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Partisan Preferences in Southern State Legislatures

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M.A. Emory University, 2003

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An Abstract of

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 2011.

Abstract

Partisan Preferences in Southern State Legislatures

By Matthew Gunning

Legislative parties in Congress have merited increased scholarly attention in the late 20th and early 21st century. At mid-century American legislative parties appeared to be at low ebb. Individual members chosen in candidate-centered elections were characterized as free-lancing policy entrepreneurs. Strong committee chairs protected by the seniority system were able to thwart party leadership inside of the Congress. In the following decades party leaders benefited from reforms that increased their authority and the tools at their disposal. Inside the chamber party line voting increased sharply and electoral parties benefited from a decline in split ticket voting in national elections.

Recent scholarship on political party strength in the U.S. House of Representatives has focused upon the revival of formal party leadership positions. Other scholars have suggested these changes are not meaningful because parties cannot cause House members to vote against their preferences. This debate has caused scholars to look for empirical evidence of direct party effects—situations where the presence of political party activity could be credited with shifting or biasing outcomes.

This dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of party influence by looking at evidence of indirect party effects on legislator preferences. In particular it seeks to demonstrate that through their monopoly over the nomination phase of elections parties select in favor of candidates who hold a specific party-ideology. This partisan filter effect on legislator preferences is present when primary voters are polarized between the two parties.

A cross-sectional examination of ten southern State House chambers will demonstrate that when competitive parties exist across that region, the filtering effect of parties produces a predictable polarization of legislator preferences. Legislators who survive the polarized nominating electorate tend to be non-centrist in their ideological location. In contrast, this polarization effect is lacking during the one-party period when nearly all registered voters participated in the same nominating election.

A second indirect effect of parties is the reduction of the multi-dimensional policy space. When a competitive party system exists and polarized electorates filter in favor of candidates who adopt the party ideology, roll call voting within the legislative chamber is primarily one-dimensional. When party filtering is absent, the policy space is multi-dimensional.

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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction and Background

American political parties are a form of institutional innovation. The United States Constitution contains no explicit role for political parties and grants party leaders no institutional power or authority. The governing documents of most industrialized democracies make provision for political parties and grant to them institutional prerogatives (Ware 1996). Therefore, American political parties exist within an unusual constitutional framework; they have been grafted onto a formal structure that was intended to attenuate the formation of parties or factions. They are akin to a plant that has flowered on hostile ground.

Because mass political parties were invented after the construction of the U.S. Constitution they are among the most endogenous of American political institutions. Other elements of the American political scene are rooted and fixed in constitutional law, but nearly every aspect of political party operation has developed through innovation and practice. After two hundred years of practice some aspects of party operation have been fixed through state laws or court decisions, but a great deal of party behavior still remains a matter of endogenous choice. American political parties have utilized a variety of institutional forms to accomplish their objectives. This variety makes American parties both fascinating to study but also difficult to characterize.

Goldman (1951) divided U.S. parties into three categories that correspond with three distinct areas of action. *Party-in-government* consists of elected officials who hold legislative or executive office. These office holders seek to govern in a way that will earn their party additional seats or terms in future elections. *Party-as-organization* refers to the national, state and local party organizations which write party platforms, raise money, turn out voters and nominate

candidates. *Party-in-the-electorate* includes those citizens who identify with a given party and support the party with their votes, financial contribution or time.

That parties engage in the activities identified in the tripartite typology is not disputed; what is in dispute is the extent to which parties exercise power. This question about the strength of parties stems directly from a constitutional framework which pre-dates modern mass parties. Not only does the U.S. Constitution (and most state constitutions) not designate a specific role for political parties, but the very structure of the government itself was designed to thwart the influence of narrow parities or factions which might be adverse to the rights of citizens or the general interest of society (*The Federalist #10,* 1789).

The construction of the federal government was intended to diminish or break short term unjust impulses. Features such as staggered terms of office, different modes of selection and the bicameral legislature were all intended to weaken short term passions and engender a variety of time horizons among government decision makers. The use of varied electoral mechanisms such as the Electoral College (U.S. President), state legislatures (U.S. Senate) and large electoral districts (U.S. House) were intended to make more likely the selection of a better class of politicians. In contrast to modern scholarship, which sees parties as providing the useful function of interest aggregation and coordination, the founders emphasized that each department of the government should have a unique political selection process to ensure independence (Federalist #51, 1789).

Given this historical context, it is not surprising that the U.S. Constitution creates difficulties for political parties. Constitutional features such as the separation of powers and staggered term of elections and fixed terms of office all complicate efforts at unified party government. Furthermore, American parties and party leaders lack constitutional mechanisms to

enforce party discipline. The powers they do posses are modest and were granted by the same members who might be disciplined.

In contrast, the governing documents of most industrialized democracies grant political parties an explicit role. Parties are seen as necessary instruments which channel popular will and enable voters to chart the direction of public policy. In many nations, political parties and their leaders) are granted specific constitutional tools which enable them to punish and reward party members (Ware 1996).

Given that the American context is uniquely hostile to the operation of party authority it is perhaps not surprising that some scholars have focused upon the relative weakness of U.S. parties. Even during the party machine age Wilson (1885) emphasized how Congressional party leaders were too weak to control strong committee chairmen. Other functionalist scholars failed to mention parties at all in their treatment of the U.S. government (Burgess 1890).

The post-World War II generation of scholars focused upon the normative question of how U.S. parties could be made stronger. Schattschneider (1942) considered parties essential to the operation of democracy and suggested that despite their flaws U.S. parties played a key role in interest aggregation and interest articulation. Key demonstrated that the lack of party competition in the U.S. South left voters without a means to direct the direction of public policy (1949). Burns (1963) despaired that at the national level the party system was impaired by strong regional factions that led to cumbersome four-party politics. The American Political Science Association (1950) associated even offered a program of change designed to strengthen U.S. parties and make them conform more to the responsible party ideal.

During the 1960s and 1970s political parties as organizational structures appeared to reach a low point. Voters increasingly identified themselves as independents, the electoral

process became increasingly candidate-centered (Wattenberg 1990) and legislators became increasingly immune to defeat with the emergence of the incumbency advantage (Mayhew 1974b). Scholars began to talk about voters de-aligning from political parties (Ladd 1980). Within Congress, party cohesion continued to decline as the cross-party Conservative Coalition exercised significant influence (Manley 1973, Shelley 1983). Mayhew (1974a) suggested that legislative organization was ordered more by the reelection needs of individual members and less according to collective party needs.

However, in the 1980s and 1990s parties appeared to be re-invigorated and more robust than in previous decades. Reforms within the U.S. House in the 1980s resulted in a more aggressive and influential speakers (Rohde 1991, Strahan 2007). The speaker's office was further strengthened after the Republican majority took office in 1995 (Aldrich and Rohde 2001, Strahan 2007). While party identification among voters did not increase appreciably, split ticket voting appeared to ebb as the number of U.S. House district with split outcomes decline (Jacobson 2000, 19-20). American parties appeared to have rebounded as political institutions but questions remained about their degree of influence.

How Are U.S. Parties Influential?

How important are political parties in American legislatures? This question has sparked considerable debate about party effects inside the legislative arena. New Institutionalism scholars have emphasized rules and procedures which provide advantages to members of the majority and reduce the opportunities for minority party legislators. On the other hand, the pivotal voter model suggests that party influence is an illusion because the median member or pivotal member is decisive for all organizational and lawmaking decisions.

Both of these schools of thought place significant emphasis upon legislator preferences in their accounts. But both approaches give slight attention given to party effects on legislator preferences. The debate has become overly focused on whether party or preferences are more important without giving sufficient attention to the possibility that parties themselves may shape legislator preferences. The goal of this study is to develop further our understanding of the interplay between party and preferences which will facilitate a more nuanced account of party influence.

The Organization of this Study

In the following chapter (Chapter Two) I will review the historic variation of American political parties and then give attention to recent scholarship which assesses the power and influence of parties. In particular I will give attention to the historical tendency of American scholars to emphasize the comparative weakness of parties. More recent work has focused on tangible evidence of a revival of legislative party organization at the national level. Finally I will review the critique of the pivotal voter model to the effect that direct party influence is an illusion because individual legislators cannot be forced to act against their own preferences.

Chapter Three will consider candidate positioning strategy in elections and a theory of party filtering. Candidates selected by non-centrist party activists in the party primary are expected to express non-centrist preferences in their roll call behavior within the legislature. In the empirical section I present evidence in support of this party winnowing effect by looking at variation in the observed preferences of legislators when the party filtering effect is present and when it is absent. This employs a natural experiment design that grants leverage of the role of party selection effects.

In Chapter Four I will use the theory of party filtering to suggest that modern party primaries favor candidates who utilize party ideology to structure their policy positions. In this way the wide variety of distinct issues become mapped onto a single left-right ideological dimension. Empirical evidence that spatial constraint varies with two-party competition is drawn from a cross-sectional analysis of ten southern state legislative chambers before and after the advent of competitive parties in the region.

The remainder of the dissertation (Chapters Five through Eight) will consist of a longitudinal case study of one legislative chamber, the Georgia State House. This case study will facilitate greater understanding of the temporal relationship between preference polarization and other possible explanations of that change. Rival explanations to polarization include redistricting, the re-enfranchisement of black voters, the emergence of strong independent leadership within the State House, and urbanization.

Why study state legislatures?

This dissertation will address the theoretical debate over party influence by looking at the behavior of legislators in the southern states. American legislative scholars have focused almost exclusively upon the U.S. Congress and the bulk of that research looks at only one chamber, the U.S. House of Representatives. The U.S. Congress is without question a very important legislative body, certainly one of the most dynamic and complex in the world. However, some have questioned whether the field suffers from a fixation on just a single legislative chamber. In particular there are so many theories attempting to explain just one case (or one case over time) that when it comes to model testing, the lack of variation is problematic.

Do scholars seek to develop legislative theories that apply to just one legislature or just one chamber, or should they aspire to nomethetic conclusions which can be applied to a whole

class of legislative institutions? This dissertation endeavors to establish theoretical expectations which are applicable to an array of American legislatures that share a similar partisan and constitutional framework and then empirically test those predictions with original data from a variety of states and time periods.

Are state legislatures important enough to warrant study? Collectively state legislatures pass many of the laws that regulate the lives of American citizens and businesses. State regulations fix the boundaries of permissible action allowed to citizens and many the states administer national programs. While the national government does occupy a place of primacy among American legislatures, the fifty state legislatures create a wide variety of laws that govern the lives of ordinary citizens.

One great advantage of studying legislatures is that they offer the opportunity for a natural experiment research design. Most state constitutions copy the basic outline of the national Constitution and contain such features as three separate branches of government, bicameralism and staggered terms of office. In the midst of this pattern of conformity, variation does exist and that variation can grant leverage in sorting out which institutional rules create which political effects.

In particular, the dissertation seeks to assess the indirect effects of political parties by exploiting the unusual circumstances of southern legislatures which have transitioned from one-party to two-party systems. Some of the questions that will be considered are the following. Are legislators behaving systematically and predictably different in a functional two-party system than they were under the one-party system? If parties are the “most frequent coalition” inside a normal legislature, what are the patterns of conflict and coalition when party distinctions are meaningless because almost everyone is a member of the same party? At what point in the

transition from a one-party to two-party system do party effects manifest themselves? What aspects appear to trigger a dramatic shift in legislator alignments?

These questions are rather difficult to answer if scholars focus exclusively on the U.S. Congress or the U.S. House. Competitive national party systems have been present since the 1830s and much information from this formative period is missing. An examination of the more recent development of two-party competition in southern state legislatures will grant new leverage to old questions.

Chapter Two: The Historical Variation on U.S. Political Parties

The U.S. Constitution contains no explicit mention of parties and it was specifically created to thwart the potentially destructive influence of party or faction. The founders' conception of *party* was rather different from the modern understanding of mass parties. Embryonic political parties had existed in some colonial legislatures, especially in the mid-Atlantic colonies (Newcomb 1995). Early parties were not broad-based coalitions that characterize modern American politics, instead these proto-parties represented regional interests, narrow economic sectors or a faction centered upon a strong political leader. During the monetary crisis that following the Revolutionary War most state governments were consumed with legislative strife between factions representing debtors and creditors (Bessette 1984).

Given the founders experience with narrow factional parties and the abuses of the early national period they crafted a national government that dispersed power across the three branches and further subdivided the legislative power into a bicameral body. Each branch was granted certain checks to protect it against encroachment from the other branches. The framers also provided for a unique mode of selection and unique terms of office for each element of the national government. The intent of this feature was to prevent the government from making rash decisions driven by some temporary, unjust passion. Different terms of office would encourage elected officials to have a variety of time horizons, which was intended to promote contemplation of both the short and long term consequences of proposed laws. The different modes of selection in effect required approval by concurrent majorities; a majority of the people in the U.S. House and a majority of the states in the U.S. Senate. A key motivation behind the institutional order of the U.S. Constitution was the desire to avoid the concentration of power

into the hands on one person or faction and the government was structured to make cooperation and coordination much more difficult as a defensive measure.

The founders envisioned a Constitution in which the large scope of the nation and the separation of powers would diminish the ability of parties and factions to divide the people with vicious arts (*The Federalist* #10 1789). Instead, they hoped that the Congress would be composed of men of good reputation who had earned the respect of the state legislature (for Senators) or a positive reputation in the large electoral districts of the U.S. House. Nor was there any specific provision for internal leadership within the legislature. In summary, the new Constitution provided for a system of government with decentralized distribution of power a decentralized electoral system significant obstacles to coordination across elements of the national government.

After the Constitution went into operation, the founders themselves quickly discovered the need for an institution that could bring more organization to legislative politics and elections. The competing Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian factions each desired to win the "Great Question" of how the new U.S. Constitution should be interpreted. Each faction began to organize to win this contest. Legislators would caucus together to plot strategy and external committees of correspondence to promote like-minded candidates and mobilize the rather limited electorate of the time (Aldrich 1995). This first generation saw these first parties as something of a temporary necessary evil, but they were substantially broader than the narrow factions which *The Federalist Papers* had warned against.

These proto-parties were voluntary ideological coalitions that connected a variety of distinct issue areas (assumption of public debts and monetary policy, foreign relations) to the main question of constitutional interpretation. These first parties were rather limited in their

legislative organization and electoral mobilization efforts. They did not exercise any sort of party discipline, but rather were a means for honorable independent men to coordinate their actions. This first experiment with national parties collapsed after 1816. The Federalists stronghold had been New England region and the Hartford Convention which flirted with separation from the union during the War of 1812 discredited the party.

The Jeffersonian Republicans remained the only national party in scope but it ceased to function as a collective entity after the demise of the Federalist Party. In the election of 1824 four different Republican Party candidates competed against one another and the election ultimately had to be settled by the House. As a consequence of this particular election, national politics became polarized into two personal factions: the supporters of Adams and Clay versus the supporters of Jackson and Crawford. The Jacksonians would prove triumphant in this struggle because they began the process of moving from the politics of personality to the politics of mass parties. Under the guidance of Martin Van Burn the supporters of Jackson began to create state level party organizations that could mobilize the expanded electorate, select slates of candidates and subordinate those candidates to the goals of the party once in office. The invention of the mass party provided a solution to the related problems of pubic choice, voter mobilization and legislator cooperation while in office.

Under the mass party system an interlocking system of incentives bound together voters, party leaders and legislators. This produced a new political system characterized by high degree of voter participation, endemic corruption and (post-Civil War) high levels of party unity within the Congress. The new mass parties overcame the Constitutional barriers to coordination at the national level by linking politicians to a shared party ticket and party voter base. Patronage was a

key element of the mass-based parties of the 19th century. It provided the party organization with campaign workers, income and incentives.

Without the secret ballot the parties were able to offer favors and benefits in exchange for voter loyalty. Over time the parties were able to turn out voters with military like precision, but at the cost of significant corruption. Progressive reforms such as the party primary, secret ballot, initiative, referendum and recall and more extensive use of civil service employment all reduced the most effective tools of political machines (Erie 1988). Voter turnout declined following the 1890s realignment, although party loyalty remained. Some have portrayed the post-Progressive era as one of natural slow decay over time while others have suggested that FDR wanted to supplant party loyalty with loyalty to government programs and services (Milkis 1993).

Just as the power of machine political parties weakened during the Progressive Era so too the strong centralized Czar party leadership of Reed and Cannon was overturned (Jones 1968). As a result of the revolt, the speaker lost some of the powerful prerogatives he once possessed such as committee appointments and control of the Rules Committee. The revolt against Cannon may have been a byproduct of the change in electoral politics. As more House members were chosen through party primaries entered they were less willing to accept centralized leadership than the older machine elected politicians who cared mostly about their local party organization receiving its share of federal patronage jobs (Swenson 1982). As this new generation of politicians arrived in the House they may have been more focused upon a career within the House and less concerned with a career within the party.

Party discipline in the U.S. House began to decline greatly following the split of the Southern Democrats with their Northern Democratic colleagues after the 1936 election. The emergence of the cross-party Conservative Coalition further constrained the ability of party

leaders to control the legislative process in the House, Power devolved to powerful committee chairmen who were entrenched by the seniority rules even thought they frustrated members of their own party (Cooper and Brady 1981). Reforms in the 1970s weakened committee chairs and initially it appeared that authority was further atomized and independent legislators acted as issue entrepreneurs and less like party loyalists.

Through the middle of the 20th century political parties appeared to be in a serious decline. Elections were increasingly candidate-centered (Wattenberg 1991). Fewer voters reported strong party loyalty and they were more likely to deviate from their chosen party than in the past (Jacobson 2001). The rise in the incumbency advantage led some to suggest that voter preference for a party label had been supplanted for a preference for incumbents.

However, at the close of the century these trends began to pause or even reverse in many cases. Party organizations reinvented themselves as service organizations which assist candidates and candidates began to look to the parties for aid as soft money became more important. The decline in party identification stopped and voters began to defect from their party less often and more to vote a consistent ticket. Legislative leadership was strengthened as a result of Democratic reforms in the 1970s and Republican changes instituted when they became the majority in the 1990s. In both cases of reform party leaders gained more control over the legislative process and received enhanced tools at their disposal.

Understanding Party Influence

In light of the history of U.S. parties and all of the variation that has taken place, it is not surprising that scholars have arrived at different conclusions about the utility and importance of political parties. Because political parties are a post-Constitution invention they are among the most endogenous of U.S. government institutions. “[A] perceptive British scholar, Philip

Williams, wondered how in the 1980s American political parties can be said to have lost power when they hardly ever had any" (Epstein1986, 5). This quotation puts the question quite squarely; do American political parties have influence? Given the constraints of the U.S. Constitution how can parties exert pressure on the members of the legislative chamber?

In recent decades scholars have renewed their interest in understanding how institutional rules shape or constrain legislative actions. Among these new theories, a spirited debate has emerged between those that emphasize the importance of legislative parties and pivotal voter theory or constituency interests (Krehbiel 1991, 1993, 1998). The meaningful party camp is primarily divided into those who emphasize that party organizations are *always* important and consequential (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 1995, 2005) and those who emphasize the *variability* of party influence (Rohde 1991, Aldrich and Rohde 1997, 2001).

The *always* important argument is advanced by Cox and McCubbins (2005) who offer a cartel model where political parties are a constant solution to the problem of how to obtain greater influence and power within the legislative chamber. According to this model, a majority coalition bonds together in order to install a set of rules, which systematically favor cartel members. Members of the majority receive a larger share of institutional advantages with the expectation that cartel members will be able to translate these advantages into legislative goods. This procedural coalition emphasizes that party members need not be united on questions of policy because they are simply agreeing to exchange certain privileges with one another.

A majority party cartel, like any majority coalition, is vulnerable to the possibility that the minority will entice away enough defectors to overthrow the existing majority and replace it with a new majority cartel. Riker (1980) pointed out any institutional solution to the problem of majority cycling should itself be subject to a cycle of bidding and counter bidding. Cox and

McCubbins (1995) explain the persistence of party legislative organization by emphasizing that they provide benefits that may not be easily replaced by a competing party organization. The primary value of party cartel membership consists of the party label.

Members of a party cartel receive electoral value from the party label which aids in the mobilization of voters. Many legislators reside in districts where there are more voters that favor one party over the opposition. In addition, party supporters form the base of financial contributors every candidate needs and a supply of campaign volunteers can be draw from the activist base. These are benefits which a rival party cannot easily replace and thus the electoral side of parties provides an anchor that prevents cycling between the parties.[1]

Cox and McCubbins (1995) suggest that the external electoral side of political parties explains not only party stability but also party leadership. Since majority party members prefer to remain in the majority, they desire a positive party label which will assist them both individually and collectively in their electoral efforts. Because a positive party label is a collective good that is produced by the actions of the entire group, it will be under-produced unless a central agent is tasked to ensure its creation and punish defectors (Olson 1965). Party leaders are the central agents charged with overseeing the collective actions of party members. As payment for their services party leaders earn the prestige of leadership and are rewarded with reelection for a satisfactory performance.

Cox and McCubbins (1993, 1995, and 2005) emphasize that political parties have a constant need to offer attractive internal benefits and a good external party label. This leads them to infer that political parties must always be strong. This conclusion stands in opposition to

[1] Interestingly enough Black and Black (2002) have made the opposite claim. They suggest that the *internal* benefits of being a member of the Democratic majority were sufficient to keep many southern Democrats from switching parties.

roll call vote analysis which shows that party unity generally declined in the 1960 and 1970s and then rebounded in the 1980s and 1990s. In support of their claim, Cox and McCubbins develop a measure of leadership conflict votes, instances where the top two leaders of the Democratic Party voted together and against the top two Republicans. Using this indicator they find no secular change in support for party leadership between the 73rd and 100th Congresses (1993, 152-154). Furthermore, they note that majority party always allocates to itself more resources and advantages than the minority party. This applies to committee seats, committee staff, floor time, Capitol office space, and additional seats on control committees (2005).

Cox and McCubbins also suggest that traditional measures of party strength, such as party unity and party conflict scores, do not accurately measure when party is active in legislative decision making. The "price" of cartel membership is not party loyalty on each and every vote, but rather limited to those key procedural votes which affect the cartel's ability to control the chamber. Examples of party loyalty votes would include the approval of the rules, the election of the party's choice for Speaker and other offices, allocation of committee seats, and approval of the Speaker's interpretation of the rules (1995, 107-8). Thus they redefine party strength to include only those votes were cartel control is at stake and they exclude from their definition other roll call voting situations.

The second major party government model is the conditional party government model (Rohde 1991, Aldrich and Rohde 2001). Like the cartel model, the conditional model suggests that party leaders are useful central agents because they can coordinate and expedite important legislation, act as authoritative representatives in inter-branch bargaining, and monitor the party's reputation. However, unlike the cartel perspective, the conditional party government model suggests that amount of institutional power granted to party leaders is variable. When

preferences over policy are more homogenous within the majority party, and the minority party is actively opposed, majority party leaders are granted increased authority. However, when the majority party is internally divided over policy outcomes, authority is decentralized to other institutional subunits, such as committees or subcommittees. Furthermore, even when party leaders are granted stronger powers they are expected to exercise it only in issue areas where the majority party members are in general agreement. Unlike, Cox and McCubbins who suggest that party is always strong, Rohde and Aldrich emphasize the degree of variability in party government.

The primary example of the conditional party government theory is found in the 1970s reforms instituted by the Democratic Party Caucus. Rohde (1991) demonstrates that the growing ranks of northern liberal Democrats became restive as conservative southern committee chairs blocked liberal legislation supported by a majority within the party platform. Northern liberals formed the Democratic Study Group which developed a strategy of using the Democratic Party Caucus to effect institutional changes which would open up the legislative process to their legislative agenda. The crucial element in the strategy of the Democratic Study Group was the use of the Democratic Party Caucus as the locus for institutional change. Approval of rules changes in the party caucus allowed a minority of the chamber membership to determine the rules for a majority of the chamber. The approval of new rules within the Democratic Caucus forced southern Democrats to choose between supporting the Democratic Caucus institutional rules that would have benefited their own goals.

The specific rules changes that were adopted after the 1974 election shifted institutional power away from full committee chairman towards subcommittee chairman and the Democratic Party leadership. Full committee chairmen were made accountable to the party majority via

caucus elections. They also lost some control over subcommittee staff, subcommittee assignments, and exclusive jurisdiction rights. Subcommittees, more often chaired by northern liberals, were granted a degree of autonomy over staff and approval of legislation. Party leaders were given more influence in the committee assignment process, the power to appoint the Rules Committee and the ability to make multiple and sequential referrals. All of these institutional changes were made with the expectation that they would result in the passage of legislation sought by northern liberal Democrats (Rohde 1991, 19-20). Thus, the conditional party government model suggests that a minority of the overall chamber can use its status as a majority within the majority party to push legislative rules and outcomes away from the political center and toward the median of the majority party.

For evidence of this sequential account of change in party leadership strength, Rohde looks at House roll call votes. He demonstrates that Democratic Party unity declined in the 1950s and 1960 and then revived in the late 1970s and 1980s. This change is evident across both foreign and domestic issue categories and across all types of votes (1991, 52-53. He then demonstrates that the cause of the change in Democratic cohesion can be explained almost exclusively by the changes in voting of southern Democrats, since the party unity scores of northern Democrats remained very high throughout the period (1991, 55). As evidence of increased usage of new majority party powers, Rohde shows that the number on nonconsensual votes to suspend the rule rules rose dramatically during the 1980s (1991, 96). At the same time, the proportion of restrictive rules as a share of all rules rose, but the use of restrictive rules on "key vote" measures increased much more sharply. Likewise, the total number of roll calls taken on rules increased and the intensity of partisan divisions on those votes greatly increased (1991, 100-102). Thus the conditional party government model suggests that the strengthening of party

leadership led to increased use of procedural rules to protect non-centrist policies favored by a majority within the majority party.

Each of these two party theories provides important explanations of party influence and definitions of party strength. Each model provides a conception of how parties exercise influence; however, it seems that each model presents only one-half of a complete model of American political parties.

On the one hand, the cartel theory explains that even at their weakest moments parties matter and make significant contributions. The internal and external benefits associated with party membership are simply too great to forgo lightly. However, the argument that parties are always strong is not fully persuasive and the evidence presented by Cox and McCubbins in support of their position appears strained at several points.[2] Another problem is that their work does not test the bonding mechanism which holds the majority cartel together. Is it true that the external benefits of party membership hold party members in a majority cartel? Is it possible that a cartel could exist without the external anchoring effects of party? Parsons (1963) study of the 1950s Florida Senate found a functional cartel of northern legislators who organized the chamber so as to skew benefits to their region of the state. Could an internal legislative cartel exist without this external component or would they collapse?

In their later work Cox and McCubbins (1995) imply that the price of membership in a majority cartel is support of the majority on key chamber organizing votes. The logic of this argument might also lead to the inference that party loyalty is also necessary on all procedural votes. However, Rohde's data on party unity by vote type shows that Democratic Party unity on procedural and suspension votes was usually lower than unity on final passage votes (1991, 55).

[2] For example, even their restricted sample of party leadership roll calls clearly indicates that Democratic unity experienced a prolonged decline for over a decade (1993, 153) and case studies of leadership (Cooper and Brady) highlight the lack of party cohesion.

This evidence suggests that a party cartel model may be confounded, to a degree, by the presence of a large bloc of legislators who are not subject to national partisan tides. Southern Democrats simply did not face viable opposition from the Republican Party for much of the twentieth century. Furthermore, as the national Democratic Party became more associated with civil rights, the national Democratic Party label could actually be a hindrance to the reelection chances of a member of Congress.

The conditional party model is not without its own faults, the model is unclear regarding the potential range of party government strength. It specifies neither a floor nor a ceiling. At its heart, the conditional party model is about a causal sequence of events that determine change in party government, rather than a full fledged theory of party government.

A sterner critique of these models is provided by the pivotal voter model of legislative organization (Krehbiel 1991) and lawmaking (Krehbiel 1997). The pivotal voter model begins with the assumption that the greatest problem facing legislators is their uncertainty about the effects of legislation. While legislators enter into the legislative process with clear preferences about policy outputs, they are uncertain regarding which policy instrument will produce the desired policy outcome. The standing committee system can be understood as an institutional solution to this problem. Committee members are encouraged to spend time and resources in the development of expertise over policy questions under their jurisdiction. This information is then made available to the entire chamber through hearings, committee reports and debate among committee members on the chamber floor.

The second key element in the informational model is the majoritarian nature of legislative decision making. Krehbiel emphasizes that every decision made by the chamber, whether it is a question of policy, procedure or organization, must ultimately be approved by a

majority of the chamber. From this observation, Krehbiel reasons that the choice of legislative institutions will maximize the utility of the median member of the chamber. Congressional committees should not be composed of extreme preference outliers, but rather be representative of the parent chamber. Rules governing the consideration of legislation will not protect non-centrist policies, because the median member would not consent to such policies. Thus, the preferences of the median member of the chamber (or the pivotal member in other super-majority situations) will always be reflected in both legislative organization and legislation (Krehbiel 1991, 1998).

If preferences alone can be used to explain organization and outcomes, are political parties necessary for parsimonious legislative models? Krehbiel argues that the answer is no. In order for political parties to be necessary for a legislative model it must be shown that their inclusion brings added explanatory or predictive power. Krehbiel argues that using member preferences alone is sufficient, and therefore party theorists must show that political parties cause legislators to act differently than they would if left to act on their own preferences. Only by demonstrating a party effect that is independent of personal preferences can parties be proven necessary for inclusion.

Furthermore, Krehbiel argues that party advocates who infer party strength from roll calls votes are misleading themselves. If political party names are simply convenient labels for the two largest clumps along the main ideological axis, then high cohesion and conflict scores may simply reflect the fact that legislator preferences are clustered into more distinct preference groups. High levels of party voting do not demonstrate any causal party force at work, because party discipline may not be causing high levels of party voting (Krehbiel 1993).

Krehbiel also finds the evidence for partisan bias in House rules unconvincing. Again, he doubts that restrictive rules can be used to support non-centrist party legislation because all rules must receive the consent of a floor majority. With respect to committee assignments, he finds that the majority party gives itself a modest one-seat advantage above the ratio between the majority and minority parties (Krehbiel 1993, 243-244).[3] Krehbiel also shows that the House discharge rule provides a means for a chamber majority to circumvent the agenda control power of the leadership and committee chairs (1999, 54). Finally, Krehbiel notes that if legislative decision making is simply a function of legislator preferences, than the conditional party government model is tautological, since party leaders are strong precisely when party members are already in agreement (1993, 1999).

Partisan theorists have in turn raised significant doubts about the validity of the pivotal voter model. Specifically, the validity of the majoritarian nature of legislative decision making has been questioned. If majority party members are pressured to support the initial adoption of the rules as the price of party perks, then the vote on the rules should not be interpreted as assent every future use of those rules. The median member of the chamber may disagree with some elements of the rules, which give institutional power to non-centrist members, but ultimately the member votes for them because of the significant internal and external benefits of party membership (Krehbiel 1993, 1995). After the initial adoption of those rules, any additional change in the chamber rules requires a supermajority, which effectively forecloses the possibility of the median member from trying to alter the institutional structure by defecting from the majority party (Krehbiel 1995).

[3] However, Krehbiel's own analysis shows that the majority Democrats give themselves a greater than one seat advangate (relative to party ratio) on the three most important House committees: Rules, Ways and Means and Appropriations (1991, 244).

Despite the stark differences in the assumptions and predictions of the partisan and informational models, empirical efforts to evaluate each have proven difficult. The root of this problem is that each theory provides an explanation for institutional features found in the U.S. House.

What is the best way to test for party effects? The vast majority of evidence that has been brought to bear on this question comes from only one legislature (the U.S. Congress) and often from just one chamber (the U.S. House). Because political parties have been present in this chamber almost all of its existence, efforts to isolate the influence of party is challenging. Political party strength may vary over time in the U.S. House, but the range may not be sufficient to tease out the full range of party effects.

A second major problem, highlighted by this debate is how to measure party strength? Krehbiel has argued that traditional measures of party unity and cohesion cannot be used. The party cartel model suggests that party cartel strength can be measured by looking at a subset of roll calls, such as organizational votes and party leadership votes. Likewise, the conditional party government suggests that party strength can be measured through the use of procedural tools which are opposed by the minority party. What is the best approach to measuring party influence?

However, before the question of measurement can be evaluated, the fundamental question posed by Krehbiel must be confronted, do parties have any independent impact on decision making? Krehbiel suggests that party scholars must demonstrate that parties can cause legislators to vote against their own preferences before any influence can be credited to parties.

Krehbiel's party versus preferences test for a party effect is extremely difficult to perform because it requires a measure of legislator preferences prior to the influence of party leaders, and

then another measure of legislator behavior after the application of pressure by party leaders. Despite the difficulty of this challenge a number of scholars have attempted to find such an independent effect apart from legislator preferences (Groseclose and Snyder 2000, Anoslabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2001, Lawrence, Poole and Rosenthal, 1999Maltzman and Smith 2006, McCarty).

An alternative response to the party-vs.-preferences test is to ask whether member preferences can be assumed to be independent of party influence? If party labels have informational value then the party needs some mechanism to ensure brand consistency, or the brand becomes devalued. If the partisan nomination process results in the nomination of individuals who share a common philosophy of governance or broad ideology, then legislator preferences in a partisan legislature should differ from a chamber where members are chosen without party competition. If political parties exercise a selection effect on the preferences of candidates who win seats, then a significant portion of legislative coalition building has been accomplished ex ante. Krehbiel himself notes this as a potential problem for his party-versus-preferences test:

> Secondly, and more subtly, some party theorists claim that parties are creators of, and thus antecedent to, policy cleavages, policy preferences, intensities of preferences and so on. To the extent that this is a more accurate or complete portrayal of the legislative role of parties than the one offered here, then this empirical analysis may be regarded as misguided because it tends to pit party against preferences as concomitant causal forces (1993, 257).

The central argument of this dissertation is that political parties do shape the preferences of legislators prior to their entry into the legislature.

In the following chapters I will provide a theoretical account suggesting how competitive parties are able to bias or filter the preferences of the legislators. This effect is systematic and

predictable. I will also examine evidence from southern legislatures where the party system varies over time. The data will test the theoretical predictions of how parties influence legislator preference distributions and the spatial structure of decision making.

CHAPTER THREE: Preferences, Primaries and Polarization

I will stop, I will stop at nothing
Say the right things when electioneering
I trust I can rely on your vote
When I go forwards, you go backwards
Some where we will meet"
--"*Electioneering*" by Radiohead

The existing models of legislative institutions all place great weight on member preferences. Some see these preferences as the primary causal factor in explaining variation in party leadership over time (Rohde 1991, Aldrich and Rohde 2001). Others see legislator preferences as a powerful constrain which circumscribe independent action for leaders (Krehbiel 1993, 1998). While others see preferences as important but open to being shaped or manipulated by leaders (Strahan 2007, Lee 2009).

Legislative accounts rooted in theoretic perspectives such as Krehbiel and Cox and McCubbins tend to make the assumption that preferences are exogenous to the model and concentrate on how those preferences shape the choice of institutions and policies. Other approaches (Rohde 1991, Aldrich 1995) do seek to account for known historical shifts in member attitudes and link those shifts to institutional changes. For example, Rohde points to the entry of black voters into the southern primary electorate as one source of the increase in homogeneity within the Democratic U.S. House members (Rohde 1991, 46). The institutionalist Congressional literature generally lacks a nomethetic account of how political parties shape legislator preferences. As scholars seek to parse the effects of parties, Smith (2007) has argued for a more nuanced appreciation for the direct and indirect effects of party inside the legislature. Left unexplained by these models are several key questions. Who or what generates legislator

preferences? What conditions might facilitate party influence on preferences? What does indirect party influence look like?

What determines the expressed preferences of legislators? Conceptual models of the relationship between party and legislator preferences offer two extremely different portraits. At one extreme rests European party-list systems where the party leadership is able to dictate party voting to such a degree that some model all party legislators as having the same set of preferences. Individual politicians presumably posses varying personal beliefs but because the list-makers can sanction those who stray from the party line legislators can display limited independence without risk to their careers. This end of the spectrum demonstrates the maximum case of party influence on preferences expressed in voting. In party list systems, the personal preferences of legislators are somewhat irrelevant because party discipline can impose unity to such a powerful degree.

At the other extreme, some models of American politics see legislators as little more than delegates for the median voter in his or her electoral constituency. If the legislator strays too far from wishes of the pivotal voter he or she creates a spatial gap that another candidate could potentially exploit and unseat the incumbent. Party pressure is weak compared to constituency because constituents control the career path of politicians. Therefore legislators are highly independent of parties and it is the local median voter that determines the preferences of the elected representative.

There are two extreme pictures. The strong-party model sees individual legislators as little more than errand boys for the political party that puts them into office. The weak-party strong-constituency model sees legislators as slavishly devoted to the median voter. I will argue that in the case of U.S. elections neither of these extremes provides an accurate picture. On the

one hand, legislators do display a high level of variation compared to the strong-party European party systems. Party leaders do not control the re-nomination of party members as is the case in some party-list electoral systems. On the other hand, American legislators are not wholly the servant of the median general election voter as the party primary voters also exert influence. For each successful candidate must engage in a process of strategic position taking that will satisfy both median voters. A better understanding of legislator preferences is one of bounded independence in which legislators exercise some degree of freedom within the limits imposed by the primary and general election median voters.

Under what conditions might parties affect member preferences? The strong-constituency model of legislator preferences would suggest that local political parties exercise no great influence on members. But the overwhelming majority of U.S. elections are conducted on a partisan basis. Some have argued that the U.S. parties are so weak that party labels are essentially information branding which helps both candidates and voters at election time (Stewart and Ting 2002). But a brand is only informative if that the items categorized by that brand name display some level of consistency.

How do parties keep and maintain the uniqueness of their brand labels? Historically parties have controlled nominations through a variety of techniques: party committees, conventions and more recently primaries. Each of these choice mechanisms is a gatekeeper that bestows the party label. The shift to direct primaries during the Progressive Era broadened the participants in this process to include party identifiers and removed control of nominations from the party leadership. However, even party identifiers should prefer to award the party banner to candidates who are consistent with the informational value of the party brand. These voters are

participating in the primary of their choice and have sorted themselves between the two parties in response to the party brands.

What does indirect party influence look like? Steven Smith has argued that statistical attempts to capture direct party influence (arm twisting and horse trading) are extremely difficult because these actions happen at the margin and involve relatively few members (Smith 2007). Such direct influence is also likely to take place less frequently as party leaders save their political capital for key moments. Statistical tests involving large numbers are poorly suited for detecting such rare but strategically important interventions.

If party leaders do operate at key moments and target a small set of pivotal members for direct influence, how do we explain what determines the preferences of the members who do not need to be swayed? Why do they support legislation without direct pressure from the leadership? In party-list electoral systems, party cohesion is directly connected to the electoral fate of members. But in the United States system, leaders do not control the nominating process. If it is simply a matter of constituency determining the preferences of other legislators, then why are party lines so frequently the dividing line? Is it really true that the median voters are so heavily polarized across America? Or is there a partisan filter on constituency that fundamentally biases the distribution of legislator preferences within a chamber? This chapter will argue for a model of legislator preferences which integrates constituency pressures, party effects and space for strategic candidate choice.

Candidate Spatial Strategy

The spatial theory of elections provides the dominant theoretical perspective for predicting party or candidate behavior. Downs (1957) modeled plurality elections as competition between two parties with the ability freely to choose issue positions. When voters are arrayed

along an ideological dimension and voter preferences are single peaked and symmetrical, the winning strategy is for both parties to move towards the location of the median voter to occupy nearly the same spatial position. The prediction of convergence towards the median voter was further supported by Black (1958) and Enelow and Hinich (1984).

The spatial model of elections is elegant and offers an intuitive forecast of party convergence. However, the model is not an accurate representation of the American electoral system nor has the prediction of convergence found much empirical support. Analysis of presidential nominating process finds that candidates take divergent positions (Page 1978, Enelow and Hinich 1984) as do candidates for Congress (Erikson and Wright 1989, 1993, 1997). Analysis of roll call voting with Congress by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) finds strong evidence of ideological polarization and differentiation rather than convergence among elected representatives.

Why does the spatial theory break down and how might it be correctly applied to the U.S. elections? American elections differ from the British example in a number of respects: candidates (not parties) have more freedom to choose their own positions (i.e. spatial location), elections are a two-stage process, and candidates care about future elections iterations. These features introduce a number of complicating factors that alter the optimum strategy.

Party scholars describe the post-machine era of politics as a “candidate-centered” period (Wattenberg 1991, Jacobson 2001) because the candidates choose whether to run for office, which issues to stress, who to hire for the campaign and which donors and voter blocs they will solicit for support. Scholarship from the weak party era of the 1970s tended to place greater emphasis on constituency as a determinant of legislator behavior. Mayhew (1974a, 19-28) noted that legislators would choose constituency over party if forced to make a choice. Fenno (1978,

13) noted the proclivity of Members of Congress to run against the institution in order to enhance their own stature at home. Fiorina (1974) argued that the strong attachment to local interests caused Congress to make collective choices that were illogical or dangerous to good public policy. Clearly candidates in the U. S. first-past-the-post electoral system are more responsive to constituency pressure and it plays a significant role in structuring candidate positions. However, the extent of this pressure has become a stylized fact that understates the role that parties have in constraining legislator preferences.

The flaw of the strong-constituency model is assuming that it is the only relevant constraint on candidate policy positions. Every candidate must make choices that will allow him or her to compete and win in both the primary and general election phases of the race. If the electorates of the primary and general elections are very similar then predictions of convergence on the median voter should still hold. However, most analysis of primary voters suggests that this is not the case (Ranney 1972, Norrander 1989, Aldrich 1995).

Aldrich notes that modern U. S. parties attract activists by offering policy benefits (1995). Many of these policy promises are found in the party platform and come to define the party label. The platform then can induce sorting among voters for whom that policy is salient. As policy-demanding voters self-select themselves into each party's primary electorate they make it much more likely that the median primary voter will diverge from the median general election voter. This process has become apparent in recent decades with respect to abortion policy. Since the parties adopted divergent platform positions on abortion, party identifiers have become increasingly polarized on abortion policy at a time when aggregate public opinion on abortion has remained fairly stable (Fiorina 2004). Once these votes sort themselves into distinct primary

electorates they exercise a filter effect on candidate positions that reinforces the uniqueness of the party label.

The degree of self-sorting that occurs among primary voters will induce a polarization of the median voter in the party primary. As the median voter in each party begins to diverge from the median general election voter this creates a spatial zone that every candidate must negotiate. In the short run (single iteration election cycle) the most advantageous strategy would be adopt the exact policy preferences of the median primary voter in the nomination phase and then repudiate or moderate those positions and re-locate to the location of the median general election voters. However repudiating past positions would entail significant reputation costs in both the short run (one election year) and the long term (seeking re-election at the end of said term).

Burden (2001) looked for evidence of short-term candidate shifts by comparing pre- and post-primary voting by legislators and found only slight evidence of such moderation. Poole's (1997) long term analysis of Congress found that individual legislators were very stable in their spatial positions and moved only slightly when the possibility for legislator movement was modeled.

Because of the reputation costs incurred by dramatic shifts in policy positions, repeat winners are more likely to be successful by picking a consistent set of issue positions, some that will satisfy the primary median voter and some that will appeal to the general election median voter. Candidates can vary the stress that her or she places upon a set of issues to appear more moderate or more extreme without incurring the costs of repudiating past positions. A better conception of candidate spatial options is one of bounded independence where the primary and general election median voters establish the end points that constrain policy position choices.

The precise mix of issue positions a candidate adopts to try and navigate the gap between the median voter in both the primary and general election is a matter of political art as much as science. As is often the case in two-level games, the optimum strategy is characterized not as a single point along the space of a line, but rather a "yoke" or a region in which a modest range of winning positions exist and can be chosen (Tsebellis 1991). The existence of a winning "spatial region" within the two level game allows for some room for individual politicians to make choices that satisfy their own personal policy preferences as well as satisfy their constituents.

Fenno's (1978) study of representation found evidence of a "negotiation" between the politician and the electorate. Legislators indicated that certain policy issues were non-negotiable because they were dictated by the strong interests of the constituency. In other cases, representatives stated that they had established trust with constituents which allowed them to occasionally push the boundaries of what voters might tolerate. An example of this pattern can be observed in the case of Arkansas Senator William Fulbright. The Senator was able to indulge his own desire to become a key player on foreign policy issues that mattered very little to voters back home, as long as he adopted issue positions in areas that were salient to his primary and general election constituencies back home.

Down's model of party competition contained just a single iteration (election) and focused upon parties not candidates. The addition of a second level to the game with multiple iterations makes precise predictions of candidate choice more difficult because the solution to such a game is not a singular point but a spatial region. Individual candidates have some degree of choice on their issue positions and issue emphasis. However, adding a partisan phase to the electoral process leads to the prediction that the winning candidates from each party will be pulled towards the primary median voter and become spatially distinct from one another. Every

legislator has bounded independence it is impossible to predict the exact ideal point that a candidate will adopt based on constituency alone. However, it is possible to make a general prediction of legislator preference polarization as primary voters filter in favor of non-centrist candidates.

Hypothesis #1: Spatial polarization of legislator preferences will become occur to the degree that primary voters become polarized between the parties.

At the aggregate level if the primary median voter favors non-centrist candidates this will bias each party's set of legislators away from the middle of the ideological space. Because district lines are not drawn to sort primary median voters, the ideological distribution of those primary medians should resemble those of any sample distribution—given sufficient numbers within each party the primary median voters should be normally distributed with the collective mean biased away from the political center.

Since these primary voters occupy one boundary line that encloses the "yoke" solution for candidates, we can extend this pattern one step further and predict that within each party legislators will be normally distributed around a non-centrist party mean. In the absence of a polarizing primary electorate, legislator preference should gravitate towards the median voter and the aggregate distribution within the chamber will be approximate a normal sample distribution.

In conclusion, the theory of party filtering laid out in this chapter suggests that American political parties are complex and multi-faceted institutions. On the one hand, legislative party leaders lack the brute force to manufacture the solidarity seen in party-list electoral systems. The

use of leadership tools is likely to be conditional, selective and strategic which makes measurement of direct party pressure difficult. On the other hand, political party brands attract voters with particular policy demands and these voters act as gate-keepers to the party nomination. The presence of these activist voters leads to a consistent and predictable non-centrist bias to legislator preferences. This is an example of how American political parties exercise an indirect effect on legislator preferences that is systematic and testable. Legislators face a challenging and complex set of choices as they seek to discover the solution set that will allow them to navigate both the primary and general election. The pivotal voters essentially enclose the boundaries of the yoke solution, but each candidate has some degree of freedom to create an individual ideal point that will satisfy voters at each phase and the personal tastes and interests of the candidate.

Research Design

The great difficulty in testing hypotheses about party effects on legislator preferences is that parties are present in some form in nearly every U.S. Congress and in most states throughout their history. The lack of variation in the variable "party" has led other scholars to focus on strong or weak eras of party government (Rohde 1991, Aldrich and Rohde 1997), or close votes where parties might affect the outcome (Groseclose and Snyder 2000). There is surprisingly little research or information about legislative environments that lack partisan features. A few notable exceptions include Key's (1949) study of the one-party south and Wright and Schaffner's (2002) examination of the non-partisan Nebraska unicameral legislature and Jenkins study of the non-partisan Confederate Congress (1999, 2000a, 2000b). The research presented here follows in the traditional of V.O. Key's (1949) monumental *Southern Politics in State in Nation* and looks at the American one-party south as a venue for separating out party effects from other institutional

effects on legislative behavior. The gradual emergence of competitive party politics in state level elections over the last forty years provides a natural experiment through which party effects can be isolated.

The data used in Chapters Three and Four will consist of legislator ideal points scaled from the roll call votes of ten southern lower houses at two different points in time. The ten states are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. These ten states comprise ten of the eleven states of the old Confederacy and represent the traditional political South. The state of Arkansas is not included in the analysis because it did not publish roll call votes in widely available official journals during this time period.

The data consist of all roll calls with at least 5% dissenting during the one-party era (1961-1962) and the more recent two-party era (1999-2000). All roll calls were gathered from official state publications. The roll calls from the 1960s were coded by the author from journals published by each legislative chamber. The more recent votes (1999-2000 sessions) were gathered by Wright (2004) from electronic records published on official legislative websites or transmitted by the Clerk of the House.

The research design employs a most similar systems approach (Przeworski and Teune 1970) in which the cases are selected to control for as many variables as possible while allowing the key independent variable (political party) to vary. The ten southern states used in this study all closely resemble the federal constitutional system which imposes fundamental limits on party organizations. Each of these states has three distinct and independent branches of government which possess checks and balances and bicameralism. Each legislature copies institutional patterns observed in the U.S. House such as standing committees and leaders with modest

enforcement powers. Fortunately, these ten states also differ from the national legislature in that they experience much greater range in the party competition which is the dependent variable to this study. The cross sections portion of this dissertation employs a before and after approach in an effort to isolate the effects of the treatment (rise of party competition) on legislator preferences (Babbie 2007).

Formally these southern states had a two-stage electoral system like the rest of nation. However, the Democratic Party Primary was the *de facto* general election in most regions of the U.S. south during the one-party era (notable exceptions being the mountain counties of Virginia, North Carolina and eastern Tennessee). During the one-party era more voters participated in the Democratic Primary election than in the fall election because the general election was a mere formality that ratified the decisions rendered in the primary stage.

The Politics of the Democratic South

In essence, the one-party U.S. south lacked meaningful political parties in state and local elections. The Democratic Party Primary simply was the decisive election and the vast majority of registered voters turned out for that crucial phase. Because the Democratic Party Primary contained almost all general election voters, there was no dramatic divergence between the primary median and the general election median voter. These southern states did not experience a party filter bias which favored non-centrist candidates with non-centrist preferences.

Effectively the one-party system found in most southern states functioned as a *de facto* non-partisan electoral system. Almost every voter belonged to the same party and that party did not bring structure to the political conflict. V.O. Key (1949) found that elections in the one-party south lacked accountability and order without parties to link candidates up and down the ballot. Without parties to organize and structure alternative choices, candidates often converged on the

same policy location and there were few policy differences to separate them. Frequently elections in the one-party south turned on the aspects such as personality or parochial "friends and neighbor" voting that reflected geographic interests. Likewise, in a legislative chamber where virtually every member is a Democrat, party label was not a meaningful device in terms of structuring political divisions within the chamber or allocating institutional resources (unless the allocation principle is that of universalism). V.O. Key observed that while the south was "one-party" in national elections it was essentially without parties in state and local politics.

As Key summarizes the southern political dilemma (1949, 11):

> Consistent and unquestioning attachment, by overwhelming majorities, to the Democratic Party nationally has meant that the politics within southern states—the election of governors, of state legislators, and the settlement of public issues generally—has had to be conducted without benefit of political parties. As institutions, parties enjoy a general disrepute, yet most of the democratic world finds them indispensable as instruments of self-government, as means for the organization and expression of competing viewpoints on public policy. Nevertheless, over a tremendous area—the South—no such competing institutions exist and the political battle has to be carried on by transient and amorphous political factions within the Democratic Party, which are ill-designed to meet the necessities of self-government.

Thus the "solid south" which displayed great solidarity in national elections was anything but unified in political contests below the federal level. However, it is important to note that the Democratic Party label was not devoid of meaning. The one-party system was erected to perpetuate the racial and class system and lock in segregation and class hierarchy in the region.

Electoral power was held by a small white minority within each state as systematic barriers to voter participation kept both black and poor white voters from participating in large numbers. Turnout in the decisive Democratic Party primary rarely exceeded 30% of the voting age population even in the most competitive elections. Members of the state assemblies were elected from counties where local courthouse elites dominated the political scene. Shannon

(1949) called these elites the “banker-merchant-farmer-lawyer-doctor governing class “which included the most prominent townspeople as well as the leading agricultural producers from the surrounding countryside.

Within the south, white populations that controlled majority black counties tended to exercise a disproportionate influence in relation to their numbers within the state’s population. A minority within their own county and a minority within the state, the black belt whites were the most concerned with the creation and preservation of the one-party system that protected racial segregation (Kousser 1974). These black belt regions were typically over-represented in the state legislature and most black residents were unable to vote. To the extent that the Democratic Party had policy meaning, the Party as an institution was organized to preserve the segregation system.

One potential flaw associated with using the ten southern states from the early 1960s is that they are not representative of the rest of the nation. It is true that the southern states systematically constricted access to voting through such devices as literacy tests, poll taxes, understanding tests and grandfather clauses. These restrictions certainly greatly reduced the turnout among blacks and poor whites in most southern states therefore reducing the diversity of the electorate. In addition, it is also true that in the early 1960s the south as a region was much more rural and less industrial than the rest of the United States at that time lacking economic diversity that would arise in later decades (Key 1949, Kousser 1974, Black and Black 1987).

It must be acknowledged that the suffrage limitations likely reduced political conflict by excluding blacks and some poor whites from the debate; however, even within this constricted political system of the early 1960s we find intense competition over the allocation of resources and state priorities. In the state of Florida for example, there were frequent conflicts between the rural northern panhandle and the rapidly urbanizing southern panhandle. In overwhelmingly

Democratic Louisiana there were a great many roll call votes as factions within the state battled for influence. The constricted electorate may have reduced the number of competing groups or factions within a state but it certainly did not eliminate them.

Any attempt to explore party effects must contend with the difficulty of finding perfect cases where political party varies. Southern states may not be exact replicas of the national government but they do share a fundamental political problem of resolving clashing interests. Furthermore, these states offer a rare opportunity to look at how legislative coalitions and voting are structured in the absence of organizing aspects of party competition. The southern states provide an adequate natural experiment that controls for many constitutional or structural features while allowing political party to vary much more fully than can be found at the national level of government.

Measurement

The theory discussed thus far has focused upon the spatial location of legislators and legislative candidates. Parties are predicted to exercise a filtering effect in favor of non-centrist candidates in primary elections.

How are legislator preferences to be measured? Roll call votes will be used to observe the expressed preferences of legislators. Roll call votes are not a perfect indicator of individual preferences but they are a reasonable proxy variable. Legislators may cast insincere roll call votes from time to time as they trade votes with other legislators, committee chairmen or party leaders in order to obtain some other legislative good. Empirical evidence of this is behavior found by comparing the votes of legislators in committee with their votes on floor. At times they will reverse themselves in the floor roll call, presumably in exchange for some other political consideration.

Despite these imperfections it is legitimate to take roll call votes as indicators of a legislator's public preferences because he or she is fully aware that every roll call vote goes into the public record and voters back in the districts will treat that vote as a sincere representation of the legislators' preferences. Other political actors such as potential opponents, party leaders, committee leaders and members of the executive branch will treat those roll calls as though they were sincere. Legislators also tend to be very risk averse and act on the assumption that a vote could be the subject of public controversy, thus they often vote as though the public were watching carefully even when this is not the case.

Furthermore, insincere votes created by trading are unlikely to greatly bias the measurement of legislator preferences because the legislators most likely to trade their votes already sit near the cut line (or are "on the fence") and thus are willing to make a trade. A legislator who is deeply opposed to a piece of legislation (either due to personal preferences or those of the median voter in their district) is less likely to make a vote trade because the costs would be too great. Those who are relatively indifferent are the legislators near the cut line who can are willing to change sides because the cost is relatively modest for them.

Finally, another great advantage of roll call votes is that they occur with great frequency in many legislative chambers. Most southern states during this time period had a requirement that all bills which spend money required a roll call vote for approval. In addition most states required a roll call for final passage votes. In contrast, these states had more rigorous rules mandating roll call votes than is found in the U.S. Congress where major pieces of legislation can still be approved by a voice vote.

The spatial placement of each legislator within a given chamber is scaled using the W-NOMINATE program developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1997). This program produces a

specific numeric location with for each legislator on each dimension found within the roll call data. Legislator coordinates are constrained to lie with a space with values that range from +1 to –1.

Cross Sectional Data Analysis

The polarization hypothesis predicts that the aggregate legislator preferences in a one-party system (or a *de facto* non-partisan system as is the case) will be centrist and normally distributed and those in a competitive two party system will be bi-modal with a separate mode for each party. In the concluding section of this Chapter I present initial evidence in support of this hypothesis from an examination of the legislator ideal points generated from roll call votes using the W-NOMINATE program.

The graphs of legislator ideal point distributions (Figures 3-1 through 3-10) display three pieces of information. The histogram shows the number of legislators located within a specific region of the first dimensional axis. The Kernel Density lines provide the equivalent of a moving average that smoothes out the histogram lines allowing for easier detection of patterns. Finally a normal curve line has been added to each graph as a visual guide demonstrating what a standard normal distribution should look like given the number of legislators in that particular chamber. Visual inspection of the ideal point graphs reveals that in many of the ten southern states the number of legislators in the center of the distribution is much lower in the two-party period than during the one-party period. This polarization of legislator preferences can be seen in the hollowing out of the political center and the dearth of moderates in between the two party modes.

Hypothesis One suggested that competitive party primaries would lead to preference polarization within southern legislatures. What is happening to the number of centrists over time? Table 3-1 below contains the percentage of all legislators in each southern state who are

located in the middle third of the scaled space. Now caution must be used when comparing ideal points across time because the scaling technique can only tell us where legislators are position in relation to one another at a given moment of time (across time comparisons require more data and a different version of the NOMINATE program). For example, the length of the first dimension policy space of the 1999-2000 Georgia State House could be larger or smaller than the policy space that existed in the 1961-1962. We cannot know if the overall space has expanded contracted or moved to the right or left over time without additional data.

While we cannot know how the policy space of 1961-62 relates to that of 1999-2000, we can make note of the distribution of legislators relative to each other and how that has changed. Are legislators concentrated in the center of the space or on the periphery? During the 1961-1962 period the middle third of the policy space contained more than one-third of the legislators in eight of the ten states, Florida was right at one-third and Texas below that mark (Table 3-1). In seven of the ten southern states in our sample more than 40% of all legislators were clustered into the center third of the space. This is consistent with the expectation that in the absence of party competition the distribution will resemble a normal distribution.

The patterns observed in roll call voting from the two-party 1999-2000 sessions show a more polarized distribution of legislators within the policy space. The percentage of centrally located legislators drops in nine of the ten southern states with Mississippi being the one exception. The states of Alabama, Louisiana, Tennessee and Texas see modest declines in the percentage of spatial moderates, while Florida, Georgia, North Carolina South Carolina, and Virginia see very large declines in political moderates. Again the distribution of legislator ideal points is generally consistent with the hypothesis with some exceptions. There appears to be a direct correlation between party competiveness and polarization as the five states where

Republicans were most competitive in legislative elections were also the five states with few centrist legislators.

The states with less dramatic change include Tennessee which always had a significant number of mountain Republicans in the state legislature. It is possible that Tennessee has not become as sharply polarized as some states because of the strong regional competition and cross partisanship within the chamber. The Deep South states of Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama have lagged behind the rest of the south in terms of two-party competition in state legislative races. It is likely that the large number of centrists in those these Deep South states is the result of the continued survival of a large contingent of conservative Democrats. Texas is a curious case because of the small number of moderates during the one-party period. Observers of Texas politics have long noted that Democrats within the state legislature were divided into liberal and conservative wings. Likewise Louisiana had an unusually high level of organized factionalism between the Long family and the anti-Long. Alliances were publicized in advance of the election and these groups function somewhat like party tickets in vying for power within the state. Both of these deviant cases merit further study.

In summary, a comparison of legislator preference distributions from the early 1960s and late 1990s lends support to the theory that political parties can create a significant bias in the distribution of legislator ideal points. Empirical evidence shows that in nine of the ten southern lower chambers studied the number of legislators located in the middle of the policy space was lower in the two-party era than in the one-party era of southern politics. In five southern states the rise of full-fledged party competition coincided with a dramatic decline in the number of centrist legislators. In some states like Alabama and Mississippi the development of two-party

competition was still taking place and the process was not yet complete in the rural parts of these states.

In this chapter three I explored the effect of party competition on the spatial location of legislators. A comparison of southern state legislators showed increased preference polarization after the rise of two-party politics in the south. Chapter Four will examine the spatial structure found in roll call voting. This chapter will provide additional evidence on party preference filtering by showing that parties induce a low dimensional structure to legislator preferences.

CHAPTER FOUR: Political Parties and Spatial Constraint

In Chapter Three presented a hypothesis that parties exercise indirect influence by acting as a filter that introduces a predictable and systematic bias in legislator spatial location. In Chapter Four, a second hypothesis regarding party influence will be presented. In this case parties exercise an indirect effect upon the way the issue space is ordered such that individual issues become collapsed into a left-right party ideology dimension. The existence of a basic left-right dimension is typically a fundamental assumption of spatial theorist and most spatial models. However, the data presented in this chapter, will indicate that such an assumption is only warranted if political party competition is present in the legislator selection process.

A central problem of representative democracy is the process by which citizen preferences are translated into authoritative decisions made by elected representatives. How do representatives "make present" the substantive views of their constituents who cannot physically be present to vote and deliberate (Pitkin 1967)? Do political parties introduce a systematic bias that might distort this relationship between constituents and their representative? What affect does the presence or absence of political parties have upon the representative decision-making? To what extent do parties subtly favor legislators with certain types of preferences over other candidates?

Political parties have often been put forth as crucial instruments in the representative process. According to the responsible party school (Schattschneider 1942, APSA 1950) parties act as a critical intervening variable in the representative process because they structure choices over policies and candidates. Responsible parties articulate divergent policy platforms and offer slates of candidates who share policy objectives. After an election political parties encourage

internal cooperation and accountability because of the expectation that a collective performance will result in collective reelection or defeat.

Political scientists have devoted considerable time and effort to the study of political parties in the United States and other nations. Most studies examine *variation* in the performance of parties rather than explore the range of effects follow from the presence or absence of political parties. V.O. Key's *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (1949) is a notable exception to this pattern.

Key's work explored the theoretical question of whether intra-party factions could function as substitutes for political parties in a one-party political system. Key's analysis of electoral coalitions in the south found substantial differences between competing political parties and competing intra-party factions. Key concluded that, in most southern states, factions were insufficient substitutes for parties because coalitions were very unstable over time. Furthermore, intra-party factions failed to articulate distinct policy choices for voters. Even when factions did articulate divergent policy choices in a particular election, the succeeding election might be structured by a completely different collection of factions and issue platforms. The ephemeral nature of intra-party factions deprived citizens of the opportunity to exercise control over government policy in the long run. Thus, Key found that intra-party factions were insufficient instruments for democratic control over government institutions and policy-making.

While *Southern Politics in State and Nation* contained extensive analysis of one-party electoral politics, it did not delve into legislative decision-making in one-party states. The few studies of roll call voting in one-party legislatures have tended to confirm that voting coalitions in one-party chambers are less organized than two-party states. Patterson's (1962) analysis of in the one-party Oklahoma House during the 1959 session found that at least seven different issue

scales could be recovered from roll call votes. Parsons (1963) found that a regional structure was present in slightly more than half of 305 Florida Senate roll calls between 1947-1961. This regional split was a distributive cartel among Senators from rural north Florida who worked together to prevent the urbanizing southern part of the state from realizing its proper proportion of legislative seats, government funding and committee seats. Welch and Carlson's (1973) analysis of voting in the non-partisan Nebraska Senate found that roll calls produced an average of about nine different Guttmann scales per session analyzed. They found that almost half of all roll calls were associated sufficiently to be scalable during the 1927, 1937 and 1947 sessions. After Nebraska switched to non-partisan elections the percentage of scalable votes declined to 35% and 27% in the 1959 and 1969 sessions respectively. All three of these studies of roll call voting indicated that policy coalitions in non-partisan or one-party legislatures were only weakly associated across issue areas.

This lack of organization within one-party legislative roll call voting is rather unusual. Studies of roll call voting in the United States Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 1985, 1991, 1997, 1999; Heckman and Snyder 1997), the 1993-97 Czech Parliament (Noury and Mielcova 1997), the Third and Fourth European Parliaments (Noury 1999), the 1951-56 French National Assembly (Poole and Rosenthal 1999), and the 1995 Polish Parliament (Mercik and Mazurkiewicz 1997) all find that most roll call votes can be explained by a fairly simple one or two-dimensional spatial model of decision-making.

The Poole and Rosenthal finding of a basic low dimensional space was somewhat surprising considering that many policy issues are not related to one another. In fact, roll call vote studies conducted in the 1970s and the early 1980s began with the assumption that voting coalitions would differ across policy sectors and therefore they sorted votes within distinct policy

areas instead of looking at all roll call votes (Clausen 1973, Sinclair 1978, 1982). But the work of Poole and Rosenthal has demonstrated that there is a high degree of association.

In fact, this finding was something of an accident as Keith Poole attempted to use interest group ratings as a means of scaling Members of Congress. However, Poole discovered less variation than he expected in interest group scales because the scales were drawn from roll call votes. Rather than being unique the scales appear to be correlated (1981). This correlation suggested that votes on social, economic and foreign policy issues are interrelated. The desire to scale this underlying dimension led to the creation of the NOMINATE program and the discovery of low dimensionality found in roll call voting throughout most of the history of the U.S. Congress (1988, 1997).

From Downs' (1957) spatial model of electoral competition, Poole and Rosenthal adopted the spatial framework of legislator decision-making. Poole and Rosenthal translate this model of decision-making into a legislative setting, where legislators can be represented by a point in a multi-dimensional hyper-sphere of policy space. Legislative proposals are also located within the space and voting is a function of whether the policy proposal or the status quo is closest to the legislator's location. Decision making is a function of distance within the space.

The existence of this low dimensional space appears to be a regular feature of partisan legislatures. Why is the space organized in this way many issues can be independent of one another? Converse (1964) proposed that within the body politic there is a hierarchy of belief organization. At the top of this hierarchy are individuals who conceptualize individual policy questions as being closely bound to some underlying fundamental ideology (or "crowning postulate" in his words). For individuals who utilize ideology, individual issue positions are "constrained" because they must be consistent with the crowning postulate. Converse finds that

individuals with high levels of education and political participation are more likely to utilize ideology in their thinking. However, studies of public opinion have revealed that the only a small minority of the public is constrained in their thinking about individual issues (Abramson 1983, Kinder 1983, Kinder and Sears 1985).[4]

If members of the American public are unconstrained in their policy thinking what is it that causes the low dimensional space found in roll call voting? Is it a function of the constrained ideological thinking of the legislators? Many spatial theorists treat the low dimensional spatial structure as a function of the personal or ideological beliefs of politicians. Ordeshook (1976) and Hinich and Pollard (1981) reasoned that if candidates were highly ideological in their thinking, then ideological constraint would tend to collapse distinct issue positions into one or two ideological dimensions. Even if voters do not utilize the constrained ideological dimensions used by candidates, the effective dimensionality of the choice space would be reduced, if all candidate issue positions were constrained by a common ideological belief system.

Poole and Rosenthal realized that if legislators are constrained and they use spatial distance to make roll call decisions, then the basic space of ideology could be estimated from roll call data. In order to extract this space and legislator ideal points, they developed the NOMINATE scaling program. If Members of Congress were unconstrained in their roll call voting, NOMINATE would extract a high number of dimensions but if Members were constrained dimensionality would be low because individual "issues" would become embedded in one left-right ideological dimension.

Using NOMINATE, Poole and Rosenthal found that for most of its history, voting in the U.S. Congress appears to be rather constrained. The 1st dimension (left-right ideology) extracted

[4] For a dissenting view Stimson (2004), Claggett and Shafer (2010) point to evidence of continuity and order in long term public opinion.

by NOMINATE correctly classifies 84% of all individual House roll call vote decisions, and 82% of all Senate votes between 1789-1985. Adding a second dimension (often capturing race or north-south conflict) increases correct classification to 86% in the House and 84% in the Senate (1999). The remaining unexplained variance is a combination of random error or very infrequent voting coalitions. Thus, for much of its history, roll call voting appears to be largely uni-dimensional or at perhaps two-dimensional.

But what accounts for the party-ideology dimension that dominates most roll call voting in Congressional history? Is it a function of internal belief systems held by legislators or is it an effect induced by an outside force? Poole and Rosenthal saw members' personal beliefs as the key variable in inducing low dimensional constraint although they do accord political parties a role in establishing how issues are mapped onto the basic space (1997, 34). However, there is evidence to suggest that political parties may occupy a much more central role than the one laid out for them in the Poole and Rosenthal account. This evidence consists of covariance between two-party competition and the strength of a powerful single spatial dimension. Spatial constraint essentially disappears when the two-party system breaks down. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) find that that the number of meaningful dimensions found in U. S. House roll call votes increased to four or five during the Era of Good Feeling (The 14^{th}–18^{th} Congresses, 1815-1825). This change in the level of voting constraint also coincided with a shift from two-party competition to one-party dominance, as the Federalist Party ceased to function as a party in most of the country.

More evidence of the possible relationship between party systems and dimensionality can be found in Jenkins' analysis of the Confederate Congress (1999, 2000a, 2000b). Jenkins compared voting in the U.S. Congress with that of the Confederate Congress during the two sessions when both existed (1861-1864). Jenkins notes that both the Confederate and Federal

Congresses had the same constitutional structure and internal organization. Furthermore, both Congresses faced very similar legislative agendas pertaining to the mobilization of resources for the war effort. The chief difference between the two Congresses was the absence of political parties in the Confederate Congress.

Using W-NOMINATE, Jenkins finds that roll call voting in the Confederate Congress lacks the spatial constraint found in concurrent U.S. Congresses. For example, during the 1st and 2nd Confederate Congresses, the first dimension correctly classified only 68% and 73% of all roll call votes. These classification rates are about the same size as the average margin of victory, which means that a one-dimensional model performs little better than a naïve model which assumes which everyone voted with the majority. By contrast, contemporaneous U.S. Congresses had classification success rates of 83% and 86%, with a proportion reduction in error of about 50% over the naive model. According to Jenkins, these findings lend strength to the hypothesis that political parties play an integral role in structuring voting and coalition formation (1999).

Jenkins' work is also important because it is able to control for institutional structure, legislative agenda and belief systems. Jenkins shows that two legislatures, with virtually identical committee systems, produced very different levels of dimensionality. Furthermore, Jenkins study has the rare capacity to hold constant the identity of legislators by comparing the same individuals in a partisan and non-partisan setting with similar institutional structure. The evidence shows a large variation in behavior that varies with the presence or absence of a competitive party system. Jenkins concludes:

> Examining the voting behavior of members who served in both the U.S. and Confederate Houses, I found little evidence of individual-level cross-system stability. Rather than claim that ideological stability is not robust across legislative systems, however, I argue that party was the cause of the instability. By controlling

> the legislative agenda and expediting the exchange of votes for policy outputs, parties structure Congressional voting behavior and induce individual-level ideological stability. While the U.S. House maintained a strong two-party system throughout the war, the Confederate House lacked a party system and, therefore, a source of ideological bonding…Thus Poole's assertion that members die in their ideological boots, rather than being a general finding, is contingent upon a stable party system being in place (1999, 24).

Thus Jenkins shows that individual level ideology alone is not sufficient to explain the dimensional structure, however, he posits that ideology would likely have emerged with additional time.

Theory and Hypotheses

In the previous chapter I argued that the presence of polarized party primaries would lead to the polarization of legislator preferences. In this chapter I will elaborate on the party argument with respect to dimensionality. Specifically, I propose that a non-centrist party nomination electorate favors those candidates who employ a single party ideology dimension to order their issue positions. In the absence of a partisan selection effect legislators should adopt the issue positions of the median voter on each distinct dimension. Since voters are less constrained by ideology we would expect that legislators would show less spatial constrain when freed from the pressures of the party filter on preferences created by the nomination stage in a competitive two party system.

In practice how would the partisan selection effect operate so as to reduce the policy space found in roll call voting? According to Aldrich (1995) parties exist because they solve the collective action problem of mobilizing voters at election time and they manage the supply of ambitious politicians. For potential candidates political parties present both obstacles and benefits. The obstacle is that parties possess a *de facto* joint monopoly on viable general election candidates. The chance of winning an election without the support of one of the two major

parties is very small. This forces the candidate to compete and win within the party primary (or party conventions prior to the direct primary).

In the 19th century American politics, parties mobilized their base through the use of extensive patronage benefits. The flow of money and favors enabled the construction of a hierarchical party which was very efficient at turning out voters on behalf of the party ticket. The party machine era equation of trading votes for party supplied benefits was weakened by Progressive reforms. The advent of the secret ballot, government printing of the ballot and direct primaries all weakened traditional machine party tools for control. Later, the rise of the social welfare state with the New Deal undercut the benefits incentive that machine parties once offered (Milkis 1993). In response to these changes modern political parties have emphasized policy benefits as a means of attracting voters into the party base and mobilizing them on election day. Single issue or ideological voters have become a key source for raising money, recruiting volunteers and potential candidates for office (Aldrich 1995).

If political parties seek to attract single-issue voters with the promise of policy benefits it becomes rather important to ensure that the slate of party nominees generally subscribe to this policy platform. Technically this could become a major obstacle since party leaders lack control over the nomination of candidates. However, in reality the use of policy incentives has a powerful effect on the voters who participate in low turnout party primary elections. Policy seeking or single-issue voters are much more likely to participate and they sort themselves between the two-parties. This system results in a primary electorate that is disproportionately composed of individuals who are ideologically oriented and constrained in their belief systems (Key 1956; Ranney 1975 and 1978; Lengle 1981; Polsby 1983; Abramowitz, Rapaport and Stone 1991).

Even if many primary voters still think in terms of discrete issues rather than overarching political ideology, the self-selection of these voters into each party's primary electorate will tend to create a constraining effect on this issue space. The party primary provides an institutional advantage to candidates who offer platforms that are consistent with the orthodox party ideology. Maverick candidates, who adopt issue positions that diverge from this pattern, are at a disadvantage because some of their positions will likely offend particular policy seeking groups within the party's base.

Do orthodox candidates *always* win the party nomination? No, because it possible, even likely, that policy-seeking nominating electorates would be willing to accept some deviations from the standard party orthodoxy in order to increase the chances of their party's candidate winning the office in districts with a history of electoral losses. Obtaining some policy benefits via a successful maverick is better than receiving zero benefits while the opposition party wins (Stone and Abramowitz 1984, Abramowitz 1989).

However, candidates who deviate from the basic party-ideology run face several risks. If a key interest group within the party base is frustrated enough by the maverick party nominee that group may choose to support an independent candidate who could siphon off enough votes to prevent the maverick candidate from winning. Another tactic used by unhappy policy-seeking groups is to sabotage their party's candidate in the general election quietly by failing to mobilize their voters. Thus benefit-seeking groups with significant blocs of organized voters can attempt to exercise an *ex post veto* over distasteful nominees through their inaction in the general election.

In contrast to the two-party system, legislators chosen in a non-partisan or one-party system are less likely to display the same degree of constraint as those found in a two-party

system. The root of this difference is the shift from a two-stage electoral process to a one-stage process.[5] If the party nominating stage is eliminated, then candidate strategy will be altered as their issue platform is freed from the constraints of the orthodox party ideology expected by the primary voters. Given an unconstrained set of voters, the optimal strategy for a candidate is to adopt the median location on each issue dimension important to district voters—even if the combination of issue positions is not ordered by an over arching ideological position.

Hypothesis Two: The presence of competitive party system will induce low dimensional space in roll call voting, while the absence will produce multi-dimensional voting.

In the case of a two-party electoral system with a party nomination stage we would expect that legislator decision-making would be more constrained. Evidence of that constraint would consist of finding only one or, at most, two ideological dimensions.

Data, Methods and Results

The data used to test the dimensionality hypothesis will consist of roll call votes from ten southern lower chambers at two different points in time (1961-62, 1999-2000). These states present a natural experiment as they hold constant many key institutional features while allowing political party to vary during the latter part of the 20th century. Additional details on case selection and data collection can be found in Chapter Three.

The dimensional space will be analyzed using the W-NOMINATE program developed by Poole and Rosenthal and Heckman and Snyder's linear factor model. The NOMINATE program will estimate as many dimensions as the user requests. In most cases, higher order dimensions

[5] Elections in the one-party Democratic south technically had two stages, a Democratic Primary and a general election. Democratic candidates were usually unopposed in the general election. Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, the Democratic Primary is treated as the functional equivalent of a one-stage general election.

are simply fitting noise in the data. In theory, if each vote were decided by a unique ordering of legislators, the *n* of dimensions would equal the *n* of all roll call votes, as long as this was less than the factorial of the *n* of legislators. In practice, the number of dimensions that substantively improve the ability to explain legislator vote choice is usually quite small. I will also use Heckman and Snyder's linear factor model because the results of factor analysis with respect to dimensionality are easier to interpret.

The dimensionality of the space can be established several different ways. A first step is to establish whether roll call voting is essentially one-dimensional or not. Koford (1991) demonstrated that if legislator ideal points were evenly distributed around the edge of a two-dimensional circle, a one-dimensional line through that space would overstate the power of the first dimension. Koford calculated that the first dimension estimated by NOMINATE could correctly classify 75% of all roll call votes, even when the true dimensionality of the space was equal to two. Based on this simulation, Koford argues that unless classification rates exceed 75% the null hypothesis that more than one dimension is present cannot be rejected.[6] Because of the difficulty in interpreting NOMINATE's correct classification percentage I will not be using it to confirm or reject Hypothesis 2.

Table 4-1 provides several measures of fit for the 1st dimension scaled by the NOMINATE program. To establish a baseline of comparison I have listed the average scores for the two-party U.S. Houses over the first two hundred years. I have also listed the least organized U.S. Houses which occur during the weak party system of the Era of Good Feelings. When competitive parties have been present at the federal level the average number of votes correctly classified by the 1st dimension was 83% and when competitive parties are absent the percentage

[6] Koford's finding is based upon an extremely unlikely distribution of ideal points and should be understood as the theoretical maximum case of overstating the first dimension.

ranges from 70%-76%. A similar pattern exists in the ten southern lower chambers. During the one-party era period (1961-1962) the typical classification percentage is just under 80% for the 1st dimension (Table 4-2) and with the introduction of two-party competition the typical classification rises to the mid 80% range and all ten states are above 80% mark (Table 4-3).

Another means of assessing the strength of the 1st dimension is the Proportional Reduction in Error (PRE). This statistic estimates how much the 1st dimension improves upon a naïve model which assumes that everyone votes with the majority. If 64% of the chamber votes with the majority, the naïve model would correctly predict 64% of all votes. The naïve model leaves 36% of the votes unexplained and the PRE statistic indicates how much of this error is reduced by the more sophisticated NOMINATE spatial model of voting

The PRE for the two-party U.S. House of Representatives averages .489 which means that the NOMINATE 1st dimension explains roughly half of the votes unexplained by the naïve model (see Table 4-1). In contrast the PRE for the five one-party U.S. Houses and the two non-partisan Confederate Houses is very low with the NOMINATE scores only improving about roughly one quarter on the baseline model.

The PRE scores for the one-party south (Table 4-2) vary considerable across the ten chambers ranging from extremely low numbers in Georgia, Mississippi and Virginia to a high .431 in Alabama. All ten one-party chambers rank below the U.S. House average and the median is roughly .250 which is very comparable to the one-party U.S. House and non-partisan Confederate House. The PRE scores are significantly higher in the more recent period (Table 4-3) with about half above the U.S. House two-party average and half below that number. Three states (Louisiana, Mississippi and Tennessee) have particularly low scores.

A third measure of goodness of fit is the Geometric Metric Proportion (GMP) which measures not just the number of votes correctly classified takes into account the degree of spatial error. An error by an extreme legislator at either end of the dimension is more costly than an error by a legislator who is very close to cut line for that vote. For this measure the higher the score the better the spatial fit of the model. The U.S. House historical baseline for GMP is close to .700 while the one-party House numbers range between .574 and .642 and we see a similar pattern for the one-party southern chambers where most of the scores are around the .640-.650 range but well below the typical U.S. House. In the two-party periods seven of the ten chambers exceed the two-party U.S. House average and all ten states score above the .660 level.

All three goodness of fit measures indicate that the 1st dimension is stronger in the two-party era than in the one-party era in these state legislatures which is consistent with the hypothesis. But more precise measures of the number of dimensions are required. One approach is to examine the Eigen values produced by the Heckman-Snyder linear factor model. The Heckman-Snyder approach is an alternative approach to scaling ideal points and dimensions. While the there is little difference between the two in terms of the legislator spatial coordinates, the factor model is easier to interpret when it comes to the assessing dimensions.

Factor analysis dimensions with Eigen values which exceed 1.0 are interpreted as significant explanatory factors (Harman 1976). That is to say the factor (or dimension) is adding value to the model by doing more than simply explaining random noise in the data (see Table 4-4). During the 1961-1962 period four states had two meaningful dimensions, three states had three dimensions, two states had six dimensions and one state had seven dimensions! Virginia had no dimensions that met the 1.00 threshold although one was very close which suggests that voting was very chaotic and lacked any sort of spatial order. These data are consistent with the

expectations that the lack of competitive parties would produce a policy space with multiple dimensions. The more recent period of 1999-2000 (see Table 4-5) exhibits dramatic change as half of the states have just a single dimension present while the other half have only two dimensions present. This is very similar to Poole and Rosenthal's finding that a two dimensional model is present throughout much of Congressional history.

A key assumption of low dimensionality hypothesis is that the party primary electorate is inducing candidates to adopt issue positions consistent with the party orthodoxy. This causes the multi-dimensional issue space to become concentrated into a single party ideology dimension. But is that what has happened in the U.S. south? How strongly is party related to the basic dimension scaled from votes in the two-party period?

In order to assess this I regressed the legislators' party label against the ideal point locations for the 1st and 2nd dimension scaled by the NOMINATE program. The results (Table 4-6) show that party is very strongly correlated with the 1st dimension in eight of the ten states. This suggests that it is correct to call this a party-ideology dimension.

The two exceptions were Louisiana and Mississippi where the relationship did exist but was not strong. The weakness in these two Deep South states probably reflects the lack of party competition in Mississippi where Democrats still dominate in this mostly rural state. During the 1999-2000 session Democrats still held 70% of all State House seats in Mississippi and 74% in Louisiana.

It is my expectation that race may prove to be more important than party in Mississippi. In the case of Louisiana the evidence suggests that voting is structured but that party may not explain all of the content of that dimension. Again I suspect that race may prove to be a powerful explanatory factor but it is worth noting that Louisiana's open primary dilutes the party selection

effects by combining all voters into one primary. To a degree Louisiana is the outlier state in this study. It is the state with the lowest classification score, lowest GMP score and it is the only state where the 3rd dimension almost meets the 1.0 Eigen value threshold.

Conclusion

The theory advanced in this chapter is that political parties exercise a selection effect in screening in candidates who utilize an ideological framework for bundling their issue positions. This effect is encouraged because the party ideology attracts policy-seeking voters who in turn select the nominees. Candidates with orthodox issue positions that match up well with the policy demands are more likely to be nominated. Thus the multi-dimensional policy space is collapsed into a low dimensional party-ideology. The primary electorate effectively reduces the potential complexity of the space by limiting the combination of issue positions. The data from this natural experiment of southern politics are consistent with the theory. Roll Call voting in state legislature is much more organized in the two-party period than in the one-party era, the number of dimensions declines significantly and the first dimension in roll call voting is primarily partisan in most of the states.

CHAPTER FIVE: Political Change in Georgia, 1960-2005

In Chapters Three and Four, I presented evidence that there are significant differences in roll call voting patterns in southern legislatures before and after the rise of two party competition in that region. That pattern of evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that political parties are responsible for the rise in legislator polarization and the increased structure found in roll call voting. However, a comparison of the southern states at two widely separated points in time provides limited leverage in tracing the casual mechanism at work in this transformation. A chronological case study that examines the influence of political parties as well as other possible explanations for the observed change is required to test the hypothesized relationship.

The partisan selection effect theory advanced in Chapter Three requires measurement of a) the internal political structure found in roll call voting; b) external changes in the partisan and electoral environment and; c) other possible explanations of the change in roll call voting patterns. All of these elements must be gathered over a sufficiently lengthy period of time that matches the gradual development of two-party politics in the U.S. south. Therefore, the second portion of this dissertation will focus on a single case, the Georgia State House of Representatives during the period between 1961-2005. This case will enable the testing of hypotheses regarding the cause of legislator polarization and cover a sufficient length of time to capture the full range of variation in party competition in Georgia.

The Georgia House is a particularly useful case because the state has experienced significant variation in terms of party competition, party identification, and voter participation over time. The 1960s in particular saw the first Republicans and black legislators elected to the state legislature. Black voters registered and participated in elections in increasing numbers after

the Voting Rights Act removed barriers. The state experienced migration from non-southern states and significant urbanization as the Atlanta metropolitan region grew explosively. One advantage of using Georgia as a test case for hypothesis testing is that these tremendous changes do not all occur simultaneously, thus allowing greater leverage on the question of which factor has the greatest effect on the dependent variable which is legislator preference polarization.

Chapter 5 will provide an overview of the rise of competitive two-party politics in Georgia and compare this state with the rest of the south in terms of the speed and pacing of realignment. Chapter 6 will consider roll call voting patterns within the Georgia State House and pinpoint the period in which legislator polarization and spatial constraint become pronounced. Chapter 7 will consist of a careful examination of the timing and sequence of key political events and their effect on legislator roll call behavior. This evidence will enable the testing of competing hypotheses regarding the causal mechanism behind the rise of legislator polarization. Potential alternative explanations to polarization include conflict between rural and urban interest, racial tensions between white and black legislators, and the rise of independent chamber leadership.

Georgia Politics in 1960

The scope of change that has occurred in the state of Georgia is quite breathtaking. In 1960, the Democratic Party completely dominated Georgia politics to the extent that Republican Party candidates for governor had not won more than 20% of the state wide vote since 1876. A Republican candidate had won the won the governor's office only twice, both during reconstruction and its immediate aftermath in 1868 and 1872. In 1961 the Democratic Party held every seat in the state legislature with the exception of a single Republican member from Fannin

County. The legislature was completely white and overwhelming male despite the fact that African-Americans composed nearly one-third of the population and women half.

Complete Democratic Party success in every federal, state and local election did not entail party "control" of those offices. At the state and local level Democratic dominance was a tool for the exclusion of black voters and poor white voters from meaningful electoral contests and the preservation of segregated society in the general election. The creation of the "solid south" for the Democratic Party was accomplished by excluding voters who had voted for the Republican or Progressive Parties in the late 1890s (Kousser 1974). At the local level the Democratic Party legally excluded blacks and curtailed participation by poor whites. Barriers to voting were so effective that turnout among eligible voters in the decisive Democratic Party Primary seldom rose above 30%.

Once the dominant class agreed on which white candidate would receive the party nomination, the Democratic Party voted in unison to ensure the control of local offices. The creation of primaries with automatic run-offs ensured majority support for the nominee. Preventing competition within the Democratic Party prevented unhappy losers from running in the general election and creating an opening for overturning the existing social order. However, the party imposed no policy agreement on other policy questions beyond the preservation of segregation and social hierarchy.

In his study of southern politics, V.O. Key (1949) noted that the Democratic Party itself provided little or no organization or structure to political contests. Primary elections for governor were often wild every-man-for-himself affairs in which five, six or seven candidates each struggled to make the run-off election between the top two finishers. Elections often turned on questions of personality, local allegiances or outrageous behavior rather than policy differences.

The prominence of such non-issue elements in campaigns speaks to a lack of policy differences between the candidates. Within the Democratic Primary electorate candidates had converged on the region of the median voter and there was little other than personality to set candidates apart.

The most prominent political force across elections in Georgia was supplied by the Talmadge family, which offered itself as a champion of small town southern values against the emerging urban areas of the state (Key 1949). In some Georgia elections, the state divided into pro- and anti-Talmadge factions but this division was a weak substitute for political parties. Policy stances did not order candidates on the ballot so that voters could consistently know and vote for a particular type of policy change. Candidates for governor and the legislature were not connected and voters lacked the ability to hold one party accountable for the collective performance of state government. The downside of the dominance of the "banker-merchant-farmer-lawyer-doctor governing class" (Shannon 1949) was that exclusion of blacks and poor whites came at the price of non-organization within the Democratic Party.

In the 1960s Georgia was dominated by rural politicians because the County Unit System used for elections favored rural areas and under-represented urban places. The Unit System was first adopted within the Democratic Party for statewide nomination contests and later incorporated into the state constitution to determine general election outcomes and representation in the State House. The unit system essentially treated all counties as equals with a small bonus votes granted to the most populous 38 counties in the state.

When the County Unit System was first made permanent in 1917, the eight most populous counties received 12% of the total unit votes, the next thirty counties received 29% and the remaining rural counties 59% (Table 5-1). With each passing decade this fixed allocation of voting power became more biased as the urban counties greatly outpaced the rural areas of the

state (Table 5-2). By 1960, the eight largest counties in the state accounted for nearly half the state's population (44%) yet received only 12% of the total unit votes under this scheme (See Tables 5-1 and 5-2). In contrast, the least populated counties contained just 31% of the population but received nearly 59% of the unit votes which effectively doubled their influence in 1960.

Just as Georgia was unique among the southern states for using the County Unit System for elections, it also differed from other states in terms of the allocation of authority within the state government. Despite being a formally distinct branch, in practice the legislature lacked institutional independence and autonomous leadership. The part-time legislature, which met for forty days each year, was organized by the executive branch. The governor of Georgia routinely designated floor leaders, made committee assignments and laid out the legislative agenda in the State of the State address each session. Legislators who crossed the governor could find themselves deprived of a desired committee assignment the next time the State Legislature convened (Hyatt 1999, 50-51).

In summary, electoral power in Georgia in 1960 was controlled by the white rural upper class elite. Party competition was non-existent and intra-party competition was fractious and kaleidoscope in nature. Within the state government political power was held by the governor who organized the legislature.

Georgia Politics in 2000

Forty years later, almost every salient feature of politics in the state of Georgia has changed substantially. On the electoral side, barriers to voting were removed by the 1965 Voting Rights Act and subsequent legislation. The impact of the new law was dramatic as voter registration among black Georgians jumped from 27% in March 1965 to 53% in September 1967

and among white voters registration increased from 63% to 82% during the same time period (Fleishmann and Pierannunzi 1997, 86).

The rural stranglehold on political power was greatly reduced with the defeat of the county unit system. In *Sanders v. Gray* (1963) the Supreme Court decision struck down the use of the unit system for primary nominations and the 1965 *Toombs v. Fortson* Supreme Court invalidated the county based apportionment of the Georgia State House. Following this initial defeat, the legislature was required by federal courts to redistrict on multiple occasions after subsequent apportionment maps were overly favorable to rural areas of the state (McDonald 2003).

Over time, the state legislature has become more representative in terms or race, ethnicity, gender and region. The 1966 election produced the first black representatives but their numbers remained rather small until the 1990s when the renewal of the Voting Rights Act forced states to draw more majority-minority districts. By 2005 Black representatives held about one fifth of the total membership of the State House. In 2002 the first Latino legislator was elected to the State House and the number of women has also increased.

Republicans began to compete for seats beginning with the 1964 election, but remained greatly subordinate for decades. In the 1990s Republicans began to experience more success as their share of seats in the legislature finally rose above the one-fifth threshold. The Republican emergence as a fully competitive political party culminated in a string of breakthrough victories as the Party won the governorship in 2002 for the first time in a century. Republicans subsequently won control of the State Senate in 2002 with the help of party switchers and the State House in 2004.

The state legislature re-asserted its institutional independence in the mid-1960s after the election of Lester Maddox as Governor. As a candidate Maddox and declared in favor of legislative independence. The Democrats meet in caucus and selected their own leadership and committee chairs. Speaker Tom Murphy emerged as one of the longest serving and most powerful Speakers in the nation during his thirty year tenure in office (1973-2003).

Partisan Realignment in the U.S. South

The enormous shift that has taken place within Georgia politics is part of larger pattern of political change or "secular realignment" within the American south. Key (1949) noted that "the rise and fall of parties may to some degree be the consequence of trends that perhaps persist over decades and elections may mark only steps in a more or less continuous creation of new loyalties and decay of old" (198). Secular realignment accurately describes the gradual nature of political change in the U.S. south. Very gradually over a thirty year period (1964-1994) the Republican Party emerged from irrelevance in the south to majority status across the region.

Republicans Dwight D. Eisenhower (in 1952 and 1956) and Richard Nixon (1960) attracted some support within the southern states, but the real breakthrough came in the 1964 election. Republican Barry Goldwater ran as an unabashed conservative and his vote against the 1964 Civil Rights Act in the U.S. Senate made him an attractive alternative to the Democratic nominee Lyndon Johnson who had supported and signed the Civil Rights Act. Goldwater lost in a landslide, but he did achieve a breakthrough for Republicans in the Deep South carrying those states and his home state of Arizona (Black and Black 1987, 1993, 2002).

However, unlike the realignments of 1896 or 1932 which took place at specific moment in time, the realignment of the south was a gradual shift toward a new electoral pattern. The 1964

election represented only the first step in a process that would play out over the next several decades across multiple elections within the region.

The resistance of white southerners to the dismantling of segregation certainly played a role in the initial victories the Republicans experienced in the early 1960s, but other factors also made the party attractive to southern whites. The economic growth within the region made the Republican message of low taxes and limited government more appealing. A hawkish foreign policy and the emphasis on traditional social values also served as powerful incentives for conservative southern withes to switch partisan identities over the ensuing decades (Black and Black 1987).

Not only was this realignment gradual in terms of change over time but it was also gradual in terms of its progression down the ticket. Republican success began at the presidential level and proceeded down the ticket unevenly. Victories in federal or statewide offices usually occurred before advances in the state legislature of local offices. Presidential breakthroughs in 1964 and 1972 served as a harbinger for subsequent Republican gains in U.S. Senate and U.S. House races but in many cases these down ticket gains did not arrive for several more decades.

Republican success also varied significantly within the south. Peripheral south states provided many of the early victories while success in the Deep South lagged behind. Deep South states had larger black populations which required Republicans to win a higher percentage of white voters (Black and Black 1987, 141). Whites in the Deep South persisted in their Democratic partisan attachment longer than those in the outer southern states. Peripheral south states also had some experienced Republican politicians from the mountain areas (Tennessee, North Carolina) or booming metro areas (Florida, Texas). In the Deep South Republicans lacked quality candidates to run for high office. Republican nominees were frequently party switchers

who made the switch because they were not favored to win the Democratic nomination. On a number of occasions these opportunistic candidates struggled to govern effectively when elected to office and poor performance in office hurt the Republican Party reputation (Black and Black 2002).

Republican success in winning office is the end result of a deeper process of realigning partisan affiliation. Conservative-minded white voters gradually shifted from thinking of themselves as Democrats and embraced a new label as Republicans over a period of several decades. The question is when did this process really accelerate or experience a tipping point? In a behavioral sense it appears that from the Reagan administration onward white southerners had made a permanent shift and would not return to the Democrats (Black and Black2002). On the other hand, in terms of partisan identification many of these behavioral Republicans still called themselves Democrats or Independents. Certainly many of these Presidential Republicans still participated in Democratic Party primary elections in large numbers across the south until the 1990s.

Partisan Realignment in Georgia

Partisan realignment in the state of Georgia shares many commonalities with the broader pattern found in the south at large. While the party did experience a breakthrough with Goldwater in 1964 and Nixon in 1972 the combination of the Watergate scandal and the candidacy of native son Jimmy Carter delayed further Republican victories until the 1984 presidential election. However, from 1984 forward Georgia would become a reliable part of the GOP base in presidential campaigns.

In Congressional elections the Republican Party realized a few early breakthrough wins in the U.S. House in the 1960s and 1970s but renewed Democratic strength and a lack of quality

candidates enabled the Democratic Party to dominate the state's delegation. Not until the 1990s when redistricting, realignment and favorable national tides combined were the Republicans able to capture a majority of the state's U.S. House members.

Likewise the Republicans struggled in elections for the U.S. Senate popular incumbent conservative Democrat Sam Nunn was untouchable. Republicans did experience an initial success in the 1980 election but Mack Mattingly's inexperience showed in his inability to exploit the traditional incumbency advantage and he was defeated at the end of his six year term in the 1986 election. In 1992 Republican Paul Coverdale would benefit from a requirement in state election law which mandated a run off in the event that neither candidate in the general election won a majority of votes cast in the general election. Coverdale who had narrowly trailed in the November balloting was able win the run-off phase and defeat incumbent Wyche Fowler. He would later die in office unexpectedly and conservative Democrat Zell Miller was appointed to fill his seat. The extremely popular former governor frequently voted with the Republicans in the Senate but the Democrats held nominal control of the seat. Only after the retirement of conservative Democrats Sam Nunn and Zell Miller did the Republican candidates become competitive and later victorious in the state.

At the state level competitive two-party politics arrived quite late. Republican candidates came close to winning the governor's office in 1966 and 1994 (both years had strong pro-Republican national tides). But in most elections the Democrats nominated conservative or centrist candidates which blunted the appeal of the Republican Party. Conservative whites in Georgia stayed loyal to the Democratic Party until the 2002 election when incumbent Roy Barnes ran afoul of rural voters and teachers and suffered a shocking loss to the Republican

candidate State Senator Sonny Perdue. The first Republican Governor was elected 40 years after the Goldwater carried the state in 1964.

The long delay between the initial Republican success in Georgia in 1964 and down ticket wins is somewhat surprising. Georgia contained many of the hallmarks of associated with realignment. The booming metropolitan Atlanta area attracted many migrants from outside the south who were more open to voting for the Republican Party. The economic growth experienced by the state expanded the middle class providing an increased pool of potential Republican voters.

Why did it take so long for two-party competition to arrive in Georgia compared to some other southern states? One possible explanation is that Georgia, like most Deep South states, had a larger black percentage of the population than most peripheral south states. This provided the Democratic Party with bedrock of electoral support which required them to win a smaller share of the white vote in any given election. In the 1970s, Democrats were able to construct an alliance between moderate or conservative white voters and more liberal leaning blacks by emphasizing education and economic development which could benefit all groups. They also retained an emphasis on limited government and low taxes.

An additional factor that aided Democrats in their battle to maintain their ascendancy was their advantage in candidate quality and electoral experience. Due to their almost complete lack of success at the local level (outside of a few metropolitan suburban districts) Republicans lacked experienced candidates in races for the state legislature and the governor's office (Bullock and Gaddie 2010). Furthermore, a change in the state constitution allowed the governor to run for re-election which then provided Democratic candidates with the advantage of incumbency every other gubernatorial contest.

Republican Realignment in the Georgia State Assembly

While Democrats in Georgia were able to forestall the realignment of conservative white voters to the Republican Party for several decades Republicans did make small in-roads. During the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, Republicans won between 8%-20% of the seats under the golden dome. However, the Democrats were able to exploit their advantages in message, party leadership and quality candidates to maintain an overwhelming majority in both chambers of the state legislature. Despite the Republican efforts their numbers inside the chamber were so small that they were largely irrelevant unless the Democrats were severely divided.

The Republicans did finally break through the 20% barrier beginning with the 1994 election. The number of Republicans in the State House and State Senate would effectively double from 20% to 40% between the 1992 and 1996 elections (see Figure 5-1). At the end of this six year span, Republicans had emerged from being a nuisance tolerated by the majority party to a genuine competitor for control of the legislature.

The Republican surge would come to a halt following the 1996 election as the number of easy targets declined and the majority party Democrats responded to this sudden shift within the state. The Democratic Party used its control over the redistricting process to create numerous multi-member districts which either packed or split Republican strongholds. Republicans failed to realize further gains in the 1998 and 2000 elections and the new redistricting plan in 2002 seemed to likely to shore up the Democratic majorities in the State Assembly for years to come.

The upset win of Republican State Senator Sonny Perdue over incumbent Democrat Roy Barnes produced a few additional Senate seats and post-election party switchers enabled the Republicans to begin the 2003 session as the majority party in that chamber. Republican efforts to win control of the State House were aided by a court decision that invalidated the pro-

Democratic redistricting plan. The new map created prior to the 2004 election created more Republican opportunities and the party won control of the State House that November.

What is the appropriate threshold for defining party competitiveness? In the comparative politics literature, scholars would consider a party receiving a small percentage of the vote evidence of an effective party because that party will win seats in the state legislature. However, in the American context, 50% of the vote (or less in some cases) is usually required and Congressional elections scholars often classify any election in which the margin of victory is smaller than 60% to 40% as a competitive election (Jacobson 2001).

Using the 40% threshold of the two-party vote as the criteria for two-party competitiveness in elections, we can see in Figure 5-2 that Republicans do not win 40% of the seats in the State House until 1994. With respect to electoral support, Republican candidates do not win 40% of the general election votes until 1996. In terms of Republican Primary participation it is right at 40% in 1996 and exceeds that in 1998. Looking at all three indicators of competitiveness, the Republican Party does not become truly competitive in Georgia State House elections until the 1996 election.

Another important change in the Georgia electorate was the dramatic change in the electorate that followed the implementation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Black participation in both the general and primary election increased sharply with the removal of barriers to participation. In the 1966 election the first black legislators were elected to the state legislature. Initially a number of majority black districts continued to re-elect white Democrats, but over time black candidates prevailed within the Democratic Primary. Eventually black Democrats would come to comprise nearly 20% of the seats in the State House (See Figure 5-3). Given the history of segregation and conflict over race relations, it would not be surprising to

find that race is an important cleavage line inside the legislature. Arguably race has been more important than party divisions in the history of the state.

Another potentially important variable in Georgia politics is the conflict between rural and urban interests. The Georgia State Constitution and the County Unit System over-represented rural areas at the expense of urban ones. Because of this rural dominance V.O. Key titled his analysis of Georgia politics "Rule of the Rustics." The rural advantage was shattered in 1965 by *Toombs vs. Fortson* which struck down the County Unit System. In the redistricting which followed this decision the number of representatives from metropolitan counties increased sharply from 14% in 1962 to 39% in 1966. Subsequent court decisions forced additional re-apportionments (1967 and 1974) because of excessive variance in the population between districts (McDonald 2003).

Since the 1960s the growth of the Atlanta metropolitan region has continued further shift more seats from rural counties to the metropolitan region (Table 5-4). The smaller metropolitan areas of Columbus, Macon, Augusta and Savannah have essentially just keep pace with the state's overall population growth and have not appreciably increased their share of seats in the State House.

The literature on southern politics has long found an association between urbanization and more liberal attitudes and voting patterns in the region (Black and Black 1987). Given the history of rural dominance and the explosive growth of the Atlanta metropolitan area, it is possible that a rural-urban conflict might become a very important division that structures voting coalitions if party conflict is weak. Certainly it is an important independent variable that merits attention as an alternative to partisan structuring of political conflict.

An additional possible explanation worth considering is the rise of independent legislative institutionalization within the Georgia State Legislature. Prior to 1966 the governor had served as the primary organization force for decades choosing committee chairs, floor leaders and setting the agenda. In the 1966 election, the Democratic nominee stated that he favored legislative independence. In the 1966 election, no candidate won a majority of the popular vote and the legislature chose Lester Maddox to serve as governor. With Maddox in the governor's mansion, the state legislature took him at his word and selected their own leaders and organized their own committees.

The Georgia State House made an extreme change in the development of internal leadership. Hypothetically, the rise of strong speakers like George L. Smith (1967-1973) and Tom Murphy (1973-2003) could potentially be seen as an explanation for voting changes. Perhaps, this more robust leadership structured committees or ordered the floor agenda along a more ideological path and therefore created the patterns observed in the roll call data.

Summary and Conclusion

There are multiple possible explanations for the rise of greater stricture in roll call voting in the Georgia House in the late 1990s and 2000s. Is spatial structure an artifact of internal institutional self-government or the creation of a legislative cartel that split the chamber into coalitions of insiders and outsiders? Or could this shift be explained by the great power shift that resulted in the destruction of rural dominance and the rise of metropolitan Atlanta as the largest bloc within that body? Perhaps it was the re-enfranchisement of black voters that reinvigorated political conflict along racial or class lines after the 1965 Voting Rights Act facilitated greater participation by backs and poor whites. Or could it be the rise of party competition that ultimately explains this shift over time? Could it be that political parties weed out those

legislators who do not fit cleanly into the dominant political ideology of the time and thereby produce polarized voting inside the chamber? All of these factors will be considered in the following chapters as the roll call votes of the Georgia State House are examined to provide an understanding of what has driven conflict over time within that state.

CHAPTER SIX: Coalition Voting Patterns in the Georgia House, 1960-2005

Over fifty years ago, V.O. Key concluded his analysis of southern politics with the following statement: “Although it is the custom to belittle the contributions of American parties, their performance seems heroic alongside that of a pulverized factionalism” (1949, 303). A half-century later, scholars are still wrestling with precise empirical evidence of why parties matter and how they exercise influence under a constitutional system designed to suppress “factions” and other narrow interests.

What were the “heroic” contributions of parties which were sorely missing in the one-party era of southern politics? According to Key party-less politics were greatly inferior for three reasons. First, elections without parties failed to provide voters with substantive and distinctive policy choices in each election. Perhaps because of candidate convergence on the median voter, there were few issues that distinguished one candidate from another. Often political contests in southern primary elections centered on candidate personalities or “friends and neighbors” alliances with local power brokers. Electoral choices frequently were not connected to substantive policy choices. In partisan systems voters have ordered choices provided by the parties which allow them to move public policy in one direction or another.

Second, the episodic nature of factional electoral coalitions prevented voters from clearly identifying an “in party” that could be rewarded or punished. The lack of accountability was further enhanced by term limits for governors that eliminated the possibility of seeking re-election. Therefore each governor’s race was always an open seat contest and the coalitions were custom built for that particular election. In electoral systems with competing party tickets voters have a mechanisms for rewarding or punishing the incumbent party based upon their performance as members stand for re-election.

Third, Key noted that elected officials do not have the same incentive to coordinate between legislative chambers or across government branches since they are less likely to share a collective electoral fate without a ticket or label that will enable voters easily to identify responsible factions. Political parties provide an incentive for politicians in different bodies to act in harmony to produce good public policy that will enhance the party label. In the absence of the shared interest, legislators may defect from making sacrifices for the collective good and simply pursue legislation that is in the best interests of their local electorate.

Since Key's study on one-party politics was published shortly after World War II the politics of the U.S. South have changed more dramatically than any other part of the nation. The south has been the most politically dynamic region of the nation over the last fifty years. The end of segregation in the south and high levels of migration from other parts of the nation have reshaped the social fabric of the region (Black and Black 1987). In national elections the U.S. South shifted from being solidly Democratic in national elections to a competitive region that played kingmaker (Black and Black 1993) until the region finally realigned into a consistent element of the Republican Party's national base (Black and Black 2002).

Many studies have examined this process of political change on a state-by-state basis and most of the studies have focused on shifts in statewide elections. Within this body of work the development of two-party politics within southern state legislatures has rarely been studied. This chapter will provide a new look at the coalition patterns inside a southern state house over this period of dramatic change.

The dramatic change in party over time allows the region to serve as a "natural experiment" for testing hypotheses about the effect of parties. While party system varies greatly, other institutional variables are held constant during this period. Electoral limitations on parties

such as decentralized nomination decisions and internal limits such as modest sanctioning powers for legislative leaders exist in this case. While the natural experiment approach does hold many institutional variables constant, there is no mechanism available for social scientists for freezing the economic and social changes that constantly take place among a dynamic human population. Nevertheless, natural experiments which occur within the social world allow us greater leverage of problems that are otherwise difficult to study.

Case Selection, Data and Methods

The evidence presented in this chapter looks at a single southern state and a single legislative chamber over a long period of time. The data will consist of contested roll call votes from the Georgia State House between 1961 and 2005. The Georgia Constitution requires roll call votes to be recorded on any measure that expends public funds. There are many unanimous or nearly unanimous roll call votes listed in the legislative journals. For this study analysis is restricted to roll call votes where at least 5% of those voting are opposed to the majority (typically eight or nine members out of nearly two hundred).

The state of Georgia was selected in part because the competitive party system arrived later than in some other parts of the south. The decade of 1965-1975 was a period of great social and political change within the region, and southern states where partisan competition appears early (Tennessee, Florida and Virginia) are less useful because it is difficult to distinguish effects caused by the party system from effects that may be caused by other contemporaneous factors. On the other hand, some Deep South states still lack fully developed two-party competition in state legislative elections (Mississippi, Arkansas and Alabama). Louisiana has a completely unique primary system which does not hold constant key institutional variables. Of the remaining states North Carolina had very low levels of roll call voting during the one-party period which

made it unsuitable. Of the remaining three southern states Georgia had the advantage of sufficient variation in terms of party development, and the presence of other key independent variables such as race and a history of rural-urban politics which could potentially out weight party as important cleavages lines that organize politics.

The Georgia House also had the attractive quality of a very large number of members. Over time the number of members in the Georgia State House declined from 205 in 1961 to 195 in 1969 and the number was further reduced to 180 in 1973 and has remained fixed at that size. A chamber with a large number of legislators reduces the granularity of the data and facilitates a more fine grained analysis of spatial change. In a legislative chamber that has few members, the small population size limits the degrees of freedom available for hypotheses testing and with a small number of cases a single randomly generated error looms much larger. The larger number of legislators found within the Georgia State House enables not only the comparison of the behavior of white and black Democratic Representatives but also the potential to divide further each group into additional subgroups such as rural white Democrats and metropolitan white Democrats and still supply a sufficient number of cases for analysis.

The empirical evidence regarding legislative decision-making in the Georgia State House is derived from roll call vote data gathered across forty-five years (1961-2005) at four-year intervals. The votes have been collected from State House sessions that take place during the third year of the governor's term, which also is the year immediately following the mid-term State House elections in the state. This year was selected so as to provide a degree of isolation from short-term state electoral considerations since the purpose of this study is to discover long-term trends within this state.

All contested roll call votes were gathered to provide a picture of voting coalitions. A contested roll call is defined as one in which at least 5% of those casting votes dissented from the chamber outcome. For example, if all one-hundred eighty members of the State House cast ballots on a roll call, then at least nine of them must dissent for the vote in order for it to be coded.

Each roll call vote was scanned individually and the legislator names were read electronically by the Omnipage Pro optical character recognition software. The list of legislators was then checked for errors or omissions and converted into a numerical dataset in which the yeas, neas and not voting were replaced with the values of 1, 6 and 9 respectively (this coding is required to operate the NOMINATE scaling program used in chapter seven). The original journals contained some errors prior to the use of electronic voting in 1975. The most common error in the journals involved listing the same legislator twice on the same roll call vote. A legislator's name would be listed among those voting "yea" and also among those "not voting" on that particular roll call. These duplicate entry errors appeared approximately once every fifty roll calls—which is fairly insignificant given the large number of legislators. Cases of duplicate legislator entries on the same roll call were treated as missing data since it is not possible to know which of the duplicate listings is correct.

Other variables such as party affiliation, race and metropolitan region were also coded. Party affiliation was gathered from official election returns published by the Secretary of State from 1966-2005. Party affiliations for the 1961 and 1965 sessions were coded from the biographies found in the official State Register published by the Georgia Secretary of State on an annual basis. Racial data was obtained from the Georgia Legislative Black Caucus. Metropolitan region classifications were drawn from the county classifications found in the U.S. Census

Bureau City and County Data Books for each decade. When State House districts contained parts of both metropolitan counties and rural counties, election returns were used as a guide. House Districts in which a majority of the votes cast came from metropolitan counties were classified accordingly and if the majority of votes cast came from non-metropolitan counties the district was considered to be rural or small town.

The empirical evidence presented in this chapter is descriptive in nature, inferential statistical analysis will be presented in Chapter Seven. Roll call vote patterns are summarized using both traditional and new measures. Traditional party conflict scores and Rice cohesion scores are presented so as to illustrate broad voting patterns. Party conflict scores simply count the percentage of votes in which a majority of one party opposes a majority of another party. This technique is also applied to racial conflict and rural-metropolitan conflict over time. Party unity scores simply measure the average percentage of party members who vote with their own party on party conflict votes. Cohesion scores are also calculated for racial conflict and rural-metropolitan conflict.

New measures of voting include (Cooper and Young's 1997, 1999) Party Structuring Scores and Party Win Rates (Lawrence, Maltzman and Smith 2006). Party structuring scores seek to combine both the frequency of party conflict and the level of party unity into one score. The multiplicative nature of the Party Structuring facilitates comparison of potentially difficult situations such as when party (or group) conflict is common but cohesion is quite low or the other extreme when conflict is rare but cohesion is high.

Party Structuring scores differ from traditional party unity and party cohesion in that they code every vote (not just those were a majority of party members are opposed). The scores also only measure the behavior of each party's caucus that exceeds the 50% threshold required to

establish the direction of caucus opinion. In the traditional party unity if 80% of the party votes in one direction that party receives a score of 80% for that particular vote. But in the case of structuring scores only the portion beyond the 50% line is measured. If 80% of the party votes "yea" than the structure score only looks at the behavior of the members above the 50% mark. So 30% voted "yea" and 20% voted "nea" and each of this would be divided by 50%--therefore the "yea" structuring is scored as 60% of membership beyond the threshold needed to establish the direction of caucus opinion.

Another measure of party or group success is win rates (Lawrence, Maltzman and Smith 2006) which measure of the percentage of roll call votes in which a party (or group) are on the winning side in relationship to the distribution of member preferences. This chapter will consider only simple win rates which is the frequency with which one group prevails over another, when the two groups are in conflict on a roll call vote. Simple win rates will be examined with respect to partisan divisions, racial divisions and rural-metropolitan conflict. In addition, in the conclusion of the chapter I examine the win rates of key voting blocs within the House chamber on a subset of more competitive roll call votes.

Theoretical Questions

The roll call votes gathered from the Georgia State House over the last half century will facilitate an exploration into the question of whether parties offer a "heroic" degree of organization, as suggested by Key, or whether parties have only negligible influence as suggested by Krehbiel (1993, 1999, and 2000). This chapter will focus on three questions. First, to what degree has partisan conflict been important in structuring roll call voting in the Georgia State House? Secondly, in the absence of strong parities what sort of roll call coalitions should we expect? Thirdly, when party conflict is weak or absent, do other historical election cleavage

lines such as race and the urban-rural conflict provide an adequate substitute for party and provide systematic organization to voting?

In essence there are two slightly different but related questions that need to be answered. The first question is ***who*** exercises power? The political history of Georgia reviewed in Chapter Six suggests that in the one-party era the answer should be rural white Democrats. The second major question is ***how*** will that power be exercise? Who will be included or excluded from the governing coalition? Should the set of winners be large or small?

Distributive theories of legislative politics suggest that policy areas may be divided up into committees. Through this device influence is exchanged so that high-demand policy-seekers receive power to produce non-centrist legislation in areas most salient to them in exchange for acquiescing to granting other members the same privilege (Weingast and Marshall 1988). The committee log roll perspective is particularly useful in the case of Georgia became in its original formulation it did not leave a significant role for parties or party leaders. Given the lack of partisan organization of the Georgia State House, the distributive model may help to explain roll call coalition composition. The prediction derived from this perspective would be that roll call votes should be approved by large margins and that there is no group that consistently loses out in the decision making process.

Does such a legislature exist in the real world? The pre-World War II South Carolina legislature appears to be a good example of the *inclusive distributive model*. For many decades the South Carolina legislature ensured the executive remained weak so that the legislature could exercise not only law-making and appropriation powers but also power to appoint individuals to important state commissions. Each county's delegation to the House and Senate combined to act as *de facto* governing body over their respective counties. The legislative delegation determined

the county budget and wrote specific appropriations and even made local staff decisions via legislation. Each county delegation was allowed to operate with autonomy by the other members of the legislature (Key 1949, 150-155). To a remarkable degree the South Carolina Assembly appears to conform to the predictions of the *inclusive distributive model*.

The downside of the *inclusive distributive model* is that it provides consistent certainly for all members at the expense of seeing finite resources being spread more thinly than necessary. In the short run, a minimal winning coalition offers the promise of a greater payoff with the attendant risk of future losses if a member is excluded from the coalition in the future. This is the heart of the cartel model of legislative parties offered by (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Cartel members gain control of the institutional positions of authority, operate the procedural levers and control the chamber agenda to boost the legislative payoff delivered to the average cartel member.

The cartel model was formulated as a means of formalizing the conditions and benefits of political parties in Congress, however, this model could also be applied to groups other than political parties. Cox and McCubbins suggest that members of a partisan cartel are bonded together because they share a common party label each election and the value of that label incentivizes cooperation and coordination. But in the absence of functional electoral parties, a legislative cartel could also be formed along many other lines of conflict. To the extent that divisions such as race, class, gender, region and language are salient among voters, they too could act as bonding agents in a non-partisan or one-party environment. An *exclusive distributive coalition* could be attractive means or organization regardless of the electoral environment.

An empirical example of a non-partisan exclusive cartel arrangement can be found in the Florida legislature of the 1950s where the “Pork Chop Gang” composed of rural legislators from

the northern panhandle of that state organized to control the key leadership positions within the chamber and powerful committees. The coalition used their majority vote on the floor to reward themselves with a disproportionate share of state expenditures and prevented the reapportionment of the state legislature which would increase the voting power of the booming metropolitan counties in the southern panhandle (Parsons 1963).

The political history of Georgia suggests several salient divisions which might form the basis for an enduring cartel type of legislative organization. In fact, the segregation period might correctly be understood as an example of a cartel of the white elite which used institutional rules to effectively disenfranchise most blacks and many poor whites. The history of Georgia indicates that if a legislative cartel exists, it is highly likely that blacks, urbanites and Republicans are among the groups to be excluded from it. In 1961 the Georgia State House is overwhelming dominated by rural white Democrats in terms of membership—but did they constitute an exclusive distributive cartel?

A third alternative to the two versions of the distributive models is not a model at all, it is disorganization. Speaking of the organizational weakness of electoral factions under in the one-party south Key wrote: “In extreme situations only the most shallow continuity of faction prevails, either in voter groupings or in composition of leadership. This discontinuous and kaleidoscopic quality of faction contrasts markedly with the stability of electoral loyalty and the continuity of leadership of true political parties” (Key 1949, 301-2).

If parties are essential and perform a coordination role in both the electoral and the legislative arenas it is possible that disorder and collective inefficiency will prevail in their absence. In this case we would not expect any consistent group of winners and high degree of discontinuity from one roll call vote to another.

Analysis

In the debate over party influence little attention has been given to evidence from legislative chambers that lack political parties. Only a handful of studies have looked decision making without parties (Patterson 1962; Parsons 1963; Jenkins 1999; Shaffner and Wright 2002). Indeed almost all evidence cited in the debate over party influence is derived from just one legislature, the U.S. Congress, and often from just one chamber, the U.S. House of Representatives. While Congress is arguably the most important legislative body in the world, it certainly is not completely unique. The fifty state constitutions mimic the decentralized electoral system and the separation of powers model found in the U.S. Constitution. Forty-eight of the fifty states have bicameral legislative chambers and independently elected executives with the power of veto (North Carolina's governor lacks a veto and Nebraska has a unicameral legislature). The fifty states offer more variation in terms of party competition than can be found at the national level with respect to Congress.

A few states like Nebraska and Minnesota have banned party labels in state legislative elections for a period of time or in the case of California enacted a cross filing system that strengthened independent politicians at the expense of parties. The largest collection of states with party anomalies can be found in the south. However, only a small number of studies have been conducted on southern one-party legislatures. Patterson's (1962) examination of the overwhelmingly Democratic Oklahoma State House in the 1950s found that in the absence of strong partisan structure voting coalitions appeared to vary enormously from one issue area to another. Parsons' (1962) look at the 1950s Florida State Senate demonstrated that a cartel of rural legislators from the northern panhandle region of that state conspired to control key committees and prevent reapportionment. Key's (1949) chapter on South Carolina outlines a

cross-chamber inclusive distributive system in which the county delegations controlled their local counties and the legislature dominated the executive branch. Jenkins examined the non-partisan Confederate Congress and found that despite having legislators who had served in the partisan U.S. Congress there was little structure to roll call voting in the absence of organized parties (1999). In contrast to these previous studies this chapter examines a case that is exceptional in terms of the period of time under consideration and the range of variation in the party system.

Because Democrats held nearly every seat in the Georgia State House for many decades and it is not practical to calculate the presence of party conflict until the mid-1960s when Republican numbers reach the double digits. Prior to 1966 Republicans represented fewer than 3% of the total chamber and their numbers were so small that collectively they did not even meet the minimum number of members needed to request a roll call vote (if one was not mandated by the state constitution). Furthermore, this study only considers "contested" roll calls, those votes where at least 5% of the chamber is dissenting and the Republicans as a group did not exceed this number until 1966. The first data point for this study begins with the 1969 State House session when the Republicans held 27 seats.

Figure 6-1 demonstrates that there are three partisan eras in the recent history of the Georgia House. First is the One-Party Era, which began with the death of the Populist Party at the turn of the 19th century lasted until 1966. During this period the Democrats held nearly every seat in the State Assembly and Republicans were either entirely absent or a rare curiosity. Second, the Democratic Dominance Era (1966-1992) which saw the emergence of a consistent Republican Party presence within the chamber. However, the Republican share of seats was so small (between 10% and 20%) that they could not hope to be decisive unless the Democratic

majority was badly fractured. Third, the Partisan Era began in 1993 as both parties possessed a significant number of seats and a robust electoral competition flourished across the state. Both parties possessed at least 40% of the seats in the chamber and internal party unity became more crucial in determining who would govern inside the chamber.

To what degree was party an important factor in contested roll call votes over this forty-five year time period? A traditional measure of partisan tension is party conflict frequency, which measures how often a majorities of both parties are opposed to one another in roll call voting (see Figure 6-2). During the Democratic One-Party Era political party labels were of little practical meaning inside the chamber since almost every legislator was a Democrat. Following the arrival of a significant number of Republicans in the late 1960s, partisanship appeared in roughly one-third of all contested roll calls in 1969. As time passed partisan conflict appeared less frequently during the Democratic Dominance Era (1969-1991). In fact, the share of roll calls in which a majority of each party opposed each other receded from the one-third mark established in 1969 and would not be surpassed that number again until the Partisan Era (1993). Partisan conflict was not a central feature of voting during the Democratic Dominance Era since it only appeared in between one-quarter and one-third of all contested votes. Once the state entered the Partisan Era (1993-2005) party conflict votes grew steadily over time from 40% of all votes (1993) to well over half (2005). In summary, party labels were of no importance prior to 1966 and even after that date partisan conflict was infrequent until the Partisan Era.

If parties are to exercise some degree of influence they must hold together in moments of conflict. Observers have long noted that party unity on roll call votes in the U.S. Congress is much lower than that found in many other parliamentary legislatures. However, if a party holds a significant number of seats only a modicum of unity is required to ensure that the majority party

will prevail. In the case of the Georgia State House the evidence shows that party unity during the Democratic Dominance Era was exceedingly low (Figure 6-3). Republican unity on party conflict votes generally exceeded 70% but Democratic "unity" is nearly non-existent in the early years. Party unity scores can range from 50.1% to 100% and in the late 1960s and 1970s the Democratic Party unity tended toward the minimum.

This low level of Democratic Party unity during the Democratic Dominance Era could be a behavioral relic of the One-Party Era in which Democrats could disagree with one another without having to consider the effect of an opposition party. It is also evident that despite exercising a near monopoly on political party, Democrats scarcely marched in lock step. If anything the lack of party unity in the early decades conforms to Key's observation that politics without parties tended to be disorganized. It could also be evidence of constituency pressures mattering more than party in the absence of a polarized electorate that could act as a filter in the nomination phase of the election.

With the passage of time Democratic Party unity on party conflict votes gradually increased but not until the Partisan Era (1993-2005) did unity surpass 80%. With the arrival of the Partisan Era both parties' unity scores steadily increase. Democratic unity reached a high of 85% in 2001 and Republicans exceeded that high in 2005. The last two data points show that the two parties exchanged places following a change in party control in the State House as Republicans appear much more unified and Democrats more divided on party votes with a partisan shift in agenda control. The reversal may reflect a shift in agenda control as long time Democratic Speaker Tom Murphy preferred to build majorities within his own party and eschewed cross-party coalitions even though such an alliance may have been natural on many issues.

Another way of measuring partisan conflict is to consider competition for institutional power and resources. Cox and McCubbins have pointed out that the adoption of chamber rules at the beginning of the session is an act that fundamentally skews power away from the median member and puts it into the hands of party leaders (1993). Aldrich and Rohde (2000) have also highlighted the asymmetrical allocation of chairmanships, committee assignments, staff, office space and other legislative resources to the benefit of the majority party.

By definition an "opposition party" should put forth some effort to gain institutional resources for itself. However, during the One-Party and Democratic Dominance Eras the Republican Party did not behave in this manner. Often the party cooperated with the majority in order to obtain some legislative goods for their constituents. In the State Senate the Lt. Governor appointed committee chairs and inter-party relations were sufficiently warm that Democratic Lt. Governors appointed some Republican Senators to chair committees.

Relations were less cordial on the House side yet the Republican Caucus did not begin formally competing for the office of Speaker and Majority Leader until 1985 (Table 6-1). In part, this may reflect the harsh reality that Republicans remained a very small minority, but the choice to begin contesting those elections in 1985 does reflect an attitudinal shift in the part of the Republicans toward the end of the Democratic Dominance Era. One thing that is noteworthy about Speaker elections is that members cross party lines much more often than in leadership elections of the U.S. Congress. For example, Billy McKinney chose to vote for the Republican candidate rather than support Democratic Speaker Tom Murphy. In 2005 when Republicans became the majority party several Democrats voted for the Republican nominee for Speaker but did not switch parties and won re-election as Democrats in the 2006 House election.

The data show that party conflict votes were infrequent and that party unity was often quite low in the early decades. As an organizational unit party does not appear to be a consistent force in structuring roll call coalitions. Constituency influence may have played a more significant role.

Did the high level of Democratic disunity open the door for Republican influence? When the two parties were opposed which party prevailed? Is there any evidence of a cross-partisan alliance such as the sometime "conservative coalition" between Republicans and southern Democrats at the national level?

The evidence shows (see Figure 6-4) that even when Democratic Party unity was extremely low in the late 1960s and early 1970s Republicans seldom were on the winning side of party conflict votes. The Democrats prevailed on nine out of every ten partisan votes during the Democratic Dominance Era. Even as Republican numbers increased in the 1990s, Democratic success remained high because party leadership was successful at building majorities even as their share of seats within the chamber declined.

Smith (2007) has argued that asymmetric win rates in Congress are evidence of party influence because if the median chamber were entertaining bids from both sides the minority party should be able to have a higher win rate. Republicans win rates inched up to 20% in 1993 and 1997 as their share of seats exceeded 40% but in the 2001 session Democrats responded with even greater unity and Republican success fell once again. With the advent of Republican Party control of the chamber in 2005, the win rate reversed and Republicans prevailed more than 80% of the time when the two parties came into conflict. The dramatic increase in partisan behavior inside the State House coincides with a sharp increase in partisanship among the electorate (See Figure 5-2).

In summary, the data show three distinct periods exist in the recent history of the Georgia State House. Beginning in the 1990s, party conflict steadily increased and party cohesion climbed, and the majority party members have prevailed in conflict situations. Party is strongly associated with roll call voting patterns during the 1990s and 2000s and majority status in this legislative chamber and winning are strongly related. However in the earlier One-Party Era and the Democratic Dominant eras partisanship simply was not an important element in terms of structuring conflict and organizing voting coalitions. In the earlier years the prevalence of bi-partisan and cross-partisanship is consistent with a models of constituency driven legislators who are tend to favor large distributive coalitions which ensure benefits to all members. As the legislature enters the Partisan Period, the size of the winning coalitions becomes much more tightly bound with party identity and size the winning coalition moves more towards the Minimal Winning Coalition model which fits with a cartel model that seeks to bias benefits to cartel members in an asymmetrical fashion.

Who exercises power before the rise of party conflict in the 1990s? In 1949 V.O. Key wrote: “The critical question is whether the substitution of factions for parties alters the outcome of the game of politics. The stakes are high. Who wins when no parties exist to furnish popular leadership” (299)? Who controlled legislative outcomes in the pre-partisan period? Clearly party competition was not the main dynamic at work in contested roll call votes prior to the 1990s. Was there an alternative group or cleavage line that governed the state in a systematic fashion?

In the absence of political party as a dominant structuring device in legislative decision making, the history of politics in Georgia points to other possible cleavage lines which might provide the basis for an alternative legislative governing coalition. The history discussed in Chapter Five emphasized the centrality of race and the importance of rural-urban divisions. If

race and rural-urban conflict do not provide the foundation for stable voting alignments within the legislature other possibilities exist such as regionalism which is frequently found in the "friends and neighbors" voting patterns of factional Democratic Party Primary elections or the importance of unifying personality of the governor who exercised significant influence over legislative organization and the set the agenda. Can any of these notable historical cleavages provide fill the void left by the absence of parties?

Racial Conflict

Race has been a central to southern politics since the conclusion of the Civil War. During the Reconstruction Era, thirty-three black representatives were elected in 1868 to the Georgia State Assembly and were subsequently expelled by the white majority. White Republicans joined white Democrats in voting in favor of their expulsion even though their removal would switch partisan control over to the Democratic Party. Pressure from the federal government led to their reinstatement, but the white majority relentlessly utilized both legal and extra-legal means to reduce black voter participation and the number of black representatives. These barriers to participation become so effective that from 1907 to 1963 there were no black representatives elected to either the State House or State Senate (McDonald 2003).

The passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 resulted in the elimination of most barriers to black voter registration and participation increased sharply. This growth of the black electorate in combination with federally mandated legislative redistricting led to the creation of a small number of majority black State House districts. In the special election to fill the newly redistricted State House in 1965, six black Representatives won seats. However, only five were seated in 1966. A majority of the chamber voted to exclude Julian Bond from his seat on the basis of remarks he had made in opposition to the Vietnam War. The courts later overturned this

decision of the House and he took his seat. Growing black participation and legislative redistricting following the 1970 census resulted in an increase in the number of black House members to 17 by 1973. Although blacks continued to be underrepresented compared to their share of the population by the mid-1980s the Georgia Black Caucus was the largest in percentage terms in the entire nation (Holmes 2000, 770) and steadily increased over time (Figure 6-5).

In 1975 the black members of the legislature began formally to organize themselves led by political science professor and State House member Robert Holmes. The policy goals of the Georgia Legislative Black Caucus included: 1) increased black appointments to commissions and the judiciary; 2) creation for Office of Fair employment Practices; 3) increased payments to AFDC recipients; 4) state funds for Morehouse School of Medicine and historically black colleges and; 5) increased minority involved in state contracts; 6) more majority black seats in reapportionment for Congress and the State Assembly (Holmes 2000).

The creation of a formal Black Caucus organization produced only modest success initially. The black caucus and black community supported veteran legislator George Busbee for governor in 1974 but did not obtain firm commitments from him in advance and were disappointed in his decision not to expand minority set asides and the number of blacks appointed by the governor. Black legislators did achieve continued support for black colleges and the Morehouse Medical school and obtained a majority back U.S. House seat in lower Fulton County (that re-elected the white incumbent Democrat Wyche Fowler until he ran for U.S. Senate) that eventually elected John Lewis as Georgia's first black U.S. House member.

The 1980s were a more successful decade for the Black Caucus as they supported the winning candidate for Governor Joe Frank Harris early on and he gave them assurances of cooperation in the future. The Governor choose Black Caucus member Calvin Smyre to act as

the Governor's Assistant Floor Leader in 1983 and he was promoted to Floor Leader in 1987. Harris followed through on his promise to appoint blacks to state offices and commissions in proportion to their percentage of the population.

The Black Caucus also begin to experience greater legislative success during the 1990s with expanded funding to combat illiteracy, increased funding for AFDC, greater assistance to Black farmers and funding to Morehouse School of Medicine was doubled. Legislative disappointments included lower than desired funding levels for Atlanta University and Grady Hospital. However the Black Caucus was able to use their clout to strike a deal with Speaker Murphy in which they would support the gas tax bill in exchange for more minority business enterprise set-asides and triumphed over the governor's objection. Finally, a high profile victory during this period was the passage of the Martin Luther King, Jr. State Holiday. Previous attempts to establish a holiday had been rejected by the legislature. The governor and Black Caucus leaders were instrumental in building support for the legislation.

Despite these successes Black legislators still faced significant obstacles in passing legislation. A matched pair study of bills sponsored by black and white legislators showed the average white State House member was successful in passing 69% of bills introduced while only 33% of bills introduced by blacks were passed (Holmes 2000, 786). Racial tension within the chamber still rose to the surface at times. One of the more extreme examples occurred in 1981 when Republican House Member Dorothy Felton spoke to Democrat Joe Mack Wilson, chairman of the committee responsible for redistricting: "He said if there was anything he hated worse than blacks—and he didn't use that word blacks—he said, it was Republicans" (McDonald, 2003, 170). Clearly, race remained a potentially divisive matter beyond the 1960s.

The Black Legislative Caucus has organized within the chamber and as an organization it competes with others for resources and legislative goods. How frequently does a racial divide appear in the roll call voting patterns within the State House? History would suggest that race is a potentially powerful cleavage line within the chamber. Like party conflict, a racial conflict vote occurs when a majority of the Black Caucus is opposed to a majority of white legislators within the chamber.

During the late 1960s and 1970s a racial divide was present in roughly one-third of all votes with a declining trend line that resulted in a low of 28% in 1989 (Figure 6-6). In sessions between 1969-1989 racial conflict votes were *more numerous than party conflict* votes. Race conflict votes have appeared in every session on a significant number of roll call votes. Since the 1989 session racial conflict votes have slightly increased but remained below the level of the 1960s and early 1970s. However, after Republicans won majority status in 2005, the appearance of race conflict in roll call votes jumped up to almost half of all votes. As the Back Caucus has grown as a share of the Democratic Caucus, race conflict votes have become increasingly enmeshed with part conflict since all Republican members comprise more than half of the white legislator members.

Leaders of the Black Caucus noted that unity and cooperation within the caucus grew during the 1980s compared to the 1970s. Fragmentation was a problem in the early days according to Representative Holmes who notes: “A continuing problem area was the “cowboy” instinct of some Black legislators—namely, the tendency to promote themselves rather than the caucus agenda” (2000, 787). The empirical evidence is mixed on this question (Figure 6-7). Overall the Black Caucus was consistently more united and cohesive on racial conflict votes than the white majority. However the overall secular pattern is one of random fluctuation without a

strong direction. The same can be said for white unity on race conflict votes for most of this time period. White unity is extremely low in the early sessions but whites also had over 80% of the sets and could still win when divided. The low level of white unity suggests that white voters are either not strongly cohesive in opposition to the Black Caucus or that some factor other than race is in operation here.

The reapportionments of the 1990s and 2000s increased the number of elected black representatives as the courts and the Justice Department enforced the requirement that redistricting maps no longer dilute minority voting strength. The share of seats held by Black Caucus members gradually increased to almost one-fifth of the chamber by 2005.

At the same time the number of rural white Democrats declined precipitously during the 1990s and 2000s as the fast growing Atlanta metropolitan area greatly reduced the number of rural seats and increased the number of Republican-friendly suburban districts. The Republican Party was also able to win an increasingly large number of metropolitan seats in the 1990s and rural seats after the year 2000. The dwindling number of rural white Democrats left Speaker Tom Murphy with a strategic choice. He could construct a moderate-conservative cross-party alliance with Republicans on key issues and abandon the more liberal Black Caucus or he could concentrate on building a moderate-liberal biracial coalition within his own party. Given the importance of the biracial coalition for Democratic electoral politics party leadership chose the direction of greater internal cooperation between black Democrats and white Democrats from both rural and metro areas (Wielhouwer and Middlemass 2005, 100).

The historical evidence suggests that over time the Black Caucus became more adept at achieving their stated goals within the chamber. Furthermore, the decline of white rural

Democrats left them in an enhanced strategic position in the 1990s and early 2000s as the growing number of Republicans made each Democrat vote more valuable.

In the early years, white legislators won nearly every vote in which racial conflict is apparent (Figure 6-8). As the Black Caucus grew the win rate for this group actually diminished despite their increased numbers from 1969 to 1981. However, this pattern sharply reverses itself in the 1980s and the Black Caucus wins a steadily increasing share of racial conflict votes. By the 2001 session, the Black Caucus is winning four out of every ten racial conflict votes. This trend illustrates the increased solidarity between the Black Caucus and the white Democrats within the chamber and the growing number of white Republicans voting in opposition. After the Republicans win control of the chamber in 2005, this pattern is dramatically reversed and the Black Caucus win rate essentially collapses on racial conflict votes—which accounted for nearly half of all votes that year.

In summary racial conflict did appear with substantial frequency and began gradually to ebb over time as the Black Caucus become a more integral part of the majority party in the State House. Over time racial conflict appears to have become subsumed with the larger pattern of party conflict that predominates in the last decade and a half. The growing influence of the Black Caucus was largely contingent upon their role as a vote bloc within the majority party coalition. At first the growth of the Republican Party in the House enhanced the rise in Black Caucus but ultimately, Republicans electoral success resulted in an enormous loss of influence. In 2007 the Black Caucus reached a record high of 37 members but the ability to translate those numbers into influence has been curtailed by the minority status of the Democrats within the chamber.

Rural Versus Urban Conflict

V.O. Key titled his chapter on pre-World War II Georgia politics “Rule of the Rustics” because of the prominent role rural-urban conflict has played within the state. The county unit system provided an enormous bias in favor of rural counties and greatly penalized booming metropolitan counties. The system essentially created a rural veto power in the selection of candidates for state-wide office and within the State House.

Ready and willing to exploit this rural electoral advantage was the Talmadge family. Father Eugene Talmadge and son Herman Talmadge campaigned as plain country folk and famously proclaimed that they had no interest in carrying any county with a city big enough to contain a trolley car. Key’s analysis of Georgia elections shows that the Talmadge family and Talmadge-endorsed candidates did best in the black belt region located in southern and middle Georgia and did poorly in metropolitan counties and even some counties with even modest sized towns. At least in electoral politics, emphasizing rural-urban tension appeared to be a winning tactic for the winning candidates.

The federal courts shattered the rural stranglehold on political power within the state during the 1960s as the “one man, one vote” principle led to the demise of the county unit system in state elections and massive changes in legislative districts. The Atlanta metropolitan region which in 1961 held only 13 seats under the county unit system quickly jumped to 52 seats in 1966. The other metropolitan areas of the state are much smaller in size and realized only very modest increases. The Atlanta area however continues to grow and expand at a rate far above the national average and the number of seats allocated to the metropolitan region has steadily climbed with each U.S. Census. By 1993 the Atlanta region held almost one-half of all seats in the State House (Figure 6-9)

Simply put, the roll call vote record of the Georgia State House suggests that the rural-urban divide so often discussed in Georgia's electoral politics is present in a limited form within the state legislature (Figure 6-10). In the forty-five year period between 1961 and 2005 direct conflict between urban and rural members is comparatively rare. Urban-rural splits appear in roll call voting about half as often as partisan conflict and racial splits. Tension it appears to peak immediately after the court-ordered reapportionments of the late 1960s shifted a significant number of seats to the Atlanta metropolitan area. Since then conflict has generally edged downward.

When splits between urban and legislators do appear, the unity within each group is generally weak (Figure 6-11). Unity within the urban or rural members never crests the 70% threshold. At least 50% of the group must vote together so the level of unity above this baseline is not great. Group unity rates for the urban and rural cleavage are lower than those found on racial or partisan divisions. The infrequent appearance of such splits and the lower level of cohesion when they do appear suggest that the literature perhaps over states the importance of this particular cleavage line. Or if this division was important it faded out in the early 1960s or perhaps was only important on the electoral side of state politics but very weak in terms of roll call coalitions.

When there is conflict between rural and metropolitan representatives there is no clear pattern for most of the time period. Group win rates show that rural representatives clearly had an advantage in the first decade (Figure 6-12). Rural win rates declined until the mid-1980s when they begin to rise between 1985 and 2001. This revival of rural success is likely more a product of the increasingly partisan divide within the chamber. Republican gains in metropolitan areas resulted in a Democratic Party that was increasingly composed of rural whites and urban black

representatives. Because the Democratic Party remained unified, both rural areas and blacks show a rise in win rates during the Partisan Era because they are heavily tilted toward the majority party. With the capture of the State House by the Republicans the rural win rate on conflict votes declines abruptly.

Winners and Loser in the Georgia State House

The empirical evidence from roll call voting in the Georgia State House broadly supports Key's conclusion that political parties organize political conflict to a degree unmatched by other forms of factional organization. Analysis of voting shows that once partisan competition fully emerges in the state, party voting becomes the dominant floor voting coalition (Figure 6-13). In the Democratic Dominance Era neither party, nor race nor rural-metro provided a strong and enduring basis for structuring power within the legislative chamber.

In the absence of strong parties it would appear that neither racial conflict nor rural-metro divisions provided an adequate substitute. This evidence would seem to suggest that legislative decision-making in the pre-partisan period tended toward the inclusive distributive model. In order to assess who was a part of the governing coalition within the chamber it is important to examine whether some all factions or groups were equally likely to win or if one group was clearly dominant on the chamber floor.

Which theoretical model most accurately describes the voting coalitions observed within the State House? Once the historical "out" groups, blacks, urbanites and Republicans arrive are they shut out by a rural white Democratic cartel during the Era of Democratic Dominance? Or do they become part of an *inclusive distributive coalition*?

In order to discover which groups where winners and losers, a smaller subset of votes was selected in which at least one-fifth of those voting were dissenting. This is a subset of votes

with a higher degree of conflict and reduces the weight of very lopsided votes. Using this subset of more closely divided chamber votes the overall win rate for each group was calculated (Figure 6-14). If the minimal winning coalition predicted by the exclusive distributive cartel is present, these data should show a set of winners and losers. On the other hand, if the legislature operated under the more inclusive distributive model than there should be no clear pattern of winners and losers on these more intensely contested roll call votes.

The data clearly favor the inclusive model of legislative organization. During the pre-partisan period even minority Republicans are on the winning side on most of the intensely contested votes. The other historical "out" group of Georgia politics, black representatives are also consistently on the winning side during the pre-partisan period. Somewhat surprisingly rural white Democrats and metropolitan white Democrats are approximately equally successful in these closer roll call vote situations. In light of the historical primacy given to rural white Democrats their small win rate advantage essentially vanishes in the 1970s.

Only during the Partisan Era of Georgia politics do these roll call votes begin to show a clear pattern of winners and losers. As the Republicans increase in number and become more active as an opposition party they are increasingly excluded from the distribution of policy benefits. At this point in time, the Georgia House appears to transition from an inclusive non-partisan distributive coalition into a partisan exclusive coalition consistent with the party cartel model. With the shift of party control that takes place in 2005 the list of winners and lowers starkly reverses itself with the Republicans now winners and metropolitan white Democrats and the Black Caucus are now consistent losers. Rural white Democrats are less successful but it appears that many of them form a *de facto* cross-party alliance with the new Republican majority. Some of these rural white Democrats will switch parties in the following elections.

Conclusion

In summary, the empirical evidence from the case of the Georgia State House lends support to the party theorists who argue that parties organize and structure political coalitions in a much more profound, intense and enduring pattern than non-partisan factional alignments. The non-partisan model suggests that parties exercise negligible influence and that representatives are largely constrained not by their partisanship but by limitations that arise from constituency characteristics.The data presented in this chapter suggest that legislative coalitions are much more likely to be exclusive and distinct in a partisan political system than in a system without full party competition. Furthermore, constituency based differences such as racial composition and rural-urban differences are weak pressures in comparison to party.

The data presented in this chapter are consistent with the party selection effect theory which suggests that the timing of party polarization is a function of diverging party nominating electorates. Chapter Five demonstrated that participation in Republican Party primaries lagged significantly until the 1990s which is also the time period that legislative partisanship emerges with full force. Prior to this time period, party conflict remains low and party members cooperate to a degree in the distribution of benefits. Chapter Seven will consider the how timing and sequence might facilitate parsing what is the causal mechanism behind legislator polarization. Which political events coincided with the preference polarization observed among legislators?

CHAPTER SEVEN: Party, Preferences and Sequence

Chapter Six explored the patterns of group conflict and coalition in the recent history of the Georgia State House. In this chapter we return to the selection effect predictions of the party filter theory outlined in Chapter Three. The theory of party filtering suggests that in the *absence* of political parties the optimal strategy for candidates is to adopt the policy position favored by the median voter on each important issue dimension. If each candidate pursues this strategy with success then a chamber filled with strategic candidates should reveal a normal distribution of legislator ideal points.

A secondary prediction is that legislators chosen without a party filter effect will display multi-dimensional voting because they are responding to the median voter on each distinct issue dimension. Because voters are more likely to be unconstrained in their political thinking these issue positions will not necessarily be highly correlated but independent of one another. A chamber filled with legislators adopting the position of the median voter on each major issue dimension should display multi-dimensionality in the voting space.

The key variable in the theory of party filtering is the presence of a primary electorate that is biased in favor of the party-ideology dimension. Modern parties attract and mobilize voters by offering policy benefits. This basis of party appeals causes voters who care about those policy benefits to sort themselves into the party that best suits their demands. The creation of a primary electorate that is unrepresentative of the general election electorate induces a filtering effect on candidates. In order to win the party nomination candidates much adopt some non-centrist positions that appeal to the median voter in the primary election. Furthermore, primary electorates are more ideological and therefore will also be more likely to select candidates that offer an ideologically consistent basket of issue positions. As primary electorates become more

distinct from the set of voters found in the general election they will attract candidates away from the political center and promote those with an ideological perspective.

At the aggregate level a chamber filled with legislators who have survived the winnowing of polarized party primary should be polarized away from the political center. Within each party they may be normally distributed, but the mode of each party's distribution will be biased away from the middle of the space. Furthermore, because the primary electorate will favor ideological candidates, roll call voting within a chamber that is experiencing party filtering should exhibit spatial constraint. Rather than having multiple distinct issue dimensions, the policy space will be collapsed into a single or small number of ideological dimensions.

This theory of party filtering proposes that parties exercise an indirect effect on legislator preferences that is durable, consequential and measureable. If party primary electorates are the causal mechanism, then preference polarization in the legislature and the presence of constrained roll call voting should vary with party system.

The predictions of the party filtering theory were evaluated in Chapters Three and Four by looking at a cross-section of ten southern lower house chambers before and after the arrival of two-party competition. Legislator ideal point distributions in the one-party era tended to approximate a normal distribution with many members located in the political center of the policy space. The voting space also displayed significant multi-dimensionality. However after the development of two-party competition, the share of legislators located in the middle of the policy space decreased in most of the ten chambers and the dimensionality decreased dramatically.

The analysis of the cross-sectional data drawn from southern state lower chambers is consistent with the party filtering theory and predictions. However, other factors also were at

work during in the U.S. South simultaneous with the rise of two-party politics. Because other independent variables could potentially explain the before-and-after-treatment differences found in the cross-sectional section a case study was developed to explore the causal sequence. With the case of the Georgia State House it is possible to trace out the precise timing of legislator polarization and rise of spatial constraint in relationship to other potentially confounding independent variables. One advantage of examining the case of Georgia is that potentially confounding variables emerge at a different time than party primary polarization.

Attention to timing and sequence can facilitate sorting out which effect appears to be the causal variable. I will first review the timing of these other variables before addressing party and preference polarization. The list of alternative explanations for preference polarization include: the rise of independent chamber leadership, the entry of black voters into the primary electorate, the entry of Republican members into the legislature, and the urbanization of the state over time.

Three of these alternative explanations take place primarily in the decade of the 1960s. The Georgia State House, which had been organized by the governor's office for many decades, regained institutional independence following the 1966 election when its members selected a speaker and committee chairs internally. The State House moved dramatically towards a strong speaker form of organization. Tom Murphy who held the Speakership from 1973-2003 marked the high point of the independent House Speakership.

Another dramatic political shift was the end of barriers to black participation in politics. Black voter participation increased sharply following the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and these voters participated in the Democratic Primary which would have increased the number of primary voters with liberal policy preferences. Simultaneous with the fall of barriers to participation was the election of the first black representatives in the 1966 election. These new

members were located at the liberal end of the policy space and could potentially be credited with polarizing legislator preferences. Over time the number of black representatives increased very gradually until nearly one-fifth of all seats in the chamber were held by African-Americans.

A third shock to the political system in the 1960s was the fall of the County Unit System and the strong bias towards rural counties. This caused a sharp decline in the share of seats from rural areas and a dramatic increase in legislators from urbanized counties. Studies of southern politics have found that urban areas of the south tend to be less conservative in their political orientation. A sudden shift in the regional composition of the legislature could potentially be a driving force behind legislator polarization.

The fourth development to occur in the 1960s was the increase in Republican members in the legislature. The 1964 and 1966 elections produced a breakthrough for the party which won presidential electoral votes, U.S. House seats and state legislative seats across the region. Prior to this moment, only a handful of Republicans had won seats in the Georgia State House and these members came a few mountain counties, but after 1964 Republicans were able to compete and win seats within the metropolitan areas of the state.

The 1960s and early 1970s were a turbulent and dramatic period in Georgia political history. There was a substantial shift in the composition of the chamber as liberal black legislators and conservative Republicans took their seats. Representation of the Atlanta metropolitan area increased exponentially and the rural areas that had dominated for many decades saw their voting strength diminished. These profound changes in Georgia politics might easily manifest themselves in the form of big shifts in legislator location or changes in the spatial dimensionality of voting. If these elements are the underlying causal factors behind polarization or spatial constraint, then we might expect such shifts to occur in the late 1960s or early 1970s.

On other hand, if legislator change is driven by shifts in primary voters, then we would expect changes inside the legislature to appear later. Figure 7-1 shows the distribution of voters participating in legislative primaries in Georgia between 1966 and 2002. Despite the appearance of Republicans on the ballot in the 1960s the Democratic Primary attracted nearly every person who turned out to vote on Primary Election Day. The Republican Party Primary drew less than 10% of all primary day voters until the mid-1980s and even then the Republican share never rose about 20% until the 1990s.

The Democratic Party Primary remained the central venue for choosing candidates and frequently primary contests were the critical phase. Republican failed to field candidates in numerous legislative districts for many decades. Seats that were uncontested by Republicans in the general election were effectively decided in the Democratic Party Primary election and as late the early 1990s a majority of the seats in the Georgia State House where determined in the primary election (Figure 7-2). Liberal, conservative and moderate Democrats all continued to participate in the same primary for three decades. The primary electorate was unusually diverse because it drew voters from across the political spectrum.

Not until the 1990s did white conservatives begin to abandon the Democratic Party and participate in the Republican Party Primary. Once the shift began the movement was very quick. In 1992 Republican Primary participation was just above 20% of all primary day voters and this share exploded to 50% by 1998. The exit of white conservatives would have left the Democratic Primary electorate composed of a much higher share of liberals and moderates than had been the case in the 1980s.

Measurement of the ideological composition on primary voters in Georgia is scare because exit polling was rarely conducted during the regular party primary. However news

organizations did conduct exit poll surveys of the Georgia Presidential Primary and Georgia General Election voters from the middle of the 1980s through the present. Among General Election Voters the share of self identified conservatives is consistently three times the number of self identified liberals (Figure 7-3). The ideological self identification of general election voters has remained quite stable over the last quarter century.

However an examination of Georgia Presidential Primary voters shows a much different pattern among Democrats (7-4). The ratio of self identified conservatives to liberals has widened dramatically. Self identified conservatives have fallen from nearly one third of all Democratic Primary voters in 1984 to slightly more than one tenth in the 2000 and 2008 primaries. On the other hand self identified liberals have steadily increased from about one-quarter of Democratic Primary voters to nearly one-half in 2008. The ideological composition of the Georgia Republican Primary voters has remained very stable over time with conservatives comprising nearly two-thirds of primary voters over the last twenty years (Figure 7-5).

The temporal aspect of political change in Georgia facilitates analysis because the dependent variable (party primary polarization) happens at a distinctly different time than other key political changes in the state. The party filter theory of preference polarization predicts that change inside the legislature should occur only after a polarization of primary voters. Primary polarization takes place in the 1990s while other key changes occur during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Did Georgia legislators become more polarized over time? If so, did this change take place in the 1960s or the 1990s? Analysis of the legislator ideal points extracted from roll call voting by the NOMINATE program provides strong evidence that polarization took place toward the end of the period of study. In the decades of the 1960s and 1970s approximately one third of

all legislators were located in the middle third of the policy space see (see Figure 7-9). In the 1980s the number of centrists actually began to increase such that in the 1989 session just over half of all State House members were located in the middle third of the policy space. The dramatic political developments of the late 1960s do not appear to be the causal force behind legislator polarization.

In contrast, the early 1990s mark a dramatic turning point. The share of centrist legislators decreases in each successive session studied. In the 1989 session 53% of all members were centrists but by 2001 only 22% were situated in the middle of the policy space. This trend continued into the 2005 session where moderates comprised just 15% of the body. This trend is consistent with the theory that legislator preferences are polarized not due to constituency variables or the personal beliefs of legislators but because party primary activists filter in favor of non-centrist candidates who are responsive to their policy demands.

Rise of spatial constraint over time

The second prediction of the partisan filter model is that the appearance of spatial constraint in roll call voting is a function of ideological primary voters favoring candidates who adopt the standard party ideology framework. As noted above, primary voter polarization does not take place until the 1990s in Georgia while other profound shifts in state politics occur in the 1960s.

The three measures of 'goodness of fit' for the first dimension are the percentage of votes correctly classified, the Proportional Reduction in Error (PRE) and Geometric Mean Proportion. The vote classification percentage of the 1st dimension actually decreases in the late 1960s and early 1970s and remains low through the 1980s (Figure 7-7). In the 1990s the classification percentage rises sharply and reaches almost 90% by the end of the decade.

The Proportional Reduction in Error is a model assessment tool which demonstrates who much (or how little) the model improves over a naïve model. In this case the naïve model assumes that everyone votes with the majority. If an average of 65% of all members vote with the majority in a typical session, the error is 35% for the naïve model. The PRE lists how much of that error is explained by the more sophisticated model.

In the case of the Georgia State House the PRE for the 1st dimension during is very low for the first two decades (Figure 7-8). This suggests that the 1st dimension is not that powerful because using just one dimension to explain voting improves on the naïve model only very slightly. In contrast the PRE escalates in the 1990s such that by the end of that decade using the 1st dimension alone to explain legislative voting explains half of the error left by the naïve model.

The third measure of fit for the 1st dimension is the Geometric Mean Proportion which takes into account both the number of vote errors but also their magnitude. Legislators are scaled along the 1st dimension and they are assumed to cast roll call voted based upon their ideal point within the dimension. If a legislator casts a vote that is contrary to his or her spatial location this is scored as an error under vote classification, but the GMP measure not only scores errors but the size of the errors.

The GMP measure to evaluate the 1st dimension found in Georgia State House roll call votes (Figure 7-9) displays the same pattern observed in the previous measures of fit. The 1st dimension is not nearly as powerful at predicting legislator votes in the first two decades of this study but the accuracy rate climbs in the 1990s.

These three measures of fit test the ability of the 1st dimension to predict accurately thousands of roll call decisions made by Georgia legislators over a forty year period. These

measures all indicate that spatial constraint was lacking during the one-party period of the Georgia House. However, after party primary polarization the strength of the first dimension climbs sharply as other policy dimensions are collapsed into the party-ideology dimension.

Summary and Conclusion

The case of Georgia provides an important opportunity to tease out the relationship between political parties and legislator preferences. In the recent history of Georgia the full range of party competition can be observed as the Republican Party shifts from being nearly non-existent in the state to becoming the majority party. However, there are other important independent variables at work during this period that could also have a powerful effect on legislator preferences. These alternative variables include massive redistricting, the rise of independent legislative leadership, the end of barriers to black participation and potential tensions between the growing Atlanta region and the rest of the state. None of these factors appears to be the driving force behind preference polarization and the rise of constraint in roll call voting.

CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusion

United States political parties exist within an unusual set of parameters; they are post-facto additions to a pre-existing Constitutional framework. Because the U.S. Constitution does not facilitate political parties, party leaders lack many of the tools that are used in parliamentary systems to enforce discipline within the legislature. Are U.S. parties so toothless that they are largely irrelevant? Should scholars instead model the preferences of the median or pivotal members of the chamber? Furthermore, are legislators so strongly attuned to constituency interests that parties and party leaders have little hope of overcoming pressure from back home?

This study presents a more nuanced understanding of how electoral parties exercise influence by selecting in favor of candidates who adopt a non-centrist spatial location and who utilize party ideology to structure their issue positions. Because political parties are gatekeepers to the nomination of viable general election candidates, they introduce a persistent and predictable bias in the spatial location of legislators. Because party leaders have a modest reward and sanction powers, legislators must give attention to primary electorates that control their re-nomination. To the extent that party primary nominating electorates diverge, these electorates are hypothesized to induce polarization among legislators.

This theory of party filtering allows for predictions regarding aggregate behavior (legislators will be polarized) but still allows for individual level variation. Candidates have some freedom to strategize within the limits imposed by the median primary and the median general election voters. The theory presented here cannot predict the exact location of each individual legislator because there is room for individual choice, but it does allow a general prediction of systematic non-centrist bias.

One-Party Political Systems

The cross sectional analysis of legislator roll call behavior in ten southern state lower chambers between 1961-1962 and a longitudinal look at roll call behavior in the Georgia State House from 1961-1965 lends broad support to the hypotheses of the party filter theory. In these one-party legislative chambers, members tended to be centrist in their location within the strongest spatial dimension. But voting within these chambers tended to be multi-dimensional with the first dimension much weaker in explanatory power than is typically the case in the U.S. Congress or other national legislatures.

In American politics the Downsian prediction of candidate convergence has rarely been supported by empirical evidence. However, in these one-party legislative chambers the legislators who won tended to be clustered in the center of the policy space. The case study of the Georgia State House also shows that legislator preference polarization did not follow the appearance of Republicans, blacks and urban representatives in the late 1960s. Even as the legislature became more diverse winning politicians remained centrally clustered. As long as the overwhelming majority of voters continued to participate in the Democratic Party Primary it continued to nominate a large number of centrists who won the bulk of seats in the State House chamber.

Two Party Political Systems

According to the party filter theory, legislator preferences should vary as primary voters polarize. The cross-sectional analysis using ten southern states found evidence of increased polarization after two party competition emerged in the south. The distribution of legislators within the primary dimension tended to be bi-modal with a hollowing out of centrists. There are some deviant cases such as Mississippi which was still in the process of voter realignment during period of study. Louisiana changed their voting system (which will be discussed further shortly).

With respect to the dimensionality, the presence of multiple dimensions declined across the board and the party-ideology dimension strengthened with the rise of two-party competition. This is consistent with the hypothesis that more ideologically driven primary voters would favor candidates who utilize an ideological framework to order their issue positions. The case of the Georgia State House demonstrates that legislator polarization did not occur as a result of exogenous shocks that altered the composition of the chamber in the 1960s. Urban redistricting, racial change, independent institutional leadership and a small Republican presence all appear in that period, however polarization and uni-dimensionality do not. These changes occurred thirty years later in the 1990s when conservatives dramatically exit the Democratic Party Primary and move to the Republican Primary.

Party Influence Revisited

The search for party effects in American legislatures has proven to be puzzling. Smith (2007) has pointed out that direct party influence is likely to be rare and strategic and therefore difficult to detect with statistical tests. Strahan (2007) has highlighted the importance of personality, creativity and historical context which may be combined by transformational leaders who are able to push beyond the contextual boundaries of member preferences. Many scholars of legislator behavior have emphasized the power of the constituency in determining the actions and choices within the chamber.

This study has contributed to scholarly understanding of party influence by examining cases beyond the U.S. House or the U.S. Congress. The bulk of scholarly theory has been generated from a single case. Many of these theories seek to examine one very important case but they are rarely tested on other legislative cases. This study has taken the theoretical debates over party influence in Congress and applied them to new cases.

Another contribution of this study is the examination of the null case. Often the debate over the weakness of party influence in the United States is framed with a comparison to European party list systems. Some of these European systems might correctly be categorized as the "maximal" example of party influence—the parties pick the candidates, turn out the voters and dictate how legislators vote. Certainly American parties are much weaker than the maximum case, but any assessment of strength should also consider the null case. What does politics look like without any party organizing influence? This study clearly shows that one-party systems lacking competition are significantly different. Legislators show evidence of a Downsian convergence to the center of the political space and the issue space is multi-dimensional and is generally weakly structured.

This study also contributes to our understanding of party influence by demonstrating the interrelationship between external voter behavior and internal legislator voting. A fundamental question of democratic theory is one of political responsiveness. The political change in the American South shows that external voter polarization among primary voters was tightly connected with internal legislator polarization. Furthermore there could be a recursive aspect to this process, the polarization of voters encourages polarization of political actors with further drives polarization of voters.

One key finding of this study is the influence of party primary voters. Turnout in party primary elections is much lower than the general election (although the reverse was true in the one-party South). The shift of ideologically conservative voters from participating in the Democratic Primary to the Republican Primary is the primary factor associated with change inside the Georgia State House. The influence of these voters produced a profound shift in Georgia politics.

This study has sought to demonstrate that when party competition is present, political parties add a filter to these constituency pressures. The external role of party primaries produces a consistent and measureable effect upon legislator location and the dimensionality of the voting space. Constituency remains a powerful factor, but each legislator must adopt a set of issue stances that will satisfy the median voter in both the general and primary election if they wish to continue their electoral career.

Georgia Political History

This study also makes an unique contribution to our understanding of Georgia's political development. The examination of both electoral and roll call voting patterns reveals several important developments. The urban-rural tensions that were emphasized by V.O. Key's study of Georgia politics in the 1930s-1950s was not as evident in roll call voting patterns. The low level of rural-urban conflict in the early 1960s could be explained away as a consequence of massive under-representation of metropolitan areas. However, even after re-apportionment reform the amount of conflict along this geographic line was rather modest.

Another remarkable finding was the rise and decline of influence of the Black Caucus in the Georgia State House. Initially black Democrats entered a hostile chamber where conservative rural white Democrats held much of the power. Over time the Black Caucus became an important part of the Democratic majority and they win rate climbed. However with the Republican ascendency to power in 2005 their success rate collapsed.

The importance of leadership was also a notable part of the story in Georgia. Objectively the state had many of the conditions for a Republican re-alignment to occur much earlier. It had a concentrated suburbs, many non-south migrants, a rising middle class and yet re-alignment was greatly delayed compared to some other southern states. Even conservative voters remained

inside the Democratic Party instead of switching. Democratic Governors and the Speaker Murphy were able to maintain a broad bi-racial coalition in the state which held off Republican gains for thirty years. Democratic leaders also benefited from some good fortunate as well. When Georgia native Jimmy Carter was elected President this helped to stabilize the party's image. Even in 1980 when many southern states went narrowly for Reagan, Carter carried Georgia by a large margins. Bullock and Gaddie (2010) also point to bad luck for the Republicans. In 1966 the Republican candidate finished first in the governor's election and might have accelerated Georgia's partisan re-alignment, but the state constitution required a popular vote majority which cost the Republicans the governor's office as the Democratic legislature choose Lester Maddox.

Future Work

In future work, I would like to expand the roll call vote study to include all votes in the Georgia State House between 1950-2010. Expanding the study to a 60 year time period would grant greater leverage on some key questions. For example, during the on-party period how important was the governor in terms of setting the legislative agenda? How often did the governor prevail? Another important question is one of influence within the chamber during the one-party period. The literature on southern politics suggests that white legislators from majority black counties were most influential and vocal during the segregation era—is this supported by the roll call data? Do black-belt white legislators win more often?

Another fascinating question that could be examined following the collection of all roll call votes during the 1960s is the shift in major black districts. The literature suggest that whites elected in majority black areas would be the most racially conservative during segregation. However, some white Democrats managed to win reelection in majority black districts for some period of time. How did these white Democrats from majority black districts behave? Did they

moderate their positions and survive or did a more moderate or liberal white Democrat replace a more conservative white Democrat in the party primary?

Another potential course for future work would be to examine the deviant case of Louisiana. I have argued here that in most southern states the Democratic Party Primary tended to nominate centrist legislators because such a broad spectrum of voters participated in that phase. However, the state Louisiana was against this pattern. For many years elections within the Democratic Primary were highly factional between the Long family and the anti-Long faction. These divisions were so pronounced that newspapers printed lists of which candidates were allied with each faction. The Democratic Party electorate had a choice between two polarized set of candidates—and the winners tended to show evidence of polarization in their voting.

Later in time the State of Louisiana adopted a run-off system in which all candidates competed in the first round (and frequently there were more than one from each party who filed). In no candidate won a majority in the first round, the top two finishers advanced to a run-off that would produce a winner. In this system the median voter was advantaged and candidates had strong incentives for convergence in both phases of the election. In theory, legislators should be more polarized when candidates were endorsed by the Long and anti-Long factions and less polarized during the "jungle primary" period when the convergence on the median voter should have induced more centrists.

Conclusion

This study presents important evidence in favor of a subtle indirect party effect on legislator preferences that helps to explain why parties matter even in a Constitutional context which limits their potential power. This study also illustrates the utility of looking at state legislatures which can provide additional leverage on tough theoretical problems because of

variation across cases. Finally this study also suggests that scholars who make overly simplified assumptions about legislator preferences may err by not giving sufficient attention to the complex interplay between party, constituency and personal choices that each legislator must make in their representative career.

Figure 3-1. Alabama Legislator Preference Distributions 1961-62 and 1999-2000





Figure 3-2. Florida Legislator Preference Distributions 1961-62 and 1999-2000





Figure 3-3. Georgia Legislator Preference Distributions 1961-62 and 1999-2000





Figure 3-4. Louisiana Legislator Preference Distributions 1961-62 and 1999-2000





Figure 3-5. Mississippi Legislator Preference Distributions 1961-62 and 1999-2000





Figure 3-6. North Carolina Legislator Preference Distributions 1961-62 and 1999-2000





Figure 3-7. South Carolina Legislator Preference Distributions 1961-62 and 1999-2000





Figure 3-8. Tennessee Legislator Preference Distributions 1961-62 and 1999-2000





Figure 3-9. Texas Legislator Preference Distributions 1961-62 and 1999-2000





Figure 3-10. Virginia Legislator Preference Distributions 1961-62 and 1999-2000





Table 3-1

Change in the Percent of Centrists Legislators

State	1961-1962	1999-2000	Percentage Change
AL	40%	33%	-6%
FL	34%	7%	-27%
GA	43%	23%	-21%
LA	42%	38%	-4%
MS	46%	50%	+4%
NC	57%	18%	-40%
SC	44%	17%	-27%
TN	42%	40%	-2%
TX	30%	24%	-6%
VA	49%	8%	-41%

Table 4-1

U.S. Congress First Dimension Measures of Fit

House	Classification %	PRE	GMP
Two-Party U.S. House			
Average (1789-1980)	83.0%	.489	.682
Other One-Party Chambers			
14th U.S. House	72.3%	.256	.595
15th U.S. House	71.6%	.272	.589
16th U.S. House	76.4%	.395	.632
17th U.S. House	70.6%	.165	.574
18th U.S. House	77.0%	.433	.642
Non-Partisan Con. House			
1st Conf. House	68.1%	.105	.555
2nd Conf. House	73.3%	.275	.682

Source for Confederate Congress: Jenkins (1999).

Source for U.S. Congress: Poole and Rosenthal (1997).

Table 4-2

One-Party Era First Dimension Measures of Fit

House	Classification %	PRE	GMP
1961 AL House	79.8%	.431	.651
1961 FL House	79.5%	.242	.630
1961 GA House	79.6%	.156	.624
1961 LA House	82.7%	.272	.652
1961 MS House	72.8%	.189	.583
1961 NC House	80.7	.230	.645
1961 SC House	78.4%	.419	.642
1961 TN House	79.0%	.239	.642
1961 TX House	79.8%	.362	.643
1961 VA House	83.5%	.139	.657

Table 4-3

Two Party Era First Dimension Measures of Fit

House	Classification %	PRE	GMP
1999 AL House	83.4%	.532	.688
1999 FL House	92.2%	.711	.812
1999 GA House	85.5%	.475	.722
1999 LA House	80.9%	.268	.660
1999 MS House	84.0%	.260	.681
1999 NC House	86.0%	.463	.721
1999 SC House	85.1%	.577	.716
1999 TN House	82.5%	.293	.666
1999 TX House	86.9%	.604	.740
1999 VA House	87.7%	.452	.707

Table 4-4

Dimensionality of Roll Call Voting in One-Party Southern Houses

Eigen Values for Each Heckman and Snyder Factor for 1961-1962

Factor	AL	FL	GA	LA	MS	NC	SC	TN	TX	VA
1	**7.59**	**2.98**	**3.95**	**2.40**	**3.42**	**4.11**	**8.29**	**3.24**	**6.61**	**0.99**
2	**1.66**	**1.20**	**2.01**	**1.16**	**1.64**	**3.80**	**3.09**	**1.43**	**1.30**	0.68
3	**1.11**	**1.00**	**1.33**	0.94	0.93	**2.13**	**2.17**	0.90	**1.05**	0.45
4	0.87	0.87	**1.28**	0.72	0.77	**1.80**	**1.21**	0.69	0.78	0.43
5	0.69	0.60	**1.06**	0.52	0.60	**1.34**	**1.13**	0.63	0.62	0.34
6	0.61	0.58	**1.01**	0.46	0.55	**1.24**	**1.10**	0.53	0.57	0.30
7	0.48	0.50	0.93	0.41	0.50	**1.02**	0.92	0.42	0.52	0.27
8	0.42	0.46	0.76	0.37	0.44	0.95	0.67	0.39	0.45	0.25
9	0.34	0.42	0.72	0.35	0.43	0.90	0.63	0.32	0.33	0.25
10	0.29	0.39	0.65	0.28	0.42	0.75	0.62	0.28	0.32	0.23

Table 4-5

Dimensionality of Roll Call Voting in Two-Party Southern Houses

Eigen Values for Each Heckman and Snyder Factor for 1999-2000

Factor	AL	FL	GA	LA	MS	NC	SC	TN	TX	VA
1	**5.11**	**11.9**	**10.5**	**3.22**	**3.07**	**6.18**	**12.1**	**2.74**	**13.0**	**3.53**
2	**1.32**	0.77	0.71	**1.41**	**1.96**	0.91	**1.56**	**1.08**	0.72	0.68
3	0.66	0.52	0.65	0.95	0.73	0.47	0.60	0.64	0.64	0.34
4	0.49	0.39	0.51	0.79	0.60	0.36	0.48	0.43	0.45	0.21
5	0.30	0.27	0.37	0.51	0.43	0.28	0.31	0.39	0.40	0.12
6	0.29	0.27	0.33	0.41	0.29	0.27	0.28	0.34	0.31	0.11
7	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.37	0.28	0.24	0.22	0.27	0.30	0.08
8	0.22	0.19	0.24	0.26	0.28	0.21	0.20	0.25	0.26	0.08
9	0.20	0.18	0.23	0.24	0.22	0.18	0.17	0.22	0.23	0.07
10	0.19	0.14	0.20	0.23	0.21	0.16	0.17	0.20	0.21	0.06

Table 4-6

Party Label and Dimensions 1999-2000

Year and State	1st Dimension	2nd Dimension
1999 AL House	.688	.045
1999 FL House	.771	.003
1999 GA House	.698	.000
1999 LA House	.369	.000
1999 MS House	.411	.033
1999 NC House	.794	.002
1999 SC House	.806	.000
1999 TN House	.700	.000
1999 TX House	.848	.022
1999 VA House	.837	.000

Table 5-1

Allocation of Representation under the Georgia Unit System

Year	8 Largest	Next 30 Counties	Remaining Counties
1917	12%	29%	59%

Table 5-2

Actual Distribution of Population in Georgia, 1900-1960

Year	8 Largest Counties	Next 30 Counties	Remaining Counties
1910	21%	27%	53%
1920	24%	28%	49%
1930	30%	27%	45%
1940	32%	26%	43%
1950	38%	26%	38%
1960	44%	26%	31%

Figure 5-1

Republican Share of Seats in the Georgia Assembly, 1959-2011



Figure 5-2

Emergence of Republican Party in Georgia State House Elections, 1966-2002



Table 5-3

Black Representatives in the Georgia House of Representatives

Year	House Seats	Percentage of All Seats
1959	0	0%
1961	0	0%
1963	0	0%
1965	0	0%
1967	7	3%
1969	8	4%
1971	11	6%
1973	12	7%
1975	14	8%
1977	20	11%
1979	21	12%
1981	21	12%
1983	20	11%
1985	19	11%
1987	19	11%
1989	20	11%
1991	23	13%
1993	27	15%
1995	31	17%
1997	32	18%
1999	32	18%
2001	33	18%
2003	33	18%

Table 5-4

Geographical Distribution of State House Seats by Region, 1960-2000

Year	Atlanta Metro	Other Metros	Non-Metropolitan Areas
1962	6%	8%	86%
1966	22%	17%	62%
1968	26%	18%	56%
1972	33%	21%	46%
1982	42%	20%	38%
1992	49%	17%	34%

Figure 6-1

Republican Share of Seats in the Georgia Assembly, 1959-2011



Figure 6-2

Party Conflict Appearance in Contested Roll Call Votes, 1969-2005



Figure 6-3

Party Unity in Party Conflict Votes, 1969-2005



Table 6-1

Speaker Elections, Georgia State House

Year	Democrat	Votes	Republican	Votes
1985	Murphy	152	Isackson	26
1987	Murphy	151	Isackson	27
1989	Murphy	141	Isackson	35
1991	Murphy	146	Heard	32
1993	Murphy	123	Stancil	49
1995	Murphy	112	Irvin	65
1997	Murphy	106	Irvin	73
1999	Murphy	104	Irvin	76
2001	Murphy	104	Westmoreland	74
2003	Coleman	103	Westmoreland	70
2005	Porter	60	Richardson	117
2007	Porter	66	Richardson	113

Note: Democratic Nominee elected by unanimous voice vote 1961-1983.

Source: Journal of the Georgia State House, various years.

Figure 6-4

Win Rates on Party Conflict Votes, 1969-2005



Figure 6-5

Voting Block Strength in Georgia State House, 1961-2007



Figure 6-6

Race Conflict as a Share of All Contested Roll Call Votes, 1969-2005



Figure 6-7

Group Unity on Racial Conflict Votes, 1969-2005



Figure 6-8

Group Win Rates on Race Conflict Votes, 1969-2005



Figure 6-9

Metropolitan Representation in the Georgia State House, 1961-2005



Figure 6-10

Urban-Rural Conflict Appearance Rate



Figure 6-11

Urban-Rural Unity on Conflict Votes, 1961-2005



Figure 6-12

Urban-Rural Win Rates on Conflict Votes, 1961-2005



Figure 6-13

Roll Call Conflict by Group Type, 1969-2005



Figure 6-14

Group Win Rates on Votes with 20% Dissenting



Figure 7-1

Emergence of Republican Party in State House Elections, 1966-2002



Figure 7-2

Where Georgia State House Elections Were Resolved, 1966-2002



Figure 7-3

Georgia General Election Voter Ideological Self Identification, Exit Polls 1986-2008



Figure 7-4

Georgia Democratic Primary Ideological Self Identification, Exit Polls 1984-2008



Figure 7-5

Georgia Republican Primary Ideological Self Identification, Exit Polls 1988-2008



Figure 7-6

Percentage of Centrist Legislators in Georgia State House, 1961-2005



Figure 7-7

Percentage of Votes Correctly Classified by the 1st Dimension 1961-2005



Figure 7-8

1st Dimension Proportional Reduction in Error, 1961-2005



Figure 7-9

1st Dimension Geometric Mean Proportion, 1961-2005



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