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"The Phenomenological Dimension of the Theory of Meaning:
A Critical Inquiry Through Husserl and Wittgenstein"

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The Phenomenological Dimension of the Theory of Meaning

a Critical Inquiry through Husserl and Wittgenstein

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An abstract of
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
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Abstract

The Phenomenological Dimension of the Theory of Meaning:

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By

Jacob Martin Rump

Given the undeniable influence of the linguistic turn, it is common to characterize epistemology in the twentieth century as centrally concerned with meaning. But many of the early twentieth-century figures who helped to inspire that turn did not characterize meaning exclusively in terms of language. In response to contemporary accounts that tend to limit the scope of meaning to the semantic, pragmatic or conceptual, I use the work of Husserl and Wittgenstein to argue for the importance of non-linguistic aspects of lived experience (*Erlebnis*) to the theory of meaning, situating the project historically as a legacy of Kant's Critical epistemology and systematically in terms of contemporary debates about the role and status of nonconceptual content.

I argue in Chapter One that a robust theory of meaning must take account of the way the conditions of the possibility for meaning are determined by intrinsically value-bearing features of everyday experience, features that are not themselves inherently linguistic or conceptual. Most contemporary nonconceptualist accounts of perceptual experience fail to adequately theorize the role of the nonconceptual on its own terms, reducing nonconceptual elements of experience to that of mere "fodder" for conceptualization and ignoring the epistemic role the nonconceptual plays in determining structural conditions of possibility. This can be overcome through a transcendental-constitutional approach that examines the full range of experiential structures—including those not mediated by language or concepts—by which meaning is constituted.

Tracing a series of parallel developments in the theories of meaning of Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapters Two through Five, I argue that—despite important differences—both authors' later conceptions of meaning necessarily include accounts of its relation to an inexact, non-linguistic dimension of experiential life: the *lifeworld* (Husserl) or *form(s) of life* (Wittgenstein). What appears from the standpoint of linguistic and conceptual analysis to be an unfortunate inexactness is in terms of the later conceptions of both philosophers not the result of incomplete analysis, but of a recognition of the ontological primacy of the lived and fundamentally social phenomenon of *meaningfulness* that characterizes our experience in a way that outstrips conceptual and linguistic representation.

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List of Primary Text Abbreviations Used in the Dissertation

CM	Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*.
Crisis	Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*.
EJ	Husserl (and L. Landgrebe), *Experience and Judgment*.
FTL	Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*.
Hua	Husserl, *Husserliana - Gesammelte Werke* (see note below).
Ideas I	Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*.
IDP	Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*
LI	Husserl, *Logical Investigations* (2 vols).
LPP I	Wittgenstein, *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology,* Volume I.
LTK	Husserl, *Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge: Lectures 1906/07*.
OC	Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*.
PG	Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Grammar*.
PI	Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*.
PO	Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Occasions*.
PR	Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks*.
RC	Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Colour*.
SRLF	Wittgenstein, "Some Remarks on Logical Form."
TLP	Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

Note on Translations and Citations:

All citations from Husserl's work are keyed in the standard way to pagination of the *Husserliana* editions (Hua + volume number, page number). Since most of the Wittgenstein texts cited are printed as translations with the original German *en face,* citations to these texts are given by remark/ section number when possible, thus referring to both the English translation and the German original. For all citations in the dissertation where our own translations or modifications of the standard translations are used, the text in the original language is provided in the footnotes or (for minor modifications only) indicated by means of brackets in the quoted text itself. All modifications and original translations are indicated either parenthetically (for the texts listed above) or in the footnotes (for all others). For further clarification, German words are sometimes provided in brackets in the quoted text even when the translation has not been altered. All emphases in quotations appear in the original text, unless otherwise noted.

The Phenomenological Dimension of the Theory of Meaning: a Critical Inquiry through Husserl and Wittgenstein

Chapter One: Introduction

I. Terminological Preliminaries and Theoretical Framing of the Project

This dissertation argues that there is an important dimension—an essential structural component—to be considered in the philosophical theory of meaning that is irreducibly phenomenological in character, and that any philosophically robust account of the phenomenon of meaning—any account that seeks to adequately describe and analyze not just the things we say and write, but the fact that we, as conscious beings, live meaningful lives, and to do justice to the relation between our words and our lives—must take account of this dimension. "Phenomenological" as the term will be used here refers to much more than just the "what it is like" of experience[1]: it refers to insights into the structure of experience gained through a type of philosophical inquiry first systematically developed by Edmund Husserl around the turn of the twentieth century, and to a tradition and method whose importance to philosophy is as great today as it was one hundred years ago.

Phenomenology in this sense is a method of inquiry which begins from and ever returns to *lived experience,* to the world as experienced by conscious subjects intentionally related to it, as the originating point of all inquiry. Throughout this dissertation, we will at times use the phrase "lived experience" to emphasize our use of the word in this sense; as the active, immediate, embodied character of conscious life, as distinguished from experience in the sense of

1 As it is often used in contemporary work of thinkers such as Ned Block, David Chalmers, Frank Jackson, Michael Tye, etc., the term "phenomenology" seems to have become little more than a shorthand expression for the study of "qualia" or the "what it is like" of conscious experience, the latter phrase being taken from Thomas Nagel's seminal "What it is Like to be a Bat" (this latter work, however, does not use "phenomenology in the much restricted form favored by those later authors). Our point here is that phenomenology as we are considering it is a complete *method of inquiry*, and not merely a way of referring to the characteristic of conscious experience which marks its starting point.

a stock of remembered past events or "rules of thumb" which manifest themselves as wisdom, as in the phrase "in my experience..." uttered as a preliminary to giving advice to another.[2] Phenomenological inquiry relies upon and fully presupposes the idea that lived experience exhibits a regular, logical structure that can be rigorously and scientifically studied by means of the careful description of the acts through which phenomena are presented in their intentional correlation with the intending subject, such phenomena being considered in isolation from all existential presuppositions as to their ontological or metaphysical status and thereby simply as *meanings* (by means of what Husserl calls "bracketing" or the "phenomenological reduction"). The *correlational* character of the phenomenological conception of meaning gives ultimate explanatory priority in this domain of inquiry to *act over content,* such that meanings are understood and described by way of an inquiry into the *act of meaning intention*; judgment content by way of inquiry into *acts of judging*; the contents of our knowledge by means of an inquiry into *knowing,* etc. It is in this fundamental principle of explanatory priority, we will claim, that the phenomenological theory of meaning in the Husserlian tradition most differs from the theory of meaning as it has developed in the mainstream analytic tradition, beginning with Frege.

Although we will here use the term "phenomenology" in this specifically Husserlian sense, our primary goal is not a straightforward explication or defense of an "orthodox Husserlian" position; we rather wish to show how a series of strikingly parallel insights into the relationship between experience, meaning, and language arise more or less independently from one another in the developing thought of Husserl and of Ludwig Wittgenstein, insights manifesting the importance of what we are referring to as the "phenomenological dimension" of the theory of meaning. Tracing the parallel trajectories of their thought concerning meaning to

2 In German transcendental philosophy and phenomenology, this difference is often marked by using the different nouns *Erlebnis* (lived experience) and *Erfahrung* (past experience) and their respective verb forms. Unless otherwise indicated or made clear by the context, our use of the word "experience" in all of its grammatical forms will always be in the former and not the latter sense.

arrive at the unique final positions of our authors will bring us to a greater understanding of their work, but more importantly it will serve as a justification and a pair of historical test cases for the conception of the phenomenological dimension of the theory of meaning we wish to advocate.

Our argument, which proceeds in roughly historical order through the work of Husserl and Wittgenstein, will be pursued with an eye to contemporary work in both the analytic and continental traditions that touches upon the same fundamental issues, with a special focus on recent debates about the possibility and structure of non-conceptual content, debates to which we think a phenomenologically oriented conception of meaning can offer a unique contribution and can help to further the ongoing project of "bridging the gap" between continental and analytic thought.

One may be tempted to object, even on the basis of our title alone, that this is a misguided task; that we must be attempting either to ascribe to Husserl, the forefather of "continental" and more "literary" thinkers such as Heidegger, Sartre, and Derrida the status of rigorous analytic philosopher, or to adopt Wittgenstein, an acknowledged father figure of the "analytic tradition" who was concerned not with experience but with logic and language, into the fold of the continental. We reject both claims. The ascription of the labels "continental" and "analytic" to philosophy done in Europe before the Great War is, while certainly at times a useful historical or methodological categorization, anachronistic. Even into the 1920s, 30s, and early 40s, the distinction, which many assume to have then been as rigid and clear-cut as they have found it to be in the second half of the twentieth century, was neither simple nor static.[3]

What unites the thinkers we will be considering here is a common philosophical concern which is only now becoming fully clear to historians of twentieth-century philosophy as its dominant theme: meaning. The concern with meaning in the twentieth century includes but is not exhausted by the linguistic turn, and shows every sign of having outlasted that single

3 Cf. Hans-Johann Glock's excellent critique of "geo-linguistic" conceptions of continental and analytic philosophy in *What is Analytic Philosophy*, 61- 88.

manifestation of a much broader phenomenon. It is now a well-recognized fact that the "high church" analytic philosophy of language of the 1950s and 60s has ceded its spotlight to the philosophy of mind and to related issues in the neurosciences, and that the grip of the post-structuralist obsession with language has loosened among continental philosophers, who are once again beginning to recognize important aspects of philosophical inquiry "outside the text," and to turn to "new" avenues of research such as affect and value theory.

In line with this "turn away from the linguistic turn," the use of the term "theory of meaning" in our title does not refer exclusively to an inquiry within the philosophy of language, nor to an inquiry exclusively into semantics, pragmatics, or the structure of conceptual schemes, but to what we see as the broader and more fundamental inquiry into the phenomenon of *meaningfulness*, an inquiry beginning from the insight (which the linguistic turn was in fact instrumental in bringing about) that one of the things which distinguishes us as the conscious beings that we are is our living in a meaningful world, and our functioning not simply as passive "consumers" of meaning but producers; as beings capable of and responsible for *making sense*. That this implies that *the phenomenon of meaning in our conscious life amounts to much more than our capacity to use language or navigate schemes of concepts, because the meaningfulness of our experience "outstrips" the meaning of our words and the content of our concepts, is the central theoretical claim to be defended in this dissertation.* And we will insist that this central claim is not merely trivially true. It points to the need for an account of the connection between a theory of *meaningfulness*—understood in the broad sense of *experiential significance*—and a theory of *discrete meanings*. The problem is not that such an element of the theory of meaning is inadequately treated in most contemporary accounts; the problem is that it is by and large not treated at all.

To frame our argument that a phenomenological dimension belongs indispensably in the study of meaning, we will suggest that the concern with meaning in the twentieth century has its roots much earlier: in almost all of its twentieth-century manifestations, and among continental

and analytic figures alike, it represents at once a continued interest in and a redirection of the Critical philosophy of Kant. Though a thorough historical study of Kant's own theory of meaning is outside the scope of this work, it will become evident that the problems we trace through the works of Husserl and Wittgenstein and find again in contemporary epistemological debates—problems that arise from attempting to better understand the relationship between meaning, "first-person" experience and knowledge—are ultimately Kantian Critical problems, problems which for Kant were not intended to be "solved" by a dogmatic metaphysics, but instead delimited via the ongoing Critique of our powers of knowledge and reason, of what P. F. Strawson would later popularize as the notion of the "bounds of sense." But the Kantian heritage treated here will not be primarily that rediscovered by analytic philosophers in the second half of the twentieth century, as interpreted in the work of thinkers such as Strawson, Wilfrid Sellars, and, more recently, John McDowell. Such interpretations tend to focus on Kant's empirical realism, and to downplay, if not reject outright, his transcendental idealism, treating the latter as, in McDowell's words, "a profoundly unsatisfactory aspect of Kant's philosophy."[4] As will become clear below, our own treatment of Husserl and Wittgenstein emphasizes their philosophical relationship to Kant and specifically to the *transcendental* elements of his thought. Insofar as their concerns under investigations here lie at the intersection of meaning, experience, and knowledge, all considered in terms of *possibility*, and not just actually obtaining matters of fact, both will be shown to be Kantian thinkers in this transcendental sense.

But why this insistence on the *transcendental* character of the project? Except perhaps for the term "metaphysics" (at least until quite recently), there is hardly a term more commonly reserved for contempt among contemporary philosophers of all stripes. Transcendental philosophy has come to be associated with mere speculation, navel-gazing, a problematic "metaphysics of the subject," and even dogmatic idealism; another "outdated" and even "naive" philosophy whose grandiosity and deeply theoretical concerns have no place in a contemporary

4 McDowell, *Mind and World*, 43.

philosophical landscape dominated by various strains of realism and often largely pragmatist in its orientation.

The first answer is that we simply think it is the only currently available approach in order to deal with the *problem of meaning* in its fullness, especially because of one particular aspect of the transcendental tradition in the Kantian sense, the theory of *constitution. Constitution theory* as we use the term is the attempt to describe, to the fullest extent possible, not only the systems of meanings within which we currently operate in terms of the relations between their words or concepts, but also the way in which such meanings are originally *constituted* in the flux of lived experience. It is concerned not only with the "how" of the meaningful world, but with the regular, structurally analyzable way in which our world *becomes meaningful* subjectively and intersubjectively; with *the making* of sense, and thereby also with the conditions of the possibility of meaning.[5] We will contend that *transcendental constitutional theory*, properly understood, can play a central role in contemporary discussions of meaning and experience across continental and analytic traditions by filling a lacunae often overlooked or prematurely dismissed by those engaging such issues. The further explanation and justification of this claim is a task of this dissertation as a whole, and we can at this point only offer this promissory note.

The second, closely related reason for the explicitly transcendental character of this work is self-intentionally progressive: this dissertation is intended as a small contribution to the ongoing effort to combat all-too-common mischaracterizations of transcendental philosophy such as the caricature alluded to above. Such mischaracterizations have too often led continental and analytic philosophers alike to prematurely dismiss the potential contributions of transcendental philosophy because its fundamental tenets have not been well understood.

One such dominant mischaracterization should be singled out here at the outset, to avoid further misunderstanding of the notion of transcendental philosophy as it is used in this work. This will also allow us to offer a preliminary definition of the term "transcendental" as we shall

5 Cf. *Wörterbuch der phänomenologischen Begriffe,* 311- 315.

be using it (something we have avoided up to this point, except to give basic reference to the Kantian Critical project). The late 1970s saw a brief resurgence of interest in the notion of transcendental thinking among philosophers in the analytic tradition, and a debate about transcendental philosophy had soon rigidified—as is too often the case—into a much more specific but ultimately apparently fruitless discussion about the status of transcendental *arguments*, or, to use Roderick Chisholm's term, the transcendental "procedure."[6] *It is of the utmost importance for our own account that the term "transcendental" not be understood to refer to a specific argument type or fixed methodological "procedure."* If we take seriously the notion of a transcendental philosophy as one which takes the clarification of meaningfulness—accounting for the possibility of meaning and not just actual meanings, as in our definition below—to be absolutely primary, then it makes sense to speak of "transcendental arguments" only in the way in which it makes sense to speak of "naturalist arguments" or "inferentialist" or "compatibilist" arguments. In all of these cases, what is at issue is not the *mode* of argument, in the sense of procedure via deductive, inductive, or abductive argumentation, but the *focus* of the argument, what is being argued *for and about*.[7] Conceived in this way, "transcendental arguments" amount to nothing more and nothing less than arguments in support of a philosophical position that is ultimately transcendental in character, i.e., arguments in support of a *transcendental position*, just as "naturalist arguments" are arguments—of various forms—in support of a naturalist position. What needs to be defined here and what we will be arguing for in this dissertation is thus transcendental philosophy as a philosophical *position*, not a transcendental *mode* of argument. And just as the naturalist or the inferentialist uses every argumentative tool in her toolkit to argue in favor of her position, and just as this arguing in favor of her position

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6 See Chisholm, "What is a Transcendental Argument?," 20- 21.

7 Of course, Kant is partly responsible for the problematic focus on the transcendental as a mode of argument, as he himself attempts to give a description of transcendental thought as a specific rational method or procedure. For a critical overview of Kant's account of the multiple (and seemingly conflicting) characteristics of transcendental argument paradigmatic of the late 70s debates mentioned above, see Gram, "Do Transcendental Arguments have a Future?"

functions at the same time as a way of further refining and explaining that position (and thus giving the reader the author's particular version of it), so too can he who advocates a transcendental position give the reasons for that position in a way which simultaneously seeks to refine it and to describe its contours more fully. It is hoped that this dissertation will make some small contribution to the task of transcendental philosophy by offering its own take—by no means the only one—on some of the insights and issues central to the project of transcendental philosophy.

Such misunderstanding preempted, we are now in a position to give a preliminary definition of "transcendental philosophy" as that term will here be understood, developed, and defended: transcendental philosophy takes the question of *meaning*—understood firstly not in the narrow sense of semantic or predicative meaning but in the broader, more encompassing sense of the *meaningfulness of experience; that the world in which we find ourselves is always already a meaningful world and not merely one of brute third-personal empirical happenings*—as the most primary and fundamental question for philosophical inquiry. Furthermore, transcendental philosophy in the sense intended here takes as its methodological starting point the attempt to give a rigorous account of the *structure* of such meaningfulness, which will include not only the actual meaningful phenomena of our experience, but also *the structures of the possibility* of such phenomena; it is, in the Kantian sense, an inquiry into the *conditions of the possibility* of meaning, an inquiry whose guiding question may be stated, "how is the meaningfulness of conscious experience possible, and how is such experience structured?" and thus an inquiry into *meaningfulness* in the broadest sense. We will further insist that it is essential to the transcendental position advocated here that the structure of possible meaning not be understood as consisting simply of a set of "possible meanings."

It should be clear from these terminological considerations that we take the task of transcendental philosophy and the object of phenomenological inquiry to be intimately related. This does not mean that transcendental philosophy is a domain of research reserved exclusively

for phenomenologists: Wittgenstein, we shall argue, is not a phenomenologist in the methodological, Husserlian sense, although his thinking has phenomenological elements and manifests important phenomenological concerns and insights. It does mean, however, that we take such concerns—concerns with the status and structure of immediate first-person experience—to be essential to the transcendental project, and that we take this project to be a critical and too-often overlooked component of a complete theory of meaning and knowledge. The reason for this, as will be developed at more length in the subsequent chapters of the dissertation, is that any conception of meaning that does not engage this question risks cutting off the theorization of meaning from its place in lived experience and everyday human life, from what Husserl would come to call the "lifeworld" [*Lebenswelt*] and the structurally similar (though by no means identical) notion Wittgenstein would refer to as our "form of life" [*Lebensform*].[8]

Perhaps because of the gradual widening of the divide between continental and analytic philosophy over the course of the twentieth century, this notion of the importance of a link between a theory of meaning and a theory of *experience* has been unduly ignored, and the former pursuit has largely rigidified into a specialized inquiry in the philosophy of language into the status of "semantic systems" (see the quote from David Lewis, below) which, while both important and impressive in its own right, seems to have completely abandoned the task of relating the fruits of its inquiry to lived human experience. While it might be argued that pragmatics has arisen as a semi-independent field of inquiry in order (among other things) to fill this void, even this approach fails to capture the radical sense of meaning we have in mind here, since it tends to orient itself exclusively to questions of *linguistic* usage on the basis of *semantic* theory. Similarly, cognitive theories might be said, in a way, to relate meaning to experience, but they are concerned only with a notion of experience problematically limited to the third-personal (an approach which from our point of view should raise serious concerns about the specter of a

8 As we shall see in chapter five, section II, it is worry over just such a "cutting off" that lies at the core of Husserl's critique of Kant's transcendental philosophy for "missing" the lifeworld.

return to psychologism), and the conceptual. Our notion of the theory of meaning includes but is not limited to the inquiry into meaning in the semantic or conceptual sense.

To more fully indicate the somewhat unconventional way in which the term "theory of meaning" will be used here, we can begin from a classic formulation of the task of the theory of meaning from the later twentieth century. In "General Semantics," David Lewis differentiates two possible topics for a theory of meaning: "First, the description of possible languages or grammars as abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are associated with aspects of the world; and, second, the description of the psychological and sociological facts whereby a particular one of these abstract semantic systems is the one used by a person or population. Only confusion comes of mixing these two topics."[9] Like that of Lewis, our project here concerns the first of these two approaches, but, following Wittgenstein, we would reinterpret and expand "grammar" to include not only semantic elements of word-meaning but the order and continuity of meaningful experience in the practice of everyday life. While it is certainly important that the two topics Lewis mentions not be *confused*, we insist that the relation *between* these topics remains a philosophical problem, even if work on each of the topics carried out in isolation (as presumably, carried out by philosophers and linguists, on the one hand, and psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists on the other), can function without regard to that relation. On our view, the difficulty of relating these topics derives in part from the tendency to conceive of them exclusively in terms of third-personal *facts*, which invites a conception of them as independent realms of scientific inquiry.

The theory of meaning in our sense is thus concerned not primarily with semantic questions oriented toward an understanding of the use of language, but with the way in which our systems of meaning—linguistic or otherwise—are related to our fundamentally meaningful ways of being in the world, ways which, we contend, share a structural similarity in a *phenomenological* (not anthropological) sense, regardless of the "psychological and sociological

9 Lewis, "General Semantics," 19.

facts" specific to the person or population. Ours is thus *not* the simplistic question of how specific elements of a given way of life come to be taken up in the words or signifiers of a particular semantic system; the ultimate arbitrariness of individual relations of linguistic reference is one point upon which most philosophers of language in both continental and analytic traditions have long agreed, and this seems a more-or-less settled matter. Rather, our question is how and how far the structural conditions of meaningful experience—the *phenomenological* (as opposed to natural-scientific or causal) conditions that hold, regardless of the specific arrangements of facts in any particular lifeworld and form of life—can be clarified in terms of their relation to the "abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are associated with aspects of the world."

Without such an inquiry, it seems to us, the theory of meaning can go no further than the establishment of a logical, semantic/pragmatic /conceptual theory on the one side, ultimately unconnected to our anthropological accounts of the attention-worthy (or intentional) specifics of a given person or culture on the other, and—except insofar as both concern phenomena which happen to fall under the English word "meaning," ne'er shall the twain meet. Phenomenology offers us an alternative way to consider the latter side of this relation, by means of what, beginning with Kant, has come to be called a "transcendental logic." This strategy seeks to avoid both the largely relative character of one specific anthropological or sociological account to another, and the pitfalls of a psychologism which explains the logical character of the meaningful world in terms of empirically-observable, inductively-established regularities of human patterns of thought. From a phenomenological perspective, the relation of meaning to the meaningfulness of experience, of *Sinn* to *das Sinnvolle,* appears as much more than an interesting coincidence of our language, and as nothing so simple as to permit an exhaustive explanation of the latter by means of analysis of the former, or by means of an appeal to third-personal empirical modes of explanation *alone*.

To treat the meaningfulness of experiential life as nothing more than the totality of the conclusions of linguistic—or even, we shall see, conceptual—analysis, is to abandon a most

important task; to miss the point, brought out so elegantly by Wittgenstein, that what philosophy does at its best is not simply tell us more about the logic internal to an explanatory scheme (in this case pragmatics, semantics, cognitive theories of meaning, etc.) as distinct from the phenomena to be explained (practice, behavior, or, ultimately, experience), but to describe and thereby put into question the relation between the former and the latter; to bring into focus the *relation between the explanatory system of internal relations and the phenomena it is constructed to explain,* to question the fixity of this relation and the degree to which we problematically take it for granted. By the end of their careers both Wittgenstein and Husserl had come to recognize the insufficiency of conceiving of this relation as simple or fixed, and thus to reject accounts—including their own earlier ones—in which the relation between meaning conceived in the abstract and meaning in our everyday lives was explained in terms of a simple function; an "instantiation" (Husserl), a "projection" (Wittgenstein) or a simple representational "grasping" (Frege) which makes no appeal to experience or to the subjective character of conscious life. The defender of linguistic or conceptual analysis will insist, rightly, that her methods do not result in a reduction of all of life and experience to language or concepts. But we will insist that, without a proper regard for the *phenomenological* dimension of meaning, which cannot be captured by an inquiry exclusively oriented toward the linguistic or the conceptual, her ability to account for meaning in this *fullest sense* will remain at best a promissory note.

At this might it can be objected that it is precisely this "fullest sense"—this notion of consciousness or lived experience—that many defenders of linguistic or conceptual analysis reject. Does our inquiry not thus excoriate common conceptions of the theory of meaning for not explaining meaning's relation to such a notion, when it is only from our own position—which is the one assuming such a notion—that there is a connection in need of explaining? It is here that phenomenology as a purely descriptive method reaches its argumentative limit. In the end, the appeal to lived experience cannot be justified by argument, because it is not something that is first established through inquiry, but rather the starting point of all inquiry. We can only return, again

and again, as Husserl admonishes, to "the things themselves" and continue to appeal to experience. Against one who objects to the entire notion of first-person experience –who denies that there is a "what it is like" to our experiential lives, our argument will admittedly make no headway. But to those willing to admit that they have a unique first-personal way of being in the world that is different from the perspective of third-personal scientific inquiry—even if they do not wish to call it consciousness—we hope to show that the implicit presupposition of a complete lack of relation between meaning and lived experience is suspect not only phenomenologically but also theoretically. That two of the most important and influential of thinkers in the twentieth century both revised their theories of meaning to take account of this relation should lend some credence to the latter claim.

We end this preliminary theoretical framing of the dissertation with a further foretaste of the character of inquiry which follows: we will argue that Wittgenstein is concerned to do justice to this broader conception of meaning as *meaningfulness* already in the *Tractatus*, and that this element remains in play even through the manuscripts completed after the main drafts of the *Philosophical Investigations*. As he writes in one of those late manuscripts dating from shortly before his death in 1951:

> Sentences [*Sätze*] are often used on the borderline between logic and empiricism [*Empirie*], so that their meaning changes back and forth and they count now as expressions of norms, now as expressions of experience [*Erfahrung*].
>
> (For it is certainly not an accompanying mental phenomenon—this is how we imagine 'thoughts' [*so stellt man sich den 'Gedanken' vor*]—but the use, which distinguishes the logical proposition from the experiential sentence [*Erfahrungsatz*].) (RC I., §32)

As we shall see in our treatment of this passage in chapter five, Wittgenstein's point concerns neither a system of logic, nor a system of scientific propositions about the world (empiricism), but instead the use of language at the "borderline," and thus the relation between them. At this borderline, language is understood primarily in terms of its *use,* its possible role in our experience, and this latter does not map directly onto the a priori laws of our logic or the a posteriori *factual* claims of the empirical sciences.

In Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy, as well as in Husserlian phenomenology, this important relation, this "borderline," is instead addressed by means of an account of *transcendental logic*. And the insight that lies behind it, that an account of the relationship between meaning and experience must take place by way of the consideration of the structure of possible, not actual meaning and thus possible, not actual experience, an account which thereby includes consideration of the character of immediate, not-always-linguistically mediated experience—of the uses of meaning, of what *we do* and not just what we say—lies at the heart of transcendental philosophy. *It is a fundamental tenet of the transcendental position argued for here that any account of meaning that does not take account of this element of possibility remains philosophically incomplete and inadequate to the task of explaining the phenomenon of meaning in its full complexity, as a phenomenon that first arises from and uniquely characterizes conscious*[10] *experience.*

It is for this reason that the theory of meaning as taken up in this dissertation is not limited to the narrower, technical sense of the term in its usual sense in contemporary analytic philosophy. It cannot be so limited, since the principal claim we put forth speaks against such narrowing by rejecting the claim that the full richness of the phenomenon of meaning can be understood exclusively in terms of language and concepts. This is not to question the legitimacy of linguistic and conceptual inquiry, but only to insist that another form of inquiry different in kind is needed in addition to them.

It must be borne in mind that the definitions here provided can serve only as a preliminary statement of our position, since that position can be laid out in its full complexity only by means of the argument which at once defends and defines it, the argument made in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. As indicated above, our demonstration of this position and the claims it seems to us to entail will take place by means of an account of the development

10 Notice we do not say "human" experience here. The reasons for this will become clear in the subsequent chapters of the dissertation, and in a preliminary way in our discussion of nineteenth century anthropologism in the following section.

of certain aspects of the conception of meaning in Husserl and Wittgenstein, from relatively early to very late in their respective years of active philosophical work, culminating, in our final chapter, in a clarification of what we take to be an important and hard-won insight common to both of their mature positions: we will show that both hold versions of a transcendental theory of meaning, and on this basis place at the very heart of their accounts of meaning a conception of the immediate experiential character of conscious life –that which we refer to as the "phenomenological dimension" of the theory of meaning. As alluded to above, this conception is elaborated upon in Husserl's late work in his theory of the *lifeworld* [*Lebenswelt*]; in Wittgenstein's late work it is expressed in the central role played by the concept of the *form of life* [*Lebensform*]. These conceptions will mark the historical endpoint of our inquiry and while reinforcing our argument for the phenomenological dimension of meaning, will also serve to remind the reader of the important differences that remain in their conceptions of meaning, language, and experience.

II. Background and Historical Starting Point of the Inquiry

Before moving on to a systematic orientation of our topic with regard to some contemporary philosophical debates, it will be useful to preliminarily frame the project via a few broad historical considerations. This will also give us occasion to historically situate Wittgenstein and Husserl and explain our use of them as the principal figures through which to engage in the above-summarized inquiry. As we maintained above, philosophy in the twentieth century can be usefully characterized in terms of a turn to meaning. As Steven Crowell notes in a recent book discussing what he calls the "space of meaning,"

> ...as the messianic faith in something called the 'linguistic turn' shows every sign of having receded in late-twentieth-century philosophy, it becomes possible to recognize that what has distinguished philosophy in the twentieth century is not that it has concerned itself with language, but that, whether through the prism of language or not, it has concerned itself with *meaning*.[11]

11 Crowell, *Husserl Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, 3.

The principal lineage of the turn to meaning in the twentieth century as we shall consider it here begins with Kant's Critical philosophy, and can be formulated more specifically in terms of the relation between the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic. The question concerns the relationship between the objects of intuition and the understanding, since, as Kant notes at the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic, "Truth or illusion is not in the object, insofar as it is intuited, but in the judgment, insofar as it is thought. Thus it is correctly said that the senses do not err; yet not because they always judge correctly but because they do not judge at all. Hence truth, as much as error, and thus also illusion as leading to the latter, are to be found only to be found in judgments, *i.e.,* only in the relation of the object to our understanding."[12] Although truth and error are first to be found in the judgment relating object and understanding, such judgment is itself made possible by the status of the Transcendental Analytic as the "logic of truth."[13] It is here, in terms of the *possible* objects of intuition considered in isolation from all *actual* such objects, that the pure knowledge of the understanding, which, although remaining empty since without intuitions, cannot err, and thus can be used by reason to determine the transcendental logical conditions which will govern our use of the judgment, and therefore serve ultimately to delimit our capacities as conscious beings capable of knowledge. It is by way of the question of the status of this latter capacity—the question of the status of the capacities of the subject—that the Kantian inquiry into the judgment and its a priori laws becomes transformed into the twentieth-century inquiry into meaning. Several broad philosophical movements can be interpreted as leading to this change; we can only paint these dialectical movements in the broadest brushstrokes here.

After Kant, later German Idealists took up the Critical project but quickly lost sight of Kant's concern to keep apart but clearly in view both the empirical and the rational sources of our

12 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* A 293/ B350 (all citations from the *Critique* refer to the Guyer and Wood translation, unless otherwise noted).

13 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* A62/ B87.

knowledge, resulting ultimately in the Hegelian position in which *both* rational and empirical knowledge could be derived in the last analysis from transcendental principles and thus ultimately *a priori*.[14] Although Kant admitted the role of logical content a priori in his transcendental logic, this possible content is nonetheless empty outside its relation to *actual* experience.[15] But the later German Idealists had extended the a priori role of the object beyond its formal place in Kant's transcendental logic to what appears to many readers of Hegel as ultimately an all-encompassing *logic of concepts*, whereby the Hegelian Absolute is to be reached by way of an entirely *conceptual* unfolding of transcendental consciousness.

By the mid-nineteenth century, the a priori speculative focus of German Idealism had begun to lose its hold on German philosophy, and one major reason for this was the increasing conflict between its speculative conclusions and the actual empirical results of the then quickly maturing natural sciences. As Hans Sluga puts it, tracing these developments as a precursor to Frege's thought, the results of this conflict were

> threefold: first, a turning away from idealist philosophy and from Hegelianism in particular; second, the rejection of the speculative, deductive, a priori method the idealists had used; and third, insofar as philosophy as a whole was identified with idealism and with deductive a priori reasoning, a turning away from philosophy as a whole. In the thinking of the times, idealism was replaced by materialism, *a priori* reasoning by empiricism, and philosophy as a separate intellectual activity by an ideology in which philosophy had merged with and disappeared in the empirical sciences.[16]

By the middle of the nineteenth century, idealism had collapsed in favor of a scientifically oriented naturalism which threatened the conception of philosophy (including logic) as an independent realm of research by taking its questions to be more suitably and rigorously capable of examination by the methods of the natural sciences.[17]

But the naturalism that replaced later German Idealism was to prove no less

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14 Cf. Sluga, *Gottlob Frege,* 12- 15.
15 Cf. Brockhaus, *Pulling Up the Ladder*, 68- 69.
16 Sluga, *Gottlob Frege*, 14.
17 Cf. Sluga, *Gottlob Frege*, 8-19, Kolakowski, *Husserl and the Search for Certitude,* 6, Russell, *Husserl,* 9-10.

problematical. In turning away from a priori inquiries to the promising developments in the sciences and thus to various forms of empiricism, German-language philosophy in the mid-to-late nineteenth century began to exhibit what was to many an unnerving positivism manifested in the form of anthropologism and, more specifically in the most logically and mathematically-oriented areas of philosophy, as psychologism. The naturalist position tended to view logic as a branch of empirical psychology, following John Stuart Mill, and thus to consider logical laws as yet another type of empirically-derived *a posteriori* knowledge, downplaying or even rejecting outright the role of the a priori in logic.[18] Husserl himself describes this development in a 1906/07 lecture course: "In Kant's time, extreme empiricism had not yet made its appearance. Only the 19th century brought theories, and allowed them to become popular, in which people ventured to attribute even the law of contradiction, and thus all of formal logic, to the chance organization of the human mind and to put them on the same level as the empirical laws of the life of the mind" (LTK 335/ Hua XXIV 339). And just as the "all of formal logic" was now considered by many to be derived from some manner of empirical observations about the functioning of the human psyche, all statements about the status of the human being and her place in the world were considered to be questions belonging to some branch of an all-encompassing *anthropology*, as the socio-empirical study of the status of the human in the world. As Michel Foucault would later put it, anthropologism produced, "surreptitiously and in advance, the confusion of the empirical and the transcendental, even though Kant had demonstrated the division between them." This results in what he calls the "anthropological sleep" characteristic of the nineteenth century: "And so we find philosophy falling asleep once more... this time not the sleep of Dogmatism but that of Anthropology. All empirical knowledge, provided it concerns man, can serve as a possible philosophical field in which the foundation of knowledge, the definition of its limits, and, in the end, the truth of all truth must be discoverable."[19]

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18 Cf. Glock, *What is Analytic Philosophy,* 24- 26.

19 Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 340- 342. It seems to us that this description is also worryingly accurate

But this turn to psychologism and anthropologism was opposed, beginning in the 1860s, by a growing insistence on going "back to Kant" and a large part of this neo-Kantian project was the attempt to recapture the a priori and thus properly objective status of logic. At the same time, the neo-Kantians largely responsible for that insistence began to debate certain problems that seemed to arise from within the Kantian system, especially regarding the Kantian conception of the categories: after the Hegelian criticism of Kant, and the subsequent reaction against speculative idealism resulting in positivist empiricism and anthropologism as evidenced by the rise of psychologism, the neo-Kantians wanted to renew the project of transcendental logic, and thereby to reassert the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental which anthropologism had threatened to blur or simply ignore. But in doing this they also acknowledged several shortcomings in Kant's original idea, most of which had to do with his deduction of the categories.[20] To many, Kant's deduction of the categories from the table of logical judgments was not adequately justified, and did not seem to do justice to the whole breadth of types of human knowledge, a point given further emphasis in the late nineteenth century in Wilhelm Dilthey's development of the conception of the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*). Kant's categories seem to be exclusively oriented to the Newtonian conception of nature, and thus intended only to provide the foundations for natural-scientific inquiry.

But if the full breadth of our a priori knowledge can no longer be grounded in Kant's table of categories, but also cannot be attributed to the empirically derived "laws of thought" of the psychologistic logicians, what is to guarantee the objectivity of knowledge on the basis of a priori laws? And where are those a priori laws to be situated within the limitations of a Critically demarcated and non-speculative system still based in Kant's "Copernican revolution"? Putting

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for certain contemporary strands of the philosophy of mind prone to uncritical acceptance of neuroscientific claims.

20 Our discussion of the neo-Kantian critique of the Kantian conception of the categories follows that of Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, 56- 59.

the matter very broadly, we can say that Husserl, Wittgenstein and Frege, as well as those early twentieth century figures traditionally considered to be neo-Kantians, were all trying to construct philosophical positions that answered to these problems and fit within the basic contours of a Kantian conception of the relation of the mind to the world. In the absence of Kant's fixed conception of the categories, this was to be done by means of a rethinking of Transcendental Logic, not in terms of a conception of possible knowledge derived from a fixed table of the categories of judgment, but in terms of the a priori logical laws governing the constitution of *meaning*.

The turn to meaning as the ultimate level of conditions of possibility reinforces the claim that the inquiry into meaning and its conditions must *precede* the inquiry into truth, since the former must now be seen as transcendentally prior to the latter: this is the insight behind the Kantian conception of transcendental logic, which "concerns itself with the laws of understanding and of reason solely in so far as they relate *a priori* to objects."[21] And thus the question becomes, How is it possible to conceive of the space of meaning a priori, and thus independently of particular judgments about the world with truth-value? This cannot take place, a la Hume, by way of direct induction from the a posteriori world of facts of experience, since such a procedure would have to presuppose, according to Kantian principles, the very rules of the understanding it is supposed to determine. And it cannot be merely a matter of analytic a priori truths, since a transcendental logic involves not just formal elements but also *possible meaning content*, which can no longer be understood as partially predetermined on the basis of a fixed set of categories of judgment. Thus, to put the matter very simply, the rethinking of Kantian Transcendental Logic demands an answer to the question, *How do we explain the seemingly synthetic a priori content of* possible *meaning, when that content must somehow precede veridical experience of objects?* The different answers to this question offered by early Husserl, early Wittgenstein, and also Frege, will be the historical starting point of our inquiry in chapters two

21 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* A 57/ B 82.

and three.

As we shall see, the anti-psychologistic preoccupations underlying the turn to meaning in Husserl and Wittgenstein quickly begin to demand further *epistemological* clarifications. The turn to the primacy of meaning cannot not be supported exclusively by means of logico-semantic reflections. Such an account in isolation results in a picture of meaning dependent upon a space unclarified in terms of intentionality, such as Frege's "third realm," to be simply "instantiated" or "grasped" by the subject, an account which does not do justice to the complex structure of lived experience and its relation to the judgment conceived as *act*. These problems show that the turn to meaning cannot be supported exclusively on the basis of a closed, a priori logic, *even one that is transcendental;* they will demand a corresponding transcendental account of *experience,* a parallel rethinking of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic which incorporates Brentano's insights into intentionality. It is at this point, at the outset of chapter three, after showing how problems in Frege's account of meaning oriented to *judgmental content* are mirrored in the early work of Husserl and Wittgenstein, that we leave Frege in our story[22] and focus for the remainder of the dissertation on the subsequent development and expansion of the theory of meaning in Husserl and Wittgenstein, illustrating how subsequent changes to their theories lead them to focus on meaning in terms of the *judging act* and to their mature conceptions of the lifeworld and the form of life. (A more detailed chapter-by-chapter overview of our inquiry will be presented in section IV, below.)

While it is impossible here to fully cover the many nuanced positions that fall within the basic historical progression sketched in outline above, there is one more specific issue that seems to us largely to underlie the above-mentioned conceptions, including those of Husserl and

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22 This is not to suggest that Frege's work is any less important; indeed, in comparison to Husserl and Wittgenstein, his work has been much more influential in the development of the theory of meaning in its contemporary form. But since our inquiry intends to illustrate an element of meaning largely ignored in such contemporary work, our leaving Frege at this point allows us to illustrate how subsequent developments in the theory of meaning of the former two figures responded to a lacunae in the latter's account that has not been fully taken up in subsequent accounts of meaning in the twentieth century.

Wittgenstein, and which remains a central philosophical question up to the present day. This issue has come to a head in recent philosophical debates about conceptualism and the possibility of non-conceptual content. For reasons we hope to make clear below, in a preliminary way, and more fully in the body of the dissertation, we believe that this debate brings to the fore the place and function of a phenomenologically oriented account of meaning for contemporary philosophy concerned with perennial questions of the relation between "mind and world," and does so in a way that can contribute to the bridging of the supposed gap between continental and analytic thought today. We now turn to that debate in order to offer a final level of framing for the inquiry that follows in chapters two through five. We will have occasion to make further reference to the contours of this contemporary problem-space in clarifying and showing the relevance of our historical inquiry throughout those subsequent chapters.

III. Systematic Situating of the Project: The Contemporary Debate about Non-conceptual Content

Alongside the renewed discussions of phenomenological aspects of experience and the cognitive turn in the philosophy of mind (as discussed in section one, above), a great interest has arisen in recent philosophy in the role of experiential or perceptual content vis-a-vis our conceptual capacities. The contemporary debate about non-conceptual content is a debate about the possibility, role, and status of the unmediated presentation of experiential content to consciousness, a question typically traced (in this form, at least) to Gareth Evan's posthumously published *The Varieties of Reference*, and greatly reinvigorated by John McDowell's critical discussion of Evans' notion of non-conceptual content in *Mind and World*. This debate brings to the forefront the philosophical issues concerning the relation of language and concepts to experience and thus can be used to clarify the relevance and the place of our inquiry with regard to current philosophical debates. Our discussion here is directed to these ends and is not intended as an exhaustive or definitive account of such debates.

In the literature, the debate about non-conceptual content has come to be framed primarily in terms of the conceptual status of *perceptual* contents. On the conceptualist view, the contents of perceptual experience, insofar as they are epistemically relevant, are exclusively and exhaustively explainable in terms of our concepts. For the conceptualist, it simply makes no sense to talk about an experiential content which is non-conceptual, because it is argued that thought is conceptual "all the way down," and since—to use the Sellarsian language often employed by those taking this position—all representationally significant content must be content existing within the "space of reasons" and thus the space of concepts. On this view, our experiential capacities, insofar as they play a significant and meaningful role in thought, are exhaustively limited by our conceptual capacities. This is often expressed by conceptualists by pointing to Kant's remark that "intuitions without concepts are blind."[23] In Kantian terms, the conceptualist will argue that the spontaneity of the synthetic unity of apperception is *exhaustively* characterized by the bringing of intuitions from sensation (*Sinnlichkeit*) under the concepts of the understanding (*Verstand*), and that there is no sense to be made of intuitions *outside* of their structural organization in the understanding through the mediation of concepts. The Kantian conception of spontaneity is taken to imply that there is no meaningful sense to be made of intuitions outside of or prior to their organization under concepts.

Against this, the non-conceptualist argues that there *is* a sense in which intuitions play a role in cognition outside of their synthesis into conceptual content via the understanding. In other words, the non-conceptualist generally takes the Kantian claim that "intuitions without concepts are blind" to say *only* that sensory experience which remains unconceptualized is not fully rational because non-conceptual, but she does *not* take this to mean that the non-conceptual aspects of experience can play no role whatsoever in cognition. Most versions of the non-conceptualist position rely on some version of the claim that non-conceptual content is necessary as a "rational constraint" upon the exercise of conceptual capacities, since otherwise the exercise

23 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* A 51/B 75.

of our conceptual capacities begins to look like little more than "moves in a self-contained game,"[24] or a version of what John McDowell has influentially criticized as "coherentism," which he claims is "a version of the [Kantian] conception of spontaneity as frictionless, the very thing that makes the idea of the given attractive."[25] One recent defender of such a non-conceptualist position in a specifically Kantian vein is Robert Hanna. In Hanna's formulation,

> non-conceptualism holds that non-conceptual content exists and is representationally significant (i.e. meaningful in the 'semantic' sense of describing or referring to states-of-affairs, properties, or individuals of some sort). More precisely however, non-conceptualism says (a) that there are cognitive capacities which are not determined (or at least not fully determined) by conceptual capacities, and (b) that the cognitive capacities which outstrip conceptual capacities can be possessed by rational and non-rational animals alike, whether human or non-human.[26]

This rough sketch of the basic positions in the contemporary debate regarding non-conceptual content should give some indication of why many of those on both sides of the debate have come to see it in largely Kantian terms. (As with any contentious philosophical issue, there are a variety of nuanced positions which fall at various points between or even outside of these parameters, but this rough rendition of the landscape will be sufficient for our purposes here.) We will have occasion later, in chapter five, to argue for a different sort of non-conceptualist position from a broadly Husserlian phenomenological standpoint, using Husserl's criticism of Kant's transcendental philosophy in light of his own conception of the lifeworld.

It will be useful here to give a brief illustration of what is taken to be at issue in the contemporary debate regarding non-conceptual content, using the commonly cited example of perceptual "fineness of grain": take for example my experience of two red objects, one of which I perceive to be slightly darker and richer in color than the other. Assume for the sake of argument that my conceptual toolbox for shades of red contains only the conceptual capacity to recognize

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24 Cf. the introduction to *Non-Conceptual Aspects of Experience*, Ed. Fossheim, Larsen, and Sageng, esp. 2f.

25 McDowell, *Mind and World*, 14. This is not to suggest that McDowell supports a non-conceptualist position in opposition to such coherentism. As we shall see below, his explicit goal in *Mind and World* is to develop a middle position with regard to spontaneity which avoids *both* coherentism *and* the "myth of the given."

26 Hanna,"Kant and Non-conceptual Content," 248.

(i.e. is limited to the concepts) brick red, blood red, metallic red, and garnet, and no other shades. Assume further that, when shown each of these two red objects independently, I categorize each of them without reservation as "brick red." And yet, when shown the two objects side-by-side, I am able to distinguish between their shades: they do not appear to me to be identical in shade, despite the fact that I have no further color concept in my toolbox according to which they can be differentiated. To put it in the parlance of the contemporary debates, this would seem to suggest, *prima facie*, that the fineness of grain of my perceptual capacities "outstrips" that of my conceptual capacities, since if my perceptual capacities were limited by my conceptual capacities in a straightforward and direct manner, I should not be able to register a *perceptual* color difference for which I have no *conceptual* color difference at the ready.

Now, at first blush our example is far too simple: the conceptualist need only point out that perception can be exhaustively conceptual without being exclusively oriented by concepts of a particular type. Indeed, it seems phenomenologically accurate to say that perceptual experience is *almost never* limited to a single register: when I perceive the two objects (let's assume they are apples), I am not exclusively perceiving colors. I am also perceiving depth, texture, brightness, and a great number of other contextual factors involved in what Husserl would call the *external* horizon of the experience.[27] Because of this great variety of types of simultaneous perceptual content, it is possible to have an adequate conceptual basis for distinguishing a difference in color between the two objects on the basis of a conceptual difference other than that of color concepts as such. Since the difference is to be explained at the level of concepts and thus of rational understanding, we can claim, for example, that I recognize the difference in color because of a perceived difference in darkness, and thereby understand the difference to be one of color which is inferred (albeit in "spontaneity") on the basis of my concept of darkness of shade, in which is included a basic understanding of the relation of darkness of shade to color, but not necessarily any specific conceptual link to any specific shade of red. *Prima facie*, our example is easily

27 See our discussion of this important notion in chapter five, section II.

handled by an adequately rich conceptualist account by means of inferences between different concepts.

But such answers from the conceptualist fail to answer to a deeper problem, one that seems more difficult to deal with within the framework of an exclusively conceptualist notion of perceptual content. To speak again in Kantian terms, since the conceptualist argues that any perceptual difference can be explained by a conceptual difference at the level of the understanding (*Verstand*), she must be able by some *different* criterion to account for the distinction between *perceiving* a difference in color and merely *thinking of one*. If all of our perceptions are necessarily of concepts, upon what basis are we to differentiate those contents which are perceived from those which are thought or imagined? Even if an inference from related concepts is capable of explaining how I can *understand* the difference between the two shades of brick-red apple despite the poverty of my red-color-concepts, we would seem to need a different criteria by which to explain my *perceiving* that difference in the first place; for the perception which *causes* my judgment of the difference in shades cannot be mediated by concepts or inferences from concepts *already*. This is a version of the "coherentist" problem noted above: on this sort of conceptualist account, we seem to be in need of some assurance that the perceived difference in shades of red in our example is not merely that of an "empty concept," a figment of thought with no epistemic relation to an actual intuition related to sensation *(Sinnlichkeit*). Our inference by means of related concepts in order to explain the difference in shades of red for which we previously had no concept can only explain how a new and more nuanced concept of red can be formed by the *understanding* on the basis of other concepts; it cannot explain what *in intuition* caused the need for this new concept in the first place. Without an independent criterion to distinguish experiential difference from conceptual difference in thought, conceptualism would seem to treat of minds in isolation from the world; to amount to a series of "moves in a self-contained game" which could never generate any concepts whose possibility is not already contained implicitly in the logical content of other concepts. On the conceptualist account I seem

only to be able to learn concepts by means of other concepts, and this seems to amount to a rather impoverished conception of the role of experience in knowledge formation. Avoiding this coherentist problem would necessitate the appeal to some criterion that is *not only* epistemically relevant (the condition the conceptualist is most concerned to meet), *but also* unique to intuition as distinguished from mere thought. As Walter Hopp has put this point, "there must be something that the experience possesses that the mere thought lacks, and this feature, far from being a mere sensation that attaches to a propositional content the experience shares with the belief—the sort of thing a conceptualist would, I think rightly, regard as epistemically epiphenomenal anyway—is what distinguishes experience *epistemically*."[28]

But this coherentist objection also means that the non-conceptualist owes us an account of that aspect of experience that is non-conceptual, but in a way that still manages to preserve its status as determinant of *content* in some rationally meaningful way, such that it cannot be dismissed by the conceptualist by objecting that it is a reference to some otherwise unjustified "bare presence." This is of course raises the problem of the "myth of the given." As McDowell characterizes it,

> the idea of the given is the idea that the space of reasons, the space of justifications or warrants, extends more widely than the conceptual sphere. The extra extent of the space of reasons is supposed to allow it to incorporate non-conceptual impacts from outside the realm of thought. But we cannot really understand the relations in virtue of which a judgment is warranted except as relations within the space of concepts: relations such as implication or probabilification, which hold between potential exercises of conceptual capacities. The attempt to extend the scope of justificatory relations outside the conceptual sphere cannot do what it is supposed to do.[29]

In *Mind and World,* McDowell attempts to avoid both the pitfalls of coherentism and the error of the myth of the given while maintaining a conceptualist position in which the "space of reasons" is coextensive with the "conceptual sphere." He does so by arguing that the fact that our

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28 Hopp, "How to Think about Nonconceptual Content," 13-14, emphasis in original.
29 McDowell, *Mind and World*, 7.

experience is passive, a "matter of receptivity in operation," is enough to guarantee the needed rational constraint on spontaneity which avoids the problem of coherentism without going so far in the other direction as to reassert the myth of the given, since "the constraint comes from outside *thinking*, but not from outside what is *thinkable*. When we trace the justifications back, the last thing we come to is still a thinkable content; not something more ultimate than that, a bare pointing to a bit of the Given."[30] McDowell claims to have established a rational constraint upon the spontaneity of the understanding that arises from outside our thinking, but which, insofar as it is still within the sphere of the "thinkable," nonetheless remains within the sphere of the conceptual, and guarantees that our experience is conceptual "all the way down."

But McDowell's avowedly Kantian conceptualist position seems to rely upon the same set of distinctions as Hanna's Kantian non-conceptualism. Hanna claims unequivocally that

> non-conceptual cognitive content in the contemporary sense is, for all philosophical intents and purposes, identical to intuitional cognitive content in Kant's sense. Indeed, in my opinion the contemporary distinction between non-conceptual cognitions and their content, and conceptual cognitions and their content, is essentially the same as Kant's distinction between intuitions and 'concepts' (Begriffe). Correspondingly, if I am correct, then the contemporary distinction between non-conceptual capacities and conceptual capacities is also essentially the same as Kant's cognitively seminal distinction between the 'sensibility' (Sinnlichkeit) and the 'understanding' (Verstand).[31]

On Hanna's reading, the Kantian conception of non-conceptual content can be inferred from Kant's doctrines concerning the a priori character of time and space. He takes his clue for this analysis from an important note in the B edition of the transcendental deduction of the categories, where Kant notes that "Space, represented as an object (as is really required in geometry) contains *more than the mere form of intuition*, namely the putting-together (*Zusammenfassung*) of the manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation, so that the form of intuition (*Form der Anschauung*) merely gives the manifold, but the formal

30 McDowell, *Mind and World*, 29-30.
31 Hanna,"Kant and Non-conceptual Content," 248.

intuition (*formale Anschauung*) gives unity of the representation."32 The important distinction here is that between the "form of intuition" and "formal intuition." Since the forms of intuition require only a subjective unity of consciousness, and not the full *synthetic* unity of apperception, they seem to function coherently at a level of experience that does not necessitate the use of concepts in synthesis (a function of the understanding), and thus they offer a potential way of explaining non-conceptual content within the Kantian framework. Formal intuitions, by contrast, give us the *objective* unity of consciousness, and in order to do so such intuitions function at the level of rational thought, and thereby are in necessary relation to the concepts of the understanding. Thus formal intuitions cannot be said to be fully non-conceptual.33

On this reading, Kant's "forms of intuition" can be seen to have a certain epistemic primacy over "formal intuition," since it is only on the basis of the former that the latter can be established via rational self-consciousness. But at the same time, it is formal intuition which is responsible for the unification of the manifold of intuition and thus necessary for the putting-together (*Zusammenfassung*) of the manifold in the unity of apperception. In other words, the *formal intuition* of time and space, which occurs with the help of rational conceptual capacities, and is thus in some sense dependent on concepts of the understanding, is made possible by space and time as the *forms of intuition*, even as these forms of intuition depend upon formal intuition for the unification of their otherwise disparate manifold. This reflects the distinction that we noted above is demanded of both positions, that between the explanatory conceptual difference in the understanding and the prior difference in intuition on the basis of which we form new concepts.

That epistemic priority should be given to the latter as a non-conceptual aspect of intuition is admitted by Kant himself. The footnote in the B deduction cited above continues,

> ..In the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity [of representation] merely to sensibility, only in order to note that *it precedes all concepts*, though to be sure it presupposes a synthesis,

32 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 160, note.
33 Hanna, "Kant and Non-conceptual Content," 277. Hanna instead calls them "weakly non-conceptual."

> which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. For since through it (as the understanding determines the sensibility) space or time are first given as intuitions, the unity of this *a priori* intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding." 34

The synthesis Kant refers to thus seems to be a synthesis of intuition *epistemically prior to* the fully conceptual synthetic unity of apperception, a "unity which precedes all concepts" despite the fact that the givenness of space and time as the *forms* of intuition can be recognized only at the cognitively higher level of *formal intuition.* Up to this point, the accounts of Hanna and McDowell are similar, and both are in line with the Kantian position described above.

But it is precisely on this point, in the contemporary debate, that McDowell and Hanna part ways: on McDowell's picture, the "unity which precedes all concepts" will be glossed as the *thinkable*, and its "preceding all concepts" understood as "preceding all actual thinking." McDowell will insist that the empirical manifold of space and time amounts to "a constraint from outside *thinking* and *judging*," not "from outside *thinkable contents*."[35] For Hanna, however, Kant's notion of the "unity which precedes all concepts" will be taken as evidence that sensibility, considered theoretically in independence from the understanding, is the locus of non-conceptual content. Space and time as such (as distinguished from the *concepts* of space and time), as the a priori forms of intuition, will uniquely determine non-conceptual content: "what I am asserting on Kant's behalf is that our capacities for spatial and temporal representation constitutively explain non-conceptual content: that is, non-conceptual content is *nothing but* cognitive content that is essentially structured by our a priori representations of phenomenal space and time."[36]

For McDowell, Hanna's position amounts to the claim that space and time constitute a part of the space of reasons that extends beyond the sphere of the concept and is thus a form of the Myth of the Given. Furthermore, since the character of this non-conceptual sphere is defined in terms of the empirical notions of time and space—in Hanna' words, since "to cognize this or

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34 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B160- 161 note, emphasis mine.
35 McDowell, *Mind and World,* 28.
36 Hanna, "Kant and Non-conceptual Content," 278, my emphasis.

that individual material object non-conceptually or intuitionally ... is simply to locate it uniquely here-and-now or there-and-then"—Hanna's position would seem to lead to a particularly pernicious form of the myth which McDowell singles out for special treatment as "bald naturalism," a position that, explicitly or implicitly, leads to a reduction of the mind to the empirical world of natural science. From Hanna's position, by contrast, McDowell's conceptualism must remain a problematic coherentism in which world is ultimately reduced to the concepts pre-existent in the mind. Since the space of reasons has been limited to the conceptual, space and time will be considered only as elements in a closed conceptual system: space and time will have lost their role, *qua* a priori *forms* of intuition, of providing the "friction" by which intuition places rational constraints upon the spontaneity of the understanding. If we take both positions seriously, we would seem to be at an impasse.

Following upon a remark of Steven Crowell's,[37] we want to suggest that this impasse is the result of a refusal *on both sides* to take seriously the conception of *constitution,* a refusal which stems from the rejection of the full importance of the transcendental elements of Kant's thought. McDowell's opposition to "bald naturalism," combined with his insistence on the thoroughgoing conceptuality of experience (albeit "in passivity"), demands from him an alternative conception of nature, one which is not equivalent to the law-bound conception of nature as conceived by modern science.[38] He answers this demand through his discussion of "second nature," which he sees as recovering a conception of nature based upon the Aristotelian conception of the formation of ethical character "that would not stand in the way of a satisfactory conception of experience"[39] since it consists not of the exclusively causal laws of modern science, but of "initiation into conceptual capacities, which include responsiveness to other rational demands besides those of ethics.... If we generalize the way Aristotle conceives the moulding of ethical character, we arrive at the notion of having one's eyes opened to reasons at

37 See the introduction to *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, esp. 13- 19.
38 Cf. McDowell, *Mind and World*, 70- 72.
39 McDowell, *Mind and World,* 91.

large by acquiring a second nature. I cannot think of a good English expression for this, but it is what figures in German philosophy as *Bildung*."[40]

Intriguing as this notion of "second nature is, McDowell does little more than gesture at it by way of vague references to "*Bildung*," "culture," and the like. He goes no further in the direction of *explaining* the way this second nature functions in relating mind and world except to say that it replaces the "bald naturalist" conception, and tellingly, after speaking throughout almost the entire book in terms of "mind" and "thought," to suggest in the final pages that that the notion of *Bildung* is best understood in terms of the learning of *language.*[41] As Crowell notes, what McDowell is avoiding is any account of the *constitution* of meaning. He cannot go any further in the explanation of the way meaning comes about than the rough analogy of initiation into linguistic norms because his commitment to a Sellarsian, linguistically-oriented conceptualism leave him nowhere else to go.[42] If meaning is taken to be equivalent to conceptuality, and conceptuality is to be explained exclusively by reference to features of our language (and perhaps also including our linguistic practices), then an account of the meaningfulness of our experience can amount to nothing more than an account of linguistic norms.

But we need not share all of McDowell's commitments in order to recognize the important role intended to be played by what he calls "second nature." And if we do not share those additional commitments about language and conceptualism, the way remains open for filling out an account of the givenness of meaning that recognizes McDowell's insights without reducing the meaningfulness of conscious experience to systems of concepts and the use of words. As Crowell points out, in a passage worth quoting at length,

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40 McDowell, *Mind and World*, 84.

41 McDowell claims, for instance, "human beings mature into being at home in the space of reasons, or, what comes to the same thing, living their lives in the world; we can make sense of that by noting that the language into which a human being is first initiated stands over against her as a prior embodiment of mindedness, of the possibility of an orientation to the world" (*Mind and World*, 125).

42 For more on this point, see Gail Soffer's critique of Sellar's position against non-linguistic intentionality in "Revisiting the Myth: Husserl and Sellars on the Given."

> Assuming that if a constitutive account is not a naturalistic "explaining away" of the space of meaning there is not much else it *could* be, McDowell suggests that there is no "constructive account of what responsiveness to meaning is" beyond simple reference to "the fact that normal human maturation includes the acquisition of a second nature, which involves responsiveness to meaning.... Like Rorty, he believes that such questions only arise against "an assumed background that is supposed to make them urgent," a background that *his* notion of second nature aims precisely to dislodge. The phenomenologist must insist, however, that *her* interest in the constitution of meaning is not anxiously motivated by a background gap between reason and nature, but precisely by a *reflective* interest in getting clear about how the space of meaning, the successor to that bad picture of the world, is structured in its details. This is a task for constitutive transcendental phenomenology, not for those sciences of the "world" that investigate things appearing *within* the space of meaning. Without it, McDowell's Aristotelian conception of nature comes off as little more than a deus ex machina compared with the well-wrought conception of meaningless "nature" established by natural science.[43]

While McDowell is right to insist on a conception of the experiential world as much more than the scientific world of causal laws, his conceptualist and linguistic commitments, paired with a "quietism" he derives from Wittgenstein, which refuses to make any positive or constructive philosophical claims, leads him to reject the possibility of offering an account of meaning constitution for fear of falling into bad idealism.

But the necessity of this position begins to look questionable when we note that the idealism McDowell presumably wishes to avoid is a version of "the theory that declares the existence of objects in space outside us to be either merely doubtful and indemonstrable, or else false and impossible,"[44] the very form of idealism Kant *himself* attacks in his "Refutation of Idealism" and the very same bad form of idealism which Kant's *transcendental* idealism is intended to correct via an analysis of the *constitution* of the world according to the rules set by a transcendental logic. It begins to look as if McDowell's quietism with regard to a constitutional theory of experience is as much a result of his Strawsonian, de-transcendentalized reading of Kant as it is of a deep Wittgensteinian conviction. Indeed, as we shall show in chapter four of this dissertation, McDowell's apparent assumption that there can be nothing of epistemological relevance *between* the fully-conceptual space of reasons (expanded to include his "second

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43 Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, 17.
44 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B274.

nature") and the empirical-causal laws of natural science is one which Wittgenstein does not share, a point which—revealingly—comes out particularly strongly in the latter's discussions of "phenomenology."

But the *role* McDowell's notion of second nature is intended to play vis-a-vis the natural-scientific conception of nature is nonetheless of the utmost importance. It is precisely the attempt to further explicate the structure and function of this space, when conceived as the space of meaning or of reason in the *broad sense* in which these are *not* limited to the conceptual sphere but at the same time are not the "givens" of natural science, that is the purpose of a transcendental constitutional theory. The challenge is to further explicate how this "middle" space, which we have been calling the "phenomenological dimension of meaning," is possible, insofar as it is neither the space of concepts, nor that of natural-scientific or causal laws. To further illustrate this, we can now give a preliminary indication of the contrast between the type of non-conceptualist position we would envision and Hanna's non-conceptualist position.

As we saw above, Hanna insists that non-conceptual content is "*nothing but* cognitive content that is essentially structured by our a priori representations of phenomenal space and time." In his paper this claim is immediately followed by a qualification carefully limiting its scope:

> *by this thesis I do not mean that the sensory qualitative content of non-conceptual cognition is to be explained in this way, but rather only that the representational content of non-conceptual cognition is to be so explained.* In particular then, Kant is saying that what determines our cognitive reference to the uniquely individual material objects of empirical non-conceptual or intuitional representations, are the spatiotemporal features of those representations alone. To cognize this or that individual material object non-conceptually or intuitionally ... is simply to locate it uniquely here-and-now or there-and-then. As the real estate agents say: it's all about location.45

This qualification is of the utmost importance. What Hanna's explanation of a Kantian account of non-conceptual content is meant to accomplish is *not* the explanation of the character of sensations outside of their relation to consciousness via intuition (presumably an impossible task

45 Hanna, "Kant and Non-conceptual Content," 278, my emphasis.

on the Kantian account), but only the *representational* character—the *content*—of the non-conceptual cognition in intuition. Hanna is pointing to the distinction between the *object* of an empirical intuition and the *content* of that intuition. This allows us to distinguish between the (potentially) truth-bearing function of the *Vorstellung* ("representation," or better, "presentation") for cognition, and the truth-making function of the *perception* (what McDowell called "friction") against the spontaneity of the understanding. And this account would seem to fit with our everyday experience of the world, in which it seems odd to say that we *experience* concepts: when I fall down the stairs it is surely not the *concept* stairs that causes me pain. The *content* of our experience can be expressed conceptually, but the concept is not the same as the experience; the state-of-affairs our concepts allow us to represent is independent of their representation via concepts. On Hanna's reading of Kant, the non-conceptual cognitive content of perceptions and the conceptual content of proposition and utterance are necessarily distinct. This much of Hanna's account seems to us perfectly correct.

But given Hanna's distinction between the qualitative character of experience (which his conception of non-conceptual content does *not explain*) and the non-conceptual representational content of the experience, it seems the way is blocked to any explanation of the move from the qualitative character of the empirical object to the account of its content. While the empirical object certainly plays a *necessary role* in the presentation of the content (this is what distinguishes it from mere presentations in thought, and makes Kant a transcendental idealist *but also* an empirical realist), that object alone, independent of concepts in the understanding, is not *sufficient* warrant to conclude anything about the specific representational content of the perception. If we assume that the empirical object gives us content *directly,* we have fallen into a direct realism and thereby a version of the myth of the given by incorporating "non-conceptual impacts from outside the realm of thought."[46] On the other hand, if we refuse to give any explanation of the sensory qualitative aspect of the non-conceptual content, but nonetheless arrive at an explanation of

46 McDowell, *Mind and World*, 7.

representational non-conceptual content in cognition, then we have shown at best only that qualitative non-conceptual content somehow causes representational non-conceptual content, but we have blocked the way to an explanation of how this might occur.[47]

Thus, in the passage above, when Hanna goes on to conclude that "what determines our cognitive reference to the uniquely individual material objects of empirical non-conceptual or intuitional representations, are the spatiotemporal features of those representations *alone*," he limits the determining role of the content to the mode of spatiotemporal givenness belonging to the *object*. In other words, he takes the claim that the content of perception arises *via* space and time as the a priori forms of intuition to mean also that the content of non-conceptual intuition can amount to *nothing more* than characteristics directly dependent upon the spatiotemporal character of the representation. In Hanna's own words, "To cognize this or that individual material object non-conceptually or intuitionally ... is *simply* to locate it uniquely here-and-now or there-and-then... it's *all about* location." In considering the origin of non-conceptual content exclusively in terms of the a priori forms of time and space, Hanna assumes that what is determinate of the specific non-conceptual character of a given perception can be nothing other than the "representational" character of the intuition derived from the empirical object and its spatiotemporal environs.

But this is no less a vague gesturing than McDowell's conception of second nature, and on the basis of Hanna's account—assuming it is *not i*ntended as a non-conceptualist version of "bald naturalism—it is hard to see what further explanatory power his model of non-conceptual content could have except to claim that experience provides a non-conceptual "fodder" which becomes meaningful only upon conceptualization. Since the non-conceptual representational content is supposed to be explained only by reference to "spatiotemporal features of those representations alone," to unique locations "here-and-now or there-and-then," the upshot of

47 This would seem to be a version of the position McDowell critiques as Davidson's conception that "experience can be nothing but an extra-conceptual impact on sensibility" (see *Mind and World*, 14), but a discussion of this critique is outside our scope here.

Hanna's non-conceptualism seems to amount to nothing more than the claim that the spatiotemporal character of experience somehow affects our concepts. From the transcendental phenomenological perspective, this sounds much more like a starting point for inquiry than a hard-won epistemological insight. In Hanna's account, as in McDowell's, any substantive account of the *constitution* of meaning has been scrupulously avoided, and the task of explaining the way in which meaning *comes to be* in experience has been ignored.

We have been suggesting that a constitutional approach can help to show the way in which non-conceptual elements of immediate experience play a crucial role in knowledge and cognition which is not simply that of providing the shapeless "fodder" for subsequent conceptual cognition, and that it can do so through further explication of the structure and role of the phenomenological dimension of meaning. But here an important objection can be raised against our position, one which, as we shall see in the final chapter of the dissertation, is raised by Wittgenstein with regard to his *own* conception of phenomenology and by commentators on Wittgenstein and Husserl alike: even if we grant that the project of constitution theory—the further explication of the phenomenological dimension of meaning—is desirable, this is not yet to say that it is *possible*. For making that claim would seem to assume an ability to use language and concepts to get at something *outside* language and concepts. As one commentator has put it in a critique of Husserl's late conception of "prepredicative experience" (examined in our chapter five),

> All that we can say is that there *is* experience. Judgment is the judgment of something, the form is the form of something. However, when we wish to study it, we can only study it as fully formed, study it as moulded by predicative thought. … We can never in the end distinguish between the essential features of this structure which arise from our thought and language and the essential features which arise from something independent of it For if we could do so, this would be to suppose an independent or external position, outside of all thought or language, which is impossible.[48]

The objection can be framed in terms of a distinction commonly used to differentiate approaches to language (and also to logic) in the twentieth century: does language function—as the later

48 Harrison, "The Concept of Prepredicative Experience," 106- 107.

Wittgenstein would have it—as a "universal medium," outside of which there is simply nothing to be said, or does it function—as it seems to for the later Husserl—as a "calculus," a tool by which we can explicate aspects of the world or of experience outside their structuration by our language and concepts? And if the latter is the case, *how* is this possible? What would it mean to explicate the phenomenological dimension of meaning "outside" of language or concepts?

It is because of this important objection that we suggested in section one above that our inquiry into the phenomenological dimension of meaning would also necessarily involve an inquiry into the relationship between meaning, language, and concepts. In short, we shall see in our final chapter that Husserl and Wittgenstein come down on opposite sides of the language-as-calculus vs. language-as-universal-medium distinction. Husserl develops a compelling account by which non-conceptual, pre-predicative elements of our experience play a role in the constitution of meaning through their *orienting* function: while not providing a content proper, they nonetheless play a role in *directing or leading* our judgment, and thus contribute to the determination of meaning. This is made possible by Husserl's unique conception of meaning-as-correlation and the related notion of the phenomenological method as a following of "transcendental clues" (discussed in chapter four), a conception finally worked out in his late genetic phenomenology in his own "transcendental aesthetic" of levels of passive synthesis oriented *non-conceptually* by means of predicative types and intentional horizons (in chapter five).

In the late 20s and early 30's, Wittgenstein also briefly flirted with the language-as-calculus view, envisioning his project as the development of a "phenomenological language" capable of directly describing immediate first-person experience (this is discussed in chapter four). He later rejected this notion as impossible, and in his later thought (chapter five) he clearly thinks that there is nothing meaningful to be said about anything outside the space defined by our systems of "language games." But—to foreshadow a rather complicated point all-too-briefly—he also contends that language games, and even the seemingly fixed logical rules by which they are

played, are ultimately fluid and that the boundary between them is changeable. And this *shows* (without representing or explaining) the importance of a dimension outside the boundaries of linguistic meaning which is necessary to the very structure of the meaningful, since the space of *possible* language games, defined by the notion of a "form of life," must be greater than the space of *actual* language games. Thus, while Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of a constitutional *theory*, of an *explication* of the phenomenological dimension of meaning, his own position shows that he—like Husserl—takes such a dimension to be not only possible, but necessary for a complete account of meaning.

In this section, we have appealed to the contemporary debate about non-conceptual content and an (all too brief) discussion of some conceptualist and non-conceptualist positions to demonstrate the way in which an account of meaning which acknowledges an intrinsic phenomenological dimension can offer a more robust account of the role of experience with regard to meaning. But what further justification can we offer for ultimately preferring our own position to ones which would reject the notion of anything like a phenomenological dimension which is neither the realm of the conceptual nor the realm of natural-scientific facts? If we admit that those other theories of meaning seem *internally* coherent—as we should expect from a set of positions that have been hashed out and refined in philosophical journals for decades—and find our own position equally coherent and defensible, does the issue ultimately amount to a toss-up for the reader, to two equally well-justified but mutually inconsistent views of the nature of meaning? If we wish to engage the contemporary debates from a transcendental-phenomenological standpoint, what appeal can we give to favor our own position over the much-entrenched, mainstream conception of the theory of meaning today?

From the perspective of our own position, at least, one further appeal is possible: the appeal to the tribunal of experience –not merely to the *concept* of experience, but to our lived reality as members of a society, a culture, and a world. Against those skeptical of the notion of a phenomenological dimension of meaning, we can only make further appeal to the lifeworld and

our forms of life. And to assert that such an appeal is possible and warranted is nothing more than to reassert our thesis noted above: *that our conscious life amounts to much more than our capacity to use language or navigate schemes of concepts, because the meaningfulness of our experience outstrips the meaning of our words and the content of our concepts.*

IV. Chapter-by-chapter Overview of the Dissertation

So far, this chapter has been dedicated to the clarification of our terminology, a discussion of the basic theoretical framing of the project, and further situating of the project in historical context and in terms of some contemporary issues. We turn now to a brief chapter-by-chapter summary of the narrative to be traced in the subsequent chapters. This is followed by a very brief clarification of the hybrid systematic-historical approach of our inquiry, which completes our framing of the project and leads to the historical inquiry of chapters two through five.

The turn to a new transcendental logic discussed in section II above intersects with the early period of the "linguistic turn" in twentieth century philosophy. While the notion of transcendental logic certainly predates Wittgenstein and Husserl, the specific focus on the role of *language* in conceiving the limits of possible meaning became a foremost concern around the time of their early work. This work also manifests dedication to a very strong notion of a priori logic developed in reaction to psychologism. These two questions—that of the role of language with regard to meaning and that of the a priori status of meaning—lie at the root of the flourishing of the inquiry into meaning in the twentieth century and form the historical starting point of our inquiry in the following chapter.

Thus we begin chapter two with a discussion of the strict a priori conceptions of logic in the early thought of Husserl and Wittgenstein in order to show the implications of their shared anti-psychologism for these positions and the problematic accounts of meaning that arise for each as a result. In seeking to guarantee the objectivity of logic by assigning a pure a priori status to both it and—in line with a Kantian transcendental logic—the structure of possible meaning

content, both authors problematically conceive of meaning in a way that is "closed off" from everyday experience in the world, and thus do not give adequate consideration to the act of judgment and the role of subjective experience in determining the structure of meaning.

Husserl conceives of meaning in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations* in terms of fixed "species" "instantiated" in individual acts. Although he allows for variety in the manner of this instantiation through his account of the *quality* of individual subjective acts, the instantiated ideal entities still appear to be something akin to Frege's infamous *Gedanken* subsisting in the "third realm." In shifting the focus away from an a posteriori psychologism and toward something that looks more like an a priori Platonism, Husserl has in effect moved too far in the opposite direction, isolating his account of meaning from any point of contact with the experiential world, such that lived experience amounts to little more than the canvas upon which meanings arising exclusively from the side of the a priori are "instantiated." In Wittgenstein's conception of meaning in the *Tractatus*, such contact with the experiential world is maintained, since for him the a priori status of logic is explained by means of atomic "Objects" which contribute only logical form and are dependent upon the facts of the world for their content. But Wittgenstein's early theory conceals a related problem: behind his notion of the relation of meaning to the facts of the world by means of the simple mechanism of "projection" lies an unclarified conception of the way the logical material of a posteriori facts can be determinant of meanings at the "prior" level of possibility. The *Tractatus*' explicitly transcendental account of logic and his doctrine of the non-interdependence of possible states of affairs together demand an account of meaning content arising independently of the contingent facts of the world, something that cannot be provided by a priori objects that contribute only logical *form*. Wittgenstein's solution to this transcendental problematic in the *Tractatus* is his vague gesturing toward *the mystical*, which consists not of facts but of "feeling the world as a limited whole [*begrenztes Ganzes*]" (TLP 6.45), not the *how* of the meaningful word but "that it exists." We argue at the close of chapter two that the problems noted in the early theories of

meaning of Husserl and Wittgenstein are in effect two sides of the same coin: both sets of problems result from the attempt to conceive of meaning independently of its epistemological relationship to subjective intentional experience; to that aspect of experiential life which is not captured by the analysis of a posteriori empirical facts. Doing justice to the relationship of meaning to lived experience is thus the first step toward an account of meaning that incorporates its phenomenological dimension.

In chapter three, we begin with a discussion of the use of the concept of *Vorstellung* for Husserl and Frege, and use this to illustrate our claim above that what distinguishes the Husserlian-phenomenological approach to meaning and knowledge from the more common Fregean-analytic approach is the explanatory priority given by the latter to the *content* of judgment and by the former to the *act* of judging and its structure. Of these two, only the Husserlian approach allows for a robust account of the phenomenological dimension of meaning. We go on to show how both Husserl and Wittgenstein begin to move in such a direction as a result of the problems discussed in the previous chapter, making important changes in their subsequent theories of meaning.

For Husserl the problem of the relation of ideal meaning to experience is resolved by the new *correlational* account of meaning and the re-conceptualization of the "ideal meaning species" as *essence* in the second edition of the *Logical Investigations*. An examination of Wittgenstein's important transitional essay "Some Remarks on Logical Form" and his subsequent *Philosophical Remarks* show him revising his earlier mechanistic conception of "projection," resulting in a new account which better respects the role of intentionality by including as elements internal to the meaning-world relation both the proposition projected *and the rules of its projection*. This marks the beginning of Wittgenstein's gradual move away from the *Tractatus'* strict a priori conception of *logical form* and toward the later conception of *logical grammar.* At the end of the chapter, we examine in greater depth Husserl's development of the concepts of the phenomenological reduction and the *Wesensschau* in an important lecture course that occurred

midway between the first and second editions of the *Logical Investigations.* This allows us to more fully explicate the theoretical shifts discussed earlier in the chapter, and paves the way for our discussion of Husserl's *Ideas I* in the following chapter. In chapter three we trace the path by which both authors move away from a relatively strict, "closed" a priorism regarding meaning toward an account oriented more closely to lived experience.

Chapter four takes up a further difficulty which remains on the basis of these conceptions. Although both Husserl and Wittgenstein have modified their conceptions of meaning to take account of important aspects of intentional experience, this notion of experience cannot be explained exclusively in terms of the naturalistic and psychologistic conception of the a posteriori realm of empirical facts. Since the ultimate concern (reflecting again our historical starting point in a rethinking of Kant's transcendental logic) is not just actual but *possible* meaning, the relationship of experience and meaning cannot be explained exclusively by means of scientific observations of empirical *facts*, since these will generate only *actual*, and not *possible* meanings. The phenomenological dimension of experience is not equivalent to the totality of empirical facts. This insight is shown to be central to both of our authors: In Wittgenstein's thought in the mid-thirties, immediate experience is explicitly conceived as a *phenomenological* dimension of *possibility*, which is contrasted with the world of scientific-empirical facts, of *actuality*: "Physics differs from phenomenology in that it is concerned to establish laws. Phenomenology only establishes the possibilities. Thus, phenomenology would be the grammar of the description of those facts on which physics builds its theories" (PR § 1). The relation of the conception of possibility to the developing conception of grammar is the central task of Wittgenstein's famed "phenomenological" period, and, we argue, it relies largely on a distinction between the *empirical* (in the sense of physics) and the properly *experiential*.

In the parallel middle period in the development of Husserl's phenomenology,[49] the

49 What we are tracing as parallel developments in the thought of Husserl and Wittgenstein do not occur along precisely the same time frame. As we are considering them, Husserl's middle period, the period

account of meaning possibility is developed by means of an engagement with the Kantian account of the synthetic a priori. Where Wittgenstein differentiates the empirical and the *experiential* a posteriori, Husserl replaces Kant's synthetic a priori with his own notion of a *material* a priori, and re-conceives it as a dimension not so much preceding experience as *exceeding* it, involving elements which transcend our conceptual grasp of the intentional object and which can be differentiated into distinct *material regions*. This re-conceptualization of the a priori as containing a "transcendental clue" works in tandem with the newly developed account of meaning as noesis-noema correlation as an answer to the Kantian problem of explaining the a priori *possibility* of the subsumption of additional cases under a given concept which are not analytically contained *within* the concept, a problem whose continued importance is manifested in today's debates about the role and status of non-conceptual content.

These developments evidence in both thinkers a new concern with *temporality,* or what phenomenologists call *genetic* (as opposed to exclusively *static*) meaning analysis. It becomes increasingly important for both Husserl and Wittgenstein to account for the fact that the structures of meaning that make possible a shared meaningful world might themselves change, and thus cannot be exclusively explained by means of a static a priori system. The earlier rejection of the Kantian conception of the categories in favor of a new transcendental logic has culminated in a rejection of the notion of a *fixed* transcendental logic. But both authors also come to realize that the element of undetermined possibility in meaning cannot be exhaustively explained by appeal to an a posteriori conceived exclusively as an exterior realm of empirical *facts* explained on the model of *representation* (this was the problem with Frege's account of *Vorstellung*, which is discussed at the beginning of chapter three). This results in the recognition of a dimension of

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of the transcendental turn, begins around 1907 and culminates in the mid to late- twenties, whereas Wittgenstein's middle "phenomenological period" does not begin until around 1929. Since our purpose is a broader argument illustrated by certain parallel developments in their thought, and not a straightforward historical account of their development in context, and since, as far as we know, the two figures had no direct contact with each other and no *direct* knowledge of each others' work, we feel we are justified in ignoring this slight historical gap.

experience critical to the theory of meaning but not describable in natural-scientific terms. Wittgenstein flirts with—and eventually rejects—the idea of a "phenomenological language" for the description of this dimension, but its indescribability does not lead him to deny the dimension's existence, as is shown in the conversations with Schlick and Waismann, where phenomenology is explicitly discussed with reference to Husserl and the Kantian a priori. Husserl explicitly takes on the task of the description of the phenomenological dimension of meaning in his project of re-conceptualizing and expanding the Kantian "Transcendental Aesthetic" as the realm of transcendental meaning constitution. This difference in their conceptions of the *describability* of the phenomenological dimension will be at the heart of the differences between Husserl's *lifeworld* and Wittgenstein's notion of *form of life.*

In chapter five, we turn to these two strikingly similar conceptions of the phenomenological dimension of meaning, and show how the increasing "opening up" of the a priori, the turn toward the role of experience in meaning, culminates in both philosophers in a focus on the practices of everyday life. In Wittgenstein's thought in the *Philosophical Investigations* and especially in his subsequent unpublished writings, this takes the form of an account of praxis rooted in a "form of life." This form of life has a formal structure, in that it is always founded on sets of certainties manifested in our everyday praxis, but these certainties are not traditional foundational concepts, since their content is not fixed and the borderline between those propositions which refer to them as a priori logical constants and those which refer to contingent aspects of lived experience is *itself* fluid. Wittgenstein thus succeeds in formally demonstrating the necessity of an underlying structure of *meaningfulness*—a phenomenological dimension necessary *for* meaning—while refusing to grant that we can sensibly talk about specific *meanings* extending beyond the language and concepts through which we refer to them. He thus insists upon the infinite revisability of the distinction between a priori logical laws and a posteriori observations of experience, while simultaneously grounding his account *formally* in the notion of a *form of life* as a condition of the possibility of meaning and language.

For Husserl, the path to the phenomenological dimension of meaning culminates in lifeworld phenomenology, where the relation of immediate experience to meaning is ultimately grounded in the account of pre-predicative "types" which function in a middle position between mere intuition and fully-conceptual knowledge. On our interpretation, Husserl's transcendental constitutional theory, completed with the notion of pre-predicative types, allows him to systematically define the role of non-conceptual elements of experience in a way that does not reduce their role to that of mere "fodder" for subsequent conceptualization. This is explained through an interpretation of types functioning in tandem with Husserl's long-held notion of the directionally determinate "weight of experience" [*Erfahrungsgewicht*], which together help to determine the directionality of the intentional gaze by means of the intentional object's internal and external anticipatory horizons. This anticipatory structure fulfills a directional, orienting role but is not directly determinant of the conceptual content of the intended object. This set of structures thus offers one example of an account of the non-conceptual content of experience that avoids the problems with the "fodder" view discussed above. This also explains Husserl's conception of the role of language in the "sedimentation" of past meaning structures as an aid to the determination—but never an exhaustive prescription—of the horizons of future experience. Language plays a necessary role in the structure of meaning content while remaining dependent upon the pre-predicative meanings of the lifeworld. This is suggestive of the way we should see language and the phenomenological dimension of meaning: as necessary and necessarily related elements of a robust theory of meaning.

Both Husserl and Wittgenstein are thus shown to arrive at final conceptions of meaning founded in the inexact, non-linguistic, phenomenological dimension of experiential life, despite their radically divergent conceptions of this founding relation resulting from their opposed conceptions of the relationship of meaning to language. For Wittgenstein, language remains a "universal medium," and outside of it there is nothing meaningful to be *said,* but the ultimate rootedness of our language games in the meaningful activities of our form of life is nonetheless

shown in our everyday praxis. For Husserl, language functions as a "calculus" which allows us to grasp specific meanings with conceptual exactness, despite meaning's pre-conceptual origination in the flux and vagueness of the everyday lifeworld. But in neither case is the characteristic vagueness and incomplete demonstrability of the phenomenological dimension considered a detriment; what appears from the standpoint of conceptual analysis or natural-scientific examination to be an undesirable inexactness is not the result of a lack of logical or analytical rigor, but of a recognition of certain *phenomenological* insights into meaning, insights ultimately justified not by further strategies of analysis or experimental observation but by earnest appeal to the tribunal of experience; to the basic meaningfulness that characterizes our conscious life. This is the ultimate significance of the phenomenological dimension of the theory of meaning: it allows us to ground an account of meaning in the inexact paradigm of human experience instead of the inappropriately exact paradigm of third-person scientific knowledge of an exact world.

V. A Final Word on our Systematic-Historical Approach

Past comparisons of Husserl and Wittgenstein have tended to focus exclusively on theories of meaning in their respective early works, on notions such as normativity, practice and culture as elements of Husserl's theory of the *Lebenswelt* and Wittgenstein's notion of *Lebensform* in their respective later works, or on comparisons of their work by means of a third figure such as Frege or Kant. Although all of these points of theoretical overlap play a role in our thesis and are not ignored, our overall focus, as should be clear from above summary, is not a comprehensive historical comparison of Wittgenstein and Husserl, but an analysis of the development of a specific aspect of their work in order to assess the relation between meaning, experience, and language and to argue for the inclusion of a "phenomenological dimension" in theories of meaning.

In service of this goal, the theme of the following chapters of the dissertation, though they are primarily historical in their orientation, is not a systematic overview the philosophical

themes developed by our authors in a given work or period, but rather a selective presentation of key elements of their accounts important for our thesis. Consequently, as we proceed historically through the developing thought of Husserl and Wittgenstein in these chapters, some elements will be covered in a degree of detail not common in the usual commentaries, whereas other elements for which one might expect extensive discussion will be left largely untouched. The justification for our selective treatment can only become apparent to the reader in the context of our larger thesis. The systematic elements not directly relevant to, and thus not covered in our account are already examined in the enormous historical and philosophical literature available on both Husserl and Wittgenstein, which we have attempted to consult to the fullest extent possible, but which we make no claim to have surveyed exhaustively. We will of necessity point to some of this literature in our own discussion, and it has deeply influenced the views presented here, but our primary intent will remain less a direct engagement with the views of the commentators than a fruitful engagement with the original ideas of our authors in pursuit of our broader inquiry into the phenomenological dimension of meaning. Along these lines, the dissertation is conceived as a *philosophical* examination of the role of the phenomenological dimension of the theory of meaning undertaken through the lens of an *historical* study of some parallel developments in two paramount theories of meaning which began in the early twentieth century as attempts to explain the possibility of meaning by means of a transcendental logic.

Chapter Two: Beginnings in Transcendental Logic

We begin the historical facet of our inquiry in this chapter through a selective presentation of ideas and concepts from Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus.* Far from an exhaustive inquiry or even overview of those works, we seek only to emphasize those ideas that mark the critical presuppositions and theoretical starting points for the development of their respective conceptions of the phenomenological dimension of meaning. Though we have striven to make ours an independently coherent narrative, the sheer size of Husserl's early master work (869 pages in the English translation) and the notorious terseness and compaction of Wittgenstein's make this an ultimately unfulfillable task. We have therefore opted especially in this chapter but also to a lesser degree in subsequent ones to limit to the footnotes discussions theoretically relevant to our inquiry but too far astray from our principal topic to merit inclusion in the main text. The reader basically familiar with our authors can safely pass over these notes, but may find it useful to turn to them for further clarification of certain points.

The early philosophies of Husserl and Wittgenstein were developed in fidelity to a conception of logic very strongly a priori in its orientation, which arose as a result of the reaction against psychologism at the end of the nineteenth century. This conception of logic had important consequences for other areas in their philosophical thought, especially those concerned with language and meaning, ultimately resulting in conceptions of the a priori formal ideality of meaning that we will argue in each case led to epistemologically problematic conceptions of the relation of ideal meaning to the world. A careful laying out of the basic schematic elements of these theories of meaning in this chapter will allow us to expose the epistemological weaknesses we see in the early Husserlian and Wittgensteinian positions in a more exact manner and will lay the groundwork for our account of the subsequent revisions to the Husserlian and Wittgensteinian theories of meaning taken up in the following chapters. This overview will also give us occasion to further illustrate, as we suggested in a preliminary way in our introductory chapter, the way in

which these early conceptions of logic already manifest preoccupations with the Kantian conception of *transcendental* logic as the ultimate level of appeal in the analysis of the conditions of the possibility of meaning. The subsequent revisions to our authors' theories of meaning will be shown in subsequent chapters to have developed in tandem with a constant rethinking of the role and limits of transcendental logic in opposition to psychological-anthropological conceptions of its grounding.

I. The Critique of Psychologism as an Insufficient Theory for the Founding of Pure Logic

As we noted in our brief sketch of the historical background in the previous chapter, psychologism came to prominence in the latter half of the nineteenth century as part of a general turn in philosophy toward naturalism and empiricism in reaction to German Idealism, which had reached its high point in the first decades of the century. Against Idealism, such philosophies tended in their most extreme form toward a realist rejection of any notion of non-physical objects as the ultimate explanation of phenomena, and insisted that any seemingly non-physical objects of knowledge (e.g. numbers, thoughts, logical principles, etc.) had ultimately to be explained through reference to spatio-temporal occurrences in relation to physical objects or "psycho-physical" mental occurrences.

Along these lines, the laws of logic, as "laws of thought," were to be understood as principles derived from the study of "psychic acts" of judging, inferring, knowing, etc., and logic, as well as other formal disciplines such as mathematics and ultimately even philosophy generally, was to be understood as ultimately derivable from, and therefore dependent upon, such psychology. The laws of arithmetic, for example, were, following J.S. Mill's *A System of Logic* (1843), to be considered as general laws inferred from multiple individual acts of the judgment of numbers. Husserl himself arguably held some version of such a psychologistic view of number in his *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891), where he expounded a philosophical account of number developed during his graduate studies (not in philosophy but in mathematics, primarily with the

Austrian mathematicians Karl Weierstrass and Leo Koenigsberger) and using the "theory of intentionality" developed by his teacher in philosophy and psychology at the time, Franz Brentano. According to Brentano's theory of intentionality (to cite only the *locus classicus*),

> Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.[50]

In his *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, Husserl used this conception to approach the philosophical analysis of the concept of number through an analysis of the intentional states of the subject using numbers in instances of mental *acts*—what Brentano refers to above as "mental phenomena" [*Psychische Phänomen*]—such as counting, adding, etc.[51] Beginning with the analyses of concrete mental representations of small, intuitively graspable finite numbers, Husserl sought to then extend the field of numbers to include very large and infinite numbers by means of arithmetical equations and symbolism.[52]

But at this point in Husserl's career, his intentional inquiry seems also to have been psychologistic, since the analysis of such mental acts involved in the use of number was still approached within a naturalistically-concieved mentalist framework. Frege famously critiqued Husserl's book for these psychologistic tendencies,[53] although the degree to which the book should be considered fully psychologistic in its conception of logic remains a matter of scholarly debate.[54]

One appeal of the psychologistic position that contributed to its rise in popularity in the

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50 Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 88–89.
51 Cf. Hartimo, "Husserl's Prolegomena," 124-27.
52 Hartimo, "Husserl's Prolegomena," 125.
53 Frege, "Rezension von E. Husserl, *Philosophie der Arithmetik*."
54 J. N. Mohanty, for example, has claimed that this work exhibits at the most only a "weak psychologism" since Husserl holds, at most, that psychological inquiry into thought processes is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for establishing the foundations of logic. See Mohanty, *Husserl and Frege*, 20-22.

second half of the nineteenth century may have its potential to offer a way out of the dilemma in philosophical logic between conventionalism and strict logical realism: roughly put, the conventionalist will claim that there could be other systems of logic than our own, which is merely contingent or accidental, but is then hard-pressed to find any specific criteria to back up her claim to such alternate possibility, whereas the realist will insist that the laws of logic are the necessary laws or structures governing the real world, but will find it difficult to convincingly demonstrate this necessity without presupposing the necessity of the very principles he has set out to prove. The psychologistic logician, by contrast, attempts to bypass the dilemma by insisting that logical laws are subjective laws of thought; neither real and necessary conditions "out there," in the world, nor mere conventions resulting from decisions on our part. In this way, the psychologistic position takes up the *basic* movement of Kant's Copernican turn to the subject in accounting for knowledge, but without making the crucial distinction between things-in-themselves and *Vorstellungen* and thus remaining within an ultimately naive-realist conception of nature and the world.[55]

But this means, for example, that, in a psychologistic conception of logical phenomena such as number (and the theory of number was considered at that time, at least in the context of the logicist project, to be an essentially logical, if also—questionably—psychological affair), there is no firm distinction between the presentation of the object to the subject on the one hand and the object which is thereby presented on the other, such that everything, not merely objects but also the concepts they present to the mind, are ultimately treated in an undifferentiated manner as mere presentations (in the common German vocabulary of the time, *Vorstellungen*) in the mind.[56] In terms of the theory of meaning as understood in German philosophy in Husserl's day, this means the lack of a distinction between *sense* [*Sinn*] and the *presentation* [*Vorstellung*]

55 Cf. Brockhaus, *Pulling up the Ladder,* 73-74.
56 Mohanty, *Husserl and Frege,* 18- 19.

of that sense,[57] and this will ultimately mean that such a psychologistic position has left itself no way of distinguishing between the situation in which something is *taken to be true* and the situation in which it a*ctually is true*.

On such a conception, logical and arithmetical laws like "2 + 2 = 4" are to be explained as inductively arrived at on the basis of the totality of my mental *Vorstellungen*, understood as the individual "mental phenomena" to which a given proposition refers. This means that there is no additional *Sinn* to "2 + 2 = 4" to which we can appeal independently of the particular presentations of mental phenomena which arise in each act of thinking them. The law or equation will be true simply because I have inferred it from all previous instances in which I have taken it to be true: the truth of 2 + 2 = 4 is accounted for by the fact that in all previous presentations of two and two, my resulting presentation has been of four. But if from these subjective presentations I instead was consistently lead to infer that 2 + 2 = 5, there would be no mind-independent criterion outside those subjective acts by which I (or anyone else) could claim that my addition was incorrect. If the rules of logic and arithmetic are simply subjectively-manifested "laws of thought," then the psychologistic position ultimately relies on a faith in the consistency or lawfulness of that thought, and would seem to be able to offer no justification for that faith aside from reiterating the fact that it has held good so far. A psychologistic conception of number (and, more generally, of logic) would seem to presume the very objectivity it ought to prove, or at the very least, to outsource the criterion of objectivity to individual instances of a subjective act which are only *presupposed* to be rationally consistent, in a manner which could never secure absolute certainty but at most a strong Humean inductive probability.

Despite his early flirtations with what was arguably a form of psychologism, Husserl, like Frege, was persuaded at some time in the 1890s[58] that psychologism in formal disciplines such as

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57 Unless otherwise, noted, our use of "sense" and "presentation" should be understood to refer to these respective German terms. For further clarity, we will also often use the German terms directly in our text, without translation.

58 The psychologistic approach seems to have been already all but abandoned by Husserl around the time

logic and mathematics leads ultimately and necessarily to relativism. For while highly probable results arrived at via induction and empirical generalization are perfectly fine for the theories of empirical science, they cannot provide the *apodictic* certainty necessary to ground logic, which is supposed to have a unique a priori—and not merely subjective-mental—status as what Husserl would call the purely formal "theory of theories" itself. The task of the 1900 *Prolegomena*, the first volume of the *Logical Investigations*, was to combat this psychologistic version of logic and to propose an alternative, logical realist account that would guarantee logic's properly objective, apodictic character.

But, importantly, in ways which we hope to make clear in this chapter, Husserl's conception of objectivity would remain tied to his conception of intentionality and the intentional *act* as inherited from Brentano. This conception, with its strong emphasis on the *relation* between the a priori objective and its independently-existing contents, even when rid of its psychologistic presuppositions, would lead to friction alongside the closed a priori, non-intentional conception of ideal objectivity in the first, 1900/1901 edition of the *Logical Investigations*, leading eventually (as we shall see in chapters three and four) to the decisive move to conceive of meaning in terms of a *correlational* theory.

The defeat of psychologism was also a central impetus in the background of Wittgenstein's thought.[59] Wittgenstein's early anti-psychologism was so strong, and his limitation on what could be considered logical and objective and thus opposed to it so strict, that he claims in the *Tractatus* that the theory of knowledge (*Erkenntnistheorie*) is itself not a properly logical-philosophical enterprise but should be considered merely "the philosophy of psychology" (TLP

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of the publication of his Philosophy *of Arithmetic in 1891*. The issue of whether Husserl changed his views *because of* Frege's review, or had already begun to move away from his earlier psychologistic position before reading Frege's criticisms, has long been a topic of debate. For some of the basic positions, Cf. Føllesdal, *Husserl und Frege*, and "Husserl's Conversion from Psychologism and the *Vorstellung*-Meaning-Reference Distinction," and Mohanty, *Husserl and Frege*, and "Husserl and Frege: A New Look at Their Relationship."

59 Cf. Brockhaus, *Pulling Up the Ladder*, 15- 16 for an overview of Wittgenstein's taking up and extending of Fregean anti-psychologism and the danger of losing sight of this element in interpreting the *Tractatus* and early twentieth-century thought generally. Cf. also Hacker, *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy,* 23- 24.

4.1121). Since any account of knowledge will refer in some manner or another to facts in the empirical world—the same domain studied by the psychologist—and "psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science" (TLP 4.1121)—Wittgenstein strictly separates the a priori pursuit of logic from the natural-scientifically-oriented theory of knowledge. As we shall see below, this anti-psychologistic, anti-empiricist stance—which we will argue characterizes the entire span of Wittgenstein's work—meant a strong suspicion and almost complete downplaying of the contributions of the a posteriori in the Tractarian theory of meaning in favor of an a priori logical realism founded upon formally defined atomic "objects" which can only be *shown*, while only the empirical propositions of natural science—which have "nothing to do with philosophy"—can be *said* (TLP 6.53).

As we lay out the basic schematics of the theories of meaning in the *Tractatus* and the *Logical Investigations* below, this shared "closed" conception of the a priori logical in reaction to psychologism will be shown to be the first step—or, better (as we argue at the end of this chapter and in the following one) the beginnings of a general theoretical movement by means of an *over*step—in each philosopher's path toward a conception of the phenomenological dimension of meaning.

II. Husserl's Early Transcendental Theory of Logic and Meaning

In reaction to psychologism, German-language logicians around the turn of the 20th century began to develop conceptions of logic which emphasized both its a priori, non-empirical status, and on that basis the complete universality of its a priori laws with regard to the meaningful world. Implicit in this latter move was the thought that, by defining logic such that no empirical discovery could offer refinements to its formal laws even in principle, the threat of psychologism could be definitively suppressed. In this spirit, as Jocelyn Benoist has noted, "It seems that the author of the *Logical Investigations* and that of the *Tractatus* share at least one thesis: that of the

absurdity that it would be to envisage an illogical world."[60] For Husserl, as for Wittgenstein, it is of the greatest importance that logic at its most fundamental level be conceived as a *complete* system of formal necessity that determines the possibilities for all truths and meanings in the world, a task which Husserl explicitly compares to the Leibnizian conception of a *mathesis universalis* (LI, Prolegomena, §60/ Hua XVIII, 222- 224)[61]. In service to this goal of complete *mathesis*, strong attention is paid to the systematicity of meaning relations, to the way in which a truly universal logic must be capable of explaining the complete system of all possible meaning, and thus of justifying its *own* a priori foundations.

II. a. Pure Logic as the "Theory of all Possible Theories"

It is in this sense that, in the *Logical Investigations'* first volume, the "Prolegomena to Pure Logic," Husserl lays out his conception of logic as the "theory of theories," as that which formally unites all particular scientific theories (in the widest sense) under one formal *mathesis universalis*. If the threat of psychologism arose from a new-found confidence in natural scientific knowledge, Husserl sought to show that the material dealt with by *any* such science was nonetheless subject to underlying formal logical laws. While the use of the form/ content distinction is not always perfectly consistent throughout the hundreds of pages of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl's basic notion is that the form is the logical- theoretical schema which

60 Benoist, "Husserl, Wittgenstein, et l'impossibilité d'une pensée illogique," 241, my translation ("Il semble que l'auteur des *Recherches logiques* et celui du *Tractatus* partagent au moins une thèse: celle de l'absurdité qu'il y a à envisager un monde illogique"). (For all primary text citations in the dissertation where our own translations or modifications of the text are used, the text in the original language will be provided in the footnotes.)

61 In-text references to Husserl's *Logical Investigations* will be given as (LI, followed by "Prolegomena" or the number of the Investigation, followed by the section number(s)). The pagination differs between the two currently available editions of John Findlay's English translation (1970 (hardback) and 2001(paperback); both editions are cited in the bibliography), and much of the scholarship continues to reference the pagination of the older edition. For this reason, we have omitted page numbers and given section numbers in their place for all citations from this work. All translations of the *Logical Investigations* are those of Findlay, unless otherwise noted. All citations from Husserl are also keyed in the standard way to pagination of the *Husserliana* editions (Hua + volume number, page number).

unifies elements in a given domain of knowledge into a complex whole,[62] whereas the content or "material" so unified, while falling under formal laws, arises from a sensuous "apprehension" through an intentional "act" directed at the real world (empirical intuition) or, in more complex situations, via a reflective act wherein the intended object is itself a product of conscious reflection (categorial intuition).[63] The formal elements of any given domain will thus be the a priori relations and axiomatic laws holding *between* the material of the given presentations [*Vorstellungen*] so related, as distinguished from the particular material content *of* those *Vorstellungen* as manifested in the act. (We will discuss Husserl's conception of the intentional act later in this chapter).

Husserl's idea is, if we define the basic forms of meanings and their relations to each other in terms of the proposition, and we do so not merely in terms of the *actual* meaning-parameters of all existing sciences but rather their widest *possible formal* parameters, we will, in effect, be defining the logical conditions of the possibility of any theory as such, and will thereby establish what he calls a "theory of theories."[64] The task Husserl formulates for his work in the Prolegomena is thus not merely the development of a new account of logic but rather the ideal, theoretical task of defining logic as the a priori unifying discipline *as such: "*No matter which system of logic one considers, in order to be logic it must satisfy certain criteria, and these criteria define the idea of *possibility* involved in *possible* logics."[65] Husserl's interest lies in analyzing and thereby securing the conditions of the possibility of logic *as such*; it is in this sense an attempt to redefine what Kant had called "transcendental logic." Indeed, in the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl both explicitly notes the connection of his own project to the Kantian conception of logic, and claims to be offering a correction to it, referring to his Prolegomena as a

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62 See Drummond, *Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy*, 74.

63 On the character of the form/ content distinction in Husserl's early thought specifically in reference to sensation and perception, see Sokolowski, "Immanent Constitution in Husserl's Lectures on Time," esp. 533- 535.

64 Cf. Smith, *Husserl,* 103.

65 Mohanty, *Husserl and Frege*, 30, original italics.

taking up the task of "the science intended by Kant and the other proponents of a 'formal' or 'pure' logic, but not rightly conceived and defined by them as regards its content and scope" (LI, Prolegomena, §4/ Hua XVIII, 25- 26).[66]

As we noted above, this taking up of the task of transcendental logic is part of the wider strategy to protect logic, and ultimately the whole theory of knowledge, against psychologism. By showing that logic is both the condition of the possibility of all other scientific theories (including those of psychology, and thus of psychology itself) and also that it is *self-grounding*, and thus not in need of any sort of logical or epistemological foundations determined by another discipline, Husserl hopes to demonstrate not only that logic cannot be understood as a branch of psychology without contradiction, but also that the very idea of logic—the possibility of any logic whatsoever—depends upon the independence of logic from psychology and even demonstrates the *formal* dependence of the latter upon the former.

II. b. The Analysis of Essential Meaning as a Pre-linguistic Task for Pure Logic

It is a further result of this orientation toward the *possibility* of logic that, despite Husserl's obvious concern throughout the individual investigations of the work (and especially in the First Investigation) for the role that linguistic expression plays in meaning, Husserl's ultimate interest within the realm of the theory of meaning is more aptly described as *logico*-semantic and not directly linguistic. He is primarily interested not in the linguistic *expression* of meanings, but in the ideal *possibility* of meaning as a transcendental determination of logic. As we shall see,

66 Despite this explicit reference to Kant, however, it should be stressed that Husserl was at the time of the first edition of the Logical Investigations not in any strong sense a Kantian, and he only began to gain an appreciation for Kant's epistemology as he moved further away from the largely negative view Kant held by Brentano. His first serious study of Kant occurred only in 1907, and, as we shall see in the following chapter, this is manifested in the beginnings of his own turn toward traditional Kantian epistemological concerns in the subsequent second edition of the work (Cf. Kern, *Husserl und Kant*, 3-23; Kockelmans, "Husserl and Kant on the Pure Ego," 269- 70). These concerns will lead to further development of Husserl's own transcendental logic and, later (as we shall see in chapters four and five), to an expansion of his transcendental phenomenological project to include a re-conceptualization of the field of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic. This increasingly Kantian transcendental character of Husserl's conception of logic will thus be of the utmost importance to our discussion of changes to Husserl's theory of meaning after his "transcendental turn."

this level is for him considered to precede all accounts of meaning with regard to linguistic expression.[67] Thus, whereas in the later twentieth century we tend to think of the inquiry into meaning in terms of the semantic inquiry into systems of abstract elements of spoken and written languages (roughly, Lewis' conception from "General Semantics," mentioned in the previous chapter[68]), and to think of the inquiry of modern philosophical logic, metalogic, pragmatics, etc. as largely separate enterprises, for Husserl these tasks are not neatly separable, and they are conjoined in the fundamental task he sets for himself in the Prolegomena, the establishment of a *pure* (transcendental) logic. As David Woodruff Smith notes, "in Husserl's view, modern metalogic would be a [mere] symbolic window on the real thing: any *possible* system of ideal meanings that come together in inferential relations to form a proper theory."[69]

Thus throughout his career, Husserl conceives of the ultimate level of logic as a level of meaning-analysis, and in turn conceives of this level of meaning analysis as pre-linguistic, as a logical inquiry into the a priori forms of *Sinn,* sense or "ideal meanings," which he will come to distinguish ever more carefully from their expression in *Bedeutungen* or word-meanings.[70] It is important to note from the beginning that Husserl never adopts the more familiar Fregean use of

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67 As Michael Dummett has noted, the 1st Logical Investigation is essentially a semantics of speaker intention: "communication is not [Husserl's] concern, because, for him, logic is concerned only with the *expression* of ideal meanings. The pragmatics of communication or reception of meaning is a secondary matter, a concern for the philosopher of language" (Dummett, in the introduction to Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Paperback Edition, Vol. I, l). This does not mean, however, that the expression of meaning plays no role in Husserl's account: although we have chosen not to emphasize it here, Husserl does maintain that language can help to shape the sense as presented in a linguistic expression, although it ultimately still "borrows" the sense from the underlying act (Cf. Smith, *Husserl,* 113- 117).

68 See chapter one, section I.

69 Smith, *Husserl*, 103.

70 "*Sinn*, for Husserl, is the intentional element of an act of consciousness, whereby that act refers to its object. It is intentionally resident in all acts of perception, memory, imagination, and the like. As such, it far exceeds in scope the concerns of the philosophy of language; indeed, for Husserl, it also precedes those concerns insofar as all linguistic reference is ultimately founded on pre-predicative acts of consciousness" (Hardy, Introduction to IDP, 12). For the *Sinn*/ *Bedeutung* distinction in early Husserl, see Hill, *Word and Object*, 29- 42; also Pol Vandevelde, "An Unpleasant but Felicitous Ambiguity"; Jean-Michel Roy, "La dissociation Husserlienne du *Sinn* et de la *Bedeutung*, I."

Sinn and *Bedeutung*.[71] In fact, Husserl's use of *Bedeutung* corresponds most closely to Frege's use of *Sinn*, whereas Husserl's use of *Sinn* has no clear parallel in Frege, although its functional role is similar to the latter's *Gedanken*.

In a series of later reflections on the *Logical Investigations*, dating from the period of his explicitly transcendental phenomenology, Husserl himself notes both the importance of language as a medium of inquiry and its secondary status vis-a-vis the pure essences it expresses according to that work:

> Obviously, one cannot read and understand the *Logical Investigations* in the way one does a newspaper. One can understand descriptions only if he knows that which is described, and he can only know what is described if he has brought it into clear intuitive experience. Therefore, it is this intuitive experience which demands a step-by-step presentation, the whole effort and technique of which consists precisely in directing [the reader] through the only possible means of the word to the production of intuitive experience and then in fixating this through 'concepts'—concepts which cannot be and must not be anything other than pure 'expressions' of the 'essence' of that which is intuited.[72]

Despite its proceeding via linguistic description, according to Husserl the proper purview of the theory of meaning as expressed in the *Logical Investigations* is the underlying *essence* of meaning, the formal and general idealities of *possible* meaning which are reiterable and can be *shared*.[73] It is in this sense, as we shall see in the following chapter, that Husserl's theory of meaning is very close to that of Frege, with it's "third realm" of ideal meanings or objective "thoughts" [*Gedanken*].

But at the same time, Husserl's conception of the ideality of meaning is from the start tied

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71 Though he does explicitly acknowledge it in the *Logical Investigations* (LI I, §15/ Hua XIX, 58- 59).

72 Husserl, *Introduction to the Logical Investigations*, 56/ Hua XX/1, 320.

73 As Filip Mattens writes, "Husserl's early reflections on language are motivated by his wish to safeguard the universal laws of logical thinking from a reduction to mere psychological rules. To that end, Husserl first secures the ideality of meanings as distinct from the intentional acts that relate to them. The 'ideality of meaning' is not merely a previous assumption, since it rests on more fundamental descriptive conclusions, conclusions which might isolate Husserl's approach in advance from many current philosophical views on language. Rather, the true presuppositions underlying Husserl's view concern the belief that even though our concrete acts of consciousness are unique, i.e., temporally individuated and strictly our own, we are still able to share their 'content' and to return to it, outside and even apart from context. In line with these fundamental assumptions, the concrete linguistic expression of our thoughts can only be secondary to what remains identical over against a multiplicity of acts" (Mattens, *Meaning and Language: Phenomenological Perspectives*, Introduction, xvii).

to an epistemological concern with what he above calls (projecting some of his own later transcendental and more strongly-Kantian vocabulary into the earlier work) "intuitive experience." Thus, already at the time of the *Logical Investigations,* Husserl's account meaning is conceived not primarily in relation to language or even to the *concept*, which are only a way of further "fixing" ideal meanings which precede them, but in relation to experience.[74] The further clarification of this relation, and the subsequent development of Husserl's own attempt at the "step by step presentation" of intuitive experience will be the driving force behind the subsequent changes to his theory of meaning and the development of a full-fledged conception of the phenomenological dimension of meaning in his later transcendental period.

II. c. Intentionality as Requiring Logic's Relation to Experience

In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl's analysis of the role of experience in relation to meaning and logic begins—in an approach analogous to his earlier Brentanian investigations of number, but purged of the earlier work's psychologistic elements— from the subjective, intentional "act" of experience.[75, 76] The intentional act consists of a relation between an ideal possible meaning ("meaning intention"), and, if this possible meaning is "realized" in a presentation [*vorgestellt*], in a resultant "meaning-fulfillment" of that intention (LI*,* VI, Introduction, §5/ Hua XIX, 554- 558). Husserl's account of the ideality of meaning is thus indexed to the basic structure of intentional acts through the concept of presentation [*Vorstellung*]. Such acts (as we shall see in chapter

74 Following Husserl's own expressed priorities*,* our analysis of this early stage in his thought will thus focus primarily on the conception of a priori ideality and "essential" meanings [*Sinn*] and their relation to intentional experience—the primary focus of Husserl's project in the *Logical Investigations*—and not directly on Husserl's important, integrated theory of language and expressed meaning [*Bedeutung*] (For the latter, see especially Mohanty, *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning,* 8-102.) We will have occasion to further examine Husserl's conception of the "fixing" role of linguistic expression in the context of his later transcendental phenomenology in chapter five, below.

75 Cf. Hill, *Word and Object*, 69.

76 It is important to note from the outset that the intentional act in this sense is not dependent upon a "conscious" or "self-reflexive" intention of the subject, in the sense of an activity which is planned or premeditated in light of an explicit goal of "intent." Intentional acts in the Husserlian sense are structures of experience that are "lived-through" [*erlebt*] in immediate experience, but that can be recognized and studied retroactively, by means of reflection.

three) correspond to what Frege calls the "appropriation" [*Fassen*] of the Thought by the thinker, but for Husserl these acts have a much more intricate structure and they play a much more important role in his theory of meaning.

According to Husserl, the "intending" component of the act must *already* include a meaning within it; this is a consequence of the basic thesis of intentionality which he inherits from Brentano, according to which "in presentation *something* is presented, in judgment *something* is affirmed or denied... and so on." On Husserl's analysis of the intentional act, this "something" is an a priori "immanent objectivity," which is present whether the real object of the intention is "really" present in the "external" world or not. The intention need not be actually fulfilled in order to be the meaningful intention that it is; the sense of the intention is not dependent upon any *necessary* fulfillment from the object intended; rather, the intending sense is already "there" a priori, as an essential or "ideal" meaning. The ideal character of the meaning intention guarantees the *possibility* of the act's fulfillment by making it already internal to the structure of the intention a priori, thus prior to the intentional act.

Husserl's conception of the intentional act relies on this a priori status of the ideal meaning to distinguish this "moment" of meaning intention from that of its possible fulfillment in intuition, and this distinction is critical for the success of the phenomenological theory of the intentional act: if *every* intention were simultaneously a fulfillment, there would be no sense in distinguishing between intention and intuition at all, and we would be left with a mere phenomenalism, and not a phenomenolo-*logy*. As we will stress throughout this dissertation, it is the notion that experiences exhibit a *regular, logical structure* that differentiates phenomenology from mere empirical description of the content of experiences as facts. In phenomenological inquiry, the theoretical object of inquiry—be it everyday objects, language, concepts, ideal structures, or even the nature of experience itself—is always approached by an analysis which begins from (though it is not limited to) that object's presentation in the intentional act. The notion of the regular, phenomeno-*logical* structure of that act guarantees—at least in principle—

the rigor of the subsequent analysis and thus, for Husserl, a theory of knowledge founded in absolute certainty.

At the same time, this structure must be conceived in a necessary, "internal" relationship to the experiences in which its meanings are (potentially) fulfilled. As Benoist puts it,

> If it is possible for the things to be given *as they are meant*, it is, according to both authors, that, to mean them, in some sense, is to mean *how they would be given if they should be given*, or, at least, it entails that. In other words, in Husserl's as in Wittgenstein's view, *intentionality itself must allow fulfilment*, and is not to be conceived independently of it, to the effect that the structure of intentionality must entail at least the *logical possibility of such a 'fulfilment'*.[77]

The very structure of fulfillment implies that, in addition to this moment and its correlated ideal meaning-intention, we also need the "moment" of intuition in order to explain the way in which the intention comes to be *fulfilled*. A priori intention and its fulfillment must be related in the *act*, since meaning does not consist exclusively in a set of fixed a priori idealities. But because meaning nonetheless exhibits an ideal structure which is not simply determined from what we happen to experience in the contingency of our everyday lives (as the psychologistic position would seem to presume), it must also and equally be related to the above-mentioned a priori objectivity. For it is undeniably *also* a part of our experience to have thoughts, desires, and expectations which are *not* fulfilled, and we must also have a way of explaining the content of these un-fulfilled intentions. In this and the following chapter, we will see how accounting for this "mystery of negation,"[78] the fact that we can intend what is not the case, is a major task for both Husserl and Wittgenstein on the path leading to the phenomenological dimension of meaning. In a phenomenologically accurate account of meaning, intuition, intention, and fulfillment must *all* function together as non-independent parts of a larger whole.[79]

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77 Benoist, "Fulfillment," 84.

78 See especially our discussion of the "mystery of negation" passage from Wittgenstein's *Notebooks* in chapter three, section III. b.

79 As Benoist notes, "An intuition does not fulfil an intention by itself, but only *from a certain point of view*, as far as it answers the demands of that intention. On Husserl's conception, 'fulfilment' is the act necessary to organize intuition according to that 'point of view' which belongs to an intention, and so to put intuition in position to effectively reply to that intention." Benoist, "Fulfilment," 89.

For just this reason, we see Husserl's conception of meaning as an *act*, with "moments" of intention and fulfillment, as part of a broader commitment to a middle position in conceiving the relation of meaning to experience, neither simply reducing real lived experience to its ideal structures, nor forsaking the ideality and thus objectivity of logic and meaning in favor of a logically-naive psychologism. As we shall see below, the effort to find the right "balance" between the ideal and the experiential elements of the intentional structure led to important changes in the second edition of the *Logical Investigations*, revisions which ushered Husserl further along the path to a fully transcendental conception of phenomenology.

II. d. The Self-referential Character of Pure Logic and Ideal Material Content

The structure of the intentional act further demands that Husserl's pure logic include not only logical form but also a notion of material *content* on the side of the a priori and ideal. He contends that psychologistic logicians have missed this important insight, and erred by treating the *material* of knowledge as psychological, real objects from which the "truths" of mathematics and logic are supposed to be derived via inference, resulting in the relativistic consequences pointed out above.[80] Husserl seeks to guarantee the universality and objectivity of knowledge by asserting the a priori status of both the formal, ideal axioms of logic and arithmetic *and* the content they serve to unify and relate, i.e. the ideal "adequately given" objects of consciousness. The formal, ideal realm of logic is thus considered to be "two-sided," involving both logical form and material content; to put the same point in a more contemporary idiom, for Husserl, logical syntax is not entirely divorceable from the semantics of propositional meanings.[81]

And this means, further, that Husserl's pure logic is a fully self-referential system: Its

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80 As we shall see below in chapters four and five, this observation would later resurface in Husserl's critique of Kant. Kant's transcendental logic fails for Husserl (among other reasons, see pp. XX, below) because it does not assert a material a priori alongside the formal a priori. (Cf. Kockelmans, "Husserl and Kant..." 270ff).

81 As we shall see in chapter four, this distinction will be announced later, in *Formal and Transcendental Logic, as* the distinction between formal ontology and formal apophantics (see chapter four, section I. d.).

formal laws must apply universally, not only to all content derived from the real sciences by way of more specific theories, but also to the content of the ideal sciences and their theories and therefore, at the most fundamental level, to the theory of pure logic itself. As Suzanne Bachelard notes (from the viewpoint of Husserl's later transcendental logic, which we will discuss later in the dissertation), this is a formal consequence of Husserl's peculiar conception of logic, even in its "pre-transcendental" form:

> Logic conceived not simply as analytic theory of science but as universal theory of science is hence called upon to be the ultimate justifying discipline for the steps of science. But it is itself a science which, like every science, must receive its justification. If the particular sciences can have logic specifically for the tasks of justification, logic itself has no other recourse than itself, for it must be in a position to justify its own concepts and its own theories. Properly speaking, this problem had already arisen [in the *Logical Investigations*] on the level of analytic criticism, hence on the level of formal logic.[82]

Such complete self-grounding guarantees, in Husserl's eyes, that the objectivity established by pure logic will hold for all sciences, whether they are directed toward the real phenomena of the natural, spatiotemporal world or the ideal truths of mathematics and logic, since the self-grounded axioms of a pure logic must apply to any theory whatsoever. Furthermore, as a "theory of all *possible* theories," it guarantees that future developments of the sciences can never make the results of logical inquiry obsolete, a legitimate worry for the empirically-inclined psychologistic logician for whom further results of scientific discovery could lead in principle to revisions in the "laws of thought." Husserl's ideal of the self-grounding of pure logic is thus intended to serve the goals of a *mathesis universalis* by making pure logical inquiry into an a priori self-grounding enterprise which guarantees its own ideal validity, as against the "merely real" validity of the empirical sciences, including psychology.

II. e. The Real and the Ideal

Thus the project of pure logic announced in the *Logical Investigations* and indeed all of Husserl's

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82 Bachelard, *A Study of Husserl's Logic*, 112, my interpolation.

subsequent thought regarding meaning and knowledge depends upon a fundamental ontological distinction (which, we emphasize from the beginning, is nonetheless *not to be understood as a simple opposition*) between the real [*real*] and the ideal [*ideal*].[83] For Husserl, conflating these two realms was the fundamental error of psychologism: "The psychologistic logicians ignore the fundamental, essential, never-to-be-bridged gulf between ideal and real laws, between normative and causal regulation, between logical and real necessity, between logical and real grounds. No conceivable gradation could mediate between the ideal and the real" (LI, Prolegomena, §22/ Hua XVIII, 79-80).[84] Whereas the real is spatiotemporally individuated and particular –the world of causality, growth and decay, extension, and the like, the ideal is universal and outside of time and space –the realm of essences, idealities and the timeless laws of logic.[85] Husserl's distinction thus maps onto the distinction McDowell uses to in *Mind and World,* between the "space of causes" (Husserl's *real*) and the "space of reasons" (Husserl's *ideal*).

And both sets of distinctions reflect a common Kantian heritage: as McDowell's frequent allusions to the need for justifications and not "mere exculpations" imply, his opposition of reasons to causes is a restatement of Kant's well-known distinction between empirical and transcendental deduction, between that which concerns the facts (*quid facti)* and that which is

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83 It is important to note that this distinction arises from an ontology of logic and meaning, and not a metaphysics. The "idealism" of Husserl's logic in LI is not to be confused with the grand project of "transcendental idealism" which characterizes the later works. The ideal-ism of LI is "no metaphysical doctrine, but rather the form of a theory of knowledge which recognizes the 'ideal' as condition of the possibility of objective knowledge in general, and does not 'interpret it away' in psychologistic fashion" (LI, II, Introduction/ Hua XIX, 112. translation modified). ("...kein metaphysische Doktrin, sondern die Form der Erkenntnistheorie, welche das Ideale als bedingung der Möglichkeit objektiver Erkenntnis überhaupt anerkennt und nicht psychologistisch wegdeutet.")

84 Cf. Hartimo, "Husserl's Prolegomena," 127-28.

85 As Mohanty puts it, "there *are* general objects in much the same sense in which there are individual realities. 'Redness' and 'four' are as much, in the strictest sense, objects as are 'this patch of red over-there' and 'that group of four blackbirds sitting on that tree.' Thus, according to Husserl there is a fundamental *categorial* distinction within the realm of all that is, or rather within the 'conceptual unity of all entities,' and that is the distinction between "real being" and "ideal being," or—what amounts to the same--"Being as individual and "Being as species or general" (*The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl*, 112- 13). Cf. One of Husserl's later reflections on the *Logical Investigations,* where he explicitly notes the necessity of such analyses: "All logic would come to an end if the concept 'object' would not be conceived in as broad a sense as this equivalence demands—i.e., if one did not also allow 'ideas' to count as objects." (Husserl, *Introduction to the* Logical Investigations, 26/ Hua XX/1, 282-283).

lawful (*quid juris*).[86] Like Kant, Husserl is concerned to distinguish that which is established on the basis of logical laws alone and is therefore timeless and ideal, from that which is dependent upon the contingent facts of experience by which, as Kant puts it, "a concept is acquired through experience and reflection on it, and therefore concerns not the lawfulness but the fact from which the possession has arisen."[87] The distinction between the real and the ideal is thus meant to guarantee the timeless objectivity of the logical against the contingency of the merely empirical. For if the laws of logic were established merely on the basis of their empirical manifestations we would have no guarantee that they were not merely of the order of what Kant calls "usurped concepts" such as fortune and fate, which, while they seem to be established in the realm of empirical fact, have no ultimate *lawful* justification; no justification in terms of purely logical laws.[88] In McDowell's terms, a theory of meaning derived from empirical fact, from the "space of causes," can offer us "mere exculpations" where we sought genuine justifications.

Thus, whereas the pychologistic logician takes real empirical facts to lead inductively to the establishment of logical laws, such that logical laws are generalizations of the contents of sets of particular experiences, Husserl insists that the ideal content of our knowledge gained through experience is not reducible to the particular contents of that experience which constitute its real elements:

> ...when, e.g., we have a presentation [*vorstellen*] or make a judgment about a horse, it is a horse that is presented and judged about, and not our sensations of the moment. The latter are only presented and judged about in psychological reflection, whose modes of conception should not be read into the immediate situation. That an appropriate chain of sensations or images is *experienced*, and is in this sense conscious, does not and cannot mean that this is the *object* of an act of consciousness, in the sense that a perception, a presentation, or a judgment is directed upon it. (LI, II, §22/ Hua XIX, 165, translation modified[89])

86 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 84- 85/ B 116- 117.
87 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 85/ B 117.
88 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 85/ B 117.
89 "...daß, wenn wir beispielsweise ein Pferd vorstellen oder beurteilen, wir eben das Pferd und nicht unsere jeweiligen Empfindungen vorstellen und beurteilen, Das letztere tun wir offenbar erst in der psychologische Reflexion, deren Auffassungsweisen wir nicht in den unmittelbaren Tatbestand hineindeuten dürfen. Daß der zugehörige Belauf an Empfindungen oder Phantasmen erlebt und in diesem Sinne bewusst ist, besagt nicht und kann nicht besagen, daß er *Gegenstand* eines Bewusstseins

In other words, when, e.g., I have a presentation of or make a judgment about a horse, I do not first perceive its color, its size, its smell, its shape, its various parts etc., separately and unmediatedly, as individual "materials," and then somehow add these together to arrive at the concept "horse" by some further psychological operation. I perceive and judge about *the horse as such,* a meaningful object which is adequately given as a meaning, as distinguished from the "inadequately" given horse as it is presented in the immediate experience, as, e.g., from a particular viewpoint from which I can only see three legs and a section of the tail. In lived experience, it is *the horse* which charges at me, not a bundle of sensations, sense data, or parts. I do not doubt, in such an experience, that the horse has a fourth leg, even though only three legs are presented and visible, and I do not pause to wonder what has happened to the non-presented parts of its tail. The object *about which* I judge, an *ideal* matter of logic, is "adequately" given, unlike the merely empirical, *real* object as it is "inadequately" presented. The adequate object of my presentation is thus not reducible to the individual elements of the object as it is partially disclosed over time in a series presentations from a particular perspective,[90] or to the raw "sense data" of the presentation as a spatiotemporally quantifiable phenomenon.[91] In terms of the three non-independent "moments" of the intentional act, fulfillment is achieved [*geleistet*] when the intended object is presented in intuition *adequately*, as a meaning [*Sinn*] immanent to consciousness. This meaning is thus differentiated both from the multifarious elements of its sensuous presentation in the moment of intuition, and from the spatiotemporally "real," flesh-and-

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in dem Sinne eines darauf gerichteten Wahrnehmens, Vorstellens, Urteilens ist."

90 Husserl's term for this is "adumbration" [*Abschattung*]. See Drummond, *Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy,* 35, for a concise description.

91 This is an excellent example of Husserl "doing" phenomenology before he had fully clarified his method. Though the term phenomenology appears already in the first edition of in the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl had not rigorously developed his phenomenological method in 1901, and it is not clear that the theory of the *Investigations* as a whole is anywhere near as systematic as its manner of presentation makes it seem. As Carr notes, Husserl would later claim that the *Investigations* marked the "breakthrough" of the phenomenological method. Nonetheless, "it is as if he had almost unwittingly stumbled on the method, practiced it with considerable success in this work, and only later realized its immense significance for philosophy. Only then, in the ensuing years, did he turn his attention to its refinement and systematic presentation as a philosophical method." Carr, *The Paradox of Subjectivity*, 68.

blood horse "outside," in the word and thus transcendent to my individual consciousness.

This contrast between the adequate givenness of a fulfilled meaning intention and the inadequate adumbration of the object as it is presented is an early example of Husserl's conception of the *Wesensschau*, the doctrine which holds that universals or essences, and not only particulars, can be directly intuited in experience (a notion we will return to in chapter three[92]). And for Husserl this claim holds not only for spatiotemporal objects of experience but also in the case of purely "mental phenomena." In arithmetic, for example, the particular numbers used in addition constitute the contents of the presentation "2 + 2 = 4," but the object of the presentation is not the individual elements added on a given occasion (e.g., the two chairs on this side of the table and the two on the other side, which together make four, or the mental representations of apples "counted" in my mind to arrive at the answer), but rather "2 + 2 = 4," taken as a general and atemporal *ideal meaning*. The content of the presentation is an object of consciousness, which, while it may be revealed to me through particular instances, holds true a priori and independently of any particular 2s or 4s, regardless of whether we consider them as objects "out there" in the spatiotemporal world or objects "in the mind" of the mathematician.[93] Qua logical law, "2+2 = 4" cannot be something arrived at inductively, as the psychologistic logician would have it; it is something ideal, given a priori. As we saw above, for Husserl, in order to guarantee the ideality and thus the objectivity of logic as a purely formal discipline, it must be conceived as an *a priori* science, in the sense of a *mathesis universalis*, since its formal elements—as those which necessarily govern all thought and experience—must have a pure logical validity which is essentially general and beyond anything derivable directly from individual *real* experience (LI,

92 See especially chapter three, section IV.

93 Indeed, as we shall see in chapter three (and Wittgenstein will later be shown to hold a similar view), the naturalistic problems of perception, i.e., questions as to the physical, material workings of the process by which external perceptions of the spatiotemporal world are translated through the sensations into the physicalistic mental states of psychology, is considered by Husserl to be a problem for the empirical sciences, and not the proper province of philosophy or of any ideal a priori science such as logic. We have put the terms referring to the supposed external or internal character of the objects in quotations, since, for Husserl, the internal/ external distinction in this form is ultimately rejected.

Prolegomena, §§65- 67).

II. f. Pure Logic as A Priori Theory of Science and of Meaning

But despite the a priori focus of Husserl's pure logic, as the "theory of all possible theories" its further clarification is also and at the same time the clarification of the formal axioms governing empirical laws in the realm of the *real*. Expressed in terms of Husserl's theory of manifolds,[94]

> The logical axioms are the ones that govern *any field whatsoever*. The objects of the domain of a purely formal theory are not mere intentional objects, but they are also capable of being true since they exist in all manifolds, hence also in any intuitive one. Thus the isomorphism result secures the possible truth of the axiom-system. Accordingly, Husserl thinks that not only all abstract sciences but *also the concrete sciences* are instantiations of this general axiomatization. Husserl's intent is explicitly Kantian: *this axiomatization gives us a priori conditions of knowledge.*[95]

Despite the ultimately transcendental, *ideal* concerns of Husserl's project, his frequent opposition of "concrete" to "abstract" and "real" to "ideal" sciences is not meant as a criticism of the former terms, but rather as part of a broader Critique, in the full Kantian sense of a drawing of limits or establishing a priori conditions of all possible knowledge.[96] The motivation behind such distinctions is a radical circumscription of the *entire* field of scientific validity. From the *Logical Investigations* through to his last published works, Husserl seeks to critically establish the boundaries of different sciences' fields of validity (what will later be called "regional ontologies") through phenomenological distinctions rooted ultimately in "adequate" evidence.[97] For Husserl,

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94 Since the technical details of Husserl's formal theory of manifolds are highly complex, involving knowledge of the mathematical logic and geometric theory of Husserl's day, as expressed the ideas of Bolzano, Cantor, Dedekind, Frege, Grassman, Hilbert, Peano, etc. (Cf. Smith, *Husserl*, 104- 110), and since it is not necessary for the purposes of our overall investigation, we have largely avoided using the terminology or delving into the intricacies of this theory. Suffice it to say that the ideas of formality, systematicity, and self-referentiality that we are discussing here in a general way, in the context of Husserl's theory of meaning, are also presented by Husserl and discussed in detail by his contemporaries and later commentators in a more highly formalized and technical register, primarily in terms of set theory and the "theory of manifolds." For some such discussions in the recent literature, see Hartimo, "Husserl's Prolegomena"; and the essays collected in Hill and Haddock, eds, *Husserl or Frege*.

95 Hartimo, "Husserl's Prolegomena," 139, my emphasis.

96 See our discussion of this in the context of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* in section III. f., below.

97 Even the science of psychology is perfectly valid for Husserl, and is seen as necessary for the full pursuit of knowledge, but we must recognize its status as a real, not ideal science, and thereby

only such a self-grounded system can guarantee both the possible truth of the objects of empirical research and, more fundamentally, the ideality of the ultimate objects of the a priori science of logic, which are for him, according to the first version of the *Logical Investigations,* the class of ideal meanings.

This, in turn, means that Husserl's theory of science is rooted not only in an a priori formal logic, but also and equally in a theory of meaning. Although—like so many important aspects of Husserl's phenomenology—the conception of the world as a world of meaning would not be explicitly thematized until later, by means of the theory of the phenomenological reduction, the basic contours of the doctrine are here already in place, since the concern of pure logic is never directly with the individual object as encountered in experience but with general laws of essence and thus the *ideal content* of the experience through which is established the *possibility* of meaningful experience a priori. Husserl seems to have come to an increasing recognition of this consequence of his doctrine in the time between the first (1900/01) and second (1913) editions of the *Logical Investigations* He notes, for example, in a 1908 lecture course on the theory of meaning,

> Formal-logical thought, that which is analytic in the most pregnant sense of the word, is according to my *Logical Investigations* a thinking on the grounds of mere meaning. It therefore has its source in any and every objectivity (be it real [real] or not), *because objects in general are only objects for cognition through meaning* and because laws, which are *grounded in the essence of meanings as such,* and thus in their essential modes or forms, must obtain necessarily for any given composed objectivities in [terms of their] relation to meaning. (Hua XXVI, 4, my translation[98])

In other words, the theory of pure logic is ultimately also the most basic theory of meaning, and its own contents count among the meanings over which it must "legislate." But it is the relation

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recognize the true status of its claims as empirical facts, instead of taking them (erroneously) as ideal truths in the ideal realm of pure logic. To do the latter is not to do psychology but to commit the fundamental error of psychologism.

98 "Das formallogische Denken, das analytische im prägnantesten Sinn des Wortes, ist nach meinen Logischen Untersuchungen ein Denken auf Grund bloßer Bedeutungen. Es bezieht sich auf alle und jede Gegenständlichkeit (mag sie eine reale sein oder nicht) darum, weil Gegenstände überhaupt für das Denken Gegenstände nur sind durch sein Bedeuten und weil Gesetze, die im Wesen der Bedeutungen als solcher, die also in ihren wesentlichen Arten oder Formen gründen notwendig für bedeutungsmäßig so und so gefassten bestimmten Gegenständlichkeiten gelten müssen."

of this ideal content of meaning operative at the level of pure logic to everyday "intuitive experience" that remains unclarified in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations* and leads to tensions in Husserl's early theory of meaning.

II. g. The Levels of Logic in the *Logical Investigations*

We are now in a position to give and overview sketch of the basic framework of Husserl's early conception of logic. This will be important for our later discussion of the expansion of Husserl's theory of meaning in his transcendental period by means of the distinction between regional (material) ontology and formal ontology,[99] and in the context of our discussion in this chapter, it will also help to illustrate some important shared theoretical assumptions in the early thought of Husserl and Wittgenstein in terms of the role of logical *form* and logical material *content*.

Attempting to illustrate for the reader the difference between his conception of pure logic and that of traditional logic or the logic of the schoolroom, Husserl lays out what he calls the "purely logical theory of forms" (LI, IV, note 3/ Hua XIX, 350). This consists of two distinct levels of logic, one founded upon the other, which together contain the fundamental a priori requirements for all possible meanings. The absolutely primary level is that of "pure logical grammar," at which are determined the "essential meaning forms" which are a priori valid of all meanings (LI, IV, §14/ Hua XIX, 342- 348). Above this, and dependent upon it, is the logic of "consistency," what most philosophers would consider the 'normal' logic of non-contradiction, where both formal and *material* logical elements restrict the field of possible meanings. Represented schematically:

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99 See chapter four, section I. d.

	corresponding condition	*example* (and name) *of violation*
Logic of consistency (material possibility)	**material consistency**	**"The square is round."** (material contradiction [*Widersinn*])
(*Konsequenzlogik*)	**formal consistency**	**"p & ~p"; "This window is and is not broken"** (formal contradiction)
pure logical grammar (morphology)	**well-formed propositions (having *Sinn* as such)**	**"Or table and is."** (nonsense [*Unsinn*])

Husserl's notion of pure logical grammar (the primary level) demands of propositions only that they exhibit a grammatically comprehensible *form*. It is the role of pure logical grammar to classify propositions into their different primitive forms, and in this sense the theory encompasses the forms of all possible meanings, since for Husserl every concrete meaning must be either a proposition or a possible constituent of one.[100] Pure logical grammar thus not only classifies all propositions but establishes basic conditions for their very possibility, without regard to problems of consistency or contradiction which arise on the basis of their *material content*. This level gives the conditions of the possibility for making sense at all; it provides the primary criteria for distinguishing between that which is *sinnvoll* and that which is nonsense [*Unsinn*]. But being *sinnvoll,* in Husserl's schema, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for being logically consistent in the traditional sense; for a proposition to be *sinnvoll* is merely for it not to be in violation of the basic set of possible propositional forms.[101] This is not the standard conception of logical possibility in terms of contradiction, but, as Mohanty puts it, "something more primitive."[102]

It is only at the *second* level of the schema that we reach the more standard conception of logical consistency, a condition which, for Husserl, can be violated in two different manners. Most obviously, we have violations of formal logical principles, such as the principle of non-contradiction. But Husserl also includes at this level another, different sort of logical

100 Mohanty, *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning*, 106.
101 Cf. Farber, *The Foundation of Phenomenology*, 497- 499.
102 Mohanty, *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning*, 106-107.

contradiction; one which arises not due to form but due to the *material content* of the ideal meaning.[103] This sort of violation must be accounted for in Husserl's *logical* schema because, as we have seen above, Husserl's "pure logic" is not neatly separable from his theory of meaning, and thus his conception of the a priori and ideal involves not only logical form but also material content. For Husserl, meaning objects such as "round square" (we have presented it propositionally in the table above) are thus considered contradictions *not* because we have inspected one or more objects in the real world which fit the concept "square" and determined that they do not fit with the concept "round" (though we could certainly do this), but because there is a *material contradiction* which arises in the attempted combination of the corresponding *ideal* meanings, *independent* of any particular presentation of the complex meaning or proposition in intentional acts. On Husserl's conception, this is still a type of *logical* contradiction, since pure logic is a logic not only of form but also of ideal meaning *content*.[104]

Thus, in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations,* the logical laws according to which such meaning combinations are allowed or disallowed are not so much rules established on the basis of our experience of the real world as they are systematic relations holding between independent a priori *ideal meanings*, which, as we saw in our above discussion of Husserl's theory as a theory of *essential* meanings, are not to be considered mere linguistic relations. At the same time, it seems as if the "real" world, the non-ideal, non-a priori realm, has no point of entry into the above schema on Husserl's account. This is most evident when we notice that the logical

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103 Not to be confused with the actual content of a real meaning presented to us in a specific intentional act: we must not forget that Husserl's logical theory of forms in the Prolegomena is a fully a priori pursuit. What is at issue here is the material meaning content of the ideal meaning or *essence*, the essential meaning "as such," without regard to its possible "instantiations" in acts. Thus "material" in this sense does not mean "real" or "concrete," although this remains unclear in the first edition, a point which we will address in more detail below.

104 Cf. Drummond: "Where material combinations come into play, certain complex meanings are impossible, that is, the meanings cannot be combined into a unified material meaning. The impossibility concerns, more precisely, the impossibility of combining the meaning-categories (Bedeutungskategorien) under which the meanings in question fall. The formal laws of pure logical grammar, in other words, do not involve totally free variables, but different variables are bound to particular semantic categories" (Drummond, *Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy,* 175).

schema presented above does not have a place for truth and falsity.[105] Determination of the truth value of propositions involves the consideration of actually obtaining, *real* states of affairs, and is thus itself not part of the strictly a priori discipline of pure logic for Husserl. This is the result of his insistence, against psychologism, on a strict distinction between the *real* and *ideal* elements of a theory. According to the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*, pure logic is concerned with meanings exclusively in the context of their a priori ideality.

II. h. Ideal vs. Individual Meaning-Species

According to the first edition of the *Logical Investigations,* ideal meanings consist of the ideal forms of pure logical grammar in combination with the a priori ideal contents. They are referred to as "species," and are fully a priori, even though they are first revealed to us by means of intuition in particular experiences (LI*, Prolegomena,* §48). These a priori "meaning-species" are "instantiated" in intentional acts, but remain prior to and radically separate from the a posteriori facts of empirical observation of actual states of affairs. In other words, in the first edition, Husserl claims there is both an individual species which is the particular meaning of a given presentation (or set of presentations) *and* an ideal form-species of that meaning which makes it an instance of *that* object and not some other. I can see the same meaning-object in the course of the adumbration of a given presentation, but I can also see the same basic matter in *another different presentational act.* Although the latter is distinct from the previous one in terms of its *individual* species-instantiation, it is the same in terms of its *general* species-meaning; insofar as it is an

105 Only in his later transcendental thought, especially in *Formale und Transczendentale Logik*, will Husserl address "Truth-Logic" as yet a third level of logic, considering this further strata necessary for a properly *transcendental* logic (Cf. Rigal, "De la Fondation Phénoménologique de la Logique," esp. 126- 128; also Tito, *Logic in the Husserlian Context*, 11-18). But even there he will note, "Inquiry for formal laws of possible *truth* and its modalities would be a higher logical inquiry, *after* the isolation of pure analytics. If a logic restricts itself to the bare forms of the significations of statements—that is the judgment forms—what means does it have of becoming a genuine logic of truth? One can see forthwith that *non-contradiction* is an essential condition for possible *truth*, but also that mere analytics becomes converted into a *formal truth-logic* only by virtue of a *connexion* between these intrinsically separable concepts, a connexion that determines an eidetic law and, in a logic, *must be formulated separately*" (FTL §15/ Hua XVII, 60).

instantiation of the same ideal meaning. Husserl describes the distinction as follows:

> Meanings, we said, constitute a *class* of 'universal objects' or species. Each species, if we wish to speak of it, presupposes a meaning, in which it is presented, and this meaning is itself a species. But the meaning in which an object is thought, and its object, the species itself, are not one and the same. […] The universality *that* we think of, does not therefore resolve into the universality of the meanings *in which* we think of it. Meanings, although as such they are universal objects, fall, *in respect of the objects to which they refer, into individual and specific meanings*, or (to conform to a readily understandable linguistic prejudice) *into individual and general meanings.* (LI, I, §33/ Hua XIX, 108)

This distinction is meant to allow Husserl to maintain the general ideality of meanings at the level of pure a priori ideality while simultaneously asserting their role as individual species intended in particular acts.[106] The general, ideal meaning-species thus cannot be considered as merely subjective "mental representations" in any psychologistic sense, and while the *presentations* of individual species intentions can be considered to *originate* in psychological acts, the individual meaning species *themselves* are not thereby psychologistic but are mere "instantiations" of the a priori ideal species.[107] This "doubling" of meaning in Husserl's account is necessary, because situating the meaning-species exclusively with reference to the *real* dimension of psychological act would defeat the goal of establishing the ideal objectivity of logic and go against the *Prolegomena*'s critique of psychologism for its conflation of the ideal and the real.

And here again Husserl contends that the status of ideal meaning-species can be clearly illustrated in the case of the ideal science of arithmetic, where the relation between ideality and the real empirical instantiations through which we discover it is readily evident:

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106 Although Husserl will eventually reject this way of explaining the presence of the same matter in different acts through the talk of meaning-species, the basic insight into the structure of intentional experience will remain, i.e., that "since the matter of the act determines a presentation as this presentation of the object, it is not enough to say merely that the object which is intended is identical in such acts; we must say also that in acts sharing common matter the object is presented" (Drummond, "The Structure of Intentionality," 67).

107 Many of Husserl's early critics failed to grasp such nuances in Husserl's account, and accused him of relapsing, in the second volume of the *Logical Investigations*, into the very psychologistic prejudices he had criticized in the first. Because of this frequent misunderstanding, Husserl removed many of the uses of "psychology" in the individual investigations from the second volume (which in fact refer to *descriptive*, not *logicist* psychology) lest his use of the term be prematurely associated with psychologism. Husserl maintained even many years later that this common misreading was due to the insufficient attention paid by readers to the individual investigations of the second volume in contrast to the logical program as set out in the prolegomena (See Husserl, *Introduction to the* Logical Investigations, 20-23). We will discuss this problem in more detail in chapter three, below.

> Counting and arithmetical operation as *facts*, as mental acts proceeding in time, are of course the concern of psychology, since it is the empirical science of mental facts in general. [But] Arithmetic is in a totally different position. Its domain of research is known, it is completely and exhaustively determined by the familiar series of ideal species 1, 2, 3 ...In this sphere there can be no talk of individual facts, of what is temporally definite. …What we are now meaning is not [the] individual instance, not the intuited object as a whole, not the form immanent in it but still inseparable from it: what we mean is rather the *ideal form-species*,[108] which is absolutely one in the sense of arithmetic, in whatever mental act it may be individuated for us in an intuitively constituted collective, *a species which is accordingly untouched by the contingency, temporality, and transience of our mental acts.* (LI, Prolegomena, §46/ Hua XVIII, 173-75, translation modified,[109] last emphasis mine)

Husserl here explicitly admits that arithmetical concepts involve a psychological and real element, insofar as they are derived from actual, individuated facts "as mental acts proceeding in time." But he rejects the naturalistic claim of psychologism, which would imply that the content of such an act, the general object which is meant, is *itself* real, psychological, and in time. For Husserl, the latter claim commits a sort of genetic fallacy, although it was all too common in the (largely psychologistic) logic of his day. While this is most obvious in the case of arithmetic, as Husserl notes further on in the same section, this insight "carries over at all points to *pure* logic. In the latter case too, we accept as obvious the fact that logical concepts have a psychological origin, but we deny the psychologistic conclusion to which this seems to lead. […] We deny that the theoretical discipline of pure logic, in the independent separateness proper to it, has any concern with mental facts, or with laws that might be styled 'psychological'" (LI, Prolegomena,

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108 Note that Husserl's reference to the "ideal-form species" shows that the form/content distinction works as a relative and not an absolute distinction. Since the ideal species of the number 3 unites all the particular presentations (species) of 3 falling under it, it is correct to refer to it as a form, even though from the standpoint of a more abstract ideal science, it can also be considered as a content, e.g. as one content among many united under the "ideal form-species" "number" (Cf. Drummond, *Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy*, 78).

109 "Mit dem Zählen und dem arithmetischen Operierung als Tatsachen, als zeitlich verlaufenden psychischen Akten, hat es natürlich die Psychologie zu tun. Sie ist ja die empirische Wissenschaft von den psychischen Tatsachen überhaupt. Ganz anders die Arithmetik. Ihr Forschungsgebiet ist bekannt, es ist vollständig und unüberschreitbar bestimmt durch die uns wohlvertraute Reihe idealer Spezies 1, 2, 3… Von individuellen Tatsachen, von zeitlicher Bestimmtheit ist in dieser Sphäre gar keine Rede. …Das jetzt gemeinte ist nicht dieser Einzelfall, es ist nicht das Angeschaute als Ganzes, noch die ihm innewohnende, obschon für sich nicht lostrennbare Form; gemeint ist vielmehr die ideale Formspezies, die im Sinne der Arithmetik schlechthin eine ist, in welchen sie sich auch an anschaulich konstituierten Kollektiven vereinzelnen mag, und die somit ohne jeden Anteil ist an der Zufälligkeit der Akte mit ihrer Zeitlichkeit und Vergänglichkeit."

§46/ Hua XVIII, 176). Like arithmetic, logic is an ideal science, concerned not with empirical facts but with ideal meaning-species, and, despite the fact that its elements arise from individual experiences of meanings, the particular presentation of a meaning is not itself an empirical fact but a species-instantiation of an ideal meaning-species and, because of this, the particular instantiation—qua phenomenological, not empirical -psychological datum—is also considered to belong to the objective, a priori realm of logic.[110]

II. i. Tensions in Husserl's Early Conception of Meaning

While the version of the theory of the ideality of meaning content sketched above—that presented in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*—is effective against psychologism, it also poses the risk of moving too far in the *opposite* direction. This can be seen in the manner in which, according to this early version of Husserl's theory of meaning, the phenomenological theory of intentionality remains in partial conflict with the theory of logic and meaning. For Husserl has not clarified the way in which the *real* content of individual acts of psychological origin comes to play a role in the a priori structure of meaning in the realm of the *ideal*. And yet his theory of logic, as the theory of all possible theories including those of the empirical sciences, depends on precisely this link. According to this early version of the theory, it seems that the ideal meanings instantiated in individual acts can be nothing more than a fixed set of a priori objects, related to experience only insofar as psychological acts somehow demand their instantiation. While Husserl has gone to great pains to clarify the ideality of meaning on the side of meaning intention, and has given us an analysis of the intending *act itself* as a description of role of intuition, he has failed to clarify the nature of the intention's *fulfillment;* to explain how and why ideal meanings are related to the real intentional content manifested in actual experiences. Until this tension is clarified and resolved, Husserl's early theory of meaning looks dangerously close to a *Platonistic* conception of the ideality of meaning which will we argue in the next chapter is best represented

110 Cf. Drummond, "The Structure of Intentionality," 68.

by Frege's conception of the "third realm" consisting of ideal-objective "thoughts."

III. The Transcendental Theory of Logic in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

Our above sketch of the schema of logical levels as presented in the *Logical Investigations* will seem highly reminiscent for those familiar with the basic logical schema of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Both works share a conception of logic which we have termed transcendental, because of its focus on a priori conditions of possibility in opposition to the contingency of empirical facts. In this light, in a similar manner to our treatment of Husserl in the previous section, and for similar reasons, we will focus in the following sections primarily on laying out the basics of the complex structure of the a priori theory of meaning and logic and its relation to the a posteriori "world" of facts in the *Tractatus.*

III. a. The Isomorphic Structure of Reality and Representation in the *Tractatus*

Wittgenstein's systematic conception of meaning can be schematically represented as a three-tiered structure[111] in which meaningful propositions about the world are analyzed by means of their conditions of logico-semantic possibility, first into an intermediate level which explains the existence of *possible* meanings, and then to a transcendentally primary level which explains the *formal* make up of those possibilities. Before going into the details of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning by way of an investigation of the relations holding between the individual levels of the schema, it will be helpful to briefly present the basic structure of the schema in its entirety. In doing so, it will be most expedient to work from the "bottom up," beginning with the formally fundamental level of Wittgenstein's logical simples. We do so, however, *only with the proviso*

111 This interpretation of the basic meaning schema of the *Tractatus* owes much to the oft-overlooked interpretation put forth in Goddard and Judge, *The Metaphysics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus.* While we have drawn on a variety of commentaries throughout this exegesis, the schema presented here was developed on the basis of their text more than any other, although the interpretation is our own, and differs from theirs in several respects, most notably in its not explicitly emphasizing the metaphysical aspects of the work.

that our actual "point of access," our engagement with actual meanings, always occurs from the "top," by means of analysis of propositions at the top tier of the schema . This "bi-directional" character of Wittgenstein's conception of logic, the contribution of *form* contributed from the "bottom up" and *content* from the "top down," will be shown to plague Wittgenstein's early account of meaning with a set of problems similar to those noted in the *Logical Investigations* and to those we will later find made explicit in our discussion of Frege's "The Thought."

The Tractarian schema is divided into three levels of differentiated logical simplicity, each of which, for the analysis of a meaningful proposition which refers to an obtaining situation in the world, has both an "ontological" and a "representational" aspect.[112] At the most abstract and foundational level, Wittgenstein's schema is made up of logically simple entities called "Objects" [*Gegenstände*].[113] These Objects "make up the substance of the world," and are non-composite (TLP 2.021). Within them, Wittgenstein tells us, is contained the possibility of all situations (TLP 2.014), but they are not *content-bearing;* they are fixed *logical* simples that contribute the *logical form* for all propositions. The arrangements of Objects can change (indeed, as we shall see, it is this possibility of alteration which allows for contingency in the world) but the relations between the Objects are exclusively "internal" and never involve a third term: every Object is entirely independent of every other, and in their arrangement (a "State of affairs") they

112 The terms are our own. We use "ontological" as opposed to "metaphysical" here, to remain as neutral as possible, since the question of the "metaphysical status" of the *Tractatus* remains a major point of contention in the secondary literature, and one which we cannot fully address here. We prefer "representative" for the latter category, as it seems the best equivalent for Wittgenstein's frequently-used "*darstellen*" (which is importantly different from presentation [*vorstellen*] for Wittgenstein, since the latter term need not be linguistic in character), and since among the other obvious choices, "signifying" would carry Saussurian/ structuralist connotations of direct and inseparable reference to a "signified," which Wittgenstein's picture theory avoids, and "referring" would suggest the Fregean sense/reference [*Sinn/ Bedeutung*] distinction, which, as we also shall see in this chapter, is very different for Wittgenstein.

113 For the rest of this chapter and subsequently in the dissertation, we will follow the convention of referring to Wittgenstein's technical use of ordinary terms by using capital letters. "Objects" thus refers to objects in the technical sense of the *Tractatus*, whereas "objects" refers to the term as generally used; "Names" are Tractarian names, whereas "names" are what we commonly call names, etc. Without such a contrivance, the reader is apt to forget that the various elements of the Tractarian World do not correspond to the words in their everyday use, or even to their more common uses in discussions of logic, an issue the significance of which will be come clearer in the course of our subsequent discussion.

"fit into one another like links in a chain" (TLP 2.03).

The unit of signification that corresponds to an Object at this most general and abstract level is a Name [*Name*]. These are not the names of ordinary language, like "ball" or John" or "blue"; they are defined simply as the representatives for Objects: "a Name means an Object; the Object is its meaning" (TLP 3.203). As many commentators have noted, we can no more give examples of Tractarian Names than of their Objects, since by definition, Names never occur in isolation, but only in combination, as the ultimate constituents of propositions at higher levels, and are thus only accessible by way of "downward" analysis from levels "above." Names and Objects make up the respective representational and ontological aspects of the Tractarian account of meaning at the most fundamental level, and are formally necessary endpoints of analysis; Objects are not specified as material or phenomenal entities, but only as purely logical ones. We can no more give an example of an Object than we can state its Name.[114]

At the middle level of the schema, the configuration of Objects in "internal relation" to one another is a "State of affairs" [*Sachverhalt*].[115] States of affairs are combinations of Objects (TLP 2.01), and taken as a whole, they present the totality of the possible logical states of affairs of the world. The term "State of affairs" thus refers to any situation that is a *possible* Fact in the world, even one that does not *actually* obtain. Signifying these States of affairs are *Elementarsätze* (translated as "atomic propositions" in Ogden and "elementary propositions" in Pears and McGuinness; we shall use the latter term here). Just as States of affairs are combinations of Objects, Elementary Propositions are significations made up of Names; they are "a nexus, a concatenation, of names" (TLP 4.22), or "names in immediate combination" (TLP 4.221). Thus Names represent Objects and are combined in Elementary Propositions, and

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114 The status of Tractarian Objects is a point of much contention in the scholarship. For a discussion of the basic positions and a convincing argument in favor of the logical interpretation employed here, see Chon Tejedor, "The Metaphysical Status of Tractarian Objects."

115 It is important to note that the combination of objects does not "give us" or "make possible" the state of affairs, such that the combination and the state of affairs are separate but corresponding entities; the combination itself just *is* the state of affairs (Cf. TLP 2.1).

Elementary Propositions are the representational unit for particular States of Affairs. The symmetry between these ontological and representational aspects is perfect: there is a direct, one-to-one correspondence between Elementary Propositions and States of affairs, such that each Elementary proposition represents one and only one State of affairs, and each State of affairs is represented by exactly one Elementary proposition.[116] Furthermore, Wittgenstein famously claims that States of affairs are logically independent of one another (TLP 2.061), that "from the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is impossible to infer the existence or non-existence of another" (TLP 2.062), and, correlatively, that "One elementary proposition cannot be deduced from another" (TLP 5.134) and no Elementary proposition can be contradicted by another Elementary proposition (TLP 4.211).

This symmetry of Elementary Propositions and States of Affairs occurs at the middle level of the schema, what we above called the level of "possible" meanings. For this reason, it is the absolute center and nexus of the system (TLP 3.3). As Wittgenstein puts it later in his 1929 "Remarks on Logical Form,"[117]

> If we try to analyze any given propositions we shall find in general that they are logical sums, products or other truth functions of simpler propositions. But our analysis, if carried far enough, must come to the point where it reaches propositional forms which are not themselves composed of simpler propositional forms. We must eventually reach the ultimate connection of the terms, the immediate connexion which cannot be broken without destroying the propositional form as such. The propositions which represent this ultimate connexion of terms I call, after B. Russell, atomic propositions [=Elementary Propositions -JR]. They, then, are the kernels of every proposition, *they* contain the material, and all the rest is only a development of this material. (SRLF, 162- 63)

Examining the full implications and development of this conception of the "material" of meaning, i.e., meaning content, is one of the keys to our critical discussion of the *Tractatus* in this and the

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116 White, *Wittgenstein's Tractatus,* 85.

117 This 1929 text is generally considered to be the final written text of Wittgenstein's which adheres (to some degree) to the views of the *Tractatus* (see Hacker, "Was he Trying to Whistle It?" 375 on this point). It is therefore permissible to use this text—as many commentators have previously done—to shed light on the earlier work, despite its stemming from the period *after* Wittgenstein's break from philosophy in the mid-1920s (Cf. Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Duty of Genius*, 272ff). We will discuss the more transitional elements of this important essay in greater length in chapter three, section III.

following chapter, where we will see that the doctrine of the non-interdependence of *possible* Facts leads Wittgenstein eventually to abandon the Tractarian conception of logic and meaning.

At the third, "top" level of the schema, States of affairs which are not merely possible, but do in fact obtain, are the Facts [*Tatsachen*] of the world. A Fact is thus an actually obtaining (not merely possible) State of affairs or combination of States of affairs[118] and each such Fact is represented by a Proposition [*Satz*]. All Propositions are ultimately analyzable into Elementary Propositions (TLP 4.221). According to the *Tractatus*, the totality of Facts is the world (TLP 1.1), and the totality of Propositions contains all that we can say about this world, for they represent "all that is the case" (TLP 1).

To summarize the schema now from the "top down," the Tractarian world consists of various *Facts*, which consist of (combinations of) existent *States of affairs*, and these States of affairs are combinations of *Objects*, which are the "atomic" logical simples of the world. These Objects are eternally fixed and are not directly accessible to us but formally necessary in that they supply the logical form which determines the makeup of States of affairs, the totality of which are all of the *possible* Facts of the world. The corresponding representational side of the schema can be described as follows: Facts are expressed in *Propositions*, which are a subset of the totality of *Elementary propositions* (representing *possible* States of affairs), which are by definition combinations of *Names* (representing Objects). We can summarize this schema in the following diagram, with the terms in parentheses in the first column providing a basic indication of our reading of the role of each level of the schema in the interpretation that follows:

118 There remain discrepancies in the scholarship as to whether an *individual* State of affairs, or only *combinations* of States of affairs, can make up Facts, but the difference between these interpretive positions is unimportant for the limited purpose of our interpretation here.

Level of Analysis	*Ontological Aspect*	*Isomorphic "Mirroring"*	*Representational Aspect*
the (Tractarian) World (spatio-temporal actuality)	**Facts [*Tatsachen*]**	↔	**Propositions [*Sätze*]**
possibility/ impossibility (material potentiality)	**(Possible) States of Affairs [*Sachverhalte*]**	↔	**Elementary Propositions [*Elementarsätze*]**
Fundamental, "atomic" simples (transcendentality)	**Objects [*Gegenstände*]**	↔	**Names [*Namen*]**

As the schema makes clear, the ontological makeup of logical reality is represented or "mirrored" at each level of analysis by a representational aspect –although, as we noted above, Names, like the Objects they represent, are known only formally and never encountered directly or in isolation, as is also the case, as we shall see below, for Elementary Propositions. The *Tractatus* conceives of the relationship between the two aspects as an isomorphic relation, a *mirroring*.

Since the world that is the subject of Wittgenstein's analysis is a totality of "Facts, not things" (TLP 1), properly speaking, it is only at the third level that Wittgenstein's schema connects with the World to which our propositions refer. It is important to emphasize from the outset, however, that this is by definition an *extremely impoverished* conception of world; one concerned exclusively with logical relations and their representation. This top level of the schema, we might say, is parallel to our everyday world, but not equivalent with it, since it contains only the Facts, and not things, emotions, values, or any other elements we might wish to include in an account of the contents of everyday experience.

III. b. The Main Problem of *Tractatus* Interpretation

One way of seeing the unique interpretive difficulty of the *Tractatus* is in terms of the intention underlying this impoverishment in the text: Is it Wittgenstein's goal to illustrate the questionability or even absurdity of limiting proper philosophical inquiry to this domain, or does he genuinely believe that only Facts and the a priori structures reached by analysis beginning from the Propositions referring to them can count in our interpretation of the world? The question is whether for Wittgenstein what lies beyond the Facts (if anything does) really matters,

or if only the Facts and the Propositions referring to them (and their constituents) do. In terms of the book's famous closing remark, "what we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence" (TLP 7), is that which we cannot speak about *meaningful*, even if it cannot be put into words, or is it rather the case that "the limits of my language" are also the limits of the meaningful and even of thought?

The first alternative in each of the above disjunctive questions is (roughly) that ascribed to Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* by the more traditional interpretation.[119] The second alternative in each question represents (roughly) the interpretive strategy of the "resolute" or "New Wittgenstein" interpretation, first developed in the 1980s by Cora Diamond and James Conant, and now very popular in the extensive contemporary scholarship on the *Tractatus.* While our own interpretation falls somewhat closer to the traditional than to the "new" reading, what is most interesting about this for our purposes is the degree to which the two interpretations map onto the major camps in the debates about non-conceptual content discussed in our introductory chapter (section III): "New Wittgensteinians," like conceptualists, refuse to countenance any entities that may play a role in knowledge and meaning from "outside" the bounds of what can be expressed in language or contained in concepts, and attribute this same view to Wittgenstein, claiming that everything supposedly beyond the bounds of language is simply meaningless "nonsense." The more traditional interpreters of the *Tractatus* insist that for Wittgenstein *there is* something important that cannot be expressed; something which remains ineffable, although its significance

119 Actually, the most "traditional," or at least the oldest canonical interpretation of the text is that of the logical positivists, who took the *Tractatus* as a sort of highly abstract presentation of their own anti-metaphysical doctrines, considering Wittgenstein's position as an empirically oriented logical positivism. The following, from an addendum added by Julius Weinburg in 1964 on the occasion of the reprinting of his 1935 essay on the *Tractatus* in the Copi and Beard anthology is paradigmatic: "There are a number of misconceptions in my essay which should be corrected. The first of these is that the ultimate end of analysis is empirical reality. I do not know what Wittgenstein supposed the ultimately simple objects were, but I now see that it was rash to assume that they would be empirically accessible. The second error was to attribute to Wittgenstein the view that quantified Propositions are equivalent to *finite* conjunctions, disjunctions, etc. The third error was to think of Wittgenstein as a logical positivist…" (Weinberg, "Are there Ultimate Simples?" 85). Since such interpretations were explicitly rejected by Wittgenstein himself, they are given almost no consideration in the scholarship today. We will have occasion to mention one such interpretation, that of Moritz Schlick, in chapter four, section II.c.

can nonetheless be *shown*. For this reason their interpretation is often known as the "ineffability" reading.[120] Although a complete discussion of these different interpretive strategies and a presentation of our own interpretation of the Tractatus as a whole is beyond the scope of our targeted discussion here, we shall attempt to show below the way in which the conception of meaning possibility in the Tractatus leads us to favor a further specified and narrowed version of the ineffability interpretation, but to see it as a forebear of the sort of non-conceptualist position we criticized in the previous chapter because of its problematic adherence to what we called the "fodder" conception of the role of non-conceptual content. This serves to illustrate the epistemological problems we see in the *Tractatus* alluded to above.

III. c. The Picture Theory and Logical Form

It will be useful to begin or own interpretation of Wittgenstein's early theory of meaning with a discussion of the famous "picture theory" of the *Tractatus* and its relation to the book's conception of logical form. A brief thought experiment can help to explain this theory: for simplicity's sake, take a table, on which is set a flower vase to the left and a teacup to the right, and which takes up the whole of my field of vision, to be the complete field of entities the Facts concerning which make up my World. I now wish to represent this world in a painting. In one sense, I will do this by simply depicting a table, a vase, and a teacup. But, in another important sense, this is not all that I do. In representing the objects, I also necessarily display something else, namely, the spatial relationship *between* the table, the vase, and the teacup. While this does not consist in painting another *thing* in addition to the three entities, it is nonetheless necessary for the depiction of this "World." If I paint the table more or less as it actually appears in my "World," but paint the vase to the right and the teacup to the left, even if I have represented all three *things* quite clearly, I have not properly represented the Fact, a State of Affairs which is the

120 For recent statements and appraisals of both positions, as well as some attempts to bring them together, see the essays collected in *Beyond the Tractatus Wars: The New Wittgenstein Debate*, Reed and Lavery, Eds.

case in this World.[121]

But despite this, in the terms of the *Tractatus,* this incorrect painting is not *sinnloss*: it has represented a different State of Affairs than the actual one (the Fact), and has thus has shown a *possibility which does not obtain*, but this possibility nonetheless appears as meaningful; it has a *Sinn* independently of whether the State of Affairs it "proposes" is found to be true or false. (This point will be central to our discussion of the development of Wittgenstein's conception of meaning in terms of projection in chapter three.)

Importantly, if I were to paint a State of Affairs that did *not* even make sense (say, where the represented spatial relations between the entities somehow defied the conceptual limitations of three-dimensional space, as in an M. C. Escher drawing), one could judge such a picture to be nonsensical "a priori," *without* needing to appeal to any Fact in the "real" world. It is not as if I would need to first observe the picture, then check it against potential matches existing in space and time, and only then decide that it is nonsensical: I can know that it is nonsensical from its *logical form alone*. This is the case because the possibility of the picture having *Sinn* is ultimately tied to its *logical form,* not the specific *content* of the picture. What is important in determining whether the proposed depiction of reality is justified "a priori" is not so much the entities depicted (for human beings are always inventing new and unexpected things with little resemblance to previous familiar objects[122]), but rather the way in which the *relation* between the entities in my picture, *whatever* they may be may be, corresponds or could potentially correspond to the *relation* between the entities in reality, because of shared pictorial form: "What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in the way it

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121 For the purposes of our thought experiment we are concerned only with this one Fact in this World. We therefore ignore the issue of other potentially obtaining facts which might be related to it and thus involved in its depiction.

122 For example, in an earlier age, the object that we now know as a cell phone would perhaps have been unimaginable as an object on the table, although the fact that this is now a familiar object shows that it was not *impossible*. But the impossibility of the teacup and the cell phone occupying exactly the *same spot* on the table is deducible independently of cellphones and of teacups, since it is a matter of spatial *form,* independent of the specifics of content. Wittgenstein conceives of logical form (as distinguished from content) as operating in a precisely analogous way.

does, is its pictorial Form [*Form der Abbildung*]" (TLP 2.17). Wittgenstein thus distinguishes between the content of the picture, which is *depicted* [*abgebildet*], and the pictorial form, which is displayed [*aufgewiesen*]: "A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it" (TLP 2.172).

This account of picturing is then extended, making it clear that Wittgenstein intends the notion to apply to more than mere spatial examples, and that he takes it to show something essential about the very form of the World: "What *any* picture, of *whatever* form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in *any way at all*, is logical form, i.e., the form of reality" (TLP 2.18).[123] Logical form connects language and reality by means of the proposition, and this is explained by the crucial claims that "a proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents" (TLP 4.021) and "A proposition *shows* its sense. A proposition *shows* how things stand *if* it is true. And it *says* that they do so stand" (TLP 4.022). The mirroring relation between language and reality is explained by means of a priori logical form, which defines the logical laws—as in Kant's *quid juris*—according to which the material content expressed (said) in propositions—both those that are true and thus correspond to Facts which obtain (although they are not neccesary) in the World and those propositions which are meaningful but false—gets arranged into States of affairs and their corresponding (Elementary) Propositions. And, importantly, this ordering is accomplished through the power of the *form of representation alone;* the picture "reaches right

123 As many commentators have noted, there seems to be an unaddressed difficulty which arises when we attempt to fully conceive of the picture theory outside of spatial examples, in terms of purely *logical* space. This does not seem to be considered a difficulty in the *Tractatus*, and is given only the briefest mention: "every picture is *also* a logical one. (On the other hand, not every picture is, for example, a spatial one.)" (TLP 2.182, translation modified: "Jedes Bild ist auch ein logisches. (Dagegen ist z. B. nicht jedes Bild ein räumliches.)"). Wittgenstein seems to suggest that relations in logical space are somehow clearly and straightforwardly conceivable on the model of relations in physical space, but no full explanation of this notion is given. A similarly puzzling reference to the relation of logical and spatial relations, as if this were a topic of common knowledge and did not need further explanation, is found in TLP 6.36111, the only passage in the *Tractatus* which mentions Kant explicitly (in reference to the problem of incongruent counterparts and the well-known glove example), a passage which is often taken to imply Wittgenstein's rejection of Leibniz's thesis of the identity of indiscernibles. That passage ends with the puzzling remark: "A right-hand glove could be put on the left hand, if it could be turned around in four-dimensional space."

out to" reality (TLP 2.1511), and the relation between its elements is not another *thing* to mediate the relation. The proposition *shows* (but does not express; does not *say*) its form.

Consequently, Wittgenstein insists that when a capital letter is used in propositional notation to signify the relation between two Names, thereby showing the way in which those Names stand for Objects in relation, this does not mean that the relation is something *additional to be represented*; it is just the "way things stand" in the State of affairs depicted. Just as the relationship between the elements of the picture is mirrored in the relationship between the elements in reality which it depicts, but is not *represented* by an additional object in the picture, so the way the terms are related in the Proposition *shows* the State of affairs purported to obtain (if the Proposition indeed corresponds to a Fact in the world) although this relation is not *represented*.[124] We can represent such relations *in the symbolism* with an extra letter, so long as we do not mistakenly suppose that this letter must "represent" some additional thing, "the relation." For the relation between the terms is what makes the proposition possible in the first place: the capital letter in Wittgenstein's symbolism is thus not a marker of a relational *term*, but a marker of *Form,* of the projection of *Sinn* into the proposition. As he puts it in the *Tractatus*:

> 3.1432 Not: "the complex sign 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b, but rather: *that* 'a' stand in a certain relation to 'b' says *that* aRb.[125]
>
> 3.144 One can describe situations, but not *name* them. (Names resemble points; propositions arrows—they have *Sinn*.)[126]

This account of the relation of Names as something *shown* allows Wittgenstein to maintain that

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124 It may be the case that Wittgenstein's notion of how the proposition shows a relation through its form is more difficult to grasp in languages which do not operate with a full case system. In English, we say "The man ate the bear," or "The bear ate the man," but if we want to reverse the predicative relation between the nouns without changing their order of their appearance, we must add new elements to the sentence: "The bear was eaten **by** the man," or "The man was eaten **by** the bear." In German and other case-system languages, this can all be done with case, with the form of the article demanded by the grammatical structure of the language. We need not add any new terms to the sentence, nor change the order of the terms. The equivalent sentences in German, for example, can read: "Der Mann hat den Bär gegessen" vs. "Den Man hat der Bär gegessen." (This is offered only as a speculative remark, and has no direct bearing on our argument.)

125 My translation: "Nicht: „Das komplexe Zeichen ‚aRb' sagt, dass a in der Beziehung R zu b steht", sondern: Dass „a" in einer gewissen Beziehung zu „b" steht, sagt, dass aRb."

126 My translation: "Sachlagen kann man beschreiben, nicht benennen. (Namen gleichen Punkten, Sätze Pfeilen, sie haben Sinn.)"

the *Sinn* of the proposition is not simply something represented by the material *terms* of the proposition. It is also dependent upon the meaningful *formal* relation that makes the Proposition possible, and, as the above remark suggests, it thus involves a direction, it "points through" the Proposition, or is "projected."

This is a result of the bi-directional feature of the logical schema of the *Tractatus* pointed out above, where we noted the temptation to think that the formal concept Object is entirely "responsible for" the makeup of Facts, when it is rather the case that Objects themselves provide logical *form alone,* from the "bottom-up" in our schema*,* and that this logical form is combined with logical material (*content*) originating from the "top-down," from the world of contingent Facts. Although we may be tempted to think of Wittgenstein's atomistic Objects as responsible for logical material as well as logical form, it is clear that Wittgenstein's Objects are not only formally defined entities, but also entities that by definition can only determine form:

> 2.021 Objects establish [*bilden*] the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be combined together [*zusammengesetzt*].[127]
>
> 2.022 It is obvious that an (imagined) world, no matter how differently it is thought from the real one, must have *something*—a form—in common with the real one.[128]
>
> 2.023 Objects are just what constitute this fixed [*fest*] form.[129]
>
> 2.0231 The substance of the world *can* only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is first [*erst*] by means of propositions that material properties are represented—first [*erst*] by the configuration of objects that they are established [*gebildet*].[130]

In 3.1432 and 3.144, Wittgenstein is reminding us that the symbolism does not determine the form of the World, such that each element in it must correspond to an element in the World, but rather that the symbolism is determined via abstraction *from* the world, in perfect correlation with an a priori form to which the world *necessarily* corresponds as result of the theory's stipulated

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127 Translation slightly modified.
128 Translation modified: "Es ist offenbar, daß auch eine von der wirklichen noch so verschieden gedachte Welt Etwas—eine Form—mit der wirklichen gemein haben muß."
129 Translation slightly modified.
130 Translation slightly modified.

isomorphic relation between language and the world. But since it is "first by means of the proposition," by the *configuration* of Objects—not the formally determinant Objects themselves—that material properties are represented, this also means that the contributions of the Objects themselves, from the "bottom up" in our schema, are responsible *only* for logical form. The material content, although it is established in accord with Objects, must enter the picture from the "top down," by means of the analysis of Propositions referring to obtaining Facts.

Thus, to borrow an example from David Keyt,[131] in the proposition 'Seattle is west of Spokane', which can be expressed in the notation used in the *Tractatus* by "sWk", it is not strictly correct according to Wittgenstein to say that 'W' "stands for" the relation "being west of" in the way that 's' "stands for" 'Seattle' and 'k' for 'Spokane.' The relational term, like the directional arrow in the margin of a map, "does not enter into a triadic relation" with the terms in the proposition and thus cannot be named. As Keyt notes, "There is as much of a one-to-one correspondence between a proposition and the corresponding state of affairs as there is between a map and its corresponding state of affairs. Surely, this is as much as one can demand of the picture theory of language."[132] Asking for the thing that the relational predicate ('W' in our example) represents, is like asking for the element on the map which illustrates that Seattle is west of Spokane. The "element" on the map which demonstrates this relation is not another *element* on the map at all; it is not a road, or another town, or a specific piece of land, or some symbol standing for "being west of."[133] What shows that Seattle is west of Spokane is the State

131 Keyt, "Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Language." Though we begin with Keyt's example, the development and interpretation given here is our own. Keyt's paper is largely a response to specific interpretations of Copi and Anscombe, and makes no mention of the relation of the theory of the Proposition to the claim that "Logic is transcendental." He begins from the interpretive difficulty- closely relted to the one we present here- that "it does not seem possible to reconcile the notion that a fully analyzed elementary proposition contains a predicate with Wittgenstein's statement that 'an elementary proposition consists of names' ([TLP] 4.22). This passage strongly implies that elementary propositions consist of names *alone.*"

132 Keyt, "Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Language," 510.

133 Although the directional arrow in the margin of the map might be said to be such an element, it is ultimately superfluous to the function of the map itself and only really plays a role in *re*-orienting us if, for example, the top of the map is to be read as south and the bottom as north. The fact that this is really only necessary on maps with non-standard orientation only reinforces the isomorphic relation

of affairs represented by the very situation depicted on the map, which is not some particular element of the map in the way that towns and roads are.

This in turn means that the logical form which is shown (or "pictured") by the relation between the terms in the proposition, like the relation of cardinal direction in the map example, is simultaneously a necessary condition for representation and yet banned from the realm of that which is representable in the proposition. As the *quid juris* element of Wittgenstein's transcendental logical schema, logical form must be independent of the accidental "happening and being-so" of the World, just as "being west of" is itself independent of Seattle, Spokane, and any other location represented on a map; *that* someplace can be west of someplace else is one of the prior conditions which makes a map a map, because of the isomorphism between the form of geographical relations on the face of the earth and the form of directional and distance relations on the two-dimensional map. And, as we saw above, the same goes in the *Tractatus* for the relation of the *Sinn* to the *Satz* by means of logical form. Though it is not something representable, not some *thing* in the world, logical form is nonetheless a necessary condition for the meaningfulness of the world, and it is "shown" in every Proposition, but not "said."

III. d. Tractarian Transcendental Logic and the Role of Projection

As this discussion of the picturing relation and logical form suggests, with regard to the theory of meaning, the text of the *Tractatus* is concerned almost exclusively with the analysis of the contribution of a priori elements to meaningful propositions. For, like Husserl's *Investigations*, the *Tractatus* is first and foremost a work in philosophical logic (Wittgenstein's original title was simply *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* [Logical-philosophical Treatise]), and this means for Wittgenstein an exclusively *a priori* form of inquiry. Logic is thus is the system of formal relations represented by the schema we presented above as a whole; the very correlation of

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between the map and the world which makes the representation possible. (Cf. Keyt's very different discussion of the arrow and the scale in "Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Language," 510.)

linguistic representation and reality, "an infinitely fine network, the Great Mirror" (TLP 5.511). As the fixed system of these formal relations, logic is not itself in the world *or* outside it, but reflects its boundaries; "logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world. Logic is transcendental" (TLP 6.13).

Whereas a priori logical form is said to result from the arrangements of Objects in States of affairs, material content seems ultimately to be derived from the analysis of Propositions which refer to Facts obtaining in the world, although the "a posteriori portion" of the story is given only very brief mention in the book. Since the locus of Wittgenstein's logical schema, qua *transcendental,* is at the center level, the level of possibilities as expressed in Elementary Propositions representing possibly-obtaining States of Affairs, it seems to us that Wittgenstein must be able to explain precisely how the a posteriori contribution of logical content delivered from the "top down" on the basis of the world of Facts and the a priori contribution of logical form arising from Tractarian Objects, from the "bottom up," are brought together at this middle level.

This combination of logical form and material logical content seems to be explained in terms of what Wittgenstein calls the "projection" of possible situations by means of the proposition:

> 3.1 In the proposition the thought expresses itself in a sensically [s*innlich*] perceivable way.[134]
>
> 3.11 We use the perceptible sign of the proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as the projection of the possible situation. The method of projection is the thinking of the propositional sense.[135]
>
> 3.12 The sign, through which we express the thought, I call the propositional sign. And the proposition is the propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.[136]

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134 Translation modified: "Im Satz drückt sich der Gedanke sinnlich wahrnehmbar aus."

135 Translation modified: "Wir benützen das sinnlich wahrnehmbare Zeichen (Laut- oder Schriftzeichen etc.) des Satzes als Projektion der möglichen Sachlage. Die Projektionsmethode ist das Denken des Satz-Sinnes."

136 Translation modified: "Das Zeichen,durch welches wirden Gedanken ausdrücken, nenne ich das Satzzeichen. Und der Satz ist das Satzzeichen in seiner projektiven Beziehung zur Welt."

> 3.13 To the proposition belongs everything that belongs to the projection; *but not that which is projected*. Thus the possibility of the projection [belongs to it], but not this [projection] itself. The proposition thus *does not actually contain its sense*, but does contain the possibility of expressing it. ("The content of the proposition" means the content of a *sinnvoll* proposition.) In the Proposition is contained the *form* of its *Sinn*, but *not its content*.[137]

Although Wittgenstein holds that what is expressed in a proposition is a thought, and adds that this expression happens by means of a "projection" or "thinking of propositional sense," the thought which is expressed *through* the proposition and *by means of* the projection is not contained in them; only its "possibility" is. The proposition contains the possibility of expressing *Sinn*, but does not contain the *Sinn* itself, since it contains only its form but not its content. The key to this passage, and through it to Wittgenstein's entire transcendental-logical theory of meaning in the *Tractatus*, is the peculiar role assigned to *Sinn.* Why can the *Sinn* not be contained in the proposition, but only expressed by it?

But to answer this question, we must first pursue a further one: Whence does the meaning content, the materially-contentful portion of *Sinn* projected through the proposition but not contained in it, arise in the first place? As we noted above, it cannot be built up from the underlying Objects because of the purely *formal* role they play in the schema of the *Tractatus.* But, it would seem, it also cannot be inferred directly from the Facts of the World, since—and in this respect Wittgenstein's transcendental logic remains thoroughly Kantian—it is the projection of *Sinn* which makes the sensible world a World with meaning in the first place, and thus this *Sinn* must be logically *prior* to the ascription of truth and falsity, and thus independent of any specific States of affairs *actually obtaining* as Facts: "In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing [Object] *can* occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be prejudged in

137 Translation modified: "Zum Satz gehört alles, was zur Projektion gehört; aber nicht das Projizierte. Also dieMöglichkeitdes Projizierten, abernichtdieses selbst. Im Satz ist also sein Sinn noch nicht enthalten, wohl aber die Möglichkeit ihn auszudrücken. („Der Inhalt des Satzes" heisst der Inhalt des sinnvollen Satzes.) Im Satz ist die Form seines Sinnes enthalten, aber nicht dessen Inhalt."

the thing [Object] itself (TLP 2.012, translation modified, my interpolations[138]). "If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs... A new possibility cannot be discovered later" (TLP 2.0123), thus for Wittgenstein *possible meaning* at the level of States of affairs must in principle precede the *actual Facts* in the World, just as Kant's transcendental logic "concerns itself with the laws of understanding and of reason solely in so far as they relate *a priori* to objects."[139] As Wittgenstein himself admits, "It is obvious that in the analysis of propositions we must come to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination. *This raises the question of how the formation of propositions comes to be*" (TLP 4.221, Ogden translation, modified,[140] my emphasis).

In other words, when we recall that for Wittgenstein even Propositions which are *incorrect* picturings of the world (and thus false) have *Sinn* (TLP 2.17),[141] this suggests that the logical *material* contained in Elementary propositions, although somehow originating from analysis of Propositions referring to Facts in the world, cannot be explained simply by reference to the material contained in the complete set of contingent propositions referring to actually-obtaining Facts. If this were the case, there would be no way to explain *false* but nonetheless s*innvoll* propositions; the *Sinnvolle* would be simply synonymous with the (contingently) true. In

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138 "In der Logik ist nichts zufällig: Wenn das Ding im Sachverhalt vorkommen kann, so muß die Möglichkeit des Sachverhaltes im Ding bereits präjudiziert sein." Our interpolatation of "Object" for Wittgenstein's "thing" is justified by 2.012's position as a subsidiary remark to 2.01, where the terms are clearly suggested by Wittgenstein to be synonymous: "Der Sachverhalt ist eine Verbindung von Gegenständen (Sachen, Dingen)."

139 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* A 57/ B 82. Note that Wittgenstein's Objects and Kant's objects play very different roles in these two passages: Wittgenstein's are atomic elements which contribute the logical form and thus help to make up the logical laws "above" them, whereas Kant's objects are the entities given order by the logical laws. These two uses of "object" are very different, and must not be confused.

140 "Es ist offenbar, dass wir bei der Analyse der Sätze auf Elementarsätze kommen müssen, die aus Namen in unmittelbarer Verbindung bestehen. Es frägt sich hier, wie kommt der Satzverband zustande."

141 As André Maury notes, in the *Tractatus* "...the move in order to avoid epistemological problems in semantics was *highly metaphysical*. In Wittgenstein's case the demand that language should be 'logically perfect' … implies that language should stand in an internal relation to the world. 'Ordinary' propositions are, according to the *Tractatus*, 'logically perfect' (cf. 5.5563), since they are truth-functions of 'perfect' elementary propositions (5). Wittgenstein's position could be summarized thus: *Propositions have sense precisely because their sense does not depend on how things stand in the world.*" Maury, *The Concepts of* Sinn *and* Gegenstand, 88- 89.

terms of a transcendental logic concerned with the *a priori* role of logical content, this would be to put the cart before the horse, since it would go against Wittgenstein's claim that all possibilities of combinations of Objects in States of affairs are logically fixed and new ones "cannot be discovered later" (TLP 2.0123).

For this reason, Wittgenstein explicitly blocks the interpretation that the totality of possible States of affairs are established through a sort of straightforward induction from the "old" *Sinn* of actually obtaining Facts at TLP 4.027 and 4.03. He presents instead a more complicated analysis in which true propositions (those corresponding to obtaining Facts in the world) are analysed into the individual "constituents" appearing in them (TLP 4.025), and that these words can then be recombined into new propositions according to logical form.

But insofar as the new meaningful (but not necessarily true) propositions resulting from the rearrangements of the word "constituents" must have a "new sense" not contained in the actually obtaining Propositions but still governed by the fixed logical form determined a priori by the Objects, the obtaining Facts *themselves* seem to play very little role: it is only the *constituents* of the propositions which express them, and not the meaning of the Fact-referring propositions as a whole, which provide the raw material whose contribution to the meaning of the proposition occurs only in "projection" with the aid of a priori logical *form*.

Of course, it is here that the isomorphic structure of the *Tractatus* plays its crucial role. For when we analyze Propositions referring to Facts obtaining in the world into individual Elementary propositions, those Elementary propositions will contain Names which correspond to Objects, which, in their combination (which necessarily mirrors the combination of the Names representing them) make up possible States of affairs. By analyzing Fact-referring Propositions to the most basic level of words (referring to Objects), we arrive at the most basic atomic level on the basis of which new meaningful Elementary propositions can be "projected" in thought by means of logical form, independently of their truth value, and the Tractarian system functions as a consistent transcendental logic, where the possibility of *meaningful propositions* is explained

without the direct contribution of contingent empirical facts and therefore logically prior to the evaluation of truth and falsity.

But it is the further consequence of this peculiar version of logical atomism which is important for our own analysis. For even if we accept the above account of the constitution of sense independent of evaluations of truth value, we may still wonder what exactly has allowed for the fact that we can arrive at *new* constitutions of sense: it must be possible, in order for the Tractarian system to function at a transcendental-logical level, for the atomic building blocks arrived at through the analysis of Propositions to be recombined and "projected" to create *new* Propositions *independent of all contingently obtaining Facts.* Otherwise the doctrine of the non-interdependence of States of affairs would be violated, since actually-obtaining States of affairs (Facts) would serve as a constraint on the total set of *possible* States of affairs. The analysis into logically simple Objects would serve no purpose if such simples were only re-combinable into the very same Propositions from which they were derived. It seems then that there must be some additional functionally-significant element in the system, in addition to the "top-down" influence of material components and the "bottom-up" contribution logical form first arrived at through analysis, for neither of these components contributes meaning *as such*.

And this returns us to our original question above: why does Wittgenstein insist that the *Sinn* is not contained in the proposition, but only "projected" or expressed through it? We can now see that, if he were to claim that the *Sinn* expressed by a proposition were also contained *within* it, he would be committed to the further claim that the analysis of the Proposition into its constituent parts as discussed above *just was* the analysis of meaning into *its* constituent parts. And if this were the case, we would still have the problem of explaining the re-combinability of the atomic simples into (logically predetermined) new meanings, a problem avoided, on the above interpretation, since the *meaning itself* is neither the material content of the Proposition nor the contingent Fact to which that proposition refers. Wittgenstein thus conceives of the proposition as a sort of material vehicle for the expression of meaning, and not as the location of

meaning *tout-court*: as a "limit not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts" (TLP preface, p. 3).

III. e. The Transcendental Role of the Mystical and the Question of the Ineffable

But this means, as we suggested above, that meaning *tout-court* must be ultimately derived from some *other* functionally significant element of the Tractarian system in addition to the logical form contributed by Objects and the logical material derived from the analysis of Propositions. Insofar as this element is not contained in the Proposition as such, it cannot be something which is properly representable; it would not be reflected *in* the "great mirror," but would rather be an additional element which contributes to the isomorphic *mirroring relation.*[142] But nor can this element simply be assimilated to Objects and to logical form: the application of logic determines the form of Facts in the World by means of the method of projection, but the logical form *shown* in those Facts is, *qua* formal and a priori, not *itself* in that world. Objects are independent of all contingency, since, as Wittgenstein would later note, reflecting on his earlier Tractarian schema, those elements which are responsible for the arrangement of the logical material expressed in the proposition—the Objects—have "neither existence nor non-existence," they are "what we can speak about *no matter what may be the case"* (PR 72). Objects and the States of Affairs which are the relations between them are logically necessary—transcendentally necessary—for our having a meaningful world at all, because they determine the logical form which combines with the material in Propositions, resulting in the *Sinn* by which propositions *mirror* the Facts which make up the World. But even when we accept the ultimate givenness of logical form discovered

142 And even in this attempt to represent it, it must ultimately elude us; this is why it can only be *shown.* This elusiveness calls to mind Jacques Derrida's notion of the "trace." While a full discussion of this similarity is beyond our scope, the difference, it seems to us, can be summed up in the following way: Derrida's trace-structure is "quasi-transcendental," it always "differs" from itself and is thus (paradoxically, as Derrida fully recognizes) "necessarily" unstable, whereas Wittgenstein's *Sinn* is stable, because it is never objectified. It is rather a condition of possibility (a la Kant) for language use, and thus *fully* transcendental. This helps to explain Wittgenstein's claim that the objects of the world are fixed, though their *configuration* is "changing and unstable" (TLP 2.0271). This view has led many commentators to see the *Tractatus* as espousing a sort of "linguistic Kantianism."

by means of analysis, and admit that there could be no meaningful answer to the question, Why do Tractarian Objects have *just these* internal relations?, we can still ask about the contingency of Facts obtaining or not obtaining: why are *some* of the logically-predetermined meaning possibilities (States of affairs expressed by Elementary propositions) *not* realized as actually-obtaining Facts in the world, and how is it the case that different Facts could be found to obtain in the future but not *now*? What places a constraint on the meanings actually obtaining in the World? The constraint cannot be the contingent Facts in the World, because of the doctrine of the non-interdependence of States of affairs. But nor can it be logical form alone, which is purely formal and only determines possibilities.

Wittgenstein's "solution" to this problem in the *Tractatus* is his well-known (if not always well understood) appeal to *the mystical.* The mystical is not a matter of some "ineffable *truth*," but rather that which stands at the limit of any attempt at explanation, and outside the world of Facts:

> 6.4312 […] The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies *outside* of space and time. (It is certainly not the solution of any problems of natural science that is required.)
>
> 6.432 *How* the world is is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself *in* the world.[143]
>
> 6.4321 The facts all contribute to the task, not to the solution.[144]
>
> 6.44 It is not *how* the world is that is mystical, but rather *that* it is.[145]
>
> 6.45 The viewing of the world *sub specie aeterni* is its viewing as a whole—a limited whole. The Feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical.[146]

To begin to understand this role of the mystical as an answer to "the riddle of life" in the *Tractatus*, we must first understand that, for Wittgenstein, *the role of the mystical is first and*

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143 Translation modified: "Wie die Welt ist, ist für das Höhere vollkommen gleichgültig. Gott offenbart sich nicht in der Welt."

144 Translation modified: "Die Tatsachen gehören alle nur zur Aufgabe, nicht zur Lösung."

145 Translation modified: "Nicht wie die Welt ist, ist das Mystische, sondern daß sie ist."

146 Translation modified: "Die Anschauung der Welt sub specie aeterni ist ihre Anschauung als—begrenztes Ganzes. Das Gefühl der Welt als begrenztes Ganzes ist das mystische."

foremost an ethical one, as is made clear in the well-known letter to Ludwig von Ficker, where Wittgenstein describes the *Tractatus* manuscript in a non-technical way (in the hope that von Ficker's "literary" press might publish it):

> ...it will probably be a help to you if I write you a few words about my book. You see, I am quite sure that you won't get much out of reading it. Because you won't understand it; its subject-matter will seem quite alien to you. But in reality it isn't alien to you, since the book's point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you here, because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. I wanted to write, namely: My work consists of two parts: of that [part] which is presented here, and of all that which I have *not* written, And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. Namely, the ethical is delimited in my book as it were from the inside, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY *rigorous* way in which those limits can be drawn. In short, I believe: all of that about which *many* others today are *gassing*, I have put firmly into place in my book, by being silent about it.[147]

Although Wittgenstein's conception of ethics is not our focus here, we can use the above remark to further elucidate his conception of the relation between the formal and material elements of meaning and the transcendental status of logic, for both ethics and logic are assigned the same special status in the *Tractatus*: they are the only topics[148] that Wittgenstein explicitly names as *transcendental* (TLP 6.13, 6.421). We have already cited Wittgenstein's announcement of the transcendental character of logic (TLP 6.13) above. The transcendental character of ethics is announced in the Tractatus in explicit opposition to the contingency of the Factual world:

> 6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world...
> If there is any value that has value, it must lie outside of all happening and being-so [*So-Seins*]. For all happening and being-so is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie *within* the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.

147 "...da ist es Ihnen vielleicht eine Hilfe, wenn ich Ihnen ein paar Worte über mein Buch schreibe: Von seiner Lektüre werden sie nämlich - wie ich bestimmt glaube - nicht allzuviel haben. Denn Sie werden es nicht verstehen; der Stoff wird Ihnen ganz fremd erscheinen. In Wirklichkeit ist er Ihnen nicht fremd, denn der Sinn des Buches ist ein Ethischer. Ich wollte einmal in das Vorwart einen Satz geben, der nun tatsächlich nicht darin steht, den ich Ihnen aber jetzt schreibe, weil er Ihnen vielleicht ein Schlüssel sein wird: Ich wollte nämlich schreiben, mein Werk bestehe aus zwei Teilen: aus dem, der hier vorliegt, und aus alldem, was ich *nicht* geschrieben habe. Und gerade dieser zweite Teil ist der Wichtige. Es wird nämlich das Ethische durch mein Buch gleichsam von Innen her begrenzt; und ich bin überzeugt, daß es, *streng*, NUR so zu begrenzen ist. Kurz, ich glaube: alles das, was *viele* heute *schwefeln*, habe ich in meinem Buch festgelegt, indem ich darüber schweige..." (qtd. in and translation (modified) from Wittgenstein, *Prototractatus*, 15- 16).

148 In 6.421, Wittgenstein also mentions aesthetics as transcendental, but since the same passage also asserts that "ethics and aesthetics are one and the same" ["*Ethik und Äesthetik sind Eins"*], this does not affect the status of our claim.

It must lie outside the world.[149]

6.42 And thus there can be no propositions of ethics. Propositions can express nothing that is higher.[150]

6.421 It is clear that ethics is not expressible. Ethics is *transcendental*.[151] [152]

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149 My translation: "Der Sinn der Welt muss ausserhalb ihrer liegen. Wenn es einen Wert gibt, der Wert hat, so muss er ausserhalb alles Geschehens und So-Seins liegen. Denn alles Geschehen und So-Sein ist zufällig. Was es nicht-zufällig macht, kann nicht in der Welt liegen, denn sonst wäre dies wieder zufällig. Es muss ausserhalb der Welt liegen."

150 My translation: "Darum kann es auch keine Sätze der Ethik geben. Sätze können nichts Höheres ausdrücken."

151 „Darum kann es auch keine Sätze der Ethik geben. Sätze können nichts Höheres ausdrücken. Es ist klar, dass sich die Ethik nicht aussprechen lässt. Die Ethik ist transcendental"(last emphasis mine).

152 Interestingly, the emphasis on the transcendent status of these elements precedes their being referred to as transcendental in Wittgenstein's thought: a close comparison of the relevant early texts shows that passages in the *Notebooks* corresponding to those which in the *Tractatus* refer to the "transcendental," refer instead to the "transcendent." Anscombe and von Wright list only TLP 6.421 as the text in the *Tractatus* directly corresponding to these passages in the *Notebooks*, but it is clear from a close comparison of the passages that the full content of the *Notebooks* passage is expressed across the sequential remarks 6.41, 6.42, and 6.421 in the *Tractatus*. We find in the corresponding *Notebook* entries for 30 July, 1916: "I keep coming back to [the notion], that the happy life is simply good, and the unhappy bad. And if I *now* ask myself: But why should I live *happily,* then this seems to me to be a tautological question; the happy life seems to justify itself, it seems that it *is* the only right life. But this is really in a certain sense deeply mysterious! *It is clear* that ethics is not *expressible*! … What is the objective mark [*Merkmal*] of the happy, harmonious life? Here it is again clear that there cannot be any such mark, that can be *described*. This mark cannot be a physical one but only a metaphysical one, a **transcendent** one. Ethics is **transcendent**."/ "Immer wieder komme ich darauf zurück, daß einfach das glückliche Leben gut, das unglückliche schlecht ist. Und wenn ich mich jetzt frage: aber warum soll ich gerade glücklich leben, so erscheint mir das von selbst als eine tautologische Fragestellung; es scheint, daß sich das glückliche Leben von selbst rechtfertigt, daß es das einzig richtige Leben ist. Alles dies ist eigentlich in gewissem Sinne tief geheimnisvoll! Es ist klar, daß sich die Ethik nicht aussprechen läßt! [...] Was ist das objektive Merkmal des glücklichen, harmonischen Lebens? Da ist es wieder klar, daß es kein solches Merkmal, das sich beschreiben ließe, geben kann. Dies Merkmal kann kein physisches, sondern nur ein metaphysisches, ein transzendentes sein. Die Ethik ist transzendent" (*Notebooks* entry for 30.7.1916, translation modified; boldface emphasis mine). Note that here, as throughout the *Notebooks*, "*transzendent*" has been translated as "transcendental." This shift from talking of the transcendent to the transcendental lends support to Ray Monk's suggestion that Wittgenstein was only majorly influenced by Kant *after* the thorough study and discussion of his works while on the Front in 1918. After that time, all previous passages which in the *Notebooks* referred to the "transcendent" [*transcendent*] are reproduced in the *Tractatus (*and *Prototractatus*) as references to the "transcendental" [*transzendental*]. This suggests that Wittgenstein came to recognize that the latter, Kantian technical terminology better captured what he was trying to express, even though the close connection and transcendent status of logic and ethics (as inexpressible and thus outside the Tractarian-defined world), continues to be a part of his overall conception (Cf. Bastianelli, "Das Ethische, das Ästhetische, das Logische," 22- 24). This "ethical" claim as to the transcendent character of *Sinn,* and its relation to the notion of limits in the *Tractatus* has not recieved sufficent emphasis in the literature, and—perhaps because of its relation to Wittgenstein's remarks on God and mysticism—it is still at times treated as some sort of superfluous part of his account, not to be taken seriously in the logical context of the work as a whole. For a good summary of its importance to understanding the work as a whole see Schulte, *Wittgenstein*, 60- 67. Although he does not use the term 'transcendental," that Wittgenstein was already thinking in terms of prior conditions in relation to transcendence is clear from another *Notebook* entry occurring just a few days prior to the passage cited above: "Ethics does not treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic"

The notion of the mystical is thus a way "explaining" the aspects of life—indeed, those aspects which for Wittgenstein are most important—which are not determined by the rules of language or a priori logical form. While everything that is expressible must follow "the logic of our language" (TLP 4.003) and this includes the totality of Facts in the World, Wittgenstein's appeal to the mystical is an insistence that there are elements of life which do not fit neatly into the predicable structures of our language or the transcendental system of logic. These elements are for this reason not, properly speaking, *meanings,* and they are not *in the World*; but they nonetheless are responsible for the *meaningfulness* of the World as a whole, "that it exists," while themselves remaining *outside* it (insofar as they are outside of all Facts, and the World is "the totality of facts" (TLP 1.1).

We can now see why interpretive debates about the *Tractatus* have centered on the status of that which the book suggests is ineffable and outside the Tractarian World of Facts. If Wittgenstein's real interest in the *Tractatus* is, as he wrote to von Ficker, "that which is not written," then his account of meaning ultimately rests on an element of the system which is neither a priori logical form nor the a posteriori world of Facts but something outside of both, because outside of the World and thus beyond the reach even of a transcendental logic. If, as the "New Wittgensteinians" contend, the point of the book is to function as a sort of *reductio ad absurdum*, to illustrate the very absurdity of the notion of an ineffable realm, and thus to exhort us to "throw away the ladder" laid out by the remarks in the body of the text, then Wittgenstein's theory of meaning is ultimately dependent exclusively on the fixed a priori conditons set by logical form. We side with the former view, and the reasons for our doing so stem from our understanding of the *Tactatus* as espousing an ultimately *transcendental* conception of logic and meaning.

("Die Ethik handelt nicht von der Welt. Die Ethik muß eine Bedingung der Welt sein, wie die Logik."). *Notebook* entry for 24.7.1916.

III. f. Kantian Limits: the Transcendental and the Transcendent

Many commentators on the Tractatus may have avoided or downplayed Wittgenstein's appeal to the mystical because of a perceived risk of presenting an inflationary "metaphysical" reading of the text. Indeed, a discussion of the notion of *Sinn* in relation to a realm outside of language puts a strong emphasis on the text's transcendental elements, and such a reading does not fit well with the philosophical inclinations of many of Wittgenstein's commentators, even if it is rather clearly indicated in the work itself. But a deflationary notion of the transcendental, one that avoids the negative consequences of a non-Critical metaphysics without dismissing the goals of metaphysical inquiry outright, is already available in the text of the *Tractatus* itself. As we might suspect, the influence of Kant on Wittgenstein is highly evident in this regard.

As we noted in a long footnote above (#103), in Wittgenstein's 1916- 1918 *Notebooks*, many of whose remarks eventually made their way, in more-or-less altered form, into the text of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein invariably uses the term "transcendent" where the *Tractatus* uses "transcendental." The corresponding passages are altered in the *Tractatus* (and already in the source text known as the *Prototractatus*) to 'transcendental', presumably as a result of Wittgenstein's reading Kant, which most sources indicate occurring around 1918.[153] On one reading of the Kantian distinction, what is "transcendental"—as opposed to "transcendent"—is not "outside" the world. It is there formally, a priori, but it is also "there" in its application in experience itself (for it is not as if the conditions of the possibility of experience are only preconditions which "go away" as the experience is had), even though we do not *experience* these conditions as such. This is an important distinction in the first *Critique*:

> We will call the principles whose application stays wholly and completely within the limits of possible experience immanent, but those that would fly beyond these boundaries transcendent principles. But by the latter I do not understand the transcendental use or misuse of categories, which is a mere mistake of the faculty of judgment when it is not properly checked by criticism, and thus does not attend enough to the boundaries of the territory in which alone the pure understanding is allowed its play; rather, I mean

153 Cf. Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein, the Duty of Genius,* 158; Janik and Toulmin, *Wittgenstein's Vienna,* 223ff.

> principles that actually incite us to tear down all those boundary posts and to lay claim to a wholly new territory that recognizes no demarcations anywhere. Hence *transcendental and transcendent are not the same*. The principles of pure understanding we presented above should be only of empirical and not of transcendental use, i.e., of a use that reaches out beyond the boundaries of experience. But a principle that takes away these limits, *which indeed bids us to overstep them*, is called transcendent. If our critique can succeed in discovering the illusion in these supposed principles, then those principles that are of merely empirical use can be called, in opposition to them, immanent principles of pure understanding.[154]

Kant's distinction between transcendent and transcendental in this passage actually suggests two sets of boundaries and thus three—not two—distinct "territories," the third of which, however, as fully "transcendent," cannot be addressed since it oversteps the limits of our reason. We have, firstly, that which is itself "within the limits of possible experience." This is in itself neither transcendent nor transcendental; it is the everyday realm of human experience. Secondly, we have the "territory" of the principles themselves, of that whose *application* is limited to the previously mentioned realm of experience, but which is not *itself* experienced directly: this is the realm of the transcendental, of the conditions of the possibility for experience, which for Kant is not to be understood as a territory shared with actual or possible experience, but rather as a "territory in which *alone* the pure understanding is allowed to play." The third "territory," that of the transcendent, would (*per impossibile*) result from the application of the pure understanding *outside* the limits of possible experience, thus attempting to move beyond the limits of reason.[155]

In a sense, we can read the *Tractatus* as Wittgenstein's struggle to situate his hard-won insights into logic, language and meaning within a similar set of distinctions: everything that was understood in the *Notebooks*, in the Schopenhauerian fashion characteristic of the philosophical proclivities of Wittgenstein's youth,[156] as "beyond the world," as *transcendent*, is now to be thought of (insofar as it *can* be thought) as *transcendental*, since the transcendent "in itself" is—

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154 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B352- B353, first emphasis mine.

155 Note that the transcendental level is only reached via *reflection*. The role of reflection in establishing a transcendental account of meaning will be an important element of our discussion in chapters three and four.

156 For thorough account of Schopenhauer's influence on Wittgenstein's account, see Brockhaus, *Pulling Up the Ladder,* 29- 64.

at least according to Kant—not graspable. But this is not a simple matter of a change in terminology. Assuming Wittgenstein takes the Kantian distinction to heart, he must take account of the fact that the transcendental and transcendent are not simply equivalent terms in different vocabularies –that transcendental principles, while not directly experienced, are nonetheless *thinkable*, as opposed to the transcendent, which (per impossible) would be the thought of something which is beyond the bounds of thought itself. The shift from "transcendent" to "transcendental" must involve a rethinking of limits.

It is in this vein that, directly following the oft-quoted remark that "the limits of my language mean [*bedeutet*] the limits of my world" (TLP 5.6), Wittgenstein turns to a discussion of the limits of *logic* and world. The relation of these remarks to the Kantian schematic discussed above is readily apparent:

> Logic pervades [*erfüllt*] the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.
> So we cannot say in logic, 'the world has this in it, and this, but not that.'
> For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.
> We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot *say* either. (TLP 5.61)

Now, according to the Tractarian system for the numbering of propositions,[157] in the above cited passages we should take 5.61 as a comment on 5.6, which shows that logic and language are conceived by Wittgenstein to be related in terms of their respective limits [*Grenzen*]. Following Max Black,[158] many commentators have insisted—in direct defiance of Wittgenstein's German text—that *bedeuten* in 5.61 should be read as an identity predicate, such that the limits of my language *just are* the limits of my world. But, as we have shown above, logic is explicitly claimed by Wittgenstein to play a *transcendental role* in the *Tractatus,* and nowhere is a similar status ascribed to language, so these remarks cannot mean that language and logic are equivalent or synonymous. And nor can they be, on the *Tractarian* account, since language is a form of

157 See the footnote (marked by *) to TLP 1.
158 Cf. Black, *A Companion to Wittgenstein's* Tractatus, 307.

representation, an element involved in the Proposition, and not a condition of the possibility of the Proposition as such, whereas logic is transcendental, a fixed condition of possibility for Propositions, and is "in" the world only insofar as it "pervades" it.

Since logic itself is fixed (because the totality of Objects is fixed), Wittgenstein contends that Elementary Propositions (i.e. possible meanings) are determined not directly through logic but through its *application*:

> 5.557 The *application* of logic decides what elementary propositions there are. What lies in the [sphere of] application, logic cannot anticipate. This is clear: logic must not conflict with its application. But logic has to be in contact with its application. Thus logic and its application must not overlap.[159]
>
> 5.5571 If I cannot specify a priori what elementary propositions there are, then wanting to specify them must lead to obvious nonsense [*Unsinn*]. [160]

In these remarks, which immediately precede 5.6 and 5.61 cited above, Wittgenstein struggles to describe the complex relation of logic to its application [*Anwendung*] in the world of possible (and actual) Facts by means of the Proposition. Like Kant's transcendental principles, logic is not itself immanent to the world; it is a priori, formally fixed, and thus is not a part of the contingent, a posteriori realm of *Erfahrung*; rather, logic marks the conditions of the possibility for there *being* any contingent facts at all. It is in this sense that it "pervades" [*erfüllt*] the world, like the Kantian transcendental principles "whose application [*Anwendung*] stays wholly and completely within the limits of possible experience."[161] It is for this reason that Wittgenstein insists that the logic of Facts can be *shown* but not represented: if a Proposition is a picture of a Fact, and the components of the Propositions (Names) correspond to the components of the Fact (Objects), then the logical form, the arrangement or relation between Objects "fitting into one another like links in a chain" will be like the relation between the components of the picture. It will be a

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159 Translation modified: "Die Anwendung der Logik entscheidet darüber, welche Elementarsätze es gibt. Was in der Anwendung liegt, kann die Logik nicht vorausnehmen. Das ist klar: Die Logik darf mit ihrer Anwendung nicht kollidieren. Aber die Logik muss sich mit ihrer Anwendung berühren. Also dürfen die Logik und ihre Anwendung einander nicht übergreifen."

160 Translation modified: "Wenn ich die Elementarsätze nicht a priori angeben kann, dann muss es zu offenbarem Unsinn führen, sie angeben zu wollen."

161 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B353/A296 (full citation given above).

necessary "component" of the Fact, *shown* in the Proposition, but *not represented*.

III. g. The Mystical as Precursor to the Phenomenological Dimension of Meaning

The difference between logic and language, and thus between that which is expressible and that which is thinkable but not expressible, that which can only be shown, thus lies precisely in that which is not "in" the Tractarian world, because it is not a matter of the representable content of Facts. For, as we have seen, according to the Tractatus, language is oriented to possible Facts in the world: the material content of propositions is derived from the "top down," from constituents of propositions referring to actually obtaining Facts in the world. But the contribution of logical form happens from the "bottom up," as determined by the formal properties of Objects, and these are eternally fixed and thus not determined by the contingencies of the Factual world, although their particular arrangement is *shown* in Facts.

If we fail to give adequate weight to this distinction, if we consider language and logic to be for all intents and purposes simply synonymous, we end up with a reading of the *Tractatus* in which the contours of propositional language about the World determine the entirety of the contours of human experience; a reading that ignores the ethico-religious insight that drove Wittgenstein's early thought and is reflected in the letter to von Ficker, the insight according to which, as Wittgenstein writes in the *Notebooks,* "the facts of the world are not the end of the matter" (NB 8.7.1916).[162] Our gloss of this material from the *Tractatus* thus also corresponds to Paul Engelmann's understanding of the *Tractatus*, which had the benefit of extended direct explanation from the author. Hacker notes,

> As Engelmann understood the *Tractatus* and what Wittgenstein explained about it, Wittgenstein and the logical positivists shared a common endeavour in trying to draw

162 The remark in context: "To believe in a God means to understand the question of the meaning of life. To believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter. To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning" (my translation). "An einen Gott glauben heißt, die Frage nach dem Sinn des Lebens verstehen. An einen Gott glauben heißt sehen, daß es mit den Tatsachen der Welt noch nicht abgetan ist. An Gott glauben heißt sehen, daß das Leben einen Sinn hat" (*Notebook* entry from 8.7.1916).

> 'the line between what we can speak about and what we must be silent about'. 'The difference is only that they have nothing to be silent about.… Whereas Wittgenstein passionately believes that all that really matters in human life is precisely what, in his view, we must be silent about'. Among Wittgenstein's 'mystical conclusions', Engelmann thought, are, e.g. that the sense of the world must lie outside the world (Tractatus 6.41)—yet, he observed, 'he [Wittgenstein] does not doubt that there is such a sense'; that no value exists in the world, yet 'that which endows things with the value they have, which they show, is therefore simply not in the world …but that cannot be said'; that 'There is indeed that which is unutterable. This makes itself manifest, it is the mystical' (cf. *Tractatus* 6.522)—'(but not a "bluish haze surrounding things" and giving them an interesting appearance [as Wittgenstein once said in conversation])'.

In everyday life, there are myriad aspects of experience that are not and for Wittgenstein could not in principle be articulated in language, because they are not matters of *Fact*. If we do not recognize the distinction—the tension—between the a priori logic which pervades the world and the language which expresses the contingent, a posteriori Facts in it, we begin to mistake the impoverished Tractarian World for the actual world of human experience and life, and to think that this "*real"* world in which we live our lives can be reduced—at least insofar as it can be understood by human beings—to the language in which we talk about it and the Facts our propositions represent.

To claim that any *possible* Fact which might occur in my (Tractarian) World must be at least in principle articulable in the propositions of my language is to make a straightforward deduction which follows from the isomorphic structure and the logical propositions of the *Tractatus*: since the world is defined as the World of Facts, and Facts are expressed in Propositions, which are properly linguistic affairs, the limits of my language will necessarily mirror the limits of the Facts (the Tractarian World). But to make the same claim for any possible *experience* which I might have, which Wittgenstein *does not do*, would be to espouse a sort of linguistic idealism –to think that the everyday world in which we live is completely limited by and indeed consists of nothing but linguistically-propositionally determinable empirical Facts. Although the *Tractatus* is very concerned to explain the way the World of Facts can be represented in Propositions and thus in language, this does not commit Wittgenstein to claiming that our experience, understood as the world in which we *actually live*, must be entirely

determined by the purview of our language.

Thus, on our view, interpretations which ignore or downplay the role of the mystical miss what is most fundamental in the book; and the misstep begins with the failure to distinguish between conditions of possibility—as determined a priori by logic—and their *application* in language, something insisted upon by Wittgenstein in terms of the "method of projection" and in explicitly transcendental terms by Kant. What is most important for Wittgenstein is precisely that which, according to the *Tractatus*, *cannot* be represented in language but can only be shown; that that which determines the conferring of meaning is the *application* of logic, which is ultimately a relation *to* the impoverished Tractarian World and thus not a part *of* it.

And this is also what underlies our insistence, expressed earlier in this section (III.b), that our version of the ineffability reading differs importantly from the standard one. The interpretation given here is not equivalent to most traditional "ineffability" readings of the *Tractatus*, since we are not claiming that that which is outside the Tractarian world is some set of ineffable *Facts,* deep *truths* or hidden *knowledge*. The claim that the ineffable is a realm of *truths* can be seen as the backbone of the traditional ineffability interpretations. To cite just one example from Hacker, "according to the *Tractatus*, there are indeed metaphysical truths, many of which have been paraded in the book. But any attempt to state them, including that of the *Tractatus*, is doomed to transgress the bounds of sense..."[163] But to say that the projection of *Sinn originates* outside the world cannot be to say that it exists in a separate and prior realm of Facts, since the totality of Facts must be *within*, or, more precisely, must *be* the Tractarian World (TLP 1.1). Nor is this to say that there are ineffable "truths," in any standard sense, since truth occurs only in the World, at the level of Facts and Propositions. It is rather to say that that which makes truth possible, because it makes the constitution of meaning possible, is neither itself a truth, nor interpretable in terms of truths. This is not a matter of a question to which there is some deeply hidden answer. What is ineffable is not some sort of potential truth claim: it is not a

163 Hacker, *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy*, 35- 36.

"what." It also does not speak to "how" (TLP 6.432), and is thus not a *logical* claim, though it is not thereby *illogical*, but "prior" to the logical and thus, as it were, *a-logical.* It is rather what Wittgenstein considered the "mystical" existence of the meaningful world as a whole - "*that* it exists" (TLP 6.44), a point to which we will return below.

But to claim—as we have—that the *Tractatus* has correctly identified the *problem*, is not yet to endorse Wittgenstein's own *solution*. For the appeal to the mystical still ultimately functions as a sort of unexplained explainer, as something whose role is to make possible a meaningful world, but about which we can say nothing further, except that it plays that role. Wittgenstein's transcendental account of logic and meaning still relies ultimately on a *transcendent* foundation in order to mediate the tension between the a priori fixity of logical form and the a posteriori contingency of empirical Facts. As we shall see in chapter four, later, in the mid-1930s, when Wittgenstein began to rethink the Tractarian schema and to broaden his conception of the "projection" of meaning, he would recast this mediation by means of a distinction between the phenomenological, "experiential" domain, concerned with possibilities, and the "empirical" domain of sciences such as physics, limited to the Facts. In the *Tractatus*, however, the former domain remains something only gestured at by means of the appeal to "the mystical," because the *Tractatus* has no significant conception of experience, considering the World, as it does, to consist exclusively of a "totality of Facts." As we shall see in subsequent chapters, although Wittgenstein's suspicions about the limits of language in relation to meaningful experience will continue, the mystical mediating domain of the *Tractatus* will give way to an account of the immediacy of experience, a recognition of the phenomenological dimension of meaning.

IV. The Limits of a Pure Transcendental Logic: the Problem of the "Closed" A Priori

Having laid out the basic schematic elements of the theory of meaning in relation to

transcendental logic in the first edition of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus,* we close this chapter by briefly noting the similarities in the problems we found in the two accounts. For Husserl, meaning content, insofar as it arises from the side of the *ideal*, is not to be considered a *real* component of the world. In separating the realm of ideal meaning-species from the realm of the real in order to ward off psychologism and guarantee the objectivity of pure logic, Husserl also seems to have sealed off meaning and logic from his own conception of the intentional structure characteristic of everyday life itself: if meanings are exclusively ideal entities only involved in the intentional act insofar as they characterize the meaning intention independent of its fulfillment, then it is hard to see what role is played by the *real* side of the schema—the *real, experienced* world—at all.[164] Husserl's account is coherent and non-circular, and he has avoided the specter of psychologism, but he has paid the price of cutting off his account of meaning from the world of experience, resulting in a version of the problematic we discussed in the previous chapter in terms McDowell's criticism of the Davidsonian project for resulting in a "coherentism," what we have called a "closed a priori" conception of logic operating in independence of spontaneity and the "friction" of the lived world. In this sense, Husserl's drive to maintain the objectivity of logic seems to have pushed him dangerously close to the position of the later Frege (which we will discuss briefly at the start of the next chapter), in which the realm of meanings is to be located exclusively in some "purely logical" atemporal realm, and is thereby unconcerned with and disconnected from the *real* happenings in the *real* external, spatiotemporal world, and only present insofar as it happens to be (contingently) "effected" by a thinker. Like Frege's conception of Thoughts in the "third realm," the theory of ideal meaning-species as developed in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations* risks a privileging of abstract *intensional* entities at the expense of the concrete *intentional* character of lived experience and the

164 It is in this sense that the doctrine of ideal entities has often lead to the misconception among philosophers, especially in the analytic philosophy of mind, that Husserl's phenomenology is merely a form of a priori "introspectionism" (see Zahavi and Gallagher, *The Phenomenological Mind*, 4-10, 19-21).

doctrine of meaning as an intentional act with potential fulfillment. As Drummond puts it:

> The priority of the meaning-species to its instantiation risks dislocating the intentionality of the experience from the act itself to the meaning or sense that it instantiates. It threatens to reduce what is fundamental to what is not fundamental; it threatens, in other words, to reduce the intentionality of consciousness to the intensionality of sense, to a semantic category. […] It would leave us with a domain of pre-constituted meanings whose relation to acts once again becomes mysterious.[165]

In the following chapter, we shall see how Husserl alters his theory of meaning in the 1913 edition of the *Logical Investigations* and even more so in the contemporaneously published *Ideas I* to focus more explicitly on the intentional character of meaning and upon its "location"—which is not an hypostatization—in the intentional *act.*

With this in mind, the relation of this Husserlian problematic to the problem we noted in Wittgenstein's early account of meaning becomes clear: if according to the transcendental conception of logic in the *Tractatus* we are able to understand the sense of any Elementary proposition prior to evaluations of its truth value in the World of Facts, whence and in what way does the content which gives sense to the proposition ultimately arise? It cannot come "from below," because Tractarian Objects only contribute logical *form* to the proposition, and thus are only responsible for the formal structure of the world and not for the material content with which it is combined in the "projection" into the proposition. But it cannot come "from above" either, since the doctrine of the non-interdependence of States of affairs demands their logical independence from contingently-obtaining Facts. We are thus left in a seemingly paradoxical situation or at the very least a metaphysical problem of emergence, as many of Wittgenstein's commentators have noted: "How can a simple—propertyless in itself—yield properties when united with other equally propertyless simples? … How do [meaning] properties begin? How do we move from no properties at all in individuals [Tractarian Objects] *per se*, to properties in collections of individuals?"[166]

The formal elegance of Wittgenstein's analysis has left us with a coherent a priori account

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165 Drummond, "The Logical Investigations: Paving the Way," 36.
166 Goddard and Judge, *The Metaphysics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus,* 11.

of the structure of the world and of meaning, but the explanation of how that structure receives a content, of how our propositions have *particular meanings* and thus can be related to *actual experiences in a meaningful world*, is outsourced to a vague (if novel and poetic) conception of "the mystical." Like Husserl, Wittgenstein has outlined a complex and admirable theory of the ideal, a priori structure of meaning, but left very little room for any explanation of the role of meaning as not merely as an abstract system but also the fundamental characteristic of conscious life. Whereas Husserl's early theory of meaning failed to adequately account for the relationship of meaning to lived experience, since even the material *content* of meaning arises ultimately from the isolated side of the ideal in the form of ideal meaning-species, Wittgenstein's limiting of the a priori by means of the doctrine of the non-interdependence of States of affairs and the *Tractatus*' very strict conception of logical form results in a problematic disconnect between the contingent Facts in the world and meaning's a priori logical form "outside" or at the "border" of it.

The problem in both texts amounts to an insufficient account of the role of *experience* in meaning. In focusing on the a priori elements of the theory of meaning in an attempt to ward off the problems of a psychologistic logic, both of our authors have effectively transformed the move away from a psychologistic, anthropological account of logic and meaning into a move away from the epistemological clarification of meaning relations and thereby away from experience itself. Thus our suggestion, at the beginning of this chapter, that for both Wittgenstein and Husserl the first step toward the notion of a phenomenological dimension of meaning was in fact an *overstep*, an overcorrection. In this regard the theories of meaning espoused in the *Tractatus* and the first edition of the *Logical Investigations* share a fundamental flaw with another well-known theory of meaning from the early part of the twentieth century: that of Frege, as evidenced especially in his conception of "thoughts" and the "third realm." We begin the next chapter with a discussion of that notion, to show how similarly problematic aspects of Frege's account are avoided in the subsequent thought of our authors by conceiving of meaning in terms of the *act*, thereby allowing for a return to the world of experience and setting the stage for a distinction

between the empirical dimension of fact and the phenomenological dimension of meaning.

Chapter Three: The Turn to Experience as "Opening Up" of the A Priori

In this chapter we examine the first steps toward the recognition of the phenomenological dimension of meaning by tracing the thought of our authors in their early stages of transition. We begin in section one with a discussion of the use of the concept of *Vorstellung* for Husserl and Frege, which is used to illustrate what we see as the fundamental difference in approach between traditional analytic and phenomenological theories of meaning, a difference we characterize in terms of explanatory priority, as the "Husserl- Frege fork." In subsequent sections, we go on to address specific changes in the theory of meaning in Husserl and Wittgenstein as a result of the problems with their accounts highlighted in the previous chapter: in section two, we show how for Husserl the problem of the relation of ideal meaning to experience is finally resolved in the second (1913) edition of the *Logical Investigations* by a new account of meaning as correlation in the *act,* made possible because of the inclusion of intentional content in the realm of methodological phenomenological description. In section three, we turn to Wittgenstein's important transitional essay "Some Remarks on Logical Form" and his subsequent *Philosophical Remarks* to show him revising his conception of "projection." This marks the beginning of Wittgenstein's gradual move away from the Tractatus' strict a priori conception of logical form and toward the later conception of logical grammar, and the replacement of the *Tractatus'* appeal to "the mystical" with an appeal the "the phenomena themselves," and thus the beginnings of his own recognition of the phenomenological dimension of meaning. At the end of the chapter, in section four, we examine in greater depth Husserl's development of the concepts of the phenomenological reduction and the *Wesensschau* in the years between the first and second editions of the *Logical Investigations*, allowing us to clarify the motivations underlying the theoretical shifts discussed earlier in the chapter, and putting in place the final elements necessary for our discussion of the fully transcendental theory of meaning in Husserl's *Ideas I* in the following chapter. Our present chapter, the mid-point of the dissertation, traces the paths by

which both authors move away from a relatively strict, "closed" a priori account of meaning toward theories oriented more closely to lived experience.

I. The Husserl-Frege Fork

Like Frege, Husserl considers the proposition [*Satz*] to be the primary unit of meaning. Unlike him, however, Husserl follows Bolzano in insisting on a strict distinction between the *Satz* as the logically ideal form of the judgment (Bolzano's "propositions-in-themselves"), and the *Satz* as the (mere) grammatical written or spoken sentence.167 To clarify this difference, Husserl notes two different uses of the term judgment [*Urteil*] in the history of logic. The judgment in the psychological sense refers to *my asserting* an objective state of affairs about the objects which I am thereby judging, e.g., the *act* of *judging* that the water in this pitcher will fill two glasses. In this sense the judgment is a real [*real*] *psychological act* reflecting a *mental state* (LI, Prolegomena, §46/ Hua, XVIII 173ff). But the term "judgment" can also refer to the *assertion made* in the act of judging, e.g., to the judgment *that* the water in this pitcher will fill two glasses. In this sense the judgmental *Satz* is a logical (not "grammatical") proposition, and the *object* of that proposition is for Husserl a general ideal meaning (LI, Prolegomena, §47/ Hua, XVIII 177ff). This is the meaning that Husserl, against psychologistic logic, considers primary, since it guarantees that the objective *logical* meaning-content of the judgment I make, e.g., about the water in the pitcher and of the judgment you make about it have (or always could have) the same self-identical, ideal content, just as much as the proposition "2 + 2 = 4" is the *same* for you as for me, even though my judging so is obviously not your judging so, in the sense that our individual meaning acts will differ.[168]

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167 See Smith, *Husserl,* 48- 52; Cf. Smith, "Intentionality and Picturing," 164- 165.

168 In the Prolegomena sections cited here (§§46-48), Husserl seems to be making a general point about the domains of the logical vs. psychological in terms of judgment. He does not always clearly distinguish in these passages between individual species-meanings and general or ideal species-meanings, as they are distinguished in the first Investigation and presented above (chapter two, section II. h). In some places, he even seems to be thinking of both simultaneously. Since the basic point of

This move of course mirrors another important contemporaneous account of the objectivity of meaning content, that of Frege. In "The Thought," Frege begins with the observation that not everything that can be an object of human understanding can be a *Vorstellung.*[169] For Frege, *Vorstellungen* (translated systematically in the Quintons' English version as "ideas") are entirely subjective, and exist only for the individual. If the understanding was made up only of *Vorstellungen*, then we would never be able to communicate anything: there could be no shared truths and no ground for agreement in and about the world. Thus, "Either the thesis that only what is my idea can be the object of my awareness is false, or all my knowledge and perception is limited to the range of my ideas, to the stage of my consciousness. In this case I should have only an inner world and I should know nothing of other people."[170] But Frege and Husserl both insist that we *do* have potentially true thoughts of an external world, and we *are* aware of other people. And thus there must be something "outside" the inner world of my subjective ideas.

When we compare their respective conceptions of this "outside" element, however, an important difference begins to emerge. According to the first of Frege's well-known "fundamental principles" in the *Grundlagen der Arithmetik,* "the psychological is always to be sharply separated from the logical, the subjective from the objective."[171] The "outside" element which is to guarantee the ideality and shareability of meaning must be sharply distinguished from merely psychological elements, and *thus also*, for Frege, from the subjective character of the *Vorstellung.* It is for this reason that Frege famously insists that there must be real objects of my awareness, called Thoughts [*Gedanken*], which are not merely acts of presentation

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these sections regards the general ideality of meanings, and since this is clearly the meaning intended at the end of §46 (Hua, XVII, 177), we have focused on this sense of species throughout the above discussion.

169 Frege, "The Thought," 307/ "Der Gedanke," 74.

170 Frege, "The Thought," 303/ "Der Gedanke," 70.

171 Frege, *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik,* xxii, my translation ("Es ist das Psychologische von dem Logischen, das Subjektive von dem Objektiven scharf zu trennen").

[*Vorstellungen*] in my consciousness, because they have a "being independent of me"[172] and must be capable of being shared, and yet are not merely "out there" in the sense of scientifically-observable objects in the spatiotemporal world. The "third realm" in which such Thoughts subsist guarantees that the subject matter of logic is neither psychologistic nor subjective -not "the mental process of thinking and the psychological laws in accordance with which it takes place."[173]

Husserl's approach is, at first blush, similar. Since the ideal quality of the judgment *qua* content is supposed to guarantee the objectivity of logic, if such ideality of the proposition were merely attributed to the contingent observations of *psychology,* logical truths would not be rigorously distinguished from psychological "truths," and logic would not be the a priori objective science which for Husserl it must be. Thus, Husserl notes, in this "logical sense," "'Judgment' has the same meaning as 'proposition' [*Satz*], the latter understood, not as a grammatical, but as an *ideal meaning-unit*. This is true of all the distinctions of judgment-acts or forms, which provide the necessary bases for the laws of pure logic. […] The relevant analyses are analyses of meaning, not psychological ones." (LI, Prolegomena, §47/ Hua, XVII, 178, my emphasis). Like Frege, Husserl recognizes that the objectivity of the ideal-logical must be guaranteed by locating it outside of the psychological.

But here the crucial difference emerges. Unlike Frege's, Husserl's critique of psychologism has not been explicitly tied to a rejection of the *subjective act as such*. As we saw in the previous chapter, this was an effect of the influence of Brentano and the thesis of intentionality on Husserl's thought. Even when Husserl moved away from the (arguably) psychologistic tendencies of his early *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, he did not abandon that work's thesis of intentionality. And insofar as the thesis of intentionality recognizes the subjective

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172 Frege, "The Thought," 307/ "Der Gedanke," 74, translation modified ("Nicht alles ist Vorstellung. So kann ich denn auch den Gedanken als unabhängig von mir anerkennen, den auch andere Menschen ebenso wie ich fassen können.").

173 Frege, "The Thought," 289/ "Der Gedanke," 58.

character of the intentional act, Husserl's rejection of psychologism in favor of an a priori, ideal conception of meaning does not entail, but rather *precludes*, a rejection of the subjective as such, for, as we saw in the previous chapter, Husserl's conception of ideal meaning is established in relation to the meaning intention as one part of the tripartite structure of the intentional act. Thus although the a priori-ideal is for Husserl an objective realm, it is not thereby straightforwardly *opposed to* the subjective. We criticized Husserl's early conception in the previous chapter for its lack of an adequate account of the role *experience* in relation to meaning, but this was never a result of a move—like Frege's—which rejected the role of subjectivity along with the rejection of psychologism.

This difference between the two accounts can be clearly seen in Husserl's use of the term *Vorstellung* as compared with its use by Frege. Because of the term's ambiguities, Frege chose to associate '*Vorstellung*' exclusively with the experiential, subjective, and thus for him psychological presentation of an idea in the mind of an individual, and therefore to strictly separate it from the a priori objective sphere of logic and meaning, for which his '*Begriff*' [concept] and '*Gegenstand*' [object] are used in its stead.[174] Husserl also recognizes the danger

174 "A *Vorstellung* in the subjective sense is what is governed by the psychological laws of association; it is of a sensible pictorial character. A *Vorstellung* in the objective sense belongs to logic and is in principle non-sensible, although the word which means an objective *Vorstellung* is often accompanied by a subjective *Vorstellung* which nevertheless is not its meaning. Subjective *Vorstellungen* are often demonstrably different in different men, objective *Vorstellungen* are the same for all. Objective *Vorstellungen* can be divided into objects and concepts. I shall, myself, to avoid confusion, use *Vorstellung* only in the subjective sense. It is because Kant concatenated both meanings of the word that his doctrine assumed such a very subjective, idealist coloring, and his true view was made so difficult to discover. *The distinction here drawn stands or falls with that between psychology and logic. If only these themselves were to be kept always rigidly distinct!*" Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic,* 37 (footnote to §27)/ *Grundlagen der Arithmetik*, 37, translation modified ("Die Vorstellung im subjektiven Sinne ist das, worauf sich die psychologischen Assoziationsgesetze beziehen; sie ist von sinnlicher, bildhafter Beschaffenheit. Die Vorstellung im objektiven Sinne gehört der Logik an und ist wesentlich unsinnlich obwohl das Wort welches eine objektive Vorstellung bedeutet, oft auch eine subjektive mit sich führt, die jedoch nicht seine Bedeutung ist. Die subjektive Vorstellung ist oft nachweisbar verschieden in verschiedenen Menschen, die objektive für alle dieselbe. Die objektiven Vorstellungen kann man eintheilen in Gegenstände und Begriffe. Ich werde, um Verwirrung zu vermeiden, 'Vorstellung' nur im subjektiven Sinne gebrauchen. Dadurch, dass Kant mit diesem Worte beide Bedeutungen verband, hat er seiner Lehre eine sehr subjektive, idealistische Färbung gegeben und das Treffen seiner wahren Meinung erschwert. Die hier gemachte Unterscheidung ist so berechtigt wie die zwischen Psychologie und Logik. Möchte man diese immer recht streng auseinanderhalten!").

involved in the use of '*Vorstellung*' because of its multiple senses.[175] However, like Kant, he reserves for a certain sense of *Vorstellung* a role that is not so neatly separable from the a priori objective domain of logic. This is the sense in which the *Vorstellung* is the name for that which "presents" the content of an experience to the subject in a determinate manner, the word which Kant uses (and Frege laments) in claiming that "The I think must be able to accompany all of my *Vorstellungen,* for otherwise something would be represented [*vorgestellt*] in me that could not be thought at all."[176]

Husserl points out that there is a certain ambiguity even in *this* use of the term, since it can refer either to the act of the presentation, or to the content so presented (each sense is present in the Kant passage). He thus distinguishes between the *Vorstellung* as a psychological *act*, which is to be kept strictly separate from the domain of logic, and the *Vorstellung* as the epistemological "act-matter" [*Aktmaterie*] in which the meaningful object is presented in a particular manner, "as such and such," but "exclusive of quality" (LI V, §44/ Hua, XIX/1, 520, translation modified to reflect 1st edition[177]) (we will discuss the notion of act-quality below).

This means that Husserl's distinction between the merely psychological and the properly objective realm of logic and of ideal meaning *falls under* his conception of the subjective act. And this in turn suggests that, although Frege and Husserl agree in basing their theories of meaning on a conception of ideal meaning content (the proposition), for Frege this content is to be established by way of an analysis independent of consideration of the subjective act, whereas

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175 *Vorstellung* is a common German word which was often employed as a term of art in Germanaphone logic in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It has no exact equivalent in English. Common translations are *presentation, representation, idea, image*, *belief*, but none of these fully capture the meaning of the term. Indeed, the term has several senses even in everyday German usage: see, e.g., LI, V, §44/ Hua, XIX, 520- 527, where Husserl enumerates thirteen different senses of "*Vorstellung*."

176 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 132 ("Das: Ich denke, muss alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können; denn sonst würde etwas in mir vorgestellt werden, was gar nicht gedacht werden könnte, welches ebensoviel heißt, als die Vorstellung würde entweder unmöglich, oder wenigstens für mich nichts sein.").

177 This is the first and most important of the thirteen senses of *Vorstellung* noted by Husserl in the passage. The character of the *Vorstellung* as a sort of (nonpsychological) content is even more strongly emphasized in this passage in the second (1913) edition, where Husserl adds the words "the full content" to his description "of the act" ("...d.h. als *der volle Gehalt* des Aktes...").

for Husserl it is to be established precisely by way of an inquiry into the character of the subjective-intentional act itself. This distinction is absolutely fundamental for understanding the subsequent divergent developments of the theory of meaning in the analytic-Fregean tradition and in the Husserlian phenomenological tradition.

But we do not mean to suggest that the Husserlian version is simply clearly right here. For Frege is not ignorant of the role of the subject in such logico-epistemological considerations. Indeed, in "the Thought," Frege clearly recognizes that Thoughts can only be experienced insofar as they are effected or "apprehended" [*gefaßt*] by a (subjective) thinker:

> Thoughts are by no means unreal but their reality is of quite a different kind from that of things. And their effect is brought about by an act of the thinker without which they would be ineffective, at least as far as we can see. And yet the thinker does not create them but must take them as they are. They can be true without being apprehended by a thinker and are not wholly unreal even then, at least if they *could* be apprehended and by this means be brought into operation."[178]

Although Fregean Thoughts are logically independent of the subjects who think or "apprehend" them, they are nonetheless admitted to be *practically* dependent on the existence of a subject, insofar as Thoughts can be apprehended by none other than thinkers, and without at least one instance of such apprehension we could not have discovered the Thought in the first place.[179] Frege's notion of the "third realm," while conceived to be logically independent of subjectivity nonetheless recognizes the necessity of the subject for the apprehension of meaning. It is just that, for Frege, the *Sinn* cannot be located in the subjective act of grasping itself, for this would put it on the level of mere subjective *Vorstellung* and thus threaten the objectivity of logic. As Hans Sluga puts it, "Logic for Frege is not concerned with how and why we judge but only with the properties of the *conceptual contents* of judgments and their interrelations. This distinction is

178 Frege, "The Thought," 311/ "Der Gedanke," 77, my emphasis.

179 Furthermore, as several commentators have pointed out, even though thought-truth relations are independent of us for Frege, we cannot *know if a thought is true* without the act of judgment or assertion. Such an act necessitates a judger or assertor, and thus even if the Thought is itself independent of us, its truth cannot be established without us (Cf. Sluga, *Gottlob Frege*, 115).

what guarantees the separation of logic from psychology."[180] Despite his going to some length to emphasize the role of the subject in the apprehension of Thoughts, Frege still considers the relation of truth and meaning to the world to be a relation orthogonal to intentionality: although the Thought can be presented to me [*vorgestellt*], it remains radically separate from its *Vorstellung*.

Once we see that Frege is not ignorant of the role of subjectivity, it becomes clear that the difference between the Fregean and Husserlian accounts of the ideality of meaning derives from divergent conceptions of explanatory priority at the most fundamental level of the analysis of meaning. For Frege, the analysis of meaning is ultimately an inquiry into the *contents of judgment*, or *concepts,* and only on the basis of this established objectivity can we investigate the role of the subject in meaning. For Husserl—in a way which remains largely implicit in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations* but which, as we shall see below, will be explicitly thematized by means of the phenomenological reduction—the analysis of meaning is ultimately an inquiry into the *structure of judging,* in terms of the intentional *act*, and only on the basis of the fundamental subjective structure of consciousness can we inquire with certainty into the objective contents of meaning in propositions.

This division—the taking of two divergent explanatory paths at the point of the "Husserl-Frege fork"—has resulted one hundred years and countless permutations later in the fundamental difference that we argued in our opening chapter separates John McDowell's "Space of Reasons" from Steven Crowell's "Space of Meaning."[181] For McDowell's non-conceptualism is rooted in the conviction that it is nonsensical to conceive of anything meaningful outside the "Space of Reasons" or of concepts, and thus that at its core, the theory of meaning is—a la Frege—a theory of the conceptual. Crowell's insistence on the role of "constitution theory" in establishing the "Space of Meaning" shows his own commitment to an account rooted in the notion of meaning as

180 Sluga, *Gottlob Frege*, 76, my emphasis.
181 See chapter one, end of section IV.

intentional *act*. As we suggested in chapter one, the decision of which path to take in terms of the theory of meaning may be ultimately a matter of otherwise-unjustifiable philosophical preference. In the rest of this dissertation, however, we will argue for the Husserlian path in the hope that, with the help of some insightful correctives from Wittgenstein, we might give some further weight to our own preference through further appeal to the phenomenological dimension of meaning.

Before taking that step, however, we owe the reader a brief preliminary indication of our reasons for bringing Wittgenstein, reader of Frege and "analytic" philosopher of language, along on this path of inquiry. For, it might be objected that our account of the theory of meaning in the *Tractatus* in the previous chapter reinforces the notion that Wittgenstein subscribes to the very Fregean appeal to content over act discussed above: even if the reader accepts our reservations about the insufficient conceptualization of the role of experience in the *Tractatus*, does not the text's focus on the strict, a priori role of Objects as primary in the determination of meaning reflect a concern primarily for content, and not for act? The objection is not without merit. But as we shall attempt to show in the present chapter, Wittgenstein's theory of meaning—at least those elements of it that survive the famous turn away from the doctrines of the *Tractatus* in the 1930s—is ultimately conceived with reference to his own version of the meaning-act, the "method of projection." We will argue that important modifications to this conception lead Wittgenstein away from the earlier, Fregean focus on content and toward a phenomenological conception of meaning focused on the act, although, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, other commitments in Wittgenstein's philosophy of *language* lead to continued differences from the Husserlian phenomenological account of meaning.

II. Husserl's Rethinking of the Ideal and the Real

In this section we pick up our discussion of Husserl's theory of meaning from chapter two to show how the first edition of the *Logical Investigations'* largely implicit distinction between the

psychological and the subjective but non-psychological is made explicit in the second edition, and leads to fundamental changes in Husserl's theory of meaning, "opening" his conception of the a priori and bringing the ideal account of logical content closer to the intentional conception of experience with which it was in tension in the first edition. By considering meaning primarily (though not exclusively) in terms of the intentional act instead of in terms of the ideal object, Husserl can avoid the difficulties of hypostatization that affect Frege's conception of meaning as consisting of ideal objects ("Thoughts") located in an abstract "third realm." But in order to do so successfully he must radically reformulate his theory of the ideality of meaning to clearly distinguish between essence and meaning proper, two elements that in the first edition were hopelessly intertwined in the notion of the ideal meaning-species and its "instantiations" in acts. In the first edition, Husserl assumes that the structure of the ideality of meaning simply *must* be that of a species in relation to its particular instance. But, as we noted at the conclusion of our discussion of that theory,[182] the nature of this ideality had not been phenomenologically or epistemologically clarified in relation to the "things themselves," but only asserted on the basis of Husserl's early, quasi-Platonic and mathematically-oriented conception of the a priori realm of the objective-ideal.

II. a. The Reell-phenomenological and the Intentional

Further consideration of the nature of meaning, not exclusively in its a priori ideality but *phenomenologically,* as it is present in lived *experience,* lead Husserl to change his description of the nature of the ideality of meaning in the years leading up to the printing of the second edition of the *Investigations* to reflect a sharper distinction between the ideal *essence* and the individuated intentional *meaning*, and to distinguish both of these from the *real* object meant *in* the experience.[183] As a result of his Brentanian focus not exclusively on content but also on the

182 See chapter 2, section II. h.
183 Cf. Drummond, "The Logical Investigations: Paving the Way," 35-37.

intentional *act*, Husserl recognizes that an account of the objective status of meaning limited exclusively to an account of otherwise-undifferentiated ideal *meanings* would do little justice to the color and complexity of presentations in lived experience, in which meanings are *not* simply present or absent, but are manifested, imagined, thought, and perceived in myriad ways that seem to be genuinely qualitatively different, and not mere differences of subjective-psychological presentational "coloring."

Though the same "act-matter" may be present in all cases, it seems both uncontroversial and phenomenologically accurate that, e.g., recognizing the film to be over is very different from desiring that the film be over, or asserting that it is over. Although all these judgments can be expressed in the same proposition, "the film is over," Husserl maintains that they nonetheless differ from one another in a way that is appreciably *not* simply a matter of "subjective" psychological aspects of the perception. For this reason, Husserl contends that there are different objective but *non-independent* parts or "moments" of the meaning act, which do not exist independently of each other, since it is only as a whole that they make up the ideal meaning, but can be reflectively distinguished as individual moments within that larger whole. (As we shall see below, the "moment" under consideration here is what Husserl calls the "act-quality.") Because these non-independent moments are defined as *essentially* related to the ideal meaning intended in the act and not to the subjective-psychological character of the intending, they are counted on the ideal/objective side of the ideal vs. real distinction. Husserl calls these non-independent, objective moments *reell* components of the act.

Thus, in addition to the fundamental distinction between the ideal and the real,[184] Husserl's account of meaning in the *Logical Investigations* also makes use of the (unfortunately highly terminologically confusing) distinction between the *real* and the *reell.* We pause here for some further comment on this distinction,[185] in hopes of preventing confusion in the discussion

184 See chapter two, section II. e.
185 Cf. Drummond, *Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy*, 158; Moran and Cohen, *The Husserl*

which follows. As we saw in the previous chapter, the adjective "*real*" refers to an object which is actual as a physical or psychological entity or one of its components. The *real* exists in space and objective time (in the straightforward sense of the "world of natural science," etc.), independently of the intentional relation (insofar as its empirical existence is not dependent on my intending it), and is that which, in the intention of an object of its type (a *real* object), when present "fulfills" the intention, and, when absent, "frustrates" it.[186] Husserl distinguishes this notion (*real*) from the German adjective *reell,* which he employs as a phenomenological term of art referring to any inherent, non-independent component (moment) appearing in the structure of the act, such as the act-matter or the act-quality. A *reelle* component of an act need not necessarily refer to anything *really* existent, as in the case, for example, of intentions involving a golden mountain, where I can distinguish the reelle moments that make up the ideal meaning even though there is no *real* object in the world to which that meaning, *qua* intention, would refer. In this sense, we can think of the *reell* as that which is "nonarbitrarily present" in the intentional act.[187]

To summarize the distinction in terms of an example, the *real* parts of the dog are the legs, tail, teeth, etc. belonging to the animal in the spatiotemporal world as studied by the biologist. The *reell* parts of an ideal meaning referring to that dog might be, for example, the dog as the *matter* of my memory of its licking my face or the *quality* of that memory. As distinguished from these latter non-independent moments, the *ideal meaning* of that act of memory contains both of those reell components as non-independent parts. In my act of memory, I remember what was indeed a *real* dog—i.e., the individual spatiotemporal entity which once ran and barked and has since died—but the object which I intend in the act of remembering is the dog as *reell* matter, with a *reell* quality, both of which are non-independent parts of the ideal meaning

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Dictionary, 275- 276.

186 The role of the *real* object in fulfilling the intention must not be confused with the moment of fulfillment itself, which is a non-independent, *reell* component of the act.

187 For this formulation see Erazim V. Kohák, *Jan Patočka: Philosophy and Selected Writings,* p. 89.

of that act. To foreshadow our discussion in section four, below, we can see this distinction roughly in terms of Husserl's later conception of the phenomenological reduction: the *real* element of the experience is that which will be bracketed, along with all other existential claims, whereas ideal meaning (once re-conceived in the second edition more explicitly in terms of essence) and its reelle components will, as non-existential elements of *meaning,* remain.

In the first edition of the *Logical Investigations,* the *reell* components of the act on the ideal/objective side of the ideal vs. real distinction are distinguished from the intentional components of the act, which are considered to be on the real side of the distinction and thus, as *Vorstellungen* were for Frege, ultimately merely subjective-psychological. Only analyses on the the former side are considered to be the proper purview of objectively-valid phenomenological analysis. Husserl thus writes in the fifth investigation, first edition, of "an important distinction, obvious after our previous discussions, between [1] the *reellen* or the phenomenological (descriptive-psychological) content of an act and [2] its intentional content" (LI V, §16/ Hua, XIX, 411, translation modified to reflect A edition[188]).

And here again Husserl's terminology is at first highly confusing. For the notion of the "descriptive psychological" content as it appears in this citation can clearly not be the same as the subjectively-psychological content which we claimed in section one above was rejected by *both* Frege and Husserl. The *whole point* of distinguishing between the ideal and the real was to exclude contingent psychological observational claims from the a priori, objective realm of logic, which Husserl contends should be further investigated with the help of phenomenological—not empirical-psychological—inquiries.

But Husserl continues to use the term "descriptive-psychological" because he contends that even phenomenological inquiry has "a natural starting point in the psychological attitude" (LI V, §16, note/ Hua, XIX, 411) insofar as the descriptions which it gives (as distinguished from the

188 "...führen wir eine wichtige Unterscheidung ein, die nach den bisherigen Ausführungen ohne weiteres verständlich ist, nämlich die Unterscheidung zwischen dem reellen oder phänomenologischen (deskriptiv-psychologischen) Inhalt eines Aktes und seinem intentionalen Inhalt."

content given in those descriptions) are of phenomena of the *real* world and originate in individual psychological acts.[189] But since the phenomenologist is exclusively concerned with the description, with the *meanings* of those acts, the origination of that description is not considered by Husserl to be problematic. As he puts it in a note in the first edition, "Pure description is merely a preparatory step towards theory, not theory itself. … It is *not the full science of psychology that serves as a foundation for pure logic,* but certain classes of descriptions which are the step preparatory to the theoretical researches of the sciences" (LI, Introduction to Vol. II, §6, note 3, first edition/ Hua, XIX/1, 23).

But despite such warnings, Husserl's unfortunate continued use of the term "psychological" throughout the individual investigations of the second (1901) volume of the work in the first edition led to a highly critical reception of that volume by his contemporaries as signaling a "relapse into psychologism" after the masterful critique of psychologism offered in the first (1900) volume's *Prolegomena*.[190] To combat such misunderstanding, he changed the above citation in the second, 1913 edition of the text to explicitly meet the objection:

> If psychology is given its old meaning, phenomenology is not descriptive psychology: its peculiar 'pure' description, its contemplation of pure essences on a basis of exemplary individual intuitions of experiences (often freely *imagined* ones), and its descriptive fixation of the contemplated essences into pure concepts, is no empirical, scientific description. It rather excludes the natural performance of all empirical (naturalistic) scientific description. (LI, Introduction to Vol. II, §6, note 3, second (1913) edition/ Hua, XIX, 23)

The second edition's notion of phenomenology as "excluding" naturalistic description is a reflection of Husserl's explicit formulation of the phenomenological reduction in his work subsequent to the original publication of the *Logical Investigations*. This important working out of the conception of the reduction in relation to imagination and the theory of the *Wesensschau* will be discussed later in this chapter. But we now have enough of Husserl's terminological machinery in place to shift back to our discussion of the conceptualization and subsequent

189 As we noted in the previous chapter, section II. h.
190 Cf. Mohanty, *Husserl and Frege*, 32- 35.

rethinking of the distinction between objective, phenomenological-*reelle* components of meaning and subjective-intentional contents of the act, which as we suggested in our discussion of the "Husserl- Frege fork" above, represents the making explicit of the non-psychological, yet still subjective realm of the intentional act.

The *Logical Investigations* were originally conceived to present a theory of pure, a priori transcendental logic supplemented by investigations of its relation to different aspects of the theory of knowledge and meaning. But while the formal aspects of this logic were examined at great length in the first volume's *Prolegomena*, the status of its material content was treated only in a preliminary and highly abstract way. It was thus a task of the second volume to more deeply explore the role and nature of meaning *content* for Husserl's early conception of transcendental logic. As he notes in the introduction to that volume,

> Among our introductory investigations we shall have to raise fundamental questions as to the acts, or, alternatively, the ideal meanings [*Bedeutungen*], which in logic pass under the name of 'presentations' [*Vorstellungen*]. The analysis of the many concepts that the word 'presentation' has covered, concepts in which the psychological, the epistemological, and the logical are utterly confused, is an important task. Similar analyses deal with the concept of *judgment* in the sense in which logic is concerned with it. […] As we probe the phenomenological, thus purely descriptive content of expressive experiences, we must also dig more deeply into their *objective content*, the ideal sense [*Sinn*] of their objective intention, i.e. into the unity of the meaning [*Bedeutung*] and the unity of the object. We must, above all, dwell upon the two-sided connection, the initially enigmatic manner, in which the same experience has a 'content' in a double sense, and the manner in which in addition to its actual and proper content, an ideal, intentional content must and can dwell in it. (LI, Introduction to Vol. II, Part 1, §5/ Hua, XIX/1, 20-21, ttranslation modified and altered to reflect A (1901) edition,[191] words altered in B edition in italics)

This passage as it appears in the first edition presents a clear picture of Husserl's early

191 "In die Reihe dieser einleitenden Untersuchungen gehört auch die fundamentale Frage nach den Akten, bzw. den idealen Bedeutungen, die unter dem Titel Vorstellung für die Logik in Betracht kommen. Die *Analyse* der vielen Psychologie, Erkenntnistheorie und Logik ganz und gar verwirrenden Begriffe, die das Wort Vorstellung angenommen hat, ist eine wichtige Aufgabe. Ähnliche Analysen betreffen den Begriff des Urteils, und zwar des Urteils in dem für die Logik in Betracht kommenden Sinne. […] Wie der phänomenologisch*, also rein deskriptive Gehalt* der ausdrücklichen Erlebnisse, so erfordert dann auch ihr *objektiver* Gehalt, der ideale Sinn ihrer gegenständlichen Intention, d.i. die Einheit der Bedeutung und die Einheit des Gegenstands, eine nähere Erforschung. Vor allem aber auch die beiderseitige Zusammenhang, die zunächst rätselhafte Art, wie dasselbe Erlebnis in doppeltem Sinne einen Inhalt haben, wie ihm neben seinem eigentlichen, *aktuellen*, ein idealer, intentionaler Inhalt einwohnen soll und kann."

problematic use of the notion of the ideality of meaning. As we saw above, logic is ultimately concerned with the a priori forms of judgment, with propositions which are to be considered not in their singular instantiations but as "ideal meanings." But, self-evidently, meanings are not pure logical forms; they must also have *content*. If we take this content to be the real [*real*] content of the proposition in the world, e.g. if we take the content of our judgment in the example used above to be simply the pitcher, the glasses, and the water now presented to us, then we have understood the judgment in psychological fashion, and thereby "utterly confused" a psychological presentation with a logical one, resulting in the very psychologism which the *Prolegomena* so thoroughly criticized. This is why the content of ideal meanings cannot be *real*. *Real* content has already been excluded from the ideal province of logic as a result of Husserl's critique of psychologism and the real/ideal distinction.

However, in addressing the necessary non-reality of ideal meanings, the above passage as it appears in the first (1901) edition contains several small but important differences from the second (1913) edition, differences which help us both to further clarify Husserl's theory of the ideality of meaning and to show the important changes in this theory foreshadowed above. The 1901 version emphasizes the need to further analyze our conceptions of presentations to avoid the fundamental problems which result from confusing two fundamentally different elements: the psychological and the logical. But there is also a third element in play in the passage, albeit in nascent form: once we have distinguished the ideal and logical "objective content" from the real and psychological content, there remains an "initially enigmatic," "two-sided connection" on the *objective* side, the side of the ideal. The ideal meaning-species exhibits a "double sense" which includes both the general, ideal content and "the actual, proper content," the intentional content of the experience. But according to Husserl's own distinction between the phenomenological/objective realm, consisting of the ideal meaning and its various reell components, and the intentional realm consisting of the subjective-psychological elements of the act, ideality should not appear on this latter side at all. And yet, Husserl here seems to suggest

that the intentional contents are also, in some sense, to be considered ideal. This illustrates a major tension in the first edition of the text.

For, on the one hand, as we noted in the previous chapter, Husserl's a priori conception of the ideality of meaning paid lip-service to experience by relating the ideal meaning to meaning intention as one "moment" in the intentional structure of the act, but ultimately failed to adequately explain the relation of the ideal side of intended meaning to its potential fulfillment in experience. On the other hand, since he wants his theory of meaning to be a *phenomenological* theory of *actual experience*, Husserl at the same time places intentionality alongside psychology on the side of the *real,* which should mean, according his own set of distinctions in the first edition, that he is not allowed to consider intentional content to be *ideal* content at all. It seems that Husserl wants to have it both ways.

In order to overcome this problem, he needs to clarify the way in which the structure of intentionality can function in relation to *both* a priori objectivity *and* subjective experience. To do so, he will be forced to explicitly demarcate a realm which is subjective, insofar as it is the location of individual conscious experience, and yet objective, insofar as it is internally related to the ideal structures of meaning. This will involve distinguishing explicitly that which was previously only implicit in his account: a subjective realm of *experience* as radically distinct from the subjective realm of psychology and the other real sciences. This is accomplished in the second edition of the *Logical Investigations* by means of the distinction between the ideal essence and the individual *intentional content* of the act.

II. b. Act and Meaning in Correlation in the Second Edition of the *Logical Investigations*

Already in the first edition, we can see a clear anticipation of this development in the notion of the *act-quality.* Since individual meanings were there considered as mere instantiations of a singular, unchanging ideal meaning-species, the resultant picture of the experience of meaning would seem to be limited to a simple binary of presence or absence: I experience an instance

(instantiation) of the ideal fixed meaning, or I do not, just as, for Frege, the thinker "effects" the Thought, or she does not. For Frege's Thought, as a *Sinn*, can admit of no "coloring" [*Färbungen*], since, as we saw above, its presentation [*Vorstellung*] is considered to be merely subjective, and thus problematically involved in psychological—and thus not logical—considerations.[192] For this reason, as we saw above, Husserl asserted already in the first edition that the ideal/objective side of meaning also contained a phenomenological act-quality as a *reell* component, distinguishable from the *matter* (the content of the species-meaning) through which the ideal meaning is directed to particular objects (LI, V, §20/ Hua, XIX 425- 431).

But since in the first edition the *intentional* aspects of the act are held to be entirely distinct from the *reell* content of the meaning, even though Husserl recognizes the differences in act-character that can apply to different acts referring to the same object, these differences are not considered intentional differences but only differences pertaining to the *reell* components of the objective meaning. These components are conceived specifically in terms of the a priori objective, ideal side of the ideal/ real distinction. Even the act-quality is thus, according to the first edition, something explained in independence from its relation to actual, *real* experience.

We are thus still left, as in Frege's theory of meaning, with the black-and-white description of meaning in experience criticized above: since meaning enters the act exclusively from the side of the ideal species, and since the subjective-intentional aspects of the experience—precisely those needed to properly characterize the *intentional act* in all its fullness—are disallowed from this domain, we have an account in which ideal meanings and their objectively-determined *reell* components are simply present or absent and devoid of the intentional character of the act that "colors" our lived experience.193 This is because, according to the first edition of

192 See Frege's letter to Husserl, dated 30 October- 1 November, 1906 (a translation of the letter can be found in Mohanty, *Husserl and Frege*, 122- 125), where Frege clearly consders the assertive force of the expression to belong to the "coloring [*Färbung*] and illumination [*Beleuchtung*] of the thought, and thus not "relevant for logic."

193 Benoist finds a similarly problematic "Fregean" character in Husserl's early conception of ideality: "If, then, intentionality is essentially defined by the relation to an object it involves, and so from a logical

the *Logical Investigations*, intentional aspects of the act are not considered to be objectively describable aspects of experience at all. As Husserl himself writes in a note in the second edition of the text,

> the word 'phenomenological' like the word 'descriptive', was used in the First Edition exclusively in connection with *reell* elements of experience, and in the present edition it has so far been used predominantly in this sense. This corresponds to one's natural starting point in the psychological attitude. It became plainer and plainer, however, as I reviewed the completed Investigations... that the description of intentional objectivity as such, as we are conscious of it in the concrete act-experience itself, represents *a distinct descriptive dimension where purely intuitive description can be adequately practised*, a dimension opposed to that of *reell* act-constituents, but which also deserves to be called 'phenomenological'. These methodological extensions lead to important extensions of the field of problems now opening before us and considerable improvements due to a fully conscious separation of descriptive levels. Cf. my *Ideen zu einer reine Phänomenologie...,* Book I, and particularly the discussion of *Noesis and Noema*. (LI V, §16/ Hua, XIX, 411, translation modified,[194] my emphasis)

Thus, in the second edition, Husserl makes the decisive move to include, rather than exclude, intentional content in the realm of phenomenological description.[195] The theory of meaning is altered to include the *reell*/intentional distinction as a distinction falling *within* the realm of objective phenomenological analysis. The reworked version of the passage from Investigation Five thus speaks of "an important *phenomenological* distinction, obvious after our present discussions, between the *reellen* and the *intentional* content of an act" (LI, V, §16/ Hua, XIX, 411, B edition (1913), emphasis in original). The establishment of this "distinct descriptive

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point of view by its 'sense' as determining the relation to reference, it is not clear it allows for the act as opposed to 'the content', defined as we did, following Frege's analysis. To put it in other terms, the problem is one of Husserl's defining intentionality in *semantical* terms, thus emphasizing the *content* of intentionality" (Benoist, "Non-Objectifying Acts," 45).

194 "In der ersten Ausgabe d.W. heiß es 'reeller oder phänomenologischer Inhalt". In der tat war das Wort 'phänomenologisch', wie auch das Wort 'deskriptiv', in der ersten Ausgabe des Buches ausschließlich in Beziehung auf reelle Erlebnisbestände gemeint und auch in der vorliegenden Ausgabe was es bisher vorwiegend in diesem Sinne gebraucht. Das entspricht dem natürlichen Ausgang von der psychologischen Einstellung. Es wird aber im wiederholten Durchdenken der vollzogenen Untersuchungen... daß die Beschreibung der intentionalen Gegenständlichkeit als solcher (genommen so, wie sie im konkreten Akterlebnis selbst bewusste ist) eine andere Richtung rein intuitiv und adäquat zu vollziehender Beschreibungen darstellt gegenüber derjenigen der reellen Aktbestände und daß auch sie als phänomenologisch bezeichnet werden muss. Geht man diesen methodischen Andeutungen nach, so ergeben sich notwendige und wichtige Erweiterungen der hier zum Durchbruch kommenden Problemsphären und durch die vollbewußte Scheidung der deskriptiven Schichten erheblich Verbesserungen. Vgl. meine *Ideen zu einer reine Phänomenologie usw.*, I. Buch (insbesondere im dritten Abschnitte die Ausführung über noesis und noema)."

195 For a similar discussion of this change, see Drummond, "The Logical Investigations: Paving the Way."

dimension where purely intuitive description can be adequately practised" marks the explicit recognition of the phenomenological dimension of meaning in Husserl's thought.

Accordingly, in the second, 1913 edition of the *Logical Investigations*, meaning is considered to be located in the *correlation* between the intentional act and its object, instead of being present *both* ideally in the ideal species-meaning *and* in its instantiation in the individual *act-matter* of a given act. The meaning is thus no longer the mere instantiation of an abstract entity inexplicably pre-existing on the side of the ideal, but is at the same time not synonymous with the real [*real*] object "out there" in the spatiotemporal world. This position thus avoids, at one extreme, the psychologism from which both Husserl and Frege sought to extricate logic, and, at the other extreme, the hypostatization of ideal meanings in Frege's own anti-psychologistic position. Husserl's new account of the ideality of meaning offers a more phenomenologically nuanced description of our *experience* of a meaningful world by allowing for a distinction between the ideal essences which explain the semantic relation between various acts, and the particularity of meanings as experienced through individual (sets of) acts.[196]

This change can be seen clearly by comparing the problematic passage from the introduction to the second volume of the *Logical Investigations* in the first edition, cited in the previous section, to its reworked version in the second edition (with changes from the first marked in italics):

> Among our introductory investigations we shall have to raise fundamental questions as to the acts, or, alternatively, the ideal meanings, which in logic pass under the name of 'presentations'. The *clarification and separation* [*Scheidung*] of the many concepts that the word 'presentation' [*Vorstellung*] has covered, concepts in which the psychological, the epistemological, and the logical are utterly confused, is an important task. Similar analyses deal with the concept of *judgment* in the sense in which logic is concerned with it. […] As we probe the *essence of* expressive experiences, we must also dig more deeply into their *intentional content*, the ideal sense of their objective intention, i.e. into the unity

196 Although it is common in phenomenological scholarship to refer to an "act" in the singular when describing such experiences, it is generally accepted that this should be understood as shorthand for the multiple acts in which presentations actually occur: according to Husserl, even a simple perceptual "act" like seeing a book actually involves multiple adumbrated acts in the stream of lived experience in subjective time-consciousness. Our references to a singular "act" should be understood to reflect this common usage.

> of the meaning and the unity of the object. We must, above all, dwell upon the two-sided connection, the initially enigmatic manner, in which the same experience has a 'content' in a double sense, and the manner in which in addition to its actual *real* [*reell*] *content*, an ideal, intentional content must and can dwell in it." (LI, Introduction to Vol. II, Part 1, §5/ Hua, XIX 20-21, translation of B edition (1913), alterations from A edition in italics, translation modified[197])

Husserl's principal concern now seems to be a further distinction between two *different* senses of phenomenological meaning content. Whereas there were only vague indications of a difference in the first version, the reworked version makes a point of clearly distinguishing the "two-sided context" of meaning in the objective sense as the *reell* and the *ideal and intentional*.

II. c. The Meaning /Essence Distinction and the Turn to Experience: The Role of the *Wesensschau*

The admittance of intentional content into the realm of phenomenological inquiry in the second edition of the *Logical Investigations* opens up the way for the account of the *noesis- noema* correlation that will replace the account of meanings as species-essences altogether in *Ideas I*.[198] This change effectively relocates meaning away from an exclusively logical and a priori origin in the ideal species, placing it now in the *correlation* between the meaning intention and the object (what will later become the *noesis-noema* correlation) marked by the *intentional act*. This results in a different distinction *between* the ideal essence or general-species and the meaning in the individual act: in place of the older, more simplistic account of a singular *Gedanke*-like ideal

197 "In die Reihe dieser einleitenden Untersuchungen gehört auch die fundamentale Frage nach den Akten, bzw. den idealen Bedeutungen, die unter dem Titel Vorstellung für die Logik in Betracht kommen. Die Klärung *und Scheidung* der vielen Psychologie, Erkenntnistheorie und Logik ganz und gar verwirrenden Begriffe, die das Wort Vorstellung angenommen hat, ist eine wichtige Aufgabe. Ähnliche Analysen betreffen den Begriff des *Urteils*, und zwar des Urteils in dem für die Logik in Betracht kommenden Sinne. […] Wie der *eigene Wesensgehalt* der ausdrücklichen Erlebnisse, so erfordert dann auch ihr *intentionaler* Gehalt, der ideale Sinn ihrer gegenständlichen Intention, d.i. die Einheit der Bedeutung und die Einheit des Gegenstands, eine nähere Erforschung. Vor allem aber auch die beiderseitige Zusammenhang, die zunächst rätselhafte Art, wie dasselbe Erlebnis in doppeltem Sinne einen Inhalt haben, wie ihm neben seinem eigentlichen, *reellen*, ein idealer, intentionaler Inhalt einwohnen soll und kann." ("judgment"/ "Urteil" is italicized in the original.)

198 In fact, in the second edition of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, which was completed around the same time as the publication of *Ideas I* (1913), Husserl already occasionally uses the new terminology of the *noema* (the note quoted above is one particularly noteworthy example), though more frequently he continues to use the older vocabulary of *Spezies*.

meaning instantiated in particular individuals, we now have a separate category of *meanings,* which are more than simple instantiations of ideal-species. Since meaning, in this new account, will be seen as part of the intentional *correlation* itself, the intentional element, the "quality" of the act which "colors" my lived experience is no longer barred from playing a role in the theory of meaning, although the ultimately ideal character of the matter intended in the act of meaning is maintained, now referred to as the *essence* [Wesen].[199] Meaning is no longer "doubled," as it was in the first edition, and meaning is shown to be related both to mind and to world by means of the *act*, without being directly reducible to either the logically ideal or the psychologically real [*real*].[200]

Since meaning is now considered to be located in the *correlation* and not in an essential or ideal object as such, Husserl has realized the goal of staking out a middle ground between psychologistic and potentially solipsistic logicist conceptions of meaning *without* resorting to Frege's platonic hypostatization of a "third realm." Indeed, for Husserl, *Sinn* (as distinguished from essence [*Wesen*]) is no longer conceivable as an object in the Platonic, Fregean sense at all. And this change seems to us to mark a major step forward in terms of the phenomenological accuracy of Husserl's account. For, in everyday lived experience, we do not inspect subsistent

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199 Another related objection that can be raised against the account of ideal meaning-species in the first edition also helps to show the necessity of distinguishing meaning from essence. If meanings and essences are one and the same in the unity of an ideal meaning-species, and such entities are entirely adequate and neither spatial nor temporal, then it would seem that we are left with no way to distinguish between multiple particular instances of the same meaning: In the realm of the ideal, disconnected, as it were, from space and time, we are left with a Leibnizian conundrum as to the identity of indiscernibles (not, of course, in terms of *real* entities, but in terms of "individual" ideal objects), as there would seem to be no clear way of analyzing two individual instantiations of the same general and ideal meaning species occurring simultaneously in the stream of consciousness, as is the case, for example, in seeing identical twins: is this a single act presenting one ideality somehow "doubly present"? Two simultaneous and identical acts instantiating the *same* ideality? Presentation of an altogether different "double ideality"? Our first reaction might be to say, with Aristotle, that this is not a problem because the two identical instantiations of the (meaning) species are spatially and/or temporally discernible. But *qua* individual species, as long as Husserl's account of meaning originates from the side of the ideal essence, they are *not* so discernible: they are atemporal "instantiations" of the same ideal object. How, then do we explain our recognition of them as distinct, without appeal to psychological processes? Husserl needs a much stronger account of the notion of acts and act-character, such as that in the second edition, in order to adequately explain the individuation of meanings in such cases.

200 Cf. Drummond, "The Logical Investigations: Paving the Way," 38-39.

meaning-entities already completely adequately available in the external world, nor do we pluck them from the Platonic heavens and thereby merely "effect" them as *Vorstellungen* in subjective consciousness. When we live through meaning in the course of activities, in the stream of experience, we do not normally reflect on our acts as meaning-objects at all.[201] Thus, in Husserl's terminology, meanings are "realized;" they are the actualization or more technically, as we saw above, the "fulfillment" of a possible meaning-intention, and this realization is recognized not as the end result of a process of semantic-propositional analysis, but of the analysis of meaning *qua* intentional *act*.[202]

Husserl's revised account of meaning thus also better reflects the results of his phenomenological description of the structure of meaning-intention and meaning- fulfillment.203 The *intentional,* relational character of meaningful lived experience is analyzed prior to the *intensional* character of meaning, while the irreducible *correlative* aspect of this conception of meaning also prevents us from falling prey to the empiricist prejudice which would seek to infer meaning "directly" from the observation of *real* experience in the fashion of psychologism or direct realism.

[W]hereas for Frege the ideal, as at once objective and outside the mind, must be placed—since it is equally as real as physical objects and yet does not exist spatiotemporally in the same way—in a new ontological sphere, for Husserl the ideality of meaning is now conceived as being *already there* in the world of intentional consciousness, if only we would recognize it in it's own distinctive character. It is the radically new idea of Husserl's phenomenology as expressed in the

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201 Of course, we always *can* take meaning as an object by directing our attention to it through what Husserl calls a "categorial" act (indeed this further reflection is necessary for the *analysis* of meaning), but this is a separate act of reflection and is not part of the original lived-through act as such (LI I, §34). Cf. Mohanty, *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning*, 41-43; Carr, *The Paradox of Subjectivity*, 70; Lohmar, "Husserl's Concept of Categorial Intuition," passim.

202 In Husserl's later-developed terminology, in the context of the transcendental constitution of meanings, he will use the word *Leistung* (achievement, appropriation) to capture this sense of activity in the realization of meanings (see, e.g., Husserl's reference to the reaffirmation of the world of experience as an ideal correlate of "my achieving life" [*meines leistenden* Lebens] in *The Paris Lectures*, 30/ Hua, I, 30). Although the notion of fulfillment in the *Logical Investigations* is not explicitly transcendental, Husserl's emphasis on the active character of intentional meaning is already clearly present.

203 Cf. Rigal, "De la Fondation Phénoménologique de la Logique," 138.

second edition of the *Logical Investigations* that we have direct intuition of essences through our access to meanings as contents of presentational *acts* [*Vorstellungen*]. This claim is not open to us on the Fregean account, for which meaning must be analyzed, according to the context principle, by way of the *Satz* and thus the concept.

But Husserl's intuition of essences [*Wesensschau*] is at the same time not an *inference* from a spatiotemporal world bearing prior meaning, as was the case for psychologism. In effect, Husserl's claim is that meaning is constituted in the act of intuition itself, in the content-bearing *correlation*. Though the essences revealed by these acts are ideal, in the sense that they are reiterable, they are not subsistent entities of any sort. For this reason, though meanings can be considered "a class of concepts in the sense of 'universal objects'," they are not hypostatized as *real*:

> They are not objects which, though existing nowhere in the world, have a being in a τόπος ούράνιος or in a divine mind, for such metaphysical hypostatization would be absurd. If one has accustomed oneself to understand by 'being' only 'real being', and by 'objects' only real objects, then talk of universal objects and of their being, may well seem basically wrong; no offence will, however, be given to one who has first used such talk *merely to assert the validity of certain judgments*, such in fact as concern numbers, propositions, geometrical forms, etc., and who now asks whether he is not evidently obliged, here as elsewhere, to affix the label 'genuinely existent object' *to the correlate of his judgment's validity*, to what it judges *about*. (LI, I, §31/ Hua, XIX 106, my emphasis)

Thus, for Husserl, ideality is not to be explained by any sort of obscure metaphysical entity uncovered through painstakingly deep analyses; it is manifested in the meaning of our everyday intentional acts, the objective inquiries of the sciences among them. Our lived experience *already* presents to us the ideal objectivity of meaning. Thus we can claim (a point to which we will return and seek to refine in subsequent chapters) that for Husserl the objective and ideal is revealed to us *through the subjective*: the ideal is present *in the real*. It is for this reason that we insisted, above, that for Husserl the distinctions between the ideal and real, objective and subjective, while fundamental, are *not to be understood as a simple opposition*.

The distinction between meaning and essence in the second edition is thus more than a mere improvement in Husserl's theory of meaning; it is a fundamental change and a necessary

one. Without it, Husserl's account of ideality would seem to beg the question by taking as given the very objectivity it sought to guarantee, i.e., by making the ideal object into either a real thing that we encounter in the way we stumble upon a spatiotemporal object in the natural world, or a fixed meaning in a "third realm" that is at times "appropriated" and at times not. As Husserl himself later noted, "the average reader is fixated right from the beginning on the view that he who teaches of ideal objects cannot avoid metaphysical hypostatization—that he can only deny it verbally."[204]

In reaction to this, Husserl's appeal is not to raw givenness but to the *structure of experience*, to something which he insists is manifested in everyday life, and hidden from our view by "mere prejudices":

> My so-called "Platonism" does not consist in some sort of metaphysical or epistemological substructures, hypostases [*Hypostasen*] or theories but rather in the simple reference to a type of original "givens" … I seek to convince the reader that mere prejudices are what keep him in this situation from allowing as valid that which he has indeed and without a doubt before his eyes, which he judges on countless times in everyday life and in science, which exhibits itself to him possibly in self-evident cognition and then does so as truly being—in other words, as something that is an object, that is and yet is nothing real.[205]

Husserl attempts to describe idealities precisely as they are manifested in intentional experience: as the objective *correlates* of subjective, intentional meaning *acts*. He posits nothing further as to their "reality,"[206] and the evidence that he appeals to in making this claim is phenomenological, not empirical.

Because of this, we would argue that Husserl's theory of meaning does *not* fall prey to what Sellars (and later McDowell) would criticize as the "myth of the given."[207] Since the

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204 Husserl, *Introduction to the* Logical Investigations, 25.

205 Husserl, *Introduction to the* Logical Investigations*,* 25.

206 In one commentator's formulation, "We may thus say that Husserl's early ontology is, with respect to meanings, an economical one. It commits us to no more than mental acts and their properties, and this is something to which we are committed anyway." Aquila, "Husserl and Frege on Meaning," 380.

207 As Martin Kusch notes, "Husserl holds meanings to be ideal, abstract, non-temporal (and *eo ipso* non-spatial) entities that are independent of their being thought of. This does not make them inaccessible, however, for this would turn the cure of Platonism into something more dangerous than the disease it was meant to cure, that is, the disease of psychologistic relativism that makes meanings inaccessible by connecting them to fallible psychic faculties like memory or introspection" (Kusch, *Language as*

presentational act is considered internal to the structure of meaning, and not an issue to be dealt with separately, we cannot assume a straightforward and direct association of meaning content with perceptual content; what is "given" is not a content as such, but a content-ful *act*. In the Husserlian explication of the structure of meaning, the relation of the meaning to the intentional act has explanatory priority over the supposed real object of that act as it appears in the world. Sellars' demand to avoid all notions of an unmediated, purely given content is thus met not by the limiting of content to the space of reasons, by way of *conceptual* mediation, but by means of an *intentional* mediation which for Husserl precedes all analysis of concepts. What we are observing in such analyses are not raw givens, but the common phenomena of meaning in the real, everyday world of the natural attitude. But we can only recognize the peculiar status of such phenomena (and the ideal objects correlated with them) from the standpoint of what will come to be called the phenomenological reduction (Cf. *Crisis*, 243/ Hua, VI, 246).

We will discuss Husserl's development of the reduction in the years leading up to the second (1913) edition of the *Logical Investigations* below. But we turn first to a revealing parallel in the development of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning after the *Tractatus*, where the earlier work's conception of language, the strict a priori role of logical form, and the ultimate appeal to the mystical all begin to give way, by means of a rethinking of meaning and a new conception of the method of "projection."

III. Wittgenstein's Move Away from the Tractarian Theory of Meaning

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein uses the word *Vorstellung,* like Frege, exclusively in the subjective sense. In a way similar to Frege, his locating of the origin of *Sinne* outside the contingent World of Facts is meant to guarantee the objectivity of logic as against the merely subjective, psychological *Vorstellungen* of our everyday experience. At the same time, however, Wittgenstein insists that the *Sinn* cannot be considered in isolation from the World; that the

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Calculus, 57).

relation of a priori form to the world via projection necessitates that the *appearance* of the *Sinne* must occur with some mediation from the World by means of the Proposition and the picturing relation. From the perspective of the early Wittgenstein, Frege's turn to the "third realm," while justified in its motivation of securing logic from the contingency of the empirical-psychological, assumes a world of meanings *in themselves*, and thus fails to recognize the necessary mirroring of the a priori logical in Propositions, and the fact that, whatever we may be able to *show* about the meaningfulness of the world as a whole, we can only speak about particular meanings in terms of their presence in Propositions referring to the Facts of the World.

Despite this difference, Wittgenstein's account of the relation of meaning to experience seems to be in no better shape than Frege's. For although he has succeeded in demonstrating the difference between the necessary meaningfulness of the world as such (the mystical fact "that it exists" (TLP 6.44) at all) and individual Propositional meanings, his turn to the transcendent realm of the mystical has at best justified only the former conception and left us with a rather limited account of the latter as "propositions of natural science—i.e., something that has nothing to do with philosophy" (TLP 6.53). We are presented in the *Tractatus* with a theory of meaning which, in its abstract formality, shows the limits of any purely formal account by showing that certain elements which play a role in the system of meaning are not neatly definable within that system. The exclusively a priori orientation of the book leaves no room for the clarification of the structure of human *experience*, which manifests not only propositional meanings but the sense and value that Wittgenstein himself admits must exist outside and independent of all the Facts. As Wittgenstein would describe the situation much later in the *Philosophical Investigations*, with the "crystalline purity of logic" in the *Tractatus*, "we have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk."

The insight and motivation characteristic of Wittgenstein' return to philosophy in the late 1920s is nicely summarized in the rest of that remark: "We want to walk, so we need *friction.*

Back to the rough ground!" (PI §107). In the rest of this and the following chapter, we will argue that Wittgenstein's transitional period begins with the turn away from exclusively a priori logical concerns and leads him to turn explicitly to experience as part of that rough ground—as an a posteriori element in addition to the *Tractatus*' empirical Facts—and thereby leads him to completely abandon the earlier work's central notion of logical form in favor of the later work's phenomenologically-oriented conception of "grammar."

III. a. The Turn to the "Phenomena Themselves"

In the years between 1929 and 1933, upon his return to philosophy after spending the intervening decade between Vienna and several posts as a primary school teacher in lower Austria,[208] Wittgenstein's thinking was in a state of frequent and turbulent transition. At the beginning of this period, the 1929 essay "Some Remarks on Logical Form" marks the first major methodological shift from the *Tractatus,* though it is by no means a complete abandonment of the earlier doctrines. In this work, Wittgenstein expresses for the first time his new-found interest in investigating meaning not through a priori analysis, but by turning to the meaningful phenomena of the everyday world.209 This turn to the phenomena marks the beginning of Wittgenstein's engagement with phenomenological themes. And not only did he toy with the idea of his works as a "phenomenology" in this period, he even considered—and eventually rejected—the notion of a phenomenological language as the "primary" language of analysis.

In the essay, Wittgenstein still contends in the Tractarian manner that the elementary or "atomic" proposition is the location of the *Sinn*, the "subject matter" of propositions:

> It is the task of the theory of knowledge to find them [atomic propositions] and to understand their construction out of the words or symbols. [...] The idea is to express in an appropriate symbolism what in ordinary language leads to endless misunderstandings. That is to say, where ordinary language disguises logical structure, where it allows the formation of pseudopropositions, where it uses one term in an infinity of different meanings, we must replace it by a symbolism which gives a clear picture of the logical

208 See Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein*: The Duty of Genius, 169- 251.
209 Cf. Thompson, *Wittgenstein on Phenomenology and Experience*, 62ff.

structure, excludes pseudopropositions, and uses its terms unambiguously. (SRLF 164)

But now, in a seemingly anti-Tractarian way, Wittgenstein considers the project of getting beyond the misleading character of our ordinary language in terms of "what might be called, the logical investigation of the phenomena themselves, *i.e.*, in a certain sense *a posteriori*, and not by conjecturing about *a priori* possibilities" (SRLF 164). Wittgenstein continues to think that if we are misled in our ordinary language about the actual logical workings of the world, we can avoid such problems by bypassing the level of this language and going directly to the underlying, purely logical level. In the *Tractatus*, this was taken up as an inquiry into a priori logical form with the help of a formal language, since a logically rigorous symbolic language (such as Wittgenstein then took himself to be offering) would present things to us clearly by showing what could not be said, and thereby doing without the unnecessary addition of logically superfluous, misleading representatives for logical form. As we saw in the previous chapter in or discussion of the directionality of the map, logical form is instead considered to *show* itself in the proposition without being *some thing* to be represented.[210]

But as he begins to recognize the need to revise the doctrine of the logical non-interdependence of States of Affairs and the need to incorporate propositions other than the purely declarative into his account of logic, Wittgenstein realizes that the exclusively a priori method of inquiry of the *Tractatus* is no longer adequate to the much richer conception of meaning and language that he is beginning to develop. In order to capture this new, more complete conception of the a posteriori realm, Wittgenstein contends that we will need a method which looks to it *directly*: "we can only substitute a clear symbolism for the unprecise one by inspecting the phenomena which we want to describe, thus trying to understand their logical multiplicity" (SRLF 164). The singular conception of the function of logical form in the *Tractatus,* as that which orders the meaning content of the proposition by means of a uniform,

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210 See our discussion of the showing function in terms of symbolism and picturing in chapter two, section III. c.

calculus-like projection, has given way to a conception of logic in multiplicity, oriented not to propositions but to the phenomena themselves.

But the move away from the Tractarian account is not yet complete: as he notes at the very beginning of the 1929 essay, Wittgenstein still conceives of the proposition as consisting of a content and a form, and "we get the picture of the pure form if we abstract from the meaning of the single words, or symbols (so far as they have independent meanings)" (SRLF 162). In the Tractatus, this notion of "pure form" had been explained by way of Tractarian Objects, which determined, through their internal relation, the formal possibilities for all States of affairs and thus by extension all obtaining Facts. The *Sinn* of the State of affairs was *projected* into the world (of Facts) from outside of it through the Proposition, and pointing to the existence of a mystical element was considered sufficient to explain such projection since in the *Tractatus*, the a priori origination of *Sinn* was something which only showed itself but could not be said. As we shall see more fully in the following chapter, the color-incompatibility problem led Wittgenstein in the intervening years to call all this into question, since the revisions to the Tractarian system necessary to address this problem meant it was no longer possible to consider States of affairs, at the level prior to the determination of truth and falsity, to be independent of one another purely on the basis of their form.211 Anticipating of such concerns, Wittgenstein claims in "Some Remarks on Logical Form" that we must turn to a realm which is "in a certain sense *a posteriori*," since it is only by beginning here, in the contingent world, that the analysis of logical form can give us the not-purely-formal but also material content of the possible States of affairs as Wittgenstein now conceives them. Wittgenstein's proposed solution to the problem posed by ordinary language thus involves an "opening up" of the notion of logical form, such that the role of the a posteriori becomes more than that of a truth-functional space. The meaning-providing function between a priori logical form and a posteriori Facts played in the *Tractatus* by the mystical is now take over by a new, *broadened* conception of the a posteriori, although it is still conceived in

211 Jacquette, *Wittgenstein's Thought in Transition*, 174- 175.

terms of the same basic, Kantian form-content schematic. But even this is beginning to change in Wittgenstein's thought, as evidenced by his rethinking of the notion of projection. This marks the first major move away from Tractarian logical form and toward the later philosophy's conceptions of grammar and language games.

III. b. Projection Revisited

The move from logical form to logical grammar can thus be traced by means of the development of the conception of "projection" in Wittgenstein's work. Already in a 1914 notebook entry Wittgenstein presents a diagram skecth of this concept, entitled "Projection of the picture onto reality." The sketch[212] consists of a of two parallel horizontal lines, the top one of which is labeled "reality" and the bottom "Model (Picture)." A dotted perpendicular vertical line connects the two horizontal lines and represents the "projection" of the picture onto reality. In Wittgenstein's image, whereas the starting point of the vertical line on the lower horizontal line is labeled " 'a' ," the point where the "projection" intersects with the upper horizontal line ("reality") is *not* labeled "a." In this diagram, the projection has clearly missed its mark, and makes contact with a different, unlabeled point on the upper line ("reality"). And indeed it seems to be just this missing the mark that fascinates Wittgenstein already in the 1914 entry:

> Projection of the picture on to reality.
>
> [diagram described above]
>
> […]
> That shadow, which the picture as it were casts upon the world: How exactly should I grasp of it? Here is a deep mystery. It is the mystery of negation: This is not how things are, and yet we can say *how* things are *not*.— For the proposition is only the *description* of a situation. (But this is all still only on the surface.)213

212 Wittgenstein's actual diagram (found in the *Notebooks* entry for 15.11.1914) is omitted here because of image copyright restrictions.

213 "Projektion des Bildes auf die Wirklichkeit [*image*] […] Jener Schatten, welchen das Bild gleichsam auf die Welt wirft: Wie soll ich ihn exakt fassen? Hier ist ein tiefes Geheimnis. Es ist das Geheimnis der Negation: Es verhält sich nicht so, und doch können wir sagen, *wie* es sich *nicht* verhält. - Der Satz ist eben nur die *Beschreibung* eines Sachverhalts. (Aber das ist alles noch an der Oberfläche.)" *Notebooks* entry for 15.11.1914. Cf. also TLP 4.0141, and SRLF 164- 165.

Recalling our reading of the *Tractatus* in the previous chapter, we can see that the ability to say "how things are not" results from the capacity of Elementary propositions to have a sense independently of their truth value (and thus independent of obtaining Facts). Because of this, we are able to say not only, e.g., "this door is red," but on the basis of the same State of affairs obtaining in the World, "this door is not blue," and any number of other propositions referring to "*how* things are not." This is a result of the fact that Objects contain all possibilities (in terms of logical form) a priori, and thus independently of the contingent Facts of the world. As Wittgenstein puts it, "The proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding, and therefore one can actually see in the proposition all the logical features possessed by reality if it is true. One can draw conclusions from a false proposition" (TLP 4.023, Ogden translation).

Thus in this pre-*Tractatus* text we are already confronted with the question raised in the previous chapter; how can a priori logical form determine the content of a Proposition that does not obtain in the World, such that conclusions can be drawn even from false (Elementary) propositions? The "mystery of negation" is not that of the a priori *structure* which allows for such a situation, "*how* things are in the world," which is something Wittgenstein believes himself to have demonstrated—to the degree any such demonstration is possible—in the *Tractatus*, but *that* the meaningful world exists,[214] the mystery that such propositions can be meaningful and logically significant even though false. As he puts it in the *Notebooks*, "We portray the thing, the relation, the property, by means of variables and so show that we do not derive these ideas from particular cases that come before us, but *somehow* possess them a priori."[215]

In the *Notebooks* and in the *Tractatus,* this "mystery" was considered an a priori affair, since the transcendental character of logic precludes the derivation of Elementary propositions on the basis of particular contingent cases or Facts in the world (otherwise, the doctrine of the logical

214 See our discussion of TLP 6.44 in the previous chapter.

215 Notebook entry for 19.6.1915, translation modified, my emphasis ("Wir bilden das Ding, die Relation, die Eigenschaft vermittelst Variablen ab und zeigen so, daß wir diese Ideen nicht aus gewissen uns vorkommenden Fällen ableiten, sondern sie irgendwie a priori besitzen").

incompatibility of Elementary propositions and the States of affairs they represent would be violated). But now, in the 1929 essay, what was previously ascribed a priori to "the mystical," is re-conceived as occurring "in a certain sense *a posteriori*, and not by conjecturing about *a priori* possibilities" (SRLF 164). Where Wittgenstein had appealed to the mystical to explain the infusion of material sense into the proposition a priori and in accord with the formal determinations of objects by means of a uniform "rule of projection,"—what already in the *Notebooks* was termed "that shadow, which the picture as it were casts upon the world"—he has now begun to realize that such "crystalline purity" was an unnecessarily imposed requirement, and that the actual examination of "the phenomena" shows that the function of projection cannot be single and uniform, and thus not something graspable in purely a priori logical terms. In the 1929 essay, Wittgenstein now contends that there are a *variety* of rules of projection; a variety of ways in which the projection "on the surface" can be related to a variety of a priori forms, "and for this very reason we can draw no conclusions—except very vague ones—from the use of these norms as to the actual logical form of the phenomena described" (SRLF 165).

And with this turn to "the phenomena" the theory of knowledge—which was considered in the *Tractatus* to be an a posteriori and thus exclusively psychologistic pursuit, the mere "philosophy of psychology"— is allowed to play a more extensive role in Wittgenstein's philosophy: the analysis of the Elementary propositions at the core of the Tractarian system, underlying the misleading character of our ordinary language, is now considered an a posteriori "task of the theory of knowledge" (SRLF 163). Wittgenstein's conception of the role of the a posteriori has opened up to include much more than a merely truth-functional, black-and-white space of obtaining and propositionally-representable Facts: "We meet with the [help of the] forms of space and time with the whole manifold of spatial and temporal objects, as colours, sounds, etc., etc., with their gradations, continuous transitions, and combinations in various proportions, all of which we cannot seize by our ordinary means of expression. The "mystical" space of the *Tractatus*, outside the World of Facts, has been abandoned for the everyday, not-exclusively-

factual world of "actual phenomena."

If we momentarily expand our scope beyond Wittgenstein's terminology, we see that this marks Wittgenstein's overcoming of the same basic problem that plagued the first edition of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and that (as we shall see in the following chapter) was considered a form of "subjective idealism" by Moritz Schlick216: the privileging of the ideal and a priori at the expense of its contact with our actual experiences in the world. Against this, Wittgenstein now asserts, "An atomic form *cannot be foreseen*. And it would be surprising if the *actual phenomena* had nothing more to teach us about their structure. To such conjectures about the structure of atomic propositions, we are led by our ordinary language, which uses the subject-predicate and the relational form. But in this our language is misleading" (SRLF 162, my emphasis). To illustrate the point, Wittgenstein again appeals to the simile of projection, this time in order to illustrate a new conception of language in relation to everyday experience, and a great shift from the conception of language in the *Tractatus*.

III. c. The Question of Phenomenological Language

In "Some Remarks on Logical Form," Wittgenstein asks us—similarly to the illustration from the *Notebooks* reproduced above—to imagine two parallel planes, on the first of which are drawn variously sized and shaped ellipses and rectangles. The task is to represent these images on the second plane. Wittgenstein suggests at least two different ways of doing this: "We can, first, lay down a law of projection—say that of orthogonal projection or any other—and then proceed to project all figures from I into II, according to this law. Or, secondly, we could proceed thus: We lay down the rule that every ellipse on plane I is to appear as a circle in plane II, and every rectangle as a square in II" (SRLF 162). As Wittgenstein notes, on the second method, it will be impossible to infer the *exact* dimensions of the figures of plane I from those of plane II, although we can get a vague notion of them and whether they correspond to an original ellipse or rectangle.

216 Though, as we note in that chapter, not in direct reference to Husserl.

In order to know the *exact* shape and size of any original figure, "we would have to know the individual method by which, *e.g.*, a particular ellipse is projected into the circle before me" (SRLF 162). Although the second method of projection onto plane II does follow a general rule, there is always room for variation in the individual application of the method of projection in the case of a given figure. To put this insight into in the language of the later *Investigations* (in relation to which this 1929 essay should be seen as an early turning point) although we can define the basic method of the projection, the act of projecting is not a calculus; it is *not everywhere circumscribed by rules* (PI §68). And this is what now interests Wittgenstein about the relation of our language to the phenomena of experience:

> The case of ordinary language is quite analogous. If the facts of reality are the ellipses and rectangles on plane I the subject-predicate and relational forms correspond to the circles and squares in plane II. These forms are the norms of our particular language into which we project in *ever so many different* ways *ever so many different* logical forms. And for this very reason we can draw no conclusions - except very vague ones - from the use of these norms as to the actual logical form of the phenomena described. (SRLF 164)

The projection simile does more than just illustrate Wittgenstein's conviction, held already in the *Tractatus*, that ordinary language disguises underlying logical form. It also is now used to show, contra the *Tractatus*, that the analysis of logical form below the level of ordinary language must take place on a case by case basis, and beginning from the world of experience, thus "in a certain sense a posteriori."

While in the *Tractatus* and the *Notebooks* the projection simile was envisaged as working *from* the space of an a priori logic at the limit of the world, via logical form, into the Proposition referring to the Fact, the projection is now problematized by considering projection from an entirely different direction; by asking how the world of phenomena comes to be projected *into* our language. Wittgenstein's considering this to be a projection of the second of the two types, still useful and reliable but *necessarily* imperfect, and not governed by a single universal rule, signals his turn away from the pure a priori formality of logical form in the *Tractatus*, and toward the more open-ended notion of what will come to be called logical *grammar*. Grammar, unlike

pure logical form, can admit the role of material logical elements, elements which can only be accounted for by going beyond formal tautological analysis and investigating the phenomena themselves, since their *exact, individual* content, indexed to the present moment, cannot be predetermined and always escapes the recalcitrant categorial schemas of our language.

As Wittgenstein put this point in a 1931 lecture at Cambridge, "we cannot say that an expectation is similar to what is expected, because similarity requires comparison, and what is expected is not yet available for comparison. Things are said to be similar according to some rule of projection; but some rules of projection are more familiar than others."[217] Thus the "calculus" conception of language in the *Tractatus* is no longer thought by Wittgenstein to be sufficient to account for meaning. In its place, he begins to examine the myriad conventions and "frictions" of everyday life, and in doing so broadens his conception of projection to include various different manifestations of logical form and various different rules of projection, manifestations of a variety of "rules of grammar" or ways meanings connect up with reality.[218]

And because such grammar, although not a priori, nonetheless was conceived as going deeper than the "limitations" of our ordinary language, Wittgenstein seems at first to have considered his project an analysis of a "primary language," which he also called "phenomenological language." Unlike our ordinary language, this one would be "transparent" to the structures it presents, and thus would "*directly* map out the structure of immediate experience."[219] Despite his "phenomenological" turn and the beginnings of the shift from the paradigm of "logical form" to that of "grammar," Wittgenstein continued to see the analysis of meaning as a form of the complete symbolic analysis of *content*. As David Stern notes, "While he had already modified his conception of analysis in 'Some Remarks on Logical Form,' he had not questioned the thesis that every proposition has an unique analysis, and he had still aimed at

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217 *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1930-1932*, p. 85 (from spring or early summer 1931, as recorded in the notes of John King).

218 Cf. Schulte, *Wittgenstein,* 82- 87, Hunnings, *The World and Language in Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, 94- 97.

219 Thompson, *Wittgenstein on Phenomenology and Experience,* 83, my emphasis.

'the ultimate analysis of phenomena' [SRLF 171], thus retaining the Tractarian conviction that analysis would lead to a formal symbolism."220

But Wittgenstein now understands that analysis as involving *language as such,* something much wider and more complex than simple logical form, and on this point he follows the Fregean side of the "fork" discussed at the beginning of this chapter, considering the logical form of the judgment content (now considered to be isolated in the "primary language") to be the primary focus of analysis (as opposed to Husserl's primary focus on the form of the judging) and envisaging the endpoint of the analysis as the establishment of a fixed logical structure. Despite his admitting that "it would be surprising if the actual phenomena had nothing more to teach us about their structure," (SRLF 162), Wittgenstein still insists that this structure is to be accessed by way of its ("primary") *linguistic* form. As we will see in the following chapter in his response to Schlick, where he understands the question of synthetic a priori judgment to be a question about *types of propositions*, for Wittgenstein the analysis of phenomena still can only take place through the analysis of their linguistic or propositional presentation.

Almost immediately after writing "Some Remarks on Logical Form," however, Wittgenstein began to have serious doubts about this new notion of a primary or "phenomenological" language. By the end of 1929, he had come to the conclusion that such a language was not necessary for his project, as is clear from the opening passage of the 1930 *Philosophical Remarks*: "I do not now have phenomenological language, or 'primary language' as I used to call it, in mind as my goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary.221 All that is possible and necessary is to separate what is essential from what is inessential in *our* language" (PR §1). The full justification for this abandonment of the notion of phenomenological language is

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220 Stern, *Wittgenstein on Mind and Language*, 136. Cf. Hunnings, *The World and Language in Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, 88-93.

221 The original manuscript entry has "I no longer hold it to be possible." Commentators disagree on whether this signals Wittgenstein's intentional weakening of the claim as he prepared the manuscript for submission to the examining committee at Cambridge in 1930. For some different views, see Stern, *Wittgenstein on Mind and Language*, 136-37; Hintikka and Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein*, 137ff, 172, 241ff.; Thompson, *Wittgenstein on Phenomenology and Experience*, 84ff.

complex, and, we argue, involves Wittgenstein's further *transcendental* reflections on the nature of possibility in its relation to the temporal and spatial immediacy of lived experience. We will address these important reflections, in dialogue with similar insights in Husserl and Kant, in the following chapter. But as the final element of our analysis of the transitional moves of Wittgenstein and Husserl toward their later, "open" accounts of meaning, we now turn to a similarly transitional text from Husserl, the 1906/07 lectures on *Logic and the Theory of Knowledge*, where the notion of the phenomenological reduction, so central to Husserl's subsequent work, including the second, 1913 edition of the *Logical Investigations,* is explicitly formulated.

IV. The Phenomenological Reduction and the Beginnings of the Transcendental Turn

The changes in the second edition of the *Logical Investigations* discussed above resulted from Husserl's adoption of the notion of the phenomenological reduction and from further clarifications to the conception of the *Wesensschau.* One of the most important texts in which these conceptions are treated, especially significant for its falling exactly halfway between the first and second editions of the Logical Investigations, is the 1906-07 lecture course entitled "Introduction to Logic and the Theory of Knowledge." In this final section of chapter three, we will show how this text justifies Husserl's "opening up" of the a priori in the second edition of the *Logical Investigations* (as described earlier in this chapter) through a series of reflections on the nature of epistemological inquiry in relation to the phenomenological description of experience in terms of intentional *acts*. This will set the stage for our examination of Husserl's fully transcendental conception of meaning as noesis- noema correlation as it appeared in *Ideas I*, to which we turn in the following chapter, and will help to point out some important similarities between the Wittgensteinian position of the early 30s discussed above and the Husserlian position on the brink of the turn to transcendental phenomenology.

In this lecture course, Husserl explicitly conceives of the project of phenomenology as an

opening up of the field of epistemological investigation. And after the accusations of a "relapse" into psychologism in the second volume of the *Logical Investigations* (first edition), he is particularly insistent that this opening up does not signal a mere turn to the psychological, because it is not conceived as an inquiry into matters of empirical *fact*. Husserl now explicitly conceives of the realm of phenomenological inquiry as one *opposed to* that of psychological facts:

> One will then perhaps object here: What, *de facto*, are these phenomena other than my, the epistemologist's, phenomena? Epistemological investigators are subjects with minds. Their consciousnesses supply the material, and that is, therefore, psychological material. And, if everything they see there is *de facto* their mental experience, then the universal knowledge to which they are relating there is also nothing other than universal psychological knowledge... "De Facto"! That is indeed the whole problem! (LTK 210/ Hua, 215).

Against the interpretation of the phenomenological theory of knowledge as another way of looking at "the facts," Husserl now insists that, while there is a rightful place for investigations of that which is "de facto" "prior" to the theory of knowledge, in the "natural attitude," and there is similarly room for such investigations "after" the theory of knowledge, in the form of metaphysics, there is no place for the de facto *within* the theory of knowledge, for this is the realm in which "there is no transcendent givenness, but only the pure phenomenon of givenness" (LTK 210/ Hua, XXIV 215). Within the theory of knowledge, givenness is a "pure" phenomenon because for Husserl it is only here, in phenomenology conceived as first philosophy (because philosophy of meaning) that all inquiry must begin. Whereas for the early Wittgenstein the theory of knowledge was merely the philosophy of psychology, for Husserl it is the philosophical starting point of all inquiry as such. This claim to the "purity" of givenness in the theory of knowledge is possible only *after* the conceptual switch to include intentional data in the objective realm, since, according to the first edition of the *Logical Investigations,* such data would not count as pure, because not a priori, and thus not included the strictly a priori formal conception of "pure logic."

When Husserl now insists that in the theory of knowledge there is no *de facto*, no

"transcendent givenness," he is asserting that the starting point for all reflection on meaning and knowledge cannot be the contingent facts of psychology or any other empirical discipline; it cannot be based on a conception of givenness implicitly conceived to be transcendent to consciousness. For this would be to assign meaning to a mind-independent empirical world; to give priority to some pre-existing *content* of the world "in the state of epistemological innocence" (LTK 210/ Hua, XXIV 215) instead of the intentional-relational *act* by means of which we *know* the world. This empirical *de facto* must come *after* the theory of knowledge. But the theory of knowledge is also no longer simply a theory of logic; the originary purity which in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations* was assigned to a "closed" conception of the exclusively a priori formal-logical is now assigned to the "immanence" of conscious experience. For, as we saw in section two above, nor can the formal laws of *logic* be transcendent; they are *transcendental*, but just because of this they demand some relationship to experience. When experience is conceived not in terms of "transcendent" empirical facts, but of something *immanent,* the theory of meaning—and thereby the theory of knowledge—gains a firm and apodictic footing not dependent upon some transcendent and therefore unexplained systematic element.

Husserl introduces the phenomenological reduction as a tool for the consistent focusing of inquiry on this "pure" and "immanent" field of inquiry. The reduction systematically lays open the phenomenological dimension of meaning by means of a fixed and repeatable method. At the same time, it allows Husserl to answer to the same problem in philosophical logic—the debate between conventionalism and logical realism—that we suggested was a central motivation for psychologism.[222] For the first edition of the *Logical Investigations* harbored an implicit though unintended logical realism, since it offered no satisfactory clarification of the way its a priori account of meaning made contact with the contingencies of the world, and thus ultimately presupposed, rather than *proved*, the necessity of its logical and morphological principles. But in

222 See chapter two, section I.

place of the psychologistic solution by appeal to empirical-psychological "laws of thought" or to the contingent facts of a "transcendent" world, Husserl now appeals to the *immanence* of meaning itself, conceived not in terms of *ideality* but in terms of *essence*. By locating the starting point of phenomenological inquiry in the immanence of the intentional act, Husserl seeks to avoid both the presupposed necessity of his earlier logical realism and the radical contingency of a mere conventionalism. The reduction allows him to do so by relying on something that Husserl claims we as conscious beings are always already relying on anyway: the relative continuity of the world conceived as a world not of existents, but of essential meanings. By bracketing transcendent existence claims and focusing on essential meaning, continuously clarified by means of eidetic variation, Husserl seeks to found his epistemology on the most immediate, *immanent*, and undeniable characteristic of conscious experience: the basic meaningfulness of the world; the fact that our experience of the word must always for the most part *make sense*.[223]

Husserl characterizes the basic strategy of the reduction as follows: I position my consciousness as regards all judgments "as to a belief into which I imagine myself (as when I speak of an erroneous belief of someone else) and which I do not share. I suspend the believing, without any decision, either affirming or denying." (LTK 207- 208/ Hua, XXIV 212). But I do not thereby cancel out the *content* of the judgment, just as I can understand the *meaning* of the belief of another even though I find it to be erroneous (even though, to paraphrase the similar Wittgensteinian point discussed above, I can see "how things are *not*."). Within this reduction, "I may believe, but within the critical meditations, within all of theory of knowledge, use is made of no belief concerning transcendence. It may only serve as object and as object of clarification (or example for a class of clarifications). Never may what it believes, the obtaining of the state of

223 Notice that this is still not an appeal to the "Myth of the Given," since the claim is not based on a conception of the unmediated giveness of specific content or sense, but only on the structural necessity *that* experience presents itself as meaningful. To risk an obscure formulaton: it is based only on the giveness *of* givenness, and not on what is given *in* that givenness. This path of explanation is open to Husserl because of the explanatory priority given to the structure of the act of judging over the content of the judgment. Only within the latter framework does the appeal to givenness equate to an appeal to Sellars' Myth of the Given.

affairs, the *existence* of the thing [*Sache*] be claimed to be valid and relied upon" (LTK 208/ Hua, XXIV 213, my emphasis). In "bracketing" all such claims to transcendence, I conceive of the world not as a world of contingent facts but as a world of immanent *meanings*. And insofar as these meanings are not tied to the obtaining of a specific state of affairs, they are not given as particularized *instantiations* of something fixed and ideal, as in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations,* but as *general essences*, as matters of the lawful limitations of meaning-essence (*quid juris*) and not of facts (*quid facti*) that are nonetheless intuited directly in experience.

Thus, as Husserl makes explicit in the lecture course, the reduction's reliance on the notion of essence shows it to be nothing other than a taking up of the Kantian problem of the certainty of a posteriori knowledge:

> Ontology, not physics, speaks of nature as such. But, experience teaches that nature is *de facto* such that the laws of nature govern it. But how can experience, which only gives particulars, teach something like that? How can it prophesize? How can universal statements of a factual nature be fulfilled? …We supposedly assert these laws on rational grounds and yet do not assert them on grounds of adequacy. Were we to do that, they would be laws of essence. *Beholding the universal is beholding the general essence and the relationship of essences*. And nothing of the kind is present here. So the *big problem of experience* opens up here, the problem of *synthetic a posteriori judgments*, of singular and general, legitimate ones. (LTK 333/ Hua, XXIV 337, first emphasis mine)

Whereas Kant had responded to the skeptical challenges of Hume by defending the existence and role of synthetic intuitions a priori, Husserl does so by accepting Hume's critique of causation as a critique of the *empirical* justification of knowledge on the basis of individual experiences (*Erfahrungen*) as facts*,* while insisting that Hume's criticisms leave his own *phenomenological account* of essences untouched; for, he argues, even probability itself is only capable of being established "in accordance with the essence of thingness" (LTK 339/ Hua, 344). For Husserl, "*all objectivity has its source in phenomenological ideality*... therefore, underlying any talk of correct and incorrect, rational and irrational are certain ideal relations and laws relating to the contrast between clear and confused, intuitive and symbolic, adequate and inadequate, laws that for their part can be seen in general intuition as essence-laws" (LTK 336/ Hua, 340). To borrow a classic

formulation: for Husserl the *essence* of meaning must logically precede all claims to existence.[224] Because of the notion of the *Wesensschau,* of the intuition of essences directly in experience and not by means of induction, Husserl is able to re-conceive Kant's synthetic a priori, prior to and independent of all experience, as an a priori of *material essences* revealed *in* lived experience [*Erlebnis*] itself, but not as the contingent facts of individual experiences [*Erfahrungen*].

As he puts it in the lecture course in a discussion of Hume's die-rolling example, if we "go through Hume's analyses step by step and just cut away the rampant weeds of the psychological interpretation," it becomes apparent that

> it is not at all a question of the human mind and of influences it experiences [*erfährt*] on the basis of empirical-psychological regularity. Rather, we are simply taking a look at what is given, at the peculiar relationships of motivation, at the lived-experienceable quality [*erlebbaren Charakter*] that the universal assumption acquires from the *weight of earlier experiences* [*Gewicht der Erfahrungen*]. And, just as is usual in the realm of relations of ideas, we then perform a generalizing abstraction there in which we live through [*erleben*] a consciousness of law that allows us to see the principle of probabilities involved." (LTK 347- 349/ Hua, XXIV 352- 355, translation modified225)

This re-conceptualization of the material a priori allows Husserl to locate the a priori logical laws determinant of meaning directly in the experiential world, provided we do not limit our conception of this world to the empirical-psychologistic, but allow also the "lived experiential quality" which the subject acquires on the basis of previous experiences. As Husserl notes later in the same passage, such laws are "a matter of relations bound by laws of essence" (LTK 350/

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224 Steven Crowell summarizes the point nicely: "The reduction involves the "detachment of all naturalistic theories," not in the sense of denying their validity but in the sense of refusing to use them as premises, or modes of explanation, in philosophical reflection (Hua, XXIV:165). Such "detachment" is merely to remind us, as it were, that no naturalistic or worldly theory (including psychology) can account, without vicious circularity, for the correlation between knowledge and the world that constitutes the "unnatural" theme of philosophical reflection, since all such theories presuppose that correlation itself." (Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning* 73- 74).

225 "In der Tat braucht man <nur> Humes Analysen Schritt für Schritt durchzugehen und nur das wuchernde Unkraut der psychologischen Erklärung wegzuschneiden... In derartigen Betrachtungen... ist gar keine Rede von dem Geiste des Menschen und von den Wirkungen, die er auf Grund der empirisch-psychologischen Gesetzmäßigkeit erfährt. Sondern, wir blicken einfach auf das Gegebene hin, auf die eigentümlichen Verhältnisse der Motivierung, auf den erlebbaren Charakter, den die allgemeine Annahme durch das Gewicht der früheren Erfahrungen erhält, und wir vollziehen hier, genauso wie im Gebiet der relationen zwischen Ideen sonst, dann eine generalisierende Abstraktion, in der wir ein Gesetzesbewußtsein erleben, das uns das betreffende Prinzip der Wahrscheinlichkeiten erschauen läßt."

Hua, 354), and thus are not to be considered matters of *fact*.[226] This means that the domain of experience is no longer limited to conceptually-mediated entities determined on the basis of the fixed Kantian categories, and that the project—shared with the neo-Kantians—of re-conceiving Kantian transcendental logic without a fixed conception of the categories has been realized, and a dimension of inquiry has been opened up that recognizes experience as involving not only facts but the lived-experienceable quality and the immeasurable the *weight of earlier experiences*, which characterize meaningful conscious life.

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In this chapter we have sought to show how the working out of certain inconsistencies in their early theories of meaning in relation to experience led Husserl and Wittgenstein to transition from "closed" a priori accounts of meaning to accounts that recognize the character of meaningful conscious experience as something that exceeds characterization in terms of a posteriori facts. We suggested that this marks the beginnings of their recognition of what we have called the phenomenological dimension of meaning. Thus far, however, we have said very little about the character of this dimension. We have referred to it as a dimension of "lived experience" (*Erlebnis*), but have characterized it primarily in terms of what it is *not*: not the traditional a priori domain of transcendental logic, and not the contingent, a posteriori domain of *facts*. In the following chapter, we begin to present the *positive* conception of the phenomenological dimension as we find it in each author, a conception which in each case receives further clarification through a focus on the continued *transcendental* character of the inquiry.

226 That Husserl maintained both the fact-essence distinction and basic outlines of his critique of Hume throughout his career is given further evidence by the fact that the passage from the end of the 1906/07 lectures cited here was reproduced with only very minor changes as an appendix to the posthumously published *Experience and Judgment*. This suggests that at least Landgrebe (who assembled the later volume) and perhaps even Husserl himself (who oversaw parts of the work before his death) continued to see this early critique of Hume as central to his own epistemology.

Chapter Four: Transcendental Paths to the Phenomenological Theory of Meaning

In this chapter we turn to the explicitly transcendental thought of Husserl, primarily through *Ideas I*, and to developments in Wittgenstein's thought from the so-called "phenomenological period," in order to illustrate the fundamental importance and the inherent difficulties of a transcendental account of meaning. Following upon our discussion of the reduction and the distinction between matters of essence and matters of fact at the end of the previous chapter, we turn in section one to a discussion of Husserl's noetic-noematic correlational theory of meaning, as expressed in the *Ideas,* and the important conception of phenomenology as an "infinite task." In section two, we examine Wittgenstein's turn away from the *Tractatus'* theory of logic and meaning in light of his brief engagement with phenomenological theory, contrasting his own view with regard to the status of synthetic judgments in phenomenology in relation to the criticisms of Moritz Schlick and examining further developments to Wittgenstein's theory of meaning in the 1930s as a result of the further consideration of meaning, language, and experience in relation to temporality. Finally, in section three, we put Husserl and Wittgenstein into dialogue concerning the role of infinite possibility in relation to our claims about the non-conceptual nature of immediate experience and the need for a transcendental approach.

§I. Husserl's Transcendental Theory of Meaning

I. a. Phenomenology as Teleologically-ordered "Infinite Task"

As we saw in chapter three, Husserl's distinction in the second edition of the *Logical Investigations* between the meaning of an act and the ideal essence of that act allowed him to assert without contradiction the direct intuition of essences from experience in the form of the *Wesensschau.* This was a result of his choosing the act, and not the content of the *Satz,* as the primary element in the order of analysis of meaning. But the account is not thereby purged of all its problems. For although we have no explained its relation to experience, it remains to be

shown how the individual meaning-instance is to be understood in its now-altered connection to the ideal essence, since the latter is no longer conceived as a meaning as such. Once we have distinguished between the ideal essence and the meaning in the particular act, how do we explain the relation between them, and how should we understand Husserl's claim that we can somehow see the ideal *in* the real; that the ideal *Wesen* is somehow given in the very meaning-act?

We argue in this section that the key to making sense of these phenomenological claims lies in Husserl's conception of the relation between essence and *possibility*, and in seeing how, along with the new-found "genetic" aspect of Husserl's thought, he attempts to deal with the problems this raises for a constitutional account via his conception of what Maurice Natanson has called the "infinite task" of phenomenology. According to this conception,

> the phenomenological analysis of terms is carried out at the level of essential interpretation: it is not the actual event which interests Husserl but the event as an exemplar of its class or type. At the foundation of science there is a universe of meaning to be disclosed in terms of the possible being of its constituent data. Thus, *irreality*, the subjunctive dimension of experience, proves to be the true ground of knowledge. The task of the phenomenologist is to explore the range as well as the constitutive order of that ground in its dynamic aspect, i.e., as a living and developing realm of *possibility*.[227]

As we shall see in the following chapter, this essential analysis will culminate (in terms of the ultimate level of meaning analysis) in Husserl's notion of the pre-given set of "types" which orient our experience at the prepredicative, not-yet-conceptual level. It is according to these types that meanings become realized in individual intentional acts, and these types mark both the most fundamental building blocks of Husserl's theory of meaning, and arguably its point of greatest vulnerability to criticism. But before we can address this topic in the subsequent chapter, we must more fully lay out the structural aspects of Husserl's transcendental theory of meaning[228] to

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227 Natanson, *Edmund Husserl:Philosopher of Infinite Tasks,* 16, second emphasis mine.

228 Husserl's conception of transcendental phenomenology was under constant revision from 1913 until the time of his death. There are important differences between, for example, the theory of the reduction in its nascent form, and its formulation in the work of the late twenties and thirties (for more on such changes, see the editor's introduction to Hua XXXIV). We shall have to ignore the great majority of these historical details in order to cover the breadth necessary for our more particular historical-philosophical analysis in this chapter. But our doing so is justified by the fact that, despite many alterations in the specifics, in the development of Husserl's conception of meaning in his

show how—as we suggested already in chapter two—it is ultimately a pre-predicative theory, based not on language or propositional content, but on the analysis of the meaning-object by way of the subject's intentional *act*.

Husserl's phenomenology never loses sight of the fact that *we* think or utter propositions; that the judgment necessitates a judger, not just for the "appropriation" of propositional knowledge—as Frege's thinker seized pre-existent "thoughts"—but for the very *making* of propositional meaning. Thus, unlike Frege's *Gedanke,* which are in some sense already subsistent in the "third realm," *Sinn* for Husserl (now understood as noematic *Sinn*) is constituted in the very *act* of the judgment–it is a result of intentionality, an accomplishment [*Leistung*] of transcendental subjectivity. And as the notion of phenomenology as an infinite task suggests, this "accomplishment" is constant and ongoing, reaching ever-higher levels of phenomenological analysis in the constant explication of experience. For Husserl conceives of intelligibility *as such* as having a necessary teleological structure, and this teleology is not oriented toward the natural-scientific causal explanation of empirical reality, but toward the fundamental transcendental structures in which the *constitution* of meaning first becomes possible. In this way, phenomenology "inverts the basic assumption of modern science, that the subject introduces a note of private purpose into a reality structured by efficient causality. Rather, it is the scientist who (incidentally, for good reason and to good effect) introduces efficient causal explanation into what is essentially and primordially a teleologically ordered reality."[229] Because of his focus on the meaning in terms of *act*, Husserl contends that when we follow this teleological ordering backward to its source, what we will find is not the exact world of the natural sciences or even of formal logic, but the inexact and vague world of everyday experience; what (as we shall see in the following chapter) he will later further systematically explicate as the *lifeworld*. In order to

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transcendental period, there persists both an underlying theoretical structure and an underlying commitment in terms of priority of analysis: a commitment to the central place of intentionality, and especially to the role of what will now be called the "noetic" in the theory of meaning.

229 Kohák, *Idea and Experience*, 124.

undertake the explication of this teleological conception of meaning and the transcendental theory of constitution related to it, we must begin with Husserl's conception of the noesis-noema correlation. As the debates over this concept in Husserl scholarship over the last fifty years have shown, one's understanding of the role of noema has enormous implications for understanding and evaluating Husserl's transcendental theory of meaning.

I. b. Meaning as Correlation

The importance of the notion of correlation for Husserl actually predates the noesis-noema schematic, and is arguably at play even in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic.* To cite Spiegelberg's formulation, Husserl's basic notion of correlation consists in "the insight that *there is a parallelism between the structures of the subjective act and of its objective referent*. This parallelism forms the basis for a correlative investigation under which both aspects of any phenomenon are to be studied and described in conjunction."[230] As we saw in chapters two and three, in the years leading up to the transcendental turn, the problem of the relation of the a priori formal-logical to intentional consciousness had come to play a central role in Husserl's developing thought. As he himself would note years later: "The incomprehensibly foreign worlds bothered me: the world of the purely logical and the world of the acts of consciousness, as I would put it today, of the phenomenological and also the psychological. I did not know how to put them together into one and nonetheless they had to have a correlation between them and make up an inner unity."[231] It was the need to describe this "inner unity" of the ideal-logical and the phenomenological which led Husserl first to the distinction between the ideal essence and the

230 Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, 103. As we noted in chapter three, the basic simultaneity of the meaning/ essence distinction which appears in the second edition of the Logical Investigations and the first description of the noesis-noema correlation in the Ideen can be seen by Husserl's occasional use of the new terminology in the second edition of the older text, and in his references to noesis-noema in the footnotes to the 1913 edition (see our chapter three, section II. b).

231 Husserl, "Persönliche Aufzeichnungen," 294, qtd. in Mohanty, *Husserl and Frege*, 39, my translation ("...peinigte mich die unbegreiflich fremden Welten: die Welt des rein logischen und die Welt des Aktbewusstseins, wie ich heute sagen wurde, des phänomenologischen und auch psychologischen. Ich wusste sie nicht in eins zu setzen und doch mussten sie zueinander Beziehung haben und eine innere Einheit bilden").

reell meaning in the 1913 edition of the *Local Investigations,* and then to his conception of the noesis-noema correlation in the roughly contemporaneous *Ideas I*. [232]

Thus, despite the fact that Husserl's thought underwent important changes in the period leading up to his "transcendental turn," the conception of noesis-noema should not be seen as a radically new idea, but rather as a new and more specific vocabulary for the essential meaning correlation which was already noted in the second edition of the *Logical Investigations.* Now, however, the notion of correlation has benefited from the conceptual clarification made possible by the further development in the intervening years of the notion of *Wesensschau* and the methodological device of the phenomenological reduction. The reduction allows us to see clearly the specific type of analysis that is open to the phenomenologist when she conceives of the world of experience exclusively as a unity of constituted meanings (Ideas I §55/ Hua III, 120- 121). It is only then that we begin to recognize what Husserl would later label the "perfect correlation" of formal ontology and apophantic logic (FTL §42/ Hua XVII, 116). What we get with the explicit announcement of the noema in *Ideas I*, then, is not the announcement of a new object of inquiry, but a careful methodological clarification of the perspectival difference between phenomenological and natural-scientific analysis.[233]

Firstly, when Husserl says that meaning is continued in the noesis-noema correlation, it is important to emphasize that he does not regard this intentional correlation as a *real relation* between two *real things*, the experience *of* and the thing *out there*; but rather as a correlation between *reell* moments: an *essential structure*.[234] The noema is not to be taken as a new object, the "object of meaning," which is separate from the really-existing object. Husserl explicitly

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232 "Nowhere in *Ideas I* do we find the language of sense as an instantiated species or as a token. Instead we find the noema's relation to the noesis characterized by the language of 'correlation' and 'parallelism,' and the multiplicity of acts with the same thetic character directed to an identical objectivity in the same determinate manner characterized by the language of the 'sameness' of noematic content." Drummond, *The Structure of Intentionality,* 73.

233 Cf. Drummond, *The Structure of Intentionality,* 71.

234 Mohanty, *Phenomenology: Between Essentialism and Transcendental Philosophy*, 47. See our chapter three, section II. a.

warns against such an interpretation in the very heart of his exposition of the concept of noema in *Ideas I* (§90). The term "noema" refers to the presence of the object (the *very same* object that is really existing) just insofar as it is necessarily first and foremost the object of intentional experience, whatever the specific character of that experience might be. The difference is thus a difference of viewpoint, not of an ontologically distinct object. As Kohák notes, "the radical experiential turn represented by phenomenology consists precisely in turning from objects as abstractly reconstructed to objects as noemata, that is, as actually presenting themselves in the context of experience. The point of intentionality is not simply that every experience has an object but that every object is the object of experience."[235] In other words, Husserl's emphasis on the noesis-noema *correlation* is meant to be a theoretical terminological tool for the phenomenological analysis of meaning as act in relation to experience. Correctly understood, it functions as a built-in reminder, *every time* we undertake an analysis of the objects of experience under the phenomenological reduction (which is then, by definition, an analysis of meaning), that the object we are analyzing, while not something *other than* the real object of, e.g., the natural world,[236] is also not *just* that, but rather also, and indeed more primarily, an object of an intentional experience.

The status of the noema is much contested in Husserl scholarship, and raises a number of interpretive issues important for our own interpretation of Husserl's transcendental position. These various interpretations of the noema have been treated extensively in the literature, and have been the topic both of extended journal exchanges and of entire books. In the following sections we will be content to briefly sketch the basic position to which our own view is opposed, and to present the view to which we ascribe in criticizing it, with an eye to the problematic

235 Kohák, *Idea and Experience*, 128. Cf. John Campbell, in *Reference and Consciousness*: "We are not to take the intentional character of experience as a given; rather, experience of objects has to be what explains our ability to think about those objects" (122; qtd. in Hopp, "How to Think about Nonconceptual Content," 18).

236 The object of the natural world is ony one sort of example, since, as we shall see below, intentional analysis extends to all ontological regions, and not just the region of nature.

regarding the theory of meaning that we followed through Husserl's earlier thought in chapters two and three. This will suffice for showing the relevance of the interpretation of the noema for our argument in favor of the phenomenological dimension of meaning, and will lead us to a further interpretive disagreement which highlights the important role of *constitution* in Husserl's thought.

I. c. The Status of the Noema and Husserl's Transcendental Idealism

The two basic positions on the Noema in Husserl scholarship differ in their understanding of the status of the noema as an object. It is clear from the text of the *Ideas I* that the terms noesis and noema in some way refer to the two "poles" of the correlation, the noesis falling on the side of the act-intention, and the noema somehow "closer" to the side of the act-fulfillment. It is the exact status of the noema position which is the principle point of contention. According to what has come to be known as the "west coast" interpretation, first suggested by Dagfinn Føllesdal[237] and later taken up by his students David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre, the noema should be understood as a *mediating entity*, akin to Frege's conception of *Sinn.* According to Føllesdal, "The noema is an intensional entity, a generalization of the notion of meaning (Sinn, Bedeutung)."[238] This noema-entity is in a middle position between the intentional act and the object intended in that act, and is what allows for the directness of the intentional act to an entity even in the absence of a real spatiotemporal object. According to Føllesdal, "When we think of a centaur, our act has a noema, but it has no object; there exists no object of which we think. Because of its noema, however, even such an act is directed. To be directed simply is to have a noema."[239] The appeal of this interpretation for someone wishing to understand Husserl's conception of meaning in light of Fregean doctrines is obvious. The development of the

237 In what follows, we shall take Føllesdal's original statement of this position as found in his 1969 *Journal of Philosophy* article, "Husserl's Notion of Noema." as paradigmatic of the "west coast" interpretation in general.

238 Føllesdal, "Husserl's Notion of Noema," 681.

239 Føllesdal, "Husserl's Notion of Noema," 681.

conception of the noema would then occur largely along the lines of argument in Frege's "The Thought," which is itself a response to the challenge of explaining the functioning of the theory of reference in the absence of any really existing spatio-temporal referent.[240]

As we noted in our brief sketch of this essay at the beginning of the previous chapter, Frege argued that there must be objects of my awareness which are not mere subjective presentations [*Vorstellungen*] in my consciousness, because they have a "being independent of me," and yet are not "real" objects of my perception in the spatiotemporal world. The establishment of mediating entities, Thoughts [*Gedanken*], which are neither subjective entities in the mind of the thinker, nor real objective entities in the spatiotemporal world, solves the dilemma. Føllesdal describes essentially the same dilemma in his discussion of Brentano at the beginning of his influential "Husserl's Notion of Noema": "whereas the view that the objects of acts are real leads to difficulties in the case of centaurs and hallucinations, the view that the objects are unreal, whatever that may mean, leads to difficulties in the case of many other acts, e.g., acts of normal perception: it seems that, on that view, what we see when we see a tree is not the real tree in front of us, but something else..." Føllesdal has correctly noted the dilemma, which was a common concern for both Husserl and Frege.

But his interpretation runs into trouble as soon as it posits that Husserl's *solution* was similar to Frege's. For, although Føllesdal does not attribute to Husserl a platonic "third realm," he nonetheless hypostasizes the noema as a mediating *entity*, which while not quite a separate object falling between the intentional act (noesis) and the intended real object, is nonetheless something in addition to and distinguishable from the real object as an abstract component of the act itself. Just as Frege conceived of the *Sinn* as the mediating entity which allows for the linguistic entity's picking out of its reference, the west coast interpretation claims that the noema constitutes an entity or a "component" of the act which mediates between it and its object. This interpretation might arguably fit with Husserl's theory of meaning as presented in the 1901

240 Cf. Benoist, *Représentations sans objet,* esp. 5-17.

version of the *Logical Investigations*, but it ignores the problematic which led Husserl to alter that theory in the second edition, the problematic which we have argued lies at the heart of the development of the noesis-noema account.

As we saw in chapter three, for Husserl the problem of the origin of ideal meaning content is explained through the conception of the *Wesensschau*, whereby the ideal essence is intuited *directly* from everyday experience, unmediated by any abstract entities or "components".[241] Since the essence is conceived to be already present in lived experience, there was no need for the "doubled" account of meaning as existing both in the ideal essence *and* in the specific instantiation. This is the principle innovation of the notion of correlation: it allows Husserl to explain the ideality of meaning without psychologizing it, *but also without hypostatizing it*, since we no longer needed to posit a subsistent realm of ideal meaning-objects and then talk in terms of their "instantiation" in particular intentional acts. In the new account of meaning, then, the ideal does not subsist:

> My so-called "Platonism" does not consist in some sort of metaphysical or epistemological substructures, hypostases [*Hypostasen*] or theories but rather in the simple reference to a type of original "givens" … I seek to convince the reader that mere prejudices are what keep him in this situation from allowing as valid that which he has indeed and without a doubt before his eyes, which he judges on countless times in everyday life and in science, which exhibits itself to him possibly in self-evident cognition and then does so as truly being—in other words, as something that is an object, that is and yet is nothing real.[242]

Now Husserl might seem here to be positing the very notion of a mediating component advocated by Føllesdal in his interpretation of the noema: Husserl indeed notes in the passage that the original "givens" can be considered as objects and yet as not real. But the above passage, written well after Husserl's transcendental turn, is making its claims in specific reference to the reduction, that operation by which are removed the "mere prejudices" which prevent one from accepting as valid the unmediated presentations of immediate experience. From this very specialized perspective, there is really nothing wrong with referring to the intentional meaning as an object,

241 See chapter three, section II. c and IV.
242 Husserl, *Introduction to the* Logical Investigations*,* 25.

since once the existential question has been bracketed, we can simply consider the intentional meaning *itself* to be the object of the act. But this should not be taken as implying a contrast between this object and *another different* entity, the "real object," which lies "outside of" or "beyond" the intentional correlation as what is "really there" in the case of spatio-temporal objects of perception. For this is to make the existential assumption which should have been "bracketed" in the reduction. But this is exactly what Føllesdal does in noting that "the view that the objects are unreal, whatever that may mean, leads to difficulties in the case of many other acts, e.g., acts of normal perception: it seems that, on that view, what we see when we see a tree is not the real tree in front of us, but something else..." In other words, Føllesdal assumes that, if there is a way in which the tree can be said to be non-real, then there must be *no* way at all in which the tree is also real: either there are two separate things involved—the non-real tree-meaning as intentional "component" and the real tree as empirical object—or, in the case of "centaurs and hallucinations" there is only the non-real meaning, but there is no real object, since such things do not *really* exist.

But from the Husserlian perspective this is a false dilemma, and it ignores the methodological clarification of the reduction, and effectively lets the assumptions of a naive realism in through the back door: Føllesdal wants to take the noema as a separate meaning-entity because for him there is no other way to distinguish it from the object encountered in reality. This amounts to taking the object "in itself" which is encountered *in* experience, to have explanatory priority over the act of experiencing the object; it is to side with Frege in taking the logical priority in the analysis of meaning to lie in what is judged instead of in the act of judging. But, as we saw already in chapter three,[243] Husserl's conception of meaning takes the opposite path of the "Husserl-Frege fork." Indeed, his prioritizing of the act is just what we claimed above is "built in" to the phenomenological method by way of the reduction: the recognition of the fact that "The point of intentionality is not simply that every experience has an object but that every

243 See chapter three, section I.

object is the object of experience."[244] Husserl's conception of the noema and its place in the correlational structure of intentionality is not intended primarily to elucidate experiential content—this is a secondary effect—but to accurately describe the structure of experience in which that content is constituted.

Føllesdal, like Brentano and Frege, thus fully subscribes the first part of the above-noted Husserlian thesis of intentionality, that "every experience has an object," but his assumption that the real object must be distinguished from the intentional meaning betrays his lack of fidelity to the second part, that "every object is the object *of experience."* For if we accept this second part of the thesis, and recognize the bracketing effect of the reduction, we recognize that it makes no sense to speak of two distinct orders, that of objects and that of their meanings [*Sinne*]. The real tree and the intentional tree-meaning are not different, but different ways of looking at the same *thing*, and that thing is not determined under the presumption of a fundamentally spatio-temporal conception of reality, but on the basis of an understanding of reality as first and foremost a space of *meaning*. It is only on the former assumption that we feel the need to posit a separate "component" of the act which contains those meanings as opposed to the objects which are independently spatio-temporally real; but this is just what is excluded under the phenomenological epoche. It is for this reason that many commentators have emphasized the essential *unity* of the noesis-noema correlation. Although its parts can be abstractly considered, they are always ultimately non-independent "moments" or abstract "parts" of a larger whole.[245] As Husserl puts it, the noema is "wholly dependent... the Eidos of the noema points to the Eidos of the noetic consciousness; both belong *eidetically* together" (Ideas I, §98/ Hua III, 230).

Husserl's emphasis on the location of meaning in *correlation* is meant to emphasize that meaning is not *brought to* the object *through* the act from an outside realm of pre-existent meanings (as the account of the structure of meaning in the first edition of the *Logical*

244 Kohák, *Idea and Experience,* 128.
245 Cf. Rabanaque, "Hyle, Genesis and Noema," 205.

Investigations still problematically implied), but rather arises *in* the act itself. The west coast interpretation errs in treating the noema as a sort of mediator between the subject and the objective world; in doing so, commentators subscribing to that view "replace the intentionality of acts with the different relation of the intensionality of sense, making the intentional directedness of an experience a function of the intensional directedness (referentiality) of a meaning. For Husserl, however, meaning and reference flow from the act."[246]

It is no coincidence that those who advocate the west coast interpretation also tend to reject Husserl's transcendental turn, and to focus their interpretive efforts almost exclusively on the period of the *Logical Investigations*. For the insight that meaning originates in the intentional act forces us to reject any theory of meaning implicitly resting on common realist assumptions, since we no longer have the grounds to make *any* claim—positive or negative—about the existence of a meaningful world "outside" of its relation to intentional consciousness; this was the central insight of the phenomenological reduction. But—and this is the important point often missed by those critical of Husserl's transcendental turn—nor does this rejection of a certain sort of naive realism signal a dogmatic assertion of subjective idealism; Husserl *never* claims that there is nothing outside of consciousness. Indeed, as we shall see below, Husserl claims that it is not just possible but necessary—*logically* necessary—that there be something outside of consciousness, since the transcendental account of constitution ultimately necessitates a region of originally given logical material in the form of hyletic data *transcendent to consciousness* though recognized in immanence within it. It is just that, from Husserl's careful methodological perspective, it is entirely unwarranted, and an overstepping of the Critically-established boundaries of human reason, to take that logically necessary realm as warrant for a metaphysical claim about an independently-existing and ordered empirical world. Thus Husserl's transcendental position, though he at times refers to it as a "transcendental idealism," is in truth neither realist nor idealist, as those terms are traditionally understood. To fully grasp Husserl's

246 Drummond, "The Structure of Intentionality," 74.

attempt at a transcendental founding of the theory of meaning, we must now expand our treatment of this insight to a discussion of what Husserl calls the a priori material regions.

I. d. The Ontological Status of the Formal and Material Regions

As Husserl would later note in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, the conception of the noesis-noema correlation reflects what he had come to see as the "exact correlation of apophansis and ontology in logic" (FTL §42). The move of the *Logical Investigations* to guarantee the universality and objectivity of knowledge by assigning a priori status to both logical form and material content[247] is now explicitly announced in transcendental phenomenology in terms of the distinction between formal ontology and formal apophantics (FTL §37). For Husserl, although explanatory priority is given to the act, the truly transcendental analysis of meaning is in fact necessarily "two-sided," in that the analysis of the forms of judging (formal apophantics; the act) is always simultaneously the formal analysis of that which is judged (formal ontology; the content). This distinction at the level of the formal-logical has important implications for Husserl's conception of meaning not only *formally*, as an attempt to describe the general structure of *meaningfulness* as a fundamental and necessary aspect of intentional experience, but also *materially,* at the level of specific intentional *meaning contents*, since it defines the formal-logical domain shared by each "regional ontology" (Ideas I, §9/ Hua III, 23-24).[248]

Thus, where those holding the west coast interpretation felt the need to posit an additional meaning-entity in order to account for the status of things like centaurs, which do not correspond to any spatio-temporal entity, for Husserl this is explained by the fact that the object, once we have undertaken the phenomenological reduction, is *qua* intentional *meaning*, is not *in* any region

247 See chapter two, §I, D.

248 In this context, it is important to distinguish Husserl's use of "ontology" from Heidegger's conception of "fundamental ontology" (see Carr, *Phenomenology and the Problem of History*, 36, note 85). Our interpretation in this section differs from Carr's, at least at the level of terminology, in that we consider the transcendental realm of "formal ontology" to nonetheless count as properly ontological, whereas Carr prefers to see this realm, from the transcendental perspective, as "nonontological" (*loc. cit.*).

at all: the spatiotemporal world (what Husserl calls the region of *nature* (Ideas I §9/ Hua III, 24)) is but one region among many, and centaurs, as non-spatiotemporal objects, simply belong to a different ontological region. But *qua meanings*, centaurs are no different than trees, or numbers, or triangles. Since the analysis of meaning begins with the act, the intentional object is the *only* type of object; but the material logical content of an object comes in different forms, one of which—but not the *only* one—is in the spatio-temporally differentiated region of nature.

To take this spatiotemporal region of nature as the only or even just as the primary location of objectivity, as the west coast interpretation of the noema implicitly does, is to refuse to grant the priority of transcendental description over natural-empirical explanation, to theorize meaning without undergoing the complete epoche and thus to remain in what Husserl calls the "natural attitude." As Carr notes,

> ...what should not be done, is to confuse the natural and the phenomenological attitudes or to place them on the same plane, as if they presented an alternative between "realism" and "idealism." Quite apart from the question of whether the natural attitude, or its "thesis," corresponds to anything like philosophical realism, the phenomenological attitude is not… a different ontological thesis which seeks to overcome the natural attitude in *this* sense by putting itself in its place. Husserl is not one of those philosophers who, in Strawson's words, seeks to reform our thought about the world. Rather, he is content, like Kant and Aristotle, to describe that thought.[249]

The task of *transcendental* phenomenology is to describe the structure of the meaningfulness *of* the world and of specific meanings *in* the world, and this means that Husserl must supply an analysis not only of the *formal* conditions of possibility but also of the of the *material constitution* of specific meaning-contents. For Husserl's account of the noesis- noema correlation, alongside the methodological innovation of the phenomenological reduction, results in a universal epoche under which the world for the subject consists exclusively of noematic contents, i.e., meanings (Ideas I, §55). When we add to this account the claim that intentionality is not a mere relation, but the fundamental *structure* of meaning conceived in terms of the *act*, we recognize that the role of the noema cannot be to *explain* intentionality, but is rather to

249 Carr, *Phenomenology and thhe Problem of History*, 38.

explicate[250] in constitutional analysis, how that intentional structure comes to be endowed with sense.[251]

Once we have realized that Husserl's later phenomenology is is not tantamount to a subjective idealism, we recognize that the question of the *origin* of meaning—Where does meaning *come from*"—cannot be simply answered by *explanation;* by claiming that it originates in transcendental subjectivity. The problem here is analogous to that which we suggested, in chapter two, drove Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* to the notion of a mystical origin of *Sinn* separate from the world of contingent facts and the purely formal contribution of Objects.[252] Though Husserlian formal logic (the other side of formal ontology) can establish the *formal* "ur-region" in which meaning appears as such, individual meaning contents are conceived as belonging to different material or ontological regions, and this is a result of their *material* content and not their logical form: "Every regional essence determines 'synthetic' essential truths, i.e., such as are grounded in it as this generic essence, but are not mere specifications of formal-ontological truths. The regional concept and its regional subdivisions are thus not free to vary in these synthetical truths; the replacing of the relatively constant terms by variables gives no formal logical law..." (Ideas I, §16/ Hua III, 36- 37). Thus it is not the case according to Husserl that formal logic and its accompanying ontology present us with anything like "empty placeholders" for meaning-content all on their own; a formal analysis will only account for the logical *form* of any given meaning, and not for the material *content* which distinguishes it from others at the level of material regions.

Since after the reduction the "givenness" of such content cannot be explained in the

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250 See Bachelard, *A Study of Husserl's Logic,* 109, on Husserl's use of "explication" [*Auslegung*] in this context.

251 As Sokolowski points out, another version of the west coast interpretation attempts to do just this: "Smith and McIntyre want to use the noema as a device that would explain how consciousness becomes intentional. But Husserl's philosophy is not explanatory in this way; it does not provide devices, it merely describes. What it describes are not "hidden causes" such as abstract entities, but obvious accomplishments such as identifying across presence and absence, the constitution of groups and numbers, the intentional activities that constitute signs, pictures, and remembrances, the achievement of categorial forms, and the like" (Sokolowski, "Husserl and Frege," 522).

252 See chapter two, section III. e.

manner of the empirical realist, this material content also cannot be said to be derived a posteriori in the traditional manner, via reference to perception of already-meaningful things in a consciousness-independent world.[253] At the same, time, in admitting that the givenness of different meanings involves "synthetic"[254] logical material, and is thus not a purely formal-analytic matter, Husserl also has to admit that there is no possibility of ultimately defining the limits of the variation of these syntheses from "outside" the space of material meanings, since the replacing of the *only relatively* constant terms by variables "gives no formal logical law." In other words, although all regional ontologies are united in *form* through formal ontology, this latter is no longer a strict *quid juris;* it cannot provide the exact boundary lines which separate the regions, since the purely formal-analytic is a matter, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, "of form, not content." Instead,

> The totality... of the *regional axioms*, limits—and *defines* for us—*the system of regional categories*. These categories express not merely, as do concepts generally, specifications of purely logical categories, but are distinguished by this, that by means of regional axioms they express the features *peculiar to* the regional essence, or *express in eidetic generality what must belong "a prior'" and "synthetically" to an individual object of the region*. The application of such (not pure logical) concepts to given individuals is apodeictic and unconditionally necessary, and regulated, moreover, through the regional (synthetic) axioms. (Ideas I §16/ Hua III, 37)

Both the phenomenological method and the logical and ontological demands of transcendental philosophy preclude the account of meaning constitution from being anything more than a description reaching to the furthest possible level of analysis, which will be, ultimately, a description of the transcendental structure of the givenness of *possible* meaning. In other words, Husserl accepts from the beginning that meaning analysis will never provide an *explanation* of the *reasons why* certain meanings are given and others not, because any such attempt would overstep the critical boundary of transcendental thought in attempting explanation of the

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253 Cf. Hua VII, 364.

254 Our use of scare quotes is intended to mark the distinction between ths general notion of synthetic, of which Husserl's notion of the "material a priori" is one example, and the specific Kantian notion of the synthetic a priori which Husserl rejects because of its implication that the original passive givenness involved in meaning-constitution is itself a form of synthesis (for this point see Hua VII, 359; Kern, *Husserl und Kant,* 57).

transcendence of meaning from the position of the mere immanence of its givenness. While we can recognize the *character* of meaning's "transcendence in immanence," we cannot logically give an *explanation* for this transcendence because ours is still a recognition from an immanent standpoint. In attempting to work out the full implications of his transcendental thought, Husserl was lead to address the fundamental enigma that lies at the very heart of the theory of meaning: the process by which the individual meaning receives its sense, the point at which, in Frege's words, "something comes into view whose nature is no longer mental in the proper sense, namely the thought; and this process is perhaps the most mysterious of all."[255] For Husserl, this is described as the process of constitution,[256] but the very fact that the conception of constitution stands as a foundation stone of a *transcendental* theory means that the analysis of this process cannot result in a final, absolute explanation by reference to some further cause, but must consist, in the end, of the description of the formal and material conditions for all such causes as an infinite task.

While Husserl conceives of the inquiry into the material conditions of meaning as a version of the Kantian project of the examination of the synthetic a priori, for him, in accord with the notion of the phenomenological reduction and the *Wesensschau*, the "a priori" realm of the material categories is no longer conceived as prior to or separate from experience. Husserl has "opened up" the a priori to experience, conceiving it in terms of an "eidetic generality" of meaning that *exceeds* rather than *precedes* the meaning of the individual experienced object. The opening up of the a priori logical categories to the flux of experience has lead Husserl from a revision of Kant's Transcendental Logic in the early work to a complete rethinking of the status and role of the Transcendental Aesthetic; for the realm of experience and no longer be conceived exclusively on the basis of the space and time as the a priori forms of intuition. In Husserl's transcendental account of meaning, objects of experience reveal a transcendence in immanence;

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255 Frege, *Posthumous Writings,* 145 (qtd. in Mohanty, *Husserl and Frege* 37).
256 Sokolowski, "Husserl and Frege," 522.

the ideal is intuited *in* the real.

I. e. Intentional Analysis as Non-conceptual Theory of Constitution

In the period after the *Logical Investigations,* with its fuller explication of the notion of "meaning in correlation" in terms of noesis and noema, and with the methodological innovation of the phenomenological reduction, it became apparent that meaning, as something constituted *in* the intentional act, could no longer be adequately described by either a Fregean-Platonistic notion of universally pre-given logical types, nor by an empiricist conception of pre-existent meaning in a world "outside" the subject. Since both a pre-given ideal realm and a pre-given, independent nature have been taken off the table as possible ultimate sources for the origin of meaning content, for Husserl there is effectively nowhere else from which the givenness of meanings can arise than from the "space" of the intentional correlation itself. Thus, as Spiegelberg notes, after the *Logical Investigations*, "the intentional object is no longer conceived as the pre-existent referent to which the intending act refers as already given, but as something which originates in the act. This constituting function of the intentional act can only be revealed by the method which Husserl calls *intentional analysis*."[257]

As Husserl further pursued his project of intentional analysis, he began to recognize that the bracketing of the world of the "natural attitude" implied a bracketing of the assumption that the field of phenomenological analysis could be limited to that which appears spatio-temporally in the stream of experience.[258] For, as we saw in our discussion above, Husserl's new-found focus on the objectively real is *not* a return to direct or naive realism, but rather an account of the complex phenomenon of meaning as an act of constitution, which contains the Noema as a non-

257 Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement,* 109-110.

258 As Hermann Phillipse notes, Husserl realized around this time (1907), "that the real domain of indubitability is 'this marvelous correlation' of epistemic experiences and their intentional objects as such. […] The subject-matter of epistemology is not the stream of consciousness in the sense of what is really immanent only, but the noetic-noematic correlation" (Phillipse, "Transcendental Idealism," 283).

independent moment. This means that its status as meaningful cannot be reduced to the conceptual content of the real object.

For the epistemological status of constituted meanings can be neither pure *formality* (since such meanings involve material logical content which differentiates them into diverse material regions only on the basis of that material), nor pure synthetic a posteriority, insofar as the field of analysis is no longer limited to *actual* meanings in the stream of experience but involves the wider field of *possible* meanings falling within a given material region. The status of intentional meaning, in the full transcendental-phenomenological sense, thus involves both analytic and synthetic (material) a priority, the latter no longer conceived in opposition to the contribution of experience. As Husserl notes explicitly in *Ideas I*,

> If... one wishes to maintain approval of Kant's critique of reason, one has only to interpret the regional axioms as *synthetic cognitions a priori,* and we should then have as many irreducible classes of such forms of knowledge as there are regions. […] on this understanding, *formal ontology* takes its place, *outwardly*, in the same series as the regional (the strictly 'material', 'synthetic' ontologies). Its regional concept 'object' determines the formal system of axioms, and thereby the system [*Inbegriff*] of formal ('analytic') categories. Therein lies, in fact, a justification of the parallelism, despite all the essential differences which have been brought forward. (Ideas I, §16/ Hua III, 37)

Husserl claims that formal ontology is *outwardly* on the same level as the regional ontologies since it is in effect the absolute limit of their formalization: the material regions are defined via axiomatization to the absolute limit of logical material differentiation, the material *region*, but that which falls under any region still shares a *formal* similarity with objects falling under other regions, precisely insofar as anything falling under any region will still be an instance of an intentional object, and as such subject to pure formal laws. Thus, if we wish to think of the formal in the same terms used to characterize regional ontologies, the "region" of formal ontology is just the region of objects as such, even though it is, properly speaking, "not something co-ordinate with the material regions (the regions pure and simple)*, it is properly no region at all, but the pure form of region in general.* It has all regions with all their essential diversities of content *under* (though indeed only *formaliter*) rather than side by side with itself" (Ideas I, §10/

Hua III, 26).

Before we can treat this clear Kantian parallel in terms of our broader thesis, it is necessary to spell out the full implications of this distinction between the formal and the material a priori with reference to the notion of the location of meaning in the *act*, and therefore in the noesis-noema correlation. For it is only by reference to the act of *judgment* that Husserl more fully differentiates the specific (though non-independent) moments of the structure of meaning. In an important discussion of the relation of judgment to the noesis-noema correlation, after noting that the discussion to follow will *not* be concerned directly with the "higher level" of verbal expression (the level for which Husserl will now reserve the term *Bedeutung*[259]), he tells us that

> *The whole 'what' as content of the judgment qua judgment* [*das gesamte geurteilte Was*] and taken precisely as such, with the characterization, and in the way of its givenness [*Gegebenheitsweise*] to us as 'conscious' to us in experience, makes up the *full noematic correlate*, the 'meaning' [*Sinn*] (understood in the widest sense) of the judgment experience [*Urteilserlebnis*] More fully stated, it is the meaning as we have it through the way in which it is given to us, insofar as this way of givenness is traceable in it as a feature." (Ideas I, §94/ Hua III, 216- 217)

In this passage, Husserl is pointing to the explicitly noematic, "objectively-oriented" side of the noesis-noema correlation. Although he is not assuming its independence from the noesis (the subjective intentional side or "non-independent moment" of the *act of judging*), he is here focusing exclusively on the "objective" side of the correlation, and more specifically on the fullest notion of meaning-content: the content of the judgment insofar as it includes *both* the matter judged and the presentational character of the givenness of that matter to us. This "whole 'what'," Husserl notes, is the *Sinn* in the widest sense.

Now, as we saw in our criticism of the west coast interpretation of the noema above, the noema is not to be taken as a separate entity which mediates between the intention and the "real" object "out there." Instead, the noema should be understood as containing the object of the act *as*

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259 See our earlier discussion of the *Sinn- Bedeutung* distinction in Husserl's thought in chapter two, section II. b.

understood from under the epoche, which means that it should not be taken to posit the existence of an object separate from the "real object," but rather to mark the observation of the same one object from the phenomenological perspective as opposed to that of the natural attitude. We further noted that this latter status of the object had a certain priority over its possible status as a "real" spatiotemporal object, insofar as every object is necessarily and primarily intentional, but not every object belongs to the material region of nature.[260] Furthermore, we saw in the above discussion that, in terms of Husserl's theory of meaning, the concern of such analyses is never with the specific noema corresponding to a specific act, but rather eidetic; with the general analysis of *any possible* intentional act and the corresponding noema.

Now, within this carefully limited sphere of analysis, Husserl claims in the *Ideas* that it is possible to identify a further-differentiated part within the full noema or *Sinn* in the widest sense. The *noematic core* or *noematic nucleus* [*noematischer Kern*], fulfills the role of connecting Husserl's conception of meaning to his formal logical theory. For it is this noematic core, Husserl tells us, which contains the "content which is everywhere the same" in various judgments, as opposed to the full noema, which (even in terms of any possible meaning) also contains other varying "characterizations," depending upon its thetic character.[261] This core, then, is responsible for the meaning content in the sense of the *logical material* of the judgment, i.e., the "S is P" which is the *matter* of the judgment despite the possible variation in its presentational act-character (EJ §60[262]). In terms of our example of matter vs. character of an act from chapter three, this is the logical matter of "the film being over," regardless of its character in the

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260 We must always remember that, in passages such as §94 (under discussion here), although Husserl's examples tend to be of visible, spatial objects falling under the region of nature, such objects are serving as examples for *various* types of noema with fall under *various* material regions.

261 This latter is the notion we referred to in our third chapter, section II. a, in noting that, for Husserl, although the same "matter" is present in all cases, judging the film to be over has a different *character* from desiring that the film be over, or asserting that it is over. The above discussion of the analysis of meaning as an analysis of essential possibilities helps to further clarify why we claimed, in that section, that the thetic character differs "in a way that is appreciably *not* simply a matter of "subjective" aspects of perception."

262 Since there is no *Husserliana* edition of *Experience and Judgment,* citations from the English translation are given by section instead of page, thereby also corresponding to the German edition of the text.

intentional act as a hope, a fear, or a simple observation, etc.

It is this conception of the logical role of the noematic *core* which the west coast interpretation wishes to assign to Husserl's notion of the noema *as a whole*. But this is to miss a very important Husserlian insight into the theory of meaning: it fails to realize that a purely formal conception of meaning content, even if it succeeds in incorporating an account of the role of intentionality, can do nothing to clarify the nature of meaning, since it attempts to analyze meaning in isolation from the broader phenomenon of meaningfulness which necessarily characterizes the intentional relation. For Husserl, the meaningfulness of (intentional) experience cannot be reduced to the totality of logical concepts involved in individual meanings, or even to the set of all possible meaningful concepts; it will also involve non-conceptual elements involved in the meaningfulness of experience *as a whole,* which do not play a direct role in the pure-logical, conceptual judgments at the core of individual meanings.

In *Ideas I* (§94/ Hua III, 216- 220), Husserl makes this distinction between the noematic core and the noema as a whole with reference to an important passage in the *Logical Investigations* where, in the fifth investigation, in last section of the chapter on "consciousness as intentional experience" (LI, V, §21/ Hua XIX, 431- 435), he distiguishes between the intentional and the "epistemological"[263] essence of the judgment. The distinction is essentially that mentioned above between the noema as a whole, including both the character (also called the "quality") and the matter (or "material") of the meaning (called in the *Logical Investigations* the epistemological essence), and the specific part of that larger unity which only involves the matter considered in isolation from the character or quality. But, as he notes in the *Ideas* text, Husserl's earlier discussion of this distinction considered it (as is typical of the analyses of the *Logical*

263 The word used in the *Logical Investigations* is *bedeutungsmaesige Wesen*, but in referring to this passage in *Ideas I,* Husserl refers to the distinction as that between *intentionale* and *erkenntnismaessige Wesen*. Since we know from Husserl's citation in a footnote that he is indeed referring to the above-mentioned passage, we can take Husserl to be recollecting the distinction in the terms of his new set of terminological distinctions, in which he explicitly reserves the term *Bedeutung* for meaning as verbally expressed (Ideas I, 346- 349/ Hua III, 285- 286).

Investigations) only as a distinction applying to the subjective side of intentionality, to what is now called the noesis. Husserl now insists in *Ideas I* that this distinction must apply equally on the side of the noema. It is the application of the distinction between intentional and epistemological essence specifically to the noema, then, which gives us the conception of the noematic core responsible for the logical content of meanings. Husserl explicitly claims this extension of the distinction to the noema as an advance in his theory since, as he notes, "the noetic rendering as carried out there [in the *Logical Investigations*] in a one-sided way is precisely not the one needed for the notion of the concept of the pure logical judgment (the concept which pure logic in the sense of pure mathesis demands, in contrast with the noetic concept of judgment in the noetics of normative logic)" (Ideas I, §84/ Hua III, 217).[264]

As we might expect, the distinction between the full noema and the noematic core is a result of Husserl's insistence (as against Frege) on putting the analysis of the act of judging (the noetic side) before the analysis of the content judged in the order of explanation. Indeed, *pace* "west coast" interpretations, this is one way of characterizing Husserl's conception of the noema as against Frege's conception of the *Sinn*: like Frege's *Sinn,* Husserl's noema names the content of the judgment as a whole (and not just its logical core), but *only insofar as that content is taken as a correlate of the noesis*, i.e., only insofar as the meaning is considered as a sense constituted by a consciousness in a necessarily intentional correlation. On this account, to claim that the logical material involved in the judgment is but one part of the larger conception of the noema as a whole (which is itself but one part of the larger noesis-noema correlation) is not to devalue it, or to detract from the exactness or rigor of logical analysis. It is rather to admit into the theory of meaning the insight which we have been emphasizing throughout this work: that meaningful experience is not a simple "black and white" phenomenon which can be explained exclusively by an account of concepts occurring or not occurring, being present or absent, in a naively realist

264 Husserl claims this distinction in the noesis give us the "*Rechtslehre* of the judging process" and thus "judging in general- i.e. eidetic generality determined by form" (Ideas I 274/ Hua III, 218).

world; that, in the theory of meaning, the recognition of intentionality should lead us to specifically phenomenological problems, which in turn point to the fundamental *transcendental* problems of *possibility,* and thus to the phenomenological dimension which explains the *meaningfulness* of experience and not only individual meanings.

I. f. The Critique of Anthropologism and the Turn to Transcendental Subjectivity

Conceiving the analysis of meaning as an eidetic inquiry beginning from the noesis-noema correlation also forces Husserl to refuse to take subjective psychological experience as the paradigm of subjectivity for the noetic side of intentional analysis, and to opt instead for the much broader notion of consciousness *as such*. For, if the reduction reduces the field of experience to the field of intentional objects, and does so without positing anything regarding the real existence of those objects, and if what the phenomenologist is actually interested in is not simply the meanings encountered in specific experiences, but the theory of all *possible meanings,* then the intentional analysis of meaning must be undertaken not in reference to any specific and factually-existent human consciousness but with respect *to any consciousness whatsoever*.[265] Thus Husserl does not conceive of the "intentional achievements" [*intentionale Leistungen*] of consciousness (CM §20/ Hua I, 83- 86) in terms of the individual human subject. Instead, as he notes already in a 1907 lecture course, although he originally saw the problem of phenomenologically accounting for meaning in terms of "the relation between subjective psychological experience and the reality in itself apprehended in this experience," he had by then come to recognize that

> first we need that insight that *the radical problem is rather the relation between knowledge and object, but in the reduced sense, according to which we are dealing not with human knowledge but rather with knowledge in general, without any relation to existential co-positings, be they of the empirical ego or of a real world.* We need the insight that the truly significant problem is the problem of the ultimate sense-bestowal of knowledge, and thus of objectivity in general, *which is what it is only in its correlation to possible knowledge.* (IDP 55/ Hua II, 75- 76, my emphasis)

265 Cf. Hua VII, 361.

This focus on possibility and "objectivity in general" is indicative of Husserl's increasing turn toward transcendental thought in the years leading up to *Ideas I*,[266] and shows that Husserl in his later thought has taken the notion of transcendental limits even more strictly than did Kant, for whom transcendental inquiry, while clearly distinguished from any *personal* inquiry, is still limited to a given human subjectivity.[267] For to suppose that consciousness is equivalent to human subjectivity is to make an assumption that must fall with the reduction, since we cannot presuppose the natural, psychological conception of subjectivity arising from the presupposition of an independently existing world. Lest we forget, it was the problematic notion that questions about logic and meaning could be answered by way of analysis of the human psyche in the world that led to Husserl's first steps down the path toward to the phenomenological reduction.[268]

Here we begin to see, in rough outlines, both Husserl's move in the direction of Kant—in his move toward a transcendental-constitutional form of inquiry—and his attempt to move *beyond* Kant, insofar as Husserl's transcendental philosophy even puts into question the status of the human subject as inquirer in the attempt to secure, once and for all, the a priori foundations of logic and meaning through the subjection of transcendental theory to immanent criticism,[269] the ultimate test prescribed in the *Prolegomena*'s call for a *mathesis universalis*.[270] Thus, as Sebastian Luft puts it, from Husserl's perspective,

> Kant performs a phenomenological reduction and a turn to the subject, and maybe one could even speak of a transcendental reduction in Kant's focus on the subjective forms of intuition, but there is no eidetic reduction which moves from the human subject to subjectivity-as-such. Only this move can attain a truly scientific philosophy, which has to be about vérités de raison, not de fait. This is what Kant, too, wanted; but vérités de raison cannot be bound to, and relative to, any specific factual creature, such as the human being.[271]

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266 See the translator's introduction to Hua II, viii- x.

267 At least according to Husserl. As we shall see in the following chapter, this clam is at the core of Husserl's critique of the naturalistic and psychologistic presuppositions of Kant's transcendental theory of knowledge.

268 Cf. Luft, "The Meaning of Transcendental Idealism in Kant and Husserl," 375.

269 Cf. Hua VII, 370.

270 See chapter two, section II. a.

271 Luft, "The Meaning of Transcendental Idealism in Kant and Husserl," 375.

Though Kant does offer an inquiry into the nature of the self in terms of "the I think which must be capable of accompanying all of my representations," in Husserl's eyes he fails to subject the "I think" to a fully transcendental questioning: He does not seek the necessary conditions of the possibility of the subject *as such*. For Husserl, this failure to realize the full "two-sidedness" of transcendental inquiry is Kant's greatest shortcoming, and that which prevented him from realizing the scientific goals of a properly, fully transcendental philosophy. As Husserl would note later, in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*,

> If this science [transcendental phenomenology] is then, as may be expected, the ultimate one, it must show its ultimacy by showing that it can answer the question of its own possibility, therefore by showing that there is such a thing as an *essential, endlessly reiterated, reflexive bearing* <of transcendental phenomenology> upon itself, in which the essential sense of an ultimate justification by itself is discernibly included, and that precisely this is the fundamental characteristic of an essentially ultimate science. (FTL §101, Cairns' interpolation/ Hua XVII, 274)

We will return to the question of the self-justification of a transcendental theory in the following chapter, where we will see in the notion of the endless reiteration of theory or "infinite task" of phenomenology an important point of comparison with the mature thought of Wittgenstein.

For Husserl was not the only philosopher in the early twentieth century engaged with the question of the role of the formal and logical in the theory of meaning, and was not the only one who was led to revise his views on meaning as a result of increasing recognition of the phenomenological dimension. We turn now to the further developments in Wittgenstein's theory of meaning in the 1930s, a period in which the engagement with problems very similar to those discussed above resulted in a radically different conception of experience, meaning, and "phenomenology."

II. Wittgenstein's "Phenomenological Period" and the Transcendental Problem of Knowledge

As we saw in the previous chapter, around the time of his return to Cambridge in 1929, Wittgenstein was in the midst of a gradual turning away from the "transcendental-logical" views

presented in the *Tractatus,* oriented around the conception of logical form, and toward the more open-ended views expressed in his later philosophy, oriented around the notion of "grammar." This turn is often traced in the scholarship the "color incompatibility problem," where the problem of dealing with the seemingly logical incompatibility of different color contents in the same space through the scaled-down and strict machinery of Tractarian logic led Wittgenstein to abandon much of that machinery and the corresponding notion of logical form in favor of a less rigid conception of logic's relation to meaning. Engagement with this problem coincides with the beginning of what has come to be known as Wittgenstein's "phenomenological" period, although the two topics are usually treated separately in the scholarship.

This is perhaps in part because the foray into phenomenology, beginning in 1929, is generally considered to be short-lived, replaced within a few years (beginning with the *Blue and Brown Books*) with a different set of considerations culminating in the much better-known insights presented in the *Philosophical Investigations*, whereas the logical issues first brought to light through the color incompatibility problem are considered to have been central preoccupations of Wittgenstein's thought for the rest of his life. Against this interpretive bias, we will argue that Wittgenstein's remarks on the relation of logic and experience *both* upon his return to philosophy in 1929 and through the early thirties (in this chapter), *and* in post- *Investigations* works such as The *Remarks on Color* and *on Certainty* (in chapter five) should give us pause in dismissing Wittgenstein's concern with phenomenological problems as merely fleeting or transitional, and should lead us to recognize that the problems raised initially in the case of color-incompatibility are not simply logical but also *transcendental* problems for the theory of meaning and knowledge.

We begin with an interpretation of Wittgenstein's color-incompatibility problem as an engagement with an issue also central to the simultaneously developing tradition of phenomenology: the status of synthetic a priori judgments. Our observations in this section will lead us to claim at the end of the chapter that Wittgenstein's engagement with "phenomenological

problems" can be interpreted as an extended inquiry initiated by phenomenological observations revealing what Husserl desribed as a "transcendental clue" [*transzendentaler Leitfaden*]. This helped to lead Wittgenstein to his mature position, a position which—as we will argue both here and in the following chapter—can be understood in the context of transcendental inquiry, since it is still an inquiry oriented primarily toward *possibility*.

II. a. The Color-Incompatibility Problem arising from the *Tractatus*

The color-incompatibility problem begins with the original and strict conception of logical relations presented in the *Tractatus*. In that work, as we saw in chapter two, the relation of language to reality is made possible because of their sharing of logical form. This logical form is ultimately analyzable to the internal relations of atomistic, logically simple "Objects," whose configuration in "internal relation" to one another makes up a "State of affairs." For Wittgenstein, the central logical role given in the *Tractatus* to the Elementary (or "atomic") propositions which represent States of affairs remained unchanged in "Some Remarks on Logical Form"272 :

> If we try to analyze any given propositions we shall find in general that they are logical sums, products or other truth functions of simpler propositions. But our analysis, if carried far enough, must come to the point where it reaches propositional forms which are not themselves composed of simpler propositional forms. We must eventually reach the ultimate connection of the terms, the immediate connexion which cannot be broken without destroying the propositional form as such. The propositions which represent this ultimate connexion of terms I call, after B. Russell, atomic propositions. They, then, are the kernels of every proposition, *they* contain the material, and all the rest is only a development of this material. (SRLF 162- 163)

Now, since the Elementary propositions of the *Tractatus* express States of affairs which are arrangements of Objects, their function is ultimately dependent upon the logical function of those

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272 As we noted in chapter two, this 1929 text is generally considered to be the final written text of Wittgenstein's which adheres (for the most part) to the views of the *Tractatus*. It was published in *The Aristotelian Society Supplement*, and was intended for presentation at the meeting of the Society. Prior to the meeting, however, Wittgenstein seems to have abandoned the views expressed in the paper, and to have read instead—revealingly, if our interpretation in this chapter is correct—a paper on the concept of infinity in mathematics (see Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*, 272- 273).

Objects, which Wittgenstein calls the "substance" of the world (TLP 2.021- 2.024, discussed above in chapter two, section III. a.). But this substance "can only determine a form and not any material properties. For these are first presented by the propositions—first formed by the configuration of the objects" (TLP 2.0231). This led us to note that Wittgenstein's analysis of Objects can only account for the *form* of the proposition, but not its material content, or, as he would himself would note in the 1930 *Philosophical Remarks*, "What I once called 'objects', simples, were simply what I could refer to without running the risk of their possible non-existence; i.e. that for which there is neither existence nor non-existence, and that means: what we can speak about *no matter what may be the case*" (PR §35). Since a given State of affairs consists of nothing more than a particular *formal* arrangement of such Objects, the Elementary proposition which refers to that State of affairs is itself ultimately an expression of *form*; *Sinn* in the sense of meaning *content*, although it is represented *through* Propositions, is according to the *Tractatus* not a direct result of the arrangements of objects; the logical *form* of the proposition is guaranteed by the arrangement of Objects, but the *Sinn* of the proposition must arise independently of the (Tractarian) world. This gave rise to our question as to the seemingly unexplained "origin" of material properties at the level of elementary propositions and ("atomic") states of affairs, which we suggested Wittgenstein ultimately "solved" by his appeal to the mystical.[273]

The color-incompatibility problem arises when this claim regarding the formal side of propositional meaning is combined with the *Tractatus'* insistence upon the the bi-polarity of the proposition. As we have seen, it is essential to the Tractarian account of logic that every significant (i.e., non-tautologous) elementary proposition have a sense *independent of its truth value*: it must always be the case that an elementary proposition expresses a possibility that *can* be true or *can* be false. It is only at a higher level of the Tractarian schema that the *application* of the proposition to the world (to reality) will determine its truth and falsity, and this contingent

273 See chapter two, section III. e.

realm cannot logically play a role in determining the sense which precedes it. This lead Wittgenstein to insist upon the strict non-interdependence of States of affairs, for, as he notes in the 1929 discussions with Waismann and Schlick in Vienna,

> At that time [the *Tractatus* period] I thought that *all inference* is based on tautological form. At that time I had not seen that an inference can also have the form: This man is 2m tall, therefore he is not 3m tall. This is connected with the fact that I believed that elementary propositions must be independent of one another, that you could not infer the non-existence of one state of affairs from the existence of another.274

The height example, like that of color-incompatibility, shows that the *Tractatus'* strict conception of logical form can only allow for tautological necessity and for the contingency of what happens to be the case in the World of Facts, and which therefore, according to the non-interdependence requirement of the *Tractatus*, cannot affect any other possible or actual States of affairs. There is no room in the *Tractatus* for anything "in between" a priori tautology and a posteriori contingency. Since these two categories can be seen, respectively, as versions of Kant's analytic a priori judgments (made possible by non-significant logical propositions, or tautologies) and synthetic a posteriori judgments (contingent statements of facts in reference to particular States of affairs which happen to be the case), as many commentators have noted, the objection of color-incompatibility in effect raises a version of the Kantian question of the synthetic a priori.

II. b. Color-Incompatibility and the Synthetic A Priori

By mid-1929, Wittgenstein had realized that, despite his confident pronouncements about the "logic of color space" in the *Tractatus* (TLP 6.3751), there was no way to account for incompatibilities—such as those that arise in the case of color or in the above example of height—which are not *formal* logical contradictions in the strict Tractarian sense, but also not a posteriori in the Tractarian sense of propositions whose invalidity is derived from the comparison of their sense with the contingent realm of Facts, of what happens to be the case. If Elementary propositions are still held to have *Sinn* independent of their truth value in the contingent World of

274 *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle,* 63; in reference to TLP 2.062, 4.211, 5.1314–5.135

Facts, and thus, presumably, a priori, there would seem to be a fatal error in the Tractarian schema: for, according to the *Tractatus,* a proposition such as "This place in the visual field at the present moment is not blue" is *not* logically derivable from "this place in the visual field at the present moment is red," since nothing in the formal content of the latter proposition about red entails not-blue. This was the very "mystery of negation" referred to in the early discussion of the method of projection in the *Notebooks* as discussed in our previous chapter: how can we say how things *are not*, if every proposition is only the description of a (possible) situation?[275] If according to the tautological logic of the *Tractatus*, not-blue cannot be inferred from red, how do we arrive at the proposition "This place in the visual field at the present moment is not blue"?

Though not a tautological necessity, the incompatibility of red and blue does not seem to be a mere contingency either; it has a logical weight and necessity markedly different from that of even the most highly probable empirical generalizations, and thus it does not seem correct to assert that the logical inconsistency is inferred from contingent facts *a posteriori;* this would be to put the cart before the horse, and would represent for Wittgenstein both a relapse into psychologism and a violation of the doctrine of the non-interdependence of States of affairs.[276] Our reasoning in such cases seems to be a priori (i.e., non-contingent), but not strictly analytic. Cases like height and color incompatibility depend upon a *material* content that is not merely formal or tautologous, but also not a posteriori in the usual sense of being dependent upon contingent empirical facts. In this light, it seems that, despite the exceptional novelty of the logical schema presented in the *Tractatus*, it ultimately falls back on the very equivocation which Kant had long called into question: the exclusive association of the a priori with the analytic, and the a posteriori with the synthetic.[277]

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275 See chapter three, section III. b.

276 Especially since, as we noted in our discussion of psychologism in chapter two, Wittgenstein's criteria for inclusion in the a priori logical realm was so strong and formalist, that even the theory of knowledge was banished from it, and considered merely as the "philosophy of psychology."

277 Cf. Ciuni, "The Color Exclusion Problem and 'Synthetic A Priori' Propositions," 128. The first mention of the problem is generally attributed to Ramsey's 1923 review of the *Tractatus* in *Mind,* although

Although Kant did not express his notion of the synthetic a priori primarily in terms of a logic of tautology, the first *Critique*'s conception of analyticity can be interpreted in just this way, and indeed was so interpreted in Wittgenstein's day by Frege. According to Frege's discussion of analyticity in the introduction to the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (a text with which we know Wittgenstein to have been familiar[278]), the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgment concerns

> not the content of the judgment but rather the justification for making the judgment. […] this is not a judgment about the conditions, psychological, physiological, and physical, which have made it possible to form the content of the proposition in our consciousness; nor is it a judgment about the way in which some other man has come, perhaps erroneously, to believe it [to be] true; rather it is a judgment about the ultimate ground upon which rests the justification for holding it to be true.[279]

Since the "ultimate ground" for the justification of the judgment is to be found neither in the specific content of that judgment nor in the conditions of its formation, but in the original grounds for its truth, the question of its analytic or synthetic nature must be asked without reference to the *specific* epistemological conditions through which the *specific* content of the judgment is known, and with reference to that content only insofar as it relates to the justification for making the judgment.[280] For Frege, the analyticity of the judgment is a formal matter for logic alone, free of all considerations as to the empirical data which help to determine its content, and the way in which its truth might be regarded by others. The analysis thus leads us to conclude whether the judgment is analytic or synthetic by

> following it right back to the primitive truths. If, in carrying out this process, we come only on general logical laws and on definitions, then the truth is analytic, whereby it is presumed that we must take account also of all propositions upon which the admissibility of any of the definitions depends. If, however, it is impossible to give the proof without

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Wittgenstein may have become aware of it earlier either on his own or during his periodic discussions with Ramsey in Austria in the 1920s.

278 Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*, 32- 33; 162-63; and *passim*.

279 Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, 3, my interpolation.

280 The accuracy of Frege's interpretation of the analytic with regard to Kant's first *Critique* has been questioned (Cf. Garver, *This Complicated Form of Life*, 31- 35 for a discussion of this interpretation specifically with regard to Wittgenstein). As our interest is not an exegesis of Kant's doctrine or of Frege's interpretation of it, but only the influence of the analytic-synthetic distinction derived from it, we cite the passage merely as an attempt to explicate the distinction as it would have been known to Wittgenstein and his contemporaries.

> making use of truths that are not of a general logical nature, but belong to the sphere of some special science, then the proposition is a synthetic one.[281]

In the case of color-incompatibility, a problem arises in the Tractarian account which is not analytic, on these terms, since it is not a result of the general logical laws or of tautological definitions, but also not a posteriori, insofar as it is not a matter of the epistemological content of that which is being judged but of the material, logical content of the concepts involved in the judgment. An answer to the color-incompatibility problem would seem to need an appeal to some "special science" in order to account for its primitive truth, and thus would be, on Frege's definition, synthetic. The obvious place to turn in accounting for any such "special science," especially given the dominance of neo-Kantianism in Germanophone philosophy in the early twentieth century (including its influence on Frege himself), was some version of the Kantian synthetic a priori.

II. c. Schlick's Critique of Phenomenology and the Synthetic A Priori

In addition to the neo-Kantians, the other major philosophical school in German philosophy at this time which embraced a version of this approach was Husserlian phenomenology. We know that Wittgenstein was aware of (though not necessarily intimately familiar with) phenomenology[282] at least since the time of his recorded conversations with Moritz Schlick and Friedrich Waismann in Vienna beginning in 1928.[283] At that time, Schlick was known to be highly critical of Husserl, and would eventually publish several important articles criticizing the phenomenological claim to a material a priori and the *Wesensschau* from a logical positivist

281 Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, 4, translation modified (" Es kommt nun darauf an, den Beweis zu finden und ihn bis auf die Urwahrheiten zurückzuverfolgen. Stösst man auf diesem Wege nur auf die allgemeinen logischen Gesetze und auf Definitionen, so hat man eine analytische Wahrheit, wobei vorausgesetzt wird, dass auch die Sätze mit in Betracht gezogen werden, auf denen etwa die Zulässigkeit einer Definition beruht. Wenn es aber nicht möglich ist, den Beweis zu führen, ohne Wahrheiten zu benutzen, welche nicht allgemein logischer Natur sind, sondern sich auf ein besonderes Wissensgebiet beziehen, so ist der Satz ein synthetischer" (*Grundlagen der Arithmetik*, 4).).

282 For an overview of the positions and literature regarding Wittgenstein's historical relation to and knowledge of phenomenology, see Thompson, *Wittgenstein on Phenomenology and Experience*, 59ff.

283 Notes of these conversations were recorded by Waismann and appear as part I of *Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis/ Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle.*

perspective. A brief excursus into Schlick's critique of Husserlian phenomenology will help to situate the issue historically, and to show by contrast the very different position taken by Wittgenstein in his "phenomenological" period.

In Schlick's view, the validity of Husserlian phenomenology rests upon the claim that the propositions of the phenomenologist are *direct statements* of synthetic a priori judgments,[284] and for him this claim can only be understood as a return to the metaphysical excesses of a post-Kantian "subjective idealism":

> A philosopher who believed in the existence of a material *a priori* and wanted to clarify its possibility, would have left to him, so far as I can see, no other way out than to carry over the Kantian theory from the form of cognition to its content: he would have to assume, that not only the form of our cognition, but also its material, stems from the knowing consciousness—for only in this way could a priori pronouncements about it be made comprehensible. This would be a subjective idealism of the Fichtean type; one would find oneself involved in a venturesome and outlandish [*abenteuerlich*] metaphysics.285

For Schlick, admitting the existence of a material a priori amounts to admitting to the "outlandish" position of the subjective origin of propositional content, because it amounts to a rejection of the only potentially legitimate source (*per impossible* from the logical positivist perspective) for synthetic content: as Schlick notes explicitly, "The empiricism which I represent believes itself to be clear on the point that, as a matter of principle, all propositions are either synthetic *a posteriori* or tautologous; synthetic *a priori* propositions seem to it to be a logical impossibility."[286] For Schlick then, there are only two possibilities: the analytic a priori, and the synthetic a posteriori. Although we now know the Vienna Circle's interpretation of the *Tractatus* to have been repudiated by Wittgenstein himself, we can ignore that issue here, and note only that

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284 Waismann*, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, 66. See also Schlick's essay-length critique of Husserl in "Is there a Factual A Priori?"

285 Schlick, "Is there a Factual A Priori?," translation modified ("Ein Philosoph, der an die Existenz eines materialen Apriori glaubte und seine Möglichkeit erklären möchte, hätte übrigens, so viel ich sehe, keinen anderen Ausweg als eine Übertragung der Kant'schen Theorie von der Form der Erkenntnis auf deren Inhalt: Er müßte annehmen, daß nicht nur die Form unserer Erkenntnisse, sondern auch ihr Material aus dem erkennenden Bewußtsein stamme—denn nur so könnten apriorische Aussagen darüber verständlich gemacht werden. Das wäre ein subjektiver Idealismus nach Art des Fichteschen, man sähe sich in eine abenteuerliche Metaphysik verstrickt." ("Gibt es ein materiales Apriori?," 24).

286 Schlick, "Is there a Factual A Priori?" 281.

on this particular point Schlick adheres quite strictly to the letter of the Tractarian position even as Wittgenstein understood it. Since on this view the a priori is exclusively reserved for the analytic and formal- logical (which is, according to Schlick, now to be referred to as the "region of tautology"[287]), and everything synthetic must be non-formal-logical, the only thing that could be meant by a "material" or "synthetic" *a priori* would be a claim to the effect that the thought of the subject provides not only the *form* of the intuition but also the specific material intuited; this in effect would be a version of Wittgenstein's "Schaupenhauerian" appeal to the mystical by way of the "metaphysical subject" in the *Tractatus* (TLP 5.641), the part of the book which logical positivists such as Schlick and Rudolf Carnap largely ignored.[288] Such a position is also in many ways reminiscent of the theory of meaning in the first version of the *Logical Investigations*, with its problematic notion of meaning originating exclusively from the side of the a priori ideal. But, as we suggested in chapter two, Husserl altered his view in the second edition in order to address just such issues. As we have shown, his later *transcendental* phenomenology is clearly not susceptible to the accusation of being "a subjective idealism of the Fichtean type," since it locates the material a priori by means of a *correlational* account, and thus does not conceive of the content as arising exclusively from the subjective (noetic) side of the act.

In his critique of Husserl, however, Schlick does not reject the ascription of *a priori* status to "phenomenological propositions," but rather rejects the claim that such propositions could be seen as *synthetic*: "our 'materially' *a priori* propositions are in truth of a *purely conceptual nature*, their validity is a logical validity, they have a tautological, formal character."[289] Instead of admitting a realm of synthetic a priori knowledge, Schlick simply reasserts the claim that *any a priori knowledge whatsoever* must already be somehow implied in

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287 Schlick, "Is there a Factual A Priori?" 280.

288 As Carnap would later write, "when we were reading Wittgenstein's book in the [Vienna] Circle, I had erroneously believed that his attitude toward metaphysics was similar to ours. I had not paid sufficient attention to the statements in his book about the mystical, because his feelings and thoughts in this area were too divergent from mine." (Carnap, qtd. in Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: the Duty of Genius*, 243). Cf. also Janik and Toulmin, *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, 24, 214- 220.

289 Schlick, "Is there a Factual A Priori?" 284, my emphasis.

the full analysis of the terms or concepts involved. But this suggests a clear departure from the *Tractatus*' conception of the non-interdependence of States of affairs and of the purely tautologous nature of the logical, since it commits Schlick to claiming, for example, that not-blueness is somehow *tautologically* implied in the concept of redness, which is clearly *not* an example of tautology in the strict sense of the *Tractatus* and which would imply that the existence of one state of affairs was dependent upon another.

This stretching of the notion of the analytic or tautological forces one to include in the definition of the concepts involved in the judgment content that is not normally considered to be analytically or tautologically included. In terms of Frege's definition of the analytic/ synthetic distinction cited above, Schlick is claiming that "the justification for making the judgment" is a matter of "general logical laws" and "definitions," as opposed to "truths that are not of a general logical nature." Although Schlick is not making the simplistic claim that "not-blue belongs to the *definition* of "red," he is suggesting that cases like color incompatibility exhibit a set of a priori "general logical laws" which hold for a given set of concepts, or as he also puts it, echoing the language of the *Tractatus,* "it belongs to the logical grammar of color words that a word of this kind designates a specific property only on condition that I cannot designate this same property by means of a different color word."[290]

In order to dismiss the phenomenological conception of the *synthetic* a priori, Schlick has radically expanded the scope of the *analytic* a priori from the *Tractatus*' strict account of logical objects in internal relation (providing only logical form) to the much broader realm of the a priori *conceptual* as such, allowing him to claim that so-called phenomenological propositions "say nothing about existence, or about the nature of anything, but rather only exhibit *the content of our concepts*, that is, the mode and manner in which we use the words of our language. Given the meanings of the words, they are *a priori*, but purely formal-tautological. As indeed are all other *a*

290 Schlick, "Is there a Factual A Priori?" 285.

priori propositions."[291] With this account in place, we can now present Wittgenstein's views on phenomenology in this period in contrast to those of Schlick.

II. d. Wittgenstein's Remarks on Husserlian Phenomenology

In direct response to a question from Schlick[292] asking about synthetic a priori judgments as conceived in phenomenology, Wittgenstein responds by discussing the status of synthetic *propositions*. According to Wittgenstein, when I make the statement "an object is not red and green at the same time," this is not merely a report upon my not yet having seen such an object. Rather, when I make this statement, "what I mean is, 'I *cannot* see such an object,' 'Red and green *cannot* be in the same place.'" In such a case, Wittgenstein notes, "the word 'can' is obviously a grammatical (logical) concept, not a material one."[293] Wittgenstein then asks what happens if we take the claim "an object cannot be both red and green" as a *synthetic* judgment but still take the "cannot" to mean logical impossibility. In this situation, "Since a proposition is the negation of its negation, there must also exist the proposition 'An object can be red and green.' This proposition would also be synthetic. As a synthetic proposition it has sense, and this means that the state of things represented by it *can obtain*. If 'cannot' means *logical* impossibility, we therefore reach the consequence that the impossible *is* possible."[294]

There are two important things to note in this response. Firstly, what has been titled Wittgenstein's "Anti-Husserl"[295] argument is not so much a new argument as a reiteration of the Tractarian position: there cannot be a synthetic a priori because everything which is a priori is

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291 Schlick, "Is there a Factual A Priori?" 285, my emphasis.

292 As recorded by Waismann at the time of their first set of coversations in Vienna in December and January, 1929-30, Schlick's question was, "What answer can one give to a philosopher who beieves that the statements of phenomenology are synthetic *a priori* judgements?" *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle,* 67.

293 Waismann*, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, 67.

294 Waismann*, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, 67- 68.

295 This heading as it appears in Waismann's record of these conversations in *Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis* is not Wittgenstein's or Schlick's; it was given to this section by Waismann in his preparations for the publication of the volume. While it is clear from later in the passage that Wittgenstein has Husserl in mind, the negative connotation of Schlick's heading is not a pronounced element in Wittgenstein's recorded remarks, as we suggest in our own gloss on the passage below.

logical, and being logical entails being tautologous. In its adherence to the assimilation of the a priori realm with the analytic/tautological, Wittgenstein's position does not differ from Schlick's as discussed above.

However (and this is the second point of interest), directly following this claim, in the last paragraph of the remark as recorded by Waismann, Wittgenstein's conclusion should give us pause in assimilating his position to that of Schlick. Wittgenstein says, "here there remained only one way out for Husserl—to assert that there was a third possibility. To that I would rejoin [*erwidern*] that one can of course devise words, but I myself can think nothing that falls under them."[296] Husserl's "third possibility" must, according to Wittgenstein's prior remarks, be either a notion of the synthetic a priori, or a notion of a third type of possibility which was neither logical possibility nor a posteriori possibility. But in either case, Wittgenstein's explicitly-announced "rejoinder" is *not* that this notion of a third possibility is incorrect; he notes only that he "cannot associate a thought" with such words. From the standpoint of his own recent rejection of the notion of a phenomenological language, we can understand why Wittgenstein would make such an initially puzzling claim.

Having himself recently come to the conclusion that a "primary" language of direct experience was not possible (or at least not necessary) for the analysis of meaning, and yet that any such analysis must proceed not by a priori investigations but by way of an inquiry which is "in a certain sense a posteriori," Wittgenstein sees the notion of synthetic a priori propositions as wanting to have it both ways; wanting to assert the existence of a set of explicit "rules of projection" which are not tautological, and yet at the same time a priori, and thus not derived from empirical evidence. From his standpoint, this would amount to the claim that there are sets of a priori rules which are presented to us in a primary phenomenological *language*, which is just

296 Waismann*, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, 68, translation modified ("Hier blieb Husserl nur der Ausweg, daß er erklärt, es gäbe noch eine dritte Möglichkeit. Darauf würde ich erwidern: Worte kann man ja erfinden; aber ich kann mir darunter nichts denken" (Wittgenstein, *Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis*, 68).).

the position he himself had recently come to reject. Thus, in response to Schlick's question, Wittgenstein admits—quite honestly—that "one can of course devise words, but I myself can think nothing that falls under them."[297] In other words, Wittgenstein must be to some degree sympathetic to the Husserlian project as presented by Schlick, for it is in some respects not very different from the sort of account he himself had been recently considering. Wittgenstein's response to Schlick thus admits the allure of an account like Husserl's—he too had been drawn to the sort of thing gestured at by such words—but also immediately draws attention to the fact that he had come to the hard-won conclusion that linguistic description of such a "third possibility" was simply not possible; that the notion of a phenomenological language was misleading, and that he thus simply could not conceive of something expressible by phenomenological propositions. But in this light, Wittgenstein's response looks much less like an outright rejection of the Husserlian notion of synthetic a priori judgments than a rejection of there being a language or a propositional system in which such immediate phenomenological intuitions can be described or *thought*.

For, in giving up on the earlier mystical conception of *Sinne* projected into the world by means of the proposition, Wittgenstein also gave up the notion of a realm of the thinkable outside of language (which we claimed in chapter two, against the majority of commentators, *is* to be found in the account of meaning in the *Tractatus*[298]). Because of this, his subsequent rejection of the notion of phenomenological language becomes simultaneously a rejection of the possibility of phenomenology *tout court*, since he can no longer conceive of experience as a realm open to analysis at a level below our everyday language: once the notion of a primary phenomenological language has been abandoned, there is for Wittgenstein no primary *logos* of phenomena outside of our ordinary linguistic practice.[299] But this does not signal a rejection of the notion of

297 Waismann*, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, 68.
298 See chapter two, section III. f.
299 As we shall see more fully in the following chapter (section III. a.), this is what Jaakko Hintikka and Martin Kusch have discussed as the "language as universal medium" view, as opposed to the view of

immediate experience *as such*, as we shall argue below, for Wittgenstein has retained the insight that meaning analysis must take account of direct experience, and can no more proceed merely by means of an analysis of propositions and priori logical form than it can through the observation of contingent empirical Facts.

The turn away from phenomenological language further reinforces Wittgenstein's gradual replacement of the calculus-like notion of logical form with the more amorphous notion of grammar, and signals a recognition that logic might not be the all-encompassing discipline for the analysis of meaning in its varied forms in everyday experience. As Garver notes,

> As Wittgenstein came to appreciate the wide range of uses of language, he came to see philosophy as concerned not only with other uses of language, but also with other dimensions of predications than the logical dimension. […] Differences of these sorts cannot be symbolized in formal logic, nor can such logic illuminate the meaning of sentences used in this manner. It is not that the logic is not sharp enough, nor that the examples show that it must yield some of its rigor. Logic stays just as sharp and just as rigorous. The point is that the rigor of formal logic is relevant only within certain language-games, and that the identification of those language-games and their differentiation from others is a matter of a wider discipline than logic itself.[300]

This widening of the scope of inquiry beyond the Tractarian notion of logical form has tremendous consequences for Wittgenstein's developing conception of meaning. For it suggests that the field of inquiry can no longer be limited to the Tractarian world of Facts, but must include further elements of experience that were previously assumed to be entirely covered by the empirical sciences and thus excluded by the "crystalline purity" of the Tractarian account. The door is thus open for other elements of human life to play a role in Wittgenstein's thought, and the presupposition of a *single* paradigm of analysis via logical form and language has been stripped away. This is presaged in the claim in "Some Remarks on Logical Form" that "we can only arrive at a correct analysis by, what might be called, the logical investigation of the phenomena themselves, *i.e.*, in a certain sense *a posteriori*." Although Wittgenstein eventually rejected the notion of a phenomenological language, he gained from that engagement a phenomenological

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"language as calculus," which, according to Kusch, applies, among others, to Husserl.

300 Garver, "Philosophy as Grammar," 147.

insight into the nature of epistemological inquiry that he would keep through his very last writings: the need to distinguish the field of scientific empirical inquiry from that of lived experience.

II. e. The Empirical and the Experiential

In another discussion recorded by Waismann in late December, 1929, Wittgenstein explicitly contrasts the empirical observations of physics with the subject matter of phenomenology: "physics does not yield a description of the structure of phenomenological states of affairs. In phenomenology it is always a matter of possibility, i.e., of sense [*Sinn*], not of truth and falsity."[301] Wittgenstein now recognizes that experience cannot be directly assimilated to the a posteriori realm of *empirical facts;* we must distinguish the scientific-empirical realm of the verification of concepts from the realm of the verification of direct experience. This admittance of different systems of verification shows that physics and phenomenology represent more than just two different disciplines with the same basic subject matter. In an addendum to an earlier comment regarding color, added by Waismann a few days after the remark on physics and phenomenology, Wittgenstein explicitly announces that he was in error in a previous claim; he notes that he now believes that there can be *entirely different systems of verification*, citing the difference between counting the number of strokes on a surface as opposed to simply "seeing" the number. I can of course count the difference between one hundred strokes and one hundred one strokes, but I cannot necessarily *see* this difference directly without counting them. There is thus a contrast between the visual system and the system of counting, and thus two different types of verification.[302]

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301 Waismann*, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, 63.

302 The example involves a simple series of strokes, first one, then two together, then three, and so forth. Wittgenstein notes, "If I can see 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 strokes and seen strokes have the same syntax as counted ones, hen I must be able to *see* any number of strokes. This, however, is not the case. I can, to be sure, distinguish 2 strokes from 3 *by looking at them*, but not 100 strokes from 101. Here there are two different verifications, one by looking, the other by counting. One system has a different multiplicity

Now, if we take this notion of verificational difference alongside the distinction between physics and phenomenology noted above, it seems that Wittgenstein has replaced the Tractarian conception of the mystical as *transcendent* element, that which provided the possible sense for all propositions independently of the contingent world, with the phenomenological field of the *transcendental*, as that which, *within* the world of experience, is determinant of meaning possibility, but which can still be contrasted with the old Tractarian world of the actual Facts, just as the visual system can be contrasted with the counting system, even though they are concerned with the same objects of inquiry and thus the same perceptual reality. Wittgenstein's explicit linking of phenomenology to *possible* sense thus suggests that phenomenology—as distinguished from the empirical observation of the physicist—yields knowledge about the necessary preconditions for experience that are themselves part of experience, and not merely derived from it via induction from the empirical "facts." Unlike Schlick, Wittgenstein will not call this phenomenological realm a priori, because he recognizes that it cannot be accounted for merely by extending the scope of the tautological or analytic, since it is responsible not only for the logical *form* of reality, but also for its *possible sense*.

Nonetheless, though we can demonstrate that the experiential is separable from the empirical in reflection, and though we can see that it is the experiential realm which provides the ultimate framework of possibility for meanings, Wittgenstein does not think that we can derive some "total set of possibilities" from experience directly, since meaning is only recognizable in *actual* cases, and through the medium of language. Thus he notes in the 1930 *Philosophical Remarks*,

> If someone says, only the *present experience* has reality, then the word 'present' must be redundant here, as the word 'I' is in other contexts. For it cannot mean *present* as opposed to past and future. —Something else must be meant by the word, something that isn't *in* a space, but is itself a space. That is to say, not something bordering on something else (from which it could therefore be limited off). And so, something language cannot legitimately set in relief. (PR §54)

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from the other. The visual system says: *1, 2, 3, 4, 5, many*." (Waismann, *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, 66-67).

Wittgenstein's thought in the early 1930s, and especially in the *Philosophical Remarks,* has become intimately concerned with the nature of the spatial and the temporal in a way that his earlier thought, with its exclusively a priori focus, was not. We saw the beginnings of this shift away from an a priori focus in the previous chapter in our discussion of the 1929 "Remarks on Logical Form," and we now see a further distancing from the Tractarian position in the above-noted distinction between the empirical (that which is "in a space" in the quote above) and what he calls the phenomenological or experiential (that which "is itself a space"). This distinction shows that Wittgenstein is concerned to contrast the immediacy of our experience with the mediate forms of talking and theorizing about it; to remind us of the difference between that which is immediately lived-through and that which is measured, analyzed, or otherwise conceptually mediated and represented.

II. f. The Ineffability of Immediate Experience

In a way that clearly echoes Tractarian distinctions, the distinction between the experiential and the empirical for Wittgenstein is a distinction between the conceptual and that which, as pre-conceptual, is present and necessary, but thereby also beyond all possibility of explanation: "immediate experience cannot contain any contradiction. If it is beyond all speaking and contradicting, then the demand for an explanation cannot arise either" (PR §74). But on this account that which is necessary will for this very reason fail the criterion of truth bi-polarity: that which cannot contain contradiction cannot contain tautology either, and thus, like the logical propositions of the *Tractatus*, immediate experience *as such* simply cannot be expressed. "What belongs to the essence of the world cannot be expressed by language. For this reason, it [language] cannot *say* that everything flows. Language can only say those things which we can imagine otherwise. That everything flows must be expressed in the application of language... It is the application which makes the rod with marks on it into a measuring rod: putting language up

against reality" (PR §54). Just as he claimed, in the *Tractatus,* that *Sinn* is not *itself* an element in the world of Facts, but is shown in Facts and expressed via Propositions, while the totality of its possibilities is never *directly* representable, so now the living present of experience becomes for Wittgenstein the field of meaning-possibility which is not itself representable. Just as the *application* of logic was the intentional relation through which *Sinn* was related to the world in the *Tractatus,* in the *Remarks* the application of language marks the distinction between the meaningful—but ultimately inexpressible—immediate present in which we live and the temporally-extended realm in which meanings can be expressed.

In one of the most striking passages of the *Remarks*, Wittgenstein attempts to illustrate this relation between the experiential present and the temporal-empirical in terms of the projected image of a film on the cinema screen as distinguished from the frames of the projectionist's film strip:

> If I compare the facts of immediate experience with the pictures on the screen and the facts of physics with pictures in the film strip, on the film strip there is a present picture and past and future pictures. But on the screen, there is only the present. What is characteristic about this image is that in using it I regard the future as preformed.
> There's a point in saying future events are pre-formed if it belongs to the *essence* of time that it does not break off. For then we can say: something will happen, it's only that I don't know what. And in the world of physics we can say that. (PR §51)

Wittgenstein used this image of film and film strip repeatedly when discussing the relationship between experience and the world, and the connotations are rich for grasping his basic views on the topic. From the standpoint of the projectionist, who sees behind the film lamp not only the present moment but also the frames before and after, the "world" of the film strip is temporally ordered; it progresses, and it has a center, the present, as distinguished from—but also *by*—the future and the past. For the audience who only sees the moving image on the screen, by contrast, there is only the immediate present, and it is not defined directly in relation to a co-present representation of a past or a future. Now, as Wittgenstein notes, the image of the film strip implies that, in a certain sense, not only does the past influence the present, but the *future* is also "preformed." But it is preformed only from the perspective of the projectionist, who sees the

broader temporal order and thereby recognizes the frames which have already been projected and also those *yet to be projected*.

In suggesting that the facts of physics are like the film strip, Wittgenstein is suggesting that theorizing, which takes place by way of symbols and language, is a temporal and historical process, and, more importantly, its field of reference is therefore a temporal world. This explains why Wittgenstein considers immediate experience to be *necessarily* unexplainable, since any explanation would unfold in time and thus fail to capture the immediate present—the moving image on the screen—in its unmediated presence. Since there is no "living present" for Wittgenstein, as there is for Husserl—no phenomenological notion of a temporary duration of the now-moment, such that syntheses and thus identities of immediate experience are possible[303]—it makes no sense on his conception to attribute linguistic meaning to immediate experience.

II. g. The Temporality of Experience

A slightly later use of the projection simile from Wittgenstein's "middle period" illustrates his concern with the temporal nature of experience and meaning in this period. In a series of remarks published in *Philosophical Grammar*, probably dating from 1936, Wittgenstein explicitly repudiates his earlier conception of logical analysis: "Formerly, I myself spoke of a 'complete analysis', and I used to believe that philosophy had to give a definitive dissection of propositions so as to set out clearly all their connections and remove all possibilities of misunderstanding. I spoke as if there was a calculus in which such a dissection would be possible... At the root of all this there was a false and idealized picture of the use of language" (PG, 211). Further down in the remark, Wittgenstein links this self-criticism explicitly to his earlier doctrine of picturing, and, while not outrightly rejecting this notion, shows the way in which he has come to rethink it with regard to reality and experience:

303 For a definitive examination of this concept and its role in Husserl's thought, see Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart*.

> What gives us the idea that there is a kind of agreement between thought and reality? - Instead of 'agreement' here one might say with a clear conscience 'pictorial character'. But is this pictorial character an agreement? In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* I said something like: it is agreement of form. But that is an error... One wants to say that an order is the picture of the action which was carried out on the order; but also, a picture of the action which *is to be* carried out as an order. (PG, 212)

The Tractarian conception of picturing as an isomorphism between thought and reality guaranteed by a fixed logical form mentions but does not fully take account of role of *projection*, the fact that propositions must be written or uttered; that the rules of logic must be *applied*. When we recognize this necessary attribute of the relation between thought and reality, we can no longer consider the picturing relation one-sidedly as an a priori doctrine unrelated to its method of application. To illustrate this, Wittgenstein continues with yet another projection metaphor, this time in the form of a builder's blueprint which "*serves as a picture* of the object which the workman is to make from it." In this case, Wittgenstein notes, the way in which the worker turns the drawing into an artefact can be considered the "method of projection" which "mediates between the drawing and the object" and, which, echoing and modifying the language of TLP 2.1511,[304] "reaches from the drawing to the artefact." But in this case,

> we are comparing the method of projection with projection lines which go from one figure to another. -But if the method of projection is a bridge, it is a bridge which isn't built until the application is made. -This comparison conceals the fact that the picture *plus* the projection lines leaves open various methods of application; it makes it look as if what is depicted, even if it does not exist in fact, is determined by the picture and the projection lines in an ethereal manner; every bit as determined, that is to say, as if it did exist. (PG, 213)

This version of the "method of projection," in which all of the work seems to be done prior to the application of the picture in projection—"as if what is depicted, even if it does not exist in fact, is determined by the picture and the projection lines in an ethereal manner"—is the mystical Tractarian conception Wittgenstein has come to reject. We cannot fully anticipate the projection of meaning into our experiential lives on the basis of its a priori form alone. But characteristically, it is also part of Wittgenstein's point in this and related remarks that this is not

304 "*That* is how a picture is attached to reality. It reaches right out to it."

normally a problem: the fact that we cannot capture the immediacy of phenomenal experience through a fixed register of meanings does not bother us in everyday life, and it does not prevent us from taking the "flow" or flux of appearances as meaningful, just as the audience watching the moving picture does not fail to find meaning in the film just because they cannot undertake a complete analysis of each individual frame as it appears before them in the context of the frames before and after. As Wittgenstein notes in the remark immediately following the film image, "It's strange that in ordinary life we are not troubled by the feeling that the phenomenon is slipping away from us, the constant flux of appearance, but only when we philosophize. This indicates that what is in question here is an idea suggested by a misapplication of our language" (PR §52).

Wittgenstein, far from rejecting the notion of an immediate present of experience, and far from rejecting the phenomenological field of inquiry, instead rejects that there could be anything, aside from the very general (e.g. physics saying that *something* will happen) which could be *said* about it. Any attempt to name and categorize the phenomena *qua phenomena* will be an error of syntax, a "misapplication of our language." But for this very reason, it is also an error to think that an account of propositions and their possible forms can ever exhaustively account for the immense variety of their applications to our immediate experiential life. The "proposition plus mode of projection" model goes a long way towards explaining the relation between thought and reality—indeed, it goes as far as any a priori explanation *could possibly go*—but Wittgenstein no longer considers this relation to be a simple mirroring or agreement: the methods of projection or rules of application that define this relation and that will become the *Investigation*'s myriad "rules" for different language games do not exhaustively characterize the field of application which is our everyday experiential form of life. The relation of propositions to reality by way of rules is now seen to be checked by a sort of *friction,* an open and as yet unconceptualized *Spielraum* of future applications which guarantees that our language games *are not and never can be* entirely circumscribed by rules (PI §68). Wittgenstein thus does not reject the phenomenological *field* of inquiry, but rather the notion that anything could possibly come of the

attempt at further explanation or even description of this domain. For Wittgenstein, the persistent eluding of language is the very mark of immediate experience, and thus, paradoxically, although this is what is at the core of our meaningful life, it is never directly expressible *precisely because* it is *lived*. Although what is meaningful to us is the film as a *flow*, with its constant presence and movement, the analysis and articulation of the meaning of that fleeting present is only possible within the confines of the spatial and temporal division of the frames of the film strip.

In a later section of the 1930 *Remarks*, Wittgenstein reinforces this point in a discussion of the notion of a "preformed future" with regard to propositions. He asks, "how is a proposition of the form 'The red patch *a* lies somewhere between *b* and *c*' to be analysed?" But his response—again mirroring passages the *Tractatus*—is aimed at reminding us of the role of that which is *not* part of the proposition: "This doesn't mean: 'The patch *a* corresponds to one of the infinitely many numbers lying between the numbers of *b* and *c*' (it isn't a question of a disjunction)..." Note the similarity to a passage from the *Tractatus* we examined in the previous chapter: "Not: 'the complex sign 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b,' but rather: *that* 'a' stands in a certain relation to 'b' says *that* aRb'" (TLP 3.1432, my translation[305]). Just as, in the *Tractatus* example, Wittgenstein wished to emphasize that in an important sense the relation is not a *part* of the proposition, but rather that by nature of which the proposition *is* a proposition, so here the red patch is not to be conceived as a specific *entity* "*a*," between the two entities *b* and *c,* but rather as a marker of the *infinity of possibilities* between them; the very openness of possibility which, in the image discussed above, differentiates the moving picture from the framed and preformed future of the image on the film strip. Wittgenstein writes, "It's clear that the infinite possibility of positions of *a* between *b* and *c* isn't expressed in the proposition. Just as, in the case of 'I have locked him in the room', the infinitely many possible positions of the man shut in the room play no role whatever" (PR §147). As in the *Tractatus*, the *Sinn* of the

305 "Nicht: „Das komplexe Zeichen ‚aRb' sagt, dass a in der Beziehung R zu b steht", sondern: Dass „a" in einer gewissen Beziehung zu „b" steht, sagt, dass aRb. Sachlagen kann man beschreiben, nicht benennen. (Namen gleichen Punkten, Sätze Pfeilen, sie haben Sinn.)"

proposition is not simply an object represented by the terms of the proposition, and nor is it to be explained, as Wittgenstein had thought in the late 20s, by the proposition plus its rules of projection. Instead, the *Sinn* must depend on an element not contained in or exhaustively determined by the proposition: the meaningful *relation* that makes the representation of the proposition possible, a relation which, in its absolute immediacy, is not *some thing* which is representable.

III. The Object of Immediate Experience as Transcendental Clue

It might seem at this point that our analysis of Wittgenstein has strayed quite far from its starting point in the problem of color incompatibility and the question of Wittgenstein's relation to phenomenology in the 1930s. But we wish now to suggest that the important changes in Wittgenstein's views which occurred as he worked through his "phenomenological" period, as discussed in the above section, show him to be engaged in a project which shares important insights into the theory of meaning with Husserlian transcendental phenomenology as discussed in the first part of this chapter. These similarities are related to a central question which we suggested at the beginning of this chapter can be understood as the "transcendental" question of meaning. In the final section of this chapter, we shall attempt to elaborate on this claim with reference to the phenomenological dimension of meaning, taking as our paradigm for analysis Husserl's notion of the "transcendental clue."

In his transcendental phenomenology, Husserl refers in several passages to a "guiding insight" or "clue" [*Leitfaden*] which leads the inquirer into the deepest level of transcendental problems, the level of original meaning-constitution. In our everyday experience of an object (and this includes, but is not limited to, a real spatio-temporal object), there is something about that experience which, if our attention is properly focused in the phenomenological and not the natural attitude, points beyond the object as given to its future possibilities of givenness, and in

doing so leads us into engage in transcendental inquiry.[306] In a discussion of the relation of theoretical reason to the material regions, appearing near the end of *Ideas I*, Husserl writes, "What is implied in the fact that the inadequately given *region* 'Thing' prescribes rules for the course of possible intuitions?—and therefore manifestly for the course of possible perceptions? The answer is as follows: to the essence of a thing-noema there belong, as can be seen with absolute clearness, ideal possibilities of '*limitlessness in the development' of agreeing* [einstimmiger] *intuitions*..." (Ideas I, §149, translation slightly modified).

As Husserl's own footnote to the passage makes clear, "limitlessness in the development of agreeing" is a reference to the final argument regarding space in the first *Critique* (first edition307), where Kant notes, "If there were no limitlessness in the development of agreeing, no concept of relations could yield a principle of their infinity."308 Kant emphasizes that, while it must be understood as a priori, the representation of space cannot be understood in terms of the *concept*, and thus, by definition, must be not analytic but synthetic. The same point is more clearly expressed in the second edition:

> Now one must, to be sure, think of every concept as a representation that is contained in an infinite set of different possible representations (as their common mark), which thus contains these under itself; but no concept, as such, can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations within itself. Nevertheless, space is so thought (for all the parts of space, even to infinity, are simultaneous). Therefore the original representation of space is *an a priori intuition, not a concept*.[309]

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306 As we shall see in chapter five, this "beyond" is what Husserl will call the "horizon" of the intentional object, and is further divided in to the "internal" and the "external" horizon (see chapter five, section II. c).

307 The cited phrase is "Grenzenlosigkeit im Fortgange," which appears only in the first edition of the *Critique*. That Husserl is referencing the first edition is also made clear by the fact that the footnote refers to " das 5. Raumargument (A 25)"; for the second edition of the *Critique,* the paragraph previously labeled as the 3rd space argument was deleted, resulting in the renumbering of the subsequent arguments, 4 and 5, as 3 and 4. Thus the argument to which Husserl refers is actually labeled "4" in the second edition and in the English translations.

308 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 25, Kemp Smith translation, modified (Guyer and Wood do not provide a translation of the A edition text of this paragraph). The original reads: "Wäre es nicht die Grenzenlosigkeit im Fortgange der Anschauung, so würde kein Begriff von Verhältnissen ein Principium der Unendlichkeit derselben bei sich führen."

309 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 40, my emphasis.

Now, Husserl's reference to this passage occurs in his own discussion of the general characteristics of the thing-noema, which, as we saw in section I of this chapter, belongs to one of the possible material a priori regions (as opposed to the formal a priori, which unites *all* material regions). Since the context is a general discussion of the relation of the material regions to theoretical reason, we can take Husserl to be making not only a point specifically about the intuition of space in the material region of nature, but also about the character of a priori intuition *in general.* As is made clear in the continuation of this discussion in the following section of *Ideas*, Husserl considers the intentional analysis of an object in the thing-region to reveal a "transcendental clue," in that it leads us to examine the conditions of the possibility of the meaning-object involved in a way which is not exhausted by the formal analysis of the *concepts* involved. It serves as a "transcendental clue" in that it leads us to the recognition that the meaning-object in experience involves something additional: the material a priori intuitions which allow for the "limitlessness in the development of agreeing," i.e., for the fact that there is always the a priori *possibility* of the subsumption of additional cases under a given concept which are not analytically contained *within* the concept.

In the case of the material region of nature, analysis of the thing-noema leads us back to "the problem of the origin of the presentation of space," which for Husserl is ultimately a constitutional problem, since

> ...every genuine intuition has its place in the constitutional nexus. For this reason every intuitive ascertainment, in the attitude of positivity, concerning the sphere of eidetically necessary (axiomatic) fundamentals, serves as preliminary work and is even indispensable a priori. It furnishes the *transcendental clue* for discovery of the *full constitutive concretion, as having both a noetic and a noematic aspect*. (CM, §59/ Hua I, 165, my emphasis)

Thus, the analysis of the thing-noema—of any thing-noema whatsoever—provides the starting point for a transcendental phenomenological inquiry through which "*the law-conforming function of the correlation between the determinate appearing object as unity and the determinately infinite multiplicities of appearances* can be fully seen and so disrobed of all its mysteries" (Ideas

I, §150/ Hua III, 351). This is none other than the transcendental-phenomenological notion of *constitution* theory which we discussed in chapter one,310 clarified in terms of the phenomenological examination of material regions.

To return to Wittgenstein and the color incompatibility problem, this conception of transcendental *possibility* can make sense of the fact that "not blueness" while not *analytically* or *tautologically* implied in the concept of redness for Wittgenstein, can nonetheless be understood to be incompatible with redness in a way not dependent on an inductive principle on the basis of a series of a posteriori facts. The color-incompatibility problem shows that the *Spielraum*, the logical space of possibility represented in the *Tractatus* by the elementary proposition, cannot be explained exclusively in terms of the tautologous or analytic as it was thought to be in that earlier work, because it involves "infinite possibility... not expressed in the proposition" (PR §147), i.e., an infinity of possibilities that, while it can be marked by a name or a variable, is not reducible to any terms contained in the proposition, its rules of application, or *eo ipso* the concept under which each instance occurring within the *Spielraum* in immediate experience will fall.

We can take this further step of arguing that the Spielraum exceeds exhaustive definition by the concept because, where Schlick was content to say that the color incompatibility problem could be solved by treating the incompatibility to be logically implied a priori and *purely conceptually*, Wittgenstein's emphasis on phenomenological *possibility* shows that an analysis via a priori *concepts* will never be enough. On the basis of the changes to Wittgenstein's conception of the proposition and its projection noted above, Schlick's notion of the "logical structure of color"—like Wittgenstein's in the *Tractatus*—appears to ultimately ignore the question of the relation of our concepts to experience. While it can tell us that a color's incompatibility with other colors is implied in this logical, conceptual structure, it cannot tell us anything about the various ways in which color concepts arise in experience; in giving a much-extended analysis of the logic of our concepts, it has left no room for an account of the intentional relation which

310 See chapter one, section IV.

includes an explanation of that to which our concepts can be *applied*, resulting in the internally coherent but ultimately idle conception of mind in isolation from the world which McDowell has dismissed as "coherentism." In assuming that everything which could in the future fall under the concept must be contained analytically within it, Schlick has unwittingly destroyed the notion of the concept and the notion of analyticity along with it. What is a concept if there is nothing further to which it is applied? From the logical positivist perspective, such "friction" is to be guaranteed by the empirical world of the natural sciences, known in terms of a set of basic "empirical propositions."[311] But, as our above discussion of Wittgenstein's position in the 1930s has shown, such an account can only explain the way in which concepts have *already been applied*, and in this respect, it at once presupposes and claims to reject the open field of possibilities which is our immediate—not natural-scientific—experience of the world: the phenomenological dimension of meaning.

For, from Wittgenstein's perspective as we have explicated it here, and which we think shares certain fundamental similarities with those of Husserl and Kant on this point, there must be something *in addition* to the concept in the realm of immediate experience, which allows for the application of the finite concept to infinite cases. This is part of Kant's point in the argument for the non-conceptuality of space in his Transcendental Aesthetic, when he notes that "no concept, as such, can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations within itself." For Kant and Wittgenstein, as for Husserl, the infinite possibilities for the further application of the concept—the infinite set of possible future meanings—is not a fixed and exhaustively definable set: it is open-ended despite it's being to some degree "pre-formed" by the concept as determined by the logic of propositions. Like the frames of the film strip considered in isolation from the time-flow of the film, the concept may give us the rough outlines of future possibility, but we must not confuse this with a set of specific "pre-formed" contents already contained within it. For the future cases which will fall under the concept, while *formally* definable, cannot be listed

311 Cf. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic,* 9- 10.

or predetermined in their logical *materiality*; they are rather that part of experience which is, transcendentally considered, not merely non-conceptual, but *pre*-conceptual; the flow of immediate experience which allows the infinite possibility of the subsumption of intuitions under concepts.

This, then, is the problem which shows the need for a transcendental-phenomenological element in the theory of meaning: the need to account for the irreducible givenness not of the content of our actually meaningful concepts, but of the infinite possibility of their fulfillment in the flux of time and experience. As Wittgenstein notes in the *Remarks,* propositions in reference to future possibilities "appear to describe a *structure amorphously*. We can sketch out a structure in accordance with these propositions, which they describe unambiguously. But where can we discover this structure *in them*?" (PR §147, my emphasis[312]). With these considerations in mind, we can see that the color-incompatibility problem with which we began our discussion of Wittgenstein in this chapter[313] functions as a "transcendental clue"; as an invitation to the intentional analysis of conscious experience which leads to the recognition that the future extension of a given meaning is neither strictly determinable through straightforwardly empirical inquiry, nor analytically reducible to the concepts involved in the judgments about it, but ultimately *transcendental*, in so far as it involves accounting for the infinite possible cases falling under the concept, but not tautologically implied *in* the concept itself.

This same basic insight is incorporated into Husserl's transcendental theory of meaning. For while the noematic core contains the specific logical material constant between a number of instances of a meaning, the fact that there is *more* to the noema, that it includes other elements not reducible to its conceptual definition, and that it is indeed these *other* elements which differentiate

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312 Although Wittgenstein's remark is made in reference to set-theoretic statements in mathematics, We believe our reading of the claim to extend to possibilities of *experience* is justified by the end of the preceding remark, which is concerned with just this issue, and by the apparent allusion to Kant later in the section ("The things themselves are perhaps the four basic colors, space, time and other data of the same sort"). For the latter claim in relation to Kant, Cf. Stern, *Wittgenstein on Mind and Language*, 132.

313 See sections II. a and II. b, above.

the individual experience from the generality of its meaning-essence, suggests that Husserl, too, was intent on maintaining a rigorous logic of meaning and experience without reducing the immediacy of experiences to mere instances of the logical content of the concept.

For our purposes in this dissertation, the crucial *difference* between Wittgenstein and Husserl on this point—and the central topic of our final chapter—is the way in which this field of immediate, non-conceptual experience is to be understood in relation to language. Husserl's theory of "types" allows him to develop an account of a pre-predicative level of experience: a logic of the lifeworld. Wittgenstein's limitation of the conceptual field via language games assures that immediate experience remains a non-conceptual, but also thereby non-*representable* transcendental level: the endpoint of analysis, where our "spade is turned" against the bedrock certainties of our lived but unspoken "form of life."

Chapter Five: *Lebenswelt* and *Lebensform*: Two Accounts of Meaning and Experience

In this final chapter, we show how the problematic we have been tracing throughout this dissertation—that of the relation of meaning to lived experience and of the role of language in that relation—culminates in the later thought of Husserl and Wittgenstein in the notions of the "lifeworld" and "form of life." We have been careful throughout the previous chapters to treat the developments in their respective thought along this axis *in parallel,* but we have never claimed a strong *identity* between their ways of thought. In this chapter, we focus more specifically on what we see to be the most fundamental *difference* between their conceptions of meaning in relation to experience: the role of language. Their divergent understandings of the role of language vis-a-vis meaning are intimately tied to radically different conceptions of the analysis of meaning and of the role of philosophical method more generally. Despite these differences, however, we argue throughout this chapter that both author's later conceptions of meaning manifest crucial phenomenological and transcendental insights. On the basis of these insights, we will argue that despite their differences, both arrive at final conceptions of meaning that make room for and crucially depend upon nonconceptual and pre-linguistic aspects of experience. To answer our fundamental questions and prove the central thesis of this dissertation, we need not choose one author's conception as superior: *Lebensform and Lebenswelt* are *both* terms marking the phenomenological dimension of meaning.

§I. Wittgenstein on Meaning, Language, and the Form of Life

I. a. The Relation of Meaning to Immediate Experience in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy

In this section, we will suggest some ways in which a transcendental and phenomenological reading can shed new light on Wittgenstein's later thought regarding the relation of meaning to language, especially with regard to his post-*Investigations* manuscripts.[314] As should now be

314 We thus eschew the general trend in the literature of focusing primarily on Wittgenstein's

apparent, we take the phenomenological approach, properly understood, to involve a form of transcendental inquiry, more specifically, what we referred to at the end of chapter four as Husserl's notion of following a "transcendental clue." As we suggested in our introductory chapter, however, according to one very common story in the scholarship, Wittgenstein moved away from a distinct early position which considered logic transcendentally, as a condition for the possibility of meaning and as somehow mirroring the world, toward a late position which would deny in principle all transcendental claims as an example of the wrongheaded attempt to step beyond the limits of our language. In this section our primary goal will be to argue that a closer examination of the remarks in posthumously published texts such as *On Certainty,* the *Last Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, and the *Remarks on Color*, when seen in light of broader phenomenological concerns about meaning which we have argued Wittgenstein shares, suggest reasons to question such a view, even if—as is almost always the case with Wittgenstein—his own version of the transcendental position is anything but a standard one.

Unlike the Tractarian account of meaning, oriented toward a priori *formal* possibilities and, according to Wittgenstein's own later assessment in the *Investigations*, "not meant to concern itself whether what actually happens is this or that" (PI §89), meaning in the later work is considered in its relation to everyday practice, understood primarily in terms of *use* and *experience*. The *Investigations* insist, "it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up,—to see that we must stick to the subjects of our everyday thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties, which in turn we are after all quite unable to describe with the means at our disposal" (PI §106). In this late work, Wittgenstein suggests an account of meaning oriented toward the observation of our actual linguistic usage, but does so in a way that resists totalizing or universalizing claims. Thus, in the well-known passage from *Investigations*

Investigations in discussing his later work in favor of a focus on the writings subsequent to it, which remained unpublished in Wittgenstein's lifetime. Although these writings are continuous with the *Investigations* in fundamental ways, the different emphasis of these later works makes them even more relevant for the broader purpose of our present inquiry.

where he writes, “For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (PI §43), Wittgenstein does not give a universal *definition* or *theory* of meaning by equating it with linguistic usage, but only indicates to the reader an important but *general* shift in the orientation of his thinking.

Instead of beginning from “extreme subtleties,” Wittgenstein now insists that we must begin with our everyday experiences and practices, with how we *use* meaning in everyday expressions and situations. We need not describe—or even assume that we could describe—the extreme subtleties that underlie such practices, because everything directly relevant for our use of language is already there on the surface of linguistic discourse. Whereas Wittgenstein's reflections on language in the *Tractatus* were characterized by a focus on abstract and a priori *logical concern*s—ones we characterized as indebted to a Kantian conception of Transcendental Logic[315]—in the *Investigations* he turns away from this kind of reflection and toward everyday usage and practice: “don't think, but look!”(PI §66). In this sense, the *Investigations* represent the culmination in Wittgenstein's thought of the shift we have been tracing in this dissertation from the early organizing concept of fixed “logical form” grounded in immutable a priori structures to the later, more flexible and context-dependent conception of “grammar” “grounded” (in a very loose sense, as we shall see below) upon the multifarious practices of our everyday “form of life” (*Lebensform*). We have suggested in the previous two chapters how this shift was influenced by certain phenomenological concerns about meaning as evidenced in writings from the early to mid-1930s. In the present chapter we shall see how these concerns remain, albeit alongside a rejection of phenomenology as fixed *theory*, in the very late works completed subsequently to most of the main text of the *Philosophical Investigations*.[316]

But because of the anti-universalizing and anti-theoretical tendencies of Wittgenstein's

315 See chapter two, section III, *passim*.
316 For more on this chronology, see the editor's introductions to OC and PI.

later work, the turn to the everyday—like the turn to meaning-as-use—must *not* be understood as an outright renouncement of all other accounts or all other forms of inquiry. To say that we cannot *describe* the extreme subtleties underlying our practice does not necessarily signal a rejection of them, but only a rejection of the project of describing them *directly* with the means at our disposal, i.e., our everyday language. Indeed despite the prevalence of passages seemingly opposed to "depth inquiries" in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein's subsequent unpublished writing devotes a great deal of attention and energy to the question of such underlying "subtleties," even if he remains careful to avoid the claim that we have any direct access to them.

As we read it, the *post-Investigations* work is marked by a reexamination of the role of a transcendental level in the structure of meaning, this time in light of a different, more diversified conception of language and—importantly—the focus on the immediacy of everyday experience begun already in the 1930s. As we saw in chapter two, in the *Tractatus* meaning received its *form* from atomic, transcendental-logical "objects," the existence of which was not directly accessible to experience, and its *material content* from propositions referring to Facts obtaining in the world. This strict distinction between a priori form and a posteriori content was shown to unravel in Wittgenstein's middle period, resulting in the shift from logical form to grammar as the main orienting concept for the theory of meaning. In these late writings, the form-content distinction has been blurred even further, and both aspects of meaning are conceived with reference to the interrelated activities of our form of life, and ultimately, as we shall see below, to the "certainties" about our experienced world that our language games reflect and presuppose. We argue that these certainties should be considered to play a transcendental role in Wittgenstein's account of meaning, as conditions for the *possibility* of a meaningful world, and thus mark the place reserved for the phenomenological dimension of meaning in Wittgenstein's late work. In his very last writings, Wittgenstein considers such "lived" certainties to be at the very core of our "form of life."

I. b. The Transcendental Account of Meaning, Language, and the Experiential in *On Certainty*

In the passages of his final manuscripts concerned with knowledge and certainty, the relationship of the phenomenological dimension of immediate experience to linguistic meaning is conceived in terms of a *general structure* which neither views meaning and experience as simple parallel entities, the "outer" linguistic vs. the "inner" or "mental" experiential, nor reduces meaningfulness to linguistic usage. As Jacques Bouveresse puts it, "what goes on and what matters cannot be reduced to the simple utterance of words. But it is wrong to think that the only way of imagining the other thing or the necessary complement is through the picture of an inner process accompanying the utterance of words. Once this model is adopted, it becomes virtually impossible to be attentive to what really goes on and to describe it correctly."[317] We do indeed constantly give expression to what we have experienced in language in the form of writing and utterances, but this does not mean that what was thereby experienced was already a predicative form of meaning or knowledge. To consider it as such is, for Wittgenstein, to misunderstand the relationship of expression to experience: "People... have always learned from *experience*; and we can see from their *actions* that they believe certain things definitely, whether they express this belief or not" (OC §284).

Now, it is important to note here that such an account does not amount to dodging the real question; to naive talk about experience in ignorance of Kantian categorial insights or some sort of return to Sellars' "myth of the given." This would indeed be the case if Wittgenstein were considering experience as the *direct* vehicle for linguistic meaning, or as simply a mental or "inner" level parallel to the linguistic and properly meaningful one. But when we consider the remarks on the relation of experience to language in the late works, and the more complex, temporally mediated account of the ascription of meaning as an intention in this period, we see

317 Bouveresse, "Wittgenstein on Experiencing Meaning" 93.

that the notion of a *direct* relation between immediate experience and language is precisely what is rejected. For the later Wittgenstein, the relation of experience to propositional meaning is not a matter of the "translation" of individual *empirical* components to be put together as a propositional whole in a linguistic register; although it involves irreducible aspects of *experiential immediacy* as the condition for the possibility of any meaning whatsoever, a condition which, as we saw in the previous chapter, precludes the direct ascription of specific meaning content to immediate experience. Far from rejecting Kant's Copernican insight, then, it signals a recognition of the fact that, as William Brenner has put it, "the solution to the problem [of the correspondence of language to reality] would have to be a broadly 'Kantian' one, in that the 'correspondence' in question would be transcendental rather than empirical – that is, not itself the sort of correspondence with reality that makes true thoughts true but rather the *prior* relationship to reality that makes true or false thoughts possible."[318]

In the late remarks posthumously assembled and published as *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein makes clear that this correspondence is something which makes knowledge possible, but which itself has no neatly enumerable content: "Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off, I believe not.—For otherwise the expression 'I know' gets misused. And through this misuse a peculiar and extremely important mental state *seems* to be revealed" (OC §6, translation modified, my emphasis). The mistaken assumption of a direct, content-providing relation between our immediate experience and our linguistic expression of it in knowledge claims leads to the mistaken idea that there are distinct "mental states" of knowing which accompany our utterances and to which our words refer. For Wittgenstein, the pervasive meaningfulness on the basis of which linguistic meaning is possible is not something describable "straight off" [*ohne weiteres*], although this is a point we only recognize upon reflection and in the form of linguistic assertions about our immediate experiences, the very assertions which Wittgenstein accuses

318 Brenner, "Wittgenstein's 'Kantian Solution'," 122.

Moore of *mistakenly* describing as instances of *knowing.*[319] Wittgenstein maintains that the "objects" of Moore's knowledge claims about the external world are not fixed *objects to be known;* in recognizing them we recognize no *thing,* but rather a fundamental aspect of our *relation* to the world, something about the logical structure of our experience, namely, the way in which it presupposes *certainty: "*The primitive form of the language game is certainty, not uncertainty. For uncertainty could never lead to action. I want to say: it is characteristic of our language that the foundation on which it grows consists in steady forms of life, regular doings" (PO 397). Such doings, the steady certainty characteristic of our experience, is not a matter of empirical facts to be verified by scientific observation, but an underlying characteristic of our activity, our *doing*, our form of life.

What is at issue in passages from *On Certainty* such as that cited above is thus not so much "empirical propositions" (Anscombe's now-standard English translation for Wittgenstein's *Erfahrungssätze*) in the sense of verifiable reports upon empirical scientific observation a la Schlick and Ayer, but linguistically expressible certainties in relation to everyday human experience that are nonetheless not simply direct reports on the content of experience: "*My life* shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on..." (OC §7, my emphasis). Such certainties are a part of our form of life, and this allows them to serve as a sort of justification or final "ground" (this latter understood with certain qualifications, to which we will turn below) for linguistic meaning and thereby knowledge claims.

Indeed, Wittgenstein explicitly notes that the ultimate justification for a knowledge claim cannot be provided by yet another knowledge claim: *"It needs to be shown that no mistake was possible.* Giving the assurance "I know" doesn't suffice. For it is after all only an assurance that I can't be making a mistake, and it needs to be *objectively* established that I am not making a mistake about *that*" (OC §15). While we may be able to engage in the language game of justifications for quite a while, supporting our knowledge claims by yet other knowledge claims,

319 Cf. Moore, "Proof of an External World" 173.

we cannot do so indefinitely: the game is neither independent of other circumstances nor self-supporting. At the end of our chain of justifications—however long it may be—we will be left with the bare fact of our practice and our activity in everyday life: "If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do'" (PI §217).

What makes knowledge possible is not itself a type of knowledge, and *this* is not an empirical claim, despite the fact that when we attempt to capture this insight, we often refer to the very same objects treated by the empirical scientist. The insight here is a transcendental and *logical* one, *based on* experience but not equivalent to the objects which that experience presents (in the sense of *Vorstellung*); a distinction Kant notes (in a slightly different context) already in the first *Critique*: "the difference between the transcendental and the empirical therefore belongs only to the critique of cognitions and *does not concern their relation to their object*."[320]

We can only *describe* certainties by putting them in propositional form. But when we do so we tend to problematically assimilate the experiential, transcendental point to an empirical, naturalistic one—a tendency reflected, at least to our ear, in the published English translation of *Erfahrungssätze* as "empirical propositions"—when what is really at issue is not something registered through third-person empirical observation, not something which can be judged true *or* false, but our own, first-person *doing*: "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence comes to an end;—but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of *seeing* on our part; it is our *acting*, which lies at the bottom of the language-game" (OC, §204).

The interpretation offered here is thus directly at odds with "behaviorist" readings of the later Wittgenstein: if we recognize this "acting" as a paradigm of experience (*Erfahrung* or, less often for Wittgenstein, *Erlebnis*) and not of empirical observation (*Empirie*), it no longer makes sense to claim that Wittgenstein's turn to activity and the form of life is a call to engage in third-

320 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* A56-57/B80-81.

person scientific behavioral observation or naturalistic explanation. The framework of certainties underlying one's form of life is not *itself* something about which we ask questions of justification or truth value, but *not* because it is not "real" or not a part of experience; rather because it is *so intimately* a part of my own everyday experience that it is never subject to doubt. Certainties make up the basic and *immediate* system of activities and everyday practices upon which all my language games, including doubting, must be based. This system is so basic and immediate to our daily lives that, except when we are doing philosophy, we scarcely even notice it; it goes unremarked and does not trouble us. Thus, "One might say, '"I know" expresses *comfortable* certainty, not certainty that is still struggling.' Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as (a) form of life. […] But that means I want to consider it as something that lies *beyond being justified or unjustified*; as it were [*also gleichsam*], as something animal" (OC, §§357- 359, translation modified, my emphasis).

As Joachim Schulte notes in his own gloss of this passage in relation to language games and form(s) of life, "This 'as it were something animal' ... should however not lead us to think—or at least not only to think—of the biological or natural-historical." Rather, "that which 'lies beyond being justified or unjustified' is instinct in the sense of that which is fundamental, but ungrounded, since its role is to support our reason-giving."[321] The condition of "comfortable certainty" is not considered knowledge by Wittgenstein, but something prior –something which ultimately *supports* [*stützt*] our system of reasons. Such immediate certainty cannot itself be further justified, however, since if I could be wrong about it in ordinary circumstances, I could no longer trust my experience at all, and my entire system of knowledge would collapse: "in order to make a mistake, a man must *already* judge in conformity with mankind" (OC, §156, my emphasis); "if you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The

321 Schulte, "Die Hinnahme Von Sprachspielen und Lebensformen," 163, my translation ("Dieses 'gleichsam Animalische' der beruhigten Sicherheit im Flussbett unserer Lebensform sollte uns aber nicht—oder zumindest nicht nur—an Biologisches oder Naturgeschichtliches denken lassen. […] Was 'jenseits von berechtigt und unberechtigt liegt' ist der Instinkt im Sinne des Fundamentalen, aber Unbegründeten, weil es seinerseits unsere Begründungen stützt.").

game of doubting itself presupposes certainty" (OC §115). Although I am of course capable of asserting "I knew all along that you were so-and-so," to a friend in the middle of our conversation (OC §464), my assertion would take the form of a proposition—a knowledge claim within a specific language game—whereas the importance behind the claim was not simply a matter of its public linguistic content, but of the structure of immediate experience that, at a fundamental, "instinctual" level, makes language games as such, and thus meaning content, logically possible.[322] In this sense, Wittgenstein later conception of meaning seems much closer to Husserl, in its focus on meaning in relation to *acts*, than to the Fregean conception of meaning analysis which gives explanatory priority to propositional *content.*

And if this is right, it cannot be correct to interpret the later Wittgenstein's *Erfahrungssätze* as propositional reports on some set of third-person observational, empirical *facts* awaiting discovery simply *by means of* our experience. As the conditions of possibility which *support* our system of meanings, the actions and immediate experiences of our form of life are "beyond being justified or unjustified," despite our tendency, like Moore, to consider these most fundamental aspects of our experience on the same level as empirical facts in need of further justification in some language game or another.

> Certain occurrences would put me into a position in which I could not go on with the old language game any further. In which I was torn away from the *sureness* of the game. Yes, is it not obvious that the possibility of a language-game is conditioned by certain facts? In that case it would seem as if the language-game must '*show*' the facts that make it possible. (But that's not how it is.) Then can one say that only a certain regularity in occurrences makes induction possible? The 'possible' would of course have to be '*logically possible*'. (OC §§617-618)

That which makes language games and thus propositional meaning possible for Wittgenstein cannot be a fact; a fact, as a propositional claim with truth value, can only be determined insofar as it has a specific meaning-content to be verified, and we have argued that for Wittgenstein the underlying certainties of our form of life have no such propositional content, since they do not function as direct vehicles for meaning-content but only as conditions for the possibility of

322 Cf. Moyal-Sharrock, *Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty,* 65- 68.

meaning in the constant flow of our form of life.

The "transcendental" level in Wittgenstein's later thought is thus not a foundationalist epistemological bedrock in the traditional sense, because it does not consist of representable material content or facts. As Schulte puts it, "The foundations he speaks of are human actions –a much more mobile and changeable medium than that envisaged by the standard foundational model."[323] The medium is "foundational" only insofar as it is a formally-defined condition of possibility for linguistic meaning. It does not represent, for Wittgenstein, a fundament of primordial *meanings*. At the heart of Wittgenstein's various descriptions of our foundational "practices," "reactions" and "certainties" lies an implicit but necessarily vague conception of lived experience, of our *form of life*.

Wittgenstein's strict limiting of meaning content to language games is based upon the insight that that which makes language games possible is—properly considered—neither propositional nor factual, although when we express this in a sentence we inevitably draw attention to a proposition which then appears to us to represent a certain fact. But the grounding, transcendental character of that experience remains logically distinct, and unassimilated to the reports we make about it, and in this sense Wittgenstein's account echoes Kant's insistence that "the difference between the transcendental and the empirical therefore belongs only to the critique of cognitions and *does not concern their relation to their object*."[324] For Wittgenstein as for Kant, transcendental inquiry is not concerned with a distinct transcendent field of objects, separate from the everyday ones, just as Husserl's noema are not to be considered entities existing independently of their objects.[325] For both our authors, the phenomenological dimension of meaning does not consist of "proto-facts," similar to empirical ones but underlying them. It results from a difference in theoretical viewpoint arrived at by means of "transcendental clues."

Wittgenstein's conception of certainty is thus ultimately based upon the phenomenological

323 Schulte, "Within a System," 66- 67, my emphasis.
324 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* A56-57/B80-81.
325 See chapter four, section I. c.

recognition of the structural correlation of our pre-predicative practices as immediately experienced. Though certainty is transcendentally necessary for meaning, specific meaning content extends no deeper than language for Wittgenstein, and thus at the level of the "bedrock," of the form of life which underlies our language games, there is *quite literally* nothing left to be questioned. We are apt to confuse observations regarding experience with "straightforward" scientific-empirical reports of facts, but *On Certainty* seeks to remind us that what lies at the heart of our experiential lives is not just language and meaning-content, but action and experience; that what ultimately makes life meaningful is not reducible to the propositional meanings which express it. Much like Husserl's conception of the lifeworld (to which we will turn below), Wittgenstein's conception of "form of life" marks the theoretical endpoint of his transcendental-phenomenological inquiry into the constitution of meaning.

I. c. Do We *Experience* Meaning?

Thus whereas for Husserl the intentional relation was characterized *directly* in terms of meaning intentions (the essences which are fulfilled by the experience or frustrated by it, as the case may be[326]), for Wittgenstein the intentionality of experience is related to linguistic meaning only *indirectly*, as a necessary but not sufficient condition of its possibility. As we saw in the previous chapter in our discussion of the image of the film and the film strip, immediate experience is for Wittgenstein necessarily instantaneous and non-linguistic, and the notion that there is some potentially-representable content there which is "slipping away from us" is merely "an idea suggested by a misapplication of our language."[327]

But, importantly, this does not stop Wittgenstein from suggesting in his later work that there is a way in which what Husserl would call "meaning intention" can be attributed *retrospectively* to experiences in which we engage in linguistic practices, as long as we do not take this to mean

326 See chapter two, section II. c.
327 See chapter four, section II. f.

that there was "something additional" accompanying our words at the moment they were spoken, written, heard, etc. This is illustrative of the way Wittgenstein conceives the relation between the meaningfulness of our experience and linguistic meanings, as we see in the following discussion of the attribution of meaning intention subsequent to utterance and the retrospective attribution of knowledge to oneself in dreams:

> The experience of the 'word that hits the mark'. Is this the same as the experience of 'meaning'?
> "Why in a dream do we call *this* 'knowing'?"—We don't call anything 'knowing' in a dream; rather we say "In my dream I knew..."
> Why do we call this "meaning" and "signifying" if it is not a question of meaning and signifying?—What do I call 'meaning' (or 'signifying') in this game: I *say* "By that word I just now meant...".
> But what am I calling that?—An experience? And what experience?
> For can I describe it otherwise than just by the expression: I 'mean' this word in *this* way? (LPP I §62- 63)

According to Wittgenstein, we do not call anything which occurs in a dream—during the act of dreaming—'knowing,' and yet, there is nothing wrong with referring to the content of the dream *post factum* in terms of knowledge. Similarly, Wittgenstein is suggesting, while it does not make sense to think of some separate entity, "*the* meaning," which is the mental accompaniment to my utterance of words, it is perfectly coherent to report *post factum* that a certain interpretation was or was not what I in fact *meant*. That *report* remains an expression of meaning-intention *in language*, and not an assertion of a psychological or mental entity, *the* meaning-intention *accompanying* language in the original expression. Again and again in the later work, Wittgenstein fights against the idea that there need be some additional "mental content" "accompanying" our acts of meaning; meaning always occurs in the context of language games, which themselves presuppose the meaningful activity of our form of life. But it is wrong to conceive of this meaningfulness as *some thing, added to* our linguistic meaning.[328] As Bouveresse puts it in his gloss on the dream analogy, "reference to the past is not illegitimate; it is the attempt to see it as referring to a specific *experience* supposed to have occurred in the past

328 Cf. Stroud, "Mind, Meaning, and Pratice," 296ff.

that is [illegitimate]."[329]

But this is not the same as claiming that Wittgenstein rejects there *having been* any such previous experience: what is illegitimate is the attempt to *refer* to the experience, not the *existence* of the experience as such. Wittgenstein clearly recognizes the role of immediate experience as the original locus of *meaningfulness*, but because of its temporal immediacy, because in experience "everything flows," he separates the meaningfulness of the reality of experiential life sharply from the linguistic meanings by which we express and measure it: "That everything flows must be expressed in the *application* of language... putting language up against reality" (PR §54, my emphasis). On the one hand, the meaningfulness of immediate experience must be distinguished from word meaning, since for Wittgenstein we have no "phenomenological language" with which to describe the fleetingness of the now.[330] On the other hand, however, Wittgenstein insists that there are not two distinct entities involved in linguistic meaning: there is not the meaning on one side, and the "experience of meaning" on the other. Although experience is *meaningful*, we do not experience *meaning*.

The claim is not as paradoxical as it may at first sound. When I walk outside and it is raining, I do not experience the proposition "It is raining." We do not *experience* propositions. We talk, write, and theorize about them. For the later Wittgenstein, meanings are analyzed at the level of facts and propositions—in the realm of language—despite their ultimate dependence upon activities of our lived experience. The fact that we use language in giving an account of a given situation, and that upon reflection we can see that this has usually already given some categorial structure to our experience, does not change the status of the most primary aspect of that experience. At the same time, for Wittgenstein, that experience is not itself in the realm of conceptual meaning, because it is not in the realm of language. Our immediate experience—the

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329 Bouveresse, "Wittgenstein on 'Experiencing Meaning'," 87- 88, my emphasis.

330 And also, as we noted previously, no conception of the "living present" (see chapter four, end of section II. f).

phenomenological dimension—is meaningful, indeed it is the "foundation" of the meanings that structure our life by way of our language, but we do not experience meaning, just as we do not *experience* propositions. As above, the distinction here is based on the structure of experience *as activity* and not on its represented content. The concern is not semantic but *phenomenological*.

I. d. Phenomenology and the A Priori in the *Remarks on Color*

As we suggested in chapter four, although we cannot say for certain that Wittgenstein was aware of the specifics of phenomenological *theory,* he was concerned with basically phenomenological *problems*. In another set of his very last writings, those posthumously published as *Remarks on Color*, Wittgenstein is highly critical of the "science" or "theory" of phenomenology, but continues, as in the 1930s, to consider its domain of inquiry to constitute a legitimate set of problems. As he puts it, with characteristic brevity, "There is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems" (RC I. §53).[331] In this section we shall briefly show how Wittgenstein's *Remarks on Color,* dating from 1950- 51, address the same issues characteristic of his supposedly brief flirtations with phenomenology in the early 1930s. This will give further support to our claim that Wittgenstein's conception of the form of life and its relation to language and meaning by means of underlying certainties is not only transcendental in character, but relies upon a conception of the specifically *phenomenological* dimension of meaning.

In a characteristic passage from the first section of the *Remarks on Color*, Wittgenstein writes,

> Opaqueness is not a *property* of the white colour. Any more than transparency is a property of the green. And it does not suffice to say, the word "white" is used only for the appearance of surfaces. It could be that we had two words for "green": one for green surfaces, the other for green transparent objects. The question would remain why there

331 This sentence occurs twice in Wittgenstain's *Nachlass*: once as a question (MS 173, p. 75v) and once in this form as a statement (MS 176, p. 13r), further suggesting Wittgenstein's continued interest in and hesitation about the issue.

> existed no colour word corresponding to the word "white" for something transparent. (RC I. §§45- 46)

The phenomenological character of the question at issue is obvious: Wittgenstein is concerned to describe what seems to be a certain incongruency in our understanding of the appearance of color. While he does not claim to be seeking an *explanation* of color, in describing the phenomena of the appearances of different colors, he notes that the descriptive schema we would normally give remains incomplete. If we attempt to explain the relationship between whiteness and opacity merely in terms of a correlation of word use, we are left with a further incongruency, and one that it does *not* seem can be dissolved by further appeal to language. In such cases, the logic of color concepts points to the sort of "extreme subtleties" that the *Investigations* insisted "we are after all quite unable to describe with the means at our disposal" (PI, 106). In the language of the *Tractatus*, the problem of the logic of color points "underneath" the surface of our everyday linguistic use.

Taking up the contours of our Kantian reading of Wittgenstein from chapter four, we can see that, to say that opaqueness and transparency are not *properties* of colors is to admit that they are not analytically implied in the color concepts; in the analysis of color concepts, opaqueness and transparency do not appear among the necessary definiens, and are thus not "tautologically" implied in the concepts. But, as was the case with the original color incompatibility problem in the *Tractatus*, the above-noted distinction regarding color concepts is also not simply an a posteriori empirical observation: it is not *merely* the result of our never having happened to see an example of transparent white. The problem is not just that we have never *seen* such a thing, but that we cannot even *imagine* it. It thus seems to represent a sort of *logical* impossibility: "*Why* can't we imagine transparent-white glass,—even if there isn't any in actuality? Where does the analogy with transparent coloured glass go wrong?" (RC I §31). This example, like those from the 1930s discussed in the previous chapter, shows that the questions raised by issues such as color-incompatibility are considered to be legitimate phenomenological *problems* in

Wittgenstein's eyes, and not mere confusions resulting from the misunderstanding of language.

But to claim that there is a single *theory*—an all-encompassing *phenomenology of color*—through which *all* such problems could be solved, would be for Wittgenstein a step in the direction of reasserting the formal, tautological purity of the logical espoused in the *Tractatus*—the very idea that led him to the color-incompatibility problem in the first place—and would go against the *Investigations*' characteristic rejection of universalizing and eternally-valid explanatory truths or theories. Thus the inquiry into the logic of color concepts as Wittgenstein expresses it here is not the conceptual inquiry into the eternal "logical structure" of color advocated by Schlick in presumed fidelity to the *Tractatus*,[332] but a form of logical inquiry as ongoing *practice;* it is something we *do*, and not a once-and-for-all exposition of *the fixed logic* of the appearance—the literal *logos* of the *phenomena*—of color. This latter is what Wittgenstein claims is "unjustly expected of a theory."

For despite our recognition of the impossibility of transparent-white glass, Wittgenstein contends that we have no further grounds on which to justify this observation theoretically, in terms of "the" phenomenology of color concepts. As he immediately notes in the following remark,

> Sentences are often used on the borderline between logic and empiricism [*Empirie*], so that their meaning changes back and forth and they count now as expressions of norms, now as expressions of experience [*Erfahrung*]. (For it is certainly not an accompanying mental phenomenon—this is how we imagine 'thoughts' [*so stellt man sich den 'Gedanken' vor*]—but the use, which distinguishes the logical proposition from the experiential sentence [*Erfahrungsatz*].) (RC I, §32).

As is characteristic of his later works, Wittgenstein first attempts to deal with the problem of the logical properties of color through the appeal to *use*. As we noted above, instead of resorting to a grand theory of inner states or accompanying "mental phenomena" (and it is not unreasonable to take the scare quotes around "Gedanke" to be an allusion to the contents of Frege's "third realm"), Wittgenstein in his last writings maintains the *Investigations*' insistence on the "humble" use of

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332 See chapter four, section II. c.

language in the context of everyday forms of life. But as we noted above, Wittgenstein's famous appeal to "meaning as use" in the late work is not a hard-and-fast rule, but an *observation* or *description* which applies "for a *large* class of cases—though not for all" (PI §43). In this case, the problem regarding our color words cannot be dissolved by mere appeal to their use.

At the same time, the *Remarks on Colour* explicitly rule out the goal of constructing any kind of universal *theory* for color, and this would include a universal theory of color use: "We do not want to establish a *theory* of colour (neither a physiological one nor a psychological one), but rather the logic of colour concepts. And this accomplishes what people have often *unjustly* expected of a theory" (RC I, §22, my emphasis). Wittgenstein refuses to assume that there must be some fixed theory which underlies the multiplicity of our language games, because, in his later thought, the distinctions *themselves* are open to infinite inquiry. Since there is no "last analysis," such distinctions are ultimately only characterizable in a formal or general way, which allows for their characteristic *fluidity*, as can be seen in both the discussion of the oscillation of the meaning of sentences which "count now as expressions of norms, now as expressions of experience," and in the well-known image of the river and the riverbed from *On Certainty:*

> It might be imagined that some sentences, of the form of experiential sentences [*Erfahrungssätze*], were hardened and functioned as channels for such experiential sentences as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid sentences hardened, and hard ones became fluid. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the riverbed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other. But if someone were to say 'So logic too is a science of experience' he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the same sentence may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing. (OC, §§96, 98, translation modified[333])

This reflects Wittgenstein's insistence, as we suggested at the beginning of this section, that we

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333 "Man könnte sich vorstellen, daß gewisse Sätze von der Form der Erfahrungssätze erstarrt wären und als Leitung für die nicht erstarrten, flüssigen Erfahrungssätze funktionierten; und daß sich dies Verhältnis mit der Zeit änderte, indem flüssige Sätze erstarrten und feste flüssig würden. Die Mythologie kann wieder in Fluß geraten, das Flußbett der Gedanken sich verschieben. Aber ich unterscheide zwischen der Bewegung des Wassers im Flußbett und der Verschiebung dieses; obwohl es eine scharfe Trennung der beiden nicht gibt. Wenn aber Einer sagte "Also ist auch die Logik eine Erfahrungswissenschaft", so hätte er unrecht. Aber dies ist richtig, daß der gleiche Satz einmal als von der Erfahrung zu prüfen, einmal als Regel der Prüfung behandelt werden kann."

cannot take appeal to use and norms as *itself* a theory. In at least *some* cases—and we would include among these the "phenomenological" cases involving color—there are aspects of the "logic of our concepts" which are not *always* to be considered simply the result of patterns of linguistic usage, and these are also cases where a *final* logic could not ever be established *even in principle*. This is characteristic of the attention to fluidity and vagueness found throughout Wittgenstein's later philosophy, that which makes it seem—despite the great overlap in theoretical concerns—so distant from the a priori thought of the *Tractatus*: "is it not difficult to distinguish between the cases in which I cannot and those in which I can *hardly* be mistaken? Is it always clear to which kind a case belongs? I believe not" (OC §673).

But although no definitive theory can be established—not even a phenomenological one—for Wittgenstein it seems to be predominantly the *phenomenologically* problematic cases, the cases where the distinctions between a priori certainty and a posteriori probability are not easily or consistently drawn, that lead him to consider the relation between experience and meaning as ultimately fluid: "Wouldn't one have to say, then, that there is no strong boundary between propositions [*Sätze*] of logic and sentences [*Sätze*] of experience? The lack of sharpness *is* just that [lack of sharpness] of the boundary between *rule* and sentence of experience. Here one must, I believe, remember that the concept of '*Satz'* itself is not a sharp one" (OC §§319- 320, my translation[334]).

Such remarks show the degree to which the "transcendental clue" of color incompatibility lead Wittgenstein first toward the standpoint of traditional phenomenology in the 1930s (as we discussed in chapter four) and then beyond that position in the *Investigations* and subsequent writings. In these later writings, we see phenomenological problems arise again as Wittgenstein attempts to work out distinctions between logic, language and experience without (once again) reifying those distinctions in terms of a fixed transcendental logic. This is accomplished by way

334 "Aber müßte man dann nicht sagen, daß es keine scharfe Grenze gibt zwischen Sätzen der Logik und Erfahrungssätzen? Die Unschärfe ist eben die der Grenze zwischen *Regel* und Erfahrungssatz. Hier muß man, glaube ich, daran denken, daß der Begriff 'Satz' selbst nicht scharf ist."

of appeal to the elusive, quasi-foundational notion of the "form of life," which, in the phenomenological dimension of meaning prior to language, must necessarily remain an *unsharp* concept. We shall return to this important point in the final part of this chapter.

§II Husserl on Non-conceptual Content and the Logical Necessity of the Lifeworld[335]

For Husserl, the path to the phenomenological dimension of meaning culminates in lifeworld phenomenology, where the relation of immediate experience to meaning is fundamentally grounded in the account of pre-predicative "types" which function in a middle position between mere intuition and fully-conceptual knowledge. Husserl's transcendental constitutional theory, completed with the notion of pre-predicative types, allows him to systematically define the role of non-conceptual elements of experience at the level of the lifeworld, which he conceives to extend "below" the level of Kant's inquiries into the structure of experience oriented to the concerns of Newtonian science. In contrast to most contemporary theories of non-conceptual content, Husserl's conception does not reduce the role of the non-conceptual to that of mere "fodder" for subsequent conceptualization. We explicate Husserl's account of non-conceptual content in this section through an interpretation of types functioning in tandem with Husserl's long-held notion of the orientationally-determinant "weight of experience" [*Erfahrungsgewicht*], which we argue function together to help to determine the directionality of the intentional gaze by means of the intentional object's internal and external anticipatory horizons. This anticipatory structure fulfills a directional, orienting role but is not directly determinant of the conceptual content of the intended object. This in turn allows us to explain Husserl's conception of the role of language in the "sedimentation" of past meaning structures as an aid to the conceptual determination—but never exhaustive prescription—of the horizons of future experience: Language plays a necessary

335 A significant portion of the material in this section was first presented in a paper at the *Nachwuchstagung* of the Humboldt conference "Husserl und die klassische deutsche Philosophie," Parma, Italy, 12- 14 March 2012. I am grateful to the participants of that conference for their comments on this material. Some of them are cited specifically in the footnotes in this section.

role in the structure of meaning content while remaining dependent upon the prepredicative meanings of the lifeworld, even as prepredicative meaning is conceived as "prior" to linguistic sedimentation only in terms of reflective abstraction.

II. a. Husserl on Kant's Synthetic A Priori and the Move to the Lifeworld

Husserl's conception of the role of prepredicative and preconceptual experience can be approached through a comparison to Kant and a revisiting of our discussion, from chapter one, of the way Kant's conception of *intuition* has been taken up in contemporary debates about non-conceptual content. We noted in that chapter how one proponent of the non-conceptualist view, Robert Hanna, in considering the origin of non-conceptual content exclusively in terms of the a priori forms of time and space, seems to rule out the possibility that what is determinate of the specific non-conceptual character of a given perception might be something other than the "representational" character of the intuition derived from the empirical object and its spatiotemporal environs. We are now in a position to explain this—from a Husserlian perspective—as a result of the fact that Kant's own account of judgment begins "too high," in its concern primarily for the grounding of the natural sciences, and thus misses the phenomenological dimension of meaning—the lifeworld—which for Husserl underlies all *real* sciences.

As Husserl began to work out the details of his own account of the constitution of meaning in his later genetic phenomenology, he began to see his own project as a form of *expansion* of the Kantian conception of the Transcendental Analytic. If an account of the presentational origin of meanings in space and time as the a priori forms of intuition is explanatory only at the level of the Kantian inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of Newtonian science, Husserl, who is concerned not only with the apodictic grounding of *natural scientific* inquiry but with the wider project of grounding meaning and knowledge *as such*, proposes a radical rethinking of the character of the field of intuition. Even if we accept that

space and time are the a priori *forms* of intuition, we have said nothing about how the content appearing through those forms helps to determine *meaning content.* Since Husserl has re-conceived Kant's synthetic a priori as a material a priori which is not prior to experience but in *excess* of it,[336] his account of the contribution of sensation (*Sinnlichkeit*) is no longer limited to a purely formal description. This is at odds with Kant's account of a priori synthetic judgment since, as Paul Ricouer has pointed out, Kant ultimately founds the ordering of the manifold of intuition on *intellectual objectivity*, on the mechanism we discussed in the first chapter[337] in terms of Kant's conception of *formal intuition*, which, as an *intellectual* activity, is dependent upon the rational employment of concepts in the understanding. *Qua* non-conceptual content prior to objectification, the content of the intuition is a mere raw stuff that can only be *formally* demonstrated; the non-conceptual content of Kant's synthetic a priori does not seem to be much of a *content* at all.

By contrast, in the later Husserl, "founding no longer constitutes elevating to intellectuality, but on the contrary it signifies building up on the basis of the primordial, of the pre-given. [For Husserl,] Hume's genius is precisely that of regressing in this way from signs, symbols, and images to impressions."[338] As we saw in chapter three,[339] while he abhorred Hume's psychologism, Husserl admired his turn to experience and his questioning of the universality of empirical judgments. By combining the Humean turn to experience with the fact-essence distinction and his own notion of the material a priori as an a priori *in experience*, Husserl has carved out a space for elements of experience that are neither full-blown concepts, nor mere sensory fodder for conceptualization.

Thus, as Donn Welton notes, whereas Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic was limited to the

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336 See chapter four, section I. d.
337 See chapter one, section IV.
338 Paul Ricouer, *Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology*, 194. This point of comparison between Husserl and Hume has been extensively discussed by Dieter Lohmar: see his *Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken*, part II.
339 See chapter three, section IV.

a priori forms of space and time, "Husserl flooded that part of Kant's system with a rich account of (non-epistemic) perception as well as a genetic analysis of the interplay not only of spatial and temporal but also what he called associative syntheses."[340] Husserl expanded the field of the Transcendental Aesthetic to include preconceptual or pretheoretical elements which, while not fully conceptual elements of the understanding, are also not merely the forms of intuition or the formless fodder taken up in the manifold, but rather possessive of "a type of perceptual or aesthetic significance that Kant could only think of as 'preconceptual' and therefore, 'precategorial'."[341]

Such an expansion also serves to justify and further elucidate of the Husserlian *Wesensschau*, which, while it operates upon experiences by means of the ongoing process of imaginative variation, is ultimately interested in essences which reveal essential a priori structures. These essential structures are universally valid in a way that conceptual categories derived from an account of possible facts of experience cannot be, since essential laws, while derived from our experience, are given and universally valid in a way that must be distinguished from the contingency of actual (and possible) individual facts. Husserl's account of essences and their intuition in experience thus attempts to guarantee for synthetic judgments a certainty even greater than that ascribed to them by Kant: In Iso Kern's words, "since synthetic judgments mean a priori necessary and universally valid essential laws, they are, according to Husserl, not relativizable to a factical subject, but rather unconditionally valid, even for God." 342

Since according to Husserl, the synthetic *material* a priori has a content, it ultimately leads us to synthetic a priori laws derived via experience but not reducible to the spatiotemporal presentation of that experience, whereas for Kant the apriority of such content entailed a logical independence from everything delivered by intuition, such that the notion of a truly *material* a

340 Welton, *The Other Husserl,* 298.
341 Welton, *The Other Husserl,* 298.
342 Iso Kern, *Husserl und Kant*, 60, my translation ("Weil die synthetischen Urteile a priori notwendige und allgemeingueltige Wesensgesetze bedeuten, sind sie nach Husserl nicht auf ein faktisches Subjekt relativierbar, sondern unbedingt gueltig, auch fuer Gott.").

priori would be for him a contradiction in terms.343 Because of this, the crucial enabling mechanism which allows us to follow the "transcendental clue" and arrive at a *material* a priori cannot be mere blind *sensation*, in the sense of the empirical observation of the ultimately accidental features of our daily experience in order to arrive at inductive generalizations about *factical human consciousness.* For Husserl, only the special mechanism of the *Wesensschau* can ultimately account for the "ideal possibilities of '*limitlessness in the development' of agreeing* intuitions," because only here does the character of *essential* necessity guarantee that there can be no future contradicting evidence.

For while perception of contingent facts is still a necessary condition for the *Wesensschau*, it is by means of the *essences* inherent in them that we intuit the full breadth of the necessary structures of experience. Beginning from perception, we continuously reconsider our conception of the object in the never-ending process of imaginative variation. Although the "essential structures" we seek are not reducible to sense-data or perceptual objects, the *Wesensschau* by which they are revealed is not some mystical process by which the essences are mysteriously called forth on the basis of extra-sensory capacities, but the rather mundane, everyday occurrence whereby we consider possible variations on the actual experiences, aided by the lived experiential quality of the "weight" of previous experience,[344] in order to arrive at a better sense of what is essential to such an experience, as opposed to that which we say—revealingly—we "cannot even imagine."

This is accomplished through the ongoing—and never ending—process of *Rückfragen*, the continuous tracing of the transcendental clue to arrive at the priori material logical laws on the basis of which those concepts and descriptions arise, and which are expressed in them. This analysis of the phenomenological dimension is never completed. It is considered an "ongoing task" because of Husserl's conception of transcendence-in-immanence, the fact that the

343 Kern, *Husserl und Kant*, 57.

344 See our discussion of this notion in the context of the phenomenological reduction in chapter three, section IV.

intentional object *always* exceeds our grasp and is *never* "finally revealed." As Sebastian Luft puts it,

> The meaning within a specific perspective is always unfolding and expanding, and will never be fully revealed. The object will always disclose more aspects that enhance the meaning of the thing in its validity for me. But more experience of the thing does not necessarily continue to enhance the specific noematic sense. It does not have to 'keep going'. The sense can 'explode', can turn out to be non-sense; the validity can be annulled. I may think that I am certain that the object I see every day is a house, until one day I discover that it is a stage prop with no back. This discovery happens through some new experience that bestows new permutations of meaning… In Husserl's words, experience is always only presumptive, is always only for the time being, and always has to affirm itself; the thing experienced has meaning only insofar as it has not been contradicted by new experience, something which is always possible.[345]

Whereas Kant's limiting of the role of intuition by means of the fixed table of categories resulted in a conception of meaning in which the spontaneity of the subject must be explained—notoriously—by an appeal to the noumenal, Husserl's expansion of the domain of intuition to include the phenomenological dimension allows him to explain spontaneity in terms of a most basic phenomenological observation: he insists it is simply the case that we experience the world as always-already meaningful, and that that experience is conceptually mediated to a large degree. But he also insists that our experience is not limited to our concepts, and that it carries a certain weight by means of which we constantly reevaluate its meaning, not by means of conceptual reflection or calculation, but through the constant imaginative variation of the immediate—and non-conceptual—content of experience. Since such an account of meaning is based upon the analysis of acts of judgment and intuition in the context of *lived experience,* and not on the specific content of our concepts in an a fixed a priori realm, the presumed conflict between the demands of universal a priori objectivity and the contingency of subjective intentional experience which haunted Husserl in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations* has been overcome, and the closed conception of a priori logical laws in his earlier work has been transformed into the open-ended theory of meaning as a domain for the infinite task of phenomenological inquiry in the lifeworld.

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345 Luft, "On the Meaning of Transcendental Idealism in Kant and Husserl," 379.

II. b. Husserl on the Logic of Color

A further illustration of Husserl's conception of the material a priori vis-a-vis Kant's synthetic a priori will help to put it into dialogue with Wittgenstein's conception of the a priori status of color concepts as discussed above. In another passage from the *Erste Philosophie* lectures, Husserl elaborates on his criticism of Kant's conception of the a priori in a discussion of Kant's account of color. Husserl argues, against Kant, that the unthinkabiity (*Undenkbarkeit*) of sensual material content (such as color) without spatial extension "does not indicate the [mere] incapability of picturing a divergent intuition, an accidental incapability, but rather *an essential impossibility*, similar to how it is an essential impossibility, available to insight, that red is a tone and a color is nothing other than what a love is."[346] For Husserl, such unthinkability is the result of, and manifests, an a priori *essential* law. Husserl distinguishes these synthetic material a priori laws, which are founded on material essences, from purely formal analytic a priori laws founded on purely formal essences, considering them to constitute two distinct levels of "pure reason" (FTL 29/ Hua XVII, 33). This allows him to give an account of synthetic a priori laws localized to different ontological regions in addition to the formal a priori laws uniting all material regions.[347]

In lifeworld phenomenology, Husserl has come to see the status of the logic of color concepts in much the same way as did Wittgenstein: as a manifestation of a priori laws not reducible to analyticity or tautology. Just as the incompatibility of red and green could not be explained, for Wittgenstein, by reference to the linguistic *concepts* involved, so for Husserl the impossibility of redness as a musical tone or of a color as "nothing other than a love" is a priori in

346 Hua VII, 358, my translation ("...besagt nicht die Unfähigkeit, eine abweichende Anschauung zu bilden, eine zufällige Unfähigkeit, sondern *eine wesensmäßige Unmöglichkeit*, ähnlich wie es eine wesensmäßige und einsehbare Unmöglichkeit ist, dass Rot ein Ton ist und eine Farbe nicht etwas anderes ist als eine Liebe.").

347 As we saw in chapter four, above. As Husserl notes, "Every regional essence determines 'synthetic' essential truths, i.e., such as are grounded in it as this generic essence, but are not mere specifications of formal-ontological truths. The regional concept and its regional subdivisions are thus not free to vary in these synthetical truths; the replacing of the relatively constant terms by variables gives no formal logical law..." (Ideas I, §16/ Hua III, 36- 37).

a way that involves logical *material* content which cannot be explained simply formally and which is not exhaustively explained at the level of concepts.348 Thus Husserl is not content—as was Kant—to simply acknowledge the formal role played by the a priori forms of intuition as the provider of the content conceptualized in the understanding. For Husserl such a formal account is not enough, since for him the ultimate topic of inquiry for a transcendental philosophy is not a universal content in the sense of truths and facts about individual human experiences, but the uncovering of the fundamental universal *meaning structure* of the lifeworld:

> The universal a priori of the objective-logical level—that of the mathematical sciences and all others which are a priori in the usual sense—is grounded in *a universal a priori which is in itself prior*, precisely that of the pure life-world. Only through recourse to this a priori, to be unfolded in an a priori science of its own, can our a priori sciences, the objective-logical ones, achieve a truly radical, a seriously scientific, grounding, which under the circumstances they absolutely require. (Crisis 141/ Hua VI, 144, my emphasis)

Husserl's late genetic phenomenology is thus distinguished from the Kantian position in that it seeks to provide an open-ended *theory of essence* of the lifeworld and not simply a means of establishing the a priori objectivity of perceptual *factical* contents examined by the natural sciences. As we saw above, such a theory necessitates an *experiential, material* priori not reducible[349] to Kant's a priori forms of intuition, and this involves conceiving of experience as an *intentional relation* and not, as the "fodder" view of non-conceptual content would have it, "a matter of intrinsically non-intentional sensations undergoing 'interpretation' or 'apperception.'"[350] Husserl's notion of non-conceptual content as the a priori in experience is that which allows for the set of essential structures which define experience by delimiting the

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348 Note also the similarity of Husserl's example to Wittgenstein's discussion of "colour-space" in the *Tractatus*: "A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some color: it is, so to speak, surrounded by colour-space. Notes must have *some* pitch, objects of the sense of touch *some* hardness, and so on" (TLP 2.0131, translation slightly modified).

349 As Klaus Kaehler has pointed out to me, it is not strictly correct to say that the lifeworld a priori is "prior" to the Kantian forms of intuition for Husserl in any straightforward sense, since the lifeworld must still always be manifested in spatiotemporal experience. However, we can nonetheless maintain the *irreducibility* (and thus distinguishability in rational reflection) of the lifeworld a priori to the forms of intuition, for the reasons given in this section.

350 Hopp, "How to Think about Non-conceptual Content," 22. (Hopp is also critical of this view of experience).

construction of concepts, and thus, on the Husserlian account, non-conceptual content is no mere fodder for conceptualization, but the necessary condition for it.

Husserl's criticism of the Kantian synthetic a priori in favor of the material a priori in his own transcendental philosophy illustrates the more general point that, in phenomenology, though one is always working *with* a content, that content is never strictly speaking the ultimate object of the inquiry although in a certain sense it always delimits it. The object of phenomenological inquiry is the *structure* of experience, *not* experiential content in any individual case –or even in any individual *possible* case. Insofar as we wish to talk of this structure having or being a "content," that content is not the same in type or function—is not the same sort of thing—as meaningful conceptual content in the normal sense.

We take this conception of phenomenological inquiry to be applicable to Wittgenstein's thought as well, since for Wittgenstein, as for Husserl, the relationship between meaning and experience cannot be explained merely on the basis of the scientific-empirical, but must necessarily involve the additional elements of experience we have characterized in terms of a phenomenological dimension of meaning.[351] As Husserl puts it in the *Crisis*,

> There can be no analogue to an empirical science of fact, no "descriptive" science of transcendental being alone, in the sense of establishing *individual* transcendental correlations as they factually occur and disappear. … But the full concrete facticity of universal transcendental subjectivity can nevertheless be scientifically grasped in another good sense, precisely because, truly through an eidetic method, the great task can and must be undertaken of investigating the essential form of the transcendental accomplishments in all their types of individual and intersubjective accomplishments, that is, the total essential form of transcendentally accomplishing subjectivity in all its social forms. The fact is here, as belonging to its essence, and it is determinable only through its essence; *there is no way of documenting it empirically in a sense analogous to what is done in the objective sphere through inductive experience*. (Crisis 178/ Hua VI, 181- 182, my emphasis)

In the following section, we will emphasize how the non-conceptual content at issue here is that of an *activity of experiential life.* Insofar as that activity (when understood in the proper context of intentionality) has regular, structural features, so far can the structure of experience be said to

351 See also our discussion of Wittgenstein's distinction between the empirical and the experiential in chapter four, section II. e, above.

have an essential content. This content is ultimately revelatory of a priori material structures of experience, not of the essences of individual actual or possible experiences.[352] But how is this role played by the non-conceptual, but not merely raw-sensational content of the phenomenological dimension (Husserl's "transcendental aesthetic") explained? Answering this question demands further interpretation of Husserl's theory of the prepredicative, preconceptual aspects of experience as they relate to meaning constitution.

II. c. Prepredicative Meaning Constitution: Types, Horizons, and the "Weight of Experience"

As we saw above, Husserl's account of the material a priori and the notion of the "transcendental clue" show that the transcendental structures of experience cannot be directly reducible to the spatio-temporal conditions of their presentation or raw, pre-perceptual stuff. Since Husserl has relocated the material a priori in the realm of immediate experience, he does not need to appeal to the Kantian noumenal realm standing "before" all categories, and thus outside the world of humanly perceivable phenomena, in order to explain spontaneity. Husserl's "essential structures" are thus manifest at a *prescientific* level of experience which Kant's *Critique* (on Husserl's reading) missed because of its focus exclusively on the a priori conditions necessary for the table of the categories derived by Kant with an eye to Newtonian science.[353]

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352 Although we cannot address it more fully here, it should be evident how Husserl's Kantkritik as discussed in this section can be developed as an alternative approach to and critique of the contemporary debates about non-conceptual content we discussed in chapter one, debates which—on all sides—pick up on the same naturalist tendency in Kant that is the major point of Husserl's critique: in focusing on the spatiotemporal form of the presentation of non-conceptual content instead of on the a priori essential structures of experience revealed through it, Kant and the contemporary non-conceptualists who have used him in support of their views, miss the more fundamental universal a priori of the lifeworld. We have begun to more fully develop such an account elsewhere, and see this as a potentially fruitful avenue for future research.

353 As Luft notes, "The legitimacy of category application in a priori synthetic judgments presupposes this same ability on much simpler levels of discourse and, in terms of our complex life in the world, is a far too limited account of experiencing things as meaningful. The life-world is experienced as meaningful, and scientific ('objective') meaning is just one of many types of meaning. This in no way mitigates the legitimacy and importance of science, but emphasizes the need to see it in a layered account of the constitution of the life-world from simplest to most complex experiences. In

Whereas naturalistic accounts (and in this case this also includes, for Husserl, Kant's transcendental account) would claim that our experience records inexactly what scientific measurement can record in its actual, conceptual exactness, Husserl is able to take the inexactness of experiential life at face value by treating it as evidence not merely for an ontology of spatiotemporal existence, but for a more primordial ontology of essential meaning in the logically prior lifeworld. Thus, according to Husserl, while the exact concepts of geometry and other sciences are arrived at through a characteristic process of "idealization" beginning from experiences which in their originarity exhibit only a "vague and fluid typification" (EJ §10) the method of arriving at the lifeworld will move in precisely the opposite direction, via a "regressive analysis" which seeks to uncover such vague and fluid fundamental structures of lived experience underneath the sciences' "garb of ideas." This "regressive" method is undertaken not in order to discredit scientific knowledge, but rather to guarantee its absolute certainty by grounding it in a prior ontology of lived experience. Husserl's project remains analogous to Kant's in the first *Critique*, in that it seeks to ground scientific knowledge by taking account of the limits to knowledge set by experience, but, as we saw above, it rejects Kant's own conception of ultimate grounding in the a priori forms of intuition for what it sees as even more fundamental: the lifeworld. The account of meaning in Husserl's later phenomenology is thus a transcendental account in the Kantian sense, and yet ultimately grounded in the very different project of an "ontology of the lifeworld."

In this and the following section, we will attempt an interpretive reconstruction—rather than a straightforward explication—of the structural aspects of Husserl's conception of the prepredicative, non-conceptual, phenomenological dimension of experience as it pertains to our inquiry into meaning. In doing so, we shall follow an important exegetical strategy first

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terms of the *Crisis*, Kant is guilty of the forgetfulness of the life-world" (Luft, "On the Meaning of Transcendental Idealism in Kant and Husserl," 381).

elucidated by Eugen Fink.[354] Fink proposes that we distinguish in the work of any philosopher between "thematic" and "operative" notions. Whereas thematic notions are the exact concepts expressing fixed and explicitly-defined relations by which a philosopher systematically builds a theory, operative notions function in a less exact manner, as a sort of "placemarker" for problem spaces which we can grasp in a general way, but which we recognize will demand further clarification and thus remain at present vague and potentially ambiguous. We follow Alfred Schütz in believing that Husserl's notion of "types" belongs in this category: it fulfills a necessary role in his conception of prepredicative experience and its relation to meaning, but ultimately remains open, a "heading for a group of problems open to and requiring further analysis."[355] Our reasons for following this reconstructive, "operative" strategy will become clearer as we demonstrate how the open-ended character of the theory of types reflects its role in Husserl's conception of phenomenological inquiry as an "infinite task."[356]

Husserl's basic notion is that, by focusing on the immediate aspects of experience as revealed under the reduction, we begin to recognize basic—though still vague and fluid—structural aspects of that experience, original "associations" revelatory of certain basic "types" :

> The world of life, which, as a matter of course takes up into itself all practical structures (even those of the objective sciences as cultural facts, though we refrain from taking part in their interests), is, to be sure, related to subjectivity throughout the constant alteration of its relative aspects. But however it changes and however it may be corrected, it holds to its essentially lawful set of types, to which all life, and thus all science, of which it is the "ground," remain bound. Thus it also has an ontology to be derived from pure self-evidence. (Crisis 173/ Hua VI, 176)

This "lawful set of types," is constantly present in intuition, though always in an ultimately indeterminate way. Indeed, Husserl argues, it is only on the basis of the "anticipatory" intentions of such types that meanings are constituted and the material a priori structures of experience are

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354 See Fink, "Operative Begriffe in Husserls Phänomenologie." In *Nähe und Distanz: Phänomenologische Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 203.

355 Schütz, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy," 147.

356 In this, we are departing somewhat from Fink's use of the concept, since for him "operative" notions can —at least in principle— eventually be concretized into thematic ones, whereas we are suggesting that the notion of a type *as such* remains open and vague.

revealed to transcendental inquiry. In E*xperience and Judgment,* Husserl calls this the "presentifying intuition," which gives an anticipatory *Vorstellung*, but "not a firm determinateness which binds us to it individually, as is the case with recollection" (EJ §8). As the passage above suggests, Husserl is committed to the claim that this structure of anticipation can be characterized in terms of a set of "types" which exhibit regular lawful, *essential* patterns, despite their always containing a degree of vagueness and fluidity.

For Husserl this inexact character of types is not seen as problematic, since the lifeworld, the originary world of immediate experience in which types are manifest, is not the exact world of science, but a world characterized by the indeterminacy characteristic of the anticipation of further experience:

> In the oscillation of the anticipatory envisionment, in the transition from one temporary variant or orientation to another, we remain in the unity of the anticipation, namely, that of the color of the backside of the thing [the example used earlier in the paragraph -JR]; but, as an anticipation, it is indeterminate and general: the determination is anticipated in terms of a type, an element of familiarity. In the clarification of this typical generality in the form of determinate "possibilities" open to the real being of this color, the realm [*Spielraum*] for these possibilities is given as the explicit "extension" of the indeterminate generality of anticipation. ...every real thing whatsoever has, as an object of possible experience, its general "*a priori,*" a preknowledge that is an indeterminate generality but which remains identifiable as the same, as a type belonging a priori to a realm of a priori possibilities... (EJ §8)

The characteristic structure of anticipation is further analyzed in terms of an important reflectively distinguishable element of perceptual awareness, the *horizonality* of experience. Husserl claims that it is characteristic of our perceptual awareness not only that it is intentional, insofar as it is focused primarily on a particular object, but also that the intentional object necessarily appears to us in a broader context, and this in two ways.

First, the intentional object always appears in the context of other surrounding objects that are part of the intentional experience but in an "unthematized" way. When I look at an apple, for example, I see it in the context of the table on which it is set and the room in which that table stands, perhaps with the smell of freshly-brewed coffee and the murmur of the radio in the background. Although I can turn my attention to any of these aspects of the experience, as long

as I remain intentionally focused on the apple, they remain "unthematized," part of the horizon of the intentional object which is a necessary part of my experience of it even though it generally remains inexplicit and inexact: I may not actively, reflectively *notice* the background music or the placement of the table in the room, but they are nonetheless present in the experience, and even if I do actively notice their presence I need not do so in any exact manner. I may later recollect that there was music playing in the background, without being able to further specify what type of music it was, and this is not always because I simply "forgot" that specific detail; since the music was never the primary object of my intention, I may not have even explicitly noted—I may not have *thematized*—anything further than a vague background of sound. This context surrounding the intentional object is referred to as the "external horizon."

Secondly, the intentional object always carries with it certain further anticipations of its own: it has an "internal horizon," insofar as we always anticipate possible further characteristics of it which may be discovered in the temporal flow of experience, e.g., when I see the apple sitting on the table, and "anticipate" (unthematically) that its hidden side will look roughly like the side I am currently perceiving. This is why Husserl insists that the object *as* experienced always transcends the immediate spatiotemporal presentation *of* that object: the intentional object manifests a "transcendence in immanence," and indeed it is this necessary characteristic of the object that allows it to function as a "transcendental clue" as discussed at the end of the previous chapter, leading us to the fundamental structures of the lifeworld.

So—to continue our description of the example above in these terms—if I walk around to the other side of the table and perceive that the backside of the apple does not appear bright and red, as did the front, but is instead a rotted gray-brown, my original intention has not been fulfilled but frustrated, and my intentional disconnectedness toward the object undergoes a modification. Nonetheless, this frustration and modification itself is only possible against the backdrop of a more-or-less fixed anticipation of the experience of apples as being, e.g., generally uniform in ripeness. It is this sense of a vague structure of anticipation that Husserl attempts to

capture with the notion of an "a priori set of types." As Mohanty notes, when we take the Husserlian conceptions of internal and external horizon together,

> we may say that nothing is entirely unknown, for the unknown is known as unknown and in that sense to be unknown is already a mode of being known. For we are acquainted with the unknown as belonging to *the world* which is the all comprehensive horizon of all actual and possible experiences. Thus, there is a sense in which one could even say that *the world as a whole is always passively pre-given,* prior to all self-consciously directed activity of thought. For the *world* in this sense is not the static totality of all objects but the endless horizon—a system of intentionality and anticipation—within which the given leads to the not-yet given.[357]

As we have been arguing above, this "system of intentionality and anticipation" cannot consist simply of pre-given spatially-determinable objects or of the quantifiable entities of the exact sciences (although both of these are still important elements of intentional experience). It includes the further overlappings of horizonal intentionality as a system of meaning possibilities by which our expectations are always expectations *of*, just as our seeings are always seeings *as*. This most primary aspect of our experiential lives cannot be captured exclusively by means of empirical measurements or explanations of linguistic usage, nor simply explained by an account of the spatiotemporal conditions of experience, because it involves something which ultimately presents us not merely with the objects of experience and their preconditions in a naturalistic way, but with the transcendental structures ultimately determinate of their meaningfulness.[358] The "givenness" of meaning in human life, the fact that we are always born into an already-

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357 Mohanty, *Edumund Husserl's Theory of Meaning,* 141.

358 As we shall see in more detail below, it is in this sense that Husserl's lifeworld-oriented account of meaning can be opposed *both* to accounts of meaning oriented exclusively to linguistic usage *and* to straightforward referential accounts. Steven Crowell has emphasized this nicely in a discussion of the relationship between Husserl's transcendental theory of meaning and that of the neo-Kantian Emil Lask: "The transcendent object is never *adequately* given in experience. But if that is so, then it will not do, as Husserl says in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, to 'stop short with the empty generality of the word consciousness, nor with the empty word experience, judgment, and so forth, treating the rest as though it were philosophically irrelevant and leaving it to psychology' (Hua XVII:251/ 244). The transcendental concept of meaning remains homeless if not fleshed out in terms of its own 'noetics,' in terms of the evidence with which it presents itself. But when this is recognized, the whole ontology of transcendent meaning that Lask saw as the *sole* concern of transcendental logic is transformed into a 'transcendenal clue' (*Leitfaden*) for tracing intentional implications, or modes of givenness, within a phenomenology of prepredicative object constitution (Hua XVII:251/ 244). The doctrine of categories as an ontology of meaning must become a transcendental phenomenology" (Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, 68).

meaningful world, thus receives its final and ultimate justification in the phenomenological description of the "pregiven" structure of the lifeworld.

And Husserl insists that this is the case despite the fact that the lifeworld is never *neatly* characterizable. Indeed, if we note how the Husserlian notion of internal horizon is linked to time as the a priori form of conscious experience, we can now see how Husserl's account of horizon and the "vague and fluid set of types" can present an alternative to the Kantian account of the non-conceptual "limitlessness in the possibility of agreeing intuitions."[359] Husserl's "science of the lifeworld" can maintain its claim to logical rigor despite the inexact character of its immediate content because the *terminus ad quo* of the analysis is not simply the immediate content of perceptual experience. Whereas for Kant the certainty of transcendental inquiry was guaranteed by the a priori deduction of the fixed and exhaustive table of the categories, for Husserl this certainty is guaranteed by the essential structures which characterize and are manifest in intentional experience.

This reflects the character of transcendental phenomenological inquiry in which, as we noted above, though one is always working *with* experiential content (is always going back *zu den Sachen selbst*), that content is not the sole and ultimate *object* of the inquiry. The object of the inquiry is instead conceived as the *structure* of experience, that very certainty of experience which is the necessary starting point of all inquiry:

> The modalizations of simple certainty of belief into conjecture, probability, and the like are modifications of an original simple believing consciousness, which is the medium in which all existents as objects of experience are at first simply pregiven for us—as long as the further course of experience does not provide occasion for doubt or modalization of any kind. Objects are always present for us, pregiven in simple certainty, before we engage in any act of cognition. At its beginning, every cognitive activity presupposes these objects. They are there for us in simple certainty; this means that we presume them to exist and in such a way as to be accepted by us before all cognition, and this in a variety of ways. Thus it is as simply pregiven, that they stimulate and set going the activity of cognition in which they receive their form and their character of legitimacy, in which they become the permanent nucleus of cognitive functions having for a goal the "truly existing object," the object as it is in truth. Before the movement of cognition begins, we have "presumed objects," simply presumed in the certainty of belief. (EJ, §7)

359 See chapter four, section III.

Husserl's account of types is intended as an explication of the inexact, horizonal structure "presumed in the certainty of belief" *prior* to explicit conceptual thought, on the basis of which we cognize higher-order contents in the conceptual sphere. It thus functions at a lower, more primary level of experience than that of the concept. Types are formed on the basis of associations between "typical" qualities "pregiven" in intentional objects (internal horizon), limited by the unthematized context in which those objects appear (external horizon). Through multiple occurrences of such association we reach a level of generalization which allows us to posit the universal, and only here have we reached the level of the empirical concept, which is "an open, ever-to-be-corrected concept" (EJ §83a) whose further specification and correction will take place on the basis of attributes of yet-to-be encountered intentional adumbrations which cannot be already contained *in* that concept, although their "typical" limits are *vaguely* predeterminable. The ever-revisable type thus functions in Husserl's later phenomenology to guarantee the "limitlessness in the possibility of agreeing" of the concept at a level that falls between mere raw sensation and full conceptuality.

The difference between the non-conceptual type and the empirical concept is that the latter has its own, self-sufficient *core* independent of specific attributes belonging to its particular manifestations.[360] The mere type does not have such a core; it remains tied to the associative similarities of the particulars, to its "syntheses of like with like," a unity which is not yet a "synthesis of identity" (EJ §81a). On this basis, one might be tempted to see the type as simply another sort of concept, or at least something like a "proto-concept." Indeed, from the viewpoint of what we have called the Frege side of the Frege-Husserl fork,[361] oriented first and foremost toward the *content of judgment*, this would be the case, for what else could we be talking about if not the simplest level of the concept; of its potential content? But such an interpretation misunderstands Husserl's conception of types as a version of the "mere fodder" conception of

360 Cf. Lohmar, *Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken,* 238.
361 See chapter three, section I.

non-conceptual content criticized above.

Seen from the Husserlian perspective, in which explanatory priority is given to *act over content*, the type is much more: since its role is not presumed to be limited to its service directly to the concept, it is free to play the role of presenting to the phenomenologist a further level for the analysis of *intentional acts*. From the standpoint of already-constituted knowledge, *what* is thereby constituted will always be something which we already understand conceptually. In this sense, when we discuss any given type or set of types, the "content" of those types will inevitably be something that is for us conceptual. But this is to stop short in terms of the transcendental project of constitutional analysis, for in the living present of immediate experience, in the *act* of association, there is always something associated *prior to* its being taken up and conceptualized in active thought. This is the phenomenological observation at the root of the various non-conceptualist positions we have been discussing: we tend to experience the world as *vaguely* familiar, but not completely familiar. Experiential life is *always only incompletely mediated by concepts;* the meaningfulness of our experience always "outstrips" the meaning of our words and the content of our concepts. Husserl uses the notion of the type to explain the constitution of meaning at this intermediate, not-yet conceptual but not *merely sensible* level.

Thus, for Husserl, the type does not arise in accordance with the concept, but rather vice-versa: the type is the first mark of similarity, the first step of the process by which we arrive *at* the concept in the flow of experience To force the issue by saying that the type nonetheless *presupposes* the concept is to open the path to Platonism, to insist, against Husserl, that conceptual schemes—analyses of content—simply *must* be prior to analyses of experience and acts, and that, if conceptual content is not simply a psychologistically-explainable attribute of our mental apparatus, it must be somehow preformed and pre-existent. Kant hedged his bets against such a conception by insisting on the fixity of the *categories* by which concepts are formed and at the same time guaranteeing a role for spontaneity through the Transcendental Aesthetic's account of time and space as a priori forms for otherwise formless intuitions. Frege eventually embraced

the seemingly Platonist conception of concepts ("Thoughts") subsisting in the "third realm." If we give primacy in the order of explanation to the act and only by way of it to the concept, we need not face this dilemma.

II. d. The Orienting Function of Prepredicative Experience

But we still have not explained *exactly how* the pre-predicative, non-conceptual type is supposed to function in relation to meaning and conceptual thought: if Husserl's prescientific phenomenological dimension is not involved in meaning as mere provider of the "fodder" for later conceptualization, in what way can that content still play a role in the constitution of meaning? We have claimed above that types, horizons, and the "weight of experience" are the necessary elements for the establishment of such possibilities. But how exactly does this occur, if it is not to occur at the level of the concept or of linguistically-fixed meaning?

The following answer is suggested by various of Husserl's late manuscripts: the "weight" of our prior experiences, considered not just in terms of the intentional object's conceptual content as an expression of the noematic core, but also in terms of the internal and external horizons of prior intentional acts that contribute to the overall structure of the noema, serves an *orienting* function by directing the intentional gaze to new objects or determining our continued focus on the same object in new and different ways, as the case may be. So, to return to our example above, my intentional gaze may suddenly shift from the apple to the music that was previously only "unthematically" present as part of the external horizon, and it may so shift as a result of a particularly loud drumbeat marking the crescendo of the song being played. But in that experiential moment, in the "living present" of the experience, it was surely not the *conceptual* content of the drumbeat which shifted my attention: such a shift in the *act* of intention could equally well occur in a newborn without a concept of drumbeats or of apples.

And from the perspective of the analysis of the *intentional act*, the role of the drumbeat qua non-conceptual content is not merely that of a raw fodder for conceptualization, for there

must have been something about the content of that act *prior to its conceptualization* which first directed my attention to it. As my attention was focused on the apple, one hundred drumbeats may have already sounded—unthematized by me—on the radio, but *this one* first attracted my attention; it had a certain *experiential weight*, resulting from the complex interplay of past and future anticipatory horizons: *this one* was somehow different than the others, and the comparative context in which that difference drew my attention was in not in that moment a *conceptual* difference. The non-conceptual content of the experience has thus served to (re)orient my experience, thereby determining future experiential contents in a way which involves but is not straightforwardly reducible to its function as fodder for conceptualization.

This orienting function is not limited to the space of the conceptual because it is ultimately something attributed to *act, not content.* In lived experience, our cognition of external and internal horizons is not structured by fixed concepts, and yet it helps to orient our intentional gaze by means of the spatiotemporal mediation of "experiential weight." The totality of these overlapping experiential horizons in turn marks the universal limits of the knowable, and in this way determines the "a priori set of types"—the "structure of the known and the structure of the unknown"—and thereby the limits of possibility not in terms of scientific facts, but in terms of the overlapping structures of essential meanings. As Alfred Schütz puts this point,

> the concrete typicality of the life-world is that of the world valid for all of us. Not only my own life, but also that of each of us in the unity of its actual flux is continually surrounded by the actual horizons of our practical power (Vermöglichkeit) to guide, direct, and influence actual occurrences by an interference of our Self. But although I am always certain of such a power, I am, like everyone, bound to the essential typicality which pervades all actualities and potentialities. This is so because all horizons in their modifications form one universal horizon, first my own, and then, in the general interconnectedness of all subjects, the trans-subjective universal horizon. This problem leads again to the preacquaintedness of the life-world as a whole and the concrete objects in it."[362]

Thus, for Husserl, the lifeworld is a world of meaning "all the way down." Our experience "always already" exhibits a meaningful structure, one in which we are indeed free to *make sense*

362 Schütz, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy, 158.

of the world, but only within the limits of possible meaning as determined by the sedimentation of sense in an intersubjective community. The *Spielraum* within which constitution occurs—the phenomenological dimension of meaning—is structured not according to the logic of the concept but the logic belonging to the pre-predicative type, which Husserl insists exhibits the necessarily "vague typicality" of the lifeworld. And insofar as new meanings are constantly sedimented and our intentionality regularly alters its focus in new acts, the analysis of meaning is constantly faced with new horizons in which new intentional objects are anticipated not as fixed concepts but in terms of general types.[363] The description of our prepredicative types is ongoing; part of the "infinite task"[364] of phenomenology. And just as the lifeworld in its "vague typicality" is not be limited to the conceptual on Husserl's account, nor is it thoroughgoingly linguistic.

II. e. The Role of Language in Husserl's Late Genetic Account of Meaning and Experience

The reception of Husserl's later philosophy of language has a long and complex history in the literature. While the later, transcendental conception of language has been almost totally ignored in the "analytic"-oriented literature, which prefers to limit its focus to the "pre-transcendental" period of the *Logical Investigations*, discussions of this topic among more "continental" commentators has been dominated by the criticisms of Derrida. Derrida's criticisms of the later Husserl on language are not unique to him, and precursors of his position can be found even amongst Husserl's younger contemporaries, among them Heidegger and Fink. For Heidegger and Fink, as later for Derrida, Husserl has basically limited the role of language to the mere recording or preservation of thoughts, thoughts which, as ultimately concerned with ideal essences, are—*qua thoughts*—non-linguistic entities. Against this common conception, we will argue in this section that the function of language in Husserl's later transcendental philosophy is actually much more complex, and that it remains true to the phenomenological focus on the description of

363 Lohmar, *Erfahrung und katergoriales Denken,* 225.
364 See chapter four, section I. a.

experience as the means for arriving at a greater understanding of philosophy and meaning. Because of this, an account of the role that language *does* play in meaning will complement our discussion of the prepredicative meaning above and complete our discussion of the transcendental conception of meaning in the lifeworld period.

A clear illustration of the above-noted mis-characterization[365] of Husserl's views on language appears in the writings of one of his own students and close collaborators, Eugen Fink. In a manuscript of Fink's written around the time of the publication of the *Crisis*, he writes, "Language a *'medium of communication'?* Since Husserl construed language above all as a medium for preserving a *thought about* something prepredicatively given, and passing it on further, he thereupon also mistook the true nature of the *concept* and with it the 'clearing' and 'poetical' function of language, its '*Adamic saying,*'"[366] As Fink rightly points out, language is for Husserl primarily a medium for the objectification and the "preserving" of thought. It is also true that, for Husserl, the object of that thought *may* be something "prepredicatively given," and thus not inherently linguistic, but it *need not* be. Fink's analysis is misleading in its suggestion that the function of language is primarily, "above all," the preserving of thoughts about prepredicatively given objects, thoughts remaining at the prepredicative level.

Such interpretations tend to mistake Husserl's phenomenological *analysis or description* of language for an instrumental *explanation* of language. Husserl never denies, and in fact consistently emphasizes—even already in the *Logical Investigations*—that language is necessary for the more complex functions of thought, even when I am only "thinking to myself." But he rejects the notion that this means that thought *as such* or ideal meanings *as such*, are linguistic *all the way down.* For, as we argued above, in Husserl's genetic phenomenology, the non-conceptual

365 We do not mean to suggest that this single citation from Fink is fully representative or even that it approaches the full complexity of his views on Husserl's conception of language. We use the quote as an illustrative example of one reading of Husserl's views on the topic common in continental scholarhsip, one to which our own position is opposed.

366 Eugen-Fink-Archiv Z-XXVIII A/II/14, emphasis Fink's, qtd in Bruzina, "Language in Lifeworld Phenomenology," 96 (German text and original manuscript unavailable).

content of lived experience plays a central role in the account of meaning and that role is not reducible to its function as that which is taken up in subsequent conceptualization. The above quote suggests that Fink takes the Husserlian analysis of the pre-predicative level of meaning to signal a rejection of the central role he (and, we can add, Heidegger, especially in his later thought) would want to ascribe to the primordiality of *language* in favor of an account of the ideal *intuition* of meaning in pre-predicative experience. But this is only half right. For—as is often the case with Husserl—there is a further distinction at play in the later account of meaning, one which clearly demarcates between linguistic and non-linguistic levels of meaning. This shows that, for Husserl, the non-conceptual level of language—what we have been calling the phenomenological dimension—is also pre-linguistic. Just as Husserl's non-conceptual content was not reducible to its role as fodder for conceptualization, nor is it simply a fixed and individuated set of pre-linguistic entities awaiting their pre-determined rigidification in language.

For, as far back as the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl had distinguished between predicative, linguistic meaning, *Bedeutung*, and a priori level of non-linguistic meaning, *Sinn*.[367] The term *Sinn* is reserved for a more fundamental notion of *conceptually vague* meaning in relation to objectivities as immediately experienced, the level of meaning characteristic of the "vague and fluid set of types," whereas the *Bedeutung* is the "fixed" or "stamped" meaning of the objectivity as it is presented in language, by which it becomes general, i.e., applicable to multiple situations and indefinitely repeatable. And this means, importantly, that the fixing of *Sinn* into *Bedeutung* by means of language is not a simple matter of recording distinctions already determined at the prelinguistic level. For Husserl, language not only *records* differentiated thoughts; it is a part of the process of their individuation, of the making exact of the originally inexact lifeworld. In a short text from the early 1920s, Husserl reinforces this point in distinguishing between the "pregivenness" retrospectively-ascribed to synthetic, *Bedeutung*-level

367 As we pointed out in chapter two, this distinction does *not* map on to Frege's Sinn/Bedeutung distinction (chapter two, section II. b). Cf. also chapter four, section I. e; Ideas I, §124/ Hua III 285-286.

categorial objectivities and the pregivenness of immediate, sensuously perceived objectivities. Even if we begin with synthetic, categorial objectivities,

> Obviously we eventually come upon substrates that are not themselves further originally synthetic substrates, and these are the sensuous objects in the primary and proper sense. They are in a way already there before [our] grasping [*Erfassen*], clearly pregiven, and yet not yet seen [*angeschaut*], not yet grasped, not yet objects [*Objekte*] for the cognizer: not yet "thought" in the first, most primitive movements of thinking [*Denkschritte*]. (A concept of thinking and understanding, that is thus before the *logos,* before the features of the apprehension of the generality-consciousness [*Allgenmeinheitsbewusstsein*], of predicative thinking in all its forms, forms which are mirrored in the forms of judgment.[368]

The passage reiterates that Husserl does indeed think there is a non-linguistic (pre-predicative) level of meaning, related to the immediate experience of sensuous objects "in the primary and proper sense." This original level of meaning is "already there" and "pregiven," but only in the manner of the type, and thus it maintains its characteristic vagueness.

And this vague character of pre-predicative meaning is a clear result of its place "before the logos." It is the apprehension of an immediate objectivity, without the "generality" characteristic of linguistic meaning (*Bedeutung*). *Sinn,* then, is at once more primary than and explicitly differentiated from the higher-order meaning (*Bedeutung*) made possible because of language.[369] Thus, despite the important and even necessary role played by linguistic meaning, for Husserl, unlike for Wittgenstein, the pre-predicative level of experience is *not* a level prior to meaning as such. Meaning is present in the lifeworld even at the level of the "vague and fluid set of types," although, as pre-linguistic, meaning at this level is never the exacting medium of the geometer or the linguist.

But this does not signal a rejection of the role of language in meaning *tout court*; if

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368 Hua XXXIX, 40, my translation ("Offenbar kommen wir nun letzlich auf Substrate, die nicht selbst wieder ursprunglich synthetische Substrate sind, und diese sind die im ersten und eigentlichen Sinn sinnlichen Gegenstaende. Sie sind gewissermaesssen schon vor dem Erfassen urspruenglich da, anschaulich vorgegeben, und doch noch nicht angeschaut, noch nicht erfasst, noch nicht Objekte fuer den Erkennenden: noch nicht in dem ersten, primitivsten Denkschritte "gedacht". (Ein Begriff von Denken und Verstand, der also vor dem Logos, vor den Funktionen des Begreifens des Allgemeinheitsbewusstseins, des praedikativen Denkens in allen seinen in den Urteilsformen sich spiegelnden Formen ist.)").

369 Cf. Shim, "The Duality of Non-conceptual Content in Husserl's Theory of Perception," 211- 214.

anything, it is the mark of a more phenomenologically-nuanced account of it. For, as an important part of our everyday praxis, language *itself* has a place in the lifeworld, and contributes to the overlapping intentional horizons on the basis of which structures of meaning arise: as Husserl writes in "The Origin of Geometry," "men as men, fellow men, world—the world of which men, of which we, always talk and can talk—and, on the other hand, language, are *inseparably intertwined*; and one is always certain of their inseparable relational unity, though usually only implicitly, in the manner of a horizon" (Crisis 359/ Hua VI, 370 my emphasis).[370]

In this sense, in lifeworld phenomenology, language is inherently involved in the account of meaning—and we can even say, is involved in meaning "all the way down" to the level of *Sinn*—but that involvement is *direct and explicit* only at the higher and more exact level of meaning (*Bedeutung*) in linguistic discourse. At the lower level, language plays an implicit role in meaning constitution as an element (among many) of the horizon of the lifeworld, but Husserl's account of meaning is thereby only one which *involves* language, not—like that of Wittgenstein—a thoroughly *linguistic conception of meaning*.

A short phenomenological description can help to illustrate this: When I walk along the street and see a house, it is of course the case that I must already be living in a linguistic community (a lifeworld) with sufficient categorial resources to undertake the building of complex objects like modern-day houses (we can see the need for such basic, linguistically-mediated categorial resources as clearly as anywhere in Wittgenstein's relatively simple thought-experiment with "the builders" at the beginning of the *Philosophical Investigations*). Such scientific and technological feats involve myriad uses of exact measurements and concepts arrived at via abstraction, and would not be possible *directly* on the basis of "vague and fluid" types of our immediate experience. It is of course also the case that I have already inherited the concept "house" from my parents, from tradition, etc., and participated in a culture in which this word plays a more-or-less determined role. But Husserl wants to remind us that, in spite of this,

370 Cf. Noé, "'The Hermeneutic Turn' in Husserl's Phenomenology of Language, 124ff.

when I merely glance up at the house, my immediate perceptual experience is not *itself* in any way predicative or linguistic, any more than it is the experience *of* a concept. While linguistic schemas may be an important or even necessary part of our account of experience insofar as they allow us to *recognize and express* essential meanings, for Husserl it is far too simplistic, and simply speaks against our observation of experience as seen after the reduction, to think that that meaning itself must be linguistic "all the way down."

This way of thinking of the role of language in meaning is open to Husserl because, as in the revised edition of the *Logical Investigations* and in the *Ideas*, in the later transcendental phenomenology essential meanings are still considered to be not real but *irreal,* despite the occurrence of *specific* meanings in the individual moments of individual acts: "The irreality of the proposition as the idea of a synthetic unity of becoming is the idea of something which can appear in individual acts in any temporal position, occurring in each as necessarily temporal and temporally becoming, but which is the same 'at all times.' It is referred to at all times; or correlatively, to whatever time it may be referred, it is always absolutely the same..." (EJ, §64c). Because linguistic reference provides the vehicle through which meanings are *actively* constructed and first become explicit and exact for us, we might be tempted, like Wittgenstein, to equate the limits of meaning with those of language, and to insist that, independent of language, the notion of *Sinn* cannot be described (as we shall see below, this is often referred to as the "language as universal medium" view). But since meanings for Husserl are ultimately *irreal*, we are free to distinguish the order of their appearance to us in certain experiences as fixed entities with a "linguistic living body" [*Sprachleib*] (Crisis 358/ Hua VI, 369) from their ontologically prior role as horizonally-present but unthematized transcendental conditions *for* that experience, in which sense they must be understood as elements of the general structure of meaningfulness "preceding" their "discovery" in experience: "...we say: 'there are' mathematical and other irreal objects which no one has yet constructed. Their existence, to be sure, is revealed only by construction (their 'experience'), but the construction of those already known opens in advance a

horizon of objects capable of being further discovered, although still unknown" (EJ §64c).

Thus, for Husserl, the account of meaning rests ultimately not upon language or signification, but on the presumed horizon of *meaningfulness*, the shared horizon of the lifeworld as a world we *always* approach *fundamentally* as meaningful, despite the fact that our our particular configurations of meaning, or, in a more contemporary parlance, our *conceptual schemes*—are open to and undergoing the "infinite task" of re-evaluation and revision:

> A particular element in this world, presumed at first to exist, may turn out to be nonexistent. Cognition may bring us to correct details in opinions about existence, but this means only that, instead of being thus and so, something is otherwise—otherwise on the ground of the world existing in totality. It is this *universal ground of belief in a world* which all praxis presupposes, not only the praxis of life but also the theoretical praxis of cognition. The being of the world in totality is that which is not first the result of an activity of judgment but which forms the presupposition of all judgment. *Consciousness of the world is consciousness of the mode of certainty of belief... The world as the existent world is the universal passive pregivenness of all judicative activity,* of all engagement of theoretical interest. […] The world as a whole is always already pregiven in passive certitude, and the orientation of cognition toward a particular existent is genetically more primordial than that toward the world as a whole. (EJ §7)

In his criticism of Husserl for mistaking "the true nature of the concept," Fink seems to interpret Husserl's realm of ideal meanings as a realm of pre-existent exact *concepts*, which then get discovered or "uncovered" in experience and then re-presented in language. And, indeed, there are some passages in Husserl's copious and often contradictory writings throughout his career where he seems to imply as much.

But, as our account of a Husserlian conception of non-conceptual content in the section above and our discussion of the material a priori in the previous chapter both help to illustrate, it is a fundamental tenet of Husserl's transcendental account of meaning that the original givenness of meaning in the lifeworld is *not* to be understood on the model of a pre-given *concept* containing an infinity of possible agreements within it. Instead, for Husserl, the fundamentally meaningful activity of the lifeworld is grounded, prior to language, in nothing more and nothing less than our fundamental conviction—our certainty—that our intentional relation to the world is at least for the most part *meaningful*. And nonetheless, as we noted above, Husserl's notion of

pre-predicative experience does not reject, but rather in a certain sense *depends on* the general context of predicative or linguistic meaning. For a transcendental-phenomenological descriptive analysis which takes as its starting point our everyday conscious experience "always already" in the world, it makes no sense to offer arguments—anthropological or otherwise—as to the historical origination of human language use out of entirely pre-linguistic life.

Even the newborn human, who "has" no language herself, is born into a world of linguistic contexts "pre-given" to her, and into a world whose fundamental complexity (cultural, technological, and even scientific) could not have arisen without the higher-order predication and conceptual advances made possible by language and higher-order concepts developed in an intersubjective world that transcends individual consciousness. Like the houses in our example above, the experience of the hospital delivery room, while not linguistic, is nonetheless the experience of a situation made possible by the sedimentation of structures of meaning *via language*, since the lifeworld is a world which is always already meaningful for us: "A cognitive function bearing on individual objects of experience is never carried out as if these objects were pregiven at first as from a still completely undetermined substrate. For us the world is always a world in which cognition in the most diverse ways has *already done its work*." (EJ, §8, my emphasis). But despite the buildup of structures of meaning *by means of* language, the fundamental *immediacy* of the experience of that situation is not thereby *itself* linguistic.

§III. Between Apriority and Temporal Immediacy: Language, Life, and Meaning

III. a. Language as Calculus and as Universal Medium: Uses and Limitations of a Distinction

We are now in a position to discuss directly the crucial difference between Husserl and Wittgenstein with regard to the relationship between meaning, experience and language as these concepts are treated in the later work of both thinkers. As we saw above, although Wittgenstein by the 1930s had come to recognize the important place of immediate experience in

understanding meaning, for him the phenomenon of meaning itself extends no deeper than language. Any attempt to talk about meaning outside of particular language games will ultimately fail. While immediate experience makes meaning possible, it is itself outside the purview of meaning, which is equiprimordial with language and thus can only be shown. For Husserl, by contrast, language expresses meanings, but meanings, as ideal, are themselves prior to and not directly dependent upon language, despite the role of language in fixing the vague and inexact meanings first organized in terms of pre-given "types" in the lifeworld.

One way to categorize this difference is in terms of the well-known distinction between "Language as Calculus" and "Language as Universal Medium." The distinction was first suggested in an important 1967 essay by Jean Van Heijenoort, who proposed it as a way of categorizing philosophers in the twentieth century into two major camps according to their fundamental philosophical conception of the role of logic. The distinction was subsequently altered and developed at length by Jaakko Hintikka, and later used by Martin Kusch, as a way of characterizing the role given to language in twentieth century thinkers. Here is a formulation from Hintikka:

> Modifying and generalizing van Heijenoort's formulation, we can speak of two overall conceptions of logic and language, the conceptions respectively of language as the universal medium (van Heijenoort calls it the idea of "logic as language") and of language as calculus ("logic as calculus"). According to the former, we cannot as it were get outside our language and enjoy a detached view of it. We are from the very outset and always will remain committed semantically to our one and only home language. (Cf. Wittgenstein speaking of "the only language that I understand".) Expressed a little bit less metaphorically, we cannot think of the semantical relations that tie our language to the world as varied on a significant scale. Hence we cannot speak of these semantical relations or develop a systematic theory for them. On the opposite view, the view of language as calculus, we can do all these things, just as we can re-interpret a formal calculus at will.[371]

Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka have argued at great length that Wittgenstein's philosophical work throughout his life reflects the "language as universal medium" view.[372] Kusch has argued that Husserl, both in the *Logical Investigations* and in his later transcendental thought, should be

371 Hintikka, "A Hundred Years Later..." , p. 29.
372 Cf. Hintikka and Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein*, 215- 217.

understood as holding the "language as calculus" view.[373] Our own account thus far has given us no reason to question the broad outlines of these interpretations.

But an issue of major importance for the theory of meaning arises when we problematize this general rubric by inquiring more deeply into the theoretical space given to meaning in each approach: if Husserl sees language as a sort of calculus, how should we understand the ultimate field of objects which that calculus seeks to reach and analyze, given his notion of the vagueness and fluidity of the non-linguistic meaningfulness of the lifeworld? If for Wittgenstein language is a sort of inescapable medium, and there is no access to a standpoint "outside" it, why does he suggest that its universality and inescapability ultimately rests upon a certainty which is itself beyond the reaches of linguistic meaning? The attempt to answer these questions has lead us—as it did Husserl and Wittgenstein—to the examination of the world of lived experience and the specifically phenomenological dimension of the theory of meaning -to the *Lebenswelt* and *Lebensform*.

Whereas the task of establishing a *mathesis universalis* had initially appeared to both thinkers as a purely logical, and thus essentially a priori project, we have seen how, after Husserl's explicit transcendental turn, and around the time of Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge in 1929, both had come to place a greater emphasis on accounting for the contingencies of the experiential aspects of meaning. It became increasingly evident to both thinkers that *possible* meaning–even if conceived as containing necessary transcendental or a priori elements—could not be thought of on the model of the analytic or tautologous a priori, because of its undeniable relation to the world of immediate, everyday "lived" experience. In Wittgenstein's work from the period beginning with the *Philosophical Investigations*, *mathesis universalis*-style conceptions are rejected in favor of the notion of "form of life" [*Lebensform*], and the need to account for the essence of concepts, including the concept of *language itself*, is rejected in favor of the notions of

373 Cf. Martin Kusch, *Language as Calculus vs. Language as Medium: a Study in Husserl, Heidegger, and Gadamer,* pp. 1- 134.

"family resemblance" and "meaning-as-use." It is these well-known conceptions that most clearly evidence Wittgenstein's adherence to a "language as universal medium" view.

In Husserl's later thought, by contrast, a notion of logic as the *mathesis universalis* is maintained in the sphere of formal ontology, where it is re-conceived in terms of a transcendental logic which provides necessary, a priori formal axioms for meaning, but which is complemented by a *material* a priori consisting of essential meanings derived from lived experience. Husserl's later phenomenology is thus, in Michel Foucault's apt characterization, "trying, in effect, to anchor the rights and limitations of a formal logic in a reflection of the transcendental type, and also to link transcendental subjectivity to the implicit horizon of empirical contents, which it alone contains the possibility of constituting, maintaining, and opening up by means of infinite explications."[374] As we saw in the previous chapter, these empirical contents are treated via the logical distinction of the material from the formal a priori, so that the structures essential to contingent elements of lived experience can be ascribed a priori status without thereby ascribing any eternally-subsistent categorical validity a la the Kantian categories. This dual *logical* task of anchoring logic in something purely formal, ideal, and a priori while also taking account of the material essences revealed in contingent experience led to Husserl's parallel *ontological* distinction between a priori "formal ontology" and the diverse material regions that lie at the base of different fields of knowledge. And this division between formal and regional ontology, in turn, allowed Husserl to maintain and even to strengthen his conception of a pre-predicative, pre-linguistic level of meaning precisely where Wittgenstein—after his brief flirtation with the notion of a primary "phenomenological language"—became convinced that it was necessary to give it up.

The divergent views of the relationship of meaning, experience, and language in Husserl and Wittgenstein thus ultimately derive from their respective conceptions of the underlying "grounding" of meaning in the world of everyday life -in the strikingly parallel if fundamentally

374 Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 248.

different conceptions of *Lebenswelt* and *Lebensform*. This appears upon further examination to be not just a result of the language as a calculus vs. language as a universal medium distinction; more fundamentally, it results from the fact that, while Wittgenstein and Husserl have each worked out the heritage of the problematic of Kantian transcendental logic by turning increasingly to aspects of lived experience, they have done so in terms of fundamentally different conceptions of method and analysis.

III. b. Two Methods of Transcendental Inquiry

For Husserl, the fundamental status of the lifeworld as the origin of meaning is a result of his lifelong insistence—evident already in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*—on the complete apodicticity of logic as the theory of all possible theories. With the explicit turn to transcendental philosophy, Husserl came to recognize that his goal of fully grounding the objectivity of logic would involve not only a priori inquiry into the realm of the objective proper, but also inquiry into the subjective conditions on the basis of which the objective laws of logic arise in experience even as they transcend it. Thus, just as he posited a two-sided a priori consisting of the formal and the material, and a parallel ontological distinction between formal ontology and regional ontologies, so does he delineate a "two-sided" task for an all-encompassing logic: "Logic, as the science of all the logical as such and—in its highest form, which embraces all other forms of the logical—as the science of all sciences as such, inquires *in two opposite directions*. Everywhere it is a matter of rational productions, in a double sense: on the one side, as *productive activities and habitualities*; on the other side, as *results* produced by activities and habitualities and afterwards persisting" (FTL §8/ Hua XVII, 36- 37). The subjective side of logic, the inquiry into activity and habituality, is grounded in the vague typicalities of the lifeworld. The objective side is that investigated by the more familiar means of traditional logical and linguistic analysis: analysis based on the concept.

As we saw above, while Wittgenstein clearly shares the view that our logic and systems

of meaning are ultimately dependent upon an underlying system of eventualities and praxis, he rejects Husserl's faith in the value of further explicit *inquiry* into the subjective side, a resistance first evident in the Tractarian conception of that which can be shown but not said, and further evidenced in his rejection of the notion of a "phenomenological language" in the 1930s. As he would subsequently put it in the *Investigations*, without the aid of language, we reach the bedrock of inquiry: "'This is simply what we do.' (Remember that we sometimes demand explanations for the sake not of their content, but of their form. Our requirement is an architectural one; the explanation [Erklärung] a kind of ornamental coping that *supports nothing*.)" (PI 217, my emphasis, translation modified[375]).

Hence our claim above that these contrasting views of language as calculus and as universal medium reveal a deeper division between the thought of Husserl and Wittgenstein, a difference in their conceptions of *method and analysis*. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, despite its recognition of the "infinite task" of constantly inquiring into the ideal meaning structures constituted in experience, is nonetheless *itself conceived* as a fixed method. Even after the turn to genetic phenomenology, Husserl conceives of phenomenological inquiry as something one can step outside of and understand formally, even though the theory itself admits that its task is one that must be endlessly undertaken. *Doing* phenomenology is an ongoing task; *theorizing it* seems not to be, and Husserl himself has presumably taken care of all that is needed for defining its method. Although the results of phenomenological inquiry will change with the flow of experience in the lifeworld, the *form* of the analysis by reduction and *rückfragen* will not, and indeed it is this static nature of the *phenomenological method* which allows us to inquire into the status of meaning at the pre-linguistic level, and thereby allows us to go beyond the limits of conceptuality. On the basis of his fixed conception of the *method*, Husserl extends the notion of categories of meaning to ever more primary and pre-linguistic aspects of experience, eventually

375 Following Schulte, "Within a System," 73. For another remark emphasizing the "gratuity" of further explanation in the context of a phenomenological description of the lived body, see Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, §614.

even by means of an extension of the original Kantian conception of the region of the Transcendental Aesthetic, and through his account of prepredicative "types."

But the formally fixed nature of this deep-reaching method remains problematic from a Wittgensteinian perspective. For Wittgenstein, although transcendental considerations have led to the *formal description* of the *Lebensform* as that which underlies our inquiry, this description *itself* marks the end of meaningful inquiry. Descriptions or analyses seeking to go beyond this formal gesturing are nothing more than lip service paid to a perceived "architectural" requirement. For if the method of inquiry is itself immune to revision, then there can be no justification for engaging in the "infinite task" of the further or deeper explanation of meaning constitution:

> Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon [*Erscheinung*] in philosophical investigation: the difficulty—I could say—is not that of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a level prior to it [*Vorstufe zu ihr*]. "We have already said everything.—Not anything that follows from this, no, *this* itself is the solution!" This goes together, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation; whereas a description is the solution to the difficulty, if we give it the proper place in our considerations. When we dwell upon it, not try to get beyond it. The difficulty here is: to stop. (Zettel, §314, translation slightly modified)
>
> "Why do you demand explanations? If these are given, you will again stand before a terminus [*Ende*]. They cannot lead you any further than you are now." (Zettel, §315, quotation marks in original)

Such further inquiry was precisely what Wittgenstein had rejected in his middle period after considering the task of developing a "phenomenological language." In place of it we have the infinite variety of our language games, through which the activity of inquiry always flows back into the constitution of the logical categories themselves, in a process that only reaches description and thus the threshold of meaning at the level of those interrelated games. Wittgenstein seeks to avoid the objection of meaning-inquiry as methodological infinite regress by conceiving it as an on-going *activity* like Husserl, in terms of its task, *but also, unlike Husserl, in terms of the very theoretical establishing of those tasks and what it means to solve them.* For the later Wittgenstein, the boundaries of the inquiry are themselves always up for revision. There

can be no fixed theory, and thus, while there is constant revision, it does not follow a predefined movement that can never be satisfied. If Husserl's phenomenological theory of meaning entails an infinite *task*, Wittgenstein's consists of a constant and multifarious *coping*.

§IV. Conclusion: The Phenomenological Dimension of Meaning

But despite these important methodological differences and divergent conceptions of the role of language, both Husserl and Wittgenstein arrive at final conceptions of meaning which return to the inexact, non-linguistic, phenomenological dimension of experiential life. For Wittgenstein, although language remains a "universal medium," outside of which nothing meaningful can be *said,* the ultimate rootedness of our language games in the meaningful activities of our form of life is nonetheless *shown* in our everyday praxis. Thus Wittgenstein's conception of meaning still relies upon the notion of a phenomenological dimension—that of the inexact, quasi-foundational role played by our *form(s) of life*—despite his insistence on the exclusively formal, never material contribution of this transcendental level to the structure of meaning. For Husserl, language functions as a "calculus" which allows us to grasp individual meanings with conceptual exactness, despite those meanings' preconceptual origination in the flux and vagueness of the *lifeworld*, the more primary—if inexact—world in which meanings originate through the process of constitution. In both cases, the structure of meaning is rooted in a broader, amorphous, inexact structure of *meaningfulness*, a dimension accessible phenomenologically, although it defies exact linguistic or conceptual analysis. The phenomenological dimension guarantees—throughout ongoing inquiry and even in the face of the constant revision of the boundaries of that inquiry—the relatedness of our systems of meaning to everyday action and experiential life.

In neither case is the characteristic vagueness, non-conceptual status, and incomplete analyzability of this dimension of meaning seen as a detriment. What appears from the standpoint of linguistic and conceptual analysis to be an unfortunate inexactness is in terms of the later conceptions of both philosophers not the result of incomplete analysis, but of a recognition of the

ontological primacy of the lived and fundamentally social phenomenon of *meaningfulness* that characterizes our experience in a way that outstrips conceptual and linguistic representation. We have argued in this dissertation that this amounts to the recognition of certain *phenomenological* insights into meaning, insights ultimately justified not by further strategies of analysis or experimental observation but by earnest appeal to the tribunal of lived experience, to that which fundamentally characterizes our meaningful conscious life; to the phenomenological dimension of meaning. If our account of this inexact and experiential dimension of the theory of meaning is correct, it can be seen to lend theoretical support to a wide variety of methods of philosophical inquiry not conceived as forms of exact analysis. For it suggests—or, we should like to say, simply *reminds us*—that meaning in its most fundamental form is not a schema of objects for analysis but the structure of experience through which we *live*.

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