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Trading and Aiding Human Rights Violators:
The Negligible Influence of Bilateral Agreements on Respect for Human Rights in
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Abstract

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This thesis evaluates the effectiveness of human rights language in trade and foreign aid agreements in positively influencing human rights behaviors in developing countries. While prior studies have focused on the impact of human rights standards and their described enforcement in trade agreements, my approach puts such standards and enforcement on a scale of strength and compares the relative influences of trade and foreign aid agreements. For this research, I have utilized all available trade and foreign aid agreements made by the European Union with developing countries between 1980 and 2010. By and large, it appears that human rights language in such agreements does not have a positive effect on the human rights behaviors of developing countries. Thus, my findings suggest that using human rights language in bilateral and multilateral agreements to promote higher levels of respect for human rights abroad is an ineffective, and perhaps even counterproductive, strategy for the European Union.

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Introduction

Language is power. The precise wording a government uses in its legislation, press releases, and bilateral agreements can bind the country to a certain path or give it the leeway to choose from numerous plans of action. Just look at the response of the United States government to the overthrow of the Egyptian government in July of 2013. Though the Egyptian military clearly ousted a democratically legitimate president, the United States government refused to call the crisis a “coup d’état,” as the usage of that phrase would legally force the United States to change its foreign aid package with Egypt. This begs the questions: is all language within governmental agreements this influential? Can the specific wording of bilateral agreements change a country’s behavior? Could a country utilize such language to instigate change in another country’s actions?

The European Union throughout much of its later existence has been a strong promoter of human rights within its borders and in the international arena. However, it is unclear if the European Union’s efforts to strengthen human rights worldwide have been successful. According to Europa, the official web portal of the European Union, all of the European Union’s foundational treaties have incorporated the values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. The Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 legally bound all member states to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which clearly states the rights of each individual living within the EU. The European Union has also attempted to make significant strides as an intergovernmental organization (IGO) in promoting human rights abroad. It upholds standards of human rights not only through its foreign assistance to countries in need of improvement, but also

by embedding human rights stipulations into many of its trade agreements with non-member states.

The European Union is not alone in promoting human rights through its external policies. Much of the Western democratic world practices similar methods in the hopes that their trading partners and recipients of foreign aid will fundamentally improve their respect for human rights. However, the EU stands apart from most of these countries, as it is an immense trading bloc and foreign aid donor in addition to its support of human rights. The amount of influence the European Union possesses on the human rights front in terms of trade and foreign aid power is rivaled only by the United States.

Nevertheless, despite the European Union's unique position as an influential intergovernmental organization, other institutions can model their policies on those of the EU. If countries, as well as evolving intergovernmental organizations, aim to improve global human rights, they should be aware of the most successful mechanisms for achieving this goal. This study will evaluate the impact of human rights language in trade and foreign aid agreements to determine if, and to what degree, these efforts of the European Union to advance human rights have been successful.

This study will attempt to answer the question of whether the EU has improved respect for human rights abroad through standards and enforcement clauses related to human rights in its bilateral and multilateral agreements with developing countries. This involves an examination of human rights language embedded in EU trade and foreign aid agreements, as well as a categorization of such language in terms of strength. I define a standard as an expectation for a human rights behavior included in an agreement.

However, this research will also look into the importance of human rights enforcement

within these agreements. Enforcement in this context refers to how countries legally allow themselves to take action should trade partner or aid recipient countries fail to meet the established human rights standards. These definitions are new concepts in this area of study, as there is a lack of clear distinction between standards and enforcement clauses in the scholarly literature. Therefore, this study seeks to evaluate whether standards and/or enforcement clauses are a strong incentive for developing countries to improve human rights behaviors and thus to determine if the usage of such language is an effective strategy of the European Union in promoting human rights abroad.

But what exactly constitutes human rights standards and enforcement clauses within international agreements? Clear examples are presented within the Cotonou Agreement of 2000. This treaty established an aid partnership between the European Union and 79 countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP). The agreement aimed to reduce poverty and promote economic development in the ACP countries, and it currently serves as a foundation for foreign aid allocation to ACP countries from the EU. The treaty establishes standards on human rights that underline the partnership. The agreement contains language that strongly affirms the importance of human rights throughout the partnership, particularly in Article 9, Section 2: “The Parties undertake to promote and protect all fundamental freedoms and human rights, be they civil and political, or economic, social and cultural” (EC 2000). This statement is a clearly established standard on human rights protection within the Cotonou Agreement, and other EU agreements contain very similar statements of standards.

The treaty also suggests an element of enforcement should these rights not be respected. Article 96, Section 2(a) states that:

If...a Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfill an obligation stemming from respect for human rights...it shall, except in cases of special urgency, supply the other Party and the Council of Ministers [of the EU] with the relevant information required for a thorough examination of the situation...If the consultations do not lead to a solution acceptable to both parties, if consultation is refused, or in cases of special urgency, appropriate measures may be taken. (EC 2000)

The treaty thus establishes human rights conditions on aid allocation, but this is by no means an example of strong enforcement. Though this statement authorizes the European Union to take action if human rights standards are not met, it does not clarify what actions the EU may take nor does it bind the EU to a reaction. This in essence allows the European Union to respond in whatever way it sees fit, which could result in a failure of the EU to uphold human rights standards.

Examples of stronger human rights language can be found in the European Union's agreement on financial assistance to developing countries in Asia and Latin America in 1992. Article 1 states:

The Community shall attach the utmost importance to the promotion of human rights, support for the process of democratization, good governance, environmental protection, trade liberalization and strengthening the cultural dimension, by means of an increasing dialogue on political, economic, and social issues conducted in mutual interest. (EC 1992)

This is a strong standard that mentions human rights, democracy, and dialogue on political, economic, and social issues. Article 2 presents a stronger level of enforcement than that found in the Cotonou Agreement:

In the case of fundamental and persistent violations of human rights and democratic principles, the Community could amend or even suspend the implementation of cooperation with the States concerned by confining cooperation of activities of direct benefits to those sections of the population in need. (EC 1992)

This condition, unlike the one in the Cotonou Agreement, effectively states the right of the EU to take unilateral action in response to a violation of human rights.

The European Union is a unique body in the modern world. In trade policy, and to some extent with foreign aid, it functions in the same way as a country. All 28 members of the EU have a common trade polity and negotiate as one body with countries in establishing trade relationships with countries outside of the union. The EU also gives a significant amount of foreign aid to developing countries, though member states continue to give aid individually as well. Thus, it remains in many respects an intergovernmental organization, as its member states retain much of their sovereignty. Therefore, the actions of the European Union are similar to those taken by countries, while at the same time intergovernmental organizations can in turn model their own policies after those of the EU. Presumably, other countries and IGOs who seek to promote human rights abroad can utilize actions taken by the EU that are shown to be effective. They can similarly refrain from any unsuccessful policies used by the EU. Thus, the outcomes of this study in relation to the value of human rights standards and enforcement within trade and foreign aid agreements are applicable beyond the European Union to much of the developed world.

The question remains: Can developed countries utilize agreements in trade and foreign aid to change human rights behaviors in developing countries? Does language truly have an effect on country behavior? In evaluating the effectiveness of this aspect of the European Union's human rights strategy, I will first outline those factors believed by a consensus of scholars to influence human rights. I will also look at previous discussions on the impact of trade agreements and foreign aid on human rights behaviors by countries. After identifying areas in which scholarly debate is limited, I will present my own predictions on how trade agreements and foreign aid agreements influence human rights behaviors through specific language in the agreements. I will detail my data and methodological approach and will conclude with a summary of my results as well as their potential implications.

Literature Review

General Overview of Factors that Influence Human Rights

There is an abundance of scholarly literature on the factors that influence human rights around the world, so much so that there is a broad consensus as to the general policies that positively and negatively impact human rights. These factors fall into four broad categories, and I will present them in the following order: political factors, historical/demographic factors, economic factors, and factors related to globalization.

Several scholars (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Apodaca 1998; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Davenport and Armstrong 2004) tested the effects of political factors, such as democracy, government type, and involvement in violent conflicts, on occurrences of human rights repression. Poe and Tate (1994) and Poe,

Tate, and Keith (1999) found that democracy decreased human rights repression. Davenport and Armstrong (2004) agreed that “after a threshold has been passed [...] democracy decreases state repression” (Davenport and Armstrong 2004, 551). Wars (both civil and international) and military regimes had a consistent association with increased human rights repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).

Other influential factors can be classified as historical or demographic. British colonial influence was found to have a negative impact on human rights repression, though with varied statistical significance (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Population growth had no statistically significant effect on human rights repression (Poe and Tate 1994).

Perhaps most important for this research are the economic factors that influence human rights behaviors, as the impact of trade and foreign aid is essentially economic. Poe and Tate (1994) found “that economic standing is negatively but only rather weakly, related to regimes’ propensity to abuse of personal integrity rights” (Poe and Tate 1994, 866). Economic growth was shown to “exercise...a negative impact on repression,” but not at a statistically significant level (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999, 307). Apodaca (1998) found that the level of economic development (measured as GNP per capita) had a positive and highly statistically significant influence on respect for certain human rights, specifically women’s economic and social rights. Mitchell and McCormick (1988) added the level of involvement with capitalist countries as a factor theoretically influencing human rights, which they measured in two ways. The first accounted for the volume of trade flows between capitalist countries and third-world countries. The second measured total investment ties between the countries. They found that “extensive ties with capitalist states

did not in themselves detract from or contribute to the level of human rights violations in the nations of our dataset” (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, 497).

However, these comprehensive overviews rarely included a focus on trade or foreign aid. At most, broad studies of factors impacting human rights included trade and foreign aid as afterthoughts in the conclusion, usually to speculate on the implications of the more general economic independent variables used in the study. Poe and Tate (1994) did not reference trade at all in their research and mentioned foreign aid only as an example of states’ actions to promote economic development abroad:

Efforts to improve economic conditions within a country through programs like foreign aid might at times successfully promote human rights, defined more broadly, by leading to the provision for basic human needs, but our study indicates these conditions have, at best, a moderate impact on respect for personal integrity. (Poe and Tate 1994, 867)

Henderson (1991) also did not account for trade and foreign aid in his analysis. Mitchell and McCormick (1988) did involve trade flows in their measurement of capitalist economic ties but did not consider the potential influence of human rights language within bilateral and multilateral agreements. They did, however, mention foreign aid agreements as a possible avenue for building upon their findings: “It may be possible for the international community, or even for individual nations, to raise the costs – perhaps through aid decisions – of violations of human rights” (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, 498). This implies that foreign aid may be an influential factor in the decision-making of recipient countries. Thus, any human rights language in foreign aid agreements could have a strong impact on the human rights behavior of recipient countries. Nevertheless, scholars who

examined the effects of broad political and economic factors on human rights overall do not directly test the impact of such language in trade and foreign aid agreements.

Indeed, only a few scholars (Apodaca 2001; Morrissey 2004; Hafner-Burton 2005; Gray 2006; Bearce and Tirone 2010; Cao, Greenhill, and Prakash 2013) have used trade or foreign aid as a direct factor that may affect human rights observation. Apodaca (2001), in particular, included both trade and foreign aid as factors that could affect respect for human rights in the partner or recipient country. She cited liberal economic theory, which “posits that international trade benefits both trading partners” by increasing economic growth and development, in hypothesizing that respect for human rights will improve with higher levels of international trade (Apodaca 2001, 594). Her findings confirmed this belief, and she stated that “trade is...advantageous to guaranteeing human rights” (Apodaca 2001, 598). In addition, though she hypothesized that official development assistance (ODA) would have a negative impact on human rights in the aid recipient country, her analysis found that “aid has an influential positive impact on the human rights situation in the recipient country” (Apodaca 2001, 598).

However, though it is clear that many of these broad studies did not effectively address the impact of trade and foreign aid agreements, they provided us with an overview of factors that consistently have an effect on human rights behavior. Henderson (1991) summarized the combined effects of some of these factors well: “A country that has a government with limited power and that is responsive to its people and an economy with a healthy growth rate has a good chance of avoiding repression” (Henderson 1991, 132). Thus, I expect that regime type (specifically whether or not a country is democratic), involvement in violent conflicts, population, colonization, economic development, and

involvement with capitalist countries will all have effects on human rights behaviors in developing countries, and therefore I control for their potential impacts in my analysis. At its core, this research seeks to determine if trade and foreign aid agreements themselves matter beyond the volume of trade and foreign aid. Given that the basic influential factors on human rights have been established, I now turn to the scholarly literature that has examined the impact of such agreements.

Impact of Trade and Trade Agreements on Human Rights

There is some existing scholarly literature on how human rights standards within trade agreements have influenced human rights practices in partner countries. Hafner-Burton (2005), in particular, performed a significant study on how human rights standards within preferential trade agreements affect human rights behaviors in the trading partner countries. In addition to comparing the impacts of human rights agreements (HRAs) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on human rights, her research looked at the different responses of less developed governments to “hard” and “soft” standards on human rights set by the more developed governments. Hafner-Burton found that HRAs and some PTAs “supply ‘soft’ standards that are only vaguely tied to market access and unconditional on member states’ actions” (Hafner-Burton 2005, 594). These soft standards are associated with the mechanism of persuasion, or “the active, often strategic inculcation of norms” (Hafner-Burton 2005, 599). Her findings showed that soft standards and persuasion are not effective tools for impacting human rights: “state commitment to HRAs and [...] PTAs supplying soft human rights standards [...] do not systematically produce improvement in human rights behaviors” (Hafner-Burton 2005, 593).

Hafner-Burton also identified another mechanism, coercion, by which governments influence other countries' human rights actions: "Coercion is the threat or act by a sender government or governments to disrupt economic exchange with the target state, unless the target acquiesces to the articulated demand" (Hafner-Burton 2005, 599). This mechanism relates to hard standards, which "tie agreement benefits to member compliance with specific human rights principles" (Hafner-Burton 2005, 594). Her analysis found that coercion is much more effective than persuasion in promoting compliance to human rights norms: "State commitment to PTAs supplying hard human rights standards does often produce better practices" (Hafner-Burton 2005, 593).

Hafner-Burton's (2005) conceptualization of soft and hard standards has strong similarities to my own research. What she defined as soft standards, I simply call standards, while I equate her hard standards with enforcement clauses. However, her research design assumed there are only two types of standards, whereas, in reality, standards and enforcement fit together on a spectrum based on level of strength. The amount of influence of human rights in an agreement is largely determined by the explicit language used in the standards and enforcement clauses. The choice of such language has the potential to greatly alter participant countries' reactions in terms of human rights. This demonstrates the gap in scholarly literature in evaluating the levels of human rights language within trade agreements. Countries seeking to implement successful standards within their trade agreements may have great difficulty in classifying their norms as hard or soft. Just as other studies created five-point scales measuring human rights repression (Henderson 1991, Mitchell and McCormick 1988), my research seeks to rectify this ambiguity by modeling

these research designs and creating a scale for the strength of human rights language in agreements.

Nevertheless, Hafner-Burton (2005) established an important theory on the necessary components in trade agreements to best impact human rights practices: “In the area of human rights, hard laws are essential: change in repressive behavior almost always requires legally binding obligations that are enforceable” (Hafner-Burton 2005, 594-595). Her findings indicated that language describing the enforcement of standards is much more effective in changing human rights behavior than standards by themselves. She clearly emphasized the economic influence of enforcement: “when PTAs supply coercive mechanisms of influence that HRAs lack, they tie compliance to substantial market benefits” (Hafner-Burton 2005, 597). Thus, a key theory can be derived: the stronger the enforcement, the more respect for human rights. It can also be implied that standards in trade agreements, as I define them, have little impact on human rights behaviors. However, I believe that standards may still have an important role in compliance, particularly when compared to agreements with no human rights language whatsoever, and my research will seek further evidence to determine if standards produce more respect for human rights as well.

Another study indirectly hinted at the effectiveness of standards. Xun Cao, Brian Greenhill, and Aseem Prakash (2013) examined the effects of trade relationships on the diffusion of human rights norms. They applied David Vogel’s ‘California Effect,’ “the mechanism by which (importing) jurisdictions with higher standards are able to transmit their regulatory standards to (exporting) jurisdictions with lower standards,” to human

rights (Cao, Greenhill, and Prakash 2013, 135).¹ The original example used by Vogel to describe the California Effect was the diffusion of high air quality standards from California to the rest of the United States, which resulted in overall higher environmental laws and standards countrywide. Cao et al. (2013) found evidence that the California Effect is applicable to human rights standards only when a certain threshold is exceeded, meaning that human rights standards are successfully exported only when accompanied by a certain amount of pressure from the importing country. They believed this level of pressure occurs “when the average level of respect for human rights in the importing countries is sufficiently strong to send an unambiguous signal to the exporting country about the importance that its importers attach to human rights standards” (Cao, Greenhill, and Prakash 2013, 141). While this study did not discuss standards within trade agreements, the findings indicated that trade can be an effective mechanism for promoting human rights practices. Furthermore, the idea of a threshold implies that scaling the strength of human rights standards and enforcement, as my research will do, is a good strategy.

Other research found ties between trade and higher levels of women’s rights. Neumayer and De Soysa (2011) found that trade links between developed and developing countries are associated with greater promotion of women’s rights in the developing countries. This study, like that of Cao, Greenhill, and Prakash (2013) suggested a successful spread of human rights norms from countries with high respect for human rights to countries with low levels of respect. Trade links appeared to serve as a mechanism for diffusing standards for women’s rights: “it is suggested that the incentive to raise women’s rights is stronger where [...] major trading partners [...] provide strong rights” (Neumayer

¹ For clarification, this usage of the term “standard” refers to norms of production and should not be confused with my terminology.

and De Soysa 2011, 1066). They also emphasized that governments will more likely demonstrate human rights credentials if they are in need of financial capital, which is a major incentive of trade and foreign aid agreements (Neumayer and De Soysa 2011, 1065). Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz (2006) looked into how trade, investment, and international treaty ratification impacted women's rights. They agreed with other scholars (Cao et al. 2013; Neumayer and De Soysa 2011) that trade has the ability to diffuse human rights norms, focusing specifically on improvements in women's quality of life and equality: "increasing international exchange and communications create new opportunities for income-generating work and expose countries to norms that [...] have promoted equality for women" (Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz 2006, 327). The authors also found that country ratification of the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has a strong influence on respect for women's rights: "Participation in this agreement has played a role in increasing female levels of literacy, participation in the economy, and representation in parliament" (Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz 2006, 326). This finding indicates the power of standards in international treaties, an influence that may apply to standards in trade agreements as well. I now turn to foreign aid, another type of partnership between developed and developing countries that may have an influence on human rights.

Impact of Foreign Aid on Human Rights

A second related theoretical link is putting human rights language into foreign aid agreements. There is little existing literature dealing specifically with the strength of human rights standards and enforcement within foreign aid agreements. However, some

scholars (Bearce and Tirone 2010; Morrissey 2004) have evaluated the effectiveness of foreign aid in promoting goals other than better human rights practices. David Bearce and Daniel Tirone (2010) evaluated the impact of foreign aid on economic development in recipient countries. The study concluded that foreign aid was effective in promoting both economic reform and economic growth when the strategic benefits for the donor governments were small. This study added an important element to the distribution of foreign aid and its relationship to conditionality: “At least part of the enforcement problem with regard to aid conditionality stems from the fact that donor governments often provide their foreign aid to achieve various strategic, military, and/or political objectives” (Bearce and Tirone 2010, 839). This notion of strategic benefits for donor governments is extremely intriguing. Suppose a donor government is heavily reliant on a benefit, such as a military alliance, from a country in return for providing said country with financial assistance. In order for this benefit to continue, conditionality in other areas of the agreement will rarely be enforced by the donor country: “as foreign aid once again becomes more useful for military-strategic purposes, it becomes less effective at promoting economic growth and development” (Bearce and Tirone 2010, 849). This theory can potentially be extended to apply to trade dependence as well.

I argue that it is likely that the same theory holds true for human rights, as donor governments may overlook enforcement on human rights in their dependency on another goal. I predict that enforcement clauses on human rights in a donor country’s foreign aid agreements will be less likely to be effective when the donor country is dependent on the recipient country for some other goal. However, the usage of the European Union as a medium for studying donor governments is beneficial in mitigating some of these potential

complications. In particular, there is no risk of the strategic benefits of military alliances interfering, as the European Union does not have the purview to create alliances in its Common Security and Defense Policy. Therefore, the EU has the liberty as an intergovernmental organization to utilize a firmer stance on human rights in terms of foreign aid to developing countries.

Another study by Oliver Morrissey (2004) evaluated the effectiveness of foreign aid in general in promoting the goals of donor governments. Morrissey (2004) had a similar theory to Bearce and Tirone (2010), stating that “donors...use aid as a lever to encourage policy reform, i.e. conditions are attached to the aid” (Morrissey 2004, 154). He specifically investigated the benefits of conditionality within foreign aid agreements. It should be noted that Morrissey (2004) in some aspects conflated my definitions of standards and enforcement in his concept of conditionality: “The effectiveness of conditionality, the extent to which the reforms advocated by donors are in fact implemented, is mediated by the recipient government’s willingness to accept the conditions and its ability to implement them” (Morrissey 2004, 154). While I agree with his conclusion to a certain extent, I argue that the ability of a government to implement standards stems in part from conditions placed upon it by donor governments in enforcement clauses and that this ability is not itself a component of conditionality. However, there is clearly a consensus that enforcement in foreign aid is often ineffective: “Attaching conditions to aid will not ensure that governments will undertake reforms they would not have chosen willingly” (Morrissey 2004, 168). This further reinforces the need for levels of enforcement within my own analysis, as it is possible that as enforcement become stronger, recipient governments have more incentives to respect human rights. Morrissey did note in some cases that

“conditional lending has had effects, often quite pronounced, but these tended to become apparent slowly” (Morrissey 2004, 164). In his examination of aid impacts on trade policy reform, he noted that trade reform is economically and politically costly, and powerful interest groups with large stakes in trade protection frequently slow down the process of reform. However, conditional aid throughout the process often mitigated some of these costs. While these conditions are not identical to mine, Morrissey’s study indicated that enforcement can have an impact through foreign aid. It is also advisable, then, that my analysis of respect for human rights incorporates a time interval to account for a delay in implementation.

Other scholars (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Franklin 2008) discussed how transnational actors can influence countrywide respect for human rights and highlighted the influence of foreign aid in the process. Keck and Sikkink (1999) stressed how actors seeking to influence a country’s human rights behaviors often utilize material leverage and link respect for human rights to economic aid (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 97). Risse and Sikkink (1999) believed that “countries receiving large...economic aid flows will be more vulnerable to human rights pressures than those not receiving such flows” (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 24). Franklin’s study revealed that:

The combination of human rights criticism...with foreign capital dependency has a negative, statistically significant relationship with repression, signifying that human rights criticism significantly reduces repression...in countries that have greater reliance on foreign aid. (Franklin 2008, 203)

Thus, as foreign aid can have a strong impact on human rights behaviors in certain countries, foreign aid agreements likely contain language that stresses this importance.

Whether this wording is in the form of standards or enforcement clauses could have a significant influence on subsequent human rights-related decisions by the governments of recipient countries, underscored by Franklin's (2008) attribution of the failure of human rights treaties in improving human rights records to "weak enforcement mechanisms within these treaties" (Franklin 2008, 189). This further emphasizes the importance of enforcement in any sort of agreement, be it trade or foreign aid. However, it should be noted that none of the studies of the effects of foreign aid on respect for human rights have examined foreign aid agreements; thus the wording of foreign aid agreements has never been used as an independent variable in analyzing factors that influence human rights.

Significant Gaps in the Scholarly Literature

As stated above, scholars have not thoroughly examined the impact of standards in foreign aid agreements in particular on any policy area, let alone human rights. Such standards could potentially have an impact on respect for human rights even without enforcement. Therefore, my research aims to contribute concrete analysis on whether or not human rights standards in European Union foreign aid agreements influence human rights implementation. There have also been no studies that tie a developing country's dependency on trade or foreign aid to the wording of trade and foreign aid agreements in examining the level of respect for human rights in developing countries. The importance of trade ties and foreign aid inflows to developing countries may significantly influence their decisions in respecting human rights, and the potential to lose such relationships (as detailed in enforcement clauses) could greatly incentivize a developing country to improve their human rights records.

In addition, there is strong potential that a regional effect may come into play in promoting better human rights behaviors. If a developing country's neighbor has a trade or foreign aid agreement with the European Union, the country will likely feel the need to get an agreement of its own with the EU or to maintain an existing agreement. Therefore, if the neighboring country's agreement includes human rights language, the developing country might take its own human rights behavior more seriously, as it does not want to be deprived of a beneficial relationship with the EU over reasons of human rights.

The process of negotiation could induce a change in human rights behaviors in developing countries as well. If a developing country is in the stages of reaching a trade or foreign aid partnership with the EU, it may want to be on its best behavior on the human rights front to get the best possible agreement, especially if the developing country believes the EU takes human rights seriously in crafting bilateral and multilateral agreements.

Finally, there have been no studies comparing the different impacts of human rights wording (standards and enforcement clauses) within trade agreements and human rights wording within foreign aid agreements on the human rights behaviors in recipient countries. It is entirely possible that one mechanism, either trade agreements or foreign aid agreements, is more effective in promoting better human rights practices, in which case governments seeking to improve human rights abroad should prefer to use the more successful instrument. This study will provide evidence as to the relative effectiveness of trade agreements and foreign aid agreements in promoting better human rights practices.

Hypotheses

Given the theory derived from the existing scholarly literature, I present several hypotheses to test. The hypotheses stem from the background literature on standards and enforcement and from my specific terminology. With the testing of these hypotheses, I also hope to gain insight into which type of agreement (trade or foreign aid) is the most effective in influencing changes in the level of respect for human rights.

It must first be emphasized that enforcement cannot exist without standards: if there are no established expectations on human rights behaviors in an agreement, there can be no clauses detailing potential responses should human rights be violated in the partner or recipient country. Therefore, any trade or foreign aid agreement with enforcement clauses will accordingly have standards as well. However, standards can also stand alone in agreements, and it is likely that in some agreements enforcement is eschewed altogether.

Hypothesis 1: *If a trade agreement has human rights standards, the level of respect for human rights in the partner country will be positive. If a foreign aid agreement has standards, the level of respect for human rights in the recipient country will be positive.*

The existing background literature indicates that standards have no strong impact on human rights behavior. However, I am not convinced by these previous studies that standards have no impact whatsoever on respect for human rights, though it may be negligible when compared with the influence of enforcement.

Hypothesis 2: *If a trade agreement has both standards and enforcement, the level of respect for human rights in the partner country will be greater than if the agreement has only standards. If a foreign aid agreement has both standards and enforcement, the level of respect*

for human rights in the recipient country will be greater than if the agreement has only standards.

The scholarly literature, however, does suggest that enforcement in trade and foreign aid agreements plays an important role in encouraging countries to uphold certain human rights behaviors. Thus, one would expect that the strength of the enforcement language would have an influence on how countries behave on the human rights front.

Hypothesis 3: *The higher the level of strength of enforcement within a trade agreement, the more positive the level of respect for human rights in the partner country. The higher the level of strength of enforcement within a foreign aid agreement, the more positive the level of respect for human rights in the recipient country.*

Dependence on the European Union for a trade partnership or an aid relationship theoretically could be a powerful motivator for a developing country to be on its best behavior on all fronts, including human rights. I propose that trade or aid dependency could be a particularly influential control variable.

Hypothesis 4: *If a country is highly dependent on the EU for trade, there will be a high level of respect for human rights in the partner country. If a country is highly dependent on the EU for foreign aid, there will be a high level of respect for human rights in the recipient country.*

Furthermore, one would expect that countries reliant on the European Union for trade or foreign aid would take language dealing with respect for human rights placed in their agreements more seriously. Such countries would not want to risk losing an important trading relationship or inflows of aid. Thus, the partner or recipient countries would adhere to the established standards on human rights behavior, possibly to avoid the

enforcement of repercussions (such as the cancellation of trade or a withdrawal of aid) by the European Union. The interaction of trade or aid dependence with human rights language could have strong effects on the level of respect for human rights within dependent states.

Hypothesis 5: *If a country is highly dependent on the EU for trade and its trade agreement has enforcement, there will be a high level of respect for human rights in the partner country. If a country is highly dependent on the EU for foreign aid and its foreign aid agreement has enforcement, there will be a high level of respect for human rights in the recipient country.*

The European Union often establishes trade and foreign aid partnerships with groups of developing countries. Therefore, it stands that there may be a so-called regional effect of agreement language on the human rights behaviors of developing countries. If a developing country is surrounded by countries with trade or aid agreements with the EU and these agreements contain human rights stipulations, the developing country may feel more pressure to raise its own level of respect for human rights.

Hypothesis 6: *If a developing country's neighbors have trade agreements with the European Union that include human rights standards, this country will have higher levels of respect for human rights. If a developing country's neighbors have foreign aid agreements with the European Union that include human rights standards, this country will have higher levels of respect for human rights.*

Hypothesis 7: *If a developing country's neighbors have trade agreements with the European Union that include enforcement of human rights, this country will have higher levels of respect for human rights. If a developing country's neighbors have foreign aid*

agreements with the European Union that include enforcement of human rights, this country will have higher levels of respect for human rights.

It is also possible that the prospect of gaining a trade or aid partnership with the European Union could motivate developing countries to improve their human rights behaviors, particularly if these relationships are founded on human rights principles. The years in which an agreement is being negotiated could yield higher levels of respect for human rights in the developing country.

Hypothesis 8: *If a developing country is in the process of negotiating a trade or foreign aid agreement with the European Union, this country will have higher levels of respect for human rights.*

Finally, this research will hopefully shed some light on whether the European Union truly commits to its enforcement in trade agreements and foreign aid agreements. I suspect that the actions specified in conditions (to which the EU can resort if partner countries do not respect human rights) are rarely utilized, particularly as the primary aim of most trade and foreign aid agreements is not the promotion of human rights. As theorized by Morrissey (2004), the European Union will likely derive other benefits from the relationships established through trade and foreign aid and will be reluctant to damage the partnership over an issue of human rights. Furthermore, unless the European Union is tightly bound by law to a reaction (Hafner-Burton 2005), it will not feel intense pressure from agreement conditions to have a strong response when human rights in partner or aid recipient countries are abused.

Data and Methods

In testing the previous hypotheses, I have thoroughly examined the influence of the trade agreements and foreign aid agreements established between the European Union and developing countries on the partner or recipient country's level of respect for human rights. I looked at only agreements signed by the European Union since 1980 up to 2010, though the EU established a common trade policy in 1968.² This time frame is due to limitations on the data for my dependent variable, which I will expand upon later. Given the potential influence of the United States on developing countries, I examined the trade and agreements of the United States as well. The unit of analysis is country-year.

I identified developing countries by the World Bank's categorization of countries by income group. The World Bank has created four categories of country based upon their gross national income (GNI) per capita: low income countries (a GNI per capita of \$1,036 or less), lower middle income (a GNI per capita between \$1,035 and \$4,085), higher middle income (a GNI per capita between \$4,086 and \$12,615), and high income (a GNI per capita of at least \$12,616). I classified developing countries as those within any of the first three categories; thus a developing country in this study is one with a GNI per capita below \$12,616.

Independent Variables

My first independent variables are the existence of standards and enforcement in trade and foreign aid agreements, the level of strength of the enforcement clauses, and a

² For a brief summary of the components of the trade and foreign aid agreements, please see Appendix 2.

partner or recipient country's dependence on trade or foreign aid from the EU. For each year in a given partner or recipient country, I coded for the presence of any trade and foreign aid agreements in effect, as well as the standards and enforcement clauses within them. For each developing country (in a given year), I examined a maximum of two agreements with the European Union, one trade and one foreign aid. In determining the influence of the United States on the trade front, I coded all trade agreements between the US and a developing country during the established time frame. My coding includes those developing countries with no trade or foreign aid agreements with either the European Union or the United States. It should be noted that, though I am using the same methods for measuring trade and foreign aid agreements, I have separated the two agreement types into different variables. Thus, each independent variable will include either a "T" or an "FA" to indicate which type of agreement is being analyzed.

I coded the standards in all such agreements as binary measures. Within the agreements, I made a note whenever certain words or processes are referenced. Mentions of respect for human rights, democratic principles, fundamental freedoms, rule of law, and good governance are classified as basic human rights standards (HRDstd – human rights, rule of law, democracy). Other language relating to human rights, such as civil rights, labor rights, minority rights, women's rights, and social rights fall into the category of additional rights (Astd). Women's rights (Wstd) and labor rights (Lstd) each received their own category as well, as did references to any international human rights treaties (rt) or organizations (ro), such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the International Labor Organization. Each of these variables is binary, meaning that treaties with the required language were given a value of 1 for the applicable variable(s) while those

without the reference were given a value of 0. Though I coded for all such types of human rights standards, my study focused on the basic human rights standards (HRDstd) in the agreements. In my terminology, “soft” agreements are those that contain these basic standards.

I classified enforcement language as strong, weak, or nonexistent. A weak enforcement clause only vaguely mentions a potential response from the developed country should the developing country violate human rights standards. Such clauses either state that a country “may” respond to a violation without specifics or describe a complex bureaucratic process through which the developed country may raise a complaint. In essence, treaties with weak enforcement only tentatively allow the developed country to take action when faced with human rights violations in the developing country. Strong enforcement clauses, on the other hand, include at least one of the following elements: a breach of the essential elements of the treaty, a failure to observe principles, cases of special urgency, and the potential for unilateral action on the part of the developed country. I again used binary variables for coding. Treaties with any enforcement (either weak or strong) were given a 1 for the variable “enfA,” and treaties with strong enforcement earned a 1 for the variable “enfB.” In terms of terminology, “hard” agreements are those with enforcement clauses.

The vast majority of my statistical analysis has looked at the “regional effect” of trade and foreign aid agreements. If a developing country is surrounded by countries with agreements that involve human rights expectations, the country may feel increased pressure to show greater respect for human rights. In addition to looking at bordering countries (recorded in this study as 0 kilometers from the developing country), I created

variables for countries 500 and 1000 kilometers from the developing country. At each distance (0km, 500km, and 1000km), I looked at four measurements: how many neighboring countries had agreements at all with the EU (any); how many neighboring countries had a soft agreement on human rights with the EU (S); how many neighboring countries had a hard agreement with weak enforcement (H...A); and how many neighboring countries had a hard agreement with strong enforcement (H...B). I created variables for both the sum and the percentage of all the neighboring countries with each set of requirements. As my research has only examined the agreements between the EU and developing countries, only developing countries are recognized as neighboring states.³

My final set of independent variables attempts to capture the “negotiation effect.” When developing countries are in the process of negotiating an agreement with the EU, they may show greater respect for human rights so as not to damage their growing relationship with the EU. Thus, I have binary variables (negot) measuring whether or not a developing country was in the process of negotiating an agreement with the EU with lags of one and two years.

Dependent Variables and Controls

My dependent variable is the level of respect for human rights by country. In measuring this variable, I utilized the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset, which coded respect for various human rights for 202 countries from 1981-2011. This variable has an ordinal measurement. I looked at the data for two measures of human rights. The first, physical integrity rights (specifically the rights not to be summarily

³ For clarification, I did not include any developed countries in the regional analysis.

executed, tortured, disappeared, or imprisoned for political beliefs), is measured on a 9-point scale, with 2 points assigned to each of the four rights. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for physical rights) to 8 (full government respect for physical rights). The second, empowerment rights (specifically freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of domestic movement, freedom of foreign movement, worker's rights, and electoral self-determination), is scaled from 0 to 14, with 0 representing no government respect for civil liberties and 14 standing for total government respect of civil liberties.

I controlled for several factors that may also influence the level of respect for human rights. Of the political, historical, and demographical factors that the scholarly literature indicated as having an impact on respect for human rights, I controlled for democracy, population size, wealth, involvement in violent conflicts, and colonial experience. Democracy⁴ is measured on a 20-point scale developed by Polity IV, which gives regimes a score from -10 to 10 for the level of democracy. This dataset has been used by previous scholars, including Hafner-Burton (2005), Bearce and Tirone (2010), and Cao, Greenhill, and Prakash (2013). Population size is measured as a country's total population, determined by the United Nations Statistics Division. I used the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) to measure involvement in violent conflict, specifically intranational armed conflict. I also coded for British colonization myself, treating it as a binary variable (0 for no historical British colonization, 1 for historical British colonization).

I also controlled for several economic factors. Wealth is measured as GDP per capita from the World Bank's World Development Indicators Database. A country's resource

⁴ I tested another measure of democracy, Cheibub and Gandhi's measure for type of regime (chga_regime), but found the polity variable to provide more consistent results.

endowment could also affect its reliance on the EU for trade and foreign aid. I combined the World Development Indicator's measurement of ores and minerals exports with its measurement of fuel exports to create a new variable of natural resource exports (wdi_oamefe)⁵. I compiled another variable on foreign direct investment from EU member states (EUFDI) from the OECD online database.

Some controls are specific to models based on the usage of trade or foreign aid agreements in the independent variable. Regarding trade, I included a control for a country's overall dependence on trade⁶ with the World Development Indicator's measure of exports as a percentage of GDP. I also implemented two controls for the European Union's influence in a developing country's economy. The first is a measure of exports, in current US dollars, from the developing country to all EU members (Xeu); the second is a measure of the EU's market power in the developing country's economy (EUMP), which is calculated by dividing the country's exports to the EU by its total exports. Both of these variables used trade data from the UN Commodities and Trade Database. Regarding foreign aid, I controlled for the total amount of foreign aid a developing country receives from EU member states and the EU itself (EuropeTODApC). This information was compiled using the OECD online database and converted to a per capita measure using the population control variable from the United Nations Statistics Division.

I planned to control for the influence of US trade agreements with human rights standards as well. However, after thoroughly examining all preferential trade agreements

⁵ I also used another variable for the influence of natural resource endowment: a combination of gas and oil exports as a percentage of total exports with data compiled by Michael Ross. However, I found the WDI variable on natural resources to cover more natural resources while delivering more consistent results.

⁶ Eric Reinhardt's variable on total exports as a percentage of GDP was also utilized in my analysis as a robustness check.

made by the United States with developing countries, I found that the human rights standards related only to labor rights. I coded these agreements and created variables for them, but as my research does not involve a specific focus on labor standards in trade agreements, I did not use these variables as controls in my final models.

Empirical Model

For my analysis, I used the General Estimating Equation (GEE) approach for cross-sectional time series data (Laing and Zeger, 1986), a population average model for panel-data. I treated my analysis as a linear relationship and controlled for temporal auto correlation with a first order autoregressive correction for each country. In addition I used Huber-White standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity.

Analysis and Results

My hypotheses were for the most part not confirmed by the statistical results. By and large, it appears that human rights language in trade and foreign aid agreements does not have a positive effect on human rights behaviors in developing countries. Instead, the opposite appears to occur. As a whole, the results show that:

1. Human rights language, either in standards or enforcement clauses, does not by itself have a positive effect on human rights behaviors.
2. Dependence on trade with or aid from the EU by itself does not appear to affect the level of respect for human rights, with the exception of the influence of trade dependence on physical integrity rights.

3. The interaction between trade dependence and human rights language in trade agreements has a strong association with positive human rights behaviors. The interaction between aid dependence and human rights language in foreign aid agreements, conversely, has no significant association with human rights behaviors.
4. The regional effect demonstrates that agreements for the most part have a negative association with respect for human rights.
5. The negotiation process has no influence on human rights behaviors in developing countries.

The Effect of Human Rights Language in Agreements

The first three hypotheses all concerned the isolated impact of human rights language on human rights behavior. Table 1 shows the results of the model applied to human rights language in trade agreements, while Table 2 shows the results in foreign aid agreements. Although the effect of basic standards alone in trade agreements (THRD) on physical integrity rights is positive, it is not significant, and the effect of basic standards on empowerment rights is not only negative but also statistically insignificant. The coefficients for basic standards in foreign aid agreements (FHRD) are statistically significant for both physical integrity and empowerment rights but show a negative correlation between standards and good human rights behaviors. Thus, there is no evidence here that supports the hypothesis that basic human rights standards are associated with positive levels of respect for human rights, and Hypothesis 1 is rejected.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that agreements with both standards and enforcement clauses would be associated with greater levels of respect for human rights than agreements with standards alone. The analyses of physical integrity rights and empowerment rights with trade agreements show conflicting results as to which variable, TenfA and THRD, has a greater effect. However, neither result is statistically significant, and the differences between the coefficient values are minimal. In the case of foreign aid agreements, variables FenfA and FHRD have equal coefficients and thus the same association in respect to both physical integrity and empowerment rights. Therefore, I also reject Hypothesis 2.

Table 1: Human Rights Language in Trade Agreements⁷

Variable	Trade and Phys	Trade and Phys	Trade and Phys	Trade and Emp	Trade and Emp	Trade and Emp
TA Basic HR Standards	0.063			-0.615		
	0.206			0.34		
TA Any Enforcement		0.035			-0.494	
		0.218			0.364	
TA Strong Enforcement			-0.071			-0.493
			0.257			0.383
GDP per Capita	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Population	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Polity Score	0.037**	0.037**	0.038**	0.295***	0.295***	0.295***
	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.026	0.025	0.025
Internal Armed Conflict	-0.755***	-0.756***	-0.758***	-0.071	-0.071	-0.071
	0.082	0.082	0.082	0.116	0.117	0.117
British Colonization	-0.123	-0.125	-0.127	-0.651	-0.64	-0.634
	0.242	0.242	0.242	0.434	0.432	0.432
WDI Oars, Minerals, Fuel	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006	-0.012**	-0.012**	-0.012**
	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004
EU FDI	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Goods exports to EU members	0	0	0	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*
	0	0	0	0	0	0
WDI Exports as Percentage of GDP	71217262.748**	71124956.933**	70788562.237**	73286253.207***	73747155.272***	73922884.345***
	25020368.04	25005634.39	24946313.97	19109968.15	19103089.21	19078675.53
EU's Market Power	0.007	0.007	0.007*	0.004	0.004	0.004
	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.006
_cons	4.048***	4.048***	4.050***	7.798***	7.791***	7.788***
	0.227	0.226	0.226	0.333	0.333	0.332

⁷ The values for the variables in each table are the variable's coefficient and standard error. Asterisks indicate the variable's level of statistical significance: one asterisk (*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level, two asterisks (**) indicate significance at the 0.01 level, and three asterisks (***) indicate significance at the 0.001 level.

Table 2: Human Rights Language in Foreign Aid Agreements

Variable	FA and Phys	FA and Phys	FA and Phys	FA and Emp	FA and Emp	FA and Emp
FAA Basic HR Standards	-0.315**			-0.632***		
	0.11			0.143		
FAA Any Enforcement		-0.315**			-0.632***	
		0.11			0.143	
FAA Strong Enforcement			-0.276*			-0.710***
			0.11			0.145
GDP per Capita	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Population	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Polity Score	0.037**	0.037**	0.038**	0.299***	0.299***	0.299***
	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.025	0.025	0.025
Internal Armed Conflict	-0.730***	-0.730***	-0.728***	-0.185	-0.185	-0.188
	0.084	0.084	0.084	0.117	0.117	0.116
British Colonization	-0.037	-0.037	-0.037	-0.483	-0.483	-0.484
	0.266	0.266	0.266	0.422	0.422	0.425
WDI Oars, Minerals, Fuel	-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.013**	-0.013**	-0.013**
	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004
EU FDI	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Europe Total Aid Per Capita	2050.3	2050.3	1977.025	4268.914	4268.914	4240.737
	1405.813	1405.813	1393.019	3304.219	3304.219	3319.684
_cons	4.621***	4.621***	4.601***	8.239***	8.239***	8.246***
	0.169	0.169	0.169	0.268	0.268	0.266

Hypothesis 3 compared the relationships between the two levels of enforcement and human rights behaviors. It predicted that agreements with stronger enforcement clauses would be associated with more positive levels of respect for human rights. Again, the results were unexpected. Trade agreements with stronger enforcement (TenfB) had negative coefficients for both physical integrity and empowerment rights, while trade agreements with weak enforcement (TenfA) had either a positive coefficient or a coefficient almost equal to that of the stronger agreements. None of the values, however, were statistically significant. Foreign aid agreements showed a somewhat different story, with all coefficients being negative and significant. Although agreements with strong enforcement (FenfB) had a slightly more positive association with physical integrity rights than those with weak enforcement (FenfA), the fact that the coefficients were strongly negative overshadows this result. There is no clear evidence to support the claim that agreements with strong enforcement have a more positive association with respect for human rights, and I reject Hypothesis 3.

In the regression models used to test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, some controls regularly have statistical significance. The trade agreement models all show regime type and exports as a percentage of GDP to have a positive influence on physical integrity and empowerment rights. When the dependent variable is physical integrity rights, wealth (as GDP per capita) has a positive association with human rights behavior while population and internal conflict have negative associations with human rights behavior. The developing country's natural resource endowment has a negative association with empowerment rights. Foreign aid models have significant negative controls in population and natural resource endowment and a significant positive control in regime type. The foreign aid regressions using physical integrity rights as a dependent variable also show wealth having a positive association and internal conflict having a negative association with the level of respect for human rights.

Trade and Aid Dependency

Hypothesis 4 examined the effect of trade or aid dependency with the EU on a developing country's respect for human rights. As stated earlier, trade dependency was captured in the variable EUMP (European Union market power) while aid dependency was shown by the variable EuropeTODApC (total aid from the EU per capita). The coefficients for these variables can be found in Tables 1 and 2. While the coefficients for both EUMP and EuropeTODApC are consistently positive, they are significant only in one case⁸. Thus, I reject Hypothesis 4 and conclude that dependence on trade or aid alone is not an important motivator for developing countries in terms of respecting human rights.

⁸ The effect of hard enforcement trade agreements (TenfB) was statistically significant with physical integrity rights.

Hypothesis 5 took the dependence theory a step further by looking at the interaction between human rights language and trade or aid dependency. I created new variables to measure this interaction: for trade agreements, I multiplied EUMP with the different independent variables representing human rights language; for foreign aid agreements I used EuropeTODAp. Tables 3 and 4 show the results of these models for trade agreements and foreign aid agreements respectively.

The interaction variable in trade agreement models supplies interesting results. The effect of the interaction variable on physical integrity rights is consistently positive and significant, and it gave all the independent variables on human rights language significance they did not have before the inclusion of the interaction variable. However, the coefficients of the independent variables became strongly negative, indicating that human rights language in this case is associated with low levels of respect for physical integrity rights. The trade interaction variable was not always significant when measuring empowerment rights, but the coefficients for the variable were positive and gave two of the three independent variables significance. Though the results between physical integrity and empowerment rights are not the same, it is clear that the interaction between trade dependency and human rights language has an effect on human rights behaviors. The interaction variable, however, is never significant in foreign aid models. The interaction variables' coefficients are mixed between positive and negative, and the significance of the independent variables remains unchanged. Thus, I accept Hypothesis 5 for trade agreements, and acknowledge the influence of the interaction between human rights language and trade dependency on the level of respect for human rights, but I reject Hypothesis 5 in the cases of foreign aid agreements.

Some control variables in the dependence interaction models have particular significance. Regime type and exports as a percentage of GDP are influential, positive variables in both trade and foreign aid dependence models, while natural resource endowment has a negative association with the level of respect for human rights in the foreign aid models. In addition, in both trade and foreign aid models, wealth has a significant positive association while conflict has a significant negative association with physical integrity rights.

Table 3: Interaction between Human Rights Language and Trade Dependence

Variable	Trade and Phys	Trade and Phys	Trade and Phys	Trade and Emp	Trade and Emp	Trade and Emp
TA Basic HR Standards	-1.026*			-1.420*		
	0.417			0.663		
Interaction b/w THRD and EUMP	0.023**			0.017		
	0.007			0.011		
TA Any Enforcement		-1.107*			-1.621*	
		0.434			0.647	
Interaction b/w TenfA and EUMP		0.025**			0.025*	
		0.008			0.011	
TA Strong Enforcement			-1.073*			-1.157
			0.489			0.632
Interaction b/w TenfB and EUMP			0.023*			0.015
			0.009			0.011
GDP per Capita	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Population	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Polity Score	0.038**	0.038**	0.038**	0.296***	0.295***	0.295***
	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.026	0.025	0.025
Internal Armed Conflict	-0.761***	-0.761***	-0.762***	-0.072	-0.072	-0.071
	0.082	0.082	0.082	0.116	0.117	0.117
British Colonization	-0.081	-0.083	-0.09	-0.62	-0.599	-0.61
	0.244	0.244	0.245	0.436	0.434	0.433
WDI Oars, Minerals, Fuel	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006	-0.012**	-0.012**	-0.012**
	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004
EU FDI	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Goods exports to EU members	0	0	0	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*
	0	0	0	0	0	0
WDI Exports as Percentage of GDP	70024908.644**	70046815.316**	69950087.037**	72462880.547***	72843394.157***	73460368.115***
	24890435.3	24898058.02	24860646.75	19109701.32	19074243.08	19035482.45
EU's Market Power	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.003	0.002	0.003
	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.006
_cons	4.118***	4.109***	4.095***	7.847***	7.837***	7.810***
	0.225	0.224	0.223	0.337	0.336	0.333

Table 4: Interaction between Human Rights Language and Aid Dependence

Variable	FA and Phys	FA and Phys	FA and Phys	FA and Emp	FA and Emp	FA and Emp
FAA Basic HR Standards	-0.334**			-0.612***		
	0.124			0.175		
Interaction b/w FHRD and EuropeTODApC	1242.813			-1420.667		
	3355.75			5449.966		
FAA Any Enforcement		-0.334**			-0.612***	
		0.124			0.175	
Interaction b/w FenfA and EuropeTODApC		1242.813			-1420.667	
		3355.75			5449.966	
FAA Strong Enforcement			-0.257*			-0.700***
			0.124			0.178
Interaction b/w FenfB and EuropeTODApC			-1194.524			-673.244
			3379.399			5275.129
GDP per Capita	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Population	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Polity Score	0.037**	0.037**	0.038**	0.299***	0.299***	0.299***
	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.025	0.025	0.025
Internal Armed Conflict	-0.730***	-0.730***	-0.728***	-0.185	-0.185	-0.188
	0.083	0.083	0.084	0.117	0.117	0.116
British Colonization	-0.036	-0.036	-0.038	-0.484	-0.484	-0.485
	0.267	0.267	0.266	0.421	0.421	0.424
WDI Oars, Minerals, Fuel	-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.013**	-0.013**	-0.013**
	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004
EU FDI	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Europe Total Aid Per Capita	1291.826	1291.826	2685.411	5121.612	5121.612	4633.639
	2342.183	2342.183	2587.402	4048.468	4048.468	3990.438
_cons	4.630***	4.630***	4.592***	8.229***	8.229***	8.241***
	0.167	0.167	0.169	0.27	0.27	0.269

The Regional Effect

Hypotheses 6 and 7 dealt with the potential regional effect of agreements on developing countries. When the states bordering or neighboring a country have bilateral agreements, the pressure to maintain certain standards on human rights may be high. Moreover, if these agreements contain specific types of language on human rights, one would expect to see high levels of respect for human rights in the developing country. In describing the statistical results of this portion of my analysis and applying the information to the hypotheses, I will divide the results into four sections: first I will examine the regional effect of trade agreements on physical integrity rights, followed by empowerment

rights; I will then turn to the regional effect of foreign aid agreements on the two types of human rights.⁹

The regional effect¹⁰ of trade agreements on physical integrity rights, at any level of human rights language, is essentially nonexistent. The statistical results are shown in Table 5. None of the independent variables at any of the four levels of human rights language (no language, standards only, weak enforcement, and hard enforcement) or categories of distance (border, 500 km, and 1000 km) have statistical significance, though all are positive with the exception of the agreements featuring hard enforcement clauses. Therefore, I can reject both Hypotheses 6 and 7 for the relationship between trade agreements and physical integrity rights. Neither trade agreements with standards nor trade agreement with enforcement clauses appear to have a significant influence on a developing country's level of physical integrity rights.

Conversely, the regional impact of trade agreements on empowerment rights is significant for the majority of the independent variables, as shown in Table 6. The coefficients for trade agreements with no language, with standards only, and with weak enforcement are negative and significant at every category of distance. The coefficients for trade agreements with hard enforcement are also negative but are significant only when the neighboring country distance is 1000km. These results indicate that trade agreements,

⁹ Though I performed analysis with both the sum of neighboring countries and the percentage of neighboring countries for each level of human rights language, I am only reporting on results from the percentages. For the most part, the sum and percentages produced the same results, and I believe the percentage variable best captures the results for each country on a more equal comparison.

¹⁰ For the sake of brevity and simplification, I am presenting only some of the statistical findings in Tables 5-8, with an emphasis on significant findings. Those results that I have chosen to present are representative of the results as a whole for each section of analysis.

Table 5: Regional Effect of Trade Agreements and Physical Integrity Rights

Variable	Tany0pct	ST0pct	HTA0pct	HTA500pct	HTB0pct	HTB500pct
Border Countries with any Agreement (pct)	0.047 0.477					
Border Countries w/ Soft Agreement (pct)		0.228 0.383				
Border Countries w/ Weak Enforcement Agreement (pct)			-0.206 0.465			
Countries w/i 500km w/ Weak Enf Agreement (pct)				0.163 0.586		
Border Countries w/ Strong Enforcement Agreement (pct)					-0.478 0.552	
Countries w/i 500km w/ Strong Enf Agreement (pct)						-0.216 0.778
GDP per Capita	0.000*** 0	0.000*** 0	0.000*** 0	0.000*** 0	0.000*** 0	0.000*** 0
Population	-0.000*** 0	-0.000*** 0	-0.000*** 0	-0.000*** 0	-0.000*** 0	-0.000*** 0
Polity Score	0.033* 0.014	0.033* 0.014	0.034* 0.014	0.036* 0.014	0.034* 0.014	0.036** 0.014
Internal Armed Conflict	-0.724*** 0.089	-0.724*** 0.089	-0.723*** 0.09	-0.753*** 0.081	-0.722*** 0.09	-0.752*** 0.081
British Colonization	-0.171 0.245	-0.168 0.247	-0.169 0.245	-0.132 0.245	-0.17 0.245	-0.135 0.254
WDI Oars, Minerals, Fuel	-0.006* 0.003	-0.006* 0.003	-0.006* 0.003	-0.005 0.003	-0.007* 0.003	-0.005 0.003
EU FDI	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
Goods exports to EU members	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
WDI Exports as Percentage of GDP	67831712.922** 25867957.52	67447203.374** 25745318.06	67915698.322** 26135877.15	71316751.147** 26993908.64	68586331.290** 26609099.26	71210731.059** 27074224.71
EU's Market Power	0.006 0.004	0.006 0.004	0.006 0.004	0.006 0.003	0.006 0.004	0.006 0.003
_cons	4.145*** 0.232	4.142*** 0.231	4.152*** 0.231	4.035*** 0.233	4.148*** 0.23	4.043*** 0.233

Table 6: Regional Effect of Trade Agreements and Empowerment Rights

Variable	Tany0pct	ST0pct	HTA0pct	HT500Apct	HTB0pct	HT1000Bpct
Border Countries with any Agreement (pct)	-2.171*** 0.492					
Border Countries w/ Soft Agreement (pct)		-1.651** 0.556				
Border Countries w/ Weak Enforcement Agreement (pct)			-1.678* 0.666			
Countries w/i 500km w/ Weak Enf Agreement (pct)				-2.702** 1.005		
Border Countries w/ Strong Enforcement Agreement (pct)					-1.013 0.69	
Countries w/i 1000km w/ Strong Enf Agreement (pct)						-2.944* 1.293
GDP per Capita	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
Population	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
Polity Score	0.298*** 0.026	0.297*** 0.026	0.297*** 0.026	0.296*** 0.026	0.294*** 0.026	0.296*** 0.026
Internal Armed Conflict	-0.104 0.123	-0.118 0.124	-0.115 0.123	-0.064 0.116	-0.117 0.124	-0.067 0.116
British Colonization	-0.892* 0.395	-0.930* 0.412	-0.908* 0.406	-0.739 0.443	-0.917* 0.409	-0.668 0.434
WDI Oars, Minerals, Fuel	-0.014** 0.004	-0.013** 0.004	-0.013** 0.004	-0.012** 0.004	-0.013** 0.004	-0.012** 0.004
EU FDI	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
Goods exports to EU members	-0.000* 0	-0.000* 0	-0.000* 0	-0.000* 0	-0.000* 0	-0.000* 0
WDI Exports as Percentage of GDP	79365251.065*** 21716012.23	83280996.027*** 21444325.9	82264184.370*** 21338826.64	76279090.541*** 20924583.24	83062271.525*** 21036622.95	75654131.165*** 18797682.65
EU's Market Power	0.008 0.006	0.006 0.006	0.006 0.006	0.004 0.006	0.006 0.006	0.004 0.006
_cons	7.879*** 0.346	7.791*** 0.347	7.790*** 0.35	7.909*** 0.345	7.743*** 0.348	7.864*** 0.336

with or without human rights language, are associated with developing countries that have low levels of respect for empowerment rights. Thus, I again reject Hypotheses 6 and 7, but for reasons different from the analysis of physical integrity rights. In this case, the regional

effects of trade agreements at all levels of human rights language are significantly associated with bad human rights behaviors in terms of empowerment.

Table 7 shows the results of the regional effect of human rights language in foreign aid agreements on physical integrity rights. The coefficients for all levels of human rights language at each distance category are negatively and significantly associated with the level of physical integrity rights, with the exception of the coefficient for foreign aid agreements with hard enforcement clauses in bordering countries. Similarly, the results for language in foreign aid agreements and empowerment rights show significant coefficients at all levels of distance and language (shown in Table 8). These results indicate that foreign aid agreements are associated with low levels of respect for physical integrity and empowerment rights, and therefore Hypotheses 6 and 7 must be rejected.

Taken as a whole, these results indicate that in reality the expected regional pressure on developing countries to improve human rights behavior does not exist. It appears that the European Union has both trade and foreign aid relationships with developing countries that continuously violate human rights, and any human rights language within the agreements has no influence whatsoever on the behaviors of the developing countries in terms of human rights.

The Negotiation Effect

My final hypothesis posited that the years during which an agreement is being negotiated would have a positive correlation with respect for human rights. For simplification, I have designated the two years prior to each trade and foreign aid agreement's inception as the negotiation time period. Thus, I expected that during these

Table 7: Regional Effect of Foreign Aid Agreements and Physical Integrity Rights

Variable	Fany0pct	SFA0pct	HFA0Apct	HFA500Apct	HFA0Bpct	HFA500Bpct
Border Countries w/ any Agreement (pct)	-0.254*					
	0.123					
Border Countries w/ Soft Agreement (pct)		-0.263*				
		0.124				
Border Countries w/ Weak Enf Agreement (pct)			-0.263*			
			0.124			
Countries w/i 500km w/ Weak Enf Agreement (pct)				-0.306*		
				0.132		
Border Countries w/ Strong Enf Agreement (pct)					-0.234	
					0.124	
Countries w/i 500km w/ Strong Enf Agreement (pct)						-0.304*
						0.133
GDP per Capita	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Population	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Polity Score	0.033*	0.033*	0.033*	0.035*	0.033*	0.036*
	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014
Internal Armed Conflict	-0.684***	-0.685***	-0.685***	-0.723***	-0.683***	-0.722***
	0.088	0.088	0.088	0.082	0.089	0.082
British Colonization	-0.08	-0.079	-0.079	-0.035	-0.082	-0.04
	0.273	0.273	0.273	0.273	0.275	0.275
WDI Oars, Minerals, Fuel	-0.008*	-0.008*	-0.008*	-0.006	-0.008*	-0.006
	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
EU FDI	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Europe Total Aid Per Capita	1038.606	1046.756	1046.756	1401.508	1003.522	1368.739
	1255.562	1256.711	1256.711	1332.858	1250.746	1327.212
_cons	4.642***	4.644***	4.644***	4.549***	4.632***	4.543***
	0.172	0.172	0.172	0.17	0.172	0.169

Table 8: Regional Effect of Foreign Aid Agreements and Empowerment Rights

Variable	FAany0pct	SFA0pct	HFA0Apct	HFA500Apct	HFA0Bpct	HFA500Bpct
Border Countries w/ any Agreement (pct)	-0.636***					
	0.169					
Border Countries w/ Soft Agreement (pct)		-0.648***				
		0.167				
Border Countries w/ Weak Enf Agreement (pct)			-0.648***			
			0.167			
Countries w/i 500km w/ Weak Enf Agreement (pct)				-0.642***		
				0.176		
Border Countries w/ Strong Enf Agreement (pct)					-0.682***	
					0.166	
Countries w/i 500km w/ Strong Enf Agreement (pct)						-0.674***
						0.172
GDP per Capita	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Population	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Polity Score	0.295***	0.295***	0.295***	0.294***	0.295***	0.294***
	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.025	0.026	0.026
Internal Armed Conflict	-0.242*	-0.242*	-0.242*	-0.181	-0.243*	-0.181
	0.122	0.122	0.122	0.116	0.122	0.116
British Colonization	-0.684	-0.682	-0.682	-0.522	-0.688	-0.53
	0.411	0.411	0.411	0.432	0.415	0.435
WDI Oars, Minerals, Fuel	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.013**	-0.014**	-0.013**
	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
EU FDI	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Europe Total Aid Per Capita	3990.171	3994.662	3994.662	3929.265	3976.422	3909.674
	3587.711	3587.714	3587.714	3565.462	3594.077	3571.026
_cons	8.237***	8.240***	8.240***	8.199***	8.234***	8.196***
	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.277	0.281	0.278

two years, developing countries would have positive levels of respect for human rights. Tables 9 and 10 show the results of the negotiation effect for trade agreements and foreign aid agreements respectively.

In negotiating trade agreements, the two years prior to the creation of an agreement (negot1 and negot2) have a negative association with physical integrity rights, but the coefficients are not significant. The analysis of trade agreement negotiation and empowerment rights shows similar results, though the coefficients are close to having significance.

The years during which foreign aid agreements were negotiated (FAnegot1, FAnegot 2) conversely have a positive association with both physical integrity and empowerment rights. However, the coefficients continue to lack statistical significance. Therefore, I must reject Hypothesis 8, as it appears that the negotiation effect has no real influence on human rights behaviors in developing countries.

Some of the control variables within the negotiation models, however, have a consistent significant effect. In the trade agreement models, regime type and exports as a percentage of GDP both have a positive association with physical integrity and empowerment rights. Regime type is also significant in foreign aid agreement models, as are population and natural resource endowment, though these two controls have a negative relationship with the level of respect for human rights.

Conclusions

Given the results of my analysis, it appears that the European Union's use of human rights language in its trade and foreign aid agreements as a strategy for promoting higher

Table 9: Negotiation Effect of Trade Agreements

Variable	Trade and Phys	Trade and Phys	Trade and Emp	Trade and Emp
Negotiating TA 1 year before	-0.009		-0.068	
	0.043		0.052	
Negotiating TA 2 years before		-0.003		-0.057
		0.023		0.03
GDP per Capita	0.000***	0.000***	0	0
	0	0	0	0
Population	-0.000***	-0.000***	0	0
	0	0	0	0
Polity Score	0.037**	0.037**	0.293***	0.294***
	0.014	0.014	0.026	0.026
Internal Armed Conflict	-0.755***	-0.754***	-0.069	-0.067
	0.081	0.081	0.117	0.116
British Colonization	-0.108	-0.107	-0.641	-0.651
	0.244	0.244	0.437	0.437
WDI Oars, Minerals, Fuel	-0.005	-0.005	-0.012**	-0.012**
	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.005
EU FDI	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0
Goods exports to EU members	0	0	-0.000*	-0.000*
	0	0	0	0
WDI Exports as Percentage of GDP	71237763.948**	71260578.226**	74666018.428***	74278793.474***
	25017951.86	25034991.46	19019328.95	18959421.49
EU's Market Power	0.007	0.007	0.003	0.003
	0.003	0.003	0.006	0.006
_cons	4.022***	4.021***	7.814***	7.824***
	0.226	0.225	0.341	0.339

Table 10: Negotiation Effect of Foreign Aid Agreements

Variable	FA and Phys	FA and Phys	FA and Emp	FA and Emp
Negotiation of FAA 1 year before	0.022		0.033	
	0.024		0.028	
Negotiation of FAA 2 years before		0.007		0.019
		0.017		0.023
GDP per Capita	0.000***	0.000***	0	0
	0	0	0	0
Population	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000*	-0.000*
	0	0	0	0
Polity Score	0.036*	0.036*	0.290***	0.290***
	0.014	0.014	0.025	0.026
Internal Armed Conflict	-0.713***	-0.712***	-0.165	-0.164
	0.082	0.082	0.117	0.117
British Colonization	-0.013	-0.013	-0.461	-0.46
	0.269	0.269	0.429	0.429
WDI Oars, Minerals, Fuel	-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.014**	-0.013**
	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004
EU FDI	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0
Europe Total Aid Per Capita	1681.845	1678.057	3861.546	3861
	1359.909	1361.818	3346.057	3338.31
_cons	4.463***	4.469***	8.025***	8.012***
	0.166	0.171	0.284	0.294

levels of respect for human rights abroad is ineffective and perhaps even counterproductive. It seems that the European Union adds human rights standards and enforcement clauses to its bilateral and multilateral agreements in the hopes that such wording will convince developing countries to improve their human rights behaviors. However, there is no evidence that developing countries have changed their level of respect for human rights due to agreement language alone, and various other pressures, such as economic dependency, regional pressure, and the negotiation process, combined with this language do not result in positive levels of respect for human rights. The one exception is trade dependency. When a developing country is highly dependent on the European Union for trade and its trade agreements with the EU contain human rights language, that country will likely practice good human rights behaviors.

These results further imply that developing countries involved in trade and foreign aid relationships with the European Union do not believe that the EU will alter these relationships on the basis of human rights alone. Simply having human rights standards, and the option for enforcing these standards, does not constitute a significant threat to bilateral relationships in the minds of the governments of developing countries. The evidence shows that the European Union is willingly entering into partnerships with known human rights violators, and instead of using the threat of suspending trade or aid to pressure these countries to improve human rights, the EU has chosen to continue its relationships, apparently with no strings attached. Whether this hesitancy to take a stand on human rights results from pure ambivalence or blissful ignorance, the result is that the European Union is practicing an essentially worthless approach.

Having such language in its trade and foreign aid agreements (and increasingly utilizing it as time has gone on) but not putting the necessary pressure behind the language could result in a blow to the European Union's credibility as an influential international actor in the realm of human rights. Its careless use of human rights language with no apparent intentions towards enforcement in practice reduces the threat behind all messages the EU sends to the developing world. By choosing to include strong standards on human rights in scenarios unimportant to the EU's interests, developing countries will likely ignore future aims of the European Union in terms of human rights, even if the EU decides to make the promotion of human rights a priority. Furthermore, if the EU ever decides to make human rights a higher priority in its bilateral and multilateral relations, it will have to start following through on its enforcement threats to convince developing countries to take their agreements seriously. This "required" enforcement of human rights could be detrimental for the EU in other fields, and the potential economic ramifications could be very harmful for all EU member states.

In essence, the European Union is choosing to trade with and give aid to countries that blatantly violate human rights. The organization clearly values its trade and foreign aid relationships more than its efforts to promote human rights. So why is the EU bothering to put human rights language in its bilateral and multilateral agreements if it has no intention of enforcing it? I believe the answer lies in public opinion. As previously stated, the EU is a unique organization for which there is no previous precedent in the international community. The citizens of the EU are citizens of a national government as well, and much of the population of the EU has displayed apprehension towards the growing supranational authority of the organization. In response, the EU has felt the need to justify its existence as

a useful institution in addition to the member state governments. The EU officially states that one of its “main goals is to promote human rights, both internally and around the world” (Europa). In prominently displaying such language to the public, the EU has accentuated its potential to promote human rights worldwide with stronger influence than those of national governments. Human rights language in bilateral and multilateral agreements is simply one way for the EU to draw the public’s attention to its presumably valuable international efforts. Thus, in the eyes of the EU, the importance of human rights language may lie in its existence for public viewing rather than its actual effect on human rights behaviors.

Finally, my results contradict previous research on the subject of human rights language in bilateral agreements, particularly that of Hafner-Burton. While her analysis showed that trade agreements with enforcement have an association with positive levels of respect for human rights, my study indicates the opposite. My research instead concludes that human rights language, whether it be standards or enforcement, in trade and foreign aid agreements alike has a strong association with low levels of respect for human rights. I can possibly attribute some of our differences to our measurements of the independent variables. While Hafner-Burton treated trade agreements as exclusively either hard or soft, meaning that agreements with enforcement were not also counted among treaties with standards, I coded human rights language in trade agreements inclusively and counted trade agreements with enforcement as also containing standards. However, I attempted to replicate her findings as closely as possible with my own variables, using the Political Terror Scale as the dependent variable and matching her usage of controls with my data. My results remained the same and indicated that enforcement clauses in trade

agreements were strongly associated with negative changes in human rights behavior.

Clearly the discrepancies in our findings demonstrate that enforcement clauses on human rights in trade agreements are not as positively influential as previously thought.

For future research, a natural derivative of my study would involve an examination of whether or not the European Union utilizes its enforcement clauses in response to human rights violations. If, and when, the EU takes action, does it follow the procedures detailed in the bilateral agreements or does the EU instead choose unilateral action? Given the significance of the interaction between trade dependency and human rights language in trade agreements on human rights behaviors, I would recommend a further analysis of this effect as well.

In conclusion, human rights language in bilateral and multilateral agreements does not appear to be an effective tool for instigating human rights change abroad. If developed countries and intergovernmental organizations wish to promote higher levels of respect for human rights in developing countries, they must either put true force behind their language or pursue a different strategy altogether.

Appendix 1: Variable Descriptions

Table 11: Summary of Variable Names and Descriptions

Variable Name	Variable Description
ciri_physint	CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index
ciri_empinx_new	CIRI Empowerment Rights Index (new)
THRDstd	Trade agreements with basic human rights standards
FHRDstd	Foreign aid agreements with basic human rights standards
TAstd	Trade agreements with addition human rights standards
FAstd	Foreign aid agreements with additional human rights standards
TenfA	Trade agreements with any enforcement
FenfA	Foreign aid agreements with any enforcement
TenfB	Trade agreements with strong enforcement
FenfB	Foreign aid agreements with strong enforcement
Tany0pct	Percentage of border countries with any trade agreement
Tany500pct	Percentage of countries within 500km with any trade agreement
Tany1000pct	Percentage of countries within 1000km with any trade agreement
ST0pct	Percentage of border countries with soft trade agreements
ST500pct	Percentage of countries within 500km with soft trade agreements
ST1000pct	Percentage of countries within 1000km with soft trade agreements
HT0Apct	Percentage of border countries with any enforcement in trade agreements
HT500Apct	Percentage of countries within 500km with any enforcement in trade agreements
HT1000Apct	Percentage of countries within 1000km with any enforcement in trade agreements
HT0Bpct	Percentage of border countries with strong enforcement in trade agreements
HT500Bpct	Percentage of countries within 500km with strong enforcement in trade agreements
HT1000Bpct	Percentage of countries within 1000km with strong enforcement in trade agreements
FAany0pct	Percentage of border countries with any foreign aid agreement
FAany500pct	Percentage of countries within 500km with any foreign aid agreement
FAany1000pct	Percentage of countries within 1000km with any foreign aid agreement
SFA0pct	Percentage of border countries with soft foreign aid agreements
SFA500pct	Percentage of countries within 500km with soft foreign aid agreements
SFA1000pct	Percentage of countries within 1000km with soft foreign aid agreements
HFA0Apct	Percentage of border countries with any enforcement in foreign aid agreements

HFA500Apct	Percentage of countries within 500km with any enforcement in foreign aid agreements
HFA1000Apct	Percentage of countries within 1000km with any enforcement in foreign aid agreements
HFA0Bpct	Percentage of border countries with strong enforcement in foreign aid agreements
HFA500Bpct	Percentage of countries within 500km with strong enforcement in foreign aid agreements
HFA1000Bpct	Percentage of countries within 1000km with strong enforcement in foreign aid agreements
negot1	Negotiation of trade agreement one year prior
negot2	Negotiation of trade agreement two years prior
FAnegot1	Negotiation of foreign aid agreement one year prior
FAnegot2	Negotiation of foreign aid agreement two years prior
wdi_gdpc	GDP per capita, PPP
unna_pop	Population
p_polity2	Revised Combined Polity Score
ucdp_type3	Internal armed conflict
british	British colonization
wdi_oamefe	WDI oars, metals, and fuel exports (% of merchandise exports)
EUFDI	FDI from the European Union member states
Xeu	Goods exported to EU member states , current US dollars
wdi_exppctgdp	WDI exports as a percentage of GDP
EUMP	EU's market power over country (Exports to EU divided by exports to world, expressed as percentage)
EuropeTODApct	Total aid per capita from EU member states
EUMPstd	Interaction between basic human rights standards in trade agreements and EU market power
EUMPenfA	Interaction between any enforcement in trade agreements and EU market power
EUMPenfB	Interaction between strong enforcement in trade agreements and EU market power
EUODAstdd	Interaction between basic human rights standards in foreign aid agreements and total aid per capita from EU
EUODAenfA	Interaction between any enforcement in foreign aid agreements and total aid per capita from EU
EUODAenfB	Interaction between strong enforcement in foreign aid agreements and total aid per capita from EU

Appendix 2: Summary of Trade and Foreign Aid Agreements

In my analysis of trade agreements, I coded 46 agreements made by the EU with 42 developing countries. Several countries had multiple trade agreements with the EU between 1980 and 2010, and 10 Caribbean states signed one single trade agreement with the EU in 2008. 28 of these agreements contain basic standards on human rights (61%), 24 have general enforcement clauses (52%), and 18 have strong enforcement clauses (39%).

For foreign aid agreements, I examined five large agreements made between the EU and regional groups of developing countries. In total, these agreements applied to 134 developing countries. All agreements had both standards and general enforcement, but only four of the five had strong enforcement clauses.

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