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Tara Djukanovic April 9, 2021

Blurring The Line: How The Ethnicity Of Immigrants Affects Existing Ethnic Relationships In Post-War Serbia

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Abstract

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Political scientists have long studied how social group boundaries evolve in response to immigration influxes. Although there has been a great deal of academic focus on the ways that immigration affects in-group relationships in the United States, there is a lack of attention paid to the ways that this causal mechanism exists in post-war societies. This study evaluates the ways ethnically divergent immigration affects in-group boundaries between Serbian, Bosnian, and Croatian nationals within the Republic of Serbia, looking particularly at the ways in which ethnic relationships develop in a post-war setting in response to Middle Eastern immigration influxes. To examine this, the study introduces a conceptual framework of context-dependent categorization in Serbia, in which exposure to a new, ethnic minority leads to a new citizen perception of national identity. To test this theory, my study utilizes an experimental survey which primes Serbian respondents on the characteristics of Middle Eastern immigrants entering the country with variations in race, religion, and ethnicity to test how different salient migrant characteristics affect perceptions of Bosnians and Croats post-treatment. Additionally, the study seeks to examine how the relationships between Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats have evolved since 2004. The study finds that while attitudes towards both Bosniaks and Croats have become significantly warmer and amicable since 2004, there was no significant change in attitude when respondents were tested with the Middle Eastern survey experiment—indicating a resiliency to migration within inter-ethnic relationships not yet witnessed in other countries.

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PART 1: INTRODUCTION

In the past four decades, immigration has emerged as a controversial political issue across the globe, triggering conversations about the responsibility of receiving migrant countries to accept, welcome, and integrate international migrants into their country. As of 2020, the number of international migrants is estimated to be at 272 million globally—a historical record (McAulifee and Khadria, 2020). As this number begins to increase, the proportion of non-citizens in Western countries is also rising as international migration becomes the dominant element in population change in Europe, the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—exceeding natural increase considerably (Coleman, 2019). As climate disasters and civil conflicts continue to increase in frequency, these statistics show no signs of stabilizing. In fact, projections indicate that populations of post-conflict immigrant origin will comprise between 20-40% of western national population totals by the middle of the 21st century if recent migration trends persist (see Appendix, Figure 1) (Coleman, 2019).

These rapidly occurring influxes have not gone without impact, and the development of a nation after a significant introduction of migrants has become a new and growing field of research. In particular, the academic community is in dispute regarding the effect that cross-ethnic migration can have on the receiving country's host community. On one hand, an introduction of new, racially divergent immigration has the ability to push a nation-state to become more multicultural in its identity, lowering the salience of religion within the nation's politics (Ager and Brückner 2013, Ottaviano and Peri 2006). In a racially homogenous society, the entrance into the national identity is primarily dependent on other differences already ingrained in the nation's demographics—like region or religion. On the other hand, immigration from an ethnic minority can trigger native backlash and anti-immigrant sentiment, contributing

to far-right parties' rise (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004; Newman 2012; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Abrajano and Hajnal 2017). However, within both of these contexts and theories, there seem to be fewer studies that examine how a novel wave of racially diverse migration can impact existing cross-ethnic coalitions among a racial group within a host country (Fouka 2020, Hopkin 2010, Perez 2015). Even further, there is virtually no research on how this mechanism exists in post-war societies.

This study turns to Serbia to understand how migration can affect inter-ethnic relationships in post-war host communities. After nearly 20 years of tentative peace, Serbia's population today comprises Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Albanians, and other Eastern European ethnicities throughout the country. In an intermediate stage of development, Serbia is not often considered a destination country. However, as migration influxes worldwide continue to rise, it is expected that the Balkans—will experience unprecedented levels of immigration (Fratzke, 2020). This can already be observed in Serbia, where 5,000 immigrants from Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan found themselves essentially trapped in Serbia after Hungary closed its border—barring any refugees from seeking entry into the E.U. (Galijas, 2019). These migrants have been living in Serbia for nearly five years. There are no signs that they will have the access or resources to continue their journey to the E.U. anytime soon, effectively making Serbia their final destination. This is not a unique nor new circumstance, especially when considering that out of the 3.2 million migrants that are forcibly displaced, most are received by low to middle-income countries (Fratzke, 2020). Turkey, Lebanon, and Colombia—all countries that have or are currently experiencing a recent, violent conflict— have all become host to thousands of refugees and displaced persons (World Bank, 2018). While Serbia is not a desolate or particularly under-developed country, its post-war status and struggling economy do not make it

a destination country, making this new wave of migration particularly novel. Knowing that the frequency of post-war countries becoming destinations to new migrants will rise elevates the importance of research on the effects of these transitions on both migrants and host citizens.

In this thesis, I develop a model of the formation and change of ethnic identity, which considers how new migration influences existing in-group and out-group perceptions of membership in the Serbian context. I focus specifically on feelings of amicability and affective distance, asking: how the introduction of a new, ethnically different migrant out-group affects Serbian perceptions of amicability and social distance towards Bosniaks and Croats? In this study, I use the term 'affective distance' as a summary term for an individual's feelings towards members of different groups. Similar to the term 'social status', 'affective distance' captures a group's perceived quality or value (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Speaking to the term 'ethnically different migrants,' I use this phrase in reference to in-group and inter-group power relations within the Serbian state. Based on the relational and historical conception of ethnic identity (Barth 1969, Jenkins 1997), this study defines the dominant, white, Balkan, and Christian community as the reference group against which ethnic minorities in Serbia are categorized. Any migrant or individual who does not conform to the dominant in-group characteristics is thus categorized as an 'ethnically different migrant.'

I predict that with the influx of an ethnically and racially divergent Middle Eastern Migrant out-group, race, citizenship, and ethnicity will become salient factors in determining in-group membership—in addition to the existing factors of religion and nationality. As in-group membership characteristics expand beyond just religion and nationality, I also suspect that the salience of these two factors will be relatively lower compared to pre-migration conditions. I theorize that this causes Serbian respondents to view Bosniaks and Croats in an increasingly

amicable light and causes the affective distance between Serbs and Bosniaks, as well as Serbs and Croats, to shrink. To test this prediction, I use an experimental survey design that measures Serbian attitudes towards Bosniaks and Croats after exposing respondents to treatments that prime readers on the migration presence, race, and religion of the Middle Eastern migrant group.

The results reveal a non-significant effect between control and treatment groups exposed to the Middle Eastern Migration prime—indicating a level of inter-ethnic resiliency between Serbs and Bosniaks as well as Serbs and Croats that is not otherwise witnessed in non-post-war countries. The statistical analysis also revealed that levels of amicability and closeness towards Bosniaks and Croats from the Serbian perspective have gotten significantly larger since 2004, signaling a positive change in attitudes in the post-war era.

This study contributes to three strands of literature. First, the fluid nature of national identities and group boundaries in multiethnic societies has been extensively studied and continues to be a significant source of interest as multicultural countries become more common in a global context. This study adds to this literature by focusing on how national identities are constructed in the face of post-war reconciliations and divergent ethnic migrants—- two areas of social science that are extremely understudied. Second, this study contributes to the literature on racial and ethnic politics in the Balkan context. A majority of works in this literature focus on cross-country relations, focusing mainly on how governments have decided to respond to each other post-conflict. Less attention has been paid to intra-country relationships, specifically in reference to how individuals who do not identify with the national identity (such as Bosnian-Serbs) develop relationships with the dominant national in-group. Third, this study contributes to the literature examining post-conflict nation-building, giving insight into the ways that migrant integration is received in post-conflict societies.

PART 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

SECTION A: THE STUDY OF ETHNIC BOUNDARIES AND NATIONAL IN-GROUPS

The crux of this study combines existing literature in political science and psychology, analyzing how individual psycho-social mechanisms influence inter-group conflict. As a field, the study of how an out-group becomes part of the dominant in-group has historically focused on the ways that large European groups, such as the Italians, Slavs, and Irish, "became white" in the U.S. context (Ignatiev, 2006). In his work "Whiteness of a Different Color," Matthew Frye Jacobson explores the history of whiteness in America, tracking ethnographies and historical changes that shaped whiteness into the dominant identity seen today. In the 1900s, the United States saw a massive influx of Eastern European move into the nation at proportions comparable to those Serbia is experiencing right now. At the time, this influx was not welcomed by existing migrants and citizens. Senators and Representatives even went so far as to say that "according to the spirit of our meaning when we speak of 'white man's government', the Italians are as black as the blackest of negros" (Barrett and Roediger, 9). In terms of belonging, these new European migrants were not included in the definition of 'white' and therefore pushed to the edges of the American identity. How, then, did these outsider Europeans construct themselves into the definition of whiteness we witness today? The answer lies in the visible separation from the non-white culture in America. Author Brando Starkley describes the non-western European's struggle as a choice: "fight for inclusion into the white race or align with people of color, who they knew fared even worse than them" (Starkley, 2017). In short, by conforming and defending white supremacy, 'other' European groups could assimilate into the definition of whiteness that northern and western Europeans had gate kept for decades.

By uniting against a common out-group, these new immigrants were able to join the 'in-

group' and thus altered the definition of the American identity from 'western and white' to just 'white.' Detailing moments of discrimination, oppression, and alienation against Black Americans, Jacobson outlines how entrance into the in-group is marked by opposition to a common enemy (Jacobson, 1998). He makes it clear that not only has the in-group of the United States definitively included white citizens into their definition of 'American' but that they have also definitively relegated Black Americans to the 'out-group'—denying them any chance of movement into the in-group despite legislative and constitutional changes. This model of broader national inclusion and expanding ethnic boundaries as a response to comparatively diverse migration is what the study seeks to test in Serbia—a country experiencing a similar wave of new migration.

In addition to intergroup conflict, this study also touches on how immigration of one ethnic group can shift the out-group positioning of other ethnic groups within the broader U.S. social order. While there is little research on this specific conflict, Daniel Hopkins from Georgetown University provides insightful information on how immigration's salience can affect the local perception of already established out-groups. Using panel data over the September 11 terrorist attacks measuring local opposition to various immigrant groups, Hopkins finds that while hostile media rhetoric regarding immigrants post-9/11 was primarily targeted at Muslims and Middle Eastern migrants, all migrant groups experienced backlash from local communities whether they were religious or not. This shows us the capability of one immigrant group's perception to affect all other ethnic groups.

In 2020, Vasiliki Fouka et al. tackled this same issue in a new light in the essay "Changing In-Group Boundaries: The Effect of Immigration on Race Relations in the U.S.." This essay examines the ways that Mexican immigration altered White Americans' relations with

Black Americans. Using data from 1970-2010 on immigration flows, hate crimes, and national surveys, Fouka et al.'s study uses a difference in differences designs to "compare changes in racial attitudes across states experiencing differential changes in the fraction of Mexican immigrants over time, holding constant time-invariant state characteristics and accounting for time-varying unobservable common to all states within the same census region" (Fouka, 2020, pg. 10). Their results showed a significant increase in warmness between White and Black Americans due to an influx in Mexican immigration. Fouka writes that "Mexican immigration improves whites' attitudes towards blacks, increases support for pro-black government policies and lower anti-black hate crimes, while simultaneously increasing prejudice against Hispanics" (Fouka, 2020). This support largely came from the understanding that Black and White Americans were united against a 'common enemy.' Both groups perceived Mexicans as creating economically worse conditions for their own groups, and similarly to the above-mentioned Irish and Italian immigrants, Black Americans were able to identify themselves with the in-group by distancing themselves from "a larger racial enemy" (Fouka, 2020). It should be noted that Fouka et al. attributed this effect to the ways that Mexican migrants are divergent from the American in-group in both citizenship status AND race, as opposed to white migrants that are only divergent in immigration status. The stereotype and commonly held belief that Mexican migrants are 'illegal' and thus a burden on the economy placed them as affectively more distant to white Americans, a condition that did not happen with previous waves of migration.

This exact mechanism of immigration influxes triggering recategorization of an ethnic minority closer to the in-group has also been documented outside of the U.S. context. In 2013, Jens Hainmueller and Dominik Hangaertner analyzed 2,400 naturalization referendums between 1970 and 2004 within communities in Switzerland. During this time, each municipality held

closed ballot referendums with detailed information of an immigrant applicant to decide if the applicant is granted a naturalization request—allowing the researchers to analyze how specific characteristics affected naturalization referendums over time (Hainmueller and Hangaertner, 2013). Their results showed that immigrants from Southern European countries, such as Italy, experienced low naturalization approval levels between 1970 and 1990. However, with the onset of new Yugoslavian and Turkish immigration in the late 90s to the early 2000s, the naturalization rate of Southern European migrants significantly increased as Slavic, and Turkish migrants were denied naturalization 13-15% higher than applicants from other European countries (Hainmueller and Hangaertner, 2013). Yugoslavian migrants are perceived as both culturally, religiously, and ethnically divergent more distant from Southern European groups from the perspective of Swiss citizens voting in the referendum, signaling that entrance of an ethnically divergent Slavic out-group allowed for Italian migrants to be recategorized closer to the Swiss in-group, thereby shrinking the affective distance that had existed without significant change for nearly 20 years (Hainmueller and Hangaertner, 2013).

Fouka et al.'s and Hainmuller et al.'s studies create the foundation for this paper's research. While it should be noted that this paper's theory is drawn from Fouka et al. and Hainmueller et al.'s work, it departs in its use of an experimental survey and its focus on post-war communities. I build upon Fouka et al.'s existing research by testing their model of Racial Self-Categorization theory on issues of ethnicity, asking if the impact of racially different migrant out-group will have a similar effect of warmness on racially homogenous and religiously diverse communities.

SECTION B: THE SERBIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION

While this study is primarily focused on studying what triggers the re-definition of in-group boundaries in post-war communities, it is crucial first to understand why Serbia acts as a good model to answer this question as a country that is currently experiencing its first novel wave of ethnically distinct migration in modern times directly after experiencing decades of violent conflict. While there has been a consistent Slavic population residing in Serbian territory since the 6th century, the modern Serbian National Identity is rooted in the Byzantine empire (1018-1185), in which ethnically Slavic people converted to Orthodox Christianity from paganism as a way to establish allegiance with the kingdom at the time (Jovic, 2003). However, in 1190, a uniquely Serbian kingdom established independence as the strength of the Byzantine Empire collapsed, creating the first documented Serbian nation-state (Allock, 2000). Soon after, the Serbian Orthodox Church, an institution that sought to distinguish itself from its Byzantine conquerors, declared itself as an autonomous and self-headed church, further entrenching Orthodox Christianity with the Serbian identity (A'goston and Masters, 2010). This period of autonomy marked one of the largest cultural expansions of Serbia as Serbian monasteries, monuments, and cultural sites were produced in celebration of the newfound strength of the Serbian country (Cirkovic, 1964).

After 200 years of independence, Ottoman forces occupied the Serbian territory in 1389, sweeping the country under a 500-year-long rule that marked the extended suffering, assimilation, and fracturing of the Serbian people. During this time, Orthodox Christian Serbs were heavily punished for their religion as the Ottoman state forced taxes on Serb-aligned persons, forced young Serb boys to fight in the Ottoman military as janissaries, and burned down Orthodox churches across the country (Allock, 2000). While this level of punishment reinforced

some Serbs' dedication to the Orthodox Christian Faith, the Raska regions of Serbia were forced to convert to Islam for survival and subsequently became privileged groups that were given opportunities to develop townships and participate in trade and lower-level government. As a result, there was a substantial level of resentment held against those who had converted to Islam on behalf of Christian Serbs, with many individuals harboring feelings that Muslim Serbs had betrayed the nation in favor of the Ottoman Empire (Cirkovic, 1964). In 1831, after years of civil strife and rebellion, Serbia gained independence from the Ottoman Empire and achieved full, internationally recognized statehood in 1878 (Ramet, 1992). During this period, the former territory of southwest Serbia that was mostly populated with Slavic Muslims, then called "Bosnia and Herzegovina," was not granted independence but was instead ceded to Austria-Hungary in the Treaty of Berlin (Allock, 2000). This split marked one of the first and most significant increases in affective distance between Serbs and Bosniaks, as the Bosnian territory under the rule of Austria-Hungary became more deeply associated with a Muslim identity and a unique Bosnian nationhood while Serbia became increasingly associated with Orthodox Christianity.

With religion as one of the only fully intact cultural traditions remaining before the Ottoman occupation, Christian Orthodoxy served as the basis of the Serbian National Identity post-independence, acting as a point of pride and historical continuance for the Serbian people (Mappes-Niediek, 2005). In the one-hundred-year period immediately following this new independence, the Serbian state became deeply dedicated to reclaiming their previously colonized territories of Raska, Kosovo, Metohija, and Vardarian Macedonia, engaging in battles with both the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire during this time. In the early 20th century, this effort culminated in an initiative to liberate Bosnia and Herzegovina from Austria-Hungary, leading to the assassination of Archduke of Franz Ferdinand by a Bosnian

liberation group named "Young Bosnia" (Jovic, 2003). This, in turn, led to Austria-Hungary declaring war on Serbia, which ultimately resulted in the beginning of World War I in 1915 (of which Serbia fought for the Allied Forces). Serbia suffered particularly large losses during this conflict, with over 58% of the army and 57% of the total male population perishing in the war (Radivojevic, 2014). It should be noted that during this time, Croatia, a part of the Austria-Hungary empire at the time, was forced to fight on behalf of the Central Powers, leading to a substantial level of resentment between Serb and Croat individuals.

As the First World War approached its official end in 1919 and small Balkan states began recovering from the devastating losses to their populations and territories, the idea of a pan-Slavic state was born. Between citizens of South Balkan nations (Serbs, Montenegrins, Croats, Bosniaks, Slovenians), people not only shared virtually indistinguishable languages but also shared very similar foods, music, and overall culture—as well as a general fear of national destruction and re-colonization. In 1920 the newly established "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovene's was internationally recognized during the Paris Peace Conference and was subsequently renamed "Yugoslavia" in 1921 with the introduction of the nation's first constitution (Boban, 1993). Yugoslavia remained in relative peace for thirty years as the four major states within the nation—Serbia (including the region of Bosnia), Croatia, Slovenia, and Montenegro—shared commerce, wealth, and national defense.

In 1940, the rise of Axis powers and Hitler's reign marked an era of destabilization within Yugoslavia as Serbia-Croatia relations became increasingly tense and calls for ethnic federal subdivisions rose. In 1941, the Axis Powers invaded Yugoslavia as part of Operation 25 during World War II and subsequently divided the country into German, Italian, and Hungarian borders. (Ramet, 2002) Additionally, Croatia was individually recognized by the

Axis as the Independent State of Croatia (NDH)—a puppet state of Nazi Germany that had roots in unpopular far-right ultra-nationalist parties in the former Yugoslavia (Radivojevic, 2014). The NDH particularly targeted Serbs during a large-scale genocide campaign that included 22 concentration camps within the territory of Croatia, leading to the mass murder of over a third of the Serbian state's pre-war population (Boban, 1993).

It was not until 1945, under Josip Broz Tito's leadership, that Yugoslavian territory was freed from Germany's occupation and their domestic collaborators. As the new leader of Yugoslavia, Tito established Yugoslavia as a socialist state, renaming it the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Woodward, 1995) This period was marked by diplomatic measures between the Soviet Union and Western forces, de-centralization, and an intense crackdown on any expressions of national and ethnic pride (Jovic, 2003). Fearing a resurgence of nationalist movements, Tito's Yugoslavia preached that the Balkan people's common Slavic identity was more important than anything—including religious practices or anger about attempted genocides and other atrocities that occurred during WWII (Jovic, 2003). In many ways, Tito's era marked one of the most prosperous periods for the Balkans, but also represented one of repression for Serbs. While Serbs celebrated the newfound stability and peace found under Tito's era, they were also asked to effectively erase mentions of the ethnic cleansing that occurred in World War II from public discourse. Justice following the massacres that occurred at the hands of the Ustasa movement was largely ignored, and Serbs saw their grief over a massive part of their population ignored for the sake of inter-Balkan peace. While this intense focus on brotherhood and unity above all else resulted in substantial economic prosperity and peace during his rule, Tito's approach proved to be only effective under his command. Upon Tito's death in the 1980s, ultra-nationalist rhetoric and extreme levels of resentment rose in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and

Bosnia. The subsequent presidency of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia marked the ultimate destabilization of Yugoslavia and the rise of ultra-nationalist and violent rhetoric (Ramet, 1992).

Under Milosevic's rule, the Serbian army began a strategic ethnic cleansing against Bosnians that triggered the beginning of the Yugoslav Wars, marking one of the bloodiest and most studied conflicts of recent history. While there were nearly 100,000 people killed during these wars, over 2.2 million people were also displaced (King, 2010). Most notably for this study, Serbia had the largest refugee population in Europe at the time, and over 7% of the population between 1990 and 1995 was comprised of refugees and internally displaced persons—a factor that may explain the uniquely warm-natured responses that Serbs have had towards new refugees only 20 years later (King, 2010). Serbia's nation remained tense as the territorial conflict in Kosovo and general anti-Western sentiment has left the country in a bitter and economically devastated state, and maintained high levels of Serbian refugees and displaced persons throughout the early 2000s (King, 2010). Today, while peace has been held for more than 20 years, the Serbian national identity continues to struggle to be defined. With dark and long histories of religious and territorial violence, the country's people seem to associate their country's identity strongly with Christian Orthodox religions, Slavic roots, and Serbian citizenship—lending itself to a national boundary and in-group that is extremely hard to join.

SECTION C: SERBIAN RESPONSES TO MIGRATION SINCE 2015

SUBSECTION I: ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRANTS

While the onset of Middle Eastern Migration in Serbia is a relatively recent phenomenon, a significant amount of literature on the topic has emerged, analyzing the effects of this event in recent years. Armina Galijas from the University of Graz was one of the first authors to begin

studying the impact of migration in Serbia in 2015. Using media analysis, ethnographies, and interviews, Galijas witnessed a humanitarian approach to migration that was enforced by autocratic means in earlier years (Galijas 2016). Refugees in the state have been allowed to stay in reception centers for unlimited periods of time, legally labeled as 'migrants in transit' (Galijas 2016). While racism and violence against migrants have been documented, it is at one of the lowest rates of all receiving Middle Eastern migrant countries, signaling a uniquely human rights-based approach to what Serbia has called an international crisis. Galijas theorizes that this empathetic approach is not without its limits, noting that the Serbian state's wording about the migrants emphasizes the temporary and short-term nature of migration, signifying that as migrants continue to stay in the state, warm-natured responses may wane (Galijas, 2016). Current data supports this prediction as Serbia only granted refugee status to 14 individuals and subsidiary protection to only 15 migrants in 2019 in hopes that the E.U. will instead take on the burden of long-term care (Human Rights Watch, 2019). The warm-natured attitudes towards migrants that this evidence notes is somewhat surprising given the long, documented history of refugees being met with significant resistance and backlash in the Balkans (Kalpouzos, 2020; Majcher, 2020; Weber, 2016). However, as Galijas notes, the warm-natured responses that categorized Serbian attitudes towards migrants in 2015 may have been due to the idea that the migration was temporary—especially considering that the Middle Eastern migrants themselves were vocal about their desire to move on from Serbian territory (Galijas, 2016). On the other hand, the warm-natured responses to migrants may also be fueled by many Serbian's own experiences with being refugees and displaced persons. With many citizens having experienced displacement themselves due to a violent conflict, the Serbian understanding of migrants may be more sympathetic than a country that has not been host to a recent conflict.

Jelislaveta Petrovic and Jelena Pesic from the University of Belgrade confirm this theory by conducting a survey on 1000 Serbian citizens on their attitudes towards migrants in 2016. Their findings demonstrate an initial humanitarian and warm response to tolerating migrants, with most Serbian respondents relating to their own migration experiences from the 1990-2000 conflict era as a source of empathy (Petrovic and Pesic, 2017). Nevertheless, even with this level of overwhelming tolerance, when Serbian respondents were asked about their willingness to integrate the Middle Eastern migrants into their neighborhoods, there was significant resistance, with a majority of respondents expressing security fears regarding possible terrorist attacks and a viewpoint that the Middle Eastern migrants would be unable to merge with the culture. When asked about what factors drive these views the most, many Serbian respondents pointed to the regional differences between the Middle East and the Balkans, accentuating race, language, and religion as crucial distinctions that they believe would prevent the migrants from having a successful integration into their state (Petrovic and Pesic, 2017). This study essentially confirms the basis of my theory, which predicts that with the entrance of a racially and regionally divergent migrant group, the salience of race and nationality will become important in the Serbian national context, thereby diminishing the salience of religion. While religion was undoubtedly mentioned as a critical difference that Serbians identified in the migrant population, their concerns and reasons for relegating them as an out-group were primarily focused on the regional violence and racial/cultural differences present between the two groups. This is especially important when understanding that Serbians do not associate Bosniak Muslims with terrorist organizations and fear in public opinion surveys, indicating that this fear and stereotyping is created on the basis of nationality more than it is on religion (Galijas, 2016).

This sense of fear and stereotyping has continued since the study's completion in 2017

and has been subsequently heightened since the onset of COVID-19. Danica Santic and Marija Antic from the University of Belgrade studied migration management, public opinion, and immigration responses between April 2020 to September 2020. Among their findings, they saw a huge return of Serbian citizens who had previously emigrated from the country, with more than 300,000 residents returning within a 3-month period (Santic and Antic, 2020). As a result, urban areas that experienced the most amount of returnees also experienced the most overburdened health systems, which the researchers found influenced public opinion to be against immigration as a whole: regardless of the citizenship of the migrant (Santic and Antic, 2020). Surprisingly, the researchers found that long-term residents who had stayed in the region before the COVID-19 outbreak, like Bosniaks and Croats, were more favorably viewed when compared to the Serbian returnees—a temporary yet significant finding (Santic and Antic, 2020). This rise in anti-immigration sentiment resulted in an extreme crackdown on the movement of Middle Eastern migrants in Serbia and a new rise in xenophobic tensions that had been previously muted in public opinion. The study found that following the national lockdown in response to the pandemic in March, right-wing extremist sentiment rose, with campaigns against refugees and migrants reaching mainstream news. This media attention was primarily focused on a few prevalent stereotypes of the Middle Eastern migrants, including claims that the migrants were infectious, committing violent crimes in the country, and that they had overstayed their welcome, resulting in an increased security and army presence in the migrant camps themselves (Santic and Antic, 2020). Nonetheless, Serbia continues to maintain some of the strongest and most sympathetic migrant protections and policies towards Middle East Migrants among all Eastern European countries, and rivals Germany in its advocacy for migrant acceptance and aid (Antic, 2000). This is both a remarkable and expected reaction, indicating that while there is significant

anxiety about the impact of migration on Serbia's already fragile economy there is also a significant level of empathy for a refugee's experience among most Serbian citizens, creating an internal political conflict in which Serb's have found themselves both calling for better treatment for migrants while also pushing them to continue their journey into the EU.

SUBSECTION II: ATTITUDES TOWARDS BOSNIAKS

While it is difficult to obtain any causal mechanism on the ways that new migration has impacted the ways that Serbs see Bosniaks in the Republic of Serbia without longitudinal public opinion data, Tijana Karic, Vladimir Mihic, and Jose Jimenez from the University of Novi Sad studied stereotypes in Serbs about Croats and Bosniaks from 2015 to 2017. The researchers in this study used a sample of 300 participants of Serbian ethnicity, using a survey instrument that included social distance scales, national identity scales, and a socio-demographic questionnaire. This survey was administered once every year among the same participants, allowing them to track how feelings and stereotypes changed from year to year. Their findings first revealed that ideology and religion categories are most used when describing Bosniaks every year; however, there was an increase in race and region categories used in 2017 (Karic et al., 2018). This finding is perhaps one of the most significant for the study. While this cannot be directly tied to the onset of racially divergent migration, the importance and ascription of commonalities between Serbs and Bosniaks (both are white and Balkan) indicate that these two groups' affective distance has become smaller. This affirms that as the integration of racially divergent migrants has grown over time, so too has the importance of a common Balkan identity, broadening the national identity boundaries and allowing Bosniaks to become more closely positioned to the Serbian in-group.

The researchers' second finding was that out of all tested ethnic group (Middle Eastern migrants were omitted), Serbian attitudes towards Bosniaks were both overall positive and the most favorable results in the study—-a result that the researchers themselves identify as deviant from previous public opinion work (Petrović, 2003; Turjačanin, 2004). This reaction is in line with the literature observing reactions to migration in the United States and Switzerland, as this warming of relations between Serbs and Bosniaks is a condition that is both novel and indicative of a broader opening of the in-group. While the authors do not explain why this positive effect may have occurred, nor do they engage with the influx of migration in their study, this data was collected during the same time that Middle Eastern migration was at its highest rate—indicating that racially divergent immigrant influxes may be a factor for the positive characteristic attribution given to Bosniaks in this survey. This, however, is unconfirmed and must be studied further before any ascriptions can be made.

A public opinion poll conducted by the Office of the U.N. Resident Coordinator, assessing levels of national identity and ethnic perceptions, further confirmed the results recorded in Karic et al. Their survey, conducted in March of 2016, saw a rise in reported interethnic friendships and friendships between Serbs and Bosniaks in the Republic of Serbia, as well as a higher amount of respondents reporting hope that ethnic reconciliation between Serbs and Bosniaks is possible compared to responses that were recorded in 2010 (UNRCO, 2016). Again, these results may not be related to the migrant onset; however, they signify a level of ethnic reconciliation between two post-conflict ethnic groups that have not been previously recorded at this level before.

SUBSECTION III: ATTITUDES TOWARDS CROATS

Vedran Dzihic from the Johns Hopkins University also studies the Middle Eastern migration event in Serbia, paying close attention to the importance of national and border politics in the Balkan region during a dispute between Croatia and Serbia over refugees between 2015 and 2016 (Dzihic, 2017). During a 6-month conflict in which Croatia closed its borders and expelled 2,000 Middle Eastern migrants into Serbia, Dzihic noted a significant increase in anti-Croatian sentiment. During this time, Serbian news media expressed a great deal of resentment towards the Croatian state, often describing the country as "racist, unsympathetic, and cruel" (Dzihic, 2017). In particular, Dzihic noted that during this time, Serbian media often brought up the Ustasa movement and the ethnic cleansing that occurred during World War II. Dzihic argues that the recent refugee crisis has "re-opened and re-fueled old identity conflict lines, thus contributing to an increase in nationalist rhetoric and behavior…contributing to the reaffirmation of borders and the strengthening of exclusive nation-state concepts in the Balkans (Dzihic, 2017). This is particularly important for developing the ethnonational self-categorization theory in Serbia, indicating that while the entrance of a new, distinctly different out-group may create warmer Serbian-Croatian relationships, the current border politics and actions may outweigh any potential changes in in-group boundaries that can result in migration.

It is important to refer back to the separate relationships that Serbians have with Bosnians and Croatians when examining the potential effects of migration on public perception. Whereas Serbian conflict with Bosnians is based much more concretely on differences in religion from the Serbian perspective, the Serbian conflict with Croatians is both muddled by differences in religion AND resentment against past attempts at ethnic cleansing. Dzihic's paper indicates that while migration can push the national identity to be broader in terms of religion, it may not be

able to overcome generational resentment towards political violence and conflict, suggesting a limit to the broadening in-group effect that Fouka et al. theorized in the American context.

SECTION D: RACE, MIGRATION, AND RELIGION IN THE SERBIAN CONTEXT

When speaking about the creation of national boundaries and in-groups, it is essential to note that politics of nationality, ethnicity, race, migration, and religion are unique to every country and culture. In this section, I will briefly describe the current politics of each of these factors in the Serbian state.

- Nationality
    - As demonstrated in the previous sections of this literature review, Serbian nationality is uniquely defined by the conflicts and wars that have resulted in a state that is defensive of both its independence and religion. This history and allegiance to the Serbian state above all else defines the Serbian country and is perhaps the most prominent indicator for Serbian in-group belonging. Currently, 84% of Serbia's population identifies with Serbian nationality (Serbian Census, 2020).
- Ethnicity
    - Serbia is heavily identified as a South Slavic state—a signifier defined by the cultural and political ideals created after hundreds of years of imperialism in the Balkans (Norbu, 1999). As demonstrated above, while Yugoslavia—a pan-Slavic attempt at nation-building—failed, that does not negate the strong presence of a South Slavic ethnic unity. It is difficult to deny the common culture, language, and history shared between South Slavic groups— despite the glaring differences in allegiance, religion, and nationality that have presented themselves in the past 200 hundred years as well.

- In this study, it is important to note that ethnicity is used to identify the regional and Slavic identity of Serbian people and is not to be conflated with nationality, which points to the country-specific identity of the focus group.

- Race
  - As an exceptionally racially homogenous country, the discourse surrounding race in Serbia is minimal. In fact, no census or United Nations-led survey has even taken the initiative to ask Serbian respondents their racial identity in documented reports. That being said, the whiteness of the Serbian nation is an important factor that must be documented. While an overwhelming percent of the population (>95%) is white, a racial minority does exist among the Roma people. At 2.1% of the population, the Romani are a small but significant minority in the Serbian context—appearing both darker and culturally divergent from the Serbian in-group (UNICEF, 2020). While the Romani are believed to be of South-Asian descent among Serb respondents, Serbs and other Balkan individuals do not have a word to describe their race. The Romani population experiences a great deal of discrimination within Serbia, often being segregated and denied equal access to jobs, education, and social opportunities (UNDP, 2016).
  - Race in Serbia and the greater Balkans continues to be a limited yet developing conversation among white citizens. As racial diversity and immigration rise in the coming years, we can expect to see the vocabulary and definition regarding whiteness and non-whiteness expand in this context.
- Migration

- Citizenship in Serbia is primarily based on the tradition of Jus Sanguinis—a Latin nationality principle that dictates citizenship is obtained by the nationality or ethnicity of at least one parent ("Law On Citizenship Of The Republic Of Serbia," 2018). By law, there are three main ways that one can obtain Serbian citizenship:
    1. Citizenship by descent: One must prove that at least one parent had Serbian citizenship at the time of one's birth
    2. Citizenship by birth
    3. Citizenship by naturalization: One must have at least three years of uninterrupted permanent residence in Serbia to apply for citizenship.

  While obtaining citizenship through naturalization is indeed an option for those seeking it in Serbia, it should be noted that Serbia's rates of naturalized citizens are meager and insignificant (UNICEF, 2020). It is unclear if this is mainly due to the fact that few non-Serb individuals seek to live in Serbia as a final destination, or if it is because of the Serbian government's reluctance to grant citizenship to those who may not fit the ethnic profile of what a Serb is stereotyped as. However, regardless of the cause, this points to a country tradition of citizenship being almost exclusively granted to those who were 1) living in Serbian territory during the dissolution of Yugoslavia or 2) those who have documented Serbian heritage. Thus, having Serbian citizenship typically signals dedication and acceptance to the Serbian state—making it a robust social categorizer for in-group belonging.

- Religion
    - As demonstrated through the history of Serbian national identity above, religion is highly central to the perception of what it means to be a Serb. While Serbia's

government does not have a state religion, the practice of Serbian Christian Orthodoxy is widely practiced among more than 80% of the Serbian population (UNICEF, 2020). Additionally, while religious discrimination is forbidden in Serbia's constitution, the government does split registered religions into a two-tiered system between "traditional" and "nontraditional" religions in which traditional religions receive tax refunds, can have their faith taught in public schools, and have available chaplain services in the military (United States Department of State, 2017). These 'traditional' religions include the Serbian Orthodox Church, Roman Catholic Church, Slovak Evangelical Church, the Islamic community, and the Jewish community.

- Religion continues to be a complex and contentious issue in Serbia today. While religious freedom is encouraged legally, Serbian Orthodoxy is seen as a central source of pride and defiance for the Serbian people. While other religions are allowed to practice in the Serbian context, these are not seen as 'Serbian' religions and are often used to categorize one as an out-group.

PART 3: THEORETICAL ARGUMENT

The study of prejudice and discrimination within a nation has been an objective explored by hundreds of researchers. Specifically, after the horrific tragedies of the second world war, social scientists and psychologists focused on developing a theory that could shed light on the seemingly inexplicable ways humans choose to differentiate and discriminate against one another. While many psycho-social frameworks were proposed following this influx in research, this study is particularly interested in two particular theories developed by psychologists John Turner and Henri Tajfel: the Social-Identity Theory and the Self-Categorization Theory.

The first theory I consider is heavily related to intergroup processing and how one understands their personal identity within the context of a larger group, such as a nation. Tajfel and Turner theorize that a large part of an individual's self-understanding "derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups)" (Tajfel, 1981). Thus, the researchers expect that humans will attempt to assimilate themselves into various groups to feel both protection and higher self-esteem in their personal lives—this is both a personal and social necessity to gain power and security in a community. If one is not part of a positive group, one will not be given a job, security, or even a guarantee of human rights. However, when one is born and belongs to a 'negative group,' that individual has few options to regain status into the positive 'in-group.' Social Psychologist Matthew Hornsey argues that an individual with negative group membership can either "leave the group entirely, make downward intergroup comparisons that are more flattering to the in-group, focus on dimensions that make the in-group look relative good, devalue dimensions that reflect poorly on the in-group, or engage in social change to overturn the existing hierarchy" (Hornsey, 2008).

Self-Categorization Theory, in contrast to Social Identity Theory, answers how people

choose which of their identities they will use for categorization. Oakes and Turner argue that categorization is structured in a way that "maximizes perceived inter-category differences and minimizes intra-category differences," therefore both alienating the out-group and bonding the in-group closer (Oakes, 1987). Self-categorization ultimately makes it so that individuals do not evaluate others based on their unique features but instead on their social memberships. Turner found that "the more similar an in-group or out-group target is to the relevant characteristic of the perceiver's in-group, the more favorable the evaluation" (Mastro and Kopacz, 2010). In other words, dominant groups rank individuals among the groups based on their perceived closeness to the in-group's salient characteristics. This perceived closeness is called affective distance and describes how far the dominant group perceives secondary out-groups to be different from them. However, these distances are not static and can be altered with the addition of another, different group (Fouka, 2020). This addition makes the dominant group feel that the perceived distance between them and the secondary group has diminished due to the alliance against a 'common other'—particularly when the first out-group also distances themselves from the new incomer. This has the potential to widen the in-group's boundaries, blurring them enough for partial membership of the first out-group for the sake of uniting against a common enemy.

For my study, I seek to use these social categorization theories to model how the Serbian national in-group's boundaries are blurred and altered by introducing different immigrant out-groups. In line with the literature review, I observe that Serbian residents are primarily categorized upon five main characteristics:

- Nationality: Serbian

    - As documented in the literature, Serbian respondents identify with a unique, Serbian national identity that is self-applied and typically based on genealogy and political alignment during World War II, the Bosnian War, and recent conflicts with Kosovo.
- Race: White
    - Despite Serbia's lack of discourse on race and racial identity, it would be false to say that whiteness is not central to Serbian identity. As a racially homogenous country, there is little room for non-white people to fit into a 'Serbian' image that many Serbian respondents have created. Roma people—some of which have stayed in the country for centuries—know this most personally. As persons of color, their stay in Serbia means little to how Serbians see and categorize them into the national context. Their non-whiteness prevents them from reaching that status—signifying that whiteness is indeed a central aspect of Serbian identity.
- Ethnicity: Slavic/Balkan
    - As the literature review notes, the common Slavic identity present in the Balkans is a common unifier among the former Yugoslavian states and is easily defined by the common language, food, and culture shared among themselves.
- Religion: Serbian Orthodox
    - Religion is by far one of the most important characteristics that the Serbian people identify with and is often the most cited characteristic for how Serbs categorize themselves differently from their Balkan counterparts.
- Citizenship: Citizens

- While citizenship and migration status is less documented in the literature as a defining characteristic of the Serbian people, it is undoubtedly an important and salient one. Citizenship is an indicator that one is dedicated to the Serbian state and a sign that one is loyal. As documented in the literature review, Serbian respondents have recently reacted poorly to Serbs living abroad returning to the state. The Serbian Diaspora to the western world is a contentious issue within the country, and as a result, Serb residents have deeply identified continued citizenship as a sign that one is loyal and dedicated to being a Serb.

As noted above, it seems that five characteristics primarily define the central Serb identity. However, since racial diversity, ethnic diversity, and migrant presence were all relatively low before the migration influx of 2015, the characteristic boundaries of national identity were defined by other demographic characteristics that had more diversity among the population living in Serbia, mainly religion and nationality. This study's focus out-groups, Bosniaks and Croats living in Serbia, are identified with the five previously listed characteristic in the following ways:

- Nationality
  - Bosniak: Bosnian
  - Croat: Croatian
- Race
  - Bosniak: White
  - Croat: White
- Ethnicity
  - Slavic/Balkan

    - Slavic/Balkan
- Religion
    - Bosniak: Islam
    - Croatian: Croatian Catholicism
- Citizenship[1]
    - Bosniak: Citizen
    - Croat: Citizen

Religion and nationality are characteristics with high rates of diversity in Serbia and the Balkans. For religion, Serbian Orthodox Christianity largely dominates what is perceived as the Serbian national religion—a direct response to its Croatian and Bosnian neighbors who identify with Catholicism and Islam, respectively. Non-Serbs living in Serbia who identify with these non-Orthodox religions were thus perceived to be affectively distant from the national in-group. Nationality, a characteristic that is most closely associated with one's family's allegiance during the Yugoslavian civil war and the subsequent Bosnian War, is a characteristic that carries an immense amount of political and emotional weight. Most Balkan residents strongly identify with their nationality—and are often quite defensive of it—regardless of what country they currently reside within. As a result, identifying with the Serbian national identity was—and is—one of the most powerful considerations that determine whether one is accepted into the Serbian national in-group. Any individual who does not—including those who see themselves as Bosniak, Croat, Roma—is instantly characterized as an out-group. It should be noted that among both Religion and Nationality, both of these characteristics are not identified by visible markers but instead by self-identification. This study theorizes that pre-2015, Religion and Nationality were the most

[1] While the vast majority of Bosniaks and Croats in the global population are not Serbian citizens, those individuals residing in Serbia after the Bosnian wars overwhelmingly retain Serbian citizenship.

salient factors for in-group membership in Serbia.

While Religion and Nationality continue to be seen as primary characteristics necessary for one to be perceived as 'Serbian,' this study theorizes that the migration onset of 2015 broadened this. The Middle Eastern Migrants that were introduced to Serbia as a part of this migration wave are perceived as with the five key characteristics of the Serbian in-group in the following ways:

- Nationality
    - As a group, the Middle Eastern migrant group of 2015 came from several different countries and nationalities including, Syria, Afghanistan, and Iran. While there is no homogenous nationality among this group, they are all considered "non-Serbian" and, thus, an out-group under this factor.
- Race
    - In line with the literature review, while Serbs do not have a vast working language for racial differences, and individuals from the Middle East are considered "White—Middle Eastern," ethnographic studies in Serbia have noted that Serbs see Middle Eastern Migrants as non-white or at the very least, racially divergent from what they see themselves as.
- Ethnicity
    - Middle Eastern
- Religion
    - While Middle Eastern migrant individuals often identify with various religions, over 85% of migrants self-identified as Muslims at the Serbian border, and a vast majority

of Serb respondents see the migrant group as a Muslim monolith—indicating that the Serbs' perception of Middle Eastern migrant groups is that they are Muslim.

- Citizenship
    - Non-citizen

As noted above, the Middle Eastern migrant group diverges from the Serbian identity in all five characteristics—including in Race, Ethnicity, and Citizenship, characteristics that were seen as homogenous between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Out of these characteristics, these migrants are most identified for being ethnically, racially, and religiously divergent from the Serbian in-group (Galijas, 2016). This study is most interested in seeing how these three characteristics most affect existing inter-ethnic relationships between Serbs and Bosniaks, and Serbs and Croats, respectively.

This study theorizes that as rates of racial, ethnic, and citizen diversity in Serbia rose with the influx of the Middle Eastern migrant out-group, Race, Ethnicity, and Citizenship have become salient factors for in-group membership, lowering the relative importance of religion and nationality. It should be noted that religion and nationality continue to hold great importance for in-group membership, but because they are no longer the sole identifiers, they lose parts of their importance as weight is redistributed to other factors. This theory culminates in a model that I call the Ethno-National Self-Categorization Approach, in which the main drivers that expand the national in-group evolve from just Religion and Nationality to these characteristics as well as Race, Citizenship, and Ethnicity. Figure 2 visualizes this theory.

Figure 2: Visualization of the Ethno-National Self-Categorization Theory

<table>
<tr><td colspan="3">Ethno-National Self-Categorization Theory</td></tr>
<tr><td>The established Serbian in-group has a large affective distance with Bosniak and Croat out-groups on the basis of religion and nationality.</td><td>A new, nationally, ethnically, racially, and religiously divergent migrant out-group is introduced to the Serbian context, changing the boundaries of the national identity to be defined by not only religion and nationality, but on ethnicity, race, and citizenship as well.</td><td>The existing out-groups (Bosniaks and Croats) who are perceived as being similar to the Serb in-group on the basis of ethnicity, race, and citizenship are moved affectively closer to the Serb in-group as religion and nationality are devalued in importance. This effect is driven by the comparison between the "higher" perceived Slavic out-groups to the more divergent Middle Eastern migrants.</td></tr>
<tr><td> 
</td><td> 
</td><td> 
</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Group A: Dominant, Serbian In-group (Serbian, Slavic, White, Christian Orthodox, and Citizens)
Group B: Bosniak Out-Group (Bosniak, Slavic, White, Muslim, and Citizens)
Group C: Croat Out-Group (Croat, Slavic, White, Catholic, and Citizens)
Group D: Middle Eastern Out-Group (Nationality from various Middle Eastern Countries, Middle Eastern, Arab, Muslim, and Migrants)
*Size of circles indicates relative dominance within the Serbian context
**For the purposes of this study, this theory asserts that because Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity are within the umbrella of Christianity, and Islam is not, the Croat out-group is affectively closer to the Serbian in-group compared to Bosniaks,</td></tr>
</table>

PART 4: PREDICTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS

This study uses the Ethno-National Self-Categorization theory to make six main predictions. It should be noted that while this section focuses explicitly on how the mechanisms function within the Serbian context, both the style of the predictions and the testable implications can be applied to similar migrant-receiving countries around the world. Using the three most recorded and divergent characteristics of the Middle Eastern migrant group (ethnicity, race, and religion), these predictions theorize the effects that each characteristic may have on existing inter-ethnic relationships in Serbia. This study uses two different measures to analyze the status of inter-ethnic relationships: the feeling thermometer and the affective distance measure.

The feeling thermometer aims to measure amicability and sympathy for ethnic groups at hand, whereas the affective distance scale seeks to aim how willing Serbs are to welcome certain ethnic groups into their lives. While these are certainly intertwined (we can expect that if one is viewed amicably, they will be more likely to be welcomed into the nation versus an individual that is viewed unfavorably), there are significant differences between the two measures. For example, while one may feel amicably towards one group, or even see them as a group that deserves justice, that often is not enough to convince an individual to welcome them into their nation or their home—particularly if the national identity of the respondent is very homogenous and rigid in nature. In fact, one of the most prominent critiques of the feeling thermometer is that it does not measure general familiarity and comfortability between groups but rather only measures general attitude and amicability (Jacoby, 1994). While it is important to measure general amicability towards ethnic groups, it is also important to measure how willing one would be to welcome an individual from an out-group into various social circles---this study does this through our summary term of 'affective distance,' which refers to the level of closeness one is

willing to be put in with a member of an out-group. Levels of affective distance may range anywhere from not willing to welcome an individual to any common social groups (nation neighborhood) to being willing to welcome an individual to one's closest and most familiar circles (as a spouse or family).

SECTION A: FEELING THERMOMETER PREDICTIONS

1. Prediction 1 (Feeling Thermometer, General Migration)
    a. Subjects exposed to the migration frame will express higher levels of amicability for Bosniaks than those exposed to the control frame.
    b. Subjects exposed to the migration frame will express higher levels of amicability for Croats than those exposed to the control frame.
2. Prediction 2 (Feeling Thermometer, Race)
    a. Subjects exposed to the race frame will express higher levels of amicability for Bosniaks than those exposed to either the control or the migration frame.
    b. Subjects exposed to the race frame will express higher levels of amicability for Croats than those exposed to either the control or to the migration frame.
3. Prediction 3 (Feeling Thermometer, Religion)
    a. Subjects exposed to the religion frame will express lower levels of amicability for Bosniaks than those exposed to the race and migration frames, whereas they will express higher levels of amicability than those exposed to the control frame.
    b. Subjects exposed to the religion frame will express lower levels of amicability for Croats than those exposed to the race frame, whereas they will express higher levels of amicability than those exposed to the control and migration frame.

    Predictions 1 through 3 are directly related to my theory and are based on the fact that

when there is an increase in Middle Eastern migrants, then race, citizenship, and immigration rise as determinants of whether or not one belongs in the in and out-group. As these racially, ethnically, nationally, and religiously divergent migrants expand the boundaries of distance to the dominant in-group, I expect that there will be a reduction in frequency and intensity of prejudice towards Bosnian and Croatian individuals on behalf of Serbian respondent's post-migration influx, as a well as general warming and rise in amicability towards out-groups in general. I expect that this effect will be even more substantial when Serbs are exposed to a focus on the racial identity of Middle Eastern Migrants. Finally, I expect that this effect will actually be weakened for Bosniaks when the focus is put on the Muslim identity of Middle Eastern Migrants and will be strengthened for Croats, as this is an out-group characteristic that Bosniaks and Middle Eastern Migrants share, reminding Serb respondents less of the characteristics that they share in common with Bosniaks and more on the ways that they are an out-group that is similar to the new, divergent, migrants. For Croats, who on a fundamental level share Christianity (although there is divergence on the type of Christianity) as a characteristic with Serbs, I do not expect the same type of mechanism to occur, and in fact, expect a slightly lower level of amicability when compared to the race focus. Figure 3 visualizes these hypotheses on a feeling thermometer scale.

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Figure 3: Visualizations of Feeling Thermometer Predictions 1, 2, and 3



SECTION B: AFFECTIVE DISTANCE PREDICTIONS

4. Prediction 4 (Affective Distance, General Migration)
    a. Subjects exposed to the migration frame will express lower levels of affective distance for Bosniaks than those exposed to the control frame.
    b. Subjects exposed to the migration frame will express lower levels of affective distance for Croats than those exposed to the control frame.
5. Prediction 5 (Affective Distance, Race)
    a. Subjects exposed to the race frame will express lower levels of affective distance for Bosniaks than those exposed to either the control or to the migration frame.

   b. Subjects exposed to the race frame will express lower levels of affective distance for Croats than those exposed to either the control or to the migration frame.

6. Prediction 6 (Affective Distance, Religion)
   a. Subjects exposed to the religion frame will express higher levels of affective distance for Bosniaks than those exposed to the race and migration frames, whereas they will express lower levels of affective distance than those exposed to the control frame.
   b. Subjects exposed to the religion frame will express higher levels of affective distance for Croats than those exposed to the race frame, whereas they will express lower levels of affective distance than those exposed to the control and migration frame.

This set of predictions theorize that re-classification is not determined necessarily by one's absolute distance to the dominant in-group but rather by the group's relative distance to other out-groups. In Serbia, Bosnian and Croatian individuals will only be reclassified if they are perceived to be affectively closer to dominant Serbians compared to the new Middle Eastern Migrants. The more distant this new out-group is perceived compared to existing ethnic minorities, the more an increase in its size improves attitudes towards existing out-groups. Similar to the feeling thermometer predictions, this set of predictions theorize that being primed to the existence of migrants will shrink the affective distance between Serbs and Bosniaks as well as Serbs and Croats. I also expect that this effect will be even stronger when Serbs are exposed to a focus on the racial identity of Middle Eastern Migrants. Finally, I additionally expect that the effect of a religious focus will increase the affective distance towards Bosniaks when compared to just a general exposure, whereas I expect the religious focus to decrease the affective distance towards Bosniaks when compared to the general exposure. Figure 4 visualizes these hypotheses.

Figure 4: Visualizations of Affective Distance Predictions 4, 5, and 6



PART 5: METHODS

SECTION A: THE SURVEY EXPERIMENT

To test the above hypotheses, I conducted an online vignette survey experiment that asked respondents to indicate their feelings towards ethnic minorities after being randomly assigned a vignette that primed respondents on a particular characteristic of Middle Eastern migrants in Serbia. The vignette study was part of a representative Serbian online panel survey of almost 1,050 respondents, fielded in February 2021 and executed by TGM Marketing. The study only included respondents who identified as Serbian citizens and who were currently in Serbia during the period the survey was being administered. I focus on the Serbian citizen population for two main reasons:

1. Serbian citizens are a clear, dominant in-group within the Serbian state. Their values, bodies, and opinions are prioritized on both individual, local, and national scales, making their perceptions of other minorities a good measure of how immigrant ethnicity is impacting minority distance to the dominant in-group. Thus, the individual perception of the Serbian citizen is the most appropriate unit of analysis for the goals of this study.
2. Additionally, the level of approval, closeness, and tolerance of Serbian nationals towards ethnic minorities is a well-documented signifier of how well a minority is likely to be treated in occupational and social settings (UNDP, 2013). Studying this unit allows this study to analyze the potential implications of changing perceptions more clearly.

SECTION B: THE VIGNETTES

Figure 5: Survey Experiment Sequence of Assigned Frames



The survey began with preliminary questions on race, religion, gender, age, and refugee history to account for any control variable prior to giving respondents a treatment. Among the respondents, only 1.7% of the sample identified as non-white, with nearly 49.5% of respondents self-reporting as White (European) and 34.3% reporting as White (Middle Eastern). For religion, nearly 80% of the sample identified as Christian Orthodox, 7% identified as Christian Catholic, and only 0.7% of the sample identified as Muslim. Finally, among the respondents, only 10.4% of the sample had been refugees themselves at one point or another. A demographic profile for the sample is presented in Table 1. Further, participants' profiles appear to be reasonably consistent and representative of the current Serbian population, as demonstrated in Table 2. It should be noted, however, that the experiment's sample is slightly younger than the recorded demographics in Serbia in 2021. This may be due to the lack of respondents that are age 65+, who have reported significantly lower levels of internet usage in the Serbian state than all other

age groups (Stojic, 2017). However, this deviation is not large nor concerning for the sample, and given the representative nature of the control variables, I am confident that this sample is large and representative for the purposes of this study.

Table 1: Demographic Variables Descriptive Statistics; Data from Survey Experiment

Summary Statistics: Demographic Information			
		Frequency	Percentage (%)
Gender	Woman	532	50.6%
	Not-Woman	519	49.4%
Age	18-24 years old	134	12.7%
	25-34 years old	217	20.6%
	35-44 years old	258	24.5%
	45-54 years old	247	23.5%
	55-64 years old	179	17%
	65+ years old	16	1.5%
Nationality	Serbian	949	90.3%
	Not Serbian	101	7.7%
Race	White	1037	98.7%
	Non-White	13	1.3%
Religion	Christian Orthodox	822	78.2%
	Christian Catholic	72	6.9%
	Christian Protestent	29	2.8%
	Muslim	7	0.7%
	Other/Not Religious	121	11.5%
Refugee	Yes, at one point	109	10.4%
	No, never	942	89.6%

Table 2: Demographic Statistics of Serbia in 2020, Sourced from CIA World Factbook

Serbia 2021 Demographics, Sourced from CIA World Factbook		
Variable		Percentage (%)
Age	0-14 years	14.07%
	15-24 years	11.04%
	25-54 years	41.19%
	55-64 years	13.7%
	65 years and over	20%
Gender	Female	51.01%
	Male	48.99%
Nationality	Serbian	83.3%
	Hungarian	3.5%
	Romani	2.1%
	Bosniak	2%
	Other	9.1%
Religion	Christian Orthodox	84.6%
	Christian Catholic	5%
	Christian Protestant	1%
	Muslim	3.1%
	Other	6.4%

***note** most ethnic Albanians boycotted the 2011-2021 censuses; Romani populations are usually underestimated in official statistics and may represent 5–11% of Serbia's population

****note** as demonstrated in the literature review, because of the racially homogenous nature and relatively low value put on racial identity, race is not asked on census data

*****note** in order to abide by IRB and international ethical guidelines, the survey did not interview individuals 0-18 years old

Once a respondent completed the preliminary questions, they were randomly assigned one of four frames. Approximately 260 respondents were assigned to each frame. To ensure that randomization was successful, I regress the outcome variables on the pre-treatment questions (Gender, Age, Serbian Nationality, Religion, Race) first in Model 1 and then on the complete set of controls in Model 2. Results of the regression are presented in Table 3

Table 3: Balance Test Results on Survey Treatment Groups

	Balance Test Results on Survey Treatment Groups	
	Control vs. Treatment	
	logistic	*normal*
	(1)	(2)
Gender	0.020	0.004
	(0.144)	(0.027)
Age	-0.018	-0.003
	(0.056)	(0.010)
Serbian Nationality	0.053	0.009
	(0.289)	(0.052)
Religion	-0.289	-0.051
	(0.208)	(0.037)
Refugee History	0.216	0.038
	(0.270)	(0.048)
Race	0.205	0.040
	(0.183)	(0.035)
Constant	1.150***	0.757***
	(0.374)	(0.070)
Observations	1,050	1,050
Log Likelihood	-586.509	-607.777
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,187.018	1,229.555
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Based on the results, the two groups are very comparable to each other and are indeed good counterfactuals, indicating that randomization across groups was successful. In line with Dunning et al. l, this allows us to move forward with conducting t-tests as well as regression analyses later on (Dunning, 2016).

After respondents were assigned to their frame, they were taken to separate next steps. The first frame involved the control group, in which respondents were given no vignette and were taken directly to outcome questions.

The second frame is uniquely focused on migration and is designed to prime respondents on the influx of non-citizens into the country. This frame reads as follows:

- *"In 2015, more than a million people fleeing wars and poverty in the Middle East began traveling into Europe seeking refuge in the European Union. One route that was commonly used for this travel often went through Serbia as these migrants sought a final destination in Hungary and other E.U. countries. However, in June of 2015, Hungary closed the Serbian border and 7000 migrants were effectively stranded in the Serbian state. Since 2015, migrant centers in Serbia have estimated that 150 migrants enter the country from the South every day".*

The third frame maintains the same migrant prime from above but adds a paragraph that focuses explicitly on the Arab racial identity of the migrant influx. This vignette reads as follows:

- *"In 2015, more than a million people fleeing wars and poverty in the Middle East began traveling into Europe seeking refuge in the European Union. One route that was commonly used for this travel often went through Serbia as these migrants sought a final destination in Hungary and other E.U. countries. However, in June of 2015, Hungary closed the Serbian border, and 7000 Middle Eastern migrants were effectively stranded*

in the Serbian state. Since 2015, Migrant Centers in Serbia have estimated that 150 migrants enter the country from the South every day.

Some of these migrants, who are often from Syria, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Morocco, have now been in the Serbian state for over five years. If current migration trends persist, migration and demographic experts predict that there will be 20,000 Middle Eastern Arab migrants in 2030".

Since respondents might have different understandings of what race and ethnicity mean both in the Serbian and Middle Eastern context, this frame is meant to signify that migrants are not only not Slavic, but they are also darker and racially divergent. In line with the literature, the Serbian population has notably identified Middle Eastern Migrants as a racial out-group, despite having a limited vocabulary to define their racial identity. Thus, by using the signifier "Arab," the study primes BOTH race and ethnicity as they are difficult to separate in the Serbian context.

Of course, it is still possible that people connote additional meanings with these labels. For example, while the word 'Arab' is only meant to prime respondents for ethnicity and race, some respondents may think of Islam when they hear this term. Regardless, this frame's focus is centered not on religion but on race and ethnicity, making the effect of whatever conflation or connotation arises minimal in comparison.

The fourth frame also maintains the same migrant prime in frame two but adds a paragraph that focuses explicitly on the predominant Muslim religious identity of most migrants entering Serbia. While it should be noted that not all migrants entering Serbia from the Middle East are Muslim, demographic data has noted that over 85% of migrants have self-identified as Muslim upon arrival at the Serbian border, and most Serbian respondents see the Middle Eastern migrant

community as Muslim monolith. Frame four reads as follows:

- *"In 2015, more than a million people fleeing wars and poverty in the Middle East began traveling into Europe seeking refuge in the European Union. One route that was commonly used for this travel often went through Serbia as these migrants sought a final destination in Hungary and other E.U. countries. However, in June of 2015, Hungary closed the Serbian border, and 7000 Middle Eastern migrants were effectively stranded in the Serbian state. Since 2015, Migrant Centers in Serbia have estimated that 150 migrants enter the country from the South every day. These migrants, who are often from Syria, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Morocco, have now been in the Serbian state for over five years.*

  Some of these migrants, who often come from Muslim-majority countries, have now been in the Serbian state for over five years. If current migration trends persist, migration and demographic experts predict that there may be 20,000 Muslim migrants in 2030".

SECTION C: MAIN DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

After respondents are primed with a specific frame, they are then asked a series of outcome questions. The questions in these sections are sourced from a previously conducted survey that was part of the South-East European Social Survey Project (SEESP) conducted in Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Kosovo between November 2003 to March 2004, as well as several United Nations Development Programme polls on public perceptions of discrimination conducted in partnership with the Serbian government in 2009, 2011, and 2013 (Simkus, 2007;

UNDP, 2013). While this study's focus is on Serbian citizen's attitudes towards Bosniaks and Croats, the survey also measured feelings and attitudes towards Migrants, Albanian Kosovars, and Roma People as well.

The feeling thermometer score constitutes my first dependent variable (Lupton & Jacoby, **2016**). Established most notably in the American National Election Studies public opinion poll, the feeling thermometer is one of the most frequent and influential tools used to measure favorable feelings towards out-groups. It reflects the general attitudes toward the groups that are presented in the vignettes and varies between 0 (very negative) to 100 (very positive). The feeling thermometer allows us to measure amicability, affectivity, and sympathy for others.

Affective Social Distance constitutes my second dependent variable and is measured using the Bogardus Social Distance Scale. The Bogardus Social Distance Scale is one of the oldest psychological attitude scales and is a commonly used method of measuring prejudice (Wark, 2007). The scale is based upon the belief that "social distance is essentially a measure of how much or little sympathy the members of a group feel for another group"—a definition that this study also adopts (Wark, 2007). This measure is derived from a battery of 5 questions regarding social distance towards different ethnic minorities. The questions ask about a respondent's willingness to accept a member of a particular ethnic group in the following social relations: "Living permanently in my country" (Item 1); "Living in my neighborhood – same building or street" (Item 2); "As my friend or companion to spend time with" (Item 3); "As a close relative by marriage to a brother, sister, or your child" (Item 4). I also include a question that asks respondents how similar they feel to the ethnic minority at hand as well (Item 5). All five questions are asked on an ordinal, Likert scale ranging from 1-7, with 1 being "Extremely willing/There is no difference to me" and 7 being "I would have very strong objections/Not

similar at all." To create my final variable of "Affective Distance," I aggregated the amounts in all five questions to create one variable on a scale of 35. A complete list of survey questions is presented in Figure 5 in the Appendix.

My key independent variables are the three characteristics that were presented to the respondents, and that varied across the vignettes (migration, race/ethnicity, religion). The variables are coded 1 if a respondent received a vignette with the respective characteristic and 0 if not.

SECTION D: FURTHER VARIABLES

While it is not the focus of the study, I also measured respondents' attitudes towards commonly held stereotypes against ethnic minorities. Respondents were given a particular characteristic and asked where they would rate a certain ethnic minority on a 7-point scale, with 1 signifying the most positive attribute and 7 signifying the most negative attribute. Respondents were asked to answer for Bosnians, Croats, Albanian Kosovars, Migrants, and Roma People in this battery. The characteristics that respondents were asked to rate minorities against are as follows:

- Intelligent/Unintelligent
- Hard-Working/Lazy
- Peaceful/Violent
- Trustworthy/Untrustworthy

PART 6: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

SECTION A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

The following figures detail the descriptive statistics of the main dependent variables from the survey data.

Figure 6. Descriptive Statistics of Affective Distance Dependent Variables for Bosniaks; Data from Survey Experiment

Dependent Variable	Response	N=1051	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Deviation
How similar do you believe Bosniaks are to you?			1	7	3.307	1.678
	There is no difference	173 (16.48)				
	Very many similarities	204 (19.43)				
	More than 50% similar	193 (18.38)				
	Only partially (50%) similar	269 (25.62)				
	Less than 50% similar	96 (9.14)				
	Very few similarities	48 (4.57)				
	Not similar at all	67 (6.38)				
How willing would you be to accept a Bosniak Individual as a person permanently living in your country?			1	7	2.599	1.736
	Extremely Willing	432 (41.14)				
	Very Willing	167 (15.90)				
	Somewhat Willing	156 (14.86)				
	Neither Willing or Unwilling	145 (13.81)				
	Somewhat Unwilling	72 (6.86)				
	Very Unwilling	43 (4.10)				
	Extremely Unwilling	45 (3.33)				
How willing would you be to accept a Bosniak individual as a person permanently living in your neighborhood?			1	7	2.695	1.767
	Extremely Willing	399 (38.00)				
	Very Willing	180 (17.14)				
	Somewhat Willing	164 (15.62)				
	Neither Willing or Unwilling	145 (13.81)				
	Somewhat Unwilling	71 (6.76)				
	Very Unwilling	47 (4.48)				
	Extremely Unwilling	44 (4.19)				
How willing would you be to accept a Bosniak individual as friend or companion to spend time with?			1	7	2.571	1.752
	Extremely Willing	446 (42.68)				
	Very Willing	168 (16.00)				
	Somewhat Willing	149 (14.19)				
	Neither Willing or Unwilling	139 (13.24)				
	Somewhat Unwilling	63 (6.00)				
	Very Unwilling	43 (4.10)				
	Extremely Unwilling	42 (4.00)				
How willing would you be to accept a Bosniak individual as a close relative by marriage?			1	7	3.175	2.049
	Extremely Willing	349 (33.24)				
	Very Willing	193 (18.38)				
	Somewhat Willing	136 (12.95)				
	Neither Willing or Unwilling	103 (9.81)				
	Somewhat Unwilling	102 (9.71)				
	Very Unwilling	88 (8.38)				
	Extremely Unwilling	79 (7.52)				

Figure 7. Descriptive Statistics of Affective Distance Dependent Variables for Croats; Data from Survey Experiment

Dependent Variable	Response	N=904	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Deviation
How similar do you believe Croats are to you?			1	7	3.164	1.757
	There is no difference	197 (18.76)				
	Very many similarities	256 (24.38)				
	More than 50% similar	186 (17.71)				
	Only partially (50%) similar	211 (20.10)				
	Less than 50% similar	68 (6.48)				
	Very few similarities	53 (5.05)				
	Not similar at all	79 (7.52)				
How willing would you be to accept a Croat Individual as a person permanently living in your country?			1	7	2.735	1.925
	Extremely Willing	435 (41.43)				
	Very Willing	161 (15.33)				
	Somewhat Willing	152 (14.48)				
	Neither Willing or Unwilling	109 (10.38)				
	Somewhat Unwilling	75 (7.14)				
	Very Unwilling	71 (6.76)				
	Extremely Unwilling	47 (4.48)				
How willing would you be to accept a Croat individual as a person permanently living in your neighborhood?			1	7	2.741	1.886
	Extremely Willing	418 (39.81)				
	Very Willing	179 (17.05)				
	Somewhat Willing	151 (14.38)				
	Neither Willing or Unwilling	130 (12.38)				
	Somewhat Unwilling	75 (7.14)				
	Very Unwilling	55 (5.24)				
	Extremely Unwilling	42 (4.00)				
How willing would you be to accept a Croat individual as friend or companion to spend time with?			1	7	2.638	1.856
	Extremely Willing	441 (42.00)				
	Very Willing	173 (16.48)				
	Somewhat Willing	168 (16.00)				
	Neither Willing or Unwilling	107 (10.19)				
	Somewhat Unwilling	64 (6.10)				
	Very Unwilling	50 (4.76)				
	Extremely Unwilling	47 (4.48)				
How willing would you be to accept a Croat individual as a close relative by marriage?			1	7	2.992	2.044
	Extremely Willing	387 (36.86)				
	Very Willing	180 (17.14)				
	Somewhat Willing	147 (14.00)				
	Neither Willing or Unwilling	111 (10.57)				
	Somewhat Unwilling	105 (10.10)				
	Very Unwilling	68 (6.48)				
	Extremely Unwilling	51 (4.86)				

Figures 6 and 7 depicts the descriptive statistics of the affective distance variables which include respondents willingness to accept Bosniaks and Croats into their country, as neighbors, as friend, as family, as well as how similar they believe they are to Bosniaks and Croats. The responses to the affective distance variables indicates that for both Bosniaks and Croats,

respondents report overwhelmingly positive attitudes towards welcoming both groups into their lives on every level. For Bosniak responses, Serbs were most likely to be welcome a Bosniak individual as a friend with 42.68% of the sample reporting that they would be extremely willing to do so. Welcoming Bosniak individuals as family was comparatively lower with only 33.24% of the survey sample reporting that they would be extremely willing to do so. Overall, the survey sample was welcoming towards Bosniaks in any situation with less than 20% of the survey population reporting that they would be 'unwilling' to welcome a Bosniak for any given affective distance variable. Similar results were seen with the Croat-focused variables. Almost identically to the Bosniak variable, Serb respondents were most willing to welcome Croats as friends among all other variables with 42% of the survey sample reporting that they are extremely willing to do so. Additionally, welcoming a Croat as family had the least positive results, with only 36.86% of the population reporting that they would be extremely willing to do so. For similarity variables, 16.48% respondents reported they say themselves as identical to Bosniaks compared to 18.76% for Croats. For both Bosniaks and Croat-focused questions, the majority of the sample reported having more than 50% of all characteristics similar to the mentioned group. Compared to the Bosniak results, affective distance variables for Croats yielded slightly more positive results across all variables, indicating that affective distance between Serbs and Croats may be slightly smaller than the distance between Serbs and Bosniaks—a result that is in line with this paper's theory and expectations.

Figure 8: Histogram of Frequency of Bosniak Feeling Thermometer Scores; Data from Survey Experiment



Figure 9: Histogram of Frequency of Croat Feeling Thermometer Scores; Data from Survey Experiment



Figure 10. Descriptive Statistics of Feeling Thermometer Dependent Variables for Bosniaks; Data from Survey Experiment

Bosniak Feeling Thermometer, Descriptive Statistics	
Mean	57.4247619
Standard Error	0.837537205
Median	54
Mode	50
Standard Deviation	27.13930725
Sample Variance	736.5419983
Range	100
Minimum	0
Maximum	100
Count	1050

Figure 11. Descriptive Statistics of Affective Distance Dependent Variables for Bosniaks; Data from Survey Experiment

Croat Feeling Thermometer, Descriptive Statistics	
Mean	53.26666667
Standard Error	0.875743471
Median	50
Mode	50
Standard Deviation	28.37733177
Sample Variance	805.2729584
Range	100
Minimum	0
Maximum	100
Count	1050

Figures 8 and 9 depict the frequency of the feeling thermometer scores reported for Bosniaks and Croats within the survey experiment, whereas Figures 10 and 11 depict basic descriptive statistics for the feeling thermometer variables. For the Bosniak feeling thermometer variable, responses were fairly neutral and skewed positive with 23.24% of the sample reporting

a score between 40-50, and 56.53% of the population reporting a score upwards of 50. Only 20.47% of the survey sample reported scores below 40, indicating that the survey sample overall feels generally warm towards Bosniaks. Similar trends are witnessed for the Croat feeling thermometer variable. 25.05% of the survey sample reported scores between 40-50 for Croats, while 49.05% of the population reported scores above 50---this indicates that the sample generally felt either warm or neutral attitudes towards Croats. Only 25.93% of the survey sample reported scores below 40 for Croats. Between Croats and Bosniaks, the Bosniak feeling thermometer had a higher rate of very positive scores (90 to 100 range) and a lower rate of very negative scores (0 to 10 range), indicating that within the survey sample, respondents tended to think more amicably and positively about Bosniaks compared to Croats. This is especially interesting when considering that Croats witnessed smaller affective distance scores compared to Bosniaks, indicating that while Bosniaks may be seen as more affectively distant than Croats, they may also simultaneously be seen in a more positive and amicable light as a group.

SECTION B: HYPOTHESIS TESTING

The analysis of the data proceeds in two steps. First, I compare the mean feeling thermometer ratings of each minority across the four frames for the sample as a whole through a simple linear regression—paying particular attention to the ways that each treatment condition significantly variates from the controls. This tests Predictions 1 through 3, looking at whether the characteristics of a migrant group have a significant effect on the feeling and empathy the Serbian in-group has towards existing ethnic minorities. Second, I fit a linear probability model and then subsequently an ordered logit regression model while controlling for age, race, religion, and gender to evaluate each treatment's individual effect on the affective distance variable. This allows us to evaluate Predictions 4a, 5a, and 6a, which posited that in the case of Bosnians, the

migration treatment would decrease the affective distance compared to the control, the religion treatment will have the same effect as the migration treatment, and the race treatment will have the smallest affective distance of all frames. This also allows us to evaluate Predictions 4b, 5b, and 6b, which posited that in the case of Croats, the migration treatment will decrease the affective distance compared to the control, the religion treatment will have a smaller affective distance than the migration treatment, and the race treatment will have the smallest affective distance of all.

The following tables present the results of each analysis. I report the coefficients and standard errors for each variable. Note that because lower numbers indicate positive feelings within the Affective Distance variables, the presence of a positive coefficient means there is a negative shift in opinion toward the group at hand. Because the inverse is true for feeling thermometers (low scores indicate negative attitudes), the presence of a positive coefficient within those variables means there is a positive shift in opinion toward the group at hand. For each analysis, I conduct both a simple model that shows attitudes towards Bosniaks and Croats, respectively, while also conducting an additional regression that accounts for the complete set of controls.

SECTION C: FEELING THERMOMETER RESULTS

Table 4. Simple Regression Results on Bosniak Feeling Thermometer, Control Against All Treatments,

	Linear Regression Result, Bosniak Feeling Thermometer, Control Against All Other Treatments:			
	Feeling Toward Bosniaks			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	2.432	2.351	-0.739	
	(2.414)	(2.377)	(2.380)	
Migration Treatment				2.432
				(2.367)
Migration + Race Treatment				2.351
				(2.371)
Migration + Religion Treatment				-0.739
				(2.376)
Constant	56.406***	56.406***	56.406***	56.406***
	(1.714)	(1.684)	(1.683)	(1.680)
Observations	526	524	522	1,050
R^2	0.002	0.002	0.0002	0.003
Adjusted R^2	0.00003	-0.00004	-0.002	-0.0002
Residual Std. Error	27.683 (df = 524)	27.206 (df = 522)	27.192 (df = 520)	27.142 (df = 1046)
F Statistic	1.015 (df = 1; 524)	0.978 (df = 1; 522)	0.097 (df = 1; 520)	0.938 (df = 3; 1046)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5. Simple Regression Results on Bosniak Feeling Thermometer, Control Against All Treatments, Accounting for Control Variables

	Regression Results on Bosniak Feeling Thermometer, Control Against All Other Treatments, Accounting for Control Variables:			
	Feeling Towards Bosniaks			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	2.222	1.759	-0.936	
	(2.409)	(2.348)	(2.363)	
Migration Treatment				2.073
				(2.347)
Migration + Race Treatment				1.947
				(2.351)
Migration + Religion Treatment				-0.851
				(2.351)
Gender	6.020**	4.664**	6.132***	5.519***
	(2.408)	(2.351)	(2.368)	(1.666)
Age	-0.868	-0.609	-0.604	-1.145*
	(0.929)	(0.920)	(0.924)	(0.647)
Serbian Nationality	6.348	14.114***	-1.728	5.148
	(4.901)	(4.547)	(4.746)	(3.241)
Religion	-7.814**	-13.529***	-8.563**	-9.104***
	(3.420)	(3.214)	(3.484)	(2.292)
Refugee History	-6.030	0.964	-0.005	-1.303
	(4.178)	(4.187)	(4.785)	(2.985)
Race	-0.860	-2.125	-2.523	-2.725
	(3.166)	(3.112)	(2.997)	(2.199)
Constant	57.844***	55.780***	65.800***	62.266***
	(6.497)	(6.228)	(6.185)	(4.558)
Observations	526	524	522	1,050
R^2	0.029	0.048	0.031	0.031
Adjusted R^2	0.016	0.036	0.017	0.022
Residual Std. Error	27.456 (df = 518)	26.718 (df = 516)	26.930 (df = 514)	26.832 (df = 1040)
F Statistic	2.248** (df = 7; 518)	3.750*** (df = 7; 516)	2.321** (df = 7; 514)	3.682*** (df = 9; 1040)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: Two-tailed tests; robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 5 presents the simple regression results of the Bosniak Feeling Thermometer against all treatments while controlling for Gender, Age, Nationality, Religion, Refugee Status, and Race. Model 1 presents the results of the control compared to the migration treatment; Model 2 presents the results of the control compared to the migration + race treatment, Model 3 tests the results of the control versus the migration + religion treatment, and Model 4 tests the control against every individual treatment. In Model 1 and 2, positive regression coefficients are recorded for the migration (2.222) and race (1.759) treatments, respectively, whereas a negative

coefficient is recorded for the religion treatment (-0.936)—indicating that the priming of Middle Eastern Muslim identity had the effect of reducing positive feelings on Bosniaks. However, while these results are promising for Predictions 1a, 2a, and 3a, none of these results are statistically significant, meaning I fail to reject the null hypothesis for all three predictions. There is no significant effect among the treatment groups for the variable of the feeling thermometer.

Table 6: Simple Regression Results on Croat Feeling Thermometer, Control Against All Treatments,

	Regression Results on Croat Feeling Thermometer, Control Against All Treatments:			
	Feelings Towards Croats			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.488	2.194	-0.858	
	(2.519)	(2.499)	(2.494)	
Migration Treatment				-0.488
				(2.476)
Migration + Race Treatment				2.194
				(2.481)
Migration + Religion Treatment				-0.858
				(2.485)
Constant	53.054***	53.054***	53.054***	53.054***
	(1.788)	(1.770)	(1.763)	(1.757)
Observations	526	524	522	1,050
R^2	0.0001	0.001	0.0002	0.002
Adjusted R^2	-0.002	-0.0004	-0.002	-0.001
Residual Std. Error	28.890 (df = 524)	28.601 (df = 522)	28.486 (df = 520)	28.393 (df = 1046)
F Statistic	0.037 (df = 1; 524)	0.770 (df = 1; 522)	0.118 (df = 1; 520)	0.609 (df = 3; 1046)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7: Simple Regression Results on Croat Feeling Thermometer, Control Against All Treatments, Accounting for Control Variables

	Simple Regression Results on Croat Feeling Thermometer, Control Against All Treatments, Accounting for Control Variables:			
	Feeling_Croatian			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.897	1.373	-1.375	
	(2.477)	(2.390)	(2.426)	
Migration Treatment				-0.833
				(2.412)
Migration + Race Treatment				1.794
				(2.416)
Migration + Religion Treatment				-1.297
				(2.417)
Gender	5.465**	6.509***	5.301**	5.517***
	(2.475)	(2.392)	(2.431)	(1.713)
Age	1.436	1.454	1.554	1.208*
	(0.955)	(0.936)	(0.949)	(0.665)
Serbian Nationality	3.265	8.647*	-0.375	1.047
	(5.039)	(4.628)	(4.872)	(3.331)
Religion	-15.010***	-22.654***	-16.007***	-14.840***
	(3.516)	(3.271)	(3.577)	(2.356)
Refugee History	-8.008*	-5.452	-6.452	-6.248**
	(4.296)	(4.261)	(4.912)	(3.068)
Race	-0.153	-1.586	-3.065	-2.975
	(3.255)	(3.167)	(3.077)	(2.260)
Constant	55.679***	57.372***	61.713***	60.372***
	(6.679)	(6.339)	(6.350)	(4.684)
Observations	526	524	522	1,050
R^2	0.056	0.108	0.069	0.064
Adjusted R^2	0.044	0.096	0.056	0.056
Residual Std. Error	28.225 (df = 518)	27.192 (df = 516)	27.647 (df = 514)	27.579 (df = 1040)
F Statistic	4.429*** (df = 7; 518)	8.908*** (df = 7; 516)	5.455*** (df = 7; 514)	7.849*** (df = 9; 1040)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: Two-tailed tests; robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 7 presents the simple regression results of the Croat Feeling Thermometer against all treatments while controlling for Gender, Age, Nationality, Religion, Refugee Status, and Race. Model 1 presents the results of the control compared to the migration treatment, Model 2 presents the results of the control compared to the migration + race treatment, Model 3 tests the results of the control versus the migration + religion treatment, and Model 4 tests the control against all other treatments. In Model 2, positive regression coefficients are documented for the

race (1.759) treatment, whereas we see a negative coefficient for the migration (-0.897) and religion treatment (-1.375)—indicating that the priming of Middle Eastern migrant racial identity has the potential effect of increasing positive attitudes towards Croats, whereas migration and religion could potentially increase negative attitudes towards Croats. However, similar to the Bosniak Feeling Thermometer results, while these findings are promising for the Predictions 1b, 2b, and 3b, none of the regression coefficients are statistically significant, meaning I fail to reject the null hypothesis for all three predictions. There is no significant effect among the treatment groups.

SECTION D: AFFECTIVE DISTANCE RESULTS

Table 8: Bivariate and Multivariate Regression Results on Affective Distance Against Bosniaks and Croats, Testing Control Against All Treatment Groups

	Bivariate and Multivariate Regression Results on Affective Distance Against Bosniaks and Croats:			
	Bosniak Affective Distance	Croat Affective Distance	Bosniak Affective Distance(Controls)	Croat Affective Distance(Controls)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migration Treatment	0.277	0.251	0.418	0.425
	(0.668)	(0.711)	(0.661)	(0.694)
Migration and Race Treatment	0.636	-0.146	0.795	0.037
	(0.670)	(0.712)	(0.663)	(0.695)
Migration and Religion Treatment	0.866	0.364	0.966	0.542
	(0.671)	(0.713)	(0.663)	(0.695)
Gender			-0.660	-0.261
			(0.470)	(0.493)
Age			0.581***	-0.174
			(0.182)	(0.191)
Serbian Nationality			-0.227	0.215
			(0.913)	(0.958)
Religion			2.915***	4.625***
			(0.646)	(0.677)
Refugee History			-0.097	0.568
			(0.841)	(0.882)
Race			0.634	0.338
			(0.620)	(0.650)
Constant	13.904***	14.153***	9.714***	10.561***
	(0.474)	(0.504)	(1.284)	(1.347)
Observations	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050
R^2	0.002	0.001	0.034	0.059
Adjusted R^2	-0.001	-0.002	0.026	0.051
Residual Std. Error	7.665 (df = 1046)	8.150 (df = 1046)	7.562 (df = 1040)	7.930 (df = 1040)
F Statistic	0.652 (df = 3; 1046)	0.213 (df = 3; 1046)	4.091*** (df = 9; 1040)	7.274*** (df = 9; 1040)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: Two-tailed tests; robust standard errors in parentheses.

Finally, I analyze the Affective Distance variable among Bosniak and Croats in Table 8. I examined each treatment's impact independently on the dependent variables compared to the control in bivariate (excluding all control variables—Model 1 and Model 2) and multivariate (including all control variables—Model 3 and Model 4) models.

First, for Bosniak Affective Distance bivariate regression model , we see positive coefficient values across all treatment (migration=0.277, race=0.636, religion=0.866) in Model 1. A similar trend is witnessed among the multivariate regression in Model 3 (migration=0.418, race=0.795, religion=0.966). This indicates the possibility that priming respondents on Middle Eastern Migrant identities across the board could potentially trigger a larger social distance between Serbs and Bosniaks. However, despite this trend, none of the regression coefficients were statistically significant, meaning I fail to reject the null hypothesis for Prediction 5a, 6a, and 7a, and I cannot conclusively say that the treatments resulted in any meaningful difference in attitudes among respondents. I also examined the impact of each treatment against each other in Appendix Figures 9 through 11 and found similarly insignificant results.

A similar trend is documented among the results for Croat Affective Distance. Among the bivariate regression model, positive coefficient values are recorded across migration and religion treatments (0.251 and 0.364, respectively), whereas there is a very slight negative coefficient value recorded for the race treatment (-0.146). This is fairly consistent with the multivariate analysis, which saw positive coefficient values across migration, race, and religion (0.425, 0.037, 0.542, respectively). The coefficient values for Croat Affective Distance are relatively small compared to the Bosniak Affective Distance variable. Similar to the Bosniak Affective Distance Variable, none of the regression coefficients in this analysis were statistically

significant. I cannot conclusively say that any treatment within the experiment resulted in meaningful difference among the respondents and fail to reject the null hypothesis in Prediction 5b, 6b, and 7b. I also examined the impact of each treatment against each other in Appendix Figures 9 through 11 and found similarly insignificant results.

I will also briefly discuss the control variables and what can be observed. Women have a somewhat more positive view of Bosniaks and Croats compared to men. In addition to this, people who self-identify as Serbian Orthodox have a more negative opinion towards out-groups in general compared to their non-Orthodox counterparts. In addition to this, there is a notable trend in the model of feeling toward Croats - people who are refugees themselves have more negative opinions toward Croats compared to people who were never forced to leave their homes. This could be explained by the fact that many refugees in Serbia had to leave Croatia during the civil war in the '90s. Overall, these results are not surprising and in line with Serbia's historical and demographic trends noted in the literature review.

SECTION E: FURTHER VARIABLES

This section will focus on the variables that tested Serbian respondents' feelings on commonly held stereotypes against Bosniaks and Croats. While these variables do not test the hypothesis, they give us valuable information on how the national in-group of Serbia is created in response to changes in migration, race, and religion. Each of these treatments tests the control against all other treatments to search for significant variance.

Table 12: Simple Regression Results on Stereotype Attitudes Against Bosniaks, Control Against All Treatments

	Simple Regression Results on Stereotype Attitudes Against Bosniaks, Control Against All Treatments:			
	Intelligent(1)/Unintelligent(7)	Hardworking(1)/Lazy(7)/	Peaceful(1)/Violent(7)	Trustworthy(1)/Untrustworthy(7)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migration Treatment	-0.038	-0.211*	-0.156	0.015
	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Migration + Race Treatment	-0.049	-0.184	-0.052	0.023
	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Migration + Religion Treatment	0.245**	0.165	0.000	0.065
	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Constant	3.506***	3.218***	3.360***	3.536***
	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.093)	(0.094)
Observations	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050
R^2	0.008	0.013	0.002	0.0003
Adjusted R^2	0.005	0.010	-0.001	-0.003
Residual Std. Error (df = 1046)	1.354	1.337	1.509	1.513
F Statistic (df = 3; 1046)	2.749**	4.511***	0.629	0.089
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 13: Simple Regression Results on Stereotype Attitudes Against Bosniaks, Control Against All Treatments, Accounting for Control Variables

	Simple Regression Results on Stereotype Attitudes Against Bosniaks, Control Against All Treatments, Accounting for Control Variables			
	Intelligent(1)/Unintelligent(7)	Hardworking(1)/Lazy(7)	Peaceful(1)/Violent(7)	Trustworthy(1)/Untrustworthy(7)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migration Treatment	-0.042	-0.202*	-0.158	0.026
	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.131)	(0.132)
Migration + Race Treatmentt	-0.055	-0.176	-0.049	0.038
	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.131)	(0.132)
Migration + Religion Treatment	0.245**	0.162	0.002	0.075
	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.131)	(0.132)
Gender	-0.067	-0.053	-0.270***	-0.142
	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.093)	(0.094)
Age	-0.022	0.037	0.123***	0.081**
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Serbian Nationality	0.040	0.025	-0.094	0.183
	(0.164)	(0.162)	(0.181)	(0.182)
Religion	0.031	0.010	0.141	0.186
	(0.116)	(0.114)	(0.128)	(0.129)
Refugee History	0.004	-0.213	0.214	0.024
	(0.151)	(0.149)	(0.166)	(0.168)
Race	0.127	0.032	0.197	0.053
	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.123)	(0.124)
Constant	3.445***	3.085***	2.901***	2.985***
	(0.230)	(0.227)	(0.254)	(0.256)
Observations	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050
R^2	0.011	0.016	0.025	0.011
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.008	0.016	0.003
Residual Std. Error (df = 1040)	1.356	1.339	1.496	1.509
F Statistic (df = 9; 1040)	1.250	1.914**	2.940***	1.303
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Tables 12 and 13 test the effect that treatments had on how intelligent, hardworking, peaceful, and trustworthy Bosniaks are. There are two significant effects within this chart. First, the correlation coefficient for the Migration and Religion Treatment on the Intelligent/Unintelligent variable is 0.245 with a p-value that is less than 0.05, signifying that as Serbian respondents are primed to the Muslim orientation of migrants, they are significantly more likely to categorize Bosniaks as 'unintelligent' compared to the control group. Second, the Migration Treatment on the Hardworking/Lazy variable recorded a correlation coefficient of -0.202 with a p-value of less than 0.1, signifying that as Serb respondents are exposed to the migrant nature of the Middle Eastern out-group, they are more likely to find Bosniaks hardworking compared to the control.

Table 14: Simple Regression Results on Stereotype Attitudes Against Croats, Control Against All Treatments

	Simple Regression Results on Stereotype Attitudes Against Croats, Control Against All Treatments:			
	Intelligent(1)/Unintelligent(7)	Hardworking(1)/Lazy(7)	Peaceful(1)/Violent(7)	Trustworthy(1)/Untrustworthy(7)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migration Treatment	0.126	-0.101	0.007	0.060
	(0.126)	(0.108)	(0.146)	(0.144)
Migration + Race Treatment	-0.108	-0.163	-0.137	-0.029
	(0.126)	(0.108)	(0.146)	(0.144)
Migration + Religion Treatment	0.138	0.038	0.119	0.107
	(0.126)	(0.108)	(0.146)	(0.144)
Constant	3.176***	2.966***	4.027***	3.789***
	(0.089)	(0.076)	(0.104)	(0.102)
Observations	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050
R^2	0.005	0.004	0.003	0.001
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.001	0.0001	-0.002
Residual Std. Error (df = 1046)	1.444	1.235	1.672	1.649
F Statistic (df = 3; 1046)	1.696	1.467	1.028	0.357

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15: Simple Regression Results on Stereotype Attitudes Against Croats, Control Against All Treatments, Accounting for Control Variables

	Simple Regression Results on Stereotype Attitudes Against Croats, Control Against All Treatments, Accounting for Control Variables:			
	Intelligent(1)/Unintelligent(7)	Hardworking(1)/Lazy(7)	Peaceful(1)/Violent(7)	TTrustworthy(1)/Untrustworthy(7)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migration Treatment	0.131	-0.095	0.022	0.081
	(0.126)	(0.108)	(0.144)	(0.142)
Migration + Race Treatmentt	-0.104	-0.159	-0.118	-0.004
	(0.126)	(0.108)	(0.144)	(0.142)
Migration + Religion Treatment	0.148	0.041	0.156	0.137
	(0.126)	(0.108)	(0.144)	(0.142)
Gender	-0.057	-0.087	0.129	-0.025
	(0.089)	(0.076)	(0.102)	(0.101)
Age	-0.089**	-0.034	-0.013	-0.034
	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Serbian Nationality	0.105	0.193	-0.004	0.206
	(0.173)	(0.149)	(0.199)	(0.196)
Religion	0.292**	0.118	0.710***	0.627***
	(0.123)	(0.105)	(0.141)	(0.139)
Refugee History	0.039	-0.192	0.399**	0.204
	(0.160)	(0.137)	(0.183)	(0.181)
Race	0.085	0.133	0.016	-0.009
	(0.118)	(0.101)	(0.135)	(0.133)
Constant	3.083***	2.756***	3.385***	3.203***
	(0.244)	(0.209)	(0.280)	(0.276)
Observations	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050
R^2	0.023	0.016	0.040	0.035
Adjusted R^2	0.015	0.008	0.032	0.027
Residual Std. Error (df = 1040)	1.435	1.231	1.646	1.626
F Statistic (df = 9; 1040)	2.732***	1.929**	4.830***	4.202***
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Tables 14 and 15 test the effect that treatments had on how intelligent, hardworking, peaceful, and trustworthy Croats are. There were no significant findings that the treatment had any effect on whether Serbs believe Bosniaks and Croats are intelligent, hardworking, peaceful, or trustworthy.

SECTION F: TIME-SERIES FINDINGS

Because this study was based on a public opinion poll that measured social distance among Serbs and ethnic minorities in Serbia in 2004, I also had the opportunity to measure how affective distance among certain variables changed from 2004 to 2021in reference to Bosniaks

and Croats. Tables 16 through 19 test the significance of these changes through a simple linear regression controlling for Age and Gender.

Table 16: Linear Regression Results On Changes in Willingness To Accept Bosniaks and Croats Into The Country From 2004 to 2021

	Linear Regression Results On Changes in Willingness To Accept Bosniaks and Croats Into The Country From 2004 to 2021:	
	Accept Bosniaks Into Country	Accept Croats Into Country
	(1)	(2)
Year	-0.424***	-0.419***
	(0.041)	(0.044)
Gender	0.011	-0.036
	(0.030)	(0.031)
Age	-0.022**	-0.0004
	(0.009)	(0.010)
Constant	1.489***	1.439***
	(0.040)	(0.043)
Observations	1,700	1,696
R^2	0.061	0.053
Adjusted R^2	0.059	0.051
Residual Std. Error	0.608 (df = 1696)	0.646 (df = 1692)
F Statistic	36.410*** (df = 3; 1696)	31.434*** (df = 3; 1692)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 17: Linear Regression Results On Changes in Willingness To Accept Bosniaks and Croats Into Neighborhoods From 2004 to 2021

	Table 17: Linear Regression Results On Changes in Willingness To Accept Bosniaks and Croats Into Neighborhoods From 2004 to 2021:	
	Accept Bosniaks Into Neighborhood	Accept Croats Into Neighbourhood
	(1)	(2)
Year	-0.461***	-0.436***
	(0.043)	(0.044)
Female	0.034	-0.042
	(0.031)	(0.032)
Age	-0.020**	0.004
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Constant	1.509***	1.446***
	(0.042)	(0.043)
Observations	1,698	1,696
R^2	0.066	0.056
Adjusted R^2	0.065	0.054
Residual Std. Error	0.631 (df = 1694)	0.657 (df = 1692)
F Statistic	40.070*** (df = 3; 1694)	33.302*** (df = 3; 1692)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 18: Linear Regression Results On Changes in Willingness To Accept Bosniaks and Croats As Friends From 2004 to 2021

	Linear Regression Results On Changes in Willingness To Accept Bosniaks and Croats As Friends From 2004 to 2021:	
	Accept Bosniak as Friend	Accept Croat as Friend
	(1)	(2)
Year	-0.479***	-0.463***
	(0.044)	(0.045)
Female	0.051	-0.006
	(0.031)	(0.032)
Age	-0.001	0.018*
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Constant	1.456***	1.410***
	(0.043)	(0.044)
Observations	1,698	1,693
R^2	0.069	0.063
Adjusted R^2	0.067	0.061
Residual Std. Error	0.644 (df = 1694)	0.667 (df = 1689)
F Statistic	41.543*** (df = 3; 1694)	37.550*** (df = 3; 1689)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 19: Linear Regression Results On Changes in Willingness To Accept Bosniaks and Croats As Family From 2004 to 2021

	Linear Regression Results On Changes in Willingness To Accept Bosniaks and Croats As Family From 2004 to 2021:	
	Accept Bosniak Into Family	Accept Croat Into Family
	(1)	(2)
Year	-0.809***	-0.738***
	(0.048)	(0.049)
Female	0.078**	0.039
	(0.034)	(0.036)
Age	0.006	0.008
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Constant	1.751***	1.692***
	(0.047)	(0.048)
Observations	1,696	1,692
R^2	0.149	0.119
Adjusted R^2	0.148	0.118
Residual Std. Error	0.707 (df = 1692)	0.730 (df = 1688)
F Statistic	98.761*** (df = 3; 1692)	76.292*** (df = 3; 1688)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Across Tables 16 through 19, it is seen that there are negative coefficient values across every variable for both Bosniaks and Croats, signifying that ethnic distance is shrinking and

Serbs are becoming more open to Bosniak and Croat relationships over time. Additionally, each of these coefficient values also proved to be statistically significant, with all eight tests earning a p-value that is less than 0.01. In all cases, this indicates that the affective distance between Serbs and Bosniaks as well as Serbs and Croats has become significantly smaller over 17 years of observation. Perhaps most notably, this is especially significant in Table 19, which measured the change in individual's willingness to accept Bosniaks and Croats into their families. The regression coefficient was recorded at -0.809 and -0.738, respectively—a value far greater than any other variable tested. This indicates that over time, interethnic marriages have made the most progress in becoming accepted overall.

PART 7: CONCLUSION

As a result of unprecedented levels of global migration, the face of previously homogenous countries has become more diverse. In the United States, Switzerland, and several other European countries, influxes of affectively distant migrant groups (primarily non-white, non-Christian people) have had the effect of pushing existing minorities and out-groups closer to the dominant in-group of the country, culminating in warmer relationships between ethnic groups whose contact had been primarily defended by tension and discrimination (Fouka et al., 2020). How does this trend apply to post-war nations experiencing similar types of migration? More specifically, how does this apply to the case of Serbia? Defined by centuries of ethnic conflict, genocides, and oppression, the ways in which Serbia's ethnic boundaries were created are fundamentally different from those of Western European countries, making it a unique location to test the effect of racially divergent migration. As rising climate disasters and global unrest promise rising migration rates, it is crucial not only for scholars of the Balkans but also for governments, reconciliation organizations, and minority protection groups to understand the ways that migration can affect ethnic cleavages after a civil war.

This study fills the gap in scholarly literature regarding the effect of migration on ethnic reconciliation within post-war countries, using a survey experiment to not only measure the ways affective distance between Serbs, Bosnians, and Croats have changed since 2004 but to also measure the effect that Middle Eastern Migration has had on these same relationships. Specifically, I test the ways that priming Serbian respondents on the migration status, race, and religion of Middle Eastern Migrants affects feelings and affective distance between Croats and Bosniaks, respectively. The data reveals that while the affective distance between both Serbs and Croats as well as Serbs and Bosniaks has become significantly warmer since 2001, the migration,

race, and religion vignettes did not have a significant effect on the relationships between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks within the experiment. This latter finding deviates from a trend observed in studies done in the U.S., Switzerland, and western countries that have not experienced a recent civil war.

The survey indicates that no treatment condition significantly varied from the control among both feeling thermometer and affective distance variables. This finding diverges from a considerable trend of racially divergent migration resulting in warmer relationships among existing ethnic groups within European societies. The non-significant findings indicate that the ethnic boundaries between Serbs and Croats, as well as Serbs and Bosniaks, are more resilient to external change and are more rigid in general. While this data fails to support my hypothesis, it is in line with the history and nature of ethnic relationships in the Serbian context. That is, the ethnic cleavages of a post-war country are fundamentally different and less prone to change than those of non-post-war countries. While I cannot say for certain why the effect of migration on Serbian ethnic cleavages deviated from that of western nations, I offer four possible theories that may explain this effect.

First, post-conflict cleavages are unique and rigid in ways that ethnic cleavages in the United States and Switzerland are not. As documented in the literature review, the conflict between Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats is not only rooted in differences in religion but is also grounded in mutual resentment over colonization, genocides, and failed unification. Whereas conflictual situations in the United States and Switzerland are often characterized by one ethnic group having consistent and powerful domination over all other groups with little significant retaliation, the situation of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs is that all three ethnic groups have had a moment of significant power, abuse, and domination over the others at different periods of time.

Resentment between the groups is not rooted in animosity against one central oppressor but rather over a perception that each respective culture has betrayed, defiled, and deviated from their ethnic origin to the point that the Slavic nature of the groups is no longer a unifier.

One unique characteristic shared between Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats is their common culture, one that is rooted in a shared nationality, language, and origin. Unlike that of the White/Black American dynamic or the Swiss/Italian relationship in Switzerland, the common Slavic origin of the three groups in question may in fact be a reason why inter-ethnic cleavages are so immobile to external change like migration. This Slavic origin acts as both a basis for unification and a catalyst for antagonism, often leading to the high rates of inter-ethnic marriages that were witnessed in Yugoslavia while also accounting for the deep feelings of betrayal that respondents have reported in past surveys towards their Balkan counterparts (Kitromildes, 1989). The difference here from other countries who did experience a significant ethnic reconciliation in response to migration is that the primary determinant of what makes one an out-group is not solely based on one's race, religion, or nationality, but rather, is based on one's historical perception. That is, is that individual's group perceived to be one that betrayed their Slavic origin? Is one group perceived to have committed a war crime against someone that was once called their 'brother' in government documents? While it is difficult to tell whether this common Slavic origin drives warmness or distance between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, it can certainly explain the unique rigidness to migration that is observed in the results.

Second, the visibility of existing ethnic minorities is also a factor that may have accounted for the non-significant effect of migration. While the visible difference between Black and White Americans is highly apparent, as is the difference between Swiss citizens and Italian migrants, the visible difference between Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats is almost non-existent. The

primary difference and out-group determinant in the Serbian context is religion—a non-visible characteristic.[2] Aside from a few dialectal differences, these groups appear identical—often even to each other. Within the U.S. and Swedish contexts, the dominant in-group of the country can often use race, language, and general appearance to distinguish an ethnic minority in their country or neighborhood. Their difference is both noticeable and immediately divergent from their own visible characteristics, enabling them to use visual characteristics as a primary tool for out-group categorizations, whereas Serbs often rely on self-volunteered information regarding religion and nationality that is not immediately apparent and may not always be volunteered.

Additionally, because of the existence of Yugoslavia, many Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats have been or are already integrated into communities in a way that segregated communities in the United States and Switzerland have yet to achieve. Because the immediate visibility of Croats and Bosniaks is difficult to distinguish or tell and levels of relatively smooth integration have already occurred in the Serbian context, questions of affective distance may not be as significantly impacted compared to countries where segregation is present across visible, racial lines. That is, affective distance to Croats and Bosniaks may have already been minimal among Serb respondents not because of their willingness to be closer or warmer to these groups, but rather because of existing inter-ethnic neighborhoods that have survived since the era of Yugoslavia. While integrated communities also exist in the United States, the racially divergent nature of ethnic minorities has often led to high levels of discrimination, hate crime, and reports of continued high affective distance despite long-term integration. However, because of the similar, visible nature of the three groups at hand, the backlash against integrated community living is not, and has never, as harsh as that of integrated communities in the United States—

[2] While hijabs and other religious head coverings can be considered as visual indicators of religion, the frequency of Muslim women wearing the hijab in non-religious settings within Serbia is very low.

raising the possibility that affective distance may not be an adequate measurement for reconciliation in Serbia.

Third, the short-term nature of the current migration influx may also account for the relatively low impact of migration on ethnic relationships. It is important to note that the influx of Middle Eastern Migrants has only been significantly present since 2015 and that the studies cited in this paper on the United States and Switzerland tracked the effect of migration on a decadal scale, oftentimes measuring social distance and feelings after more than 20 years of migrant presence. Currently, in the Serbian context, both migrants and Serb residents have both noted that they believe that the Middle Eastern influx is temporary and will soon be moved into the E.U. After five years of being "permanently stuck in transit," this eventual move is unlikely to happen, yet it is significant that citizens continue to hold this belief (Galijas, 2017). Levels of antagonism may be relatively low towards Middle Eastern migrants in Serbia as compared to other countries due to this belief, and as a result, may not have the full effect of changing in-group boundaries because they are still not considered to be a true, permanent out-group. Rather, they are seen as a temporary out-group, one that is different but ultimately not there to stay. This may have weakened the effect of the migration treatment as compared to countries like the United States and Switzerland, whose migrant stay has surpassed multiple decades and has established itself as a permanent characteristic of the country.

Finally, Serbia's own experience with having high levels of Serbian refugees and internally displaced person across Europe may contribute to abnormally warm attitudes towards the Middle Eastern migrant population. As noted in the literature review, Serbia had the highest amount of refugees in Europe both from 1990 to 1995, as well as from 2006 to 2009 (Kilmongres, 2010). Over 15% of the current population living in Serbia has inexperienced inter-

country displacement during periods of conflict, and over 45% of the country has reported some level of intra-country displacement for the same reason (King, 2020). Within the sample survey, over 11% of the respondents reported being refugees themselves at one point or another. Possessing a very recent familiarity with what it means to be a migrant fleeing a violent situation, Serbs have a unique level of sympathy towards the Middle Eastern migrants fleeing their own respective violent conflict. This understanding has created a country that has some of the warmest and most sympathetic refugee policies and attitudes in all of Europe in recent years, indicating that the level of antagonism that was documented against in immigrants in the U.S. and Swiss contexts is not witnessed at nearly the same level in Serbia. Without this same level on antagonism, the mechanism that forced in-group boundaries to change in non-post-war nations is not as effective, and does not lend itself to the type of inter-ethnic alliance against a 'common out-group' enemy that Fouka et al witnessed in the U.S. context because Serbs do not see migrants as a true out-group enemy (Fouka, 2020). Instead, Serbs may have high levels of identification with the migrants themselves. This is important for our understanding of post-war nations in general. Like Serbia, many post-war nations have experienced a significant portions of its citizens being categorized as 'refugees' or 'displaced persons' at one point or another—a significant difference from countries who have not experienced a similar violent conflict. Post-war societies in general may have a higher tolerance for migrants in general, and may also exhibit warm attitudes towards them because of shared sympathy for the refugee experience, indicating that post-war nations may differ significantly from nations who have not experienced a civil conflict that has displaced a portion of their citizenry.

It is also important to note the general findings in the data about changes in attitude between 2004 and the present. In a period of seventeen years, affective distance grew smaller on

every single variable for both Bosniaks and Croats. While this is somewhat expected two decades after the Bosnian war, the results are also promising. The findings indicate that ethnic cleavages between Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats are mending and becoming more positive with the passing of time. While it is challenging to conclude precisely why these ethnic relationships have grown socially closer within the past seventeen years, one can point not only to the effect of time but also to the effect of reconciliation efforts as a cause. Indeed, the presence of economic normalization agreements, the conviction of not only Serb generals but also Croatian and Kosovar politicians, and the gradual coming-of-age of a younger, less polarized political generation have certainly eased the tensions felt immediately after the conclusion of the Bosnian War (Reuters, 2016).

However, while the findings—as well as the ongoing reconciliation efforts in place—are promising, it is important to note that inter-ethnic relationships in the Balkans are far from being considered amicable or harmonious. As of 2021, war tribunals for crimes committed in the wars spanning from the 1990s to 2008 continue to be held, resulting in the indictments of high-profile politicians among all Balkan countries, including Kosovo's former president, Hashim Thaci. These tribunals, along with various debates on the legitimacy of areas such as Republika Srpska and the country of Kosovo itself, continue to maintain levels of resentment and anger that have strained inter-ethnic relationships.

It is still unclear as to what interethnic relationships will look like in Serbia—or the greater Balkans—in the next few decades, but what is clear is that despite continued controversy and tension, relationships between ethnic groups appear to be repairing with the passage of time. This study indicates that while this progressive healing is slow, it is also somewhat immune to external factors like short-term migration, indicating a level of inter-ethnic relationship resiliency

that is not witnessed in the United States or Switzerland. Further studies must be done to evaluate the resilient nature of Bosniak-Serb and Croat-Serb relationships to understand what other external factors, in addition to migration, may or may not have an effect on the social distance of ethnic groups in Serbia.

The survey results of the study beg for further attention on the ways that migration affects post-war societies differently from relatively non-conflictual studies. This type of study must be expanded beyond western societies that have not recently experienced a civil war. As displacement and climate change increases in frequency, it will not only be western nations hosting refugees and diverse migrants. In fact, current projections show that most forcibly displaced migrants will be received in low- and middle-income countries—many of which have recently experienced a violent civil conflict themselves (Fratzke, 2019). It is thus imperative that researchers examine the possible effects of international migration in post-war contexts in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. A study similar to mine testing individuals on their reaction to ethnic minorities after being exposed to a migration vignette is suggested. This type of data would reveal to us the ways that ethnic reconciliation may be hindered, advanced, or resilient in response to migration, giving us insight into the ways that transnational justice may be affected in the coming years.

Additionally, the study of Serbia requires further research. As Middle Eastern migration influxes may rise and become more permanent, this study may require re-evaluation to see if the longevity of migrant stay will result in more significant findings. Finally, the integration of migrants themselves in response to varying levels of ethnic conflict also needs to be further studied. While migrants in Serbia are currently finding themselves in a relatively safe environment compared to migrant conditions in Turkey or Hungary, how will the religious

conflict Serbs experienced with Bosniaks and Croats influence the ability of migrants to express their freedom of religion on a long-term basis? Similar to the U.S. context, is there intergroup conflict witnessed between existing ethnic minorities in Serbia and new migrants? While this study focuses on the ways that migrants affect the experiences of existing minorities, it is also equally important to study the ways that existing minorities may affect migrant experiences and integration.

There are also several areas where this study could be improved and where further research can expand on its findings. First, the survey experiment would have benefited from the inclusion of pictures during the vignettes. While the vignettes did indeed prime respondents on race and religion through written prompts, the vignettes were relatively sanitized. A more visible reminder of race and religion may have a more significant and realistic effect that can replicate the actual feelings of social distance Serbian residents may feel upon seeing a Middle Eastern migrant in their country or neighborhood.

Another area where the study could be improved is the addition of treatment categories that focus on East Asian migration in contrast to Middle Eastern Migration. As Serbia-China relations have begun to strengthen substantially and a plan to build a new silk road through Belgrade is underway, Serbia has begun to witness a steady level of voluntary Chinese migration into the country. In contrast to Middle Eastern migrants who are forcibly displaced, the Chinese migrants in Serbia are not refugees but are often voluntary migrants seeking economic expansion in the Balkans. Replicating the same experiment with the use of Chinese migrants as the treatment condition has the potential to tell us the ways that Serbian conceptions of race are being built as increasingly more racial minorities begin to enter the country.

There is hope for greater ethnic reconciliation in Serbia; however, this study makes it

clear that Middle Eastern Migration is not currently impacting ethnic reconciliation on a significant level. As the country begins to construct new definitions of what 'race' and 'nationality' mean in the wake of ethnic war, it is clear that Serbia's post-war status separates the effect migration has on existing ethnic relationships from that of the United States and Switzerland. This study diverges from the existing literature, indicating that a different, more resilient type of ethnic boundary may exist in post-war nations. As migration shows no signs of slowing down, it is crucial not only to understand how this mechanism will continue to evolve in Serbia but in the rest of the world as well.

APPENDIX

Figure 1: Projection of Ethnic Minority and Migrant Background % of Population, Sourced from the Centre on Migration, Policy, and Society



Figure 12: Complete List of Survey Questions

Question	Supplementary Information and Answer Choices
What gender do you most identify with?	a. Man b. Woman c. Not Applicable
What is your age?	a. 18-24 years old b. 25-34 years old c. 35-44 years old d. 45-54 years old e. 55-64 years old f. 65-74 years old g. 75 years or older
Are you considered a Serbian Citizen?	a. Yes b. No

What do you consider to be your own nationality (check as many boxes as apply)?	a. Serbian b. Bosnian c. Croatian d. Montenegrin e. Kosovar f. Albanian g. Roma h. Other Nationality—Balkan i. Other Nationality—General
What is your race? (check as many boxes as apply)	a. White b. White (Middle Eastern) c. East Asian d. Southeast Asian e. Black or African f. Other
What do you identify as your religion	d. Christian i. Orthodox ii. Catholic iii. Pentecostal iv. Protestant v. Other and Unknown Christian e. Muslim i. Sunni Muslim ii. Other Muslim f. Other Religion g. Not Religious
Were you ever forced to change the community where you were living due to conflict and war during 1990-2000?	a. Yes b. No
Are you still living away from what you consider your real "home" republic/territory?	a. Yes b. No
Feeling thermometer [Group]	I'd like to get your feelings toward some people in the news these days. I'll read the name of a person and I'll ask you to rate that person on a thermometer that runs from 0 to 100 degrees. Rating above 50 means that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Rating below 50 means that you feel unfavorable and cool toward the person. Rating right at the 50-degree mark means you don't feel particularly warm or cold. You may use any number from 0 to 100 to tell me how favorable or unfavorable your feelings are. Still using the thermometer how would you rate the following groups? [Group] 1. Bosnians 2. Croatians 3. Kosovar Albanians 4. Montenegrins 5. Roma People

	6. Middle Eastern Migrants
[Group] intelligent	The next set asks if people in each group tend to be "intelligent" or "unintelligent". Where would you rate [Group] (in general) on this scale? [1. Intelligent - 7. Unintelligent] 1. Bosnians 2. Croatians 3. Kosovar Albanians 4. Montenegrins 5. Roma People 6. Middle Eastern Migrants
[Group] hard-working	Now I have some questions about different groups in our society. I'm going to show you a seven- point scale on which the characteristics of the people in a group can be rated. In the first statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group tend to be "hard-working". A score of 7 means that almost all of the people in the group are "lazy". A score of 4 means that you think that most people in the group are not closer to one end or the other, and of course you may choose any number in between. Where would R rate [group]'s work ethic on this scale? 1. Bosnians 2. Croatians 3. Kosovar Albanians 4. Montenegrins 5. Roma People 6. Middle Eastern Migrants
[Group] violent	Do people in these groups tend to be violent or do they tend to be peaceful? Where would R rate the group's disposition? [Group] [1. Peaceful - 7. Violent] 1. Bosnians 2. Croatians 3. Kosovar Albanians 4. Montenegrins 5. Roma People 6. Middle Eastern Migrants
[Group] trustworthy	Where would you rate [Group] on this scale? [1. Untrustworthy - 7. Trustworthy] 1. Bosnians 2. Croatians 3. Kosovar Albanians 4. Montenegrins 5. Roma People 6. Middle Eastern Migrants
[Group] similar	How similar do you believe these groups are to you on this scale (1. Not similar at

	all-7-Idenitical/No Difference) 1. Bosnians 2. Croatians 3. Kosovar Albanians 4. Montenegrins 5. Roma People 6. Middle Eastern Migrants
Community: Country	How willing would you be to accept [group] as a person permanently living in your country? (1. It makes no difference to me/I don't mind, 7. I would have very strong objections) 1. Bosnians 2. Croatians 3. Kosovar Albanians 4. Montenegrins 5. Roma People 6. Middle Eastern Migrants
Community: Neighborhood	How willing would you be to accept [group] as a person permanently living in your neighborhood? (1. It makes no difference to me/I don't mind, 7. I would have very strong objections) 1. Bosnians 2. Croatians 3. Kosovar Albanians 4. Montenegrins 5. Roma People 6. Middle Eastern Migrants
Community: Friend	How willing would you be to accept [group] as friend or companion to spend time with? (1. It makes no difference to me/I don't mind, 7. I would have very strong objections) 1. Bosnians 2. Croatians 3. Kosovar Albanians 4. Montenegrins 5. Roma People 6. Middle Eastern Migrants
Community: Close Relative by marriage	How willing would you be to accept [group] as a close relative by marriage to a sibling or child? (1. It makes no difference to me/I don't mind, 7. I would have very strong objections) 1. Bosnians 2. Croatians 3. Kosovar Albanians 4. Montenegrins

	5. Roma People 6. Middle Eastern Migrants

Table 9: Bivariate and Multivariate Regression Results on Affective Distance Against Bosniaks and Croats, Testing Control Against the Migration Treatment Group

	Bivariate and Multivariate Regression Results on Affective Distance Against Bosniaks and Croats, Testing Control Against the Migration Treatment Group:			
	Bosniak Affective Distance	Croat Affective Distance	Bosniak Affective Distance(Controls)	Croat Affective Distance(Controls)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migration Treatment	0.277	0.251	0.411	0.405
	(0.657)	(0.706)	(0.655)	(0.692)
Gender			-1.442**	-0.667
			(0.655)	(0.691)
Age			0.544**	-0.254
			(0.253)	(0.267)
Serbian Nationality			0.414	0.767
			(1.333)	(1.407)
Religion			2.137**	4.551***
			(0.930)	(0.982)
Refugee History			-0.165	0.962
			(1.136)	(1.199)
Race			0.323	0.458
			(0.861)	(0.909)
Constant	13.904***	14.153***	10.530***	10.455***
	(0.466)	(0.501)	(1.767)	(1.865)
Observations	526	526	526	526
R^2	0.0003	0.0002	0.030	0.064
Adjusted R^2	-0.002	-0.002	0.017	0.051
Residual Std. Error	7.534 (df = 524)	8.099 (df = 524)	7.465 (df = 518)	7.881 (df = 518)
F Statistic	0.178 (df = 1; 524)	0.126 (df = 1; 524)	2.285** (df = 7; 518)	5.067*** (df = 7; 518)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10: Bivariate and Multivariate Regression Results on Affective Distance Against

Bosniaks and Croats, Testing Control Against the Migration + Race Treatment Group

	Bivariate and Multivariate Regression Results on Affective Distance Against Bosniaks and Croats, Testing Control Against the Migration + Race Treatment Group:			
	Bosniak Affective Distance	Croat Affective Distance	Bosniak Affective Distance(Controls)	Croat Affective Distance(Controls)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migration + Race Treatmebt	0.636	-0.146	0.844	0.117
	(0.657)	(0.700)	(0.650)	(0.675)
Gender			-0.679	-0.776
			(0.650)	(0.676)
Age			0.492*	-0.391
			(0.255)	(0.264)
Serbian			-1.021	-0.951
			(1.258)	(1.307)
Religion			3.688***	5.955***
			(0.889)	(0.924)
Refugee			-0.586	1.112
			(1.158)	(1.204)
Race			0.447	-0.444
			(0.861)	(0.895)
Constant	13.904***	14.153***	10.284***	12.072***
	(0.465)	(0.496)	(1.723)	(1.791)
Observations	524	524	524	524
R^2	0.002	0.0001	0.045	0.091
Adjusted R^2	-0.0001	-0.002	0.032	0.078
Residual Std. Error	7.514 (df = 522)	8.009 (df = 522)	7.393 (df = 516)	7.682 (df = 516)
F Statistic	0.938 (df = 1; 522)	0.043 (df = 1; 522)	3.461*** (df = 7; 516)	7.344*** (df = 7; 516)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11: Bivariate and Multivariate Regression Results on Affective Distance Against Bosniaks and Croats, Testing Control Against the Migration + Religion Treatment Group

	Bivariate and Multivariate Regression Results on Affective Distance Against Bosniaks and Croats, Testing Control Against the Migration + Religion Treatment Group:			
	Bosniak Affective Distance	Croat Affective Distance	Bosniak Affective Distance(Controls	Croat Affective Distance(Controls)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migration + Religion Treatment	0.866	0.364	1.037	0.596
	(0.668)	(0.716)	(0.653)	(0.693)
Gender			-0.192	0.196
			(0.654)	(0.695)
Age			0.501*	-0.193
			(0.255)	(0.271)
Serbian Nationality			-0.041	0.516
			(1.311)	(1.392)
Religion			4.425***	5.283***
			(0.963)	(1.022)
Refugee History			-0.362	1.135
			(1.322)	(1.404)
Race			0.747	0.483
			(0.828)	(0.879)
Constant	13.904***	14.153***	8.260***	9.425***
	(0.472)	(0.506)	(1.709)	(1.815)
Observations	522	522	522	522
R^2	0.003	0.0005	0.062	0.077
Adjusted R^2	0.001	-0.001	0.049	0.065
Residual Std. Error	7.626 (df = 520)	8.175 (df = 520)	7.440 (df = 514)	7.901 (df = 514)
F Statistic	1.683 (df = 1; 520)	0.259 (df = 1; 520)	4.866*** (df = 7; 514)	6.144*** (df = 7; 514)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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