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Zoe Robbin, April 9, 2019

Tribalism and Power in the Sanctioning of Sexual Harassment:
A Qualitative Study from a Jordanian University

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Abstract

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By Zoe Robbin

The fallout of the #MeToo movement has prompted a global reckoning with institutional power structures and the positions of women within them. The movement has focused on sexual harassment within schools, workplaces, and on the streets. Following incidents of harassment, there is widespread recognition of the barriers many women face during help-seeking and reporting. However, there is a lack of research discussing the specific bases of organizational power that enable a climate of tolerance towards harassers. This study attempts to address this gap in the literature by focusing on institutional responses to sexual harassment at a Jordanian university. Specifically, this study focuses on the mechanisms through which tribal organizations modify the bases of power within Jordan, and how this power impacts the sanctioning of sexual harassment on campus. To answer these research questions, this study applies French and Raven's model of the Bases of Social Power to the results of six focus group discussions with students at a Jordanian university (French and Raven, 1959). French and Raven's model of social power enables an innovative analysis of the relative impacts of tribal power and institutional sanctioning on harassing behavior. This study finds support for the conceptualization of tribal affiliation as a modifier of social power. In addition, the results provide evidence that harassers rely on coercive, referent, and legitimate bases of power, while potential targets may rely exclusively on coercive power. Tribal power was also modified by gender, suggesting that gender also functions as a form of legitimate social power. Based on these results, I provide a recommendation for policymakers and institutional architects to increase protections for sexual harassment survivors during the reporting and sanctioning process. Because the negative implications of help-seeking are often social, this may center around the provision of platforms and safe spaces for student activists to organize and train together. I hope this analysis of organizational power will benefit policymakers across the globe as they seek to cultivate institutional climates that are conducive to gender equity.

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Contents

Introduction

In October 2017, the #MeToo movement began as an expression of solidarity against sexual harassment. The movement gained traction globally, triggering an international discussion about gendered abuses of power. In their activism during the #MeToo Movement, Arab feminists have launched a number of campaigns, from the "Not Your Habibti" brand in Palestine to the #MeshBasita (Not Okay) campaign in Lebanon.

The global nature of the #MeToo movement demonstrates both the pervasiveness and the severity of sexual harassment. Workplace sexual harassment is particularly problematic as it represents a barrier to women's economic participation in the labor force. The scandals revealed during the #MeToo movement provide a snapshot of the social forces that concurrently empower male harassers, while preventing women from seeking help or reporting. Over the past two years, many women have come forward about the direct and indirect pressure to remain tacit in response to harassment. Within corporations and universities, policymakers are coping with these forces as they seek to develop institutions that ensure women's safety and equity.

In this context, an analysis of sexual harassment that incorporates organizational power is particularly relevant. Policymakers must grasp the conscious and unconscious forms of power that function within organizations. These sources of power are often derived from social norms that extend beyond organizations, permeating the society. In this study, I have attempted to provide a framework for evaluating organizational power based on shared perceptions of cultural norms and social bases of power. While this study focuses on a Jordanian university, this framework may serve policymakers and institutional architects across cultures and institutions. Jordan is not unique in its prevalence of sexual harassment, and this framework may be useful around the globe.

In Jordan, sexual harassment is endemic for women in the labor force. A 2018 report from the Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development found over half of Jordanian women and nearly 75 percent of Syrian refugees in Jordan who informally sought legal consultation for workplace issues reported sexual harassment (AARD, 2018). The report also provided evidence that sexual harassment is drastically underreported in Jordan's legal and institutional channels. In addition, Jordanian women are vastly underrepresented in the workforce and more than twice as likely to be unemployed than men (Norimine, 2015).

In contrast to other countries in the region, Jordan's lack of female representation within the workforce does not stem from a lack of qualified candidates. More Jordanian women attend university than Jordanian men (Sweiss, 2018). In addition, unemployed Jordanian women are more likely to have post-secondary degrees than unemployed Jordanian men (Norimine, 2015). Though women are represented in universities, they are less able to take advantage of economic opportunities afforded to men through higher education. It is vital to analyze the mechanisms through which women are underprivileged within universities. By focusing on sexual harassment in higher education, this study attempts to analyze one barrier at a vital precipice on the path to economic participation.

In addition, evaluating women's positions in Jordanian universities provides insight into the organizational power dynamics. Because more women attend university than men, explanations for sexual harassment that focus on women's underrepresentation fail to apply in this setting. Instead, I will evaluate women's organizational power in a context in which women are overrepresented. I will rely primarily on French and Raven's model for the Bases of Social Power (French and Raven, 1959). This model provides a framework to conceptualize the power of different actors within an organization, while recognizing that power frequently extends beyond

the university campus. French and Raven's model recognizes five bases of power: legitimate, coercive, reward, referent, and expert power. Individuals or social groups may draw on these bases to exert power over an individual in causing him or her to perform a desired action (French and Raven, 1959). In addition to evaluating an individual's power, the model allows researchers to weigh this power in lieu of organizational and social sanctions. As policymakers struggle to design institutions that prevent sexual harassment, it is vital to analyze the relative impact of institutional sanctions.

I will focus on one modifier of power throughout this thesis: tribal organizations. This focus on Jordanian tribes is motivated by several factors. First, tribes represent a powerful pillar of civil society within Jordan. An analysis of Jordanian history demonstrates the powerful role tribes have played in supporting and legitimizing the nation's political institutions. While the structure and function of tribal organizations is evolving, they retain influence on university campuses, as demonstrated by the outbreak of several inter-tribal fights on university campuses over the past three years. This thesis attempts to put a pulse on the conscious and unconscious influence of tribalism by positioning affiliation as a form of legitimate and socially-accepted power (from French and Raven's Social Bases, 1959)[1]. The pervasiveness of tribal power within the Jordanian political sphere necessitates an analysis to understand how this power influences formal and informal sanctioning of sexual harassment.

In addition, tribes in Jordan are a significantly understudied aspect of civil society. Since the 1990s, civil society has been recognized as a bedrock of democratization within Western scholarship. Within this category of civil society organizations are labor unions, human rights organizations, political parties, independent newspapers, and universities (Antoun, 2000). Held

[1] French and Raven's Bases of Power are defined with examples on page 48.

against this civil society standard, Jordanian institutions appear weak compared with the United States or the United Kingdom. However, as Richard Antoun argues, this definition of civil society is not a politically or culturally appropriate concept for Jordan or many of its Levantine neighbors (Antoun, 2000). This conceptualization fails to consider tribes and Islamic courts as forums for conflict resolution, political discourse, and information diffusion. Because Western scholars have defined tribes by their nomadism, the evolution of tribes into sedentary organizations that promote social mobility and dialogue has gone unnoticed. Instead, most Western social scientists have reported on the decline of tribes since the 1950s (Antoun, 2000). As Antoun argues, the transformation of Trans-Jordanian tribal groups from nomadic to sedentary illustrates a shift in the Jordanian economy and polity, rather than a decline in tribalism.

Recognizing tribalism as a form of civil society is relevant for not only scholars of political science, but also for scholars of women's rights. In many instances, including some cases of adultery, the strength of tribal law overpowers that of codified state laws. In addition, the Jordanian political and legal system is positioned to respect tribal law in matters related to honor. At the 1973 Palace Convention, tribal representatives met with government advisors to agree upon the bounds of state and tribal law. Though this agreement was never codified, the leaders agreed that tribal law would remain preeminent in three specific matters: killing (*qatl*), honor (*ird*), and violating truces (*taqti al-wajh*) (Watkins, 2014). Because cases involving women's conduct are commonly cases of familial honor (*'ird*), this delineation demonstrates a tribal base of judicial legitimacy over women. As I will argue, an examination of this relationship between tribal, state, and institutional power is critical to understanding the treatment of women within society. This judicial overlap also provides a foundation to consider tribal affiliation as a form of legitimate power within French and Raven's Social Bases.

The aim of this study is to analyze the mechanisms through which tribal organizations impact the sanctioning of sexual harassment at a Jordanian university. My first chapter will describe the historic role of Jordanian tribes and their relationship with the Hashemite monarchy. This chapter will serve as the foundation for my argument that tribes are a socially-accepted source of power, in contrast to the weakness of most other civil society institutions. My second chapter will describe the treatment of women across the civil society spectrum. I will particularly focus on the treatment of women within tribes and the perpetuation of patriarchal values. My third chapter will include my analysis of six focus group discussions conducted with Jordanian university students about sexual harassment. Through these discussions, my study finds evidence that tribes modify the bases of social power on a Jordanian campus.

By qualitatively measuring the influence of tribal organizations, this research provides a framework for institutional architects to design improved reporting and sanctioning mechanisms. Though the study of tribes is a politically controversial task, I hope this thesis can take a nuanced approach to address a substantial gap in the literature about Jordanian civil society. As I will discuss in my concluding chapter, sexual harassment in Jordan is not unique in the region or globally. Though this study focuses on tribes, I hope a similar framework can be applied to measure culturally-powerful social networks in regions around the world.

Chapter 1: Tribalism and Power in Jordan

Throughout Jordan's history, tribes have served as a pillar of civil society. In the 19th and 20th centuries, intra-tribal mechanisms for conflict resolution worked to adjudicate personal disputes, while inter-tribal mechanisms for diplomacy worked to maintain peace. In this chapter, I will examine the mechanisms through which Jordanian tribes entered into symbiotic relationships with the Hashemite monarchy, and how these relationships are evolving today. The goal of this

chapter is to contrast the power of tribes with the feebleness of political parties and women's organizations. This history will provide a justification for my focus on tribal organizations, rather than other political forces, in understanding the response to sexual harassment at the University of Jordan.

The term "tribe" or *'ashira* has been used as a functional political label and a reductive construct. During the colonial period, British officials labelled tribal groups and defined the terms of tribal affiliation in their efforts to control the region. At home, these officials often invoked the term "tribe" as a symbol of backwardness, reducing the people of Transjordan while justifying colonial rule. More recently, the Hashemite monarchy has invoked the word "tribe" in its cultivation of Jordanian nationalism. Upon tribalism, the state has built a shared character and common history, epitomized by East Bank Bedouin history (Watkins, 2014).

These examples demonstrate the political manipulations of tribal history to create a static monolith. Tribal history, however, is better illustrated as an overlapping mosaic of histories and cultures. While tribes continue to evolve from nomadic groups into sedentary and electronically connected networks, the term itself remains relevant. As I will demonstrate throughout this chapter, tribes are not disappearing, rather they are adapting.

Throughout this chapter, I hope to illustrate the mechanisms that concurrently legitimize tribal and monarchical power. I will argue that as tribal identity supersedes state identity, supra-tribal institutions have superseded democratic institutions in their power. Even with their ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity, East Bank tribes constitute a pillar of civil society and the most formidable domestic check on Hashemite power. Although I will not discuss the unique histories of each tribe, I will draw a distinction between Transjordanian (East Bank) tribes and Palestinian (West Bank) tribes in their relations with the Hashemite monarchy and participation in Jordan's

limited democracy. Specifically, I hope to demonstrate that Jordanian citizens in East Bank tribes are extended a higher degree of political influence relative to West Bank Palestinian tribes.

At the same time, I hope to recognize the evolution of tribes in response to institutional change. Centuries of policies designed to sedentarize nomadic tribes have resulted the development of villages and urban centers. Although tribes were once defined by their nomadic lifestyle, I will use Eugene Rogan's definition of a modern tribe as "a social group defined in genealogical and territorial terms. Genealogy is taken here in a political rather than biological sense. While not necessarily linked by DNA, fellow tribesmen acknowledge a common ancestor as part of a shared foundation myth and history" (Rogan, 2002). While the nature of Jordanian tribes is changing, they remain a powerful pillar of the Hashemite government.

1.1 Tribes in Jordanian History

During the Ottoman Empire, the majority of Transjordanian tribes were nomadic (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010a). Other groups lived in towns as peasants or *fellaheen*, or in urban centers including Amman, Jerash, and Madaba (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010a). Based on this nomadism, individuals defined their identity through their tribe (*'ashira*) and kinship relations, rather than the nominal state in power (Torki & Salameh, 2017)(Torki & Salameh, 2017). Within these tribes, elders or *Shaykhs* served as the central authority in disputes.

Rather than remaining mutually exclusive, settled (*hadari*) and nomadic (*'asha'ari*) Jordanian tribes constantly interacted and intermarried (Watkins, 2014). To maintain security, people relied on intra or inter-tribal protection agreements, rather than centralized state power (Torki & Salameh, 2017). Throughout Ottoman rule, Transjordanian tribes functioned without a central authority or state. Instead, villages commonly paid a more powerful tribe to protect them, through an agreement known as the *khuwa* (Watkins, 2014).

This form of nomadic tribalism was incompatible with the modern nation-state, which requires a shared national identity and centralized power (Torki & Salameh, 2017). After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the League of Nations placed Palestine and Transjordan under the British Mandate (Rogan, 2002). In 1921, Winston Churchill selected Abdullah I to be the Emir of Transjordan. Abdullah I was the son of King Hussein of Hijaz, the recognized leader of a pan-Arab uprising against the Ottoman Empire during World War I known as the Great Arab Revolt (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010a). In addition, Emir Abdullah was a member of the Hashemite family, which claims lineage from the prophet Mohammad.

Although Abdullah was apt to govern the territory of Transjordan, his true aspirations lay in the formation of a Pan-Arab state (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010a). In pursuit of this goal, the Emir failed to distinguish between Palestinian and Jordanian identity, a national cleavage which would vex the future state (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010a)

When the future King Abdullah arrived in Transjordan, it was a barren and underpopulated region. In 1922, the Tribal Administration Department reported nearly half of the Transjordanian population lived in nomadic tribes (Watkins, 2014). To establish hegemony over these tribes and develop the land, the King depended on extensive financial and military support from the British. Based on his political and religious claims, Emir Abdullah and his British supporters began the process of forging a nation from a web of competing and autonomous tribes.

To rule the Transjordanians, Emir Abdullah sought not to compete with, but to participate in tribal power structures. He cultivated loyalty among the tribes based on a system of patrimonialism, creating competition for land, resources, and government ranks (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010a). In addition, Emir Abdullah and British officials attempted to oversee tribal courts, in an effort to codify laws for the Bedouin population (Watkins, 2014). This surveillance

and legislation was aimed at sedentarizing nomadic tribes, a process that would enable the state to establish firm borders (Watkins, 2014).

In addition to the Hashemite monarchy, the future Jordanian Army invoked tribal power structures in building its legitimacy. Frederick G. Peake and Captain John Glubb were the British officials tasked with organizing a military force capable of legitimizing Emir Abdullah and asserting control over the Transjordanian tribes (Jureidini, 1984a). Rather than compete, Glubb channeled tribalism in creating the Desert Mobile Force. Glubb was careful to maintain tribal hegemony within army ranks, consistently placing men from powerful tribes in positions of power (Jureidini, 1984a). With the understanding that the son of a tribal Sheikh should never be subordinate to the son of an unranking member, these British officials created a military that reflected and enforced tribal structures. While Bedouin tribes in particular had previously approached state organizations with distrust, Glubb soon proved the value of his army. He used these forces to defend Transjordanians against Arabian Wahhabi attacks and settle disputes between tribes (Jureidini, 1984a). The Desert Mobile Force would later become the basis for the Arab Legion and the Jordan Arab Army (Jureidini, 1984a). For Transjordanian civilians, the structure and organization of tribes remained largely unchanged throughout this period. As Paul A. Jureidini and R.D. McLaurin argue in their book *Jordan: The Impact of Social Change on the Role of the Tribes*,

> *"Few tribesmen, and even relatively few of the settled population in the principle towns - Salt, Irbid, Karak, and Amman - paid any attention to, or were aware of, the role of the British, the nature of the mandate, or the intentions of Abdullah to govern Transjordan"* (Jureidini, 1984a).

In 1946 following World War II, the Jordanian National Movement achieved independence. Two years later, the Arab-Israeli War further confounded the issue of Jordanian national identity, as half a million Palestinian refugees flooded the banks of the Jordan river (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010a).

Although King Abdullah and later King Hussein hoped to integrate Palestinians within the Jordanian nation, this would prove unsuccessful. The 1948 displacement of Palestinians disrupted West Bank tribal networks (Bīk, 1958a). Because the Palestinian population was more urbanized that the Transjordanian population, these West Bank tribal networks were significantly weaker prior to the war. In 1949, the Jordanian Nationality Act of 1928 was amended to extend equal citizenship rights to Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and within Trans-Jordanian territory, annexing the West Bank into Jordan (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010a). By this time, Palestinians outnumbered Trans-Jordanians among the Jordanian citizenry by a ratio of three to one.

The influx of Palestinians into Jordan disrupted the delicate political establishment. King Hussein attempted to Jordanize the Palestinians through nationalist rhetoric (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010a), however they remained excluded from East Bank tribal networks. With over 60 percent of the Jordanian citizenry excluded from this system of tribal patrimonialism, Palestinians began to develop political networks of their own (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010a).

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) enabled Palestinians to organize politically against Israel, however this level Palestinian political mobilization soon became a source of instability in Jordan (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010a). At the same time, King Abdullah continued to present East Bank Bedouin culture as the paradigm of the Jordanian people and history. During the 1950s, King Hussein came to power and the Hashemite monarchy passed a constitution, which remains the basis of Jordanian rule today (Abdel-Samad, 2017a). Though Article 24 of the

constitution states that “the Nation is the source of all powers,” it also provides the king with complete legal immunity (Abdel-Samad, 2017a). In addition, it allows the king to call and dismiss parliament as he wishes (Abdel-Samad, 2017a). In 1957, following an alleged military coup attempt, King Hussein declared martial law an outlawed political parties, forcing these Palestinian-Jordanians to organize covertly (Anderson, 2005).

Following the 1967 Six Day War, Jordanian national identity was shaken by an armed conflict known as Black September (Salibi, 1998). As the Jordanians lost control of the West Bank during the Six Day War, Palestinian guerrilla fighters known as *feyadeen* moved east into Jordan. Over the next two years, these fighters began actively calling for an overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy (Salibi, 1998). By 1970, Yasser Arafat led the PLO against the Jordanian Armed Forces and King Hussein. The Jordanian Armed Forces targeted urban centers like Amman and Zarqa, which housed the majority of Palestinians (Salibi, 1998).

This civil war between Palestinians and Trans-Jordanians led to a redefined Jordanian identity and political establishment. Transjordanian identity reemerged with unique characteristics, including East Bank Bedouin culture, Islamic religion, and Hashemite origin (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010a). Palestinians continued to operate outside tribal institutions of power, instead relying on Islamist or Pan-Arab organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. This war created an antagonistic relationship between the Hashemite monarchy and its Palestinian subjects. Although some Palestinian families banded together to form tribe-like organizations, they remained an underrepresented majority within the Jordanian government (Watkins, 2014).

Despite the sedentarization process, which brought the nomadic population to below four percent (Bīk, 1958a), Jordanian tribes maintained their political power and influence throughout the following decade. The monarchy continued to hamstring political organization outside of its

interaction with East Bank Tribes. The restrictions on political parties primarily impacted Palestinian refugees, many of whom existed outside of these tribal networks. Although the nature of his relationship with the tribes changed, King Hussein remained dependent on this system of patrimonialism, strategically appointing East Bank tribal leaders to high government and military posts. In other instances, patrimonialism took the form of infrastructure projects or outright monetary gifts. Because political parties remained banned since the 1950s, tribes remained the dominant form of political dialogue and consent.

Throughout Jordanian history, the domains of tribal and state law often overlapped or outright conflicted. In 1976, the monarchy formally abolished tribal law, with consent and input from tribal representatives (Watkins, 2014). In preparation, representatives from the major East Bank tribes met with members of the Jordanian security service to draft a list of recommendations about the potential cooperation between tribal and state law. The 1974 Palace Convention, though not legally codified, represented a mutual understanding between the Hashemite monarchy and East Bank tribes on the bounds of tribal law (Watkins, 2014).

At the 1974 Palace Convention, these tribal leaders reached an agreement with the state that all tribal law would be subsidiary to civil law, with three notable exceptions (Watkins, 2014). For cases dealing with killing (*qatl*), honor (*ird*), and violating truces (*taqti al-wajh*), tribal adjudication systems would remain preeminent (Watkins, 2014). For this thesis, the delineation of cases of honor within the domain of tribal law is especially significant, as this category encompasses issues of sexual modesty and women's behavior. Although this agreement lacked legal codification, it is recognized and cited by tribal leaders, police officers, and administrative governors (Watkins, 2014). Because tribal organizations were largely autonomous, the abolition of tribal law had little impact on their functioning. Over the following two decades, tribes in Jordan

would be forced to adapt to a liberalized political climate and the resumption of parliamentary elections (Alatiyat & Barari, 2010a).

1.2 Tribes and Political Parties After 1989

1989 marked a shift in the Jordanian political arena, with the resumption of parliamentary elections. In 1989, the Jordanian government was forced to levy high taxes due to its outstanding debts to the IMF and the World Bank (Lowrance, 1998). Demonstrations erupted across the country as the populace demanded an end to the austerity measure (Robinson, 1998). The riots were diffused in the following year, as the king agreed to extend more political representation to the Jordanian people. Notably, these rioters protested the high price of commodities and the weakening relationship between East Bank tribes and the Hashemite monarchy (Robinson 1998). There was little grassroots mobilization demanding increased formal representation through the parliament (Robinson 1998).

In 1992, the IMF debt crisis and subsequent demonstrations resulted in the passage of the National Charter of Civil Liberties or *al-mithaq*, a set of supportive guidelines for political organization. While the document affirmed the Hashemite family's position as the leaders of Jordan, it also legalized political parties for the first time in Jordanian history. Since the passage of the National Charter, the press has been extended greater freedoms and the secret police reduced their activity (Lowrance, 1998). Although King Hussein did allow for parliamentary elections, he hamstrung political organizations with a variety of convoluted and specific regulations. In *Defensive Democratization in Jordan* (1998), Glenn Robinson points out that parliament's primary achievement was to approve Jordan's agreement with the IMF, the source of protests (Robinson, 1998). Rather than increase political dialogue, parliamentary elections provided King Hussein with a scapegoat. Robinson argues that in Jordan, "the democratization program has been directed from

the beginning by the regime, and should be seen as a means of strengthening the regime's position in society, not as an example of the regime yielding to domestic forces" (Robinson 1998).

In this era of liberalization, tribal organizations were forced to formalize their networks of power to achieve government representation. In the 1989 elections, the Muslim Brotherhood achieved a plurality of seats, with 34 candidates elected to the lower house of parliament (Holdo, 2016). Considering most Jordanian citizens are Palestinian, this outcome is not surprising. These Islamist parliamentary seats displaced those allocated to loyalist tribal factions. In a demonstration of his loyalty to the tribes, the king revised the electoral law by royal decree, changing the voting system from Block Voting to the Single Non-Transferable Vote ("One Man, One Vote"). This meant that Jordanian voters were no longer able to cast multiple ballots, forcing them to choose between a tribal and ideological representative.

As expected, this change in the electoral law strengthened tribal representation within parliament (Buttorff, 2015). This prioritization was largely motivated by the informal system of patrimonialism, in which each social clan requires an interlocutor or *wasta* to extract economic and political benefits from the state. Because prominent family names are heavily tied to their tribal identity, tribal candidates run as an independents, with their family name serving as a signal of their affiliation (Buttorff, 2015)

Although political parties were formally legalized in 1992, King Hussein continued to empower tribal power above political parties. . Following this electoral change, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), an ideological offshoot from the Muslim Brotherhood (Buttorff, 2015) was significantly weakened within parliament. In the 2007 elections, the IAF nominated only 22 candidates over 45 districts, with the understanding that tribal organization within most districts would preclude the nomination of a political candidate (Buttorff, 2015). More so than any other

political party or forum, Palestinians are welcomed into the upper echelons of leadership within the IAF (Robinson 1998), a factor which may contribute to their sidelining. In addition, cities which are heavily populated by Palestinians are subject to malapportionment, leading to the over-representation of East Bank tribes (Robinson 1998).

At the same time, East Bank tribes have adapted to Jordan's new electoral law. While the single vote has benefited tribal representation, the electoral law has also forced tribes to unify around a candidate. If tribes are divided over their political candidate, they risk losing representation. For example, in 1993 the Al-Tarawneh tribe in Karak was unable to select a single candidate, splitting their vote across six tribal representatives (Buttorff, 2015). Although the tribe is relatively large, this vote splitting resulted in their loss of a parliamentary seat (Buttorff, 2015). Other tribes, such as the large Bani Hani tribe in Irbid, hold a *Diwan* or informal primary to decide on their candidate (Buttorff, 2015). Although primaries are less common, this practice demonstrates the adaptation of Jordanian tribes to the new political landscape.

While the urbanization of Jordan has led to the geographic decentralization of tribal members, political liberalization is now serving to link tribes with a regional district. During elections, large tribes often provide complementary bus service to transport their urban members to district polling stations (Buttorff, 2015). In contrast to their nomadic origins, today's Jordanian tribes are tied to a geographic voting district. In addition, non-tribal members are increasingly able to rely on tribal systems of conflict mediation, depending on their geographic proximity to tribal bases. This can be reflected in the evolving role of tribal officials such as Shaykhs, who now serve as civil actors and mediators for local residents within and outside of tribal networks (Watkins, 2014).

This emphasis on geography, in addition to kinship, has led to an expansion of tribal functioning and membership. In 1999, King Abdullah II succeeded King Hussein. King Abdullah has continued to support nationalist organizations which aid in the transformation of East Bank Bedouin identity into a symbol of Jordanian nationalism. In 2002, King Abdullah launched the Jordan First campaign intended to unify the Jordanian people (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010). The imagery used in the Jordan First campaign heavily centered around Bedouin, nomadic ethnic groups, ostensibly promoting a theory of shared national origin for all Jordanians. The Jordan First campaign is a clear example of the Hashemite monarchy's continued efforts to empower and legitimize East Bank tribal legitimacy. In the following section, I will explain the coexistence of East Bank tribes and the Jordanian government. As the Hashemite monarchy has been forced to liberalize, strengthening its democratic institutions, tribes have adapted to the new political structure. The continue to represent a pillar of civil society, with power to influence policy and wage counter demonstrations.

1.3 Framing Tribes as a Pillar of Civil Society

Although some tribes and political parties inhabit similar roles within parliament, their dissimilarities lie outside the sphere of formal government. In addition to soliciting patrimonial benefits, tribal institutions fulfill civil society roles such as conflict mediation. While Jordanians have the option to use civil courts to settle their disputes, many opt to use tribal structures for conflict mediation. Most commonly, tribal courts have been used to rapidly settle auto accidents and occupational injury cases (Watkins, 2014), a fact which demonstrates the durability of this institution.

Over the past two decades, Western social scientists have focused on the concept of civil society in measuring citizen participation, government accountability, and levels of

democratization within countries. The most common definition of civil society has evolved to be organizations outside the family where people voluntarily associate to advance their political interests (Antoun, 1972). Within this category of civil society organizations are labor unions, human rights organizations, political parties, independent newspapers, and universities (Antoun, 2000). Through this Western political lens, civil society organizations are recognized as a bedrock of democratization and citizen participation.

Despite this trend towards inclusivity, the definition is wanting in its applicability and relevance to the Jordanian political arena. As Richard Antoun argues in Civil Society, Tribal Process, and Change in Jordan: An Anthropological View (2000), this ethnocentric definition of civil society leads scholars to neglect one of the most resilient and powerful institutions in the Jordanian political arena: tribes. For example, one Brookings Institution report about Jordanian civil society mentions tribes a single time in reference to their "taming" (Jarrah, 2009) . Because Western scholars have defined tribes by their nomadism, many social scientists have reported on the decline of tribes since the 1950s (Antoun, 2000). Instead, the transformation of Transjordanian tribal groups from nomadic to sedentary illustrates a shift in the Jordanian economy and polity, rather than a decline in tribalism overall.

In some dimensions, tribes have provided a check on monarchical power. It is customary for Hashemite rulers to discuss and receive consent from tribal leaders for new economic policies. When the monarch and tribal leaders disagree, tribal networks are also invoked to demonstrate. As recently as February of 2019, the Beni Hassan tribe, the second largest tribe in Jordan, was instrumental in organizing opposition to the government's taxes on fuel and basic goods (Ersan, 2019). Members of the Bedouin Beni al-Abbadi have also been vocal in countering government

corruption. However, this civic participation has a notable exception: women are nearly absent from the organizing process.

Rather than weakening, many tribal organizations are becoming increasingly complex and organized in their political participation (Buttorff, 2015). The digital era has brought another dimension to tribalism by allowing members to remain connected despite geographic distance. For example, the Al-Serhan tribe maintains a tribal website to update its members about elections and other events in a digital form of retribalization (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008). Tribal networks have even been established abroad in cities like Chicago and Detroit (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008). Some scholars have referred to the transformation of tribes as neo-tribalism (Kao, 2015).

The power of tribes translates into university campuses. This social reality can be demonstrated by the recent resurgence of tribal-related violence on university campuses. As noted by the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* there were 80 documented instances of tribally-motivated violence on university campuses in 2017 (Sweis, 2018). In future chapters, I hope to examine how the pervasiveness of tribal power impacts sexual harassment. The ubiquity of tribal power within Jordan, in addition to its historic basis, provides a robust foundation to consider tribalism as a form of legitimate social power, according to French and Raven (French and Raven, 1959).

Recognizing tribalism as a form of civil society is particularly relevant for scholars of women's movements. As discussed in the previous section, the 1974 Palace Convention affirmed the supremacy of state law, yet reserved cases of honor for tribal courts and mechanisms of adjudication (Watkins, 2014). In these cases, it is common for a woman's male relatives to lead the adjudication process (Watkins, 2014). In the following chapter, I will discuss these internal

power dynamics of tribes within Jordan. I will specifically focus on the roles of women within and across tribes.

Chapter 2: Women in Modern Jordan

Jordan's modern legal structure melds together Islamic, tribal, civil, and international jurisprudence. While the Jordanian state and international bodies have attempted to impose top-down policies to extend equal rights to Jordanian women, tribal law remains the most salient. The following chapter will provide an overview of women's participation in politics and their roles within tribes. In combination with the previous chapter, which established tribes as a vital component of political power, I argue that tribes have maintained rigid gender roles despite international political pressure. A key focus of this chapter will be the concurrence and conflict between tribal and civil laws. As demonstrated in the previous chapter by the Palace Conference of 1974, the government continues to respect tribal hegemony over matters related to family honor, which often involve women's behavior (Watkins, 2014). In addition to the Palace Conference, this discussion of women and tribal law will provide evidence that tribal power remains salient over women. This tribal influence in the domain of women's honor is a key factor motivating this study's focus on tribal power in sexual harassment mediation.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the treatment and activism of Jordanian women in the political arena and tribe. The first section will discuss the treatment of women under tribal law. In the second and third section, I will discuss women's political participation through women's groups and political parties, with a focus on Jordan's major political party, the IAF. While the women's movement was active in Modern Jordan, it often functioned in coordination with the globalist human rights establishment through the United Nations and other bodies. The following section will focus on the passage of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) passed by the United Nations in 1979 (Bydoon, 2011a), and its recommendation for Jordan to implement a quota system.

2.1 Women in Tribal Law

Tribes include networks of clans related through patriarchal ancestors. As discussed in the previous chapter, the majority of Transjordanian inhabitants lived within nomadic tribes prior to the British Mandate. Each clan is divided into family groups (*ham'ula*), many of which can trace their lineage back for over ten generations (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008). The harsh conditions of nomadic life rendered tribal cohesion imperative, leading these groups to develop a rigid social structure and to prioritize tribal loyalty. Economic egalitarianism was emphasized between clans and family groups to prevent violence or inter-tribal theft (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008). Within these clans, male elders served as the source of authority and were required to approve any marriages and mediate social conflicts (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008).

While women were expected to work alongside men, they were viewed as objects of male control. This can be viewed in the exchange of blood money between tribes, in which a responsible or negligent party provides compensation to the family of the descendant. Until 1936, Jordanian tribes were permitted to exchange a daughter or young woman if money was not available (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008). This woman or girl was typically permitted to return to her original tribe after giving birth to a son, who could, theoretically, replace the murdered tribal member (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008).

Due to the nature of oral histories, we are unable to examine historical gender roles within tribes. However, tribal poems and tales provide insight into the way that gender was conceptualized. A famous story involves a woman named Um Salama from the Kinanan tribe. During a tribal raid, she was taken captive and married to a member of a different tribe. After 11

years, Um Salama was able to return to her original tribe but refused. In response to her refusal, her father killed her and ten female infants born to his clan (Sonbol, 2003). Other traditional love stories romanticize obedient, clean, and chaste women.

Though the advent of Islam impacted the structure and functioning of tribes, local custom often took precedent over Quranic law in many regions. One example of this is related to adultery punishments. As discussed above, one of the top goals of nomadic tribal groups was to maximize cohesion. Due to the interconnectedness of familial honor and female chastity, tribes often imposed deadly punishments on adulteresses. This death penalty directly conflicts which Islam, which advocates for non-lethal, public punishments in response to sex outside of marriage (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008)[2].

Because the clan was valued more than the individual, a woman who disobeyed tribal honor codes (*'ird*) brought shame upon her entire family. A woman caught having sex outside of marriage tarnished the family reputation, and it was unlikely that her sisters would marry (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008). Because this family reputation and honor was more important than life, a woman's male relatives often tried to cleanse the family by removing the "unclean" (*al'jerba*) woman (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008). This practice is known as an honor killing, and persists today, despite women's activism against the issue. I will go into more detail about this activism in the following section on women's organizations. Notably, the tribal approach to adulterating women differs from the approach applied to adulterating men. For a man who has transgressed tribal honor codes, his family may renounce him as a member of their family or clan. This means that the family will not demand retribution, revenge, or compensation in the event that he is killed (Furr & Al-Serhan,

[2] For a more in-depth discussion on religious discourse, see Lilia Labidi's "Islamic Law, Feminism, and Family," in From Patriarchy to Empowerment, ed. Valentine Moghadam (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2007), 278-292.

2008). These differences applied to men and women demonstrate the objectification and subjugation of women within East Bank tribes. During periods of nomadism, familial honor was determined by strength and valor in inter-tribal raids (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008). Today, theft or raiding is associated with shame (Watkins, 2014). Rather than being determined by male valor, "tribal honor today has been placed almost exclusively on the shoulders of women" (Sonbol, 2003).

In addition to maintaining familial honor (*sharaf*) in the face of female disobedience, tribal organizations have mechanisms to restore honor following an economic, political or social dispute. Among these dispute resolution practices are the *wasta* (intermediator), *jaha* (the delegation sent on behalf of an offending party), *'atwa* (temporary truce signed between the kin of disputing families), and the *sulh* (the final reconciliation between the two parties) (Watkins, 2014). Over the past three decades, the concept of *wasta* has developed to refer to an institutional or governmental interlocutor who can help the tribe secure economic or political benefits. Because women's honor falls under the domain of tribal law, it is important to note that women are excluded from these processes of dispute mediation. In the previous chapter, I discussed Richard T. Antoun's argument that tribes function in modern Jordan as an aspect of civil society (Antoun, 2000). One example Antoun provided concerned the mediation of a divorce settlement between a man and his wife's father (Antoun, 2000). Although the tribal processes of dispute mediation functioned successfully in this case, Antoun barely mentions the interest of the daughter and wife. Excluded from negotiation and settlement process, the wife is not able to benefit from these patriarchal structures.

Additionally, the Jordanian legal system is positioned to respect tribal honor. Jordanian law recognizes two rights in criminal cases, the public right (*Al-Haq al'am*) and a personal right (*Al-Haq a'Shakhsey*). The public right is satisfied by the state judiciary system, while the personal right allows tribes to exert influence over the process. For example, in cases involving murder,

payment of blood money may satisfy the private right and cause the state to reduce the penalty to the minimum sentence (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008). The police force also respect tribal law, as demonstrated in an issue of the official police magazine, *Al-Shurta*, in an article about tribal traditions which stated:

> *"Tribal customs preserve the restoration of social balance after a crime has occurred and complete procedures to the satisfaction of all sides by preserving community cohesion after treating the violation that has occurred... What is remarkable here is that tribal customs are undertaken with the agreement and on the initiative of the conflicting parties without the intervention of the state in most cases."* (*al-ʿAdat al-ʿAshaʾiriyya wa-l-ʿUrf*, 2011)

In addition, the Jordanian legal system maintains flexibility to respect tribal honor codes. As women's activists frequently point out, three laws in Jordan's Penal Code reduce penalties for murderers who commit honor killings. Code 340A and B are the most commonly cited, which state that a man's sentence will be reduced "if he surprises his wife or one of his consanguineous relatives with a man in an illegal situation [in bed]" (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008).

In other situations, the state works concurrently with tribal adjudication procedures. It is common for an adulterating woman to be arrested to protect her from an honor crime (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008). However, as Nedel Dweik, a Jordanian lawyer who has represented detained women, has pointed out, the detention of women is often against their wishes, and some police officers seek to "teach women a lesson" (Cherland, 2014).

Domestic women's movements and international bodies have attempted to subvert the power of tribal patrimonialism through new laws and procedures. Specifically, there are many

movements to extend women increased economic rights. Within traditional Bedouin tribes, a woman with money is considered suspect until the source of the money can be identified (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008). Within the past decade, rural Bedouin women have been increasingly able to use and receive money (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008). While the social structure is constantly evolving, the strength of patriarchal customs remains. For example, although women are granted inheritance rights under both Islamic and Jordanian law, many women in rural communities voluntarily renounce their inheritance based on the prevailing custom that family assets must be kept within the patriarchal family, meaning that the full inheritance goes to the woman's brothers or uncle, rather than her husband (Bydoon, 2011a). In the following sections, I will go more into detail about the various domestic and international forces impacting women's positions within Jordanian society.

2.2 Jordanian Women's Organizations

Women have been an active force in shaping Jordanian social welfare and morality laws through political parties. Movements to increase women's rights, however, are largely unrepresented in government. Outside of existing political parties, upper-class Jordanian women have led and indicated the bounds of women's civic agitation. Through large umbrella organizations and strategic regulation, the Jordanian state has moderated its feminist activists.

During the 1940s, the first two women's organizations were established, predominantly dedicated to family health and childhood development (Lowrance, 1998). While the organizations sought to raise the status of Jordanian women, their effort focused on social work rather than politics. Both groups were dissolved by 1949 (Lowrance, 1998).

The beginning of King Hussein's reign in 1952 brought an atmosphere of political openness, and the women's movement began to blossom (Lowrance, 1998). In 1954, Emily

Bisharat, the first woman lawyer in Jordan, established the Jordanian Women's Alliance (Al-Atiyat, 2012). In contrast to Jordan's two prior women's organizations, the Jordanian Women's Alliance was overtly political with the goal of equalizing women and men's political rights in Jordan. The Women's Alliance spread quickly, opening branches in Salt, Irbid, Zarqa, Karak, and Madaba within its first year (Lowrance, 1998). Their first campaign was partially successful in 1955, when the Jordanian government extended suffrage to educated women holding elementary certificates (Al-Atiyat, 2012). However, the government maintained its ban on women candidates for political office (Lowrance, 1998). This ban, combined with the limited extension of suffrage, triggered a fierce backlash as members of the Women's Alliance demanded "complete political rights" (Lowrance, 1998). The Alliance began a petition to demonstrate solidarity with illiterate Jordanian women, stating,

> *"`We (female) Jordanian citizens have been deprived by difficult economic conditions and tradition from education; thus we demand our complete right to vote equal to our illiterate brothers and our educated sisters, because fundamental rights cannot be divided."(Lowrance, 1998).*

In addition to women's rights, the Women's Alliance served as a platform for nationalist causes, particularly within Israel and the Palestinian Territories. The alliance openly criticized the government's handling of the Palestinian refugee crisis and the Arab-Israeli War. Although the Women's Alliance received considerable support from policy makers, the union was dissolved in 1957. It's activism around the Palestinian problem, one of Jordan's most sensitive political issues, likely played a large role in its dissolution (Al-Atiyat, 2012). As discussed in Chapter 1, the Palestinian national movement gained strength in the Jordanian political forum, causing the king to begin safeguarding his power and cracking down on political liberties. For years to come, the

Palestinian issue remained sensitive in the relationship between the women's movement and the government.

This government crackdown pushed the women's movement underground, causing it to partially fragment. Some prominent leaders of the 1950s movement remained outspoken activists for women's equality, however their ability to cultivate a movement and organize politically was hamstrung (Lowrance, 1998). Rather than representing a larger social group, these women spoke and issued memoranda as individuals (Lowrance, 1998). Other women who remained committed to political representation joined underground parties, including the Ba'ath, Communists, or growing Palestinian national movements (Lowrance, 1998). This period, from the late 1950s through the 1970s, marked a significant decline in civil liberties. Following Black September, King Hussein imposed martial law and outlawed political parties, with the notable exception of the IAF (Sawalha, 2014). This exception may be attributed to the IAF's branding as the "loyal opposition" to the regime (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010a).

As the conflict in Israel and Palestine continued to shape Jordanian identity, women began to re-engage with political organization. In 1970, the Arab Women's Society in Jordan (*jam'iyyat al-nisa' al-arabiyyat fi al-urdun*) was established to promote social work (Lowrance, 1998). Although the Women's Society remains active, it has largely avoided the political arena. By 1974, Emily Bisharat re-established her Jordanian Women's Alliance under a new name, the Women's Union in Jordan (*al-ittihad al-nisa'i fi al-urdun*) (Lowrance, 1998). As Bisharat and her women colleagues began to organize, the government preempted their demands by extending to all women the right to vote and run in parliamentary elections (Lowrance, 1998). Despite this apparent victory, women were prevented from exercising these rights due to a suspension in parliamentary elections which lasted for ten years (Al-Atiyat, 2012). In addition, women remained legally barred

from voting in municipal elections for the following decade (Lowrance, 1998). Nonetheless, Bisharat's Women's Union opened branches across Jordan, surging to over 1,000 members in the year following its founding (Lowrance, 1998). While women's rights were its chief focus, the Union continued to criticize the government's handling to the Palestinian conflict, an issue that remained a political hot button for the Hashemite monarchy. Less than a decade after its reestablishment, the Women's Union was forced to close due to alleged legal breaches, which were later found to be spurious (Al-Atiyat, 2012). Although the High Court annulled the closing order, the Union faced insurmountable financial and security barriers and was forced to freeze operations in 1982 (Lowrance, 1998).

While the Women's Union was closed, the pro-government General Federation of Jordanian Women (*al-ittihad alnisa'i al-urduni al-`am*) was established with the support of the Ministry of Social Development (Lowrance, 1998). This federation was designed to serve as an umbrella organization, encompassing all Jordanian women's societies. Many smaller women's organizations refused to send a delegation to the federation in an effort to protect their autonomy (Lowrance, 1998). At the same time, women from oppositional political parties were unlikely to be granted membership on an individual basis. Both factors have limited the efficacy of the General Federation of Jordanian Women in influencing political movements for women's equality (Lowrance, 1998).

As discussed in Chapter 1, the Jordanian government reestablished parliamentary elections and implemented a policy of liberalization following the IMF debt crisis in 1989. This liberalization also marked the entry of many women into the political sphere, as organizers, politicians, and activists. In 1989, twelve women candidates ran for election in the lower house (Lowrance, 1998). Although popular IAF and Muslim Brotherhood leaders voiced their categorical

objection to women candidates, one woman won an assembly seat (Lowrance, 1998). Toujan Faisal, a Circassian candidate critical of Jordan's Islamist parties, faced stark opposition to become a member of the assembly (Lowrance, 1998). She was charged with apostasy during the 1989 election, sparking an international outcry (Lowrance, 1998). Although she was eventually found not guilty, Faisal was unable to assume a seat in the assembly until she ran again in 1993 (Lowrance, 1998). She became Jordan's first woman member of parliament (Lowrance, 1998).

Following the 1989 liberalization crisis, women's movements across Jordan began to gain more strength. Princess Basma Bint Talal, King Hussein's sister, has also been active in the Jordanian women's movement. In 1992, she established the National Committee for Women's Affairs (*al-lajna al-wataniyya li-shu'un al-mar'a*) to cultivate a pro-government counterbalance to more radical women's rights movements in Jordan. The committee was formed at the request of governmental officials and comprised an array of ministers concerned with women's affairs, including the Minister of Labor, the Minister of Social Development, and the Minister of Education. The committee grew and began opening branches across Jordan. Eventually, Princess Basma united these smaller committees into an NGO, the Jordanian National Forum for Women (*tajamu' lijan al-mar'a al-watani al-urduni*). The forum grew in popularity and soon boasted over 100,000 members. Since its formation, the forum has portrayed itself as a policy forum, although its goals and strategy are kept vague.

Despite its substantial membership, the National Forum is a pillar of state feminism, rather than an emblem of grassroots organization. Although it has coordinated the work of women's organizations, the forum provides a route through which the government can influence the trajectory of the women's movement. Its structure includes a national committee, which sets policy goals and strategy, along with local committees spread across Jordan. Through this structure, the

National Forum is largely able to set the agenda for the women's movement while signaling the parameters and barriers for social change (Lowrance, 1998). This control effectively provides state ministers with veto power over the proposed campaigns of the forum's member organizations.

It is also important to view the National Forum within a historic and global context. At the time of its establishment, Jordan was under considerable domestic and international pressure due to its economic crisis with the IMF. It is likely that the National Forum provided the government with an avenue to surveil and moderate the mainstream domestic women's movement, while placating Jordan's more liberal Western donors. From the regime's standpoint, a state-supported moderate women's equality movement is preferable to a more radical and activist movement.

Although the National Forum held substantial political sway, the Jordanian government also allowed for slightly more radical elements of the women's movement to blossom in the aftermath of the IMF liberalization. For example, Emily Bisharat's Women's Union was re-established in 1990 and was permitted to openly advocate for the right to abortion, a stance which may have landed activists in jail a few years prior (Lowrance, 1998). The mere fact that the Women's Union was able to openly advocate for the legalization of abortion demonstrates the dramatic change caused by the 1989 liberalization.

Despite these developments, the state remains in control over all political and civil organizations. Civil society law 51 requires all civil society organizations (CSIs) to register with a specific ministry (i.e. Ministry of Culture, Social Development, or Interior) (Abdel-Samad, 2017a). In addition, all CSIs must register as members of the General Council of Voluntary Organization (GCVO), an outwardly nongovernmental organization that cultivates links between smaller organizations and the state (Abdel-Samad, 2017a). Members of the GCVO receive a stipend from the state and are limited in their ability to receive outside funding. Labor unions and professional

associations are also required to join respective umbrella organizations that enable government influence and oversight (Abdel-Samad, 2017a).

Through financial and political control of the public arena, the state has historically limited the number of active civil society organizations and their behavior (Abdel-Samad, 2017a). In 1966, the Voluntary Associations Law 33 was passed enabling the government to legally enter the offices of nongovernmental organizations and review their financial statements (Abdel-Samad, 2017a). This law prohibits any nongovernmental organization from trying to achieve a political goal or personal benefit, effectively baring these organizations from the political arena. Currently, the majority of civil society organizations are social and charity organizations (Ababsa, 2011), while women's organizations make up less than ten percent of CSIs (Abdel-Samad, 2017a).

Within this context, upper-class women with connections to the Hashemite monarchy have led most political movements for women's rights. As discussed in the previous section, women's rights movements have targeted Code 340 A and B which provide the perpetrators of honor crimes against women with lenient sentences. In the 1990s, the Women's union and the Jordanian National Commission headed by Princess Basma began a campaign to change this aspect of the penal code (Janine A. Clark, 2003). Princess Basma's support likely served as a signal to other Jordanian citizens that it was safe and permissible to oppose this penal code. Without her visible support, it is unlikely that the movement would have gained such traction. Despite their activism, these organizations were ultimately unable to modify the Jordanian penal code. This failure is especially notable considering the recent surge in honor crimes (Coogle, 2016).

In contrast to the women's movement of the 1950s and 1980s, Jordan's current women's movements are shifting their language around activism. For example, the term "feminist" is used less commonly today, as it is associated with Westernization and sexuality (Alatiyat & Barari,

2010a). Instead, leaders of today's women's movements are more likely to speak about empowerment within the confines of Arab-Islamic culture (Al-Atiyat, 2012). In the following sections about Jordanian political parties and international bodies, I will go more into detail about reactions to perceived Westernization within Jordan.

2.3 Women in Political Parties

As the 1989 liberalization allowed the women's movement space to flourish, other political parties and organization became more vocal. Islamist political parties influenced the Jordanian women's movement through direct participation, and through initiating women's segments of their own. Similar to the leaders of the women's movement, many Islamist parties condemned the King's apparent weakness on addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Lowrance, 1998). The king used his power to weaken these opposing coalitions within the lower house. As discussed in Chapter 1, following the election of 34 Muslim Brotherhood candidates to the lower house in 1989, the king revised the electoral law by royal decree, making congress more amenable to his interests (Buttorff, 2015).

As discussed in the previous section of Chapter 2, the National Forum was established as an umbrella organization for women's societies across the country and political spectrum. Islamist women began joining the National Forum in droves during the early 1990s, triggering a government investigation (Clark & Schwedler, 2003). Concerned that the National Forum would become overly Islamist, the government reinterpreted the forum's charter and removed many of the Islamist women (Lowrance, 1998). This state action may have also prevented the National Forum from developing a strong allegiance with the Palestinian national movement, a cause central to the IAF and other Islamist parties.

In 1992, the IAF shifted its stance toward women in politics. Its platform supported women's involvement in public life, including the right to hold political posts (Lowrance, 1998). The IAF included the caveat that women must remain barred from the highest political post: head of state (Lowrance, 1998). Although the party allowed women to hold higher party posts, they continued to promote a conservative Islamist vision for Jordan (Lowrance, 1998). From 1989 to 1993, the IAF advocated for the passage of two radical and unpopular laws intended to segregate men and women (Lowrance, 1998). The first law would prohibit male hairdressers from working in women's beauty salons and the second law would prohibit fathers from attending their daughters' sporting events, thereby preventing fathers from looking at their daughters' teammates (Lowrance, 1998). The IAF's unbending support for these two bills cost them at the polls (Lowrance, 1998).

Although the IAF formally supported women's political involvement, women leaders were consistently placed in the IAF's Women's Committee, preventing them from influencing party stances on wider political and economic issues (Lowrance, 1998). One notable exception is Nawal Faouri, an IAF politician and former head of the women's branch (Lowrance, 1998). In 1994, Faouri won support from a predominantly male electorate and served on the IAF's Consultative Council (Lowrance, 1998). She was able to attend the International Conference on Women in Beijing, a conference developed by the United Nations to promote women's equality and develop the Declaration and Platform for Action to promote women's opportunities. Ironically, upon Faouri's return to Jordan, she received stark condemnation from her IAF colleagues for travelling without a male escort (Lowrance, 1998). Following her election, a handful of other women have achieved positions in party leadership, although they remain drastically underrepresented.

In 1995, the Women's Committee of the IAF was replaced by the Women's Sector, a branch within the party tasked with increasing women voters' support for IAF candidates (Janine A. Clark, 2003). Women leaders in this branch have been primarily focused on social issues, such as drug use and immodest television content (Clark & Schwedler, 2003). Their political elevation, however, failed to signify a party shift towards increased women's rights. Although officially supportive, the IAF has consistently discouraged women from seeking parliamentary election. In addition, their policies toward women's rights have remained unchanged. The few women candidates who have won election devote their efforts toward party goals, which do not include women's rights. As Janine Astrid Clark and Jillian Schwedler write,

> *"Both the IAF and the Islah parties have supported increased roles for women within their parties. However, the introduction of separate, "parallel" women's sectors reflects the efforts of party leaders to ghettoize women's activities rather than envision meaningful gender equality." (Clark & Schwedler, 2003).*

In 1999, King Abdullah II succeeded King Hussein. Security concerns quickly shifted King Abdallah's focus to regulating political activity. From 2001 to 2003, King Abdallah gradually rescinded civil liberties through the passage of over 200 provisional laws and amendments (Muasher, 2011). Philanthropic and social welfare organizations have provided the Jordanian populace with a safe outlet to assemble. The majority of these social welfare organizations are explicitly Islamic and largely depoliticized, due in part to the Jordanian law which precludes social welfare organizations from taking political stances. Despite this law, social welfare organizations have played a significant role in organization and uniting Jordanian reformers, particularly women.

2.4 International Law and Women

In 1979, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), a universal human rights document to eliminate defacto discrimination of the basis of sex and gender (Al-Atiyat, 2012). Although Jordan signed onto CEDAW by 1992, it raised three reservations related to women's mobility, nationality rights, and housing (Al-Atiyat, 2012). Even with these reservations, Jordanian political parties including the IAF raised considerable backlash to CEDAW. It was never passed by parliament, and the monarchy was forced to act unilaterally to publish the text of CEDAW in the National Gazette in 2007 (Bydoon, 2011a). Although CEDAW allows for its member countries to maintain a degree of flexibility, its weakness lies in its one-size-fits-all approach. There are many examples of human rights policies that have failed to be successfully translated across cultures. In this section, I will focus on the quota system.

Countries that ratify CEDAW are legally bound to submit national reports to demonstrate their compliance, and Jordan has been no exception (“Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,” n.d.). In Jordan's 2000 hearing at the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, international experts pressed the Jordanian delegation to increase women's participation in government through the implementation of a 20 percent quota, stating that "without such a quota, it would take too long for women to become parliamentarians and gain the capability to influence national policy on that level" (“CEDAW Takes up Reports of Jordan” 2000).

In January 2007, the government of Jordan adopted a quota to reserve ten percent of parliamentary and 20 percent municipal seats for women. Under the policy, these reserved seats are allocated to women who did not win seats competitively but received the most votes in their

district. This quota largely arose from donor pressure, as wealthy countries such as the United States pushed Jordan to improve women's inclusion with substantial aid initiatives. Jordanian women's organizations were noticeably absent from both the quota lobbying and implementation process. As Assaf David and Stefanie Nanes (2011) write,

> "*On behalf of the quota in the municipal councils, there were only limited and disjointed efforts from the women's movement and absolutely no lobbying by female members of parliament… Women's organizations have displayed marked apathy toward municipal governance."* (David & Nanes, 2011)

This policy was directly responsible for the election of 203 Jordanian women to these councils, although 23 women achieved a seat through plain competition. During the 2007 election, 71 percent of women candidates were elected. While women did achieve a higher degree of political representation in government, tribal groups differed in their response to the quota. Some smaller tribes chose to nominate women, exploiting the quota to achieve representation. Other tribes, such as the Shirfat Tribe, failed to nominate any women. A study of the subsequent 2007 municipal elections conducted by Sarah Sunn Bush and Eleanor Gao found that smaller Bedouin tribes were more likely than larger tribes to nominate and ultimately elect women candidates (Bush & Gao, 2017). Their result is particularly notable as Bedouin tribes have historically been more rigid in their application of gender roles (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008). In addition, this study demonstrated that tribes with a high level of cohesion and organization were less likely to support women candidates (Bush & Gao, 2017). Based on these two results, the authors concluded that successful women candidates were able to exploit organizational gaps in leadership, rather than cultivate a grassroots base of support.

Women's activists have also differed in their support of the quota system. One former municipal councilor explained her opposition to the quota, "The small tribes nominate women because they feel like they can control them. Then, when the women councilors try to talk, the men councilors make fun, saying, 'Ha, let the quota have her chance to talk.'" (Clark & Schwedler, 2003). While the quota was intended to increase women's inclusion, its implementation may have backfired. The lack of grassroots political organizing combined with the weakness of women's political groups have instead created an atmosphere where women are fragmented across the political spectrum, supporting tribal or Islamist groups rather than advancing the cause of women's equality. Despite the lack of proven success, the CEDAW committee recommended that Jordan adopt a quota "of at least 30 percent... at all decision-making levels" in its 2007 report (Al-Atiyat, 2012).

At the same time, there has also been considerable backlash to these international charters. Sharia scholars and the IAF have released statements arguing that CEDAW "is a deliberate attack on the foundations of Arab and Islamic societies through weakening the family unit" (Bydoon, 2011a). More extreme opponents have argued that CEDAW is one aspect of a larger plot to Westernize and secularize Middle Eastern societies (Bydoon, 2011a). Their opposition extends past CEDAW, to Western NGOs or funding sources with links to domestic Jordanian political movements.

Despite this rhetoric, Jordanian women's organizations are completely dependent on Western economic aid (Al-Atiyat, 2012). Among other initiatives, the European Union allocated 385 thousand euros (over 400 thousand dollars) to the Battered Women's Shelter at the Women's Union in Jordan in 2008 (Al-Atiyat, 2012). At the same time, USAID has allocated over two

million dollars to strengthen Jordanian political organizations through the National Democratic Institute, a national nonprofit, nonpartisan organization (Al-Atiyat, 2012).

Chapter 3: Women in Higher Education and Analysis

Jordan is one of eight countries in the Middle East where more women than men attend university (Sweis, 2018). Among Jordan's 50,000 university graduates, only half are able to successfully find jobs, according to Atef Obeidat, Jordan's former labor minister (Sweis, 2018). However, women's unemployment trends are the opposite of men's unemployment trends. As the World Bank stated in a 2013 report, "vulnerability to unemployment rises with the level of education for women, while men with higher education are less likely to be unemployed" (The World Bank, 2013). Women in Jordan are also twice as likely to be unemployed as men (Norimine, 2015). Within this population, nearly three in four unemployed women have their bachelor's degrees, while only one in four unemployed men have their bachelor's degrees (Norimine, 2015).

These statistics support the assertion that women are either less able or less willing to take advantage of the economic opportunities extended to university graduates. One aspect contributing to the disparity in educational benefits may be social norms that value male over female education. Although most Jordanian private schools have coeducation, public schools are gender-segregated (Sonbol, 2003). Women are ostensibly provided with equal opportunities to learn, however this often fails to translate into practice. Policies and funds aimed at improving Jordan's education system tend to impact boys' schools disproportionately. For example, boys' public schools typically have more computers than girls' public schools (Al-Rabadi & Al-Rabadi, 2018), financially demonstrating the prioritization of boys’ over girls’ educations.

Following graduation from the education system, a confluence of religious, economic, and cultural factors impedes women's labor force participation. Jordanian women go from being slightly over-represented at the university, to being drastically underrepresented in entry-level positions (Sonbol, 2003). One factor contributing to women's lack of labor-force participation may

be Jordan's culture of masculinity which positions women's economic contribution to the household as a symbol of male impotence. Certain aspects of Sharia law also disincentivize women from entering the workforce, such as laws which force women to cede control of their earnings to their husband or guardian (Sonbol, 2003).

Sexual harassment also serves as a barrier to women's participation in education and the workplace. Although *'urf* stresses the need to protect women, there are no laws which explicitly forbid sexual harassment (Sonbol, 2003). According to the Women's Union in Jordan, five percent of complaints reported to their legal assistance hotline are related to allegations of sexual harassment (Sonbol, 2003). While sexual harassment poses an inherent barrier to women, this thesis will treat sexual harassment as a symptom of a larger social norm. As I will explain in the following section, sexual harassment can be considered a display of male power, while the sanctioning of sexual harassment can be considered a display of socially-accepted norms.

By evaluating the results of six focus group discussions, I hope to demonstrate how gendered social roles are translated from tribal contexts into educational contexts. In addition, I will qualitatively consider the link between tribal affiliation and institutional power in the sanctioning of sexual harassment. I will interrogate this link using French and Raven's Model of the Bases of Social Power (French and Raven, 1959). By shedding light on these formal and informal mechanisms, this thesis seeks to provide a snapshot of women's treatment within educational institutions. By focusing on university climate, this thesis will evaluate a vital precipice in the road to economic participation.

3.1 Theoretical Background

Sexual harassment in a classroom or university setting is a barrier to women's social and economic participation. In response to sexual harassment, students' academic performance often

suffers, and some choose to leave school (*Sexual harassment*, 1997). Although sexual harassment is recognized by international governments and NGOs as a significant barrier to women's educational involvement, the definition remains controversial. In many instances, the barrier between consensual flirtation and gender harassment is unclear.

For public health and sociological research, the most commonly used definition of sexual harassment is Fitzgerald's Tripartite Model (Fitzgerald, Drasgow, Hulin, Gelfand, & Magley, 1997). This model uses three mutually exclusive dimensions for sexual harassment: gender harassment, unwanted sexual attention, and sexual coercion. Definitions for each dimension and examples are provided below in Table 1.

Table 1: Dimensions of Sexual Harassment (Fitzgerald, 1998)

Dimension	***Definition***	***Examples***
Gender Harassment	A broad range of verbal behavior, physical acts, and symbolic gestures that are not aimed at sexual cooperation but that convey insulting, hostile, and degrading attitudes about women.	Sexual epithets, slurs, taunts, gestures
Unwanted Sexual Attention	Verbal and nonverbal attention that is unwelcome, offensive, and reciprocated.	Repeated requests for a date
Sexual Coercion	The extortion of sexual cooperation in return for job-related considerations.	Sexual behavior with a quid pro quo agreement

Sexual coercion is the clearest form of sexual harassment intended to extract a sexual action from the target. Unwanted sexual attention, though it may be perpetrated with the aim of extracting a sexual action, may also take the form of unwanted touching. Gender harassment includes any form of persecution based on an individual’s gender. The perpetration of these forms of sexual

harassment displays a degree of organizational power, through which the perpetrator is able to act against the target (McLaughlin, Uggen, & Blackstone, 2012).

In their research on organizational power, French and Raven define power as the "influence on the person P, produced by a social agent O, where O can be another person, a role, a norm, a group, or part of a group" (French and Raven 607, 1959). In its application to sexual harassment, the social agent O will be considered the harasser, and the person P will be considered the survivor or intended target. I will use the term target rather than survivor in my discussion of sexual harassment, as the intended act of harassing may be prevented. As I will discuss below, French and Raven's theory also recognizes the power of the target P, and this power may be sufficient to prevent the intended action of the social agent O. O's power can only be viewed relative to the power of P. In addition to defining power, French and Raven discuss the bases of power and their corresponding levels of influence. These bases include reward power, coercive power, expert power, referent power, and legitimate power. Below, I will describe these bases of power and provide examples.

Reward power. Reward power is defined as the as power whose basis is the ability to provide a reward (Cartwright, 1959). The reward may take the form of a positive incentive or the cessation of a negative influence on O. The degree of O's reward power is mediated by P's ability to achieve the reward absent O. A piece-work rate in a factory is a common example of a supervisor attempting to exert reward power over an employee. In this example, the intended action would be for the employee to increase production.

Coercive power. Coercive power is defined similarly to reward power; however, it is derived from the expectation of P that O will exact a punishment if the action if not completed (Cartwright, 1959). In contrast to reward power, coercive power tends to increase the distance

between O and P. At its extreme, coercive power may cause P to leave O's sphere of influence, diminishing O's power. An example of coercive power in a university context would be a threat of a lower grade if P does not complete an assignment.

Expert power. Expert power is defined as O's influence on P's knowledge or perception in a given area. Because its impact is primarily observed in P's cognitive structure, expert power does not commonly function in a larger social system. For this reason, I will not discuss expert power in detail. An example of expert power is a professor's influence on a student's understanding of a scientific concept.

Referent power. Referent power refers to the identification of O with P. This means that P has a feeling of oneness with O and a desire to maintain this oneness, or a desire to achieve this identity. In many instances, P is not consciously aware of the referent power that O exerts over him or her. Out of all these bases of power, French and Raven hypothesize that referent power has the broadest range, and this range corresponds to O's desire to identify with P (French and Raven, 1959). Unlike reward, coercive, or expert power, referent power commonly functions between individuals at the same level within the organizational hierarchy. For example, a group of campers may exert referent power over one of their fellow camper P. The intended action of O, the group of campers, may be for their fellow camper to join a sports team. The extent to which P hopes to identify with the larger group, O, determines O's power over P. If P strives to maintain this feeling of oneness with the larger group, the larger group exerts increased power in determining P's actions.

Relevant to this thesis, tribal membership can function as a form of referent power, motivating its members to support one another socially. As discussed in Chapter 1, tribal influence permeates many aspects of life. This influence is also reflected in the retributory tribal fighting

across Jordanian university campuses discussed above (Sweis, 2018). However, as French and Raven discuss, this referent power depends on P's attraction towards O, meaning the referent power of tribal organizations varies between individuals based on their feeling of connection with their tribe.

Legitimate power. Legitimate power is the most complex base of power, as it encompasses both internal and extra-organizational legitimacy. This means that the recognition of power stems not only from within-organization status, but also from social bases (French and Raven, 1959; Popovich and Warren, 2010). Legitimacy is defined as an internalized norm or value that provides O with the right to influence P, while compelling P to accept this influence (French and Raven, 1959). Within organizations, this may function based on O's role. For example, a professor may suggest that a student make modifications to his or her essay. In this example, the student feels that he or she should adhere to the professor's feedback, regardless of positive or negative sanctions, but instead based on social norms at the university. However, legitimate power is not role-dependent. For example, P may feel compelled to help O with a task, based on a favor O provided to P in the past.

Legitimate power may be derived from an accepted social structure or a legitimizing agent. In addition, this form of power may be derived from cultural values or norms. These cultural bases of power are considered to be functioning when O has the "characteristics which are specified by the culture as giving him [or her] the right to prescribe behavior for P, who may not have these characteristics" (French and Raven, 1959). In some cultures, legitimate power may function through rigid social castes, while in others, the social hierarchy is more difficult to define.

Popovich and Warren consider gender as a form of legitimate power that functions within organizations through their analysis of sexual harassment. The earliest research on sexual

harassment focused on male abuses of organizational power (Farley, 1978; MacKinnon, 1979). The quintessential example of sexual harassment was characterized by sexual coercion or intimidation from a male supervisor to a female subordinate. Some scholars theorized that sexual harassment was gender-neutral, arguing that organizational power imbalances can be abused to extort sexual gratification regardless of the perpetrator or target's gender identity (Crocker & Weber, 1983; Gutek, Nakamura, & Nieva, 1981). However, this is contradicted by numerous studies which have demonstrated that peers, rather than supervisors, are the most common perpetrators of sexual harassment (Gold, 2008; Gutek, 1985). In addition to these studies, contra-power harassment, in which a subordinate harasses a supervisor, has also been documented most commonly in university settings (Grauerholz & King, 1997). Contra-power harassment is almost always perpetrated by men against women in power. In one study on higher education, nearly half of women professors reported being sexually harassed by male students or professional subordinates (Grauerholz, 1989). Together, these studies point to a gender as a pervasive base of legitimate power. Figure 1 displays an adaptation of French and Raven's bases of power and levels of influence.



Figure 1: Bases of power x levels of influence (adapted from French & Raven, 1959; Ragins & Sundstrom, 1989; Popovich & Warren, 2010)

Tangri, Burt, and Johnson were among the first researchers to provide theoretical models to explain the basis of male power in relation to sexual harassment (Tangri, Burt, & Johnson, 1982). They describe the Natural/Biological Model that explains sexual harassment based on the assumption that males have a more powerful sex-drive than women. This powerful male sex-drive results in a biological propensity to "aggress sexually against women" (Tangri et al., 1982). In addition, this model emphasizes that the physical strength of men is greater than women. Tangri, Burt, and Johnson also provide an Organizational Model that emphasizes the tendency of men to inhabit more powerful roles within organizational hierarchies. To explain the perpetration of sexual harassment between peers, Sex-Roll Spillover Theory was developed within this Organizational Model. It is defined as the carryover into the workplace or school of gender-based expectations for behaviors that are irrelevant or inappropriate to work or school (*Sexual harassment, 1997)*. Sex-Role Spillover Theory is characterized by the application of gendered stereotypes to both female targets and male harassers (Burgess and Borgida, 1997). Lastly, Tangri, Burt, and Johnson describe the Socio-Cultural Model that positions sexual harassment as a "manifestation of the larger patriarchal system in which men rule and social beliefs legitimize their rule" (Tangri et al., 1982). This theory provides that harassment perpetrated by men against women because most societies prescribe the role of "initiator and pursuer to men, and nay-sayer and limit setter to women" (*Sexual harassment*, 1997).

In their study of sexual harassment, Popovich and Warren analyze these three models of male power (Popovich and Warren, 2010). They argue that,

> *"Another way of looking at these theories is not to assume that each is different from the other, but instead note their similarities. In taking this view, one can see that each of these theories describes the inherent power differential that is necessary for an incident to be*

considered as sexual harassment, although that power may be operative at different levels." (Popovich and Warren, 2010)

These theories integrate with French and Raven's conceptualization of social power. These power differentials not only take place on the interpersonal level but make up a socially accepted structure of gendered power relations. The Natural/Biological Model emphasizes the physical strength of males of females, while the Organizational and Socio-cultural Models emphasize male and female socialization.

Within Jordan, I hypothesize that political and economic competition between tribes serves as a legitimate source of power for both targets and harassers. Targets may receive protection from their tribal affiliation, which serves as a deterrent for harassers. On the other hand, harassers from powerful tribes may be exempted from punitive action and may be empowered to perpetrate harassment against members of weaker tribes. In addition, intra-tribal mechanisms that position women as the subjects of male guardianship may act in one direction to disadvantage women and empower men.

In evaluating sexual harassment in Jordanian higher education, I will evaluate organizational climate as a reflection of shared perceptions of power relations and social norms. To measure these shared perceptions, I will focus on three characteristics developed by Charles L. Hulin of organizations that are tolerant to sexual harassing: refusal to take complaints seriously, risk to the victim for reporting, and lack of meaningful sanctions for the perpetrator (Sexual harassment, 1997). These three characteristics have also been positively correlated with increased prevalence of sexual harassment (Hulin, 1993). I will consider both gender power relations and intra-tribal power as mediators of organizational response. This focus on organizational climate is

motivated not only by a desire to understand organizational power, but also to understand the efficacy of university policies aimed at stemming sexual harassment.

3.2 Methods

Study design. Six focus group discussions (FGDs) with men and women students were conducted as part of a larger mixed-methods study of sexual harassment at a university in Jordan. The Emory University Institutional Review Board approved the larger study [IRB00099940]. The larger study is being conducted as a partnership between researchers at Emory University and the Information and Research Center of the King Hussein Foundation based in Amman, Jordan.

Setting. A large university in Jordan was selected for the study. The university has a relatively large proportion of female undergraduate students at 65 percent.

Eligibility and recruitment. The research team emailed the recruitment information sheet to the peer researchers at the Center for Women's Studies, who then passed them on to their peers. Additionally, the research team posted the recruitment information sheet in various student Facebook groups. Eligible participants satisfied three inclusion criteria: (a) matriculated during the time of the study, (b) not cognitively impaired, and (c) attending classes on the main campus. Throughout the recruitment and discussion process, the research team followed Ethical and Safety Recommendations for Intervention Research on Violence Against Women developed by the World Health Organization (Ethical and safety recommendations for intervention research on violence against women, 2016). Accordingly, participants were provided with the opportunity to withdrawal their consent at any time. In addition, the research team was prepared to provide referrals to support services for survivors of violence if needed.

Measures. FGDs centered around the construct and scope of sexual harassment to diagnose social norms. Discussions were based on a Social Norms Theory and Diagnosis framework, as reflected in the FGD guide in Appendix B. As part of the larger study, students participated in three exercises: (a) a free listing exercise to identify the scope of perceived sexual harassment, (b) a social mapping exercise to explore the frequency and setting of sexual harassment and social reactions, and (c) participant responses to hypothetical scenarios involving sexual harassment. Two scenarios were presented to the participants. The first scenario concerned a female student walking on campus while wearing tight clothes. She encounters verbal harassment from a group of men. Participants were asked to assess the culpability of the woman in the tight clothing. The scenario continues with the female student reporting the harassing men to a university official. Participants were then asked to assess the most likely institutional response. The second scenario concerned a professor harassing a female student. The professor askes the female student to come to his office and proceeds to make inappropriate comments about her physical appearance and sexuality. Similarly to the first scenario, the female student then seeks help from a university official, and the participants were asked to assess the likely institutional response. This study will primarily use the results of exercise (c) which are reflected in translated transcripts of the discussion.

Data collection. FGDs with an average of six participants were conducted in Arabic in sex-separate groups by professional researchers of the same gender. Two female discussions were conducted in August 2018, after which revisions were made to the discussion guide. Following these two discussions, four additional FGDs were conducted in September 2018. Each FGD was recorded, transcribed, and translated into English prior to analysis.

Analysis. Data analysis was carried out using a grounded theory approach integrated with open coding. This grounded theory approach was selected to minimize investigator bias ad accommodate for the paucity of sexual harassment research in Jordan. All coding was conducted using MAXQDA software. Throughout the process, memos were recorded to provide an organized trail of thought. The coding analysis concluded with theoretical coding, through which different codes were related to one another in construction of a theory. Specifically, codes around tribalism and sexual harassment were analyzed in evaluating the validity of Organizational Power Theory in the Jordanian context. These relationships were evaluated through the construction of a quote matrix in MAXQDA.

The topics presented in the Analysis Plan in Appendix A.1 are based on Hulin's three characteristics of organizational tolerance to sexual harassment (Hulin 1993). Although Hulin et al. separate the lack of meaningful sanctions dimension and the refusal to take complaints seriously dimension, I have chosen to combine these two characteristics. This decision was made based on the inherent overlap between these two dimensions, with a lack of meaningful sanctions often resulting from a refusal to take complaints seriously. While stakeholder interviews and an institutional review are required to determine the seriousness with which university actors approach sexual harassment allegations, this analysis focuses on student perceptions. As Hulin et al. have demonstrated, student perceptions of high organizational tolerance are associated with an increased prevalence of sexual harassment.

3.3 Findings and Results

Although the researchers leading these focus group discussions did not specifically ask participants to comment on tribalism, all six of the discussions referenced tribalism or wasta. Five of the six focus group discussions referenced tribalism or wasta in explaining potential sanctions

for sexual harassment, while one (male) discussion referred to tribalism in explaining social norms. Half of the discussions (two female and one male) discussed the tribal affiliation of the target, in explaining her support during help seeking processes.

Both male and female students cited tribal affiliation as a factor that protects perpetrators from negative sanctioning. Formal institutional sanctioning is considered a punitive response from the university, potentially taking the form of a citation or suspension. Participants noted that tribal membership often facilitates social connections at the university. These tribal connections with university officials could be leveraged at any stage of the reporting or disciplinary process to preclude sanctioning. One participant described this process, stating,

> *"When it comes to me, I am not worried about anything happening to me, because… I know I come from a certain tribe, and nobody will talk to me, or maybe I know that official, or I know people in the business area, or the literature [area], or the security guard, or the majority of them, so no matter what I do, even if a girl goes and reports me to someone, I know that I will get away with it, given my background and the fact that I know the officials."* (Male student)

In addition to referent power, this is an example of legitimate power. The socially-accepted norm that men from a certain tribe are free from sanctions is a clear demonstration. Within the focus group discussion, the only mention of tribalism together with negative sanctioning was in reference to internal informal sanctions. Within the male focus groups, most participants displayed an opposition to sexual harassment, often citing religious or moral principles. Though many participants were willing to individually confront a hypothetical harasser, these same participants also explained their reluctance to impose negative sanctions on members of the same tribe. One male student explained this behavior, saying,

"Now, [members of the harasser's tribe] may talk about it internally, but they have to defend [the accused harasser] in public…. They may say, 'You should stop,' but he will do it again, because they stood by his side the first time, and the second time, because he is their cousin, they won't leave him." (Male student)

In addition, this failure to sanction sexual harassers was cited in the male focus groups as a factor contributing to the continuation of harassment. One participant explained this trend, stating,

"Will this reaction [protection from formal sanctioning] deter the perpetrator? Honestly no, because… if you know that someone has your back, and that you won't be held accountable no matter what, why don't you just act as you please? Especially if they think no one is going to [watch] them, well… no one is going to ask [them] anything." (Male student)

For women, belonging to a powerful tribe was commonly cited as a factor protecting a potential target from sexual harassment. This type of harassment was mentioned twice during the discussions. Both instances, harassing a woman from a powerful tribe was perceived as likely to result in an informal negative sanction, rather than a formal institutional sanction. None of the participants asserted that tribal affiliation would allow a woman target to better utilize the institutional sanctioning process. Instead, both discussions of target sexual harassment concerned a tribal fight that may result as a negative, informal sanction. One female student described this pattern in relation to geographic centers for the tribes on campus, explaining,

"North [of campus] are more tribal communities… If [sexual harassment] happens [there], tribes will get involved and possibly [turn to] fights and shooting." (Female student)

However, a woman from a powerful tribe lost these protective benefits if the harasser came from the same tribe. This instance of harassment may be handled through intra-tribal dispute resolution mechanisms, if at all. One male student explained this phenomenon, stating,

"This factor [tribalism] plays a role in both cases, if a girl belongs to a certain tribe, nobody will come near her, or only guys from the same tribe, but if she doesn't, or she has no support base, they say anything." (Male student)

In addition, a woman's help seeking behavior was strongly impacted by tribal affiliation. For example, waging an accusation of sexual harassment against a member of powerful tribe was noted as a factor placing the female accuser at risk for institutional or social sanctioning. One male student described this phenomenon,

"Some students misuse their power and their tribes… they end up exploiting girls, sometimes some girls have to give in, because they fear that someone may cause trouble for them, may circulate something, may cause a scandal, or maybe [the harasser] knows the security guard, maybe they will expel her, or gossip, or anything." (Male student)

Not only did participants describe institutional barriers to formal help-seeking, but they also reported social barriers to informal help-seeking. These barriers typically manifested as forms of victim blaming, in which a survivor's community would attribute the harassment to a woman's clothing or behavior. In the focus group discussion, one scenario concerned a professor sexual

harassing a female student in his office. In response to this scenario, one female student explained the negative repercussions of filing a report with the dean,

> *"The first thing she [is] going to hear [if she reports the incident] is, 'What took you to the professor's office? Just like any other student, you could've waited in the class to ask him about anything or to take anything from him, or you could've asked the rest of the students.' They'll give the professor a hundred excuses. They won't support her, especially those who are from the tribes."* (Female student)

In the above quote, the term tribe is being used generally, to convey conservatism, rather than to denote a specific affiliation. This trend was consistent throughout both the male and female focus groups, with the term tribal being used as an antonym for urban or liberal.

Table 2 displays a typology of male harassers and female targets with and without tribal power. These typologies should not be viewed as mutually exclusive categories, but instead as a relative spectrum, with the tribal power of a harasser being measured in comparison to the tribal power of a target. Because the focus group discussions heavily focused on male harassers and female targets, these typologies omit female harassers and male targets. This form of harassing is also the most common (*Sexual harassment*, 1997).

Table 2: Typology of Harassers and Targets

Gender	**Powerful Tribal Affiliation**	**Lack of Powerful Affiliation**
Male Harasser	Protection from institutional sanctioning based on social connections with university officials	Lack protection from institutional sanctioning May achieve institutional connections through other social networks
Female Target	Protection from sexual harassing based on a perceived threat of tribal retaliation	Lacks protection from sexual harassing

		May encounter increased repercussions to help seeking based on the tribal affiliation of the perpetrator

These typologies describe harassers and targets from different tribes. Participants in the focus groups described a benefit of tribal affiliation, that increased with tribal representation at the institution. Though tribal affiliation provided a route to achieving these institutional connections, participants also attributed protection from institutional sanctions to other social connections. In addition, the female typologies display a gradient of tribal retaliation, depending on the tribal status of the target woman. Participants did not attribute tribal retaliation to female help seeking, and therefore this female typology may reflect values of patrimonialism rather than agency. In addition, women without powerful tribal affiliations were perceived to encounter greater repercussions during help seeking. These repercussions included institutional punishments, such as expulsion for waging an accusation with insufficient evidence, and social punishments, such as rumors or shaming. Though tribal affiliation is not the only social structure impacting the sanctioning process, the results of these focus group discussion support the assertion that tribal affiliation strongly impacts institutional power.

3.4 Discussion

These focus group discussions provide support for Popovich and Warren's inclusion of gender as a form of legitimate power. Because organizational tolerance is a display of shared values, the social barriers women encounter to help-seeking demonstrate these gendered power relations. While women are perceived as culpable for their harassment, male harassers are frequently able to avert negative sanctioning at the university level.

In order to perpetrate sexual harassment, a male harasser perceives that his power outweighs that of the target. The relative power of the harasser and the target can be viewed in the target's help-seeking behavior and the harasser's corresponding sanctions. Within the focus group discussions, the students described various bases of power for both the harasser and the target. Harassers were perceived as having coercive and referent power, while the targets were perceived as having coercive power. Tribal affiliation strongly mediated these bases of power.

For women targets, coercive power may take a variety of forms. To prevent harassment, targets may threaten harassers with institutional sanctions through filing an official report with the university. This report could result in a student's expulsion or a professor's firing. However, men with an affiliation to a powerful tribe were perceived as largely immune to this form of negative sanctioning. A man with a powerful affiliation was perceived as more powerful than a woman in the organization.

This perceived immunity often took the form of referent power functioning through tribal affiliation. The male focus groups engaged in substantial discussion about the impact of their social connections on sanctioning. While social connections function outside the tribal sphere, men with tribal connections are at an advantage when a member of their tribe is present at any level of the reporting process. Referent power also functions on male bystanders, who will often fail to confront or report a male harasser from the same tribe, despite their opposition to the harassing. In addition to referent power, legitimate power was also associated with male harassers from powerful tribes. This was demonstrated in both the male and female focus groups, which discussed the perceived immunity provided to men from powerful tribes based on the accepted social structure of tribal hierarchies.

In addition, male harassers also demonstrated coercive power. This was particularly displayed in the women's focus groups in which they discussed the perceived social repercussions to reporting sexual harassment. These repercussions included poor grades if the harasser was a professor to rumors if the harasser was a fellow student. If the harasser was affiliated with a powerful tribe, perceived coercive power was heightened. One participant even noted that tribal affiliation may enable the accused harasser to exact institutional retribution on his accuser. Though this specific claim is unverified, the strengthening of coercive power based on tribal affiliation was a trend throughout the discussions.

Women with a powerful tribal affiliation also carried coercive power. Both the male and female discussions noted that harassing a powerful woman may result in tribal fighting, while none indicated a reliance on institutional help-seeking procedures. However, none of the participants mentioned female help seeking in relation to this tribal retaliation. Based on this evidence, I cannot conclude whether this form of relation represents an avenue for women to exercise agency, or a display of paternalism.

In addition, women targets from powerful tribes were viewed as losing their coercive power if the male harasser came from the same tribe. While this may be a form of referent power, it is most likely a form of coercive power. Exacting institutional punishments on a member of the same tribe may result in social repercussions for the woman within her tribe. Table 3 provides a

model for the perceived interaction between tribal affiliation and the bases of power.

Table 3: Tribal Affiliation, Gender, and the Bases of Social Power



The results of the focus group discussion also provide support for Hulin's organizational climate theory. The male focus groups particularly linked the lack of negative sanctions with an increased incidence of sexual harassment. Analyzed based on Hulin et al.'s Organizational Climate Theory, the results of these focus group discussions indicate that this university qualifies as tolerant of sexual harassment.

This study comes with several limitations. The small sample size and limited nature of the discussions limits the generalizability of these results. Specifically, many women in the discussions were specializing in Women and Gender Studies, a factor which may make our sample more progressive on women's issues than the majority of students at the university. In addition, the presence of peers and researchers may have skewed participant responses. The scope of the questions, which did not focus on tribalism, also prevents an in-depth analysis of how tribalism translates into sanctioning at the university. However, the absence of tribalism as a prompt during the discussion also provides this study with legitimacy, as all discussions organically discussed the impact of wasta and tribalism. Lastly, a more in-depth analysis of sexual harassment sanctioning

may have focused on the recruitment of sexual harassment survivors. This study did not take this approach, as both harasser and target perceptions of power are necessary to analyze institutional climate. Future studies should supplement this analysis by evaluating formal complaints and their corresponding sanctions.

Despite these limitations, these focus group discussions provide support for the application of French and Raven's Bases of Power to sexual harassment. This study highlights the functioning of tribal mechanisms on campus and ties these mechanisms to the perpetration of sexual harassment. These discussions support the claim that tribal power structures continue to function as a base of legitimate power outside the bounds of formal university mechanisms. Future studies should continue to examine the interaction between different bases of power in creating a safe organizational environment.

Go guther to talk about unconscious element of social power in the DNA of Jordanian

Conclusion and Recommendations

In this study on sexual harassment, I have attempted to illustrate the mechanisms through which tribal power impacts sanctioning. The first chapter of this study positioned tribes as a base of power within the Jordanian political arena. This power can be demonstrated historically through an analysis of the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy. In addition, tribes remain powerful pillars of civil society today. By viewing the power of tribes in contrast to the power of political parties, this thesis argues that tribes remain the most serious domestic check on monarchical power. Chapter Two of this study went on to discuss the role of women within civil society institutions. In this chapter, I also discussed the civil society functioning of tribal organizations in domains such as conflict resolution. Despite their widespread use today, many of these tribal mechanisms for dispute mediation continue to exclude Jordanian women.

Based on the pervasiveness of tribal power and their perpetuation of rigid gender roles, this study argues that tribes constitute a base of power in Jordan. French and Raven's model for the Bases of Social Power provides a theoretical mechanism through which this power extends beyond tribal affairs. My analysis of six focus group discussions conducted at a Jordanian university provides support for this positioning of tribes as a base of power. Students within these focus groups discussed the perceived coercive and legitimate power attributed to a man from a powerful tribe. Though women with a powerful tribal affiliation benefited from the protective benefits of coercive power, power was moderated on the basis of gender. This effect was most clearly demonstrated in the occurrence of sexual harassment between two members of the same tribe. In

this instance, a woman with a powerful affiliation was largely stripped of her coercive power. This effect provides support for the positioning of gender as a cultural base of legitimate power.

In addition, the results of this research provide a relevant case study for institutional architects who endeavor to design help-seeking mechanisms for survivors of sexual harassment. Though women from powerful tribes maintained coercive power, this power was based in their tribal affiliation rather than their identity as a student. This suggests that tribes have a strong degree of influence over the sanctioning process for tribal members.

This reliance on tribal mechanisms rather than institutional mechanisms in response to sexual harassment is a key area for future study. Researchers must evaluate the factors that contribute to a climate of trust and responsiveness between institutions and women.

In addition, this study's focus on sexual harassment sanctioning largely omitted the role of women in the perpetuation of tribal power. This may be attributable to the relatively short focus groups and their limited focus. Future studies must examine women's agency in systems of tribalism and patriarchy within Jordan.

Based on the results of this study, university officials should endeavor to create a safe climate for women students to report sexual harassment incidents. The university must counter coercive power used to silence and undermine help seeking women. Additional protections must be afforded to women help-seekers to diminish the coercive power of harassers. Foremost, university policies that penalize women reporters for failing to provide sufficient evidence promote an institutionally-sanctioned barrier to help seeking. This is a form of coercive power that must be diminished through policy changes. In addition to institutionalized coercive power, the most common punishments associated with help-seeking were social, often involving the spreading of

rumors. To combat this form of coercive power, I recommend that universities provide women's activists with spaces to organize and hold trainings on sexual harassment.

The social reality at this Jordanian university is not unique within the region or globally. Over past two years, the #MeToo movement has created a global space to build women's solidarity. These activists have demonstrated the power of women's solidarity to function as a powerful social net. In the future, scholars and policymakers may witness women activists harnessing their own bases of power to counter sexual harassment. This display of solidarity may develop into a form of referent power. In addition, by reducing negative social sanctions to reporting incidents, women students may strip harassers of their coercive power. In addition, they may develop coercive power of their own through the creation of institutions that are intolerant to harassing behavior. On campus, this process has begun as students join together to promote a climate that emphasizes human rights and educational equity.

Appendix

A.1 Analysis Plan

Research Question: What extra-university tribal power structures impact organizational tolerance to sexual harassment at the University of Jordan?

I. TOPIC 1: RISK TO THE VICTIM FOR REPORTING

How do university students describe the impact of tribal systems of patriarchy on survivor help-seeking behaviors?

A. Descriptor Code:

- Tribalism
- Wasta

B. Variables and Subgroups to Compare by:

- Formal Help-seeking
- Informal Help-seeking
- Barriers to reporting

II. TOPIC 2: LACK OF MEANINGFUL SANCTIONS & REFUSAL TO TAKE COMPLAINTS SERIOURLY

How do university students perceive the impact of tribal affiliation of perpetrator, survivor, or bystander on formal or informal sanctioning?

A. Descriptor Codes:

- Tribalism
- Wasta

B. Variables and Subgroups to Compare by:

- Positive sanctions
- Lack of sanctions
- Negative sanctions

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