allgemeine*] in this context signifies a universal cognition or rule. The power of judgment subsumes a particular case under this rule. This means that it applies the rule to the case in question. Kant thinks that the power of judgment consists of our ability to recognize whether a particular case is an example or instance of a general rule. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he writes, “If the understanding in general is explained as the faculty of rules, then the power of judgment is the faculty of **subsuming** under rules, i.e. of determining whether something stands under a given rule (*casus datae legis*) or not.”⁴¹ Here Kant clarifies what he means by subsumption. It is our recognition that a rule applies to a particular case, or our decision to apply the former to the latter. By subsuming something under a rule we determine that it “stands” under the rule. This means that the rule can be legitimately applied to it.

In chapter two, I explained the difference between two expressions: *Urtheilskraft*, or the power of judgment, and *Vermögen zu urtheilen*, which I translate as either the “faculty of judgment” or “capacity to judge.” Kant defines the higher faculty of cognition in general, or the understanding (in the broad sense), as the soul’s capacity for judgment [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*]. However, he also claims that the higher faculty of cognition consists of three sub-faculties, one of which is the power of judgment. The term, “judgment,” has two distinct, but nonetheless related, meanings. It can denote

⁴⁰ Kant, “First Introduction,” 20:201.

⁴¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 132/B 171.

either a mental *act* or the mental *content* that results from this act. When Kant defines the higher faculty of cognition as the capacity for judgment he means that it is a capacity to form a certain kind of cognition; namely a judgment. Hence, he is referring to judgments as a species of mental representation or content. I describe this kind of judgment as a propositional judgment. It is a type of mental content, rather than a mental act.

Conversely, when Kant defines the power of judgment as the capacity to apply rules, he is describing the *activity* of judging. Kant thinks that judgment, insofar as it is regarded as an act, consists in the application of a rule. When we judge what we are really doing is assessing whether a particular case is an instance of a general rule. Kant claims that some individuals lack this ability. They struggle to apply rules correctly. As a result, they possess abstract knowledge but cannot put it to concrete use. He diagnoses this problem as a lack of the power of judgment. Thus, the power of judgment pertains to judgments as acts. The capacity to judge or faculty of judgment pertains to judgments as representations, i.e. propositional judgments.

One question that I did not address in chapter two is the relation between the soul's general capacity for judgment [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*] and its power of judgment [*Urtheilskraft*]. The former is the capacity to formulate propositional judgments; the latter is the capacity to apply rules. Judgments as representations are produced by acts of judgments. We still need to explain how this occurs. How does the concrete application of a rule result in the formation of a propositional judgment?

This question can actually be answered fairly easily. In chapter four, we considered the two competing accounts of judgment that can be found in Kant's *Nachlass*. In some of Kant's *Reflexionen*, he claims that judgments are based on the

subordination of concepts. For example, in an (affirmative) categorical judgment, the concept that serves as its subject-term is subordinated under its predicate. I pointed out that this model is flawed because it only applies to analytic judgments. If concept A is contained, or subordinated, *under* concept B, then concept B will also be contained *in* concept A. Hence, the relationship between these two concepts is analytic; A contains B. I argued that this explanation of judgment is superseded by the other account of this topic that we find in Kant's notes. There are other *Reflexionen*, in which he indicates that judgments are actually based on the subsumption of objects under concepts. This position has the advantage of being able to accommodate both analytic and synthetic judgments. I am reviewing this point because it can help us to understand how propositional judgments arise from the application of rules. The *Reflexionen* explain how propositional judgments are formed.

According to Kant, a categorical judgment assesses whether an object, which is already represented by the judgment's subject-term, is also represented by its predicate. An affirmative judgment asserts that its predicate represents this object; a negative judgment denies that this is the case. If an object is represented by a concept, then it is contained under this concept. Therefore, categorical judgments subsume objects under concepts – specifically, the concepts that serve as their terms, i.e. their subject and predicate. Since the objects of these judgments are always represented by their subject-term, their logical quality depends on their predicate. We must determine whether the objects, which are contained under the subject-term, are also contained under the predicate. This is the crucial act of judgment that we make whenever we render a categorical judgment: is the predicate a mark of a given object? If we judge that the

predicate is indeed representative of the object in question, then we subsume it under this concept. A propositional judgment arises from this act of subsumption.

This thesis is supported by a number of Kant's *Reflexionen*. We have already examined them at some length in chapter four, so I will only quote from one of them here. Kant writes in *Reflexion 3738*, "In every judgment, the concept of the subject is something *a*, which I think in the object *x*, and the predicate is regarded as a mark of *a* in the analytic judgment or of *x* in the synthetic one."⁴² Although Kant makes a sweeping claim about the nature of all judgments in this passage, it is actually limited to just those that are both affirmative and categorical. Nonetheless, we can still infer a broader point about all categorical judgments. Kant claims that the subject-term of such a judgment (*a*) represents an object (*x*). The predicate of this judgment is either a mark of the subject-term itself (*a*), or the object (*x*). In the first case, the judgment is analytic; in the second, it is synthetic. In either case, the object (*x*) is represented by the predicate. The marks that define a concept are also shared by its extension. Hence, if the predicate is a mark of the subject-term (*a*), it will also be a mark of any objects that are contained under this concept, e.g. *x*. If we look beyond the distinction that Kant draws between analytic and synthetic judgments, we can conclude that all affirmative categorical judgments assert that an object, which is represented by their subject-term, is also represented by their predicate.⁴³ Likewise, a negative judgment denies that its predicate represents such an object. Thus, we form these judgments by determining whether an object is subsumed

⁴² Kant, *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* 3738, 17:278.

⁴³ "If I say: a body is divisible, then it means the same as: something *x*, which I know [*kenne*] under the predicates, which together constitute the concept of a body, I also think through the predicate of divisibility" (ibid., 17:278).

under their predicate. This determination is the act of judgment that constitutes a representation, or propositional judgment.

This explanation of judgment is a way of describing predication: we attribute a mark or predicate to an object by subsuming the object under the concept of this property. One might object that I have found a complicated way to describe a relatively simple idea. In my defense, Kant explains judgments in this exact manner in his notes and I am simply following his example. Moreover, this explanation can help us to understand how the application of a rule results in a propositional judgment. According to Kant, all concepts are capable of serving as rules. Hence, when we subsume an object under a concept, we have effectively applied a rule. The concept is the rule. For example, in the judgment, "Socrates is ugly," Socrates is subsumed under the predicate, the concept of ugliness. This concept can be regarded as a rule and it is applied to Socrates through the judgment above. Since the object of a judgment is always represented by its subject-term, the crucial determination that we must make in rendering a categorical judgment is whether the object is also represented by, or subsumed under, the predicate. This is the act of judgment that constitutes a representation, or propositional judgment: the subsumption of the object under the predicate. For example, in the judgment, "Socrates is ugly," Socrates, regarded as a man or object, is represented by our concept of Socrates. Hence, he is subsumed under this concept. However, the judgment is not actually about whether something is Socrates. It concerns whether he is ugly. Hence, the act of judgment that yields the propositional judgment, "Socrates is ugly," subsumes an object, i.e. Socrates, under the predicate, the concept of ugliness. Categorical judgments are formed through the subsumption of objects under the concepts that serves as their

predicate. Since Kant regards all concepts as potential rules, the subsumption of an object under a concept can be regarded as the application of a rule.

Thus, predication can be understood in terms of the application of rules. The predicate is a rule and it is applied to an object by subsuming the object under the rule or concept. This act of subsumption is performed by the power of the judgment. Given that this is so, it is not difficult to grasp how the application of rules yields propositional judgments, or at least those of the categorical variety. We form categorical judgments by subsuming objects under the concepts that serve as their predicate. This act of subsumption can be described as the application of a rule. In *The False Subtlety*, Kant describes a judgment as an act of “comparison” [*Vergleichung*]. It compares something with a mark. The purpose of this comparison is to determine whether the object of comparison is actually characterized by the mark. The comparison involved in forming a judgment is akin to the function that Kant later attributes to the power of judgment. Comparison and subsumption are two different ways of describing the same activity: predication. In order to formulate a propositional judgment, we must determine whether a *universal*, which can be described as a mark, a concept, or a rule, can be applied to a *particular* case. This determination constitutes the act of judging, and it is involved in the formulation of any propositional judgment.

The reader might still wonder how the “power of judgment” [*Urtheilskraft*] actually differs from the “capacity to judge” [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*]. We know that there is a difference between these two expressions because Kant defines the entire higher faculty of cognition as the capacity to judge, and the power of judgment is one part of this faculty. I have argued that what Kant terms the “capacity to judge” or the

“faculty of judgment” [*Vermögen zu urtheilen*] denotes the capacity to form a specific type of mental representation; namely, a propositional judgment. I have also argued that propositional judgments are formed through an activity that can be described in terms of the application of rules. For example, in order to form a categorical judgment, we must determine whether the predicate, which functions as a rule, can be applied to the objects that are represented by the judgment’s subject-term. In other words, we must determine whether the objects can be subsumed under the predicate, which is a rule. This determination is made through the power of judgment. However, if propositional judgments are formed through the *power of judgment*, how does this faculty differ from the *capacity to judge*, which is the capacity to form these judgments? I have argued that the former pertains to the activity of judging, while the latter pertains to the representations or cognitions that result from this activity. However, we are distinguishing between two different aspects of the same thing. This does not appear to be a sufficient basis for differentiating between the capacity to judge and the power of judgment.

We need to specify that what Kant terms the “power of judgment” does not just consist in the capacity to apply rules; it is the capacity to do so *correctly*. Propositional judgments are formed through an activity that can be described in several different ways: the comparison of an object or concept with a mark, the subsumption of an object under a concept, and the application of a rule to a particular case. Kant comes to favor the last description because he defines the understanding as a faculty of rules. Every judgment requires us to weigh whether a general rule or concept applies to a particular case. The soundness or verity of the judgment will depend on whether we make this determination

correctly. The power of judgment is the ability to *correctly* recognize whether a particular case is an instance of a rule. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he describes it as a “talent” [*Talent*].⁴⁴ We need this talent in order to form *correct* judgments, but it is not required to formulate judgments in general. Kant claims that some individuals actually lack the power of judgment, or are least deficient in this area. They know and understand rules but they struggle to apply them correctly. Consequently, they possess abstract knowledge but cannot put it to concrete use. Kant writes,

A physician therefore, a judge, or a statesman, can have many fine pathological, juridical, or political rules in his head, of which he can even be a thorough teacher, and yet can easily stumble in their application, either because he is lacking natural power of judgment (though not in understanding), and to be sure understands the universal *in abstracto* but cannot distinguish whether a case *in concreto* belongs under it, or also because he has not received adequate training for this judgment through examples and actual business.⁴⁵

As Kant explains here, if one lacks the power of judgment, then one will not be able to recognize the instances of a general rule and will therefore apply this rule incorrectly.⁴⁶

A person who suffers from this cognitive defect is not incapable of forming propositional judgments. Kant claims that physicians, judges, and statesmen, sometimes lack the power of judgment. This does not mean that they struggle to form propositional judgments, since this would mean that they have difficulty thinking. Kant means that they are pedants, who possess a great deal of abstract or theoretical knowledge but cannot

⁴⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 133/B 172.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, A 134/B 172.

⁴⁶ Kant defines the lack of the power of judgment as “stupidity” [*Dummheit*]. He contrasts it with the lack of understanding, which he describes as having “a dull or limited head” [*ein stumpfer oder eingeschränkter Kopf*]. See *ibid.*, A133/B172. In his *Anthropology*, he describes this problem simply as ignorance. See Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:204. Kant claims that an ignorant person is not actually stupid, since ignorance consists in a lack of knowledge, but stupidity denotes an inability to *apply* this knowledge concretely. Moreover, stupidity is far worse than ignorance, because ignorance can always be ameliorated through education. However, there are no rules or precepts for the power of judgment. It is a talent that can be acquired through practice, but it cannot be taught. Consequently, if one lacks the power of judgment, this problem cannot be redressed through further education. A stupid person will often remain stupid.

apply it concretely. Insofar as one of these individuals misapplies a rule, he will judge incorrectly. However, he is still capable of formulating the judgment itself. He lacks the power of judgment, but not the capacity to judge.

The power of judgment is the capacity to *correctly* apply rules. This thesis is supported by Kant's claims about stupidity, or the lack of the power of judgment. It is also supported by my explanation of the genesis of this faculty in chapter two. I argued that Kant added the power of judgment to the higher faculty of cognition between 1772 and 1775. This faculty also has an antecedent: the healthy understanding. Kant originally described our capacity to apply rules as the "healthy understanding" [*gesunder Verstand*]. He defined this faculty as the correct use of the common understanding. The common understanding [*gemeiner Verstand*] is the capacity for concrete judgment. It is also the capacity to apply rules. Abstract judgments are general rules and these rules are applied to particular cases through concrete judgments. Thus, if we disregard the soundness of our judgments, then rules are applied through the common understanding, i.e. our capacity to judge concretely. The healthy understanding is the *correct* use of the common understanding. Hence, the healthy understanding is not just the capacity to apply rules; it is the capacity to do so correctly. Since the power of judgment assumes the function of the healthy understanding, we can infer that it also denotes the capacity to correctly apply rules.

We can explain the difference between the expressions, *Vermögen zu urtheilen* and *Urtheilskraft*, as follows: Kant defines the higher faculty of cognition in general, or understanding in the broad sense, as the *Vermögen zu urtheilen*, or capacity to judge. It denotes the capacity to conceive of a certain type of mental representation or cognition: a

propositional judgment. The table of judgment enumerates the basic functions of the understanding that are involved in the formation of such a judgment. We employ these functions in every judgment, regardless of whether it is true or false. They are only responsible for producing the logical *form* of a judgment, and have no bearing on its content. In order to form a judgment that is also true or correct, we must accurately assess whether a particular case is an instance of a general rule. In the case of a categorical judgment, this rule is the judgment's predicate. The power of judgment [*Urtheilskraft*] is the ability to correctly recognize the instances of a general concept or rule. Hence, it is the capacity to judge correctly. The activity of judging can be described in two ways. First, it unites representations in the mind or consciousness in an objectively valid way. For this reason, Kant defines judgments, in the metaphysical deduction, as "functions of unity among our representations." The basic mental acts or functions that are involved in this unification are set forth in Kant's table of judgment. Second, the act of judging requires us to determine whether a particular case is an instance of a general rule, or whether the latter can be legitimately applied to the former. The power of judgment is the ability to make this determination correctly.

Thus, the power of judgment consists in one's ability to correctly apply general rules to particular cases. As we know, Kant equates rules with universal cognitions, which means that they can take two possible forms. A rule is either a concept or a universal judgment. If a rule is a mere concept, then it is applied to an object through a categorical judgment. The rule, in this case, is the predicate of the judgment. The power of judgment applies the rule by subsuming an object, which is represented by the subject-term, under the predicate. If a rule is a judgment or proposition, then it is applied to a

particular case through a syllogism. The power of judgment subsumes this case under the condition of the rule.

In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant adds a new aspect to this faculty. He claims that the power of judgment can actually be employed in two different ways. He distinguishes between what he calls the “determining power of judgment” [*bestimmende Urtheilskraft*] and the “reflecting power of judgment [*reflectirende Urtheilskraft*].” The former starts with a universal cognition or rule and applies it to a particular case. It could be described as the deductive use of the power of judgment, since it proceeds from the universal to the particular. Conversely, the reflecting power of judgment employs this faculty inductively. It starts with particular cases and then infers the universal from them. Kant writes,

If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it (even when, as a transcendental power of judgment, it provides the conditions *a priori* in accordance with which alone anything can be subsumed under that universal) is **determining**. If however, only the particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, then the power of judgment is merely **reflecting**.⁴⁷

What Kant now terms the *determining* power of judgment corresponds with his initial definition of the power of judgment in general. He claims that the determining power of judgment subsumes the particular under the universal, which he identifies with “the rule, the principle, the law.” In the first *Critique*, he defines the power of judgment as “the faculty of **subsuming** under rules [*Vermögen unter Regeln zu subsumiren*].”⁴⁸

Likewise in the “First Introduction,” he defines it as “the faculty for the subsumption of

⁴⁷ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5:179.

⁴⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 132/B 171.

the particular under the general.”⁴⁹ Both of these definitions match Kant’s account of the determining power of judgment in the third *Critique*.

Indeed, Kant offers a new definition of the power of judgment in this work, presumably in order to accommodate its reflective use. He writes, “The power of judgment in general is the faculty for thinking of the particular as contained under the universal.”⁵⁰ Rather than stating that the power of judgment *subsumes* the particular under the universal, Kant now claims that the power of judgment *thinks* “of the particular as contained under the universal.” This is significant because Kant’s new definition does not specify whether the universal is applied to the particular or inferred from it. Subsumption entails the application of the universal or rule and it is always deductive. According to the new definition, the power of judgment establishes a relationship between a universal and a particular. This relationship can be established either deductively – by applying the universal to a particular case – or inductively – by inferring the former from the latter.

In his “First Introduction” to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant also distinguishes between the determinate and reflective employment of the power of judgment. However, his definition of this faculty corresponds with the one found in the first *Critique*. I have argued that both of these definitions pertain exclusively to the *determining* power of judgment. Thus, the definition of the power of judgment in general in section II of the “First Introduction” is too narrow to accommodate the reflective use of this faculty.

⁴⁹ Kant, “First Introduction,” 20:201.

⁵⁰ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5:179.

There is an explanation for this discrepancy. In the “First Introduction,” Kant defines the power of judgment in relation to the two other higher cognitive faculties: the understanding and reason. He defines the understanding as the faculty of universal cognition or rules. The power of judgment is the capacity to apply these rules, or to subsume particular cases under them. Reason is the capacity to judge on the basis of a rule. It draws particular judgments or conclusions, which are deduced from more general rules.⁵¹ These definitions correspond almost exactly with notes from Kant’s anthropology lectures. For example, he writes in *Reflexion* 424,

Understanding is the faculty for the cognition of the universal [*Vermögen der Erkenntniß des allgemeinen*], power of judgment of the particular under the universal, reason, of the determination of the particular through the universal. 1. Rule. 2. Subsumption. 3. Inference from the universal to the particular by means of a subsumption.⁵²

Given the close similarity between these notes and Kant’s descriptions of the three higher faculties of cognition in the “First Introduction,” it is plausible, if not likely, that he consulted the former when he wrote the latter. Thus, Kant’s definition of the power of judgment in the “First Introduction” was probably based on his anthropology lectures. This is significant, because these lectures predate Kant’s distinction between the determining power of judgment and the reflective use of this faculty. Kant does not introduce the *reflecting* power of judgment until at least the late 1780s, when he was working on the third *Critique*. I further examine this concept in the final chapter of this

⁵¹ “The systematic representation of the faculty for thinking is tripartite: namely, first the faculty for the cognition of the **general** (of rules), **the understanding**; second, the faculty for the **subsumption of the particular** under the general, **the power of judgment**; and third, the faculty for the **determination** of the particular through the general (for the derivation from principles), i.e., **reason**” (Kant, “First Introduction, 20:201).

⁵² Immanuel Kant, *Reflexionen zur Anthropologie* 424, in *Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-), 15:171. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from 1776-1778. See also idem, *Reflexionen zur Anthropologie* 423, 15:170-171.

dissertation. There I attempt to answer two questions related to the reflecting power of judgment.

Chapter Seven

The Reflecting Power of Judgment

In the previous chapter, I briefly discussed an important innovation of Kant's third *Critique*: the reflecting power of judgment. In the introduction to this work, he distinguishes between the two different ways of employing our power of judgment. It can be exercised either deductively or inductively. Kant refers to the deductive use of the power of judgment as the *determining* power of judgment. The *reflecting* power of judgment denotes the inductive use of this faculty. Rather than applying rules to particular cases, it starts with particular cases and ascends to the universal or rule. In this chapter, I will address two questions regarding the reflecting power of judgment.

The first question concerns its place within Kant's *Logic*. The *Logic* mentions Kant's distinction between the determining and reflecting power of judgment. However, it is not found in the section of the *Logic* that is devoted to judgment, as we might expect. Instead, this topic appears in the following section on inferences. Thus, the *Logic* discusses the reflecting power of judgment in the context of inferences, rather than judgments. I will explain why this is so. I will also explain the significance of the two kinds of inferences that are made through the reflecting power of judgment: induction and analogy. They can both be traced back to Meier's logic.

The second question that I will consider in this chapter concerns the role of the reflecting power of judgment in the formation of empirical concepts. In "First Introduction" to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant argues that concepts are formed through the use of the reflecting power of judgment. However, he does not explain the actual process through which we acquire these concepts. He only claims that

it commits us to the assumption that nature can be classified in terms of genera and species. Kant describes this principle as the purposiveness of nature. Kant's theory of concept formation is among the most misunderstood aspects of his philosophy. In this chapter, I will clarify his position. I will start by revealing the unreliability of what is often considered the *locus classicus* for Kant's views about concept formation: §6 of the *Logic*. The passage from this section that is most often cited by scholars does not correspond with any of Kant's own *Reflexionen*. Hence, it cannot be traced to Kant's pen. For this reason, my account of concept formation eschews the *Logic*. Instead, I turn to the actual notes from Kant's logic lectures, which are more reliable sources.

7.1 Meier's account of induction in the *Vernunftlehre*

The key to understanding the place of the power of judgment in the *Logic* is Kant's account of induction. Moreover, in order to understand his views about induction, we must start with Meier's *Vernunftlehre*. As we will see, Kant's approach to this topic is influenced by Meier's logic. Meier regarded induction as a kind of inference [*Schluß*]. In his *Vernunftlehre*, he draws a distinction between a "formal syllogism" [*formlicher Vernunftschluß*] and what he terms a "hidden syllogism" [*versteckter Vernunftschluß*]. The former is a syllogism that has been placed in the standard form. The latter is a syllogism that does not exhibit this form.¹ Meier then adds that some "hidden syllogisms" are also "mutilated" [*verstümmelt*]. A syllogism is "hidden" if it is not arranged in the standard form of these inferences. It is "mutilated" if one its premises is suppressed. Thus, a so-called "mutilated syllogism" is equivalent to an enthymeme.²

¹ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 591-592, §427. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 108, §399.

² "A **mutilated syllogism** [*verstümmelter Vernunftschluß*] consists in a syllogism, in which not every judgment is thought distinctly. Namely, one can leave out either the major premise, or the minor premise,

Meier defines three specific types of mutilated syllogisms. The first type is a “contracted syllogism” [*zusammengezogener Vernunftschluß*]. This is a syllogism, in which both of its premises have been suppressed. It is reduced to just the syllogism’s conclusion and its middle term. The middle term is the only proof that is cited for the conclusion. For example, the following syllogism is in standard form; it is what Meier terms a “formal syllogism:”

All bodies are divisible
Metal is a body.
∴ Metal is divisible.

We can reduce this syllogism to the proposition, “Metal is divisible because it is a body.” This is an example of a “contracted syllogism.” Both of its premises are suppressed and it appeals only to the syllogism’s middle term.³ A mutilated syllogism in general is an enthymeme. A contracted syllogism is an enthymeme in which both of its premises are suppressed.

As I mentioned earlier, Meier identifies three specific types of mutilated syllogism. The second type that he describes is an “inference by analysis” [*Zergliederungsschluß*]. All inferences by analysis are based on the same rule or principle. This principle states that if a set of concepts are subordinated under a higher one, then what is true of *all* of the lower concepts will also be true of the higher concept.^{4,5} If we attribute the same mark to *all* of the lower concepts, then we can also

or the conclusion by representing it obscurely or at least only somewhat clearly” (Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 593, §428). See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 109, §400.

³ “One can also mutilate a syllogism in such a way that one leaves out both premises and only adds the middle term to the conclusion, so that it ceases to be a conditioned judgment [*es kein bedingtes Urtheil wird*], and this is called a **contracted Syllogism**” (Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 593-594, §428). See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 110, §401.

⁴ “**Inferences of analysis** [*Zergliederungsschlüsse*] are also considered mutilated syllogisms. As a whole, they infer according to the following rule, which I have already proved: What can be affirmed or negated about every lower concept . . . can be universally affirmed or negated about their higher concepts, about

ascribe this mark to the higher one. Likewise, if a certain mark is excluded from *all* of the lower concepts then we can also exclude this same mark from the higher one.

Essential what this means is that what is true of a genus will also be true of its species and vice versa. Hence, if of all of the species of a particular genus are characterized by a certain mark then the genus must be characterized by this mark as well. Meier describes this principle as the major premise [*Obersatz*] of an inference by analysis. In addition to this principle, an inference by analysis consists of a series of judgments about each of the lower concepts, or species. The judgments either attribute a mark to each of these concepts or they exclude this mark from them. On the basis of these judgments about the lower concepts, we relate the same mark, either positively or negatively, to the higher concept. This is the conclusion of an inference by analysis: a judgment about a higher concept, which is inferred from a series of judgments about the lower concepts that are contained under it. Meier offers the following example of an inference by analysis.⁶

What can be affirmed of every lower concept can also be affirmed universally of the higher one.

The sense of sight represents things that are present.

The sense of hearing represents things that are present.

The sense of smell represents things that are present.

The sense of taste represents things that are present.

The sense of touch represents things that are present.

∴ All of the external senses represent things that are present.

As we can see from this example, an inference by analysis is always grounded on the principle that what is true of *all* of the lower concepts will also be true of the higher concept that stands over them. Meier describes it as the major premise of these

their their species or genus [*Art oder Gattung*]” (Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 594, §429). See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 110, §401.

⁵ I explain the meaning of Kant’s distinction between “higher” and “lower” concepts in part one of chapter four. They roughly equivalent to the terms “species” and “genus.”

⁶ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 594, §429.

inferences. However, he also claims that this principle is typically omitted or suppressed. We draw upon it whenever we infer by analysis, but we rarely state it explicitly. Meier writes, “This rule is at the same time the major premise of all inferences by analysis and one leaves it out as an un-provable and familiar judgment.”⁷ Meier claims that an inference by analysis is a type of mutilated syllogism and he defines a mutilated syllogism as a syllogism with a suppressed premise, i.e. an enthymeme. An inference by analysis qualifies as an enthymeme because its major premise, the principle that grounds all inferences of this kind, is typically left unstated, or suppressed.

The third type of mutilated syllogism is an “inference by example” [*Exempelschluß*]. In an inference by example, we relate a mark to a concept, because we have related this same mark to another similar concept, and both of these concepts are subordinated under the same higher concept.⁸ They are both species of the same genus. For example, we judge that whales have hair or fur, because beavers also have fur, and they are both mammals. An inference by example is a mutilated syllogism and mutilated syllogisms are enthymemes. An inference by example qualifies as an enthymeme because Meier thinks that it is actually based on a formal syllogism. The major premise of this syllogism is revised through subalternation and the minor premise is suppressed. Meier illustrates this process with the following example. He writes,

Suppose we have the following syllogism: All finite spirits can sin. The holy angels are finite spirits. Thus, the holy angels can sin. Now if we leave out the minor premise and replace the subject of the major premise with a lower concept,

⁷ Ibid., 594, §429.

⁸ “**Inferences by example** [*Exempelschlüsse*] are also considered mutilated syllogisms, if one infers from one case to another because they are similar to each other, or if one takes a predicate, which one either affirms or denies of a single thing or lower concept, and also affirms or denies it of another single thing or lower concept, because the former belongs with the latter under one species or genus” (ibid., 595, §430). See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 110, §401.

e.g. human beings, then we receive the following inference by example: Human beings can sin; thus, the heavenly angels can also sin.⁹

We can clarify Meier's example a bit by stating all of the premises that underlie his inference by example and placing them in the form of the following argument:

All finite spirits can sin.	(suppressed)
Human beings can sin.	(through subalternation)
The holy angels are finite beings.	(suppressed)
∴ The holy angels can sin.	

When viewed in this way, we can clearly see that a so-called “inference by example” involves two suppressed premises. Consequently, it is an enthymeme, or mutilated syllogism.

To review: Meier distinguishes between formal syllogisms and “hidden syllogisms” [*versteckte Vernunftschlüsse*]. The former are in standard form; the latter are not. Hidden syllogisms can also be “mutilated” [*verstimmt*]. A “mutilated syllogism” is a syllogism with a suppressed premise, i.e. an enthymeme. Meier further distinguishes between three specific types of mutilated syllogisms: “contracted syllogisms” [*zusammengezogener Vernunftschlüsse*], “inferences by analysis” [*Zergliederungsschlüsse*], and “inferences by example” [*Exempelschlüsse*]. The last two types of mutilated syllogisms – inferences by analysis and examples – become the basis for Kant's own explanation of induction.

7.2 Kant's account of induction in his logic lectures

This becomes clear if we examine the notes from his logic lectures. For example, in *Logik Philippi*, Kant repeats Meier's distinction between formal syllogisms and hidden ones. He claims that there are *two* kinds of hidden syllogisms [*ratiocinia cryptica*]: enthymemes and contracted syllogisms [*ratiocinium contractum*]. Kant then describes

⁹ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 595, §430.

two further forms of inference: induction and analogy.¹⁰ These two types of inference correspond with what Meier calls inferences by analysis and by examples. In the *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, the textbook for Kant's logic lectures, Meier identifies inferences by analysis with induction.¹¹ He presumably does this because a so-called "inference by analysis" infers a judgment about a higher concept or genus from judgments about the lower concepts that contained under it, i.e. its species. Hence, it proceeds from the particular to the universal. *Logik Philippi* does not actually define an inference that is based on analogy, but these notes do contain an example of such an inference and it gives a clear indication of what Kant means. *Logik Philippi* states,

If I have an effect and know its cause and see an effect elsewhere, which is similar to it, then I infer that it also has a similar cause. Then I also infer from similar causes to similar effects. Furthermore, if I see that two things agree in most respects, then I judge that they agree completely.¹²

According to Meier, an inference by example relates a mark to a concept because we have related this same mark to another similar concept. In his words, it "infers from one case to another because they are similar to each other."¹³ This description corresponds with Kant's example of an inference that is based on analogy. Thus, Kant teaches that we can draw inferences on the basis of induction and analogy. These two types of inferences correspond with Meier's definitions of inferences by analysis and example. What Kant terms an inference by induction is akin to an inference by analysis. Likewise, an inference by analogy is akin to Meier's inference by example.

However, there is an important difference between Kant's explanation of these inferences and Meier's position in the *Vernunftlehre*. According to Meier, inferences by

¹⁰ Kant, *Logik Philippi*, 24:478.

¹¹ Meier, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 110, §401.

¹² Kant, *Logik Philippi*, 24:478.

¹³ Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 595, §430.

analysis and inferences by example are both types of mutilated syllogisms, or enthymemes. Kant does not adopt this term. Moreover, *Logik Philippi* lists only two species of hidden syllogisms, i.e. syllogisms that are not arranged in standard form: enthymemes and contracted syllogisms. We can conclude from this fact that Kant does not consider inferences that are based on either induction or analogy to be varieties of enthymemes. This is significant, because he thinks that these inferences are merely probable. They lack the necessity or certainty that characterizes deductive syllogisms. Meier does not hold this view. The conclusion of any inference by analysis or by example can be proved deductively. Indeed, according to Meier, these inferences implicitly rely on this deductive reasoning. This is why he considers these inferences to be enthymemes. They are all based on formal syllogisms.

Meier identifies inferences by analysis with induction, but they actually consist of a deductive argument. Every inference by analysis is supposed to be deduced from the principle that what is true of all of the species of a genus will also be true of the genus itself. They are supposed to exhaustively address *all* of the species that fall under a given genus. The principle for these inferences does not pertain to what is true of some, or even most, species. It only allows us to infer from *all* of the species of a genus to the genus itself. Consequently, Meier claims that inferring by analysis is rarely possible. He writes,

It is a pity that one can infer in this way in very few cases because the subject of universal conclusions usually comprehends [*begreifen*] infinitely many things under it, which we are not in the position to specify individually. E.g. All humans must die. All things have a sufficient reason. Who would dare even once to prove these judgments through an exhaustive [*ausführlichen*] inference by analysis?¹⁴

¹⁴ Ibid., 595, §429.

We can only infer by analysis in cases, in which we can identify all of the lower concepts that are subordinated under a higher one. For example, we can infer that our external senses in general represent objects that are present – as opposed to the imagination, which represents objects that are absent – because we have only five external senses. Likewise, if I judge that each of my brothers enjoys spicy food, and I enjoy food of this kind, then I can infer that all McAndrew brothers enjoy spicy food. However, I could not make an analogous inference about the tastes of all Irishmen. I have only two brothers, but there are millions of Irishmen. What this shows is that Meier’s notion of an inference by analysis does not correspond with the typical understanding of induction.

In any case, Kant breaks with Meier and accepts a more conventional notion of induction that is merely probabilistic. *Logik Philippi* states, “Although all syllogisms consist in this: that one infers from the universal to the particular, one also infers in empirical cognition [*Erfahrungserkenntnissen*] from the particular to the universal (although of course not with all of the strictness). This kind of inference is called induction.”¹⁵ These notes go on to acknowledge the inherent fallibility of induction. They state, “One always only infers suppositionally [*mit Vermuthung*] from the particular to the universal.”¹⁶

Logik Philippi is thought to date from beginning of the 1770s. We find a similar account of analogy and induction in *Logik Blomberg*, which also belongs to this same period. Like *Logik Philippi*, it repeats Meier’s distinction between formal syllogisms and hidden ones. It also identifies two types of hidden syllogisms, i.e. syllogisms that are not in standard form: enthymemes and contracted syllogism. *Logik Blomberg* then turns to

¹⁵ Kant, *Logik Philippi*, 24:478.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 24:478.

analogy and induction. These notes state, “Also included here is *induction*, which is particularly noteworthy. The rule of reason in the case of apodictic certainty in inferences always goes from the *universal* to the *particular*. There are inferences, nonetheless, where we infer from the particular to the universal.”¹⁷ When Kant claims that induction is “also included here” he is presumably referring to his textbook, Meier’s *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*. Meier distinguishes between three types of mutilated syllogisms, or enthymemes: contracted syllogisms, inferences by analysis, and inferences by example. As I explained earlier, the last two inferences correspond with what Kant describes as inferences based on induction and analogy.

Logik Blomberg adds one important detail to Kant’s theory of induction, which is not included in *Logik Philippi*. It explains that inferences based on analogy are a form of induction. These notes state the following:

2nd, as for what concerns inference according to an analogy, this is nothing other than induction, only an induction in respect of the predicate. When, namely, 2 things have come together in respect of all attributes that I have been able to cognize in them, then they will also come together in the remaining attributes, which I have not cognized in them, thus runs the inference in regard to *analogy*.¹⁸

According to Kant, an inference that is based on induction concerns the members of a set or class, or the species of a genus. We infer that what is true of some of these members is actually true of all of them. Hence, we proceed from the particular members to the class as a whole, or from the species to their common genus. This could be described as Kant’s primary understanding of induction. It reflects the influence of Meier, who taught that a so-called “inference by analysis” is based on the principle that what is true of *all* of the lower concepts that are subordinated under a higher one must also be true of the

¹⁷ Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, 24:287.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 24:287.

higher concept itself. However, Kant recognizes that an inference based on analogy also involves induction. In an inference based on analogy, we start with two things or concepts that share some of the same marks. Based on their similarity, we infer that *all* of their marks are the same. This is a case of induction because we draw an inference from *some* of a thing's marks to *all* of them; namely, that they are all shared by another similar thing or concept. For this reason, *Logik Blomberg* describes an inference based on analogy as an "induction in respect of the predicate." It concerns the marks or predicates of a concept or object.

Thus, Kant distinguishes between two kinds of inductive inference: inferences that are based on induction and inferences that are based analogy. The former concerns the members of a set or class. It infers from some of these members to all of them. The latter concerns the marks that define a concept or object. Some of these marks are shared by another similar concept. We infer that all of them are shared by this concept. Kant's distinction between these two forms of induction is modeled on Meier's definitions of inference by analysis and by example, and it occupies a corresponding place in his logic lectures. However, as I explained, there is a crucial difference between Kant and Meier in regards to this topic. According to Meier, inferences by analysis and by example are both enthymemes, or what he describes as "mutilated syllogisms." This is because they are based on formal syllogisms. Consequently, even an inference by analysis, which Meier associates with induction, is derivable from a deductive argument. If we stated all of the premises, which are implicitly thought in such an inference, then we would have a complete proof that starts with the principle that what is true of *all* of the lower concepts that are subordinated under a higher one will also be true of the higher concept. Thus,

neither inferences by analysis nor inferences by examples actually involve induction. They are deductive arguments with suppressed premises, which is why Meier classifies them as enthymemes. Kant, on the other hand, regards inferences based on induction and analogy as cases of true induction. He takes these concepts from Meier, renames them, and sheds their grounding in deductive reasoning. He writes in one of his *Reflexionen zur Logik*, “Every syllogism must give necessity. Therefore induction and analogy are not syllogisms, but rather presumptions [*praesumptionen*].”¹⁹ Unlike Meier, Kant does not regard inductive inferences as syllogisms, not even as so-called “mutilated” ones, or enthymemes.

Logik Blomberg and *Logik Philippi* both date from the early 1770s. If we turn to the notes from Kant’s logic lectures during the 1780s – *Logik Pölitz*, *Logik Busolt*, the *Wiener Logik*, and *Logik Hechsel* – we find essentially the same account of induction and analogy. For example, *Logik Pölitz* states,

Now we still have 2 kinds of inferences, which do not actually belong to logic, but cannot be conveniently affixed elsewhere; namely, an inference by induction [*per inductionem*], where we infer: what belongs to many things, which belong to one genus, belongs to all of the rest, which belong to this genus . . . The 2nd kind of inference is the [inference] by analogy [*per analogiam*]: if 2 or more things of one genus agree in so many marks, which I have been able to discover, then I infer that they also agree in all of other marks, which I do not know.²⁰

We possess one set of student notes from the 1790s: the manuscript known as *Logik Dohna-Wundlacken*. These notes present a slightly different account of induction and analogy than we find in Kant’s earlier lectures.

7.3 Inferences of the power of judgment

¹⁹ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3276, 16:755.

²⁰ Kant, *Logik Pölitz*, 24:594. See also idem, *Logik Busolt*, 24:679-680; idem, *Heschel Logic*, 408-409.

Logik Dohna-Wundlacken classifies induction and analogy as “inferences of the power of judgment” [*Schlüsse der Urteilskraft*]. These notes distinguish between three types of inference: inferences of the understanding, inferences of reason, and inferences of the power of judgment. Inferences of the understanding are equivalent to what we typically describe as *immediate* inferences, e.g. obversion, conversion, inversion, and contraposition. They consist of just two concepts: the subject and predicate terms of a categorical judgment. An inference of the understanding infers or derives one judgment from another without appealing to any additional concepts. The subject and predicate terms alone are sufficient to make such inferences. An inference of reason [*Vernunftschluß*] is a mediate inference or syllogism. It differs from an inference of the understanding in that it requires an additional concept to infer one judgment from another. This concept is the syllogism’s middle term. Kant had already explained this distinction between immediate inferences and mediate ones, or inferences of the understanding and of reason, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He writes,

If the inferred judgment already lies in the first one, so that it can be derived from it without the mediation of a third representation, then this is called an “immediate inference” (*consequential immediate*); I would rather call it an *inference of the understanding*. But if, in addition to the cognition that serves as a ground, yet another judgment is necessary to effect the conclusion, then the inference is called an *inference of reason* [*Vernunftschluß*].²¹

Kant’s distinction between inferences of the understanding and inferences of reason also appears in his logic lectures, dating back to at least the early 1770s.²² *Logik Dohna-Wundlacken* adds a third type of inference: inferences of the power of judgment. An

²¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 303/B 360. My italics. I have slightly modified Guyer and Woods’ translation. For the sake of clarity, I have rendered the term *Vernunftschluß* literally as an “inference of reason.”

²² See e.g., Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, 24:280-281; idem, *Logik Philippi*, 24:469-470; idem, *Logik Pöhlitz*, 24:583; idem, *Logik Busolt*, 24:670; idem, *Hechsel Logic*, 383-384.

inference of the power of judgment is one that ascends from the particular to the universal.

These notes define the three types of inferences as follows: “An inference of reason is the consequence of one inference of the understanding from another through a *judicium intermedium*. Inferences of the understanding infer from the universal to the particular, inferences of the power of judgment from the particular to the universal.”²³ According to this passage, an inference of the understanding always infers “from the universal to the particular.” This is not technically true, at least if an inference of the understanding remains equivalent to an immediate inference. For example, subcontraries infer between particular judgments, e.g. a judgment of the form “Some *S* is *P*” entails the judgment “Some *S* is not *P*.” It is possible that either Kant or the author of these notes – we must always remember that they are not the same – is equating inferences of the understanding with propositional judgments. This would explain the otherwise puzzling assertion that an inference of reason or syllogism is “the consequence of one inference of the understanding from another through a *judicium intermedium*.” A syllogism consists of three propositional judgments. It derives the conclusion from the major premise by means of the minor premise, which can be described as a “*judicium intermedium*,” or intermediate judgment, for this reason. In any case, the real significance of this passage lies in the fact that it posits a third type of inference: an inference of the power of judgment. It defines such an inference as one that proceeds inductively “from the particular to the universal.”

Kant offers a far more complete account of this new type of inference in his own lecture notes. One of his *Reflexionen zur Logik* (3200) defines all three inferences. Kant

²³ Kant, *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*, 24:771.

first explains that inferences of the understanding are determining judgments [*bestimmende Urtheile*], i.e. judgments that are formed through the determining power of judgment. He writes, “Inferences of the understanding ([later addition] are immediate inferences) infer from the universal to the particular, or from the particular to the particular ([later addition] but immediately), but never from the particular to the universal, because they should give determining judgments.”²⁴ As this passage shows, Kant continues to maintain that inferences of the understanding are *immediate* inferences. His subsequent emendations to this note, which Erich Adickes, the editor of Kant’s *Handschriftlicher Nachlass*, sets off in parentheses, both underscore this fact. Kant also claims that inferences of the understanding are determining judgments. His reasoning seems to be that these inferences are deductive in nature. They either “infer from the universal to the particular, or from the particular to the particular.” In this case, the terms “universal” and “particular” denote the logical quantity of propositional judgments. Inferences of the understanding can derive particular judgments from universal ones. For example, we can infer judgments of the form “Some *P* is *S*” from the judgment “All *S* is *P*.” This is an example of conversion by limitation. Inferences of the understanding can also derive particular judgments from other particular ones. For example, we can infer judgments of the form “Some *S* is not non-*P*” from the judgment “Some *S* is *P*.” This is an example of obversion. Kant denies that inferences of the understanding can derive universal judgments from particular ones. The traditional square of opposition does not allow inferences from particular judgments to universal ones. We often regard determining judgments or reflecting judgments as propositional judgments. For example,

²⁴ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 3200, 16:709. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from 1780-1789. He estimates that the emendations to this note date from 1790-1804.

both pure aesthetic judgments and teleological judgments are reflecting judgments and these judgments can both be expressed in the form of a proposition, e.g. the forest is beautiful. However, in this case, what Kant describes as a determining judgment is actually an immediate inference between two propositional judgments. He describes it in these terms because it is based on deductive reasoning. This is presumably the same point that the author of *Logik Dohna-Wundlacken* was attempting to make when he wrote, incorrectly, that an inference of the understanding always infers “from the universal to the particular.”

If we read further from this same *Reflexion*, Kant next claims that inferences of the power of judgment ascend from the particular to the universal and that consequently they are *reflecting* judgments. He writes,

Inferences of the power of judgment go from the particular to the ([later addition] empirical) universal ([later addition] are ways of progressing from the individual [*individuis*] to the general [*generibus*]), from some things, which belong to a certain species [*Art*], to all of them, or from some properties, in which things of the same species agree, to the rest of them, insofar as they belong to the same principle. They are nothing but ways of coming from particular concepts to universal ones; thus, of the reflecting ([later addition] not determining) power of judgment; therefore not ways of determining the object, but rather only the manner of reflection about the object, in order to arrive at knowledge [*Kenntnis*] of it. ([later addition] are inferences to arrive at provisional, not determining judgments. – Analogy and Induction.)²⁵

Once again, the terms “particular” and “universal” denote the logical quantity of a propositional judgment. An inference of the power of judgment derives a universal judgment from a particular one. For this reason, Kant claims that inferences of this kind are formed through the *reflecting* power of judgment. The reflecting power of judgment consists in the capacity to employ this faculty inductively, i.e. to infer the universal from the particular rather than subsuming the particular under the universal. Kant further

²⁵ Ibid., 16:709.

states that inferences of the power of judgment infer either “from some things, which belong to a certain species, to all of them, or from some properties, in which things of the same species agree, to the rest of them.” Here he is describing the two forms of inductive inference that he defines in his logic lectures; namely, inferences that are based on induction and on analogy. As I explained earlier, an inference by induction concerns the members of a set or class. It infers that what is true of some of these members is actually true of all of them. This is presumably what Kant means when he writes that we infer “from some things, which belong to a certain species, to all of them.” An inference by analogy concerns the marks that define a concept or object. Some of these marks are shared by another similar concept. We infer that all of them are shared by this concept. This is what Kant means when he writes that we infer “from some properties, in which things of the same species agree, to the rest of them.” Thus, induction and analogy are both inferences of the power of judgment. This is confirmed by the fact that Kant mentions “Analogy and Induction” in one of the additional remarks that he inserted into this note. If we return our attention to *Logik Dohna-Wundlacken*, these notes also state that analogy and induction are inferences of the power of judgment.²⁶

Thus, Kant defines an inference of the power of judgment as an inductive inference – it always infers from the particular to the universal – that is formed through the *reflecting* power of judgment. These inferences can take two possible forms: they are either based on induction or analogy.

²⁶ “*Analogy and induction* are inferences of the power of judgment . . . An inference of [induction] is when I infer from some things that belong to a species to all the things of the species, that it belongs to all the others . . . According to the inference by analogy, if 2 things agree under as many determination as I have become acquainted with, then I infer that they agree also in the other determinations. I infer, then, from some determinations, which I cognize, that the others belong to the thing too” (Kant, *Logik Dohna-Wundlacken*, 24:772).

The student notes from Kant's logic lectures show that induction was among the topics that he covered in these lectures. Like Meier, he regards induction as a kind of inference. In the *Vernunftlehre*, Meier addresses induction in his chapter on syllogistics. He actually explains it as a kind of enthymematic syllogism. Although Kant does not share this view – he denies that inductive inferences are syllogisms – he agrees that induction is a kind of inference. For this reason, he includes this topic in his account of syllogistics. It typically follows his explanation of enthymemes and precedes his discussion of paralogisms. In *Logik Dohna-Wundlacken*, Kant describes inductive inferences as “inferences of the power of judgment.” He contrasts them with inferences of the understanding and inferences of reason. The former are immediate inferences; the latter are mediate ones, or syllogisms. Thus, Kant distinguishes between three basic types of inferences – immediate, mediate, and inductive – and he identifies them with the three higher faculties of cognition – the understanding, reason, and the power of judgment. It is not difficult to guess why Kant describes inductive inferences in this new way in *Logik Dohna-Wundlacken*. These notes are based on lectures that Kant delivered during early 1790s. He wants to take into account his third *Critique*, which was first published in 1790. Kant had discussed inductive inferences in his logic lectures since at least the early 1770s. In *Dohna-Wundlacken*, he adds that these inferences are based on the reflecting power of judgment.

This actually fits well with his existing account of mediate inferences. As we know from chapter six, Kant claims that all three of our higher faculties of cognition, including the power of judgment, are involved in syllogistic reasoning. The understanding formulates a general rule, the power of judgment applies this rule to a

particular case, and reason draws a conclusion about this case on the basis of the rule.

Rules are applied deductively through the *determining* power of judgment. Thus, mediate inferences, or syllogisms, involve the determining power of judgment. Inductive inferences are based on the reflecting power of judgment.

We are now in a position to answer the first question that I posed in the introduction to this chapter: why does Kant's *Logic* address his distinction between the determining power of judgment and the reflecting power of judgment in the section devoted to inferences, rather than in the section on judgment? The answer to this question is rather simple: the distinction is part of his account of induction. After the third *Critique*, Kant describes inductive inferences as "inferences of the power of judgment." Just as mediate inferences, or syllogisms, involve the determining power of judgment, inductive inferences are made through the reflecting power of judgment. The *Logic* identifies two specific types of inductive inference that can be made by this faculty: induction and analogy. We now know that these inferences were always part of Kant's account of induction. He borrowed these concepts from Meier's logic. Kant's definitions of induction and analogy roughly correspond with Meier's inferences by analysis and by example. Thus, Jäsche addresses the reflecting power of judgment in the section of the *Logic*, which is devoted to inferences, because this is where Kant had always located his account of induction. Moreover, Kant's treatment of this topic is influenced by Meier's *Vernunftlehre*. Meier is the source for Kant's distinction between induction and analogy.

7.4 Kant's theory of concept formation

In the “First Introduction” to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant claims that one of the main functions of the reflecting power of judgment is the formation of empirical concepts. The determining power of judgment applies concepts to appearances. Its counterpart, the reflecting power of judgment, is responsible for forming these concepts. Kant initially defines the reflecting power of judgment with this specific function in mind. He describes it as “a mere faculty for **reflecting** on a given representation, in accordance with a certain principle, for the sake of a concept that is thereby made possible.”²⁷ In other words, the power of judgment reflects on given representations for the purpose of forming new concepts. These concepts are “made possible” by this reflection.

In the definition above, Kant specifies that the reflection, which gives rise to new concepts, is performed “in accordance with a certain principle.” This is important because Kant argues in the third *Critique* that the power of judgment has its own *a priori* principle. He does not mean the principles of pure understanding. These principles prescribe how the categories are applied to our pure intuition of time as transcendental time-determinations, or rules for relating representations temporally. They govern all synthetic judgments. However, Kant attributes these principles to the understanding (presumably, in the broad sense) because they are based on the categories. He argues that the power of judgment is the source of an additional *a priori* principle that pertains specifically to its inductive use: the purposiveness of nature. This principle presumes that there is a systematic order within nature, which can be classified in terms of genera and species. Kant argues in the “First Introduction” that the formation of empirical concepts

²⁷ Kant, “First Introduction,” 20:211.

requires this principle.²⁸ It is why he stipulates in his definition of the reflecting power of judgment that our reflection accords with a “certain principle.” The principle in question is the purposiveness of nature.

Kant’s argument for why this principle is required to form concepts is generally well-understood. The manner in which we form concepts establishes a hierarchy among them. I will subsequently explain Kant’s theory of empirical concept formation in some detail. However, in order to understand his reasoning in the “First Introduction,” we only need to know that empirical concepts are derived from other representations: either intuitions or other concepts. A concept represents the common features or marks that are shared by the original representations that it is derived from. This method of concept formation results in a hierarchy that ascends from intuitions, which are singular representations of individuals, to the most general concept possible: the concept of a generic object. Consequently, our concepts can be organized in terms of species and genera. Lower concepts or species are subordinated under higher concepts or genera. As I mentioned, this arrangement is simply a consequence of our method for forming concepts. Kant points out that the fact that nature lends itself to being classified in this way is utterly contingent. It is actually conceivable that nature might exhibit such a wide diversity that we could not easily discover common marks or properties. We can imagine a world composed entirely of individuals that could not be classified into common species or genera. In such a world, it would be impossible for us to form empirical

²⁸ In the published introduction to the third *Critique*, Kant offers a slightly different deduction of this same principle. He argues that *the discovery of empirical laws* presupposes the purposiveness of nature. See Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5:183-186.

concepts.²⁹ Hence, our very method for forming concepts presupposes that nature can be classified in terms of species and genera. Kant describes this order within nature as “purposive” [*zweckmäßig*] because it is suitable for our understanding. It is as if nature were deliberately organized in a way that we can comprehend. There is no reason to suspect that nature is actually ordered in this way for our benefit. Kant’s point is that our method for forming concepts presupposes that this kind of order exists within nature, and that it can be systematically classified in terms of species and genera. For this reason, empirical concept formation, which is a function of the reflecting power of judgment, requires the principle of the purposiveness of nature. We cannot form empirical concepts without implicitly assuming that nature is organized in this way.

Although Kant’s deduction of this principle in the “First Introduction” is well-understood, his views about empirical concept formation are not. He does not address this topic in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and it is only briefly discussed in the introductions to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Kant argues that empirical concept formation presupposes the purposiveness of nature, but he does not explain how these concepts are actually formed. The *locus classicus* for Kant’s views about concept formation is generally regarded to be §6 of his *Logic*. However, there are strong reasons to be suspicious of this text in general – I discuss these reasons in the introduction to this dissertation – and its account of concept formation in particular.

7.4.1 Jäsche’s account of concept formation

²⁹ “For it is open to question how one could hope to arrive at empirical concepts of that which is common to the different natural forms through the comparison of perceptions, if, on account of the great diversity of its empirical laws, nature (as it is quite possible to think) has imposed on these natural forms such a great diversity that all or at least most comparison would be useless for producing consensus and a hierarchical order of species and genera under it” (Kant, “First Introduction,” 20:213).

The problem is that §6 only partially corresponds with Kant's own *Reflexionen*. It will be easier to explain why this passage is so problematic if I first reproduce it here.

Jäsche writes,

The logical *actus* of the understanding [*logischen Verstandes-Actus*], through which concepts are generated as to their form, are:

1. *comparison* of representations among one another in relation to the unity of consciousness;
2. *reflection* as to how various representations can be conceived in one consciousness; and finally
3. *abstraction* of everything else in which the given representations differ.

Note 1. To make concepts out of representations one must thus be able *to compare, to reflect, and to abstract*, for these three logical operations of the understanding are the essential and universal conditions for generation of every concept whatsoever. I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and a linden. By first comparing these objects with one another I note that they are different from one another in regard to the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.; but next I reflect on that which they have in common among themselves, trunk, branches, and leaves themselves, and I abstract the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I acquire a concept of a tree.³⁰

As we can see from this passage, §6 can be divided into two parts. Jäsche first offers a brief explanation of the process through which concepts are formed. This is followed by three much longer *Anmerkungen* or remarks. I have only included the first of these three remarks (Note 1) here.

The first part of §6 is based on two *Reflexionen*: *Reflexion* 2876 and *Reflexion* 2878. A brief comparison of these two fragments with the text of the *Logic* leaves no doubt that they were Jäsche's source for this passage.³¹ The main text of §6, i.e. its first

³⁰ Kant, *Jäsche Logic*, 9:94-95, §6,

³¹ Kant writes in *Reflexion* 2876, "Logical origin of concepts: 1. through comparison: how they are related to each other in one consciousness . . . 2. through reflection (with the same consciousness): how various [representations] can be conceived [*begriffen*] in one consciousness . . . 3. through abstraction: since one leaves out their differences" (Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 2876, 16:555). Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from between 1776 and 1778.

Kant writes in *Reflexion* 2878, "reflecting means: to become progressively conscious of the representation [*sich nach und nach der Vorstellungen bewusst werden*], i.e. to hold them together with one consciousness. Comparing [means]: to compare them among one another, i.e. to hold them together with

part, is based primarily on *Reflexion* 2876. Jäsche combines it with *Reflexion* 2878 by inserting a number of phrases that he draws from the latter. For example, in 2876, Kant explains that comparison is concerned with “how they [representations] are related to each other in one consciousness.”³² In 2878 he writes, “Comparing [means]: to compare them [representations] among one another, i.e. to hold them together with the unity of consciousness.”³³ Jäsche combines these two propositions. He writes, “comparison of representations among one another in relation to the unity of consciousness.”³⁴ It is worth pointing out that Jäsche’s interpolation actually obscures the meaning of Kant’s notes. We know what it means to say that comparison is concerned with the relation between representations within consciousness. We can also explain what it means to “hold” representations “together with the unity of consciousness.” Presumably, Kant means that we think about, or contemplate, these representations simultaneously. Jäsche combines these two relatively straightforward propositions into one that is unnecessarily cryptic.

In any case, most scholars have ignored Jäsche’s initial explanation of concept formation in the main text of §6.³⁵ Instead, they favor the remarks that follow the main

the unity of consciousness” (Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 2878, 16:556. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from between 1776 and 1789.

³² Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 2876, 16:555.

³³ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 2878, 16:556.

³⁴ Kant, *Jäsche Logic*, 9:94, §6.

³⁵ Rudolf Makkreel is a notable exception. In his essay, “Reflection, Reflective Judgment, and Aesthetic Exemplarity,” Makkreel actually addresses the main text of §6. This is significant because it is the portion of the text that corresponds with Kant’s notes. He also quotes from *Reflexion* 2878, which is one of the two fragments that Jäsche drew upon for §6. Makkreel emphasizes that the kind of reflection, which is involved in concept formation, falls within the purview of *general* logic. See Rudolf Makkreel, “Reflection, Reflective Judgment, and Aesthetic,” in *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy*, ed. Rebecca Kukla (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 225-226. Kant is very clear that general logic can only teach us how concepts acquire their generality or *form*. It does not address the source of their content or *matter*. This is a topic that belongs to metaphysics, not general logic. In other words, logic can teach us how we transform intuitions, which are singular representations, into general representations, i.e. concepts. However, it does not explain how we receive these intuitions to

text. Here Jäsche offers a much clearer exposition of the three logical acts that are supposedly involved in concept formation: comparison, reflection, and abstraction. He even provides an example of this process. However, these remarks do not correspond with any of Kant's *Reflexionen*. There are actually only two *Reflexionen* in Kant's entire *Nachlass* that explain concept formation in terms of comparison, reflection, and abstraction: *Reflexion* 2854 and *Reflexion* 2876.³⁶ Neither of these notes matches Jäsche's straightforward explanations of the three logical acts in his remarks. According to Jäsche, we compare representations to identify their differences and we reflect on them to recognize their similarities. According to *Reflexion* 2876, the purpose of comparison is to determine how representations "are related to each other in one consciousness." Reflection determines how these representations "can be conceived [*begriffen*] in one consciousness."³⁷ *Reflexion* 2854 – the other note that explains concept formation in terms of three logical acts – is even more oblique. Comparison is the means by which we form "the representation of a mark." Reflection makes this "representation of a mark" into the "ground of the cognition of a thing" [*Erkenntnisgrund eines Dinges*]. The only point of agreement between these two *Reflexionen* and Jäsche's account concerns

begin with. Makkreel emphasizes this fact because it distinguishes the reflection, which is involved in concept formation, from *transcendental* reflection, which Kant discusses in the amphiboly chapter. The former falls under general logic; the latter is a subject for transcendental logic. Transcendental reflection concerns the *source* of our representations. It assesses whether a representation arises from sensibility or belongs to the understanding. This reflection is necessary if we are to avoid the subreptic fallacy, which Kant first cautions against in his *Inaugural Dissertation*, and which is the subject of the amphiboly chapter. Consequently, transcendental reflection cannot belong to general logic. Kant explicitly denies that general logic addresses the source of our representations; it only considers their form. Therefore, transcendental reflection must fall within the purview of transcendental logic, which, unlike general logic, takes the matter of our cognition into account. Transcendental logic only abstracts from the *empirical* content of cognition, but considers its *a priori* content.

³⁶ I have already quoted from *Reflexion* 2878. It is one of the two notes that served as the basis for the main text of §6. See n. 31. *Reflexion* 2854 states, "Logical acts [*actus*] in the concept: firstly, the representation of a mark [*nota*] as a common comparison [*communis comparatio*]. Second, that [representation] as ground of the cognition of a thing: reflection [*reflexio*]. Third, the abstraction of that which distinguishes it from other things" (Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 2854, 16:547).

³⁷ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 2876, 16:555.

abstraction. They all agree that we disregard the differences between various representations through abstraction. Thus, Jäsche's explanation of the three logical acts of the understanding, which are involved in concept formation, does not correspond with any of Kant's own notes. I want to underscore this last point. There are just two *Reflexionen* (2854 and 2876) in Kant's *Nachlass* that mention comparison, reflection, and abstraction. Neither of them supports Jäsche's account of comparison and reflection in the remarks to §6.

This means that the passage from §6 that is most-often cited by scholars – the remarks – cannot be traced back to Kant's own pen. The only portion of this text that corresponds with his *Reflexionen* is the part that is generally ignored by scholars: the difficult main text. This is unfortunate because the remarks are far more lucid than the main text of this section. However, the views expressed in the remarks cannot be attributed to Kant. If we want to understand his views about concept formation then we must look to the notes from his logic lectures – both Kant's own *Reflexionen* and the notes from his students.

7.4.2 Meier's theory of concept formation

We have seen in this dissertation that many of Kant views about logic were adopted from, or at least influenced, by Meier. For example, his distinction between the two types of inductive inference, induction and analogy, come from Meier. The same is true of his theory of concept formation. It is modeled on Meier's account of this topic in the *Vernunftlehre*. Hence, if we want to understand Kant's views about empirical concept formation, then we must disregard Jäsche and the *Logic*, and start with Meier.

According to Meier, there are three basic methods for forming concepts; they are acquired through experience, abstraction, and what he terms “free association” [*willkürliche Verbindung*].³⁸ Meier is committed to the view that all concepts originate in experience, a position shared by Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten. We first acquire concepts through experience. These concepts from experience [*Erfahrungsbegriffen*] serve as the material for any further concepts that we might form. The latter are obtained from the former through the processes of abstraction and free association. In the *Vernunftlehre*, Meier offers a very broad definition of a concept. He writes, “Through a concept we understand, any representation or cognition of a thing [*Sache*] in a thing [*Dinge*], which possess the capacity to think.”³⁹ In other words, a concept is a mental representation.⁴⁰ This definition includes sensations, which are a kind of representation. Hence, sensations, according to Meier, are a type of concept.⁴¹ Since they are concepts, the apprehension of sensations qualifies as a method for forming concepts. We acquire these concepts directly from experience.

The other two methods – abstraction and free association – derive new concepts from existing ones. Free association, for Meier, simply means combining two concepts to form a new one. The only limit placed on this combination is that the concepts must

³⁸ “We have only three ways to arrive at concepts: experience, abstraction, and free association” (Meier, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 70, §254). See also idem, *Vernunftlehre*, 415-416, §287.

³⁹ Ibid. 409, §282. See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 69, §249.

⁴⁰ Wolff also defines concepts in this way in his *Deutsche Logik*: “I call **a concept** any representation of thing in our thoughts.” See Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit*, 123, §4, c. 1.

⁴¹ “Experience is the very first way through which we acquire concepts of things. In childhood, the senses are the first, among all of the cognitive faculties, to be actualized. Therefore, sensations, among all concepts, are the first concepts that we receive, and by means of which we little by little obtain all the rest. Through sensations we understanding concepts of actual and present things, and the capacity to sense is called sense” (Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 416, §288). See also idem, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 70, §255.

be compatible with each other.⁴² Meier understands abstraction as the act of removing or separating [*absondern*] something. We form abstract concepts by identifying both the similarities and the differences among a group of existing representations or concepts. We then abstract or disregard the differences, leaving only their similarities. This proves to be the most influential aspect of Meier's theory of concept formation. Hence, it is worth examining in more detail.

According to Meier, we form abstract concepts by comparing existing concepts with each other. These notions must share at least some of the same marks. If they are completely dissimilar, no further concepts can be abstracted from them. We then analyze each of these concepts. In doing so, we identify the marks that they share in common as well as those that they do not share, i.e. the marks that distinguish them. We abstract the latter, which means that we disregard them. I explained earlier that to abstract something means to remove or separate it. We separate the distinguishing marks from the common ones by deliberately ignoring the former.⁴³ Meier explains that we "obscure" [*verdunkeln*] these differences, or exclude them from our consciousness.⁴⁴ This leaves only the marks that the concepts happen to share in common. These shared

⁴² "A concept is made through the **scholarly free association**, if one represents two concepts as one, and one has cognized in a scholarly way that they are not contrary to each other" (Meier, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 73-74, §266). See also idem, *Vernunftlehre*, 439, §299.

⁴³ Kant also understands abstraction in this way. In *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Kant explains that abstraction [*abstrahieren*] consists in the deliberate withdrawal of one's attention. He writes, "The endeavor to become conscious of one's representations is either the *paying attention to* (*attentio*) or the *turning away from* an idea of which I am conscious (*abstractio*)" (Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:131). In other words, we intentionally ignore something or exclude it from our consciousness. Kant compares abstraction with distraction [*Zerstreuung*]. In both cases, our attention is diverted away from something. However, distraction is unintentional; abstraction ignores something deliberately. See *ibid.*, 7:131

⁴⁴ "One obscures [*verdunkelt*] the different marks, or separates [*absondere*] them by means of abstraction" (Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 427, §292).

marks are then combined to form a new concept.⁴⁵ This process can be summarized as follow: we compare several concepts and identify both their similarities and differences. We then abstract the differences, leaving only the marks that they share. These shared marks are finally combined into a new concept, one that is a general representation of the original concepts or representations that it was abstracted from.

7.4.3 *Logik Philippi*

Meier's theory of concept formation becomes the model for Kant's own explanation of this topic in his logic lectures. However, Kant cannot adopt it entirely. One of Meier's three methods for acquiring concept, experience, is not compatible with Kant's own distinction between intuitions and concepts. Meier taught that we acquire our first concepts directly from experience because he considered sensations to be a kind of concept. Hence, according to him, we can receive some concepts directly through the senses. Kant cannot accept this position because, beginning with his *Inaugural Dissertation*, he draws a strong distinction between intuitions and concepts. He argues that the intuitions are *singular* representations and that concepts are *general* or *universal* ones.⁴⁶ One consequence of this distinction is that we cannot receive concepts through the senses. All concepts must be actively formed by the understanding. I discuss this idea in more detail in chapter three. It is the basis for Kant's assertion in the metaphysical deduction that concepts are "grounded on the spontaneity of thinking" and that they rest on the functions of the understanding rather than the affections of

⁴⁵ "We make a concept through logical abstraction [*logische Absonderung*], if we compare corresponding concepts [*übereinstimmende Begriffe*] of different thing, and only distinctly represent the marks that they have in common with each other. To this end, 1) one takes several concepts, which are different and similar at the same time. E.g. a rational and a non-rational animal; 2.) one analyzes each of the concepts; 3.) one abstracts the different marks in them, or one obscures them; 4) one combines the remaining marks in a concept, e.g. an animal" (Meier, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 71, §259). See also idem, *Vernunftlehre*, 426-428, §292.

⁴⁶ Kant, *Inaugural Dissertation*, 2:396.

sensibility.⁴⁷ In any case, it means that Kant cannot accept one of Meier's three methods for forming concepts: their acquisition directly from experience.

In *Logik Philippi*, which is based on lectures that Kant delivered in the years immediately following the defense of his *Inaugural Dissertation*, he adapts Meier's theory of concept formation to fit his new distinction between intuitions and concepts. As I have explained, Meier taught that there were three basic methods for forming concepts: experience, abstraction, and free association. Kant cannot accept the first method, experience. Hence, in *Logik Philippi*, he teaches that there are actually just two methods for forming concepts. Concepts are either given or made.⁴⁸ He describes concepts that are made as "fabricated concepts" [*erdichtete Begriffe*] and subsequently explains in a later section that they are formed through the processes of free association [*willkürliche Verbindung*] and free separation [*willkürliche Trennung*].⁴⁹ Concepts that are given have two possible sources. They are either given through experience or pure reason.⁵⁰ Thus, Kant first divides concepts into two basic classes: those that are given and those that are fabricated through free association and separation. He then distinguishes between those concepts that are given through experience and those that are given through pure reason. He refers to the former as abstract concepts and the latter as rational ones.

⁴⁷ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 68/B 93.

⁴⁸ "All concepts are either

1. given, or

2. the understanding made them through connection itself. These are fabricated concepts [*erdichtete Begriffe*]" (Kant, *Logik Philippi*, 24:452).

⁴⁹ "All fabrications arise either through free association of what is separated in experience, or through free separation of what is connected in experience" (ibid., 24:453).

⁵⁰ The given [concepts] are either given through experience *a posteriori* or also *a priori* through pure reason" (ibid., 24:452).

Kant next draws a distinction between a concept's form and its matter. In the case of abstract concepts, or concepts that are given through experience, their form and matter come from separate sources. The form of these concepts is obtained through abstraction. Their matter is given through experience.⁵¹ The matter of a concept refers to its content. Its form consists in its universality. Empirical concepts acquire their form through abstraction. Their matter or content is given through experience. This means that experience and abstraction are not separate methods for forming concepts. Instead, they both contribute to the formation of empirical concepts. *Logik Philippi* states, "The concept does not arise through abstraction, but rather it is only made universal through it. Therefore, abstraction is not a second way to acquire concepts, which is different from experience; since it is only the means to make experience universal."⁵² Here Kant contrasts his position with that of Meier. According to Meier, there are three distinct methods for forming concepts: experience, abstraction, and free association. However, Kant is arguing that neither experience nor abstraction can yield concepts, at least on their own. Experience only supplies the matter for a concept and abstraction provides its form. Both are required to generate empirical concepts. Hence, Kant denies that abstraction is a "second way to acquire concepts." It is not a separate method for concept formation.

Kant's explanation of abstraction, in *Logik Philippi*, corresponds with Meier's account of this concept. To review: Meier claims that we form concepts through abstraction by analyzing the content of other existing concepts. Through this analysis, we identify the marks that they share in common, as well as the marks that distinguish

⁵¹ *Conceptus abstractus* is e.g. the concept a genus. The matter arises through experience, but the form of universality [arises] through abstraction" (ibid., 24:452).

⁵² Ibid., 24:452.

them from each other. Finally, we abstract all of the distinguishing marks. This means that we disregard or ignore them. This leaves just the marks that were shared by our original concepts. These shared marks are combined into a new, more general concept. *Logik Philippi* states, “Through logical abstraction, we compare many concepts with each other and we see what they have in common. If many concepts have the same mark, then I make the mark into a concept, in which all of these concepts are then contained.”⁵³ Obviously, this explanation of abstraction lacks many of the details of Meier’s account. It is rather cursory. However, it nonetheless agrees with the essence of his position: we form concepts through abstraction by taking what is common among a manifold of existing representations and making it the content of a new concept.

If we compare the account of concept formation in *Logik Philippi* with the *Vernunftlehre*, we can see how Kant adapts Meier’s position to fit his own distinction between intuitions and concepts. Meier taught that there were three methods for forming concepts: experience, abstraction, and free association. The first method, the acquisition of concepts directly from experience, is not compatible with Kant’s distinction between intuitions and concepts, because, according to Meier, concepts that are acquired from experience are sensations. Kant continues to discuss experience, abstraction, and free association as part of his account of concept formation in *Logik Philippi*. However, he ceases to regard experience and abstraction as distinct methods for forming concepts. He claims that concepts are either given or made. Concepts are made or fabricated through free association. Meier’s two other methods for forming concepts, experience and abstraction, both contribute to the formation of empirical concepts. He distinguishes between a concept’s form and matter. In his *Inaugural Dissertation*, he distinguished

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 24:453.

between the form and matter of sensitive cognitions, or intuitions. In his logic lectures, he applies this same distinction to concepts. Kant claims that in the case of empirical concepts, their matter or content is supplied by experience. Their form is acquired through abstraction. Thus, all of the elements from Meier's theory of concept formation remain in place, but Kant assigns different roles to some of them. Experience and abstraction cease to be independent methods for forming concepts. Instead, they are both involved in the formation of empirical concepts.

The account of empirical concept formation that Kant presents in *Logik Philippi* remains his position for the remainder of his career. For example, the *Wiener Logik*, which is based on lectures that Kant delivered during the 1780s, states, "How does it happen, then that a singular representation [*repraesentatio singularis*] becomes general [*communis*] . . . I compare things and attend to that which they have in common, and I abstract from other things; thus this is a concept, through which all these things can be thought."⁵⁴ According to this passage, concepts acquire their generality or form through abstraction. We identify both the similarities and the differences among a group of things. Then we focus our attention solely on the similarities and abstract the differences. We find the same explanation of concept formation in a footnote to the "First Introduction." Kant writes, "[logic] teaches how one can compare a given representation with others, and, by extracting what it has in common with others, as a characteristic for general use, form a concept."⁵⁵ This passage is the closest that Kant comes in the "First Introduction" to explaining how concepts are actually formed. It corresponds with

⁵⁴ Kant, *Vienna Logic*, 24:907. See also idem, *Logik Pölitz*, 24:566; idem, *Logik Busolt*, 24:654.

⁵⁵ Kant, "First Introduction," 20:211.

Kant's account of abstraction in *Logik Philippi*. This suggests that Kant views about concept formation remained essentially unchanged.

What conclusions can we draw about Kant's theory of empirical concept formation on the basis of this analysis? To the extent that Kant has a worked-out theory regarding how empirical concepts are acquired, it is closely modeled on Meier's position in the *Vernunftlehre*. *Logik Philippi* clearly shows how Kant adapts Meier's account of concept formation to fit his own distinction between intuitions and concepts. Thus, Kant's theory of empirical concept formation is essentially cribbed from Meier.

Some scholars have developed elaborate explanations of how empirical concepts are acquired from experience and then attributed these theories to Kant. For example, Béatrice Longuenesse has argued that in order to derive an empirical concept from intuitions, we must first compare these intuitions with each other. The purpose of this comparison is to identify both the similarities and the differences among their objects. This, of course, corresponds with my own account of concept formation in this chapter. It is supported by Kant's own notes, the notes of his students, and even the *Logic*, which is the text that Longuenesse primarily cites. However, Longuenesse then adds an interesting twist to this theory. She claims that when we compare intuitions for the purpose of forming concepts, we are actually comparing their *schemata*.⁵⁶ She writes,

⁵⁶ According to Kant, a schema is a rule for the imagination. It prescribes how the imagination must synthesize intuitions in order for these intuitions to represent a certain kind of object, or to exhibit certain marks. He writes, "Now this representation of a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image is what I call the schema for this concept" (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 140/B 179-180). In order to present or exhibit an intuition that corresponds with a particular concept, the imagination must synthesize the intuition in a particular way. This imaginative synthesis forms the intuition into the appropriate image. For example, in order to form the image of a circle, the imagination must draw a line that remains equidistant from a fixed point. The synthesis, which is required to present a concept with a corresponding intuition, constitutes the schema for this concept. We can think of a schema as being analogous to the formula for a geometric figure. For example, the formula, $(x-h)^2 + (y-k)^2 = r^2$, describes how any possible circle can be constructed. Likewise, a schema represents how the imagination

“To compare representations in order to form concepts is therefore to compare schemata.”⁵⁷ This not only commits her to the position that empirical concepts each have their own corresponding schemata,⁵⁸ Longuenesse argues that we actually possess the schemata for these concepts *before we acquire the concepts themselves*.⁵⁹ Since we form concepts by comparing schemata, we must possess the schemata first and the concepts second. This is not the only unusual claim that Longuenesse makes about the role of schemata in concept formation. She also asserts that we form schemata through the same acts of comparison that we use to form concepts. She writes, “And to compare schemata . . . is first of all to *generate* these schemata. Thus the schemata result from the very acts of universalizing comparison of which they are the object.”⁶⁰ Presumably, Longuenesse does not mean that we actually form schemata by comparing them; although, she writes as though this were the case. Instead, she must mean that we form schemata through the same *type* of comparison that we use to form concepts, as opposed to the very same act. She claims that this type of comparison consists of the combination of three basic acts: comparison, reflection, and abstraction. The reader may recall that these are the same

synthesizes any intuitions that correspond with a certain concept. It is the “formula” for the imaginative synthesis of these intuitions.

⁵⁷ Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 116.

⁵⁸ This position has been rejected by some scholars. Some deny altogether that empirical concepts have their own schemata. Others argue that empirical concepts serve as their own schemata and hence they are essentially indistinguishable. Rudolf Makreel offers an example of the first position. Paul Guyers advances the second. See Makreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, 31n; Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 164).

⁵⁹ Longuenesse acknowledges that this idea appears to contradict Kant’s explanation of schemata in the analytic of principles. A schema *schematizes a concept*. This means that it prescribes the synthesis that is required to present the concept with a corresponding image or intuition. Hence, it does not seem possible to possess a schema without its corresponding concept. Without the concept, what would the schema actually schematize? Yet Longuenesse claims that schemata must precede their concepts, because they are the means for forming these concepts in the first place. She defends this unconventional thesis by arguing that the analytic of principles is only concerned with how concepts, which are already formed, can be applied to appearances. It does not ask how these concepts are originally acquired. Hence, it is not surprising that Kant describes schemata as subordinated to their concepts. This is simply a consequence of his “perspective” in the analytic of principles. See Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 116n.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 116-117.

“acts of the understanding” [*logischen Verstandes-Actus*] that Jäsche discusses in §6 of the *Logic*, and which he claims are responsible for generating a concept’s form.⁶¹

Longuenesse refers to the combination of these three acts collectively as a “universalizing comparison.”⁶² Thus, we form schemata through a “universalizing comparison” of intuitions, and then we form concepts through a similar comparison of the schemata.

Longuenesse also argues that this same “universalizing comparison” is guided by the concepts of comparison [*Vergleichungsbegriffen*] that Kant lists in the amphiboly chapter, i.e. identity/difference, affirmative/negative, inner/outer, and matter/form. This means the concepts of comparison are actually rules for the formation of empirical concepts and that this process is governed by these concepts. Longuenesse writes, “the concepts of comparison that govern the comparison of concepts in judgment also govern the comparison of sensible representations that generates empirical schemata and thus also empirical concepts.”⁶³ Her reasoning is that the concepts of comparison govern the logical comparison of different concepts. This comparison is a precondition for forming judgments because it establishes the logical relationship between a pair of concepts – it does not, however, establish their cognitive relationship to an object. According to §6 of the *Logic*, empirical concept formation also involve comparison. Concepts acquire their generality or form through the combination of three acts: comparison, reflection, and abstraction. Longuenesse refers to these three acts collectively as a “universalizing comparison.” She argues that the logical comparison, which is governed by the concepts of comparison, and the “universalizing comparison,” which is involved in the formation

⁶¹ Kant, *Jäsche Logic*, 9:94, §6.

⁶² Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 116.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 127.

of concepts, are related. Indeed, she argues that they are essentially the same.⁶⁴ Hence, the “universalizing comparison” of intuitions that allows us to form empirical concepts is governed by the same concepts of comparison that Kant describes in the amphiboly chapter.

Longuenesse’s account of empirical concept formation, which I have only sketched out in the most cursory way, is an impressive feat of scholarship. Its chief virtue is that it addresses a serious flaw in Kant’s theory of concept formation, as it is presented in §6 of the *Logic* and the notes from Kant’s logic lectures; namely, it cannot explain how we acquire our first concepts.^{65,66} Although Longuenesse does not

⁶⁴ Ibid., 121.

⁶⁵ The problem can be summarized as follows: In order to form a concept, or general representation, we must first acquaint ourselves with the marks that characterize a manifold of existing representations. Some of these marks, the ones that are shared by all of the representations, will become the content of a new concept. The rest, i.e. the marks that distinguish the representations from each other, are abstracted or ignored. This is an explicit feature of Meier’s account of concept formation through abstraction. Abstraction begins with analysis. It is also presupposed by Kant’s theory. However, in order to think about a mark we must form a concept of it. Herein lies the problem. Unlike Meier, Kant denies that we can receive concepts through the senses. Every concept must be actively formed by the understanding through a process that involves abstraction. Abstraction is the source of a concepts generality or form. Yet we cannot form a concept in this way without first analyzing other representations, which are already given, and identifying their marks, and we cannot identify these marks without forming concepts of them. Thus, in order to form a new concept, we must already possess a few others. These are the concepts of the marks. This raises an obvious question: if we must possess the concepts of various marks in order to form a concept through abstraction, how does this process ever get started? How do we acquire our first concepts from experience? Kant does not address this question in his logic lectures. I assume that Longuenesse intends to answer it, when she argues that we derive empirical concepts from intuitions by comparing schemata.

⁶⁶ In *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, Henry Allison claims that the account of concept of formation in §6 of the *Logic* is actually circular. He focuses on Jäsche’s additional remarks and ignores the main text. As Allison explains it, Kant thought that we form empirical concepts by reflecting on different objects. We identify the essential marks of these objects and abstract all of the non-essential ones. The essential ones are united in a new general concept. But how do we know which marks are essential and which are merely accidental? In order to make this determination, we would have to already possess the concept that we are trying infer. Hence, this entire process is viciously circular. Allison writes, “We supposedly arrive at the concept of a tree by reflecting on precisely those features of the perceived objects (trunk, branches, leaves, etc.) in virtue of which we recognize them to be trees, and abstracting from those that are irrelevant. But how could one recognize and select these “tree-constituting” features unless one already had the concept of a tree, which is precisely what was supposed to have been explained?” (Henry Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001], 22) The problem with this reading is probably very obvious to the reader. Kant never claims that we form concepts by distinguishing between the essential marks that define a class of objects and the non-essential ones. If this were true, then his account of concept formation would be circular. However, this is not

acknowledge this problem explicitly, I assume that the unprecedented role that she assigns to schemata in the acquisition of empirical concepts is intended resolve it. Nonetheless, I find her interpretation utterly implausible. There is almost no textual evidence to support it. For example, her assertion that we form empirical concepts by comparing schemata is based on a single *Reflexion* (2880). It states, “We only compare the universal of the rule of our apprehension [*Wir vergleichen nur das allgemeine der Regel unserer Auffassung*].”⁶⁷ This remark is located on a page of Kant’s *Handexemplar* that is devoted to concept formation. We can reasonably assume that Kant is describing how concepts are formed and that the comparison, which he refers to, leads to a new concept. Longuenesse assumes that a “rule of our apprehension” is a synonym for a schema. She concludes that we form empirical concepts by comparing schemata. Her interpretation of this phrase is not unreasonable. Schemata are rules for the imagination that prescribe the synthesis of intuitions. Hence, they could be accurately described as rules for (the synthesis of) apprehension. However, Longuenesse still invests an incredible amount of significance in what is ultimately a mere fragment from Kant’s *Nachlass*. One could object that I have also cited fragments from Kant’s *Nachlass* in this dissertation – indeed, I devote an entire chapter to them. However, when I cite

Kant’s position. In order to form concepts, we only need to be able to recognize the similarities and differences among various objects or representations. We abstract or ignore the differences and focus our attention on the similarities. The similarities, or shared marks, are united in a new concept. There is nothing circular about this process. We don’t have to know in advance which marks are significant. We only need to recognize the similarities between different objects or representations. Kant’s account of concept formation is not circular, but it *is* still problematic. The problem is that it cannot explain how we first acquire concepts. It presupposes that we already possess some concepts. In order to form a new concept through abstraction, we must first analyze the content of other existing representations – either intuitions or other concepts. This means that we must identify their marks. However, in order to identify the marks that distinguish an object or its representation, we must first form concepts of these marks. Otherwise, we could not think about them, let alone compare or abstract them. Hence, in order to form a new concept, we must already possess some concepts. See n. 64.

⁶⁷ Kant, *Reflexionen zur Logik* 2880, 16:557. Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* dates from between 1776 and 1789.

Reflexionen, I can almost always appeal to multiple passages. Longuenesse has one *Reflexion* and she uses it to reevaluate Kant's own explanation of schemata in the analytic of principles.

As for her thesis that the formation of empirical concepts is governed by the concepts of comparison, Longuenesse devotes chapter six of *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* to showing how each of these concepts contribute to this process. However, ultimately there is no direct evidence that supports this thesis. She can merely show that the concepts of comparison *could* guide the formation of empirical concepts. However, we can surely distinguish between what Kant *could* have thought, what we wish that he *would* have thought, and what he *actually* thought.⁶⁸ In this dissertation I have sought to explicate the latter, even if it does not always yield the most sympathetic reading of Kant's philosophy.

I find it simply implausible that Kant could have worked out an elaborate theory of concept formation, such as the one that Longuenesse attributes to him, without committing it to paper. Yet we find no clear statement of this position in Kant's *Nachlass*. Longuenesse cites a few *Reflexionen* that indirectly support her thesis about the role of schemata. However, they are all obscure enough to be open to interpretation. The evidence for her reading is very meager at best. It is bolstered primarily by her impressive erudition and the thoroughness of her argument. Nonetheless, it remains far more likely that Kant devoted very little time or thought to the question of how concepts are formed. He never worked out the complicated theory that Longuenesse finds in the

⁶⁸ Longuenesse explicitly denies that she is offering a reconstructive reading of Kant. She writes, "I shall attempt to establish their relation [the relation between logical comparison, as discussed in the amphiboly chapter, and the logical acts of comparison, reflection, and abstraction, which are discussed in §6 of the *Logic*], not in order to 'understand Kant better than he understood himself,' but, on the contrary, in order to show how he must have understood himself" (Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 115).

amphiboly chapter and *Logic*. If he did, then there would be a record of it in his *Nachlass*.

If the student notes from his logic lectures are any indication, he only briefly addressed concept formation in his course. In each set of student notes, the account of this topic typically runs to little more than half of a page in the *Akademie Ausgabe*.⁶⁹ The one exception is *Logik Philippi*, which devotes almost two full pages to this topic.⁷⁰ The explanation of concept formation in these lectures is consistent, albeit cursory. We identify both the similarities and the differences among a group of things or representations. We then abstract or ignore the differences and instead focus our attention exclusively on the similarities. These similarities, or shared marks, become the content of a new general concept. Thus, Kant largely ignored the question of how concepts are formed. This is why he adopted Meier's theory and modified it to fit his own critical philosophy.

* * * * *

In this chapter, I have traced the development of two elements of Kant's logic: his account of induction and his theory of concept formation. In both cases, I showed that Kant models his position on Meier's *Vernunftlehre*. This is not the first time that I have pointed out Meier's influence on Kant's views about logic. As we saw in chapter four, this influence was not always a positive one, since Meier's definition of judgment would only apply to analytic ones. After all of this, I do not want to leave the reader with the impression that Kant's philosophy in general is heavily indebted to Meier or that Meier was a better or more innovative thinker. He remains a minor figure in the history of

⁶⁹ See e.g. Kant, *Logik Pöhlitz*, 24:566-567; idem, *Logik Busolt*, 24:654; idem, *Vienna Logic*, 24:907, 909.

⁷⁰ Kant, *Logik Philippi*, 24:452-453.

philosophy for good reason. Although Kant taught logic during his entire career, and was a popular lecturer, he never intended to make a significant contribution to this field. His interests lay elsewhere, in metaphysics, ethics, and the philosophy of science. Hence, it is hardly surprising that he sometimes relied on Meier's textbook. He consulted the *Vernunftlehre*, much in the same way that a philosopher today might refer to Copi and Cohens' well-known logic text. Moreover, induction and concept formation share something in common: they are both topics that Kant barely engages with in his lectures. He addresses them almost in passing. We should, therefore, not be surprised that Kant's explanation and approach to them is heavily influenced by Meier. Furthermore, since Kant left us with relatively little about these topics, and we know that he was influenced by Meier, the *Vernunftlehre* can serve as an important clue to understanding his views about induction, concept formation, or other minor concepts from his lectures.

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