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Zhi Luo

April 10, 2023

Stock Behavior and Mispricing Puzzle of Chinese Dual-Listed Stocks on U.S. and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges During Listing Periods

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An abstract of a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Emory College of Arts and Sciences of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors

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Abstract

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By Zhi Luo

This paper examines 39 Chinese companies that dual-listed on the U.S. stock exchanges and Hong Kong stock exchange between January 1, 2019 and February 21, 2023. The focus of this paper is to study the changes in stock behavior during the dual-listing period as well as the differences between Hong Kong listing prices and U.S. listing prices. China's economic growth has driven up demand for capital, especially foreign capital. However, major U.S.listed China-based companies faced delisting risks after President Trump signed the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA) into law on December 18, 2020. HFCAA required China-based audit firms to give the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) complete access to inspect and investigate U.S.-listed China-based companies' financial statements. Many of these companies decided to dual-list domestically on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) as a backup plan to continue gaining access to foreign capital. December 15, 2022 was a turning point in the tension between U.S. regulators and Chinese regulators as PCAOB published a statement confirming that it secured complete access to inspect and investigate Chinese firms that have access to U.S. capital markets A major finding of this paper is that the 39 Chinese stocks experienced a shift of correlation with market indices before and after the enactment of HFCAA and PCAOB's announcement. When delisting risk was high, these Chinese stocks were more correlated with Hong Kong's Hang Seng Index and less correlated with U.S.'s S&P 500 and DJIA indices. This study adopts causal inference and finds that stock and market volatility has a significant impact on the mispricing between Hong Kong listings and U.S. listings. By observing 3 years of price differences from 2019 to 2022, I noticed that the mispricing was the biggest after the HFCAA was signed into law. The delisting risks caused the market to be volatile. However, explaining what is causing the mispricing is still a challenge.

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Stock Behavior and Mispricing Puzzle of Chinese Dual-Listed Stocks on U.S. and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges During Listing Periods

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1 Introduction

Classical economists typically operate on the assumption that the Law of One Price holds true, meaning that the price of a particular asset should be identical across different regions after accounting for exchange rates. In an ideally integrated global financial market, any deviations from this principle would be corrected via arbitrage.

This paper presents a counterexample to the Law of One Price by demonstrating that stock prices can be impacted by the location of trading. Specifically, I conducted an analysis of the stock prices of 29 China-based companies that are listed on both U.S. and Hong Kong stock exchanges over a three-year period. According to the Law of One Price, the prices of these companies' stocks should be equivalent in Hong Kong and the U.S. when accounting for currency conversion and American Depositary Share (ADS) ratios, which indicate the number of Hong Kong Ordinary Shares represented by one U.S. ADS. Surprisingly, duallisted stock prices do not behave in this manner. Many of them exhibited large deviations when the market is volatile.

This paper aims to investigate three primary areas of interest. Firstly, it answer whether dual-listing have a positive impact on the stock performance. Secondly, it analyzes the behavior of stocks immediately following dual-listings, with a focus on factors such as stock return, trading volume, liquidity, and volatility. Thirdly, it examines the potential causes of mispricing and the resulting implications on market integration, market liquidity, and dispersion of opinion.

In the past few decades, dual-listing and cross-listing companies are well-studied by researchers around the globe. Many studies have focused on emerging markets in Japan, Thailand, and Finland during globalization since the 1980s. In contrast to previous literature, this study examined data from U.S.-listed Chinese companies from 2019 to 2023. During this time period, the U.S.-China trade war, U.S.-China 5G competition, COVID-19, and supply chain disruptions accelerated deglobalization.

Furthermore, the increasing adoption of data centers and cloud computing has elevated data security to a matter of national security. Both the U.S. and China have implemented data protection laws that regulate the usage and storage of domestic data. The center of the conflict was the U.S. regulators' access to audit data of Chinese companies listed in the U.S. On December 18, 2020, President Trump signed the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA) into law to address the concerns about the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) limitations in complete access to inspect and investigate registered public accounting firms in mainland China and Hong Kong. If the PCAOB's limitations are not removed by 2024, the HFCAA poses delisting risks for securities of Chinese issuers that audited their financial statements using public accounting firms that limited PCAOB access. Facing the delisting risk, 29 China-based companies urgently dual-listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) as a backup plan to continue accessing foreign capital in

the event of HFCAA banning trading on U.S. stock exchanges. It is unprecedented for companies to dual-list domestically to avoid delisting risks in foreign markets. In fact, it has been uncommon for companies with listings on U.S. stock exchanges to pursue dual-listing in their home market because U.S. stock exchanges have superior liquidity and higher listing standards.

On December 15, 2022, the PCAOB released a statement confirming that it had obtained full access to inspect and investigate Chinese firms that have access to U.S. capital markets. As a result of this development, U.S. and Chinese authorities were able to reach an agreement that substantially reduced the risk of delisting for Chinese companies. This effectively brought a temporary end to the tensions that had been brewing between the two countries on this issue.

The enactment of the HFCAA on December 18, 2020, and the subsequent statement by the PCAOB on December 15, 2022, marked two crucial time points that establish a clear starting and ending point for the tensions surrounding Chinese firms with access to U.S. capital markets. These events provided a clear delineation between the before and after stages, allowing for a more precise analysis of the impact of these developments.

1.1 Timeline With Two Cutoff Points

1.1.1 First Case of Chinese State-owned Enterprise Delisting

The first delisting of major Chinese companies from U.S. stock exchanges under political pressure occured on November 12, 2020. President Trump signed the Executive Order 13959 to prohibit U.S. investments in three Chinese telecommunication companies: China Telecom, China Mobile, and China Unicom. The U.S. government believed that the three companies "directly support the PRC's military, intelligence, and security apparatuses and aid in their development and modernization". On January 6, 2021, the New York Stock Exchange an-

nounced the delisting of the three Chinese ADSs effective on January 11, 2021. Although, they were the first three major Chinese ADSs delisted from the U.S. stock markets under the pressure of government officials, the market did not think that all the Chinese ADSs faced delisting risks. At the time, the market considered these three delistings as the result of the U.S.-China 5G competition and the U.S.'s sanction on Huawei and ZTE. Therefore, it is a special case under unique geopolitical environment that does not represent the overall trend.

1.1.2 First Cut Off Point: The Beginning of Delisting Risk

The Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA) was passed by U.S. Senate on May 12, 2020 and U.S. House of Representatives on December 2, 2020. It was signed into law by President Trump on December 18, 2020. Under the law, China-based audit firms are required to give the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) complete access to inspect and investigate U.S.-listed China-based companies' financial statements. Failure to meet the requirements may result in the Chinese ADSs being banned from trading and delisted from exchanges. The HFCAA created delisting risk to all of the Chinese ADSs, so December 18, 2020 is the first cutoff in this paper's data. It is the beginning of a growing trend among Chinese ADSs to dual-list on Hong Kong stock exchange as a backup plan. The Hong Kong stock exchange has been quick to approve secondary listings for companies that meet the minimum requirements, which are less rigorous than those for primary listings. The key requirements for secondary listing on Hong Kong stock exchange are summarized below.

	Without weighted ve	oting rights ("WVR")	With WVR
Stock Exchange of Primary Listing	Recognised Stock Exchanges ^{Note 3}	Qualifying Exchanges Note 2	Qualifying Exchanges(*) Note 2
Centre of Gravity in Greater China ^{Note 1}	Generally Prohibited(**)	Permitted	Permitted
"Innovative Company" Requirement ^{Note 4}	Not Re	oquired	Required
Minimum Market Capitalisation at Listing	HK\$ 3 billion	HK\$ 3 billion	HK\$40 billion or HK\$10 billion and revenue of at least HK\$1 billion for the most recent audited financial year
Minimum Track Record on Primary Exchange	5 years of listing with good compliance record (***)	S years of listing with good compliance record (***) (or 2 years of listing with good compliance record if its market capitalisation has at least HK\$ 10 billion at the time of Listing)	2 years of listing with good compliance record

Figure 1: Hong Kong Secondary Listing RequirementsHKR

1.1.3 Second Case of Chinese State-owned Enterprise Delisting

On August 12, 2022, five major state-owned Chinese companies including, China Life Insurance Company Limited, PetroChina Company Limited, China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation, Aluminum Corporation of China Limited, and Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited, announced that they intended to voluntarily delist their ADSs. This is a sign that the Chinese decided that the five state-owned companies are impossible to follow the U.S.'s disclosure obligation because of the administrative burden and the sensitivity of the data. The five delistings are an effort to avoid mass delisting of other Chinses companies and conform with the U.S. disclosure obligation.

1.1.4 Second Cut Off Point: The Temporary End of Delisting Risk

On December 15, 2022, PCAOB published a statement that it secured complete access to inspect and investigate Chinese firms that have access to U.S. capital markets. Therefore, U.S. and Chinese authorities reached an agreement that significantly reduced the delisting risk of Chinese companies. This temporary end to the trend of delisting is the second cutoff in this paper's data.

1.1.5 Third Case of Chinese State-owned Enterprise Delisting

On January 13, 2023, China Eastern Airline and China Southern Airline filed for delisting their ADSs listed on the New York Stock Exchange.




Figure 2: Market Capitalization of Listed Companies, Nov. 2021-Jan. 2023Chi

According to a report published by U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) on January 9, 2023, 23 out of the top 30 Chinese companies, based on market capitalization, listed on U.S. stock exchanges have dual-listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange. The remaining seven companies that are only listed on the U.S. stock exchanges are: Pinduoduo Inc., Full Truck Alliance Co. Ltd., Vipshop Holdings Limited, Legend Biotech, TAL Education Group, Lufax, iQIYI, Inc. If delisting risks increase in the future because of changes in rules, these major dual-listed Chinese companies have a contingency plan to

continue attracting foreign capital and investment through the Hong Kong stock exchange. The dual listing fortifies their capital structure to continue access international capital markets and mitigate the potential negative impact of delisting from U.S. stock exchanges. China Eastern Airlines and China Southern Airlines were the last two companies identified by USCC as state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The remaining ADSs are identified by USCC as non-state issuers.

2 Definitions and Literature Review

2.1 American Depositary Receipts (ADRs)

According to Karolyi (1998), U.S. individual and institutional investors began to diversify their portfolios by investing in foreign equity markets during the 1980s. In response to this globalization trend, many companies in emerging markets listed their shares in developed markets such as the U.S., reducing the cost of capital, illiquidity, and investment barriers. They benefited from the higher reporting standards and attracted an enlarged investor base. Depositary Receipt (DR) programs were developed by JP Morgan in 1927 as an alternative option for foreign companies to list in the U.S. Most Chinese companies listed in the U.S. are American Depository Receipts (ADRs). A depositary bank holds the underlying securities and converts dividends and other payments into U.S. dollars.

However, government regulations created market segmentation by imposing restrictions on certain investor groups. Generally, most ADRs are held by U.S. investors because Chinese investors are subject to capital controls capped at \$50,000 per year. The underlying Hong Kong shares are unrestricted with fewer capital flow restrictions, so they can be held by both U.S. investors and Chinese investors. As a result of this market segmentation, two distinct pricing mechanisms emerged: one for U.S. ADRs and another for Hong Kong listings. Previous literature Hietala (1989) examined the Finnish market structure in the 1980s. Finnish domestic investors can own all the restricted Finnish stocks and a portion of unrestricted Finnish stocks while Finnish foreign investors can own a portion of unrestricted Finnish stocks and all the foreign stocks. This market segmentation created three different price quotations for restricted stocks, unrestricted stocks, and foreign stocks. The unrestricted stocks persistently trade at a premium because their demand by both domestic and foreign investors is greater than the restricted stocks' demand by only domestic investors. The ownership restrictions prohibited arbitrage strategies to close the pricing gap.

Despite the possibility of market segmentation, no consistent premiums or discounts between U.S. ADRs and Hong Kong listings were observed in the sample, suggesting today's global market is very integrated. To convert Hong Kong share prices to ADRs, we need Hong Kong Dollar to U.S. Dollar exchange rate and ADS ratio which refers to the number of underlying Hong Kong shares represented by an ADRs.

Hong Kong Share Price (U.S.Equivalent) = Hong Kong Share Price × HKD to USD Exchange Rate × ADS ratio

The difference between the theoretical Hong Kong Share Price (U.S. Equivalent) and the U.S. Share Price is the mispricing.

Mispricing = Hong Kong Share Price (U.S.Equivalent) - U.S. Share Price

2.2 Law of One Pirce

The law of one price assumes that international financial markets are perfectly integrated, meaning that an identical asset or commodity will have the same price globally, and that the asset's price is unaffected by its location of trade. In other words, the price of a particular asset should be identical across different regions after accounting for exchange rates.

2.3 Liquidity

Kyle (1985) defined liquidity as a number of transactional properties of markets, including tightness (the bid-ask spread), depth (ability to absorb large order flow without moving market price), and resiliency (the speed of recovering from a random uninformative shock). From market surveys by Mittoo (1992), the superior liquidity provided by overseas exchanges compared to the home market not only attribute to gains in stocks' value but also attracted more trading volume than the home market, reducing the order flow of the home market. This difference in liquidity might cause a price difference in the two markets. As stock exchanges around the world compete for order flow and liquidity by innovating the trading process, the distribution of trading volume among exchanges has changed. Therefore, the price difference might be related to the changes in the distribution of order flow in the overseas market and home market.

3 Data Description

3.1 Dual-listed Stock Data (Treatment Group)

For the purposes of this study, the stock price data used was sourced from the Refinitiv DataStream database. The dataset contained comprehensive information on 29 companies, including their closing price, bid price, ask price, and trading volume, for both their U.S. and Hong Kong listings. The data covered the period spanning from January 1, 2019, to February 17, 2023.

It is important to note that only three companies (BeiGene, China Eastern Airline, and China Southern Airline) dual-listed on both U.S. stock exchanges and Hong Kong stock exchange before January 1, 2019. The remaining 26 companies are split into two groups: 10

Name	US Symbol	Hongkong Symbol	ADs Convertion	US First Trading Date	HK First Trading Date	IPO Month and Year	IPO Value (US\$ mil)	Sector
BeiGene	BGNE	HK5160	1 ADS : 13 shares	Before 1/1/2019	Before 1/1/2019	February 2016	158	Health Care
China EasternAirlinesCorporation Ltd.	CEA	HKD670	1 ADS : 50 shares	Before 1/1/2019	Before 1/1/2019	February 1997	n/a	Transportation
China SouthernAirlines CompanyLimited	ZNH	HK1055	1 ADS : 50 shares	Before 1/1/2019	Before 1/1/2019	July 1997	n/a	Transportation
Alibaba GroupHoldingLimited	BABA	HK998.8	1 ADS : 8 shares	Before 1/1/2019	11/26/2019	September 2014	21,767	Technology
NetEase, Inc.	NTES	HK9999	1 ADS : 5 shares	Before 1/1/2019	6/11/2020	June 2000	n/a	Technology
JD.com, Inc.	JD	HK9618	1 ADS : 2 shares	Before 1/1/2019	6/18/2020	May 2014	1,800	ConsumerServices
Yum China	YUMC	HK9987	1ADS : 1 shares	Before 1/1/2019	9/10/2020	November 2016	n/a	ConsumerServices
H World Group Limited (previously Huazhu Group Limited)	нтнт	HK1179	1 ADS : 10 shares	Before 1/1/2019	9/22/2020	March 2010	110	ConsumerServices
Zai Lab Limited	ZLAB	HK9688	1ADS: 10 shares	Before 1/1/2019	9/28/2020	September 2017	150	Health Care
Baozun Inc.	BZUN	HK9991	1 ADS : 3 shares	Before 1/1/2019	9/29/2020	May 2015	110	ConsumerServices
ZTO Express(Cayman) Inc.	ZTO	HK2057	1ADS : 1 shares	Before 1/1/2019	9/29/2020	October 2016	1,406	Transportation
GDS HoldingsLimited	GDS	HK9698	1 ADS : 8 shares	Before 1/1/2019	11/2/2020	November 2016	193	Technology
New OrientalEducation &Technology Group,Inc.	EDU	HK9901	1 ADS : 10 shares	Before 1/1/2019	11/9/2020	March 2006	113	ConsumerServices
		On 12/18/2020), Holding Foreign Compani	ies Accountable Act Sig	ned Into The Law			
Autohome Inc.	ATHM	HK2518	1 ADS : 4 shares	Before 1/1/2019	3/15/2021	December 2013	133	Technology
Baidu, Inc.	BIDU	HK988.8	1 ADS : 8 shares	Before 1/1/2019	3/23/2021	August 2005	109	Technology
Bilbili Inc.	BILI	HK9626	1 ADS : 1 shares	Before 1/1/2019	3/29/2021	March 2018	483	Technology
Trip.comInternational, Ltd.	TCOM	HK9961	1ADS : 1 shares	Before 1/1/2019	4/19/2021	December 2003	76	BusinessServices
HUTCHMED (China)Limited	HCM	HK0013	1ADS : 5 shares	Before 1/1/2019	6/30/2021	March 2016	101	Health Care
Xpeng	XPEV	HK9868	1ADS : 2 shares	8/27/2020	7/7/2021	August 2020	1,500	Technology
Li Auto	LI	HK2015	1 ADS : 2 shares	7/30/2020	8/12/2021	July 2020	1,000	ConsumerDurables
Weibo Corporation	WB	HK9898	1AD5 : 1 shares	Before 1/1/2019	12/8/2021	April 2014	286	Technology
NIO Inc.	NIO	HK9866	1 ADS : 1 shares	Before 1/1/2019	3/10/2022	September 2018	1,000	ConsumerDurables
Zhihu	ZH	HK2390	1ADS : 0.5 shares	3/26/2021	4/22/2022	March 2021	772	Technology
KE Holdings	BE KE	HK2423	1 ADS : 3 shares	8/13/2020	5/11/2022	August 2020	2,100	Real Estate
OneConnectFinancialTechnology Co., Ltd	OCFT	HK6638	1 ADS : 3 shares	12/13/2019	7/4/2022	December 2019	312	Technology
Tuya Inc.	TUYA	HK2391	1ADS : 1 shares	3/18/2021	7/5/2022	March 2021	915	Technology
Miniso	MNSO	HK9896	1 ADS : 4 shares	10/15/2020	7/13/2022	October 2020	608	ConsumerServices
Noah Holdings Ltd.	NOAH	HK568.6	1 ADS : 0.5 shares	Before 1/1/2019	7/13/2022	November 2010	101	Finance
Tencent MusicEntertainmentGroup	TME	HK1698	1 ADS : 2 shares	Before 1/1/2019	9/21/2022	December 2018	1,100	Technolog

Figure 3: Dual-listed Stock Data Summary

completed dual-listings prior to the enactment of the HFCAA, while the remaining 16 did so after the enactment. This division provided a clear distinction between the stock behaviors that were impacted by the new legislation and those that were not.

3.2 Single-listed Stock Data (Control Group)

To investigate the impact of HFCAA on dual-listing stocks using the difference in differences method, I included 16 additional Chinese companies that were exclusively listed on the U.S. stock exchange from January 1, 2019, to February 18, 2023. The single-listed stocks are a valid control group because they have similar size and industries as the treatment group, and they were also affected by the HFCAA.

Name	US Symbol	ADs Convertion	US First Trading Date	IPO Month and Year	IPO Value (US\$ mil)	Sector
Pinduoduo Inc.	PDD	1 ADS : 4 shares	Before 1/1/2019	July 2018	\$1,626	Business Services
Full Truck Alliance Co. Ltd.	YMM	1 ADS : 20 shares	6/22/2021	June 2021	\$1,568	Transportation
Vipshop Holdings Limited	VIPS	5 ADS : 1 shares	Before 1/1/2019	March 2012	\$72	Consumer Services
Legend Biotech	LEGN	1 ADS : 2 shares	6/5/2020	June 2020	\$424	Health Care
TAL Education Group	TAL	3 ADS : 1 shares	Before 1/1/2019	October 2010	\$120	Consumer Services
Lufax	LU	2 ADS : 1 shares	10/30/2020	October 2020	\$2,360	Finance
iQIYI, Inc.	IQ	1 ADS : 7 shares	Before 1/1/2019	March 2018	\$2,250	Technology
RLX Technology	RLX	1 ADS : 1 shares	1/22/2021	January 2021	\$1,400	Consumer Non-Durables
360 DigiTech	QFIN	1 ADS : 2 shares	Before 1/1/2019	December 2018	\$52	Finance
Dada Nexus	DADA	1 ADS : 4 shares	6/5/2020	June 2020	\$320	Consumer Services
DAQO New Energy Corp.	DQ	1 ADS : 5 shares	Before 1/1/2019	October 2010	\$76	Technology
ChinData	CD	1 ADS : 2 shares	9/30/2020	September 2020	\$540	Technology
Atour Lifestyle Holdings	ATAT	1 ADS : 3 shares	11/11/2022	November 2022	\$52	Consumer Discretionary
JOYY Inc.	YY	1 ADS : 20 shares	Before 1/1/2019	November 2012	\$82	Technology
Canadian Solar Inc.	CSIQ	NA	Before 1/1/2019	November 2006	\$116	Technology
JinkoSolar Holding Company Limited	JKS	1 ADS : 4 shares	Before 1/1/2019	May 2010	\$64	Technology

Figure 4: Single-listed Stock Data Summary

3.3 Market Indices Data

I downloaded Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), S&P 500 (SP500), Hang Seng Index (HSI), Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index (SHCOMP) from Yahoo Finance. DJIA and S&P500 are U.S. stock indices. HSI tracks a selection of companies from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. SHCOMP tracks the performance of all A-shares and B-shares listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect (SHHK-Connect) was launched on November 17, 2014, as a cross-border investment program that enables investors in Mainland China and Hong Kong to trade and settle shares listed on the other's stock exchange. Given the significance of this cross-border program and the tighter connection between the two markets, I included the Shanghai Composite Index (SHCOMP) in my analysis.

3.4 Exchange Rate

I used the HKD to 1 USD exchange rate from Yahoo Finance.

3.5 ADS ratio

I pulled the ADS ratio from the 20-F forms provided by foreign private issuers from SEC's website.

3.6 Risk Free Rate

I used ICE U.S. 10-year treasury futures price from Yahoo Finance.

4 Methodology

4.1 No Positive Impact On Stock Price After Dual-listing

Since the 1980s, globalization has prompted companies in emerging markets to seek crosslisting in developed markets. Consequently, several studies have examined the impact of cross-listings on stock prices immediately after the listing. While the focus of this paper is on the reverse scenario, where companies with ADSs in developed markets cross-list back in their home emerging markets, the insights from previous studies on liquidity, risks, and managerial implications can still be relevant.

Overall, the empirical evidence of previous research indicates that when non-U.S. companies list on U.S. stock exchanges, they will experience an increase in market value in the listing month, but the post-listing performance varies widely over the next year.

Switzer (1986) found that "there appears to be fairly strong evidence of positive abnormal performance in the interlisting period. Cumulative abnormal returns become persistently positive about 12 days prior to interlisting and continue to rise in a definite trend."

However, another study by Alexander et al. (1988) contradicted Switzer's finding. Alexander examined a sample of 34 foreign firms listed on U.S. stock exchange. He concluded "no ab-

normal returns were detected in the listing period." In fact, he observed a persistent decline after listing "reaching -7.29 percent by month +12, -38.23 percent by month +24, and -53.21 percent by month +36."




Figure 5: Stock Price After Dual-listing

As shown in Figure 5, the data of 26 Chinese companies immediately before and after the dual-listing on Hong Kong stock exchange shows no consistent trend in stock price and market value. The stock price exhibits no discernible pattern and the daily returns fluctuate in a chaotic manner.

The first potential explanation for the negligible abnormal return is that market is more efficient today than Switzer's study. The low trading cost and easier access to different markets allowed the arbitrageurs to reduce abnormal returns that deviate from fair valuation. The fact that our financial market consistently reflects new information and adjusts prices rapidly suggests that it is integrated globally and conforms to the efficient market hypothesis, which posits that asset prices reflect all available information at any given time. Despite the possible regulatory barriers to cross-border capital investment, arbitrageurs have been shown to quickly exploit mispricing opportunities and enhance market efficiency.

Another potential explanation for the differing results between Swizer's study on Canadian companies and this study on Chinese companies is that the Canadian companies that interlisted on NYSE and AMEX were experiencing upswings with positive outlooks, whereas the Chinese companies were facing more challenging circumstances, especially the risk of delisting, which created downward pressure on their stock valuations. In particular, the 29 Chinese firms analyzed in this study saw an average decrease of 48.58% between 2021 and 2022. The the high levels of uncertainty and pessimistic outlook might wiped out the positive impact of dual-listing.

4.2 Volatility




Figure 6: 5-Day Volatility After Dual-listing

Volatility is calculated by the sample standard deviation of stock's daily return and is calculated over a rolling window of 5 consecutive trading days. Given that the dual-listing occurs on the 10th day, the rolling window volatility for a period of 5 days will only be available on the 15th day. There was significant increase in volatility for U.S. stock prices during the dual-listing period starting 5 days before the dual-listing. The U.S. stock prices finally stabilize 10 days after the dual-listing. Volatility is the highest for Hong Kong stock prices in the beginning. It takes about 10 days for the Hong Kong stock prices to stabilize.

4.3 Liquidity And Trading Volume

A potential factor that dual-listing might impact the stock price is the superior liquidity and more trading volume provided by the matured exchanges. Liquidity is measured by the bid-ask spread. A narrower bid-ask spread suggests more liquidity. A wider bid-ask spread suggests less liquidity.




Figure 7: Bid-Ask Spread After Dual-listing

4.3.1 Liquidity's Effect on Cost of Capital

Keim (1989) estimates that "this bid-ask spread represents, on average, from 0.6 to 8.0% of a security's price (depending on a firm's size with larger firms typically displaying smaller percentage spreads), so this spread represents a sizable portion of total transaction costs (which also include commissions)."

Both individual and institutional investors tend to prefer liquid markets due to the lower transaction costs associated with buying and selling securities. By dual-listing their securities in highly liquid markets, firms can increase their shareholder base and trading volume, The Volume For 10 Chinese Companies Immediately After Dual-listing Before HFCAA

Volume For 16 Chinese Company Immdiately After Dual-listing After HFCAA




Figure 8: Volume After Dual-listing

ultimately leading to a decrease in their cost of capital. This can result in significant benefits for firms, including improved access to capital, greater financial flexibility, and increased visibility among potential investors.

$$WACC = \frac{E}{V}r_e + \frac{D}{V}r_d(1-t)$$

A reduction in r_e leads to a reduction in WACC, which in turn increases the valuation of the firm when calculating the present value of future cash flows. Thus, the improved liquidity resulting from dual-listing can have a positive and material impact on stock valuations. Although Foerster and Karolyi (1998) found in their analysis of 52 Canadian securities that interlisted on U.S. exchange that "an 11% decline in the unadjusted spread", they also mentioned that "the impact on trading costs is complex and is related to a number of factors including whether a firm experiences a volume increase on the domestic market and the extent to which US market makers are successful at capturing a market share of trading." My sample of 26 dual-listed Chinese companies showed no significant change in bid-ask spread for both U.S. and Hong Kong listings during the listing period. This result suggest that dual-listings in Hong Kong had no effect on the firm's liquidity. Although it might be easier for Hong Kong investors to invest in these companies, the global market is highly integrated, and transaction costs are so low that the potential impact of expanded shareholder base and change on access to investment opportunities may be negligible. It is also important to note that Hong Kong's bid-ask spread seems to be narrower than U.S.'s bid-ask spread, but it does not actually indicate a higher level of liquidity in the Hong Kong market. Rather, the difference in bid-ask spreads can be attributed to the fact that ADSs in the U.S. market represent a multiple of Hong Kong shares, resulting in smaller slices and a smaller bid-ask spread.

There is a clear increase in trading volume on the day of listing, but it quickly diminished back to the pre-listing level for U.S. listings. Hong Kong listing demonstrated abnormal high initial trading volume and it took about 5 days for the trading volume to stabilize. The liquidation of the IPO in the first week of trading is called flipping activity. It is a natural process in the stock market and provides liquidity to the broader market.

Following the enactment of HFCAA, there appeared to be greater fluctuations in trading volume during the listing period. This could be attributed to heightened uncertainty in the market, as well as frequent news updates regarding the tensions between US and Chinese regulators.

4.3.2 Dividends

Most Chinese companies do not pay dividends. Many literature reviews suggested that dividend policy can significantly affect a company's cost of capital and valuation, particularly when distributions are made differently across various locations. Since these Chinese companies do no pay dividen, it is no an issue for this study.

4.3.3 Liquidity's Effect of Mispricing

Atanasova and Li (2018) examined a sample of 650 international firms cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange. Their results showed that "lower ADR liquidity leads to a larger price difference between the U.S. and the home market." Moreover, "U.S. market liquidity has a stronger effect than the home market liquidity." It is consistent with the asset pricing literature that suggest illiquidity depresses asset prices.

In my analysis, there was no changes in market liquidity for both U.S. and Hong Kong during the listing period. Therefore, there is no evidence that liquidity had an impact on mispricing. However, the subsequent regression analysis revealed a significant relationship between mispricing and both the liquidity and volatility of the stock. This suggests that these factors may also play a role in influencing mispricing, in addition to the regulatory and market factors previously considered.

4.4 Regressions

I performed a total of nine regression analyses on the dataset. For the first regression, I used Hong Kong daily return as the dependent variable.

$$\begin{split} HongKongReturn &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * HKUSExRate + \beta_2 * SP500 + \beta_3 * HSI + \beta_4 * SHCOMP + \\ \beta_5 * TenYearYield + \beta_6 * HKVolatility + \beta_7 * USVolatility + \beta_8 * HKBidAskSpread + \\ \beta_9 * USBidAskSpread + \beta_10 * HKVolume + \beta_11 * USVolume + \\ \mu \end{split}$$

For the second regression, I used U.S. daily return as the dependent variable.

$$\begin{split} U.S.Return &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * HKUSExRate + \beta_2 * SP500 + \beta_3 * HSI + \beta_4 * SHCOMP + \beta_5 * \\ TenYearYield + \beta_6 * HKVolatility + \beta_7 * USVolatility + \beta_8 * HKBidAskSpread + \beta_9 * \\ USBidAskSpread + \beta_10 * HKVolume + \beta_11 * USVolume + \mu \end{split}$$

For the third regression, I used Mispricing as the dependent variable. $Mispricing = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * HKUSExRate + \beta_2 * SP500 + \beta_3 * HSI + \beta_4 * SHCOMP + \beta_5 * TenYearYield + \beta_6 * HKVolatility + \beta_7 * USVolatility + \beta_8 * HKBidAskSpread + \beta_9 * USBidAskSpread + \beta_9 * USBidAsk$

 $\beta_1 0 * HKVolume + \beta_1 1 * USVolume + \mu$

They were then split into three distinct time periods to account for the regulatory changes. 1) The first period, spanning from January 1, 2019 to December 17, 2020, was before the enactment of the HFCAA. Prior to December 17, 2020, only 13 companies were dual-listed on both exchanges. As a result, the regression analysis for the first period was conducted exclusively on these 13 companies.

2) The second period, from December 18, 2020 to December 14, 2022, occurred after the enactment of the HFCAA but before the announcement of the PCAOB gaining full access. By the end of this period, all 29 companies were dual-listed, providing sufficient data to conduct regression analysis on all of them.

3) The final period, from December 15, 2022, to February 17, 2023, was after the PCAOB had announced gaining full access. However, the third period is short because of the time constrain of this study. The small sample size in period 3 might be a problem. It can easily be solved with more data in the future.

4.4.1 Regression Variables

The daily return is calculated by $DailyReturn = \frac{Today'sClosingPrice-PreviousClosingPrice}{PreviousClosingPrice} - 1$ HKUSExRate: Daily exchange rate changes in percentage between Hong Kong Dollar and U.S. Dollar.

SP500: Daily return of the S&P 500 Index in percentage, representing the U.S. market. I only included S&P 500 because it is highly correlated with other U.S. market indices such as Dow Jones Industrial Average. As shown in the market indices correlation table below, the correlation between S&P 500 and DJIA is about 0.974443. To prevent multicollinearity problem in the regession, I only used the S&P 500 Index.

HSI: Daily closing price changes in percentage of the Heng Seng Index, representing the Hong Kong market.

SHCOMP: Daily return of the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index in percentage, representing the Mainland China market. As discussed in the previous section on Data Description, the SHHKConnect program has created significant connections between the Hong Kong and Mainland China markets. Given that many of the 29 companies in our analysis are headquartered in Mainland China, it is reasonable to include the SHCOMP in our analysis. TenYearYield: Daily of ICE Treasury Yield 10 Years Futures in percentage, representing the risk-free rate of the U.S. market. *HKVolatility*: The sample standard deviation of Hong Kong listings' daily return, which is calculated over a rolling window of 5 consecutive trading days.

USV olatility: The sample standard deviation of U.S. listings' daily return, which is calculated over a rolling window of 5 consecutive trading days.

HKBidAskSpread: The difference between closing ask price and closing bid price for Hong Kong listings.

USBidAskSpread: The difference between closing ask price and closing bid price for U.S. listings.

The following graph depicts the mispricing observed between the U.S. and Hong Kong listings.

While GDS, EDU, ZLAB, ZTO, and YUMC exhibit smaller R^2 values in the period 1, this is likely due to their small sample size. As they were dual-listed only about one or two months before the enactment of the HFCAA, they had fewer observations compared to other companies.

HKVolume: The log of daily turnover volume in thousands HKD amount.

USVolume: The log of daily turnover volume in thousands USD amount.

						Dep	Dependent variable.	uble:					
	BABA	BZUN	BGNE	CEA	HNZ	GDS	HTHT	JD	NTES	EDU	ZLAB	$\rm ZTO$	YUMC
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
HKBidAskSpread	1.583	-3.763	0.268	-0.358	0.126	-1.358	2.901^{***}	3.275	5.998	3.120^{*}	0.085	-0.760	-0.821
	(5.813)	(2.288)	(0.194)	(0.726)	(0.659)	(4.170)	(0.926)	(4.227)	(4.032)	(1.469)	(0.285)	(1.373)	(1.130)
HKUSExRateReturn	-6.310^{**}	-15.820	-0.736	-3.757	-2.950	35.638	1.312	-7.199	23.409	-50.541	34.300	6.722	34.563^{**}
	(3.151)	(37.285)	(3.786)	(2.288)	(2.369)	(57.551)	(26.261)	(24.898)	(19.564)	(61.448)	(24.504)	(27.335)	(13.183)
HKVolatility	-0.266^{*}	-0.219	0.105	0.023	0.054	-0.237	-0.851^{*}	0.232	-0.019	2.369^{**}	0.032	0.607	0.124
	(0.148)	(0.512)	(0.144)	(0.119)	(0.123)	(0.622)	(0.503)	(0.257)	(0.268)	(0.884)	(0.424)	(0.521)	(0.307) E
HKVolume	0.003	0.000	0.002	0.005^{***}	0.008^{***}	-0.001	0.002	-0.006	0.011^{**}	-0.020^{*}	0.004	0.001	1: ***900.0
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)
$\operatorname{HSIReturn}$	0.945^{***}	0.569	0.677^{***}	1.070^{***}	1.238^{***}	1.713^{*}	0.393	1.267^{***}	0.810^{***}	3.220^{***}	0.920^{*}	0.887^{*}	0.550***
	(0.114)	(0.696)	(0.166)	(0.100)	(0.105)	(0.936)	(0.472)	(0.287)	(0.225)	(0.849)	(0.488)	(0.511)	(0.202)
Intercept	-0.052	0.095	-0.027	-0.039***	-0.069***	0.050	-0.033	-0.126^{*}	-0.107^{**}	0.569^{***}	-0.124	0.056	-0.010
2	(0.039)	(0.115)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.108)	(0.062)	(0.075)	(0.048)	(0.151)	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.051) (0.051)
U SHCOMPReturn	0.132	1.250	0.233	0.275^{***}	0.272^{***}	-0.318	0.281	-0.007	0.186	0.849	0.403	-0.320	0.379
	(0.124)	(0.861)	(0.159)	(0.096)	(0.100)	(0.984)	(0.605)	(0.238)	(0.193)	(0.496)	(0.627)	(0.635)	(0.255)
${ m SP500Return}$	0.033	0.041	0.045	0.054	0.061	1.295	0.174	0.159	-0.138	1.367	0.321	0.693	0.221
	(0.066)	(0.552)	(0.111)	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.859)	(0.396)	(0.252)	(0.204)	(1.033)	(0.383)	(0.487)	(0.179)
${ m TenYearYieldReturn}$	0.007	0.096	-0.004	0.016	0.010	0.073	-0.154	-0.111^{*}	-0.087*	-0.196	-0.019	-0.031	0.002
	(0.018)	(0.128)	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.170)	(0.095)	(0.058)	(0.046)	(0.182)	(0.084)	(0.090)	(0.041)
${ m USBidAskSpread}$	4.869	-4.526	2.877^{*}	-0.530*	-0.254	-6.701	-11.813^{*}	-28.665^{**}	-2.744	-5.117	0.477	8.204	-4.017
	(4.191)	(10.520)	(1.599)	(0.321)	(0.246)	(11.355)	(6.447)	(13.434)	(4.653)	(4.810)	(4.362)	(18.762)	(6.731) DC
USVolatility	-0.096	-0.066	0.075	-0.194^{**}	-0.274^{***}	-0.904	0.202	-0.447	0.060	-2.440	0.338	-1.143^{*}	-0.276
	(0.166)	(0.739)	(0.126)	(0.088)	(0.096)	(0.820)	(0.556)	(0.323)	(0.273)	(1.554)	(0.333)	(0.615)	(0.302)
USVolume	0.003	-0.010	0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.002	0.005	0.021^{**}	0.001	-0.067***	0.016	-0.007	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.00)	(0.007)
Observations	236	41	434	435	435	27	46	109	114	22	42	41	54
R^{2}	0.466	0.347	0.139	0.457	0.496	0.427	0.322	0.307	0.271	0.771	0.440	0.260	0.543
Adjusted R^2	0.440	0.100	0.116	0.443	0.483	0.006	0.103	0.229	0.193	0.519	0.235	-0.021	0.423
Note:											*p<0.1	*p<0.1; **p<0.05;	***p<0.01

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						Dep	Dependent variable:	able:					
	BABA	BZUN	BGNE	CEA	HNZ	GDS	HTHT	JD	NTES	EDU	ZLAB	$_{\rm ZTO}$	YUMC
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
HKBidAskSpread	-10.840^{*}	-2.021	0.110	-0.066	0.096	-4.051	0.391	-0.458	2.236	0.144	-0.277	0.893	-1.444
	(6.066)	(2.480)	(0.195)	(0.862)	(0.767)	(2.896)	(0.950)	(3.859)	(3.525)	(1.765)	(0.286)	(1.386)	(1.131)
HKUSExRateReturn	-3.055	7.899	1.332	-2.890	-2.085	-48.199	35.016	23.261	47.722^{***}	45.859	-3.391	19.934	22.027
	(3.288)	(40.413)	(3.808)	(2.718)	(2.757)	(39.967)	(26.929)	(22.731)	(17.104)	(73.819)	(24.558)	(27.599)	(13.198)
HKVolatility	-0.391^{**}	0.116	-0.070	-0.176	-0.082	-0.416	-0.024	-0.154	-0.496^{**}	0.299	-0.091	0.317	-0.412
	(0.154)	(0.555)	(0.145)	(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.432)	(0.516)	(0.234)	(0.234)	(1.062)	(0.425)	(0.526)	e (0.308)
HKVolume	0.009^{**}	-0.013	0.003^{**}	0.001	0.004	0.012	-0.006	-0.001	0.017^{***}	0.001	0.003	-0.003	4: 100.0
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)
$\operatorname{HSIReturn}$	0.440^{***}	0.739	-0.160	0.513^{***}	0.596^{***}	0.496	0.501	0.390	0.007	1.454	0.296	0.689	-0.131
	(0.119)	(0.754)	(0.167)	(0.118)	(0.122)	(0.650)	(0.484)	(0.262)	(0.197)	(1.020)	(0.489)	(0.516)	
Intercept	-0.046	0.186	0.010	-0.009	-0.046^{**}	-0.002	-0.044	-0.095	-0.062	0.137	0.041	0.069	<u> </u>
2	(0.041)	(0.125)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.075)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.042)	(0.182)	(0.073)	(0.078)	00
$ m {{\mathfrak C}}$ SHCOMPReturn	0.098	-0.248	0.438^{***}	0.232^{**}	0.292^{**}	0.536	0.394	0.001	0.353^{**}	0.181	0.363	-0.606	11
	(0.130)	(0.933)	(0.160)	(0.114)	(0.116)	(0.683)	(0.620)	(0.217)	(0.168)	(0.596)	(0.629)	(0.641)	R (0.256)
${ m SP500Return}$	0.536^{***}	0.864	0.632^{***}	0.757^{***}	0.837^{***}	1.791^{***}	0.804^{*}	0.947^{***}	0.613^{***}	1.782	1.409^{***}	1.138^{**}	00
	(0.069)	(0.598)	(0.111)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.597)	(0.406)	(0.230)	(0.178)	(1.241)	(0.384)	(0.492)	ar
${ m TenYearYieldReturn}$	-0.017	-0.019	-0.014	0.005	-0.013	-0.363^{***}	0.054	-0.152^{***}	-0.152^{***}	-0.472^{*}	-0.116	-0.071	
	(0.019)	(0.138)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.118)	(260.0)	(0.053)	(0.040)	(0.219)	(0.085)	(0.090)	(0.041) O.041
${ m USBidAskSpread}$	-1.275	-2.314	-2.135	-0.067	0.368	-0.409	4.412	-13.165	-8.021^{*}	1.513	-7.763*	8.767	9.970 STI
	(4.373)	(11.402)	(1.608)	(0.381)	(0.287)	(7.886)	(6.611)	(12.265)	(4.068)	(5.778)	(4.371)	(18.943)	(6.738) 00
USVolatility	-0.138	-0.678	0.305^{**}	-0.138	-0.275^{**}	-0.491	-0.048	-0.237	0.065	-0.897	0.164	-0.871	-0.561*
	(0.174)	(0.801)	(0.127)	(0.104)	(0.112)	(0.569)	(0.570)	(0.295)	(0.239)	(1.867)	(0.333)	(0.621)	(0.302)
USVolume	-0.002	-0.014	-0.005	0.004^{**}	0.005^{**}	-0.009	0.011	0.013	-0.008	-0.021	-0.006	-0.006	0.025^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Observations	236	41	434	435	435	27	46	109	114	22	42	41	54
R^{2}	0.434	0.201	0.154	0.403	0.449	0.637	0.392	0.288	0.380	0.416	0.535	0.311	0.594
Adjusted R^2	0.406	-0.102	0.132	0.387	0.435	0.371	0.196	0.208	0.313	-0.226	0.364	0.049	0.488
Note:											*p<0.1	p<0.1; *p<0.05;	***p<0.01

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	442 0.279 0.260	.05, *** p<(1 -0.735 1 (0.537)									10	
(0.005)		0.1; **p<0		HCM (96)			~					0.954)								0.629 0.466	1	
	442 0.241 0.221	*										0.270 (0.317)				_				0.627 0.463	* *	
(0.009)	146 0.274 0.215			HZ	0.032	(1.597) 24.043	(16.976)	(0.273)	0.021)	2.617**	-0.302	-1.717 (1.875)	2.109*	0.555	(0.503) -4.456	(12.694) 1.101*	(0.568)	0.050 (0.036)	37	0.666		
(0.005)	442 0.236 0.216			ZLAB	1.870	(6.344) -22.004	(20.059)	(0.452)	0.007	0.038	-0.460**	1.392 (2.016)	0.780	0.229	(0.624) 9.213	(22.514) 0.415	(0.368)	0.067**	37	0.543 0.342		
(0.07)	320 0.339 0.316			XPEV	-1.257	(22.767) 30.499*	(16.229) -0.245	(0.832)	-0.001 (0.025)	2.447**	0.254	(1.548)	2.115**	0.251	(0.463) 2.710	(34.323) -0.295	(0.649)	-0.024 (0.039)	37	0.367 0.088		
(0.005)	226 0.308 0.272			WB	-1.288	(1.866) 13.700	(8.723) 0.201	(0.646)	010.01	0.847	-0.013	(0.853) (0.853)	1.010*	0.365	(0.286) -17.994	(15.274) 0.138	(0.729)	0.007 (010.0)	37	0.509 0.293		
(0.011)	77 0.329 0.216			VUYA	-0.559	(0.483) 27.206	(19.202) 0.375	(0.377)	(0.010)	2.757**	-0.028 (0.127)	-0.189	1.524	0.072	(0.490) 3.331	(4.890) -0.274	(0.617)	(0.019)	29	0.604 0.347		
(0.004)	370 0.296 0.274			TCOM	-1.855	(7.626) 1.093	(6.968) -0.482	(0.581)	-0.010 (0.014)	1.149**	-0.090	0.144	0.168	0.008	(0.196) 12.047	(24.757) 0.281	(0.689)	(0.020) (0.015)	37	0.369 0.091		
(0.019)	47 0.530 0.383											-0.865 (0.801)				-				0.624 0.459		
	101 0.265 0.174						_					(3.143) (3.143)				-				0.392 0.125		
	56 nan nan						-					(uan)								nan nan		
(0.011)	173 0.442 0.403			OIN (21)								-1.106 (0.870)								0.576 0.390		
	443 0.132 0.110			EDU (16)			_					-0.359				_				0.513 0.298		
(0.004)			Dependent variable:									0.215 - (0.581) ()				_				0.519 (0.308 (
(0.012) (Depend	MNSO N								-0.052 0 (1.023) (0				_				0.572 0 0.384 0		
(200.0)												0.556 -0 (1.180) (1.				-				0.353 0.069 0.		
	137 0.341 0.284					-	-									_				0.629 0. 0.465 0.		
	443 0.331 0 0.314 0											4 0.604 35) (0.770)										
	443 443 44 0.293 0.1 0.275 0.1			E E								 (0.135) (1.1584^m (0.735) 								2 0.572 8 0.383		
(0.05) (0.0												0.747)				-				7 0.492 7 0.268		
				GDS			-					0.264				-				5 0.567 7 0.377		
1) (0.002)	i 442 1 0.261 1 0.242			HNZ V								80 1.239 H) (0.781)								54 0.256 54 0.207		
(0.001)	443 0.221 0.201			L CEA								5 0.180 8) (1.344)								8 0.354 3 -0.154		
(200.0) (381 0.297 0.276			E BILI			-					5 1.465 1) (1.128)				-				0 0.488		
(0.004)	443 0.247 0.228			N BGNE								a -0.435 (0.674)								L 0.500 0 0.280		
(0.004)	441 0.186 0.165			NUZE .			-					-1.073 (1.148)						 0.025 (0.016) 		0.701 0.569		
(0.003)	386 0.383 0.365			BIDU	1.	(12.589) -4.362						-0.460 (0.974)				-				0.666 0.519		
(0.004)	389 0.227 0.205			MHTA (0)								0.100 (0.827)								0.412 0.154		
(0.005)	443 0.360 0.343			BABA	-11.769	(26.708) -1.977	(7.439)	(0.820)	-0.016)	1.415**	-0.173 (0.236)	0.099 (0.803)	0.450	-0.066	(0.228) -19.890	(37.506) 0.466	(0.605)	0.034 (0.023)	37	0.561 0.368		
	Observations R ² Adjusted R ²				HKBidAskSpread	HKUSExRateReturn	HK Vola tility		HK Volume	HSIReturn	Intercept	SHCOMPReturn	SP 500Return	TenYearYieldReturn	USBidAskSpread	USVolatility		USVolume	Observations	R^{\pm} Adjusted R^{2}	Note:	

Та	ม	~	5		т	Т	C		C	!+	~		1.	_	т)	~	+.			5	т	ה	~*	.:	~	d 1
Ta		÷.	0.398	-																						0.260 O	
	N MUH								(0.004) ()																	0.245	™p<0.05;
	- ULL	(21)							0.001) (442	0.241	0.221	ii.
	711	(36)	-0.023	(0.295)	17.405"	0.508"	(0.234)	-0.007	0.005)	(0.370)	0.195***	(20.0)	1.134	(0.686)	1.223*** ((0.320)	0.103	(0.192)	2.873	(2.508)	0.2021	0.026	(0.009)	146	0.274	0.215	
	71 A.B.	(25)	0.255	(0.792)	5.084	-0.064	(0.123)	0.002	(0.003) 1.180***	(0.202)	-0.052* -	(0.029)	0.026	(0.312)	1.229***	(0.199)	-0.127	(0.078)	2.746	(2.325)	0.250	0.004	(0.005)	442	0.236	0.216	
	VDEV	(24)	-0.608	(3.642)	7.639	-0.333	(0.144)	-0.003	(0.003) 0.042***	(0.224)	-0.043	(0.056)	0.496	(0.364)	1.742***	(0.214)	0.036	(0.092)	-4.329	(8.274)	(0.132)	200.0	(0.007)	320	0.339	0.316	
	WB	(33)	-0.061	(0.300)	7.813	0.193	(0.191)	0.002	(0.002)	(0.182)	-0.071**	(0.031)	-0.221	(0.310)	0.789***	(0.172)	-0.017	(0.084)	-3.921	(5.372)	-0.007	0.009**	(0.005)	226	0.308	0.272	
	TIVA	(22)	-0.096	(0.215)	0.645	-0.372	(0.273)	-0.004	(0.004) 1.402	(0.465)	-0.006	(0.071)	-0.809	(0.843)	1.115**	(0.433)	0.187	(0.247)	-0.289	(1.433)	1.131	-0.003	(0.011)	12	0.329	0.216	
	TOOM	(21)	-0.193	(1.139)	-0.998	-0.042	(0.131)	0.006***	0.002)	(0.154)	-0.073**	(0.037)	0.102	(0.244)	1.020	(0.148)	0.080	(0.062)	1.316	(6.243)	-0.016	0.004	(0.004)	370	0.296	0.274	
	TME	(20)	0.664	(0.697)	12.484	-1.128	(0.397)	-0.014	(0.009)	(0.591)	-0.431**	(0.198)	1.607	(1.272)	0.830	(0.528)	-0.089	(0.345)	-2.565	(19.835)	LU/U	0.054	(0.019)	47	0.530	0.383	
	OCET	(61)	-0.039	(0.408)	12.124	-0.598*	(0.307)	0.002	(0.008) 1 130°	(0.657)	-0.082	(0.062)	1.429	(1.280)	0.393	(0.598)	-0.219	(0.3.49)	-0.880	(0.877)	0.360	0.022*	(0.013)	101	0.265	0.174	
	NOAH	(18)	nan***	(nan)	nan ()	nan"	(nan)	nan***	(nan)	(nan)	nan***	(nan)	nan***	(nan)	nan"	(nan)	nan ***	(nan)	nan"	(nan)	nan (nan)	nan""	(nan)	56	nan	nan	
	OIN	(11)	-1.526	(1.386)	12.212 (7 814)	-0.158	(0.168)	0.005	(0.005)	(0.257)	-0.234*	(0.124)	0.426	(0.444)	1.766	(0.239)	-0.043	(0.131)	-21.072	(13.654)	0.244	0.020*	(0.011)	173	0.442	0.403	
	able: EDIT	(16)	1.186	(0.988)	2.007	-0.400	(0.135)	0.004	(0.004)	(0.250)	0.006	(0.036)	0.546	(0.384)	0.928	(0.244)	0.060	(0.097)	-1.022	(1.282)	(0.126)	-0.004	(0.005)	443	0.132	0.110	
	Dependent variable: so vrrts	(15)	2.178	(1.759)	-2.826	0.020	(0.131)	-0.002	(0.003)	(0.126)	0.011	(0.029)	0.215	(0.192)	0.740***	(0.124)	-0.001	(0.049)	-6.759"	(3.721)	0.081	0.001	(0.004)	443	0.233	0.213	
	Dep	(14)	0.633	(0.490)	12.641	0.242	(0.283)	-0.003	(0.004)	(0.400)	-0.067	(0.067)	-1.498	(0.805)	1.162***	(0.392)	-0.056	(0.236)	-1.227	(5.132)	10.366)	0.013	(0.012)	94	0.305	0.212	
	1	(13)	5.291**	(2.478)	-2.024 (c 180)	0.303"	(0.158)	-0.000	(0.003)	(0.202)	-0.137**	(0.056)	0.554^{*}	(0.327)	1.223***	(0.194)	0.043	(0.086)	-6.713	(08.9)	-0.1505 (0.161)	0.014**	(0.007)	295	0.316	0.290	
	BEKE	(12)	0.026	(0.323)	2.082	0.004	(0.218)	-0.008*	0.005)	(0.291)	0.004	(0.078)	0.573	(0.563)	0.948	(0.248)	0.006	(0.149)	-53.339	(16.775)	0.238	0.007	(0.008)	137	0.341	0.284	
	Ē	(II)	-5.607*	(3.145)	-0.110	0.016	(0.132)	0.004	(0.003)	(0.138)	-0.036	(0.038)	0.069	(0.211)	0.965***	(0.136)	0.015	(0.053)	2.573	(7.622)	0.139)	-0.000	(0.004)	443	0.331	0.314	
	THTH	(10)	0.507	(0.411)	0.456	0.020	(0.097)	0.004**	(0.002)	(0.143)	-0.036	(0.025)	0.061	(0.218)	0.908	(0.140)	0.059	(0.055)	-0.969	(3.585)	0.049	0.001	(0.004)	443	0.293	0.275	
	SUD	6)	0.810	(1.287)	-7.525	0.074	(0.122)	-0.000	(0.004)	(0.203)	0.011	(0.036)	0.299	(0.310)	$1.454^{}$	(0.198)	-0.069	(0.078)	-0.160	(3.364)	0.1221.0	-0.003	(0.005)	443	0.321	0.304	
	INT	(8)	2.527***	(0.887)	0.629	(111.0-	(0.147)	0.005**	(0.002)	(0.091)	-0.065***	(0.018)	0.358**	(0.140)	0.597***	(0.089)	0.021	(0.035)	0.229	(0.149)	0.057	0.004*	(0.002)	442	0.261	0.242	
	VEV	j e	-0.189	(0.566)	2.976	-0.139	(0.140)	0.005***	(0.002)	(0.078)	-0.046	(0.013)	0.348***	(0.120)	0.360***	(170.0)	0.020	(0.030)	0.071	(0.157)	0.136)	-0.001	(0.001)	443	0.221	0.201	
	DIT I	9	1.813	(3.434)	4.263	0.139	(0.166)	0.003	(0:005)	(0.240)	-0.041	(0.049)	0.392	(0.382)	1.530***	(0.234)	0.024	(0.096)	2.482	(6.472)	0.029	0.001	(0.007)	381	0.297	0.276	
	BUNE	(2)	-1.362*	(0.798)	-3.834 (5.049)	-0.189*	(0.112)	0.009***	(0.003)	(0.163)	-0.033	(0.024)	0.289	(0.251)	1.108***	(0.160)	-0.087	(0.064)	1.222	(1.758)	0.2497	-0.004	(0.004)	443	0.247	0.228	
	NILLE	(7)							(0.002)												_			441	0.186	0.165	
	IUII								(0.003)															386	0.383	0.365	
	ATHM								0.002)																-	0.205	
	VAVA	(1)	-6.231			-0.117	(0.123)	0.004	(0.004)	(0.130)	-0.049	(0.042)	-0.023	(0.198)	0.961		-	(0.050)	-3.939	(9.031)	0.119)	0.000	(0.005)	443	0.360	0.343	
			HKBidAskSpread		HK USExRateReturn	HK Volatility		HK Volume	HSIReturn		Intercept		SHCOMPReturn		SP 500Return		TenYearYieldReturn		USBidAskSpread		USVolatility	USVolume		Observations	R^2	Adjusted R ²	Note:

4.4.2 Market Indices

The study conducted regression analysis using Hong Kong and U.S. stock returns as dependent variables in Tables 1-3 and Tables 4-6, respectively. Market indices are return-based and are calculated using the daily percentage changes in closing prices.

Based on the results in Tables 1-3, it appears that only the coefficients for HSI and SHCOMP are statistically significant for Hong Kong stock returns during period 1-3, while the coefficient for S&P 500 is not statistically significant. This suggests that the location of the trade can have an impact on stock returns, as stocks listed in Hong Kong are more influenced by movements in the Asian market, and less sensitive to the movements in the U.S. market.

Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate that all three market indices (S&P 500, HSI, and SHCOMP) are statistically significant for U.S. stock returns during period 1 and 2. This is expected since these stocks are listed in the U.S., and changes in the U.S. market indices are likely to impact them. However, in Table 6, only the coefficients for HSI and SHCOMP are statistically significant, while the significance of S&P 500's coefficient decreases. This weakening of statistical significance might be attributed to the small sample size in period 3, as most companies had only 37 observations during that period. If it is not caused by the small sample size, it could suggest following the dual-listing of major Chinese companies on the Hong Kong stock exchange, their movements are more closely aligned with the Hong Kong market and less aligned with the U.S. market.

During period 1 and 2, the newly dual-listed stocks were added to the Hang Seng Index, so these stocks accounted for a significant weight in the index. Consequently, the movement of these dual-listed stocks can heavily influence the behavior of the Hang Seng Index. However, the U.S. market indices, including the S&P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial Average, only comprise U.S.-based companies, meaning that none of the dual-listed Chinese companies were included. This could lead to a divergence from the U.S. market, particularly given the delisting risks that these companies are currently facing.

The theoretical model of multi-market trading developed by Baruch et al. (2007) suggested

that trading volume migrates to the exchange in which the cross-listed asset returns have a greater correlation with returns of other assets traded on that market. The study by Froot and Dabora (1999) found that the relative price of the dual-listed stocks was highly correlated with the stock market indexes in the locations where the dual-listed stocks are traded. Figures 9 and 10 exhibit a noticeable declining trend in correlation between 29 Chinese

	Table 7: I	Market Indices	Return Correla	ation Table	
	$\operatorname{ExReturn}$	SP500Return	DJIAReturn	HSIReturn	SHCOMPReturn
ExReturn	1.000000	-0.111667	-0.108176	-0.221430	-0.085430
SP500Return	-0.111667	1.000000	0.962574	0.226793	0.172230
DJIAReturn	-0.108176	0.962574	1.000000	0.228287	0.173656
HSIReturn	-0.221430	0.226793	0.228287	1.000000	0.638185
SHCOMPReturn	-0.085430	0.172230	0.173656	0.638185	1.000000

companies' stock prices and the U.S. market indices during the HFCAA era compared to the pre-HFCAA period. This observed trend could indicate that the market anticipated a weaker linkage between the 29 Chinese companies and the U.S. market due to the delisting risks they were facing. This might be explained by the forward-looking nature of valuation. The post-HFCAA period seems to be more chaotic, particularly with the newly listed Hong Kong shares. With the delisting risk temporarily resolved, both the U.S. and Hong Kong markets now exert a shared influence on the stock prices. U.S. listings still account for a significantly higher trade volume in terms of total monetary value than Hong Kong listings. In fact, the majority of the order flow continues to occur in the U.S. stock exchanges.




Figure 9: Correlation Between Stock Prices And S&P 500 Index




Figure 10: Correlation Between Stock Prices And DJIA Index

Figure 11 showed that there is a significant increase in correlation with the HSI Index after HFCAA. This result aligns with the conclusions drawn from the previous regression models, which indicate that the HSI has greater impact on share prices.

According to Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) analysis, "Firms will dual list when they have a significant base of low-cost information producers in their own country, but would like to enlarge that base by listing in the foreign exchange, or take advantage of the higher transparency of the foreign exchange, or both." The increased correlation between stock prices and the HSI may suggest that dual-listed companies are becoming less likely to comply with the stringent continued listing standards of US exchanges, such as NYSE and NASDAQ (A detailed summary of the respective listing standards can be found in the Appendix). They are more likely to comply with the less stringent Hong Kong stock exchange continuing obligation. This lower listing standard predicts a negative or zero effect on stock prices.

Moreover, increase of "a substantial base of investors who have a comparative advantage in evaluating firms" are likely to have a positive effect on stock prices. Hong Kong stock market is considered a free and open market. According to 2022 Investment Climate Statements: Hong Kong Tseng (2022) report published by U.S. Department of State, "there are no impediments to the free flow of financial resources. Non-interventionist economic policies, complete freedom of capital movement, and a well-understood regulatory and legal environment make Hong Kong a regional and international financial center. It has one of the most active foreign exchange markets in Asia." This freedom promoted transparency and attracted a large foreign investor base, including U.S. investors to trade in the Hong Kong stock market. In fact, "approximately 1,260 U.S. companies are based in Hong Kong, according to Hong Kong's 2021 census data, with more than half regional in scope. Finance and related services companies, such as banks, law firms, and accountancies, dominate the pack. Seventy of the world's 100 largest banks have operations in Hong Kong." This is further evidence of the high level of integration in the global market. The investor base between the U.S. and Hong Kong stock exchanges overlaps significantly. To conclude, the dual-listings did not necessarily increased investor base who have better information about the valuations of these Chinese companies.




Figure 11: Correlation Between Stock Prices And HSI Index

Figures 12 demonstrate that the correlation between stock prices and SHCOMP increased less significantly than that with HSI in the second period. However, there is no converging trend in the third period. This is probably the result of changes in Mainland China's political landscape and relationship with Hong Kong, especially Beijing's influence on autonomy of the territory and its financial systems. Given that BGNE, CEA, and ZNH are triple-listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, it is likely that they are strongly influenced by the SHCOMP.




Figure 12: Correlation Between Stock Prices And SHCOMP Index

4.4.3 Exchange Rate




Figure 13: Correlation Between Stock Prices And Exchange Rate




Figure 14: HKD to 1 USD Exchange Rate

The correlation between stock prices and exchange rate appears to have shifted from positive to negative between period 1 and period 2. This suggests that the stock prices are now more closely aligned with the Hong Kong market, whereas previously they were more closely linked to the U.S. market. However, during period 3, there is no clear trend towards convergence as both the U.S. and Hong Kong markets continue to impact stock prices, making it difficult to determine the impact of exchange rate changes on stock prices. The influence of these factors has resulted in a more complex relationship between exchange rates and stock prices during this period.

The coefficients for the Hong Kong Dollar and U.S. Dollar exchange rate are statistically significant. Basic theory suggest that an increase in exchange rate will lead to an increase in stock prices because investor's confidence on the country's economic growth is rising. In my sample, an increase in exchange rate data suggests a depreciation of the Hong Kong Dollar and can indicate lower confidence among foreign investors in China's economic growth. This can, in turn, result in a decrease in stock prices of the affected companies. Therefore, the coefficients are negative for exchange rate in the regressions.

It should be noted that the Hong Kong government exercises a certain degree of control over the exchange rate. Figure 14 shows that the exchange rate stabilized after March 2022. While the exchange rate control may have various effects, analyzing its full impact is beyond the scope of this paper.

4.4.4 Volatility

For period 1 and 2, the coefficients for Hong Kong Volatility are statistically significant for BABA, BGNE, CEA, JD, and ZTO, but the coefficients for U.S. Volatility are not significant for these companies. On the other hand, the coefficients for U.S. Volatility are significant for ZNH and NTES, while the coefficients for Hong Kong Volatility are not significant for these two companies. Neither the Hong Kong nor the U.S. bid-ask spread coefficients are statistically significant for Hong Kong stock prices.

For period 3, the coefficients for Hong Kong and U.S. Voaltility are statistically significant

for fewer companies. It might be attributed to lower volatility levels in this period. This contrasts with the high market volatility experienced during periods 1 and 2, which were characterized by the shock of the HFCAA. However, the market achieved greater stability in period 3 following the positive news from PCAOB.

4.5 Difference In Difference

This study adopts a panel data approach to examine the impact of dual-listing before and after the enactment of the HFCAA. All the cross-sectional stock data are pooled into a panel dataset, with two dummy variables employed for analysis. The first dummy variable represents whether a stock is dual-listed on both Hong Kong and U.S. exchanges (represented as 1) or is single-listed on U.S. exchanges only (represented as 0), with dual-listed stocks serving as the treatment group and single-listed stocks serving as the control group. There are 29 dual-listed stocks and 16 single-listed stocks. The second dummy variable indicates whether the data point corresponds to a period before or after the enactment of the HFCAA, with a value of 0 for pre-HFCAA data points and 1 for post-HFCAA data points. Pre-HFCAA data covers the period from December 18, 2020, to February 17, 2023.

$$\begin{split} U.S.Return &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Post + \beta_2 * DualListed + \beta_3 * [Post * DualListed] + \mu \\ U.S.Volatility &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Post + \beta_2 * DualListed + \beta_3 * [Post * DualListed] + \mu \\ U.S.BidAskSpread &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Post + \beta_2 * DualListed + \beta_3 * [Post * DualListed] + \mu \\ U.S.Volume &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Post + \beta_2 * DualListed + \beta_3 * [Post * DualListed] + \mu \end{split}$$

4.5.1 Regression Variables

U.S.Return: is daily stock return in percentage.

U.S.Volatility: The sample standard deviation of U.S. listings' daily return, which is calculated over a rolling window of 5 consecutive trading days.

U.S.BidAskSpread: The difference between closing ask price and closing bid price for U.S. listings.

U.S.Volume: The log of daily turnover volume in thousands USD amount.

The parameter β_0 is the average single-listed stock variable before HFCAA.

	USReturnReg	USV olatility Reg	${\rm USBidAskSpreadReg}$	USVolumeReg
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
DualListed	-0.129	-0.849***	-0.021***	-0.390***
	(0.086)	(0.050)	(0.005)	(0.033)
DualListed:Post	0.063	0.021	0.059***	-0.234***
	(0.110)	(0.064)	(0.006)	(0.043)
Intercept	0.350***	3.789***	0.155***	7.508***
	(0.072)	(0.042)	(0.004)	(0.028)
Post	-0.338***	1.119***	0.008	0.412***
	(0.091)	(0.053)	(0.005)	(0.036)
Observations	$36,\!437$	36,330	$36,\!445$	36,482
\mathbb{R}^2	0.001	0.058	0.011	0.023
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.058	0.011	0.023

 Table 8: Difference In Difference Regressions

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The parameter β_1 captures changes in all stock variables before and after HFCAA.

The parameter β_2 captures changes in dual-listing effect that is not due to the enactment of HFCAA.

The Parameter β_3 measures difference in the changes in dual-listing stock variables comparing to the single-listed stock variables due to the enactment of HFCAA.

$$\beta_3 = (\bar{y}_{Post,Treatment} - \bar{y}_{Post,Control}) - (\bar{y}_{Pre,Treatment} - \bar{y}_{Pre,Control})$$
$$\beta_3 = (\bar{y}_{Post,Treatment} - \bar{y}_{Pre,Treatment}) - (\bar{y}_{Post,Control} - \bar{y}_{Pre,Control})$$

According to a study analyzing the impact of dual-listing on U.S. stocks, dual-listing had a positive impact on U.S. Return, U.S. Volatility, and U.S. BidAskSpread, which was attributed to the enactment of HFCAA. However, only U.S. BidAskSpread showed a significant impact, with an increase observed in the bid-ask spread for dual-listed stocks. This increase in bid-ask spread typically indicates less liquidity, which can be disadvantageous for investors. Additionally, the study found that dual-listing led to a decrease in U.S. Volume, indicating that dual-listed stocks became less liquid and traded less frequently in the U.S. As a result, I conjecture that a portion of trade and liquidity transferred to the Hong Kong listings, with some investors opting to trade in Hong Kong rather than the U.S. These findings suggest that dual-listing may have negative implications for U.S. listings and investors. Further research is needed to fully understand the effects of dual-listing on the market.

4.6 Mispricing

Here is a graph of the mispricing for all 39 companies. According to the graph, mispricing appears to be the lowest in period 1, but increases significantly in period 2. This increase coincides with the enactment of HFCAA, which generated delisting risk and caused a shock in the market. However, in period 3, there appears to be a decrease in mispricing following the announcement of positive news from PCAOB, which resolved the delisting risk.




Figure 15: Dual-listed Stock Mispricing

4.6.1 Mispricing and Volatility

As mentioned in the Regression section, the mispricing regression is the following: $Mispricing = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * HKUSExRate + \beta_2 * SP500 + \beta_3 * HSI + \beta_4 * SHCOMP + \beta_5 * TenYearYield + \beta_6 * HKV olatility + \beta7 * USV olatility + \beta_8 * HKBidAskSpread + \beta_9 * USBidAskSpread + \beta_10 * HKV olume + \beta_11 * USV olume + \mu$

The results of the regression analysis show that the SP 500 is the only significant market

						л Г	Dependent variance.						
	BABA	BZUN	BGNE	CEA	HNZ	GDS	HTHT	JD	NTES	EDU	ZLAB	DTD	YUMC
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
HKBidAskSpread	2237.178^{*}	91.122	-35.860	5.399	12.270	338.560	19.991	80.573	-8.778	71.589	8.753	-19.461	-13.983
	(1338.839)	(88.956)	(28.748)	(14.154)	(13.894)	(305.534)	(43.606)	(280.366)	(248.562)	(380.755)	(25.811)	(35.510)	(75.474)
HKUSExRateReturn	49.701	210.390	-31.924	-109.159^{**}	-58.794	4842.062	-594.217	-1757.156	-2434.827^{**}	3284.431	2839.272	-239.479	-233.679
	(725.735)	(1449.809)	(562.370)	(44.610)	(49.941)	(4216.485)	(1236.452)	(1651.384)	(1205.979)	(15922.440)	(2218.855)	(706.980)	(880.741)
HKVolatility	13.700	-0.134	47.189**	0.646	-2.012	65.507	11.978	25.335	51.531^{***}	14.287	24.244	-11.518	-20.345
	(33.983)	(19.919)	(21.398)	(2.320)	(2.588)	(45.558)	(23.684)	(17.034)	(16.507)	(229.079)	(38.380)	(13.474)	(20.527)
HKVolume	-1.053	0.421	-0.170	0.027	0.058	-0.990	0.327	0.172	-0.925^{***}	-0.518	-0.241	0.218	-0.081
	(0.840)	(0.322)	(0.211)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(1.223)	(0.282)	(0.429)	(0.331)	(2.624)	(0.397)	(0.140)	(0.132)
HSIReturn	39.263	-8.677	88.388***	0.863	2.102	-9.126	-6.651	16.607	28.873^{**}	-17.526	15.309	-11.774	-0.873
	(26.279)	(27.059)	(24.591)	(1.944)	(2.212)	(68.587)	(22.228)	(19.024)	(13.887)	(219.989)	(44.164)	(13.220)	(13.475)
Intercept	-2.915	-8.297*	-8.442^{***}	0.015	-0.117	-4.998	1.696	-3.030	-2.090	-12.620	-0.462	-1.908	7.615^{**}
	(9.053)	(4.470)	(2.941)	(0.290)	(0.370)	(7.921)	(2.917)	(4.991)	(2.953)	(39.257)	(6.608)	(2.010)	(3.380)
9.5HCOMPReturn	-21.451	30.945	-31.326	-0.927	0.814	-26.444	-8.382	6.367	-20.060^{*}	-44.836	-32.516	22.398	20.788
	(28.596)	(33.478)	(23.653)	(1.870)	(2.106)	(72.080)	(28.465)	(15.762)	(11.873)	(128.547)	(56.808)	(16.414)	(17.058)
SP500Return	-74.855^{***}	-30.203	-46.344^{***}	-11.002^{***}	-14.785^{***}	-142.782^{**}	-24.454	-56.319^{***}	-54.236^{***}	-17.286	-84.142^{**}	-32.756^{**}	-42.992^{***}
	(15.145)	(21.463)	(16.423)	(1.293)	(1.463)	(62.932)	(18.649)	(16.742)	(12.579)	(267.717)	(34.671)	(12.597)	(11.952)
TenYearYieldReturn	5.882	0.675	-4.461	0.778**	0.880^{**}	37.490^{***}	-2.040	9.998**	9.385^{***}	63.414	18.264^{**}	0.620	1.867
	(4.225)	(4.959)	(4.562)	(0.358)	(0.403)	(12.470)	(4.468)	(3.839)	(2.850)	(47.190)	(7.641)	(2.316)	(2.710)
USBidAskSpread	-298.275	303.802	28.290	-10.218	-23.111^{***}	-254.414	-104.713	-24.757	349.431	555.671	285.247	-247.297	-582.184
	(965.230)	(409.054)	(237.480)	(6.251)	(5.196)	(831.946)	(303.543)	(891.029)	(286.846)	(1246.358)	(394.977)	(485.244)	(449.671)
USVolatility	69.308^{*}	13.114	-43.067^{**}	-0.840	3.691^{*}	41.921	-0.829	14.812	-11.169	167.953	-8.516	8.551	52.867^{**}
	(38.307)	(28.721)	(18.720)	(1.708)	(2.025)	(60.069)	(26.176)	(21.432)	(16.829)	(402.699)	(30.125)	(15.906)	(20.154)
USVolume	1.092	0.755	1.629^{***}	-0.091^{***}	-0.115^{***}	1.587	-0.562	0.095	1.166^{**}	1.831	-0.079	0.139	-0.970**
	(0.842)	(0.576)	(0.522)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(1.374)	(0.432)	(0.632)	(0.466)	(4.933)	(0.987)	(0.234)	(0.458)
Observations	236	41	434	435	435	27	46	109	114	22	42	41	54
<u>2</u> 2	0.140	0.195	0.085	0.185	0.255	0.625	0.211	0.252	0.378	0.316	0.313	0.336	0.358
Adjusted R^2	0.097	-0.110	0.061	0.164	0.235	0.350	-0.044	0.167	0.310	-0.436	0.061	0.084	0.189

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index. Hong Kong Volatility and U.S. Volatility exhibit consistent statistical significance with regard to mispricing. Moreover, upon graphing the stock volatility, we can observe that the stocks were most volatile during period 2, which is also the period with the highest mispricing.

Based on my conjecutre, I believe that mispricing in the market is caused by a discrepancy of opinions between U.S. investors and Hong Kong investors. This discrepancy of opinions is most pronounced during periods of market volatility. To support this conjecture, future research could compare analyst reports from the two locations to identify differences in opinion and how they impact pricing. By understanding the sources of mispricing, investors may be able to capitalize on market inefficiencies and improve their returns.




Figure 16: Hong Kong Listings Volatility




Figure 17: U.S Listing Volatility

It is worth noting that the stock price volatility of the 39 companies exhibits the highest similarity with the volatility of the Hang Seng Index. This finding provides further evidence that the stock prices of these companies are strongly correlated with the Hang Seng Index.




Figure 18: S&P 500 Volatility




Figure 19: HSI Volatility




Figure 20: SHCOMP Volatility

4.6.2 Low R^2

In contrast to the regression analysis for stock prices, which generally yielded R^2 values exceeding 0.8, the regressions for mispricing showed considerably lower R^2 values. In fact, the majority of R^2 values were less than 0.2, indicating that the model does not explain much of the variance in mispricing.

4.6.3 Critique To Linear Regression Method

A possible explanation for the low R^2 is that linear regression is not a good model to study mispricing. Linear regression method like most parametric models relies heavily on the input data quality. In this case, most of the variables except volatility were not relevant to mispricing, producing low quality output. Moreover, parametric regressions assumes the relationship between dependent variable and independent variable follows a specific functional form. Mispricing might not be expressed as a functional form. More complicated machine learning models such as Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) or Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) might be able to capture more complex relationship between dependent variables and independent variables, but they still relies on the input data quality. Additional variables may have improved the accuracy of the models, but the available data in the database and online resources constrains the inclusion of more variables. As a result, the selected variables represent the best possible approach for the analysis at hand.

4.6.4 Non-parametric Models

Non-parametric models seems suitable for studying mispricing because the approach does not make assumptions about the underlying distribution of the data. They can be used to detect various patterns in time-series data, including level, trend, and seasonality. In this case, the mispricing is centered at zero, which means that the average value is zero. The trend in the data is also centered at zero, which implies that there is no overall upward or downward trend in the data. The autocorrelation functions (ACF) of the data can help determine the presence of seasonality. In this case, the ACF plots show that there is no significant seasonality in mispricing. Furthermore, the ACF plots reveal that there is a small correlation between two consecutive days, but this correlation quickly diminishes as the lag between the days increases.




Figure 21: Autocorrection 1




Figure 22: Autocorrection 2




Figure 23: Autocorrection 3




Figure 24: Autocorrection 4

5 Summary and Conclusions

I studied 39 Chinese companies that dual-listed on U.S. stock exchanges and Hong Kong stock exchange. I examined stock behavior during the dual-listing period. During the duallisting periods, most of the stocks faced delisting risks after the HFCAA was signed into law. Therefore, they are subject to lower listing standards which had negative or no impact on stock prices. The delsting risks and related news update shocked the market and caused an increase in stock volatility. As a result, bigger mispricing between U.S. listings and Hong Kong listings was observed. PCAOB's announcement that U.S. authorities gained full access to audit these Chinese companies was a turning point to the delisting risk and brought stability to the market. The U.S. listed Chinese companies are now subject to higher listing standards. The previous literature predict this higher listing standards will have a positive impact on their stock prices. Due to the time limit of this paper, I did not have enough data to support this prediction. In future research, it would be important to differentiate the positive effects of higher listing standards from the positive impact of news related to the resolution of delisting risks.

This paper also observed a shift in correlation between stock prices and market indices. During the period when the Chinese companies faced delisting risks, their stock prices were more correlated with the Hang Seng Index than S&P 500 and DJIA. Although most trading volume is still executed on U.S. stock exchanges, Hong Kong stock exchange is a competitor for order flow after dual-listing. The higher correlation can be explained by market index compositions. The U.S. market indices does not include any of these Chinese companies because they are based in China not U.S., so U.S. market indices do not capture the movements of these Chinese companies. On the other hand, a significant portion of the Hong Kong market index is comprised of these dual-listed companies. Consequently, movements in the stock prices of these Chinese companies can have a significant influence on the Hong Kong market index.

The expansion in investor base is not significant because today's global market is very

integrated. The overlap between U.S. and Hong Kong investor bases is considerable, so dual-listing did not attract more investors who are comparatively better at valuating the companies.

The competition for order flow between U.S. and Hong Kong exchanges is complicated. Future research might be able to learn how the trading volume, trading liquidity, and trading location change over time. The liquidity during the listing period did not experience significant changes.

S&P 500 and Volatility appears to be the only variable that could account for some of the mispricing observed. However, despite the effort to find additional variables or better models, it remained a challenge to improve the low R^2 in my mispricing regressions. The input data quality remains poor. Mispricing does not seem to follow a specific functional form. It is centered at zero with no upward or downward trend. There is no seasonality and each value seems discrete. Based on these findings, I conclude that mispricing appears to be a random phenomenon, devoid of any significant patterns or trends. Future research might want to explore more on the discrepancy of opinions between U.S. investors and Hong Kong investors.

Mispricing is corrected quickly without consistent premium or discounts. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the arbitrageurs are able to overcome market segmentation and barriers to international capital investment and improve market efficiency.

6 Appendix

		Before				
Company	Location	Stock Info	Obs.	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	1018	130.21	115.80	47.5
	Hong Kong	Bid Price	1018	129.82	115.45	47.5
	Hong Kong	Closing Price	1079	130.22	115.40	47.8
	Hong Kong	Turnover By Volume	1018	566.21	332.75	1012.4
BGNE	Hong Kong	Market Value	1079	145724.56	134707.20	67852.1
DGNE	U.S.	Ask Price	1040	216.68	192.00	79.7
	U.S.	Bid Price	1040	216.22	191.67	79.4
	U.S.	Closing Price	1079	216.43	191.72	79.4
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	1041	303.77	246.70	279.8
	U.S.	Market Value	1079	18638.60	17117.13	8671.9
		Ask Price	1018	3.45	3.25	0.7
	Hong Kong	Bid Price	1018	3.43	3.24	0.7
		Closing Price	1079	3 45	3 26	0.7
		Turnover By Volume	1018	13299.21	9964.50	12868.9
		Market Value	1079	17462.22	16876.30	3117.1
CEA	U.S.	Ask Price	1030	22.13	20.98	4.7
	U.S.	Bid Price	1030	22.13	20.98	4.7
	U.S.	Closing Price	1030	21.99	20.84	4.7
		-				
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	1041	16.63	10.80	20.7
	U.S.	Market Value	1079	2232.94	2158.72	398.7
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	1018	4.74	4.66	0.7
	Hong Kong		1018	4.73	4.65	0.7
	Hong Kong		1079	4.75	4.67	0.7
	Hong Kong	Turnover By Volume	1018	16888.72	12971.80	13361.9
ZNH	Hong Kong	Market Value	1079	19544.67	19409.15	2955.0
2011	U.S.	Ask Price	1029	30.41	29.87	4.8
	U.S.	Bid Price	1029	30.19	29.62	4.8
	U.S.	Closing Price	1079	30.35	29.86	4.7
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	1041	26.00	18.40	25.0
	U.S.	Market Value	1079	2398.25	2391.52	422.7
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	796	172.28	189.40	65.6
	Hong Kong		796	172.14	189.30	65.5
		Closing Price	844	172.20	189.90	65.5
		Turnover By Volume	796	38078.33	30921.30	25276.9
	Hong Kong	Market Value	844	3714376.98	4092395.00	1423159.0
BABA	U.S.	Ask Price	1041	175 52	177.05	60.2
	U.S.	Bid Price	1041	175.49	177.03	60.2
	U.S.	Closing Price	1079	175.41	177.03	60.1
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	1079	20447.98	17345.90	13362.8
	U.S.	Market Value	1079	469405.40	462238.40	164038.8 20.7
		Ask Price	663	147.32	146.00	
	Hong Kong		663	147.17	145.80	20.7
		Closing Price	702	147.33	146.00	20.7
		Turnover By Volume	663	6100.48	5098.60	4382.0
NTES	Hong Kong		702	501520.24	497193.55	76532.6
	U.S.	Ask Price	1041	81.51	87.21	21.2
	U.S.	Bid Price	1041	81.45	87.16	21.2
	U.S.	Closing Price	1079	81.52	87.22	21.2
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	1041	3012.14	2574.40	1731.5
	U.S.	Market Value	1079	54287.40	58067.52	15168.6
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	658	274.18	278.40	50.9
	Hong Kong	Bid Price	658	273.94	278.20	50.9
	Hong Kong	Closing Price	697	274.21	278.80	50.7
		Turnover By Volume	658	7560.28	6114.65	5473.2
		Market Value	697	856052.18	872585.60	162729.9
JD	U.S.	Ask Price	1041	57.30	59.61	20.8
	U.S.	Bid Price	1041	57.29	59.60	20.8
	U.S.	Closing Price	1079	57.32	59.59	20.8
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	1079	12477.02	10787.30	7160.9
	U.J.	r an over by volume	1041	124/1.02	10/0/.30	/ 100.5

Figure 25: Summary Statistics 1 Before HFCAA

Company		Before H	FCAA			
~ inparty	Location	Stock Info	Obs.	Mean	Median	Std. Dev
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	600	422.36	429.20	55.98
	Ho ng Ko ng	Bid Price	600	421.71	428.70	55.9
		Closing Price	637	422.05	428.80	55.8
		Turnover By Volume	600	322.80	188.70	734.9
		Market Value	637	177748.58	180737.40	23156.5
YUMC	U.S.	Ask Price	1040	50.35	48.64	7.7
	U.S.	Bid Price	1040	50.33	48.62	7.7
	U.S.	Closing Price	1079	50.34	48.63	7.7
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	1041	2424.61	2095.20	1525.7
	U.S.	Market Value	1079	20398.37	19883.55	3853.0
	Hong Kong		592	33.91	34.18	6.4
	Hong Kong		592	33.78	34.08	6.4
	Hong Kong		62.9	33.91	34.15	6.4
		Turnover By Volume	592	1200.01	777.20	1687.2
	Hong Kong	Market Value	629		110865.70	20797.3
HTHT	U.S.	Ask Price	1041	40.06	38.00	8.1
	U.S.	Bid Price	1041	40.03	37.99	8.1
	U.S.	Closing Price	1079	40.05	38.04	8.1
	U.S.	Turno ver By Volume	1041	1635.55	1318.50	1129.8
	U.S.	Market Value	1041	12499.70	11725.38	2914.8
	U.S. Hong Kong	Ask Price	587	67.60	54.45	2914.8
						C
	Hong Kong		587	67.34	54.25	39.8
		Closing Price	625	67.48	54.45	39.8
		Turnover By Volume	587	762.79	473.00	940.7
ZLAB		Market Value	625	60356.26		34178.4
	U.S.	Ask Price	1041	69.90	50.00	45.5
	U.S.	Bid Price	1041	69.76	49.95	45.4
	U.S.	Closing Price	1079	69.84	49.86	45.6
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	1041	465.84	355.40	453.4
	U.S.	Market Value	1079	6057.38	4335.66	4392.4
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	585	52.40	36.80	35.2
	Hong Kong	Bid Price	587	52.04	36.75	35.0
	Hong Kong	Closing Price	624	52.32	36.70	35.3
	Hong Kong	Turnover By Volume	587	184.06	91.20	419.1
BZU N	Hong Kong	Market Value	624	11819.28	8551.12	8556.9
	U.S.	Ask Price	1041	27.90	32.74	14.4
	U.S.	Bid Price	1041	27.86	32.72	14.4
	U.S.	Closing Price	1079	27.86	32.80	14.4
	U.S.	Turno ver By Volume	1041	1198.23	975.60	924.0
	U.S.	Market Value	1079	1767.40	1913.08	933.0
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	587	220.38	220.60	24.8
	Hong Kong	Bid Price	587	219.77	220.00	
			587 624	219.77 220.45	220.00 220.90	24.8
	Hong Kong					24.8 24.5
	Hong Kong Hong Kong	Closing Price Turno ver By Volume	624 587	220.45	220.90	24.8 24.5 761.4
zто	Hong Kong Hong Kong	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value	624 587	220.45 227.21	220.90 115.60	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4
zто	Ho ng Ko ng Ho ng Ko ng Ho ng Ko ng	Closing Price Turno ver By Volume	624 587 624	220.45 227.21 140952.89	220.90 115.60 141982.10	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1
zто	Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S.	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price	624 587 624 1040	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.53	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.89	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1
ZTO	Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S.	Closing Price Turno ver By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price	624 587 624 1040 1040	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.53 26.51	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.89 26.88	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 5.1
ZTO	Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S.	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume	624 587 624 1040 1040 1079	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.53 26.51 26.52 2992.75	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.89 26.88 26.88	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 5.1 2228.5
ZTO	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S.	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value	624 587 624 1040 1079 1079 1041	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.53 26.51 26.52 2992.75 17400.93	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.89 26.88 26.88 2481.30 18502.91	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 5.1 2228.5 4105.2
ZTO	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price	624 587 624 1040 1040 1079 1041 1079 567	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.53 26.51 26.52 2992.75 17400.93 51.17	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.89 26.88 26.88 26.88 2481.30	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 5.1 2228.5 4105.2 27.4
ZTO	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price	624 587 624 1040 1079 1079 1041	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.53 26.51 26.52 2992.75 17400.93 51.17 51.06	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.89 26.88 2481.30 18502.91 45.00	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 2228.5 4105.2 27.4 27.4
ZTO	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price	624 587 624 1040 1079 1041 1079 567 567 600	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.53 26.51 26.52 2992.75 17400.93 51.17 51.06 51.08	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.89 26.88 2481.30 18502.91 45.00 44.95 44.40	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 2228.5 4105.2 27.4 27.4 27.4
	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume	624 587 624 1040 1079 1041 1079 567 567 600 567	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.53 26.51 26.52 2992.75 17400.93 51.17 51.06 51.08 2697.70	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.89 26.88 2481.30 18502.91 45.00 44.95 44.40 1903.30	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 2228.5 4105.2 27.4 27.4 27.4 2569.9
ZTO GDS	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value	624 587 624 1040 1079 1041 1079 567 567 567 600 567 600	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.53 26.51 26.52 2992.75 17400.93 51.17 51.06 51.08 2697.70 73145.51	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.89 26.88 2481.30 18502.91 45.00 44.95 44.40 1903.30 63385.01	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 2228.5 4105.2 27.4 27.4 27.4 2569.9 38920.7
	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S.	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Market Value	624 587 624 1040 1079 1041 1079 567 567 600 567 600 1041	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.51 26.51 26.52 2992.75 17400.93 51.17 51.06 51.08 2697.70 73145.51	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.89 26.88 2481.30 18502.91 45.00 44.95 44.40 1903.30 63385.01 46.83	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 2228.5 4105.2 27.4 27.4 27.4 2569.9 38920.7 24.0
	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Did Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price	624 587 624 1040 1079 1041 1079 567 567 567 600 1041 1041	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.53 26.51 26.52 2992.75 17400.93 51.17 51.06 51.08 2697.70 73145.51 51.97 51.91	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.89 26.88 248.130 18502.91 45.00 44.95 44.40 1903.30 63385.01 46.83 46.75	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 2228.5 4105.2 27.4 27.4 27.4 2569.9 38920.7 24.0 24.0
	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S.	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price	624 587 624 1040 1079 1041 1079 567 567 600 567 600 1041 1041 1079	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.53 26.55 2652 2992.75 17400.93 51.17 51.06 51.08 2697.70 73145.51 51.97 51.91	220.90 1115.60 141982.10 26.88 26.88 2481.30 18502.91 45.00 44.95 44.40 1903.30 63385.01 46.83 46.75 46.83	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 2228.5 4105.2 27.4 27.4 27.4 2569.9 38920.7 24.0 24.0 24.0
	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S.	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume	624 587 624 1040 1079 1041 1079 567 567 600 567 600 1041 1079 1041	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.53 26.53 2652 2992.75 17400.93 51.06 51.08 2697.70 73145.51 51.97 51.91 51.94 1306.72	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.88 26.88 2481.30 18502.91 45.00 44.95 44.40 1903.30 63385.01 46.83 46.75 46.83 46.75	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 2228.5 4105.2 27.4 27.4 27.4 2569.9 38920.7 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.1 959.2
	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value	624 587 624 1040 1079 1041 1079 567 600 567 600 1041 1041 1079 1041 1079	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.53 26.51 26.52 2992.75 17400.93 51.17 51.06 51.08 2697.70 73145.51 51.97 51.91 51.94 1306.72 8458.50	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.89 26.88 2481.30 18502.91 44.95 44.40 1903.30 63385.01 46.83 46.75 46.82 1065.60 7529.22	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 2228.5 4105.2 27.4 27.4 27.4 2569.9 38920.7 24.0 24.0 24.1 959.2 4345.5
	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Did Price Closing Price Closing Price Closing Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price	624 587 624 1040 1079 1041 1079 567 600 567 600 1041 1041 1079 1041 1079 562	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.53 26.51 26.52 2992.75 17400.93 51.17 51.06 51.08 2697.70 73145.51 51.97 51.91 51.94 1306.72 8458.50 47.33	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.89 26.88 2481.30 18502.91 44.95 44.40 1903.30 6338.501 46.83 46.75 46.82 1065.60 7529.22 19.72	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 2228.5 4105.2 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 2569.9 38920.7 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.1 959.2 4345.5 48.0
	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Did Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Bid Price	624 587 624 1040 1079 1041 1079 567 567 600 567 600 1041 1079 1041 1079 562 562	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.53 26.51 265.52 2992.75 117400.93 51.06 51.08 2697.70 73145.51 51.97 51.94 1306.72 8458.50 47.33 47.19	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.89 26.88 2481.30 18502.91 45.00 44.95 44.40 1903.30 63385.01 63385.01 63385.01 46.83 46.75 46.82 1065.60 7529.22 19.70	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 2228.5 4105.2 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27
	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value	624 587 624 1040 1079 1041 1079 567 567 600 567 600 1041 1079 1041 1079 562 562 562 595	220.45 227.21 1409528 26.53 26.51 26.52 2992.75 17400.93 51.06 51.08 2697.70 73145.51 51.91 51.94 1306.72 8458.50 47.33 47.19 47.28	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.89 26.88 248.30 18502.91 44.90 44.95 44.40 1903.30 63385.01 46.83 46.75 46.82 1065.60 7529.22 19.72 19.72 19.70 19.80	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 2228.5 4105.2 27.4 27.4 27.4 2569.9 38920.7 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.1 959.2 4345.5 48.0 47.8
	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Closing Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Closing Price Closing Price Closing Price Closing Price	624 587 624 1040 1079 1041 1079 567 600 567 600 567 600 1041 1079 1041 1079 1041 1079 562 562 562	220.45 227.21 1409528 26.53 26.51 26.52 2992.75 17400.93 51.17 51.06 51.08 2697.70 73145.51 51.97 51.91 1306.72 8458.50 47.33 47.19 47.28 3190.98	220.90 14198210 26.89 26.88 266.88 248130 18502.91 45.00 44.95 44.40 1903.30 63385.01 1903.30 63385.01 46.82 1065.60 7529.22 19.72 19.72 19.70 19.80 00 2017.95	24.8 24.5 761.4 17674.4 5.1 5.1 2228.5 4105.2 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 2569.9 38920.7 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.1 959.2 4345.5 48.0 47.8 47.9 95962.6
	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Did Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value	624 587 624 1040 1079 1041 1079 567 567 600 567 600 567 600 1041 1041 1079 1041 1079 562 562 595 562	220.45 227.21 140952.89 26.53 26.51 26.52 2992.75 17400.93 51.17 51.06 51.08 2697.70 73145.51 51.97 51.91 51.94 1306.72 8458.50 47.23 347.19 47.28 319.098 79946.85	220.90 115.60 141982.10 26.89 26.88 2481.30 18502.91 45.00 44.95 44.95 44.90 1903.30 63385.01 46.83 46.75 46.83 46.75 46.82 1065.60 7529.22 19.70 19.80 2017.95 33599.95	24.8 24.5 7614 5.1 5.1 2228.5 4105.2 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 2569.9 38920.7 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.1 959.2 4345.5 48.0 47.8 4345.5 68.0868.1
GDS	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Closing Price Market Value Ask Price Market Value Ask Price Closing Price	624 587 624 1040 1079 1041 1079 567 567 600 567 600 1041 1079 1041 1079 1041 1079 562 562 562 595 562 595	220.45 227.21 140952.89 265.51 265.52 2992.75 17400.93 51.06 51.08 2697.70 73145.51 91 51.97 51.91 1306.72 8458.50 47.33 47.19 47.28 3190.98 79946.85 85.02	220.90 141982.100 26.89 26.88 248.30 18502.91 45.00 44.95 44.40 1903.30 6338.501 46.83 46.75 46.82 1065.60 7529.22 19.70 19.80 2017.95 3359.95 90.20	2488 2455 76114 176744 1167441 511 511 511 511 511 511 512 285 599 207 7240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240
GDS	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Closing Price Closing Price Closing Price Closing Price Bid Price Bid Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price	624 587 624 1040 1079 567 567 600 567 600 567 600 1041 1079 1041 1079 562 562 555 562 555 562 595 562	220.45 227.21 1409528 26.53 26.51 265.52 2992.75 17400.93 51.07 51.06 51.08 2697.70 73145.51 51.97 51.91 151.94 1306.72 8458.50 47.33 47.19 47.28 3190.98 7946.85 85.02 84.88	220.90 141982100 26.89 26.88 26.88 26.88 26.88 26.88 26.88 26.88 26.88 26.88 26.88 26.88 26.83 48.10 1903.30 63385.01 44.95 44.40 1903.30 63385.01 46.82 1065.600 7529.22 19.72 19.70 19.70 2017.95 33599.95 90.200 90.14	24.8 24.5 7674.4 7674.4 7674.4 751.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2228.5 4105.2 27.4 727.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 2
GDS	Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong	Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Bid Price Closing Price Turnover By Volume Market Value Ask Price Closing Price Market Value Ask Price Market Value Ask Price Closing Price	624 587 624 1040 1079 1041 1079 567 567 600 567 600 1041 1079 1041 1079 1041 1079 562 562 562 595 562 595	220.45 227.21 140952.89 265.51 265.52 2992.75 17400.93 51.06 51.08 2697.70 73145.51 91 51.97 51.91 1306.72 8458.50 47.33 47.19 47.28 3190.98 79946.85 85.02	220.90 141982.100 26.89 26.88 248.30 18502.91 45.00 44.95 44.40 1903.30 6338.501 46.83 46.75 46.82 1065.60 7529.22 19.70 19.80 2017.95 3359.95 90.20	24.8 24.5 761.4

Figure 26: Summary Statistics 2 Before HFCAA

Company	Location	After Hi Stock Info	Obs.	Mean	Medlan	Std. Dev
	Hong Kong		472	84.28	69.50	38.58
	Hong Kong		475	83.52	68.85	38.43
		Closing Price	505	84.11	69.40	38.70
	Hong Kong		475	72.40	31.30	207.48
ATHM	Hong Kong U.S.	Market Value Ask Price	505 1041	42809.28 67.26	35351.50	19619.89 28.29
	U.S.	Bid Price	1041	67.20	75.87	28.23
	U.S.	Closing Price	1079	67.23	75.97	28.30
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	1041	754.22	658.30	448.18
	U.S.	Market Value	1079	8148.55	9049.87	3291.48
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	470	146.21	144.90	30.21
	Hong Kong	Bid Price	470	146.07	144.80	30.18
		Closing Price	499	146.36	144.80	30.28
		Turnover By Volume	470	5596.04	4302.90	4842.34
BIDU	Hong Kong U.S.	Market Value Ask Price	499 1041	413456.13 145.48	409615.80 137.65	84138.03 41.33
	U.S.	Bid Price	1041	145.48	137.55	41.3
	U.S.	Closing Price	1079	145.65	137.74	41.3
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	1041	4683.61	3504.50	5364.60
	U.S.	Market Value	1079	40128.90	37901.08	11377.44
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	465	387.34	233.00	267.76
	Hong Kong	Bid Price	465	386.86	232.60	267.39
	Hong Kong	Closing Price	495	387.81	233.20	267.98
		Turnover By Volume	465	2123.99	1594.90	1952.65
BILI	Hong Kong		495	116887.00	71133.00	79697.2
	U.S.	Ask Price	1041	43.26	26.96	34.14
	U.S. U.S.	Bid Price	1041	43.23	26.95	34.1
	U.S.	Closing Price Turnover By Volume	1079	43.30 5980.24	26.94 4790.50	4555.83
	U.S.	Market Value	1041	12165.16	7890.13	9940.99
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	454	225.04	214.00	42.05
	Hong Kong	Bid Price	454	224.61	213.70	41.9
	Hong Kong	Closing Price	480	225.40	215.00	42.26
	Hong Kong	Turnover By Volume	454	767.83	510.35	732.3
тсом	Hong Kong	Market Value	480	148901.00	142917.60	26993.1
	U.S.	Ask Price	1041	31.08	30.86	5.79
	U.S.	Bid Price	1041	31.07	30.85	5.79
	U.S.	Closing Price	1079	31.09	30.94	5.79
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	1041	5238.67	4450.40	3301.94
	U.S.	Market Value Ask Price	1079 404	18664.69 35.13	18303.94 28.18	3167.49
	Hong Kong Hong Kong		404	35.03	28.05	17.6
	Hong Kong		428	35.03	27.70	17.56
	Hong Kong		404	2122.78	1212.00	3080.4
нсм		Market Value	428	30252.68	23950.88	15136.56
HCIVI	U.S.	Ask Price	1041	24.70	25.95	8.1
	U.S.	Bid Price	1041	24.64	25.90	8.1
	U.S.	Closing Price	1079	24.69	25.95	8.16
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	1041	312.74	213.80	476.36
	U.S.	Market Value	1079 400	3731.28	3554.19 107.60	1333.74
	Hong Kong Hong Kong	Ask Price Bid Price	400	109.85	107.50	53.5
		Closing Price	400	109.70	107.50	53.1
	Hong Kong Hong Kong		400	8064.71	4505.30	10241.7
		Market Value	423	142503.48	140898.40	68466.03
XPEV	U.S.	Ask Price	623	30.44	31.40	13.43
	U.S.	Bid Price	623	30.42	31.38	13.42
	U.S.	Closing Price	647	30.55	31.41	13.5
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	624	17814.39	13400.95	
	U.S.	Market Value	647	17930.73	17674.99	7957.05
	Hong Kong		374	105.46	108.00	21.3
	Hong Kong Hong Kong	Closing Price	374	106.33	107.85	21.3
		Turnover By Volume	374	5257.63	4122.40	4975.93
	Hong Kong		397			
U	U.S.	Ask Price	644	26.36	26.70	6.03
	U.S.	Bid Price	644	26.34	26.68	6.0
	U.S.	Closing Price	667	26.40	26.80	6.03
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	644	12951.30	9669.90	
	U.S.	Market Value	667	20853.65	21895.96	5506.93
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	293	173.26	168.10	44.3
	Hong Kong		294 313	172.00 173.28	165.95 167.60	44.43
	Hong Kong	Closing Price	313 294	173.28 44.81	167.60	80.76
	Hong Kong Hong Kong	Turnover By Volume Market Value	313	44.81	24883.07	6509.30
WB	U.S.	Ask Price	1041	39.56	41.45	14.0
	U.S.	Bid Price	1041	39.53	41.41	14.0
	U.S.	Closing Price	1079	39.55	41.43	14.03
			1041	1616.52	1287.40	1330.1
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	1041	1010.52	1267.40	1220.13

Figure 27: Summary Statistics 3 After HFCAA

Company	Location	After HF Stock Info	Obs.	Mean	Medlan	Std. Dev
company	HongKong	Ask Price	232	126.53	134.50	34.38
	Hong Kong Hong Kong	Bid Price	232	126.33	134.30	34.3
	Hong Kong Hong Kong	Closing Price	232	126.27	134.10	34.23
	Hong Kong	Turnover By Volume	232	943.28	726.05	714.78
	HongKong	Market Value	247	194981.44	205859.10	53129.01
NIO	U.S.	Ask Price	1040	19.73	15.45	16.33
	U.S.	Bid Price	1040	19.72	15.44	16.32
	U.S.	Closing Price	1079	19.77	15.49	16.39
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	1041	67137.04	51761.50	61184.14
	U.S.	Market Value	1079	25520.57	20226.87	22202.43
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	204	21.84	21.20	4.21
	Hong Kong	Bid Price	204	21.55	20.88	4.30
	Hong Kong	Closing Price	216	21.79	21.20	4.15
	Hong Kong	Turnover By Volume	204	159.33	67.55	381.16
ZH	Hong Kong	Market Value	216	6642.65	6468.86	1279.76
2.	U.S.	Ask Price	478	4.86	2.87	3.77
	U.S.	Bid Price	478	4.85	2.85	3.76
	U.S.	Closing Price	496	4.85	2.87	3.78
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	479	3669.58	2366.20	4386.33
	U.S.	Market Value	496	2586.59	1504.37	1915.31
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	193	40.80	40.60	6.74
	Hong Kong	Bid Price	193	40.55	40.15	6.78
	Hong Kong	Closing Price	203	40.86	40.60	6.78
		Turnover By Volume	193	561.87	429.20	497.9
BEKE	Hong Kong	Market Value	203	148143.33	147594.20	24368.43
	U.S.	Ask Price	634	32.16	19.89	20.5
	U.S.	Bid Price	634	32.13	19.88	20.5
	U.S.	Closing Price	657	32.18	19.88	20.5
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	634	10205.08	8132.85	9422.62
	U.S.	Market Value	657	29915.21	20503.26	16757.93
	Hong Kong	Ask Price Bid Price	154	2.57	2.05	1.1
	Hong Kong			2.40		
	Hong Kong	Closing Price	165	2.49 224.61	2.04	417.10
	Hong Kong	Turnover By Volume	200		86.10	
OCFT	Hong Kong U.S.	Market Value Ask Price	165 801	2913.68	2386.76	1275.7 80.3
		Bid Price	801	93.43	95.20	80.3
	U.S. U.S.		801	93.20	95.00	80.2
	U.S.	Closing Price Turnover By Volume	801	104.81	94.80 61.80	139.9
	U.S.	Market Value	831	3572.39	3508.29	3079.2
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	142	13.34	13.05	4.93
	Hong Kong	Bid Price	133	12.68	12.50	4.7
		Closing Price	164	12.84	12.50	4.8
	HongKong	Turnover By Volume	143	25.43	6.60	50.75
	HongKong	Market Value	164	6406.70	6239.33	2436.06
TUYA	U.S.	Ask Price	484	7.62	4.15	7.54
	U.S.	Bid Price	484	7.60	4.15	7.5
	U.S.	Closing Price	502	7.61	4.16	7.5
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	485	1567.92	1118.30	1912.9
	U.S.	Market Value	502	3314.79	2033.94	3138.8
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	150	17.03	13.26	7.2
	HongKong	Bid Price	147	16.95	13.38	7.2
	Hong Kong	Closing Price	158	17.17	13.38	7.2
	Hong Kong	Turnover By Volume	150	241.86	102.90	448.1
	Hong Kong	Market Value	158	21742.16	16951.25	9180.03
MNSO	U.S.	Ask Price	589	14.70	13.23	7.7
	U.S.	Bid Price	589	14.67	13.21	7.70
	U.S.	Closing Price	612	14.72	13.26	7.7
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	590	873.15	631.25	1126.83
	U.S.	Market Value	612	3500.28	3378.24	1669.6
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	136	258.85	251.10	32.6
	Hong Kong	Bid Price	101	252.33	250.00	33.2
	Hong Kong	Closing Price	158	254.47	246.00	32.8
	Hong Kong		93	2.86	0.50	7.0
NOAH		Market Value	158	8158.28	7896.34	1041.0
	U.S.	Ask Price	1040	32.24	30.70	11.0
	U.S.	Bid Price	1040	32.20	30.67	11.04
	U.S.	Closing Price	1079	32.26	30.69	11.03
	U.S.	Turnover By Volume	1041	255.09	191.30	250.2
	U.S.	Market Value	1079	1507.97	1388.89	404.10
	Hong Kong	Ask Price	101	24.97	26.80	8.08
	Hong Kong	Bid Price	101	24.72	26.60	8.0
		Closing Price	108	25.22	29.10	8.0
	Hong Kong		99	98.49	67.20	96.0
	Hong Kong	Market Value	108	43300.56	49965.10	13869.46
TMF	115	Ask Price	1040	12.00	12.70	5.6
TME	U.S.					
TME	U.S.	Bid Price	1040	11.98	12.69	5.6
TME	U.S. U.S.	Bid Price Closing Price	1079	12.00	12.69	5.6
TME	U.S.	Bid Price			12.69	

Figure 28: Summary Statistics 4 After HFCAA




Figure 29: Mispricing 1




Figure 30: Mispricing 2




Figure 31: Mispricing 3




Figure 32: Mispricing 4




Figure 33: Mispricing 5

NYSE MKT CONTINUED LISTING STANDARDS

DISTRIBUTION CRITERIA	Required to meet all of the following public distribution criteria ⁽¹⁾ : • Shareholders 300 • Shares 200,000 • Market value \$1MM
FINANCIAL CRITERIA	 Required to meet <u>all</u> of the following*: \$2MM in stockholders' equity if reported losses from continuing operations and/or net losses in 2 of last 3 fiscal years \$4MM stockholders' equity if reported losses from continuing operations and/or net losses in 3 of last 4 fiscal years \$6MM in stockholder's equity if reported losses from continuing operations and/or net losses in last 5 fiscal years \$6MM in stockholder's equity if reported losses from continuing operations and/or net losses in last 5 fiscal years \$6MM in stockholder's equity if reported losses from continuing operations and/or net losses in last 5 fiscal years \$6MM in stockholder's equity if reported losses from continuing operations and/or net losses in last 5 fiscal years \$6MM in stockholder's equity if reported losses from continuing operations and/or net losses in last 5 fiscal years \$6MM in stockholder's equity if reported losses from continuing operations and/or net losses in last 5 fiscal years \$100 fiscal condition of the company cannot be impaired *The NYSE MKT will not normally suspend an issuer which is below criteria (I) through (III) above if issuer is in compliance with <u>all</u> of the following: 1.1MM publicly-held shares \$15MM market value of publicly-held shares \$15MM market value of publicly-held shares \$00 round lot holders \$50MM market cap OR total assets & revenue of \$50MM each in last fiscal year or 2 of last 3 fiscal years
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS	 NYSE MKT reserves the right to delist companies should any of the following occur: Issuer ceases as an operating company or disposes of principal operating assets where issuer has substantially discontinued business it conducted as the time it was listed⁽³⁾ Liquidation of the issuer has been authorized Advice has been received, deemed by the Exchange to be authoritative, that the security is without value Failure to comply with listing or other agreements with the Exchange and/or SEC requirements in any material respect Common stock sells for a low price for a substantial period of time and/or issuer fails to effect a reverse split of such shares within a reasonable time after being notified of such potential actions by the Exchange Issuer or its management engage in operations which, in the opinion of the Exchange, are contrary to the public interest Issuer fails or refuses to pay, when due, any applicable NYSE MKT listing fees

Figure 34: NYSE Continued Listing StandardsNYS

Continued Listing Standards

For Nasdaq Capital Market Companies

Requirements	Equity Standard	Market Value of Listed Securities Standard	Net Income Standard
Listing Rules	5550(a) and 5550(b)(1)	5550(a) and 5550(b)(2)	<u>5550(a) and 5550(b)(3)</u>
Stockholders' Equity	\$2.5 million		
Market Value of Listed Securities		\$35 million	
Net Income from Continuing Operations (in the latest fiscal year or in two of the last three fiscal years)			\$500,000
Publicly Held Shares	500,000	500,000	500,000
Market Value of Publicly Held Securities	\$1 million	\$1 million	\$1 million
Bid Price	\$1	\$1	\$1
Public Holders	300	300	300
Market Makers	2	2	2

Companies must meet all of the criteria under at least one of the three standards below.

Figure 35: NASDAQ Continued Listing Standards NAS de dede

CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS

Once listed, a listed issuer and its directors will face various continuing obligations. The Listing Rules cover such obligations the major ones of which are set out below.

		Main Board	GEM
Continuing Obligations		sting Rules set out certain of the continuing obligations which an iss Exchange. Major areas covered include:	uer is required to observe once its securities have been listed
	1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.	General obligations of disclosure including those relating to the d in the issuer's securities and inside information under Part XIVA o Avoid False Market" below). Response to enquiries made of the issuer by the Exchange concer its listed securities, the possible development of a false market in Compliance with the prescribed minimum percentage of listed se Pre-emptive rights, being circumstances under which the director shareholders in general meeting prior to allotting, issuing or gran Arrangements for annual general meetings and board meetings. Disclosure of financial information (see "Financial Disclosure" bel Notification to the Exchange of changes with regard to a listed iss documents, its directorate or supervisory committee, rights attacc year end, its secretary or registered address.	f the Securities and Futures Ordinance (see "Disclosure to ning unusual movements in the price or trading volume of its securities, or any other matters. curities in public hands at all times. 's of the listed issuer must obtain the consent of ting securities. ow). suer's memorandum or articles of association or equivalent
	8.	Submission to the Exchange of draft circulars and other documer and (2) and GEM Rules 17.53(1) and (2).	nts for review, as required under Main Board Rules 13.52(1)
	9.	Trading and settlement arrangements.	
	10.	Directors' dealings, service contracts, nomination and contact info	ormation.

Figure 36: Hong Kong Stock Exchange Continuing Obligation HKE

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