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April 7, 2022

“Worse than Communism”: A Case Study of Homophobic Appeals and Poland’s Law and
Justice Party

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Abstract

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The LGBTQIA+ community across Eastern Europe is currently under attack. The Polish Law and Justice party, known as *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* in Poland, increasingly relies on homophobic appeals to establish their dominance. Politicized homophobia is understudied, therefore it is difficult to understand how these political homophobic appeals operate and why they are successful. This thesis explores the causal mechanisms behind various political homophobic appeals and how they affect support for the Law and Justice party, as well as support for greater restrictions on the LGBTQIA+ community. By conducting one of the first survey experiments surrounding politicized homophobia, this research can shed light on why these appeals are so powerful and help create a framework for addressing homophobic attitudes in other Eastern European nations.

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I. Introduction

“[M]amy do czynienia z bezpośrednim atakiem na rodzinę i dzieci – seksualizacja dzieci, ten cały ruch LGBT, gender...[t]o jest importowane, ale one dzisiaj rzeczywiście zagrażają naszej tożsamości, naszemu narodowi, jego dalszemu trwaniu i wobec tego polskiemu państwu.”¹

“[W]e are dealing with a direct attack on the family and children - sexualization of children, this whole LGBT movement, gender...[i]t is imported, but today they really threaten our identity, our nation, its continued existence and therefore the Polish state.”

-Jarosław Kaczyński, Deputy Prime Minister of Poland and Leader of the Law and Justice Party

The villainization of LGBTQIA+ communities in Eastern Europe has attracted scholars in numerous disciplines, from feminist theorists (Graff 2006) to sociologists (Mole, Golec de Zavala, and Ardag 2021). While homophobic attitudes are not necessarily new in many of these spaces, the spread and strength of these narratives have rapidly proliferated in the past decade (Sleptcov 2018). Previous research draws connections between these growing homophobic trends and the weakening of democracies across the region, as populist and right-wing movements are gaining traction all over Eastern and Central Europe² (Anna Vachudova 2020; Bustikova and Guasti 2017; Mole, Golec de Zavala, and Ardag 2021). A member of the

¹ Polityka. 2019. “Imponujący wykład prezesa PiS o patriotyzmie: "Trwa atak na Kościół, rodzinę i dzieci. To zagraża naszemu narodowi oraz państwu (The attack on the church, family and children continues. This threatens our nation and state).” wPolityce.pl. <https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/443928-imponujacy-wyklad-prezesa-pis-polska-musi-byc-wyspa-wolnosc>.

² For example, Victor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, ended Gender Studies programs in universities as a way to display his distaste for a broader understanding of gender and sexuality. For more information, see Redden (2018).

European Union's attitude towards LGBTQIA+ communities is often used to evaluate that country's "Europeanness" (Slootmaeckers 2020). Overtime, these attitudes also became a proxy for the European Union to determine the extent to which members were upholding democratic principles and institutions. This connection between respect for democratic institutions and the treatment of LGBTQIA+ people highlights that understanding the ways politicians address queer communities could have wide-reaching political implications for these nations. Groups and political leaders spearheading the current right-wing movements increasingly rely on homophobic appeals to attract support in countries such as Hungary, Russia, and, most recently, Poland (Sleptcov 2018; Wiącek 2019).

The conservative, right-wing Law and Justice party (known in Poland as *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*) set the stage for the rise in politicized homophobia in Poland and serves as a bellwether for many other Eastern European countries. Since the party's major victory in 2015³, they have effectively abandoned democratic principles such as respect for human rights through their demonization of minorities, including but not limited to LGBTQIA+ people. LGBTQIA+ citizens cannot fight against the injustices since the Law and Justice party has stripped the judiciary of its power through the election of quasi-judges (Sadurski 2018). Anti-LGBTQIA+ lawyers have sued organizations advocating for alleging that laws such as the Family Charter⁴, which bans same-sex marriage and adoption, discriminate against them.⁵

³ The Law and Justice Party previously won seats in parliamentary elections and enjoyed a period of rule from 2005 to 2007 during which they used homophobic rhetoric. However, they ruled in a coalition government since they could not secure a majority of seats, limiting the extent of their ability to change policies and deconstruct the rule of law. For more information, see Sadurski, W. 2018.

⁴ This was signed into law in June of 2020 under President Duda as an effort to preserve the traditional model of a Polish family.

⁵ Gordon-Martin, T. 2021. "Polish LGBTQ activists refuse to be silenced by lawsuits." Deutsche Welle. <https://www.dw.com/en/polish-lgbtq-activists-refuse-to-be-silenced-by-lawsuits/a-58308876>.

Since anti-queer legislation is not subject to judicial review under the weakened judiciary in Poland, politicians have been able to codify anti-LGBTQIA+ policies into law freely. For example, President Andrzej Duda declared that thirty percent of the country is an “LGBT-free zone” in which any queer or “gender ideology” is explicitly barred (Dutra Santo 2020). A small town outside Lublin, a major city, was the first to approve the declaration in March of 2019. The remaining provinces that make up the zone are primarily located in rural areas of the nation in the southeast, which happens to be “the electoral heartland” of the Law and Justice party.⁶ Politicians in major cities such as Warsaw and Poznań have banned pride parades (Graff 2006), and media outlets continue to refer to the acceptance of LGBTQIA+ rights as “communist propaganda” (Żuk and Żuk 2020; ILGA-Europe 2020). The threat to LGBTQIA+ communities has become so dangerous in the nation that the European Commission recently launched an infringement procedure against Poland in 2021 for violating Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union by mistreating queer people.⁷ In addition, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights released a memorandum stating that the increased “stigmatisation” and hate speech towards the LGBTQIA+ community in Poland is particularly alarming to international organizations (The Commissioner for Human Rights 2020).

Almost seventy percent of queer people in Poland have experienced violence against them due to their identity, while fewer than four percent have reported it to the police (Abramowicz et. al 2016). Further research could aid in developing solutions to decrease the assaults (both cultural and physical) on LGBTQIA+ communities in Poland. Understanding the

⁶ Janiszewski, J. 2021. “Neither in Nor Out: The Paradox of Poland’s ‘LGBT-Free’ Zones.” *Balkan Investigative Reporting Network*. <https://balkaninsight.com/2021/04/15/neither-in-nor-out-the-paradox-of-polands-lgbt-free-zones/>.

⁷ Chalmers, J. and Baczynska, G. 2021. “EU Executive Takes Legal Action Against Hungary, Poland over LGBT Rights.” *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/eu-executive-take-legal-steps-against-poland-hungary-over-lgbt-rights-source-2021-07-15/>.

causal mechanisms that make political homophobic appeals attractive will allow queer activists and advocates to communicate with homophobic voters in an empathetic manner. This thesis asks: *how does politicized homophobia affect support for the leading party?* Specifically, which type of political homophobic appeal affects support for the Law and Justice party, as well as support for greater restrictions on the LGBTQIA+ community, among Polish citizens? Political scientists have conducted little research into understanding how politicized homophobia operates in Eastern Europe. Scholars recognize that this practice exists, but there has been almost no investigation into the various political homophobic appeals used there. While some research suggests that politicians' homophobic appeals work when based on religion (Sadurski 2018; Sleptcov 2018), others claim they operate best through drawing on nationalist sentiments (Graff 2010; Sloomaeckers 2020) or evoking partisan ties (Haggard and Kaufman 2021; Magni and Reynolds 2021). While these three elements work together (Weidemann 2021), these appeals still maintain their distinct qualities (Chojnicka 2015).

To the best of my knowledge, Chojnicka is the only scholar to have studied all three of these possible explanations (religion, nationalism, and partisanship) when exploring the potential causal mechanisms behind politicized homophobia in Poland. However, her analysis was observational, and her research was conducted before the Law and Justice Party consolidated power and began relying heavily on politicized homophobia (Chojnicka 2015). I build upon the causal mechanisms she proposed while adopting a framework based on political science (rather than her linguistic framework). Instead of focusing on voters and politicians as members of two separate spheres, I aim to evaluate the relationship between these two entities and uncover how outside institutions (such as the Church) may impact these relationships.

By firmly grasping how various types of political homophobic appeals are operating in Poland and to what degree each appeal is successful, queer advocates can get to the root of why these appeals are so powerful. Activists can later use this information to address homophobic attitudes in a way that can support sustainable change regarding the treatment of queer people in Poland. If we accept the argument that homophobic attitudes are grounded in the specifics of Poland's history, culture and demographic makeup, my results are not readily generalizable to other Eastern and Central European nations (Czarnecki 2007; Mole, Golec de Zavala, and Ardag 2021). While I focus only on Poland, understanding the appeals under which political homophobia operates in one country could help craft the tools necessary for understanding how this practice functions. We can then use this information to help queer communities in other nations who have become political scapegoats.

Discussion on Language

Queer and feminist theory scholars use similar language when describing queer communities, but with important distinctions. While some opt to use "LGBTQ," others use "LGBTQIA+," as well as "GLBTQ" and "LGBTQ+" (Myers et al. 2020). Most scholars have stopped using the simplified "LGBT," as it does not recognize the wide range of sexual and gender identities that society has historically ignored in the queer community. However, current Polish Law and Justice Party members continue to use this term when referring to queer people, including in their exclusionary policies such as the aforementioned "LGBT-free zones." To remain consistent and respectful to fellow queer people and advocates, I will be using the most inclusive: LGBTQIA+. I will refer to members of the LGBTQIA+ community as "queer." Although I choose to use this term, I acknowledge LGBTQIA+ people are not a monolith. The term "queer" expresses a wide range of non-heterosexual, non-cisgender experiences that I

cannot summarize in this short of a thesis (Ison 2019). As many LGBTQIA+ people have embraced the term “queer” (including myself), I believe it is the most empowering language to use when discussing members of the community. The more exclusive “LGBT” will only be used in reference to politicians’ speeches or policies.

II. Literature Review

It is crucial to contextualize the current state of homophobia in Poland. I begin by exploring the historical roots of homophobia, including the ways in which homophobic rhetoric in Poland today mirrors anti-Semitic appeals of the mid-twentieth century. I then transition into the contemporary age of homophobia with projects such as Operation Hyacinth and the “Pink Archive.” This leads to present day arguments about whether LGBTQIA+ rights should be considered human rights, as well as recent action taken on behalf of human rights organizations to address homophobia in Poland. I then explore the three mechanisms that play a role in current political homophobic appeals adopted by the Polish Law and Justice party, which will serve as the basis for my survey experiment that I describe in the fourth section of this thesis.

Origins of Homophobia in Poland

The following sections will trace the history of homophobia in Poland, beginning with the middle of the twentieth century after the Second World War. Various actors, from the government to the police apparatus, played a role in perpetuating homophobic ideas in the nation. These players continue to have a role in the proliferation of anti-queer rhetoric today. While this history is grim, it is imperative to highlight the ways in which it holds a significant role in Polish politics today, especially since homophobia in Poland is acutely understudied.

Connections to Anti-Semitism

While there is no way to determine when homophobic ideas began to spread in Poland definitively, homophobia became of political importance after the Second World War when the government needed a new political scapegoat to replace the Jewish population (Krzyżanowski 2018; Czarnecki 2007; Wiącek 2019; Graff 2010; Ostolski 2007; Charnysh 2015). Scholars draw many parallels to anti-Semitic rhetoric used prior to the war and homophobic rhetoric used today⁸. For example, beginning in the eighteenth century, Jewish people were painted as spreaders of disease, specifically syphilis and conjunctivitis (Czarnecki 2007). Similar ideas exist about the LGBTQIA+ community, as politicians both in Poland and around the world perpetuate the idea that queer people are responsible for the HIV/AIDS crisis. Both anti-Semitism and homophobia are viewed as “acceptable and intelligible opinion[s] that c[an] be seriously discussed” in the Polish public sphere (Ostolski 2007).

Adam Ostolski (2007) argues that anti-Semitism is the “matrix” for homophobic discourse today, operating through three exclusionary appeals. The first appeal portrayed Jewish people as “corruptors,” as “forces of Evil” who were threatening pure, Christian civilization (5). Now, it is the LGBTQIA+ community that supposedly threatens that structure. Newspapers in Poland such as *Nasz Dziennik* (a Roman Catholic newspaper published weekly) depict the movement for LGBTQIA+ rights as “a radical movement” made up of people “who are not so much striving to defend their cause as they are seeking to change our rights, our customs, our morality, and even our Catholic religion” (7). The second appeal operated by likening Jewish

⁸ I want to emphasize that the treatment of Jewish people in Poland prior to and during the Second World War was significantly more brutal, degrading, and inhumane than the treatment of the LGBTQIA+ community today. This comparison is solely based on the rhetoric used in public and political spheres in Poland. For more information, see Ostolski (2007).

people to “conspirators” attempting to dismantle the public and private spheres. Today, similar language is used against the queer community, but with more subtlety. Politicians typically opt for the phrase “homosexual lobby” rather than “conspiracy” (Ostolski 2007; Graff 2010). Lastly, the third appeal worked by describing Jewish people as “pariahs.” The Jewish people were stripped of the right to express their religion, could not work in specific fields (for example, education), and were economically secluded. Ostolski notes that LGBTQIA+ communities are not necessarily stripped of their rights but deprived of “public visibility” (2007, 12). While I agree that the queer community is not nearly as marginalized as the Jewish population was (and, to a certain extent, continues to be), Ostolski explored the connections between anti-Semitism and homophobia prior to the Law and Justice party’s consolidation of power in 2015. The rhetoric used to vilify the LGBTQIA+ community is much stronger today. There are now legal provisions that contribute to the exclusion of queer people, such as the aforementioned Family Charter.

State Attacks Against Queer People Leading into the Twenty-First Century

Policing and surveilling minority communities was common practice following the Second World War when Poland served as a satellite state under Soviet rule. Police apparatuses, specifically the Security Service, scouted out LGBTQIA+ people to gain information that they could later use as a tool for blackmail. The Security Service utilized this information to criminalize homosexuality, painting queer individuals as hypersexualized pedophiles (Żuk and Żuk 2020). There is evidence that this idea remains in the public sphere today with initiatives such as the “Stop Pedophilia” bill. The bill was implicitly aimed at homosexual individuals and promoted by the Law and Justice party in 2020 (Löwdin 2021).

Aggression against the queer community in Poland during the latter half of the twentieth century peaked between 1985 and 1987 with a project known as Operation Hyacinth. The goal of the operation was to create a “Pink Archive” that included “both actual and alleged homosexuals” in Poland (Szulc 2016). The police eventually gathered information on over ten thousand queer men.⁹ While the extent of the brutality that LGBTQIA+ people faced through this project is unclear, the detainment and forced coercion was undeniably demeaning, especially since the aim of the initiative was to supposedly promote “health and sanitation” (Żuk and Żuk 2020).

It is important to note that police frequently questioned interviewees on whether or not they had been in contact with people from the West. They considered this to indicate that the interviewee was either homosexual or communicating with homosexual people (Selerowicz 2015; Żuk and Żuk 2020). Members of the Law and Justice Party still advance the idea that the West somehow harbors LGBTQIA+ people. In the 2005 parliamentary elections, queer rights were used a way to create a dichotomy between the “decadent West” and the “traditional Poland” (Mole, Golec de Zavala, and Ardag 2021), as if the LGBTQIA+ community was some “secret weapon” that the West could use to destroy the Polish nation (Żuk and Żuk 2020). I will further explore anti-Western sentiments and their connection to homophobia later in this thesis.

LGBTQIA+ Rights as Human Rights

Human rights organizations in Europe only began considering the right to freely express one’s sexual orientation and gender identity to be a human right in the past decade. The

⁹ There is very limited information about Operation Hyacinth in Poland, therefore it is unknown why queer men were the sole target (excluding lesbians or women in general). I can only speculate that this is related to national ideas of masculinity, which are still present today.

European Union amended their Charter of Fundamental Rights to include LGBTQIA+ rights in the anti-discrimination article (European Union 2010). In addition, The United Nations Human Rights Council formed a resolution to protect members of the LGBTQIA+ community in 2011 and later expanded on this initiative in 2016 (Voss 2020). Along with the expansion, the Council appointed an independent expert to help investigate discrimination and violence against the LGBTQIA+ community. The relatively new efforts of the United Nations to protect the queer community are considered a “remarkable development” (Langlois 2020). While some argue that this step on behalf of the United Nations was long overdue, it is still a significant achievement for the queer community and human rights advocates (Gerber and Gory 2014; Langlois 2020).

The growing attention towards LGBTQIA+ rights by human rights organizations led to greater scrutiny of Poland. Domestic and international actors are condemning the Law and Justice party for their attacks on queer people. However, there is a disconnect between these two realms, as international organizations often disregard the calls from domestic human rights groups. Regional actors such as the European Court of Human Rights are starting to address Poland’s abuses against the queer community, but they are still hesitant to hold Poland accountable (The Commissioner for Human Rights 2020).

For example, in January of 2021, two advocacy groups known as Campaign Against Homophobia and The Equality Foundation tweeted the European Union Commissioners for thirty days to highlight the ways in which the “LGBT-free zones” (see Figure 1 below) and the policies in the Family Charter are harming the Polish queer community. Organizers in both groups already submitted a complaint to the European Commission in 2020 about Poland, claiming that the Law and Justice party breached their obligations found in the European Union

Charter of Fundamental Rights.¹⁰ It was not until these efforts that the European Commission finally launched an infringement procedure against Poland in 2021, even though these abuses were occurring for years by this point.¹¹ These proceedings, which aim to address Poland's "LGBT-free zones," are proving to be moot. The Law and Justice party has little interest in cooperating with the Commission in their investigation.¹² A nation's lack of compliance with infringement procedures typically results in a referral to the European Union's Court of Justice, as well as a withdrawal of funding on behalf of the European Union. However, it is unclear whether the European Union will take this next step against Poland.¹³

¹⁰ Reid, G. 2021. "Poland Breaches EU Obligations Over LGBT, Women's Rights." *Human Rights Watch*. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/24/poland-breaches-eu-obligations-over-lgbt-womens-rights#>.

¹¹ Chalmers, J. and Baczyńska, G. 2021. "EU Executive Takes Legal Action Against Hungary, Poland over LGBT Rights." *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/eu-executive-take-legal-steps-against-poland-hungary-over-lgbt-rights-source-2021-07-15/>.

¹² Ciobanu, C. 2021. "Poland Set to Lose Billions in EU Funds Over Anti-LGBT Zones." *Reporting Democracy, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network*. <https://balkaninsight.com/2021/08/23/poland-set-to-lose-billions-in-eu-funds-over-anti-lgbt-zones/>.

¹³ Chalmers, J. and Baczyńska, G. 2021. "EU Executive Takes Legal Action Against Hungary, Poland over LGBT Rights." *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/eu-executive-take-legal-steps-against-poland-hungary-over-lgbt-rights-source-2021-07-15/>.

A third of Poland is 'LGBT-free'

Hundreds of regions and several provinces have passed resolutions denouncing the LGBT "ideology" or promoting heterosexual families.




Figure 1: A map of the “LGBT-free” zones in Poland as of 2021. These zones are primarily in the southeast region, where there are higher levels of religious observance and the Law and Justice party has a strong electoral base (Levesque 2021).

Mechanisms of Politicized Homophobia in Poland

Religion and Morality

Religious institutions, the Roman Catholic Church in particular, played a major role in spearheading the movement against “gender ideology” across the globe in the past decade and a half. This movement began gaining traction in 2004 with a letter by the Pontifical Council on the Family, which argued that a broadened perspective of gender ideology threatens society (Reuterswärd 2021). According to the Council, “gender ideology” encompasses many issues, from abortion to LGBTQIA+ rights. Religious actors affiliated with the Council often believe that calls to expand society’s interpretation of gender and sexuality are an effort “to usurp God’s power of creation¹⁴.” This hints at how the Church wrestles with the principles of liberal democracy. While the Church rejects bodily autonomy and sexual freedom, it encourages self-determination and certain human rights (Reuterswärd 2021).

Though this tension between the Church and modernity is present throughout history, it was not long ago that the Church was beginning to embrace modernity. After the Second World War, the Second Vatican Council determined that the Church would be unable to maintain any sense of power unless it adjusted to the new political attitudes of the time, such as freedom and self-expression, which were promoted by the newly formed United Nations (Oftestad 2018; Reuterswärd 2021). Thus, the institution adopted a human rights framework, advocating for freedom of religion, democratic principles, and the separation of church and state. However, the Church refused to accept the postwar shift towards sexual freedom and preached that marriage should be reserved for heterosexuals. Social movements, including the LGBTQIA+ movement, became increasingly popular in Europe. When the United Nations hosted its World Conferences in the 1990s, in which member states expressed support for a more fluid interpretation of gender and sexual expression, leading religious institutions such as the Vatican still opposed

¹⁴ Butler, J. 2019. “The Backlash Against ‘Gender Ideology’ Must Stop.” *New Statesman*.
<https://www.newstatesman.com/2019/01/judith-butler-backlash-against-gender-ideology-must-stop>.

LGBTQIA+ movements. From then on, the Vatican deemed itself to be the “guardian of rigid sexual morality” (Reuterswärd 2021).

Eastern Europe, and Poland in particular, is susceptible to the authority of the Roman Catholic Church (Mach 2007). In Poland, the Church maintained a sense of nationhood even during the nation’s deepest struggles. When Poland lost its independence in the eighteenth century and was partitioned into three different states, the Church somehow created a sense of cohesion among the people. Though the Church suffered during both the First and Second World Wars, with the destruction of religious buildings and the perishing of priests, the institution survived (Nowak 1982). During the communist era that followed the Second World War, state institutions challenged the role of the Roman Catholic Church by advocating to separate religion from Polish national identity (Mach 2007; Hruby 1982; Nowak 1982). However, the Church held onto its power. Public demonstrations and workers’ strikes often used religious symbols, illustrating that faith in the Church was only increasing despite the government’s efforts to suppress the institution’s role (Hruby 1982).

The nature of the relationship between the Church and the State eventually shifted in Poland, transforming from an antagonistic power struggle to mutual cooperation. After 1970, the two bodies began working together to police sexuality effectively. In the 1980s, the Church pressured the Polish government to ban textbooks about sexual education in schools (Jarska 2019). Suddenly, the Church was far more concerned with questions of morality and family. Family planning, abortions, and sexuality became of the utmost importance. The Roman Catholic Church established itself as a powerful entity throughout the nation’s history, meaning it had the tools to affect the political sphere (Mach 2007).

It is undeniable that religion is a source of power, power that can potentially unite a group of people together. However, it can also separate those on the inside (members of the religious group) from those on the outside (Putnam, Campbell, and Garrett 2012). By classifying the followers of a religion as “sacred” beings, those who do not practice or do not adhere to the religion’s teachings are “perceived as...threatening” and thus deemed the enemy (Terren 2010, 17). These dynamics often arise when there is a power struggle between a nation’s dominant religious group versus the minority religious group (Disney 2017). In the case of Poland, the Roman Catholic Church is not creating an enemy out of a minority religious group but instead out of the LGBTQIA+ community by deeming them impure. I will further expand on this idea in the third section of this thesis, but it is essential to recognize that the Church in Poland capitalizes off this dichotomy of “us” versus “them” through their connections to prominent Polish politicians (Krzyżanowski 2018; Bill and Stanley 2020).

According to Anna Grzymala-Busse, churches influence political policies through “direct institutional access” (2016, 2). They develop this access in two ways: “high moral authority” and a close relationship with parliament and/or the politicians in power (2016, 2). Grzymala-Busse operationalizes moral authority by measuring public opinion of the Church, precisely the extent to which people believe that the Church represents national interests. Whether or not the public holds this opinion depends on various factors, including the historical significance of the Church and public confidence in the institution.

There is a clear relationship between Polish politicians and the Roman Catholic Church, which satisfies one of the two criteria Grzymala-Busse indicates as necessary for a church to gain access to the political sphere (Żuk 2020). Jarosław Kaczyński, the Deputy Prime Minister of Poland at the time of writing this paper, described the Roman Catholic Church as “the only

legitimate source of moral values in Poland” on multiple occasions (Bill and Stanley 2020). On top of that, the prominent Catholic radio station known as “Radio Maryja” has a relationship with many members of the Law and Justice party, as they are frequently invited to be guests on the network (Bustikova and Guasti 2017; Weidemann 2021). The Law and Justice party often relies on religious appeals to strengthen their attacks against the LGBTQIA+ community. Prominent figures in the party promote the idea that queer people are “invaders intent on attacking religion” and engage in activities such as “giving pornography to children” (Bill and Stanley 2020).

Many scholars claim that it is nearly impossible for Polish citizens to separate their national identity from their Catholicism (Kotwas and Kubik 2019; Bustikova and Guasti 2017; Löwdin 2021; Chojnicka 2015; Wiącek 2019). While the Roman Catholic Church has strong ties to the Polish people and a significant effect on public opinion, a recent decrease in faith in the Church may dampen its ability to exert influence (Żuk and Żuk 2020). Over ninety percent of Polish people identify as Roman Catholic¹⁵, which suggests that religious appeals are convincing (Żuk 2020). In addition, political homophobic appeals based on religion and morality were successful in the past (Bill and Stanley 2020; Chojnicka 2015). However, the Church recently lost virtually all of its legitimacy in the eyes of the Polish citizenry. Current trust in the Church dipped to the lowest since 1993 due to the recent exposure of pedophilic church officials.¹⁶ The dip in trust violates the second requirement proposed by Grzymala-Busse, suggesting that the role of the Church in policymaking is limited. This makes evaluating the power of appeals based

¹⁵ For comparison, 62% of people in Hungary identify as Catholic. For more information, see European Commission (2019).

¹⁶ Pawlak, J. and Ptak, A. 2021. “As Poland’s Church embraces politics, Catholics depart.” Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-church-insight/as-polands-church-embraces-politics-catholics-depart-idUSKBN2A30SN>.

on religion consequential in the present day. Not only will my research illuminate how useful religion is as the basis for political homophobic appeals, but perhaps reveal whether religion as a social construct is losing some of its authority in Poland.

Nationalism

Due to the various manifestations of nationalism, from ethnic (Duncan and Holman 2019) to economic (Johnson 2021), a precise definition of the term is difficult to pinpoint. This difficulty is in part because of the controversial term “nation,” an idea that scholars still struggle to define (Garret 2008; Jayet 2019). While I understand that the evolution of the term “nation” plays a role in current nationalist appeals, I choose not to examine its transformation. Instead, I will adopt the definition of “nation” that Rogers Brubaker offers in his 2004 book, *Ethnicity without Groups*. His constructivist approach focuses on “groupness,” on forming a sense of collective identity with others (Brubaker 2004, 12). The formation of groups is a dynamic process that invites change over time, demonstrating that a “nation” is a social construct rather than a static object. This approach is not without flaws. Since the constructivist approach operates off the principle that nations are not real, it becomes even more challenging to understand nationalism when employing this approach (Jayet 2019). Still, scholars both within political science and sociology widely accept the constructivist approach, so I choose to adopt it for this thesis (Jayet 2019; Yalçin 2019). The approach will allow us to better evaluate how national identity is malleable and can transform through time, as it has in Poland.

Before I explain present-day nationalism in Poland, I must clarify the difference between nationalism and populism. Though some may conflate these two ideas, especially when investigating the illiberal trend currently spreading across Eastern Europe, it is important to

differentiate them from one another (Brubaker 2020). To avoid confusion, I rely on the definition provided by De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017) that explains the distinction between populism and nationalism through a spatial model: populism operates through a vertical axis in which power and class separate the ordinary people from the elites (311). The Law and Justice party uses populist, specifically ethnopopulist, strategies to concentrate its power by dismantling the judiciary branch and eroding democratic institutions (Vachudova 2020; Sadurski 2018; Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016). Populist sentiments help further the Law and Justice party's stance against the West, which I will return to momentarily. Nationalism, on the other hand, depends on a horizontal axis in which some groups are within the nation and the rest are outside of the nation (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017, 309). Nationalist sentiments "other" certain minority groups, such as LGBTQIA+ communities, separating the nation into the authentic Polish people ("us") and outsiders ("them") (Krzyżanowski 2018). Both populism and nationalism work together to further marginalize the queer community in Poland, which is why it is valuable to understand both concepts for this thesis.

Nationalism is on the rise in post-communist regimes across Eastern Europe. This trend is due to multiple factors, some that are applicable to all post-communist nations in Europe and some that are specific to each country (Tismaneanu 2019; Park 2019). The long history of conflict between the domestic government and foreign powers in Poland is of the utmost importance in order to properly evaluate its relationship with nationalism. It is imperative to emphasize the point that Hubert Tworzecki makes in *Parties and Politics in Post-1989 Poland*: "[t]he legacy of centuries of rule by different foreign powers over different sections of the country's present-day territory," as well as "the border changes that took place after the Second World War" shape Polish identity today (1996, 83). The nation's history is defined by constant

struggles for self-autonomy only to be again taken over by a foreign entity. From the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian rule of the eighteenth century to the finale of the Cold War in 1989, Poland experienced constant instability as a pawn in the international system (Tworzecki 1996). This is undeniably a reason why nationalism is on the rise in Poland. In a way, the Polish people are making up for centuries of lost time, of not being able to experience their own sense of national identity.

The historical movement for sovereignty in Poland is evident in today's current manifestations of nationalism. On the 11th of November every year, Polish citizens across the nation organize marches to celebrate their nation's independence established in 1918. Though Poland endured foreign rule after this time (for example, as a satellite state of the Soviet Union), the citizenry still commemorates the day. While the march itself illustrates national pride, the display has become increasingly nationalistic in recent years (Bustikova and Guasti 2017; Wiącek 2019; Kotwas and Kubik 2019). The day transformed from a series of unorganized, relatively small marches in 2007 to over sixty thousand people gathered in what Elżbieta Wiącek refers to as "one of the biggest gatherings of far-right activists in Europe in recent years" in 2017 (2019, 159). Three years later, in 2020, marchers repeatedly used homophobic phrases, painted signs with homophobic messages, and even set fire to an apartment that had a gay pride flag on its balcony.¹⁷ Homophobia and nationalism have become intertwined in Poland, two mutually reinforcing ideologies that feed off each other (Graff 2010).

Anti-Westernism

¹⁷ Charlish, A. and Ptak, A. 2020. Far-right Polish Independence Day march draws thousands despite ban. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-independence-march/far-right-polish-independence-day-march-draws-thousands-despite-ban-idUSKBN27R2PY>.

Similar to nationalism, anti-Westernism is noticeably growing in Eastern Europe. This connects to the right-wing wave spreading across the region, since Eastern European leaders are rejecting the democratic, “liberal” values of the West (Sleptcov 2018; Korkut 2017). Instead of leaning into modernization, these countries attempt to cling onto tradition in hopes of preserving what they view as their authentic identities. In this way, anti-Westernism and nationalism are strongly linked. The underlying motive of both ideologies is the same: to maintain tradition and preserve national identity. This illuminates why previous scholars studying Eastern Europe chose to lump nationalism and anti-Westernism into one category (Chojnicka 2015; Sleptcov 2018).

One puzzling aspect of anti-Westernism is that there is no concrete definition of the “West.” Is it the European Union? Is it the United States? Are the Balkans included in the West? The answer is all of these regions and none of these regions simultaneously (Millas 2021). The exact target of critique varies, though countries such as Hungary and Croatia often attack the European Union specifically when referring to the West (Žuk and Žuk 2020). It is more about what the West represents: modernity, liberalism, democracy. In addition, Inglehart and Norris (2016) propose the “cultural backlash theor[y]” as an explanation for this rise in anti-Westernism. In essence, the theory suggests that current populist parties are reacting against “cultural change” occurring mainly in Western nations after the war with the spread of liberal and “progressive movements” (Inglehart and Norris 2016, 2). Populist parties responded (and are continuing to respond) to these movements with “counter-revolutionary retro backlash” by “actively reject[ing] the rising tide of progressive values” (Inglehart and Norris 2016, 2). Thus, they appeal to groups in society who do not want to lose their historical privileged status, which

progressive movements are threatening, or who do not want to abandon tradition.¹⁸ With this aversion to modernity, which national leaders across Eastern Europe associate with greater rights for LGBTQIA+ people, these nations are contributing the supposed increase in queer populations to Western infiltration.

There is clear evidence that Eastern European governments are spreading the idea that queerness is a product of the West. These claims are both implicit and explicit. Croatian leaders refer to LGBTQIA+ people broadly as “outsiders,” and Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that his political opponents were “sexually degenerated” due to “Western decadence” (Žuk and Žuk 2020). Polish politicians of the Law and Justice party rely on the phrase “homosexual lobby” to liken queerness to a form of propaganda that the West is attempting to impose on Eastern Europe (Graff 2010; Ostolski 2007; Žuk and Žuk 2020). The Law and Justice party tends to conceptualize the West as the European Union, blaming the Union for pushing a pro-LGBTQIA+ agenda (Slootmaeckers 2020; Chojnicka 2015; Žuk and Žuk 2020). Members of the party also claim that “homosexuality (and promiscuity) *originat[ed]* in the European Union,” rejecting the idea that homosexuality existed in Poland prior to accession (Chojnicka 2015).

However, while the relationship between Poland and the so-called “Western” European Union is important to understand current homophobic trends, it is essential to note that Polish politicians also consider the United States to be the West. The historically complicated dynamics between the United States and Poland illuminate the ways in which Poland developed its relationship with the West today. In sum, a distinct power imbalance exists between Poland and the United States. While the Second World War did not necessarily initiate this imbalance, the

¹⁸ While there are recent criticisms of the claims proposed by Inglehart and Norris (2016) about the applicability of cultural backlash theory, the underlying premise of the theory itself is still widely accepted. For more information, see Schäfer, A. 2021.

war solidified it. During the Yalta Conference (and later during the Potsdam Conference), Western countries such as the United States allowed the Soviet Union to establish its dominance over Eastern Europe (Cienciala 2010). After the Cold War, the United States and Poland attempted to mend their relationship. However, anti-American sentiments already pervaded the nation because the United States was viewed as too “modern” (Delaney and Antoszek 2017). Rising populism in the nation resulted in the rejection of not only “modernization,” but “globalization...secularization, and commercialization” (Delaney and Antoszek 2017). According to the aforementioned cultural backlash theory, it is possible that the direction of causality is flipped, that the shift in values led to a rise in populism instead (Inglehart and Norris 2016). No matter which occurred first, this value shift slowly crept into political rhetoric beginning in the 2005 presidential election, during which “politicians worked to associate the LGBTQ community with Western liberalism” (Weidemann 2021, 28).

Thus, the Law and Justice party continues to distance themselves from the West through homophobic rhetoric and policy. Originally coined by President Duda, the idea that “LGBT is not people, it [is] an ideology” pervades the political and social sphere (Weidemann 2021, 29). Polish politicians further distance Poland from the West by conceptualizing queerness as an ideology, specifically one from abroad. It is not only through speeches that the Law and Justice party attempts to differentiate itself from the West, but through policy. For example, in 2015, the Law and Justice party introduced the 500+ Program. The program provides Polish families with 500 złoty (about \$125) per month per child. While one could view this as a politically progressive policy, the Law and Justice party describes it as a way to uphold traditional values, differentiating the program from “social democratic models” in the West (Bill and Stanley 2020). It is also worth mentioning that while the benefits are provided to families with informal parent

relationships and single parents, the program does not offer any assistance to LGBTQIA+ couples (Löwdin 2021).

Partisanship

Previous studies demonstrate that partisan cues influence voters. A 2017 study conducted by the Huffington Post showed that survey respondents' assessment of the economy in the United States varied based on whether or not the question included former President Donald Trump's name. Half of the participants were asked to evaluate the success of the national economy at "the beginning of the year" while the remainder were asked to assess the economy "when President Trump took office." Explicitly mentioning President Trump's name also affected the respondents' evaluation of their personal financial state.¹⁹ A similar effect existed in a survey conducted the year before when the questions focused on former President Barack Obama.²⁰

This effect of partisan cues on voters can have wide-reaching implications, even in countries with weaker democracies such as Poland. Survey experiments conducted in Russia reveal that partisan cues not only influence the opinion voters have, but whether or not they have an opinion on an issue at all (Brader and Tucker 2009). This is especially strong when voters receive a partisan cue from a party they already support (Foos and DeRooji 2017). Previous research in Poland suggests that partisan cues have a minimal effect on voter opinion, since Polish parties are relatively young and therefore have not established strong relationships with

¹⁹ Edwards-Levy, A. 2017. "How Do Americans Feel About Their Finances? It Depends On Whether You Mention Trump." *The Huffington Post*. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/how-americans-feel-finances-trump_n_5980c71be4b00bb8ff3a2266.

²⁰ Edwards-Levy, A. 2016. "Opinions On Barack Obama's Economic Legacy Don't Have Much To Do With The Economy." *The Huffington Post*. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-economic-legacy_n_57325736e4b016f3789778f7?pi7dtzkbusknmte29.

the citizenry (Brader, Tucker, and Duell 2013). However, most researchers collected data on Polish parties before the Law and Justice party came to the height of their power and thus needs to be revisited. Although the party formed merely twenty years ago, its members arguably altered the political scene in a way that completely reshaped the country (Folvarčný and Kopečekno 2020). Therefore, it is worth exploring the power of partisan cues to not only update the outdated research, but to see whether there is something especially unique about the impact that the Law and Justice party has on voters.

Though Poland adopted democratic principles in the early 1990s, its history of nondemocratic institutions made it impossible for parties to rely on partisan loyalties within the public. Some assume that Polish voters are not politically knowledgeable (a common argument about post-communist countries), but Tworzecki suggests that the citizenry is actually quite politically aware. He states that “demographic and value/issue cleavages play a role in the structuring of partisan sympathies” (1996, 153). Although my thesis aims to gain a better grasp of the causal mechanisms behind political homophobic appeals, my research could help scholars better understand the relationship between the Polish citizenry, their values, and political parties.

The Law and Justice party developed a relationship with the Polish citizenry by displaying itself not only as a party but as, in a way, a movement for justice. Leaders who claim to be “anti-system” appeal to Polish voters who overwhelmingly do not trust the government (Haggard and Kauffman 2021). In the European Values Survey conducted in 2017, 32.1% of Polish respondents reported no confidence in the government, and 39.0% claimed to have very little confidence (EVS 2020). The party displays itself as a force separate from the “corrupt” government, which may be contributing to why voters support these politicians (Żuk 2020). In this way, the party is distinguishing itself as a unique entity representing the true will of the

people. Thus, the Law and Justice party creates two groups: those on the inside (its members and supporters) and those on the outside (the corrupt government and the party's opposers). I will explain this relationship in greater detail in the following section. By further investigating the role that partisanship plays in appeals, my research could help pave the way to understand how successful this political strategy is.

Political scientists and queer theorists have already established the interplay between partisanship and acceptance of nonheteronormative people. Evidence illustrates that right-wing and ideologically conservative voters are more likely to express prejudice against LGBTQIA+ people (Jones and Brewer 2019; Magni and Reynolds 2021). However, to the best of my knowledge, no studies test whether partisan cues can evoke this specific prejudice, meaning my study will be the first to do so. Whether or not explicitly mentioning the Law and Justice party plays a role in support for queer rights could have dramatic effects for other right-leaning parties, as they are more likely than liberal parties to position themselves against LGBTQIA+ communities (Lewis et al. 2017).

III. Theory

The process of otherization is not new in Eastern Europe. Otherization is, at its core, “based on the principle of essentialization of identity differences” (Kara and Erbaş 2020, 2). Adrian Holliday, Martin Hyde, and John Kullman coined the term in 2004 in their book, *Intercultural Communication: An Advanced Resource Book*, and described otherization as a way to form a social hierarchy. This allows one group to defend their supposed superiority by claiming an inherent, natural difference between them and the other group. Eventually, the process of otherization results in a political scapegoat (the “Other”) (Weidemann 2021). In

Europe specifically, the tactic originated before the Age of Enlightenment with Christians who “othered” Jewish communities to promote and spread Christianity. The strategy was successful, which is why so many nations and organizations, from Russia and the Orient in 1787,²¹ to the Nazi party and Jewish Europeans prior to and during the Second World War, to the Law and Justice Party and the LGBTQIA+ community in Poland, readopted it (Wyner 2019).

While the goals of the European Union are multifaceted, one of the foundational aspects of the European Union is its creation of the “Other.” Membership in the Union “is conceptualised as the product of a system of Self/Other relationships” (Slootmaeckers 2020, 348). Some nations exist within the system (“us”) and those who are supposedly inferior that exist outside of it (“them”). The European Union’s definition of who exactly counts as “them” is not stagnant but can change over time with the creation of a new Other, as well as the absorption of previous Others into the system. The process of othering occurs through three mechanisms: geopolitical othering, normative othering, and temporal othering. As Slootmaeckers describes it:

Whereas geopolitical Othering relies on security issues and realpolitik to define the symbolic boundaries of the EU, normative processes function through highlighting differences in norms. Temporal Othering, on the contrary, creates and maintains boundaries by positioning the Self and the Other in different temporalities, often with the Other lagging behind the Self or by the abjection of past versions of the Self (2020, 349).

Although the Law and Justice party positions itself against the liberal members of the European Union, it is adopting the same strategy as the European Union. While all three processes may be playing a role in the otherization of the LGBTQIA+ community, temporal othering seems to be the most relevant in Poland. However, unlike the European Union, the Other (queer people in Poland) is not “lagging behind the Self,” but is straying away from

²¹ This is a reference to the period in which Catherine II extended her empire to include the Crimea and Southern Ukraine, creating a line of communication with Russia’s Asiatic neighbors and thus creating a group of the “Oriental ‘Others.’” For more information, see Dickson, S. 2002.

tradition (Slootmaeckers 2020, 349). Anti-queer sentiments in Eastern Europe are “a manifestation of cultural rebellion,” which allows these countries to “express their opposition to the liberal...countries and their moral standards” (Żuk and Żuk 2020, 7).

As mentioned previously, otherization is not a new phenomenon in Eastern Europe, and it is certainly not new in Poland. The act of scapegoating an internal Other began in Poland prior to the Second World War with the Jewish population (Krzyżanowski 2018). The strategy was successful for politicians who blamed all of the nation’s problems, from economic to social, on Jewish people (Ostolski 2007). Once the Jewish population dwindled after the war, politicians needed a new scapegoat. By relying on the same pejorative rhetoric used in the 1930s and 1940s against Jewish people, the Law and Justice forced queer people to fill this empty role (Krzyżanowski 2018; Czarnecki 2007; Ostolski 2007; Graff 2010).

While the othering of Jewish people prior to the Second World War was based partly on religious differences, the role of religious othering concerning the LGBTQIA+ community operates distinctly today. Religious groups partake in othering practices to distinguish the followers of the faith, the pure, from those who do not practice (Putnam, Campbell, and Garrett 2012). Christians specifically tend to be “more associated with othering attitudes” compared to other religious groups, particularly in the United States as the religious majority (Disney 2017, 70). With the high population of Roman Catholics in Poland (over ninety percent of the population), one should expect the same type of relationship between those who identify as Roman Catholics and those who do not (Żuk 2020). This is especially true because of the relatively homogeneous nature of Poland, where differences that typically result in othering (for example, ethnic diversity) are not present (Onuch and Hale 2018). Since the Roman Catholic Church and its leaders paint being a member of the LGBTQIA+ community as being against the

Church and against God, queer people are seen as threats and outsiders. With the strong presence that the Church has in Poland, engaging in religious othering between followers of the faith and those who supposedly deny the Church's authority by being queer is an effective strategy.

However, despite previous scholars' arguments about the strength of religion in Poland, I hypothesize that the deep mistrust of the Roman Catholic Church growing among the citizenry will mitigate any effect that religious sentiments could have. The low approval ratings of religious officials are a significant change to the established culture of Poland.²² Since this is a relatively recent development in the nation, the exact effect that it could have on public perception is not yet known. Still, as this is the most significant decline in approval of the Roman Catholic Church in almost three decades, I believe it will have drastic effects on Polish opinion. This leads to my first hypothesis:

H1: Evoking religious sentiments will have no effect on support for the Law and Justice party, as well as support for restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people, compared to control.

Similarly to the European Union, otherization in Poland not only ostracizes the out group, but strengthens a sense of national unity. Solt (2011) explains that nationalistic appeals work due to the "theory of diversionary nationalism." The theory argues that elite politicians use nationalist rhetoric to distract marginalized groups from their status and create a sense of solidarity among diverse groups. Solt (2011) focuses primarily on class differences, but other scholars believe this theory extends into realms outside of economics (Howe, Szöcsik, and Zuber

²² Pawlak, J. and Ptak, A. 2021. "As Poland's Church embraces politics, Catholics depart." Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-church-insight/as-polands-church-embraces-politics-catholics-depart-idUSKBN2A30SN>.

2021). Although Poland is a relatively homogenous society, any differences among the population and any frustrations that the people have with the government diminish when politicians force the public to focus on one goal: bettering the nation. By referencing both the current status of the nation and how it could potentially grow in the future (and scapegoating LGBTQIA+ people to do so), the nationalist/anti-Western appeal will provide respondents with “a sense of self-esteem as members of a nation” (Howe, Szöcsik, and Zuber 2021, 7).

Though the mechanisms through which otherization and nationalism work to influence voter opinion are evident, one must understand the position of Polish society. Heteronormativity, the assumption that heterosexuality is the norm, is a crucial part of Poland’s culture. Therefore, political homophobia is a powerful tool to “strengthe[n] national collective identity” (Löwdin 2021, 12). Unifying the nation against one common enemy allows the Law and Justice party to consolidate their power and garner public support. The enemy is multidimensional in this case, as it is not only LGBTQIA+ people, but the Western nations that brought queer “ideology” into the nation (Weidemann 2021; Graff 2010; Ostolski 2007; Żuk and Żuk 2020). According to the party, LGBTQIA+ people represent the worst aspects of modernization, of everything that is wrong with the West.

This is why I believe the combination of these two sentiments, nationalist and anti-Western, will have the greatest effect on Polish voters’ views of the LGBTQIA+ community. Nationalism and anti-Westernism operate by othering certain groups and strengthening social ties between the “in” groups. For Polish nationalists, anyone who strays from the image of the authentic Polish citizen is an outsider. For anti-Westerners, the West is the outside. With nationalism, along with resentment towards the West, on the rise in Poland (Graff 2010; Ostolski

2007; Żuk and Żuk 2020; Chojnicka 2015), I believe these two forces together will be powerful in effectively painting queer people as the “Other.” Thus, the second hypothesis is as follows:

H2: Evoking nationalist/anti-Western sentiments will result in higher levels of support for the Law and Justice Party, as well as support for restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people, compared to control.

While nationalist views are centered on racial ideology, race is only part of the puzzle, especially in a relatively homogenous nation such as Poland. Nationalist sentiments interact with misogyny in order to establish the “true members of the national community,” which are often the most historically privileged members of society (i.e., in the case of Poland, cisgender white men) (Bonikowski 2017). Privileged members of a society do not want to jeopardize the status of their nation because they do not want to lose their established privilege. As a result, if the supposed safety of the nation is at stake, privileged members will want to protect it in any way possible. This is why I expect men to be more responsive to the national/anti-Western appeal than women. They want to preserve their place at the top of the societal food chain, which means protecting the Polish institutions that maintain this hierarchy (Lui 2017). If LGBTQIA+ people threaten the hierarchy, then men will be more inclined to support anti-LGBTQIA+ efforts. This leads to my first sub-hypothesis in relation to the nationalist/anti-Western appeal:

H2_a: Evoking nationalist/anti-Western sentiments among men will result in higher levels of support for the Law and Justice Party, as well as support for restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people, compared to women.

We believe this same logic can apply to those with class privilege. Wealthier members of Polish society do not want to lose their status. Therefore, they will do whatever they can to maintain the national institutions that enable the survival of their privilege. This effect may be particularly notable among high-income men since they use their privilege as a means to retain and “gain power,” as opposed to low-income men, who use their privilege “to build relationships” (Liu 2017). This means that lower-income men are not necessarily trying to use their privilege to protect existing institutions of power but instead attempt to gain the social ladder as individuals. Thus, the following sub-hypothesis is as follows:

H2_b: Evoking nationalist/anti-Western sentiments among higher-income people will result in higher levels of support for the Law and Justice Party, as well as support for restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people, compared to lower-income people.

Due to the unique placement of the Law and Justice party in Polish society, I believe that partisan cues will also have an effect. Partisan messages provide voters with “a concrete cause or personality” rather than an “abstract duty” (Panagopoulos 2009, 11). In addition, these messages allow voters to feel that they are part of something bigger, part of a “larger movement” (Panagopoulos 2009, 11). Political parties engage in the othering process by claiming that their views are correct and “in the lines of the nation’s interest” (Karakunnel 2021, 5). Political groups often spread this idea through hate speech (Karakunnel 2021). By positioning itself as an entity against the “corrupt” government, the Law and Justice party exhibits itself as a just group that will further national progress (Żuk 2020).

Radical right-leaning political parties, including the Law and Justice party, often engage in developing an “us” versus “them” dichotomy by “constructi[ng]...common enemies” (Sakki

and Pettersson 2016, 157). Right-wing groups have historically adopted this strategy to further racist or anti-immigrant agendas. The Law and Justice party often “others” immigrants, particularly Muslim refugees beginning in 2015 during the European refugee crisis (Vachudova 2020; Krzyżanowski 2018). They developed a similar strategy when first targeting the LGBTQIA+ community during the party’s first claim to power in 2005, even if the strength of its influence was limited during that reign. The Law and Justice party has repeatedly described the LGBTQIA+ community as the enemy of Poland. Queer people and queer ideology represent what is wrong with the nation; they represent the corruption that the party is supposedly fighting against (Żuk 2020). This creates two groups: members and supporters of the party who want to improve Poland versus those destroying the nation (i.e., queer people). This turns the LGBTQIA+ community into a political scapegoat and paints them as the Other.²³

Much of the previous research about partisan appeals is from literature in the United States, where parties have much stronger ties to their constituency than in Poland (Brader, Tucker, and Duell 2013). However, the Law and Justice party has mobilized support in a way that previous parties were unable to, signaling that partisan appeals may actually begin to work there (Folvarčný and Kopečekno 2020). The party positions itself as the saviors of Poland, as being against the corrupt outsiders (i.e., the West, where LGBTQIA+ ideology is born). Thus, I believe appeals that explicitly mention the party will persuade the Polish citizenry more. This brings me to the third hypothesis:

²³ Polityka. 2019. “Imponujący wykład prezesa PiS o patriotyzmie: "Trwa atak na Kościół, rodzinę i dzieci. To zagraża naszemu narodowi oraz państwu (The attack on the church, family and children continues. This threatens our nation and state).” wPolityce.pl. <https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/443928-imponujacy-wyklad-prezesa-pispolska-musi-byc-wyspa-wolnosci>.

H3: Evoking partisan sentiments will result in higher levels of support for the Law and Justice party, as well as support for restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people, compared to control.

Although previous studies suggest that ideological conservatism and age are positively correlated (Truett 1993; Sherratt and Morand-Ferron 2018), a notable trend exists in Poland that strays from this pattern. The Law and Justice party performs particularly well among younger voters. A 2019 poll reported that 50 percent of voters between the ages of 18 to 24 support the party and 49 percent of voters between the ages of 25 to 44. Among older voters, the party has 42 percent of voters.²⁴ Young voters may be particularly attracted to the party because of its economic policies. The minimum wage has increased significantly under the party's rule and all workers who are 26 years old are exempt from income taxes (Orenstein and Bugarič 2020). Previous ruling parties, such as the Civic Platform, have left young people in particularly precarious economic positions. In contrast, the policies of the Law and Justice party have significantly improved the economic status of young people in Poland. Unlike previous rulers, the Law and Justice party has “actually deliver[ed]” on their promises to young voters.²⁵

Similar to the reasons I expect the nationalist/anti-Western appeal to work on men and high-income respondents, I believe that young people will be especially susceptible to the partisan appeal because they do not want to lose the privileges that the Law and Justice party has provided them. They want to continue reaping the benefits of income tax exemptions, and employed, young people in particular want to reap the benefits of a higher minimum wage. The first sub-hypothesis in relation to the partisan appeal is as follows:

²⁴ Super Express, PolandIn. 2019. “Half of Young Voters Support Ruling Party.” TVP World. <https://tvpworld.com/44565009/half-of-young-voters-support-ruling-party>.

²⁵ Szczerbiak, A. 2017. “Why is Poland's law and justice government so popular?” *The Polish Politics Blog*. <https://polishpoliticsblog.wordpress.com/2017/10/26/why-is-polands-law-and-justice-government-so-popular/>.

H3_a: Evoking partisan sentiments among younger people will result in higher levels of support for the Law and Justice party, as well as support for restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people, compared to older people.

As stated previously, working-class Polish citizens have benefited significantly from the economic policies of the Law and Justice party. Therefore, I expect that employed people will be more influenced by partisan sentiments. Thus, my final sub-hypothesis is as follows:

H3_b: Evoking partisan sentiments among employed people will result in higher levels of support for the Law and Justice party, as well as support for restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people, compared to unemployed people.

While I believe both nationalist/anti-Western appeals and partisan appeals will have an effect, I hypothesize that a nationalist/anti-Western appeal will be the most influential. By combining both nationalist sentiments and anti-Western sentiments in a single appeal, these two forces will force together and reinforce each other. Though I do believe that partisanship will have an effect, the relatively young age of the Law and Justice party will prevent the partisan appeal from being as strong. Thus, the final hypothesis is as follows:

H4: Evoking nationalist/anti-Western sentiments will result in the highest support for the Law and Justice party, as well as support for restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people, compared to partisan sentiments, religious sentiments, and control.

Why Poland?

Poland is currently a target among members of the European Union for violating LGBTQIA+ rights.²⁶ The International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) voted Poland as the worst country in the European Union for LGBTQIA+ people for two years in a row (Löwdin 2021). Despite this, voices of the Polish queer community are rarely heard because “[t]here is no polling on their views or preferences.”²⁷ This shows that the LGBTQIA+ population is severely understudied, and therefore acutely unprotected. Though the European Union was previously an entity that kept Poland’s government accountable for protecting LGBTQIA+ rights, it is clear that “EU conditionality c[an] no longer be used to shape the politics of homosexuality” (O’Dwyer and Vermeersch 2016, 133). The fictional speeches provided to survey respondents, which will be further explained later in this thesis, are not truly fictional. The language is borrowed from the real, dangerous homophobic rhetoric politicians are using. I choose the word “dangerous” precisely because the queer community is not only verbally assaulted, but physical attacked for simply existing (Dutra Santo 2020; Graff 2006; Weidemann 2021).

Poland’s homophobic policies also have international consequences, further highlighting why it is a critical case to study. In 2019, Polish members of the European Parliament “abstained from a vote on a resolution condemning the persecution of LGBTQ persons in Uganda” (Dutra Santo 2020). Far right-wing groups from nations all over Europe, including Italy and Spain, are inspired by the Law and Justice party adopt the same political strategies (Wiącek 2019). This means that other European nations could soon ostracize their LGBTQIA+ population in the same

²⁶ Chalmers, J. and Baczynska, G. 2021.

²⁷ Pronczuk, M. 2021. “In Poland, an L.G.B.T.Q. Migration As Homophobia Deepens.” *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/24/world/europe/poland-lgbtq-gay-migration.html>.

manner that the Law and Justice party currently is. Thus, queer people across Europe and potentially around the globe are at risk of greater violence and discrimination unless activists take action to confront the issue in Poland.

Furthermore, studying homophobia in Poland could pave the way to prevent greater atrocities against the LGBTQIA+ community in Eastern Europe. Although Poland is currently experiencing an episodic “illiberal swerve,” it is not necessarily undergoing an “illiberal turn.” It therefore has the opportunity to readopt institutions that promote gender and sexual equity with the proper guidance and policies (Bustikova and Guasti 2017, 167). This defends why I choose Poland instead of a country such as Hungary, which heavily relies on politicized homophobia but cannot recover as quickly due to the status of their illiberal turn. Poland may not be experiencing an illiberal transition as extreme of that in Hungary, but its democratic backslide is more extreme than those in Czechoslovakia and Slovakia (Bustikova and Guasti 2017). By studying politicized homophobia in Poland now, I can aid in developing a framework to address the issue in Eastern European countries that are following in Poland’s footsteps before it escalates.

IV. Research Design

Survey Experiment

Previous research into politicized homophobia relies exclusively on observational data (Chojnicka 2015; Löwdin 2021). Therefore, I chose to conduct a survey experiment to capture the causal mechanisms that prior studies have not explored. To test the three different politicized homophobic appeals, I distributed a survey in which all participants were randomly assigned to receive the religious appeal, the nationalist/anti-Western appeal, the partisan appeal, or the control appeal. The control group received a vignette about attitudes regarding Russia, since

Russia is a nation that the majority of the Polish public feel, to some extent, threatened by (Butkiewicz 2017; Riedel 2018).

Participants started by answering a series of demographic questions about their gender, sexual orientation, age, income level, other factors to address potential covariates, which I will discuss further in the next section. I measured initial levels of homophobia pre-treatment by modifying a question on the European Values Survey that has been asked since, to the best of my knowledge, the wave of 1990. The question instructs respondents to rate the extent to which they would be comfortable with a queer person as their neighbor.²⁸ I followed by asking participants to assess how important religion and politics are to them, as well as if they had favorable opinions on the West and if they took pride in Poland. This survey received approval from the Emory Institutional Review Board (IRB) to ensure that the survey questions as well as the execution of the survey met high ethical standards. All questions in the survey (translated into English) can be found in Appendix A.

I tested the three appeals through three different vignettes, which I described to the participants as excerpts from a politician's speech (I informed participants after completing the survey that they were fictional but based on actual speeches). The religious appeal is as follows:

In order to solve our country's political problems, we need to follow the Church's guidance. Being a member of the LGBT community is violating the wishes of God. People who identify as LGBT do not adhere to the moral standards of the Church and are destroying the traditional model of the family. Those who support the Church will not support or engage with LGBT people.

²⁸ Previous scholars have used this question to measure homophobia, illustrating that it is a reliable question (Takács and Szalma 2013). However, there is still the risk that this question could potentially dissuade people, particularly ones with homophobic attitudes, from taking the survey.

The nationalist/anti-Western appeal is as follows:

In order to solve our country's political problems, we need to return to our national roots. People who are LGBT are tainting the authentic Polish identity, bringing in their foreign ideas from the West to our nation. Those who support and love Poland will not support or engage with LGBT people.

The partisan appeal is as follows:

In order to solve our country's political problems, we need to rely on our elected officials. As a member of the PiS party, I believe that the LGBT community is ruining our country. People who identify with the community are disrupting the social and political order. Those who support the PiS party will not support or engage with LGBT people.

I chose to use vignettes because they create situations that respondents perceive to be real, even if they do not entirely understand the topic of interest at hand (Morrison et al. 2004). As stated previously, the control group received a vignette that discussed Russia as a threat to the nation, since a fear of Russia is commonly held among Polish citizens (Butkiewicz 2017; Riedel 2018). The control appeal is as follows:

In order to solve our country's political problems, we need to separate ourselves from Russia. Russia is putting the Polish people at risk by threatening the nation and our values. Those who want to make Poland a safe place to live will not support or engage with Russia.

To measure the dependent variable (support for restrictions on LGBTQIA+ rights as well as support for the Law and Justice party), all respondents were asked what party they would vote

for in an upcoming election and if they support greater restrictions on LGBT²⁹ rights after reading the vignette. I included various questions about these restrictions, including restrictions on marriage, adoption, ability to relocate, and ability to hold pride marches to assess a wide range of potential restrictions on queer communities. Respondents could report the extent to which they would support these restrictions through a sliding scale ranging from 1 to 7.

Distribution

I designed the survey using Qualtrics, an online survey tool. I then distributed the survey via Panel Ariadna, the largest independent nationwide research panel in Poland. The platform compensates participants by providing points that users can then exchange for rewards (Kachurka, Krawczyk, and Rachubik 2021). I estimated that the survey took about three to five minutes to complete, which amounted to ten points for users. Respondents were informed that the survey could include sensitive topics and were free to opt out at any time. I obtained consent at the beginning of the survey and provided my contact information at the end. To avoid dissuading people from participating, I did not include that the survey was intended to study homophobic appeals in the consent form. However, I informed participants that the true nature of the survey would not be revealed until after completing the survey. In addition, I informed all of the participants after completing the survey that the excerpts of political speeches were fictional, though based on rhetoric adopted by Polish politicians.

There are limitations to Panel Ariadna that I must address. Previous scholars note that the “incentive structure” of the panel, in which participants can exchange their points for rewards, may result in the overrepresentation of low-income Internet users who are more attracted to such

²⁹ I choose to opt for “LGBT” over “LGBTQIA+” because this is the language that the Law and Justice party typically uses in their speeches and policies.

benefits (Sekścińska 2022). Along with this, data collection is limited solely to Internet users, which means that the opinions of those living in rural areas cannot be considered. Online survey platforms tend to overrepresent younger, educated populations who are lower-income (Sekścińska 2022). This may limit the generalizability of the results.

While there are flaws with Panel Ariadna, researchers choose to use the platform because it is an effective tool. Since participants are recruited through online banners and advertisements, the samples are collected randomly, and the methods of data collection ensure anonymity (Kachurka, Krawczyk, and Rachubik 2021). In addition, the panel has Interviewer Quality Control Programme (PKJPA) certification, guaranteeing that the data is of the highest quality (Sekścińska et al. 2022). Many institutions, from universities to media agencies, choose to use Panel Ariadna in Poland because it is considered a strong research platform. Thus, since the evidence suggests that it is a reliable platform for the purposes of my research, I believe that it is an effective tool for distributing the survey.

V. Analysis

The following describes the results of my data, which consisted of 1708 participants who completed the survey in February of 2022. The power analysis I conducted was based on previous surveys about support for the Law and Justice party, which illustrates why I chose to pursue a minimum of 1500 responses.³⁰ I begin by discussing the treatment effects for the religious, nationalist/anti-Western, and partisan appeals compared to the control group. I then explore the heterogeneous treatment effects that exist among various demographic dimensions.

³⁰ Sas, A. 2021. “Public support for political parties in Poland 2021.” *IBRIS Market and Social Research Institute*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1094949/poland-support-for-political-parties/>.

Validity and Robustness

I took various measures to ensure the validity of the data. I included three attention checks throughout the survey as well as a comprehension check to guarantee that respondents understood the term “LGBT.” Furthermore, as a robustness check, I asked participants to assess how convincing they found the argument in the speech, as well as if they would be willing to vote for the politician who supposedly gave the speech. As an additional attention check, I confirmed that participants read the entirety of the vignette by asking a follow-up question about its content and included a page break before showing the vignettes in an attempt to force respondents to refocus during the survey. Respondents were informed when they failed the first two attention checks and had the option to leave the survey after failing. I chose not to include results from the respondents who failed the attention checks and decided to leave the survey early due to this failure. The number of survey respondents who fell under this category was not statistically significant (1.5%).³¹ The codebook for the data, which I analyzed through R Studio, is located in Appendix B.

Despite these validity checks, there are limitations to survey experiments that focus on sensitive topics. Social desirability response bias, which “refers to the tendency of individuals to over-report socially desirable characteristics...and under-report undesirable characteristics” potentially played a role in my research (Dalton and Ortegren 2011, 73). However, even if the respondents did not report the true extent of their support for restrictions on queer people, it is still valuable to evaluate how the treatment groups’ responses differed from the control group.

³¹ In addition, I explored the results both with and without participants who failed both attention checks and continued with the survey. These differences were not significant, especially since the majority of participants who failed the first attention check did not fail the second one.

While the effect of the appeals may be stronger than what the data shows, the presence of an effect itself is more important for this thesis.

Treatment Effects

Support for the Law and Justice Party

To begin, I explored the differences in support for the Law and Justice party between the treatment groups and the control group. Table 1 illustrates the raw results of the proportion of respondents willing to vote for the Law and Justice party among the treatment groups, which was measured after receiving the vignette. I then compared this proportion to the proportion of the Law and Justice party voters in the control group, calculating the difference between each treatment group and the control.

Table 1. Support for the Law and Justice Party Among Treatment Groups Compared to Control³²
(N=1708)

	Proportion	Proportion of Control	Difference	P-value
Religious	0.176	0.173	0.003	0.999
Nationalist/Anti-Western	0.171	0.173	-0.002	0.999
Partisan	0.166	0.173	-0.007	0.993

³² Demonstrates the proportion of people in each treatment group who reported they would vote for the Law and Justice party compared to participants assigned to the control. A p-value of less than 0.05 demonstrates statistical significance.

As seen in the table above, for all three treatment groups (religious, nationalist/anti-Western, and partisan), there were no statistically significant differences between the extent to which they supported the Law and Justice party compared to the control. For those assigned to receive treatment, 17.6% of those who received the religious appeal supported the Law and Justice party, 17.1% of those who received the nationalist/anti-Western appeal supported the party, and 16.6% of those who received the partisan appeal supported the party. For those in the control group, 17.3% supported the party. The difference between the average for the control group and the three treatment groups is relatively small, illustrating that the treatment did not impact the likelihood that respondents would vote for the Law and Justice party. A p-value of less than 0.05 shows statistical significance. Since all of these values are above 0.05, there seems to be no difference in how respondents in the treatment groups versus the control ranked their support for the party.

Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation

I then explored how respondents in the various treatment groups responded in their support for restrictions on queer people. I asked respondents to report the likelihood that they would support various hypothetical policies on a slider scale ranging from one (“very unlikely”) to seven (“very likely”). Concerning the variables “marriage” and “adoption,” a lower number (with one being the lowest) demonstrates that the respondent is supporting anti-LGBTQIA+ policy, as these questions asked participants to report how likely they were to support marriage equality and adoption rights for queer couples. On the other hand, for the variables “area” and “parade,” a lower number indicates less homophobic tendencies since participants were asked to report the extent to which they would support restrictions on where queer people can live and on

their ability to host pride parades. Table 2 shows the average response for participants assigned to receive the religious appeal, as well as the average response of the control and the difference of means between these groups. On average, those who received the religious appeal rated that, on a scale of one to seven, their support for marriage equality lay at 4.23, compared to 4.13 in the control.

Table 2. Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation for the Religious Treatment Group³³ (N=854)

	Mean	Mean of Control	Difference	P-value
Marriage	4.23	4.13	0.10	0.921
Adoption	3.43	3.40	0.03	0.997
Area	2.46	2.50	-0.04	0.989
Parade	3.03	3.23	-0.20	0.466

These results reveal that support for anti-queer legislation among those who were assigned to the religious appeal did not differ from those assigned to the control group to a statistically significant degree. The most considerable difference I observed was in relation to restrictions on pride parades. However, since the p-value is above 0.05, this marginal difference is irrelevant.

Table 3 compares those assigned to the nationalist/anti-Western appeal and the control group. On average, participants assigned to this treatment group rated that, on a scale of one to seven, their support for the adoption equality lay at 3.61, compared to 3.40 in the control group.

³³ Illustrates the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the religious appeal. These averages are then compared to the control group to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

Table 3. Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation for the Nationalist/Anti-Western Treatment Group³⁴ (N=854)

	Mean	Mean of Control	Difference	P-value
Marriage	4.31	4.13	0.18	0.622
Adoption	3.61	3.40	0.21	0.474
Area	2.46	2.50	-0.04	0.991
Parade	3.16	3.23	-0.07	0.955

Similar to the religious appeal, there were no statistically significant differences concerning support for anti-queer legislation between those who received the nationalist/anti-Western appeal and participants who received the control appeal. No p-value was below 0.05.

Table 4 shows the differences between the control and respondents assigned to the partisan appeal. The average response for participants in this treatment group in relation to support for restrictions on where queer people can live on a scale of one to seven lay at 2.21, compared to 2.50 in the control group.

Table 4. Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation for the Partisan Treatment Group³⁵ (N=854)

	Mean	Mean of Control	Difference	P-value
Marriage	4.32	4.13	0.19	0.592

³⁴ Shows the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the nationalist/anti-Western appeal. These averages are then compared to the control group to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

³⁵ Demonstrates the average support rating for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the partisan appeal. These averages are then compared to the control group to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

Adoption	3.61	3.40	0.21	0.474
Area	2.21	2.50	-0.29	0.112
Parade	2.92	3.23	-0.31	0.118

Again, no p-value was below 0.05, illustrating that the difference in support was not statistically significant between those assigned to the partisan appeal and those in the control group. However, the p-value is notably lower for this treatment group concerning the area and parade variables than the other two treatment groups, though it is the control group that showed higher homophobic tendencies.

This evidence suggests that my first hypothesis, Hypothesis 1, is correct, as there were no statistically significant differences in support for the party as well as support for anti-LGBTQIA+ measures between those who received the religious appeal and the control appeal. It is likely that my second, third, and fourth hypotheses were incorrect, as there was no effect on respondents who received the nationalist/anti-Western appeal and the partisan appeal.

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Gender

While there were no statistically significant differences between the treatment and control groups in relation to the dependent variable, there is evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects at play within specific treatment groups. I began by comparing the responses of men who received the religious appeal to those of women in the same treatment group.³⁶ Table 5 shows the

³⁶ Although respondents did have the option to identify as neither gender, the marginal number of respondents who chose this made it statistically irrelevant to study the potential differences between men, women, and non-binary participants.

results of these comparisons. For the first four variables (marriage, adoption, area, and parade), the table includes the average response of each group. For example, on a scale of one to seven, men in the religious treatment group on average reported a 4.00 concerning support for marriage equality, while women reported a 4.44. The variable “PiS” illustrates the proportion of people in each group that would vote for the Law and Justice party. Among male respondents assigned to receive the religious appeal, 19.0% favored the Law and Justice party. In comparison, 16.4% of women reported they would support the party in an upcoming election.

Table 5. Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation and the Law and Justice Party for the Religious Treatment Group by Gender³⁷ (N=426)

	Men (N=200)	Women (N=226)	Difference	P-value
Marriage	4.00	4.44	-0.44	0.036
Adoption	3.23	3.62	-0.39	0.063
Area	2.45	2.47	-0.02	0.917
Parade	3.11	2.97	0.14	0.469
PiS	0.190	0.164	0.026	0.478

Men in the religious treatment group were statistically less likely than women to support marriage equality, with a p-value of 0.036. This was the only significant difference between men and women in relation to support for restrictions on LGBTQIA+ communities, as well as support for the Law and Justice party.

³⁷ Demonstrates the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the religious appeal, based on gender. The table also shows how support for the party within this treatment group varied based on gender. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

To test Hypothesis 2_a, I compared the responses of men assigned to receive the nationalist/anti-Western appeal to the responses of women in the same treatment group. Table 6 depicts the results of this comparison. On a scale of one to seven, men in the nationalist/anti-Western treatment group on average reported a 3.45 in terms of their support for restrictions on pride parades, while women reported a 2.95. Among male respondents assigned to receive the nationalist/anti-Western appeal, 14% favored the Law and Justice party. In comparison, 19.4% of women in this treatment group reported they would vote for the party.

Table 6. Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation and the Law and Justice Party for the Nationalist/Anti-Western Treatment Group by Gender³⁸ (N=426)

	Men (N=178)	Women (N=248)	Difference	P-value
Marriage	3.98	4.56	-0.58	0.008
Adoption	3.31	3.84	-0.53	0.014
Area	2.68	2.30	0.38	0.040
Parade	3.45	2.95	0.50	0.015
PiS	0.140	0.194	-0.054	0.152

As seen in the table, men in this treatment group were more likely to favor anti-queer legislation compared to women for all measures related to LGBTQIA+ life. However, men were not statistically more likely to vote for the Law and Justice party than women. The data suggests that Polish men may be more affected by political homophobic appeals that evoke nationalist

³⁸ Illustrates the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the nationalist/anti-Western appeal, based on gender. The table also shows how support for the party within this treatment group varied based on gender. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

and/or anti-Western sentiments than women who receive the same appeal, offering partial support for Hypothesis 2a.

I then compared the responses of men versus women assigned to the partisan treatment group. Table 7 shows the difference of means tests I conducted, as well as the difference in proportions to investigate support for the leading party. Among men assigned to receive the partisan appeal, 16.8% reported they would support the Law and Justice party in an upcoming election compared to 16.6% of women in this treatment group.

Table 7. Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation and the Law and Justice Party for the Partisan Treatment Group by Gender³⁹ (N=426)

	Men (N=197)	Women (N=229)	Difference	P-value
Marriage	4.24	4.38	-0.14	0.493
Adoption	3.41	3.77	-0.36	0.090
Area	2.42	2.04	0.38	0.027
Parade	3.01	2.86	0.15	0.467
PiS	0.168	0.166	0.002	0.965

Within the partisan treatment group, men were more likely to support restrictions on where queer people can live than women to a statistically significant degree, with an average rating of 2.42 versus 2.04, respectively. This was the only statistically significant difference within this treatment group based on gender in relation to the dependent variables. Since

³⁹ Illustrates the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the partisan appeal, based on gender. The table also shows how support for the party within this treatment group varied based on gender. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

restrictions on where LGBTQIA+ people can live is an existing policy in Poland (with the aforementioned “LGBT-free zones), this may suggest that men are influenced by anti-queer policies adopted by the Law and Justice party.

Men in the religious treatment group were statistically less likely to support marriage equality than women, and men in the partisan treatment group were favored restricting where queer people could live compared to women. However, these two treatment groups only saw statistically significant differences in one of five variables. On the other hand, men assigned to the nationalist/anti-Western treatment group were statistically more likely to favor anti-LGBTQIA+ measures than women for all four variables related to queer people. This offers partial support for Hypothesis 2_a, although there were no statistically significant differences between men and women concerning support for the Law and Justice party in any treatment group.

Income

I then explored how income may impact respondents in all three treatment groups. Table 8 shows the difference of means tests for the dependent variables, as well as the difference in proportions of respondents who reported they would vote for the Law and Justice party. Low-income respondents reported that they earn less than 2100 złotych per month, while high-income respondents stated that their income was more than 5600 złotych per month.⁴⁰ When asked to the extent to which they support queer couples looking to adopt on a scale of one to seven, low-income people assigned to receive the religious appeal reported, on average, a 3.38. High-income respondents reported, on average, a 3.35. Among low-income people in this treatment group,

⁴⁰ In Poland, citizens typically report their salaries and wages monthly. This is unlike the United States, where citizens report their salaries and wages annually.

14.9% stated they would vote for the Law and Justice party in an upcoming election compared to 18.9% of high-income respondents.

Table 8. Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation and the Law and Justice Party for the Religious Group by Income⁴¹ (N=174)

	Low-Income (N=47)	High-Income (N=127)	Difference	P-value
Marriage	4.49	4.02	0.47	0.205
Adoption	3.38	3.35	0.03	0.938
Area	2.64	2.39	0.25	0.447
Parade	3.02	2.87	0.15	0.667
PiS	0.149	0.189	-0.04	0.540

There were no statistically significant differences between low-income and high-income respondents in the religious treatment group concerning support for restrictions on the LGBTQIA+ community, as well as support for the Law and Justice party.

To test Hypothesis 2_b, I compared low-income and high-income respondents assigned to the nationalist/anti-Western appeal. I initially hypothesized that high-income respondents in this treatment group were more likely to favor restrictions on queer people, as well as more likely to favor the Law and Justice party. Table 6 shows the results of the difference of means tests conducted for each dependent variable and the difference in proportions concerning support for

⁴¹ Shows the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the religious appeal, based on income. The table also shows how support for the party within this treatment group varied based on income. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

the Law and Justice party. Among low-income respondents in the treatment group, 17.4% reported they would vote for the Law and Justice party, compared to only 11.6% of high-income respondents. When asked how highly they would favor restrictions on where queer people could live on a scale of one to seven, the average response among low-income respondents was 2.85, compared to an average of 2.02 among high-income participants.

Table 9. Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation and the Law and Justice Party for the Nationalist/Anti-Western Treatment Group by Income⁴² (N=175)

	Low-Income (N=46)	High-Income (N=129)	Difference	P-value
Marriage	4.11	4.60	-0.49	0.193
Adoption	3.50	3.95	-0.45	0.238
Area	2.85	2.02	0.83	0.010
Parade	3.41	2.91	0.50	0.167
PiS	0.174	0.116	0.058	0.372

Low-income respondents were more likely to support legislation restricting queer people from residing in specific areas than high-income respondents to a statistically significant degree. While there may be many reasons for this effect, I propose it is related to the fact that the majority of LGBT-free zones in Poland are located in lower-income areas of the country, such as

⁴² Illustrates the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the nationalist/anti-Western appeal, based on income. The table also shows how support for the party within this treatment group varied based on income. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

the southeastern region.⁴³ These regions also have higher levels of church attendance, which increases potential exposure to the anti-queer speech prevalent in many of these religious institutions (as discussed previously). This means that low-income respondents may have stronger relationships to such restrictive policies, prompting them to favor it. However, further research is necessary to determine the exact reason for such a difference.

I then tested whether low-income and high-income respondents who received the partisan appeal responded differently to the various dependent variables. These tests are in Table 10. Among low-income participants in this treatment group, 25.6% supported the Law and Justice party, compared to 13.0% of high-income respondents.

Table 10. Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation and the Law and Justice Party for the Partisan Treatment Group by Income⁴⁴ (N=170)

	Low-Income (N=39)	High-Income (N=131)	Difference	P-value
Marriage	3.77	4.53	-0.76	0.043
Adoption	3.03	3.84	-0.81	0.041
Area	2.15	1.84	0.31	0.317
Parade	2.90	2.70	0.20	0.602
PiS	0.256	0.130	0.126	0.061

⁴³ Janiszewski, J. 2021. "Neither in Nor Out: The Paradox of Poland's 'LGBT-Free' Zones." *Balkan Investigative Reporting Network*. <https://balkaninsight.com/2021/04/15/neither-in-nor-out-the-paradox-of-polands-lgbt-free-zones/>.

⁴⁴ Illustrates the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the partisan appeal, based on income. The table also shows how support for the party within this treatment group varied based on income. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

High-income respondents in this treatment group were statistically more likely to support marriage equality than low-income participants, with a p-value of 0.043. In addition, high-income respondents were more likely to support queer couples seeking to adopt than low-income people, with a p-value of 0.041. This reveals a remarkable relationship between partisanship, economic class, and anti-queer legislation. The data shows statistically significant differences in relation to marriage equality and adoption rights between economic classes. Thus, evoking partisan sentiments among low-income groups may result in a higher degree of support for restrictions on the private lives of LGBTQIA+ people. This effect may not exist with the public lives of queer communities (i.e., pride parades).

I cannot say that Hypothesis 2_b is fully supported by the evidence. Only one statistically significant difference (p-value of less than 0.05) existed among the five dependent variables. Still, the data suggests something particularly interesting about how nationalist/anti-Western sentiments may provoke certain economic classes in Poland to support legislation that curbs the ability of LGBTQIA+ citizens to move freely within the country. In addition, the data offers insight into how partisanship may affect the ways in which low-income Polish citizens prefer to restrict the private lives of queer people.


Age

Support for the Law and Justice Party

To investigate how age may have affected the results of the survey, I compared the responses of participants in four age brackets: 18 to 29-year-old respondents, 30-44-year-old respondents, 45-64-year-old respondents, and 65 and older respondents. I began by evaluating

support for the Law and Justice party among these age groups across treatment groups. Figure 2 shows the variation in support for the leading party within all three treatment groups by illustrating the proportion of respondents in each age bracket who reported they would vote for the Law and Justice party in an upcoming election. Among those between the ages of 30 to 44 in the religious treatment group, 16.2% of respondents reported they would vote for the party in an upcoming election. In comparison, 19.4% of respondents in the age bracket assigned the nationalist/anti-Western appeal reported they would vote for the party.

Figure 2. Support for the Law and Justice Party by Age⁴⁵ (N=1281)



There were no statistically significant differences in support for the Law and Justice party between the four age groups within each treatment group. This is inconsistent with Hypothesis


⁴⁵ Shows the proportion of people across treatment groups who reported they would vote for the Law and Justice across the four age groups. A p-value of less than 0.05 demonstrates statistical significance.

3_a, as young respondents were not more likely to report that they would support the party compared to older respondents.

Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation

To continue investigating the data, I compared the responses of the previously mentioned age groups in relation to support for anti-LGBTQIA policies. I originally planned to compare only the responses of the youngest participants (age 18 to 29) to the oldest group (age 65 or older). However, I found notable differences between middle-aged groups and the youngest group worthy of future exploration and thus included all ages in my analysis. Figure 3 illustrates the average response among those assigned to the religious treatment group concerning measures related to support for restrictions on the LGBTQIA+ community. On a scale of one to seven, the average report of support for marriage equality among participants between the ages of 18 to 29 was 4.27, compared to an average of 4.04 among respondents 30 to 44 years of age in the same treatment group.

Figure 3. Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation for the Religious Treatment Group by Age⁴⁶
(N=427)




For those assigned to the religious treatment group, there were statistically significant differences between various age groups concerning support for restrictions on the queer community. Firstly, the youngest group of participants (18 to 29-year-olds) who received the partisan appeal were more likely to support restrictions on pride parades than the oldest group (65-year-olds or older), with a p-value of 0.027. Yet, this youngest group was also more likely to favor adoption rights for queer couples compared to respondents between the ages of 30 to 44, with a p-value of 0.001. The middle-aged group (between the ages of 30 to 44) was statistically

⁴⁶ Demonstrates the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the religious appeal, based on age. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

more homophobic than the oldest group, as they were more in favor of restrictions on where LGBTQIA+ communities can live (p-value of 0.005), as well as whether these communities can host pride parades (p-value of 0.030). This suggests that Polish citizens between the ages of 30 to 44 may favor restrictions on the public lives of queer people when evoking religious sentiments.

I continued by comparing the results of the various age groups who received the nationalist/anti-Western appeal. Figure 4 includes the average responses of all four age brackets. Among respondents between the ages of 30 to 44, the average report of support for queer couples seeking to adopt was 3.18 on a scale of one to seven. In comparison, the average for those 65 years of age or older was 4.51.

Figure 4. Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation for the Nationalist/Anti-Western Treatment Group by Age⁴⁷ (N=427)



Between respondents ages 18 to 29 and respondents 65 years of age or older, the youngest group was statistically more likely to support restrictions on the queer community for all four measures besides the “area” variable. On a scale of one to seven, the average report of support for marriage equality among the youngest group assigned to the nationalist/anti-Western treatment group was 4.08, compared to an average of 5.23 among the oldest participants (p-value of 0.002). The average report of support for queer couples adopting among the youngest group was 3.66, while the average for the oldest group was 4.51 (p-value of 0.021). Concerning

⁴⁷ Demonstrates the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the nationalist/anti-Western appeal, based on age. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.


restrictions on pride parades, the average response for the youngest group was 3.17 compared to 2.45 within the oldest group (p-value of 0.040).

For all four measures of support for restrictions on the LGBTQIA+ community, participants in the treatment group between the ages of 30 to 44 were statistically more in favor of restrictions on the queer community than the most senior respondents. These differences were highly significant for measures related to the private lives of queer people. On a scale of one to seven, the average report of support for marriage equality among those between 30 to 44 was 3.84. In comparison, the average among the oldest group was over one whole point higher at 5.23, with a p-value of 0.0000423. In relation to adoption rights for queer couples, the average response among middle-aged respondents in this treatment group was 3.18, compared to an average response of 4.51 in the oldest group (p-value of 0.0000775). When reporting the extent of their support for restrictions on where LGBTQIA+ people can live, the average response for 30-44-year-old people was 2.88, while the average among 65-year-old and older respondents was 2.06 (p-value of 0.004). Lastly, when asked about their support for restrictions on pride parades, the average among middle-aged participants was 3.68, compared to 2.45 among the oldest group (p-value of 0.00012). This suggests it may be impactful to evoke nationalist and anti-Western sentiments in homophobic speech among Polish citizens aged 30 to 44.

To test Hypothesis 3_a, I compared the responses of the youngest participants (age 18 to 29) to the oldest group (age 65 and older) among those who received the partisan appeal. I expected that young people would be more likely to favor restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people than older people who received the partisan appeal. Similar to the last two treatment groups, I compared the responses of various age brackets to each other. Figure 5 includes the average responses of all four age groups assigned to the partisan treatment group. When asked to report

whether they support queer couples adopting on a scale of one to seven, the average response among 18 to 29-year-old participants in this treatment group was 4.24, compared to an average response of 3.25 among 30 to 44-year-old respondents.

Figure 5. Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation for the Partisan Treatment Group by Age⁴⁸
(N=427)



There were no statistically significant differences between the extent to which the youngest participants who received the partisan appeal (age 18 to 29) and the oldest group (age

⁴⁸ Shows the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the partisan appeal, based on age. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

65 and older) supported anti-LGBTQIA+ legislation. Those between 30 and 44 were less likely to support LGBTQIA+ couples interested in adopting than the youngest group, with a p-value of 0.003. Similarly, 45 to 64-year-old respondents were statistically less likely to support queer couples adopting than those between 18 to 29, with a p-value of 0.013. Concerning marriage equality, 30 to 44-year-old participants were less likely to support such a measure compared to the oldest group of participants (p-value of 0.004). The most senior group of respondents was also more in favor of queer couples adopting than those between 30 to 44 (p-value of 0.013). This contrasts with the results of the difference of means tests among middle-aged respondents and the oldest respondents assigned to receive the religious appeal. Participants between the ages of 30 to 44 in the religious treatment group favored restrictions of queer people in the public sphere to a statistically significant degree compared to the oldest group. However, this same age group assigned to receive the partisan appeal statistically favored restrictions on the private lives of LGBTQIA+ people compared to those 65 years of age and older.

The data is inconsistent with Hypothesis 3_a, as there were no statistically significant differences between the youngest and oldest participants assigned to receive the partisan appeal concerning support for restrictions on the LGBTQIA+ community, as well as support for the Law and Justice party. Still, there is valuable insight to be gained from exploring the relationship between age and anti-LGBTQIA+ legislation. Based on the data, Polish citizens ages 65 and older are statistically less homophobic than middle-aged respondents, but this effect varies depending on what kind of sentiments (religious, nationalist/anti-Western, or partisan) are evoked. Homophobic appeals based on nationalist/anti-Western sentiments tend to be especially effective among those between the ages of 30 to 44 compared to older respondents, as there were statistically significant differences in support for restricting the lives of queer people for all four

dependent variables. Religious and partisan appeals also seemed to produce support for homophobic policies among middle-aged respondents, suggesting that this age group in Poland may show strong homophobic tendencies overall.


Employment

As the final set of tests regarding heterogeneous treatment effects, I compared the responses of participants in numerous fields of employment within treatment groups to each other. To remain consistent with previous surveys conducted in Poland, participants could choose from various options when reporting their employment status. Appendix A includes the complete list of options (eight choices) available in the survey. Only a selection of these groups showed statistically significant differences within treatment groups compared to unemployed people. For the sake of clarity, I chose to include only those specific groups in the following figures. Thus, I explored the results of two groups who received the religious appeal (students and retired people) six groups who received the nationalist/anti-Western appeal (full-time employees, part-time employees, retired people, students, those on parental leave, and farmers), and three groups who received the partisan appeal (people who run a business/company, students, and people on parental leave), all compared to unemployed people concerning measures regarding support for restrictions on LGBTQIA+ communities. However, I explored the results of all the groups in relation to support for the Law and Justice party, as I evaluated all three treatment groups at once for simplicity.

Support for the Law and Justice Party

I began by comparing support for the leading party among employees within each treatment group. Figure 6 shows the variation in support for the leading party for all three treatment groups by illustrating the proportion of respondents in each employment sector who reported they would vote for the Law and Justice party in an upcoming election.

Figure 6. Support for the Law and Justice Party by Employment⁴⁹ (N=1281)



There were no statistically significant differences in support for the leading party among those who received the religious appeal between unemployed people and the additional seven occupations. Among those who received the nationalist/anti-Western appeal, unemployed respondents were statistically more likely to vote for the Law and Justice party than full-time

⁴⁹ Shows the proportion of people across treatment groups who reported they would vote for the Law and Justice across occupation. A p-value of less than 0.05 demonstrates statistical significance.

employees (p-value of 0.007). Unemployed people assigned to this treatment group were also more likely to vote for the party than retired people (p-value of 0.006). Within the partisan treatment group, those on parental leave were statistically more likely to support the Law and Justice party in an upcoming election compared to unemployed people (p-value of 0.002). However, the generalizability of these results may be limited. Among the approximately 1700 respondents who took the survey, only twenty-three were on parental leave. Within this group, only two received the partisan appeal. Therefore, although this was the only group that showed a statistically significant degree of support for the Law and Justice party, future research must further explore this relationship.

Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation

I continued to compare participants in the employment sector to unemployed respondents within the three treatment groups in relation to support for restrictions on the LGBTQIA+ community. I conducted difference of means tests between employed and unemployed people who received the religious appeal. Only students and retired people reported statistically significant differences in relation to the dependent variables. The following two tables will explore these differences.

Table 11 compares the responses of unemployed people assigned to the religious treatment group to students who received this same appeal. Among unemployed people assigned to the religious appeal, regarding support for restrictions on pride parades on a scale of one to seven, students reported an average response of 2.25. In comparison, unemployed respondents in this same treatment group reported an average response of 3.29.

Table 11. Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation for the Religious Treatment Group Between Unemployed and Students⁵⁰ (N=57)

	Unemployed (N=45)	Student (N=12)	Difference	P-value
Marriage	4.00	5.5	-1.50	0.034
Adoption	3.27	4.83	-1.56	0.023
Area	3.09	1.75	1.34	0.028
Parade	3.29	2.25	1.04	0.108

For three out of four of the dependent variables related to restrictions on LGBTQIA+ life, unemployed people were statistically more likely to support restrictions than students in the religious treatment group. Students were less likely to support restrictions on where LGBTQIA+ people can live compared to unemployed participants within this treatment group. In addition, they were more likely to support marriage equality and queer couples who want to adopt.

Table 12 shows the results of the difference of means tests conducted between unemployed people and retired people who received the religious appeal. On average, unemployed people in this treatment group reported a 4.00 regarding support for marriage equality, compared to 4.39 among retired participants.

⁵⁰ Illustrates the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the religious appeal based on employment, specifically unemployed respondents and students. I then compared the ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

Table 12. Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation for the Religious Treatment Group Between Unemployed and Retired Participants⁵¹ (N=146)

	Unemployed (N=45)	Retired (N=101)	Difference	P-value
Marriage	4.00	4.39	-0.39	0.321
Adoption	3.27	3.59	-0.32	0.388
Area	3.09	2.02	1.07	0.0015
Parade	3.29	2.62	0.67	0.062


As seen in Table 12, the only statistically significant difference between unemployed people and retired respondents in the religious treatment group concerning restrictions on queer people was in relation to restrictions on where LGBTQIA+ people can live. Unemployed people were statistically more likely to favor such restrictions compared to retired people in this treatment group.

I then investigated these same dependent variables among respondents assigned to the nationalist/anti-Western treatment group. As there was more variation within this treatment group across multiple occupations, I chose to graph the responses rather than display the results in a series of tables. Figure 7 includes the average responses of seven groups (full-time employees, part-time employees, farmers, those on parental leave, retired people, students, and unemployed people) assigned to the nationalist/anti-Western treatment group for all four measures related to LGBTQIA+ life, with unemployed participants compared to the six groups.

⁵¹ Illustrates the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the religious appeal based on employment, specifically unemployed respondents and retired participants I then compared the ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

On a scale of one to seven, the average report of support for marriage equality among those on parental leave in this treatment group was 1.86, compared to 4.06 among unemployed people.

Figure 7. Support for Anti-LGBTQIA+ Legislation for the Nationalist/Anti-Western Treatment Group Across Employment⁵² (N=401)



Part-time employees who received the nationalist/anti-Western appeal were statistically more likely to support marriage equality than unemployed people (p-value of 0.034). In contrast, people on parental leave were statistically less likely to support marriage equality compared to unemployed respondents (p-value of 0.015). Those on parental leave and farmers in this treatment group were also less likely to support adoption rights for queer couples than

⁵² Illustrates the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the nationalist/anti-Western appeal based on employment. I then compared the ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

unemployed participants (p-value of 0.013 and 0.025, respectively). There were no statistically significant differences between unemployed people and any employees concerning restrictions on where queer people can live. Both retired people and students were statistically less likely to support restrictions on pride parades compared to unemployed people (p-value of 0.022 and 0.0059, respectively). This wide range of results suggests it may be valuable for future researchers to explore the impact of homophobic, nationalist/anti-Western appeals on the working class.

To test Hypothesis 3_b, I compared the respondents of participants in the employment sector assigned the partisan appeal to those who were unemployed. I expected that employed people in the partisan treatment group would be more likely to support restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people, and support the Law and Justice party, than unemployed people. Among those eight choices, only three groups showed statistically significant differences in relation to the dependent variables compared to unemployed people. The following three tables will explore these differences.

Table 13 compares the responses of unemployed people who received the partisan appeal to participants who run a business or company. Within this treatment group, concerning support for marriage equality on a scale of one to seven, those who run a business or a company reported an average response of 5.04, while the average response for unemployed participants was 4.05.

Table 13. Support for LGBTQIA+ Legislation for the Partisan Treatment Group Between Unemployed and Participants Running a Business/Company⁵³ (N=69)

	Unemployed (N=41)	Business/Company (N=28)	Difference	P-value
Marriage	4.05	5.04	-0.99	0.049
Adoption	3.66	4.39	-0.73	0.166
Area	2.44	1.93	0.51	0.229
Parade	2.90	2.54	0.36	0.465

Participants assigned to the partisan appeal who run a business or company were statistically more likely to support legislation that would allow for marriage equality than unemployed respondents. This was a significant difference of almost one whole point (5.04 versus 4.05, respectively). In addition, this was the only statistically significant difference between the two groups.

I then compared unemployed people in this same treatment group to students who received the partisan appeal. The results of this comparison are located in Table 14.

⁵³ Illustrates the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the partisan appeal based on employment, specifically unemployed respondents and participants who run a business or company. I then compared the ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

Table 14. Support for LGBTQIA+ Legislation for the Partisan Treatment Group Between Unemployed and Students⁵⁴ (N=50)

	Unemployed (N=41)	Student (N=9)	Difference	P-value
Marriage	4.05	4.56	-0.51	0.500
Adoption	3.66	5.22	-1.56	0.049
Area	2.44	1.33	1.11	0.083
Parade	2.90	2.22	0.68	0.367

The only statistically significant difference between unemployed participants and students in this group concerned support for adoption. Students were statistically more likely to support queer couples looking to adopt than unemployed participants, with the difference of over a whole point between the two groups (5.22 versus 3.66, respectively). This was the only statistically significant result between these groups.

Lastly, I compared the unemployed participants in the partisan treatment group to those on parental leave. The results of these comparisons are located in Table 15.

⁵⁴ Includes the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the partisan appeal based on employment, specifically unemployed respondents and students. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

Table 15. Support for LGBTQIA+ Legislation for the Partisan Treatment Group Between Unemployed and Participants on Parental Leave⁵⁵(N=43)

	Unemployed (N=41)	Parental Leave (N=2)	Difference	P-value
Marriage	4.05	1.00	3.05	0.040
Adoption	3.66	1.00	2.66	0.089
Area	2.44	2.00	0.44	0.726
Parade	2.90	3.50	-0.60	0.687

While there seems to be a statistically significant difference concerning support for marriage equality between unemployed people and those on parental leave, the generalizability of these results may be limited. As mentioned previously, only two people on parental leave were assigned to receive the partisan appeal. Therefore, this relationship requires further investigation.

In sum, there is only slight support for Hypothesis 3_b, as the only employed participants assigned to the partisan appeal likely to favor restrictions on LGBTQIA+ communities were those running a business or company. In addition, I only observed this effect for one out of the four variables (marriage equality) that measured support for anti-queer legislation. Students and those on parental leave may not technically count as “employed,” which means that comparing these two groups to unemployed participants is not entirely relevant for proving/disproving Hypothesis 3_b. The results from these groups are still worthy of future study, as there were

⁵⁵ Shows the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among participants assigned to receive the partisan appeal based on employment, specifically unemployed respondents and those on parental leave. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

statistically significant differences between the opinions of unemployed participants versus students and unemployed respondents versus those on parental leave. The variation within the religious treatment group, as well as the nationalist/anti-Western treatment group, should be further explored. While there were statistically significant differences among employees in the treatment groups, it is necessary to conduct additional research regarding the relationship between support for LGBTQIA+ restrictions and religious, nationalist/anti-Western, and partisan sentiments due to the limited representation of certain employment sectors (ex. those on parental leave).

Homophobic Participants versus Non-Homophobic Participants

To further explore the data, I chose to investigate whether homophobic participants responded differently to the appeals compared to non-homophobic participants. For the survey question that asked respondents to rank how uncomfortable they would be with an LGBT person as their neighbor, participants who reported a five or above were coded as “homophobic.” I coded anyone who reported a four or below as “not homophobic.” I then explored the extent to which non-homophobic people supported restrictions on LGBTQIA+ communities, as well as supported the Law and Justice party, within each treatment group and compared these results to non-homophobic people in the control group. I followed this same process for homophobic participants.

Non-Homophobic Participants

The results of the difference of means tests among participants labeled as not homophobic who received the religious appeal can be found in Table 16. Among non-

homophobic respondents who received this treatment, 14.8% reported they would vote for the Law and Justice party compared to 12.8% of non-homophobic respondents in the control group.

Table 16. Support for LGBTQIA+ Legislation and the Law and Justice Party for the Religious Treatment Group Among Non-Homophobic Participants⁵⁶ (N=345)

	Mean	Mean of Control	Difference	P-value
Marriage	4.47	4.40	0.07	0.687
Adoption	3.57	3.51	0.06	0.711
Area	2.12	2.08	0.04	0.761
Parade	2.67	2.85	-0.18	0.205
PiS	0.148	0.128	0.020	0.450

As expected, based on the previous analyses, non-homophobic participants assigned to receive the religious appeal did not report higher support for anti-LGBTQIA+ legislation nor support for the Law and Justice party to a statistically significant degree compared to the control group.

Table 17 compares non-homophobic participants who received the nationalist/anti-Western appeal to the control group. Among non-homophobic participants assigned to the nationalist/anti-Western appeal, 12% reported they would vote for the Law and Justice party.

⁵⁶ Shows the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among non-homophobic participants assigned to receive the religious appeal compared to the control. The table also shows the proportion of non-homophobic participants who support the party in the religious treatment group compared to non-homophobic participants in the control group. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

Table 17. Support for LGBTQIA+ Legislation and the Law and Justice Party for the Nationalist/Anti-Western Treatment Group Among Non-Homophobic Participants⁵⁷ (N=334)

	Mean	Mean of Control	Difference	P-value
Marriage	4.65	4.40	0.25	0.124
Adoption	3.87	3.51	0.36	0.032
Area	2.10	2.08	0.02	0.890
Parade	2.74	2.85	-0.11	0.444
PiS	0.120	0.128	-0.008	0.744

Non-homophobic participants assigned to the nationalist/anti-Western appeal were more in favor of allowing queer people to adopt than non-homophobic people assigned to the control appeal. The average report among non-homophobes who received the treatment was 3.87 versus 3.51 for those assigned to the control (with a p-value of 0.032). However, as this was the only scenario in which non-homophobic participants who received the nationalist/anti-Western appeal reported less support for anti-LGBTQIA+ legislation than the control, it is difficult to determine precisely why this was the case. There was no statistically significant difference in support for the Law and Justice party nor any other measures of restrictions on the queer community.

Table 18 shows the difference of means tests conducted between non-homophobic participants assigned to the partisan appeal versus non-homophobic respondents in the control

⁵⁷ Shows the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among non-homophobic participants assigned to receive the nationalist/anti-Western appeal compared to the control. The table also shows the proportion of non-homophobic participants who support the party in the nationalist/anti-Western treatment group compared to non-homophobic participants in the control group. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

group. Among these participants who received the partisan appeal, 13.3% responded that they would vote for the Law and Justice party.

Table 18. Support for LGBTQIA+ Legislation and the Law and Justice Party for the Partisan Treatment Group Among Non-Homophobic Participants⁵⁸ (N=345)

	Mean	Mean of Control	Difference	P-value
Marriage	4.55	4.40	0.15	0.352
Adoption	3.79	3.51	0.28	0.083
Area	1.90	2.08	-0.18	0.154
Parade	2.49	2.85	-0.36	0.012
PiS	0.133	0.128	0.005	0.845

Non-homophobic respondents in the partisan treatment group were not statistically more likely to vote for the Law and Justice party than the control. In relation to measures of support for LGBTQIA+ restrictions, non-homophobic respondents who received the partisan appeal were statistically less likely to support restrictions on pride parades than the control group (with an average rating of 2.49 versus 2.85, respectfully). This was the only measure of statistical significance between the groups. It is possible that some anti-LGBTQIA+ speeches can potentially encourage non-homophobic people to publicly support queer people (through, for example, supporting pride parades), perhaps in solidarity.

⁵⁸ Shows the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among non-homophobic participants assigned to receive the partisan appeal compared to the control. The table also shows the proportion of non-homophobic participants who support the party in the partisan treatment group compared to non-homophobic participants in the control group. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

Overall, there were few statistically significant differences between non-homophobic people in the treatment groups and the control group concerning support for restrictions on the queer community and support for the Law and Justice party. I observed only two significant differences, the first being among non-homophobic participants in the nationalist/anti-Western treatment group concerning adoption and the second in the partisan treatment group in relation to pride parades. For both of these differences, the participants assigned to their respective treatment groups were less likely to be in favor of anti-LGBTQIA+ legislation compared to the control. There is no clear explanation for these differences, therefore additional research is necessary to understand why evoking nationalist/anti-Western and partisan sentiments may have this effect on opinions regarding adoption and pride parades.

Homophobic Participants

The results of the difference of means tests comparing homophobic participants assigned to the religious appeal to homophobic respondents in the control group are in Table 19. Among homophobic participants in this treatment group, 29.3% reported they would vote for the Law and Justice party compared to 35.7% of respondents in the control group.

Table 19. Support for LGBTQIA+ Legislation and the Law and Justice Party for the Religious Treatment Group Among Homophobic Participants⁵⁹ (N=82)

	Mean	Mean of Control	Difference	P-value
Marriage	3.22	3.04	0.18	0.568
Adoption	2.83	2.94	-0.11	0.730
Area	3.89	4.20	-0.31	0.325
Parade	4.56	4.82	-0.26	0.405
PiS	0.293	0.357	-0.064	0.379

There were no significant differences between homophobes in the religious treatment group and those in the control group concerning support for anti-LGBTQIA+ legislation, as well as support for the Law and Justice party.

Table 20 compares homophobes assigned to the nationalist/anti-Western appeal to the control group of homophobic participants. Among the respondents in this group who received the nationalist/anti-Western appeal, 35.5% reported they would vote for the party in an upcoming election.

⁵⁹ Shows the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among homophobic participants assigned to receive the religious appeal compared to the control. The table also shows the proportion of homophobic participants who support the party in the religious treatment group compared to homophobic participants in the control group. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

Table 20. Support for LGBTQIA+ Legislation and the Law and Justice Party for the Nationalist/Anti-Western Treatment Group Among Homophobic Participants⁶⁰ (N=93)

	Mean	Mean of Control	Difference	P-value
Marriage	3.10	3.04	0.06	0.845
Adoption	2.70	2.94	-0.24	0.440
Area	3.76	4.20	-0.44	0.154
Parade	4.69	4.82	-0.19	0.660
PiS	0.355	0.357	-0.002	0.974

Similar to homophobic respondents who received the religious appeal, there were no statistically significant differences between the nationalist/anti-Western treatment group and the control group in relation to support for the leading party as well as support for restrictions on the queer community.

Lastly, Table 21 depicts the results of the difference of means tests conducted to compare homophobic participants assigned to the partisan appeal and the control group. Among these participants in the partisan treatment group, 30.5% reported they would vote for the Law and Justice party in an upcoming election.

⁶⁰ Shows the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among homophobic participants assigned to receive the nationalist/anti-Western appeal compared to the control. The table also shows the proportion of homophobic participants who support the party in the nationalist/anti-Western treatment group compared to homophobic participants in the control group. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

Table 21. Support for LGBTQIA+ Legislation and the Law and Justice Party for the Partisan Treatment Group Among Homophobic Participants⁶¹ (N=82)

	Mean	Mean of Control	Difference	P-value
Marriage	3.34	3.04	0.30	0.342
Adoption	2.84	2.94	-0.10	0.759
Area	3.51	4.20	-0.69	0.030
Parade	4.74	4.82	-0.08	0.804
PiS	0.305	0.357	-0.052	0.476

Table 21 reveals a notable result for homophobic participants assigned to receive the partisan appeal. These respondents were less likely to support restrictions on where LGBTQIA+ people could live (labeled as the “area” variable) compared to homophobic participants in the control group. The average response for homophobic people in the control group was 4.20, while the average response for homophobic people assigned to the partisan appeal was 3.51, with a p-value of 0.030.

In summary, there were no statistically significant differences in support for the Law and Justice party, as well as anti-LGBTQIA+ legislation, between participants in the treatment groups and the control group. However, there were statistically significant differences among the dependent variables within treatment groups, particularly those assigned to the nationalist/anti-Western appeal and those set to receive the partisan appeal. The data shows support for

⁶¹ Shows the average rating of support for various restrictions on LGBTQIA+ people on a seven-point scale among homophobic participants assigned to receive the partisan appeal compared to the control. The table also shows the proportion of homophobic participants who support the party in the partisan treatment group compared to homophobic participants in the control group. I then compared these ratings to each other to determine statistical significance, with a p-value of less than 0.05 depicting significance.

Hypothesis 1, as the religious appeal did not affect support for anti-queer legislation as well as support for the Law and Justice party, but is inconsistent with Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4.

Concerning the sub-hypotheses, there is evidence of partial support for Hypothesis 2_a, specifically due to statistically significant differences in support for anti-queer legislation between men and women when evoking nationalist/anti-Western sentiments (with men reporting higher levels of support for anti-queer legislation). There is only minimal support for Hypothesis 2_b due to the statistically significant difference in relation to support for restrictions on where LGBTQIA+ people can live between low-income and high-income participants who received the nationalist/anti-Western appeal. Low-income respondents assigned to this treatment group were more in favor of restricting where queer people can live compared to high-income respondents. The data does not support Hypothesis 3_a but does show statistical differences between middle-aged groups (specifically those of the age 30 to 44) compared to younger respondents, as well as older respondents. There is slight support for Hypothesis 3_b, as unemployed participants who received the partisan appeal were more likely to favor of marriage equality than respondents who run a business or company in this treatment group. There were statistically significant differences between support for restrictions on queer people among unemployed individuals and students, as well as between unemployed people and those on parental leave who were assigned to the partisan treatment group. However, additional research is required to confirm these differences, as the number of participants who were on parental leave was marginal.

Descriptive Statistics

Since Panel Ariadna conducts random sampling, the data can be used to illustrate general trends in Poland that are worthy of future study. The data generally reflects the Polish

population, with just over 53% of respondents being women (compared to just over 51% of the citizenry in 2021) (Central Statistical Office of Poland 2021). The age distribution of respondents also closely mirrors that of the Polish people. Furthermore, almost 20% of participants were coded as homophobic, while 17% of the Polish population stated that homosexuality is not normal and must not be tolerated, according to a 2021 poll (Public Opinion Research Center 2021). Only 17% of survey respondents reported they would vote for the Law and Justice party, compared to 30% of Polish voters in 2022.⁶² This may suggest that the results do not accurately represent the political preferences of the general population. However, recent polls also show that support for the party are faltering.⁶³ Therefore, the results of my survey could indicate declining faith in the party.

Table 22 depicts the average responses of participants on a variety of measures.

Appendix B includes a codebook of these variables.

Table 22. Opinions on Political and Social Measures Among Respondents⁶⁴

Variable	Mean
Politics	4.17
Religion	4.15
Left/Right	4.96
National Pride	4.92

⁶² Ciobanu, C. 2022. "Poland in 2022: Can the Opposition Make Inroads into PiS's Popularity?" *Balkan Investigative Reporting Network*. <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/01/10/poland-in-2022-can-the-opposition-make-inroads-into-piss-popularity/>.

⁶³ Szczerbiak, A. 2021. "Law and Justice's grip on Poland is faltering." *Financial Times*. <https://www.ft.com/content/aa3e38c6-ced3-480a-92e7-0ceb6e1848e7>.

⁶⁴ Shows the average response for various measures among survey participants as a whole. Participants responded to these survey questions before receiving an appeal on a scale of one to seven. These questions can be found in Appendix A, and the codebook for these variables are located in Appendix B.

West	4.49
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Respondents reported that religion and politics are of similar importance in their lives. On a scale of one to seven, with one being completely politically left-leaning and seven being completely politically right-leaning, the average response was a 4.96. This demonstrates that Polish people are, as a whole, leaning towards the right. This aligns with current trends in Poland, as voters are consistently supporting right-wing politicians. There is evidence of relatively high levels of national pride, with an average rating of 4.92 on a scale of one to seven. Interestingly, respondents showed slight admiration for the West, as well. This information may be helpful for understanding public attitudes and opinions in Poland in the present-day.

VI. Discussion and Conclusion

One potential confounding factor that may have affected the results of this experiment is the political climate of Eastern Europe at the time of fielding. On the 24th of February 2022, while conducting the survey, the Russian military invaded Ukraine. This led to the United States government sending troops to Poland, creating political and social instability. Furthermore, the Polish government decided to open up its borders to Ukrainian refugees, a decision that sent shock waves to many bystanders who watched the nation reject Belarusian refugees a few months prior.⁶⁵ These events may have complicated the survey results in various ways, especially because the control appeal evoked anti-Russian sentiments. While Poland was not under direct Russian attack during the Ukrainian crisis, the violence may have still affected survey respondents. For example, they could have been hesitant to challenge the status quo

⁶⁵ Francis, E., and Dixon, R. 2021. "Migrants trapped in Poland-Belarus standoff: What to know." *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/11/09/belarus-poland-border-refugee-crisis/>.

(including supporting changes in legislation) due to the chaos caused by the invasion, even hypothetical changes like those present in the survey. Polish leaders seemed to put aside their mistrust of the European Union and the West during the crisis, which may have encouraged the citizenry to do the same. Thus, the series of events could have limited the extent to which these appeals influenced survey participants.⁶⁶ The impact that the Ukrainian invasion had on participants is purely speculation, therefore additional research is required to uncover the full extent of its effect.

In addition, there is reason to believe that the survey pool was not entirely representative of the greater Polish population. As stated previously, Panel Ariadna randomly selects Internet users to participate in their surveys. This may have resulted in excluding residents in rural areas, where high-speed Internet services required to participate in the survey could be limited. Since many LGBT-free zones are concentrated in these rural areas, such as the southeastern region, the survey potentially overrepresented progressive individuals in major urban locations. Due to geographical limitations, as I was not in Poland during fielding, I could not conduct outreach to people in these areas. Further research into politicized homophobia in Poland may want to focus on those regions, including the southeastern region.

Although there were no statistically significant differences between treatment groups and the control group in relation to support for the leading party as well as support for restrictions on the LGBTQIA+ community, there is still valuable insight to be gained from the results of the study. Statistically significant differences between the ways in which men versus women reacted to homophobic appeals that evoke nationalist/anti-Western sentiments should be explored further, as men were statistically more in favor of anti-queer legislation for all four measures

⁶⁶ Kranz, M. 2022. "How the Russia-Ukraine Crisis Is Turning Poland Into a Strategic Player." *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/23/poland-ukraine-russia-crisis-nato-strategic-role-military-diplomacy-war/>.

implemented. Although previous scholars in the field of political science have explored the connections between masculinity and nationalism, the results of this thesis suggest that it may be a subject worthy of further study, particularly in Eastern Europe and in relation to LGBTQIA+ rights (Darakchi 2019; Jacques and Taylor 2008).

Continuing with the effects of nationalist/anti-Western appeals, the variation in support for restricting LGBTQIA+ Polish citizens from living in some areas of the nation among various income groups could be a field of future exploration. It is unclear exactly what may cause high-income Polish citizens to support limiting the movement of queer people, but this could be key in uncovering homophobic rationale among wealthier citizens of the nation. Once we understand this phenomenon better, LGBTQIA+ activist groups can combat such rationale and increase acceptance of queer communities in Poland. In addition, future studies may want to investigate why evoking partisanship appeals in homophobic speeches results in support for restrictions on the private lives of queer people among low-income Polish citizens.

The results of my study also highlight a relationship between age and LGBTQIA+ legislation. Citizens between the ages of 30-44 assigned to receive the partisan appeal were more likely to be against marriage equality and adoption rights for queer couples than the older population of Poland. This suggests that middle-aged citizens favor restricting the lives of queer people in the private sphere, but not necessarily in the public sphere. Middle-aged respondents tended to favor restrictions on the queer community in all three treatment groups. Though this thesis cannot identify precisely why this is the case, future research into politicized homophobia may want to focus on this age group in particular.

Lastly, political scientists focused on Poland should invest in exploring how citizens on parental leave, potentially parents in general, respond to homophobic partisan appeals that

specifically mention the Law and Justice party. It is clear from the data that employed people on parental leave have a significant level of support for the Law and Justice party. The relationship that the party has established with families in particular is important to investigate, as this relationship provides insight into the electoral success of the party.

Despite the inconclusive results of my survey experiment, future research can build upon the methods I adopted to further investigate the causal mechanisms behind politicized homophobia. The variation within treatment groups is particularly notable and studying this variance can aid efforts in crafting a framework for the protection of LGBTQIA+ communities in Poland and across Eastern Europe. It is only through understanding the otherization of queer people in the political realm that we can fully advocate for them, and I believe this thesis will pave the way to do so.

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Appendix A

Which of the following best describes your gender identity?

- 1 Woman
- 2 Man
- 3 Other

Do you identify as heterosexual?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know

Which of the following best describes the highest level of education you have attained?

- 0 Less than elementary
- 1 Primary
- 2 Lower secondary
- 3 Basic vocational
- 4 Secondary general without high school diploma
- 5 Secondary general with high school diploma
- 6 Secondary vocational without high school diploma
- 7 Secondary vocational with high school diploma (technical, vocational or technical high school)
- 8 Post-secondary or post-secondary
- 9 Higher with the title of engineer, bachelor, chartered economist
- 10 Higher with a master's degree, doctor or equivalent
- 11 Higher with a PhD or higher
- 12 Other

Which of the following best describes your current employment status?

- 0 I work full-time (employment contract)
- 1 I work under a contract of mandate/for specific work
- 2 I run a company or business
- 3 I run a farm
- 4 I do not work
- 5 I am in school
- 6 I am on pension/retirement
- 7 I am on maternity/parental leave

What is your age?

- 1 18-29
- 2 30-44

- 3 45-64
- 4 65 or older

What is your relationship status?

- 1 In a relationship
- 2 Not in a relationship
- 3 Other

How much was your household's total net monthly income in 2020?

- 1 Under 2100 zł
- 2 2100 - 3200 zł
- 3 3201 - 4300 zł
- 4 4301 - 5600 zł
- 5 Over 5600 zł
- 6 Other

Please indicate where you would place yourself on a political scale.

1 Left

7 Right

Various acronyms are used to describe the community of non-heterosexual and non-cisgender people in the world. The acronym "LGBT" stands for "Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender." The acronyms used by the community have changed through time and continue to change in order to adapt to the needs of a wide range of identities.

With that said, what groups are described by the acronym, "LGBT"?

- 1 Lesbian and Gay people only
- 2 Transgender people only
- 3 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender people
- 4 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Allies
- 5 Do not know

Please indicate how important the following are in your life, where "1" means "completely unimportant" and "7" means "very important."

Religion 1 _____ 7
 Politics 1 _____ 7

Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement, where "1" means "I completely disagree" and "7" means "I completely agree."

I take pride in the nation of Poland.

1 _____ 7

Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement, where "1" means "I completely disagree" and "7" means "I fully agree".

I admire the values of liberal democracies in the West.

1 _____ 7

Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement, where "1" means "I completely disagree" and "7" means "I completely agree."

I would be uncomfortable with a member of the LGBT community as my neighbor.

1 _____ 7

You will now read a brief excerpt from a Polish politician's speech. The speech was given sometime in the past year. Please read the entire excerpt. Feel free to read the excerpt as many times as you would like. There may be questions about it later.

The following is a brief excerpt of a speech from an established Polish politician. Please read the excerpt in its entirety.

In order to solve our country's political problems, we need to return to our national roots. People who are LGBT are tainting the authentic Polish identity, bringing in their foreign ideas from the West to our nation. Those who support and love Poland will not support or engage with LGBT people.

The following is an excerpt of a speech from an established Polish politician. Please read the excerpt in its entirety.

In order to solve our country's political problems, we need to follow the Church's guidance. Being a member of the LGBT community is violating the wishes of God. People who identify as LGBT do not adhere to the moral standards of the Church and are destroying the traditional model of the family. Those who support the Church will not support or engage with LGBT people.

The following is an excerpt of a speech from an established Polish politician. Please read the excerpt in its entirety.

In order to solve our country's political problems, we need to rely on our elected officials. As a member of the PiS party, I believe that the LGBT community is ruining our country. People who identify with the community are disrupting the social and political order. Those who support the PiS party will not support or engage with LGBT people.

The following is an excerpt of a speech from an established Polish politician. Please read the excerpt in its entirety.

In order to solve our country's political problems, we need to separate ourselves from Russia. Russia is putting the Polish people at risk by threatening the nation and our values. Those who want to make Poland a safe place to live will not support or engage with Russia.

Which of the following is the problem that the politician is trying to solve?

- The country's economic problems
- The country's political problems
- The country's social problems
- The country's environmental problems

From that brief excerpt alone, how convincing did you find the politician's argument on a scale of 1 to 7, where "1" means "very unconvincing" and "7" means "very convincing"?

1 _____ 7

How comfortable would you feel if this politician was elected in the upcoming election on a scale of 1 to 7, where "1" means "very uncomfortable" and "7" means "very comfortable"?

1 _____ 7

How likely would you be to support legislation that would allow LGBT people to get married on a scale of 1 to 7, where "1" means "very unlikely" and "7" means "very likely"?

1 _____ 7

How likely would you be to support legislation that would allow LGBT people to adopt on a scale of 1 to 7, where "1" means "very unlikely" and "7" means "very likely"?

1 _____ 7

How likely would you be to support legislation that would outlaw LGBT people from living in certain areas of Poland on a scale of 1 to 7, where "1" means "very unlikely" and "7" means "very likely"?

1 _____ 7

How likely would you be to support legislation that would outlaw LGBT pride parades or marches on a scale of 1 to 7, with "1" being "very unlikely" and "7" being "very likely"?

1 _____ 7

If the Sejm elections were held next Sunday, which party would you vote for?

1 PiS/Zjednoczona Prawica

2 Koalicja Obywatelska (PO, Nowoczesna, Zieloni)

3 Lewica

4 PSL

5 Polska 2500 (Hołownia)

6 Konfederacja

7 Another party

Appendix B

Code	Meaning
Marriage	Support for marriage equality on a scale of 1-7
Adoption	Support for LGBTQIA+ couples to freely adopt on a scale of 1-7
Area	Support to outlaw LGBTQIA+ people from living in certain areas of the nation on a scale of 1-7
Parade	Support to outlaw pride parades on a scale of 1-7
PiS	Support for the Law and Justice party, indicated through selecting the party from a list of several party options
Politics	Importance of politics in the respondent's life on a scale of 1-7
Religion	Importance of religion in the respondent's life on a scale of 1-7
Left/Right	Political leaning of the respondent, with "1" meaning completely left-leaning and "7" meaning completely right-leaning

National Pride	Level of pride in the Polish nation, with “1” demonstrating a low level of pride and “7” demonstrating a high level of pride.
West	Level of admiration for liberal democracies of the West, with “1” demonstrating a low level of admiration and “7” demonstrating a high level of admiration.