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Externalities of Consent: Host Government Consent and UN Institutional Weakness

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Abstract

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UN peacekeeping operations intervene in war-torn countries to protect civilians and restore peace. However, operations must deploy with the consent of the host government. Consent can be revoked at any point, forcing peacekeeper exit. This gives governments leverage over the mission: by threatening to revoke consent, governments gain power over peacekeepers. In civil wars, this is not leverage that non-state actors possess. This dissertation explores how consent is used by governments to reap benefits from peacekeepers and how consent alters peacekeeper behavior. This dissertation argues that peacekeepers' subnational deployment patterns are influenced by governmental preferences. Modern peacekeeping operations are able to use force, allowing them to contribute military benefits to the subnational locations where they are deployed. Host governments seek to ensure that peacekeepers are deployed to the areas where these benefits can support them in battle and aid in consolidating territorial control. Thus, subnational peacekeeper deployments should be more likely to go where they can support a government in conflict, as opposed to deploying to where they can support non-state actors. Moreover, consent also implies that peacekeepers should be less effective at constraining host government violence against civilians. This results in peacekeepers being ineffective at reducing host government violence. Using an original database of subnational peacekeeper deployments, this project introduces host governments as political actors with agency in peacekeeping operations; rather than understanding peacekeepers as neutral, this dissertation instead demonstrates that political constraints force bias into their actions.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In February of 2020, rebels from the Popular Front for the Rebirth of Central Africa (FPRC) entered into the town of Birao in the Central African Republic. After clashing with the UN peacekeepers and government troops stationed there, 12 members of the FPRC were killed and the remaining rebels were pushed out of the area (*Al Jazeera* 2020). This is not a story unique to Birao. For example, during the UN operation in Sierra Leone, UN peacekeepers stationed near a key bridge skirmished with Revolutionary United Front (RUF) members as they tried to advance to the capital. The peacekeepers, able to return fire in self-defense, defeated the rebels and pushed them out of the area, costing the RUF an advance, ammunition, and the bridge (*Reuters* 2000, *The Telegraph* 2000). This occurred in 1999 – 21 years before the Birao attack. Most notable is the case of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), an offensive peacekeeping unit installed in MONUSCO, the current mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The FIB engaged in direct attacks against the M23 rebel group, prompting the group to lose territory across multiple Congolese towns. Eventually, the group was forced to retreat to Uganda and Rwanda, declaring the end of its rebellion in the Congo (Tull 2018). Indeed, across many of its missions, UN peacekeeping operations are playing a clear and active role in the conflicts to which they are deployed.

These stories, of UN peacekeeping operations actively participating in the conflicts to

which they are deployed, demonstrate the military benefits that can be provided by these peacekeepers. This, on its face, is counter to the traditional understanding of UN peacekeepers and the benefits that they offer. Indeed, we tend to think of peacekeepers as providing peace, rather than being immersed in violence. This has been the key takeaway of much of the literature surrounding UN peacekeepers. The presence of peacekeepers is associated with an increase in the duration of peace and a decrease in the likelihood of conflict resumption; the containment of conflict, both regionally and at a subnational level; and a reduction in both battlefield deaths of civilians and one-sided violence against civilians (Fortna 2008, 2004, 2003, Sambanis 2008, Sambanis and Doyle 2007, Doyle and Sambanis 2006, Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015, Beardsley 2011, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013, 2014, 2015, Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019, Carnegie and Mikulaschek 2020, Bove and Ruggeri 2016). In sum, we know that peacekeepers, writ large, can reduce violence and promote peace.

This dissertation focuses instead on two aspects of peacekeeping operations that have yet to be discussed by much of the literature: the role of the governments that host these missions, and the military benefits that peacekeepers can offer to these governments. This study argues that modern, robust peacekeeping operations can offer a variety of military benefits to the host governments that are embroiled in civil conflicts, and that host governments can take advantage of these benefits in a way that rebels cannot. This influences where peacekeepers deploy within a conflict, and how they operate once they are in those locations. However, prior to understanding how peacekeepers can effectively assist governments in conflict, we must first establish what UN peacekeeping operations are and how they have evolved to this point.

1.1 The Shifting Nature of UN Peacekeeping

United Nations peacekeeping operations have deployed to respond to conflicts since 1948. Since then, there has been a dramatic shift in the types of conflicts that peacekeepers re-

spond to and the functions of such operations. This dissertation distinguishes between two main types of UN peacekeeping operations: traditional peacekeeping operations and robust peacekeeping operations. Traditional peacekeeping operations, for the purposes of this dissertation, are those missions not authorized to use force to protect civilians and typically focused on a relatively small number of post-conflict tasks. These missions are primarily deployed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Chapter VI, "The Pacific Settlement of Disputes," did not allow peacekeepers to use force to fulfill their mandate or to ensure their own safety. Prior to 1992, all peacekeeping operations under the control of the United Nations were authorized under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Traditional peacekeeping missions were largely deployed during the 20th century to respond to interstate conflicts.[1] These missions observed ceasefires, demobilization, demilitarized zones, and more. Traditional missions were largely staffed with military observers or lightly armed troops, and were primarily not able to use force beyond self defense.

Robust peacekeeping, sometimes referred to as "multidimensional" peacekeeping, emerged in the post-Cold War era, and has developed into the standard peacekeeping operation of the 21st century.[2] The language of robust missions was formalized in 2008 by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, defining robust missions as a strategy "to signal the intention of a UN mission to implement its mandate and to deter threats to an existing peace process in the face of resistance from spoilers" (United Nations 2009, p. 21). The UN acknowl-

[1] This conceptualization of traditional peacekeeping blurs earlier concepts of observer peacekeeper missions and interpositional or traditional peacekeeping missions. The key aspect of these missions, for the purposes of this dissertation, is that these missions are not authorized to use force, not equipped to protect civilians, and typically focused on a relatively small number of post-conflict tasks.

[2] What, broadly, consists of a robust mission has evolved over time. Initially, Chapter VII or robust missions were meant to capture those that did not deploy with the consent of the host government due to the ability of such operations to use force. For example, Fortna (2008) distinguished between consent based, or Chapter VI, missions and peace enforcement, or Chapter VII, missions. Likewise, in that book, multidimensional peacekeeping missions are those with civilian and military personnel deployed to implement a peace agreement but not with the ability to use force. As the norm of robust peacekeeping operations grew in the 1990s and 2000s, it became readily apparent that missions authorized under Chapter VII still required the consent of host government. For example, Howard (2019) defines multidimensional peacekeeping as those with police, military, civilian, human rights, and elections components within the mission. So, for the purposes of this dissertation, robust missions are those that host a broad variety of peacekeepers (military, police, observers, and/or civilians), have a protection of civilians mandate, and can use force for self-defense and for civilian protection.

edged formally that to carry out robust mandates, the "use of force at the tactical level may be necessary to defend the mission and its mandate from spoilers, and to protect civilians (when mandated)" (de Coning, Detzel and Hojem 2008, p. 19). These operations are thus authorized with the consent of the host nation but allow for the use of tactical force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This norm of the use of force to support a mandate largely emerged after the missions of the 1990s (Findlay 2002). Robust peacekeeping operations are largely deployed to intrastate conflicts. Continuing into the 21st century, peacekeepers have been mandated to do much more than oversee the end of conflicts; they are responsible for human rights, supporting and strengthening domestic institutions, overseeing elections, security sector reform, the protection of civilians, and more. Likewise, these missions are staffed with a broad variety of peacekeepers: military, police, observer, and civilian personnel are deployed in nearly all ongoing UN peacekeeping operations. How has the shift to robust peacekeeping and the deployment to civil conflicts affected the practice of UN peacekeeping?

First, UN peacekeepers are more likely to engage with a broader number of combatants beside a host government. In previous and more traditional peacekeeping operations, UN peacekeepers were largely only interacting with the state and its agents; the modern era of peacekeeping, in which peacekeepers are largely deployed in civil conflicts, instead has the UN interacting with a variety of non-state actors. In particular, the conflicts that the UN has deployed to are often complex and feature a variety of non-state actors, including multiple rebel groups, militias, and more.

Second, the capacity of the average peacekeeping operations has greatly increased over time with the shift to robust peacekeeping operations. Authorizing the use of force to back up a mandate has become the norm in peacekeeping operations since 1999 (Hultman 2013*a*). Capacity has increased across a broader range of peacekeeping personnel; it is not just military peacekeepers who can use force. Police peacekeepers, for example, are also allowed to engage in the use of force to protect civilians, a marked shift away from older missions in which military peacekeepers could only use force for self-defense (United Nations

Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support 2017). This too has complicated peacekeeping operations: robust peacekeeping is authorized with the consent of the host nation but involves the use of tactical force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This has coincided with a rise in the importance of protection of civilians to UN peacekeeping operations (Lilly 2012, Hunt 2017). Because peacekeepers are better equipped to use force to protect civilians from conflict and post-conflicted related violence, it has become a central aspect of their mandates. This also reflects the shifting norm of protection of civilians across the broader international community (Hultman 2013*b*). Thus, in operations with a robust Chapter VII mandate, peacekeepers have the potential to engage in the use of force against conflict actors; this includes the host government, should the government behave in a manner that is directly against the mandate of the mission.

Third, the role and functioning of peacekeeping operations has greatly expanded. Peacekeepers take part in a wide variety of tasks in any given conflict. These activities can include election monitoring, security-sector reform, strengthening judicial institutions and the rule of law, protection of civilians, and more. This is a significant evolution of the tasks assigned to peacekeepers, which were primarily for ceasefire observation in their earliest iteration. Because peacekeepers are responsible for more activities, they are engaging more with the conflicts to which they are deployed. In turn, they are also offering a greater number of benefits and goods to the combatants and civilians that they interact with.

Fourth and finally, the entry point of peacekeeping missions has largely been moved to earlier in the conflict. Traditionally, peacekeepers deployed at the request of the parties to the conflict and/or as a result of a peace agreement; both of these requests came at the end of the conflict. Modern peacekeeping operations are increasingly deploying to active and still violent conflicts. This is largely because a new or renewed conflict has erupted, despite the presence of the mission – such as in the case of the mission deployed to the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUSCO. Modern peacekeeping operations have been deploying to active conflicts more frequently, including in the cases of Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Cote D'Ivoire, Burundi, South Sudan, Sudan, and Mali.

These shifts have allowed the UN to become a more significant and important actor on the ground. The increased capacity and role of the UN means that it can provide more tangible benefits on the ground. Instead of simply monitoring combatants, peacekeepers are now deeply embedded in the countries in which they operate, playing a role in security, governance, and human rights systems. Likewise, as peacekeepers are deploying to more active conflicts, they are more likely to actively participate in and contribute to the fighting itself, as seen in the motivating examples of this chapter. This produces a concrete set of goods that can be captured and utilized by the actors that the UN peacekeepers interact with. However, tensions arise on two fronts as a result of these shifts.

First, consent has remained vital to the presence and continuation of a mission, but primarily along traditional state-UN lines. Despite the increased number and types of non-state actors that UN peacekeepers interact with, the consent of these non-state actors has yet to be prioritized by the UN. Moreover, even if these non-state actors consent to the presence of the peacekeeping operation, the UN faces a variety of problems that complicate the nature of non-state actor consent. There is a risk of spoilers splintering from the main body which has agreed to the peacekeeping operation. For example, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was deployed several years after the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi. Although eighteen political parties signed the agreement, the armed wings of two of the signatories broke apart from their organizations and formed splinter groups, continuing the conflict (Koops et al. 2015). Likewise, peacekeepers have dealt with umbrella groups of multiple rebel groups. In these settings, it is not always clear who actually constitutes the main party to the conflict, and who the peacekeepers need to negotiate with. Additionally, even if non-state actors consent to the presence of a peacekeeping operation, there is no guarantee that they will remain the relevant parties to the conflict once the operation has deployed. For example, MONUC was deployed to the DRC in 1999 after the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, an agreement that was not signed

initially by the rebels currently active in the conflict (Koops et al. 2015). Thus, despite the increased role of non-state actors in the settings to which peacekeepers deploy, their consent is often not sought by the United Nations. Host government consent remains the crucial – and typically singular – veto from conflict actors on the ground.

Second, these changes have simultaneously made UN peacekeeping operations lucrative and dangerous to these host governments. While host governments have the potential for clear gains from a UN operation – in that it can contribute to managing or ending a conflict and in that it offers a variety of long-term governance and economic benefits – there are also potential risks that stem from interacting with the UN. Because of the increased capacity and role of peacekeeping operations, most modern missions are explicitly authorized to use force against the host government's agents should they engage in violence against civilians. This risks the imposition of direct costs against the state.

What does this mean for the host government and for the UN? This dissertation argues that the prioritization of host government consent, as well as the competing costs and benefits of the mission, gives the host government the ability and the incentive to utilize the power of consent to influence peacekeeper outcomes. Once consent is withdrawn, an operation must leave the country. Importantly, consent can be withdrawn at any point in the duration of an operation. Thus, a government can credibly punish the peacekeeping operation by threatening to revoke consent, whereas a non-state actor cannot. By threatening to revoke consent, host governments can effectively veto peacekeeper actions. This provides a powerful ability to influence peacekeeper freedom of movement. The host government also has a clear incentive to ensure that peacekeeper locations suit its preferences, as it is a key party to the conflict.

Given this, where would a host government want peacekeepers to deploy? This dissertation argues that peacekeeping operations must be understood through the military benefits that they provide. Robust peacekeeping operations can use force to protect themselves and to protect civilians. Several operations have also been granted mandates with more relaxed

provisions on the use of force. This broadening and robust role of peacekeeping has essentially allowed for operations to act as an additional party to a conflict. Peacekeepers should therefore deploy to locations where their military benefits can be utilized by the government. Once deployed to these locations, peacekeepers can provide the benefits that can aid the host government. These benefits vary by peacekeeper base type – the types of base, the benefits they offer, and the incentives that the government has in light of these differences are drawn out in more detail in later chapters.

However, due to the fear of having consent withdrawn, the use of force against the host state is not credible. This is something that the UN itself acknowledges. In a report to the UN General Assembly by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, the UN itself acknowledged that, when confronted with incidents in which the state is the perpetrator of violence against civilians, the use of force " is considered unrealistic" in recognition of "operational and political constraints" despite the fact that such a response is "at odds with the legal authority and mandate to act" (United Nations General Assembly 2014, p. 14-15) Thus, there is a general awareness of the problematic externalities of consent, in that overstepping may result in severe operational restrictions or the expulsion of the operation. How does this affect the ability of peacekeepers to actually protect civilians? This balance between civilian protection and consent means that peacekeepers are not likely to be effective at stopping government-perpetrated violence. In sum, consent allows for UN peacekeeping operations to be biased towards the host government – both in terms of where they locate and in how they operate.

1.2 Where Do Peacekeepers Deploy?

What do we currently know about where peacekeepers deploy, within the countries to which they are deployed? To date, all of the current research on subnational peacekeeping de-

ployment explains the location patterns of static operating bases.[3] Just as peacekeeper deployment at the international level is not random, neither is subnational peacekeeper deployment. There are a wide range of factors that influence where peacekeepers deploy, including logistical concerns, conflict concerns, and political concerns. Logistically, peacekeepers often face a difficult task: they are required to move thousands of civilian, police, and military personnel into a conflict or post-conflict country. Likewise, the food, living, and support equipment required of an operation must accompany the personnel. The countries to which peacekeepers deploy vary in size and in operational infrastructure. Having more rail lines, roads, and airports facilitates the flow of personnel and supplies into and within a host country. As such, urban subnational locations that are near the capital city with functioning airports and roads tend to be the locations that are most likely to see peacekeepers, as these are the areas best able to accommodate the movement of personnel and goods (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2016).

Conflict dynamics and a legacy of violence also influence where peacekeepers deploy. Peacekeeping operations are often said to deploy to "the frontlines" of a conflict to monitor combatants and protect civilians from battle-related violence (Fortna 2008, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013, 2014); however, the rate at which conflicts can spread geographically is faster than the rate at which peacekeepers can gain the authorization and ability to follow. While peacekeepers do deploy to the areas within a country that have a history of intense violence, there has been a noted and significant temporal lag between when this violence occurred and the arrival of the peacekeepers; while this lag may only take several months, some scholars have noted that there may be years in between intense violence and peacekeeper arrival (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2016, Costalli 2014). In addition to battle-related violence, peacekeepers also deploy to locations of one-sided violence (Phayal and Prins 2020, Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019), another form of violence that peace-

[3]Static operating bases, for the purposes of this dissertation, are the UN headquarters and company operating bases that tend to deploy to one location for an extended period of time. More detail is provided in the next section of this chapter.

keepers are mandated to protect against, although their presence continues to lag behind the actual violence. However, there are political concerns with respect to one-sided violence that influence where peacekeepers deploy: peacekeepers are less likely to deploy to areas that have recently experienced one-sided violence by government actors (Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019).

However, these works have yet to explore how the role of host government consent might alter where peacekeepers deploy at the subnational level based on the strategic conflict-related goals of that government. This dissertation adds to this research by exploring the role of host governments in where peacekeepers go, and how their deployment patterns in turn affect their effectiveness.

1.3 UN Peacekeeper Base Types and Data

This project seeks to explain the local-level dynamics of peacekeepers and conflict actors. To do so requires local-level data on peacekeeper deployments. However, not all peacekeeper deployments are the same. Peacekeepers are deployed within a state via bases; likewise, the goods and services they offer are distributed via bases. There are three main types of UN peacekeeper bases that: headquarters, company-operating bases (COBs), and temporary-operating bases (TOBs) (Department of Field Support, Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2012*a*,*b*). Because there are not major theoretical differences between the benefits provided by headquarters and COBs, they will be referred to from here on out under the broad category of "static operating bases," whereas TOBs will be specifically addressed as such.[4] To date, and to the best of this author's knowledge, all other work exploring subnational peacekeeping dynamics have studied the placement of static operating bases.

[4]While COBs and HQ operate on different scales, they both can house civilian, police, and military peacekeepers. Both HQs and COBs can also provide security and non-security related goods. Both have greater infrastructural and security requirements (Department of Field Support, Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2012*a*), and tend to be deployed in a given location for a sustained period of time. As such, they are collapsed into the general category of "static operating bases." Per the UN's 2020 version of the Infantry Battalion Manual, the UN appears have switched to a similar system, distinguishing between permanent and temporary operating bases (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020).

Static operating bases and TOBs have different purposes, face different constraints from the UN, and, in turn, can apply their military benefits in different settings. Practically speaking, static operating bases are larger than TOBs; they hold more types of units and larger numbers of personnel. Additionally, static operating bases can store a good deal of equipment, unlike TOBs. Due to the size of static operating bases, they are slow moving and stay in position for a long period of time. Static operating bases are not responsive to changes in the state in which they are deployed; there is a significant lag between changes in the conflict and where static operating bases deploy (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2016, Costalli 2014). Additionally, static operating bases are required by the UN to have a degree of security prior to deployment. Because static operating bases will be in position for an extended period of time and because they house personnel and goods crucial to the success of the operation, "the commander must therefore carefully consider site suitability for an extended time as well as operational and environmental requirements as factors for site selection" (Department of Field Support, Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2012*a*, p. 87).

Figure 1.1 demonstrates the differences between static operating bases and temporary operating bases.[5] The top two photos show a mission headquarters and a company operating base, which are both considered static operating bases for the purposes of this dissertation. Both have a great deal of infrastructure associated with the physical structure of the base; the infrastructure also appears to be of more stable and protective material. Likewise, both appear to be large in size. The temporary operating base, pictured in the bottom photo, is much smaller, and lacks protective gating. The physical structure of the base facilities appear to be tents, rather than being made of a more sound and protective metal.

Unlike static operating bases, TOBs are smaller units that can move and adapt quickly to changes in the conflict, and are used to respond to active conflict. They are intended to "cover vulnerable areas and hotspots by the fastest means available" and to "carry out day

[5]All photos are from each mission's Flickr account.

Figure 1.1: From top to bottom, these pictures depict the headquarters of the United Nations operation in South Sudan, a company operating base of the operation in the DRC, and a temporary operating base of the operation in the DRC. These bases are respectively located in Juba, South Sudan, Ndromo in Province Ituri, DRC, and Ngilima in Province Orientale, DRC.

and night operations through mobile and static elements" (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020, p. 41). Because of their size, mobility, and military nature, TOBs can retreat if necessary, relieving TOBs from the stringent security requirements enforced for static operating bases. They are also, as the name suggests, deployed for a short period of time; they have a specific goal and do not assist outside of it. In sum, TOBs and static operating bases vary drastically in their size, the longevity of their duration at a given site, and in the safety requirements of the UN.

As a result, static operating bases and TOBs are used for different purposes. TOBs, due to their small and mobile nature, can be used to respond to active fighting and are used for direct military-related aspects of the peacekeeping operation. Peacekeepers can directly contribute to battle outcomes in two ways. First, peacekeepers can return fire in specific settings. While some peacekeeping operations have mandates to specifically engage offensively against specific groups, nearly all modern peacekeeping operations deployed after 1997 have a mandate to engage in force for self-protection and for the protection of civilians. This additional force, although constrained in when it can be activated, can and has been used to push conflict actors out of areas (Karlsrud 2015). Second, peacekeepers can limit the mobility of combatants. Peacekeepers establish blockades, which prevents new combatants from entering into an area, and by obstructing movement within the areas to which they deploy. This contains actors in one concentrated area, which encourages a quicker battle outcome and a limited theater of combat.

While TOBs can be used to respond to battles and conflict hotspots, static operating bases are essentially used to maintain security and hold territory. Static operating bases are not able to effectively keep up and respond to changes in the conflict due to their slow moving nature and more stringent security requirements. While they provide stability in the locations to which they are deployed, they are not as effective at managing active sites of conflict. While violence may erupt at the locations to which they are deployed, these bases do not follow emerging conflict threats in the way that TOBs do. Instead,

static operating bases are primarily focused on maintaining peace and stability in a given area. Static operating bases can do this in a variety of ways. First, they provide security. Peacekeepers actively patrol neighborhoods and cities to ensure that violence is contained; they also supplement the strength of the police or military by responding to violent incidents. Additionally, peacekeepers provide training to the security sector to ensure that police and the military can sufficiently handle threats. In addition to supplementing the security sector, these peacekeeper bases also assist in supplementing to the bureaucratic strength of the state. This allows static operating bases to contribute to holding the territory where they are deployed, preventing new threats from emerging and ensuring growing state control.

In order to study these various bases, this dissertation leverages original data on the deployments of all temporary and static operating bases in robust peacekeeping operations deployed to African civil conflicts between 2000 and 2015. Where do these data come from? Information on base locations is available in the reports of the Secretary General of the United Nations; the Secretary General is mandated to report on the activities of all active peacekeeping operations on a set basis; for active operations, this can be as frequent as once a month or as infrequent as each quarter. Each report contains a map of the static operating bases deployed in the operation at the time of the report. For example, the map shown in Figure 1.2 highlights the static operating base deployments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in May of 2015. Each base is deployed to a city and comprised of multiple units. Each unit is identified as a small rectangle on the map; that rectangular representation contains information about the unit type based on the symbol within the rectangle and information about the unit size based on the symbol above the rectangle.

There is a great deal of variation in the specific subtype of peacekeeper unit; while peacekeepers are of four personnel types – military, police, observer, and civilian – there are range of subtype that falls under these categories. For example, military peacekeeper units can be regular infantry units, aviation units, special forces, naval units, and more. However, for the sake of working with the rest of the literature on peacekeeping operations,

Figure 1.2: Static operating base deployments in the UN peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO, in May of 2015.

the dissertation aggregates the peacekeeping units type up to the four broad types.[6]

TOBs are not likely to be placed on these maps; due to their temporary nature and the relative infrequency of the report issuance, their locations are included within the text of the reports. Also collected and geocoded are the deployments of peacekeeper "forward operating bases," "rapid reaction forces," and "quick reaction forces," due to their similarity in size, capabilities, and mandate as TOBs. For an example of the text containing TOB location information, please refer to the appendix. Given this, it is important to note that while the data used in this dissertation are quite detailed for static operating base units – including

[6]For more information on the classification scheme, please refer to the appendix.

Country	Mission Name	Years of Deployment
Burundi	United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)	2004 - 2006
Central African Republic	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)	2007 - 2010
Central African Republic	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)	2014 - Present
Chad	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)	2007 - 2010
Côte D'Ivoire	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	2004 - 2017
Democratic Republic of Congo	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)	1999 - 2010
Democratic Republic of Congo	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo(MONUSCO)	2010 - Present
Liberia	United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	2003 - 2018
Mali	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)	2013 - Present
Sierra Leone	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone(UNAMSIL)	1999 - 2006
South Sudan	United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)	2011 - Present
Sudan	United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	2005 - 2011
Sudan	United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)	2007 - Present

Table 1.1: United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Sample of this Dissertation

their size and composition – the data on temporary operating bases are only a binary indicator of their presence; data on the size and composition of TOBs is not available. These base locations were geocoded using the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GEOnet Names Server, and cross-referenced with Google Maps.

1.4 The Sample Of This Dissertation

While this dissertation speaks broadly to the dynamics of modern, robust peacekeeping operations, the hypotheses are tested using data from robust peacekeeping operations deployed to African civil conflicts between 2000 and 2015. Table 1.1 lists the countries in this sample.

There are a number of missions excluded from this sample. For example, there have been only six UN missions authorized after 2000 that are not in this sample; all were sent to three non-African countries: Haiti, Timor-Leste, and Syria.[7] Likewise, there are a number of

[7]Haiti had three peacekeeping operations deployed after 2000: United Nations General Assembly International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH, 2000-2001), United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004-2017) and United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH,

peacekeeping operations that are currently operational but not in this sample because they are not in Africa with a robust mandate. These are largely missions that were authorized in the earlier eras of UN peacekeeping.[8] Most of these operations are traditional missions, largely featuring observers. For example, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan was deployed in 1949 and remains operational with a remaining 94 personnel deployed.[9]

Is this an appropriate sample to draw general conclusions from? If a scholar wanted to learn about ongoing and future UN peacekeeping operations, then it is an appropriate sample. The majority of ongoing UN missions are deployed to Africa. Of the ongoing peace operations, seven out of thirteen are deployed to African conflicts. Of all of the missions deployed after 1990, half have been deployed to Africa; of those missions deployed after 2000, two thirds were deployed to Africa. There is a clear trend of African civil conflicts as the norm for modern UN peacekeeping operations.

Likewise, robust peacekeeping operations are quickly becoming the norm for UN peacekeeping, and as such, are likely to remain the standard of peacekeeping operations in the future. The UN mission in Syria, UNSMIS, was deployed as an observer-only mission in 2012, one of the last holdouts of a more traditional form of peacekeeping in the modern era of robust peacekeeping operations. It was a noted and rapid failure. It deployed in mid-April of 2012, suspended operations in June of 2012 due to increased violence, and fully shuttered operations in August of 2012. The "accumulation of obstacles to mandate implementation

2017-2019). Timor-Leste had two operations deployed after 2000: United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET, 2002-2005) and United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT, 2006-2012). Syria had one mission deployed, the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) for roughly four months in 2012.

[8]The presently ongoing missions not in this sample – because they are not deployed to African civil conflicts featuring a robust mandate – include the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO, which covers the Middle East, 1948 -); the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP, 1949 -); the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP, 1964 -); the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF, Golan, 1974 -); the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL, 1978-), the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO, 1991-); and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK, 1999-).

[9]This number was obtained from the UN, per this webpage: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmogip. This total reflects the number of personnel as of November 2020.

functions — due to the level of violence, monitoring access restrictions and direct targeting — had rendered operational activities unworkable" (United Nations Secretary-General 2012, p. 4), meaning that isolated observers in the midst of civil war – exactly the type of conflict that modern peacekeepers are likely to be involved in – were unable to function. Given this, it does not seem likely that the Security Council would authorize a similar mission.

Finally, the protection of civilians mandate has become increasingly important to UN operations. As this happens, peacekeepers have seen an expansion in their ability to utilize force to carry this mandate out, as well as an expansion in the tools and technology they can use to do so (Lilly 2012). For example, the UN has increased its use of unmanned aerial vehicles for intelligence gathering across all of its missions (Karlsrud and Rosén 2013). The UN has implemented an All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) in its operation in Mali for counterinsurgency and to protect civilians, including the deployment of tactical intelligence officers (Karlsrud 2015). Focusing this dissertation on those missions with a robust, protection of civilians mandate is thus in line with the trend of UN peacekeeping operations.

How does this sample align with current trends of armed conflict? Many ongoing civil conflicts are located in Africa; indeed, focusing on African conflicts is a good place if one wants to study civil conflicts. The number of civil conflicts in Africa is increasing, and has been steadily rising since 2006; of the ten conflicts that emerged in 2019, eight of them were in African countries (Strand et al. 2020). The types of conflicts in Africa are also indicative of larger conflict trends. The majority of conflicts in Africa are civil conflicts, which is also true of conflict around the world. Many conflicts in Africa feature conflicts between the state and non-state actors, as well as between multiple non-state actors (Palik, Rustad and Methi 2020). In addition to civil conflicts between state actors and rebels, African conflicts feature a host of other actors as well. For example, African conflicts increasingly feature violence committed by religiously-based extremist organizations (Palik, Rustad and Methi 2020). The UN mission in Mali, MINUSMA, is considered the first UN peacekeeping operation

to engage in counterinsurgency, having deployed to an active conflict featuring extremist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). There has also been a global rise in communal violence, violence between factions of civilians, although this trend is especially stark in sub-Saharan African (Nomikos n.d.). Moreover, African conflicts have also seen a rise in one-sided violence against civilians (Palik, Rustad and Methi 2020). In sum, African conflicts are representative of a variety of global conflict trends: they are complex and feature a multiple of armed actors, often result in localized violence across communities, and feature significant amounts of violence against civilians.

Finally, the sample used in this dissertation can speak to broader peace operations. The United Nations is not the only actor that deploys peacekeepers; regional and international organizations, such as ECOWAS and NATO, deploy peacekeepers to conflicts to keep and manage peace. Like the UN, most non-UN peace operations deploy to African conflicts (Bara and Hultman 2020). The theory described here is applicable to these missions, as non-UN peacekeeping operations tend to be comprised largely of military personnel (Bara and Hultman 2020). In practice, these peace operations tend to require host government consent in order to operate, and protection of civilians is often a mandate of such missions (De Wet 2014). While there have more non-UN peacekeeping missions deployed since 2000, most deployed peacekeepers are from the UN (Bara and Hultman 2020).

As such, the focus of this dissertation - on robust peacekeeping operations sent to African civil conflicts - should be taken as speaking to the likely trends of future peacekeeping operations.

1.5 Why Does Bias in UN Operations Matter?

Prior to discussing the roadmap of this dissertation, let us take a step back and consider the implications of the argument. Why would bias in favor of host governments matter, in

a peacekeeping operations? Bias in peacekeeping missions is problematic from a variety of perspectives. First, it directly contradicts the self-professed neutrality of UN peacekeeping, a factor argued to be crucial to the effectiveness of operations (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Department of Field Support 2015, Pouligny 2006). Bias towards the government allows for the operation to act as a source of supplementary capacity in the conflict. Peacekeeping operations offer a variety of military benefits, which can assist in altering the balance of power between warring factions (Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen 2013, Karlsrud 2015). By deploying to locations where they can support the government, peacekeepers may contribute to the demise of non-state actors and the growth of the government, making them far from an impartial actor to the conflict. This not only risks the UN playing an expanded and active role in the conflict, but risks influencing the perception of other conflict actors and civilians, their willingness to support and cooperate with the UN, and more. Much of the IR literature presumes that third-party peacekeepers are motivated purely by humanitarian concerns, rather than viewing them as actors who face political constraints. By introducing the more complicated reality, this dissertation serves as a jumping-off point for future scholarship and policy recommendations that can be used to better understand how peacekeepers can protect civilians despite the institutional challenges they face. Moreover, this is a problem that is not only faced by the UN and its peacekeepers. The need for consent exists in all third party interventions that are not forcibly imposed, and thus gives host governments the ability to resist the third party, demand concessions, and gain from the intervention (Campbell and Matanock n.d.). Moreover, even when an intervention is imposed forcibly, these dynamics can still occur (Elias 2018).

Second, many of the governments that host peacekeeping operations engage in violence against civilians and repression. If peacekeepers are not willing to use force against the host government, they directly risk not upholding their mandate to protect civilians. Moreover, if peacekeepers are indeed operating in a manner that benefits the government in conflict, they may be helping to prolong a predatory regime. The survival of these regimes may

then enable these actors to continue acting in bad faith down the road. This is striking because the cornerstone of modern peacekeeping operations is its effort to protect civilians from violence. Peacekeepers have a clear responsibility to protect civilians from all actors in a conflict if they have a sufficiently strong mandate – yet they face significant obstacles in enacting this due to the need to maintain consent. Likewise, this is striking given the high degree of civilian victimization that occurs in conflict and post-conflict states. In all active African civil conflicts from 1990 to 2010, approximately 1000 civilians were killed per year; approximately 200 civilians were killed per year in post-conflict settings within that same timespan (Kathman and Wood 2014). Given the scale of the problem – and the UN's own emphasis on mitigating it – the potential costs of peacekeeper weakness in protecting civilians is dire.

1.6 Road Map of the Dissertation

This dissertation will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the theory at play and addresses the following questions: what is host government consent? How does consent allow host governments to influence where UN peacekeepers deploy? How does consent alter how peacekeepers protect civilians once they are deployed to a given location? It then sets up the basic logic and expectations that future chapters will test.

Chapter 3 explores the military benefits offered by static operating bases and then empirically evaluates the factors that predict their deployment patterns. It outlines that static operating bases are best suited to deploy to areas with a history of recent violence, but not to sites of active conflict. These large, stable bases provide a host of benefits that can be used to hold territory and consolidate power. These bases, according to the logic of host government consent, should be most likely to deploy to the areas where the government has a need to consolidate its power and territorial control – not to the areas where it has a high degree of control, or to the areas where the rebels could use these benefits to grow stronger.

Indeed, the empirical results from this chapter reveal that military peacekeepers at static operating bases are significantly more likely to deploy to areas of *some* government control, but not full government control. However, these peacekeepers are not likely to deploy to the areas in which rebels have regained territory or have full control.

Chapter 4 then describes the military benefits offered by temporary operating bases and their deployment patterns. TOBs are more mobile and smaller deployments that can be used to respond to active conflict, sites where tensions might renew, or sites where there is a high risk of conflict. From the logic of a host government, TOBs are best suited to deploy to the areas where it is performing poorly in battle; in those locations, there is a need for additional support from the peacekeepers. Where the government is performing well in battle, it does not need to use the military resources of a TOB. This chapter provides interesting empirical results. TOBs are likely to deploy to the locations where the government is experiencing more battle deaths relative to rebels, a clear indicator of poor performance. Likewise, TOBs are likely to deploy to the locations where the rebels have recently seized territory as a result of battle.

Taken together, Chapters 3 and 4 outline the ways in which conflict dynamics shape where peacekeepers deploy. How do they operate, once in these locations? Chapter 5 outlines how the role of consent means that the use of force against the host government by the UN is not credible – meaning that the UN is not effectively able to protect civilians from violence perpetrated by the state. This empirical analysis in this chapter demonstrate a nuanced and not often robust relationship between subnational peacekeepers and violence against civilians; the analysis in this chapter demonstrate that there is largely no statistically significant relationship with the deployment of UN military peacekeepers at TOBs or static operating bases and government perpetrated violence. Counter to the logic set forth in this dissertation, there is often a lack of statistically significant relationship with military peacekeeper deployment and rebel perpetrated violence against civilians.

This suggests a few things that warrant further exploration. First, Chapter 5 explores

the *short-term* association between peacekeeper deployment and violence against civilians. It could be the case that peacekeepers do have an effect but that it takes several months to take hold. Second, this suggests that the relationship between peacekeepers and violence against civilians needs to be carefully modeled moving forward; the literature on peacekeepers has set up the expectation that they are typically associated with a reduction in violence, but these results provide evidence to the contrary. Moreover, the results shown in this dissertation vary based on the identification strategy utilized. Scholars exploring this relationship should continue to work to advance how to model this nuanced dynamic, and to further wed theories of micro- and macro-level effectiveness. Third, and finally, this chapter explores the role of military peacekeepers on violent outcomes. Other types of peacekeeping personnel can contribute to the protection of civilians – future work should expand on how they do so, and if they are effective.

Finally, Chapter 6 concludes. In addition to setting up future research questions for scholars to address, this chapter establishes policy recommendations for ongoing and future UN peacekeeping operations.

Chapter 2

A Theory of Consent, Host Government Influence, and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

The literature on peacekeeping operations has largely perceived these missions as neutral, unbiased actors intervening during or after conflict to reduce violence against civilians, to halt the recurrence of fighting, and to promote a lasting, positive peace. From this perspective, peacekeepers respond to the conflicts that are the most difficult to resolve and deploy to where the humanitarian need is greatest. However, this perspective does not take in to account the role of actors beyond the United Nations itself. Instead, this dissertation argues that in order to more accurately understand the role of peacekeepers in the conflicts to which they deploy, we must also consider the role of the governments that host these operations. All UN peacekeeping operations must deploy with the consent of these host governments. Consent is not permanent or even guaranteed for a set period of time – host governments can revoke consent at any point in time, ejecting the operation from its territory. Likewise, host governments can restrict consent as they please, constraining peacekeeper actions and limiting the role of the operation within the state. In civil conflicts, only the host government

is able to leverage this power of consent.

This dissertation argues that this allows host governments influence over the operation that is not afforded to the rebel groups that they are fighting; this influence, in turn, affects peacekeeper outcomes in line with the government's preferences, but not the rebels' preferences. In this dissertation, two peacekeeping outcomes are explored: peacekeeper base locations and peacekeeper effectiveness. Because of consent, peacekeepers are more likely to deploy to the locations where they can support the government in the conflict; they are also less likely to protect civilians from violence perpetrated by the government. Both of these outcomes demonstrate that, far from being a true unbiased actor, peacekeeping operations are more likely to act in line with the government.

This chapter outlines a theory of how host government consent affects subnational peacekeeper deployment and their subsequent ability to protect civilians. To do so, it describes what consent looks like in UN peacekeeping operations and why it asymmetrically holds for government actors rather than non-state actors. It then formulates hypotheses regarding UN peacekeeper base deployments and peacekeeper effectiveness at halting violence against civilians. These hypotheses are later tested in Chapters 3-5.

2.1 What is Host Government Consent?

One of the key principles of UN peacekeeping operations is deployment with the consent of the "main parties to a conflict" (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2019*b*). Despite the self-stated importance of consent, in civil wars, this tends to exclusively center on the consent of the host government. Non-state actors' consent, especially if the peacekeepers are deploying to an active conflict without a negotiated settlement, is rarely attained. In civil conflicts, the type of conflict that most modern peacekeeping operations are deployed to, the main parties to a conflict include at least one non-state actor. Non-state actor consent, however, is often complex and rarely obtained pre-deployment, especially in

settings where there is active conflict.

As the Introduction highlighted, peacekeepers increasingly deploy into active conflicts that do not have a negotiated settlement. The UN acknowledges that consent "requires a commitment by [the main parties to the conflict] to a political process" (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2019*b*). Beyond this specification, the UN does not provide further guidance on what provides a "main party," beyond the host state authorities. In practice, this complicates the matter of consent. When peacekeepers deploy to settings without an active political process, it may not be clear which non-state actors are those whose consent should be gained; this is made more complex by the often dynamic nature of rebel groups. Even if a rebel group has consented to the presence of the mission, there is a risk of spoilers splintering from the main body of the group, which would result in non-state actors that have not consented to the operation. Likewise, in settings with a rebel group that consists of multiple organizations, it is not always clear who actually constitutes the main party to the conflict and whose consent actually matters for the operation.

Additionally, even if non-state actors consent to the presence of a peacekeeping operation, there is no guarantee that they will remain the relevant parties to the conflict once the operation has deployed; peacekeeping operations tend to deploy for multiple years,and the actors involved in a conflict may change in that period. For example, MONUC, the operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo was deployed in 2000 after the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which was an attempt to peacefully settle the Second Congo War; the conflict including fighting between a multitude of non-state actors, state-sponsored actors, and states. MONUC was re-authorized as MONUSCO in 2010 and remains operational today; in the past 20 years, the mission has faced a series of new non-state actor challengers, including the M23 rebel group, the Mai Mai, and the Allied Democratic Forces. Each of these groups have grown in the Congo since the mission's deployment, but, to best of the author's knowledge, no attempt to obtain the consent of such actors has been made.

Finally, there is an increasing tension between UN peacekeeper mandates and obtaining

the consent of non-state actors. Many UN operations are now mandated to increase the authority of the host state; in many settings, such as Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic, this translates into the increased strength of the host government relative to the non-state actors present in such states. As rebel cooperation with peacekeepers is already less likely than government cooperation with peacekeepers (Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen 2013), mandates that empower the state relative to non-state actors are perhaps less likely to engender rebel support, and in turn, consent.

As a result of the presence of peacekeepers without a relevant peace process, the complexity of rebel groups in conflict, and the historic and institutionalized state-centric approach to the UN, the consent of the host government takes precedence over the consent of non-state actors. Increasing in practice, this means that only the consent of the host government is sought and maintained.

Why is consent important? Without consent, peacekeepers cannot operate. Under this guiding principle, should consent be revoked, then the peacekeeping operation would be forced to withdraw from the country. Take, for example, UNEF I, the UN mission in Egypt from 1956 to 1967. UNEF I was largely successful in managing relations with the Egyptian government for the first ten years of its operation. However, the mission was operational in the prelude to the Six Days War between Egypt and Israel. In May 1967, Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, began preparing for war after receiving Soviet intelligence that Israel was preparing to attack Syria (Central Intelligence Agency 1970). However, UNEF I was stationed in Sinai and along the Gaza Strip, effectively serving as a blockade between Nasser and his target (Findlay 2002, Burns 1968, Garvey 2008). Nasser called for a redeployment of the UN peacekeepers away from the buffer zone; when the UN held firm, Nasser responded by demanding that the entire operation leave the country.

Just as consent is often only sought after from the host government, withdrawn consent also matters along the lines of state power. Peacekeeping operations have deployed without the consent of non-state actors and have remained operational when the consent of non-state

actors has been withdrawn. The loss of consent from a host government, however, almost always results in the end of a peacekeeping operation. To the author's knowledge, there is only one instance where the withdrawal of host government consent was challenged by the UN, but it is a case in which the *former* host government had lost power, refused to concede power, and then revoked consent – whereas the internationally recognized host government still requested the operation. The UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), was already deployed to the country in 2011 when incumbent Laurent Gbagbo lost the election. Gbagbo refused to concede and ordered the operation to leave the country. However, because this demand occurred *after* Gbagbo's loss, the UN – along with the European Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the African Union, and others – did not recognize him as the legitimate head of the government. Because they recognized his opponent, Alassane Ouattara, and Ouattara's government as the legitimate host government, the UN ignored Gbagbo's request. The UN remained as Ouattara permitted the mission's continued presence.[1] Another potential outcome when host governments have threatened to revoke consent or asked the mission to leave, is the UN instead negotiating a new mandate and Status of Forces Agreement that is in line with the host government's preferences. This was the case in the transition of UNPROFOR to UNCRO in Croatia 1995, and in the switch from MONUC to MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2010.

Consent, from the beginning of an operation, is often a fluid concept – while there are key documents that the UN and the host government produce that outline the framework through

[1]This raises the question, though, of what would happen if a legitimately recognized head of government requested that the UN depart the country, and the UN refused to leave; that is, what are the costs of the UN defying host government consent? It is likely that the UN would face significant political costs from individual member-states as well as from actors outside of the system due to the prioritization of state sovereignty. The response to peace enforcement missions, which has been discussed within this chapter, as well as the Responsibility to Protect illustrate this. Despite the acceptance of norms such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which permits the use of international intervention *without* host government consent to halt specific, large-scale crimes against citizens, such norms are rarely implemented in practice due to concerns of state sovereignty. Indeed, despite calls for humanitarian intervention as justified by R2P and in response to crimes against humanity (a type of crime that would activate the R2P standard) in Darfur, the UN still refused to intervene without host government consent (Badescu and Bergholm 2009). Likewise, actors within the UN are actively reconceptualizing R2P as moving away from intervention without consent (Teitt 2011). The UN keeping a peacekeeping mission in place if the legitimate host government requested it leave thus seems incredibly costly to the UN, and thus quite unlikely to occur.

which the UN will operate within the country, such as a Status of Forces Agreement and/or Memorandum of Understanding (SOFA and SOMA, respectively), consent is less formalized. Consent is gained prior to the authorization of a mission, and entails the host government agreeing to the presence of an operation and its objectives, strength, and composition. That is, consent means that a host government has agreed that a UN peacekeeping operation can deploy within its territory, and has agreed to the tasks that those peacekeepers will carry out, how many peacekeepers of each type will be present, and who those peacekeepers will be. After consent is gained and a mandate has been authorized by the United Nations, the documents that further set up the mission's legal status and privileges, such as the SOFA and SOMA, are drawn up. These privileges can include aspects such as freedom of movement within the country. These documents thus give host government another opportunity to influence the role and actions of the mission within the country of deployment.

However, despite these documents, consent is very tenuous and not guaranteed. One key reason for this is that these documents imply consent – in that they would not exist had the host government consented to the operation – but do not actually lock consent in or punish the host government should it renege. They are not binding on the host government. Should the host government decide to restrict features of the mission it has consented to, such as peacekeeper freedom of movement or the size of the mission, or revoke consent and expel the mission, it will not suffer legal consequences for doing so. Thus, the documents that outline and present manifestations of consent are not binding and can be altered, in theory, at the will of the host government.[2]

The tenuous nature of consent is also reinforced because these documents do not explicitly outline every action and behavior that peacekeepers might engage in that would be costly to the government. Many operations deploy to a country with a model SOFA or SOMA and deploy with such a template in place for years. This means that the UN may not have a

[2]The UN also plays a role in the establishment of these documents; likewise, the UN can choose to withdraw from a country on its own accord. The key tension is instead that the UN can unilaterally strip things away from these documents but cannot unilaterally add to them if doing so went against the will of the government.

clear outline of the features of a mission that are allowed or disqualified under a specific host government's preferences - either because the mandate has not been updated to reflect the host government's preferences, and/or because the mandate is not specific enough to cover every potential scenario that the host government might object to. These documents tend to cover very broad concepts. For example, as highlighted above, SOFAs often provide for the freedom of movement within the country. This allows for a blanket freedom of movement across the entire country that peacekeepers are deployed to; however, it is very likely that there are areas within the country that the host government would *not* like peacekeepers to go. This is often the case in practice – host governments will block peacekeeper movement within specific areas of the country. Rather than negotiating or outlining which territories are not covered under the principle of the freedom of movement, which would explicitly demonstrate to peacekeepers where they can move without risking host government consent, the SOFA instead covers the broad concept. This leaves peacekeepers to figure out what actions are costly to the host government. By keeping the SOFA broad – that is, by granting peacekeepers the ability to conduct a vague and very general set of actions – peacekeepers do not possess an explicit set of the tasks and activities that are and are not acceptable to the host government, and instead have to navigate and learn about these potential costs on the ground.

Additionally, these documents do not tend to be renegotiated frequently, despite a changing political and conflict reality.[3] Should the conditions on the ground change – such as shifting conflict dynamics, new threats posed by various actors, or shifting civilian support – the features that were once acceptable to a host government can also change. UN peacekeeping operations tend to deploy for an extended period of time; the average peacekeeping operation lasts for 28 years (Landgren 2018). The average completed UN mission, however, lasts for roughly eight years(Bellamy and Williams 2015). This makes it difficult for the UN to keep up with the features of its missions that may be unacceptable to a host government.

[3]Mandates are often extended after a certain period of time; this typically involves the UN formally setting aside a budget to continue funding the mission and extending the past mandate.

As time passes, the mandate and set of actions undertaken by peacekeepers that were once acceptable to a host government may become less acceptable – either because the key actors in the regime or the conflict on the ground have shifted, altering the preferences of the host government and making peacekeeper action costly. Recall the example of UNEF I, the UN mission in Egypt. Because UNEF I was stationed in Sinai and along the Gaza Strip it effectively acted as a blockade between Nasser and Israel (Findlay 2002, Burns 1968, Garvey 2008). The mission had been mandated to operate in the buffer zone – but because of the shifting nature of the conflict and Nasser's updated intelligence that Israel was preparing to attack Syria, this placement became too costly to Nasser. The mission tried to stay firm on its mandate and remain in place. This cost the mission its consent and ability to remain operational.

In sum, this means that while peacekeepers may be invited to operate within a country there are often A) not explicit, highly specific lists of what the government has consented to, but rather broad guarantees and B) shifting concepts of what is and is not acceptable to a host government due to the long-term nature of a mission and the relatively long-term nature of the documents outline what the government has consented to. This, coupled, with the lack of legal consequence for reneging on the UN, leads to the need for constant management of host government consent.

2.2 Restricted and Revoked Consent

Due to the tenuous nature of consent, host governments are able to revoke or restrict consent at will. Revoked consent means that the operation is no longer welcome to operate in the state and must leave; this was the case in UNEF I. Restricted consent means that the host government can deny specific aspects of a mission – a task or function carried out by peacekeepers, who the peacekeepers are, where the peacekeepers can go, etc. Host governments are able to use their power of consent to influence the peacekeeping operation during two

distinct stages of the life cycle peacekeeping operation: during the pre-deployment negotiation, and during the deployment of the operation. There are three features of a mission that a host state can exert influence over: what country the personnel of the peacekeeping operation are from, where the operation can go within a country, and what strength of the operation will be. These can either be influenced via the host government involving itself in the process of determining the logistics of the peacekeeping operation, or in explicitly blocking the actions of the peacekeepers once deployed. As referenced above, a common type of restricted consent takes the form of the host government denying the mission the ability to travel to certain areas within the country.

Revoked or restricted consent becomes a possibility when peacekeepers operate in a manner in a way that is out of line with the government's preferences, if the mission imposes sufficiently large costs on the government, or the government is concerned that the mission will impose sufficiently large costs on it in the future. What actions from the operation may impose costs on the host government? One common source of costs to the government are those actions by the mission that criticize its human rights practices or utilize force against its agents. Peacekeeping policies that address human rights conditions within a state are often met with hostility and a lack of cooperation from state actors (Dorussen and Gizelis 2013). Peacekeepers and human rights officers who attempt to engage in fact finding missions about government-perpetrated atrocities are often denied access to those locations. The use of force against state agents has resulted in government backlash (Labuda 2020). Likewise, political components of UN mandates that seek to promote international norms can be seen as undermining local authority and impinging on state sovereignty (Pouligny 2006).

When these costs are imposed on the government, it can use its power of consent to expel the mission or to restrict what the mission can do. Host governments have traditionally not explicitly asked the mission to fully leave the country, although it has historically occurred. For example, UNPROFOR, the UN operation in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, was criticized by the the Croatian government for its impositions on Croatian sovereignty, al-

though it continued to consent to the mission. From 1992 to 1994, the mandate of UNPROFOR was enlarged five times and the troop size of the operation was increased seven times, despite continued reservations expressed to the UN from the Croatian government. Finally, in January 1995, the Croatian government withdrew consent from UNPROFOR. While it accepted an updated mission, UNCRO, in March 1995, this new force was much smaller and had fewer mandated tasks. Thus, the size and scope of UNPROFOR were unacceptable to the Croatian government, which saw a continued threat to its sovereignty (Gray 2001); it used consent as leverage to gain an operation which was acceptable.

Far more common than fully revoked consent, however, is restricted consent. This most commonly entails the host government not permitting an operation to carry out some component of its mandate, or not deploying to a specific locality within its territory; that is, the government revokes consent with respect to a function of the mission, not to its overall presence. For example, the first peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUC, deployed in 2000. Then-president Kabila severely restricted the freedom of movement granted to peacekeepers via their SOFA, refused to communicate with the peacekeepers, and encouraged demonstrations against the operation (Rhoads 2016, p. 126). This was the state of affairs for the operation until Kabila's death in 2001. Congolese authorities have continued this restriction of consent in the second peacekeeping operation deployed to the state, MONUSCO. For example, in 2016 the central government jammed the MONUSCO radio signal, interrupting operations for several days. The Sudanese government has grown notorious for this style of restrictions; some of its more infamous restrictions include the routine denial of peacekeepers' entry visas after the mission has used force against its agents and the denied access to areas in which alleged atrocities against civilians occurred (Labuda 2020).

The need to maintain governmental consent becomes especially salient in these situations; ignoring the calls for restricted movement or moving past government issued roadblocks would be to explicitly challenge the host government, potentially risking full expulsion of the

operation. The restriction of consent could thus lead to the revocation of consent. Thus, by holding this power of consent, host governments can block or halt peacekeeper actions that it perceives as costly. Likewise, by threatening to revoke or restrict consent, host governments are able to gain leverage over a peacekeeping operation and pressure peacekeeper actions in line with its preferences. MONUSCO peacekeepers have indicated that they are acutely aware of the tightrope on which they walk, "express[ing] concern that being outspoken may undo the progress made so far on repairing relationships with the government – and may even risk the expulsion of the mission" (Stimson Center and Better World Campaign 2016, p. 8). Indeed, the so-called "Brahimi Report," a UN report commissioned to describe the shortcomings of the UN's security activities, noted that consent could be problematic and could be "manipulated" by parties to a conflict (Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2000).

In sum, UN peacekeepers must deploy with the consent of the host government. However, consent is not stable and can be revoked or restricted at the will of the host government. A peacekeeper official in the mission in South Sudan described consent as "a nagging challenge"(Tull 2013, p. 196). Should consent be revoked, peacekeepers must exit the country. Should consent be restricted, peacekeepers have a limited set of actions that they can engage in. Moreover, the threat of both may push peacekeepers to operate in a manner that limits tension and potential problems with the host state. Taken together, this gives host governments a powerful incentive to use this influence to gain from the operation. In practice, this has allowed the government to block UN activities, especially those that may be costly to it. Moreover, it allows for host governments to exert influence over peacekeeper actions such that its behavior is in line with the host government's preferences.

2.3 Consent and Government Incentives

The need to maintain consent gives host governments the ability to influence UN peacekeeping operations; consent can be valuable to a host government in order to avoid or manage the costs the operation may impose upon the government. However, consent can also be used to influence the mission in order to gain from the benefits that it offers.

Peacekeepers offer a variety of benefits, including military benefits, economic benefits, and governance benefits.[4] This dissertation focuses on military benefits, defined as the goods and advantages peacekeepers provide to restore state security and physical security; these primarily stem from the ability of peacekeepers to use force to protect themselves and to uphold certain aspects of their mandate, such as the protection of civilians. For example, a military benefit of peacekeepers is that they can be used to hold and maintain territory. Where peacekeepers deploy, these military benefits can be captured and utilized by the government. Therefore, there is a powerful incentive and ability for governments to use the influence provided by consent to ensure that peacekeeper bases – and in turn, their benefits – are placed where they can maximize their gains from such deployments.

Recall from the previous section that governments can influence peacekeeper deployment locations in several ways. The government can use its power of consent to outline where peacekeepers can and cannot deploy in a number of ways. The host government can strategically choose where to allow base construction and where to permit land-lease agreements. For example, prior to the deployment of the UNAMID operation in Darfur, the UN initially

[4]These other types of benefits include economic benefits, the benefits to local economies and infrastructure that arise as a result of deployment. This can take the form of increased demand following missions that can stimulate local economies (Beber et al. 2019), or the use of peacekeeper resources to improve or create infrastructure. For example, the UN mission in Lebanon is credited with contributing to the development of the country's "basic infrastructure such as electricity, roads, or water and sewage systems" (Howard 2019, p. 117) throughout the decades after its deployment in 1978. Governance benefits come from the efforts of peacekeepers to support and strengthen national institutions such as the security sector, the judiciary, and more. These are not explored in this dissertation because the goal of this project is to explore how conflict dynamics predict where military peacekeepers deploy; only military peacekeepers can provide military benefits to a host government. Likewise, as it relates to conflict management, the military benefits should be the primary consideration in placing bases subnationally. Future work should explore when, why, and where these additional benefits are delivered, and the role of host governments in seeking to gain them.

was able to only establish four bases in the Nyala, El Fasher, Geneina and Zalingei areas, after protracted discussions with the government of the Sudan to get formal land-lease arrangements for those sites (United Nations Secretary-General 2007). Furthermore, once the operation is in place, the host government can explicitly halt peacekeepers from deploying into certain locations. Finally, the host government can also influence where peacekeepers deploy by simply not completing the process to approve base construction. Returning to the example of UNAMID, the UN aimed to establish a temporary operating base in Golo in 2018 after a series of violent incidents resulting in civilian deaths. However, the government of Sudan refused to approve the construction of the base for a month, eventually allowing peacekeepers to deploy (Amnesty International 2018, *Sudan Tribune* 2018).

Likewise, the threat of revoked or restricted consent may make peacekeepers cautious of acting in a manner not in line with the host government's preferences, making them more susceptible to deploying to areas of government suggestion or self-selecting into locations that they do not expect to raise the government's ire. Why do peacekeepers want to act in line with the government's preferences? The primary reason for this is to remain operational as long as possible. This has been highlighted specifically in at least the case of MONUSCO, the mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the mission has been described as seeking to maintain "a friendly attitude [with the Congolese government] to retain the mission's license to operate" (Tull 2013, p. 191). From the standpoint of the mission, this is desirable to ensure that it can remain in place to act on its mandate in the long-term. Former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour, in an interview with *Foreign Policy*, said that:

> [Caution] is always for a good reason. It's always not to aggravate the government or make sure they can stay in the game as long as possible. That's exactly why it's so important to look at the facts and start asking are we getting to a point where we are almost complicit with the government in our desire to maintain the delivery of service.

The UN has been accused of making decisions that go along with the government's preferences in order to remain operational, even if this results in actions that are counter to

the mission's mandate. The missions in Sudan and Mali have been accused of "withholding criticism and manipulating reports" to obscure state violations of human rights, and officials within UN missions have admitted that they have avoided investigating abuses by the government (Foley 2017, p.25). UN closures of Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites in South Sudan have been interpreted as playing into governmental frustrations against the sites (Labuda 2020). Taken together, the government's ability to influence where peacekeepers can deploy and the potential for peacekeeper self-censorship with respect to the government's preferences could both result in the operation *acting* in line with those preferences and benefits being placed where the host government can best gain from them. How can we test, though, if peacekeepers are being placed in line with host government preferences? This dissertation argues that exploring patterns of base deployment is one key way to do so.

2.4 UN Peacekeeper Deployments

Peacekeepers deploy via bases. From these bases, peacekeeper benefits are distributed. Recall from Chapter 1 that there are three types of bases that provide goods: headquarters, company operating bases, and temporary operating bases (TOBs) (Department of Field Support, Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2012*a*,*b*). Because there are not theoretical differences between where headquarters and company operating bases should be located and the benefits that they provide, they will be grouped together and referred to from here on out as "static operating bases," whereas TOBs will be specifically addressed as such.[5] While the government has an incentive to place bases in the locations where their military benefits can best be used to contribute to the government's conflict agenda, these base types have a number of differences that influence how those benefits are realized.

Static operating bases and TOBs have different purposes, face different constraints from the UN, and, as such, apply their military benefits in different settings. The distinctions

[5]Note that static operating base is the term that is used within this dissertation; this is not the official categorization by the UN.

between these bases have already been discussed in the Introduction. The varying benefits that they offer will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4; however, the key differences are that static operating bases are larger, more permanent, and less responsive to active conflict. TOBs are smaller, deploy for short periods of time, and are more responsive to active conflict. These differences influence the military benefits that each base type can provide and the type of locations to which they can deploy to. In turn, the strategic incentives of the government varies by base type. Briefly, the following section will outline the logic of how the government can gain from each base type and the subsequent expectation about where each type should be placed.

2.4.1 Static Operating Bases

First, what is the optimal placement, from the host government's perspective, of static operating bases? Peacekeepers at these bases provide a range of benefits; these will be further explained in Chapter 3, but effectively they can be used to hold territory and consolidate territorial control. This is done in a number of ways, including limiting the potential for renewed conflict, provide local security, and contributing to security sector reform. These benefits offer great appeal to a host government in two ways. First, they can contribute to the immediate goals of maintaining its control and reducing an enemy's capabilities. Second, they can contribute to the long-term goal of increasing territorial control.

In particular, *only military peacekeepers* at these bases can provide these benefits. Military, police, observer, and civilian peacekeepers are stationed at static operating bases in formed units of varying sizes. While the presence of *any* type of peacekeeper, to varying degrees, can promote economic benefits and governance benefits, *only* military peacekeepers can bring about military benefits. For that reason, this theory on optimal static operating base placement explores – and later tests– only the military units of peacekeepers at such bases.

From the perspective of the United Nations, static operating bases could deploy to any

location within a country that meets its own security requirements. Although these bases can provide military benefits, static operating bases are limited from deploying to sites where there is active and ongoing battle. Because static operating bases will be in position for an extended period of time and because they house personnel and goods crucial to the success of the operation, "the commander must therefore carefully consider site suitability for an extended time as well as operational and environmental requirements as factors for site selection" (Department of Field Support, Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2012*a*, p. 87). Large static operating bases require a good deal of infrastructure. Large, stable facilities to store ammunition, weapons, and machinery, a secured structure that protects the perimeter of the base, housing accommodation for personnel, storage facilities for food, water, and fuel, and watch towers are some of the key components that make up such an operating base. The process of physically establishing such facilities requires some degree of extant security on the ground, as the UN engineers and other personnel that construct the base need to have a sufficiently safe setting to accomplish that task. The UN facilities at static operating base are not likely to be able to be constructed in throes of an ongoing skirmish. Instead, they need to be constructed in relative security. Moreover, the size of these bases means that they are often slow to respond to ongoing events; these are large bases with large contingencies deployed at them. Constructing such a base and moving the personnel to it is not a quick process.

Given the operational requirements of the UN with respect to static operating bases, as well as their slow nature, these bases should not deploy to active conflict sites. Thus, and even prior to the introduction of the role that host government consent plays, static operating bases have a UN-imposed limitation on where they can deploy: these bases are not likely to deploy to areas where there is sustained active fighting and where neither actor – the government or rebels – possess control over the territory at hand.

This means that static operating bases could deploy to areas that have either *full* or *some* territorial control by either the rebels or government. How does host government consent

influence the choice to deploy within this choice set?

Host governments should hope to influence static operating base deployment patterns in the manner that allows them to use the base's benefits to maximum effect. However, there is not an unlimited number of static operating bases that deploy within a country. On average, about twelve static operating bases are deployed within a given country per month. This means that bases are a relatively scarce resource and cannot be deployed to all potentially feasible locations within a country. Host governments must strategically influence base allocations and prioritize the locations where bases would most benefit them.

Given this, the locations that have previously been reclaimed by the government are well suited to receiving these peacekeeper benefits. The military benefits of peacekeepers in such locations work to maintain control over territory recently reclaimed by the government. By consolidating the territorial gains of the host government, the mission contributes to a lasting governmental hold over those previously contested locations. Taken together, this implies that we should expect to see static operating bases deploying to those locations where the government has some control, but not full control.

While peacekeeper security benefits may be additionally stabilizing in the locations where rebels have full or some territorial control – and in turn, where government authority is *especially* weak – the host government should not want static operating bases deployed to such locations. Locating peacekeepers in the locations where rebels hold territory risks allowing the rebels to gain those same benefits. Allow military peacekeepers to deploy to where rebels have any control risks those rebels using the same peacekeeper activities to consolidate their power within a locality. This in turn risks rebels gaining the power and resources to mount a stronger campaign against the state.

Given these incentives regarding military peacekeeper benefits – the desire to ensure that they go to places where governments, not rebels, can reap those gains – in combination with the need to deploy to a location with a history of some violence but relative stability, leads to the first hypothesis of this dissertation:

Hypothesis 1 – Static Operating Base Placement: Military peacekeepers at static operating bases are more likely to deploy to subnational areas where the government has some territorial control, compared to subnational areas where the rebels have some territorial control, where the rebels have full territorial control, or where the government has full control over the territory.

2.4.2 Temporary Operating Bases

Next, let us consider temporary operating bases. Recall that TOBs are best suited to deploy to areas experiencing active conflicts. Indeed, they are explicitly designed to respond to conflict hotspots (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020). A TOB consists of an infantry company or platoon, or roughly 40 to 150 troops; whereas static operating bases often host other types of peacekeeping personnel, TOBs only host military peacekeepers (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020). This means that all personnel at a TOB are armed and equipped to use force for self-protection; this is not true of static operating bases. The UN itself explicitly describes TOBs as "a military position, which can be used as a secure location from which the UN...projects combat power in support of operational goals and tactical objectives." (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020, p. 129).

This, coupled with the more skeletal infrastructure of a TOB, makes it far easier to construct such a base in less safe environments. It also means that it is less risky to abandon the base, should the UN need to evacuate the TOB. Unlike static operating bases, which are large and relatively permanent, TOBs are only intended to briefly deploy to a location as they "are not equipped to self-sustain for extended periods of time" (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020, p. 41); their infrastructural requirements are markedly thinner, as a result. Take, for example, Figure 2.1, which includes the UN Infantry Battalion Manual's example of a TOB set-up.[6] It contains many of the key elements of a static operating base – barracks, a protective perimeter, watch towers – but to a smaller scale and with less durable

[6]This image is taken from the United Nations Department of Peace Operations (2020).



Figure 2.1: Example of the layout and infrastructure used to build a TOB.

structures. The barracks, meeting hall, and other spaces that house personnel are often tents on hard stands. Likewise, rather than a permanent and solid fence to cover the TOB perimeter, barbed and concertina wire are used.

This allows TOBs to be established or deconstructed quickly and in accordance with the current conflict situation on the ground. Likewise, should a TOB need to evacuate a location, there are relatively few peacekeepers and no large stores of ammunition, heavy machinery, or other key items that the UN would seek to protect. Taken together, the military nature of TOBs and their mobile nature allow TOBs to face fewer operational requirements from the UN. This lets TOBs deploy to sites of active conflict. These two factors also allow TOBs to be effective in responding to active conflict. Per the UN, "TOBs are deployed to cover vulnerable areas and hotspots by the fastest means available" to, among other things, "deter armed groups from settling in the vicinity" (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020, p. 41). Their intended purpose is to quickly respond to conflict.

Because TOBs are best suited to deploy to areas experiencing active conflict, deploying to a stable location without battles denies TOBs the ability to provide the military benefits

that they are best suited to offer – and that the host government seeks to maximize. There is no practical benefit in deploying TOBs to stable areas. Instead, they should deploy to sites of active conflict or sites where there is active risk of renewed conflict; those areas are referred to under the general title of conflict sites.

Within active conflict sites, TOBs can deploy to locations where the government is winning or losing in battle. At sites with an active risk of renewed conflict, TOBs can deploy to locations where the government has recently won or lost territory. Either setting is appropriate for a TOB, as there is a use for additional military presence. However, the placement of TOBs is constrained by the relative scarcity of these bases; on average, a mission hosts about 14 TOBs per year. TOBs cannot deploy to every location that sees a battle or skirmish. Instead, the host government must prioritize the locations where a TOB could most benefit it.

A TOB's benefit to the host government is greatest when it deploys to the areas where non-state actors are out-performing the government. Because TOBs can deploy to these sites, they can use their military presence to limit active fighting and push combatants out of strongholds. Where the government is already winning or has recently seized territory, it does not require additional assistance - although the presence of the peacekeepers may expedite a victory, the government does not require additional forces to ensure success. However, a TOB deployed to a location where non-state actors are successfully challenging the state not only has a practical use, but also offers the greatest strategic benefit to the government. The government, without additional assistance, faces a greater risk of losing a skirmish, suffering more fatalities, or losing territorial control; even if the risk is manageable, these are the locations that require a greater number of costly resources to ensure success.

Thus, TOBs should deploy to locations where they can offer the largest marginal return to the government. This leads to the following hypothesis.

> *Hypothesis 2 – Temporary Operating Base Placement: TOBs are more likely to deploy to an area where the government is performing poorly in battle.*

2.4.3 Discussing the Independent Variables Across Chapters 3 and 4

Prior to moving on from the discussion of the factors that predict where peacekeeping bases deploy, let us discuss the rationale of the use of separate independent variables predicting where temporary and static operating bases deploy. Whereas Hypothesis 1 – tested in Chapter 3 – uses territorial control as the independent variable, Hypothesis 2 – tested in Chapter 4 – uses battle performance as the independent variable. Why this difference? The actual mechanisms through which military peacekeepers provide military benefits to a host government do not dramatically vary across base type; what does vary, however, is the type of conflict setting to which the UN will allow each base type to deploy to, and the longevity of the base in that given location.

Per the prior discussion of base types, due to the size of the base and its equipment, large number of non-armed personnel, and the slow pace at which such a base can be constructed, the UN has strict security and operational requirements that limit where static operating bases can deploy. Once in place, these bases remain deployed for a significant period of time. The smaller, mobile, TOBs do not face these same stringent operational requirements. Instead they deploy to sites of active conflict to complete a specific task in the short-term. Whereas the host government would ideally want to target any military peacekeeper to the locations where it can gain the largest marginal return on their place, these differences create different predictors of where these bases will deploy.

Specifically, the operational and security requirements imposed by the UN influence the type of conflict site that a base can deploy to. This dissertation conceptualizes three types of conflict sites: active conflict sites where no actor holds control, contested sites with some control by a conflict actor, or site where there is full control by a conflict actor.[7] The key

[7]This maps closely to the zones of control established in Kalyvas (2006). A key difference between this conceptualization and that of Kalyvas is that whereas this dissertation describes locations of no control, Kalyvas has a zone wherein both actors have equal levels of control; while equal levels of control could be interpreted to mean a common lack of control, this theory makes that distinction explicit. For example, his key example of that middling zone is a location where the government controls the location by day, and the rebels control the location by night (Kalyvas 2006, p. 212). Most of the locations of no control described in this dissertation do not fall under that description.

independent variables at hand map on to these three site types. Battle performance is used to capture sites with active clashes. The degree of territorial control held by an actor is used to capture whether or not a site is contested or held.

The UN's security requirements limit where static operating bases can deploy – such bases cannot deploy to sites with active conflict. Given that, using immediate battle outcomes to predict static operating base deployment would not appropriate, as the UN would not allow these bases to respond to hotspots. But, TOBs are intended to "cover vulnerable areas and hotspots by the fastest means available," and so are suited to deploy to active conflict sites (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020, p. 41). Thus, using battle outcomes to describe where TOBs deploy is fitting. Likewise, static operating bases require more stability and control. As such, the degree of territorial control is a fitting predictor of these bases. Thus, the independent variable used in Chapters 3 and 4 captures the type of conflict site each operating base type can deploy to.

Next, consider how the duration of the base type deployment influences what factors predict where it will deploy. How long a base can deploy to a given site influences whether or not its military benefits are best applied in the short-term or long-term. For example, TOBs are not intended to remain in place for a long period of time (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020, p. 41). As such, they would not be able to efficiently contribute to territorial consolidation because they depart a location after their specific task is completed. Because there is a delay in between the seizure of territory and the consolidation of control over that territory, consolidation requires a long-term commitment.[8] TOBs are not able to provide long-term consolidation support, and so we should not expect host governments to influence TOBs deployment to sites where there is some or full territorial control. However,

[8]The delay in territorial seizure to control is for several reasons. First, as Kalyvas (2006) notes, "gaining control over an area brings collaboration and losing control brings it to an end" (p. 121). Even in locations where the government has regained territory, it must work to re-establish and cement control; this is especially in the context of the African civil wars that are the focus of this dissertation, where state control was likely weak prior to the onset of the conflict. Given that, after claiming territory, actors must secure borders, rebuild institutions (Oswald et al. 2020), co-opt local elites (Raleigh and De Bruijne 2017), and gain civilian support (Kalyvas 2006) in order to work towards locking down that control.

because static operating bases remain in place for an extended period of time, they can contribute to consolidation. Thus, the degree of territorial control should predict static operating base deployment.

In sum, Chapters 3 and 4 use different independent variables to predict the deployment of temporary and static operating bases to reflect the operational and security requirements from the UN, which limits where bases can deploy and how they can be used by a host government.

2.5 Consent and Peacekeeper Incentives

Consent not only shapes the host government's incentives as it relates to the UN peacekeeping operation; indeed, it also influences the peacekeepers' incentives once they are deployed. As has been argued previously, consent introduces problems in upholding a mandate. Acting in a manner that imposes costs on the government or that is out of line with the government's preferences risks consent being restricted or withdrawn. A key area of peacekeepers' mandate that could impose such costs on the government is the protection of civilians. With the exception of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), every peacekeeping operation deployed since 2000 has been mandated to protect civilians. It is the backbone and core feature of all modern UN peacekeeping operations. The UN has explicitly clarified that a mandate to protect civilians includes a mandate to use force against the state if its agents are engaged in such violence. This is a direct imposition of costs onto the host government and an action that likely directly contradicts the host government's preferences.

Given the need to maintain the state's consent and the fragility of that consent, the threat of UN force is not credible against the government.[9] Peacekeepers are likely to be less willing

[9]Why, then, would the UN ever issue such a threat? First, the language of the use of force for the protection of civilians in most mandates is rather generic - rather than outlining which actors the UN can and cannot use force against, peacekeepers have a blanket ability to use force to protect civilians. This effectively avoids the problem of issuing a specific threat against the host government, although it is still technically made. Second, there is a divide between the UN headquarters and the UN operation on the ground. The prioritization of the protection of civilians has become a key norm of the international community and a

to utilize force against the government if doing so would threaten the mission. In a report to the UN General Assembly by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, the UN itself acknowledged that when confronted with incidents in which the state is the perpetrator of violence against civilians, the use of force "is considered unrealistic" in recognition of "operational and political constraints" despite the fact that such a response is "at odds with the legal authority and mandate to act" (United Nations General Assembly 2014, p. 14-15) This highlights that there is a general awareness of the problematic externalities of consent, in that overstepping this threshold of costs to the host government may result in severe operational restrictions or the expulsion of the operation.

It also seems to be the case that host governments are aware of this reduced willingness of the part of peacekeepers to use force. Host governments have long since engaged in bad behavior near and around peacekeepers without prompting a significant change in how the UN treats the state. The UN has collaborated with national armies in joint operations in which state agents have engaged in campaigns of violence against civilians; even the use of force against peacekeepers by host governments has not resulted in serious UN action against the state (Rhoads 2016, p. 141). Despite the common use of obstructionist tactics to influence where peacekeepers deploy and to interfere with peacekeeper operations, peacekeepers continue to collaborate with host governments. Host governments have long been able to threaten revoked or reduced consent as a means of weakening UN operations, rarely being met with retaliation. This is clearly evident in the willingness of UN peacekeepers to obscure state abuse and to "[back] down in the face of government pressure," (Labuda 2020) in order to remain operational. Given that, the threat of force against the state is not credible, meaning that the deterrent threat of peacekeepers' force against violence by host governments does not hold.

bedrock of UN peacekeeping missions, but the peacekeepers on the ground face challenges and incentives that are distinct from UN headquarters. While UN headquarters have normative concerns and pressures to prioritize the protection of civilians, peacekeepers on the ground have to strategically implement the norm (Bode and Karlsrud 2019). While the General Assembly has in recent years clarified that the use of force against host governments does present challenges and may be "unrealistic" (United Nations General Assembly 2014), it has yet to offer a solution to this problem or change how it issues mandates.

In sum, halting government violence against civilians, especially via the use of force, risks the stability of host government consent. This means that peacekeepers, aware of this tension, may censor their protective capacity towards victims of host government violence; this should hold at both static and temporary operating bases, as both have opportunities to protect civilians from violence. However, consent should *not* alter their incentives to protect civilians against violence carried out by rebels, as rebels do not hold this power of consent. That is, using force to halt rebel violence against civilians will not result in any restrictions or the revocation of consent. This leads to the final two hypotheses of the dissertation.

> *Hypothesis 3a – Government Violence Against Civilians at Static Operating Bases: As the number of military units at static operating bases increase, host government violence against civilians is not altered.*
>
> *Hypothesis 3b – Rebel Violence Against Civilians at Static Operating Bases: As the number of military units at static operating bases increase, rebel violence against civilians decreases.*
>
> *Hypothesis 4a – Government Violence Against Civilian at Temporary Operating Bases: TOB deployment does not alter host government violence against civilians.*
>
> *Hypothesis 4b – Rebel Violence Against Civilians at Temporary Operating Bases: TOB deployment decreases rebel violence against civilians.*

2.6 Conclusion

Although the requirement for consent is one of the three key principles of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, it may come at the cost of its operations' effectiveness. To summarize, this dissertation offer a novel theory on reduced peacekeeper effectiveness due to their ability to influence the location of peacekeeper bases and the ability of peacekeepers to deter state violence. This dissertation outlines the different types of peacekeeper bases – specifically, temporary operating bases and static operating bases – and the benefits that they can offer to a host government. It then develops a theory of the ways in which those benefits can be maximized by host governments in order to best support their short-term

and long-term attempts to win the conflict and consolidate power.

Specifically, Hypothesis 1 argues that military peacekeepers at static operating bases should deploy to the areas where the government has recently reclaimed territory, to support the government's attempts to consolidate its control and power. Chapter 3 expands on this logic and quantitatively tests this hypothesis using the data outlined in the Introduction. Hypothesis 2 argues that temporary operating bases should deploy to locations where the government is performing poorly in battle; that logic that is quantitatively tested in Chapter 4. Finally, Hypotheses 3 and 4 argue that while peacekeeper deployment does not alter government patterns of violence against civilians, it can deter rebel violence against civilians. Chapter 5 further explores this logic and quantitatively tests these hypotheses.

Chapter 3

Static Operating Base Locations and Territorial Consolidation

This chapter and the next seek to answer the question of where do peacekeepers deploy, sub-nationally. Within a given country, peacekeepers cannot realistically deploy uniformly across the entirety of the territory; instead, the choice of where to deploy must be strategically considered. In particular, this chapter explores the trends of peacekeeper deployment with an understanding that the need to maintain consent allows for host governments to influence these deployment patterns in a way that their non-state counterparts do not have.

The literature on the subnational deployment trends of peacekeeping operations have largely been considered from the perspective of the United Nations itself. Indeed, deployments have been found to be influenced by factors of convenience to the UN (e.g., where peacekeepers can travel safely and easily), and of UN mandate (e.g., where peacekeepers can best carry out their mandate). To these ends, peacekeepers have been found to deploy to the areas that have a history of violence and to the locations that are accessible to them as a result of proximity to urban areas and the capital city (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2016, 2017). Additional literature has begun to explore how one-sided violence can predict where peacekeepers deploy (Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019, Phayal and Prins 2020). Despite a

clear connection between deployments and the experience of violence, however, there may be a significant delay in how quickly peacekeepers are able to respond to that violence (Powers, Reeder and Townsen 2015, Costalli 2014).

This chapter argues that the current literature has not incorporated two key components in understanding and explaining where peacekeepers are sent within a country. First, conflict dynamics – beyond intensity – have not been examined as a driver of peacekeeper deployment. Second, and relatedly, the strategic incentives of host governments as they relate to the conflict have not yet been explored in shaping peacekeeper locations. As previewed in Chapter 2, because peacekeepers offer military benefits to host governments, they can help to consolidate the military gains of the government. These security benefits offer a cheap alternative for governments seeking to ensure territorial control, entrench their power subnationally, and ensure that non-state actors are less able to challenge the state. Given that, this chapter argues that host governments channel military peacekeepers to the subnational locations where they have recently reclaimed territory, but do not have consolidated control.

Indeed, the results in this chapter support the proposed theory of military peacekeepers being strategically deployed as a potential source of territorial consolidation for the host government. Military peacekeepers are significantly likely to deploy to areas of *recent* government control, but not full government control. That peacekeepers do not deploy to the locations that should be the most stable and present the least danger – where the government has full control – is evidence against a theory of peacekeepers self-selecting into the locations with the least associated risk to themselves. Moreover, peacekeepers are not likely to deploy to the areas in which rebels have territorial control. Under this theory, this finding makes sense; host governments seek to ensure that rebels do not gain from the benefits offered by peacekeepers.

This chapter first, briefly, revisits and outlines the role of host government consent in UN peacekeeping operations; for a more in-depth discussion of the role and shape of consent in UN peacekeeping operations, refer to Chapter 2. It then describes the static operating bases

and the military benefits they offer. It then sets up a logic of where a host government would be able to maximize the gains from these bases, leading to an empirically testable hypothesis. The chapter then sets up the research design, introduces original data on peacekeeper base deployment, and tests the key hypothesis of this paper. It concludes with results and a discussion.

3.1 Host Government Consent and Peacekeeper Operations

Recall from Chapter 2 that UN peacekeeping operations must deploy with the consent of a host government; in civil conflicts, non-state actor consent is often complex and rarely obtained. Thus, in a civil war, there is only one actor with the power to reduce or eliminate peacekeeper autonomy via the loss of consent: the host government. Consent is rather fragile; it can be withdrawn at any stage of the mission's deployment, and a host government faces no legal consequences for doing so. Consent can be fully revoked – resulting in the closure of the mission – or restricted. Restrictions in consent result in the host government refusing to allow the operation to perform a specific duty or function in some capacity.

Restrictions of consent can be used to influence where peacekeepers are allowed to deploy within a country. Common to many operations is the refusal of a leader to allow peacekeepers into a given area after the operation's deployment, despite the freedom of movement allowed in a Status of Forces Agreement. Leaders can engage in a variety of blocking activities, such as verbally denying the incursion into a certain area, or physically halting the movement of peacekeepers. In this sense, restrictions of consent directly shape where the UN can operate within a country. Likewise, the threat of revoked or restricted consent may allow for increased input and influence by the host government, or make peacekeepers cautious of acting in a manner not in line with the host government's preferences. Both could result in the operation *acting* in line with those preferences.

In sum, the consent of host governments is necessary for peacekeeper deployment – but

is often tenuous and can be manipulated in order to ensure that peacekeepers are deployed to the locations that suit the government's preferences via the threat of revoked consent and by limiting where peacekeepers can travel once deployed. Combined, this gives host governments an ability to exert some control over where peacekeepers are located.

3.2 What Are Static Operating Bases?

After consent has been gained, peacekeepers are able to deploy within a country. Recall from previous chapters that peacekeepers primarily deploy within a conflict via large, relatively stable bases that are referred to in this paper as *static operating bases*. These bases include headquarters and company operating bases.[1] For example, the map shown in Figure 3.1 highlights the base deployments in the DRC in May of 2015. These maps are generated and included in each of the reports of the UN Secretary General to the General Assembly. Each base is deployed to a locality and comprised of multiple units. Each unit is identified as a small rectangle on the map; that rectangular representation contains information about the unit type based on the symbol within the rectangle and information about the unit size based on the symbol above the rectangle.

Take, for example, the base deployed to the city in the top-left of the DRC, Dungu, as seen in Table 3.1. For readability, this base can be viewed separately in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2 shows that there were three units deployed to Dungu in May of 2015. Based on the UN Joint Military Symbology, these three units are all military in nature: from top to bottom, they are a mechanized infantry battalion, an aviation company, and an engineer company. There is a great deal of variation in the specific subtype of peacekeeper unit; in addition to the types of units described above, there can be formed police units, special forces, observer units, naval units, and more deployed at a base. However, for the sake of working with the

[1]Note that static operating base is the term that is used within this dissertation; this is not the official categorization by the UN. The UN refers to these bases as headquarters and company operating bases (COBs). Because they are pooled together, they are referred to under the general label of static operating base.

Figure 3.1: Static operating base deployments in the UN peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO, in May of 2015. This map was created by the United Nations Geographic Information Section.

rest of the literature on peacekeeping operations, these peacekeeping units are collapsed into four broad types: military, police, observer, and civilian units.[2]

The main focus of this chapter is military peacekeepers. Military peacekeepers are the most common type of peacekeeping deployment in the temporal range explored in this project, in part because much of a peacekeeping operation's mandate is related to conflict dynamics and requires some capacity for force. Infantry soldiers are the most common type of military peacekeeper, meaning that the majority of military peacekeepers are rank and file soldiers.

Static operating bases are relatively stable - on average, they deploy to a given site for 12 consecutive months; headquarters deploy for even longer. These bases also hold a large number of peacekeepers. The average static operating base holds over one thousand peacekeepers of a variety of types and functions. Headquarters, again, hold even more

[2]For more information on the classification scheme, please refer to the appendix.

Figure 3.2: Map of the deployment to Dungu, Democratic Republic of Congo in May 2015

peacekeepers. With these peacekeepers come a large variety of benefits: economic benefits (Beber et al. 2019), military benefits (Howard 2019, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013), and governance benefits (Blair 2019). Each of these benefits can be used to support and strengthen state authority. In fact, many of these benefits are explicitly constructed in order to strengthen state authority. This becomes potentially problematic when the state is only represented by an incumbent regime that is either predatory and/or is dismissing or oppressing non-state challengers that seek to play a role in the state. This dissertation argues that military benefits are the most crucial type to consider when exploring subnational peacekeeper deployment patterns, as military peacekeepers are the largest contingency of personnel deployed and due to clear and pressing need for such benefits presented by the conflict itself. How do military benefits offer potential gains for host governments, and how do they that shape governmental incentives in where military peacekeepers at static operating bases are located?

3.3 Peacekeeper Benefits

UN peacekeepers at static operating bases provide a variety of benefits that work to stabilize the locations to which they deploy. While peacekeepers were largely designed to restore physical security by managing warring parties, modern peacekeeping missions provide a variety of benefits that stabilize localities. From the perspective of the host government, these benefits can work together to contribute to its territorial gains. This is especially true of the missions that deploy during active conflict. Through a variety of benefits, peacekeepers

are able to contribute to the consolidation of territorial control – an outcome that is especially vital to many of the contexts that peacekeeping operations deploy, where government control pre-deployment is likely to be weak. Military peacekeepers are best able to offer the benefits that can lead to increased control, as they can reduce the likelihood of renewed fighting, can hold territory, and can engage in security-sector reform. Together, these benefits offer host governments greater control and capacity within a subnational locality. Each military benefit is outlined below.

3.3.1 Military Benefit: Limit Renewed Conflict

Military peacekeepers can contribute to the consolidation of government territorial control in a number of ways. First, these peacekeepers reduce the likelihood of renewed fighting between combatants by raising the costs of aggression. With a mandate to use force to protect themselves, peacekeepers can deter violence by combatants that may have been used to renew fighting by positioning themselves between combatants (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013, 2019). Peacekeepers create blockades, buffer zones, and protected areas which can prevent combatants from entering easily into areas where peacekeepers are deployed (Howard 2019). By physically imposing themselves between combatants, peacekeepers further make it more difficult to engage in hostilities. This forces combatants to either choose to not pursue a campaign of violence where the peacekeepers are stationed, or to engage with the peacekeepers in order to carry on. This not only risks immediate costs of peacekeeper force, but also future political costs (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2019).

The costs of renewing conflict are also raised by the monitoring role of peacekeepers. By informing the other side of its opponent's movements, peacekeepers deprive combatants of the opportunity to exploit an informational advantage. In this function, peacekeepers reduce the likelihood of a successful surprise attack (Fortna 2004, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2019).

Likewise, the peacekeeping operations featured in this dissertation hold a mandate to

protect civilians with the use of force. Combatants often face incentives to engage in violence against civilians to limit the resources and/or resolve of an opponent (Downes 2006, 2011, Valentino 2014). Violence against civilians can be a strategy to weaken an opponent. Likewise, ceasefires, peace agreements, or other negotiated settlements may include provisions to ensure that civilians are protected from violence carried out from combatants (United Nations Department of Political Affairs 2012). Should combatants decide to renege on a peace deal by engaging in violence against civilians, they will find it costlier to do so if peacekeepers can use force to prevent or halt that action.

3.3.2 Military Benefit: Hold Territory and Limit the Geographic Spread of Conflict

Second, military peacekeepers can hold territory and limit the ability of combatants to expand the geographic area in which fighting occurs (Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015, Duursma and Read 2017). By separating combatants and stationing themselves at the front lines of conflict, peacekeepers are able to physically impose and interrupt conflict activities, contributing to lasting stability. Peacekeepers at static operating bases hold and maintain the territory to which they are deployed; their ability to use force in self-defense ensures that should a combatant attempt to seize the territory to which they are deployed, military peacekeepers can return fire to protect themselves and to secure their environment. When non-state actors fire on peacekeepers, then they are able to use force to protect themselves and stop the violence, which often results in peacekeepers using force to drive out the offending rebels. Indeed, government actors have been found to take advantage of this aspect of peacekeeping mandates, sometimes strategically placing themselves near the UN and engaging in a clash with rebels to prompt a UN response. The national military of the DRC was noted for "employ[ing] various tactical manoeuvres in active combat to draw the UN into fighting on their side, in such a way that would bear the brunt of retaliatory attacks," including "position[ing] their tanks next to, or behind, positions held by UN forces with the

goal that when whatever militia return fire on [the DRC armed forces], the peacekeepers would be provoked into responding" (Rhoads 2016, p. 182).

However, this often extends beyond simply returning fire at the site that peacekeepers are fired upon. The language of mandates is often somewhat vague; with respect to the mandate for self-defense, what constitutes self-defense is not clear. Similarly, it is not clear how far-reaching the activities are that fall under self-defense. In practice, this often means that peacekeepers return fire until the threat is eliminated; this often results in peacekeepers using this self-defense mandate to push rebels out of a locality, further contributing to local security. For example, the so-called Cruz Report called for missions to "identify threats to their security and take the initiative, using all the tactics, to neutralise or eliminate the threats" as part of "defensive postur[ing]" by UN peacekeepers (dos Santos Cruz 2017).[3]

The UN using force to contribute to territorial gains has been exhibited across multiple missions. Recently the UN operation in the Central African Republic, MINUSCA, was able to effectively repel militia members – even inflicting a number of causalities – after the militia attacked the city of Birao (*Al Jazeera* 2020). This is not only a facet of modern, robust peacekeeping mandates. In 2000, for example, during the operation in Sierra Leone, UN peacekeepers stationed near a key bridge skirmished with Revolutionary United Front (RUF) members as they tried to advance to the capital. The peacekeepers, able to return fire in self-defense, defeated the rebels and pushed them out of the area (*Reuters* 2000, *The Telegraph* 2000).

Some modern missions have gone even further than utilizing the self-defense mandate to contribute to the territorial gains of the government, instead actively being deployed to stabilize territory without state control or to neutralize certain armed groups (Karlsrud 2015). The Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) deployed within the mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is an example of the UN contributing clear military benefits to the

[3]This was a report authored by former Force Commander for MONUSCO, the operation in the DRC, and MINUSTAH, the operation in Haiti. The report centered on how to improve security for UN peacekeepers in the field. This report eventually led to the UN developing a Plan of Action based on the recommendations in the report.

host government outside of its defensive capabilities. The FIB, a UN peacekeeping unit of more than 2000 military peacekeepers, was initially deployed to Goma in 2013 as a response to the government and UN's inability to halt successful territorial gains of the M23 rebel group (Karlsrud 2015). The FIB's military might was significant and included "combat troops, attack helicopters, artillery and mortar fire" (Tull 2018, p. 175). In a series of joint operations with the government, the FIB was successfully able to push M23 out of the area, which then fled to Uganda and surrendered. Indeed, the FIB's success is "inherent[ly]" linked to "the expansion of the state's territorial control" (Benson 2016, p. 9). The FIB is, at the time of this writing, still operational in the DRC.

The UN's choice to allow for offensive operations is not limited to the DRC, but is rather becoming a hallmark of many of its ongoing missions deployed to African civil conflicts – especially those facing what the UN labels "asymmetrical threats" from "violent extremist and terrorist groups" (United Nations Security Council 2016). For example, the UN operation in Mali, MINUSMA, has been authorized to use force to "anticipate, deter and counter" such threats.

3.3.3 Military Benefit: Security Sector Reform

Taken together, the ability of military peacekeepers to reduce the likelihood of renewed hostilities and to maintain territorial control offers clear gains that a host government could benefit from. By placing such peacekeepers in fragile locations, they can contribute to lasting stability. This effect is compounded by military peacekeepers' role in security-sector reform. Through these efforts, peacekeepers work to increase security capacity (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping and Department of Field Support 2012, Blair 2019). Security sector reform trains and improves the capacity of the state's military and police agents, which may contribute to their ability to hold and control territory. As a result, peacekeepers have been found to have been associated with increased state authority (Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2020). Military peacekeepers, at the subnational level, can thus reduce the risk

of renewed conflict, hold territory, and strengthen state capacity within it. Combined, this provides a potentially powerful tool for ensuring continued government control over territory.

3.3.4 Why Do Host Governments Want These Benefits?

Why would these benefits appeal to host governments? First and foremost, military peacekeepers offer a cheap way for governments to maintain territorial control. Most of the countries that peacekeepers deploy are in active, ongoing conflict in which the government has little extant control. The government of Central African Republic, for example, has been estimated to have control over as little as one-third of the country.[4] Increased territory can contribute to increased access to resources and power, while limiting the duration and scope of a conflict (Cunningham, Skrede Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009, Kalyvas 2006). Moreover, they can be utilized to the advantage of the host government; the mission in the DRC was described by the UN Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations as "a kind of gun for hire...President Kabila's own private military company" (Rhoads 2016, p. 150). These military benefits thus offer clear appeal to leaders who are in need of additional force.

But beyond the immediate goal of winning the conflict and reducing an enemies' capabilities, these benefits can also strengthen the government in a variety of other ways. These benefits are able to be used by the host government for credit claiming and to reward its supporters. The public good of security that the UN provides, as well as the expansion of the state's security apparatus can act in a manner that is similar to foreign aid, supporting the regime's survival and prolonging the likelihood that it remains in power (De Mesquita and Smith 2009, Jablonski 2014). As argued in Blair (2019) "UN-provided public goods are especially ripe for credit claiming of this sort" (p. 327). Goods and aid, provided by a third party – both with and without the knowledge of the public benefiting that they have been provided by a third party – have been found to be credited to the government and to increase positive perceptions of the government (Dietrich, Mahmud and Winters

[4]See, for example, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic.

2018, Cruz and Schneider 2017, Beath, Christia and Enikolopov 2012, Lyall, Zhou and Imai 2017). Through the provision of security stabilization, host governments can take credit for returning peace to a local area of deployment.

UN peacekeeper stabilization benefits offer a path to protecting and growing incumbent power; this is especially tempting in the wake of conflict in which state control and authority is likely decreased. These benefits can be used to entrench elites' position of power and ensure their control over the state apparatus (Barnett, Fang and Zürcher 2014, Münch and Veit 2018, Wade 2016). Thus the military benefits of peacekeepers not only contributes to host government survival in the short-term, but perhaps *also in the long-term.* In sum, UN military peacekeepers provide goods that can be used to ensure stability and the increased hold of the host government to the areas to which those peacekeepers deploy; this provides a powerful incentive to ensure that peacekeepers deploy to locations where such benefits can be maximized.

3.4 Where Do Governments Want Peacekeeper Benefits?

As outlined in the two previous sections, host governments face an incentive to place military peacekeepers where they can gain from their stabilization benefits. Where would stabilization benefits best advantage the host government?

Recall that there is a finite number of static operating bases deployments; on average, about twelve static operating bases are deployed within a given country per month, with an average of about 30 military units deployed across the country at these bases. This means that bases are a relatively scarce resource and cannot be deployed to all potentially feasible locations within a country. Host government must strategically influence base allocations, and prioritize the locations where benefits would most benefit them.

Military peacekeepers at static operating bases deploy to areas that have historically experienced violence. With that in mind, bases are likely to deploy to locations that are

not actively experiencing conflict. The UN requires such bases to have a degree of security prior to deployment. Because these bases will be in position for an extended period of time and because they house personnel and goods crucial to the success of the operation, "the commander must therefore carefully consider site suitability for an extended time as well as operational and environmental requirements as factors for site selection" (Department of Field Support, Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2012*a*, p. 87). The timeline, however, between experienced violence and peacekeeper deployment has been found to vary. For example, (Costalli 2014) found that peacekeepers could be as slow as two years behind experienced violence in Bosnia in the 1990s. Other work has found that peacekeepers deployed in missions in the late 1990s and early 2000s responded to violence one year after it occurred (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2016, 2017). On a hopeful note, recent work has found a much shorter lag between violence and peacekeeper deployment, with peacekeepers responding as soon as three months after violence against civilians (Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019). Thus, a precondition of base deployment is that it go to a location with a history of some violence.

This means that static operating bases are not likely to deploy to areas where there is sustained active fighting and where there is a lack of territorial control. Instead, static operating bases could deploy to areas that have either *full* or *some* territorial control by either the rebels or government. Those locations with some territorial control by either actor are likely to be stable enough to permit base construction and base maintenance; while there may be some occasional violence and attempts to unseat the incumbent holding the territory, locations with some control are largely secured by an actor (Kalyvas 2006). These are locations where "[the territory] is not within the grasp" of the challenger, "but within their reach"(Kalyvas 2006, p. 212).

The locations with some territorial control by the government are best suited to receiving the military benefits of peacekeepers. These benefits would work to maintain control over territory already possessed by the government. By consolidating the territorial gains of

the host government, the mission contributes to a lasting governmental hold over those previously contested locations, ensuring challengers are not able to grasp those locations. Security sector reform and the militarized presence of the peacekeepers ensure that violence is reduced and that future clashes are handled quickly, or deterred entirely. Finally, the provision of stability and security may work to win over local civilians, who are among the least likely to have firmly aligned with either actor due to the contested nature of the territory (Kalyvas 2006).

The areas where the government has full control are not likely to reap large rewards from the military benefits of peacekeepers. The most prominent conceptualization of full control in conflict settings is Kalyvas (2006), which argues that full territorial control is signified when an actor can control who enters into and out of the territory and when enemy combatants have been eliminated from that area. If this is the case, then the military benefits of a peacekeeping operation are of little use to the government.

While peacekeeper security benefits may be additionally useful in the locations where rebels have some or full territorial control – and in turn, where government authority is *especially* weak – the host government should not want static operating bases deployed to such locations. Locating military benefits in the areas where rebels hold territory risks allowing the rebels to gain those same benefits. Likewise, the risk of credit claiming could run both ways – if rebels can take the credit for the stability associated with peacekeepers, then they perhaps can gain increased civilian support. This in turn risks rebels gaining the power and resources to mount a stronger campaign against the state.

Given these incentives regarding military peacekeeper benefits – the desire to ensure that they go to places where governments, not rebels, can reap those gains – in combination with the need to deploy to a location with a history of some violence but relative stability, leads to the main hypothesis of this chapter, as first outlined in Chapter 2:

> *Hypothesis 1 – Static Operating Base Placement: Military peacekeepers at static operating bases are more likely to deploy to subnational areas where the government has some territorial control, compared to subnational areas where the rebels have some ter-*

ritorial control, where the rebels have full territorial control, or where the government has full control over the territory.

3.5 Empirically Testing Where Static Operating Bases Deploy

To understand where peacekeepers deploy at the subnational level, a geographically disaggregated research design is used to capture local trends of movement. Rather than relying on subnational low-level administrative levels, the unit of analysis is a grid-cell unit of analysis. This is in line with other recent work on subnational peacekeeper location (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2016, Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019). Each country in the sample – the countries in Africa that experienced a civil conflict and hosted a robust peacekeeping operation – is divided into multiple grids that each measure 0.5 x 0.5 decimal degrees, or roughly 55 kilometers by 55 kilometers at the equator. Here, robust peacekeeping operations refer to those Chapter VII operations that have a protection of civilian mandate. Because the temporal range of this analysis is 2000–2014, this is almost all peacekeeping operations deployed to Africa in this time. This includes Burundi (ONUB), Central African Republic (MINURCAT, MINUSCA), Chad (MINURCAT), Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, MONUSCO), Cote D'Ivoire (UNOCI), Liberia (UNMIL), Mali (MINUSMA) Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), South Sudan (UNMISS), and Sudan (UNMIS, UNAMID).[5]

The United Nations has made protection of civilians a cornerstone of its modern missions, and as such, it is very likely that most operations mandated in the future will have a similar mandate. Likewise, the vast majority of modern UN peacekeeping operations have been deployed to Africa - as outlined in Chapter 1, two-thirds of missions authorized after 2000

[5]MINURCAT, which covered CAR and Chad is included – this is because the mission, while in two countries, was deployed in response to the violence and refugee crisis stemming from the crisis in Darfur, rather than an interstate conflict (at least, rather than an interstate conflict between the governments of Chad and CAR. One dynamic that did escalate local violence in Chad and CAR was tensions and proxy fighting between the Chadian and Sudanese governments. But because this interstate tension is not between two host governments, this mission is taken as operating within the context of civil conflict.This is an approach taken by other scholars constructing data on subnational peacekeeping in civil conflicts, including (Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019).

have deployed to Africa. On a practical note as well, much of the available, subnational conflict data covers African conflicts, making this sample suitable for quantitative analysis. While this theory applies to all UN peacekeeping operations deployed to a civil conflict with a robust mandate, the reality of modern peacekeeping operations is that this largely encompasses African conflicts.

Countries leave the sample when either the mission concludes or in December 2014, the last month-year included in the temporal sample of the base dataset; although the base data spans through 2015, the empirical analysis for this chapter span 2000–2014, due to availability of other data.

3.5.1 Dependent Variables

The outcome of interest for this chapter is the deployment of military peacekeepers at static operating bases. The data collected from the reports of the Secretary General are at the unit level. Each static operating base is comprised of multiple peacekeeper units. Figure 3.3 again demonstrates a static operating base deployed in Dungu, DRC. This figure shows that this static operating base is comprised of three different units. Units are of varying sizes – for example, squadrons, platoons, and companies are all units of different sizes. In addition to differing sizes, units are also of varying personnel types. Units can be staffed by military, police, observer, or civilian personnel.

The dependent variable in this chapter is *the number of military units deployed at at static operating base within a grid-cell in a given month.*[6] Units, rather than the number of troops, are used because although units can be of differing sizes, there is uncertainty about that sizing. This is because UN standard unit sizes follow that of NATO, but there is variation in the standard unit size. For example, a company can consist of 80 to 150 soldiers (Moran 2006). Moreover, the actual number of troops per unit, within a given unit type, may vary based on who the Troop Contributing Country sending those troops is. Per the UN Military

[6]Note that when the Secretary General reports are shorter than one month, the number of units is linearly imputed to cover the periods in which there is not a confirmed number of units.

Figure 3.3: Example of the unit-level structure of the UN Secretary General maps; the symbol above each rectangle indicates unit size.

Engineer manual, the "actual strength, composition, availability of military contingents and deployment locations are subject to Troop Contributing Country (TCC) negotiations with the DPKO" (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support 2015, p. 59). This means a formed company from China may be of a slightly different size than a formed company from Nepal. Because there is variation in what the total number of soldiers per unit type is, this chapter relies on the certainty of the number of units.[7] The Secretary General maps do not provide precise numbers of personnel deployed at each subnational static operating base. While data such as that provided by Kathman (2013) has monthly data on the aggregate number of peacekeepers per mission, these data are not subnational. The most precise data on subnational military peacekeeper presence at static operating bases are therefore at the unit level.

As described above and in Chapter 1, information on static operating base locations is available in the reports of the Secretary General of the United Nations; the Secretary General is mandated to report on the activities of all active peacekeeping operations on a set basis; for active operations, this can be as frequent as once a month or as infrequent as each quarter. Each report contains a map of the static operating bases, in the style of Figure 3.1. These base locations were collected and then geocoded using the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GEOnet Names Server, and cross-referenced with Google Maps.

[7]In the appendix for this chapter, the results are presented using the high and low number of estimated peacekeeping personnel.

3.5.2 Independent Variables

To test Hypothesis 1, the analysis presented in this chapter utilizes data provided by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2010). Recall that the expectation is that peacekeepers should deploy to areas where the government has some control, but not where the rebels have some control; nor should peacekeepers deploy where either actor has full control. Two operationalizations of territorial control are used due to the inherent difficulties in capturing and measuring territorial control at a subnational level. Conceptually, scholars have argued that territorial control should be understood as a continuum, with each end representing full to no control by a given actor (Kalyvas 2006, Rubin and Stewart n.d.). In order to empirically study such a concept, territorial control is often grouped into a finite range of distinct categories. For example, Kalyvas (2006) uses a five zone categorization, ranging from full government control to full rebel control. Operationalizing these categories of control is difficult. This challenge is made more difficult when studying a variety of countries using subnational data. In order to most accurately overcome this, two operationalizations are used to better ensure that this chapter is validly capturing the concept it aims to study.

First, to capture the locations where the government and rebels have some territorial control, ACLED data on territorial seizures are used. First, *Govt Territory* captures if the government forces have reclaimed territory within a grid-cell in a given month. Second, *Rebel Territory* captures if rebels have seized territory in a grid-cell in a given month.[8] These measures indicate that an actor was strong enough to expel its opponent and hold the territory. Note that the entire territory of a grid-cell does not need to change hands, but rather just a subset of it, in order to be included in the model. As such, an actor can seize multiple localities within a grid-cell. Given that, the number of seizures by an actor within a grid-cell are aggregated at the month-level.

[8]This does not include battles or clashes in which territory is seized for a period shorter than one day, per (Raleigh et al. 2010).

To compare areas of some territorial control to areas of full territorial control, ACLED's data on headquarter/base establishment by government and rebel actors is used. Headquarters and bases are likely to be areas with a great degree of control held by a combatant (Raleigh 2010). These are also likely to be "point[s] of concentration" of a given combatant (McColl 1969, p. 622). These locations are likely to be of strategic value, where the combatant has great access to its resources and personnel, and so should be placed where territorial control is greatest to ensure the safety of such goods. For example, Charles Taylor headquartered the National Patriotic Front of Liberia in Gbarnga, which minimized the distance to the NPFL's other centers of controls; not only was it a location where Taylor had clearly seized power, but it served as a locus of his control (Johnston 2008). Even the locations housing the NPFL's rear bases were called "Taylorland," speaking to the clear territorial control exercised at such bases (Johnston 2008). In sum, base and headquarter locations of government rebels are likely a good indicator of consolidated territorial control. This, then, also allows for a test of the second part Hypothesis 2, which argues that static operating bases should be less likely to deploy to locations of consolidated government control.

These variables present information on the *immediate* territorial actions of conflict actors; that is, if territory was seized or a headquarters was established in that month. However, previous literature suggests that peacekeepers at static operating bases may be delayed in locating to areas of violence, following such trends as soon as three months later (Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019) or up to two years later (Costalli 2014). To test this, the proposed determinants of static operating base placement – territorial capture and headquarters/base establishment – are tested with a three month lag and a six month lag.[9]

However, these data are not perfect measures of the full range of territorial control. First, the data on headquarters locations are especially rare. Second, the locations where

[9]These more responsive peacekeeping reactions are tested for two reasons. First, (Costalli 2014) explored the lag in peacekeeper responsiveness in the operation in Bosnia in the 1990s. The mission was criticized for its delay in responding to violence, leading to calls to ensure a more prompt response. Thus it isn't likely that modern peacekeepers would be as slow, because of the noted delay of past missions. Second, this chapter focuses on a more modern era of peacekeeping captured in this study, in which the technology and capacity of operations have improved to allow for greater urgency of peacekeeper response.

an actor has full control are significantly less likely to be measured. Conflict event datasets, by design, capture contentious events. The consolidation of territorial control implies that fewer contentious events should occur; Kalyvas (2006) argues that, among other features, full control is established when an actor can prevent combatants from entering into that location. By that logic, there should be fewer clashes, changes in territorial control, and civilian killings as control increases – all events that would enter into a dataset. The territorial seizures and headquarters establishment variables can only provide information on which actor actively engaged in those activities in a given period. But, they cannot provide information on the maintenance or duration of control.

However, the data on territorial seizures can be manipulated to yield additional insights. If a given grid-cell has territory seized by a given actor *and* no other actor seizes that territory later, than we can say with some confidence that that grid-cell remained in the control of that actor. That is, these data can be used to capture which actor last seized territorial control and how long they held control for. This was used for the second operationalization of some and full territorial control. As highlighted above, Kalyvas (2006) argues that full territorial control is signified when an actor can control who enters into and out of the territory; when enemy combatants have been eliminated from that area; and, as a result, when there is minimal need to engage in violence against civilians to coerce support or punish supports of the enemy. Indeed, the use of violence against civilians has been used as a means of measuring territorial control (Anders 2020); likewise, the use of violence against civilians has been taken as a strategy of cementing and expanding fledgling territorial control (Wimmer and Miner 2020, Sullivan 2012). Indeed, even after fighting has ceased, violence against civilians can be present for months (Kathman and Wood 2014, Bara 2020). Other work has shown that full territorial control can be taken as the ability for an actor to establish rules over that territory, and can thus be indicated by the ability of an actor to freely establish political and social institutions (Rubin 2020). That is, governance - by rebels or the government - increases with territorial control (Rubin and Stewart n.d.).

This produces a relatively high bar of establishing full control over territory – being able to control combatant movement within the area, establishing and implementing rules over that area, and limiting violence against civilians for coercive purposes are all actions that require a great deal of time and effort. Likewise, there is likely to be variation in the form and means of these actions. Given this, this chapter uses a conservative measure of full control, defined as those grid-cells in which an actor has held territory for 24 consecutive months. An actor is designated as having some control if it held territory within a grid-cell for less than that. Because these variables are not describing the immediate actions of conflict actors (as was the case with headquarters establishment and the seizure of territory), there is not a need to lag these variables.

Table 3.1 highlights the summary statistics of the key independent and dependent variables. While these territorial shifts are relatively infrequent – largely driven by the large number of grid-cells that do not experience violence – government actors are slightly more likely to seize territory and establish headquarters than rebels. Likewise, government actors are more likely to have territorial control than rebel actors.

Variable	Min	Max	Median	Mean	Std. Dev
N. Military Units	0.00	38.00	0.00	0.08	0.68
Govt HQ	0.00	2.00	0.00	0.0006	0.009
Rebel HQ	0.00	5.00	0.00	0.002	0.01
Govt Terr	0.00	12.00	0.00	0.002	0.07
Reb Terr	0.00	14.00	0.00	0.002	0.06
Govt Some Control	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.10
Reb Some Control	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.0009	0.009
Govt Full Control	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.14
Reb Full Control	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.13

Table 3.1: Summary Stats, Main IVs and DV

3.5.3 Control Variables

In addition to the explanatory variables proposed in this paper, there are several potential confounding variables that are controlled for. Territory transfers, headquarters/base locations, and peacekeeper deployment may be affected by the degree of a grid-cell's accessibility.

Accessibility affects the ability of both peacekeeper and conflict actors to travel to a given location, and is measured by the estimated travel time in minutes by land transportation from the pixel to the nearest major city with more than 50,000 inhabitants (Uchida and Nelson 2009). Additionally, these models include the proportion of mountainous terrain in a given grid cell (Blyth 2002), as mountainous terrain is association with the civil conflict onset and duration but may also affect the ability of peacekeeper access.

Likewise, more populous locations face a greater risk of conflict onset (Brückner 2010, Raleigh and Hegre 2009), and peacekeepers are more likely to deploy to urban and well-populated areas (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2016). Thus, an estimate of the logged population per grid-cell is included, using data from the Gridded Population of the World (CIESIN 2005).

Variable	Min	Max	Median	Mean	Std. Dev
Logged Pop.	4.74	14.52	10.43	10.31	1.35
Excluded Groups	0.00	5.00	1.00	0.91	0.91
Travel Time	58.88	5794.42	451.24	0.00	500.68
Past One-Sided Violence (Decay)	0.00	0.84	0.00	0.03	0.13
Spatial Lag Base	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.10	0.30
Past Base (Decay)	0.00	0.84	0.00	0.04	0.16

Table 3.2: Summary Stats, Controls

	HQ Govt	HQ Rebel	Govt Terr	Rebel Terr	Govt Some	Govt Full	Reb Some	Reb Full	Mnt.	Pop (Log)	T. Time	Excluded	Past OSV	Past Base	Spat. Lag Base
HQ Govt		0	0	0	-0.001	-0.001	0.016	-0.001	0.007	0.001	-0.003	-0.003	0.015	0	0
HQ Reb			0	0.044	0.012	0.013	0.021	-0.001	0.011	0.012	-0.007	-0.005	0.031	0.024	0.004
Govt Terr				0.069	0.161	0.036	-0.002	-0.003	0.041	0.024	-0.011	-0.01	0.082	0.035	0.017
Reb Terr					0.015	0.002	0.164	0.001	0.025	0.014	-0.008	-0.007	0.048	0.017	0.008
Govt Some						-0.012	-0.009	-0.013	0.094	0.077	-0.042	-0.026	0.228	0.13	0.061
Govt Full							-0.011	-0.018	0.109	0.097	-0.046	-0.026	0.16	0.141	0.073
Reb Some								-0.012	0.056	0.04	-0.037	-0.025	0.097	0.085	0.052
Reb Full									0.069	0.073	-0.052	-0.052	0.064	0.121	0.098
Mnt.										0.076	-0.029	-0.173	0.154	0.06	0.095
Pop (Log)											-0.594	-0.099	0.131	0.237	0.286
T. Time												0.135	-0.1	-0.151	-0.169
Excluded													-0.043	-0.108	-0.149
Past OSV														0.227	0.078
Past Base															0.298
Spat. Lag Base															

Table 3.3: Correlation Matrix for All Variables Included in Chapter 3

Previous literature has documented that peacekeepers are sent to locations that have experienced violence against civilians (Costalli 2014, Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019). As such, the models presented in this chapter control for the previous experience of one-sided violence within a grid-cell using a decay function.[10] There is also evidence that peacekeepers are more effective at halting violence as ethnic polarization decreases (Di Salvatore 2020); likewise, the subnational geographic distribution of ethnic groups can contribute to local violence (Weidmann 2011, Klašnja and Novta 2016, Di Salvatore 2016). While it is difficult to measure the degree of ethnic polarization across all of the countries in this sample at a subnational level, the number of discriminated or powerless ethnic groups, referred to from here on out as excluded groups, per grid-cell is included. (Weidmann, Kuse and Gleditsch 2010*a*).

Finally, to account for spatial and temporal dependence across base deployments, these analyses include a decay function of previous static operating base deployment within a grid-cell[11] and a spatial lag that captures whether or not any a grid-cell's first-order neighbors[12] hosted a base in the last month.[13] Table 3.2 highlights the summary statistics of the control variables.

Using OLS models with country fixed effects and robust standard errors, these expectations regarding static operating base deployment patterns can be tested. Including fixed effects ensures that geographic trends within unit are accounted for. This is especially important for the study of UN peacekeeping operations, as the mandate of the mission holds at

[10]The decay function relies on a functional form of s $2^{-(T/K)}$, where T is the time since one-sided violence, by any perpetrator, occurred in a given grid-cell, and K is the half-life parameter. The half life is set to 4, as is the case in Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019). This half life is used in other conflict work, such as (Hegre et al. 2019). The half life effectively indicates the number of periods in which the variable of interest has an effect; here, the decay is of one-sided violence. So, if a grid-cell experienced violence in only one period, the four periods following that would have a positive decay function. Moreover, as the name implies, the strength of that violence wanes over time.

[11]The decay function for the base deployment takes on the same functional form as the one-sided violence decay function.

[12]These models use a rook neighborhood construction.

[13]Both the decay function and spatial lag capture *any* previous static operating base activity, not just military peacekeeper deployment at a static operating base. That is, these measures would also capture previous police, observer, military, or civilian deployment via a static operating base.

the country level. That is, while there may be subnational variation in where peacekeepers deploy, their mandate is expected to apply uniformly within the country they are working in.[14]

3.5.4 A Note on Event Data

This chapter – and the following two – rely primarily on two sources of event data to study a variety of conflict events. Event data face a variety of problems, as studying armed conflicts at a subnational level is inherently difficult. This section will summarize the majority of the problems that such data face, and the ways in which this chapter (and other chapters in this dissertation) have attempted to overcome them. Of course, it is worth noting that these data are presently the best available source of information on contentious events in African civilian conflicts; the work of ACLED and UCDP in gathering such data is vital in furthering the quantitative study of conflict and peace. However to best understand the results presented, the limitations of the data must be transparent.

First, there is a key problem of which events are included in the dataset versus those that do not. The events that are collected in such datasets are more likely to be from urban locations (Dawkins 2020) and from areas with better communications structure and cell phone access (Weidmann 2015). For example, two of the sources of data used by ACLED include targeted and verified "new media" sources (such as reporting of verified events from select sources on web-based platforms such as Twitter, and a variety of national/subnational traditional media sources). Larger and more urban areas are likely to have local news sources, or to have a better internment network to support web-based information sharing. Likewise, larger events – especially those that produce multiple casualties – are more likely to be

[14]One possible exception to this is when peacekeepers have a mandate that holds for a certain geographic area within a country – for example, within this sample, there are ongoing missions in both the Darfur region of Sudan and Sudan itself. However, because those mandates were very similar in nature (they both had a Chapter VII mandate that called for the protection of civilians, but lacked mandates that called for the extension of state authority, etc.), it does not present a problem for these analyses. Given that, for this analysis, it is acceptable to include country fixed effected rather than grid-cell fixed effects or an alternative, lower administrative level fixed effects. However, other scholars should consider this possibility when working with samples that may include overlapping missions within one country.

reporter than smaller events that produce no or few causalities (Friedman 2015). There is also a risk of reporting bias, if information on events is coming from political actors with a vested interest in what information is released or how the information was collected (Dawkins 2020). Thus, the events that end up in the final event dataset are likely to reflect a selection process. This is a problem that this dissertation cannot overcome, other than conditioning on the known factors that also predict event recording. This is more of a concern for Chapter 5, as peacekeepers are also likely to deploy to more urban locations.

However, and more fundamentally, event datasets pose a problem in studying the "non"-events. As described earlier, most conflict event datasets, by design, collect data on contentious and violent occurrences. That is, these data have a difficult time in distinguishing between a location where an event did not occur and a location where an event that was not violent occurred. This is especially problematic when events are reflective of broader concepts that are hard to measure. For example, this chapter uses data on territory seizures to measure where actors have some territorial control; the locations where actors have fully consolidated control are not likely to be present in event datasets precisely because there are either not many contentious events (as they relate territorial control) within these locations or because the contentious events that led to control happened long ago.

Second, the precision of the events that are recorded can vary. Geographically, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact location of a battle or massacre. This can be for a number of reasons - the location of the event may occur in a remote location, or pose a risk to immediately investigate. Often, events are described as occurring within a locality as opposed to being precisely identified at the village level (Croicu and Hegre n.d., Chojnacki et al. 2012). It is also worth highlighting that over-aggregation can also be a problem; scholars may attribute a trend to an entire country when it is actually driven, for example, by a specific region (Kalyvas 2006). This is one reason to utilize a grid-cell design; by aggregating events to a 55 km by 55 km grid absorbs some of this imprecision, while remaining at a relatively geographically precise size.

This is also true of temporal imprecision; while many events are often recorded at the precise day, some events are recorded as occurring in "the previous week" or "recently" (Chojnacki et al. 2012). This too can be alleviated by aggregated up to the monthly level, again allowing for some imprecision to be absorbed as the data are aggregated up.

3.6 Where Do Military Peacekeepers at Static Operating Bases Deploy?

This section presents the results of the analyses of where military peacekeepers at static operating bases deploy. The results that use data on territory seizures and headquarters establishment to capture some and full control are shown in Table 3.4. Column 1 reflects the results when the main independent variables are lagged three months behind peacekeeper deployment. Column 2 reflects the results when the main explanatory variables are lagged six months behind peacekeeper deployment. The results that rely on the duration of territorial control to capture some and full control are presented in this chapter are shown in Table 3.5.

Turning to the results, we see evidence in support of the main expectation of this chapter, that peacekeepers are more likely deploy to areas where the government has reclaimed territory compared to areas where the rebels have reclaimed territory or where either actor possesses full control of territory. Column 1 of Table 3.4 demonstrates that although there is not a statistically significant relationship between the government's recent capture of territory and the number of military peacekeeping units at static operating bases, there is a negative and statistically significant coefficient on $Govt\ HQ_{t-3}$. This is partial evidence in favor of the theory proposed here, in that peacekeepers are not deploying to the locations where governments have consolidated territorial control.

Likewise, there is a negative and statistically significant coefficient on $Rebel\ Territory_{t-3}$; this indicates that military peacekeepers are also not likely to deploy to the locations where rebels have recently regained territory. $Rebel\ HQ_{t-3}$ fails to attain statistically significance

with respect to military peacekeeping units.

	Dependent variable:	
	N. Military Units	
	(1)	(2)
Govt Territory$_{t-3}$	0.064	
	(0.095)	
Reb Territory$_{t-3}$	-0.094*	
	(0.057)	
Govt HQ$_{t-3}$	-0.432**	
	(0.171)	
Reb HQ$_{t-3}$	0.971	
	(1.020)	
Govt Territory$_{t-6}$		0.212*
		(0.125)
Reb Territory$_{t-6}$		-0.127**
		(0.051)
Govt HQ$_{t-6}$		-0.197*
		(0.114)
Reb HQ$_{t-6}$		0.094
		(0.819)
Mnt. Terrain	-0.036***	-0.038***
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Logged Population	0.031***	0.032***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Travel Time to City	0.00004***	0.00004***
	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Excluded Groups	-0.004***	-0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
OSV Decay	0.693***	0.701***
	(0.054)	(0.056)
Base Decay	2.200***	2.200***
	(0.037)	(0.038)
Base Spatial Lag	0.047***	0.045***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Observations	148,970	145,489
R^2	0.332	0.332
Adjusted R^2	0.332	0.331
Residual Std. Error	0.638	0.644
Note:Results are fixed effects linear models with country fixed effects and robust SE.	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 3.4: Territorial Seizures and HQ Establishment on Military Units at Static Operating Bases

Turning to the key variables with a six month lag, we see further evidence in support of

the theory. *Govt Territory*$_{t-6}$ is both positive and statistically significant, demonstrating that military peacekeepers at static operating bases are likely to deploy to the locations where the government has recently reclaimed territory – the areas where it is likely to have some, but not full, territorial control. In these locations, additional military support from peacekeepers is likely to be of great value to a host government and work to ensure that non-state actors cannot successfully capture that territory in the future. Again, *Govt HQ*$_{t-6}$ is significant and negative, in support of this theory. Moreover, the lack of peacekeeper deployment to the locations where the government has previously established headquarters suggests that peacekeepers are not simply deploying to the locations where there is the greatest stability.

Rebel Territory$_{t-6}$ remains both negative and statistically significant. This reveals that peacekeepers are not following battles, regardless of the actor who is winning or losing – there is a clear preference to the locations where the government has gained territory. This makes sense, given the theory of governmental preference in static operating base deployment. Should peacekeepers deploy to the locations where rebels could benefit from the stabilization benefits of military peacekeepers, they could pose a greater threat to the host government.

In sum, both Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.4 present evidence for a theory of military peacekeepers being strategically deployed as a source of consolidation for the host government: such peacekeepers are significantly likely to deploy to areas of recent government control, as measured by a recent territorial seizure, but not full government control, as measured by the establishment of headquarters; moreover, while peacekeepers do not deploy to locations where rebels have previously captured territory, their location is not predicted by rebel headquarters establishment.

How does this align with the results that measure some and full control via the duration of the territorial control? These results are presented in Table 3.5.

These results are largely in line with those presented in Table 3.4. Military peacekeepers at static operating bases do have a positive and statistically significant relationship with the

	Dependent Variable:
	N_Unit_HQMil
Some Govt Control	0.232**
	(0.105)
Some Reb Control	−0.195***
	(0.069)
Full Govt Control	0.437
	(0.270)
Full Reb Control	0.025
	(0.028)
Mnt. Terrain	−0.059
	(0.074)
Logged Population	0.026
	(0.020)
Travel Time to City	0.00003*
	(0.00002)
Excluded Groups	−0.004
	(0.003)
OSV Decay	0.593*
	(0.349)
Base Decay	2.166***
	(0.336)
Base Spatial Lag	0.045***
	(0.010)
Observations	150,646
R^2	0.339
Adjusted R^2	0.339
Residual Std. Error	0.632
Note: Fixed effects linear models with country, year FE and robust SE.	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.5: The Relationship Between Territorial Control on Military Units at Static Operating Bases

locations that have been held by the government for less than 24 months, suggesting they are likely to deploy to locations of some government control. However, military peacekeepers at static operating bases have a negative and statistically significant relationship with the locations that have been held by the rebel for less than 24 months, suggesting they avoid areas of weak rebel control. In line with the results presented in Table 3.4, there is a positive, but not statistically significant relationship between military peacekeepers at static operating bases and the locations of full rebel control. Distinct from the previous results, however, is the lack of a statistically significant result on the locations of full government control.

While the coefficients on these results are small, they are substantively large.[15] For example, if a rebel seized territory three months earlier, then peacekeepers experience a roughly 30 percent decrease in the likelihood in deploying to that grid-cell relative to the baseline.[16] Likewise, if a government actor seized territory three months prior, then peacekeepers are roughly 20 percent more likely to deploy there relative to the baseline.[17]

The control variables operate as suggested. While the significance varies across Tables 3.5 and 3.4, they are directionally consistent. Across both tables, it is clear that peacekeepers are more likely to deploy to areas that have previously seen one-sided violence against civilians, as evidenced from the consistently positive and significant result on *OSV Decay*. This is a positive sign for peacekeeping operations, in that they are deploying to areas where there is an opportunity to protect civilians. As this is a core feature of almost all modern peacekeeping operations, the responsiveness of peacekeepers to such violence suggests that they are acting in line with the guiding principles of the UN. However, the negative coefficient on *Excluded Groups* suggests that, at least in the short-term, military peacekeepers are not deploying to the locations that hold a larger number of excluded ethnic groups.

As expected, previous base activity predicts future base activity. Both *Base Decay* and *Base Spatial Lag* are positive and significant, signalling that base location is conditional on

[15]Because of the difficultly in estimating baseline probabilities in models utilizing fixed effects this was generated using the same models presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.4 but without the inclusion of fixed effects.

[16]This is also in line with the substantive size predicted in Table 3.5.

[17]This is also in line with the substantive predictive increase in the model shown in Table 3.5.

where other static operating bases are located in time and space. Finally, the controls that measure accessibility largely operate as expected. Peacekeepers are more likely to deploy to locations that are not mountainous and that are more populous. Interestingly, though, the positive result on *Travel Time To City* suggests that peacekeepers are traveling further away from the main cities of the countries to which they deploy.

3.7 Robustness Checks

A number of robustness checks are utilized. First, it could be the case that in addition to the transfer of territory, peacekeepers are simply more likely to deploy to the locations that are hosting active battles, rather than the areas that see territorial change as a result of battles. These results are robust to the inclusion of a measure of armed clashes that did not result in territorial change, as seen in the Appendix.

Second, there are multiple different ways to measure the presence of peacekeepers within a grid-cell. One such way is to simply use the number of peacekeepers per cell; models that instead use high and low estimates of the number of peacekeepers deployed per grid-cell are included in the Appendix for this chapter, and the results remain largely robust. [18] Likewise, the specification of unit type presented in these main results combines low-level headquarter units (such as force headquarters, etc.) with military units. However, it could be that these unit types are predicted by different trends. As shown in the Appendix, the results excluded these headquarters units are identical to when they are pooled with military units.

Finally, the military units captured in this chapter are deployed at static operating bases, which consists of company operating bases and headquarters. One concern could be that headquarters are unique amongst this class of bases, as they are often the largest deployment. To check that this is the case, military units at headquarters are dropped; the results remain robust to this. These results are also displayed in the Appendix.

[18] Recall that there is potential variation in the number of peacekeepers deployed because of differing unit sizes; e.g., a company could consist of 80 to 150 troops.

3.8 What Does This Tell Us About Peacekeepers?

What do these trends tell us about peacekeeping operations, host governments, and how the two interact? First, and importantly, these results demonstrate that peacekeepers are more responsive to violence and conflict dynamics that some previous literature suggests. Past work that demonstrated a lag of up to one to two years of peacekeeper deployment following violence relied on a sample of peacekeeping operations that occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s Costalli (2014), Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis (2016). In evaluating later peacekeeping operations, it is possible that peacekeepers have gained the mandate and logistical supplies needed to more quickly respond to conflict. As peacekeepers become increasingly focused on protection of civilians and more likely to deploy during active conflict, larger numbers of military peacekeepers are deployed to a country. With more robust mandates, the technologies peacekeepers use for surveillance, monitoring, and protection have also grown as well (Lute et al. 2014). It is likely that such technologies have allowed for increased response time; likewise, with larger robust, military capacities, missions are perhaps better suited and equipped to securely deploy to such locations.

This suggests that static operating bases may be more responsive than they have been historically. The need for some lag makes sense - these bases require a degree of stability before they deploy, and the logistical and infrastructural needs of the mission to travel into a country to establish a base may take time to confirm and acquire.This is a hopeful sign that peacekeepers in the 21st century are improving their rate of responsiveness and ability to carry out their mandates in that there are clear patterns of peacekeepers responding to conflict trends as early as three months after they occurred. Especially as peacekeepers are increasingly deploying to conflicts in which there is active fighting, the ability to carry out a mandate is in many ways tied directly to the ability of peacekeepers to efficiently travel where violence is located.

Second, these trends show that peacekeepers are largely not responsive to the territorial dynamics of rebels. Military peacekeepers deploy to locations where the government have

had some control, measured in a variety of ways – either via the recent seizure of territory or where they have held territory for less than 24 consecutive months. But, peacekeepers do not deploy to areas where rebels recently acquired territory or have held territory for less than 24 months. This is evidence in line with an understanding of consent biasing peacekeeper outcomes. Peacekeepers are not prevented from deploying to such locations by their mandate; and, as impartiality is a key principle of UN peacekeeping, deploying to such locations could credibly convey unbiasedness. Instead, though peacekeepers avoid these locations.

The negative result on government headquarters and lack of statistical significance in the locations where the government has full control is especially important in finding evidence of bias. An alternative understanding of peacekeeper deployments could be that peacekeepers are driven by risk aversion. If peacekeepers are risk averse to putting themselves in the line of fire, as evident in several notable instances in which peacekeepers chose to ignore ongoing violence near their bases,[19] then deploying to locations where the government has reclaimed territory is perhaps more secure than deploying to where rebels have reclaimed territory. As most attacks on peacekeepers are carried out by non-state actors (Dorussen and Gizelis 2013, Fjelde, Hultman and Bromley 2016, Bromley 2018), one could argue that peacekeepers are safer around government actors than rebel actors, pushing them to avoid rebel locations not out of the proposed stabilization benefit logic, but rather out of a logic of self-preservation. However, according to that logic then peacekeepers should be *especially* likely to deploy to locations of government full control, since those areas are likely most stable and safe for peacekeepers. The strong negative and significant coefficient on government headquarters, and lack of a statistically significant result on the locations where the government has held territory for over 24 months thus suggests that this is not the case.

Finally, this leads to some potentially troubling implications about the role of peacekeepers in conflict. A key principle of peacekeeping operations is neutrality. Indeed, the

[19]In incidents such as the non-response to active and nearby violence in Juba, as documented by United Nations Independent Special Investigation Independent Special Investigation (2016) .

perception of neutrality is often attributed to driving peacekeeper success and public willingness to cooperation with such missions (Pouligny 2006, Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen 2013). If peacekeepers are more likely to deploy to the areas where the government has control, as shown in this chapter, then they are not responding to the conflict in a neutral manner. Moreover, many of the governments that host UN operations engage in violence against civilians or repression (Phayal and Prins 2020, Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019). If the presence of peacekeepers does in fact provide opportunities for host governments to extend their control in the short-term and long-term, peacekeepers may be contributing to the prolonged power of harmful regimes.

3.9 Conclusion

This chapter has started to provide an answer to the question of where peacekeepers deploy at the subnational level. Military peacekeepers at static operating bases deploy to the areas where the government has recently captured territory – that is, where they have some control. However, these peacekeepers avoid the areas where the government has full control and where the rebels have control. Taken together, these results provide evidence in support of the theory outlined in this dissertation: military peacekeepers at static operating bases are deploying to the locations where they can best support the government in consolidating its territorial gains. Indeed, if we expected that rebels had the same ability to influence where peacekeepers deploy – or even that peacekeepers were responsive to the wishes of rebels – we should expect them to also deploy to areas where the rebels can use the same military benefits of these peacekeepers. Yet the robustly negative and statistically significant result on peacekeeper deployment to the locations were rebels have recently captured territory suggests that this is not the case. Rather, this chapter provides suggestive evidence that military peacekeepers at static operating bases deploy to the areas where their military benefits can be accessed by the host government alone.

However, static operating bases are not the only type of UN peacekeeping deployment. Temporary operating bases, or TOBs, are the smaller, more mobile, and more able to respond to active conflict. Do these bases also deploy to the areas where their benefits best assist the host government? What benefits do they offer? Chapter 4 explores these questions.

Chapter 4

Peacekeeper Temporary Operating Base Locations and Active Conflict Benefits

Chapter 3 demonstrated that military peacekeepers at static operating bases deploy to the areas where the government has some territorial control. However, static operating bases are not the only type of peacekeeper deployment; these large bases are not likely to respond to active conflict. Many peacekeeping operations are deployed to conflicts in which there is active skirmishing and battles between a variety of conflict actors. The bases that are best suited to respond to these clashes are temporary operating bases (TOBs): smaller, mobile installments of military peacekeepers that deploy for a short period of time. This chapter details how these bases differ from static operating bases, outlines the ways in which these TOBs can benefit the host government, and empirically tests the hypothesis that TOBs deploy to the areas where the government is performing poorly in battle.

The analysis in this chapter find that TOBs do initially respond to ongoing conflict in a biased manner. Above all, TOBs deploy to sites of ongoing conflict; they deploy to the sites where civilian casualties are present and to locations that are actively experiencing skirmishes between rebels and the host government. Moreover, TOBs deploy to the locations where the government is suffering more battle deaths, relative to rebels. Finally, whereas TOBs

deploy to the locations where the government lost territory as a result of battle, there is not a statistically significant relationship with TOB deployment and government capture of territory after a battle.

The results presented in this chapter suggest that peacekeepers avoid locations where the government has recently regained territorial control, a grave problem if the government engages in repressive activities after it has regained control to punish supporters and co-ethnics of the non-state actor or to consolidate power (Sullivan 2012, Fjelde, Hultman and Bromley 2016). If that is the case, then peacekeepers are denied the opportunity to protect civilians from this type of violence; this is in line with other recent work which explores a lack of peacekeeper effectiveness in protecting civilians from government violence (Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019). Moreover, if peacekeepers are more likely to deploy to the locations where governments performed poorly in battle, ostensibly neutral peacekeepers have the opportunity to apply their military benefits where governments need such support; rebels do not have this same access to these military benefits, as peacekeepers are not likely to deploy to the locations where governments have previously seized territory. In addition, peacekeepers may be shifting the balance of power between rebels and government actors. As battle outcomes shape the balance of power and provide powerful leverage for conflict actors at the bargaining table once conflict has ended (Slantchev 2003), peacekeepers may also be contributing to the insulated and sustained power of these regimes. As several peacekeeping operations are deployed in countries where the host government has engaged in notable campaigns of repression (e.g., South Sudan, Sudan, and Democratic Republic of Congo), peacekeepers may be helping to prolong the tenure of such leaders. The bias in peacekeeper TOBs, then, may have consequences reaching further beyond any individual battle.

4.1 Consent and Peacekeeper Operations

Recall the key premise of this dissertation: that the governments hosting peacekeeping operations have both the ability and incentive to influence subnational deployment locations. To briefly recap, this ability is based on consent, a fundamental principle of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Consent is the confirmed willingness to accept and continually host the peacekeeping operation, and is granted by the parties to the conflict that the UN is intervening in. The UN requires the consent of the "main parties to a conflict" (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2019*b*); yet in practice, only state actors are explicitly required to give and maintain consent. In civil conflicts, the consent of non-state actors is not critical – operations have deployed without their consent and have remained operational when the consent of non-state actors has been withdrawn. The loss of consent from a host government, however, almost always results in the end of a peacekeeping operation. Thus, in a civil war, there is only one actor with the power to reduce or eliminate peacekeeper autonomy via the loss of consent: the host government.

Most relevant for this project is the control governments may exercise over an operation's freedom of movement. In this early negotiation stage, the government can establish red lines or areas in which peacekeepers cannot utilize force or travel to. Such impositions, explicitly written into a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the document which outlines the rights and obligations of the mission and the government, are not typically utilized; far more common is the refusal of a leader to allow peacekeepers into a given area after the operation's deployment, despite the freedom of movement allowed in a SOFA. Leaders can engage in a variety of blocking activities, such as verbally denying the incursion into a certain area, or physically halting the movement of peacekeepers. The latter has included the refusal to allow UN aircraft to land in certain localities or the construction of government road blocks.

In sum, host governments have some ability to influence where peacekeepers end up prior to their deployment, and a powerful ability to limit where peacekeepers can travel once

deployed. By explicitly preventing peacekeepers for deploying to certain locations before deployment or blocking certain locations from peacekeeper access, host governments exert control over where peacekeepers are located.

However, not all bases offer can deploy to any given area; temporary operating bases are bases that are designed to deploy to deploy to conflict hotspots. Because of their small size, mobile nature, and military personnel, they are able to apply military benefits in settings of active conflict. The next section will recap what temporary operating bases are, followed by a discussion of how their military benefits can aid host governments.

4.2 Temporary Operating Bases

This dissertation has outlined that peacekeepers are housed at bases, subnational facilities operated by the UN. Chapter 3 explored the subnational deployment patterns of static operating bases. To date, and to the best of this author's knowledge, all other work exploring subnational peacekeeping dynamics have studied the placement of static operating bases. This chapter instead studies temporary operating bases; such bases are best suited to deploy to sites of active conflict and can, in turn, support host governments where they are actively performing poorly in conflict. Recall that static operating bases and TOBs serve different purposes, face different constraints from the UN, and, importantly, provide different benefits. Practically speaking, static operating bases are larger than TOBs; they hold more units of larger numbers of personnel. These bases hold civilian, police, and observer peacekeepers, as well as military peacekeepers. Static operating bases also house more permanent equipment, such as armored personnel carriers and tanks. Due to the size of static operating bases, they are slow moving and stay in position for a long period of time. Static operating bases are not as responsive to changes in the state to which they are deployed; there is a significant lag between changes in the conflict and the arrival of peacekeeper bases (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2016, Costalli 2014, Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019). For all of these reasons,

static operating bases do not deploy to locations that face active conflict; rather, and as Chapter 3 showed, they deploy to locations after battles have subsided and there is some degree of control held by an actor.

Figure 4.1: A temporary operating base of MONUSCO, the operation in the DRC. This base is located in Ngilima, in Province Orientale.

Instead, TOBs are "military positions, which can be used as a secure location from which the [United Nations] projects combat power in support of operational goals and tactical objectives" (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020, p. 129). TOBs are smaller military units of either company or platoon size, or roughly 40 to 150 troops. TOBs can move and adapt quickly to changes in the conflict, and can be used to respond to active conflict. Typically, TOBs deploy from formed units stationed at static operating bases. To establish a TOB, the unit commander identifies potential sites for base construction, the march route, and navigation plan; the commander liaises closely with the mission's intelligence wing to assess potential threats and recent activity near the base site (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020). After the location site is selected and secured, the unit deploys with a convoy escort equipped with an armed support team (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2015).

Figure 4.2: A temporary operating base on UNAMID, the operation in Darfur. The TOB is located in Golo, Darfur.

They are also, as the name suggests, deployed for a short period of time; TOBs are not built to " self-sustain for extended periods of time" (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020, p. 41). Instead, TOBs deploy with a specific goal and do not operate outside of it. These bases are used to "cover vulnerable areas and hotspots by the fastest means available" (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020, p. 41). This mobility and short-term nature means that TOBs are staffed with military personnel so that they can most efficiently carry out their task and protect their base. TOBs do hold some equipment, as evidenced in Figure 4.1; TOBs often hold armored vehicles and can house a number of armored helicopters to support their mandate (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support 2015). However, they do not hold large quantities of equipment; instead, they house the equipment that is necessary for the specific mission of the TOB deployment and to enable rapid movement (Department of Field Support, Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2012*a*).

Figure 4.3 demonstrates the mobility of TOBs; it shows the TOB deployments in the DRC from January to March 2014. In January, there were seven TOBs deployed. They were concentrated in the eastern part of the country, but spread across four provinces. In

February, only five TOBs remained and only three have stayed in position. Finally, by March, no TOBs were deployed.

As outlined in Chapter 2, the infrastructural components of a TOB are relatively vulnerable. As Figure 2.1 demonstrated, the physical structure of a TOB is made of tents on hard stands, uses sand bags and temporary fencing to protect the base and equipment, and covers a small physical space. This supports a rapid deployment, and if necessary, retreat. Because of this, TOBs are able to deploy to relatively remote locations which static operating bases would be vulnerable at. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate the remoteness of many these bases.[1]

To summarize, given their mobile nature and increased likelihood of being staffed by military peacekeepers, TOBs are the deployments best suited to respond to ongoing skirmishes and violence. Where, then, should we expect these TOBs to deploy within a country?

Peacekeeping operations provide potential military benefits: by using force against conflict actors and limiting the geographic scope of a conflict zone, they can contribute to more decisive and quicker battle outcomes. Moreover, if their force is directed against one side, as has been seen in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo or the Central African Republic, peacekeepers can directly influence conflict outcomes, creating an incentive for a host government to ensure that peacekeepers are positioned in the areas that best support its own military campaign. Given that, if the ability and incentive exists for host governments to bias the subnational locations of peacekeepers, then we should expect that bias to operate such that TOB deploy where their military benefits support the host government.

[1]The photo of the TOB in Ngilma was taken from the MONUSCO Flickr account and can be accessed here https://www.flickr.com/photos/oxfam/6328764525. The photo of the TOB in Golo was taken from the UNAMID Twitter account and can be accessed here https://twitter.com/unamidnews/status/1039883879866400770.



Figure 4.3: These maps demonstrate the variation in TOB locations in MONUSCO, the UN operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, from January, February, and March 2014 (L-R).

4.3 Military Benefits of TOBs

Where would a host government want a TOB to deploy? To preserve its power, a government can engage in a variety of tactics, including increasing military engagements with non-state actors and circumventing civilian support given to non-state actors. One way to preserve power is to increase its military presence in the areas of previous non-state actor support or where state control is weak. As the capacity and mandates of peacekeeping operations have changed to allow for more military engagement, these missions have become a potential tool that governments can utilize to carry this strategy out. Many of the military benefits provided by TOBs are similar to those provided by military peacekeepers at static operating bases. The key difference in the application of these benefits is that TOBs deploy to sites of active conflict, meaning that the functionality of military peacekeepers is applied in settings where they can contribute to battle outcomes or the active seizure of territory.

As early as 2010, the UN was explicitly linking the deployment of TOBs with active military engagement. In a press release, the operation in the DRC stated that six temporary operating bases were deployed to the South Kivu region in order to "neutralise the armed groups and reinforce security" in the area (United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo 2010). Likewise, the same press release outlines that the TOB presences aims to "prevent infiltration of armed groups...through Lake Tanganyika" (United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo 2010). Indeed, the UN has written that TOBs are not intended to "hold the ground" but rather to "achieve tactical advantages" (United Nations Department of Peace Operations, Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell 2020, p. 35). How do TOBs do this?

To provide a recap of the military benefits of peacekeepers from Chapter 3, peacekeepers can contribute to battle outcomes and territorial seizures in two ways. First, peacekeepers can limit the mobility of combatants. Peacekeepers establish blockades and protected areas, which prevents combatants from entering into an area and obstructs movement within the areas in which combatants are currently operating. Even through defensive and observa-

tional mechanisms, peacekeepers can reduce the geographical spread of conflict (Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015). By reducing the physical scope of the conflict, peacekeepers contain conflict actors in one concentrated area, which encourages quicker battle outcomes and a limited theater of combat (Buhaug and Gates 2002). By remaining active on key roads, within protected areas, and along routes to non-state actor strongholds, peacekeepers also raise the potential costs of movement (Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015). For example, the UN operation in the Central African Republic, MINUSCA, deployed a contingency to the town of Bambari in 2017 to ensure the exit of the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) rebels in the area (Gilder 2019). When the rebels reneged and attempted to re-enter the city, "MINUSCA again used its armed helicopters to engage FPRC coalition fighters...preventing armed groups from entering Bambari" (United Nations Security Council 2017*a*, p. 3). Likewise, TOBs can limit the scope of conflict by providing intelligence on where combatants are operating to support future campaigns. For example, from December 2015 to January of 2016, MONUSCO deployed three TOBs to the areas of Bangadi, Duru and Faradje, in Haut-Uélé, DRC, in order to gather intelligence the locations of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (United Nations Secretary-General 2016).

This highlights the second way in which peacekeepers can influence battle outcomes: peacekeepers have the restrained ability to use force. They can return fire in specific settings, and under some mandates, can use force against specific groups or threats. The key settings in which modern peacekeepers can use fire is to protect themselves and to protect civilians, although some missions have gone further in allowing specific peacekeeper units (such as the Force Intervention Brigade), in mission-specific operations,[2] or against specific types of combatants.[3]

[2]For example, the mission in the Central African Republic, MINUSCA, has had several robust operations to protect specific areas or act against various groups via force. Operation Damakongo, carried out in October 2017, forced the Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation (3R) and a branch of the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) in the Bang and Bocaranga areas of the CAR (Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Extended Pursuant to Resolution 2339 2017).

[3]For example, the operation in Mali, MINUSMA, has been authorized to use force to "anticipate, deter and counter" asymmetric threats (United Nations Security Council 2016).

The protection of civilians mandate allows peacekeepers to use force to limit the gains of rebels when and where they are engaging in violence of civilians. Additionally, this mandate has been interpreted more broadly to allow military peacekeepers to have a more active role in the conflict. For example, returning to the example of MINUSCA in the Central African Republic, the mission used its protection of civilians mandate to explicitly engage with the FPRC rebels. In February of 2017, MINUSCA peacekeepers made "repeated warnings" that the advancement of the group towards the town of Ippy "would be considered a clear threat to civilians" (United Nations Security Council 2017*a*, p. 2). When the FPRC continued to move on Ippy, "a MINUSCA armed helicopter engaged a column of approximately 300 members of the FPRC coalition" and then "reinforced its position in Ippy to prevent further movement" (United Nations Security Council 2017*a*, p. 2). The FPRC had been engaging in violence against civilians, but this action by MINUSCA peacekeepers was carried out in order to halt potential future attacks. By relying on its protection of civilians mandate, the peacekeepers were able to use force to limit the movement of the rebels and prevent the potential seizure of Ippy.

Or, take for example the deployment of a TOB to the town of Golo in Darfur in late December of 2020. Figure 4.4 shows a picture of armed military peacekeepers deployed to the mission in Darfur, UNAMID, patrolling a locality close to their TOB, the village of Bariary.[4] The UN has noted a recent string of clashes between the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid faction and government forces prior to this deployment (Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations 2020).

The patrol of these peacekeepers in Bariary is notable given that it is under SLA/AW control, and that their presence in the area is justified is via the protection of civilians. Using this mandate, UNAMID is allowing its peacekeepers to incur into rebel-held territory beyond the site of its TOB. This means that when peacekeepers are placed in areas of strategic value, locations where actors are likely to engage in violence against civilians, or

[4]This tweet can be found here: https://twitter.com/unamidnews/status/1341739347893252097.



Figure 4.4: Tweet from the official UNAMID Twitter account showing military peacekeeper presence in a rebel-held town.

locations where actors are likely to use force against the peacekeeping operation, there is an increased likelihood of the use of peacekeeper defensive force. This additional force, although constrained in when it can be activated, can and has been used to push conflict actors out of strongholds (Karlsrud 2015).

The deployment of military peacekeepers to these conflict hotspots, often in remote areas, requires the deployment of TOBs. TOBs have been specifically called to utilize these military tactics. TOBs are deployed to carry out "day and night operations through mobile and static elements," to " deter armed groups from settling in the vicinity of villages" and to be "interposed between armed groups in times of rising tension" (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020, p. 41). This allows TOBs to be of clear tactical value in the

locations where they deploy and to deliver on the military benefits highlighted above.

4.4 Governmental Utility in TOB Location

Given its preferences and the resources that peacekeepers distribute, host governments should aim to maximize the utility that they can gain from the peacekeeping operation. Moreover, peacekeeper deployments in general are a relatively rare phenomenon; TOBs are no exception. On average, a mission sees about one to two TOBs deployed per month, but this varies by country. For example, as many as 13 TOBs have been deployed in a given month.[5] Given that resource constraint, host governments should want to strategically influence the placement of TOBs to the locations of greatest governmental need with largest marginal impact on the conflict.[6] Because TOBs are best suited to deploy to locations that experience active conflict, deploying to a stable location without active fighting denies TOBs the ability to operate effectively. That is, there is no practical benefit in deploying TOBs to stable areas and host governments face no incentive to host TOBs in such locations.

Instead, they should deploy to sites of active conflict or sites where there is a risk of renewed conflict. Within these sites, TOBs can deploy to either locations in which the government is performing better relative to the non-state actors, or locations in which the non-state actor is performing better relative to the government. Although the setting of both is appropriate for a TOB, as there is a use for additional military presence, the benefit to the host government is greatest when TOBs deploy to the areas where non-state actors are outperforming the government. Where the government is already winning or has recently seized territory, it does not require additional assistance - although the presence of the peacekeepers may expedite a victory, the government does not require additional forces to ensure success.

[5]For example, the DRC, Mali, and South Sudan have all had months where more than ten TOBs were deployed across their territory.

[6]Note that host government influence could come across in several logistical mechanisms. Governments could explicitly suggest or request to peacekeepers that they deploy to their preferred locations; they could also deny the freedom of movement to the areas where they do not want peacekeepers to deploy. Either mechanism could lead to the same observational result of peacekeeper deployment to the governmental preferred locations. Future work should continue to uncover the logistical mechanism.

However, a TOB deployed to a location where non-state actors are successfully challenging the state not only has a practical use, but also offers the greatest strategic benefit to the government. The government, without additional assistance, faces a greater risk of losing a skirmish, suffering more fatalities, or losing territorial control; even if the risk is manageable, these are the locations that require a greater number of costly resources to ensure success. The additional force of peacekeepers, although constrained in when it can be activated, can and has been used to push combatants out of strongholds. By ensuring that peacekeepers are located where non-state actors have incentives to fight, due to their desire to gain or maintain territorial control, the ability to use force is activated, making the peacekeepers a viable source of supplementary force. The blockades provided by peacekeepers prevent new rebels from entering an area, ensuring that the government only has a limited number of combatants to defeat. Additionally, by constraining the movement of the non-state actors already within the area of deployment, peacekeepers assist in concentrating the non-state actors in one area, which can reduce the amount of time spent in battle (Buhaug, Gates and Lujala 2009). Thus, TOBs should deploy to locations where they can best supplement the government's military needs.

The government should most need this supplement in the locations where the government is suffering more battle casualties than the rebels, or where the government has recently lost territory in an armed clash. Where the government is experiencing more battle deaths than its opponent, rebels have been able to mount a serious threat to the government. In these instances, additional force is likely to have the largest effect. Likewise, in instances where the government has lost territory as a result of a battle, additional force can be used to attempt to actively regain that territory. Anecdotally, there is evidence of this. For example, take the establishment of a TOB in Tonj, South Sudan, by the UN operation deployed to that country. A series of clashes between the government and militants over one weekend in August of 2020 resulted in a total of 148 deaths – of which 63 were from the government's armed forces and the rest were civilian deaths. The UN responding by deploying a TOB the

following Tuesday (*Reuters* 2020).

Although it could be the case that the government would want TOBs to deploy to locations where it has recently regained its own territory to ensure that control is maintained, under the theory outlined in this chapter, this should not be the case. Because the government was able to capture the territory via its own strength, it seems plausible that it would be able to hold it on its own strength as well. Moreover, given the resource constraint of TOB availability, the government should prioritize locations of weakness over locations of strength. Finally, TOBs do not deploy for an extended period of time; the benefits they offer would be short-term. TOBs would not be able to make large gains in consolidating control. Based on that logic, the following hypothesis – first stated in Chapter 2 – is proposed:

> *Hypothesis 2 – Temporary Operating Base Placement: TOBs are more likely to deploy to an area where the government is performing poorly in battle.*

4.5 Research Design

To understand where peacekeepers deploy at the subnational level, this chapter uses the same disaggregated research design first established in Chapter 3: using the grid-cell unit of analysis, each country in the sample is divided into multiple grids that each measure 0.5 x 0.5 decimal degrees, or roughly 55 kilometers by 55 kilometers at the equator. The countries that make up the sample are those African countries experiencing a civil conflict that hosted a peacekeeping operation with a robust mandate between 2000 and 2015.[7] Countries leave the sample when either the mission concludes or in December 2015, the last month-year included in the temporal sample.

[7]Again, the sample includes Burundi (ONUB), Central African Republic (MINURCAT), Chad (MINURCAT), Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, MONUSCO), Cote D'Ivoire (UNOCI), Liberia (UNMIL), Mali (MINUSMA), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), South Sudan (UNMISS), and Sudan (UNMIS, UNAMID).

4.5.1 Dependent Variables

The key dependent variable is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a TOB has been deployed to a grid in any given month. If there are multiple TOBs deployed to a single grid in a given month, that grid-month is still coded as a positive case; there are very few instances in which a grid hosts multiple TOBs, and the same theoretical mechanisms should be at play regardless of whether or not one or more TOBs are deployed to a grid-cell. Information on TOB location is available in the reports of the Secretary General of the United Nations; the Secretary General is mandated to report on the activities of all active peacekeeping operations on a set basis; for active operations, this can be as frequent as once a month or as infrequent as each quarter. Each report contains a map of the static operating bases. TOBs are not likely to be placed on these maps; due to their temporary nature and the relative infrequency of the report issuance, their locations are included within the text of the reports.[8] These base locations were geocoded using the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GEOnet Names Server, and cross-referenced with Google Maps.

Unlike the data on the military peacekeepers at SOBs, which provide the number, size, and type of the units stationed at each static operating base via the visual depiction on the map, the text of each document does not describe the size or number of peacekeepers stationed at each TOB; rather, only that a TOB was deployed. Moreover, as the UN Infantry Battalion Manual outlines, most TOBs are only staffed by one unit - either an infantry company or infantry platoon (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020). This means that the key outcome variable of this chapter, then, is a simple indicator of whether or not a TOB is deployed within a grid-cell.

[8] I also collect and geocode deployments of peacekeeper "forward operating bases," "rapid reaction forces," and "quick reaction forces," due to their similarity in size, capabilities, and mandate as TOBs. For an example of the text containing TOB location information, please refer to the appendix.

4.5.2 Independent Variables

How, then, to measure the poor performance of governments in battle? This chapter proposes two measures. First, a ratio of government battle deaths compared to rebel battle deaths is utilized. Second, separate indicators of the locations where the government has seized territory and where the rebels have seized territory are incorporated. Why use both measures? First, these measures describe distinct, but related, concepts of battle success. It is also likely that the type of battle outcome may matter more or less to different types of host governments, and at different times in the conflict. Territory might matter less in a large country; battle deaths might matter less where there is a large supply of soldiers. Secondly, battle deaths in Africa are unlike battle deaths elsewhere in the world. Battle deaths in African conflicts, in general, have experienced a significant decrease in battle deaths since 2000 (Palik, Rustad and Methi 2020). This is true despite a rise in battle deaths in that same time period around the rest of the world (Strand et al. 2020). Thus, battle deaths alone may not convey sufficient information on the entire universe of locations where the government may want peacekeepers to deploy. Third, and relatedly, in many of the countries where peacekeepers deploy, the status quo is of low state control. There are instances in which territory has been seized without much violence; in these instances, battle deaths may not be indicative of failure. Take, for example, the case of Buchanan, Liberia in 2003, which was seized by the Movement for Democracy in Liberia without government counter-attacks (Carroll 2003). Or, take the example of Alindao in the Central African Republic, which was seized with "no resistance from government forces," who instead vacated the area (al Jazeera 2013).

The number of battle deaths per actor is taken from the PRIO Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) (Sundberg and Melander 2013), and is aggregated to the total number of deaths of each actor type in a given grid-month, to account for the possibility that battles may span across the geographical range of a given grid-cell or be distributed across multiple days in a given month. This chapter relies on a ratio of government deaths to rebel deaths to

understand how TOBs respond to the performance of the government relative to rebels.[9] The ratio is government battle deaths relative to rebel battle deaths; a larger value thus indicates that the government has suffered more battle deaths in a grid-cell relative to rebels.

This chapter also utilizes a second independent variable: whether or not territory is lost by the government. These data are taken from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2010). These variables measures whether or not an actor violently seized territory as a result of battle. Note that for this analysis, the entire territory of a grid-cell does not need to change hands, but rather just a subset. Given that, the number of seizures by an actor within a grid-cell are aggregated at the month-level. These models utilize distinct variables on government seizures of territory and rebel seizures of territory, to explicitly test for a difference in how peacekeepers at TOBs respond to battle dynamics by different actors. For summary stats on the variables used, refer to Table 4.1.

Variable	Min	Max	Median	Mean	Std. Dev.
Rebel Battle Deaths	0.00	140.00	0.00	0.01	0.61
Govt Battle Deaths	0.00	303.00	0.00	0.02	1.13
Govt Territory Seizure	0.00	12.00	0.00	0.01	0.08
Rebel Territory Seizure	0.00	14.00	0.00	0.01	0.07

Table 4.1: Summary Statistics For Chapter 4 Main Variables

4.5.3 Control Variables

In addition to the explanatory variables proposed in this chapter, there are several potential confounding variables that are controlled for. Both battle outcomes and peacekeeping deployment may be affected by population density, the degree of accessibility, and the type of terrain. More populous locations face a greater risk of conflict onset (Brückner 2010,

[9]In the appendix, the raw number of deaths per actor is also included. This allows for the inclusion of information on the scale of the deaths; a battle in which a government loses 100 soldiers is significantly greater than a battle in which a government loses 10 soldiers. Using a ratio prevents an understanding of the relative scale of an individual battle event. In small skirmishes where only a handful of government actors have been killed, the government may not feel the need for additional back-up. A ratio would not provide this information. Second, and perhaps relatedly, there are grid-cells that report only battle-deaths from one actor – this could be because of bias in how events are recorded (Weidmann 2011, Dawkins 2020), or reflect that battle deaths in African conflicts in general have experienced a significant decrease in battle deaths since 2000 (Palik, Rustad and Methi 2020).

Raleigh and Hegre 2009); likewise, peacekeepers are more likely to deploy to urban and well-populated areas (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2016). Population density is measured as the estimated population per grid-cell, using data from Center for International Earth Science Information Network (2016). Likewise, the GlobCover measure of urban coverage captures the percentage area of the cell covered by urban area (Bontemps et al. 2011).[10]

Accessibility affects the ability of both peacekeeper and conflict actors to travel to a given location, and is measured by the estimated travel time in minutes by land transportation from the pixel to the nearest major city with more than 50,000 inhabitants (Uchida and Nelson 2009). Due to the heavy presence of peacekeepers in host capital cities, the distance in kilometers from the grid-cell centroid to the host capital city is controlled for (Weidmann, Kuse and Gleditsch 2010*b*).[11] The proportion of mountainous terrain in a given grid cell is additionally controlled for, using data from Blyth (2002), as mountainous terrain is association with civil conflict onset and duration but may also affect the ability of peacekeeper access.

With the growing concern for the protection of civilians, it may that peacekeeper locations are also driven by civilian causalities; this still allows for the possibility that TOBs are likely to deploy to the locations where the government needs additional force, but may make that a secondary concern to the number of civilian casualties at any given site. The UN has prioritized the protection of civilians in recent years, and outlines that the establishment of TOBs should "ideally" be based on "likely tasks such as POC [protection of civilians]" (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020, p. 41). As such, these models control for the number of civilians killed in a given grid-month, both due to one-sided violence and as collateral damage. Likewise, previous literature has shown that peacekeepers are likely to deploy to locations with the most intense violence, although with a significant delay (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2016, Costalli 2014). This data is also from the GED.

[10]GlobCover's definition of urban area is one with "an artificial cover resulting from human activities." (Di Gregorio and Jansen 2000)

[11]The capital city of a country typically serves as the operational headquarters for the peacekeeping mission, and typically hosts the largest number of peacekeepers.

The models that utilize territorial seizures as the key independent variables also incorporate the possibility that peacekeepers may deploy to locations experiencing battles that did not result in a territorial exchange. As such, those models include a variable that indicates the number of armed clashes that did not result in territorial exchange per grid-cell. These data also come from ACLED.

Finally, past exposure to bases must also be accounted for. TOBs often deploy from the static operating bases; as such, it is likely that TOB positions are dependent on where static operating bases are located. To account for this, a static operating spatial lag is included to capture previous static operating base deployment in neighboring cells. Likewise, as conflict sites can cluster together, the presence of other TOBs in nearby cells is accounted for through the incorporation of an additional spatial lag on neighboring TOBs. Finally, to account for past base activity within a given grid-cell, a decay function of past base deployment is included.

Due to the binary nature of the dependent variable, logistic regression is appropriate; however, there are relatively few TOB deployments given the overall number of grid-months. There are 993 recorded grid-months that hosted a TOB out of a total of 312,372 possible grid-cell observations in the sample.[12] The large number of units without a TOB, therefore, introduces concerns of bias. To overcome this, the models utilize rare event logistic regression. These models also incorporate country fixed effects, to account for potential time invariant heterogeneity across the countries to which TOBs deploy.

Accounting for the nonrandom nature of peacekeeper deployment requires an understanding of how rapidly peacekeepers move relative to violence. Previous work has found that static operating bases move relatively slowly, catching up to violence at a pace of anywhere between several months and several years (Costalli 2014, Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019, Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2016). Temporary operating bases, while more mobile and better able to respond to ongoing violence than static operating bases, may still experience

[12]The population size variable, at the grid-cell level, faces some missingness, hence the smaller sample size; the results are robust to models that do not include this variable.

a delay in their response. This may be for several reasons. First, the government may still desire some delay in peacekeeper movement, to ensure that they will be unconstrained in their battle-related violence. For example, if the government is likely to rely on tactics that peacekeepers are mandated to stop, such as violence against civilians, then the government may attempt to slow peacekeeper movement so as to avoid the risk of peacekeeper retaliation.

Second, there is some necessary logistical delay in peacekeeper movement. TOBs tend to consist of equipment and personnel housed at static operating bases and deploy after receiving orders to do so. When there is an ongoing conflict event, TOB deployment requires a call for peacekeeper response, approval from the host government, and approval from UN leadership on the ground. Peacekeepers then have to travel to the area of violence. How long this process takes is likely to be highly variable, even within a given mission, based on extant infrastructure and conflict trends. Likewise, there may be a delay in the timing of the intelligence that reports on ongoing violence.

Finally, the peacekeepers themselves may slow their progress. There have been notable instances in which peacekeepers have failed to respond to ongoing violence (United Nations Independent Special Investigation Independent Special Investigation 2016), due to risk aversion. The associated risk may be concern over travelling into isolated territory or entering into a particularly violent area. As such, there may be intentional slowing on the part of the peacekeepers to allow the violence to abate prior to their arrival.

To capture the possibility for all three potential slow-down effects, the deployment of TOBs at two different points in time: at the same month of battle event (t) and one month after a conflict event (t *+1)*. This allows for both a contemporaneous assessment of TOB deployment and the possibility that there may still be a lag, in line with previous peacekeeping literature.

Variable	Min	Max	Median	Mean	Std. Dev.
Civilian Deaths	0.00	1200.00	0.00	0.09	4.48
Cap. Dist. (Log)	1.64	7.56	6.67	6.50	0.74
Mnt. Terrain (Mean)	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.08	0.20
Pop. (Log.)	4.74	14.52	10.43	10.31	1.35
Travel Time	58.88	5794.42	451.24	583.19	500.68
Urban GC	0.00	9.40	0.00	0.04	0.33

Table 4.2: Summary Statistics For Chapter 4 Control Variables

	Reb Deaths	Govt Deaths	Civ Deaths	Govt Terr	Reb Terr	Clash	Cap. Dist.(Log)	Mnt.	Pop. (Log)	T. Time	Urban
Rebel Deaths		0.01	0.025	0.01	0.01	0.012	0.004	0.003	0.007	-0.006	0.004
Govt Deaths			0.031	0.04	0.03	0.074	0.002	0.013	0.01	-0.007	0.016
Civ Deaths				0.05	0.22	0.112	0.015	0.031	0.021	-0.012	0.006
Govt Terr					0.096	0.242	0.015	0.039	0.023	-0.12	0.014
Reb Terr						0.137	0.01	0.031	0.02	-0.01	0.019
Clash							0.016	0.069	0.056	-0.031	0.056
Cap. Dist.(Log)								0.17	-0.204	0.161	-0.184
Mnt.									0.118	-0.041	-0.037
Pop. (Log)										-0.56	0.169
T. Time											-0.105
Urban											

Table 4.3: Correlation Matrix of All Variables Used in Chapter 4

4.6 Results

Recall that Hypothesis 2 outlines the expectation that TOBs are more likely to deploy to the locations where the government is performing poorly in battle. The models presented in Table 4.4, examines how TOBs respond based on the number of battle deaths the government has experienced relative to rebel battle deaths. There is support for this hypothesis. A larger value on the ratio variable reveals that the government has suffered higher casualties in a grid-cell, compared to the rebels in that same grid-cell. TOBs consistently deploy to the locations where the government has done poorly in battle compared to rebels, across both periods.[13] The areas where the government is dealing with a relatively poor performance in battle or the aftermath of a poor performance are more likely to host TOBs, suggesting that military deployments of peacekeepers follow the locations where the government needs additional reinforcements and support. This makes sense; in the rare case that peacekeepers have an offensive mandate, they may be able to undo the progress of the rebel group. Even without an offensive mandate, however, peacekeepers will be able to limit the geographic spread of the rebel group and monitor their movements, providing information to the government about potential surprise attacks. Peacekeeper presence where non-state actors have succeeded, therefore, can be a valuable tool in slowing down their progress. Likewise, a government should not want peacekeepers to deploy to the areas in which it can already manage rebels without additional forces. These results are substantively different as well. The experience of one battle death from the government increases the likelihood of future TOB deployment by seven percent, relative to two percent if a rebel group experiences one battle death.[14]

Before discussing the control variables, let us consider the second independent variable -

[13] As the appendix shows, there are similar results when the raw number of battle deaths, per actor, is used. There is no significant association between the locations of ongoing non-state actor battle deaths and TOB deployment, but a positive and statistically significant relationship between the government battle deaths and TOB deployment. That is, TOBs do not deploy to the areas in which rebels currently sustain high battle deaths, but do deploy to the locations where the government is currently sustaining high battle deaths. However, these results show that both variables are positive and statically significant at a one month lag.

[14] This is taken from the models using the raw number of battle deaths as two separate variables, included in the appendix, due to the problems of interpreting ratios for comparative differences by both groups.

	Dependent Variable:	
	TOB Deployment	TOB Deployment$_{t+1}$
	(1)	(2)
Govt: Rebel Battle Deaths	0.031**	0.090**
	(0.012)	(0.035)
Civilian Deaths	0.017***	0.023***
	(0.004)	(0.003)
Mnt. Terrain	0.377	0.378
	(0.282)	(0.295)
Travel Time	−0.002***	−0.002***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Urban Cell Coverage	0.454*	0.467**
	(0.195)	(0.197)
Population (Logged)	0.006	0.067
	(0.006)	(0.067)
Dist. to Cap. (Logged)	1.716***	1.781***
	(0.176)	(0.178)
Spatial Lag, TOB	1.210***	0.452**
	(0.168)	(0.209)
Spatial Lag, SOB	2.8840***	0.346**
	(0.173)	(0.153)
Base Decay	2.884***	2.855***
	(1.351)	(0.176)
Constant	−16.210***	−16.340***
	(1.351)	(1.340)
N. Observations	175,550	175,534
AIC	3940.5	3972
Controls?	✓	✓
Country FE?	✓	✓

Model: rare events logit. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.4: Battle Death Ratio as TOB Deployment Predictor

territorial losses by the government. Using this variable, Hypothesis 2 predicts that TOBs should deploy to the locations where the government has recently lost territory and should not deploy to the locations where the government has regained territory. Again, there is some support for this hypothesis. Table 4.5 shows that those areas that hosted a battle without any change in territorial control are significantly likely to host a TOB. This trend holds whether the deployment occurs in the same month as the battle, or in the month following a battle. While *Govt Territory Seizure* is positive, it is not significant, suggesting that there is a null relationship between the seizure of territory by the government and TOB deployment. However, *Rebel Territory Seizure* is positive and statistically significant in Column 2 of Table 4.5, indicating that TOBs are likely to deploy to the locations where rebels have seized territory in the month after that seizure. Indeed, this relationship too is also substantively large; if a grid-cell experiences rebels seizing part of the territory within its boundaries, then it is roughly 60% more likely to be met with a TOB in the following month. In line with the theory, these are the locations that a host government should most prefer to see peacekeepers deployed to: the areas where rebels have relatively recently taken control. The military power of peacekeepers, via a potential offensive force, the risk of returned gunfire, and monitoring, are in place where the government is actively weaker relative to the rebels.

The results present some evidence that TOB deployments operate slightly differently during active fighting and the period immediately following that fighting. Peacekeepers deploy to locations that are actively hosting battles and experiencing casualties; indeed, peacekeepers are more likely to deploy to a battle where both conflict actors and civilians are suffering. In the month when fighting is occurring, peacekeepers deploy to active battle sites where there has been no change in territory; moreover, they are more likely to deploy to locations where government battle deaths are greater relative to rebels. However, in the month following conflict, peacekeepers are more likely to deploy to areas where rebels seized territory.

	Dependent Variable:	
	TOB Deployment	TOB Deployment$_{t+1}$
	(1)	(2)
Govt Territory Seizure	0.056	0.256
	(0.257)	(0.204)
Rebel Territory Seizure	0.312	0.488**
	(0.285)	(0.228)
Armed Clash (No Territory Seizure)	0.147**	0.157**
	(0.061)	(0.058)
Civilian Deaths	0.017***	0.026***
	(0.004)	(0.003)
Mnt. Terrain	0.355	0.354
	(0.284)	(0.297)
Travel Time	−0.002***	−0.002***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Urban Cell Coverage	0.440**	0.449**
	(0.198)	(0.202)
Population (Logged)	0.061	0.061
	(0.066)	(0.067)
Dist. to Cap. (Logged)	1.699***	1.753***
	(0.176)	(0.178)
Spatial Lag, TOB	1.190***	0.393*
	(0.170)	(0.209)
Spatial Lag, SOB	0.498***	0.332**
	(0.149)	(0.154)
Base Decay	2.849***	2.814***
	(0.174)	(0.177)
Constant	−16.050***	−15.990***
	(1.352)	(1.374)
N. Observations	175,550	175,534
AIC	3941.2	3965.8
Controls?	✓	✓
Country FE?	✓	✓
Model: rare events logit.		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.5: Territory Seizures as TOB Deployment Predictor

Why do we see this difference? One explanation could be that the battles where the government is suffering more battle deaths than the rebels are not necessarily those battles that result in territorial exchanges. A stalemated battle could produce battle deaths and could be prolonged over a period of time. Logistically, this would allow peacekeepers the ability and time to respond to these types of skirmishes. Likewise, TOBs could act in a triage manner. A government – and the peacekeepers – may prefer to first respond to the locations where there are battle deaths, compared to the locations where territory is seized. Where territory is seized is not necessarily where battle deaths are especially high. Recall the city of Alindao in the Central African Republic, which was seized with "no resistance from government forces" (al Jazeera 2013). Whereas territory that is lost can be recaptured, forces killed in battle can not be regained later. The delay in TOB deployment to the locations where rebels have seized territory could then indicate a triage role of those peacekeepers.

Next, let us consider the results on the control variables. Across both tables, the controls operate in very similar ways. These results clearly demonstrate that peacekeepers do deploy to the locations where civilian suffering is high; *Civilian Deaths* is positive and statistically significant across both models. Across all models, the experience of a single civilian death increases the likelihood of TOB deployment by roughly two percent. This is good news for the UN; as the protection of civilians is a cornerstone of its modern missions. Peacekeepers must deploy to locations where they have the opportunity to engage in this aspect of their mandate; the results in this chapter clearly indicate that this is the case.

The controls also confirm that accessibility matters for TOB deployment; *Travel Time* and *Urban Cell Coverage* indicate that TOBs are increasingly likely to deploy to grid-cells that have a larger percentage of urban area and that are closer to cities. Interestingly, however, the significant and positive results on *Dist. To Cap.* suggests that TOBs deploy away from a country's capital. Taken together, this implies that TOBs are scattered across a country, but deploy closer to other, non-capital cities.

Finally, TOB deployment is correlated with past and neighboring base activity. The

positive and significant coefficients on *Spatial Lag TOB* and *Spatial Lag SOB* indicate that if a grid-cell's neighbors hosted a base, it is significantly more likely to host one as well. Likewise, if a grid-cell had hosted a static operating base in the past, it is more likely to host one in the future.

4.7 What Does This Tell Us About Peacekeepers?

This chapter has shed light on the question of where peacekeepers deploy and the factors that influence deployment. While current work has focused on the preferences and incentives of the peacekeepers themselves, there has yet to be a comprehensive understanding of the role of host governments in this process. In civil conflicts with peacekeeping operations, host governments have a great ability to influence where peacekeepers are located due to the operation's need to maintain government consent. Moreover, government actors have a clear incentive to utilize the peacekeeping operation in a manner that is in line with its preferences. In instances of active fighting, the government has an incentive to use the peacekeeping operation as additional force where it is not performing well; as such, military deployments of peacekeepers should be more likely to deploy to the areas where the government has suffered battle deaths relative to the rebels, and where the government has recently lost territory.

These results show that TOBs deploy to the sites that are currently and have previously experienced higher government battle deaths relative to rebel battle deaths. Likewise, while TOBs initially respond to sites that experience a battle without a territorial exchange, in the aftermath of battles TOBs are significantly more likely to deploy to the locations with territory captured by rebels. However, the models utilized here suggest that TOBs do not deploy to locations where the government previously regained territory. These results suggest deployments are biased towards the preferences of the government and are sent in the locations where they are best able challenge non-state actor success.

A key takeaway from this chapter is that TOBs do deploy to ongoing conflict events – this, on its face, is a positive sign for the United Nations. The UN describes these bases as " deploy[ing] to cover vulnerable areas and hotspots by the fastest means available" (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020, p. 41). This chapter has demonstrated that TOBs meet this challenge, going where conflict, battle deaths, and civilian deaths are actively being experienced. Given the literature's description of a significant delay in the past deployment of static operating bases (e.g., Costalli 2014), the immediacy of TOBs speaks to the advances that the UN has made in its logistical capabilities and in its ability to engage with increasingly dangerous conflicts.

However, the results suggest that TOBs deploy in a biased manner. Bias in peacekeeper allocation is problematic from a variety of perspectives. First, it directly contradicts the self-professed neutrality of UN peacekeeping, a factor argued to be crucial to the effectiveness of operations (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Department of Field Support 2015, Pouligny 2006). Bias towards the government allows for the operation to act as a source of supplementary capacity in the conflict. Peacekeeping operations carry material and security resources, both of which can assist in altering the balance of power between warring factions (Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen 2013, Karlsrud 2015). By deploying to locations where non-state actors are out-performing the government, peacekeepers may contribute to the demise of non-state actors and the growth of the government, making them far from an impartial actor to the conflict.

Second, many of the governments that host peacekeeping operations engage in violence against civilians and repression. If peacekeepers are indeed operating in a manner that benefits the government in conflict, they may be helping to prolong a predatory regime. The bias away from TOB deployment to territory recently regained by the government is especially problematic, as governments may engage in one-sided violence to consolidate their control and to punish the supporters of non-state actors in such locations (Valentino 2014, Fjelde and Hultman 2014, Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004). By avoiding these

areas, peacekeepers may be allowing unchecked governmental violence against civilians, an offense that they are mandated to halt.

4.8 Conclusion

Chapters 3 and 4, taken together, have demonstrated the role that conflict dynamics place in shaping where peacekeepers deploy at the subnational level. Under the expectation, these chapters have shown that peacekeepers deploy to the locations where their various military benefits are most likely to be utilized by the host government. These two chapters provide the first analysis of how such conflict dynamics predict peacekeeper deployments, subnationally, and the role of the host government in influencing these locations.

In addition to highlighting how peacekeepers move in relation to shifting battle dynamics, this chapter has provided the first analysis of the determinants of UN peacekeeping temporary operating bases. Shifting to an understanding of where TOBs are located is useful for a number of reasons. First, these deployments are far more mobile than most static operating bases. They are more responsive to ongoing violence, and provide for a better sense of how peacekeepers are effected by the changing dynamics of conflict. Second, much of the literature on peacekeeping is focused on operations' ability to protect civilians from violence. Current approaches to understanding how peacekeepers manage subnational violence uses the number of overall peacekeepers at a given base to measure the deterrent effect of peacekeepers.

However, not all peacekeepers at a given base are equipped or authorized to engage in force to protect civilians. Static operating bases also face a significant delay in when they shift to address changes in where violence is located (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2016, Costalli 2014). Concentrating on TOBs instead selects on a subset of the peacekeepers that are best able to respond to violence and that are most likely to respond to violence; while there are fewer TOBs deployed in the lifespan of a conflict, the precision gained from a more accurate measurement of concept is a crucial benefit to both the study of peacekeeping and

conflict dynamics in general.

The question that naturally follows from these chapters is how peacekeepers are able to operate once they are deployed in these areas. A major tenet of modern peacekeeping operations is the protection of civilians; it is the priority mandate of most ongoing peacekeeping operations, and one of the key aspects of a mandate that can be defended with the use of force. Indeed, UN Secretary-General António Guterres claimed that UN peacekeepers are "one of the most effective means of protecting civilians in conflict zones around the world."[15] This is a statement that has been backed up with a good deal of academic research: the deployment of peacekeepers is associated with a reduction in both battlefield-related deaths of civilians and one-sided violence against civilians, as well as post-conflict violence (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2014, Carnegie and Mikulaschek 2020, Bove and Ruggeri 2016, Kathman and Wood 2016).

However, the results of Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that peacekeepers are strategically deployed to areas based on the host government's conflict preferences. This implies that peacekeepers are sent to locations where the violence against civilians that they witness is perhaps not representative of the violence against civilians where they are not located; moreover, the broader dynamic of consent raises questions about peacekeepers' willingness to use force against their operational guarantor. Are peacekeepers willing to fire on a government agent if that might result in the expulsion of the mission? What effects might this have on peacekeepers protective capabilities? Chapter 5 examines these questions, exploring the protective capabilities of military peacekeepers at both static and temporary operating bases.

[15]This statement was made in a speech to the UN Security Council in May 2020; this speech can be accessed here: https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sgsm20097.doc.htm

Chapter 5

The Protective Subnational Capabilities Of United Nations Peacekeepers

Thus far, this dissertation has demonstrated some evidence in favor of a logic of host governments using the power of consent to influence where subnational peacekeeper deployments end up. This means that UN peacekeepers are systematically attending to the locations that bolster the authority and capacity of the state; on its face, this is troubling if the state uses this increased authority and capacity to repress and oppress its citizens.[1] That is, it could be the case that the UN role in extending state authority "risks exposing civilians to corruption, mismanagement, abuse, and even violence" (Labuda 2020). As Chapters 3 and 4 have demonstrated, UN peacekeepers are systematically more likely to deploy to the areas where the government is performing poorly in battle and to where the government has some territory, based on the benefits that base types can offer. However, peacekeepers do not deploy to the areas where rebels have some control and do not respond to where the government is performing well in battle. Combined, this suggests that peacekeepers may be helping to support governments in battle, undermining rebel gains in battle, and that peace-

[1] E.g.,https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/04/dr-congo-police-fire-beat-protesters; https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article236868528.html; https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/19/south-sudan-reform-abusive-security-agency

keepers may help governments consolidate their control over previously contested territory, undermining long-term rebel success. This too is potentially problematic for concerns over renewed conflict if the underlining issues that prompted the civil war are not addressed (Toft 2010).

These findings are perhaps more troubling from an *immediate* perspective if the dynamics of host government consent mean that UN peacekeepers are systematically failing to address the violence perpetrated by the host government in the areas where they are deployed. Chapters 3 and 4 provides evidence that UN military peacekeepers – the actors conventionally understood to be best equipped to halt ongoing violence that occurs in their presence – deploy to locations that have previously experienced civilian violence. Given that they are going to location that have experienced violence, do they stop further violence from occurring?

This is a crucial question, as the protection of civilians in conflict is an increasingly vital cornerstone of UN peacekeeping operations. The protection of civilians is a mandated task of almost every modern peacekeeping operation. With the exception of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), every peacekeeping operation deployed since 1999 has been mandated to protect civilians. While not every operation that is mandated to protect civilians is authorized to use force to fulfill this task, most peacekeeping operations authorized since 1997 have the ability to use force in some capacity. Since 1997, of the thirteen conflicts with a completed peacekeeping operation, only four did not authorize the use of force. Likewise, nearly all ongoing operations after 1991 have a robust mandate to use force. More specifically, the UN has authorized its peacekeepers to engage in "all necessary means, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, prejudice to the responsibility of the host government," which includes "the use of force against elements of government forces at the tactical level where such forces are themselves engaged in, or pose an imminent threat of, physical violence against civilians" (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Department of Field Support 2015). Peacekeepers thus have a

legal responsibility to protect civilians from all actors in a conflict if they have a sufficiently strong mandate.

However, as has been argued previously, consent introduces problems in upholding a mandate. Halting government violence against civilians, especially via the use of force, risks the stability of host government consent. This means that peacekeepers, aware of this tension, may censor their protective capacity towards victims of host government violence. However, consent should not alter their ability to protect civilians against violence carried out by rebels and militias. Given this tension between their mandate and consent, do peacekeepers actually protect civilians? And if so, who do they protect civilians from? This chapter explores how the peacekeepers at static and temporary operating bases are able to protect civilians from ongoing and short-term violence. It first lays out the current literature exploring peacekeepers and the protection of civilians, then sets out theoretical expectations regarding peacekeeper protection of civilians. It then quantitatively explores peacekeeper effectiveness, and discusses the results presented.

5.1 How Can Military Peacekeepers Protect Civilians?

Although there are a variety of explanations for how peacekeepers protect civilians, the key mechanism military peacekeepers utilize to do so is by raising the costs of engaging in such violence. This can be done in a number of ways.

First and foremost is raising the costs of engaging in violence against civilians via the threat of the use of force or the active use of force in response to ongoing violence. Peacekeepers with a robust, Chapter VII mandate that outlines that peacekeepers can use force to fulfill their mandate to protect civilians can change the cost-benefit calculation of combatants who are considering engaging in violence against civilians, potentially deterring future violence from occurring. Combatants who choose to prey upon civilians need to take into consideration potential costs to their own physical security. An effective deterrent threat re-

quires two components: first, the deterrer must have the capacity to punish the deterree, and second, the deterrer must credibly commit to invoke the punishment if necessary (Schelling 2008). To protect civilians, peacekeepers thus must credibly issue a threat to respond with force should any conflict actor violate the physical integrity rights of non-combatants. This credibility comes from the mandate allowing peacekeepers to engage in such force, but also from the actions of peacekeepers on the ground - they must establish that they are willing to carry out that mandate and engage with combatants to protect civilians.

That is, peacekeepers need to use their ability to use force to halt ongoing violence against civilians to both deter future violence and to actively protect civilians. This is in line with the UN's own description of how its peacekeepers protect civilians, noting that "peacekeepers...take action to provide physical protection, usually by deterring attacks on civilians through active patrolling but using force if necessary" (Department of Peacekeeping Operations N.d.).

As outlined by the UN, patrols are a crucial mechanism for peacekeeper deterrence. Patrols "demonstrate the presence of the mission and imply a deterrent capacity that will take action if violence is observed or anticipated within the area of patrolling" (Holt, Taylor and Kelly 2009, p. 200). Patrols can occur as a result of the deployment of static operating bases or temporary operating bases. By deploying to at-risk or vulnerable locations and patrolling the area around their base, peacekeepers can preemptively secure locations that may attract violence or become future hot spots of violence – such as IDP camps or Protection of Civilian (POC) sites. These peacekeepers are then able to respond to any violence that does occur. For example, after a series of mass rapes in villages in North Kivu, DRC, the operation in the DR Congo established two temporary operating bases in two villages in order to carry out day and night patrols to deter further violence (UN Joint Human Rights Office 2011).

The active response to ongoing violence requires the use of force by peacekeepers against the actor engaging in such violence. As such, only armed peacekeepers can engage in this

mechanism of protecting civilians. Military peacekeepers can engage in this mechanism, especially on the front lines of conflict; police peacekeepers are also able to use force to protect civilians, although they are mandated to respond to non-military situations. Non-military situations are those in which "there is no sustained and large-scale use of firearms or military weapons" (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support N.d., p. 11). Given that and the active conflict dynamics explored in this chapter, this section focuses on military peacekeepers' protective capabilities.

Peacekeepers have also engaged in military operations and campaigns that protect civilians, either as the explicit goal of the campaign or as a result of the stabilization these campaigns bring about. There have been notable instances of UN peacekeepers using force to act upon the protection of civilians mandate. The Force Intervention Brigade, an offensive peacekeeping unit deployed within the mission in the Congo, was authorized to use force to push M23 rebels out of Goma as part of the operation's mandate to ensure the protection of civilians. Likewise, missions have notably deployed to halt ongoing waves of communal violence (*Agence France-Press* 2019). Police too have been credited with actively working to protect civilians, especially in settings behind the front lines of conflict that are nonetheless fraught and violent. For example, UN police in the DRC were noted for intercepting protest violence (Labuda 2020).

In addition to raising the costs of engaging in violence against civilians via the use of force, peacekeepers make violence costly in a number of other ways. In active conflicts, peacekeepers can physically separate civilians and combatants, creating buffer zones or protective areas for civilians (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013, 2019, Doyle and Sambanis 2000). By creating safe spaces in which combatants are removed from an area, peacekeepers limit opportunities for violence against civilians and make it more difficult to engage in such activities. Peacekeepers can also monitor and report on combatant behavior at the front lines, ensuring that civilians have ample time to protect themselves and seek shelter should an attack be impending. By removing elements of surprise, removing civilians from the

grasp of combatants, and being able to use force, violence against civilians becomes more logistically difficult, less likely to be executed, and, overall, more costly.

Additionally, in post-conflict settings, peacekeepers can disarm and demobilize combatants, again limiting opportunities for violence against civilians (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2019, Kathman and Wood 2014). By removing certain means of violence against civilians and limiting the agents available for such activities, it becomes more costly.

Finally, military peacekeepers can report on violence against civilians to impose costs on the perpetrators. Military peacekeepers have the ability to observe violence in a number of settings. Peacekeepers deploy on patrols; in addition to responding or deterring violence, these patrols allow for intelligence gathering, human rights monitoring, and fact finding missions (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2020). Peacekeepers are often the initial investigating authority after a violent incident that resulted in violence against civilians, such as "hostage-taking, hijacking, abductions or missing persons; Assaults / murders;[and] Human rights violations" (United Nations Integrated Training Service, Department of Peace Operations 2019).

These activities can prompt more formal investigations and fact finding missions, such as those conducted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. They can also prompt immediate political costs. For example, UN peacekeepers in the UN Mission to Syria engaged in a fact-finding mission after a massacre in the village of Mazraat al-Qubeir. The team videotaped their findings and posted it online, prompting immediate and widespread international criticism (Gladstone 2012). Moreover, the incident prompted further discussions of escalated sanctions on Syrian leadership (Lynch 2012). Note too that these are costs that can be imposed on state and rebel actors; for example, the International Criminal Court can try both state and non-state actors for specific crimes.[2] Thus, UN peacekeepers are equipped to engage in activities that could impose political costs, deterring

[2]The ICC can prosecute for the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. The first person convicted by the ICC was Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a Congolese rebel leader. Omar al-Bashir has had two arrest warrants issue while he was sitting president of Sudan.

future violence.

Given these various mechanisms, the composition of a peacekeeping operation - whether or not the operation consists of military troops, police, or observers - as well as the size of the operation both directly contribute to the credible threat of responding to violence against civilians. Indeed, those peacekeeping operations with larger contingencies of military and police personnel have been found to reduce violence against civilians by both government and non-state actors in conflict and post-conflict settings (Kathman and Wood 2014, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013, 2016). Through these mechanisms, peacekeepers can effectively ensure the safety of civilians from conflict actors. This chapter focuses on the presence of military peacekeepers deployed at static operating bases and the presence of temporary operating bases.

5.2 How Does Consent Alter Peacekeepers' Protective Capabilities?

How might consent influence or disrupt the ability of peacekeepers to protect civilians? UN protection of civilian mandates apply to any actor engaging in such violence. Moreover, the UN has even explicitly highlighted that peacekeepers are mandated to protect civilians from violence that is perpetrated by "elements of host state security forces" (Labuda 2020). However, the need for continued consent means that should a mission impose costs that are too severe on a host government, it may be expelled from the country. These costs can be brought about simply by "denouncing and strong-arming government officials" (Labuda 2020, p. 25). Given that relationships can be frayed as a result of reporting on government actions or overstepping perceived boundaries of state sovereignty, the use of force against state agents holds great potential to anger a host government and risk losing consent.

Moreover, even if consent is not fully revoked, the UN often greatly relies on the host government's cooperation to carry out parts of its mandate (Holt and Taylor 2009). The host government must consent to allow for operational freedom of movement, which can and

has been revoked or restricted when the government believes that the UN is overstepping its authority or may impose costs. Recall the particularly contentious relationship between between Conglese President Laurent Kabila and MONUC, the UN operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which often resulted in Kabila imposing severe restrictions of the freedom of movement on the peacekeepers within the county (Rhoads 2016). Similarly, the Sudanese government required that the UN seek its permission prior to any movement by the mission in Darfur's forces, despite the freedom of movement granted to the mission (Stimson Center 2019, Johnstone 2011). Without the ability to move around the country, peacekeepers were very limited in their ability to keep the peace and protect civilians. Likewise, many aspects of a mandate require cooperation and collaboration with the government, such as improving rule of law, election monitoring, and security sector reform. Even if a mission isn't removed from a country, imposing costs or angering the host government risks this cooperation.

Given the need to maintain the state's consent and the fragility of that consent, the threat of force is not credible against the government. Peacekeepers are likely to be less willing to utilize force against the government if doing so would threaten mission stability. MONUSCO peacekeepers have indicated that they are acutely aware of the tightrope on which they walk, "express[ing] concern that being outspoken may undo the progress made so far on repairing relationships with the government – and may even risk the expulsion of the mission" (Stimson Center and Better World Campaign 2016). Indeed, the so-called "Brahimi Report," a UN report commissioned to describe the shortcomings of the UN's security activities, noted that consent was problematic and could be "manipulated" by parties to a conflict (Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2000).

In a report to the UN General Assembly by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, the UN itself acknowledged that, when confronted with incidents in which the state is the perpetrator of violence against civilians, the use of force " is considered unrealistic" in recognition of "operational and political constraints" despite the fact that such a response

is "at odds with the legal authority and mandate to act" (United Nations General Assembly 2014, p. 14-15) Thus, there is a general awareness of the problematic externalities, in that overstepping this threshold may result in severe operational restrictions or the expulsion of the operation.

Moreover, peacekeeper self-censorship, as it relates to protection of civilians, has been documented previously with respect to some human rights reports. The missions in Sudan and Mali have been accused of "withholding criticism and manipulating reports" to obscure state violations of human rights, and officials within UN missions have admitted that they have avoided investigating abuses by the government (Foley 2017, p.25). UN closures of Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites in South Sudan have been interpreted as playing into governmental frustrations against the sites (Labuda 2020). Given that self-censorship occurs with respect to some mission tasks, it makes sense that this would also occur with respect to the use of force towards the state and its agents. Thus, consent manifests in the decreased willingness and likelihood of peacekeepers to engage in the use of force against host governments.

It also seems to be the case that host governments are aware of this reduced willingness of the part of peacekeepers to use force. Host governments have long since engaged in bad behavior near and around peacekeepers without prompting a significant change in how the UN treats the state. As mentioned earlier, peacekeepers in the DRC continued to carry out joint operations with the Congolese army, despite the fact that its agents engaged in campaigns of violence against civilians and attacked peacekeepers during these operations (Rhoads 2016, p. 141). Host governments have long been able to threaten revoked or reduced consent as a means of weakening UN operations, rarely being met with retaliation. This is clearly evident in the willingness of UN peacekeepers to obscure state abuse and to "[back] down in the face of government pressure," (Labuda 2020) in order to remain operational. Given that, the threat of force against the state is not credible, meaning that the deterrent threat of peacekeepers' force against violence by host governments does not hold.

However, the threat of peacekeeper use of force is credible against non-state actors. As outlined in previous chapters, United Nations peacekeeping operations require the consent of the "main parties to a conflict." As the UN increasingly deploys its operations to civil conflicts, this means that main parties to a conflict may include non-state actors. This can be problematic for the UN for several reasons, even if the non-state actors do consent to the peacekeeping operation. First, there is a risk of spoilers splintering from the main rebel group which has agreed to the peacekeeping operation. This creates additional non-state actors that are a party of the conflict, yet have not consented to the presence of the mission. Additionally, even if non-state actors consent to the presence of a peacekeeping operation, there is no guarantee that they will remain the relevant parties to the conflict once the operation has deployed. For example, MONUC was deployed in 1999 after the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed, an agreement that was not signed initially by the rebel groups currently active in the conflict (Koops et al. 2015). The consent of those parties had not been sought by the United Nations.

In practice, only state actors are explicitly required to give consent. Peacekeeping operations have deployed without the consent of non-state actors and have remained operation when the consent of non-state actors has been withdrawn. This means that while rebels are a key party to the conflict at hand, their consent is not crucial; moreover, because peacekeepers are increasingly deploying in the middle of a conflict, rather than at its end, rebel consent is not sought after. Without a peace agreement in sight or an indication of which non-state actors may take on a role in a post-conflict government, the inclusion of rebels into the development of an operation is not likely. Likewise, as new conflicts emerge in the wake of peacekeeping deployment, the consent of these newly operational groups is not sought after.

This is especially apparent in light of the increasing UN trend of mandating missions to support the increased capacity and/or authority of the state; in the midst of war, without a peace agreement on the horizon, this translates to supporting the incumbent regime at the

cost of rebels. This means that peacekeepers should have no incentive to censor their use of force against rebels; likewise, they should be willing to report on rebel violations against civilians, as there is, in practice, no risk of losing rebel consent.

In sum, while the deterrent threat of force and the active use of force by peacekeepers is not likely to be effective against government agents, it is likely to be effective against rebel forces. Thus, the operation is not likely to punish the state with force. However, the operation is likely to punish non-state actors with force. This, in turn, implies that while military peacekeepers will be effective at halting rebel violence against civilians, they will *not* be effective at managing government violence and should not affect a change in the levels of such violence. That leads to the following hypotheses, first stated in the theory chapter.

> *Hypothesis 3a – Government Violence Against Civilians at Static Operating Bases: As the number of military units at static operating bases increase, host government violence against civilians is not altered.*
>
> *Hypothesis 3b – Rebel Violence Against Civilians at Static Operating Bases: As the number of military units at static operating bases increase, rebel violence against civilians decreases.*
>
> *Hypothesis 4a – Government Violence Against Civilian at Temporary Operating Bases: TOB deployment does not alter host government violence against civilians.*
>
> *Hypothesis 4b – Rebel Violence Against Civilians at Temporary Operating Bases: TOB deployment decreases rebel violence against civilians.*

5.3 Do Peacekeepers Protect Civilians?

5.3.1 Outcome Variable

This chapter aims to explain the number of civilians killed as a result of one-sided violence. The outcome variables of interest are the number of civilians killed by government agents and the number of civilians killed by rebel forces, respectively. This chapter uses data from ACLED, provided by Raleigh et al. (2010), to capture the number of civilian fatalities as a

result of one-sided violence in a given grid-cell month. The total number of civilians killed per month is included to allow for the maximum amount of information to be incorporated into these models; moreover, peacekeepers are mandated to halt and deter low levels and high levels of violence. Other work studying subnational peacekeeper effectiveness has used alternative sources and operationalizations of this outcome. For example, Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019) use data from the GED to measure one-sided violence; and utilize a dummy indicator of whether or not a grid-cell experienced more than five deaths as a result of one-sided violence. To ensure consistency and comparability with this work, the appendix for this chapter includes the GED data as the outcome variable as a robustness test.

5.3.2 Explanatory Variables

In order to test the ability of peacekeepers to protect civilians, the various types of subnational peacekeeper deployment described and studied in previous chapters are utilized. Peacekeepers deploy within a conflict via bases – this dissertation has identified two broad types: static operating bases and temporary operating bases (TOBs).[3] To recap from earlier chapters, static operating bases are in place for a longer period of time and require more extant stability in the areas to which they deploy. They hold civilian, observer, police, and military peacekeepers; this chapter, however, explicitly and exclusively tests the effectiveness of military peacekeepers at these bases. TOBs, on the other hand, are smaller deployments of military peacekeepers that deploy briefly to respond to violence. These are not combined due to the differences in deployment patterns across the two types of bases. Because it is unlikely that a grid-cell would host both a static operating base and a temporary operating base, they are modeled separately.

The first set of models tests the number of peacekeeper military units deployed at static operating base/s in given grid-cell. However, the appendix tests for the low and high esti-

[3]Note that static operating base is the term that is used within this dissertation; this is not the official categorization by the UN. The UN refers to these bases as headquarters and company operating bases (COBs). Because they are pooled together, they are referred to under the general label of static operating base.

mated number of troops stationed at these bases, as well as the logged estimated number of troops. The second set of models tests whether or not a temporary operating base was deployed to a grid-cell.

In line with Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019), this chapter tests for the immediate effects of peacekeeper deployment; that is, the relationship between peacekeeper deployment and violence against civilians, as they temporally co-occur. In addition, and to account for a longer term effect, that relationship is tested one month after deployment.[4]

5.3.3 Control Variables

In addition to the main variables of interest, these analyses include a variety of variables that are likely to influence both peacekeeper deployment and violence against civilians. Chapter 3 demonstrated that the deployment of static operating base units is also correlated with the establishment of government headquarters and the capture of territory as a result of battle; as such, government headquarter establishment and territory capture is included in the models determining the relationship between static bases and violence against civilians. Headquarters establishment may indicate a calming of civilian violence, as control has been established and there is less of a need to use violence to punish civilian supporters of the other warring faction; this is in line with the expectations of territorial control set forth in (Kalyvas 2006). However, territorial seizures may lead to a spike in violence against civilians. Per Chapter 4, when studying the deployment of TOBs, it is clear that previous battle deaths by the conflict actors should be included. Each of the variables related to conflict dynamics – battle deaths, headquarter establishment, and territorial gain – were taken from Raleigh et al. (2010).

In addition to conflict dynamics, other factors may prompt both peacekeeper deployment and violence against civilians. Distance from a capital city has been shown to have a negative effect on civilian fatalities, and per the previous two chapters, is associated with the onset

[4] Phayal and Prins (2020) also tests for ongoing dynamics of peacekeepers' ability to protect civilians, but they aggregated up to the year level.

of peacekeeper deployment (Buhaug and Gates 2002, Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2016).[5] Likewise, locations with larger civilian populations are more likely to host peacekeepers; population density may also drive civilian targeting. As such, the logged population per grid-cell is included.

Given that there is a clear link between past violence and ongoing violence, such dependencies must be accounted for. Two common ways of accounting for the temporal dependency at hand is to use either lags or to incorporate a decay function. In line with current peacekeeping work by Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019) and the previous chapters in this dissertation, the main models presented in this section use a decay function to capture past exposure to one-sided violence.[6] In the appendix, models instead capture this dependency by incorporating a one-month lag of the count of one sided-violence by each of the actors.

Finally, to account for previous exposure to peacekeepers, the models include a decay function for previous base deployment within a given grid; the models incorporate a decay function for past operating base presence. Likewise, to account for potential spatial dependencies between peacekeeper base deployment, this chapter includes in its main models a spatial lag of previous peacekeeper deployment in neighboring cells. The spatial lag equals 1 if any of a grid-cell's first order neighbors hosted a static operating base in the prior month. Regardless of whether or not the model relies on a temporary or static operating base as the key independent variable, the previous presence of a static operating base is used to account for these spatial and temporal dependencies. This is because while TOBs do not often deploy near one another, they are deployed from static operating bases. It is thus important to model spatial and temporal correlation between TOBs and static operating bases.

[5]Previous models in Chapters 3 and 4 included mountainous terrain these won't converge with the inclusion of grid-cell fixed effects; however they are included in the appendix with models that rely on country fixed effects. They are included in the models that use country fixed effects.

[6]The decay function relies on a functional form of s $2^{-(T/K)}$, where T is the time since one-sided violence, by any perpetrator, occurred in a given grid-cell, and K is the half-life parameter. The half life is set to 4. This half life is used in other conflict work, such as Hegre et al. (2019) and Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019). The half life effectively indicates the number of periods in which the variable of interest has an effect; here, the decay is of one-sided violence. So, if a grid-cell experienced violence in only one period, the four periods following that would have a positive decay function. Moreover, as the name implies, the strength of that violence wanes over time.

	N. Military Unit	Govt Territory	Rebel Territory	Govt HQ	Rebel Battle Deaths	Govt Battle Deaths
Min	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Max	38.00	12.00	14.00	2.00	140.00	303.00
Mean	0.08	0.002	0.0001	0.001	0.0001	0.02
Std. Dev	0.68	0.08	0.07	0.01	0.62	1.14

Table 5.1: Summary Stats, Conflict Variables

	N. Mil.	G Terr	R. Terr	HQ Govt	NSA BD	G BD	Mnt	(l) Cap. Dist	(l) Pop.	OSV Decay	Base Decay	S. Lag Base
N. Mil. Unit	1											
G Terr	0.03	1										
Reb Terr	0.01	0.05	1									
HQ Govt	0	0	0	1								
Reb Deaths	0.01	0	0	0	1							
G Deaths	0	0.05	0.03	0	0	1						
Mnt.	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.01	0	0.01	1					
L. Cap. Dist.	-0.19	0.01	0.01	0	0	0	0.17	1				
L. Pop.	0.17	0.02	0.01	0	0.01	0.01	0.12	-0.18	1			
OSV Decay	0.21	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.14	0.03	0.11	1		
Base Decay	0.58	0.03	0.02	0	0.01	0	0.06	-0.2	0.24	0.2	1	
S Lag Base	0.19	0.02	0.01	0	0	0	0.12	-0.15	0.32	0.07	0.29	1

Table 5.2: Correlation of Key Variables

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present the summary statistics of the main independent and dependent variables used in this chapter, and the correlation matrix between all variables used in this chapter.[7] Table 5.1 shows that there is a good deal of variation in the number of military units deployed across the grid-cells. While a relatively low number of grid-cells host a static operating base, driven largely by the large number of grid-cells in the sample, there is a wide range in how many units are held at each grid-cell. For example, Table 5.1 shows that the maximum number of military units deployed within a grid-cell in a given month was 38, signifying a large military presence. This table also shows that governments are more likely to seize territory than rebels, but that government actors experience more battle deaths than rebels.

Likewise, 5.2 shows that while most of the variables used in this analysis are positively correlated with one another, the correlation tends to be at low levels. Note that the negative correlation between the capital distance and most of the variables stems from the fact that a negative value indicates that distance between the grid-cell and the capital grows smaller. In fact, the variables that are most closely correlated are those variables that present information about the presence of a military unit at a static operating base; present unit deployment is correlated with past base exposure (Base Decay) and bases being deployed in neighboring cells (S. Lag Base).

5.3.4 Modeling Approach

Two modeling approaches are used for this chapter. First, OLS regressions with two way fixed-effects with robust standard errors clustered at the grid level are used; these results can be seen in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. The fixed effects are at both the grid-cell and year level, to account for unobserved heterogeneity across units and time. Such heterogeneity across units could bias the results presented if its sources influenced both one-sided violence and peacekeeper deployment. Moreover, there is variation in the number of TOBs and static

[7] The summary stats for the control variables can be seen in the appendix.

operating bases deployed across countries *and* at different points in time. Fixed effects works to account for variation in these trends.

However, this modeling approach does not overcome the issue of selection effects that risk biasing the results presented in this chapter. Peacekeepers are not deployed randomly; of course, the past two chapters have demonstrated that in highlighting how battle and territorial control dynamics predict where peacekeepers deploy. This has been demonstrated at the national level as well; the UN is more likely to deploy peacekeepers to "harder" conflicts (Hultman 2013*b*, Fortna 2004, Gilligan et al. 2003), and is more likely to intervene in conflicts where the interests of the permanent five members of the Security Council or other major powers are present (Gilligan et al. 2003, Beardsley and Schmidt 2012, Mullenbach 2005). Likewise, the subnational deployment of peacekeepers is not random. As previous chapters have outlined, a literature is emerging that works to explain the dynamics that predict subnational peacekeeper trends. In addition to the trends identified in Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation, previous work has showed how logistical and conflict trends matter for where peacekeepers deploy. Urban subnational locations that are near the capital with functioning airports and roads are more likely to see peacekeepers (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2016). Peacekeepers deploy to locations that have historically experienced violence and violence against civilians as well (Phayal and Prins 2020, Costalli 2014, Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019). This work highlights that there are clear selection dynamics at play. Moreover, the previous two chapters highlight that there is the possibility for the strategic influence of deployment by conflict actors. As such, simply relying on models without directly accounting for the unknown or unobserved selection process may confound the results presented.

This is addressed in the second modeling approach, which uses a nearest neighbor matching design to better construct a sample of those locations that received peacekeepers compared to a sample of those locations that did not receive peacekeepers. This is done by selecting a subset of the observations that are as similar as possible on a variety of covariates, with the exception of the "treatment" of base deployment. The matching design

attempts to pair each grid-cell with a base to a comparable grid-cell *without* a base, that way the key difference across the two is the treatment. The covariates used to select on are the amount of mountainous terrain per grid-cell, logged distance to the capital, logged population, past battle experience, past one-sided violence, past base deployment within a grid-cell, and base deployment within neighboring cells.[8] The balance across the cells with bases and those without bases can be seen in the appendix.

Assuming the covariates selected accurately and fully predict treatment assignment, matching can be used for causal inference; however, this can be a difficult assumption to meet and to test for (Sekhon 2009, Stuart 2010). Moreover, matching is only as good as the covariates it relies on, and can only overcome selection on observables. There is the potential that there is a correlation in the errors between peacekeeper deployment and violence against civilians. However, this dissertation has contributed vitally in understanding the covariates that predict where peacekeepers deploy, advancing the use of matching as a tool in understanding where peacekeepers deploy. The work established in the first two chapters thus also contributes to and advances other work, such as (Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019), which has used matching as a means of working to overcome the fundamental problem of selection bias.

Matching was done in `R` using `MatchIt`.[9] Once the matched sample is established, the relationship between peacekeepers and violence against civilians is estimated using linear models. This also works to reduce the large number of grid-cells in the main sample that peacekeepers never deploy to; this presents a sample that perhaps provides a more appropriate comparison. These results can be seen in Tables 5.5 and 5.6.

[8]Specifically, the past base deployment variable utilizes a decay function for past base exposure within a given grid-cell; the spatial lag measures whether or not the neighboring cells, using a rook neighborhood construction, hosted a base; the past battle variable captures whether or not there was an armed clash in a grid-cell in the past six months, including those clashes with territory capture and without territory capture; and past one-sided violence measures the amount of one-sided violence by *any* actor in the past six months.

[9]The default matching model to sort grid-cells into treated or not-treated units is logit, so the number of military units is collapsed to a binary indicator of whether or not there is any military peacekeeper at a static operating base within a grid-cell. TOBs are already in a binary form.

5.4 Results

Do subnational peacekeeper deployments protect civilians from one-sided violence? Table 5.3 shows the correlation between military units and violence as they co-occur temporally, and one month after deployment. Both time periods are included to account for the fact that there may be a delay in peacekeeper effectiveness, but still capture short-term effectiveness. Across all models, to provide consistency and comparison with Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019), Column 1 demonstrates the relationship between military units deployed at static operating bases and one-sided violence by the government as they co-occur; Column 2 demonstrates the relationship between military units deployed at static operating bases and one-sided violence by the rebels as they co-occur. Column 3 demonstrates the relationship between military units deployed at static operating bases and one-sided violence by the government one month after peacekeepers have deployed to a given location; Column 4 demonstrates the relationship between military units deployed at static operating bases and one-sided violence one month after deployment.

5.4.1 Fixed Effects Linear Models

Turning first to the results of the fixed effects linear model, Table 5.3 reveals a lack of a statistically significant relationship between military peacekeepers at static operating bases and violence against civilians by either type of actor. While Hypothesis 3a expected a null relationship between the deployment of military units and violence against civilians by the government, the null relationship between military peacekeepers and rebel violence against civilians is unexpected and counter to Hypothesis 3b. Although the direction of the coefficients on *N. Mil. Units* on rebel violence against civilians is as expected, it fails to attain statistical significance. The consistent lack of a statistically significant finding on peacekeeper deployment holds both in the contemporaneous period, and in the first month after peacekeeper deployment.

	Dependent variable:			
	VAC Govt	VAC Reb	VAC Govt$_{t+1}$	VAC Reb$_{t+1}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N. Mil Units	0.001	-0.001	0.002	-0.003
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Govt Territory$_{t-3}$	-0.005	0.044	-0.006**	0.023
	(0.004)	(0.042)	(0.002)	(0.018)
Reb. Territory$_{t-3}$	-0.004	-0.009	0.002	-0.011
	(0.003)	(0.026)	(0.004)	(0.067)
Govt HQ$_{t-3}$	-0.030**	0.047	-0.007***	-0.120***
	(0.014)	(0.138)	(0.0001)	(0.001)
Lagged Reb BD$_{t-3}$	-0.0002	-0.0002	0.001***	-0.001**
	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Lagged Govt BD$_{t-3}$	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001***	0.0002***
	(0.0001)	(0.0004)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Dist. To Capital	0.001	0.011*	0.002	0.013
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.046)
Logged Population	0.012	0.058	0.008	0.036
	(0.012)	(0.046)	(0.005)	(0.049)
OSV Decay	0.094***	0.523***	0.011***	0.219***
	(0.011)	(0.060)	(0.004)	(0.027)
Base Decay	-0.004	0.029	-0.003***	0.039***
	(0.004)	(0.025)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Base Spatial Lag	0.001	0.001	0.0004	0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Observations	181,478	181,478	181,456	181,456
R^2	0.071	0.162	0.036	0.111
Adjusted R^2	0.060	0.152	0.025	0.101
Residual Std. Error	0.038	0.151	0.039	0.157

Note: FELM with grid and year FE; robust SE clustered at the grid-level. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5.3: Military Peacekeepers at Static Operating Bases and Violence Against Civilians: Fixed Effects Linear Models

The controls act largely as expected. Previous one-sided violence predicts future violence, as noted in the consistently positive and significant coefficient on *OSV Decay*. And, while

previous exposure to peacekeeper units decreased the future co-occurrence of government violence against civilians, it increased rebel violence against civilians. There are some interesting results with respect to the territorial seizure and battle death variables, however. While government headquarter establishment is associated with a reduction in all violence against civilians, in line with the theory of full territorial control outlined in Kalyvas (2006), the experience of increased battle deaths by an actor is associated with fewer civilian deaths perpetrated by that actor. Past work suggested that when actors perform poorly in battle, they may engage in one-sided violence later to raise the costs to their opponent (Hultman 2007). However, these results suggest that this isn't necessarily the case.

Next, let us consider Table 5.4, which presents the relationship between temporary operating base deployment and violence against civilians. Again, the coefficients on *TOB* fail to attain statistical significance, although all are positive. This could in part be due to the very active nature of the locations that TOBs are deploying to; because TOBs deploy to locations that are actively experiencing or have recently experienced a clash between the rebel and the government, there is likely to be a high number of civilian deaths at these locations due to the clash.

These results also demonstrate some interesting findings with respect to the controls utilized in these models. In line with the literature on violence against civilians, it is clear that past one-sided violence predicts future one-sided violence. The results across multiple time periods and both base types demonstrate this with strongly statistically significant results on the *OSV Decay* variable. This also suggests that if indeed peacekeepers are deploying to locations where there is experienced one-sided violence, they are likely to encounter it in the future. Additionally, Table 5.3 shows that increased past base exposure within a grid-cell is associated with reduced violence against civilians, yet this result in only in the period after initial deployment.

Taken together, Tables 5.3 and 5.4 raise a number of questions about the effectiveness of UN military peacekeepers at temporary and static operating bases. Are these peacekeepers

	Dependent variable:			
	VAC Govt	VAC Reb	VAC Govt$_{t+1}$	VAC Reb$_{t+1}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
TOB	0.006	0.073	0.021	0.049
	(0.009)	(0.049)	(0.013)	(0.035)
Govt Territory$_{t-1}$	0.002	0.018	0.0004	-0.009
	(0.008)	(0.033)	(0.004)	(0.012)
Reb. Territory$_{t-1}$	0.001	0.027	0.005	0.011
	(0.008)	(0.073)	(0.009)	(0.034)
Lagged Reb BD$_{t-1}$	-0.0004**	-0.001	-0.0003**	-0.0001
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.0001)	(0.001)
Lagged Govt BD$_{t-1}$	0.001	0.002	-0.00002	-0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0001)	(0.0003)
Dist. To Capital	0.001	0.011*	0.002	0.013*
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.007)
Logged Population	0.011	0.059	0.008	0.040
	(0.012)	(0.046)	(0.013)	(0.045)
OSV Decay	0.093***	0.518***	0.011**	0.218***
	(0.010)	(0.060)	(0.005)	(0.050)
Base Decay	-0.003	0.027	-0.001	0.033
	(0.003)	(0.029)	(0.003)	(0.033)
Base Spatial Lag	0.001	0.001	0.0004	0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	183,269	183,269	183,247	183,247
R^2	0.072	0.162	0.037	0.111
Adjusted R^2	0.061	0.152	0.026	0.101
Residual Std. Error	0.038	0.151	0.039	0.156

Note: FELM with grid and year FE; robust SE clustered at the grid-level. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5.4: TOB and Violence Against Civilians: Fixed Effects Linear Models

able to effect change on the ground and actually protect civilians? The results used in these models cannot overcome the fundamental issue of selection. To further probe this question and continue to attempt to overcome this issue, let us turn next to the results of the matching design.

5.4.2 Matching

Recall that the following two samples were constructed using nearest neighbor matching on the following covariates: the amount of mountainous terrain per grid-cell, logged distance to the capital, logged population, past battle experience, past one-sided violence, past base deployment within a grid-cell, and base deployment within neighboring cells.

Specifically, the results shown in Table 5.5 matched on cells on whether or not the cell experienced an armed clash in the six months prior to deployment and the amount of one-sided violence in the six months before deployment; this was done to capture the conflict and violent trends previous chapters and previous literature have found to predict peacekeeper deployment.

The logged population per grid, mountainous terrain, and distance to its capital of a grid-cell were matched upon, as static operating bases tend to deploy to larger, more populous localities and temporary operating bases often deploy to more remote and less populated locations. Finally, previous exposure to static operating bases, via a spatial lag and a decay function, are also matched upon. Past base exposure predicts future exposure, and may alter the degree to which a peacekeeper threat of the use of force is credible. For example, if the past deployment actively protected civilians, future deployment should deter future violence. Likewise, if the past deployment did not engage in protective actions, as this theory would expect, then future deployments should not deter further violence.

This is the same set of covariates used to match for the temporary operating base sample. However, the violence against civilians and armed clash variables are set at a one month lag, not a six month lag, to reflect that TOB deployment is far more responsive to ongoing violent events than static operating bases. These results for the matched sample of temporary operating base units are presented in Table 5.6.

Table 5.5 demonstrates a complex relationship between military peacekeepers and violence against civilians. While military deployments initially *decrease* host government violence – counter to Hypothesis 3a – this effect is short-lived. Although the coefficients are

small, the substantive effect of deploying a military unit is relatively large, given the small baseline associated with these base deployments; the presence of a military unit reduces violence by government actors by nearly sixty percent. One month after deployment, military peacekeepers' presence is not associated with a significant change in violence by the state or rebels. This could indicate an initial reduction in violence while the host government assesses the degree to which the peacekeepers stationed at a locality are willing to use force, followed by either a conclusion that such a threat is not credible or a relocation of violence. However, there is no such initial decrease in violence perpetrated by the rebels; indeed, there is a consistent null relationship between military units and rebel violence civilians. This finding is not in line with Hypothesis 3b, which predicted a negative and significant relationship.

Next, Table 5.6 shows the results of the matched sample on violence against civilians. These results remain statistically insignificant, providing further evidence that the peacekeepers at TOBs may not be able to affect levels of violence against civilians at these locations of active conflict. This is particularly troubling, given that these are the locations where active conflict is occurring; although a hard test of peacekeeper effectiveness, given the violent nature of these grid-cells, these are the locations where peacekeepers can have a significant effect in ensuring civilian safety. Moreover, TOBs are part of the UN's campaign to protect civilians in conflict; these deployments deploy to where civilians are most vulnerable and have been envisioned as a tool for protection of civilians (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020). These results suggest that, although there is not an associated increase in the number of civilian deaths where TOBs deploy, they are not reducing deaths either.

The controls on the matched sample once again yield interesting insights. Again, the one-sided violence variable is consistently positive and statistically significant across both 5.5 and 5.6, highlighting that where such violence has been experienced in the past it is likely to be experienced in the future. An interesting finding in these controls is the lack of statistical significance illustrated in Table 5.6 of the variables related to past base exposure; the decay

	Dependent variable:			
	VAC_ByGovt	VAC_ByReb	VAC Govtt+1	VAC Reb$_{t+1}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mil. PK	-0.009**	-0.011	0.005	0.019
	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.015)
Mnt. Terrain	-0.019***	0.012	0.006	0.065**
	(0.007)	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.029)
Logged Population	0.0001	-0.014***	0.001	-0.009*
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Dist. To Capital	-0.002	-0.012**	0.0002	0.006
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Base Spatial Lag	0.002	-0.016	-0.0004	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.014)
Base Decay	-0.001	0.010	-0.001	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.020)
OSV Decay	0.148***	0.718***	0.074***	0.516***
	(0.007)	(0.025)	(0.007)	(0.028)
Lagged NSA BD (6)	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.005
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Lagged Govt BD (6)	-0.005**	0.025***	-0.003	0.044***
	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.008)
Constant	0.014	0.215***	-0.016	0.053
	(0.018)	(0.067)	(0.018)	(0.074)
Observations	6,936	6,936	6,936	6,936
R^2	0.069	0.126	0.024	0.070
Adjusted R^2	0.068	0.125	0.023	0.069
Residual Std. Error	0.106	0.394	0.108	0.438
F Statistic	57.393***	110.631***	19.155***	58.143***

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5.5: Military PK at Static Operating Bases and Violence Against Civilians: Matched Sample

	Dependent variable:			
	VAC_ByGovt	VAC_ByReb	VAC Govt$_{t+1}$	VAC Reb$_{t+1}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
TOB	-0.003	0.013	-0.010	0.002
	(0.014)	(0.053)	(0.010)	(0.053)
Mnt. Terrain	0.093***	-0.136	0.026	-0.073
	(0.030)	(0.113)	(0.021)	(0.113)
Logged Population	-0.001	-0.063***	0.003	-0.053**
	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.005)	(0.024)
Dist. To Capital	-0.020**	-0.011	-0.005	0.024
	(0.010)	(0.037)	(0.007)	(0.037)
Base Spatial Lag	0.005	-0.026	0.006	0.057
	(0.018)	(0.067)	(0.012)	(0.067)
Base Decay	-0.007	-0.017	0.022	-0.017
	(0.021)	(0.082)	(0.015)	(0.082)
OSV Decay	0.134***	1.001***	0.049***	0.770***
	(0.025)	(0.096)	(0.018)	(0.096)
Lagged NSA BD (1)	-0.002	-0.013	-0.001	-0.019
	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.003)	(0.014)
Lagged Govt BD (1)	0.011**	0.032*	-0.002	-0.006
	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.003)	(0.017)
Constant	0.122	0.698*	-0.0001	0.384
	(0.099)	(0.376)	(0.070)	(0.375)
Observations	738	738	738	738
R^2	0.082	0.166	0.031	0.108
Adjusted R^2	0.071	0.156	0.019	0.097
Residual Std. Error	0.176	0.672	0.126	0.672
F Statistic	7.263***	16.140***	2.549***	9.797***

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5.6: Temporary Operating Base and Violence Against Civilians: Matched Sample

function of past base exposure within a grid-cell and the spatial lag capturing neighborhood effects lack statistical significance. This too may be indicative of the remote nature of temporary operating bases. Finally, an especially interesting finding is the divergent results on *Lagged Govt Battle Deaths*. While past government deaths are associated with decreased

violence against civilians by the government at static operating base locations, the opposite is true at temporary operating bases: past government battle deaths increases the amount of government battle deaths. This is in line with the theory set forth in Hultman (2007). In line with work such as Kalyvas (2006), which argues that increased control by an actor reduces violence against civilians, these results suggests a difference in how governments engage in violence against civilians based on the degree of control they have. Static operating bases deploy to locations where the government has some control and temporary operating bases deploy to locations of active conflict and where the government is performing poorly. Where governments can seize and grow control, future violence against civilians is reduced.

Taken together, these analyses present mixed support for Hypothesis 3a. There is some evidence that military peacekeepers at static operating bases do not affect government violence, but some evidence that they may have a very short-term ability to reduce such violence. However, there is consistent evidence that military peacekeepers at temporary operating bases do not have a significant relationship with either government or rebel violence against civilians. Moreover, military peacekeepers at static operating bases were not found to be associated with a shift in rebel-perpetrated one-sided violence. This latter set of findings regarding rebel violence against civilians is directly counter to the theory set forth in this dissertation.

The majority null results presented here are robust to a number of other specifications. The null results presented in the fixed effects models are robust to the use of country fixed effects, instead of grid fixed effects. This could be drawn out of a concern that a source of unobserved heterogeneity that affects both peacekeeper deployment and violence against civilians is at the national level. These results can be seen in the appendix.

These null results are also robust to the inclusion of two additional control variables: whether or not there is a peace agreement negotiated in a given month, and whether or not there is a presidential election in that year. Previous work has argued that some peacekeepers are more focused on larger, strategic aspects of the mission, as compared to the "human

rights people" (Labuda 2020, p. 26). Peacekeeping operations are mandated to assist with and often monitor elections, and support the peace processes – these are often high stakes and highly visible components of their mandate. Several missions have been accused of de-prioritizing the protection of civilian in order to manage tensions during and in the lead-up to elections and peace processes (Labuda 2020). Conflict actors can also grow increasingly critical of peacekeepers during these processes (International Crisis Group 2018). These are also occasions that are ripe for violence. Peace agreements can pose opportunities for spoilers who hope to end the peace process or alter bargaining outcomes, prompting risks of increased violence against civilians. Likewise, electoral violence can be a strategy of suppressing votes, of preventing opposition from campaigning, or suppressing post-election protests – the risks of violence, indeed, may be heightened in the presence of third party monitors (Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2014, Daxecker 2012). Analyses presented in the appendix account for this potential. The data on peace processes were taken from the UN Peacemaker website[10], and the data on presidential elections came from (Carr 2003). The results are again largely consistent, with the null result across base deployment firm.

Likewise, rather than using the number of military units at static operating bases, the results from Table 5.3 are replicated using the high and low estimated number of military peacekeepers, as well as the logged number of military peacekeepers at static operating bases.[11] Moreover, replacing the decay function of one-sided violence with a simple lag structure also produces the same null result on the key independent variables presented.

To ensure comparability with the analyses of Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019) and to test for areas of sensitivity, the appendix also includes models that rely on GED data to construct the dependent variables of one-sided violence.[12] In order to follow the same coding scheme as Fjelde et al., the outcome variable is divided into government actors,

[10]This included peace agreements, not documents outlining a schedule for the implementation of a peace agreement, ceasefires, declarations of ceased hostilities, etc.; the website can be accessed here: https://peacemaker.un.org/document-search

[11]The results presented use the estimate of the high number of military personnel.

[12]In addition, the appendix contains a rather extensive replication and extension of the models used in that paper to highlight the fragile relationship between peacekeepers and violence against civilians.

which includes the pro-government militias identified by the case experts at UCDP, and non-state actors, which includes rebel groups and all other militias.[13] These results, utilizing a fixed effects model with grid and year fixed effects and grid clustered robust standard errors, again produce a null result across both government one-sided violence and rebel one-sided violence. This variable is utilized as both a count of the number of deaths per actor, and a dummy indicating that more than five deaths occurred within a grid-cell. Across both operationalizations, the results show a null relationship with peacekeeper deployment.

5.5 What Does This Tell Us About UN Peacekeeping Operations?

These results have demonstrated that the relationship between subnational UN peacekeeper deployments and one-sided violence is not as straightforward as results taken at the national level. Several findings emerge that are surprising: most pressingly, that there is not a stable relationship between peacekeeper deployments at static or temporary operating bases and violence against civilians. While there may be a short-term effect of military peacekeepers towards government violence against civilians, as shown by the matching results indicated in Table 5.5, it is short-lived. However, these results are not robust to the use of a fixed effects linear model. Likewise, there is a consistently and robust null effect of peacekeeper deployment on rebel violence against civilians.

The majority of the results on peacekeeper deployments demonstrate a null relationship with violence. This perhaps could be driven by three dynamics. First, it could be that positive effects of peacekeepers are not immediate. These results explored the relationship between peacekeepers and violence as they co-occurred and in the month following deployment. Instead, perhaps peacekeepers can reduce violence by conflict actors – but only in the long-term. Given that the protection of civilians is such a significant part of peacekeepers' mandates, this would be a worrisome conclusion; this is especially true of temporary operating bases, which do not have the ability to remain in place for an extended period of time

[13]Thanks are extended to Lisa Hultman for sharing those data to ensure consistency in this coding.

and are thus not able to actively deter violence in the long-term.

Second, it could simply be the case that peacekeepers are hesitant to protect civilians and do not have an effect on ongoing violence. Instead of this theory, which expected that peacekeepers were able and willing to halt rebel violence, this alternative would suggest that instead peacekeepers are not willing to halt any violence. Peacekeepers have not acted on their protection of civilian mandate in many notable occasions. For example, in 2005, MONUC, the operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, carried out a series of military campaigns with the Congolese national army, the *Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo* (FARDC). An internal UN report estimated that during one such campaign aimed at restoring peace in the province of Ituri 75% of the human rights offenses could be attributed to the FARDC – the UN's direct operational partner. Despite this, force was never used by MONUC against the FARDC (Rhoads 2016, p. 133).

Other notable cases include the attack of a UN POC site in Malakal, South Sudan in Feburary of 2016 by members of the national army (along with members of a local pro-government militia). Despite the UN presence in the camp, "SPLA and Dinka fighters appear to have had free reign of the camp for at least several hours, firing on civilians they encountered" (Matt Wells N.d., p. 14). Although UNMISS troops eventually pushed the combatants out of the camp, their operation's Crisis Management Team only met to discuss how to handle the situation 16 hours after the violence began (Matt Wells N.d.). As a result of the attack, 30 people were killed, 120 were injured, and nearly one-third of the camp was burned.

Peacekeepers have also been found to not intervene to halt rebel violence on many occasions. For example, there were a series of protests in the Beni region of the DRC in late 2019 in response to the lack of peacekeeper protection from rebels; one attack resulted in the deaths of 19 civilians and "dozens" more had been killed by the rebels since the fall – despite the presence of military peacekeepers in the area (al Jazeera 2019).

This is not a problem that is isolated to these examples. The UN Office of Internal

Oversight documented "a persistent pattern of peacekeeping operations not intervening with force when civilians are under attack," citing an 80% rate of non-response to incidents involving violence against civilians between 2010 to 2013 (United Nations General Assembly 2014, p.1). Although this varied by mission, the intervention rate sank as low as 10% for the operation in South Sudan, UNMISS (United Nations General Assembly 2014). Moreover, even when peacekeepers did respond, shows of force to deter or halt the violence were noted as "rare" (United Nations General Assembly 2014, p. 11). Such hesitance by peacekeepers to respond to violence at all could drive many of the null findings reported in these results. Deployment itself could prompt a spillover of violence away from where the UN itself is located, followed by a general lull if peacekeepers are not willing to leave base to act on their PoC mandate.

Third, specifically considering the results from the matched sample on military peacekeepers at static operating bases, it could be the case that government forces have decreasing incentives to engage in violence against civilians where peacekeepers are deployed. Previous work has shown that government actors engage in violence against civilians in order to remove threats and to consolidate control over territory (Sullivan 2012, Wimmer and Miner 2020). Chapter 3 demonstrated that peacekeepers are likely to deploy to the locations where government actors have some, but not full, territorial control. Perhaps the supplementary military benefits of these bases that can further consolidate territory also remove a need for government actors to engage in such violence. As peacekeepers remain in place and government territorial control increases, the need to use violence to establish control decreases – the peacekeepers perhaps provide the outcome that violence would otherwise contribute to. Because peacekeepers at these bases deploy to where government actors have control, rebel violence is less likely to occur.

Future work should further work to pinpoint the precise mechanism driving the results found here. The results presented here are a first test of the subnational effect of the varying types of bases on violence against civilians. As such, the design is broad. However,

understanding this relationship is crucial as peacekeepers are often explicitly deployed to protect civilians. Overall, these multiple theoretical paths highlight that future work should continue to explore the relationship between peacekeepers and violence against civilians. Moreover, because the results here run counter to the findings by other works[14] more work needs to be done to more precisely model this relationship.

In particular, qualitative work would complement these quantitative studies to provide insights on what the best timeline of effectiveness should be studied; should we expect peacekeepers to reduce violence within the first month or two of deployment, as was the case in this dissertation and in Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019), or within a year of deployment, as is studied in Phayal and Prins (2020)? This chapter focused on the immediate deployment, as this is often the stated goal of the United Nations, but would peacekeepers deployed in the field agree with this? Likewise, do peacekeepers agree with the assessment made by the Office of Internal Oversight? In what settings do they choose to respond to violence and engage with actors engaging in violence? Using this information, future scholars can hone in on the sample and settings in which there might be different outcomes in peacekeeper effectiveness.

Moreover, as scholars continue to produce theoretically grounded work about what drives peacekeeper deployment at the subnational level, future work will be better able to account for the selection effects. Likewise, developing increasingly precise identification strategies will alleviate concerns about selection driven by unobservables or not easily measured concepts. This dissertation yielded important insights about what factors drive subnational deployment patterns, but there is still much work to be done.

[14] Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019) find that peacekeepers are associated with a reduction in violence by rebel actors; Phayal and Prins (2020) find that peacekeepers are associated with a reduction in the yearly amount of government and rebel perpetrated violence; but, in areas that have not recently experienced a clash, peacekeepers are not effective at reducing government violence.

5.6 Conclusion

The analysis presented in Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated that peacekeeper deployments were partial to the locations where they could best support the host government, based on the military benefits those bases provide. However, they did not reveal whether or not peacekeepers altered their protective capabilities once deployed to those locations. This chapter has addressed peacekeeper protective capabilities after deployment, under the expectation that consent *does* influence peacekeeper behavior.

In sum, this chapter has presented a variety of results that demonstrate the relationship between peacekeepers and violence against civilians. The results were largely null, although the results using the matched sample indicated perhaps that initially static operating base deployment could limit government violence. Overall, though, these results show that the field's current understanding of peacekeepers as effective in halting subnational violence against civilians is perhaps more nuanced and more difficult to model than previously understood. In particular, the selection effects driving where peacekeepers do and do not deploy are crucial to overcome in definitely determining this relationship. While other work, such as Phayal and Prins (2020) and Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019) has shown some ability of peacekeepers to limit one-sided violence, these works have not accounted for a key predictor of both peacekeeper deployment and violence: trends and patterns of territorial control at the subnational level. Moreover, the literature in predicting subnational deployment is still nascent, and future scholars should work to theorize on additional factors driving peacekeeper locations in order to improve on this dissertation and other work that uses observables to predict the relationship between peacekeepers and violence.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

6.1 Overview of the Argument

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations are typically understood as unbiased, third party interventions in conflict. Indeed, impartiality is one of the key principles of peacekeeping operations. Impartiality is important in that it is one mechanism through which peacekeepers are able to ensure lasting peace: the ability to credibly guarantee peace agreements is what allows combatants to lay down their weapons (Walter 1997). If peacekeepers are perceived as impartial actors, then combatants are confident that deviations from ceasefires and peace agreements will be punished. Likewise, impartiality is crucial in peacekeeping operations in which there is still active conflict, as impartiality is crucial to eliciting cooperation from non-state actors and civilians (Rhoads 2016, Pouligny 2006).

Despite this goal of impartiality, there is often a state-centric bias that exists in such operations. For example, the UN peacekeeping operation in the Democratic of the Congo, MONUSCO, features a mandate that as of 2018 calls on the mission to contribute to the "consolidation of State authority," to "assist in restoration of State authority," and to reduc[e] the threat posed by armed groups to State authority" (United Nations Security Council 2018). This language is notable given both the ongoing civil conflict raging within the

country and accounts of large-scale violence against civilians by the Congolese government (Human Rights Watch 2018). MONUSCO is not unique in this respect; multiple missions have mandates to extend state authority, and others mandates have included languages that allow for the "neutralization" of armed groups or allow peacekeepers to take "active steps to prevent the return of armed elements" (United Nations Security Council 2013, 2017*b*).

As UN missions increasingly deploy to ongoing conflicts, the principle of impartiality conflicts with another principle of peacekeeping: maintaining the consent of the conflict actors. The UN requires the consent of states before deploying within their sovereign territory. As a state-centric institution, the UN has committed to norms of state sovereignty. In practice, this means that not all consent is respected equally: the consent of the host government is prioritized over that of non-state actors. The state-centric focus of the UN, coupled with the need for consent, gives host governments influence over a peacekeeping operation. This influence, however, is not extended to rebels.

The potential for host governments to exert influence over a peacekeeping mission has largely gone understudied by the political science literature; moreover, much of the literature treats peacekeepers as unbiased actors driven by humanitarian concerns. For example, there is evidence that peacekeepers deploy to the "difficult" cases that experience high levels of violence (Fortna 2004). Likewise, a key takeaway from this literature is that peacekeepers deploy to the "frontlines" of conflict, albeit with a significant delay after the violence has occurred (Costalli 2014, Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2016, Fortna 2008). This suggests that the locations of peacekeeper deployment enable, as intended by the United Nations, implementation of their mandate in a way that impartially reflects the conflict conditions on the ground.

However, this potential for influence intuitively makes sense. In addition to the *ability* of such governments to use the power of consent, host governments have the *incentive* to exert influence. Host governments have the potential to benefit greatly from the presence of a peacekeeping operation. Peacekeeping operations have been found to boost the economies

of the countries in which they deploy to (Carnahan, Durch and Gilmore 2006, Beber et al. 2019), as well as provide tangible benefits such as infrastructure improvement, water aid, and more (Rhoads 2016). Moreover, this dissertation argues that peacekeepers provide a host of military benefits. These are especially valuable given that peacekeepers are increasingly deploying to active, protracted and complex conflicts. Given the benefits associated with a peacekeeping operation, a host government should want to maximize its gains.

This dissertation explored how host governments influence the subnational location of peacekeepers. Due to an operation's crucial need to maintain governmental consent, host governments have the ability to influence the subnational location of peacekeepers. Moreover, the military benefits that peacekeepers offer provide an incentive to influence deployments such that their locations are in line with the government's conflict preferences. Peacekeepers can raise the costs of renewed fighting (Fortna 2004), can limit the geographic spread of combatants (Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015) and can use force against combatants in limited settings. Governments have the ability to bias peacekeeper locations in an attempt to undermine non-state actors' military gains and to consolidate their own military gains.

Not all peacekeepers can provide military benefits, however. There is a variety of different subnational peacekeeping deployments. These differing bases house different types of peacekeepers, implement varying parts of a mission's mandate, and signal distinct information to combatants. To test this theory, this dissertation explored the various types of peacekeeping deployments that provide different military benefits to the government. The main two types of peacekeeping bases are temporary operating bases, or TOBs, and static operating bases. Because of their mobile nature and smaller size, TOBs are most likely to be used for military engagement in active clashes by peacekeepers; static operating bases are instead slow moving, larger, and more likely to be deployed where there is more extant stability and no active fighting. Due to these differences, TOBs should be used as back-up to active fighting, and static operating bases can be used to consolidate territorial gains.

Using an original dataset of UN static operating bases and temporary operating base

deployments in African peacekeeping operations from 2000-2015, this dissertation tested for government influence over military peacekeeping deployment. This is the first project of its kind to study TOB deployments; all other work on subnational peacekeeper location has studied the locations of larger headquarters and company operating bases, referred to here under the umbrella term of static operating bases.[1] Moreover, this is the first project to explore how subnational conflict dynamics drive both static and temporary operating base deployments.

If it is the case that governments can influence base deployment patterns, we should see them deploying to where their various benefits can be maximized by those governments. Specifically, this dissertation argued that if this is the case, then TOBs should be more likely to deploy to locations where the government is performing poorly in battle; that is, where the government has suffered battle deaths relative to the rebels or where it has lost territory. Likewise, static operating bases should deploy to the areas where the government has some territorial control, but not where rebels have some control or where either actor has full control. In short, subnational peacekeeper locations should be biased in favor of the government's military benefit, rather than that of the non-state actor. Additionally, these bases should go where their military benefits can maximize the return to the government. Moreover, because of the need to consent, peacekeepers should be not willing to use force against the host government; nor should the host government take the threat of the use of that force as credible. In turn, peacekeepers should not affect government patterns of violence against civilians.

Several findings emerged in support of this theory. Military peacekeepers at static operating bases deploy to the areas where the government has recently recaptured territory and where they have held control for less than two years – that is, where they have some control. Yet these peacekeepers avoid the areas where the government has full control and where the

[1]Note that peacekeeper location here is studied by capturing base locations. While peacekeepers can move off-base to implement patrols, deliver goods, and more, they will do so in the immediate vicinity of their base.

rebels have recently recaptured territory. Likewise, TOBs deploy to the locations where the government is experiencing more battle deaths relative to the rebels. Likewise, TOBs are significantly more likely to deploy to the locations where rebels recently captured territory in battle; these trends do not hold for the locations where the government regained territory. Strikingly, however, the results on peacekeeper effectiveness were mixed: in an unmatched sample, peacekeepers were not found to be associated with a reduction in civilian killings by *any* actor type. While the matched sample demonstrated that there may be a short-term reduction in government violence against civilians where static operating bases deploy, it does not hold beyond the initial period of deployment. However, there is still much to learn about this process, and the nuances of the dynamics between peacekeepers and host governments. As subnational data on conflict continues to become more precise and describe more events, scholars should continue to test how battle events and territorial control influence where peacekeepers deploy at a subnational level, as well as peacekeepers' protective abilities.

6.2 Consent and International Relations

The need for host government consent in UN peacekeeping operations is not likely to be relaxed in future missions. Moreover, the UN is increasingly deploying to active civil conflicts that host a number of non-state actors. Additionally, as the protection of civilians mandate becomes a centerpiece of UN missions, peacekeepers are likely to face an expansion in their ability to utilize force to carry this mandate out – and an expansion in the military tools and technology peacekeepers can use to do so. Taken together, this means that the fundamental dynamics described in this dissertation are likely to be of increased relevance.

Moreover, the need for host government consent is not a dynamic that is unique to UN peacekeeping. Much of the IR literature explores topics that fundamentally rely on host government consent. The implications of this dissertation – that consent introduces the potential for bias in line with the host government's preferences – can be seen as affecting a

number of other international interventions and processes. The vast majority of third party interventions carried out by the international community rely on host government consent and thus risk inefficiency, government manipulation, or reduced effectiveness. Scholars of these interventions should consider carefully the role that host governments play in determining studied observable outcomes.

Consider the first key outcome explored in this dissertation - *where* within a country such interventions are deployed. The ability for host governments to select where interventions operate in their territory affects much more than UN peacekeeping.

Take the variety of intergovernmental organizations that engage in peacekeeping operations; for most, consent is a necessary condition of deployment. The African Union, another key actor that deploys peacekeepers, in effect exclusively operates with the consent of the host government. Even though its Constitutive Act allows for nonconsensual intervention after mass atrocity crimes, this has yet to be invoked – despite credible arguments that such crimes have occurred (De Coning 2017). Likewise, the peacekeeping operations of the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) have been deployed with host government consent (De Wet 2014). These missions all face similar barriers that UN peacekeeping operations face: host governments have the ability and incentive to ensure that these missions operate in a manner that is in line with its preferences. The parallel of this dissertation – that host governments can influence where such peacekeepers deploy, and perhaps how they operate once in those locations – is likely to also be a direct concern in peacekeeping missions run by other organizations as well. Thus, peacekeepers from other organizations are likely to also deploy along similar patterns, based on the various benefits they can offer to a host government.

This selective deployment of intervention to the areas where a host government can maximize its gain is not isolated to peacekeeping. Indeed, deployments of humanitarian aid or statebuilding efforts are at a similar risk. In their study of the role of host government consent and statebuilding efforts, Campbell and Matanock (n.d.) argue that consent opens up

the ability for host governments to influence where international organizations are able to implement statebuilding services (p. 16). Similarly, accounts of food relief and other humanitarian aid in South Sudan has demonstrated that the host state can leverage its authority to direct where such goods go. In the midst of a UN declared famine, the government of South Sudan was accused of deploying aid into areas with populations that largely support the regime; more troubling, this was taken as a direct attempt to not only reward its supports, but to also "[restrict] assistance to starve those it perceived as its enemies" (*Washington Post* 2017).

Third party election monitors are also at risk of host government intervention and manipulation. This theory would suggest that while election monitors may seek to implement their own strategy of which sites to monitor, host government consent may play a role in which sites are ultimately monitored. When election monitors are from a third party organization, the host government is able to use its ability to threaten to expel monitors to block observer access. In some settings, this may mean that monitors are likely to avoid locations where the host government is engaging in fraudulent behavior.

Or, consider nuclear inspections. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the international organization that inspects nuclear facilities, and recent examples have highlighted that host governments are similarly able to block where IAEA inspectors deploy. Inspectors have been prevented from accessing nuclear facilities by the governments hosting them; likewise, host governments have limited which actors are able to act as inspectors (BBC News 2019, Wall Street Journal 2020). Due to weak non-compliance punishments, as well as an incentive to maintain long-term cooperation, host governments have an ability to influence where inspectors deploy within a country and what those inspectors see; this in turn, has implications for the ability of the international community to have complete information on the nuclear activities of the inspected.

The theory outlined in this dissertation also implies that the need to maintain long-term host government consent may introduce incentives for the interventer to ignore or downplay

abuses, non-compliance, or bad behavior, in order to remain operational.

Consider again the example of international election monitoring operations. Some monitors have been accused of minimizing the degree to which elections are unfree and unfair due to the political pressure they face. Such monitors require the consent of the host government to continually operate; criticism or reporting of wrongdoing during elections not only risks the monitors' ability to operate during the present and future elections, but also risks undermining the legitimacy of the regime. Observers may be motivated to underplay the true degree to which elections are unfair due to concerns of regional instability and internal conflict stemming from their reports of fraud or misconduct (Brown 2001). Moreover, at least one monitor in Kenya highlighted the financial incentives to behave in such a manner, after having been told to "tone down the statements...on how the elections were not free and fair, so that [the aid agency] would not have its funding reduced," jeopardizing its "good programs with NGOs"(Brown 2011, 525-526).

Finally, this dissertation joins other work in highlighting that consent can be used to shape the rules and outcomes of international processes. When intergovernmental organizations and bodies require state consent, that consent can be used to shape processes to their own benefit. In particular, leaders have an incentive to manipulate institutional constraints that hinge on their consent in order to protect themselves or their supporters from potential punishments imposed by that institution. For example, Hashimoto (2020), demonstrates that leaders consent to international processes when they are able to use institutional constraint in their favor; this work shows that a factor motivating autocratic leaders consent to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, despite potential costs, is that the institutional ability to obstruct evidence against themselves and their allies.

This is true of statebuilding interventions as well. As Campbell and Matanock (n.d.) point out, because statebuilding efforts rely on host government consent, these host governments can manipulate institutional rules to benefit themselves. For example, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was an investigative and

prosecutorial body established the by the UN and the Guatemalan government; because its authority was tied to the Guatemalan government, CICIG's ability to act independently and to fully carry out its mandate was limited. For example, the government "maintained the authority to sign off on the cases in which CICIG could involve itself," at times blocking certain cases that CICIG sought to hear (Campbell and Matanock n.d., p. 31).

In sum, the need for host government consent plays a key role in the composition, distribution, and effectiveness of the international interventions and organizations that require it. In particular, this dissertation argues that consent means that host governments can influence where benefits are targeted. It argues that when consent is not guaranteed, fragile, and necessary for a long-term relationship between the intervener and the host government, that interveners have incentives to minimize punishment to host governments to remain operational. Finally, it argues that host governments are able to use consent to shape institutional rules and processes to protect themselves from punishment.

6.3 Contributions and Next Steps

This dissertation has made several contributions. First, it outlined a novel theory about the role of host government consent in influencing where peacekeepers deploy at the subnational level. While there is a growing literature on the subnational effects of peacekeeping operations, little is known about the political dynamics that influence where peacekeepers go within a country. This paper identifies an actor that plays a crucial role in the development and effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation - the host government. It is the first project to offer a theory that explores the preferences and power of the host government in affecting peacekeeping operations. Without understanding the role of the host government in peacekeeping operations, we cannot fully understand or assess peacekeeper effectiveness. As peacekeeping operations are increasingly relied upon in the 21st century (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2019*a*), it is important to ensure that the academic

and policy worlds have a full understanding of all of the "veto players" that have the ability to shape what such operations look like, where they operate, and what they can do.

Second, this dissertation highlighted that there are multiple types of subnational peacekeeper deployments. Despite the variation that exists, most scholars assume uniform effects across subnational deployment type. By outlining the key differences between those base types, exploring their respective military benefits, and demonstrating differences in the factors that predict their deployment, this project has outlined that base type matters and should be considered when studying peacekeeping effects.

Third and finally, this dissertation introduced data on those base types – in particular, this dissertation is the first source of any data on UN temporary operating base deployments. Studying temporary operating bases is useful for future scholars for a number of reasons. These deployments are far more mobile than most static operating bases. They are more responsive to ongoing violence, and provide for a better sense of how peacekeepers interact with the changing dynamics of conflict. As many scholars are interested in the conflict-reducing role of peacekeepers, (for example, but not limited to Di Salvatore 2019, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2019, Bara 2020) studying the type of deployment that is most responsive to the outcome of interest will contribute to a more precise study of peacekeeping operations. Likewise, as peacekeepers are increasingly deploying to active and violent conflicts, these bases are likely to an important feature of modern missions. While there are fewer TOBs deployed in the lifespan of a conflict, the precision gained from a more accurate measurement of concept is a crucial benefit to both the study of peacekeeping and conflict dynamics in general.

However, there is still much to be done to explore the role of host governments in UN peacekeeping operations. One area to explore is the interplay between peacekeepers on the ground, UN headquarters, and the host government. There are a variety of peacekeeper types deployed on the ground, from rank and file troops of varying national origins to force commanders of the entire mission. These peacekeepers have varying access to and relation-

ships with the host government. How do these actors interact? How do peacekeepers of varying types manage host government consent? When and why is there variation in what peacekeeper activities and behaviors are taken as too costly to a host government? In particular, these questions are ripe for a qualitative exploration of the relationship between a UN peacekeeping operation and the government that hosts it.

Other avenues to expand on are to continue to draw out the theoretical implications of this dissertation. The relationship between a host government and a United Nations peacekeeping operation is not static; what factors produce such shifts? Future work could explore when and why host governments are most likely to leverage the institutional requirement of consent to reduce UN peacekeeper effectiveness in protecting civilians from government violence. For example, when domestic political concerns are especially salient and opportunities to consolidate power are present, governments may face additional incentives to restrict consent and engage in violence against civilians. These are also likely to be periods in which peacekeepers are particularly motivated to maintain consent. Combined, the government has stronger incentives to ensure that peacekeepers cannot protect civilians *and* peacekeepers have stronger incentives to avoid using force against the host government. Knowing when this dynamic is particularly salient is crucial, as this is when the protection of civilians is least likely to be upheld. Indeed, periods wherein the host government faces pressure to consolidate its power and that are of importance to the peacekeeping operation are likely to exacerbate these tensions. Elections and peace agreement negotiation or implementation periods are likely to meet these criteria.

Finally, future work should expand on this theory to explore if peacekeepers can overcome the challenges of consent as it relates to the protection of civilians? Perhaps the composition of a peacekeeping operation leads to variation in the ability of peacekeepers to protect civilians. Peacekeepers' credibility to use force—and host government willingness to revoke or restrict consent—likely varies based on the identity of the peacekeeper. Peacekeepers come from a variety of troop-contributing countries (TCCs); relationships between the host

government and TCCs—as well as the relative sticks and carrots that can be leveraged by a given TCC—vary. The national identity of unit leaders within peacekeeping operations is one source of relational variation with the host government that could alter subnational effectiveness. These relational ties might enhance or alleviate the problem of consent, and in turn alters peacekeepers' ability to protect civilians.

Appendix A

Appendix to Chapter 3

A.1 Example of Grid Cells and Rook Neighbor Construction



Figure A.1: Example of Mali reconstructed as a number of grid-cells of equal size; the red grid-cell has two rook neighbors, shown in blue.

A.2 Alternative Outcome Specifications

	Dependent variable:	
	Mil. Personnel (High)	Mil Personnel (Low)
	(1)	(2)
Govt Territory (3)	46.900	
	(30.300)	
Reb Territory (3)	49.800	
	(58.400)	
Govt HQ (3)	-126.000***	
	(39.300)	
Reb HQ (3)	406.000	
	(295.000)	
Govt Territory (6)		30.800**
		(14.500)
Reb Territory (6)		16.900
		(19.700)
Govt HQ (6)		-29.600**
		(12.600)
Reb HQ (6)		57.400
		(98.100)
Mnt. Terrain	12.000***	4.230***
	(3.120)	(1.310)
Logged Population	8.830***	3.700***
	(0.469)	(0.195)
Travel Time to City	0.011***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Excluded Groups	-1.020***	-0.385***
	(0.336)	(0.140)
OSV Decay	203.000***	86.400***
	(14.300)	(6.150)
Base Decay	469.000***	207.000***
	(9.160)	(3.910)
Base Spatial Lag	19.700***	7.880***
	(2.070)	(0.893)
Observations	148,970	145,489
R^2	0.286	0.300
Adjusted R^2	0.286	0.300
Residual Std. Error	165.000	69.300
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.1: IV: Territory Seizure and HQ Establishment; DV: N. Mil Personnel

	Dependent Variable:	
	Mil. Personnel (High)	Mil Personnel (Low)
	(1)	(2)
Some Govt Control	122.323***	49.765***
	(22.375)	(9.026)
Full Govt Control	145.066	60.401
	(78.322)	(32.787)
Some Reb Control	−23.810	−10.360
	(17.611)	(7.400)
Full Reb Control	0.835	0.415
	(7.055)	(2.586)
Mnt. Terrain	3.006	0.386
	(15.830)	(6.854)
Logged Population	7.287	2.994*
	(4.071)	(1.791)
Travel Time to City	0.010*	0.004*
	(0.005)	(0.002)
Excluded Groups	−0.966	−0.426
	(1.353)	(0.514)
OSV Decay	164.252*	68.865*
	(87.088)	(37.003)
Base Decay	456.993***	202.717***
	(53.491)	(22.415)
Base Spatial Lag	18.093***	7.347***
	(4.048)	(1.821)
Observations	150,646	150,646
R^2	0.297	0.313
Adjusted R^2	0.297	0.313
Residual Std. Error	163.717	68.310
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.2: IV: Some/Full Measured By Duration of Territorial Control; DV: N. Mil Personnel

	Dependent Variable:	
	N. Mil Unit	
	(1)	(2)
Govt Territory (3)	0.052	
	(0.077)	
Reb Territory (3)	-0.099*	
	(0.052)	
Govt HQ (3)	-0.374**	
	(0.147)	
Reb HQ (3)	0.822	
	(0.883)	
Govt Territory (6)		0.189*
		(0.105)
Reb Territory (6)		-0.127***
		(0.049)
Govt HQ (6)		-0.170*
		(0.096)
Reb HQ (6)		0.012
		(0.719)
Mnt. Terrain	-0.025***	-0.027***
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Logged Population	0.025***	0.025***
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Travel Time to City	0.00003***	0.00003***
	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Excluded Groups	-0.004***	-0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
OSV Decay	0.586***	0.591***
	(0.047)	(0.048)
Base Decay	1.937***	1.939***
	(0.032)	(0.032)
Base Spatial Lag	0.045***	0.043***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Observations	148,970	145,489
R^2	0.346	0.346
Adjusted R^2	0.346	0.346
Residual Std. Error	0.547	0.552
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table A.3: Removing HQ Units From Total Number of Military Units, IV #1

	Dependent variable:
	N_Military_Unit
Some Govt Control	0.223^{***}
	(0.085)
Full Govt Control	0.394
	(0.239)
Some Reb Control	-0.192^{***}
	(0.071)
Full Reb Control	0.021
	(0.016)
Mnt. Terrain	-0.046
	(0.065)
Logged Population	0.020
	(0.016)
Travel Time to City	0.00003
	(0.00002)
Excluded Groups	-0.004
	(0.002)
OSV Decay	0.494^{*}
	(0.289)
Base Decay	1.908^{***}
	(0.288)
Base Spatial Lag	0.043^{***}
	(0.009)
Observations	150,646
R^2	0.354
Adjusted R^2	0.354
Residual Std. Error	0.542
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.4: Dropping Military HQ From Military Units, IV # 2

A.3 Additional Controls

	Dependent variable:	
	N Units	
	(1)	(2)
Govt Territory (3)	0.038	
	(0.102)	
Reb Territory (3)	-0.104*	
	(0.057)	
Govt HQ (3)	-0.470**	
	(0.203)	
Reb HQ (3)	0.963	
	(1.020)	
Armed Clash (3)	0.035	
	(0.028)	
Govt Territory (6)		0.132
		(0.112)
Reb Territory (6)		-0.153***
		(0.054)
Govt HQ (6)		-0.183*
		(0.109)
Reb HQ (6)		0.067
		(0.820)
Armed Clash 6		0.115***
		(0.044)
Mnt. Terrain	-0.037***	-0.041***
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Logged Population	0.031***	0.031***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Travel Time to City	0.00004***	0.00004***
	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Excluded Groups	-0.004***	-0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
OSV Decay	0.681***	0.663***
	(0.054)	(0.056)
Base Decay	2.190***	2.190***
	(0.037)	(0.038)
Base Spatial Lag	0.047***	0.044***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Observations	148,970	145,489
R^2	0.332	0.333
Adjusted R^2	0.332	0.333
Residual Std. Error	0.638	0.643
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table A.5: Chapter 3, IV # 1 with Armed Clash as a Control

	Dependent variable:
	N. Units (Mil)
Some Govt Control	0.208*
	(0.111)
Full Govt Control	0.429
	(0.271)
Some Reb Control	-0.211***
	(0.071)
Full Reb Control	0.023
	(0.028)
Past Armed Clash	0.113*
	(0.054)
Mnt. Terrain	-0.064
	(0.076)
Logged Population	0.026
	(0.020)
Travel Time to City	0.00003*
	(0.00002)
Excluded Groups	-0.003
	(0.004)
OSV Decay	0.573
	(0.354)
Base Decay	2.162***
	(0.335)
Base Spatial Lag	0.043***
	(0.009)
Observations	145,489
R^2	0.340
Adjusted R^2	0.340
Residual Std. Error	0.640

Note: FELM; Country, Year FE. Robust SE. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.6: Chapter 3, IV # 2 With Armed Clash as Control

Appendix B

Appendix to Chapter 4

B.1 Example of TOB Language in Secretary General Reports

> 31. The security situation in Katanga province remained fragile. Attacks and exactions by Mayi-Mayi Kata-Katanga in Mitwaba territory resulted in the displacement of an estimated 50,978 persons. From 15 to 18 July, MONUSCO fielded a mission to Mitwaba to ascertain the veracity of the reported intention of the group's leader, Gédéon Kyunguto, to surrender. MONUSCO started deploying a temporary operating base in Mitwaba to facilitate his surrender as well as the creation of an island of stability in the locality. Contrary to his intention to surrender, Gédéon Kyunguto set up headquarters in the caves of Kibawa in western Moba territory, from which he started recruiting and training local youth. On 17 August, the headquarters was overrun by FARDC.

The above paragraph describes the presence of a TOB deployed in the UN operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) in Mitwaba, a city in Katanga province in September of 2014. This paragraph is from UN document. S/2014/698.

B.2 Alt. Specification of IV - Raw Number Battle Deaths

	Dependent Variable:	
	TOB Deployment	TOB Deployment$_{t+1}$
	(1)	(2)
Rebel Battle Deaths	0.20	0.024*
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Govt Battle Deaths	0.031**	0.074**
	(0.012)	(0.030)
Civilian Deaths	0.017***	0.022***
	(0.004)	(0.003)
Mountainous Terrain	0.383	0.381
	(0.282)	(0.295)
Time to Nearest City	−0.002***	−0.002***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Urban Coverage	0.456***	0.469***
	(0.194)	(0.197)
Population (Logged)	0.063	0.067
	(0.066)	(0.067)
Distance to Capital	1.7199***	1.784***
	(0.169)	(0.0001)
Spatial Lag (TOB)	1.204***	0.445**
	(0.169)	(0.209)
Spatial Lag (SOB)	0.508***	0.349**
	(0.169)	(0.209)
Decay (SOB)	2.877***	2.847***
	(0.173)	(0.176)
Constant	−16.200***	−16.270***
	(1.352)	(1.375))
Controls	✓	✓
Country FE?	✓	✓
N. Observations	175,550	175, 534
AIC	3941.4	3972.9

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.1: Raw N. Battle Deaths as TOB Deployment Predictor, Full Controls

B.3 OLS Models

	Dependent variable:		
	(TOB)	(TOB_t+1)	(TOB_t+2)
NSA Deaths	0.001	−0.0001	−0.00002
	(0.001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Govt Deaths	0.0003	0.0004*	0.0001
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)
Civilian Deaths	0.0004**	0.001***	0.0003*
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)
Mountain Terrain	0.010***	0.010***	0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Travel to Nearest City	−0.00000***	−0.00000***	−0.00000***
	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Urban Coverage	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Cap. Dist	0.00000***	0.00000***	0.00000***
	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Constant	0.001**	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Country FE?	✓	✓	✓
Robust SE?	✓	✓	✓
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.2: H2, Actor Battle Deaths, OLS

	Dependent variable:		
	(TOB_t)	(TOB_{t+1})	(TOB_{t+2})
Armed Clash (No Change in Territory)	0.013^{***}	0.008^{***}	0.007^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Govt Takes Territory	-0.004	0.004	0.018^{**}
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Rebel Takes Territory	-0.005	0.005	0.017^{*}
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Civilian Deaths	0.0002	0.0004^{**}	0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)
Mountainous Terrain	0.008^{***}	0.009^{***}	0.008^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Travel Time to Nearest City	-0.00000^{***}	-0.00000^{***}	-0.00000^{***}
	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Urban Coverage	0.001^{***}	0.001^{***}	0.001^{***}
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Distance to Capital	0.00000^{***}	0.00000^{***}	0.00000^{***}
	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Constant	0.001^{***}	0.001^{***}	0.001^{***}
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Country FE?	✓	✓	✓
Robust SE?	✓	✓	✓
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.3: H2, Territorial Gains, OLS

Appendix C

Appendix to Chapter 5

C.1 Correlation Matrix of Controls

	Mnt Terrain	Logged Dist to Cap.	Logged Pop	Decay OSV	Decay Base	S. Lag Base
min	0.00	1.64	4.74	0.00	0.00	0.00
max	1.00	7.56	14.52	0.84	0.84	1.00
mean	0.08	6.50	10.31	0.03	0.04	0.16
std.dev	0.20	0.74	1.35	0.13	0.16	0.37

Table C.1: Summary Stats, Geographical Variables and Past Base Exposure

C.2 Balance Of Matched Samples

Static Operating Base (Mil. Unit)	Armed Clash	Past Violence Against Civilians	Mnt. Terrain	Pop. (Logged)	Cap. Dist. (Logged)	S. Lag Base	Past Base	*Distance*	*Weights*
0	0.04	0.02	0.07	10.59	6.51	0.18	0.32	0.18	1.00
1	0.10	0.10	0.10	11.76	5.68	0.53	0.84	0.82	1.00

Table C.2: Balance, Static Operating Base

TOB	Armed Clash	Mnt. Terrain	Pop. (Logged)	Cap. Dist. (Logged)	S. Lag Base	Past Base	Past Violence Against Civilians	*distance*	*weights*
0	0.17	0.14	10.73	6.61	0.12	0.28	0.17	0.00	1.00
1	0.41	0.20	11.15	6.74	0.14	0.84	0.29	1.00	1.00

Table C.3: Balance, Temporary Operating Base

C.3 Robustness of Main Models in Chapter

C.3.1 Alternative Fixed Effects

	Dependent variable:				
	VAC Govt	VAC Reb	VAC Govt$_{t+1}$	VAC Reb$_{t+1}$	lead_vac_reb
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
N. Mil Units	0.001	-0.001	0.003*	0.003	
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.006)	
Govt Territory (3)	-0.004*	0.039***	-0.003***	0.024**	
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.009)	
Reb. Territory (3)	-0.004**	-0.012***	0.004**	-0.006**	
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	
Govt HQ (3)	-0.038***	0.032	-0.016***	-0.141***	
	(0.009)	(0.064)	(0.004)	(0.023)	
Lagged NSA BD (3)	-0.0002	-0.001	0.001***	-0.001**	
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	
Lagged Govt BD (3)	-0.0002	-0.0001	-0.0001	0.001	
	(0.0001)	(0.001)	(0.0001)	(0.001)	
Mnt. Terrain	-0.001	-0.014***	0.002***	-0.003	
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.0004)	(0.003)	
Dist. To Capital	-0.001*	-0.001	0.0001	0.003**	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.001)	
Logged Population	0.00001	-0.005***	0.001***	-0.003***	
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.0001)	(0.001)	
OSV Decay	0.087***	0.517***	0.030***	0.314***	
	(0.016)	(0.108)	(0.007)	(0.066)	
Base Decay	0.001	-0.002	0.005	0.017	
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.011)	
Base Spatial Lag	-0.001	0.002	-0.0002*	0.002	
	(0.0004)	(0.003)	(0.0001)	(0.002)	
Observations	181,478	181,478	181,456	181,456	
R^2	0.050	0.104	0.012	0.046	
Adjusted R^2	0.049	0.104	0.012	0.045	
Residual Std. Error	0.039	0.156	0.039	0.161	

Note: FELM with country, year FE; robust SE clustered at the country-level.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.4: Country, Year FE: SOB Models

C.3.2 Alternative IV Operationalization

C.3.3 Results with OSV Lags Instead of Decay Function

	Dependent variable:			
	VAC Govt	VAC Reb	VAC Govt$_{t+1}$	VAC Reb$_{t+1}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
TOB	0.002	0.056	0.022	0.057
	(0.006)	(0.057)	(0.014)	(0.046)
Govt Territory (1)	0.002	0.015**	0.002	-0.006
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Reb. Territory (1)	0.002	0.022	0.007	0.012
	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Lagged NSA BD (1)	-0.0004***	-0.002**	-0.0002***	-0.0005
	(0.0001)	(0.001)	(0.0001)	(0.0005)
Lagged Govt BD (1)	0.001	0.002	-0.00002	-0.00002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0001)	(0.0005)
Mnt. Terrain	-0.001	-0.015***	0.002***	-0.004
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.0003)	(0.002)
Dist. To Capital	-0.001**	0.00004	-0.0001	0.004**
	(0.0005)	(0.002)	(0.0004)	(0.002)
Logged Population	-0.00001	-0.005***	0.001***	-0.002**
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.0001)	(0.001)
OSV Decay	0.087***	0.506***	0.031***	0.307***
	(0.017)	(0.106)	(0.009)	(0.066)
Base Decay	0.002	-0.005	0.009***	0.021*
	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.012)
Base Spatial Lag	-0.001	0.002	-0.0003**	0.002
	(0.0004)	(0.002)	(0.0001)	(0.002)
Observations	183,269	183,269	183,247	183,247
R^2	0.050	0.107	0.012	0.049
Adjusted R^2	0.050	0.107	0.012	0.049
Residual Std. Error	0.038	0.155	0.039	0.160

Note:FELM; country and year FE;
robust SE clustered at the country level

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.5: Country, Year FE: TOB Models

	Dependent variable:			
	VAC Govt	VAC Reb	VAC Govt$_{t+1}$	VAC Reb$_{t+1}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Logged N. Troops	-0.001	0.004	0.001	0.006
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Govt Territory (3)	-0.006	0.032	-0.006***	0.025
	(0.004)	(0.039)	(0.002)	(0.019)
Reb. Territory (3)	-0.004	-0.018	0.0002	-0.015
	(0.003)	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Govt HQ (3)	-0.031**	0.047	-0.008*	-0.119*
	(0.015)	(0.137)	(0.005)	(0.067)
Lagged Reb BD (3)	-0.0002	-0.0002	0.001	-0.001*
	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Lagged Govt BD (3)	-0.0001	-0.0003	-0.0001	0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0003)	(0.00005)	(0.0002)
Dist. To Capital	0.001	0.011*	0.002	0.015**
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Logged Population	0.009	0.042	0.006	0.014
	(0.012)	(0.047)	(0.013)	(0.046)
OSV Decay	0.095***	0.526***	0.014***	0.228***
	(0.010)	(0.058)	(0.005)	(0.049)
Base Decay	-0.0002	0.009	-0.003	0.008
	(0.003)	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.017)
Base Spatial Lag	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Observations	187,641	187,641	187,621	187,621
R^2	0.071	0.158	0.035	0.106
Adjusted R^2	0.060	0.148	0.024	0.096
Residual Std. Error	0.039	0.152	0.040	0.157

Note:FELM, Grid, Year FE; Grid cluster SE. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.6: Logged Troops as IV

	Dependent variable:			
	VAC Govt	VAC Reb	VAC Govt$_{t+1}$	VAC Reb$_{t+1}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N. Troops (High Estimate)	0.00001	0.00003	0.00001	0.00002
	(0.00000)	(0.00002)	(0.00001)	(0.00002)
Govt Territory (3)	-0.006	0.032	-0.006***	0.025
	(0.004)	(0.039)	(0.002)	(0.019)
Reb. Territory (3)	-0.004	-0.018	-0.00005	-0.015
	(0.003)	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Govt HQ (3)	-0.031**	0.048	-0.006*	-0.120*
	(0.014)	(0.137)	(0.004)	(0.066)
Lagged Reb BD (3)	-0.0002	-0.0002	0.001	-0.001*
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Lagged Govt BD (3)	-0.0001	-0.0003	-0.0001	0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0003)	(0.00005)	(0.0002)
Logged Population	0.001	0.012*	0.002	0.015**
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.007)
OSV Decay	0.009	0.042	0.007	0.016
	(0.012)	(0.047)	(0.013)	(0.047)
Base Decay	0.095***	0.524***	0.013**	0.228***
	(0.010)	(0.058)	(0.005)	(0.049)
Base Spatial Lag	-0.004	0.017	-0.004	0.026
	(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.004)	(0.026)
SLagR_SOB	0.001	0.0004	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Observations	187,903	187,903	187,882	187,621
R^2	0.071	0.158	0.036	0.106
Adjusted R^2	0.060	0.148	0.025	0.096
Residual Std. Error	0.039	0.152	0.040	0.157

Note: FELM, Grid, Year FE; Grid cluster SE. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.7: Number of Troops (High Estimate) as IV

	Dependent variable:			
	VAC Govt	VAC Reb	VAC Govt$_{t+1}$	VAC Reb$_{t+1}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Low Estimate Mil PK	0.00002	0.00004	0.00004	0.00003
	(0.00001)	(0.0001)	(0.00002)	(0.0001)
Govt Territory (1)	-0.005	0.044	-0.006**	0.023
	(0.004)	(0.042)	(0.002)	(0.020)
Reb. Territory (1)	-0.004	-0.008	0.002	-0.010
	(0.003)	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.013)
Govt HQ (3)	-0.030**	0.049	-0.005*	-0.117*
	(0.014)	(0.137)	(0.003)	(0.066)
Lagged Reb BD (1)	-0.0002	-0.0002	0.001	-0.001
	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Lagged Govt BD (1)	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	0.0002
	(0.0001)	(0.0004)	(0.0001)	(0.0003)
Mnt. Terrain				
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Dist. To Capital	0.001	0.011*	0.001	0.013*
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Logged Population	0.012	0.058	0.009	0.036
	(0.012)	(0.047)	(0.013)	(0.046)
OSV Decay	0.094***	0.522***	0.011**	0.218***
	(0.010)	(0.060)	(0.005)	(0.050)
Base Decay	-0.005	0.022	-0.006	0.031
	(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.004)	(0.026)
Base Spatial Lag	0.001	0.001	0.0004	0.00001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	181,478	181,478	181,456	181,456
R^2	0.072	0.162	0.038	0.111
Adjusted R^2	0.060	0.152	0.026	0.101
Residual Std. Error	0.038	0.151	0.039	0.157

Note: FELM; grid, year FE. Robust SE clustered at the grid level. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.8: Number of Troops (Low Estimate) as IV

	Dependent variable:			
	VAC Govt	VAC Reb	VAC Govt$_{t+1}$	VAC Reb$_{t+1}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N. Mil Units	0.001	-0.0004	0.002	-0.003
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.007)
Govt Territory (3)	-0.002	0.050	-0.006**	0.019
	(0.004)	(0.038)	(0.003)	(0.024)
Reb. Territory (3)	-0.004	0.0001	-0.0004	-0.015
	(0.003)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.015)
Govt HQ (3)	-0.012	0.138	-0.015	-0.115
	(0.009)	(0.131)	(0.012)	(0.090)
Lagged Reb BD (3)	0.00002	0.001	0.001	-0.0002
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0002)
Lagged Govt BD (3)	-0.0001	-0.0002	-0.0001	0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0003)	(0.0001)	(0.0003)
Dist. To Capital	0.001	0.011	0.001	0.012
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.008)
Logged Population	0.009	0.033	0.007	0.021
	(0.013)	(0.043)	(0.013)	(0.041)
OSV Govt (3)	0.022	0.016	0.041**	0.025
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.037)
OSV Reb (3)	0.004	0.116***	0.003	0.113**
	(0.003)	(0.025)	(0.003)	(0.044)
Base Decay	-0.003	0.033	-0.003	0.039
	(0.004)	(0.027)	(0.004)	(0.026)
Base Spatial Lag	0.001	0.002	0.0004	-0.00001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Observations	181,775	181,775	181,752	181,456
R^2	0.037	0.110	0.038	0.111
Adjusted R^2	0.025	0.100	0.026	0.100
Residual Std. Error	0.039	0.156	0.039	0.157

Note: FELM, Grid, Year FE; Grid cluster SE. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.9: Use of Lag OSV, Instead of Decay of OSV

C.3.4 Additional Controls, SOB: Peace Agreement and Election Year

	Dependent variable:			
	VAC Govt	VAC Reb	VAC Govt$_{t+1}$	VAC Reb$_{t+1}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N. Mil Units	0.001	-0.001	0.002	-0.003
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.007)
Govt Territory (3)	-0.005	0.044	-0.006**	0.023
	(0.004)	(0.042)	(0.002)	(0.020)
Reb. Territory (3)	-0.004	-0.009	0.002	-0.011
	(0.003)	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.013)
Govt HQ (3)	-0.030**	0.047	-0.007	-0.120*
	(0.014)	(0.139)	(0.004)	(0.065)
Lagged Reb BD (3)	-0.0002	-0.0002	0.001	-0.001
	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Lagged Govt BD (3)	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	0.0002
	(0.0001)	(0.0004)	(0.0001)	(0.0003)
Dist. To Capital	0.001	0.012**	0.001	0.014**
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Logged Population	0.017	0.007	0.015	0.004
	(0.016)	(0.040)	(0.017)	(0.038)
OSV Decay	0.094***	0.523***	0.011**	0.219***
	(0.011)	(0.060)	(0.005)	(0.051)
Base Decay	-0.004	0.029	-0.003	0.039
	(0.004)	(0.025)	(0.005)	(0.027)
Base Spatial Lag	0.001	0.001	0.0004	0.0002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Election Year	0.0005	-0.005**	0.001	-0.003
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Peace Agreement	-0.001**	-0.0003	-0.0003	0.002
	(0.0004)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Observations	181,478	181,478	181,456	181,456
R^2	0.071	0.162	0.036	0.111
Adjusted R^2	0.060	0.152	0.025	0.101
Residual Std. Error	0.038	0.151	0.039	0.157

Note:FELM, Grid, Year FE; Grid cluster SE. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.10: Additional Controls: Peace Agreement and Election Year

	Dependent variable:			
	VAC Govt	VAC Reb	VAC Govt$_{t+1}$	VAC Reb$_{t+1}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
TOB	0.006	0.073	0.021	0.049
	(0.009)	(0.049)	(0.013)	(0.035)
Govt Territory (1)	0.002	0.018	0.0004	-0.009
	(0.008)	(0.033)	(0.004)	(0.012)
Reb. Territory (1)	0.001	0.027	0.005	0.011
	(0.008)	(0.073)	(0.009)	(0.034)
Lagged NSA BD (1)	-0.0004**	-0.001	-0.0003**	-0.0001
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.0001)	(0.001)
Lagged Govt BD (1)	0.001	0.002	-0.00002	-0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0001)	(0.0003)
Dist. To Capital	0.001	0.012**	0.002	0.014**
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.007)
Logged Population	0.016	0.009	0.016	0.009
	(0.015)	(0.040)	(0.017)	(0.039)
OSV Decay	0.093***	0.518***	0.011**	0.219***
	(0.010)	(0.060)	(0.005)	(0.050)
Base Decay	-0.003	0.027	-0.001	0.033
	(0.003)	(0.029)	(0.003)	(0.033)
Base Spatial Lag	0.001	0.001	0.0004	0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Peace Agreement	0.0004	-0.005**	0.001	-0.003
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Election Year	-0.001**	-0.0002	-0.0004	0.001
	(0.0004)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Observations	183,269	183,269	183,247	183,247
R^2	0.072	0.162	0.037	0.112
Adjusted R^2	0.061	0.152	0.026	0.101
Residual Std. Error	0.038	0.151	0.039	0.156

Note: FELM; grid, year FE; robust SE clustered at the grid.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.11: Additional Controls, TOB: Peace Agreement and Election Year

C.3.5 GED OSV as DV

	Dependent variable:	
	OSV Govt	OSV NSA
	(1)	(2)
N. Mil Units	-0.014	0.014
	(0.067)	(0.009)
Govt Territory (3)	0.437	-0.232
	(0.359)	(0.171)
Reb. Territory (3)	-0.289***	0.286
	(0.064)	(0.715)
Govt HQ (3)	0.196	-3.404
	(0.631)	(3.016)
Lagged Reb BD (3)	0.005	-0.003
	(0.011)	(0.003)
Lagged Govt BD (3)	0.021	0.0005
	(0.023)	(0.002)
Mnt. Terrain	0.020	0.005
	(0.021)	(0.006)
Dist. To Capital	0.920*	-0.258
	(0.518)	(0.252)
Logged Population	1.958***	-0.515
	(0.407)	(0.389)
OSV Decay	0.152	-0.217
	(0.150)	(0.174)
Base Decay	-0.034	-0.029
	(0.022)	(0.021)
Observations	181,775	181,775
R^2	0.025	0.017
Adjusted R^2	0.013	0.005
Residual Std. Error	2.279	3.169

Note: FELM; grid, year FE. Grid clustered SE. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.12: GED Counts of One Sided Violence (Ongoing) as DV

	Dependent variable:			
	Govt VAC (Dummy)	Reb VAC (Dummy)	Govt VAC (Dummy)$_{t+1}$	Reb VAC (Dummy)$_{t+1}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N. Mil. Units	-0.001	0.00003	-0.001	0.00002
	(0.001)	(0.0001)	(0.001)	(0.0001)
Govt Territory (1)	0.016	-0.001*	0.017	-0.001
	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.001)
Reb. Territory (1)	-0.004	0.009	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Govt HQ (3)	-0.026**	-0.009	-0.020**	-0.009
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Lagged NSA BD (1)	0.0003	-0.00001	0.00004	-0.00001
	(0.0005)	(0.00001)	(0.0004)	(0.00001)
Lagged Govt BD (1)	0.001	-0.00001	0.001	0.00001
	(0.001)	(0.00002)	(0.001)	(0.00001)
Mnt. Terrain	0.002**	0.00001	0.002***	-0.00001
	(0.001)	(0.00002)	(0.001)	(0.00002)
Dist. To Capital	0.030***	-0.001	0.025**	-0.003***
	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.001)
Logged Population	0.057***	-0.002	0.032***	-0.002
	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)
OSV Decay	0.003	-0.0002	0.004	-0.0001
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Base Decay	0.0003	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001
	(0.0004)	(0.0001)	(0.001)	(0.0001)
Observations	181,775	181,775	181,752	181,752
R^2	0.063	0.041	0.056	0.035
Adjusted R^2	0.052	0.030	0.044	0.024
Residual Std. Error	0.040	0.010	0.040	0.012

Note: FELM; Grid, year FE. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Robust SE clustered at the grid level.

Table C.13: GED Dummy, More Than 5 Counts of OSV

C.4 Replication of Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson 2019

This section replicates Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019). This is for two reasons. First, these authors also explore the subnational dynamics of peacekeeper protection of civilians with a mind to the role of consent in attenuating peacekeeper ability to halt government violence. The authors argue that military peacekeepers will lead to an overall reduction in one-sided violence and one-sided violence by rebels, but that increased peacekeeper troops will not effect on one-sided violence by government actors. Second, the results of this dissertation suggest that modeling the relationship between peacekeepers and violence against civilians may be fragile; as such, examining other work with a similar research design is important in examining that relationship.

Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019) also collected data on what this dissertation labels static operating bases; the two datasets correlate at about .7. Differences likely arise as a result of Fjelde et al. accessing maps that were not publicly available on the internet. Table C.14 reproduces their main findings, using their replication data.[1] These results indicate that in general, peacekeepers do not have a significant effect on one-sided violence by the state, but are associated with a decrease in one-sided violence by rebels. Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson utilize a binary indicator of whether or not at least five deaths occurred within a given grid-cell as the outcome variable.[2] The authors do so to provide a hard test of peacekeeper ability to protect civilians at low levels of violence. Their independent variable is the logged number per grid-cell.

However, after replicating their results, a probe into the their models reveals some sensitivity in their findings – excluding or altering the decay function modeling previous exposure to one-sided violence within a grid-cell instead reveals a positive and often statistically sig-

[1] The standard errors are slightly different, in part because the authors used Stata to generate their robust clustered standard errors, and this replication was produced in R. However, the results are consistent with Fjelde et al.'s, directionally and with respect to statistical significance. These results use a logit model with grid fixed effects.

[2] Both Fjelde et al. and these analyses used in this dissertation rely on PRIO grids at a 55 KM X 55 KM size.

	Dependent Variable:		
	OSV (All)	OSV (Reb)	OSV (G. and PGM)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Logged Sum Troops	−0.005	−0.024*	−0.012
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Pop. (Logged)	−0.007	−0.052	0.153
	(0.053)	(0.065)	(0.096)
Mnt. Terrain	1.162***	1.375***	0.431
	(0.188)	(0.232)	(0.384)
Time to City	−0.658***	−0.687***	−0.654***
	(0.123)	(0.149)	(0.212)
Lag. Battle Deaths	0.002	−0.001	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)
OSV Spatial Lag	1.349***	1.523***	0.751***
	(0.131)	(0.162)	(0.279)
Troops in Neighbor Cell	−0.007	−0.011*	−0.007
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)
OSV Decay Function	4.025***		
	(0.149)		
OSV Govt Decay Function		0.245	4.012***
		(0.257)	(0.290)
OSV Rebel Decay Function		4.335***	1.323***
		(0.184)	(0.361)
Constant	−3.211***	−2.972**	−5.740***
	(1.132)	(1.378)	(2.008)
Observations	217,202	217,202	217,202
Log Likelihood	−2,228.146	−1,585.794	−890.066
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,474.293	3,191.587	1,800.132

Note: Logit models with grid-cell FE. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.14: Fjelde, Hultman, Nilsson Replication

nificant relationship between peacekeeper deployment and one-sided violence. Appendix Table C.15 demonstrates that *without* the decay function, the coefficients on any one-sided violence, one-sided violence by the government, and one-sided violence by rebels all become statistically significant and positive, indicating that peacekeepers at a subnational level are associated with *increased* violence, rather than decreased.

	Dependent Variable:		
	OSV (All)	OSV (Reb)	OSV (G. and PGM)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Logged Sum Troops	0.033***	0.020*	0.035***
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Pop. (Logged)	0.029	−0.075	0.308***
	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.097)
Mnt. Terrain	1.813***	2.052***	1.496***
	(0.168)	(0.196)	(0.304)
Time to City	−0.903***	−0.911***	−0.730***
	(0.115)	(0.137)	(0.204)
Lag. Battle Deaths	0.006***	0.003	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Spatial Lag OSV	2.618***	2.967***	1.735***
	(0.117)	(0.136)	(0.232)
Troops in Neighbor	0.0004	−0.0001	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Constant	−1.953*	−1.298	−6.956***
	(1.063)	(1.248)	(1.962)
Observations	217,202	217,202	217,202
Log Likelihood	−2,550.050	−1,856.086	−991.184
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,116.101	3,728.171	1,998.368
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.15: Excluding the Decay Functions

This, however, could be driven by a need to model the temporal dependencies between previously experienced violence and ongoing violence – an important dynamic to include. Yet the inclusion of a one period lag of one-sided violence, demonstrated in Table C.16, similarly

prompts a reversal of the sign on all of the troop coefficients; the relationship between troop deployment is significant for one-sided violence in general and one-sided violence by the state, but not rebels.[3]

	Dependent variable:		
	OSV (All)	OSV (Reb)	OSV (G. and PGM)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Logged Sum Troops	0.03**	0.05**	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Pop. (Logged)	0.01	0.47***	−0.21**
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Mnt. Terrain	1.51***	1.85***	1.60***
	(0.19)	(0.37)	(0.22)
Time to City	−0.98***	−0.41*	−1.22***
	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.15)
Lag. Battle Deaths	0.01*	0.01***	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Spatial Lag OSV	2.26***	1.27***	2.62***
	(0.13)	(0.27)	(0.15)
Troops in Neighbor	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
OSV Rebel$_{T-1}$	2.68***	1.89***	2.71***
	(0.19)	(0.38)	(0.19)
OSV Govt$_{T-1}$	2.75***	3.43***	1.36***
	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.40)
Constant			
Observations	197,952	197,952	197,952
Log Likelihood	−2341.86	−865.09	−1680.55
Deviance	4683.72	1730.18	3361.10

Note: Logit models with grid-cell FE. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.16: FHN Replication and Extension - Lagged One Sided Violence

[3]Note that this lag was created using a dummy for whether or not a grid previously experienced more than five deaths as a result of one-sided violence by the state and by rebels, respectively, and in line with the DV used by these authors. These results are directionally consistent with other ways of modeling one-sided violence, such as a dummy for any one-sided violence or a count of the number of deaths as a result of one-sided violence.

Likewise, altering the functional form of the decay function results in the reversal of the direction of the main results. As described in the paper, the authors use the functional form $2^{-(T/K)}$ in order to model the decay function. The parameter T is the time since the grid-cell experienced one-sided violence, and K is the half-life parameter. The half-life was set to 4, per Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019). The results are sensitive to how the T parameter is constructed. The authors begin counting the T parameter after the first instance of violence occurs; before then, the decay function is set to zero.[4] After there is an instance of violence, a positive count begins and resets at an additional experience of violence.

For example, consider a sample of data, wherein *Cell* contains a unique identifier for the grid-cell and *Month* and *Year* denote the period. *OSV* is a dummy indicating whether or not any OSV occurred within a grid-cell. Given that, *(T) Time Since OSV* is the T parameter counting time since OSV, and what goes into the decay function. Finally, *Decay Output* is the output of the decay function. Table C.17 presents this method of calculating the T parameter - it is effectively set to infinity, such that the decay function is equal to 0 until violence is experienced.[5] This is the way that the decay function is created in Table C.14. This is the method of constructing the T parameter, and in turn, the decay function, used in Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019).

Cell	**Month**	**Year**	**Decay Output**	**OSV**	**(T) Time Since OSV**
1	1	2005	0	0	Inf
1	2	2005	0	0	Inf
1	3	2005	0	0	Inf
1	4	2005	0	1	Inf
1	5	2005	2^(-(0/4) = 1	0	0
1	6	2005	2^(-(1/4) = .84	0	1
1	7	2005	2^(-(2/4) = .70	0	2
1	8	2005	2^(-(3/4) = .59	1	3
1	9	2005	2^(-(0/4) = 1	0	0

Table C.17: Method 1 of Counting T

An alternative way of counting this would be to start counting from the first period

[4] I greatly thank Lisa Hultman for her time and consultation in confirming this.
[5] This is because $2^0 = 0$.

(although this is censored, given that the sample begins when a peacekeeping operations deploys to a country). That would result in the construction of different decay output. Table C.18 highlights how the T parameter is constructed in this manner, and the decay function modeled in Table C.19 is constructed this way. The results demonstrated in Table C.19 instead begin counting the T parameter at 0, such that the T parameter for a grid-cell that doesn't not experience violence is equal to 0 in the first period it doesn't experience one-sided violence, 1 in the second consecutive period that is does not experience one-sided violence, and so on. It then resets when one-sided violence is encountered within the grid-cell, as is the case in Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019). Table C.19 shows that once again, the directions on each of the coefficients switch to positive, indicating that peacekeeper presence may lead to an increase in one-sided violence. In all, the extension of this replication suggest that modeling the relationship between UN peacekeepers is sensitive to the choice of how to model previous experience of one-sided violence.

Cell	**Month**	**Year**	**Decay Output**	**OSV**	**(T) Time Since OSV**
1	1	2005	2^(-(0/4)) = 1	0	0
1	2	2005	2^(-(1/4)) = .84	0	1
1	3	2005	2^(-(2/4)) = .74	0	2
1	4	2005	2^(-(3/4)) = .59	1	3
1	5	2005	2^(-(0/4)) = 1	0	0
1	6	2005	2^(-(1/4)) = .84	0	1
1	7	2005	2^(-(2/4)) = .74	0	2
1	8	2005	2^(-(3/4)) = .59	1	3
1	9	2005	2^(-(0/4)) = 1	0	0

Table C.18: Method 2 of Counting T

Moreover, the choice of how to measure violence against civilians itself can result in changes in these results. Table C.20 demonstrates the shift in results when the dependent variable is changed from a binary indicator of whether or not at least five deaths resulting from one-sided violence to a count of the number of deaths resulting from one-sided violence. Using negative binomial regression to model the relationship between troop deployment and one-sided violence by the government/PGMs and rebels, both coefficients become positive

	Dependent variable:		
	OSV (All)	OSV (Reb)	OSV (G. and PGM)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Logged Sum Troops	0.470***	0.022	0.025
	(0.100)	(0.023)	(0.018)
Pop. (Logged)	0.045	−0.031	0.363***
	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.103)
Mnt. Terrain	1.939***	2.015***	0.482
	(0.268)	(0.269)	(0.380)
Time to City	−0.692***	−0.664***	−0.450**
	(0.155)	(0.170)	(0.224)
Lag. Battle Deaths	0.007	−0.005	0.008*
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.005)
OSV Decay Function	2.731***	2.600***	0.343
	(0.194)	(0.181)	(0.279)
Spatial Lag OSV	0.104***	0.005	0.020**
	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Troops in Neighbor	210.533	113.954	103.800
	(705.671)	(1,140.617)	(1,205.997)
Decay Function (Time Since Starts at T=1)	−209.551	−112.701	−108.330
	(705.672)	(1,140.618)	(1,205.999)
Observations	217,202	217,202	217,202
Log Likelihood	−748.674	−676.506	−461.713
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,515.347	1,371.011	941.427
Note: Logit models with grid-cell FE.			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.19: FHN Replication and Extension - Alternate Decay Function Parameter Form

and statistically significant.[6]

In sum, the relationship between peacekeeping and violence against civilians is sensitive to the data, models, and parameters used. This is an important relationship to model, and one with clear policy and moral implications. The work of scholars such as Fjelde, Hultman

[6]Note that when modeling this count dependent variable with as a linear model, the result on government/PGM violence remains the same. The coefficient on rebel OSV becomes negative and fails to attain statistical significance. When including country and year fixed effects, the results on both coefficients do not attain statistical significance.

	Dependent Variable:	
	(1)	(2)
	Govt OSV	Rebel OSV
Logged Sum Troops	0.139***	0.235***
	(0.028)	(0.055)
Pop. (Logged)	−0.031	0.117
	(0.121)	(0.211)
Mnt. Terrain	3.682***	2.536***
	(0.998)	(0.582)
Time to City	−2.424***	−0.554*
	(0.335)	(0.328)
Lag. Battle Deaths	0.166***	0.244***
	(0.005)	(0.004)
Spatial Lag OSV	1.007*	2.972***
	(0.571)	(0.363)
Troops in Neighbor	0.059**	−0.066***
	(0.029)	(0.020)
OSV Govt Decay	11.234***	0.979
	(0.632)	(1.006)
OSV Reb Decay	1.014	13.786***
	(0.678)	(0.700)
Constant	8.855***	−3.310
	(3.000)	(3.683)
Note: Negative Bin. Model with Robust SE Clustered at Grid	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table C.20: Replication and Extension of Fjlede Et Al. - Count Of VAC, Rather Than Dummy

and Nilsson (2019) has been crucial in making advances in doing so, and future work should continue to precisely identify how to model this relationship.

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