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Restoring the Ultimate Sense of Shame: A Pastoral Theology of *Shameability*

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Abstract

Restoring the Ultimate Sense of Shame: A Pastoral Theology of *Shameability* Kwan-Hae Chi

This dissertation presents a pastoral theology of shame (which includes *Shameability*) as a complex, multilayered phenomenon. It shows that *Shameability* is part of who we are based on our being created in the image of God, meaning that *Shameability* exists before the fall; however, it is distorted by sin and psychopathology after the fall. This dissertation illustrates how a revised theological anthropology that includes *Shameability* will affect our interpretation of pastoral encounters, as well as human interactions on a more global scale.

For this purpose, I adapted my Neo-Confucian heritage. Neo-Confucian anthropology views ‘shame’ not as something negative but as something crucial that is present in the characteristic of a sage—the one who lives according to nature as it was endowed directly from Heaven/God. From this Neo-Confucian anthropological perspective, it is the people without ‘shame’ that have a problem, not the ones with ‘shame.’ This unique aspect of Neo-Confucian ‘shame’ forms the backbone of this dissertation, and my pastoral theology of *Shameability* is a re-interpretation of the Neo-Confucian concept of *suojishim* (羞惡之心) based on my perspective as a Korean American pastoral theologian.

What I mean by *Shameability* (*the ultimate sense of Shame*) is the capacity to see, recognize, and experience the potential disconnection (*Shame*) within the state of being united with God, self, and others. This dissertation assumes that human beings are born with the seed of *Shameability* so that they can grow toward true and complete human being as it is found in Jesus. While human beings are created according to the image of God (Genesis 1:26-27), this capacity itself indicates that God is God of *Shameability* as well, meaning that God can never become a God of *Shame*, or *Shamelessness*.

The dissertation suggests that all humans have the capacity to experience six different levels of shame within three categories of shame-related states both at an individual and communal level. The three categories are: 1) *shame*, 2) *shamelessness*, 3) *shameability* (*sense of shame*). The six levels are: 1) *proto*, 2) *pathological*, 3) *stigma*, 4) *social*, 5) *moral*, and 6) *ultimate*. While this means that there can be a total of eighteen shame related states for all human beings, the pastoral theology of *Shameability* assumes that *Shameability/the ultimate sense of Shame* (p-vi) is the only undistorted form of shame that God originally granted human beings.

As this dissertation understands ‘shaming’ and ‘affirming *Shameability*’ to be different, it concludes that the caregiver’s job is not to help a person or nation to avoid, relieve, remove, or defend against shame, but to help restore that person or nation to *the ultimate sense of Shame* through nurturing, empowering and liberating the seed of *Shameability* as it is found in Jesus’ ministry.

Keywords: shame; *Shameability*; *the ultimate sense of Shame*; shamelessness; Neo-Confucian anthropology; Neo-Confucian self; theological anthropology; image of God; Korean American pastoral theology of shame; pastoral care and counseling; prayer; self-cultivation; self-discovery; pastoral formation; spirituality; *suojishim* (수오지심 羞惡之心)

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This dissertation grew out of my ministries in the United States and Korea in the years since I was ordained in 1994 (UCC, RI Conference). Even though there were differences in our contexts, cultures, traditions, race, gender, ethnic backgrounds, socio-economic backgrounds, theologies, religions, and values, I noticed that the dynamic of shame influenced all people greatly. I saw many individuals, families, communities, and countries suffering from distorted shame.

While the past twenty years of my ministry involved going back and forth between theory and practice, one of my earliest experiences of pastoral ministry was the first unit of CPE (clinical pastoral education) in Concord, New Hampshire (1993) while I was doing a M.Div. degree. The training site was a retirement community, and I met a number of elderly people there who were experiencing shame along with their other losses.

Following my ordination in 1994, I did two years of CPE residency in hospital settings in Houston, Texas. There, I also met patients and families who were experiencing shame under the circumstances of various illnesses, trauma, burn, death, suicide, and other critical physical, emotional, socio-economic, and spiritual situations. During my second-year residency, I met a woman in a waiting area whose sister was in the burn unit in critical condition. She seemed to be a withdrawn person compared to others in the waiting area; she appeared to be reserved, depressed, and traumatized, as if hiding from something. Although she was there for an extended period of time, she never made eye contact with me when I made my rounds in that area. After several attempts to offer pastoral care to her, one day

she finally accepted my pastoral presence, and allowed me to be with her. She and her entire family were having a family re-union in Houston; all four sisters had gathered with their husbands and children from all around the country. Their father had been diagnosed with cancer, and they wanted to gather together as a family before he died. As many members of the family, including children and cousins, rode back in the car from the airport to the father's house, a drunk driver hit their car. Some of them died; some of them were severely burned. While the accident itself caused plenty of pain, the sister (who was not riding in the same vehicle) was experiencing something else. She believed that the accident was somehow related to their father's unfaithfulness. "He had to be more God centered," the woman told me. According to her, the father was a dedicated Christian when he was young. At one time, he even went to a seminary in order to become a pastor. However, he abandoned his faith, and refused even to go to church any more. Being a conservative Christian herself, it seemed that she was feeling as if the whole family, including the father, was disconnected from God. She had been sitting there in the hospital waiting area asking "Why?" I knew that something was deeply distorted there; however, I could not provide an adequate pastoral care response based on the theological assumptions I had at that time, assumptions I was beginning to question.

From 1996, I did a pastoral counseling residency at Georgia Association for Pastoral Care (GAPC). There, I met many clients with shame issues (i.e., people with separation and individuation issues, depression, losses, personality disorders, relational difficulties, identity issues, addictions, domestic violence, etc.). At that time, I was doing my doctoral course work at Candler School of Theology, Emory University (Th.D. in pastoral

counseling). At the time I was becoming more acquainted with various psychological as well as pastoral theological theories of shame along with my clinical pastoral experiences and materials, and I chose to write about the concept of shame for my dissertation from a pastoral theological perspective. Five of the most influential books that I have read during that period were John Patton's *Is Human Forgiveness Possible?*,¹ James Fowler's *Faithful Change: The Personal and Public Challenges of Postmodern Life*,² Edward Wimberly's *Moving from Shame to Self-Worth: Preaching and Pastoral Care*,³ Stephan Pattison's *Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology*,⁴ and June Price Tangney et al.'s *Shame and Guilt*.⁵ These books were all very helpful. But the existing theories found in them often seemed to be an inadequate response to the pastoral situations in which I found myself within the global context; it seemed to me that each theory captured only a partial understanding of the human phenomenon of shame. Although such thoughts were only latent in me at that time, I began to recognize that the current Western theories of shame were limited.

After my dissertation proposal was approved, I received a call from Seoul, Korea to serve a parish as a senior pastor. There, I began a new ministry within a different context in terms of socio-economic backgrounds as well as the culture, value system, and theology. More than ever, I began to understand the limitations of the existing theories of shame. I had reviewed the literatures of shame (mainly the psychological and theological views of

¹ John Patton, *Is Human Forgiveness Possible? : A Pastoral Care Perspective* (Nashville: Nashville : Abingdon Press, 1985).

² James W. Fowler, *Faithful Change: The Personal and Public Challenges of Postmodern Life* (Nashville: Abingdon Pr, 1996).

³ Edward P. Wimberly, *Moving from Shame to Self-Worth: Preaching and Pastoral Care* (Nashville: Nashville : Abingdon Press, 1999).

⁴ Stephen Pattison, *Shame : Theory, Therapy, Theology* (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

⁵ June Price Tangney and Ronda L. Dearing, *Shame and Guilt* (New York: Guilford Press, 2002).

shame developed primarily by thinkers in Europe and the U.S.); those psychological views were mainly focused on the pathology of shame while the theological views were focused on distorted shame after the fall into a state of estrangement from God, self, and others. Neither of them sufficiently addressed the gift of shame. It seemed to me that the existing theories of shame: 1) focused on low level, or maladaptive shame—resulting in a negative view of shame overall; 2) were heavily dependent on the guilt-versus-shame dichotomy where guilt is regarded as a positive, mature, and healthy emotion (or state of being) in general, while shame is viewed as a negative, immature, and unhealthy emotion (or state of being) in general; 3) seemed to discuss shame on an individual level while excluding the problem of communal or systemic levels of shame; 4) not sufficiently sensitive to the powerless, subordinating group of our society and humanity (meaning, it is more centered on caring for the dominant groups of humanity who often believe that they suffer more from ‘guilt’ than ‘shame’); 5) did not include ‘shame’ (meaning, *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability*) as an integral part of human nature, or as the image of God, although it is often implicit in major theologians’ works.

As I became more aware of these limitations and inadequacies, I was moved to re-theorize the shame theory to encompass *Shameability*. I consequently began to re-formulate the theory while adapting my heritage of Neo-Confucian spirituality in the area of shame for the purpose of restoring *Shameability* in theological anthropology.⁶ For me, *Shame* (s-

⁶ The root of Neo-Confucianism goes back to Confucius (551-479 B.C.), a Chinese philosopher in the Spring and Autumn times of Chinese history. Confucius championed abiding by social roles and personal judgment based on virtue more than inhabiting any set of standardized rules. By Confucianism, based on Confucius’ teachings, it was taught that familial loyalty and respect for elders be held in high reverence – as well as an early form of the golden rule by which Confucius said: “Do not do to others what you do not want done to yourself.” Always Confucius upheld *Ien* (인 仁) otherwise translated most closely as “humaneness.” Then,

vi) is the state of being estranged from self, others, and God. Just as this state can be further distorted into the state of *Shamelessness* (I-vi) as a way of defending against *Shame*, it can also be restored into the state of *Shameability* with the grace of God that is found in Christ.

What I mean by *Shameability* (*the ultimate sense of Shame*) is the capacity to see, recognize, and experience one's potential disconnection (*Shame*, p-vi) from God, self, and others. This capacity is a way of preventing oneself from falling into the state of estrangement (*Shame*). Throughout this dissertation, it is my assumption that *Shameability* is a part of God's creation as well as the image of God. That is why being in the state of *Shame*, in which a person has a self-awareness of his or her estrangement, or being in the state of *Shamelessness*, in which one is rigidly defending oneself against one's disconnection (*Shame*) means to be less than a human, or in the state of being possessed. In today's world, people often so deeply defend against shame that even the most severely distorted shame appears to have nothing whatsoever to do with shame. However, there is

Mencius (385-303 B.C.) followed as the best known Confucian after Confucius, who despite Confucius's lack of addressing the subject, believed in the innate goodness of human beings that is only subverted by society's lack of positive influence in cultivating good character and virtue. It was based on these two main figures that the classical Confucianism in China was forming from the sixth century B.C.E. to the second century. Later, classical Confucianism was shaped into a political orthodoxy under the Han Empire (202 B.C.-220) and began to spread to other parts of East Asia. It is based on classical Neo-Confucianism that Neo-Confucianism was developed and spread mostly in the 13th to 17th centuries, starting humbly in schools of South China where Chu Hsi's disciples spread his teachings. There are numerous factors that brought about the rise of Neo-Confucianism: 1) reaction against foreign invasions, 2) reaction against nihilist metaphysics of Buddhism, 3) influence of Daoism, and 4) revival of Confucianism. While Buddhists introduced the view that the universe as well as man's life are illusory, Neo-Confucianism reasserted reality of both. Neo-Confucianism thought that there is a "pervading moral principle that runs through the entire cosmos and the life of man." Michael Kalton (professor at the University of Washington Tacoma, an expert of East Asian Languages and Civilization and Comparative Religion) explains that Neo-Confucianism encompassed metaphysics, cosmology, and philosophy of human beings in the scope of a unified anthropocosmic vision. Its practical aim was the cultivation of character, and it developed a sophisticated ascetical theory combining both intellectual and meditative pursuits. At the very center of *Songnihak* stands the metaphysically based description of the structure and functioning of the human psyche" where the "shame" plays an important role. For more information, see Hwang Yi and Michael C. Kalton, *To Become a Sage : The Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning*, Neo-Confucian Studies; Variation: Neo-Confucian Studies. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

almost no one on earth who is free from *Shame*, the state of estrangement or disunion from God, since all individuals and community are in fact under the common predicament of fallen humanity.

The bottom line is that human beings are born with the seed of *the ultimate sense of Shame (Shameability)* so that they can grow toward true human being as it is found in Jesus, and it is important to note that this capacity is an integral part of human nature because it is a part of God's creation. While human beings are created according to the image of God (Genesis 1:26-27), this capacity itself indicates that God is the God of *Shameability* as well, meaning that God can never become a God of *Shame*, or *Shamelessness*.

Later, I will explore the *Shameability* of God. Does God have *the ultimate sense of Shame*? How about Jesus? Some theologies would consider this question in itself to be blasphemous. Nevertheless, I argue that God can have a sense of *Shame*. For example, why did Jesus bear the cross? Why did he not run away from it? He did this because he knew he would experience disconnection (*Shame*, p-vi) if he chose not to give himself on the cross, namely, if he chose not to follow 'Thy will' but 'my will.' It does not mean that Jesus was caught in *Shame*, but that because he was in such close union with God, self, and others he could sense the potential of estrangement (*Shame*) through the gift of *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability* he had since he was a true human made in the image of God.

***Shameability* as Part of Human Nature**

While such a theological assumption may be disturbing to some readers, I suggest that there is much evidence in the human condition (regardless of race, culture, societies, religions, languages, traditions, values, and ideologies) to indicate people's pre-

understanding, admission, and expectation of *Shameability* among themselves and others. For example, we often see groups of picketers on the streets in America with big signs saying, “Shame on...” such and such organization or person. Such signs presuppose the fact that people are already aware of the existence of the innate *Shameability* they have, as well as that of the opposing parties or institutions against which they are demonstrating. Likewise, on a recent family trip to Rock City in Tennessee, a phrase engraved on a thick metal plate and attached securely to the surface of a big rock at the entrance of the park proclaimed: “Let no one say and say it to your shame that all was beauty here until you came.”

Americans often hear political leaders refer to shame. On March 28, 2013, President Barack Obama, speaking alongside parents of the Newtown, Connecticut school shooting victims, asked Americans to urge Congress to support his gun control measure. He said:

And there are some powerful voices on the other side who are interested in running out the clock, or changing the subject...their assumption is that people will just forget about it.... And I want to make sure every American is listening today. Less than 100 days ago that [the shooting in Newtown] happened, and the entire country was shocked. And the entire country pledged we would do something about it and that this time would be different. Shame on us if we’ve forgotten! I haven’t forgotten those kids. Shame on us if we’ve forgotten.”⁷

A phrase like “shame on...” is also common in other cultures although the style of saying or usage may be different. In Korea, for example, it is one of the most common phrases in ordinary life—common enough to be promptly employed even in the context of a fight between a husband and wife, or other disputes: “사람이면 부끄러워할 줄 알아야지! 저것 좀 봐, 얼굴 빛 하나 안 변하네!” (meaning, “If you are a human, you are supposed to be able to

⁷ *ABC News* (March 28, 2013).

feel shame! Look at you. You are not even blushing!”)

Shameability as a dimension of human nature is portrayed often in some of the most famous literature in Korea, for example in a poem entitled “Prologue” by Dong-Ju Yun (1917-1945). Widely recognized as a poet who resisted Japanese colonial rule, Yun wrote a poem that was published in 1948 (three years after Yun died in a Japanese prison), and that became one of the most popular and most beloved poems of all time in Korea.

Until the day I die
 I long to have no speck of shame
 when I gaze up toward heaven,
 so I have tormented myself,
 even when the wind stirs the leaves.
 With a heart that sings the stars,
 I will love all dying things.
 And I will walk the way
 that has been given to me.

Tonight, again, the wind brushes the stars.⁸

Neo-Confucian⁹ Anthropology of *Suojishim* (수오지심 羞惡之心):¹⁰

As the above-mentioned examples show, *Shameability* is in fact widely recognized as an integral part of being human. The problem is that such knowledge of ordinary people remains only at the level of common sense rather than being accepted as a part of theological anthropology.

Yet, some cultures, religions, and spiritual traditions more readily recognize it as

⁸ Translated by Chae Pyong Song and Darcy Brandel,
<http://jaypsong.wordpress.com/category/yun-dong-ju/>

⁹ Neo-Confucianism is also known as *Songrihak*, namely “the study of nature and principle.” Here, *song* (성性) stands for “nature,” *ri* (리理) stands for “principle,” and *hak* (학學) stands for “study.”

¹⁰ *Suojishim* (수오지심 羞惡之心) is Mencius’ term for “shame” which is regarded as one of the *Four Sprouts* that human beings have. Here, *su* (수羞) stands for “shame,” *o* (오惡) stands for “dislike, or aversion,” *ji* (지之) stands for “of,” and *shim* (심心) stands for “mind-and-heart.”

part of human nature than others. For example, I myself grew up in a family and society with a kind of innate understanding of human nature that includes this *Shameability*. I believe this was an influence of Neo-Confucianism on Korea, especially under the Lee Dynasty (1392-1910). I thus bring to this dissertation the Neo-Confucian perspective of ‘shame’ that I have as a Korean American pastoral theologian coming from a Neo-Confucian spiritual background.

Shameability as the Mark of a True Human: Contributions of Neo-Confucianism

When I was young, I often heard my father say: “사람이라면 부끄러워할 줄 알아야 한다!” meaning, “If one is a human, one must have the capacity to sense shame!” As a child, I had no idea what this meant. Neither did I have any idea from where such a lesson came. As I recall, my father never told me the source of this wisdom. Later, I found out that it was a part of Neo-Confucian spirituality that was deeply embedded in Rev. Dr. Chi’s pedagogy of ‘shame.’ It is from this personal experience that I derive the term *Shameability* that is central to this project.

Although Chi never articulated ‘shame’ theologically, I know that he went through the traditional Korean educational system of *seodang* (village school) in his childhood, and that there he must have read *Sasusamkyoung* (사서삼경 四書三經 —the seven classics of Neo-Confucianism). I did not have the opportunity to read them at school since the Korean education system had been totally changed by the time I was of school age. Even if the books had been available for me, I would not have been able to read them because my generation was not properly educated for reading the classics. I know that I am not the only one who was disconnected from my own heritage because of the radical change Korean

society was undergoing thanks to its uncritical acceptance of Western culture. It was a generational plight.

However, I did read one of these classics later in English translation, a volume in which Mencius discusses shame understood as one of the *Four Sprouts* (or *Four Beginnings*) that leads or help restore a human to his/her heaven-endowed nature.¹¹ There he speaks of

one who lacks a mind that feels pity and compassion would not be human; one who lacks a mind that feels shame and aversion would not be human; one who lacks a mind that feels modesty and compliance would not be human; and one who lacks a mind that knows rights and wrong would not be human. The mind's feeling of pity and compassion is the sprout of humaneness; the mind's feeling of shame and aversion is the sprout of righteousness; the mind's feeling of modesty and compliance is the sprout of propriety, and the mind's sense of right and wrong is the sprout of wisdom. Human beings have these four sprouts just as they have four limbs"¹² (Mencius 2A6).

This particular section of Mencius was the catalyst for the Four-Seven Debate among the Korean Neo-Confucian scholars during the Lee Dynasty.¹³ Two of the most famous scholars in this debate were Toegye (Lee Hwang, 1501-1570) and Yulgok (Lee Yi,

¹¹ According to Neo-Confucian anthropology, human nature consists of four heaven-endowed virtues. They include *Ien* (인 仁, meaning "humanness"), *Ui* (의 義, meaning "righteousness"), *Ye* (예 禮, meaning "propriety"), and *Ji* (지 智, meaning "wisdom"). Yet, it is the view of this anthropology that people can only live according to their nature through a daily life of self-cultivation while nurturing the *Four Sprouts* including *suojishim* (수오지심 羞惡之心).

¹² Mencius, P. J. Ivanhoe, and Irene Bloom, *Mencius, Translations from the Asian Classics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 35.

¹³ In Neo-Confucian tradition, there was a list of feelings in general. These were the *Seven Feelings* of joy, anger, grief, fear, love, hate, and desire. On the other hand, there were feelings on higher levels (*Tao Mind*) that manifest the human nature, namely, the *Four Beginnings* (*Four Sprouts*) of the initial clue, or a piece of thread that lead human beings towards their heaven-endowed nature. Those are: a mind that feels pity and compassion, a mind that feels shame and aversion, a mind that feels modesty and compliance, and a mind that know right and wrong. The main topic of the Four-Seven Debate involved the various kinds of feelings and the way they originated. For more information on the Four-Seven Debate, read Michael C. Kalton et al., *The Four-Seven Debate : An Annotated Translation of the Most Famous Controversy in Korean Neo-Confucian Thought* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).

1536-1584), whose names are familiar to Koreans and national emblems of pride. While it is not my intention to go into a deep scholarly investigation of Neo-Confucian philosophy, what is pertinent to our discussion is that ‘shame’ (수오지심 羞惡之心) as one of *the Four Sprouts* is viewed not as something negative but as something crucial that is present in the characteristic of a sage—the one who lives according to nature as it was endowed directly from Heaven. From this perspective of Neo-Confucian anthropology it is the people without shame that are the problem, not the ones with shame. This unique view of Neo-Confucian shame became the backbone of this dissertation. My own pastoral theology of *Shameability* is a revision, or an imaginative re-interpretation, of Neo-Confucian shame based on my perspective as a Korean American pastoral theologian.

Yet as I began employing this unique concept, I began to think that I needed to replace the Neo-Confucian term of shame with a new theological term. For the Neo-Confucian term for shame can be easily confused with the general emotion of shame as we understand it in today’s psychological context. Nowadays, most Western scholars translate Neo-Confucian shame as “shame,” “sense of shame,” or “shame for evil;” however, average shame and Neo-Confucian shame are very different, and they must be differentiated.

To distinguish them, I have created a new term: *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability* as a way of preventing such confusion, as well as a way of relating Neo-Confucian ‘shame’ (수오지심 羞惡之心) to theological anthropology so that I can help restore *the ultimate sense of Shame* in the context of doing pastoral theology. I am not just importing Neo-Confucian shame into the pastoral theological system using new

terminology; rather, the Neo-Confucian insight of shame had great influence on me while I was re-defining the nature of human beings and God in light of *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability* found within the Christian perspective. In short, I suggest that this is a kind of perspective that is missing in the traditions of Western depth psychology, sociology, philosophy, and theology, although it is often implicit in the works of great Western theologians, as well as the Bible, and of course is evident in the person of Jesus the Christ himself.

The basic assumption of this project, then, is that *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability* (p-vi) is an integral part of being a true human being. While people are not born with a mature form of *Shameability* but rather with the seed (sprout, beginning) of *Shameability (the ultimate sense of Shame)*, it is up to people to nurture, empower, and liberate (or cultivate) that seed so that it may grow toward the mature form of *Shameability* that Jesus embodies.

Shameability is an integral part of being a true human; it is part of the image of God. “사람이라면 부끄러운 줄 알아야 한다.” (“If one is a human, one must have the capacity to feel shame!”). I assume that I am not the only person who understand that all humans have an innate capacity for *Shameability*. Nevertheless, so far I have not read any academic theological anthropology treatment that recognizes *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability* as an integral part of human nature. That is why I want to explain it clearly through this project as a way of doing pastoral theology of *Shameability*.

With these thoughts in mind, the following are the purposes of this dissertation, as well as the main arguments that I present.

Statement of Purpose

1. To present a pastoral theology of shame (which includes *Shameability*) as a complex, multilayered phenomenon. For this purpose, I began with an assumption that human beings are connected with God, self, and others. It means that the pastoral theology of shame must account for shame as it is expressed in all three relationships while psychological theories of shame look primarily at the impact of shame on the self, and to some extent to the relationships with others, but primarily in terms of pathological expressions.

2. To show that *Shameability* is part of who we are based on our being created in the image of God, meaning that *Shameability* exists before the fall (or before disunion from God, self, and others); however, *Shameability* is distorted by sin and psychopathology after the fall.¹⁴

3. To illustrate how a revised theological anthropology that includes *Shameability* will affect our interpretation of pastoral encounters, as well as human interactions on a more global scale.

Main Arguments

1. Shame is a complex and multilayered phenomenon. There are three main categories of shame and these are at work at six different levels. The three main categories are *shame*, *shamelessness*, and *shameability* (sense of shame). The six different levels are *proto*, *pathological*, *stigma*, *social*, *moral*, and *ultimate*. This means that there can be a total

¹⁴ Parallel to psychological views is that 'shame' is a normal human experience that can help positive dimensions, but can also be distorted through pathology. This is buried in the literature, but most psychologists believe that shame is part of human development especially when it becomes pathologically distorted.

of eighteen kinds of human shame-related experiences that occur at both the individual and communal levels.

2. *Shameability (the ultimate sense of Shame)*—the capacity to see, recognize and experience the potential of *Shame* (the state of estrangement) is the only form of shame among the eighteen that is not distorted.

3. *Shameability (the ultimate sense of Shame)* is a mark of being a true human being, and it has been shown most obviously through Jesus.

4. The ministry of Jesus was the ministry of restoring *Shameability*, both at the individual and communal levels. He ministered by nurturing, empowering, and liberating the seed of people's *Shameability*. In his ministry of restoring *Shameability*, the four pillars of prayer, word, pastoral formation, and pastoral care are key. Among them, Jesus' first priority was the nurturing of his own *Shameability* through his daily life of prayer. By extension, this same goal would be desirable for every caregiver (as well as global leaders).

5. While much psychology talks about removing shame, the pastor's (or the caregiver's) job is not primarily to help avoid, relieve, remove, get rid of, hide, conceal, run away from, repress, suppress, or defend against shame, but to help restore it in the image of God, which includes *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability*. The ministry of the church is the ministry of restoring *Shameability*. *Shameability* actually helps people to claim their humanity, meaning it helps one to claim one's self as a child of God.

6. People are born with the seed of *Shameability*, which with the faithful state of being immersed in the words and grace of God they can develop into its mature form.

7. All forms of distorted shame (both at the individual and communal levels) have tendencies to defend against ‘shame’ (on its particular level and category).

8. All forms of distorted shame (both at the individual and communal levels) have deep yearnings to be reunited with self, others, and God.

9. Among the three main categories of shame, *shameability* (excluding *Shameability* on the *ultimate* level which is not distorted at all) is the least distorted category. It is the state where the agent (both at the individual and communal levels) is most self-aware, relational, and the least self-defensive as well as being equipped with the capacity to see, recognize, and experience the potential of disconnection (*shame*) on that particular level.

The category of *shame* is where the agent is being caught in *shame*. In this state, the agent is relatively more self-aware and relational compared to the state of *shamelessness*, although it is a more distorted category than *shameability*. People in this category (usually powerless, subordinated people) tend to hide, conceal, withdraw and attack themselves as ways of trying to defend against their *shame*.

The category of *shamelessness* is the most distorted one. It is the state in which the agent is least self-aware, least relational, and most defensive against *shame*. People who belong to this category (they usually belong to the powerful, dominating group) tend to be less concerned about disconnection; they often choose the path of attacking others and being unempathic and avoidant as a way of defending against *shame*. This state I describe as being possessed or being “immune” to *shamelessness*.¹⁵

¹⁵ Julien A. Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni, *In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 234.

10. When *Shameability* is restored, it takes care of the distorted parts as well. By restoring *Shameability*, distorted shame(s) becomes undistorted; by restoring the image of God by restoring *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability*, the distortion dissolves.

11. Guilt, which inevitably involves evaluation of self (both at the individual and communal levels), cannot be completely separated from shame although it can be distinguished from it. When they are distinguished, ‘shame’ (p-v, p-vi)¹⁶ is actually more moral than guilt because shame is related to self-reform, while guilt is related to making up for the wrongdoings or atoning for particular unacceptable actions.

12. A research method that is heavily dependent upon the dichotomy of guilt versus shame can be one of the indicators that the involved researchers and theorists are defending against their own shame (both at the individual and communal levels) through theorizing.

13. Shame includes the cognitive and relational dimensions of affect.¹⁷

14. Much of what psychology, sociology, philosophy, and theology describe is forms or experiences of shame that have been distorted by psychopathology and sin.

15. Psychology of shame (as well as the theology of shame) must include the communal and vicarious dimensions of shame as well.

Methodology

I am using the pastoral theological method for this dissertation, specifically the practice-reflection-practice (practice-theory-practice) method. This means that I do practice, analyze it, get questions, refer to theories for answers, find the theories to be inadequate, re-

¹⁶ See Table 1 for details.

¹⁷ Meaning that most psychological theories of shame problematically only deal with the affective dimension.

formulate the theory based on the practice, and develop a new practice based on what I have theorized.

Emmanuel Lartey (2003) has introduced a pastoral theological method that combines the practice-theory-practice model with liberation theology. For him, there are four areas of engagement between liberation theology and pastoral care: concrete experience, social/contextual analysis of the situation, theological analysis of the situation, and the pastoral praxis of liberation.¹⁸ It is a way of doing pastoral theology through practice, contextual analysis, examining the theories, situational analysis of theology, and by then developing a response with a new perspective within the changed situation. Lartey calls this the “pedagogical cycle for liberative pastoral praxis.”¹⁹ What he means by the term *praxis* is “to convey the sense of constant interaction between action and reflection.”²⁰ As it is not the goal of liberation theology to produce a more adequate theology or clearer statement of belief but to bring about change through right actions, Lartey believes that it is the task of pastoral theologians to delve deeply into the particular cases. This comes from the liberation theological framework in which everything begins from the concrete experience of the poor.²¹

Employing Lartey’s methodological frame, I present my pastoral theological method that grew out of my ministerial experience of encountering distorted shame both at the individual and communal levels (which led me to study shame literature further); however, I have discovered that the existing theories of shame are limited because their

¹⁸ Emmanuel Yartekwei Lartey, *In Living Color: An Intercultural Approach to Pastoral Care and Counseling* (London; New York: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2003), 123.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 131-8.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 122.

²¹ *Ibid.*

psychological views primarily focus on pathology, while theological views see it as distorted by the fall. After reviewing social science theories on shame, it seemed to me that each theory captured only a partial understanding of the human phenomenon of shame; current theories of shame are limited or not sufficiently inclusive. These are the dilemmas that I have found in the existing theories, and that is why I came to re-theorize mine along with the new practice.

By employing the basic elements of liberative pastoral praxis, the purpose of this dissertation is to develop a pastoral theology of shame as a way to restore *Shameability* (meaning, the capacity for awareness for potential disconnection) in order to develop a complex, multilayered view of shame that will take into account potential positive contributions of *Shameability*. After exploring how these views of shame are distorted by pathology and by the fall, I propose a method of doing pastoral theology in such a way that it helps to restore *Shameability* as part of theological anthropology within the context of practicing a postcolonial Korean American pastoral theology of shame.²²

While I employ Lartey's methodology, I do not entirely depend on all aspects of the liberation theology that undergirds it. Along with the framework of the liberation theological method, I use the theology of Paul Tillich and Dietrich Bonhoeffer with reference to shame in order to restore *Shameability* as an integral part of theological anthropology. The goal of pastoral care is to restore the *ultimate sense of Shame* (*Shameability*) to humanity, and it is my assumption that the problem of distorted shame exists at both individual and communal levels (including socio-economic and systematic

²² For more information regarding the way of doing postcolonial pastoral theology in the African context, see Emmanuel Yartekwei Lartey, *Postcolonializing God : New Perspectives on Pastoral and Practical Theology* (London: London : SCM Press, 2013).

levels). Just as liberation theology begins with the concrete experience of the poor, so pastoral theology of *Shameability* begins with the concrete experience where distorted shame makes people suffer (or be oppressed). Pastoral theology of *Shameability* resembles liberation theology because it also pays serious attention to the problem of distorted shame at the communal level (meaning, socio-economic, political, and systemic distortions of shame). That is why a pastoral theology of *Shameability* takes into account the problem of the existing theological anthropology itself along with the individual, small group, or communal dynamics of distorted shame.

Therefore, I address the problem of Western theological anthropology in general that does not include *Shameability* as an integral part of being truly human. While it is important to listen and care for the oppressed, it is also important to help transform the theological assumption that does not see *Shameability* as part of the image of God. I see this problem as underlying current socio-economic, political, as well as systemic structures that are shameless in oppressing those who are powerless. That is the background against which I employ a new hermeneutical analysis because the way we read the text is directly related to the views we have regarding the nature of human beings as well as God. In the current situation where the existing hermeneutical perspectives derive chiefly from the dominant, Western theological system, it is very difficult to read and understand the text as supporting the arguments that I am presenting. That is why I approach the problem from a different perspective, and employ the Neo-Confucian perspective to do pastoral theology. Unlike liberation theology, I do not propose that this approach will lead to radical social transformation. Rather I aim to restore a sense of *Shameability* to theological anthropology

as well as to those individuals and collectives that are suffering from distorted shame. My assumption is that shame distortions, both at the individual and communal levels, will dissolve once *Shameability* is restored. In this way, my dissertation is a process of re-theorizing based on the existing method of the liberation pastoral theological model.

A Case and Context

Since my ordination in 1994, I have served two American hospitals as a CPE resident (1994-1996), one American pastoral counseling center as a resident (1996-1999), one Korean immigrant church as an associate pastor (1996-1999), one Korean immigrant church as a senior pastor (2000-2002), and one Korean church as a senior pastor (2004-2011).

The case that I am going to present is from the church that I served from 2004-2011 in Seoul, Korea. This church was a member of the Korean National Council of Churches, and it was the mother church of the B denomination. This seventy-year-old church had a mixed population; about 20% of its members were from the old generation that had experienced Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945), the division of Korea (1945-1950), as well as the Korean War (1950-1953).

Ec's Case

Ec was the congregation to which I was proclaiming the Word of God as a pastor while I was serving in Seoul, Korea.²³ As the settings for delivering the Word were diverse,

²³ There were many settings in the church in which to deliver the words. Examples include weekly Sunday morning services (9:30 A.M., 11:00 A.M.), monthly Sunday afternoon services (praise and worship), Wednesday night services (7:30 P.M.), early morning services (5:30 A.M., Monday through Saturday) and *simbang* (family visit) services. I was also called to give a message on special occasions like members' wedding services, funerals, birthdays (usually the big birthdays like the first birthday and the seventieth

I tried my best to deliver that Word according to God's revelation that is found in Jesus with *the ultimate sense of Shame*. However, my efforts often resulted in misunderstandings and even feelings of hatred toward me. My perception was that this was because I did not obviously affiliate my message with any particular human parties' view or expectations. An example is the sermon I delivered on November 28, 2010, the first week of Advent, under the title "Repent!":

Now after John was arrested, Jesus came to Galilee, proclaiming the good news of God, and saying, 'The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God has come near; repent, and believe in the good news' (Mark 1:14-15).

The scripture for the day was timely because North Korea's army had just bombarded *Yeonpyeong* Island that week (November 23, 2010), killing four South Koreans including two civilians, as well as injuring nineteen others. While the incident prompted widespread political condemnation of the North's actions, I tried to base my response on how I understood the Gospel itself. As this shelling followed a joint *Hoguk* military exercise between South Korea and the United States in the very sensitive area of the so-called Northern Limit Line (NLL),²⁴ I said that President Myong Bak Lee and his administration should have been more faithful to the agreement that had been made between the late former South Korean President Mu Hyun Ro and North Korean leader Jung Il Kim regarding their common efforts of developing *the five Northwest Islands Area* as a peace zone between the South and North. That area had long sparked military confrontations between the two Koreas.

birthday), anniversaries of the deceased (usually the first anniversary), services to mark the beginning of members' businesses,,as well as at diverse group and cell church gatherings.

²⁴ The United Nations Command established the Northern Limit Line at the close of the Korean War (1950-1953).

In the sermon, I also pointed out that there was a structural problem underlying the ongoing confrontation between the South and North, namely that the ceasefire treaty, to which the United States and North Korea agreed in 1953, had not yet been changed into a peace treaty. I said that all the involved parties (South and North Korea as well as the United States) were responsible for the incident and therefore in need of repentance. Although not explicitly mentioned, underlying my message was the point that it was such a shame for all the involved parties (North, South and the U.S.) because we were not faithful to one another (nor to God) and indeed were actively hating each other (as well as not taking proper action for peace—including the action to change the cease fire treaty into a peace treaty between North Korea and the U.S.).

Some people understood my sermon to be saying that I was aligning myself with the North, and consequently it upset a number of members especially those in the conservative senior group, many of whom had gone through the Korean War (1950-1953) and had lost their loved ones or become separated from their families as a result of the division. Even some of the most supportive elders of the church criticized me, turned their backs on me, and even stopped coming to the church. When I visited an old member in her late seventies, she told me, “I am greatly disappointed in you, pastor!” This incident helped me to realize that the church’s ministry to restore *Shameability* in a particular area or a region cannot be separated from its ministry to restore *Shameability* at a global level.

From the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, the clinical pastoral materials within a Korean parish setting are not separate from but instead are deeply related to the global context of distorted shame. This means that the sufferings of people that I am

going to present in Chapter 7 are in fact not separate from the collective shame distortions on the global level. This situation exemplifies why the ministry of the church needs to include efforts to help restore the *Shameability* of the global community especially in the area of shame theories, including theological anthropology, because this influences the dynamics of international relationships, particularly in the divided Korean context. In order to understand the underlying context of why the global leaders/powers need *Shameability* more than anything else, I will now critically review the shame-related literature, explain why it is limited, and present my method of doing pastoral theology of *Shameability* as a way of reconceiving those theories of shame. In so doing I will present additional clinical pastoral materials from my practice. Although these cases of individuals and families may appear to be quite different than the case of divided Korea, they are in fact not unrelated.

Prediction and Research Question

Today, many disciplines understand shame as a negative emotion or a negative state of being. Western depth psychologists, for example, often theorize that shame is an emotion (or state) of people who suffer from incompetence, pathology, trauma, stigma, social problems and moral defects. The general public also has a negative view of shame.

This current situation reminds me of the time when people held similar views about anger; indeed, the Christian tradition once regarded this emotion as one of the seven deadly sins. However, people are now understanding anger as a normal and indeed acceptable and useful emotion; they have discovered the positive side of anger and realized that anger is

one of the gifts that God gave us.²⁵ I predict that the same thing will happen with shame eventually, although it will take a bit longer, and that is certainly understandable given the nature of shame as such an unpleasant emotion or state of being.

From the perspective of the pastoral theology of *Shameability*, however, it is only distorted shame(s) that is problematic. As a matter of fact, ‘shame’ in its undistorted form (meaning, the seed of *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability*) is certainly a part of God’s creation that human beings must properly nurture, empower, and liberate in order to grow mature, and live according to the image of God as it is found in the person of Jesus as a fully human being.

I predict that my thesis will still remain a minority voice among the already established mainline theories of shame of our time. Nevertheless, I cannot help but say as a Korean American pastoral theologian who believes that there can never be a single piece of waste among the gifts and blessings that God has given us: If it is true that human beings have an inborn capacity to sense shame, there must be some reason for that.

Today, our humanity as a whole is living in the era of distorted shame, and it is certainly the age of *shame* and *shamelessness* rather than *Shameability*. As a Korean American pastoral theologian, I am deeply concerned about this situation because I can see that the world is at the brink of self-destruction, and that is why I present this dissertation as a way of criticizing the existing mainline Western theories of shame as well as the medical model of ‘pastoral counseling.’

With these concerns in mind, the research questions I have for this project is: Why

²⁵ For more information on this, read Andrew D. Lester, *The Angry Christian: A Theology for Care and Counseling* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003).

are the mainline Western theories of shame in general problematic? And how can these theories be altered based on the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*

Structure

This dissertation consists of six chapters excluding the introduction, and each chapter is arranged according to the six levels of shame that I have named previously (the *proto*, *pathological*, *stigma*, *social*, *moral*, and *ultimate* levels of shame). While I will find the majority of mainline Western shame theories to be helpful yet somewhat inadequate, I will connect each level of shame to one or more disciplines to which the characteristic of that particular level of shame is best related. I will relate the six levels of shame to psychology, sociology, philosophy, theology, the Bible, and to individual and communal clinical pastoral experiences from my ministry.

By relating these materials at the same time to the three main categories of *shame*, *shamelessness*, and *shameability*, my goal is to produce a sufficiently complex, globally minded, balanced, unbiased, and holistic view of shame that can undergird a robust pastoral theology of *Shameability*. This dissertation correlates diverse views on shame in order to support the main argument for restoring *the ultimate sense of Shame* as a ministry of the church. It is rooted in a Korean American pastoral theologian's perspective, Neo-Confucian spiritual experience, and is backed by common evidence that recognizes *Shameability* as a peculiar human characteristic.

I will often indicate each category and level of shame by using abbreviations (See Table 1). Here, "s" stands for the *shame* category, "l" stands for the category of

shamelessness and “p” stands for the *shameability* category.²⁶ For the six levels, I will use Roman numerals (meaning, i - *proto*, ii - *pathological*, iii - *stigma*, iv - *social*, v - *moral*, vi - *ultimate*). For example, “s-i” stands for the state of “*proto shame*,” “l-ii” indicates the state of “*pathological shamelessness*” and “p-vi” indicates “*the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability*.” When I use the upper case letter, it means that the shame category of that level is on the ultimate level among the six.

Table 1

Levels	Category	Abbrev.	State	Nature
<i>ultimate</i>	<i>Shameability</i>	p-vi	Being in union with God	Capacity to see, recognize, experience the potential of estrangement (<i>Shame</i>)
	<i>Shame</i>	s-vi	Estranged, disunited	
	<i>Shamelessness</i>	l-vi	Being possessed	
<i>moral</i>	<i>shameability</i>	p-v	autonomous	Human conscience, moral/ethical value-system, law, principle; right and wrong; good and evil
	<i>shame</i>	s-v		
	<i>shamelessness</i>	l-v		
<i>social</i>	<i>shameability</i>	p-iv	heteronomous	Audience, eyes of others, reputations, value-system of a group/society, beliefs, evaluation of others
	<i>shame</i>	s-iv		
	<i>shamelessness</i>	l-iv		
<i>stigma</i>	<i>shameability</i>	p-iii	spoiled	Stigmatized, less than a human
	<i>shame</i>	s-iii		
	<i>shamelessness</i>	l-iii		
<i>pathological</i>	<i>shameability</i>	p-ii	pathological, traumatic	Underdeveloped, tragic, traumatized
	<i>shame</i>	s-ii		
	<i>shamelessness</i>	l-ii		
<i>proto</i>	<i>shameability</i>	p-i	basic, physiological	Being possessed
	<i>shame</i>	s-i		
	<i>shamelessness</i>	l-i		

²⁶ I use the letter “p” because it is from the image of the pilot light (actually a tiny flame) that can be found in some kitchen ovens. Most of the time we are not even aware that there is such a light, yet this tiny light plays a very important role: without this light, the oven cannot be heated up. The state in which the pilot light is functioning normally is like the state of *Shameability*. On the other hand, the state of *Shame* is as if the oven is always on fire, whereas the state of *Shamelessness* parallels the pilot light being out so that the oven cannot be turned on.

Overview of Chapters

I will start by reviewing depth psychology's understanding of shame, and this discussion will extend through Chapters 2 and 3. The first part of Chapter 2 is an investigation of *the first phase* of shame research in which guilt and shame were not yet separated, as was the case with Sigmund Freud. I examine how Freud's view on shame became a gift as well as a stumbling block for his followers in the area of depth psychology of shame in the West.

As a way of dividing the mainstream Western shame theories after Freud (namely, *the second phase*) into three generations, I will in the remaining part of Chapter 2 critically review the views of first two generations that include Erik Erikson, Gerhart Piers and Milton Singer (*the first generation*), as well as Helen Block Lewis (*the second generation*). Examining the contributions and limitations of each theory, I explain that these two generations basically had become a seat for Western psychology of shame that is heavily dependent on the method of separating guilt and shame.

In Chapter 3, I will critically review the selected materials from the *third generation* during which shame-related books and articles have been pouring in to the West. From this chapter, I will arrange the review materials based on the order of the six levels of shame, and this particular chapter will include the two areas of the *proto* and *pathological* levels.

I will focus on recent evolutionary psychology (mainly on the views of Paul Gilbert) for the review of the *proto* level, and I will show some connections and similarities between the evolutionary view and that of Freud, in particularly noting that both are aligned with the powerful and dominant parties as a way of defending against their shame (meaning that

these theories are operating on the collective state of the *proto shamelessness* of the dominant party).

For the review of the *pathological* level, I will include the selected materials from the object relations theory tradition (Warren Kinston), the self psychology tradition (Leon Wurmser and Andrew Morrison), and the affect theory tradition (Donald Nathanson and Gershen Kaufman). The critical review of the psychology of shame will bring me to a point where I criticize this area of discipline by noting: 1) the psychology of shame is centered on low-level and maladaptive shame, 2) the category of *Shameability* (meaning, *proto/pathological* sense of shame on this particular section) is missing, 3) the method is heavily dependent on the guilt versus shame dichotomy.

Chapter 4 is where I critically review the selected materials that are related to *stigma*, and to the *social* and *moral* levels of shame with reference to sociological perspectives (Erving Goffman, 1963) and philosophy (Gabriele Taylor, 1985; Deonna, Rodogno, & Teroni, 2012). Although the types of shame at these levels can be viewed as relatively higher than the ones on the *proto* and *pathological* levels in terms of the degree of their maturity, I will explain why these types of shame still remain lower level shame in terms of the shame scale of this project.

While Chapter 5 as a whole is a discussion of shame at the *ultimate* level, I will critically review the Augustinian doctrine of the fall of humanity, and of original sin through the eyes of Ritson (1992), Capps (1985, 1990a, 1990b, 1994), Park (1993, 2004) and McFarland (2010) in the first part of the chapter. The main goal of this section is to criticize the popular and general understanding of Augustinian theology as being

exclusively focused on guilt. The next section is my critical review of the theologies of Paul Tillich and Dietrich Bonhoeffer in the area of shame. I will show examples of theological elements from these figures relating to the areas of the three main categories of *Shame*, *Shamelessness*, and *Shameability*—although their theological articulations about these elements are often not sufficiently explicit.

Chapter 6 is my own constructive work. Here I provide textual evidence for the proposed *Shameability* as an aspect of human nature so that I can lay out the biblical foundation for pastoral theology of *Shameability*. I choose not to refer to biblical scholars in my reading of the text because the existing views neither include *Shameability* as an integral part of being either a true human or God. In the current situation where the existing hermeneutical perspectives are basically coming from either the dominant Western theological system or liberation theology's view in general, it is difficult to read and understand the text in a way that supports the arguments that I am presenting.

The remaining chapter will attempt to answer the following two questions based on biblical materials: 1) What does Jesus' pastoral ministry of restoring *Shameability* look like? 2) How might one define church from the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability* based on textual evidence as well as Jesus' ministry of *Shameability*?

Chapter 7 is the place where I illustrate how a revised theological anthropology that includes *Shameability* will affect my interpretation of individual pastoral encounters as well as more global human interactions. As I try to show what it would mean if we were to adopt the idea of *Shameability* in our practice of ministry both at the individual and communal/global levels, I offer examples from both my parish ministry situation in Seoul,

Korea (2004-2011) and from the global context of a divided Korea. The chapter concludes with a call to restore the “God of *Shameability*,” as we see that exemplified in Jesus, and to overcome both the distorted images of the “God of *Shame* (the God of a subordinating group)” and the “God of *Shamelessness* (God of dominant group).”

Limitations of the Project and Suggestions for Future Studies

People cannot truly see a landscape for what it is until they go to a higher elevation to look at the grand view of things, and the same holds true for the shame theorists of our day. Certainly it is sometimes necessary to focus on the “ground level;” however, the current shame theories deal with only snippets of shame rather than the big picture. It seems that the contemporary perspectives on shame focus only on the small picture.

Keeping this problem in mind, this dissertation hopes to provide a balanced, less biased, and holistic view of shame. While it deals with the very broad and complex notion of shame, its goal is not to provide a full-length, in-depth look at each category and level of shame. Rather it focuses on the proposed theological anthropology of *Shameability* and it does so with the help of diverse yet limited resources, based on an interdisciplinary approach. Its purpose is to help people to have a holistic view of shame by seeing the wider view.

Yet, I admit that all shame research, including this dissertation, is only in its infancy. I believe it is time for us to start *the third phase* of shame research that is neither based on the shame-guilt fusion²⁷ nor on the shame-guilt dichotomy²⁸ but on *the ultimate sense of*

²⁷ Meaning, as it is found in *the first phase*'s (Freud's) view on shame.

Shame/Shameability as an integral part of human and divine nature. For this purpose, I suggest that the following areas be included in future research: 1) extended research on the theological anthropology of *Shameability*, 2) extended research on Neo-Confucian versus Christian understandings of *Shameability* particularly in the area of the image of God (or, “Heaven” in Neo-Confucian terms), 3) extended close reading of the Bible in the areas of *Shame*, *Shamelessness* and *Shameability* both at the individual and the communal level, 4) extended research on social and moral levels of shame, 5) extended research on the diverse cultural views on *Shame*, *Shamelessness*, and *Shameability* around the world, 6) extended empirical studies of the *Three-Six Shame Model* for the purposes of assessing, diagnosing, and restoring *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability* both at individual and communal levels, 7) extended empirical studies for the implication of the *Three-Six Shame Model* in the areas of pastoral formation and leadership development both at the individual and communal levels, 8) study of imagination in the area of *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability*, 9) further exploration on the God of *Shameability* in relationship to the “postcolonializing God”²⁹ both within and beyond the context of a divided Korea.

Definition of Terms

Six Levels of Shame

Proto level—shame at the basic, animal, physiological level; unlike the case of animals, this is the level where shame can also be distorted for human beings.

Pathological level—where shame is distorted based on various forms of pathology

²⁸ Meaning, as it is found in *the second phase* shame studies including the three generations after Freud as well as any theology of shame that is significantly influenced by the shame theories from *the second phase*.

²⁹ Lartey, *Postcolonializing God : New Perspectives on Pastoral and Practical Theology*.

and trauma.

Stigma level—where shame is distorted based on different kinds of stigma in human society.

Social level—where shame is distorted based on the eyes of others, on reputations, saving face, as well as the system of evaluation that people share in a given group, society, or culture.

Moral level—where shame is distorted based on human conscience that people share (or, being personally convinced) based on the system of moral, ethical, and value related systems.

Ultimate level—where shame is either distorted (*Shame* and *Shamelessness*), or undistorted (*Shameability*) depending on the quality of relationship with God.

Three Categories of Shame on the Ultimate Level

I approach the shame topic through a theological perspective (meaning, the understanding of shame on the *ultimate level*). On the *ultimate* level, I indicate three categories using the upper case, italic letters.

Shame—is the state of estrangement from self, others and God. In this state, the agent (both at the individual and communal levels) is relatively more self-aware than the state of *Shamelessness*. The biblical characters that fit this category are Adam and Eve (Genesis 3:1-24). They knew that they were estranged from self, others, and God, so they hid, concealed, and withdrew themselves. Using a psychological term, the agent's state in this category can be somewhat similar to the 'withdrawal' mode in Nathanson's shame

compass.³⁰

Shamelessness—is the state of *Shame* as well. However, this is the state where the agent (individual or community) is rigidly defending against their *Shame*. It means that the agent may not even be aware that he/she/they are in the state of *Shame* (estrangement).³¹

In this state, the agent(s) are in the ‘attack other’ mode or in the ‘avoidance’ mode, to use Nathanson’s term;³² they do not care much about disconnection. While attack and avoidance is the position of the dominant parties in many cases in our humanity, the agent in this category is the least self-aware, the least relational of the three. The biblical character who fits this category is Cain (Genesis 4:1-15).

Shameability—(the *ultimate sense of Shame*) is the state that is found in a true human being as we see in the person of Jesus Christ. It is the state where the agent has the capacity to see, recognize, and experience the potential of disconnection (*Shame*) while the agent is in the state of union with self, others, and God. Such *Shameability* is a part of God’s creation as well as the image of God. This is the state where the agent is fully self-aware and relational. It is also the state where one can nurture, empower, and liberate others.

³⁰ Donald L. Nathanson, *Shame and Pride : Affect, Sex, and the Birth of the Self* (New York: New York : Norton, 1992), 315-25.

³¹ In this state, people often believe that they are faithful to ‘God’; however, this is in fact a ‘pseudo-god’ that they have manufactured internally as a way of defending against their disconnection (*Shame*). As many religious and ‘pious’ people adapt this kind of defense, they justify their shame-related issues (in the areas of ‘self’ and ‘action’) in the name of ‘god’. Accordingly, this is the state of ‘being possessed’ by something else (rather than God). They can appear to be ‘faithful’ in human eyes; however, the state has nothing to do with God (as Jesus criticized some religious people of his day).

³² Nathanson, 360-77.

CHAPTER 2

Development of Psychodynamic Theories of Shame: Freud and His Followers

In this chapter, I will critically review depth psychology's understanding of shame. The first part is an investigation of *the first phase* of shame research that did not yet separate guilt and shame, as was the case with Sigmund Freud. As the distinction between guilt and shame had not yet been made, Freud often understood the two concepts as being interchangeable. I will examine how Freud's view on shame became a gift as well as a stumbling block for his followers in the area of depth psychology of shame in the West.

As a way of dividing the mainstream Western shame theories after Freud (*the second phase*) into three generations, I will in the remaining part of the chapter critically review the first two generations' theories which include the views of Erik Erikson, Gerhart Piers and Milton Singer (*the first generation*), as well as Helen Block Lewis (*the second generation*). In the second phase, guilt and shame became differentiated. After theorists made the distinction, studies gradually became more focused on the concept of shame itself, with a general assumption that guilt and shame could be separated—and many theories of guilt and shame thereafter were built upon this assumption. Examining the contributions and limitations of each theory, I rationalize that these two generations basically had become a seat for a Western psychology of shame that was heavily dependent on the method of separating guilt and shame.

The First Phase—Sigmund Freud

Sigmund Freud, considered the primary developer of psychoanalytic theory, made significant contributions to the views of shame, even though he did not present a coherent

theory on shame itself. Still, he provided ample resources for his followers in the area of depth psychology to research shame in more depth within his limited views. Several concepts within the Freudian theory contribute to his own understanding of shame. These include: 1) the motive for defending against exposure; 2) drive inhibition; 3) shame and ego-ideal; 4) shame and super-ego. His works were beneficial in showing the phenomenon of shame on different yet limited levels and in terms of different categories.

1) Motive for Defending Against Exposure. One of the most prominent concepts that contributed to the phenomena of shame for Freud was related to the motive for defending against the exposure of self-reproach. In a letter he wrote to Wilhelm Fliess on September 27, 1898, Freud mentioned the case of an anxious young man whose symptoms of stiffness of the legs, spasms, and tremors were deeply connected to the fear of exposure. In the process of psychoanalysis, according to what he reported to Fliess, Freud later discovered that the young man had regularly wet his bed while he was in school, and his mother had threatened to come and tell the masters and all the other boys about it.³³

Analyzing this patient, Freud explained:

...that is where the shame belongs. The whole story of his youth on the one hand has its climax in the leg symptoms, and on the other hand releases the affect belonging to it, and the two are soldered together only for his internal perception. The whole lost story of his childhood has to be inserted in between them.³⁴

Through this case, we realize that shame becomes a motive for defending against self-reproach, in this case through the process of creating some physical bodily habits.

³³ Sigmund Freud, "Extracts From the Fleiss Papers" (1892-1899). In *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1966), volume 1, 275-6.

³⁴ Ibid.

Freud's understanding of shame was also related to the fear of exposure in connection with sexuality. Gerhart Piers (1953) explains that the German terms "Scham" and "Schamgefuehl" are closely correlated to the emotions connected with exposure of the nude body, especially the genitals. Indeed, the genital regions are called "die Scham," the pubic mound is called "der Schamberg," and pubic hair "die Schamhaare."³⁵ Freud described how the "genitals, which were previously concealed" became "visible and in need of protection" after the human species became bipedal, "and so provoked feelings of shame in him."³⁶ This was very much tied to the historical perspective of the genitals as objects of disgust, and the resulting desire to hide, or defend against one's feelings of shame in the area of genitals.

Freud thought that such tendencies were found both in males and females but appeared to be more sensitive in females. In his discussion of puberty, for example, Freud wrote that girls around the age of puberty were "seized by a non-neurotic sexual repugnance," which might account for "the flood of shame which overwhelms the female at that period" while boys at the same age were seized by "libido."³⁷ It seems that Freud was more inclined to view shame as a feminine characteristic. In his *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1966), Freud stated that:

shame, which is considered to be a feminine characteristic *par excellence* but is far more a matter of convention than might be supposed, has as its purpose, we believe, concealment of genital deficiency.³⁸

³⁵ Gerhart Piers and Milton B. Singer, *Shame and Guilt: A Psychoanalytic and a Cultural Study* (Springfield, Ill.: Thomas, 1953), 18.

³⁶ Freud, "Civilization and Its Discontents" (1930). In *Ibid.*, volume 21, 99.

³⁷ Freud, "Extracts From the Fleiss Papers." In *Ibid.*, volume 1, 270.

³⁸ Freud, "New Introductory Lectures On Psycho-Analysis" (1933). In *Ibid.*, volume 22, 132.

It is not difficult to find the connection between shame and exposure in Freud. In his letter to Fliess of July 7, 1897, Freud wrote about a case of someone dreaming of wandering among strangers dressed inappropriately, or not dressed at all, and having feelings of shame and anxiety. Three years later in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), Freud explored this issue further and talked about several dreams that gave rise to a feeling of inadequacy and distress. In these dreams, in which the subject was either totally naked or improperly dressed, Freud explained that the essence of the emotions and thus the interpretation lay “in a distressing feeling in the nature of shame and in the fact that one wishes to hide one’s nakedness... but finds one is unable to do so.”³⁹

Freud did not only view the shame of exposure through the lens of sexuality. He also understood it as being closely tied to the fear of other people knowing about one’s self-reproach. Not limited just to the physical realm, shame of exposure for him was a strong motive for defending against others seeing one’s true nature, in an attempt to mitigate awareness of pain from others’ rejection. The anticipation, in turn, results in a type of self-reproach out of one’s self-consciousness that projects one’s self attributes or ideas that may not be compatible with the approval of others. The pain defended against by the repression of these incompatible attributes or ideas is shame.⁴⁰

2) Drive Inhibitor. The concept of shame as a driver inhibitor emerged in Freud’s later writings, specifically those after 1905. Freud argued that human beings have sexual needs that are expressed in biology and sexual instinct. Freud used the analogy of how we

³⁹ Freud, “The Interpretation of Dreams” (1900). In *Ibid.*, volume 4, 242.

⁴⁰ *The Widening Scope of Shame*, ed. Melvin R. Lansky and Andrew P. Morrison (Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press, 1997), 7-9.

use our instincts to find nutrition to satisfy our hunger to explain also our need to satisfy our sexual appetites, which shows how seriously Freud considered human sexual needs.

Before Freud's work, it was believed that sexual instincts only arose during puberty. Apparently before Freud no one thought that children had sexual instincts.⁴¹ Freud believed that "germs of sexual impulses are already present in the new-born child and that these continue to develop for a long time."⁴² Based on this reasoning, Freud believed that there were infantile sexual lives visible even in young children, and the examples he presented were the instincts of intense exhibitionism, scopophilia, infant masturbation, and tendencies of cruelty. Freud suggested that even though they appeared independently of erotogenic zones, these instincts would ultimately be linked to a person's intimate and genital relations later in life.⁴³

Freud believed that one could organize the pre-genital sexual lives of children according to their developmental process—the first being oral. In this first type, sexual activity is unseparated from the ingestion of food, and the purpose of both activities is the same. One example of this is thumb-sucking by children. The second is anal organization. Either in the form of active or passive sexual currents, even though they could not yet be described as 'masculine' and 'feminine,' Freud believed that sexual polarity and an extraneous object were already observable in this pregenital phase.⁴⁴ Freud thought that the third phase of latency kicks in when sexual impulses cannot be utilized since the reproductive functions have not yet matured. But Freud believed that the impulses did not

⁴¹ Freud, "Three Essays On the Theory of Sexuality" (1905). In *Ibid.*, volume 7, 173.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 191-2.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 198.

cease even during this period. He thought that this energy was redirected from sexual use to other ends via the process of sublimation.⁴⁵

Because civilized human society does not allow children to freely express their sexual needs, it is inevitable that children's sexual development is overtaken by a progressive process of suppression,⁴⁶ where "the sexual instinct has to struggle against certain mental forces which act as resistance."⁴⁷ This begins to form in unison with the arising of children's sexual lives; feelings of shame, disgust, and moral ideals restrict the flow of sexual conduct. Freud believed that such a mental dam could cause neuroses of many kinds.⁴⁸

In other words, Freud believed that shame functions as the inhibiting power in the process of civilizing children so that they learn to control their sexual instincts—and it is only later that this can become problematic and possibly result in neurosis.

3) Shame and Ego-ideal. Freud provided a clue for understanding shame in the dynamic he described between ego and ego-ideal, though he did not fully explore it. For example, in *On Narcissism* (1914), he introduced the concept of the 'ego-ideal' and what would later be developed and described as the 'super-ego.'⁴⁹ In *On Narcissism*, Freud explains that libidinal impulses are repressed when viewed in the context of a subject's

⁴⁵ Ibid., 178.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 176.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 162.

⁴⁸ At first, Freud believed that the cause of neurosis was irregular sexual activity in childhood. Sexual seduction by an adult or by older children, for example, could play the chief part in the history of the neurotic and perverse patients. But later he developed his view with amendments. The reason for this change he explained in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905) saying, "I could not further elucidate this part of my theory without a detailed discussion of my view on repression" (Freud, 1905, volume 7, 274-7)

⁴⁹ Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction" (1914). In Ibid., volume 14, 70.

cultural and ethical ideas, and that such impulses are kept in check by a higher standard ideal of him/herself.

We can see that one man has set up an ideal in himself by which he measures his actual ego, while the other has formed no such ideal. For the ego, the formation of an ideal would be the condition factor of repression.⁵⁰

The subject, in trying to return to the self-love enjoyed in childhood, attempts to retrieve a primary state of narcissism from the past. Freud believed that the ego-ideal is important in understanding group psychology as well, since whole families, classes, and nations can strive after common ideals. Such ideals also include turning one's back on homosexual impulses. Any failure to achieve the ideal results in a fear of losing the love of parents, and later that of an indefinite number of fellow citizens.⁵¹

Though not explicitly directed at the emotion of shame, Freud similarly stated this idea in relation to his views on melancholia:

It is not so obvious, but nevertheless very probable, that the misery of the melancholic is the expression of a sharp conflict between the two agencies of his ego, a conflict in which the ideal, in an excess of sensitiveness, relentlessly exhibits its condemnation of the ego in delusions of inferiority and in self-depreciation.⁵²

Such melancholia (now known as depression) that is an expression of a rage on self, or “gratification of sadistic tendencies” turned on the self, was correlated with shame later. As Freud hinted strongly at the notion that people experience shame when there is a gap between their ego and ego-ideal—an idea to be developed much more by his later followers,

⁵⁰ Ibid., 93-4.

⁵¹ Ibid., 101-2.

⁵² Freud, “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” (1921). In Ibid., volume 18, 132.

including Gerhart Piers, Milton Singer and Andrew Morrison who were particularly interested in the dynamic of shame.

4) Shame and Super-ego. Freud suggested a third component within the psyche that acts as a type of internal parenting of the ego—a regulator-type conscience that keeps individual identification in check. This “internal monitoring agency” through which one evaluates oneself and one’s behavior Freud called the super-ego. This internal monitoring agency is guided by the personal and moral values of the individual, and Freud believed it to be the original source of guilt. Freud believed that the identification phenomena occurring within this monitoring system was a response to the Oedipus conflict—and failure of this identification process led to an absence of moral code.⁵³ After he recognized this critical and prohibiting agency, Freud’s initial dream theory changed, and he decided that censorship of dreams occurs through this agency.⁵⁴ While Freud recognized the important role of this self-conscious regulating behavior based on guilt, he failed to specifically develop this observation in relation to shame. Freud’s idea of the super-ego was not fully explored, but gave insight for significant studies later in relation to shame, especially those by Helen Block Lewis.

As a whole, Freud mostly based his theories on the concept of guilt and hardly mentioned shame. But he did not exclude shame from his work; though not apparent linguistically in the form of ‘shame’ words, shame was nonetheless implicit throughout his works, and provided a crucial foundation for later shame studies in the West. Instances of

⁵³ Helen Block Lewis, *Shame and Guilt in Neurosis* / by Helen B. Lewis (New York: New York : International Universities Press, 1971), 18-20.

⁵⁴ Freud, “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914). In *Ibid.*, volume 14, 7-28.

implicit shame include the motive for defending against exposure, drive inhibition, the gap between the ego and ego-ideal, and the internal monitoring agency known as the super-ego.

In his theory that was primarily focused on guilt, Freud was mainly interested in the Oedipus complex; however, most theorists after him were looking at pre-Oedipal development and argue that shame forms before the concept of guilt, and that this requires certain cognitive capacities, such as the ability to distinguish right from wrong, to be present.

Sigmund Freud's Contributions

While Freud primarily structured his entire theory upon the foundation of guilt, in my opinion one of the most important contributions he made was his understanding of *shamelessness*. This category of shame does not describe a state of being without shame, but rather a state of shame being rigidly defended against. Another positive contribution was his discovery of counter transference, even though he viewed counter transference as a threat to both the treated subjects and the methodology of psychoanalysis.

1) Shamelessness. Freud understood the defense mechanism of shamelessness as rigidly defending against shame in relation to guilt, but not directly to shame itself. For him, it was a mechanism that persons used to minimize guilt while maximizing instinctual gratification.⁵⁵ However, it is clear that this defense mechanism arises whenever shame is present. When one's shame becomes too big of a psychic pain, a reactionary anxiety occurs—leading to the defensive mechanism otherwise described as *shamelessness*. The shame defense that Freud implicitly proposed is not limited to the social and interpersonal

⁵⁵ Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality Theories: A Comparative Analysis*, 6th ed. (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., 1996), 36.

arenas. The underlying implication here is that there can be shame defenses of many kinds and on diverse levels. While Freud himself did not specifically theorize the dynamic of shame defense, such defenses are apparent at both the individual and community levels, and they can be as diverse as *proto*, *pathological*, *stigma*, *social*, *moral*, and *ultimate* levels depending on their features, as I will explore.

2) Counter Transference. Another contribution of Freud's in the area of shame studies was the discovery of counter transference. However, it seems that Freud viewed counter transference as something that he and his colleagues should keep confidential within the circle of professionals in the area of psychoanalysis, meaning that counter transference was something he wanted to hide.

Freud first mentioned counter transference in a letter to Jung when he was advising Jung about controlling his sexual urges:

Such experiences, though painful, are necessary and hard to avoid. Without them we cannot really know life and what we are dealing with. I myself have never been taken in quite so badly, but I have come very close to it a number of times and had a narrow escape. I believe that only grim necessities weighing on my work, and the fact that I was ten years older than yourself when I came to psychoanalysis have saved me from such experiences. But no lasting harm is done. They help us to develop the thick skin we need and to dominate the 'counter transference,' which is after all a permanent problem for us; they teach us to displace our own affects to best advantage.⁵⁶

If the counter transference was "painful," one possibility is that it could have been shame related, although it might also be the case that Freud's main concern was about its potential harm for the patients. Later, Freud wrote to Jung again before the two parted ways:

⁵⁶ Sigmund Freud and C.G. Jung, *The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C.G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), 230-2.

Permit me, speaking as the venerable old master, to say that this technique is invariably ill-advised and that it is best to remain reserved and purely receptive. We must never let our poor neurotics drive us crazy. I believe an article on ‘counter-transference’ is sorely needed; of course we could not publish it, we should have to circulate it among ourselves.⁵⁷

Why would Freud insist on not publishing such an article? Why would he want to keep it confidential among the professionals? Was it because he was concerned about the ‘exposure’ of something? Pamela Cooper-White (2004) suggests that Freud viewed “counter transference as a threat to both the treated subjects and the methodology of psychoanalysis.”⁵⁸ If this is so, then it is not surprising that Freud, having such false convictions, tried to get rid of or possibly defended against the potentially shame-ridden counter transference instead of using it in positive ways.

It is unfortunate that Freud was not able to see the gift of shame. What if Freud had been able to use his ‘counter transference,’ his *shameability*, instead of concealing it? What if he had been able to grow with it as a way of deepening his self-awareness? If Freud could have done that, he could have developed much further himself, and he could even have opened another chapter in psychoanalysis using the idea of an analyst’s *shameability*. However, it seems that Freud was not even aware of what he had discovered.

Freud’s Limitations and Problems

1) Focus Almost Exclusively on Guilt. One of the largest problems is that Freud, thanks to his instinct theory, structured his whole theory upon guilt. Regarding this, some people seemed to believe that Freud ignored the affect of shame. Francis Broucek (1991),

⁵⁷ Ibid., 475-6.

⁵⁸ Pamela Cooper-White, *Shared Wisdom: Use of the Self in Pastoral Care and Counseling* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004), 11.

for example, says that Freud's attitude and the attitude of later psychoanalysts toward shame was one of disrespect.⁵⁹ I do not believe that was the case. Ignorance or disrespect does not happen if the object is something with obvious worth. Why, then, did Freud build his theory on guilt? The first possibility is that Freud was not able to fully comprehend the gravity of shame, and focused primarily on guilt and anxiety. Another possibility is that Freud was confused about the nature of shame and guilt. Lewis (1971), for example, thought that in forming a theory that was mainly based on guilt Freud had failed to deal with neurotic patients with shame issues, mislabeling their problems as guilt-related.⁶⁰

Some theorists believe that this is due to Freud's own shame and defense against it in the context of psychoanalysis. Andrew Morrison and Robert Stolorow (1997) say:

One reason we believe that shame was for so long ignored by psychoanalysts had to do with their need to avoid considering their own shame as it inevitably reverberated with that of patients. This evasion of shame began with Freud, who, as we have seen, turned from shame to guilt, intrapsychic conflict, and the structural model, perhaps in part to conceal his own shame sensitivity.⁶¹

Other theorists go so far as to suggest that Freud was a shame-prone individual. Malcolm Pines (1987), for example, says that the reason Freud used a couch in his psychoanalysis settings was to make his patients lie down and have no direct eye contact with the analyst as a way of defending against and hiding his own shame.⁶²

⁵⁹ Francis J. Broucek, *Shame and the Self* (New York: Guilford Press, 1991), 12.

⁶⁰ Helen Block Lewis, *Shame and Guilt in Neurosis* (New York: International Universities Press, 1971), 11-22.

⁶¹ Andrew Morrison and Robert Stolorow, "Shame, Narcissism, and Intersubjectivity," in Melvin Lansky and Andrew Morriso (Eds.), *The Widening Scope of Shame*, 76.

⁶² Malcolm Pines, (1987). "Shame: What Psychoanalysis Does and Does not Say," in *Group Analysis*, 20: 16-31.

I believe these are all valuable and important observations. However, I suggest that the more important reason why Freud arrived at a theory that focused almost exclusively on guilt was because he was a thinker who belonged to a dominant group of humanity.⁶³ For example, the guilty killer sons in *Totem and Taboo* (1913) were the ones who eventually became powerful and dominating figures in a primitive clan even though their beginnings were not like that at all. While Freud was clearly aware of, and identified with the guilt factor of such powerful figures, it seems that Freud was not able to see the other side nor the shame factor of the powerless group in the village including women, children, young males, and the father himself, who once was a powerful figure but was apparently becoming increasingly weak to the point that he was killed and devoured by his own sons whom he had become too weak to drive out.⁶⁴ In my opinion, this is not the problem and limitation of Freud alone, but that of Western theorists in general who have been living on the earth as part of the dominant, powerful group for a long period of time in human history—and presumably because of that is often unable to empathize with the shame of powerless people.

2) No Sense of Shame. Another problem is that while Freud's work can be helpful in the area of understanding the categories of *shame* and *shamelessness*, his position

⁶³ Some people may disagree because Freud was Jewish, and he was also living in a historical moment where anti-Semitism was quite present. However, Jews in our human history (along with others within the influence of Judeo-Christian system that is based on an 'all-powerful God' whether they notice it or not) have often (but not always) been in the positions of power (in terms of their socio-economic and political conditions) and they need to be differentiated from the powerless, subordinating groups. Andrew Sung Park (a systematic theologian) talks about this kind of dominating 'guilt-centered' position where they do not pay enough attention to the shame of the powerless group. I will introduce his thoughts in Chapter 5. I argue that Freud's psychoanalytic system that is centered on guilt is also an extension of the dominating model although it is not quite the same as what Park is arguing.

⁶⁴ Freud, "Totem and Taboo" (1913). In *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, volume 13, 141-2.

neglects the area of the *shameability* (*sense of shame*). Carl Schneider (1977), a pastoral psychotherapist who takes the sense of shame seriously as a distinguishing mark of our humanity, points out that Freud, in dealing with his patients, showed little regard for the patients' desires to downplay their embarrassment or feelings of shame. In fact, he was often downright disrespectful in the sense that he directly attacked patients on what he thought of as their flaws—instead of having a greater sensitivity himself, which would have been synonymous to a sense of shame. In other words, Freud himself was shameless when it came to such matters.⁶⁵

Francis Broucek (1991), a shame theorist who integrates Heinz Kohut's self psychology and Carl Schneider's perspective as an integral part of his theory, criticizes that any sense of shame is missing in Freud's theoretical framework. First Broucek gives Freud a partial compliment regarding his essay entitled, *On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love* (1912). Broucek recalls that Freud made a remarkable statement in this essay:

It is my belief that, however strange it may sound, we must recon with the possibility that something in the nature of the sexual instinct itself is unfavorable to the realization of complete satisfaction (pp. 188-189).⁶⁶

Broucek, however, shows resentment of Freud's failure to develop this important idea. He says that Freud contradictorily went on to target civilization as the cause of inhibitions and restrictions 'imposed' on human sexuality.⁶⁷ Based on this observation, Broucek asserts that Freud failed to further develop his ideas of the relationship between sexual regulation

⁶⁵ Carl D. Schneider, *Shame, Exposure, and Privacy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1977), 92-100.

⁶⁶ Broucek, 110.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

and civilization based on the notion of human sexuality having innate inhibitions and restraints—that “civilization may owe more to intrinsic constraints on sexual expression than constraints on sexual expression owe to civilization.” Broucek asserts that if only Freud had not driven himself away from his own hunch, he potentially could have realized that shame’s root was in these innate restricting and inhibiting forces of erotic life.⁶⁸

3) Understanding Human Nature as Shameless. While understanding that the basic motivation of human behavior is derived from instinctual needs, human beings’ primary condition according to Freud is that of being shameless, and this problem originates from Freud’s basic position of psychoanalytic anthropology. In his view, shame is something that only comes in later through the process of development as a prohibitive; it opposes the sexual instinct, and leads one to abstain from certain behaviors that are not acceptable in human society.⁶⁹ This position of Freud had great influence on his successors’ understanding of shame in the area of psychology, as well as in other broad disciplines in the West.

However, human beings are born with *Shameability* (the seed of *the ultimate sense of Shame*), and their capacity to sense the potential disconnection (*Shame*) is what makes them true human beings. It is not that human beings who are born shameless become gradually regulated by shame, but rather that human beings who are born with *the ultimate sense of Shame* have gradually lost their *Shameability*. This view is something dramatically different from what Freud and his successors have focused on. I will be exploring this more in the latter part of this dissertation.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Freud, “Three Essays On the Theory of Sexuality” (1905). In *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, volume 7, 162-67, 192.

Conclusion/Freud

In sum, even with significant contributions to the field, Freud's understanding of shame is limited because: 1) he is centered on low-level shame (especially in the area of exposure and inhibition); 2) he discusses only two categories of shame (*shame* and *shamelessness*) among the three; 3) he does not deal with the communal level of shame; 4) he seems to align himself with the powerful, dominant parties with shamelessness and not be sufficiently sensitive to the shame dynamics of the powerless group. Though this means that what Freud discovered regarding shame is not comprehensive, even his limited understanding of shame had great influence on his successors. As a result, the mainstream Western theories of shame in general still operate very much under the shadow of the limitations of Freud's theory. This explains why it is now time for a more holistic understanding of shame, one that includes *Shameability* at the ultimate level.

The Second Phase—Three Generations of Shame Study After Freud

I propose to divide the mainstream Western shame theories after Freud into three generations. Among the many theorists in this line, I believe that Erik Erikson and Gerhart Piers belong to the *first generation*, Helen Block Lewis belongs to the *second generation*, and numerous theorists after Lewis fall into the *third generation*. The first and second generations of shame theorists were heavily dependent on the method of distinguishing between guilt and shame. Though this dichotomy was still evident in and foundational for the third generation's theories, their theories became more diverse.

Erik Erikson—First Generation (1)

In the history of shame studies of the West, Freud seems like a pioneering miner who discovered a new type of mineral but only brought back small amounts of it, not knowing its true value. Successors of Freud, on the other hand, are like subsequent miners who began to dig up more of the material after seeing its potential for greater value—they began to see the workings of shame, uncovering more of what Freud was unable to do in his own lifetime.

In 1950, Erik Erikson wrote a book titled *Childhood and Society*, which ended up becoming the first book in the psychoanalytic tradition to distinguish between guilt and shame. Erikson's main interest was not on shame but on human development; however, his study resulted in the inevitable distinction between shame and guilt from a developmental point of view. Of course, the basic idea behind Erikson's work did not come from Erikson himself but rather from Freud's framework. As previously mentioned, Freud had never focused solely on shame; nor did he try to distinguish between guilt and shame. However, what Freud showed in the area of human development became a thread that led to the main idea for Erikson's understanding of developmental stages, one that includes shame and guilt.

Erikson's idea of the life cycle included the following eight stages: basic trust versus basic mistrust (oral-sensory), autonomy versus shame and doubt (muscular-anal), initiative versus guilt (locomotor-genital), industry versus inferiority (latency), identity versus role confusion (puberty and adolescence), intimacy versus isolation (young adulthood), generativity versus stagnation (adulthood), and ego integrity versus despair (maturity). For Erikson, shame was correlated to the anal phase struggles that dealt with

issues of self-control and autonomy. This same phase was where shame and self-doubt either became amplified or minimized according to a child's experience with autonomy and interpersonal connections.⁷⁰

It is important to note that Erikson's view on shame included varied states of the emotion based on which phase a person was in. But as a whole, Erikson viewed shame as the product of self-doubt and insecurity from a person's failing to reach full autonomy—no matter what the person's particular phase. As Gershen Kaufman (1989) puts it, “the negative pole of each crisis is actually an elaboration of shame, given new or wider meaning. Each subsequent crisis involves, at least in part, a reworking of shame.”⁷¹

Contributions of Erikson. One of the most important contributions Erikson made was his realization of how neglected shame had been in Western culture. Erikson said, “Shame is an emotion insufficiently studied, because in our civilization it is so easily absorbed by guilt.”⁷² I believe this awareness itself was a significant contribution considering the atmosphere of the culture and psychoanalysis of the day. By having such a notion of the problem, Erikson could include shame as an important factor in the process of development in human beings.

Problems and Limitations of Erikson. Erikson's view of shame, however, is negative. In fact, Erikson is one of the most significant contributors in the process of defining shame as a negative factor in the psychoanalytic tradition. In particular, his belief that shame precedes guilt in the human developmental process helped create an assumption

⁷⁰ Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: Norton, 1950), 247-74.

⁷¹ Gershen Kaufman, *The Psychology of Shame: Theory and Treatment of Shame-Based Syndromes* (New York: Springer Pub. Co., 1989), 10.

⁷² Erikson, 252.

that shame can be the factor for the more serious form of fixation in the human developmental process. Based on this assumption, many successors of Erikson ended up viewing shame as an enemy of human health and well-being.

Erikson's position is most helpful in understanding shame as a developmental problem; however, it is not multifaceted enough to understand shame as a whole. Erikson basically understood shame as a result of failure in the human developmental process. As he saw it, the accumulations of such failures could be developed and exacerbated, causing more severe forms of malfunctions, defects, and pathologies in later years of life.

Yet, it is not accurate to say that all shame is a problem. What Erikson theorized was just one of the examples among the complex, multi-layered shame phenomena that human beings can experience. Certainly what Erikson offered can be most helpful in understanding maladaptive shame particularly in the area of human development; however, it is not entirely helpful if we want to have a full picture of shame.

Piers and Singer—First Generation (2)

Gerhart Piers' Theory

In 1953, Gerhart Piers, a psychoanalyst, and Milton Singer, an anthropologist, collaborated on a book entitled *Shame and Guilt*, which became another important book on shame that was rooted in the method of distinguishing guilt and shame. Here, the basic idea was from Freud's understanding of the ego-ideal.⁷³

Piers distinguishes guilt from shame by first stating that unconscious guilt is the result of impulses to violate inner “internalized prohibitions of punishing parents”—while

⁷³ Freud, “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914). In *The Standard Edition of Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, volume 14, 70, 93-4, 100-2.

unconscious shame is the actual failure to live up to internalized ideals conditioned by projections of loving parents.⁷⁴ This basic idea is well summarized by Piers himself in the first part of his book by the following four main points:

- 1) Shame comes from the tension between the ego and ego-ideal, as opposed to tension between the ego and super-ego (guilt).
- 2) Guilt happens when a guideline set by the super-ego is violated or disturbed, but shame happens when the ego has not reached the ego-ideal's expectations.
- 3) Whereas guilt comes from fear of punishment, shame arises from fear of abandonment.
- 4) The Law of Talion does not apply as much to shame as it does to guilt.⁷⁵

Central to the four basic ideas is that while guilt is produced from violations of the super-ego's projections, shame is produced from failure of the ego to meet the ego-ideal's demands. Overall, Piers agreed with Freud and his contemporaries about how guilt is produced, yet he had quite different ideas about how shame arises. For Piers, shame originates from many different ego-ideal standards, and is not only related to the early childhood years and sexuality.

The Vicious Cycle of Shame and Guilt. Piers provided his understanding of neurotic individuals by explaining how the vicious cycle of guilt and shame affects them. For example, Piers explained the case of a male individual who was trying to cope with his sexual impulses that arose out of his internal Oedipal conflict. To avoid this conflict, the individual in inhibiting his sexuality entirely, or permitting only pregenital outlets, made himself feel shame by his awareness that such behavior would result in his peers' disapproval. However, this same shame would bring the individual back into the Oedipal

⁷⁴ Piers and Singer, 70.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 23-4.

sphere, resulting in further feelings of guilt—the beginnings of the guilt-shame cycle. Piers believed that the same dynamic applied for pathological exhibitionism, masturbation guilt, moral masochism, anger, rage, and so on.⁷⁶ What Piers showed by identifying “the vicious guilt-shame cycle” was actually one of the most common characteristics of neurotic symptoms, and therefore it can be helpful in understanding shame on the neurotic and pathological levels. Yet again, it is not very helpful in understanding shame as a whole.

Milton Singer’s Theory

The second part of the book is Milton Singer’s criticism on the comparative studies on guilt-shame cultures, especially focusing on the works of Ruth Benedict (1946) and Margaret Mead (1948). According to Benedict, while there are many shame cultures, there are only a few guilt cultures. Asian cultures and “primitive cultures” (except for a few outliers) are primarily shame cultures that rely on shame to create conformity—an external sanction. Western cultures, on the other hand, such as those in Europe or North America, rely more on one’s conscience or guilt to create a sense of absolute moral standards for individuals—namely, an internal sanction.⁷⁷ Mead believed that the absolute morals peculiar to the guilt culture are enforced by a super-ego that is dedicated to individual well-being and dignity in Europe or American cultures. In contrast, shame cultures are considered to be static while having no absolute moral standards internally—cultures in which progressive change is more difficult and “crowd psychology” rules.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Ibid., 31-45.

⁷⁷ Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin company, 1946), 222-24, cited in Pires and Singer, 59.

⁷⁸ Mead Margaret, “Social Change and Cultural Surrogates,” (American Sociological Association, 1940), 92-110, cited in Piers and Singer, 59-60.

Singer agreed with neither Benedict nor Mead, and provided an example of the two world wars that were spearheaded by the most advanced guilt and moral cultures, not by the primitive shame cultures.⁷⁹ Singer says the mainstream methodology for distinguishing shame and guilt cultures relies on the differentiation between internal and external sanctioning—where a culture with external sanctioning is considered to be a shame culture, and a culture with internal sanctioning is classified as a guilt culture. While this may be a useful distinction at times, Singer challenged the assumption that cultures with external and internal sanctioning are always respectively shame and guilt-based cultures.⁸⁰

Contributions

Singer asserted that shame and guilt cannot actually be distinguished only through observing internal or external sanctioning—that there are other “inner” variations of shame that are parallel to certain forms of guilt. Singer also said that we cannot preserve the internal-external classification by seeing shame as requiring an audience and guilt not requiring one—or that guilt is based on extending a childhood response and shame is not. Such specific characteristics can be used to differentiate specific types of shame and guilt, but cannot be used to distinguish between shame and guilt overall.⁸¹ This is a meaningful contribution made by Singer because up to the point when Singer made this clear, Benedict’s and Mead’s position was generally accepted, and shame was viewed as a negative emotion along with the primitive and Asian culture and its morality. Singer’s position helped to clarify such a view, and showed that such a position may be a bias from a

⁷⁹ Piers Gerhart and Gerhart Piers, *Shame and Guilt: A Psychoanalytic and a Cultural Study* / [by] Gerhart Piers and Milton B. Singer. Foreword by Roy R. Grinker, ed. Milton B. Singer (New York: New York : Norton, 1971), 61.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 68-9.

Western scholar's perspective. It is true that Asian culture is more aligned with shame than guilt compared to the West; but perhaps there is a deeper value to be observed in such a shame culture, as it is found in a Neo-Confucian tradition.

Problems and Limitations

What Piers and Singer did not recognize, though, is the fact that shame operates not only in the gap between the ego and ego-ideal. Erving Goffman (1963), for example, showed that the social concept of stigma comes from a person's view of him- or herself as inhabiting a discreditable identity.⁸²

While differentiating between guilt and shame, Piers and Singer (as others do in Western psychoanalytic tradition) failed to reach a more thorough understanding of shame itself. While they showed tendencies of generalizing shame in the category of the gap between the ego and ego-ideal, that is just one example of shame-related experiences among the many.

Helen Block Lewis (1971)—Second Generation

The Launching of a Modern Study of Shame. Helen Block Lewis, a clinical psychologist at Yale University, is generally viewed as a pioneer who launched modern studies of shame in a variety of disciplines.⁸³ It is true that there had been some shame-related books before Lewis; however, it is only after Lewis' work that shame studies received more interest in the West.

Motivation and Method. Lewis' work was mainly based on trying to understand treatment failures from examining hundreds of transcribed psychotherapy sessions. Using

⁸² Goffman's view will be reviewed later in more detail.

⁸³ Scheff and Retzinger, "Helen Block Lewis on Shame: Appreciation and Critique," in Lansky and Morrison (Eds.), *Widening Scope of Shame* (1997), 139-54.

an assessment strategy called Gottschalk's method, she measured session transcripts for instances of hostility, guilt, and shame. According to her analysis of the sessions, shame was by far the most prevalent emotion—more prevalent than anxiety, grief, or anger. Moreover, when her own former patients returned later, only to be struggling with even worse cases of super-ego, she observed that in all of these cases the negative therapeutic reactions had occurred as a result of unanalyzed shame in the patient-therapist relationship. Lewis found that this unaddressed shame between the patient and therapist, which both parties attempted to avoid, was the greatest common denominator in negative therapeutic reactions—and that to fix this, the analyst must identify shame in his or her own internal responses within sessions.⁸⁴

Lewis' Contribution: Learning from Analyst's Discomfort

One of the strengths that Lewis shows is her ability to learn from her own failures, experiences that could be considered shameful for her. Though she never explicitly mentions her therapeutic failures as shame, she uses the expression “analyst's discomfort,” and this could have been her way of referring to shame indirectly. If we can assume this to be the case, Lewis' work can be one example in the Western psychoanalytic tradition of using a gift of shame. Of course, she could have been much more helpful if she had explored the unanalyzed feelings of the therapist's shame more explicitly, and how the therapist's shame affected the patient in the dynamic of transference and counter transference. Seen like this, what Thomas Scheff and Suzanne Retziner (1997) argue is true: that Lewis did not provide an equal analysis of the therapist's feelings—the effect of

⁸⁴ Lewis, *Shame and Guilt in Neurosis*, 11-8.

the patient on the therapist, the therapist's bypassed shame.⁸⁵ However, Lewis' work is nonetheless an important step in remedying the lack of insight about shame.

In this, Lewis appears to be different from Freud who apparently was not able to use what to him was his shameful counter transference. He tried to conceal it instead of using it and learning from it. While Freud apparently was caught in shame and tried to defend against it, it seems that Lewis was able to experience shame on a higher level by enlisting it to further the therapeutic relationship.

Bypassed Shame. Even though Lewis does not explicitly use the term “shamelessness”, her study is much more helpful than Freud's for understanding shamelessness more deeply. Lewis' discussions about “bypassed shame” for example, shows that people—including both clients and analysts—who appear to have no issues of shame whatsoever, are in fact possibly in the state of shame, and are in the process of defending against or concealing shame though perhaps not even being aware of this themselves.⁸⁶ In this respect, Lewis' study is a landmark work in psychoanalytic history that clearly called attention to the problem of “shamelessness” (bypassed shame).

Distinction Between Guilt and Shame. The basic framework of Lewis' distinction between shame and guilt starts from her assumption that:

shame and guilt are equally advanced although different superego functions, developed along different routes of identification. The difference in route of identification determines in part whether the shame or guilt state will be stirred when the superego goes into operation. Specifically, identification with the threatening parents stirs an ‘internalized threat’ which is experienced as guilt. Identification of the beloved or admired ego-ideal stirs

⁸⁵ Thomas Scheff and Suzanne Retzinger, “Helen Block Lewis on Shame: Appreciation and Critique” in *The Widening Scope of Shame*, 139-52.

⁸⁶ Lewis, *Shame and Guilt in Neurosis*, 35-9.

pride and triumphant feeling; failure to live up to this internalized admired imago stirs shame.⁸⁷

This was an important observation that Helen Block Lewis contributed. In understanding the difference between shame and guilt, Lewis asserted that while shame has to do with the self, guilt has more to do with the particular actions of the self. As she explained:

The experience of shame is directly about the *self*, which is the focus of evaluation. In guilt, the self is not the central object of negative evaluation, but rather the *thing* done or undone is the focus. In guilt, the self is negatively evaluated in connection with something but is not itself the focus of the experience.⁸⁸

Lewis exemplified how the guilty self focuses on the act by saying, “How could I have *done* that; what an injurious *thing* to have done; how I hurt so and so; what a moral lapse that *act* was; what will become of *that* or *him* now that I have neglected to *do* it, or *injured him*. How should I be *punished* or *make amends*?” On the other hand, Lewis illustrated how a shamed self might think, “How could *I* have done that?; What an *idiot I am* – how humiliating; what a *fool*, what an *uncontrolled person*... – how mortifying; how *awful and worthless I am*. Shame!”⁸⁹ In identifying such distinctions between the ways of guilt and shame, Lewis paved the way for further iterations of shame studies.

The Differences between Lewis’ and Erikson’s/Piers’ Distinctions

Lewis versus Erikson/Piers. Lewis’ position is different from what Erikson and Piers understood. Erikson, within his stage theory of personal development, said that all infants must go through the autonomy versus shame and doubt stage before progressing to

⁸⁷ Ibid., 23.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 30.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 35-6.

a higher stage of initiative versus guilt. On the other hand, Lewis thought of shame and guilt as being on the same level in regards to origin, importance, and frequency.⁹⁰ Here we see a clear difference between Erikson and Lewis. While Erikson's shame is relatively primitive in its nature, Lewis' shame is something that is as mature as guilt. With Lewis, shame has become upgraded in terms of its developmental level.

Piers versus Lewis. Piers thought that shame originates from the tension between the ego and ego-ideal, while guilt comes from the tension between the ego and super-ego. This means that for Piers, guilt happens when a guideline set by the super-ego is violated while shame, on the other hand, happens when the ego has not reached the ego-ideal's expectations.⁹¹ Lewis, however, believes that shame and guilt are likewise super-ego functions, but they are developed through alternative paths of identification. For her, "identification with the threatening parents stirs an internalized threat which is experienced as guilt, while identification with the failure to live up to this internalized admired image of the parent stirs shame."⁹² Considering the basic concept and motivation behind Freud's structuring of the super-ego as a system of conscience and morality (though not completed by Freud in his lifetime), I believe it is fair to say that Lewis, again, contributed by upgrading the status of shame from a mere level of the ego's failure to live up to its own ideal to the higher level of conscience and morality.

Lewis: Problems and Limitations

Seeing Shame as a Problem. While there is no doubt that Lewis made significant contributions in the field, shame in Lewis' theory overall still remains a negative factor, a

⁹⁰ Erikson, 244.

⁹¹ Piers and Singer, 23-4.

⁹² Lewis, *Shame and Guilt in Neurosis*, 23.

‘problem’ that causes therapeutic failure. But what about flipping it over and trying another perspective on shame from the opposite direction? This question leads me to understand Lewis’ view of shame not as wrong but as insufficiently holistic and balanced. As I will explore later, there is another side of shame, just as there is a hidden side of the moon that people cannot see and so forget for a moment. Through *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability*, Jesus was able to see the other side of shame, a place in themselves with which people actually had *a yearning to be reunited*. Based on this reasoning, along with a number of pastoral theological and Biblical observations, I will later assert that shame is not only a cause of a relational failure but that it can also be a powerful driver for restoring relationships.

Under Freud’s Umbrella. Despite a number of important contributions, Lewis could not break the frame itself that was set by Freud. This means that Lewis still understood shame as an acquired intrapsychic element that is under the influence of the super-ego. But shame has to do with something deeper than that, and I will discuss it later in the theology chapter.

A False Assumption. One of the contributions that Lewis made was the highly influential distinction between guilt and shame. However, the distinction itself is based on the guilt versus shame dichotomy, and led to huge misunderstandings in the area of shame studies. I am not suggesting that we do not need to distinguish between guilt and shame. It is important to have a clear understanding of them both, and I believe the distinction helps. However, the purpose of making such a distinction between guilt and shame is not to

choose one over the other. Any attempt to make a distinction under such motivation can actually do serious harm to humanity.

For example, water consists of hydrogen and oxygen, which we represent as H₂O. In order to get a better understanding of water, it is necessary and helpful to have knowledge of each element that makes up the water—and the distinction of specific atoms can be useful. But such analysis and distinction is to help us understand water better, not to choose one of the elements while rejecting the other. With only one element, water would not be water anymore.⁹³

The same truth applies for guilt and shame. For a better understanding of the human condition, the distinction between guilt and shame is actually helpful. But, the goal of making such a distinction is not to choose one of the elements while rejecting the other. If one goes that far, humans would not be human anymore.

Lewis' distinction, whether she intended it or not, became a given assumption for her successors in Western psychoanalytic tradition who believed that guilt and shame are not only distinguishable but also separable so that a person can keep one and reject the other. Today, some advocates of mainstream shame theory depend heavily on this assumption, and seem to be operating like surgeons performing circumcision while envisioning the state of “shame-free guilt.” One example is June Price Tangney and her

⁹³ There are increasing numbers of people among recent thinkers who believe that guilt-shame distinctions are not actually possible. Pastoral theologian Jill McNish (2004) is one example. She says that it would clearly be a mistake to separate guilt and shame, for they are often paired intimately, and a person who has done something wrong can feel both guilty and ashamed at the same time.

colleagues in the field of empirical psychology who belong to the third generation of those who have developed the guilt-shame dichotomy.⁹⁴

What if Lewis had made a clear statement about the reason for making the distinction between guilt and shame? If she had explained that the goal for making such a distinction was not in order to be exclusively selective, but to gain a deeper understanding of the human condition, would that have prevented confusion? It again explains why this is the time for a more holistic approach to viewing shame.

⁹⁴ Tangney and Dearing.

CHAPTER 3

Six Levels of Shame

In this chapter, I will critically review selected materials from the *third generation* (meaning, the post-Lewis *second phase*) during which shame-related books and articles have been pouring into the West. The material here is based on the order of the six levels of shame, and this particular chapter will include the two areas of the *proto* and *pathological* levels. I will critically review what *the third generation* shame theorists in the psychoanalytic tradition discuss about shame in the area of *proto* and *pathological* levels, and visit the areas of *stigma*, *social*, *moral* and *ultimate* levels later where the disciplines of sociology, philosophy and theology are more helpful in order to grasp what shame actually means for human beings.

For the review of the *proto* level, I will focus on recent evolutionary psychology (mainly on the views of Paul Gilbert); meanwhile, I will show some connections and similarities between the evolutionary view of shame and Freud's theory as I observe that both of them come from the dominant party's perspective, although they belong to different schools of thoughts. For the review of the *pathological* level, I will include selected materials from the object relations theory tradition (Warren Kinston), self psychology tradition (Leon Wurmser and Andrew Morrison) and affect theory tradition (Donald Nathanson and Gershen Kaufman). The review of the psychology of shame will bring me to a point where I find that the materials in this area of discipline are helpful in understanding shame on *proto* and *pathological* levels based on the following four contributions: 1) evolutionary psychology (Paul Gilbert) is helpful in understanding 'shame'

(*proto shameability* according to my term) as the capacity to survive as a living creature; 2) affect theory (Tomkins and Nathanson) is helpful in understanding ‘shame’ as an innate affect (meaning, human beings are born with the seed of *Shameability* according to my pastoral theological position); 3) affect theory is helpful in the area of overcoming the current guilt/shame dichotomy that is proposed by the main line psychoanalytic tradition (meaning, ‘guilt’ which inevitably involves evaluation of ‘self’, cannot actually be separated from ‘shame’ though it can be distinguished on a theoretical level); 4) the disciplines related to *proto* and *pathological* levels are helpful in understanding shame as a pathology.

I also criticize this area of discipline based on the following five limitations: 1) the psychology of shame in general is centered on low-level and maladaptive shame; 2) the category of *shameability* (meaning, *proto/pathological* sense of shame) and the category of *shamelessness* (meaning, *proto/pathological shamelessness*) are often missing; 3) the method is heavily dependent on the guilt versus shame dichotomy; 4) psychology of shame is interested in shame on an individual level while it excludes shame dynamics on the communal/systemic level from its discussion; 5) psychology of shame is seemingly aligned with the powerful and dominant parties as a way of defending against their shame (meaning, these Western theories are seemingly operating on the collective state of the *proto shamelessness* of the dominant party).

The Third Generation

After the publication of Helen Block Lewis's work on shame (which belongs to *the second generation of the second phase*), shame-related books and articles began to flood depth psychology studies.

In this group, there are various kinds of shame theories depending on where their roots are located. For example, there is the psychoanalytic tradition, object relations theory tradition, affect theory tradition, self psychology tradition, trauma theory tradition, evolutionary approach, and the empirical psychology approach, to name a few. However, the psychological theorist's view of shame, in general, is not comprehensive enough overall although such theorists are often helpful in understanding some specific areas of shame dynamics.

Proto Level

Recent evolutionary psychologists have introduced an understanding of the *proto* level of shame. The term "evolution" may automatically trigger recollections of Charles Darwin's position (1809–1882); however, the perspective of recent evolutionary psychologists is somewhat different from that of Darwin.

Darwin believed shame to be a unique emotion belonging to the human species.⁹⁵ Blushing, for example, which Darwin associated with self-attention and the capacity to imagine, was a type of self-consciousness found in self-reflexive humans. Darwin paid attention to the bodily gestures that accompany blushing, and discovered that they are

⁹⁵ Darwin originally speculated on the capacity of animals to feel shame or embarrassment (*The Descent of Man*, 1871). In his more developed work in the next year however, he discussed shame as a peculiar human emotion. See Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, 3rd ed. (London: Fontana, 1872/1999), 132-3.

common throughout the world. Referring to shame-related bodily gestures, Darwin noted persons

hiding the face, or turning it towards the ground, or to one side. The eyes are generally averted or are restless, for to look at the man who causes us to feel shame or shyness, immediately brings home in an intolerable manner the consciousness that his gaze is directed on us. Through the principle of associated habit, the same movement of the face and eyes are practiced, and can, indeed, hardly be avoided, whenever we know or believe that others are blaming, or too strongly praising, our moral conduct.⁹⁶

Accordingly, shame for Darwin was a human trait that allowed the species to be aware of how they presented themselves in front of others, and to imagine how others would perceive them. For Darwin, shame was an emotion that arises through “thinking [about] what others think of us.”⁹⁷

Recent evolutionary psychology, however, has argued that the root of shame comes from rank negotiation and appeasement found in the animal kingdom. Daniel Fessler (2004), for example, says:

the ancestral form of shame in no way necessitates the ability to think about others’ assessments of oneself, but rather is contingent merely on the capacity to assess relative position in a social hierarchy.⁹⁸

Although shame requires a sense of self and complexity of self-consciousness that only humans possess, evolutionary psychologists in general believe that animals in their sensitivity towards threats react with this primitive shame in a way of self defense.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Ibid., 344.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 325.

⁹⁸ Daniel M. T. Fessler, “Shame in Two Cultures: Implications for Evolutionary Approaches,” *Journal of Cognition & Culture* 4, no. 2 (2004): 249.

⁹⁹ Paul Gilbert, “Evolution, Social Roles, and the Difference in Shame and Guilt,” *Social Research* 70, no. 4 (2003): 1203.

Evolutionary psychologists believe that animal display of appeasement is a submissive behavior in potentially aggressive or violent situations. It is only when animals believe they are on a level of equal power or strength that fighting occurs. Otherwise, a signal of submission can diffuse tension and stop the more dominant party or the “territory-holder” from attacking the subordinate. In this sense, shame for evolutionary psychologists is a “*damage limitation strategy*,” adopted when continuing in a shameless, non-submissive way that might provoke very serious attacks or rejections from others” as Paul Gilbert and Michael McGuire explain.¹⁰⁰ Such appeasement displays acknowledge the dominant party as more powerful—and accept one’s own position of subordinacy.¹⁰¹

Evolutionary psychologists believe that shame displays observable in human beings are means of showing submission to more powerful others, and could be similar in that they have the implicit purpose of averting potential or actual attack by the dominant. Shame displays are adopted in order to prevent potential aggression or exclusion. Evolutionary psychologists give examples of blushing, gaze avoidance, lowering of the chin, stooping body posture, hiding as well as concealing.¹⁰² Furthermore, Gilbert points out that shame in this context affects the mood of subordinates greatly, citing that mood disorders are often involved with social rank and status. Depression, for example, can be a result of setting unrealistic targets and goals, which if achieved bring great love and esteem. Envy and low self-esteem can be a result of comparing oneself to much higher-ranked subjects, while

¹⁰⁰ *Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture*, ed. Paul June Gilbert and Bernice Andrews (New York: New York : Oxford University Press, 1998), 102.

¹⁰¹ Fessler, “Shame in Two Cultures: Implications for Evolutionary Approaches,” 239.

¹⁰² Paul Gilbert, “Changes: Rank, Status and Mood,” in *On the Move : The Psychology of Change and Transition*, ed. Shirley Fisher and Cary L. Cooper (Chichester ; New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990), 34.

narcissistic personality disorder can be a result of ranking oneself unrealistically highly in the society.¹⁰³

Overall, for evolutionary psychologists the concept of shame is an emotion of subjects who are appraised to be low-ranking, inferior, powerless, subordinate, and incompetent. Shame in this context can be a submissive signal. Yet, often the cost of such a state of mood can include discomforts and disorders like depression, low self-esteem, envy, envious-aggressive response, rage-induced attack, narcissistic fantasy, and many other rank-related psychosocial and psychobiological symptoms.

However, the concept of shame for evolutionary psychologists is a double-edged sword, as there is another aspect of shame that they point out. Gilbert first explains a necessary background context: that the last two million years have played an essential role in forming human shame. While in the animal world rank is determined by characteristics such as fighting ability and physical strength, human beings determine rank based on many other factors such as intellect, material wealth, social attributes, and more. Accordingly, Gilbert made an interesting observation and introduced a concept called SAHP (Social Attention Holding Potential) assuming that human fitness is crucially related to attracting positive social feedback or evaluation.¹⁰⁴ Gilbert states that:

Perhaps the greatest social dangers for early humans within a group were probably not so much aggressive fights as being ignored, rejected, or

¹⁰³ Ibid., 42-8.

¹⁰⁴ Gilbert developed the concept of SAHP (Social Attention Holding Potential) based on pre-existing studies of RHP (Resource Holding Potential). In territorial situations, animals will display their competency of obtaining and defending territory through ritualistic displays, face-offs, or engaging in side-on movements designed to advertise fighting ability and strength. This is called the display of resource-holding potential – namely, RHP. For more information, read G.A. Parker, “Assessment Strategy and the Evolution of Fighting Behavior,” in *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 47, 223-243.

ostracized. In a cooperative environment, one had to impress upon others one's value to them.¹⁰⁵

Based on this reasoning, Gilbert proposes that human shame has become an adaptation that often contributes to maximizing the social attention-holding potential. He believes that shame is still a rank-related emotion; however, while it has evolved through time, it is redirected as a capacity to maintain one's attractiveness. This means that human social status and acceptance in groups and relationships have come to rely upon signals of attraction, value, and wanting or approval by others. Loss of these signals can place individuals in lower ranks within a society.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, being equipped with well-evolved, "pre-emptive" shame leads to higher possibilities of acquiring better rank and status within society because it presupposes the capacity to be well regarded by others, and motivates one to excel in a wide variety of social contexts. Here, it is clear that 'shame' can be a highly adaptive function in moving up the ranks of society. While the previously discussed aspects of shame causes issues related to lowered self-worth, this other side of shame is seen as a useful one in navigating the social hierarchy.

Contributions and Limitations: Evolutionary Psychology

While I argue that human shame (meaning, the seed of *Shameability* which is the capacity to sense potential disconnection) is not an evolutionary product but an integral part of being a true human, I admit that the dynamic of the basic animal level of shame is also present in the human condition, and suggest calling it *proto shame* (s-i). Even though the evolutionary psychologist's view is incomplete because it does not recognize the aspect of

¹⁰⁵ Paul Gilbert and Michael McGuire, "Shame, Status, and Social Roles," in *Shame : Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture*, 112.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 99.

human *Shameability* (p-vi), there are helpful pieces of it that I would like to carry forward. However, the problem is that the evolutionary psychologists' view is not comprehensive enough.

The first limitation is that evolutionary psychologists talk singularly about what should actually be two categories of shame on this particular level. Submissive behaviors are indeed part of *proto shame*, but the second more-adaptive side of shame (Social Attention Holding Potential) needs to be distinguished from the *proto shame* category. This second category of shame is more of a capacity to see the potential of *shame* on this level—and so is different than the first one.

My proposal is to make this distinction clear between these two categories calling the first *proto shame* (s-i), and the second *proto shameability* (p-i). It is also important to note clearly that this works not only at an individual level but also at a communal level. *Proto shameability* (both on individual and communal levels) is something related to what evolutionary psychologists refer to as the 'survival of the fittest' based on their theoretical framework. This dimension of *shameability* is certainly the characteristic that belongs to the fittest.

Another problem is the absence of the *shamelessness* category. While evolutionary psychologists talk much about shame itself, the topic of the *shamelessness* category never arises. While this is an area that needs more empirical research in the future, my pastoral theological observations so far show that there can be at least two possibilities for this category of *proto shamelessness* (l-i). The first possibility is when living creatures (animals or human beings) are simply too young to feel or experience *proto shame* (s-i). For example,

a child at the age of only a few weeks is not able to distinguish between strangers and its mother—only after a certain point does this begin to happen and signals of *proto shame* are emitted.¹⁰⁷ The second possibility of *proto shamelessness* is the case of defense against *proto shame*. As we reviewed in Freud’s framework already, shame is closely related to defense mechanisms, and is also applicable on this level of shame.

In the case of defense, according to my pastoral theological observations there can be two subcategories. The first one is the case of subordinates who become so accustomed to the state of lower rank or status within society that they become unable to feel *proto shame* anymore.¹⁰⁸ This is a situation that might be referred to as a servile spirit where shame is defended through powerlessness. The second subcategory is the case of the dominant. The subject is not able to feel shame because he or she, as an individual or a group, is filled with a sense of power that is great enough to overpower the opposing party. While the opposing party may feel *proto shame* as well as feel threatened, this dominant subject may not even notice any shame (of the self and the other) on a conscious level. While this observation also needs further support through empirical research, I came to this conclusion through personal experiences as a pastoral theologian who comes from a powerless, subordinated group of our humanity as my country of origin has been abused and threatened by the dominant parties throughout its history.¹⁰⁹

My question at this moment is why Western evolutionary psychologists do not seem to notice this important category of shame-related experience at the *proto* level, that is

¹⁰⁷ For example, Margaret Mahler (1958) described that the first weeks of life are spent in a state of “primitive hallucinatory disorientation;” she designated those first few weeks as the “normal autistic phase.”

¹⁰⁸ For more information on the “protracted” state of shame that is often found in subordinating group of our humanity, please refer to Deonna et al., 226-39.

¹⁰⁹ The related cases will be shared in Chapter 7 with the contextual analysis.

proto shamelessness. My assumption is that these theorists of a dominating group in the human species are not easily able to see outside of the context to which they are accustomed: the dominating group of *proto shamelessness*.¹¹⁰

In this sense, the position of evolutionary psychologists is not something that is entirely different from Freud's own stance. As we reviewed through the work of *Totem and Taboo*, Freud was not sufficiently sensitive to power dynamics between groups, or the shame aspects of the powerless group. According to my pastoral theological research and observations, Gilbert and his colleagues also show similar tendencies of not noticing the *shame* factor in the powerless, subordinated group as they are seemingly immune to *proto shamelessness* (meaning, the state where this party is defending against the potential *proto shame* as they also belong to the dominant group in our humanity although they may not even notice it on a conscious level).

But in fact this *proto-shamelessness* of the dominant can be a way of defending against their potential *proto shame* as well. As was portrayed in the father figure of Freud's *Totem and Taboo*, there are no everlasting dominant and all-powerful beings in the world. As we look back at history, the powerful and dominant individuals or groups are impermanent in their position of power, and ultimately perish or become subordinates to the newly arising power when their time comes. In this sense, the *proto shamelessness* of

¹¹⁰ My assumption stems from my pastoral theological observation that is based on the following factors: 1) Western people (including Jewish) have been living under the influence of the all-powerful, Judea-Christian God image for a long time; 2) they are influenced by the dominance of the current Western scientific world-view; 3) they have socio-economic, political, military as well as intellectual power; 4) they have tendencies to relying on reason rather than emotion or spirituality; 5) they are mainly operating on Western individualism, meaning that they do not see the world as one body, or as an interdependent whole. While there could be more factors, these four elements are seemingly the major contributors to the insensitivity of this dominant group towards the shame of powerless and subordinating people as well as their own shame both on individual and communal/systematic levels.

the dominant can be viewed as a way of defending against their potential *proto shame* on a conscious, or unconscious level as a way of preventing a situation of being defeated by the subordinate in the future. Based on this reasoning, the recent evolutionary psychologists' inability to notice the category of *proto shamelessness* can also be viewed as a defense against their *proto shame* on a theoretical and systemic level.

The second limitation I see is that evolutionary psychologists tend to dichotomize shame and guilt based on their world view of rank and hierarchy. Here, shame becomes the peculiar trait belonging to the subordinates while guilt becomes the characteristic of the dominating ones. I find this distinction problematic because this view assumes that shame is the peculiar characteristic of the powerless group while guilt is the characteristic of the powerful group. One question that arises is: "Does this mean that the powerless group cannot experience guilt? Does it mean that the dominant party cannot experience shame?" Based on my pastoral theological observations, such a distinction does not make sense at all. While I will explore more on this issue later in the theology section, it is useful to remember one thing here: While the Bible contains images of a God who is powerful and eternal, it is the core message of the Bible that such an omnipotent God was also able to become the lesser and vulnerable human being, participating in the human condition through the revelation of Jesus. Here, the *Shameability* of God is not something that is related to powerlessness; it is rather something that belongs to the image of God. Therefore, it is not reasonable to distinguish shame and guilt based on the traits of the power and powerlessness, or dominating and subordinate groups.

The third criticism is also related to my last assessment that evolutionary psychologists tend to treat guilt as an emotion of the mature, competent, and moral person, while shame is an emotion of the immature, incompetent, and immoral person. For example, referring to the basic position of empirical psychologists like Tangney and Dearing (2002), Gilbert (2003) states that guilt is focused outwardly in caring or feeling for others, while shame is an emotion that can lead to concealment, avoidance, unhealthy defense, deeply damaging anger, self-focus, blaming, lack of empathy, and general immoral behaviors that one uses as an attempt to be seen more favorably by superiors, and avoid being rejected for non-compliance.¹¹¹ Such views of the evolutionary psychologists can be true in some areas. However, it is only applicable to the lower level of shame, and it is not appropriate to generalize this view to shame as a whole. Unlike guilt, shame has a very broad and wide spectrum. As it is apparent in evolutionary studies, shame on the lower level is not mature; it can be neither relational nor empathic enough either. But I argue that at higher levels ‘shame’ can become more mature, healthy, and empathetic than guilt. As I will explore later, *Shameability/the ultimate sense of Shame* (p-vi), for example, is the core element for participating in divine nature and that it is clearly more relational, empathic, and participatory than is guilt.

How then can we understand shame on the *proto level*? From the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, the *shameability* on this level (p-i) is more related to the capacity to live and survive as a living creature. For this, every creature has been endowed with the seed of *proto shameability* (although the seeds are different when we compare

¹¹¹ Paul Gilbert, “Evolution, Social Roles, and the Difference in Shame and Guilt.” In *Social Research*, vol. 70, No. 4 (Winter 2003), 1225.

animals and human beings); when this seed is nurtured properly, every individual and community of certain species is able to live and survive while enjoying the fullness of their life, as well as contributing to the entire eco-system. The sense of shame on the *proto* level is designed to make that happen. But when shame is not nurtured, or is empowered improperly in the process of growing, it becomes distorted and maladapted; *proto shameability* (p-i) often becomes distorted in the form of *proto shame* (s-i) and *proto shamelessness* (l-i). It is my assumption that both forms of distortion cannot achieve the original goal of fulfilling life as God has created it. In this sense, the *shameability* on the *proto* level is somewhat related to the notion of “survival of the fittest” as evolutionary psychologists insist. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily mean that “the fittest” is always the higher in rank. Survival is important, but survival is not everything for human beings. Sometimes, to survive means ‘shame’ for some people, depending on their individual circumstances. Therefore, I do not agree with Gilbert (1990) when he states that:

While it is true that we can gain rank and status by numerous means, evolution does not seem to have changed very much what happens to those that lose rank or are rendered subordinates. Here we see various anxieties, depressions and envious aggressive response.... Although we cannot abandon ranking (and in a sense nor should we try, since we do need the more competent to be our doctors, scientists, etc., rather than the less competent), we must concern ourselves with those that need extra help. In other words we need to think more clearly about how ranks work and how we can overcome the more distressing and destructive aspects of ranking.¹¹²

Here, what Gilbert says is that it is inevitable to have rank and hierarchy in our society and the world; it is even better for us to have such rank and hierarchy because only

¹¹² Paul Gilbert, “Changes: Rank, Status and Mood,” in *On the Move: The Psychology of Change and Transition*, ed. S. Fisher and Cary L. Cooper (New York: Chichester, 1990), 50.

a certain portion of the population is actually competent enough to handle and maintain ample Resource-Holding Potential (RHP) and Social Attention Holding Potential (SAHP) in a responsible way. From the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, Gilbert's view is derived from the low level perspective of shame because it assumes that the one with 'higher rank' is 'the fittest' in human society. However, it can be viewed as a position that understands human beings on a similar ground of the basic, animal level. As we will observe later in the theology chapter, the real 'rank' cannot solely be measured based on the capacity to be 'the fittest' in the human society and the world. While we cannot deny there are some ranks present among animals, the measurement of 'rank' or 'status' is far more comprehensive among human beings because humans are on a higher level and are more complex than animals. One example is the death of Jesus on the cross, and the people who followed him. Jesus on the cross, as well as many of his followers, were not regarded as 'the fittest' on many occasions; however, of all people, Jesus is the one who actually has the highest rank of all because he was the one who *loved*. This is the background from which I can carry forward certain aspects of evolutionary psychology, even though there are some elements that are problematic in the evolutionary view.

What is most problematic in evolutionary psychology is the inability to recognize the danger of maladapted, communal *proto shamelessness* of the dominant. While the *proto shamelessness* (namely, the way of defending against one's potential *proto shame* both at individual and communal levels) is also found in non-human beings, it is important to distinguish between the *proto shamelessness* of the non-human beings and that of human beings. In the case of animals, they are able to stop and limit themselves even in a territorial

dispute, and much of it is because of their limited ability to use tools or technologies. Unlike animals, the dominant parties of human beings have all the means to power over the subordinate ones; they can devour the powerless others as a way of defending against their potential *proto shame*. While not being sensitive enough to the shame of the subordinating, powerless group, the dominant often become disconnected. They are not empathic toward others, and become immune to their own *proto shamelessness* as the dominant on a communal/systemic level. However, what they do not usually recognize is that this kind of maladapted *proto shamelessness* ultimately results in harming themselves and destroying the whole. What reminds me of this situation is an unforgettable parable that I heard in Korea which puts it aptly when comparing greedy humans to cancer cells that take up nutrients for themselves alone, and prevent other cells around it from flourishing properly – which ultimately kills itself and the whole body.¹¹³

On the other hand, it is important to note that the state of *proto shame* (s-i) of the powerless, subordinating group is also problematic because it is a servile, obsequious way of living manner that is against the order of God's creation. However, if we observe carefully, the “small ones” and the “big ones” in the non-human world are actually living as an interdependent whole. On the surface level, it may seem as if the “big ones” are simply dominating the others, but in fact all creatures both small and large are living together while benefiting each other. Of course, there are some cases in which the big ones seem to have all the control, but in fact that is not true because even such cases do not last long because

¹¹³ This view mainly derives from my personal world view as a Korean American pastoral theologian who grew up influenced by Neo-Confucian spirituality. While there are a number of Western thoughts that are similar to this (e.g., process theology), I do not believe that such thoughts are integrated with the real life of Western people, in general, either at the individual or communal levels.

the “dominant ones” become weak, fragile, and ultimately die while offering themselves as food for the small and tiny others, as well as enriching elements for the earth and heaven. Therefore, it is mostly the case of distorted human situations where the capacity of naturally given *proto shameability* (p-i) becomes a servile, obsequious, maladaptive type of *proto shame* (s-i) for the powerless, subordinating group.

Both subjects who fall into the categories of *proto shamelessness* and *proto shame* need to be restored to the state of *proto shameability*. It means that neither the cases of *proto shamelessness* (the “dominant”) nor the cases of *proto shame* (the “subordinate”) are natural and healthy. In fact, both the “dominant” and the “subordinate” need to live their lives as an interdependent whole as creatures of God while exercising their unique roles and responsibilities.

While both animals and human beings are endowed with the seed of *shameability* on the *proto* level; humans need to grow beyond the basic, animal level and be fully restored to *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability* (p-vi) so that their conditions do not necessarily mean being stuck on the level of “animals,” but being fully actualized to the realm of “true human beings,” and this is something that evolutionary psychology does not mention.

Pathological Level

Understanding the pathological dimensions of shame is perhaps the most important contribution that depth psychologists of the West have made. Understanding the

pathological aspects of shame has been explored by many different schools of psychoanalytic traditions in *third generation* shame theories.¹¹⁴

The term “psychopathology” reminds us of four broad areas of health-related conditions. From the most severe to least severe these are: 1) psychosis, 2) severe neuroses (personality disorders), 3) traumatic neurosis, and 4) classic neuroses.¹¹⁵ Of these four, psychosis is the most severe of mental disorders in which adaptive function is mostly absent, thoughts and feelings are highly disorganized, and as a result the ability to understand one’s environment is almost completely lost.¹¹⁶ Shame that is related to this severe condition of psychosis has not been the major focus of the main line *third generation* shame theorists. Of the remaining three, I have already reviewed classic neuroses in the work of Freud. Classic neuroses are relatively less severe since they originate from the Oedipal level. The primary concern is the guilt caused by sexual and aggressive impulses that clash with inhibiting forces of the ego-ideal or a super-ego.¹¹⁷ In this regard, Heinz Kohut referred to Freud’s Oedipal personality as the *Guilty Man*, and to the pre-Oedipal, narcissistic personality as the *Tragic Man*.¹¹⁸ The vast majority of the *third generation* shame theorists have been paying more attention to the pre-Oedipal level especially in the

¹¹⁴ Discussion of the pathological elements of shame can be found in psychoanalytic Jungian theory (Jacoby, 1994), Kohutian self-psychology (Wurmser, 1981, 1987, 1997, 2000; Morrison, 1987, 1989), object relations theory (Kinston, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1987), affect theory (Nathanson, 1992, 1997), affect-cognitive-developmental theory (Lewis, 1992, 1993, 1995), cognitive-behavioral theory (Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985; Klass, 1990), developmental psychology (Barrett, 1995) and recent empirical psychology (Tangney, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002), as well as various combinations of the above-mentioned theories (Lankey, 1992; Broucek, 1982, 1991; Miller, 1985, 1996; Kaufman, 1989; Mollon, 1993)

¹¹⁵ While Leon Wurmser (2000) believes that there are three conditions of psychosis, severe neurosis and classic neurosis, I believe that the traumatic neurosis needs to be included in this group. Leon Wurmser, *The Power of the Inner Judge : Psychodynamic Treatment of the Severe Neuroses* (Northvale, N.J.: Jason Aronson, 2000), 12-20.

¹¹⁶ “Dictionary of Pastoral Care and Counseling,” ed. Rodney J. Hunter et al. (Abingdon, 1980). 1016.

¹¹⁷ Wurmser, 15.

¹¹⁸ Heinz Kohut, *The Restoration of the Self* (New York: New York : International Universities Press, 1977).

area of shame-related narcissistic and borderline disturbances where splits of personality, structural defects, ego-weakness, or some sort of self-deficiency is present while a number of them also have been paying attention to traumatic neurosis.

Shame and Psychopathology

While differing slightly in each school and discipline, the *third generation* shame theorists generally agree that shame is caused by experiences of early relational deficiency with parents or mothering persons.

Object Relations Theory Tradition—Warren Kinston

It was Ronald Fairbairn (1889-1964)—an active member of the church throughout his life, and a person of faith who first made a decision to become a minister but later became a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst—who launched a new relational model of psychoanalysis radically different from Freud’s instinctual model. According to Freud, all interpersonal relationships are derived from instinctual needs. For him, even an infant is just a self-centered individual who wants the gratification of his/her sexual need. Freud even thought of an infant’s motivation for sucking a nipple as a pleasure-seeking behavior when the mother feeds the baby. Fairbairn simply disagreed with such a view. In his landmark book, *Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality*, Fairbairn (1952) asserted his basic position saying, “Libidinal aims are of secondary importance in comparison with object-relations... a relationship with an object and not the gratification of an impulse is the ultimate aim of libidinal striving.”¹¹⁹ It means that the basic human motivation is not

¹¹⁹ W. Ronald D. Fairbairn, *Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1952), 60.

pleasure-seeking, but of establishing and maintaining relationships. For Fairbairn, human nature is relational rather than instinctual.¹²⁰

Although the subject of shame generally did not receive much attention from most ORT theorists, Warren Kinston did develop a theory of shame centering on narcissistic disturbance from the object relations theory perspective. For Kinston, shame does not simply come from wrongdoing or discrepancies between one's present state and one's ideal state. He argues that shame cannot simply be linked to instinctual expression or suppression of it. While the ego-ideal/super-ego is the crucial "internal regulator of the narcissistic equilibrium," Kinston believes that "it has to bow to the pressures of the external world and external activates to secure narcissistic balance."¹²¹ Based on this assumption, Kinston asserts that narcissistic disturbance begins when a child moves to individuate from their parents' will to maintain fusion or symbiosis. The parent, unable to perceive their own narcissistic needs, does not provide the child with what he or she needs for autonomy. The child's assertiveness is simply seen as awry, and in the parents' view, the child is failing them. The child, in not acting in accordance with its parents' wishes, becomes the cause of pain and resentment for them.¹²²

Yet, still having the natural desire to connect and relate to the parents, the child begins to learn to become molded "into parental expectations of symbiosis, being what the parent wants, and realizing that he or she is rewarded by parental love and approval,"¹²³

¹²⁰ James W. Jones, *Religion and Psychology in Transition : Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Theology* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 24-35.

¹²¹ Warren Kinston, "A Theoretical Context for Shame," in *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, (1983): 224.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 220.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 213-24.

even though the process requires the destruction of self and autonomy. But every child has an “inherent uniqueness,” and thus painful oscillation between identity and fusion kicks in. In this sense, shame for Kinston is “the signal experience” that the individual encounters when he or she is faced with “painful self-awareness.”¹²⁴ Under normal circumstances, such awareness should be recognized, mirrored, and fully supported; however, in the context of narcissistic parental-child symbiosis, it instead becomes the source of shame. In this kind of dysfunctional relationship, Kinston says that even autonomy becomes evil.¹²⁵

Overall, Kinston talks about two possible routes in narcissism. The first route is to be shame-prone. For longer or shorter periods, a shame-prone person is aware of him/herself, but “with an awareness loaded with negative connotations.”¹²⁶ Basically, it is a “state of self-negating submission,” and “an unpleasurable experience associated with the maintenance of narcissistic equilibrium.”¹²⁷ It is the origin of the child of a negative valuation of his/her core self-image, and later adult manifestation of shame-prone narcissism. This is basically a state that is fused with the parents’ sense of well-being, sinking or becoming part of the ground (mother) as a way of wishing to hide and withdraw—the state called object-narcissism by Kinston. According to Kinston, shame-prone object-narcissism can be a state without conflicts and needs, but it can also be a state of moving towards behaving in an apathetic or inhumane way. It is upon arriving at this state that the experience of shame diminishes. It is a deeply destructive ruthless state that is

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 217.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 224.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

shamelessness. According to Kinston, this is a state in which narcissistically vulnerable people “lock themselves into a defensive invulnerability.”¹²⁸

The second route of narcissism comes by denying or overcoming the feeling related to negative evaluation of the self. Characteristics of this group also include a desire to hide and withdraw but in a way that protects the self, and Kinston refers to this group as self-narcissists. This type of person often tries to gain public admiration or acclaim. As generally accepted by the larger community of theorists, symptoms include an exaggerated sense of self-importance, an overestimation of one’s abilities, pervasive self-focus, inability to empathize with others, a vulnerability to criticism and rejection, and shallow and chaotic relations. Kinston thought this group includes both “ostensible failures (psychopaths, perverts), and highly successful persons who are withdrawn or chaotic in their private lives.”¹²⁹ What Kinston shows in the area of self-narcissism is what Heinz Kohut mainly theorized.

Self Psychology Tradition: Wurmser and Morrison

Leon Wurmser, who is a Kohutian shame theorist, basically has a similar view on the origin of shame. He believes that the cause of the early shame is the lack of parental empathy. Heinz Kohut (1971) believed there to be two fundamental self object needs in a human child: 1) mirroring need, and 2) idealizing need. He believed that the infantile, exhibitionistic grandiosity needs to be warmly responded to and affirmed through parental empathy. Here, the adequate mirroring need usually requires the mother’s attentiveness to the baby’s grandiosity. When this need is met, the baby gradually transforms its power-

¹²⁸ Ibid., 218.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

based grandiose perception of self to a more realistic and mature model of self. The idealizing need occurs in the baby sensing a greatness of parental models. Kohut believed that the child's need to have an "idealized other" (frequently through the father) offers an empathic response to the child's admiring interest, and the child's self-esteem is thereby enhanced. This image of perfection then gradually shifts to "guiding ideals" and aspiration. The important point here is that repeated empathic failures lead to the splitting off of the early grandiose image of self and other, so that these images are retained in their original, unrealistic form, and cannot be well integrated into the personality. This process is crucial to understanding the shame phenomena.¹³⁰

Based on this framework, Leon Wurmser (1981) developed his shame theory that is particularly related to narcissistic disturbance. For Wurmser, the earliest form of shame is something that kicks in when the parents refuse and ignore the baby's self object needs. He says that the archaic fears of shame are the "loss of the object" and "loss of the self" that accompanies it. Wurmser believes that the other person turning away results in removing the right of presence, and perhaps even the right of existence for the one expressing need. "He who is not loved stops loving himself; he feels he is 'a nothing,' ... the basic fear to be feared is this total object loss and self-loss."¹³¹ In this sense, shame for Wurmser is something that starts from an immediate response to another's disapproval, or lack of response from very early childhood—as Susan Miller (1971) interprets. Later, this response develops into the second form of shame which begins to tie in with self-punishment, in

¹³⁰ Heinz Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self: a Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders* (New York: International Universities Press, 1971), 149-. Susan Miller, *Shame in Context* (Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press), 91-2.

¹³¹ Leon Wurmser, *The Mask of Shame* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 83.

addition to grandiosity. Through the second form of shame, the grown baby begins to reject itself through “not just castigation by another” because it has “the ability to conceive of the self as an object.”¹³² Here, Wurmser explains that shame at its deepest layer is in reality the confrontation with one’s unlovability: “The most radical shame is to offer oneself and be rejected as unlovable.”¹³³

Andrew Morrison, another Kohutian shame theorist, suggests that, “just as guilt is the central negative affect in the classical (conflict/drive) theory... shame occupies that position in problems of narcissism, in the psychology of the self and its deficits.”¹³⁴ Admitting that Kohut and his self psychology provided a framework for understanding shame and its relationship to narcissism and the self, Morrison (1989) criticizes Kohut’s limitation of maintaining shame only as the outcome of unmet self object needs of mirroring and idealizing.¹³⁵ Morrison modifies Kohut’s view, and highlights that shame is an emotion experienced in relation to self-critical judgments, as well as failures to meet the goals and expectations of the ego-ideal and idealized self object (idealized parental imago).¹³⁶ Morrison believes that “shame over failure in the compensatory (or healthy) pursuit of ideals (as over any failure with regard to the idealized self object) potentially is as devastating as is the shame from overwhelming grandiosity.”¹³⁷ Adding to this, Morrison says:

¹³² Susan B. Miller, *Shame in Context* (Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press, 1996), 158-9.

¹³³ Wurmser, *The Mask of Shame*, 92.

¹³⁴ Andrew Morrison, “The Eyes Turned Inward: Shame and the Self,” in Donald Nathanson (ed.), *The Many Faces of Shame* (New York: New York : Guilford Press, 1987), 274.

¹³⁵ Andrew P. Morrison, *Shame, the Underside of Narcissism* (Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press, 1989), 78.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 72, 95.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 78-9.

failure of the parental self object to respond to the self's idealizing needs and quest for merger is a prominent source of shame vulnerability, and a model for subsequent shame over the self's experience of its needs.¹³⁸

Affect Theory Tradition: Nathanson and Kaufman

Donald Nathanson is one of the most active and widely recognized shame theorists in the field of modern depth psychology. Nathanson's major theoretical root is from Silvan Tomkins (1911-1991) who became a founder of the affect theory. Nathanson (1992) reports that Tomkins first came to recognize the nature of innate affect through observation of his newborn child. While witnessing the newborn baby crying similarly to the way an adult would, Tomkins thought that the infant did not cry based on any value judgment or evaluation of the situation. The newborn baby did not know why it cried—it merely cried. Through this experience, Tomkins began developing a unique theory of affects, the group of “hard-wired, preprogrammed, genetically transmitted mechanisms” that exist in human beings, and claimed that they were responsible for the earliest form of emotional life.¹³⁹

Each of Tomkins' innate affects is given a two-word group name with some exceptions—the first indicating the mildest form of it, the second representing its most intense presentation. Tomkins thought that there are nine innate affects, and among them the positive affects include: interest-excitement and enjoyment-joy; the neural affect is called surprise-startle; and the negative affects are fear-terror, distress-anguish, anger-rage, dissmell-disgust, and shame-humiliation. Each affect is related to particular facial expressions.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Ibid., 79.

¹³⁹ Nathanson, 58-9.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

Nathanson believes, as Tomkins did, that shame is not a value-related emotion, but a natural response to any frustration or impediment in positive affects of “interest-excitement” or “enjoyment-joy.” Based on this, Nathanson even asserts that “we can demonstrate the visible expression of shame affect in the days old infants.”¹⁴¹ Nathanson explains that it is a “programmed response,” not necessarily a response of “I,” but “as soon as the infant decides that I will do it.” Nathanson believes that this is where “the self concept has begun to form.”¹⁴² This means that the shame affect can be influenced by a complex set of factors and particularities in the course of development from that time on. Nathanson provides examples of later manifestations of a child’s severe illness when affects fuse between a caregiver and an infant at the early stage of development.

Just as the child learns to associate maternal dissmell and disgust with the shame of soiling and to link the concepts of self-dissmell and self-disgust to the very idea of shame, the child shamed by its rejection for any behavior will tend to build a lexicon of self-related negative affect states characterized by a fusion of dissmell, disgust, and shame.¹⁴³

Nathanson further explains that persons referred to as borderlines are shame-bound people who are produced by this kind of early fusion and experience of severe impediments to positive affects while learning to become independent. Borderline shame includes the symptoms of “severe emotional instability, terrible intolerance for loneliness, crippling difficulties in forming close personal relationships, a deep sense of emptiness, and a chronic incapacity to develop a solid sense of self.”¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 204.

¹⁴² Ibid., 207.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 182.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 183.

Affect theory is relatively speaking not as sensitive as the other theories about the difference between shame and guilt. While in general accepting the distinction made by Helen Block Lewis, Nathanson says:

One of the most prominent groups within the shame family of emotions consists of the feelings we know as guilt.... Certainly guilt feels different from shame; nevertheless, it appears that guilt involves, at the very least, shame about action.¹⁴⁵

By saying this, Nathanson is moderately suggesting that guilt is a part of a “shame family of emotions” because it is a “combination of shame and fear” while being more focused in the area of action, behaviors, rules, morality and fear of punishment/retaliation.¹⁴⁶

What is intriguing in affect theory is the importance of “affect magnification.” Nathanson explains that each affect is both an analogue and an amplifier of its stimulus conditions. That is why shame affect becomes a painful analogic amplification of any impediment to positive affect. For example, our sense of disgust will tend to color everything within that script with disgust affect. It is this *coloration* to which Tomkins referred as affective magnification where scripts take on their own affective climate which, in turn, magnifies all of the affect contained within the scenes themselves.¹⁴⁷ But interestingly, any affect feels better than shame, and from this come the tendencies to defend against shame where people unconsciously try to convert the experience of shame into something less painful. Nathanson observes that people’s defensive scripts fall into four major patterns, which he has organized as *the compass of shame*. The four poles in

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 144.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 19, 144-9.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 311.

Nathanson's shame compass are: 1) withdrawal, 2) avoidance, 3) attack self, and 4) attack others.¹⁴⁸

At each pole, Nathanson believes that there are auxiliary affects brought in to bolster its defenses: *withdrawal* is likely to be accompanied by distress and fear; *avoidance* by excitement, fear, and enjoyment; *attack self* by self-disgust and self-dissmell; and *attack others* by anger.¹⁴⁹ In the case of withdrawal, for example, people show blushing, eyes drop from contact, and sense of mutuality is lost. These people also often hide themselves, and are depressed easily where the experience of distress and fear are evident. With masochism, for example, people are even willing to welcome and self-inflict shame in order to maintain their stability in relationships with others. In this “topsy-turvy frame of reference,” what prevails are the affects of self-disgust and self-dissmell. Nathanson explains that these type of patients “often feel that they should not get better—that their illness is deserved.” In disavowal, for example, people attempt to avoid shame because it gives them uncomfortable feelings. Instead of feeling shame, they often lie to themselves, blame others, and avoid responsibilities while being captive to narcissistic delusions, false pride, and a manipulated sense of self. In attacking others, people often shift from shame to rage. In a burst of rage, Nathanson explains that people try to prove their “power, competence, and size,” and the level of meanness along with the weapons chosen is a measure of the perpetrator's inward pain. When people are in one of these modes of a shame defense, they are typically unaware of what is going on.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 305-77.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 30, 312-4.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 315-77.

Gershen Kaufman—another shame theorist who uses Tomkins as a theoretical foundation but also combines object relations theory and interpersonal theory—has developed a unique view that can be most helpful for understanding trauma-related shame. According to Kaufman (1989), “events” are not traumatic at the moment in which they occur, but they become traumatic later through the process of affect magnification, as Tomkins originally asserted. While “there is no such thing as a traumatic experience,”¹⁵¹ what gives rise to trauma is what further developed into a “governing scene” that is filled with related affect, imagery (visual recall) and language (inner voice). Kaufman explains that any of the affects present during any event becomes imprinted directly into the scene; both images and language also become embedded in the scene. This can include experiences of trauma, abuse, or shocking events along with involved behavior, action, language, facial expression, sound, and even smell. All experiences become stored in memory in the form of very specific and quite separate scenes, and later are reactivated by the occurrence of new situations that are similar to those original scenes, along with the magnified affect. It is Kaufman’s position that “even when the governing scene itself remains completely blocked from awareness, the affect embedded in that scene can nevertheless forcefully intrude,” and the governing scene “eventually develop into states of shame related to body, relationships or competence, and these in turn contribute to character shame.” In this situation, Kaufman believes that “psychological health depends

¹⁵¹ Silvan Tomkins, *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness. Volume 2, the Negative Affects* (New York: Springer, 1963), 386.

on the conscious recovery of scenes and complete reconnection of all three channels— affect, imagery, and language—by which scenes become reactivated.¹⁵²

Overview

I have reviewed diverse views from the *third generation* shame theorists. Kinston (Object Relations Theory), Wurmser and Morrison (Self Psychology), Nathanson and Kaufman (Affect Theory) have been helpful in understanding shame at the *pathological* level. At this stage, it had not yet become clear to the various schools of psychotherapy that ‘shame’ could be a significant factor for causing severe neuroses until the *third generation* shame theorists evolved. Due to the contributions of this group, however, it is now better known that shame can be “the bedrock of psychopathology, the gold to be mined psychotherapeutically,” as Susan Miller puts it,¹⁵³ and it is certainly one of the most important contributions that the theorists in this group have made.

Overall, the *third generation* shame theorists are focused on specific aspects of pathological shame, and there are pieces of their work that I would like to carry forward in order to understand the dynamic of shame on *pathological* levels within the complex, multilayered phenomenon of shame.

Contributions and Limitations of the Third Generation Theories and the Claims of the Pastoral Theology of *Shameability*

Among the many contributions, it is important to note that ‘shame’ is now becoming more understood as an innate affect. The affect theory’s view (Tomkins and Nathanson), based on their observations of early childhood, presupposes that human beings are born

¹⁵² Gershen Kaufman, *The Psychology of Shame: Theory and Treatment of Shame-Based Syndromes* (New York: Springer Pub. Co., 1989), 301-32.

¹⁵³ Miller, 151.

with shame affect. Of course, not all psychologists accept this view. Michael Lewis (1992), for example, rejects the notion of shame as a primary innate affect present from birth.

While seeing shame as a self-conscious emotion that can only occur when *objective self consciousness*¹⁵⁴ has come into being in the infant,¹⁵⁵ Lewis also criticizes the position of the affect theory. But I am aligned with Tomkins' view because it is supportive enough to validate my basic pastoral theological position. My position, derived from the views of affect theory, is that the seed of *Shameability*, not 'shame' or 'shame affect,' is the given, and the reason which explains why we are called to restore it for human beings in their fallen situation. Although the position of the affect theory is different from mine, I believe that adherents of both positions can agree that 'shame' is something innate to human nature from birth. Unlike the position of affect theory, I assert that human beings are born with the seed of *Shameability*, and the seed cannot grow normally in an unhealthy environment. While the innate seed of *Shameability* has to be nurtured, empowered, and liberated properly in order to become mature, it is important that the seed experience good care through the soil of healthy parenting, community care, and the larger culture.

Another contribution that has been made by the *third generation* shame theorists on the *pathological* level, especially by Tomkins and Nathanson, is the challenge to reconsider the tendencies of dichotomizing shame and guilt. While such a dualistic view is still

¹⁵⁴ Amsterdam and Levitt (1980) showed that a child develops a very different reaction to its own reflection in a mirror in the period between 18 and 24 months of age. Until this point, what the baby sees in the mirror is only another baby; however, during this six-month period, the child begins to respond to the reflected image in the mirror and shows some tendencies of acting shy. Amsterdam and Levitt called it "painful self-awareness," and identified it as the earliest manifestation of shame. Broucek (1982) later developed this view and called it "object self-awareness" meaning that the baby at this stage is no longer merely the subject of his/her own musings but the object of the scrutiny of others (Amsterdam & Levitt, 1980; Broucek, 1982, cited in Nathanson, 1992, 175-6)

¹⁵⁵ Michael Lewis, *Shame: The Exposed Self* (New York: Free Press, 1992), 29-43.

prevalent in Western psychoanalytic tradition, the affect theory has raised an important question of whether shame and guilt actually can be separated as much as they can be distinguished. While saying that guilt is “a part of the shame family of emotion” as well as that “guilt... involves shame about action,”¹⁵⁶ the affect theory supports my basic pastoral theological position on the inseparable nature of the shame-guilt relationship. Guilt, which inevitably involves evaluation of self,¹⁵⁷ cannot actually be separated from shame (though it can be distinguished theoretically) as long as the involved shame-guilt unit under the given situation becomes manipulated, or rigidly defended against either at the individual or the communal level. Here, what I mean by communal level includes systemic and theoretical efforts to defend against shame.

While there are a number of contributions in *third generation* shame theories, there are limitations as well. First, while theorists in this group talk much about the category of *pathological shame* and *pathological shamelessness*, the topic of *pathological shameability* (p-ii) never arises. While this is also an area that needs more research in the future, my pastoral theological observations show that there are certain proportions of people on the *pathological* level that are relatively self-aware. The self-awareness they have is not only sufficient enough to know and accept their neurotic reality, but also adequate enough to help prevent them from getting worse or suffering relapses. For example, I have seen a number of narcissistic people who know that they are narcissistic and manage their narcissistic rage. I have seen a number of PTSD patients who are still actively engaging in normal life despite the repetition of intense, shame-provoking situations of their traumatic

¹⁵⁶ Nathanson, 144.

¹⁵⁷ Lewis, *Shame and Guilt in Neurosis*, 30.

events. I have also seen a number of recovering addicts who are able to discipline themselves into not returning to the bad habit of using alcohol or drugs. Such people often make cognitive, emotional, relational, and faithful efforts while monitoring their feelings, thoughts, behaviors, and motivations with the help of pastoral supports so that they can maximize their potentiality of life even with an already damaged, traumatized, and spoiled self. No matter how severe their neurotic conditions are, it is my basic pastoral theological position that such people with *pathological shameability* (p-ii) are actually able to achieve a quality of life that is not any less than that of *less-damaged* people, or even that they are able to achieve more compared to people who do not have any sense of shame whatsoever. While this does not mean that such people with neuroses are necessarily free from their disturbances, what they show is certainly a different category of shame, and that is why *pathological shameability* (s-ii) needs to be distinguished from *pathological shame* (s-ii) and *pathological shamelessness* (l-ii) in which people are enmeshed and engulfed by *pathological shame* or rigidly defending against it.¹⁵⁸ One thing to be reminded of here is the need for further studies in the area of psychosis-related shame, something that has been neglected in the psychoanalytic tradition thus far. While there needs to be extended empirical research in this area, it is my hunch at the moment that even some psychotics may reach certain degrees of *pathological shameability* with a good, on-going, and compassionate nurturing of *the innate seed of Shameability* that they have. Related to this, I am reminded of a man who lived in the country of the Gerasenes and had what was termed

¹⁵⁸ My position is seemingly well supported by literature on post-traumatic growth. For more information, read *Posttraumatic Growth and Culturally Competent Practice: Lessons Learned from around the Globe*, ed. Tzipi Weiss and Roni Berger (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2010); *Handbook of Posttraumatic Growth: Research and Practice*, ed. Lawrence G. Calhoun and Richard G. Tedeschi (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006).

an unclean spirit. The Bible explains that he was living among the tombs, that he was naked and inflicted harm on himself, to the extent that no one could restrain him anymore, not even with a chain. But when Jesus approached him asking his name, he replied, “My name is Legion; for we are many” (Mark 5:1-9), suggesting that even his *pathological shamelessness* was restored to *pathological shameability* and possibly beyond. Verse 20 says, “And he went away and began to proclaim in the Decapolis how much Jesus had done for him; and everyone was amazed.” Through this ministry of restoring *Shameability*, Jesus seems to show us that it is not electric shock, chemical pills, or psychoanalytic theory that heals, but that the *Shameability of a caregiver* can nurture, empower, liberate, and make the difference. Jesus may have experienced unbearable *Shame* (p-vi) had he not gone across the lake to the country of Gerasenes in order to meet this poor man. Of course, it is not because Jesus was caught in *Shame*, but because he was in union with God that he could see the potential of his becoming estranged (*Shamed*, s-vi) if he did not follow the will of God by participating in the shame (s-ii) of the estranged human being.

The second limitation is that *third generation* theorists reflect a strong negative connotation of shame. For example, Tomkins’ grouping of shame shows this imbalance by sorting shame under the category of negative affects coupled with “humiliation.” Following his footsteps, Nathanson also understands shame as “the polar opposite of pride”¹⁵⁹ as his book title *Shame and Pride* suggests. It shows again that Western psychology of shame, in general, is centered on low-level and maladaptive shame. Shame for this group of thinkers is a cause of pathology (or pathology itself) where shame becomes a major problem or

¹⁵⁹ Nathanson, 86.

obstacle that needs to be removed or prevented for the sake of normal human development and well-being.

I hold that this view of shame is too narrow, and that having such a limited definition will prevent the so-called “shame problem” from being solved. It is true that shame can be a negative factor that creates pathological symptoms; however, it is “distorted shame,” not shame as a whole, that creates such problems. A principal limitation of the depth psychological view of shame is that it is not complex enough to provide a clear distinction between “distorted shame(s)” and *Shameability*. Had psychological views of shame included the existence of this undistorted *Shameability*, the goal of therapy and psychoanalysis could have been the restoration of shame—not the removal or prevention of shame.

Third, psychology of shame on the *pathological* level is operating in response to a dualistic worldview. The guilt-shame dichotomy is still prevalent even though a number of shame theorists in object relations theory, self psychology, and affect theory have achieved some meaningful progress on the theoretical level. In actual relationships, however, the guilt-shame dichotomy still exists as a foundation, and the *third generation* theorists’ views on the pathological level also are basically extensions of the Western world view of “dominants” (who are generally viewed as competent, mature, moral, responsible, and empathic) versus “subordinates” (who are generally viewed as incompetent, immature, immoral, irresponsible, and not empathic). Using the method of labeling people as “guilt-prone” and “shame-prone,”¹⁶⁰ the *third generation* psychologists still never see themselves

¹⁶⁰ Tangney and Dearing, 33-46.

and their theories as a part of distorted shame in which they easily objectify their patients, or powerless, subordinate, and traumatized others as ‘shame-prone’ both at the individual and communal levels.

For example, while I appreciate a number of insights from Nathanson’s work (1992), one thing that I could never understand was his way of viewing an incident that he experienced in a slum area. One evening, driving in his “precisely tuned, state-of-the art foreign car,” traveling from his office at the center of the city to his home that was located in a “beautifully landscaped upper-middle-class suburb,” Nathanson was stopped at a light and was “shocked into frightened alertness by a sudden thumping noise.” Standing next to him, pounding on the side of his car, Nathanson says, “was a tall, angry man of African descent shouting obscenities. I had cut him off at an intersection, he raged. ‘Where, how?’” Nathanson asked while having no idea what had provoked the man’s anger. Nathanson continues:

He was certainly on *attack other* script! [meaning, he was in an ‘attack-other’ mode according to Nathanson’s shame theory]. As he strode back to his car I was left to muse about the changes in our society that might make a relatively trivial driving incident into something that could have ended with real danger to my person. Something has happened to encourage a large and growing segment of our population to extend the radius of its response to shame. People now go to greater lengths to redress humiliation than ever before in my lifetime.¹⁶¹

In this episode, Donald Nathanson, one of the foremost experts on shame in Western psychoanalytic tradition, neither seemed to be cognizant of his own shame distortion as a member of the dominant group that had been abusing the people of African descent, nor

¹⁶¹ Nathanson, 461.

was he willing to make any meaningful efforts to restore it to *Shameability* (p-vi). Rather, he simply applied his theoretical “compass of shame” to the angry black man (and the group to which he belongs). However, it is not only the angry black man (or the group to which he belongs) but also Nathanson (and the group to which he belongs) who is under the same roof of distorted shame from the perspective of pastoral theology of *Shameability*. It seems that it is not only Nathanson but most shame theorists in the West (if not all of them) who are depending on a similar type of broken compass that misses a crucial part at the center called *Shameability*. Somehow, Western depth psychology in general and the psychology of shame in particular seems to be designed and developed to defend against the dominant party’s shame through various means, and this party’s shame theories are possibly serving the same purpose in order to hide and conceal who they actually are. However, in my view, regardless of its tradition discipline or method, any theory of shame with impaired *Shameability* can ultimately do more harm than benefit to the human community as a whole because of the static nature of blindness to its own distorted shame.

CHAPTER 4

Shame at the Stigma, Social, and Moral Levels

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the concept of shame at what I have identified as the *stigma*, *social*, and *moral* levels. In the previous chapter, I reviewed the contributions and limitations of the psychoanalytic traditions in developing an understanding of the *proto* and *pathological* levels of shame. As we have observed, psychoanalytic traditions often theorize shame as an emotion (or the state) of people who have experienced trauma, or are diagnosed with some form of psychopathology. The insights from psychology can also be relevant and useful in defining *shame* as it operates at the *stigma*, *social* and *moral* levels; however, these insights are limited. Therefore, an interdisciplinary approach is helpful to understand how *shame* operates at the *stigma*, *social*, and *moral* levels.

While there are many resources available for understanding the dynamics of *shame* at the *stigma*, *social* and *moral* levels, I will narrow down my research by using selected materials from the disciplines of sociology and philosophy in the area of shame. In the first part of this chapter, I will briefly review the understanding of stigma-related shame mainly from the perspective of Erving Goffman (1963), and try to draw out from his work what it means to have three categories of shame at the *stigma* level. Next, I will review the philosophy of Gabriele Taylor (1985) in order to have a deeper understanding about the dynamics of shame at the *social* level. After the review, I will try to show what the three categories of shame look like at the *social* level. The next portion of the chapter is devoted to the dynamics of shame at the *moral* level where I mainly use the philosophy of Julien

Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni (2012). After this review is done, I will again explain what the three categories of shame on the *moral* level look like as I draw on perspectives from Deonna et al., as well as perspectives from the pastoral theology of *Shameability*.

The review of the selected social and philosophical resources will bring me to a conclusion that the understandings of shame at the *stigma*, *social* and *moral* levels from these disciplines are helpful within these levels; however, they are incomplete because what they discuss is still limited in the area of low-level/distorted shame from the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*. While I can carry forward the insights from Goffman, Taylor, and Deonna as well as some of the other theorists discussed for understanding the dynamics of shame on these particular levels, I will argue that we still need to expand the meaning of shame beyond these levels because they do not include the dynamics of shame at the *ultimate* level. The problem is that the views from sociology and philosophy are limited as they mainly deal with shame dynamics within the context of human relationships, society, culture, value, and conscience. After recognizing these limitations, I will move on to the *ultimate* level in order to have a better understanding about the undistorted side of ‘shame’ (p-vi). This will bring me to a point of exploring shame in the areas of theology and biblical texts, as well as the clinical pastoral materials both at the individual and communal/global levels.

Stigma Level

The term *stigma* originated from the Greeks who carried out bodily cutting or burning to mark and advertise that the bearer was “a slave, a criminal, or a traitor—and a

blemished person, ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places.”¹⁶² The concept of stigma as a powerful phenomenon related to the value interwoven with varying social identities has received considerable attention in the fields of sociology and social psychology. For example, John Dovidio and his colleagues explain that “stigma is a social construction that involves at least two fundamental components: 1) the recognition of difference based on some distinguishing characteristic or “mark”; and 2) a consequent devaluation of the person [or community.]”¹⁶³

Erving Goffman

Another researcher who has made a contribution to the limited research on stigma-related shame is Erving Goffman (1922-1982). Goffman’s work made a meaningful contribution to the concept of stigma and its inevitable connection with shame, even though shame itself was not a major topic in his work. Goffman (1963) discusses a variety of stigma or stigmatizing conditions using three different categories: 1) abominations of body (e.g., physical defects, ugliness);¹⁶⁴ 2) blemishes of individual character (e.g., addictions, mental disorders, criminal history, unemployment); and 3) tribal identities (e.g., racial and ethnic background, sex, religion, nation).¹⁶⁵ Goffman believed that society establishes certain procedures of categorizing different persons—and attaches to them specific attributes felt to be characteristic of the members of each of these categorizations, in case there is a gap between an individual’s true social identity and his/her presented one.

¹⁶² Erving Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 1.

¹⁶³ John Dovidio et al., “Stigma: Introduction and Overview,” in *The Social Psychology of Stigma*, ed. Todd F. Heatherton et al. (New York: Guilford Press, 2000), 3.

¹⁶⁴ For more detailed information regarding stigma-related particularly as regards the human face, please refer to Stephen Pattison, *Saving Face: Enfacement, Shame, Theology* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2013).

¹⁶⁵ Goffman, 4.

Goffman believed that people can sense this fact beforehand, and that it is quite evident when the stigmatized person presents him- or herself before the “normals.”¹⁶⁶ Goffman further explained that it is not only the stigmatized individuals that suffer from stigma because the stigma is so easily spread to his/her family members or close friends where such relations often are either to be avoided or to be terminated.¹⁶⁷ For Goffman, stigma is a deeply discrediting characteristic, and the person with a stigma is regarded as not quite normal, or even as “not quite human.” It is where “shame becomes a central possibility, arising from the individual’s perception of one of his[her] own attributes as being a defiling thing to possess, and one he[she] can readily see himself [herself] as not possessing.”¹⁶⁸ Goffman observed that the members either in or related to a specific stigma category would often come together as a small group, only then to create an array of stigma categories within themselves.¹⁶⁹

Goffman thought that it is not only the influence of these “normals” who stigmatize certain individuals or groups based on what they regard as “normal” or “standard” in a given society, but also the ambivalence and self-contradiction that the stigmatized individuals or communities have within themselves that perpetuates stigma. While stigmatized people do not want to stay in such a state, Goffman explained that they at the same time have tendencies of having a “self-betraying kind of stratification” of social alliances (like their choices of friends, dates and spouse, as well as their general behaviors of preference and

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 41.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 30.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 7.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

decision-making) that makes it hard to lead them to be more affluent “across the line.”¹⁷⁰

This is where stigmatized individuals often become self-contradictory because “they define themselves as no different from any other human being, while at the same time they define themselves as set apart.”¹⁷¹

One example from Goffman’s work related to this problem is the story of a dwarf. The dwarf was about four feet tall but was highly educated. Yet, when around others, she acted the part of a foolish dwarf,

with the same mocking laughter and the same quick, funny movements that have been the characteristic of fools ever since the royal courts of the Middle Ages. Only when she was among friends, she could throw away her cap and bells and dare to be the woman she really was....¹⁷²

This example illustrates Goffman's view that it is not only the “normals” but also the stigmatized that need to be more open to change. Because of the ambiguity and fickleness that the stigmatized individuals have within themselves, they continue to perpetuate their own stigmatization among the “normals.”

While it is Goffman’s basic position that there can be “no authentic solution” for the problem of stigma (and shame that inevitably comes with it in our social context), he believed that it is still helpful for both parties, the “normal” and the “stigmatized,” to learn to be “sympathetic” and “wise” to help bring about and maximize the potentiality for change regardless of both groups’ perception of any stigma. In illustrating this point, Goffman used another story about Ray Birdwhistell (1955), an example of a white boy who played with a group of Negro [sic] boys his own age. When the white boy first joined them,

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 108.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid., 106-10. (The quotation is from *The Carling*, op. cit., 54-55, cited in Goffman, 110).

the black boys would use the term “nigger” cautiously in the white boy’s presence. Gradually though, as they spent time together, the black boys began to joke comfortably with each other in front of the white boy and call each other “nigger.” Then, one day another shift occurred when even the white boy could use the word “nigger” to refer to his black friends; the previously forbidden word and the old categories had totally disappeared.¹⁷³ While the boys in the illustration are still young, they exemplify what Goffman tried to mean by being “sympathetic” and “wise” enough to lift the self-imposed barrier.

There is another story that shows from another perspective what Goffman was trying to do—a story of a man with both hands amputated. Whenever this poor man went out to a restaurant, he brought out a pack of cigarettes, lit one, and sat back puffing it in a cool manner. “That almost always attracted attention,” the man explained. “People would stare and I could almost hear them saying, My! Isn’t it wonderful what he can do with a pair of hooks?” So whenever somebody made a comment about the small spectacle, the man explained that there is a remark he always makes with a smile, “There’s one thing I never have to worry about. That’s burning my fingers.”¹⁷⁴ Goffman tried to explain that the “normals” really mean no harm in many cases, and the “out-group alignments” are quite possible when the stigmatized people are compassionate and shrewd enough to remove the stumbling block, which is often self-imposed. It is true that the “normals” need to be attentive, sensitive, and tactful—but the stigmatized can still make efforts at “sympathetic re-education of the normal[s], showing them, point for point, quietly, and with delicacy, that

¹⁷³ Ibid., 26-9. The quotation is from Ray Birdwhistell in B. Schaffner, ed., *Group Processes*, Transactions of the Second (1955) Conference (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, 1956), 171. Cited in Goffman (1963).

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 114-25.

in spite of appearances the stigmatized people are, underneath it all, a fully-human being.”¹⁷⁵

Since Goffman published his classic monograph in 1963, a number of meaningful progressions in investigations on the relationship between stigma and the issues of deviance, marginality, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination have emerged (Archer, 1985; Ashmore, 1970; Brigham, 1971; Crandall, 1994; Hebl & Heatherton, 1998; Jones, 1986; Jones et al., 1984; Frable, 1993; Crocker et al., 1998; Mackie et al., 1996; Wills, 1981). For these theorists, one key question was about the motivation of the stigmatizers. Thomas Wills (1981), in his ‘downward comparison theory,’ explained that “comparing oneself to less fortunate others can increase one’s own subjective sense of well-being, and therefore boost one’s self-esteem.” He believed that downward comparison can be passive (e.g., seeking out others who are well off in some relevant dimension) or more active (e.g., creating a condition of disadvantage of others through discrimination); therefore, stigmatization can involve both passive and active forms.¹⁷⁶ Diane Mackie et al. (1996) explained that, “stigmatizing others can enhance the stigmatizer’s perceived and actual control to the extent that it leads to differential treatment, systematic avoidance, segregation, and marginalization of others who are threatening to the stigmatizer’s personal well-being or values.”¹⁷⁷ Political scientist Philip Klinker and his colleague Rogers Smith proposed that stigmatization may come from motivations to maintain a certain status quo in society

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 116.

¹⁷⁶ Thomas A. Wills, “Downward Comparison Principles in Social Psychology,” *Psychological Bulletin* 90, no. 2 (1981): 245-71.

¹⁷⁷ Diane Mackie et al., “Social Psychological Foundations of Stereotype Formation,” in *Stereotypes and Stereotyping*, ed. C. Neil Macrae, Charles Stangor, and Miles Hewstone (New York: Guilford Press, 1996), 41-78. Cited in Heatherton, 8.

which usually involves both individual and group-based variations of institutional discrimination and segregation. Such discrimination and segregation serve to justify the treatment towards disparate groups, and for the dominating group to preserve its power or advantage over others. In the case of America, for example, historically, white Americans have held most of the positions of influence or power—which then became thought of as the “status quo” that was to be protected. This in turn could only be done through systematic discrimination carried out by the whites themselves: residential, occupational, and social segregation. Slavery and seizure of lands from the Native Americans acted as a first catalyst in initiating such systematic discrimination so that white Americans could continue to exploit other parties politically, economically, educationally, religiously, culturally, and socially.¹⁷⁸

Contributions and Limitations

The disciplines of sociology, social psychology, and political science can contribute to a more complex understanding of shame through studies on stigma and the process of stigmatization, even though shame itself is not often explicitly addressed. Scholarship in this field has shown that stigmatization, at its essence, challenges one’s social identity where a stigmatized person or a community is treated as being less than “normal”— a serious challenge to one’s humanity that inevitably involves shame. While I disagree with their basic assumption that human shame is a social or political product, I admit that it is the reality of distorted shame (particularly at the *stigma* level) that is prevalent in our society and the wider world today both at the individual and communal levels.

¹⁷⁸ Philip A. Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith, *The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 1-9.

However, the problem again is that their view is neither sufficiently multifaceted nor balanced. Even with the number of valuable insights they have made, the socio-political view still remains unbalanced, as well as failing to mention some crucial categories of shame-related phenomena. What are not explicitly stated in Goffman's work, for example, are actually three distinct categories of shame-related experiences at the *stigma* level. The problem is that Goffman's language is not sophisticated enough to individuate them. Instead, all three categories of *stigma shamelessness* (l-iii), *stigma shame* (s-iii) and *stigma shameability* (p-iii) are fused under the term "stigma." For example, what Goffman described as stigmatized people are actually of two kinds: 1) an individual or a group being caught with *stigma shame*; the people who are neither self-aware nor relational enough; and 2) an individual or a group who is "sympathetic" and "wise" enough regardless of their stigmata; the people who are both self-aware and relational enough. While the latter group is not necessarily free from stigma (either in the form of "the stigmatizing" or "the stigmatized"), these people are clearly operating on a different category of shame from the former, and therefore need to be distinguished as having *the stigma sense of shame/shameability*.

There is another distinction to be made for Goffman and his successors. It is for the group of people who fall into the category of *stigma shamelessness* both at the individual and communal levels. Overall, the dynamic between "the stigmatizing" and "the stigmatized" is actually no different from the formally mentioned dynamic between the "shameless dominant" and the "shameful subordinated" that was present on the *proto* and *pathological* levels. There are stigmatized people who do not feel shame because they are

immune to it (e.g., the people who live with lower socio-economic status generation to generation as we see in some minority communities of the United States; lower classes in the caste system of India and other parts of the world; the minors in such subordinated groups who are born with the stigma and grow up with the stigma that their parents and community bear). These people easily fall into the first type of *stigma shamelessness* where they defend against their shame through powerlessness, servile spirit, and fatalism.

The second type is the shameless dominant group, the stigmatizer. While this group sets and labels all the standards for what it means to be “normal,” they are unable to recognize others as the same human beings as they are. What these people do not realize though is how shameful their state of dehumanizing others is. While it is the “itish” relationship they have, in Buber’s term, where they keep themselves detached and uninvolved while viewing others as a “means of achieving their predetermined goals,”¹⁷⁹ they do not honestly face their true identity. Although what the members of this group show through their shamelessness nature is in fact truly shameful, they are unable to see or even notice their own shame because they are rigidly defending against it. This is where the most shameful becomes completely manipulated, hidden, and concealed even from themselves, and is passed on to the next generation due to the very nature of this party’s shame deep inside.

Both cases show that stigma, either in the forms of “being stigmatized” or “stigmatizing others,” can be a way of defending against shame (either through the means of powerlessness or power). On the individual level, this can happen through all sorts of

¹⁷⁹ James William Jones, *Contemporary Psychoanalysis and Religion: Transference and Transcendence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 128.

personal prejudice, bullying, blaming, and victimizing. On the communal level, this can happen through all kinds of socio-economic, political, legislative, religious, ideological, educational, systematic, intelligent, classified, and military efforts to manipulate and defend against shame. While Western sociology, social psychology, and political science do not reveal enough truth yet, such efforts of defending against stigma shame are still going on through stigmatizing others as “uncivilized, less-human, gentile, terrorist, axis of evil...” where all kinds of unjustifiable actions, policies and decision-making are accepted within the dominating groups. Due to the effectiveness of this systematic stigmatization, even a number of innocent people have been killed by drone attacks by the U.S., and the NSA’s programs are surveilling phone calls and e-mail exchanges of the world without an appropriate sense of shame.

This is the context in which a widely controversial essay by James Wagner, the president of Emory University, was published in which he used the example of the “3/5ths compromise” in the United States Constitution as an illustration in order to support his argument for achieving “our most noble goals.”¹⁸⁰ Later, Wagner publically apologized, regretting that his point in the essay was not delivered as he had intended. However, the concern is the deeply embedded shamelessness of these sorts of acts that play out by themselves without even being noticed by many others who are running large institutions, corporations, governments, and international organizations led by the dominating group.

Stigma-based Shame

¹⁸⁰ James Wagner, “As American as . . . Compromise,” in *Emory Magazine* (Winter, 2013).

Goffman said that there can be “no authentic solution” for the problem of stigma, and his successors appear to have no objection to his position. But I am positive, based on my pastoral theological observations, that there is a solution for this and it shows in *the Shameability/the ultimate sense of Shame* of Jesus. He came to a stigma-filled world where people were suffering from the pain of dehumanization either through the form of “being stigmatized” or actively “stigmatizing others.” However, Jesus himself did not experience being stigmatized by others, although people often tried to stigmatize him. His goal was to help restore *Shameability* for both groups. For this, He embraced stigmata; He nurtured, empowered, and liberated those with a severely distorted sense of *Shameability* because He still saw hope for their restoration.

What Jesus did was a pastoral ministry of restoring *Shameability* both at the individual and communal levels (though making such a distinction often did not make any sense for him). Among the many examples,¹⁸¹ I am reminded of two cases. One morning, Jesus met a woman who had been caught in adultery. What Jesus said to the accusing stigmatizers of scribes and the Pharisees was: “Anyone among you who is without sin be the first to throw a stone at her.” After they left one by one, Jesus asked the accused—the stigmatized, “Woman, where are they? Has no one condemned you?” “No, sir.” Then, Jesus said, “Neither do I condemn you. Go your way, and from now on do not sin again” (John 8:3-11). This is where the seed within her of *stigma shame* was nurtured and possibly restored into *Shameability* through her meeting with Jesus. The Bible does not describe her life after this incident in detail; however, many believe that this woman was changed and

¹⁸¹ Some other examples are the cases of Zacchaeus the tax collector (Luke 19:1-10), a man born blind (John 9:1-12), a leper (Luke 5:12-26), a woman suffering from hemorrhages (Luke 8:42-48), little children (Mark 10:13-16), a Roman centurion (Matthew 8: 5-13), and a Canaanite woman (Matthew 15:21-28).

spread the good news, and indeed that she played an important role in the early church. It seems that a certain degree of *shameability* was also restored in the scribes and the Pharisees because none of them was able to throw a stone at her that morning. This incident shows that for both parties it is always the *Shameability/the ultimate sense of Shame* that needs to be restored.

Another episode happened when Jesus went to Samaria, the land of stigma, and met a woman at the well—the stigmatized among the stigmatized. This woman, who was unable even to come to the well while other people were present, went back to the village to spread the good news after she met Jesus—who helped her unload the burdens of stigma-based shame (John 4:7-14). It is apparent that something had stirred up her *stigma shame* (s-iii) during the conversation between her and Jesus, helping it to be healed into *stigma shameability* (p-iii) and beyond—something great that she had long forgotten. She was changed; shame of some sort was still there, but the old stigmatized category was completely gone. Had she not gone back to the village in order to spread the good news to the people, she would have experienced unbearable *Shame*. Again, it does not mean that she was caught in *Shame*, but that because she was now in union with the Lord she could see the potential of *Shame* through her restored *Shameability*. Presumably those who heard her testimony after meeting Jesus would have been empowered as well.

Social Level

The dynamic of shame on the *social* level is the most typical shame experience for the majority of people in the public at large, and it is one of the most popular claims in the area of diverse shame-related disciplines as well. That is why the meaning of shame as a

social emotion is perhaps the closest one to the definitions of shame that appear in the dictionaries. The following definitions are from the two famous classic dictionaries of the English Language that are published in the United States:

Shame: . . . the uneasy sensation of mind produced by a consciousness of guilt or loss of reputation, or from the exposure of that which modesty prompts us to conceal; the pain or emotion arising from the thought of another person beholding us, or something connected with us, with contempt, indignation, or disgust; that which brings reproach, and degrades in the estimation of others; reproach; dishonor; disgrace; ignominy.¹⁸²

Shame: . . . a painful sensation excited by a consciousness of guilt, or of having done something which injures reputation; or by the exposure of that which nature or modesty prompts us to conceal. Shame is particularly excited by the disclosure of actions which, in the view of men, are mean and degrading. Hence, it is often or always manifested by a downcast look or by blushes, called confusion of face; the cause or reason of shame; that which brings reproach, and degrades a person in the estimation of others.¹⁸³

While these dictionary definitions demonstrate that the majority of people are actually operating on a *social* level of shame, such a view is also apparent in ordinary people who do not even need to refer to the dictionaries in order to know what shame means for them.

When I asked one of my old friends to define shame for me, he wrote the following definition:

shame is a painful emotion marked by a keen sense of exposure or vulnerability, or social disgrace or rejection; shame is primarily an emotion (although it may have other components) that has to do with being exposed, and being disgraced in front of other people; meaning, revealed and found in the area of unwanted; the paradigmatic experience of shame for me is nakedness—to be naked is to be shamed; what should be covered is now uncovered.

¹⁸² James Stormonth, *A Dictionary of the English Language*, ed. P. H. Phelp (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1885).

¹⁸³ Noah Webster, *An American Dictionary of the English Language*, ed. Chauncey A. Goodrich and Noah Porter (Springfield: G & C Merriam, 1850).

While the *social* character of shame is the most widespread notion of shame for the public at large, it also has been the heart of some classic philosophical, anthropological and psychological accounts. Among them is a meaningful study done by philosopher Gabriele Taylor (1985).¹⁸⁴

Gabriele Taylor

For Taylor, shame belongs to the same group of emotions as pride, humiliation, and guilt. The reason she puts these four emotions in the same group is because she believes that they are all related to self-assessment. Taylor argues that self is the object of these emotions, and “what is believed amounts to an assessment of that self,” meaning Taylor believes that emotional experience comes through certain “beliefs.” Although it cannot be said that all emotions are always caused by beliefs, Taylor is pretty certain that over a wide range of emotions, beliefs are “constitutive of the emotional experience.”¹⁸⁵ “They are constitutive in two ways,” Taylor says. First, a belief makes emotional experience what it is, meaning that belief identifies an experience through a particular emotion (i.e., “this is a situation for feeling anger,” or “this is a time to cry,” and so on). Second, a belief makes the emotional experience rationally intelligible, meaning that emotional experience can be evaluated in the light of available evidence. In this sense, Taylor is talking about two kinds of possibilities in human emotional experience, which she believes are related to beliefs. Here, she is saying that there are two kinds of beliefs: 1) a belief that is related with

¹⁸⁴ These include the works of Baruch Spinoza (2010/1677), Jean-Paul Sartre (1977/1943), Margaret Mead (1937), Ruth Benedict (1947), and Sigmund Freud (1966), to name a few.

¹⁸⁵ Gabriele Taylor, *Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 1-2.

identification; and 2) a belief that is related to the intelligibility of a particular emotional state (Taylor, 1985).

One example that Taylor provides for explaining the two kinds of beliefs is an episode of a person who encounters a snake while walking. Taylor explains that the first response of the person will be the experience of fear, and it is natural because this person is operating on a belief that is related to the notion of this creature being dangerous. However, upon realizing that the snake is withdrawing, based on his/her rational and intelligible belief this agent does not experience fear anymore, given the evidence that the snake is not in attack mode. With this example, Taylor explains that the former belongs to the “identificatory belief,” while the latter belongs to the “intelligible/rational belief.”¹⁸⁶ In this sense, the rational/intelligible belief for Taylor can be viewed as the agent’s reason for holding the identificatory belief.

When these two dynamics are adapted in the case of shame, Taylor explains that there can be basically two elements in each case. The first one is “the self-directed adverse judgment” of the person who feels shame.¹⁸⁷ Here, the agent is the one who feels him/herself degraded. Taylor explains “this judgment is constitutive of the emotion,” meaning it belongs to the person’s “identificatory belief.”¹⁸⁸ The second type is the shame where there is the notion of the audience for the agent, and Taylor believes that “this notion has a role to play in the explanation of the self-directed judgment” as well.¹⁸⁹ Taylor says that the audience does not have to be the actual audience because it can also be the

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 1-5.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 64.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 65.

imagined audience, or even the agent's own eyes (meaning, the various forms 'internalized others' becoming my audience that is hidden inside).¹⁹⁰

In any case, for Taylor, the audience plays a significant role in shame-related experience, and this means that people feel shame because they think of themselves "as being seen."¹⁹¹ In Taylor's understanding of shame, a person can assess him/herself "only in terms of what the audience thinks of him."¹⁹² Based on this reasoning, she says that if an agent has lost his/her reputation, then he/she has lost his/her value in the eyes of all the members of the group, and this includes him/herself.¹⁹³ It means that self-respect and public respect "stand and fall together" for Taylor, and "there can be no distinction between private and public."¹⁹⁴

Related to this basic notion of shame, Taylor argues that the agent needs to be a member of a group of people who are governed by a relevant honor-code or value system that they share in a particular society or culture. This is the context where the members of this group expect "certain types of behavior of themselves and others, and judge themselves and others accordingly."¹⁹⁵ This means that shame does not occur for Taylor when somebody is in the position of not sharing the shame belief, value, and honor-code. In order to experience shame (on a *social* level), one must "share the point of view of the group," meaning, "he has failed in his own eyes" as well as "from others' eyes." If somebody is not experiencing the shame that everybody else in that particular group is experiencing, this

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 59.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 54.

¹⁹² Ibid., 55.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 55.

somebody “would not be a member” of that group.¹⁹⁶ For this, Taylor uses an example that is often quoted from the heroes in Homer’s *Iliad*. Taylor says, “to be dishonored, it is necessary to belong to an honor group in the first place,” meaning, “it may happen to the hero [in Homer’s *Iliad*], but cannot happen to the slave.”¹⁹⁷ This means that shame-related experiences can be very different depending on the diverse groups to which people belong, as well as their different beliefs, cultures, value-systems and levels of shame. Accordingly, shame dynamics on the *social* level can be very specific and particular compared to the other levels because “the code will be sufficiently well articulated for members to recognize failure to comply”¹⁹⁸ while there can be some other cases where no such code (terms like ‘honor’ and ‘shame’) are available. Then, to understand one’s (or, a community’s) dynamic of shame on the *social* level, it is crucial to understand the code (belief, value-system) as well as the shame levels that a particular agent (both at the individual and communal levels) has. Depending on the nature of the agent’s sense of belonging as well as its code and shame-related levels, something that is regarded as ‘shame’ for a particular agent can be experienced as something that has nothing to do with shame in other systems of value and culture.¹⁹⁹

Meaning of Audience

Taylor’s understanding of audience is very complex. She warns that it can be easily over-simplified. According to Taylor, there can be two kinds of over-simplification about

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 56.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ For example, being a gay person can be viewed very differently depending on the society and culture. The way women should clothe themselves when they go out, or having more than one wife can be viewed very differently depending on the society and culture as well.

the notion of audience. The first kind of over-simplification is to assume that the observer is critical of the agent in order to elicit shame from the agent. Taylor argues that “the audience required for shame” does not have to be critical at all. There can be all kinds of observers, and “the seeing may be indifferent, or friendly or hostile,”²⁰⁰ meaning that even when the audience is not critical, the agent is still able to experience shame.

Taylor explains “if the agent feels shame although she thinks she is seen with approval, then this can only be because she believes that being so seen [itself] puts her on a level with the audience, and it is this which is degrading.”²⁰¹ By saying this, Taylor means that people can experience shame because “there is nevertheless something wrong in his being so seen...”²⁰² and “the thought of being seen at all may be enough for feeling shame.”²⁰³ If the audience is “indifferent,” the agent may feel shame because he/she believes “either that the audience does not think her worthy of attention, or the agent believes that on this occasion she ought not to be seen at all.”²⁰⁴

The second kind of over-simplification is to assume that “the agent accepts what he takes to be the observer’s description of what he is doing” in case the audience is a critical one. It means that the agent may feel shame even when he/she/they disagree(s), or reject(s) the audience’s description of his/her/their position.²⁰⁵ This is the case when the agent (both at the individual and communal levels according to my pastoral theological observation) is selflessly heteronomous while submitting him- or herself uncritically to the beliefs, values,

²⁰⁰ Taylor, 64.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 65.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid., 60.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 64-5.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 60.

expectations, demands or standards of others in order to maintain his/her status, position, reputation, face, or public image within a given group, society, culture, or power group in the world.

Nevertheless, this does not mean for Taylor that there must be an actual or imagined observer for particular cases of shame. For Taylor, “the actual or imagined observer may merely be the means of making the agent look at himself.”²⁰⁶ Taylor explains that shame requires “a sophisticated type of self-consciousness.” A person feeling shame will exercise her “capacity for self-awareness,” and “she will do so dramatically: from being just an actor absorbed in what she is doing, she will suddenly become self-aware and self-critical.” Taylor says that it is plainly a state of self-consciousness which “centrally relies on the concept of another,”²⁰⁷ meaning that shame is related to self-consciousness that inevitably involves the concept of another, although Taylor says that “it is not necessary for feeling shame that the agent believes there to be some observer who views him under some description.”²⁰⁸

Three Categories of Shame on the *Social* Level

The question, then, is what it looks like to be in the state of *shame*, *shamelessness*, and *shameability* on the *social* level. Regarding this, it might be helpful if we think about some possible scenarios because Taylor does not provide such distinctions in her philosophy although we can draw out some insights from her.

Suppose there is a woman who is from a lower class in a society but ended up belonging to a very high class as a result of her marriage. One day, she accidentally blurts out

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 66.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 67.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 66.

a profanity. She is shamed because the going assumption in that community is that people do not think such thoughts, and if she accidentally blurted out some profanity it will reveal that she is not what she is advertising herself to be. It would reveal her hypocrisy, and show that she is not the person others presumed her to be. There would be an exposure of deficiency, or something socially unacceptable within that particular group. When it happens, she may feel horribly shamed, and she may even want to hide and get away. In a worst-case scenario, she may even feel as if her selfhood is damaged and therefore that she is no longer worthy of being part of the group anymore. Such a state can be called *social shame* (s-iv).

On the other hand, suppose this woman learned and mastered how to behave within that particular group, culture, and value-system. Now she is ready and never makes a single mistake when she is around others in that group. She smiles, talks, acts, and greets others just like a full, legitimate member of this group because she knows what will happen if she does not meet the expectations of others; such a state can be called social *shameability* (p-iv). In this sense, *shameability* on this particular level is the awareness of potential disconnection (*socio-cultural shame*, s-iv).²⁰⁹

Even more complex is the case of *social shamelessness* (l-iv). On the *social* level, there can be three kinds of *shamelessness*, according to my observation. Suppose this woman does not care much about her disconnection with the people even after she accidentally blurted out a profanity. She rigidly defends herself against her *shame* (s-iv) instead of hiding: “I didn’t do anything wrong!” That can be the first possibility for

²⁰⁹ In some aspects, what David Augsberger (1986) talks about as *interpathy* can be related to this type of capacity at the *socio-cultural* level. For more information, read David W. Augsberger, *Pastoral Counseling across Cultures* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986).

shamelessness (I-iv). On the other hand, suppose the woman does not share any values with this elegant group, and does not want to join it in the first place. She prefers to stay at home and watch television because she is not interested in being part of such an elegant group. Then, this case is just like the slave who does not belong to the group of heroes in Homer's *Iliad* as Taylor explains. This can explain the second type of *shamelessness* (I-iv) on the *social* level.

The third possibility for *social shamelessness* (I-iv) is the case where the woman actually exceeds the maturity level of the people who are gathered in the polite community. Given that social class does not determine the maturity level of people but the inner quality and integrity of people, this woman can actually be on a higher level compared to the people in that particular group, even though other people do not recognize it. In other words, it is possible that a figure like a slave (in Homer's *Iliad*—who is seemingly unable to experience shame because the agent does not belong to the honor group due to his lower status) can actually be a character who belongs to a group that far exceeds the level of the heroes in Homer's *Iliad*. What I mean by this is that there can be another type of *social shamelessness* (I-iv) where the agent does not belong to the same group not because of his/her low status, but because his/her status is significantly higher than the others (meaning that the agent does not believe that he/she is supposed to be ashamed at all by the external standards of the given culture because this agent is operating on a completely different level in terms of his/her/their values, beliefs, and sense of belonging).

This explains why Jesus, who boldly said to Pontius Pilate, “My kingdom is not of this world” (John 18:36), could possibly have been in a state of being socially *shameless* (I-

iv), although it is possible that he could have experienced some shame when He was crucified. His ‘shamelessness’ was not actually *social shamelessness* (l-iv) that was related to the rigid defense against his *social shame* (s-iv); instead, it was his state of *Shameability* (p-vi)— he was sharing the honor-code, value-system and sense of belonging that was based on the culture of the Kingdom of God. For Jesus, it seems that the standard of evaluation was wrong, and he refused to submit blindly to the expectations of others in order to prevent his *social shame* (s-iv).

Nevertheless, for the majority of people including theologians from the East and West, the crucifixion of Jesus is still viewed as a state of utmost shame, or even a “godless vortex.”²¹⁰ Pastoral theologian Jill McNish (2004) along with James and Evelyn Whitehead (1994) for example, seems to understand Jesus on the cross as the one who was suffering from this particular level of *shame* (s-iv). Such shame is about exposure and vulnerability. As James and Evelyn Whitehead have noted, “At the beginning of Christianity looms the shameful public execution of a naked Jesus. This startling memory must indicate a special contribution of Christianity for healing the social shame.”²¹¹

What was Jesus thinking as he hung naked from the tree of shame, in agony, publically exposed, and unspeakably humiliated? Of course we will never know.... But the testimony of two of the gospel narratives put these words in his mouth: ‘My God, my God,

²¹⁰ Jill L. McNish, *Transforming Shame: A Pastoral Response* (Binghamton, NY: Haworth Pastoral Press, 2004), 143.

²¹¹ James D. Whitehead and Evelyn Eaton Whitehead, *Shadows of the Heart: A Spirituality of the Negative Emotions* (New York: Crossroad, 1994), 13.

why have you forsaken me?’ (Matthew 27:46; Mark 15:34) It would not be an overstatement to say that Christianity literally had its birth on the altar of shame.²¹²

Nevertheless, just the opposite is true from the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*. Jesus was not ashamed because he was following the will of God. Had he not been crucified on the cross (meaning, had he run away from the cross in a cowardly fashion) disobeying the will of God, then he would have experienced truly unbearable *Shame* (s-vi). The problem is that many thinkers, including McNish and Whitehead, tend to treat divine shame on the same level as we sinners experience it. However, shame is a very complex, multilayered phenomenon, and this in turn means that there is a very wide range of belief-systems, values, as well as cultures and societies that are drastically different from each other depending on the levels of shame.

As mentioned earlier, there is a basic animal level, a *pathological* level, a *stigma* level, a *social* level, a *moral* level, and there is an *ultimate* level as well. To underestimate the divine *Shameability* into the category of sinful human beings’ distorted shame(s) is simply to project the lower level, the distorted shame of human beings, on to God on high. This is probably one of the reasons that many people are not convinced with the dissertation’s claim that God is a God of *Shameability* (p-vi), and God can never be a God of *Shame*, or *Shamelessness*. Instead of accepting the *Shameability* of God on the *ultimate/divine* level (p-vi), people often project their distorted shame(s) onto God, and

²¹² McNish, 13-4.

claim that they cannot imagine that God can experience ‘shame.’ But, what I mean by this is that God has ‘*Shameability*’ because God is relational.²¹³

Moral Level

At first sight, shame on the *moral* level appears to happen a lot because many people believe that they experience it in the social context. Although the dynamics of *social* and *moral* shame can often overlap, shame at the *moral* level is very different from that of the *social* level because the *moral* agents are autonomous enough to act upon their own conscience and value as long as it is relevant to themselves. This means that shame cannot be said to be moral if an agent acts morally just because he/she is concerned about the eyes of others. This is the reason why *social* shame as a whole belongs to the lower level compared to *moral* shame because others often impose its standards, and the agents often experience those standards as external sanctions. Under this circumstance it is also important to note that “not only need the subject not adhere to the standard in question, he might even completely disagree with it and yet feel shame,” and it shows the heteronomy that is often found in *social* shame.²¹⁴

Traditionally, philosophers and anthropologists including Plato, Hume, Lynd, and a handful of others, have discussed the autonomous character of *moral* shame. According to my observations, what attracted these thinkers was moral *shameability* (p-v); they often

²¹³ If God does not love sinners, it would be a *Shame* (s-vi) for God because it contradicts who God is. In this sense, *Shame* can never occur to God because God has the capacity to sense potential *Shame* (*the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability*, p-vi) which belongs to the image of God. In relation to this nature of God, Saint Paul delivered important messages in his letter saying, “For I am convinced that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor rulers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord” (Romans 8:38-39); “For while we were still weak, at the right time Christ died for the ungodly. Indeed, rarely will anyone die for a righteous person; though perhaps for a good person someone might actually dare to die. But God proves God’s love for us in that while we still were sinners Christ died for us” (Romans 5:6-9).

²¹⁴ Deonna et al., 27.

believed that shame could function as a ‘guide,’ or ‘warning signal’ for the agents who are operating according to their consciences and self-relevant values so that they can remove themselves from any potential transgressions. It seems that these thinkers did not doubt that shame could have a positive role to play in morality, and that is why they often characterized shame as a ‘safeguard’ (Plato), as a ‘guardian of the virtues’ (Hume), or as ‘revelatory of people’s integrity’ (Lynd).²¹⁵ These thinkers often view human beings as moral agents who can react with shame to their moral failings independent of how they appear to others.

Based on this reasoning for their argument of shame as a moral emotion, Deonna and his colleagues (2012) have done meaningful work while criticizing the two most popular dogmas of our day where shame is negatively viewed: 1) as an essentially social emotion, 2) as a morally bad emotion. While a large portion of Deonna and his colleagues’ work is devoted to defending shame against those negative views, one opposing stance that they are criticizing is the position of the recent empirical psychologists that hold extremely negative views of shame as a morally problematic emotion.

This position of recent empirical psychology is based on the guilt versus shame dichotomy that is further developed from its original form in Lewis (1971); for this Tangney and her colleagues (1995, 1996, 2000, 2002) have certainly been some of the most influential and powerful anti-shame advocates along with recent evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Paul Gilbert).

Views of Recent Empirical Psychology

²¹⁵ Ibid., 154.

The method that recent empirical psychologists are employing is to pin down the individual differences between shame and guilt through questionnaire-based studies such as the Test of Self Conscious Affect (TOSCA). As Deonna et al., (2002) summarize:

These studies focus on the affective and behavioral associations of shame and guilt, both at the dispositional level (i.e., with respect to subjects' distinctive proneness to feel shame or guilt) and the episodic level. TOSCA-based method argues that the empirical evidence show that guilt is good and shame is bad in specific morally and socially relevant areas. First, guilt promotes interaction with others, whereas shame motivates concealment (hiding) from them. Guilt is thus associated with taking responsibility, shame with shirking responsibility. Second, guilt is associated with other-oriented empathy, whereas shame is associated with self-oriented distress. Guilt, thus, manifests and fosters concerns and care for others, while shame makes us oblivious or indifferent to others' feelings and needs. Third, shame is connected with anger in a way that guilt is not. As a result, shame is likely to go hand-in-hand with hostile and destructive behavior. Fourth, shame is distinctively associated with depression, a connection that has not been shown to exist in relation to guilt. Consequently, shame is also linked to decreased well-being and has obvious damaging consequences for constructive social interactions.²¹⁶

Deonna and his colleagues (2002) find these study results problematic because shame, according to this position, is basically treated as an ugly emotion particularly in the area of morality. Deonna and his colleagues criticize empirical psychology's view based on a number of studies (Luyten, Fontaine & Corveleyn, 2002; Ferguson & Stegge, 1998) that show it is "bound to tap into mild and adaptive forms of guilt and into mostly maladaptive forms of shame."²¹⁷ Deonna and his colleagues argue that, "many of the data adduced in favor of this study come from the study of shame-prone individuals."²¹⁸ Another example they present is the evidence that shows that "the correlation between shame and anger may well depend on issues pertaining to fragile self-image" as Sander Thomaes and colleagues

²¹⁶ Tangney and Dearing, 26-129. Summarized by Deonna et al., 46-7.

²¹⁷ Deonna et al., 160.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 164.

(2008) present.²¹⁹ This leads Deonna and his colleagues to conclude that we should be careful in assessing the relevant empirical evidence because “there is no clear-cut empirical evidence in favor of a distinctive correlation of shame with socially and morally ugly emotion.”²²⁰ Based on these data, Deonna and his colleagues assert that the position of recent empirical psychology “exhibits a bias in favor of guilt and against shame.”²²¹ The problem is that much of the evidence in favor of guilt is derived from the guilt versus shame dichotomy—the view that originated from Lewis (1971), and was further developed by Tangney and her colleagues. Behind such a dichotomy, there can be a motive to defend against shame, or exposure that is related to the nature of the dominant party as well. The case of recent empirical psychology shows that the method of “empirical research” can also be limited and biased because its method of data-collecting, as well as its assumptions depend on the researchers and the group they belong to, i.e. the dominant or insubordinate. If this is the case, there is a danger that researchers can create a theoretical bubble in favor of a particular group or culture in the name of doing empirical science, which in fact can be categorized as a state of systematic *shamelessness* as a way of defending against the involved party’s shame.

Shame as a Moral Emotion: The Position of Deonna and His Colleagues

Deonna and his colleagues argue that shame is a moral emotion. As a foundation for their discussion, they explain that some preconditions must be met in order for shame to arise:

²¹⁹ Ibid., 161.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid., 160.

- 1) A subject must be complex enough to be attached to values,
- 2) She must furthermore be attached to self-relevant values – i.e., values that she takes as imposing practical demands on her,
- 3) She must have the following discriminatory ability: she must be sensitive to the fact that she may fare more or less well in regards to the demands these values impose on her.²²²

Given these preconditions, Deonna and his colleagues explain that the subject will feel shame if, and only if, the following conditions are met:

- 1) She comes to take a trait or an action of hers to exemplify the polar opposite of a self-relevant value,
- 2) She apprehends this as indicating a distinctive incapacity with respect to the demands of this particular value,
- 3) This incapacity is distinctive in the sense that it consists in the incapacity to exemplify, even minimally, this value.²²³

What Deonna and his colleagues take seriously is the relationship between self and self-relevant value that is found in shame: “No account of shame denies that a relation to the self is constitutive of shame; ... the nature of shame is to be located in the fact that it relates in a specific way to the self (object dimension), and to the values to which people are attached (evaluation dimension).”²²⁴ Deonna et al., believe that “a subject’s identity in the sense of self-conception is constituted by the values to which she is attached, values that shape the expectations she has with regard to others and herself.”²²⁵ Based on this notion, Deonna et al., argue that shame is a severe emotion: “shame is much more than an unfavorable construal of ourselves. It is a verdict of unworthiness that has an all-or-nothing character.”²²⁶ For them, the ‘all-or-nothing’ character of shame is best captured in the idea

²²² Ibid., 103.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid., 72.

²²⁵ Ibid., 99.

²²⁶ Ibid., 98.

of a threshold one passes over, as they believe that it often embraces the whole self.²²⁷ For example, a certain situation in which a subject realizes his or her limitation of telling anything close to the truth may result in the spreading of negative self-evaluation in other moral values as well.²²⁸ Based on this observation, Deonna and his colleagues understand shame “as the feeling of our being incapable of honoring even minimally the demands entailed by self-relevant values.”²²⁹ In shame, Deonna and his colleagues believe that people take it that they exemplify a specific disvalue that strikes them as an indication of their incapacity to exemplify a self-relevant value even to a minimal degree. This means that people’s identities are being constituted by the values to which they are attached, and their identities are shaken precisely insofar as they experience their inability to honor even minimally the demands that go with this value.²³⁰

This is why shame is a guardian of the self, Deonna and his colleagues explain.²³¹ For Deonna et al., the sense of shame occurs when certain situations trigger it. These certain situations are when the subject painfully cannot bring him or herself to meet even minimally the demands of the values to which he or she is attached; shame results as fear of one’s own incapacity to maintain specific values to which that the subject is attached.

However, “values can be either positive or negative and can come in different types,” according to Deonna et al. These include moral values (e.g., honesty, cowardice), intellectual values (e.g., originality, stupidity), aesthetical values (e.g., beauty, ugliness) and political values (e.g., justice, injustice) to name a few. Deonna and his colleagues explain

²²⁷ Ibid., 107.

²²⁸ Ibid., 106.

²²⁹ Ibid., 125.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid., 173.

that these values also apply to norms (e.g., you shall not lie, you must pay your taxes, alcohol is forbidden, etc.)²³² They explain that values and norms are very different despite their apparent similarity. The most intriguing thing to observe here is that shame measures in terms of negative values, whereas guilt measures on “negative normative (deontological) terms while both operate through negative assessment.”²³³ Thus, shame is more focused on the state of ‘self’ while guilt is more focused on ‘transgression.’ Deonna and his colleagues show the crucial contrast of how guilt and shame operate on different levels, respectively understanding a circumstance in ‘value terms’ versus understanding it in ‘normative terms.’ The point is that shame is related to “specific values that constitute the shame-relevant identity” as a whole. That is why shame involves an assault on, or loss of dignity, or assault on, or loss of integrity.²³⁴ This is one piece of evidence with which Deonna and his colleagues argue that shame can be more moral than guilt is because shame is related to self-reform. In guilt, people are usually moved to make up for their wrongdoings by accordingly atoning for their past actions.²³⁵ On the other hand, one’s responsibility of self-reform that accompanies shame is quite extensive. It not only requires a person to realize their guilt, it also makes a person realize that some deeply embedded characteristic of their nature must be overturned.²³⁶ That is why Deonna and his colleagues believe that the sense of shame is actually a catalyst for positive action; within this positive action is self-reform that does not require us to actually endure shame experiences. Through prospective shame, “the capacity to simulate shame on the basis of imagining relevant circumstances, or even

²³² Ibid., 78.

²³³ Ibid., 80.

²³⁴ Ibid., 97.

²³⁵ Ibid., 176.

²³⁶ Ibid., 177.

just thinking about possible future shame-inducing situations (which is *moral shameability*, p-v),” Deonna and his colleagues argue that people can most definitely sidestep certain actions or avoid finding themselves in circumstances that would cause them shame. Even more important, according to Deonna and his colleagues, people can “vicariously explore the evaluative space within which life can still be comfortably lived.”²³⁷ This means that prospective shame (*moral shameability*, p-v) can be seen as a valuable tool for living a life led by a proper relationship to what our inner values expect. Deonna and his colleagues thus explain why shame is considered to be a ‘semi-virtue of the learner’ in Aristotelian thought.²³⁸

Three Categories of Shame on the Moral Level: A Scenario-Based Understanding

Suppose there is a CEO who has fallen in love with a woman who is not his wife, and he is drawn into a seductive relationship. Suppose that this CEO is also quietly stealing money from his company. In borrowing money from the company, the CEO’s situation becomes more and more serious; he tells no one about either the affair or about “borrowing” money; he is acting criminally. After a certain threshold, this person begins to deceive himself, saying what he is doing “is O.K.”—until he is caught. When he is caught, he is ashamed because his wife discovers what he has been doing, and the people in the company as well as the public discover that he was stealing from the company.

In this scenario, *shamelessness* (l-iv, l-v) describes the state of the CEO in the seduced phase; he is not thinking (or is unable to think) straight because he is drawn into the bubble of the fantasy world, which is the state where blind *shamelessness* (l-iv, l-v)

²³⁷ Ibid., 178.

²³⁸ Ibid.

prevails. In this state, this individual is rigidly defending against *shame* (l-iv, l-v), and his capacity to see the potential of *shame* (p-iv, p-v) is disabled because of that *shamelessness*.

Somehow, he begins to feel uncomfortable about the situation; he is becoming aware of the fact that he can be shamed. He stops what he was doing based on the warning inside: “Stop it now. Otherwise, you will be shamed,” and this is the state of *social shameability* (p-iv). He even begins to hear some internal voice saying: “Stop it now! This is not right. You are cheating (s-v).” After months of struggling, he finally decides to end the illicit relationship; he also decides to pay back what he has stolen from his company; this state can be described as the state of guilt. Then, he goes further than this until he reaches a point of honest self-reformation that is not based on his acceptance of the immoral ‘behaviors’ but based on his reflection, awareness, and acceptance of immoral ‘self’ that has been behind such immoral behaviors; this state can be described as *moral shameability* (p-v) which in fact, rarely happens for people who are at the phase of living in the bubble of *shamelessness* (l-iv, l-v). As a matter of fact, if this person were truly operating in response to *moral shameability* (p-v), he would never have entered into such behavior in the first place.

Such cases can happen on communal and systemic levels as well. One good example is the recent academic cheating scandal discovered in Atlanta, Georgia in which a group of teachers was involved. Although they may be fundamentally good people, it seems that they had been living in the bubble of *shamelessness* (l-iv, l-v), and then on being discovered were disgraced (s-iv, s-v). Somehow, they were drawn into the world of cheating and lived in the bubble of conspiratorial fantasy (l-iv, l-v on a communal/systemic

level), and the whole group was in it together. However, it is as well to remember that these kinds of conspiracies have long been going on in our society, and continue on a much larger scale than this particular case, along with more careful and systematic strategies for denying wrongdoing. Within their fantasy bubble worlds, there is collective *shamelessness* (l-iv, l-v) that is a way of defending against *shame* (s-iv, s-v); in many cases, such bubbles are protected by systems and power.

One thing not to oversimplify here is the case of shamelessness at the *moral* level because this state can be very complex at this particular level as well. According to my pastoral theological observations, there can be two more possibilities for being *shameless* on top of what we already have discussed. Take, for example, the case of the CEO; suppose this man does not care much about the disconnection he has caused; meaning, even after he is caught, he does not believe that he has done something wrong: “What’s wrong?” This can be an extra possibility for the state of *moral shamelessness* (l-iv) where the agent is probably somewhere in one or more of the lower levels of *shamelessness* (i.e., l-i, l-ii, l-iii, l-iv) as well, including the state of shame-related pathology or trauma.

Another possibility for *moral shamelessness* is the case where the agent far exceeds the maturity level of the people who are operating on the more typical moral level. A good example of this type is Jesus; the Bible relates a number of incidents in which people could not understand him based on the moral code and value-system they shared among themselves. His disciples considered Jesus to be wasting a lot of money with which he could have helped the poor when he allowed a woman to pour costly ointment on Him (Mark 14:3-9; Matthew 26:6-13; John 12:1-8). Jesus also seemed to be breaking the Jewish

law for the sake of healing (Luke 6:1-11; John 5:1-18). On other occasions, Jesus told a disciple who wanted to go first and bury his father: “Follow me, and let the dead bury their own dead” (Matthew 8:21-11; Luke 9:57-62); and he responded to another, “Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword....” (Matthew 10:34-39). In addition to these examples of Jesus, there are many other cases in which we tend to question the morality or justice of God, typically cases where we human beings cannot easily figure out “Why?” when we either believe that bad things happen to good people, or good things happen to bad people. These are the cases that can possibly be viewed as another type of *moral shamelessness* (I-iv, at least from our human perspective), a type in which we reckon the agent does not belong to the same group not because of its low status but because the agent’s status is significantly higher than the ordinary people.

Conclusion

With this, the critical review of the selected materials from sociology and philosophy has been completed in the area of the *stigma*, *social*, and *moral* levels. While each discipline has offered its own gifts for understanding the nature of shame on each particular level, their views are incomplete because from the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability* what they discuss still remains in the area of distorted/low level shame.

With the insights in mind from Goffman, Taylor, and Deonna et al. about understanding the dynamics of shame on these particular levels, I will now move to the *ultimate* level so that we can expand the meaning of shame. The problem is that the views from sociology and philosophy mainly deal with shame dynamics within the context of human society, relationship, culture, value, and conscience. On the other hand, the views

from the discipline of theology and biblical texts as well as the clinical pastoral materials will help us to relate shame in the area of the human-God relationship both at the individual and communal/global levels.

CHAPTER 5

The Ultimate Level

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the concept of shame that I have identified as the *ultimate* level. While the understanding of shame from the ultimate perspective has been most meaningfully tackled through theology, shame itself is not as easily visible in the theological tradition. A striking fact is that in the work of many church fathers and Christian theologians, the topic of shame has not received significant attention, whereas the topics of sin and guilt have been plentifully addressed. However, when we delve deeply into these texts, we begin to notice that there are concepts related to the experience of shame beneath the surface of these theological discourses.

In the first part of this chapter, I will briefly review the thoughts of Augustine of Hippo that contribute to an understanding of shame on the *ultimate* level. The main goal of this section is to criticize the popular and general understanding of Augustinian theology as being exclusively focused on guilt. In order to criticize this view, I will first examine Augustine through the eyes of G. Joy Ritson (1992) and Donald Capps (1985, 1990a, 1990b, 1994). This will bring me to a position where I see as incorrect the popular and general understanding of Augustinian theology as being exclusively focused on guilt. The reason that Augustinian theology seems to be focused on guilt is because, as Ritson argues, the vocabulary and the underlying thought patterns prevalent in Augustine's time can never be compatible with the terms and conceptual frameworks that are available today.

Next, I will critically review Andrew Sung Park's theology of *han*, as well as Ian McFarland's criticism of Park's position because their understandings are directly related to

the proposed problem of the Christian doctrine of sin. This will actually reveal three categories of shame in Augustine's writings on his spiritual life, although he does not explicitly articulate these concepts.

Then, I will review the theological positions of Paul Tillich (existential theology), and Dietrich Bonhoeffer (a position that is generally viewed as an extension of neo-orthodox theology). I will present examples of theological elements from these major figures relating to the areas of the three main categories of *Shame*, *Shamelessness*, and *Shameability*—although their theological articulations about these elements are often not sufficiently explicit. This will bring me to a conclusion that Tillich and Bonhoeffer also provide concepts that correspond to the three categories of shame that I have proposed, namely, *Shame* (s-vi), *Shamelessness* (l-vi) and *Shameability* (p-vi), although these figures did not articulate them in the same way.

Augustine of Hippo

Augustine of Hippo (354-430) is recognized as a person who laid the foundation for the Western doctrines of the fall from grace and original sin of human beings. While the church had developed its theology of sin well before Augustine, he played a central role in the development of a doctrine of original sin. It was through Augustine that sin was divided into *peccata* and *criminal*. *Peccata* are daily occurrences, which can be redressed by the offering of good deeds; *criminal* are serious falls from divine grace, which can be removed only by prayer, baptism, and penance.²³⁹

²³⁹ Andrew Sung Park, *The Wounded Heart of God: The Asian Concept of Han and the Christian Doctrine of Sin* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1993), 87-8.

While Augustinian doctrines of the fall and original sin can be understood from diverse perspectives, Ian McFarland (2010) summarizes that the doctrines affirm:

- 1) Adam and Eve's violation of God's commandment against eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Genesis 2:16-17; 3:6) caused a fundamental deformation in humanity's relationship to God, each other, and the rest of creation; and,
- 2) that this fall includes among its consequences that all human beings thereafter are born into a state of estrangement from God – an “original” sin that condemns all individuals prior to and apart from their committing any “actual” sins in time and space.²⁴⁰

Because of the nature of these doctrines, Augustine is often viewed as the one who had the most decisive effect on Western theology's inclination towards being primarily focused on guilt rather than shame. While such an observation is not entirely wrong considering the theological impact that Augustine had, it does not mean that Augustine's theology cannot contribute to reflections on shame. Augustine's works, particularly *Confessions*, reveals that his personal spiritual experience was deeply related to the state of shame on the *ultimate* level as defined here. One of the difficulties in Augustine's definition of shame, as G. Joy Ritson (1992) points out, is that the vocabulary and the underlying thought patterns prevalent in Augustine's time can never be compatible with the terms and conceptual frameworks that are available today. The concept of shame is largely a modern construction, yet it points to a more universal human experience that we see revealed even in Augustine's writings about the spiritual life.²⁴¹

²⁴⁰ Ian A. McFarland, *In Adam's Fall: A Meditation on the Christian Doctrine of Original Sin* (Chichester ;Maldon, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 29-30.

²⁴¹ Gloria Joy Ritson, “The Effects of Shame Experiences on Saint Augustine's Developing Sense of Personal Identity with Particular Reference to His Theory of the Will” (M. Div. Honors Thesis: Emory University, 1992).

Ritson (1992) explains that Augustine's culture often used the concept of "soul" in instances where a modern person might think more in terms of "self" or "personal identity." Ritson explains that the language of shame is of relatively recent origin, and that one needs to find bridges between the conceptual framework used by Augustine and modern psychological theories. What Ritson means is that one needs to keep in mind that the modern distinction between shame and guilt was not part of Augustine's conceptual framework at all. With an impressive amount of literature review from Augustine's original works, as well as from modern psychoanalytic theories, Ritson warns that there can be a high risk of data distortion in the process of predictive study if one ignores the sociocultural context of the time and society in which Augustine lived.²⁴²

Pastoral theologian Donald Capps (1985, 1990a, 1990b, 1994) provides a different assessment of Augustine, and even argues that, "shame was a more fundamental trait of Augustine's personality than guilt." Capps says that references to experiences that fit the concept of shame are commonplace throughout the *Confessions*, such as the pear-stealing episode (Book II), the death of an anonymous friend (Book IV), and the garden experience. Just before Augustine submitted himself to the voice of Continence, Capps reminds us that Augustine said to those who opposed the doctrine of man's single nature, "Take heed of what you say, and blush for shame" (Book VIII). Capps explains that most of Augustine's accounts of shame experiences were brought to a conclusion with confessions of sin and asking for God's forgiveness; but in contrast to his guilt-based confessions, Augustine's shameful self was probably slowly revealed to himself with time along with the awareness

²⁴² Ibid., 1-4.

that if he were to disguise his shame, he would be “hiding God from himself”: “Lord, before whose eyes the abyss of man’s conscience lies naked, what thing within me could be hidden from you, even if I would not confess it to you? I would be hiding you from myself, not myself from you” (Book X). Capps argues that references to shame are so numerous that the general understanding of Augustine as a person with a strong sense of guilt is incorrect. Instead, Capps says that Augustine was a person of profound shame. Capps believes that Augustine’s motivation behind writing *Confessions* was to recall his shame experiences even though they may have been a painful part of his past.²⁴³

Such views of Capps and Ritson have three limitations. The first is that their theoretical framework is strongly affected by a Western psychology of shame in which a guilt versus shame dichotomy prevails. Second, while their analyses are psychanalytically oriented, their view is not sufficiently theological. For example, in Capps’ psychological analysis, he identifies Augustine’s basic traits as including: 1) intellectual problem solving, 2) control of emotions, 3) passive aggressiveness, 4) health worries, 5) desire for fame, 6) casting blame, 7) inflated by God, 8) personal shame.²⁴⁴ Lastly, although it is true that Ritson and Capps helped uncover some of Augustine’s shame experiences, they failed to recognize others. For example, Augustine’s remark, “Take heed of what you say, and blush for shame” (Book VIII),²⁴⁵ could be an indication that Augustine saw others as people with *the ultimate Shamelessness* (I-vi), the state of *Shame* where he himself could have been situated for an extended period of time before his conversion.

²⁴³ Donald Capps, “An Allportian Analysis of Augustine,” (1994), 221-2.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 214-222.

²⁴⁵ Capps, 221-2.

Another category of shame that is missing in Ritson's and Capps' observations is *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability* (p-vi) that could have become a motivating factor for Augustine's conversion experience. As Augustine later recalls, his conversion was triggered by the voice of a child saying "take up and read." Taking this as a command to open the Bible and read the first verses he saw, he read the section of *Transformation of Believers* where Paul speaks of how the Gospel changes believers and their attitudes.²⁴⁶

Let us live honorably as in the day, not in reveling and drunkenness, not in debauchery and licentiousness, not in quarreling and jealousy. Instead, put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh, to gratify its desires.

Augustine's resulting account of his conversion led to one of the must-read classics of today that tells the story of his self-transformation (namely, the story of his restoring *Shameability*, p-vi).

Capps suggests that Augustine was motivated to write *Confessions* in order to recount his experiences of shame, "however painful such revelations and the reliving of these experiences through writing about them proved to be."²⁴⁷ It is a good observation yet falls short of a more nuanced understanding. The *Confessions* seems to be more than a recounting of shame. Rather, it could have been the growing sense of his *Shameability* (p-vi) that was guiding Augustine; a capacity to see the potential of estrangement, the state that was slowly recovering in him. Had he not written *Confessions*, Augustine may have experienced *Shame* (s-vi). Again, it was not because Augustine was caught in *Shame* that he wrote *Confessions*, it was because of his growing sense of reconnection in relationship with

²⁴⁶ Augustine of Hippo, *Confessions*, ed. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 152-3.

²⁴⁷ Capps, 222.

God, self, and others that he became increasingly aware of the potential of disconnection (*Shame*, p-vi).

Andrew Sung Park

A unique theological perspective by Andrew Sung Park (1993, 2004) critiques the Augustinian doctrine of sin from an Asian point of view based on the concept of *han*. Park's major argument is that while the church historically has highlighted the concept of sin, including structural and systemic dimensions, it has not been nearly as concerned with the pain of the victims of sin—those who feel a deep sense of bitterness and helplessness. Such experiences of these types of pain is called *han*, a unique Korean term used to delineate the depth of victims' suffering. While *han* is fundamentally an untranslatable term, Park explains that it is an “abysmal experience of pain” that can be seen as the “critical wound of the heart” brought about through “unjust psychosomatic repression, as well as by social, political, economic, and cultural oppression.” It is deeply embedded “in the hearts of the victims of sin, and is often expressed by diverse reactions of sadness, helplessness, hopelessness, resentment, hatred, and the will to revenge.”²⁴⁸

Park explains why the Western way of thinking that has been oriented almost exclusively to sinners is problematic. He argues that it is a sinner/oppressor-centered way of thinking that has arisen from Christian theology's doctrines of sin and salvation. According to Park's observation, “Christianity has thoroughly analyzed the issues of sin, the way of conquering the power of sin, the way of repentance, the doctrine of reconciliation, justification by faith, sanctification, glorification, and Christian perfection.”

²⁴⁸ Park, 9-20.

Yet while it has outlined the steps of salvation for sinners, it has not addressed the needs of the oppressed victims of those sinners.²⁴⁹

Park's contention is that there needs to be a recontextualization of sin and salvation through the concept of *han* so that there is a more holistic approach to understanding these issues. What Park proposes is that sin and *han* must be discussed and treated together. For this, Park says that we need "a theological revolution—a Copernican revolution in the doctrine of sin and salvation."²⁵⁰ In short, we need to overcome the imbalance of "the unilateral perspective of Christian doctrines" and change it into "a bilateral one" so that the "subject-object divisional thinking" can be overcome in our theological discourse.²⁵¹ Park criticizes that in this kind of "one-sided scheme," everything, including God "exists for the well-being of the sinners," the oppressor.²⁵² To stop this vicious cycle of sin and *han*, Park believes that not only the problems of sin, but also the problems of *han* must be dissolved. While sin and *han* compose the powerful reactions by inimical communities, *han* can only be resolved by compassionate and empathetic interaction with involved parties.²⁵³

There is no doubt that Park raises an important theological issue because the Augustinian doctrine of sin has actually been inclined to focus on the well-being of perpetrating sinners, while the *han* of those who were victimized by them was not considered enough. As Park argues, usually the doctrines of sin and salvation center around the morality of the sinner; but while this tendency may effectively describe the sinners' responsibility for their actions, it falls short of addressing the victims' reality of suffering.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 72.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 73.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid., 73-4.

In this sense, Park articulates well this blind spot where the system of Western theology is more aligned with the abuser, while it somewhat neglects the victim of that abuse.

Yet Park's position has been criticized. Ian McFarland (2010), for example, points out that Park's understanding of sin is too concerned with offenses against human beings.²⁵⁴ While these offenses are most certainly sins, McFarland argues that they do not fully encompass the inexhaustible ways by which, in a more general Christian traditional sense, human beings resist God's will. What McFarland means by "resistance to God's will" includes the state of the disrupted and damaged relationship with God, seemingly the more serious state of sin than what Park proposes with the sin of "a willful act."²⁵⁵ From McFarland's point of view, Park's core problem is that his proposal restricts the scope of sin by the radical dichotomization of the oppressor and the oppressed.²⁵⁶ What is missing in this view is the recognition that both groups are estranged from God, self, and others.

However, McFarland's criticism is not complex enough to pinpoint the underlying problems present in Park's position, particularly in the area of shame. As I observe, there are three problems in Park's position. First, Park does not recognize the shame of the dominant group—the perpetrators' shame that is usually concealed, disguised, and defended against in the form of *shamelessness*. While it is true that shame is more easily visible in the victims of the perpetrators' sin, the perpetrators are not free from shame. Therefore, it is not right to generalize people into the categories of either the sinful perpetrators, or the shameful victims. On the surface level, the two groups may appear to be

²⁵⁴ McFarland, 174.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 174-5.

in dramatically different forms; however, both of them are actually in the state of *Shame* where they are estranged from God, self, and others.

Second, Park's position does not explain enough about the reality that the sin, as a willful act, is also present in victims of the perpetrators' sin. While the victims' sin can be relatively insignificant compared to that of the perpetrator, it is not true that subordinates are free from the sin of perpetrating sin against others. In fact, they can be very violent and exploitative of others especially within their own community; when they do that, they also become perpetrators whose shame turns into shamelessness as well.

Third, Park's position does not provide any understanding of *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability* as a God-given nature before the fall—the image of God that is found in Christ. Throughout his system, it seems that Park's understanding of shame is almost identical to the *han* of the perpetrator's victim, namely the “abysmal experience of pain” that prevails throughout the marginalized. Here, the problem is that Park only recognizes the distorted side of shame, not the undistorted side of *Shameability* in the process of his theological discourse.

Because his theological framework is heavily dependent on the modern psychological theories of shame (which basically dichotomize guilt and shame) as well as on the Korean concept of *han*, Park does not hesitate to employ the most typical and popular view when he says that there is no event that speaks to the shame of humiliation better than the crucifixion of Jesus: “Jesus' cross was a sign of shame particularly for the

Messiah-to-be.... The shame of Jesus' crucifixion is the symbol of a victim's shame and the pain of humiliation."²⁵⁷

I do not agree that the crucifixion was shameful for Jesus. In fact, as I mentioned earlier, I believe that the opposite was true. Jesus willingly accepted the cup that God gave him because he was obedient and wanted to follow the will of God. Had he not borne the cross, or had he ran away from the cross, then he would have experienced unbearable *Shame* (p-vi). He could bear the cross because he was able to sense the potential of *Shame* (estrangement) through *the ultimate sense of Shame*. With that gift, he could make the decision to continue in the state of union with God, while he was willingly going through pain, and suffering faithfully even unto death. Of course, there could have been some *stigma*, or *social* levels of shame involved in this process; however, Jesus apparently did not care about these. While eliciting low level shame(s) on Jesus could be one of the motivations for the condemning of Jewish authorities as well as the bystanding crowds, that was not an issue of any significance for Jesus: what he was concerned about was the potential of the most profound *Shame* (p-vi), the disunion with God. In this sense, Park's position is also an extension of a limited view of shame, the very position he is seeking to critique.

As our critical review of Ritson, Capps, McFarland, and Park's work has shown, the popular and general understanding of Augustinian theology as being exclusively focused on guilt is incorrect. The reason that Augustinian theology seems to be focused on guilt is because, as Ritson shows, the vocabulary and the underlying thought patterns prevalent in

²⁵⁷ Andrew Sung Park, *From Hurt to Healing: A Theology of the Wounded* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2004), 38-9.

Augustine's time can never be compatible with the terms and conceptual frameworks of today. While recognizing some shame-related issues in Augustine's theology, Ritson, Capps, and Park's observations, as well as McFarland's criticism of Park's position are not sufficiently complex to recognize three categories of shame in Augustine. Accordingly, these positions fail to recognize *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability* (p-vi) that is at the core of Augustinian theology particularly in the area of self-transformation of believers, and the believers' resulting behaviors.

Paul Tillich

Paul Tillich (1886-1965) was one of the leading theologians of the twentieth century whose insights, based on his philosophical and existential theology, capably articulated the core of shame present in us at the *ultimate* level. Although his system did not use the language of shame explicitly as was the case with Augustine,²⁵⁸ Tillich's underlying point was the state of *the ultimate Shame*, the state of separation where "man is estranged from the ground of his being, from other beings, and from himself."²⁵⁹

Tillich's perspective was significantly influenced by existentialism. The root of such thinking goes back to as early as the seventeenth-century French thinker Blaise Pascal, who is considered to be the first known existentialist analyst of the human situation in terms of anxiety and finitude. Others who share similar traits are Johann Hamann, Georg W. Hegel, Søren Kierkegaard, Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Fyodor Dostoyevsky,

²⁵⁸ In the index of Tillich's *Systematic Theology: Three Volumes in One* (1967) for example, there is no entry for the world of "shame" itself.

²⁵⁹ Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology: Three Volumes in One* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), Volume II, 44.

Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre—thinkers who were all writing about finitude and anxiety.²⁶⁰ At the foundation of Tillich’s theology is a presupposition that existential anxiety (which is different from neurotic anxiety according to Tillich) can never be removed from human beings due to the fact that they are finite. While everything that exists (including “God”)²⁶¹ is overshadowed by the threat of non-existence, Tillich believed that only the power of being itself (the “ground of being”) is able to help overcome the threat of non-being. While anxiety is defined as the awareness of being finite, Tillich believed that “God must be called the infinite ground of courage.”²⁶²

Based on an existential perspective, Tillich tried to develop a theological system that could “satisfy two needs of the statement of the truth of the Christian message, and the interpretation of this truth for his generation.”²⁶³ Overall, it seems that Tillich tried hard to remain connected to traditional Christian language and symbols so that he could help relate his readers of the day to the core of the Christian message. However, it seems that such efforts often left him frustrated because of the implied limitation that traditional language raised. Such feelings are visible when he says:

[The great words of our religious tradition] are strange, just because they are so well known. During the centuries, they have distorting connotations, and have lost so much of their genuine power that we must seriously ask ourselves whether we should use them at all, or whether we should discard them as useless tools. But there is a mysterious fact about the great words of our religious tradition: they cannot be replaced.²⁶⁴

²⁶⁰ “Existentialism and Psychoanalysis,” in Paul Tillich, *The Meaning of Health: The Relation of Religion and Health*, ed. Perry Lefevre (Richmond, CA: North Atlantic Books, 1981), 85-6.

²⁶¹ According to Tillich, God does not exist. Rather, “He is being-itself beyond essence and existence.” Based on this reasoning, Tillich explained that, “to argue that God exists is to deny him.” (Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, volume I, 205)

²⁶² Tillich, *Systematic Theology: Three Volumes in One*, volume I, 64, 186-92.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁶⁴ “You are Accepted,” in Paul Tillich, *The Shaking of the Foundations* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1948), 158.

There are many examples of Tillich trying to explain the state of *Shame* (s-vi) within the traditional languages and symbols. One is found in his effort to distinguish “Sin” and “sins.” Tillich explained that the meaning of “Sin” had been changed over the years. In the Bible, “Sin” usually refers to the state of estranged human beings. For example, Tillich recalled that Paul many times spoke of “Sin” in the singular form and with no article. It was the churches that later often changed it into “sins,” meaning deviations from moral laws. Tillich explained that “this has little to do with ‘Sin’ as the state of estrangement from that to which one belongs—God, one’s self, one’s world... If one speaks of ‘sins’ and refers to special acts which are considered as sinful,” Tillich thought that, “one should always be conscious of the fact that ‘sins’ are expressions of ‘Sin’.”²⁶⁵ One thing that is clear for Tillich is that the “sins” are outcomes of “Sin;” therefore a state of Sin comes first because of our estrangement from “something to which we really belong, and with which we should be united.”²⁶⁶

Such an observation of Tillich is important because his position well describes why it can be misleading for us to assume that sin and shame can be separated as simply as modern depth psychology of shame theorizes. While the state of Sin [*Shame*] in Tillich’s system is where the estranged human beings are all located, it is a false impression provided by modern shame theorists that some “healthy, competent, responsible, empathic and dominant” people have nothing to do with shame. While there is no doubt that depth psychology’s view can be helpful in understanding maladaptive and pathological shame or

²⁶⁵ Tillich, *Systematic Theology: Three Volumes in One*, volume II, 45-6.

²⁶⁶ Tillich, *The Shaking of the Foundations*, 155.

shamelessness, Tillich's observation suggests that depth psychology's definition of shame is too limited. Related to this problem, Tillich warned many times against the danger of doing counseling based on a one-sided relationship where the caregiver considers him/herself as the subject and the other(s) as the object(s). The ideal state, according to Tillich, is to develop a relationship of mutuality where a caregiver offers a counsel "in the light of the eternal" so that both the counselor and the counselee can be recognized as being "in the same predicament."²⁶⁷

On the other hand, there is another category of examples in Tillich's efforts to explain the state of estrangement [*Shame*] that seems to better fit the state that I prefer to distinguish as *the ultimate Shamelessness* (1-vi). In a dialogue with Carl Rogers (March 7, 1965), for example, Tillich talked about a phenomenon for which he thought that even the traditional terms of "fallen men" and "sinful men" were inadequate. Regarding these kinds of cases, the only sufficient term that Tillich could find, according to what he explained to Rogers, was the New Testament's usage of "demonic," or "being possessed." Tillich explained that it is a "force, under a force, which is stronger than the individual good will.... [the] structures which are ambiguous, both to a certain extent creative, but ultimately destructive." While this state "covers the trans-personal power which takes hold of men and of society," Tillich explained that he had to find another term because the old terminology could not cover it sufficiently well.²⁶⁸

Prior to this dialogue Tillich had explored this issue several times in his systematic theology, as we see in the following:

²⁶⁷ "Theology and Counseling," in Tillich, *The Meaning of Health: The Relation of Religion and Health*, 118-9.

²⁶⁸ "Paul Tillich and Carl Rogers: A Dialogue," in *ibid.*, 196-7.

This is easily understandable on the basis of the demoniac's claim to divinity on a finite basis: the elevation of one element of finitude to infinite power and meaning necessarily produces the reaction from other elements of finitude, which deny such a claim or make it for themselves. The demonic self-elevation of one nation over against all the others in the name of her God or system of values produces the reaction from other nations in the name of *their* God. The demonic self-elevation of particular forces in the centered personality, and the claim of their absolute superiority leads to the reaction of other forces, and to a split consciousness. The claim of *one* value, represented by *one* God, to be the criterion of all others leads to the splits in polytheistic religion. A consequence of these splits, connected with the nature of the demonic, is the state of being 'possessed' by the power which produces the split. The demoniacs are the possessed ones.²⁶⁹

While I do believe that such a state can happen not only at a communal or systemic level but also at the individual or familial level, Tillich's observation is very important because such a view is something largely missing especially in the area of depth psychology of shame. As Tillich pointed out, among the two definite limits in psychotherapy is that "it deals with individuals (or sometimes with small groups) without changing the cultural and social structure from which they come, and to which they are sent back."²⁷⁰ No doubt, it also refers to the very context of today's "demonic" or "possessed" state [*the state of the ultimate Shamelessness*] at the individual and communal levels where "either class conflicts or... conflicts of great ideologies, of great forms of political faiths which struggle with each other—and every step to overcome them has usually the consequence of driving the people more deeply into them" as Tillich described in a dialogue with Rogers.²⁷¹

²⁶⁹ Tillich, *Systematic Theology: Three Volumes in One*, volume III, 102-3.

²⁷⁰ "Anxiety-Reducing Agencies in Our Culture," in Tillich, *The Meaning of Health: The Relation of Religion and Health*, 64.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 197.

The question then is what element in Tillich's system can possibly be compatible with the proposed category of shame that I have named as *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability* (p-vi). This question can be answered within the framework of Tillich's existentialism where the main goal is not to help restore human being's "essential nature," but to help accept its "existential predicament—in time and space in finitude and estrangement."²⁷² In this view, salvation (the root of the word, *salvus*, being "healed and whole," as Tillich explained many times)²⁷³ is deeply related to the courage to accept "the unacceptable," the state of separation from self, others, and God. While criticizing the everyday Protestant teaching where "the Christian doctrine of divine acceptance" (originally referred to as the doctrine of "justification by grace through faith") was largely distorted,²⁷⁴ Tillich provided a unique understanding of Christ that is most manifest in "accepting the unacceptable" with the grace of God. In a portion of a sermon titled *You Are Accepted*, Tillich put it as follows:

In the picture of Jesus as the Christ, which appeared to him at the moment of his greatest separation from other men, from himself and God, he found himself accepted in spite of his being rejected. And when he found that he was accepted, he was able to accept himself and to be reconciled to others. The moment in which grace struck him and overwhelmed him, he was reunited with that to which he belonged, and from which he was estranged in utter strangeness.²⁷⁵

For Tillich, it was this state of *the ultimate Shame* where one could finally begin to recognize and accept his or her state of disunion while, at the same time, one could grow towards the experience of grace in spite of being unacceptable. For Tillich, grace was

²⁷² "Existentialism and Psychoanalysis," in *ibid.*, 85-6.

²⁷³ "Pastoral Psychology," in *ibid.*, 148.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 146.

²⁷⁵ "You are Accepted," in Tillich, *The Shaking of the Foundations*, 160.

something that helps the estranged human beings not to become caught in *Shame* in spite of *Shame* so that one does not fall into the state of *the ultimate Shamelessness* through various means of rigid defense against the estrangement. At the very moment of recognizing the meaning of being “struck by grace,”²⁷⁶ one enters the New Being in Christ where “reconciliation, reunion and resurrection” are radicalized into the here and now—the state of existence that can overcome the threat of non-existence through its capacity to see the potential of non-being, the state I propose to call *the ultimate sense of Shame/ Shameability* (p-vi).²⁷⁷

Dietrich Bonhoeffer

Another major figure who portrayed examples of theological elements relating to the areas of the three main categories of *Shame*, *Shamelessness* and *Shameability* is Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945), although he did so in a different context. Though a theologian from Germany, he had chosen a different path from Tillich by going back to the place where war was imminent (1939). While Tillich preferred to stay in the States and did not quote Bonhoeffer a single time in his works as I recall,²⁷⁸ Bonhoeffer is probably the thinker who has been most explicit and articulate about shame in the history of the mainline Western theological tradition. Even though the actual amount of explicit work he offered on this topic was limited, Bonhoeffer’s contribution is still significant because he was one of the rare theologians who actually named shame clearly and called attention to it.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 161.

²⁷⁷ “The New Being,” in Paul Tillich, *The New Being* (New York: Scribner, 1955), 22.

²⁷⁸ Bonhoeffer was executed on April 9, 1945. By the time Tillich had completed three volumes of his *Systematic Theology* (1951, 1957, 1963), Bonhoeffer’s works (1949, 1953) were already available through publications. Yet, there is no heading for Bonhoeffer in Tillich’s index while there is a heading for Barth with 12 locations for reference throughout three volumes. I recall no places in other Tillich’s works where he quotes Bonhoeffer either.

Three things need to be considered in order to understand the background of Bonhoeffer's theology in the area of shame. The first one is the contextual environment of Bonhoeffer's life and development. Having been defeated in the First World War, Germany was encountering severe economic turmoil; it was only allowed a 100,000-man army, not nearly enough to defend itself against neighboring countries. By the time Bonhoeffer was a teenager around the year 1923, inflation in the country was severe enough that Germany's currency was worth next to nothing.²⁷⁹ This was the backdrop from which Hitler would rise later in leading Germany in World War II. Indeed, perhaps it was because of this shame experience after the First World War that citizens were such willing supporters of Hitler's endeavors. The second contextual point to understand is the intellectual environment in which Bonhoeffer was a theologian. Having been raised and educated in one of the most liberal settings both in terms of familial and educational backgrounds, Bonhoeffer's fate could have been more naturally aligned with a figure like Adolf von Harnack at Berlin University whose approach to the Bible was primarily textual and historical-critical analysis. However, Bonhoeffer kept his distance from his world-renowned professors at Berlin whilst still upholding his independent views.²⁸⁰ Strangely enough, Bonhoeffer was actually more influenced by another theologian whom he would revere and respect as much as anyone in his lifetime, who would even become a mentor and a friend. This mentor and friend was Karl Barth who approached the Bible in what would later be called neo-orthodoxy (or keyrgmatic theology, as Paul Tillich put it). It worked on the assumption that God already exists, and subsequent theology and biblical scholarship must be carried out on

²⁷⁹ Eric Metaxas, *Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy: A Righteous Gentile Vs. The Third Reich* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2010), 44-5.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 59.

this foundation. Barth emphasized God's divinity, referring to God as "wholly other," and therefore unknowable by human beings except through revelation.²⁸¹

A glimpse of Bonhoeffer's view that was influenced by Barth can be observed in his early writings in Berlin in which he often stated that in order to know anything about God, human beings cannot rely on themselves—but rather God must reveal God-self.²⁸² This belief Bonhoeffer later developed further developed in his Christology. By the time he wrote *Ethics* (1941), central to his system was that God (through God's own freedom) "became human in Jesus Christ." This was the core understanding that became the foundation of Bonhoeffer's Christian humanism.

Unique in this view is that God's becoming human in Jesus Christ was not mainly for helping humans to become like God. Rather, Bonhoeffer argued, "God became human so that human beings could become truly human." Here, it becomes clear that God's "becoming human" was only to help restore the true humanity both at the individual and communal levels. In *Ethics*, Bonhoeffer put it in this way:

Human beings become human because God became human. But human beings do not become God. They could not and do not accomplish a change in form; God changes God's form into human form in order that human beings can become, not God, but human before God.²⁸³

Regarding this, Clifford Green, one of the editors for the series of *Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Works* (1996) explains that Bonhoeffer reversed the traditional views found in theologians

²⁸¹ Ibid., 60.

²⁸² Ibid., 62.

²⁸³ Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, ed. Clifford J. Green et al. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 95-6.

like Athanasius and Augustine that “God became human in order that humans might become divine.”²⁸⁴

The third point to know about Bonhoeffer’s context is the personal and ecclesiastical environment in which he was a Christian. Based on the above-mentioned theological foundation, what Bonhoeffer showed consistently throughout his life and death was his dedication to follow the will of God as Jesus did. At every crossroad and dilemma Bonhoeffer faced where he needed to make crucial decisions, one can sense Bonhoeffer’s genuine efforts and struggles to follow the will of God. This is the context in which one meets Bonhoeffer not only as a theologian but also as a person of faith; not only as a preacher but also a person of prayer. And this is also the area where Bonhoeffer’s quality of *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability* (p-vi) is most visible, although Bonhoeffer himself had never articulated it theologically.

While Bonhoeffer often wrote about his understanding of shame at the *ultimate* level in very short, dense, fragmented, and scattered pieces in his unfinished work of *Ethics* and others, these ideas are most explicit in the interpretation of the book of Genesis. For example, he explained that shame [*Shame*] is a state of disunion with God, self, and others where “human beings are ashamed of the loss of their union with God.” For Bonhoeffer, this is a state in which human beings “see themselves” instead of “seeing God;” the state where they “cover themselves” and “live in concealment.” Because of this, Bonhoeffer

²⁸⁴ Ibid., Footnote #86, 96.

believed that “shame creates for itself the very deepest secrecy” whereas Adam and Eve had to make “loincloths for themselves.”²⁸⁵

Although he used different languages and terms, some of Bonhoeffer’s materials are insightful enough to be matched with modern depth psychologists’ understanding of shame and guilt, as well as their understanding of the differences between the two. For example, Bonhoeffer said that “shame is more elemental [ursprünglicher] than remorse”²⁸⁶ (or “shame is more original than remorse” in another translation),²⁸⁷ meaning “shame reminds human beings of their disunion with God and one another” while “conscience is the sign of human beings’ disunion within themselves.” “Unlike shame,” Bonhoeffer argued, “conscience does not encompass the whole of life, but only reacts to a specific action.... what conscience cannot grasp is the fact that this unity itself already presupposes disunion from God and from human beings.”²⁸⁸

Bonhoeffer’s understanding of “conscience” is actually identical with the problem raised by shame on the *moral* level (s-v) that I explained earlier. As Bonhoeffer made clear, “conscience [guilt] is not as directly connected to the origin as shame; it already presupposes the disunion with God and human beings.” Here, Bonhoeffer believed that “conscience divides life into permitted and prohibited...conscience identifies what is allowed with what is good, and no longer registers that even in what is allowed the human being is in disunion with the origin.”²⁸⁹ Considering that Bonhoeffer began writing *Ethics*

²⁸⁵ Ibid., 303-4.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., 303.

²⁸⁷ Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, ed. Eberhard Bethge (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 20.

²⁸⁸ Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 307.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., 307-8.

from 1941, his theological perceptions of shame seems to go far beyond that of his peers in Western culture, and beyond many psychological theories that came after him.

Most intriguing is Bonhoeffer's interpretation of the human beings' acquired capacity to discern "good and evil" after they had eaten the forbidden fruit (Genesis 3:7). In this context, his understanding of shame [*Shame*] seems well related to the traits of what I have categorized as *the ultimate Shamelessness* (1-vi). About this state, Bonhoeffer wrote: "Knowing good and evil in disunion with the origin, human beings become self-reflective.... Conscience is thus not concerned with a person's relationship to God and other people, but with the relationship to one's own self...." Bonhoeffer believed that "conscience itself reverses this relationship" where it "portrays the relationship human beings have with God and with other persons as emerging from the relationship they have with themselves." In this sense, Bonhoeffer's understanding of "conscience" is identical with what Reinhold Niebuhr portrayed with sin of "pride" where the human beings mistake their standards for God's standards.²⁹⁰ Bonhoeffer wrote of how human conscience is mistaken to be the voice of God—where humans begin to think they know what is good and evil, and are therefore the origin of good and evil: "Conscience claims to be the voice of God and the norm for relating to other people. By relating properly to themselves, human beings think to regain the proper relationship to God and to others. This reversal is the claim of human beings who have become like God in knowing good and evil. Human beings have become the origin of good and evil."²⁹¹

²⁹⁰ Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), Volume I, 199-200.

²⁹¹ Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 307-8.

In his writing, Bonhoeffer related the state of “conscience” to Pharisees because Pharisees carry out every moment of their lives in conflict, thinking of every decision as a choice between good and evil. Bonhoeffer thought that these Pharisees are not mere phenomena of Jesus’ time, but rather representative of human beings for whom nothing else in their lives is as important as distinguishing between good and evil. Bonhoeffer defined Pharisees as “the epitome of the human being in the state of disunion.”²⁹² Abiding by their ways was also a state of disunion and judgment based on the knowledge of good and evil which actually leads only to greater disunion. But, according to Bonhoeffer, there is another type of judgment found in Jesus that is “not to condemn but to save,” the judgment which was not based on his knowledge but the knowledge of God. “The will of God may lie very deeply hidden among many competing possibilities. It is also not a system of rules that are fixed from the outset, but always new and different in each different life circumstance,” Bonhoeffer said. Bonhoeffer explained this is why Jesus had such a freedom and simplicity, unlike the Pharisees who were operating on the law of disunion.²⁹³

Tietz Christiane, a systematic theologian and a social ethicist, explains that in eating the fruit, human beings (in Bonhoeffer’s view) go beyond God’s command, beyond the given limits—a fundamental change, in which humans are now aware of their ability to reside completely beyond any limits. Existing without limits, according to Bonhoeffer, means “being alone.”²⁹⁴ Therefore, not to be alone means to be in a community with others where limits proposed by others are maintained. Inevitably, being in such a community

²⁹² Ibid., 309-10.

²⁹³ Ibid., 313-5, 321.

²⁹⁴ Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1-3*, ed. John W. De Gruchy and Douglas S. Bax (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), 115.

means to allow individuals to set limits for each other; in turn, this means accepting certain boundaries set upon oneself because one loves the other.²⁹⁵ After having eaten the forbidden fruit; however, this boundary becomes a negative one where human beings no longer live in the image of God but rather live in accordance with their own interpretation of good and evil. This is to live in a state of disunion and estrangement from God.²⁹⁶ It is where human beings have become like God and become *ultimately Shameless* beings, which is the origin of good and evil.

This view needs to be taken seriously because it is also related to the problem of psychology today. The danger is that psychology often tends to become the origin of good and evil, namely, the source of distinguishing between *health* and *sickness*. In fact, doing psychology is also the state of “being alone” where psychologists measure the conditions of their “patients” based on their theories. But as Bonhoeffer made clear, “psychological observation itself is always already subject to the law of disunion [Entzweiung].” Because of this reason, Bonhoeffer believed that “psychology will thus never be able to discover the simplicity, the freedom, and the doing that Jesus intended.”²⁹⁷ Considering that Dietrich was a son of Karl Bonhoeffer, a distinguished neurologist of the day,²⁹⁸ this observation seems not to be an exaggeration. While Bonhoeffer ably connected the Pharisees of the biblical time and that of his day (and also today), his view seems to make a lot of sense because it comes from both his theological understanding and also from his deep relationship with a particular person with particular skills and knowledge who raised him.

²⁹⁵ Ibid., 98.

²⁹⁶ Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, ed. Clifford J. Green et al., Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 313.

²⁹⁷ Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 320.

²⁹⁸ Metaxas, 13-7.

There is one paradoxical element that deserves careful attention in Bonhoeffer's understanding of shame. While shame for Bonhoeffer (seemingly including the state of rigidly defending against it) is the "irrepressible memory of disunion from their origin," he also thought that it was "the helpless *desire to reverse it*."²⁹⁹ This view is unique because it actually places hope on *Shame*. Instead of seeing shame only from a negative point of view, Bonhoeffer flips it over and tries to comprehend the other side of it.

For Bonhoeffer, human beings in the state of shame [*Shame*] are not only the ones who are estranged but also the ones who cry out for reunion; they are ashamed because "*they have lost something that is part of their original nature and their wholeness*." Even the people who are rigidly defending against *Shame* are not exempted from such an internal yearning. Bonhoeffer said, "beneath the mask lives the *desire for the restoration* of the lost unity," meaning that human beings (both in the states of *the ultimate Shame* and *the ultimate Shamelessness*) actually "*seek unity* with God." This nature of shame is something that depth psychology of shame, in general, misses and fails to understand. On the other hand, Bonhoeffer's shame is dynamic in its nature. While it is paradoxical enough to be "both an acknowledgement of and *protest against disunion*" [and union], Bonhoeffer explained that human beings "live between concealment and disclosure, between hiding and revealing themselves, between solitude and community." This is the context where Bonhoeffer said that shame "must be respected" as "shame is also necessary because human beings must now just endure themselves and live a hidden life as the estranged and

²⁹⁹ Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 303.

divided beings they are.” “Otherwise,” Bonhoeffer asserted, “they would betray themselves.”³⁰⁰ [italics added for emphasis]

The Ultimate Sense of Shame in Bonhoeffer. What apparently is missing with Bonhoeffer is the category of shame that I have proposed to call *the ultimate sense of Shame* (p-vi). With careful reading, however, one begins to realize that this category is deeply embedded in Bonhoeffer’s theology. Two particular examples deserve to be pointed out: one at the individual level, and the other at the communal/systematic level.

The first example is related to Bonhoeffer’s interpretation of a particular verse in the book of Genesis where God made “garments of skins for the man and his wife and clothed them” (Genesis 3:21). Historically, this particular passage had drawn a lot of attention especially from the Eastern Church tradition. While church fathers Epiphanius of Salamis, Methodios of Olympus, Gregory of Nyssa, Maximos the Confessor, John Chrysostom, Dionysios the Areopagite, and others had all dealt with this particular passage, Panayiotis Nellas, a modern Eastern Orthodox theologian, has explored this passage with closer attention than anybody else. According to him, one of the primary similarities between all of these church fathers is that the garments of skin are representative of human mortality; that is human beings’ second nature after the fall. Nellas presents Gregory of Nyssa as an example, citing a passage where the latter says that after the fall, “[human beings] were clothed with dead skins... therefore mortality, derived from the nature of human beings lacking intelligence, was by God’s dispensation imposed on a nature created for immortality.” Another point that church fathers made, as Nellas explains, was that God

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 303-8.

actually utilized the new situation as an opportunity for humanity to reach the highest goodness, which is a call to become deified in Christ.³⁰¹

But for Bonhoeffer, the passage held a different meaning. As Tietz suggests through her reading of Bonhoeffer, all human beings have the right to have secrets and keep certain things unsaid, which arises from the necessity of shame and covering. Tietz reminds us that Bonhoeffer even said that if people don't keep their own secrets they are "destroying themselves."³⁰² Tietz suggests that this is where Bonhoeffer talked about this duty impressively in *Letters and Papers from Prison* as he expressed his being taken aback by how revealing other prisoners were about their fear: "fright is surely something to be ashamed of. I have a feeling that it shouldn't be talked about." And Bonhoeffer argued: "God himself made clothes for men; and that means that *in statu corruptionis* many things in human life ought to remain covered." "[...] since the fall there must be [...] secrecy."³⁰³

Bonhoeffer's interpretation of Genesis 3:21 supports my pastoral theological position where I see God as the One who has *Shameability/the ultimate sense of Shame*, although Bonhoeffer himself had not explicitly mentioned it in the same terms. Based on his interpretation, Bonhoeffer believed that instead of trying to expose the secrets of another person, human beings should respect the "secrecy, intimacy, and concealment" of the others.³⁰⁴ To let others maintain their secrets is to respect their freedom and God-given boundary; and then when a secret is told, it becomes a voluntary gift instead of imposing a

³⁰¹ Panayiotis Nellas, *Deification in Christ: Orthodox Perspectives on the Nature of the Human Person*, Contemporary Greek Theologians (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1987), 43-53, 60-1.

³⁰² Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Life Together: Prayerbook of the Bible*, ed. Geoffrey B. Kelly, Daniel W. Bloesch, and James Burtness (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 104.

³⁰³ Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison. The Enlarged Edition*. (London: SCM Press, 1973), 153.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 159.

will for the other to reveal anything. What happens then is that one waits for the time when the other might be comfortable enough to reveal his or her secret.³⁰⁵

For Bonhoeffer, it was important that with a secret revealed from one to another, there must be a new cover regarding a third party. The relationship between the secret revealer and the listener is not one that originally was of disunion or estrangement; rather, it is a relationship of respect and confidence only possible between two sinners—a miracle or a mystery in itself. “That the other is so closed to me, this is the biggest mystery.”³⁰⁶ This experience of *mystery* is certainly a place where the involved parties may grow together before the *ultimate sense of Shame*, which is the grace of God.

One thing that needs clarification here is that the implied state of *the ultimate sense of Shame* between the two sinners in Bonhoeffer’s view is quite different from what psychologists often refer to as “analysts’ sense of shame” in their relationship with their patients. Some pastoral psychotherapists as well as psychoanalysts have called attention to the importance of analysts’ sense of shame. Schneider (1977, 1987), for example, has been stressing the important role of the therapist’s sense of shame, and how that sense can enhance his/her work in the clinical setting.³⁰⁷ Wurmser (1981, 1987) also talks about the importance of the awareness of the patient’s nearness to shame. “The careful analysis of shame requires great tact and patience,” he says.³⁰⁸ Nathanson also talked about the importance of the analyst’s sense of shame; indeed, he defines the role of psychotherapy as “a guided tour of the self in the company of a trusted other whose professionalism

³⁰⁵ Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Fiction from Tegel Prison*, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999), 136-.

³⁰⁶ Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *London, 1933-1935*, ed. K. W. Clements (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 361.

³⁰⁷ Carl Schneider, “A Mature Sense of Shame,” in Nathanson (ed.), 194-213.

³⁰⁸ Leon Wurmser, “Shame: The Veiled Companion of Narcissism,” in *ibid.*, 64-90.

guarantees that the shame of self-discovery will be minimized.”³⁰⁹ However, it is important to note that these professionals have not connected this notion with *the ultimate sense of Shame* found in God. For them, the sense of shame is an “analytic tact” that is useful and important in clinical settings where they themselves remain as therapists who guide their objects. While I am not intending to place blame on them, since they are operating in a particular realm where they do not see *Shameability* (p-vi) as an integral part of being a true human as well as in the image of God, the problem is that ‘shame’ can be further distorted by their practice both at the individual and communal/global levels as they still believe that ‘shame’ is not something that needs to be restored but to be removed from our humanity.

Another example that shows Bonhoeffer’s appreciation of *the ultimate sense of Shame* is found in his life itself in the historical context in which he was situated. His friends and supporters believed that he could have become a “great theologian” had he stayed in the States; he could have written and published many more books; he could have been much safer. However, Bonhoeffer felt compelled to return to his country where war clouds were gathering, after staying only twenty-six days on his second visit to the States.

In a letter that he sent to Reinhold Niebuhr on June 25, 1939, Bonhoeffer wrote:

... Sitting here in Dr. Coffin’s garden I have had the time to think and to pray about my situation and that of my nation and to have God’s will for me clarified. I have come to the conclusion that I have made a mistake in coming to America. I must live through this difficult period of our national history with the Christian people of Germany. I shall have no right to participate in the reconstruction of Christian life in Germany after the war if I do not share the trials of this time with my people....³¹⁰

Why did Bonhoeffer go back? I suppose that Bonhoeffer simply wanted to follow what he understood to be the will of God, as Jesus did. Had he not gone back, Bonhoeffer may have

³⁰⁹ Nathanson, 320.

³¹⁰ Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Theological Education Underground, 1937-1940*, ed. Dirk Schulz and Victoria Barnett (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011), 210.

felt unbearable *Shame*. Again, this does not mean that he was caught in *Shame*, but that he was in union with Christ where he could see the potential of *Shame* through his growing sense of *Shameability* as Jesus' disciple.

In Bonhoeffer's *Ethics*, there is a section in which he wrote that, "shame can be overcome only where the original unity is restored." He also wrote that "shame can be overcome only by enduring an act of ultimate shaming, namely, inevitable exposure before God."³¹¹ Bonhoeffer's last days at the execution site of Schönberg show what he meant better than anything else. Hours before he was to leave this world, Bonhoeffer still performed his duties as a pastor. Holding a small service, he prayed and read verses of the day: Isaiah 53:5, "With his stripes we are healed" and 1 Peter 1:3, "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ! By his great mercy we have been born anew to a loving hope through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead." He explained these verses to his cell mates, while others waited and hoped that he would hold a service for them as well. Bonhoeffer was then abruptly taken away by two men who told him to "get ready to come with us," which could only mean one thing: the scaffold. "This is the end," Bonhoeffer said, "for me the beginning of life."³¹²

Bonhoeffer's decision to return to Germany reminds me of Jesus' final journey to Jerusalem where he attacked the center of Jewish religious practice, as well as the core of their socio-economic, political, and ideological system that was built on an alliance with demonic Roman power (Mark 11:15-17; Matthew 21:12-17; Luke 19:45-48; John 2:13-22). What Jesus directly attacked was their *collective shamelessness* that inevitably ended up

³¹¹ Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 306.

³¹² Metaxas, 527-8.

bringing Jesus to great suffering and death on the cross as he predicted (Matthew 16:21). While he was hanging on the cross because he was accused by them as a blasphemer, he said a prayer, “Father, forgive them; for they do not know what they are doing” (Luke 23:34); in other words, “Father, restore them; for they have lost *Shameability*.” Of course, it was a prayer not only for the Jews—the dominant ones who were *possessed*, but also for the Galileans—the crowd that also shamelessly turned its back on him. Why did Jesus say such a prayer for them? Had He not loved them, Christ would have experienced unbearable *Shame* on the cross as the Christ. Not because he was caught in *Shame* but because he was in union with God he could see the potential of *Shame* through his *ultimate sense of Shame*.

What is implicit in Bonhoeffer’s theology is that God has *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability*. For example, had God not become a human in God’s own freedom as Bonhoeffer asserted, God would have experienced unbearable *Shame*. Certainly, it is a different kind of freedom than is present in other views where God prefers to use that freedom for staying off earth. Based on such views, some thinkers understood God as a shameless One. Nietzsche, for example, was deeply troubled by the “divine violation of the human” where he thought that God the “all-knowing” and “all-invading” had to be overthrown.

But, he had to die: he saw with eyes that say everything; he saw man’s depths and ultimate grounds, all his concealed disgrace and ugliness. His pity knew no shame: he crawled into my dirtiest nooks. This most curious, overobtrusive, overpitying one had to die.³¹³

³¹³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (New York: Viking Press, 1954), Part 4, 378. Cited in Schneider 1977, 130.

Sartre was another one who saw God as a shameless intruder. “Now, shame... is shame of self; it is the recognition of the fact that I am indeed that object which the Other is looking at and judging. I can be ashamed only as my freedom escapes me in order to become a given object.”³¹⁴ Based on this notion, Sartre even described his experience of shame before God as an “internal hemorrhage.”³¹⁵

However, these views are not typical from the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*. It is true that God is all-knowing, but it does not mean that God is a shameless intruder. Moreover, it is not bad at all that God is all-knowing because it means that God’s justice will be served at last; therefore, it is a relief rather than terrifying as long as one knows that he/she is accepted in spite of *Shame*.

Conclusion

The theological elements related to shame at the *ultimate* level have been explored in the works of Augustine, Tillich and Bonhoeffer. As I have briefly reviewed the thoughts of Augustine through the eyes of Ritson, Capps, Park, and McFarland, the popular and general understanding of Augustinian theology as being exclusively focused on guilt is not correct. This brought us to a point where three categories of *Shame* (s-vi), *Shamelessness* (l-vi) and *Shameability* (p-vi) are actually revealed in Augustine although he does not explicitly articulate these concepts.

I have also reviewed the theological positions of Tillich and Bonhoeffer in the area of shame at the *ultimate* level. Although their theological articulations are often not explicit

³¹⁴ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 255. Cited in Schneider 1977, 131.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 290. Cited in Schneider 1977, 132.

enough, the review brought us to a conclusion that Tillich and Bonhoeffer also provide concepts that correspond to three categories of shame that I have proposed at this particular level. Overall, the implicit elements in the theologies of Augustine, Tillich, and Bonhoeffer have proposed or supported the concept of *Shameability* (p-vi), and articulated it as an integral part of being a true human being as well as one made in the image of God.

CHAPTER 6

Restoring the Ultimate Sense of Shame: A Pastoral Theology of *Shameability* (I)— Biblical Perspective

The purpose of this chapter is to develop a biblically based pastoral theology of *Shameability*. Acknowledgement of the proposed theological anthropology of *the ultimate sense of Shame* means to accept that there can be three possible routes for human development and change. First, when the seed of *Shameability* is properly nurtured, empowered, and liberated, a person can fully actualize their potential, meaning that one can participate in the image of God as it was originally intended. Second, when the seed of *Shameability* is nurtured improperly, is neglected or maltreated, one ends up falling into one or more maladaptive and distorted states of shame. Third, when the former meets the latter, as we see in God who became a flesh and blood human being in order to help “humans to be truly human,” it means that even the ones with the most severely distorted shame can be restored to *Shameability* with grace. This is where the estranged human beings are not caught in *Shame* in spite of their *Shame* because they are “struck by grace;” the state of existence where one can overcome the threat of non-existence through its restored capacity to see the potential of non-being, the state I have termed *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability* (p-vi).

Three questions arise at this point. First, if it is true that the image of God includes *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability* and it exists before the fall, what is the textual evidence for supporting that idea? Second, what does Jesus’ pastoral ministry of restoring *Shameability* look like in the context of fallen humanity that is best characterized by

distorted shame? Third, what is the definition of church based on the above-mentioned textual evidence as well as Jesus' ministry of restoring *Shameability*? While one could ask many other questions, this section is a good place to answer these three questions before moving on to the chapter on pastoral implications.

Exploring these questions, I will argue that the biblical account supports the proposed pastoral theological position regarding *the ultimate sense of Shame* that is innate in human nature and that is created according to the image of God. When we turn to the text based on Christological approach, we can find validation for the proposed theological anthropology of *the ultimate sense of Shame* manifested in Jesus, and His ministry of restoring *Shameability*. I will explore four core and interdependent elements of Jesus' ministry as I investigate how to restore *the ultimate sense of Shame*.

This will bring me to the conclusion of this chapter where I describe God as a God of *Shameability*, meaning that God can never be a God of *Shame*, or *Shamelessness*. God's love is not self-contained. The love of God is real, as shown through Jesus. God actually cares for the potential disconnection (*Shame*) between God and the world; God actually cares for estranged human beings.

As I proceed with these thoughts, I need to make it clear that the chapter is my own constructive work. I choose not to refer to biblical scholars in my reading of the text because their views include neither *Shameability* as the integral part of being a true human nor *Shameability* as an aspect of being made in the image of God. Instead, I offer an alternative approach.

As this chapter is to help illustrate what I mean by three categories of shame in the biblical setting, I am aware that my decision not to consult any commentaries can render my readings of the text somewhat tendentious. I also understand that my position can be criticized given that it is, perhaps, far from clear that these categories are actually present in the minds of the evangelists. As a matter of fact, it seems to be generally agreed by Western theologians that the Greek word for shame is indeed not prominent in the gospels. Nevertheless, we need to remember that Jesus himself actually talked about shame,³¹⁶ meaning that ‘shame’ (possibly including the categories of *Shame*, *Shamelessness* and *Shameability*), which was originally an important part of Jesus’ ministry and his teaching, could have become somewhat weakened, forgotten, neglected, or even distorted based on the limitations of the evangelists themselves. For example, what if they were defending against their own shame (both at the individual and communal levels)? What if the evangelists belonged to the *shame*, or *shameless* categories? In addition to that, the words of Jesus were passed down orally for a period of time until they were written and translated from Aramaic to Greek, as well as being adapted to a different culture that was seemingly more dominant in its nature compared to the original one. This means that even the most extensive exegetical work can still be limited, particularly in the area of shame if they are solely dependent on the written text itself. This is the context in which I present this chapter as a pastoral re-reading of the texts. As I do so, I keep the three categories in mind, follow my intuition and imagination, and I remain aware of my *Shameability* as a Korean

³¹⁶ For example, refer to the passage where Jesus says: “Those who are ashamed of me and of my words in this adulterous and sinful generation, of them the Son of Man will also be ashamed when he comes in the glory of his Father with the holy angels” (Mark 8:38).

American pastoral theologian. I also recognize that more extensive exegesis of the texts will be necessary and helpful in the future.

Jesus' Pastoral Ministry of Restoring *Shameability*

Jesus' pastoral ministry can be viewed in the context of fallen humanity or humans in the chaotic state of distorted shame. Jesus came to this shameful world of darkness (John 1:5) in order to save people who were estranged from God, self, and others. Salvation in this context means to be restored to the state of *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability* (p-vi) by the grace of God. In this graceful participation of Jesus through his ministry of restoring *Shameability*, there are four core elements that deserve special attention. These elements are: 1) nurturing the caregivers' own *Shameability* (prayer); 2) nurturing *Shameability* through proclaiming the words of God (kerygma); 3) nurturing *Shameability* of disciples (pastoral formation); and 4) nurturing *Shameability* through healing (pastoral care).

Although these elements can be distinguished from each other, they should not be separated. Throughout Jesus' ministry we see that they are interdependent, while also rooted in one foundation that aims to restore *the ultimate sense of Shame*. In this sense, these four elements are like four pillars of a building where even a single pillar can never be removed because all of them are essential parts of the structure that supports the ministry. Using another analogy, these four elements are like four wheels of a vehicle, all integral parts of Jesus' pastoral ministry of restoring *the ultimate sense of Shame*.

Nurturing Caregivers' Own *Shameability*: Prayer

An overview of biblical characters based on their shame-related categories helps us understand the underlying context in which Jesus nurtured his own *Shameability* as the first priority in his ministry. As I observe, biblical characters can be divided into three main categories on the *ultimate* level. The first one is the *Shame* category (s-vi), the second one is the *Shameless* category (l-vi), and the third one is the category of *Shameability* (p-vi).

***Shame* Category: Adam and Eve.** My categories present a way of reading the Genesis text in such a way that Adam and Eve belong to the *Shame* category. As the book suggests, they were human beings with the God-endowed seed of *the ultimate sense of Shame*. But Adam and Eve are portrayed as figures who were not able to nurture the innate seed of *Shameability* with which they were endowed. Rather than following God’s command, they were enticed by the tempting words of the serpent (3:4-5). The result was the fall—and their estrangement from God, their selves, and their partner. This is where the Bible hints that *the ultimate sense of Shame* was first mal-nurtured, distorted, and maladapted in the form of *Shame* (s-vi). In such a state of disunion, the Bible explains the situation in which Adam and Eve began to “see themselves” instead of “seeing God.”³¹⁷ The book of Genesis also notes that this was where human beings began covering themselves, as well as blaming others for their *Shame* (3:12-13).

Nevertheless, the book of Genesis shows that the human beings in their state of *Shame* were still cognizant of their *Shame*. “Where are you?” (3:9). Responding to this question from God, Adam simply replied, “I heard the sound of you in the garden, and I hid myself” (3:10). Instead of denying or defending against their *Shame*, Adam and Eve were

³¹⁷ Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 20.

able to honestly acknowledge and accept their state of *Shame* because they were aware that they were disunited from God and themselves. This is one piece of evidence that shows that there is more hope left in the state of *Shame* (s-vi) compared to the state of *Shamelessness* (l-vi). While *Shame* is a distorted form of *Shameability*, it is less distorted than *Shamelessness*.

Shameless Category: Cain. Unlike Adam and Eve, their son Cain belongs to the category of *Shamelessness* (l-vi). He committed one of the most serious crimes; he murdered a person, and that person was his own brother (4:8). However, one can hardly find any sign of *Shame* (s-vi) from Cain. “Where is your brother Abel?” Responding to this question from God, Genesis reports that Cain boldly replied, “I don’t know; am I my brother’s keeper?” (4:9). Instead of honestly recognizing and accepting his state of *Shame*, Cain rigidly defends against it. Cain was an ultimately *Shameless* figure. Here the book of Genesis helps readers to see how the distortions of *Shameability* progress by presenting a completely different character of shame. By providing a microcosm of one symbolic family, the book seems to show the reality of distorted shame that has been gradually getting worse over the generations. Here, Adam and Eve are portrayed as experiencing unbearable *Shame* (s-vi) after only eating a small fruit forbidden them, but their eldest son does not experience *Shame* even after committing murder. Instead of *Shame* (s-vi), the scripture suggests that Cain had accepted his guilt: “My *punishment* is greater than I can bear!” (4:13). One needs to be perceptive of Cain’s choice of the word “punishment;” the word has more connotations with guilt than with shame. Had Cain actually been aware that he was in the state of *Shame* (s-vi), he would have chosen a different word: “My *state* is greater than I

can bear!” Implied here is that Cain was feeling responsible for accepting any “punishment” for his unjustifiable action; however, he was not willing to admit any *Shame* for his state of *self* as a result of that action. It seems that the dichotomy of separating guilt and shame began with Cain.

What is suggested through the three symbolic figures of Adam, Eve, and Cain in Genesis is how the God-endowed seed of *Shameability* (p-vi) can be distorted and maladapted when it is not properly nurtured, empowered, and liberated. Human beings are like soil that receives seeds from above, as Jesus had taught people with his parable of the sower (Mark 4:1-9; Matthew 13:1-23; Luke 8:4-15). While there are no differences between the seeds that each person receives, each person has the same responsibility, namely to nurture the seed well so that they can maximize the potential of it. In this sense, Adam, Eve, and Cain were not good soil. They were listening to the voices of the tempters instead, and this is where the shame distortion kicked in.

In the case of the first generation of Adam and Eve, the distortion resulted in the form of *Shame* (s-vi). When it reached the second generation of Cain, however, Genesis suggests that the already distorted shame had become further distorted into the state of *Shamelessness* (l-vi). Here, the book seems to suggest that *Shame* and *Shamelessness* was not only the problem of a few symbolic figures in the Bible, but of the whole of humanity. The book of Genesis explains that this is the situation where there are numerous people, both at the individual and communal levels—just like Adam and Eve throughout all six levels (*shame* category), as well as countless others resembling Cain throughout all six levels as well (*shamelessness* category). The book also suggests that this is the setting into

which Jesus came and reached out to the people as a way of restoring *the ultimate sense of Shame* (p-vi) so that human beings could be truly human again.

***Shameability* Category: Jesus Christ.** Before we start reflecting on Jesus' undistorted quality of the *Shameability* (p-vi), one thing needs to be cleared up straight away: was Jesus born with a fully grown capacity of *the ultimate sense of Shame*, or was He born with only the seed or potential of it? My assumption is that Jesus was born with the seed of the *Shameability* like everyone else. Based on this assumption, I assert that there is no difference between the first and 'last Adam'³¹⁸ in terms of being born with the God-endowed seed of *the ultimate sense of Shame*. This means that all human beings are basically the same in terms of being born with the innate seed of *Shameability* (p-vi).³¹⁹

Jesus' Daily Life of Prayer

While I am not interested in going into any metaphysical debate on the identity, origin, or nature of Jesus, I do claim that Jesus lived a life in which he made sincere and ceaseless efforts to nurture the innate seed of *the ultimate sense of Shame*. One piece of evidence can be found in his daily life of prayer.

³¹⁸ Paul referred to Adam of Genesis as the first Adam, and he referred to Jesus as the last Adam who became a life-giving spirit (1 Corinthians 15:45).

³¹⁹ It was Irenaeus the Bishop of Lyons (130-202) who believed that human beings were created as imperfect, immature creatures. Unlike Augustine, Irenaeus believed that human beings were not innately created whole. Instead, he thought that God formed human beings in a rudimentary state for maturation. Basically, it was Irenaeus' belief that human "life is free and self-directing," and that the maturation process of humankind could not "be perfected by God, but done only through uncompelled responses and willing cooperation of human individuals in their actions and reactions in the world in which God has placed them" (John Hick, 2007, pp. 114-5, 253-5). As John Hick explains, while human beings in Irenaeus' view are molding themselves towards the image of God, this only happens through risky and hazardous adventure through individual freedom, and not by nature or evolution (Hick, 2007, p. 256). Implicit in Irenaeus' view is that the human beings have been endowed with a seed, a beginning, or a sprout of a kind that must be nurtured and well cultivated in order to reach the fullness of its potential, and eventually made whole as intended by God.

Prayer can be defined in many ways: as petition, entreaty, expostulation, confession, thanksgiving, recollection, praise, adoration, meditation, intercession, spiritual communion, and the identification of will and activity with God.³²⁰ Prayer, from the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, is the faithful state of being immersed in the words and grace of God where the nurturing of the seed of *the ultimate sense of Shame* is ceaselessly growing. While the seed can never mature itself, this faithful relationship can provide the necessary nutrients for the seed of *Shameability* (p-vi) through good soil—that is through human beings in a continuous union with God. Prayer is the process of discovering self with growing sense of *Shameability*.

Among the textual evidence showing Jesus' daily life of prayer, the book of Mark reports: "In the morning, while it was still very dark, he got up and went out to a deserted place, and there he prayed" (1:35). Luke reports that Jesus "went out to the mountain to pray, and he spent the night in prayer to God" (6:12). Matthew reports that Jesus went up the mountain himself to pray after he dismissed the crowds of five thousand men whom he had fed (14:22-23). Some passages suggest that it was his custom to go out to remote places and pray (Luke 22:39). The gospels also report that Jesus' prayer was done through extensive periods of time with fasting while overcoming vigorous temptations. All three synoptic gospels report that Jesus stayed in the wilderness for forty days where Satan tempted him (Mark 1:12-13; Mathew 4:1-11; Luke 4:1-13). These texts suggest that Jesus was tempted in a similar way to how Adam and Eve were tempted in the Garden of Eden. However, Jesus never failed to be "good soil" for the seed of *Shameability* because he

³²⁰ M. H. Shepherd, "Prayer," in *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible*, ed. Keith R. Crim (Nashville: Abingdon, 1976), Volume 3, 857-68.

stayed in union with God, and kept listening to the words of God; there is not a single incident where Jesus gave in and followed the words of the tempter. Here, the seed of *the ultimate sense of Shame* was never weakened but became stronger; and even more so as the tempter tried to tempt him with even more vigorous temptations.

In the gospels, Jesus is viewed as the one who faithfully nurtured the seed of *Shameability* (p-vi) so that it could grow mature and bear fruit. Among the many vigorous temptations, the hardest one to overcome could have been the last temptation of Jesus at Gethsemane, although no evangelist describes this case as Jesus being tempted. Luke reports that Jesus had prayed in his anguish and “His sweat became like great drops of blood falling down on the ground” on that night (22:44). While he was praying alone, because his disciples fell asleep, Matthew reports that Jesus prayed, “My father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me; yet not what I want but what you want” (26:39). He could have rejected the cup; he could have run away from the cross, but he did not. Instead, he followed the will of God, preserving the innate seed faithfully unto death. Jesus’ daily life of prayer shows how the soil of human beings can be preserved for God as the ground of protecting and nurturing the words of God, so the seeds can bear fruit (Mark 4:20). This is something that the first Adam could not do; however, the ‘last Adam’ did it and as a result everyone who dwells in him can also do the same job as he promised (John 14:12; 15:1-5).

Jesus seems to suggest that the foremost qualification for a caregiver is a daily life of prayer. Prayer is a way of existing with its ground of being; the state of being immersed in the words of God through Jesus. Among the many, two passages in the Gospel of John

show how such a way of existing can be understood. The first passage is where Jesus is portrayed as the true vine: “I am the true vine, and my Father is the vine grower.... Abide in me as I abide in you.... I am the vine, you are the branches. Those who abide in me and I in them bear much fruit, because apart from me you can do nothing” (John 15:1-5). The second passage is Jesus’ prayer for his disciples: “As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be in us, so that the world may believe that you have sent me” (John 17:21). Inhabiting the state of the two passages, Jesus said a prayer even on the cross: “Father, forgive them; for they do not know what they are doing” (Luke 23:34).

One of the reasons that the church is in crisis today is because of the weakness of pastoral leaders to follow Jesus in a daily life of prayer. For many pastors, pastoral counselors, and theologians, their first priority often lies in dealing with the pressing and urgent matters of the church or their personal lives; my own experience included, such activities hinder us from investing enough quality time in prayer. This is the background in which it is often difficult to find the category of fruit that God is seeking these days, meaning that *shame*, or *shameless* categories are being more produced instead of *Shameability* at both the individual and communal levels.

Nurturing *Shameability* through Proclaiming the Words of God: Kerygma

Proclaiming the words of God was the next important priority for Jesus in his ministry of restoring *the ultimate sense of Shame* (p-vi). According to the gospels, it was immediately after John the Baptist was arrested that Jesus began his ministry of words: “Now after John was arrested, Jesus came to Galilee, proclaiming the good news of God, and saying, ‘The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God has come near; repent, and

believe in the good news” (Mark 1:14-15; Luke 5:1-11). From the starting point of Jesus’ public ministry, it is recognized that his words had shown themselves to be somewhat different in terms of their healing power compared to that of others. When he went to Capernaum on the Sabbath and entered a synagogue and taught, for example, Mark and Luke report that people were astounded at his teachings. He taught them “as one having authority, and not as a scribe.” They report that even an unclean spirit came out of a man who was present in the synagogue at that time; very rapidly his fame began spreading throughout the surrounding region of Galilee (Mark 1:21-28; Luke 4:31-37). What followed this initial report are numerous occasions on which Jesus’ words were sufficiently astounding and powerful for people to be liberated from distorted shame(s). Jesus had dealt with a wide range of topics in his ministry of words; however, the motivation behind the words never ceased to help people to be restored to a state of *the ultimate sense of Shame* (p-vi). Jesus’ words were carefully structured so that people could be reunited with God, their selves, and others. His words were straightforward sometimes, and metaphorical on many other occasions; however, his words were always right on target, and powerful enough to unambiguously reveal the state of *Shame* (s-vi) for both categories of people.³²¹

³²¹ Some selected examples include: “Let anyone among you who is without sin be the first to throw a stone at her” (John 8:7); “Are you a teacher of Israel, and yet you do not understand these things?” (John 3:10); “Stop making my Father’s house a market place!” (John 2:16); “Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! For you cross sea and land to make a single convert, and you make the new convert twice as much a child of hell as yourselves” (Matthew 23:15); “Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! For you tithe mind, dill, and cumin, and have neglected the weightier matters of the law: justice and mercy and faith” (Matthew 23:23); “Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! For you are like whitewashed tombs, which on the outside look beautiful, but inside they are full of the bones of the dead and of all kinds of filth” (Matthew 23:27); “And whenever you pray do not be like the hypocrites; for they love to stand and pray in the synagogues and at the street corners, so that they may be seen by others” (Matthew 6:5); “The Pharisee standing by himself, was praying thus, ‘God, I thank you that I am not like other people: thieves, rogues, adulterers, or even like this tax collector. I fast twice a week; I give a tenth of all my income.’ But the tax collector, standing far off, would not even look up to heaven, but was beating his breast and saying, ‘God, be merciful to me, a sinner!’ I

While he spoke in contexts of both individual dialogue and public proclamation, to listen to his words meant being challenged to face *Shame* honestly; there was no room to hide, conceal, or run away from facing *Shame* unless one was defending against *Shame* even while listening to his words. That was why many loved Jesus' words, and yet many others hated them; that was why many accepted his words and yet many others rejected them. Nevertheless, Jesus' proclamation of the words of God was always delivered in a way that invited all people to be restored into *the ultimate sense of Shame* (p-vi) both at the individual and communal levels.

The Fulfilled Law (Matthew 5:27-28)

There are a number of places in the Torah where human beings are portrayed as the bearers of *Shameability* (p-vi). Among a number of examples, there is one particular passage in the book of Genesis that says: “but God said, ‘You shall not eat of the fruit of the tree that is in the middle of the garden, nor shall you touch it, or you shall die’” (3:3).³²²

What did it mean that God warned the man and woman that if they should eat of the fruit of the forbidden tree, the consequence would be death? What does *death* mean in this context? Perhaps simply that God was trying to prevent human beings' access to the tree of the

tell you, this man went down to his home justified rather than the other; for all who exalt themselves will be humbled, but all who humble themselves will be exalted” (Luke 18:11-14); “Truly I tell you, this poor widow has put in more than all those who are contributing to the treasury” (Mark 12:43); “You wicked and lazy slave! You knew, did you, that I reap where I did not sow, and gather where I did not scatter? (Matthew 25:26); “Do you see these great buildings? Not one stone will be left here upon another; all will be thrown down” (Mark 13:2); “And while they went to buy it, the bridegroom came, and those who were ready went with him into the wedding banquet; and the door was shut. Later the other bridesmaids came also, saying, ‘Lord, lord, open to us.’ But he replied, ‘Truly I tell you, I do not know you.’ Keep awake therefore, for you know neither the day nor the hour (Matthew 25:10-13); “‘Truly I tell you, one of you will betray me, one who is eating with me.’ They began to be distressed and to say to him one after another, ‘Surely, not I?’ He said to them, ‘It is one of the twelve, one who is dipping bread into the bowl with me’” (Mark 14:18-20).

³²² Another passage in chapter two says, “And the Lord God commanded the man, ‘You may freely eat of every tree of the garden; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, or in the day that you eat of it you shall die’” (Genesis 2:16-17).

Knowledge of Good and Evil (3:22). However, that does not explain the situation clearly enough because it is obvious that Adam and Eve did not physically die even after they had eaten the forbidden fruit. Accordingly, it is possible to assume that what the passage suggests is that human beings, who were created according to the image of God (1:26), were actually able to see such a potential of *death*, namely, the state of *Shame* as the estrangement from God, self, and others. Otherwise, God would have not commanded the man and woman with such a warning. In other words, God's commandment itself presupposes the innate capacity that was given to human beings to see such a potential of *death (Shame)*. That is why God had presupposed that human beings were actually capable of avoiding such a potential through God-given *Shameability* (p-vi) if they were willing to nurture it. While the *fruit* itself does not necessarily mean any actual physical fruit, it is certainly a powerful symbol that shows the existence of the innate capacity of *the ultimate sense of Shame* (p-vi) within the nature of human beings who were created according to the image of God.

While this short passage from the book of Genesis already suggests much regarding the proposed *Shameability* within the image of God, this particular verse is directly connected to one of the most important teachings of Jesus where he said he had come not to abolish but to fulfill the law of the prophets, and where he clarified the law of God as it had been originally intended. In the book of Matthew, Jesus said to the people on the mount, "You have heard that it was said 'You shall not commit adultery.' But I say to you that everyone who looks at a woman with lust has already committed adultery with her in his heart" (5:27-28). While the context of this teaching was quite different from the

commandment of God to Adam and Eve in Genesis, both Jesus' and God's commands are essentially united in addressing the human capacity to sense estrangement from God. The fulfilled law of Jesus suggests that human beings, who were originally created according to the image of God, are actually able to see the potential of estrangement (the outcome of the adulterous act) in the context of human and divine relationships. Otherwise, Jesus would never have given them such demanding words. In a nutshell, Jesus' teaching itself also presupposes the existence of the innate capacity of *the ultimate sense of Shame* that the people had, just as it is found in God's commandment in Genesis. The only difference is that God's commandment in Genesis was given before man and woman had eaten the forbidden fruit; on the other hand, the teaching by Jesus recorded in the book of Matthew was given after man and woman had already fallen. But, underlying both the words of God and of Jesus, there is the same understanding about the nature of human beings as recipients of God-endowed *Shameability* (p-vi) through which they could participate in the image of God. More important, what becomes clear through both the words of God and of Jesus is this: Though right action may be important, more important is the state of 'self' in terms of how human beings exist in relationship with God, self, and others even before the actual execution of such behaviors. Borrowing the popular definitions of guilt and shame in modern shame theories, what God and Jesus are most concerned with seems to be the state of shame and not guilt, although the Greek text usually does not contain the word for shame in explicit form. The two passages explained above presuppose the innate capacity of human beings to recognize the potential of estrangement from God—that is, *Shame*.³²³

³²³ Some might say that the state of estrangement is the consequence of disobedience of God. Of course we

This view again validates my criticism against the modern distinction between guilt and shame (particularly in the area of empirical psychology and evolutionary psychology; namely, Tangney and her colleagues; Gilbert and his colleagues). They conclude that guilt is a peculiar phenomenon that belongs to relatively healthy, moral, responsible, competent, and empathic individuals and communities, while shame is a phenomenon peculiar to relatively unhealthy, immoral, irresponsible, incompetent, and unempathic individuals and communities. However, such views never take the state of *shameabilities* (p-v, p-vi) into account while the maturity level of them actually exceeds the quality of guilt. While guilt is the state of a moral level of shame that is related to specific actions and behaviors prohibited by systems of value and conscience, the state of *shameability* is where one is able to see and recognize the potential of estrangement. While the state of *shameability* is powerful enough to give warning signals even regarding the slightest chances of being involved with improper actions, the state of guilt is only effective as long as one has been already involved with such behaviors.

God spoke the words of warning to Adam and Eve as a way of entrusting them; God expected them to see and recognize any potential of *Shame* (s-vi) far before the actual execution of their actions. Here, it becomes evident that what modern shame theorists who are heavily dependent on the guilt versus shame dichotomy propose can only be applicable within the range of the lower level of shame that is distorted in its nature. In fact, what they propose with guilt is something that can be understood within the range of Moses' law. On

are guilty of disobedience to God. But, we might also experience *Shame* (s-vi) which is deeper than the cognitive capacity that guilt has because *Shame* and is the state in which we are aware of disunion through self-reflection, as well as the quality of relationships with God, self, and others.

the other hand, what the pastoral theology of *Shameability* proposes with *the ultimate sense of Shame* is something that can be understood within the range of the fulfilled law—the words of God that were restored by Jesus in the gospel (Matthew 5:27-28) based on God’s commandment in Genesis (3:3).

Another reason that the church is in crisis today is because of the unwillingness to follow the words as God originally meant them. Instead of teaching people based on *the ultimate sense of Shame* (p-vi), many churches today seem not even to be aware of the *ultimate sense of Shame* and are instead preoccupied with lower level shame by relieving or eliminating shame altogether; sometimes, they even impose shame³²⁴ – although this is not always the case. This means that the average church of our day is operating on distorted shame while further altering its members’ *Shameability* in such a way that it becomes more distorted as they become more involved in the church. This is the context in which *shame*, or *shameless* categories are often produced more often than *Shameability*, both at the individual and communal levels.

Nurturing *Shameability* of Disciples: Pastoral Formation

Pastoral formation was another pillar in Jesus’ ministry of restoring *the ultimate sense of Shame* (p-vi). The four gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John indicate that Jesus began calling people, teaching them, and started building a core community of pastoral formation early on in his public life and ministry (Matthew 4:18-22; Mark 1:16-20; Luke 5:1-11; John 1:35-51).

³²⁴ Pattison, *Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology*, 229-74.

It is not an easy task to become a disciple of Christ. One of the reasons that it is very difficult is probably because of the “costly grace,” as Bonhoeffer explained in his work of *Discipleship* (1937) as well as by his life and death.³²⁵ There are a number of scriptures on the nature of discipleship in the gospels: disciples cannot escape the persecution that his/her Master has been burdened with (Matthew 10:24-25); he/she must be prepared to depart from home, family, friends, and material possessions to follow Christ (Luke 14:26, 33); the disciple needs to carry his/her own cross (Luke 14:27); the disciple will be recompensed if he/she lives a Christ-like life of giving (Matthew 10:42).³²⁶ From the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, these scriptures are examples of showing the nature of discipleship that has to do with *the ultimate sense of Shame* although what is described in the gospels may not literally mean the same things in today’s ministerial context. Related to this perspective, one can find that much of Jesus’ effort for pastoral formation overall had been focused in the area of restoring *Shameability* for the future pastoral leadership of his day.

One widely spread misunderstanding is that Jesus only called twelve men of Jewish background to discipleship; however, such a limited view does not explain how the others, regardless of their gender or ethnic backgrounds, eventually ended up joining the core group of the disciples as Jesus’ ministry and the ministry of the early church unfolded. Therefore, what matters more is that Jesus actually reached out and called many others, and those also included people from both categories of *shame* and *shamelessness*. For example, Jesus offered discipleship to a rich young man. According to Matthew, it seems that this

³²⁵ Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Discipleship*, ed. Geoffrey B. Kelly and John D. Godsey (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), 43-56.

³²⁶ Pierson Parker, “Disciple,” in *The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible*, Volume 1, 845.

young man was a figure who had a deep sense of pride and self-righteousness based on his own religious efforts and performance of the commandments. “I have kept all these; what do I still lack?” (Matthew 19:20). To this young man who can be best described as in the category of *shamelessness* (l-iv, l-vi, l-vi), Jesus offered his discipleship without any discrimination: “go, sell your possessions, and give the money to the poor... then come, *follow me*” (19:21). It is written that the young man listened to these words, and “went away grieving, for he had many possessions” (19:22). It is possible that the young man could face *Shame* (s-vi) because he lacked the strength of will to follow Jesus. However, it is more likely that he returned to his former state of *Shamelessness* (l-vi) in glorying over his possessions. Unfortunately, he was not able to be more mature even after meeting Jesus. It shows how difficult it is for someone in the *Shameless* category to become a disciple of Christ. Using Jesus’ analogy, it seems to be easier for “a camel to go through the eye of a needle” than for someone who is rich and *shameless* to become a disciple of Christ (Luke 18:25). It is not because Jesus is not interested in caring for this category, but because they usually cannot accept his call thanks to the nature and degree of their distorted shame. As far as I recall, with several exceptions that include the apostle Paul, there was actually almost no one from the *Shameless* category who accepted Jesus’ call to be his disciple in the era of Jesus’ public ministry and Jerusalem church. Saul is an exceptional case because he originally was in the state of *ultimate Shamelessness* (l-vi)—shameless enough to persecute Jesus in the name of God. But, unlike the rich young man, Saul accepted Jesus’ offer to follow him in the identical context where Jesus had nurtured his seed of *Shameability*: “Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?... It hurts you to kick against the

goads” (Acts 9:1-7; 22:6-8; 26:14). While the process of accepting Jesus’ call was not at all easy for him, Saul was healed to the state of *ultimate Shame* (s-vi), then was eventually restored into the state of *the ultimate sense of Shame* (p-vi) with the grace of God. It shows that Jesus never excluded those in the *Shameless* category from becoming his disciples. On the contrary, Jesus always called those in the *Shameless* category earnestly from his heart. This is a type of *fish* that is hard to catch; however, once it is caught, it is usually a big fish and is able to feed and nourish many, as Saul was able to do.

It is the *shame* category that is relatively more open in terms of accepting Jesus’ call, as those in this category are in the state of a less distorted shame. The seeds of their innate *Shameability* are easier to heal and cultivate because their path’s soil is less polluted by rocks and thorns (Matthew 13:3-7). In the case of Simon Peter, John, and James, for example, it is apparent that Jesus could have enjoyed much while awakening the innate seeds of their *Shameability*. On their first encounter at the shore of the lake Gennesaret, Jesus said to Peter: “Put out into the *deep* water and let down your nets for a *catch*” (Luke 5:4). These words of Jesus were given to this poor fisherman of Galilee at a point at which he and his colleagues had worked all night but had caught nothing (5:5). The only thing that seems clear is that Peter and his colleagues had had a bad night fishing; however, the situation cannot be oversimplified considering the broader socio-economic and spiritual condition of the Galilee region. Peter and his colleagues could have been in the state of *proto shame* (s-i) due to the lack of SAHP (Social Attention Holding Potential) in Gilbert’s term because of the larger context in which the Romans were exploiting them; they could have been in the state of *stigma*, *social*, and *ultimate Shame* (s-iii, s-iv, s-vi) because of

their social and spiritual conditions. Anyhow, in contrast to the state of the rich young man's *shamelessness* (l-iv, l-v, l-vi), in his state of *shame* (s-i, s-iii, s-iv, s-vi) Peter seems far more ready to accept the call of Jesus for discipleship.

Peter and his colleagues thereafter caught an abundance of fish on that day because they had followed Jesus' words; however, it seems that they were not satisfied even with such a big catch because Luke reports that they eventually left everything behind including those fish and followed Jesus (5:11). What happened to them? My hunch is that there was some degree of restoration of *shameability* in Peter and his colleagues as a result of their meeting with Jesus on that day. As the book reminds the readers, there had been other remarks that Jesus had given him: "Follow me, and I will make you fish for people" (Matthew 4:19). What is hinted at through these words is that Peter might already have noticed that his fish catching business was too shallow in nature compared to that of Jesus.' Peter's decision suggests that there had been a process of restoration in the area of his *shameability* through meeting with Jesus. Had he stayed there and continued to live as an average fisherman of Galilee even after meeting with Jesus, Peter (as well as his colleagues John and James, the son of Zebedee) would have experienced *Shame* (p-vi, Luke 5:10-11).

Besides the cases of Peter, John, and James there are many other examples in the Bible that show Jesus' efforts to help both categories of people in the area of pastoral formation through nurturing their innate seeds of *Shameability*. The calls of Matthew the tax collector (Matthew 9:9), Simon the Zealot (Luke 6:15), Judas Iscariot the traitor (Luke 6:16), Mary Magdalene the healed (Luke 8:2), Nicodemus the Pharisee leader (John 3:1-10) are some examples among the many that are all related to awakening the *Shameability*

innate in them. “Are you a teacher of Israel, and yet you do not understand these things?” Jesus asked Nicodemus (John 3:10). “Do quickly what you are going to do” Jesus said to Judas Iscariot (John 13:27). In many cases, Jesus’ efforts of pastoral formation bore fruit; however, sometimes they did not. Nevertheless, Jesus never stopped his ministry of pastoral formation; he kept on nurturing and cultivating people’s innate seeds of *Shameability* no matter how seriously they had been distorted. Sometimes, Jesus suffered greatly because of this. In fact, the reason that Jesus was crucified is directly related to his efforts at pastoral formation through nurturing *Shameability*, as was the case with Judas. Why had he done the ministry of nurturing *Shameability* so sincerely? Because it is from nurturing *Shameability* that pastoral formation begins. Without proper education of nurturing *Shameability*, there cannot be any proper pastoral formation. Without genuine pastoral formation, there cannot be any hope for the church.

Jesus’ teaching in the area of pastoral formation was that of the *ultimate sense of Shame*; his teaching method was a pedagogy of love. Had he not loved his disciples, he would have experienced *Shame* (s-vi). In the state of being united with God, Jesus had nothing but love for his disciples. One of the places in the Bible that shows his pedagogy of love is where Jesus is having the last meal with his disciples. At this moment of farewell, it seems that he continued to feed and nurture the seeds of *Shameability* in order to help the disciples’ pastoral formation. There, he washed his disciples’ feet and wiped them with a towel (John 13:5-15); he said that one of the disciples would betray him (Matthew 26:21; Mark 14:18; Luke 22:21); he said to Peter that he would deny him three times before the

cock crowed (John 13:38); he took a loaf of bread and a cup and gave them to his disciples including Judas Iscariot (Matthew 26:26-28; Mark 14:22-26; Luke 22:14-23).

The Gospel of John suggests that Jesus' efforts of nurturing the seeds continued even after his resurrection. Jesus came back to see his disciples at the shore of the lake. After they had finished the breakfast that Jesus had prepared for them, the gospel reports that Jesus asked Peter the same question three times: "Simon son of John, Do you love me more than these?" "Yes, Lord; you know that I love you." "Feed my lambs," Jesus said. A second time He said to him, "Simon son of John, do you love me?" "Yes, Lord; you know that I love you." "Tend my sheep," He said. Then, he said to him a third time, "Do you love me?" At this point, the book provides additional information about Peter's condition: "Peter felt hurt because Jesus said to him the third time, 'Do you love me?'" The gospel explains that Peter answered differently this time: "Lord, you know everything; you know that I love you." "Feed my sheep," Jesus said. Then, Jesus added, "Very truly, I tell you, when you were younger, you used to fasten your own belt and to go wherever you wished. But when you grow old, you will stretch out your hands, and someone else will fasten a belt around you and take you where you do not wish to go. (Jesus said this to indicate the kind of death by which he would glorify God.) After this Jesus said to him, 'Follow me.'" (John 21:15-19)

The Gospel of John seems to suggest that it is the one who is restored in the area of *the ultimate sense of Shame*. Had Peter not followed the footsteps of Jesus even after experiencing such grace as is implicit in this dialogue, he probably would have experienced *Shame* (s-vi).

One of the reasons that theological education is in crisis today is because of our failure to follow Jesus' pedagogy of love that is based on *the ultimate sense of Shame*. For a growing number of professionals including professors, theologians, and clinical pastoral supervisors there can be a tendency to depend on rigid professionalism rather than Jesus' pedagogy of love. While there are inevitable limitations in such relationships in the area of achieving Christ-centered pastoral formation, all kinds of theological knowledge, psychological theories, reading, writings, exams, lectures, seminars, clinical supervisions, case conferences, and grading systems can take the place of Jesus' pedagogy of love. When that happens, it is possible that both parties of teachers and pupils can be preoccupied much with urgent matters and deadlines because they are within the system where they have to evaluate each other by the end of each semester. It is a context where pastoral formation can become a process where people pursue becoming more marketable by getting degrees and licenses required for entering the field of parish ministry, pastoral counseling, or theological education. This may make it even harder to find the category of fruit that God is seeking as well.

Nurturing *Shameability* Through Healing: Pastoral Care

Pastoral care was one of the four pillars in Jesus' ministry of restoring *the ultimate sense of Shame*. Jesus' care was that of nurturing and empowering the innate *Shameability* of people who were estranged from God, self, and others because of distorted shame. His care can be best characterized as being inclusive and open. He did not exclude anyone in his pastoral care based on race, gender, social status, moral status, wealth, power, health, value, or personal history. He did not carry out his ministry of pastoral care after defining

the qualified recipients for his love. Of course, it seems that he prioritized the objects for his care at times. In the case of a Canaanite woman, for example, Jesus said, “I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel“ (Matthew 15:24). Surprisingly enough, Jesus even said to her, “It is not fair to take the children’s food and throw it to the dogs” (15:26). But after she replied, “Yes, Lord, yet even the dogs eat the crumbs that fall from their masters’ table” (15:27), he changed his mind. Jesus’ predetermined priorities were flexible enough to love anyone that God had sent him to care for. The case of the Canaanite woman also shows the quality of Jesus’ *Shameability* as he seemingly changed his mind to accept the point that the woman was making about her desperate situation with regard to her daughter’s torment (15:22).

There are many examples of Jesus’ ministry of pastoral care of *Shameability*. Since I have already provided some examples within diverse contexts of shame-related categories and levels,³²⁷ the nature of Jesus’ pastoral care might be better grasped at this point by observing a particular symbolic pastoral figure that Jesus himself had provided through one of his best known parables.

The Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37)

While it seems that the parable of the Good Samaritan is also an extension of Jesus’ pedagogy of love that is deeply rooted on his *ultimate sense of Shame*, Luke reports that Jesus gave this parable under the context of a dialogue between him and a lawyer. It is

³²⁷ The examples that I have shared so far include: 1) *proto* level (Simon and his colleagues: Luke 5:4-11), 2) *pathological* level (a man with unclean spirit: Mark 5:1-9; Mary Magdalene: Luke 8:2), 3) *stigma* level, *social* level and *moral* level (a woman caught in adultery: John 8:3-11; a Samaritan woman: John 4:7-14; Matthew the tax collector: Matthew 9:9), 4) *ultimate* level (a rich young man: Matthew 19:20-22; Judas Iscariot: John 13:27; apostle Paul: Acts 9:1-7; Peter: John 21:15-19; Jesus’ confrontation of the collective shamelessness of the Jews in Jerusalem: Mark 11:15-17).

reported that the dialogue started with the lawyer's question that was a test, "Teacher, what must I do to inherit eternal life?" (10:25) Jesus said to him, "What is written in the law? What do you read there?" (10:26) The lawyer answered, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with all your mind; and your neighbor as yourself" (10:27). And Jesus said to him, "You have given the right answer; do this, and you will live" (10:28). That was the first round of the dialogue.

Then, Luke reports that the lawyer posed another question to Jesus as a way of "wanting to justify himself" (10:29). "And who is my neighbor?" asks the lawyer (10:30). This is where Jesus delivered the parable of the Good Samaritan in response to the lawyer's question. After telling this parable, Luke reports that Jesus asked the lawyer: "Which of these three, do you think, was a neighbor to the man who fell into the hands of the robbers?" (10:36) The lawyer replied, "The one who showed him mercy." Then, Jesus finally said, "Go and do likewise" (10:37).

As far as verses 25-28 are concerned, there are identical passages in the gospels of Mark (12:28-36) and Matthew (22:34-40). According to them, it was Jesus who had been asked by another person (a scribe or a lawyer) regarding which commandment was the first of all. Both books report that it was Jesus himself who had combined Deuteronomy 6:4 (the Shema) and Leviticus 19:18 to summarize the law as a way of giving the answer to the proposed question.³²⁸ Mark, for example, reports that Jesus had answered: "The first is, 'Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God, the Lord is one; you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength.'

³²⁸ *The Interpreter's Bible*, ed. George Arthur Buttrick (New York: Abingdon, 1951), volume 8, 192-3.

The second is this, ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself.’ There is no other commandment greater than these” (Mark 12:28-32). But, it is Luke who uniquely combines Jesus’ parable of the Good Samaritan with the already integrated great commandments; although it is not through Jesus’ mouth but through the mouth of the lawyer that we hear the story in Luke’s editing, the core message of Jesus regarding the greatest commandment of love becomes even more clear and powerful.

Interpretation of the Parable from a Caregivers’ Perspective

The parable of the Good Samaritan can be interpreted in many different ways. From the perspective of pastoral theology of *Shameability*, however, Jesus’ parable seems to be structured as a way of nurturing caregivers’ *Shameability*. There is a central figure of the Good Samaritan who is playing the role of the “true neighbor” with *the ultimate sense of Shame* (p-vi). While this character is planted as an image of the absolute standard for the Christ-centered pastoral caregiver, there are several other characters around this central figure within Jesus’ parable—a total of five excluding the victim and the good Samaritan: 1) the robbers, 2) a priest, 3) a Levite, 4) an inn keeper, and 5) an animal. From the perspective of Jesus’ pastoral care through the figure of the Good Samaritan, these five characters represent the potential images of diverse caregivers who are variously in a state of low-level/distorted shame. While it is implicit enough to go by unnoticed or be passed over by many, the core question that is raised by the parable for every care giver is with which character of the narrative he/she (or they) most identifies: “What kind of care giver are you?” With this implicit question, the parable is presented like a mirror as a way of helping all caregivers to face their actual states of shame so that they may be nurtured,

empowered, and liberated while being restored to *the ultimate sense of Shame* that is found in Jesus, namely, the Good Samaritan. The questions that each caregiver is invited to ask him- or herself include: “Am I like the character of the robber(s), or the priest/Levite? Am I like the character of the innkeeper? Or, even the animal?” These questions may imply the following meanings in relation to three categories of shame: “Do I belong to the category of *shamelessness*? Or *shame*? Or *Shameability*? If I belong to any one of these as a caregiver, what is the level of my shame category? From this category and level, how can I as a caregiver be restored to *the ultimate sense of Shame* as it is found in the Good Samaritan?”

While all care givers are invited to ask these questions of themselves through the image of the central figure in the parable, it is not easy for many to honestly face to which category they belong. For example, it is pretty certain that the character of robbers belong to the *shameless* category. In fact, their shame states are similar to Cain’s category as we have read in the book of Genesis (3:8-9) although Cain is seemingly presented as a symbolic figure with an individual level of *shamelessness*, while the robbers (although their characters are not described in any detail) could have been in the state of communal or cooperative level of *shamelessness* (I-i, I-iv, I-v). However, who among “caregivers” or “mental health professionals” would willingly identify themselves with the robbers? Nevertheless, it is possible that, for example, professionals in today’s healthcare industry might become like robbers considering the health care system under which they are operating. Under this context, it seems that the victims of the robbery (meaning all kinds of patients who are suffering from unexpected diseases, accidents, disorders, etc.) often become a great source of profit-making for many. For some of them, the only difference

between healthcare professionals and the robbers might seem to be that health professionals have a license for what they are doing.

Moreover, it seems that the robbers are not the only characters being presented as those who belong to the *shameless* category . It seems that the priest and the Levite are also portrayed as *Shameless* figures because it is clear that these characters are also rigidly defending against their *Shame*. The only difference between the robbers and the priest/Levite is to which level of *Shamelessness* among the six they belong. While the robbers are seemingly in the states of *proto shamelessness* (l-i), *social shamelessness* (l-iv) as well as *moral shamelessness* (l-v), the priest and the Levite appear to be in the state of *the ultimate Shamelessness* (l-vi). While the robbers are *shameless* (l-i, l-iv, l-v) because they do something self-centered and immoral, the priest and Levite are *Shameless* (l-vi) because they fail to participate in the image of God. It should be noted that the priest and Levite could have just passed by because they believed touching the bleeding man would have rendered them ritually unclean; yet prioritizing such a religious code over helping an injured man can be seen as a form of defending against *Shame* (s-vi) as well. The fact that they can just pass by the half dead man on the road is only explicable through a presupposition that their religious status and titles have nothing to do with their quality of relationship with God, self, and others—that they are only token signs of human-made religion that is basically a system of rigid defense against *Shame* in its essence.

In this sense, it might be suggested that the characters of the priest and Levite are less than the innkeeper, or even the animal, in the context of Jesus' narrative. The innkeeper accepted the Good Samaritan's offer to take care of the wounded man while he was gone.

Although the Bible does not explicitly state the psychological mindset of the innkeeper, suppose we can observe some implicit points for the sake of demonstrating the different levels of shame. The innkeeper's state could be understood in several potential ways. He could first be viewed as a person in the state of *proto shameability* (p-i) that is related to earning income. He can be viewed in the state of *social shameability* (p-iv) that is operating in the "eyes of others." He can also be viewed as a person in the state of *moral sense of shame*: (p-v) "If this Samaritan has done this much, it is right for me at least to participate this much...." Going a bit further with our imagination of the scenario, the animal also followed the Good Samaritan's will to carry the man while participating in the act of salvation, even though it probably had no idea of what it was doing. In such a case, the animal would be in the state of *proto shameability* (p-i) that is related to an animal level of living and survival: "If I do not cooperate, he will not feed me, or he will beat me."

However, what caregiver would willingly identify himself or herself with the priest, Levite, the innkeeper, or the animal? Nevertheless, it is quite possible for professionals in today's mental health industry to become like the characters of the priest, the Levite, the innkeeper, or the animal considering that many of them are practicing under the umbrella of a health care system that is based in capitalism rather than the ministry of the church. That is why many professionals do not care unless the half dead person actually visits their offices. With their well-trained boundaries, what they are defending against often seems to be *Shame*. This is where pastoral care is in crisis today, and its foundations are shaking more than ever.

It was the lawyer who asked Jesus, “Who is my neighbor?” (Luke 10:30). From Jesus’ point of view, however, he was not supposed to ask such a silly question; the greatest commandment itself presupposes that there can be no boundaries when one defines the term “neighbor.” It is true that there are passages regarding loving one’s neighbor in the Old Testament that are aimed solely at the people of Israel (Leviticus 19:18). However, for Jesus it seems to be different from seeing how he teaches about love through the story of the Good Samaritan. In this sense, the character of the Good Samaritan implies something very important in terms of defining Christ-centered care. Unlike other characters in the parable, the Good Samaritan is portrayed as a care giver who is operating on *the ultimate sense of Shame* (p-vi). Implicit in his loving acts and “participation,”³²⁹ there is undistorted *Shameability* as it is found in Jesus himself. Had the Samaritan not cared for the wounded man, he would have experienced unbearable *Shame*.³³⁰ It is not because he was caught in *Shame*, but because he was in union with God that he could see and recognize the potential of *Shame* through his undistorted *Shameability*. While such a capacity is seemingly well blocked, or significantly weakened in the name of boundaries for many secular care givers, there are no such boundaries found in Jesus, the Good Samaritan.

The ministry of restoring *the ultimate sense of Shame* is beneficial not only at the individual level of pastoral care. Pastoral care of *Shameability* is also related to the communal and systemic levels. Otherwise, Jesus would not have had to go up to Jerusalem and help nurture the *robbers’ Shameability* there: “Stop making my Father’s house a

³²⁹ James N. Lapsley, *Salvation and Health: the Interlocking Processes of Life* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972).

³³⁰ The other alternative would be that he was at an even lower level of shamelessness and would have passed by the wounded man without any sense of responsibility or resulting shame.

marketplace!” (John 2:16). Otherwise, his followers of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Nelson Mandela, and Dae Jung Kim would not have had to go to Berlin, London, Memphis, Johannesburg, and Seoul to help restore the *robbers’ Shameability* there either.

It is no coincidence that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. preached on the parable of the Good Samaritan in his *I’ve Been to the Mountain Top* speech in Memphis (April 3, 1968—the day before he was assassinated):

It’s possible that those men were afraid. . . . That’s a dangerous road. In the days of Jesus it came to be known as the ‘Bloody Pass.’ And you know, it’s possible that the priest and the Levite looked over that man on the ground and wondered if the robbers were still around. Or it’s possible that they felt that the man on the ground was merely faking. And he was acting like he had been robbed and hurt, in order to seize them over there, lure them there for quick and easy seizure. And so the first question that the priest asked—the first question that the Levite asked was, ‘If I stop to help this man, what will happen to me?’ But then the Good Samaritan came by. And he reversed the question: ‘If I do not stop to help this man, what will happen to him?’ That’s the question before you tonight. Not, ‘If I stop to help the sanitation workers, what will happen to my job.’ Not, ‘If I stop to help the sanitation workers what will happen to all of the hours that I usually spend in my office every day and every week as a pastor?’ The question is not, ‘If I stop to help this man in need, what will happen to me?’ The question is, ‘If I do not stop to help the sanitation workers, what will happen to them?’ That’s the question. . . .³³¹

Love is a dangerous thing. Anyone who attempts to love can end up being hated, betrayed, persecuted, beaten, imprisoned, and even executed. But love is the only place where the hope for restoring *the ultimate sense of Shame* begins as we see in Jesus’ giving of himself on the cross.

Church: A Community of Restoring *Shameability*

³³¹ *Christian Ethics: An Introductory Reader*, ed. Samuel Wells (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 217-8.

The Gospels report that there were three crosses standing at the Golgotha execution site. The one in the middle was for Jesus, and the two other ones were for bandits. The three people who were crucified on that day represent three categories of *Shame*, *Shamelessness*, and *Shameability* while the same holds true for all the others standing around the crosses including the chief priests, scribes, the centurion, soldiers, Jesus' mother, Jesus' mother's sister, Mary the wife of Clopas, Mary Magdalene, the disciple whom he loved, mocking crowds, and all the other bystanders (Mark 15:27-32; Matthew 27:32-44; Luke 23:44-56; John 19:25-27). Luke reports that one of the criminals who was hanged there kept deriding Jesus and said: "Are you not the Messiah? Save yourself and us!" (Luke 23:39) This person, along with others of similar mindset, represents the *Shameless* category among the many who were gathered around Jesus' cross. On the other hand, Luke reports that there was another criminal who rebuked him and said, "Do you not fear God, since you are under the same sentence of condemnation? And we indeed have been condemned justly, for we are getting what we deserve for our deeds, but this man has done nothing wrong... Jesus, remember me when you come into your kingdom" (23:40-42). This person, along with others like him, represent the *Shame* category among those who were gathered around Jesus' cross. It is understandable that the Church had been started through this category as Jesus replied to the second bandit: "Truly I tell you, today you will be with me in Paradise" (Luke 23:43).

There are many ways to define the church. From the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, however, church is a community of faith that consists of people who are nurtured, empowered, and liberated in terms of their *Shameability* through Jesus'

love and grace. Church is a community of people who are restored, or in the process of being restored, in *the ultimate sense of Shame*. Mark reports that even the centurion remarked, “Truly this man was God’s Son” (Mark 15:39). If a Gentile executioner was nurtured in his *Shameability* through the executed person’s love, how much more would the disciples who were gathered in the upper room on the day of Pentecost be so nurtured? (Acts 2:1-13).

There are many ways to define the state where one is filled with the Holy Spirit; however, from the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, being filled with the Holy Spirit means to live in the state of *the ultimate sense of Shame* where one is able to see and recognize the potential of *Shame* (estrangement). This is the state where one is living beyond the state of *guilt*. Paul wrote, “There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus for the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set you free from the law of sin and of death” (Romans 8:1-2). The Spirit sets one free from the law of *guilt*, and moves one up to the level of the fulfilled law of *the ultimate sense of Shame* because one is now in Christ. That is why Peter, John, James, and other disciples were finally able to pray, proclaim the words, make disciples, and care for others as the church, namely the community of *Shameability*—and this was the first forming of such a community in Jerusalem through the core community of Jesus’ disciples. In this context, Luke reports that many people were “cut to the heart” and said to Peter and to the other apostles, “Brothers, what should we do?” Peter replied, “Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ so that your sins may be forgiven; and you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit. For the promise is for you, your children, and for all who are far

away, everyone whom the Lord our God calls to him.” Luke reports that about three thousand persons welcomed Peter’s message and were baptized on that day (Acts 2:37-42). The fact that these people were “cut to the heart” and were willing to repent assumes the pre-existence of their innate seeds of *the ultimate sense of Shame/Shameability* (p-vi), as well as their yearning to be reunited with God, their selves, and others through their shame.

Conclusion

The textual review has shown that perhaps the sense of *Shameability* (p-vi) is still seen in the most sinless situations, and even for God. While it does not mean that God has the potential of being sinful, it seems that *Shameability* is part of the image of God whereas sin is not—as there is no chance for God to be sinful. One of the reasons for that is because God has undistorted (and, *undestroyable*) *Shameability*. We human beings often forget that God is truly transcendent in nature, and we try to put God (including God’s *Shameability*) into comfortable images we have made by ourselves (including our distorted shame).

However, the textual evidence suggests that God is the God of *Shameability*, meaning that God can never be a God of *Shame* or *Shamelessness*. The good news of the gospel is the discovery that we belong to one another (John 17:21), meaning that we human beings belong to God, as well as belonging to each other—whereas God’s love is not self-contained within God (meaning, not isolated from us). This is the context in which *Shameability* for God can be translated as God refusing to live in the bubble of the fantasy world of *Shame* or *Shamelessness* where God would deny God’s relational nature.

One of the most famous passages in the Bible says, “For God so loved the world that [God] gave his only begotten Son, so that everyone who believes in him may not perish

but may have eternal life” (John 3:16). This passage is one example of showing the *Shameability* of God while presupposing the fact that if God had not so loved the world, God would have experienced unbearable *Shame* (s-vi). God is aware of the potential disconnection (*Shame*). In this *Shameability* (p-vi), we see our God who would not give up on our relationship even in the midst of our sins, betrayals, sickness, suffering, and all sorts of other distorted expressions of shame.

CHAPTER 7

Restoring the Ultimate Sense of Shame: A Pastoral Theology of *Shameability* (II) – Cases, Contexts, Situational Analysis, and Developing a New Response

The purpose of this chapter is to show the significance of the theological anthropology of *Shameability* for the practice of ministry, and the implication of the idea of *Shameability* for the larger scale contexts of global/international policy-making. In this chapter, I am not suggesting a new method of pastoral care or counseling since I believe that the method of practice can vary depending on the culture and context. I am more interested in illustrating how a revised anthropology that includes *Shameability* (p-vi) can affect the interpretation of the ministry of church (which includes pastoral care, counseling and spiritual direction), as well as human interactions on a more global scale. Therefore, I am expanding the meaning of the ministry of restoring *Shameability* to the global level because there is a huge social and ethical significance to theological anthropology since it does have consequences even for domestic policies and large scale foreign policy decisions.

As I see the wide-ranging significance of *Shameability*, my argument is that it is because the Western culture has denied *Shameability* that the dominant parties have been insensitive to what their decisions mean for the people affected by those decisions. Because global issues also influence the situation of a particular parish in Korea, I believe one of the reasons that the dominant parties could divide Korea was because of the theological anthropology that does not have *Shameability* in the Western tradition. If *Shameability* had been an integral part of theological anthropology, I believe that the United States would

have displayed more sensitivity towards the shame of the powerless group, as well as being less defensive about its own shame.

Shameability and the Case of a Korean Parish

While I have been involved in a number of ministerial settings since I was ordained in 1994, the case that I am going to present here is from the church that I served from 2004-2011 in Seoul, Korea. The church was located in urban Seoul, and the membership was around 300 with a regular attendance of 230 including youth and children. This 70-year-old church had a mixed population with about 20% of its members from the old generation who had experienced Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945), the division of Korea (1945-1950), as well as the Korean War (1950-1953). About 80% of them were old-timers, and 20% were relative newcomers. The old-timers mostly lived in the newly developed suburban areas of Seoul; they were generally well-educated people who belonged to the middle class of Korean society and had professional jobs. Many of them were descendants of the founders of the church or friends of them. The newcomers were usually from the vicinity of the church. Unlike the old-timers, these people in general were not highly educated and many of them were involved in the cloth manufacturing industry; one of the biggest clothing markets in East Asia is within walking distance of the church.

Ai's Case

Ai was a man in his late forties who used to use our church facility whenever he came to the urban area, since it was difficult to find free parking space. Although he did not attend our church, I knew him through a family member who was an old time member of the church. Since Ai and I were acquainted with each other, I recognized him when I met

him accidentally in the parking lot one day. Although it did not take long to greet each other in the parking lot, I could sense that he was not well. His pale complexion made him resemble a human zombie. I was hesitant to say good-bye to him so I invited him to join me for tea if he could, and he agreed. That initial meeting was the beginning of a regular pastoral counseling visit, and these visits lasted for about a year. There was no written contract; however, I gave him my word that his case would be kept confidential even from his family. We agreed to have fifty-minute sessions once a week, and there was no contract regarding fee collection.

While he did not initiate the therapeutic relationship, it seemed as if he was waiting for somebody who could help him, and I was thrilled that I noticed such a need and could provide pastoral care. Had I not initiated pastoral care for him, I believe I may have experienced *Shame* (s-vi) as a pastor of the church, although this does not mean that I was caught in *Shame* at that time.

As a matter of fact, Ai was a motivated person, and he was never late for a meeting. I realized that my offer was a timely intervention because his situation had been getting worse for years, as I discovered later. In my assessment, his initial state was a combination of *proto shame* (s-i), *social shame* (s-iv) and *moral shame* (s-v). He was unemployed (he had a number of previous failures in his job situations as well as personal businesses), avoided people, and became dependent on alcohol, as well as womanizing with prostitutes. He was a married man with children; however, he did not have a good relationship with his wife.

My goal for the pastoral care and counseling with Ai was to nurture, empower, and liberate his innate seed of *Shameability* (p-vi). While his shame-related history was being uncovered along with the development of our pastoral relationship, he began to tell me about his feelings of discomfort regarding his habit of visiting prostitutes over the years. One day I asked him how much he paid for having visits with prostitutes. With a puzzled look, he hesitated to answer my question. I told him that I was just curious. After thinking for a moment, he replied with great uneasiness, and then there was a long pause. While I could sense the density of his feelings of self-contempt and dislike, I tried to walk with him through this shame that he was experiencing.

Instead of trying to illuminate his shame, I told him that I was glad because he was able to feel shame. As the nurturing continued, I noticed that his category of *shame* was gradually shifting towards *shameability*; namely, his *proto shame* (s-i) was growing toward *proto shameability* (p-i); his *social shame* (s-iv) toward *social shameability* (p-iv); his *moral shame* (s-v) toward *moral shameability* (p-v). As he confided in me more openly about his shame, I complemented his growing sense of *shameability* (p-i, p-iv, p-v). Overall, I could sense that his former state of lower-level shame was gradually growing toward a higher level of *Shame* (s-vi) and *Shameability* (p-vi).

From time to time, the conversation naturally gravitated towards biblical stories about Jesus caring for people with shame. Examples include the story of a woman who was caught at the scene of adultery, as well as the Samaritan woman at the well. I could see that he was relating to these biblical characters; I could sense that he was gradually understanding what it meant to be “struck by grace.” By the time I discharged him from

one year of pastoral care and counseling, I believed that his state of shame was restored enough to be relational through *Shameability*. His relationship with his wife had improved, his messy lifestyle was behind him, and he had even got a job. Meanwhile, he began to attend the service on Sunday mornings although I had never asked him to do so, and he began to meet people as well. Although I did not collect any fee from him, I knew that he often gave money for church offerings with his name written on an envelope. His contacts with people increased, and he eventually became a member of the church in good standing.

One of the benefits that a church has is its connectivity with the community. For this, it was especially helpful that some church members in a similar age group began inviting him to their gatherings. While he was getting to know people and sometimes even volunteering for community service, I witnessed that he was being restored; even his face color began to change. Later, he reported to me that he no longer needed alcohol to go to sleep; he thought he had become a person of sober mind, and I knew that he had become sober not only from alcohol but also from distorted shame. It was through the pastoral nurturing that he was able to name his shame, not in the sense of defending against it but in the sense of restoring it as a healthy aspect of his personality.

Bi's Case

Another case is that of Bi, a man who was similar in age to Ai but belonged to a family of the newcomers' group in the church. Among this group, there were very few men who were part of our church community. While I had a lot of opportunities to greet wives and kids almost every Sunday, I had almost no chance to meet the husbands. Meanwhile, I was often called to care for the wives because they were concerned, stressed, and even

despairing of their family situations especially in the area of their relationships with their husbands. Instead of being faithful to their wives and children, many of the men were dependent on alcohol, gambled, committed domestic violence, and were abusing and addicted to harmful substances. The workers in the cloth manufacturing businesses were often stressed out because of the high competition, deadlines, and the declining economy of the industry as a whole.

It is in this context that I finally decided to invite the men for a luncheon at my parsonage. After setting a date, I handwrote letters of invitation to each one of them using my fountain pen, and sent them out with stamped envelopes. Of the twenty husbands to whom I sent invitations, seven attended. I served them with the food that was prepared by our church members (including wives of my guests) along with years of their prayer as well the Lord's. The gathering was awkward at times, but everybody liked the food. At the end of the luncheon, I thanked everybody for coming and expressed my hope that we would continue our relationship. As planned, I announced that there would be a Bible study group for anyone who was interested at three o'clock in the afternoon the next Sunday. Bi was the only one who attended that Sunday, and it was the beginning of our ten-week Bible study.

I had already known through Bi's wife that he was addicted to betting on on-line horse races as well as having moderate alcoholism. However, I had neither talked about, nor pushed Bi to deal with such problems. Since our relationship started based on a Bible study setting as I proposed, I instead focused on teaching the Word on a one-to-one basis. Nevertheless, Bible study was as powerful as pastoral care and counseling in terms of restoring *Shameability*. As the meetings went on week by week, I could sense that his

Shameability was being restored gradually. According to my assessment, his initial state was a combination of *social shame* (s-iv) and *moral shame* (s-iv). As the Bible study continued, however, his state was approaching the higher level of shame including *social shameability* (p-iv), *moral shameability* (p-v), and *the ultimate Shameability* (s-vi). The climax of all the lessons, I think, came on the day we discussed the biblical text of Jesus' prayer on the cross. "Father, forgive them... because they do not know what they are doing." Listening to this particular message, Bi exclaimed with his unique accent as a man from Chunchung Province (the southern part of Korea): "How could he be so broad-minded!" It was after this point that his wife began to report to me that he was changing his lifestyle dramatically.

As with the case of Ai, Bi also began attending Sunday worship services on his own accord. Considering his previous lifestyle, this was a radical change and many people, including his wife and two children, were surprised. Later, he joined in for baptismal education, and was baptized on Easter Sunday about two years after he first appeared at the parsonage. Our church community as a whole welcomed him from our hearts, and it was especially the group of men of similar age that was most active in making an effort to include him in their relationships.

Restoring *the ultimate sense of Shame*, however, is a lifelong process of walking together in the communion of the Holy Spirit, not a task that can be completed in a moment, a day, or a week. From approximately the fifth year, Bi seemed to relapsing. I believe one of the reasons for the relapse was the sudden death of his best friend at church who was in his age group. The deceased was one of the most active and caring persons in that group;

however, he died from stomach cancer in his early fifties. Everyone in our church grieved, including Bi. He continued to come to church; however, he became more inconsistent in church activities, as well as in attending regular worship services. When he did come to church, he usually did not stay long enough to have fellowship with others, but left the church immediately after the service was done. One day, his son came to see me. I had known him before his father joined our church because he was one of our Sunday school students. Now, as a grown man in his twenties, he was very concerned about his father's relapse. In that meeting, he reported to me that he had followed his father after the worship service one Sunday afternoon, saw him get out of a taxi and enter a place where people gambled on horses. He followed him into that building and watched him from distance. As I listened to Bi's son, I could sense his feelings of anger, disappointment, and shame regarding his father; it was not the first time that I heard him express these feelings.

Nevertheless, I had never confronted Bi with such issues. I knew that the seed of *Shameability* (p-vi) in him had already been nurtured through the meeting with Jesus when he was baptized. Just as the weather can become windy, stormy, and freezing cold for the farmers, so too can it be for a pastor who is in the process of cultivating *Shameability* among the people of his church. Sometimes, a pastor needs to wait with patience and prayer. Things continued like that until just before I resigned from the church at the end of 2011. The church had a tradition of having a midnight service on the last day of each year. Bi was not there for the midnight service, which was the last service I led before I left the church. After the service, however, he came to my office and I could sense that he had drunk a lot – he reeked of alcohol. He hugged me while crying like a child, and I could not help but cry

with him. My secretarial assistant who was standing by also cried. “Pastor! I have learned a lot from you. Thank you very much,... and I am so sorry!...” “It’s O.K.,” I said to him.

I will never forget the hug that Bi gave me at the dawn of 2012 with such tears of *Shameability* (p-vi). People often relapse, but God continues to nurture. It is not we pastors, but the Christ who continues to empower; it is the Holy Spirit who continues to liberate. While there is no one who is perfect, it is the *Shameability* in people that gives them hope even in the midst of their weakness, relapse, and shame. Nevertheless, as long as we can hug each other as a community that restores *the ultimate sense of Shame* in Christ, we are still in good shape.

Ci’s Case

Ci was a woman in her late forties by the time I was called to serve the church in Seoul at the dawn of 2004. I thought she was a clinically depressed person. Later, however, I realized that she was suffering from *pathological shame* (s-ii). Though she attended the church almost every Sunday, she seemed to resemble Zacchaeus who climbed a sycamore tree (Luke 19:1-9) in order to see Jesus. Ci was not able to get along with other people, and it was not because she was a tax collector, but because she bore so much *pathological shame*. People tended not to gather around her; even the kids did not come near her because she did not smile. Knowing her relational difficulties, I approached her as Jesus did Zacchaeus when he said, “I must stay at your house today.” I often approached her and said hi. Sometimes, I sat beside her in the church cafeteria during the lunch after the service. Remembering what Jesus did for the people just like her, I knew that Ci was one of my first priorities for the ministry of restoring *Shameability* in the parish.

It is not an easy task to take care of someone with pathological shame. As one of Ci's characteristics was impulsiveness, she often came to my office without notice during the day, and called me or sent text messages in the middle of the night. I informed her several times that it would be better if she could make appointments for visits. I suggested that we could have contracts for doing pastoral care and counseling with a regular schedule if she was willing. However, she never accepted my offer and kept doing what she had been doing.

Late one night, she sent me another text message. At that time, she was not living in Seoul because she had taken a job as a teacher in an elementary school in a southern part of Korea. As a graduate of a college for education, she always wanted to be a teacher, and after years of preparation, she finally passed the exam for receiving a teacher's license. At first, she was appointed as a teacher in one of the remote islands in the South Sea of Korea. She seemed to be doing fine for a while. At that time, there was only one child in her class. She often called me from the island and reported on how she was doing. She even sent me a picture with her only student while she was teaching there. One year later, however, she was transferred to another elementary school, this time in the city. There, she became a teacher for a normal size class with many kids. It was clearly a size that she could not manage. She called me often when she was stressed, angry, lonely, and isolated, and it was often late at night that she called. I tried to support her, but I was becoming worn out and exhausted from her needs. On that particular night when she sent me a text message, I was in the middle of writing a sermon and I did not even pay close attention to what she had written. I thought, "There she is again!" I could never imagine that would be the last text

message from her. A few days later, Ci's younger sister received a phone call from the superintendent of the elementary school.

“Do you know where Ci is?”

“No, I thought she was teaching at your school down there.”

“She has not been coming to the school for the last two days, and there was no previous notice. We went to her place today, and she was not there. I don't know what's going on. Did you hear from her?”

“No.”

The younger sister went to Ci's apartment; there was no response and the door was locked. She had to break into the apartment with the help of a locksmith, and Ci was found dead on her bed. I realized that the last text message she had sent me she had written at the last moment of her life after she came back to her apartment in Seoul.

The situation was far worse than I had thought. Over the course of the recent phone conversations, Ci had told me: “I don't like this school. Kids are not disciplined here, and the parents are uncooperative. I hate the superintendent...” Later, I found out that the parents requested the superintendent to replace their kids' teacher. While she had never mentioned that she was feeling shame, it was a vicious cycle of shame that she was stuck in. It was a deadly combination of the four low-levels of shame, meaning that she was suffering from *proto shame* (s-i), *pathological shame* (s-ii), *stigma shame* (s-iii), and *social shame* (s-iv). What she did was to defend against shame. Her decision to come back to Seoul without telling anybody was her way of defending against shame. Not telling me the whole story was a defense against shame. Her decision to kill herself (this is my

assumption because the family members never told me that she committed suicide) was also her way of defending against *shame* (s-ii, s-iii, s-iv). Leading up to her funeral service, I cried heavily. It was very painful to realize that I was just like the priest and the Levite who passed by the half dead man on the Jericho road. I might have been the only person who could have cared for her at the last moment; however, I chose not to do so because I was preoccupied with my own agenda.

The case of Ci shows that even a person with the most severely distorted shame has a deep yearning for reunion. As Bonhoeffer said, shame is an “irrepressible memory of disunion” from their origin, and beneath the mask of distorted shame lives the “desire for the restoration of the lost unity.”³³² Knowing what is going on, it is a pastor’s job to recognize such a need when an individual is on the sycamore tree, and call his/her name as Jesus did for Zacchaeus. While such efforts of nurturing never guarantee the result of successful restoration of a person’s *Shameability*, it does not mean that they can never again relate to God, self, and others. Although relatively poor and unskilled, such an individual is still able to relate to others as long as the caregiver offers him/her the chance to do so. As average people are usually neither able to read such a person’s deep yearning to be reunited nor to recognize their capacity to do so, it is a call for a pastor as well as the community of faith to initiate and call out the name of the person (or community) on the sycamore tree.

As I recall the case of Ci, I have several thoughts in mind. I could have helped her to realize certain things regarding her unrealistic dream of becoming a teacher (ego-ideal; grandiosity). Perhaps I could have found a warm and caring way of telling her the truth:

³³² Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 303.

“No, you are not becoming a teacher. Your ‘self’ is too damaged to handle such a job.” If I had been able to do that, my care for her might have been more successful in the area of helping her grow toward *pathological shameability* (p-ii).

Some people may criticize me because I did not refer her to a professional who could diagnose her properly. However, I have no regret about that issue. I know there are many professionals who are good at diagnosing their patients, yet not good at caring for them. I knew that she had had enough professionals like that in her life since she was always under medication. The bottom line is that I was a pastor for her, not a psychiatrist. She had never admitted her pathology to me, and I knew that she was very appreciative of me because I was not stigmatizing her as others did (s-iii). Although it was not easy to remain within such a framework of an ‘unprofessional’ pastoral relationship, I believe I was the one who could and did provide one of the only quality relationships for her among all the professionals that she had.

Nevertheless, I deeply regret that I did not stop to help her on the Jericho road when I received that last text message from her. I find myself still feeling unbearable *Shame* that I did not care for her at the last moment. From time to time, I still remember Ci’s last text message, and I ask God to forgive me. But I believe she might already have forgiven me, and I feel at peace when I think that way. A few months after the funeral, Ci’s sister and her husband donated a large amount of money to the church, and it was from Ci’s property that was sold in the real-estate market. In a note that was included in the gift, the couple explained that they wished to respect the will of the deceased. It was an amount of money that even the richest members in our church would not usually give. People often believe

that shame only belongs to the incompetent and sick people; however, all human beings are vulnerable to *Shame* (s-vi). Yet, it is through the body of Christ that they live “in spite of” *Shame*. Through a session meeting, we decided to use Ci’s gift for scholarships for students.

Dc’s Case

From the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, pastoral care and counseling is not limited to care of individuals, but also extends to the ministry of the church and communal healing. Therefore, it is important to relate individual healing and communal healing, and it is especially important to do that through the core group of disciples in pastoral formation.

Dc was a group that I started for leadership development in our church. While I have led a number of groups similar to this within and beyond our church, this particular group consisted of eight lay people. Five of them were candidates for *gwonsa*,³³³ and three of them were candidates for the position of elder. In this particular congregation, the candidates for the lay leaders were selected through the process of written recommendations from the congregation, a session’s examination and narrowing down of the candidates, and final vote of the congregation.³³⁴ The group met weekly for a one-year period except for the summer and winter breaks. It was a total of twenty-four meetings for about an hour and half each time.

³³³ *Gwonsa* is the title for a female lay leader that is equivalent to the title of an elder in Korean church tradition. This does not mean that females can never be an elder (although it all depends on the denomination); this unique title was created in a context of the majority of elders in Korea being male. In this particular group of Dc, all five women were candidates for *gwonsa*; two men and one woman were candidates for the position of elder.

³³⁴ Before I came to the church, it was almost exclusively done through the session’s decision. I insisted that the system had to be changed and my proposal was adopted after six years of struggle. The new process was first carried out two years prior to my resignation, and it was from this point in my opinion that the lay leadership was opened to anybody who was qualified.

From the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, the education for lay leadership development and pastoral formation is the process of nurturing the candidate's *Shameability* in Christ through practicing a daily life of prayer, words, making disciples, and pastoral care of others as a way of being a *neighbor* to them as exemplified in the Good Samaritan. With these goals in mind, I structured the Dc group in a way to help the candidates grow together as a core community of disciples. The leaders' group always had one theme, and it was based on the prayer of Jesus that is found in John 17:21: "아버지여, 아버지께서 내 안에, 내가 아버지 안에 있는 것 같이 그들도 다 하나가 되어 우리 안에 있게 하사 세상으로 아버지께서 나를 보내신 것을 믿게 하옵소서. ("As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be in us, so that the world may believe that you have sent me.") In fact, this particular verse was a theme not only for this particular group, but for the whole church as a community. Since I was called to serve the church, I presented this prayer of Jesus as the core vision of the church, and I taught many times on this particular prayer. I invited members to recite this prayer together at our church's monthly communion. By the time I left the church, there was almost no one who had not memorized the prayer, as I requested them to repeat it numerous times.

At the core of Jesus' prayer, there are three parties relating to and being involved with each other: 1) a saint (who is in the state of "Father in me" according to the contents of Jesus' prayer); 2) a church (which is in the state of "me(s) in Father," namely, a community of saints); 3) a society and the world (that is in the state of "they also be in us," meaning the state where a church offers itself as a *neighbor* for the society and the world as the Good Samaritan).

Explaining this state of union of “Father-Jesus-saint-church-society and the world,” I reversed the subject of the prayer from “I (we)” to “Jesus” as it is *he* who is praying of *us* in this prayer. Jesus clearly said, “As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may *they* also be in us, so that the world may believe that you have sent me.” This way, we know that *we* are in his prayer, and that we are supposed to be the answers for Jesus’ prayer. That is why it is important to know that Jesus is the one who prays, instead of *us* becoming the subject of prayer while expecting God to give answers to our prayers. While many pastors teach people as if they are the subjects of the prayer, the problem is that people often pray based on their own will, pride, self-righteousness, expectations, and distorted shame(s) for what they want. From the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, however, it is not *I (we)* but *Jesus* who does the praying.

Saint Paul spoke of this same issue when he said, “Likewise, the Spirit helps us in our weakness; for we do not know to pray as we ought, but that very Spirit intercedes with sighs too deep for words. And God who searches the heart, knows what is the mind of the Spirit, because the Spirit intercedes for the saints according to the will of God” (Romans 8:26-27). We need to remember that everything starts with God. It is God who gave us life; it is God who gave us the Word; it is God who gave us the forbidden fruit; it is God who gave us *the ultimate sense of Shame*; it is God who gave us our society and the world as well. So it also makes sense that it is God who gave us Jesus who prays for us. It is in this context that we realize that our job is not to pray, but to participate in Jesus’ prayer by a way of living out our lives restoring *Shameability* so that we become the answers to his prayer. From the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, it has already been

promised and presupposed through Jesus' prayer that we are (or, we are going to be) in union with God as Jesus is in union with God. It is through our faith that we know that we are one (or, that we will be one) with *them* (Father-Jesus-Holy Spirit) as it is suggested in Jesus' prayer, while being accepted "in spite of" our *Shame* (p-vi) in grace. In sum, the prayer is the state where we remain in *him* (the true vine) so that *he* can nurture us.

Reciting Jesus' prayer (John 17:21) in unison every time we had the monthly communion as a congregation was a powerful way of nurturing people's *Shameability*, since it helped us to remember who we are as the body of Christ while receiving the elements. However, it was especially in the context of a small community of pastoral formation that people were more able to engage with each other in being related to this vision of Christ, and the Dc group was certainly one of the good examples for experiencing this.

Community building is the foundation of the pastoral formation of nurturing *Shameability*. For this purpose, the Dc group began with 5-10 minutes of sharing each member's story regarding their personal backgrounds, families of origin, faith journey, gifts, needs, expectations, and hopes for the group as a whole. While this time was allocated for one person each week, I volunteered to be the first person to share my personal story as there was no one who was ready or willing at the first meeting. According to psychological theories, in general it is suggested that it is not proper for a leader to share his/her personal stories in a group; however, from the perspective of pastoral theology of *Shameability*, it is important that a leader participate in a group process as a true human being with *Shameability*. As the members learn to see the pastor as human being through the telling of

his own personal life stories, that experience usually becomes an ice breaker that helps others to be nurtured in *Shameability* as well. For most people, such an experience is radically new since they often live with heavy masks for their shame. In this sense, the group dynamics of nurturing *Shameability* largely depend on pastoral leadership that is authentic enough to use the pastor's own self as a way of nurturing, empowering, and liberating the seeds of *Shameability* in others.

Once the group dynamic is set in motion, prompted by the leader's *Shameability*, the others in the group will usually follow the pastor with a reduced defense mechanism against their shame. When this happens, the people in the core group of pastoral formation begin to see a glimpse of what the Book of Genesis means when it says: "And the man and his wife were both naked, and were not ashamed"(2:25). While it neither means that people in the group no longer need any coverings for their shame nor that such coverings do not deserve respect, the nurturing of *Shameability* for pastoral formation can help reduce the burden of carrying the heavy garments of the skin that people put upon themselves. In the particular case of the Dc group for example, people were gradually uncovering themselves and sharing their personal stories. Those stories were often related to their various levels and categories of shame as they moved toward a community of restoring *Shameability* while nurturing and empowering each other in Christ. Among the other things we did in the group were sharing their daily life of prayer, words, discussing pastoral/ministerial cases, crying, laughing, celebrating, hugging, singing, and sharing meals together.

The group dynamics of pastoral formation of nurturing *Shameability* often do not remain within the group itself but affect their families, the church, as well as the neighbors

outside of the church. In this particular Dc group, for example, eight candidates for lay eldership went out and cared for others, including the above mentioned cases of Ai and Bi. Having been nurtured through the core group of pastoral formation by the end of 2011, the eight people from this particular group are now leading the congregation faithfully as a new generation of lay leadership in many areas within and beyond the church.

Overview

My pastoral approach can be viewed as a counterintuitive method from a Westerner's perspective. However, the cases show how the agents are getting in touch with their capacity for shame while the caregiver is not trying to reduce or eliminate their shame but rather to nurture, empower, and liberate their 'shame' (namely, the seed of *Shameability*). Though many Western-minded caregivers believe that it is important to relieve the feeling of shame, I argue instead that *Shameability* actually helps people to claim their humanity, meaning it helps one to claim one's self as a child of God. Therefore, it is not good for caregivers to help people to avoid or defend against shame; instead, it is the caregivers' job to restore *Shameability*.

But I need to be clear about what I do not mean by this. We need to make a very clear distinction between intensifying or imposing shame versus restoring *Shameability*. As I proposed in the above-mentioned cases, the caregiver's job is not to shame the agents but to get behind them and help the agents affirm their capacity for *Shameability*. Here, the caregiver recognizes that the agents' shame is painful, and the caregiver is not there to increase their suffering. Rather, the care giver is there to affirm the humanity before God that is visible in the capacity for the awareness of disconnection (*Shame*), and that this is a

way of affirming the agents' *Shameability* rather than further shaming them. The goal of the ministry of restoring *Shameability* is not to further shame people but to affirm them as they gain their *Shameability* and as they emerge as more mature, liberated, redeemed human beings who bear the image of God.

Ec's Case

As I have already explained in the introduction, Ec was the congregation to which I was proclaiming the word of God as a pastor while I was serving the Church. I preached on the sermon title of "Repent!" on November 28, 2010 as it was the first week of Advent:

Now after John was arrested, Jesus came to Galilee, proclaiming the good news of God, and saying, 'The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God has come near; repent, and believe in the good news' (Mark 1:14-15).

North Korea's army had just bombarded *Yeonpyeong* Island (November 23, 2010), and the sermon upset some members since I criticized all the involved parties of three governments as this shelling followed a joint *Hoguk* military exercise between South Korea and the United States in the very sensitive area of NLL.³³⁵ I pointed out that there was a structural problem behind the ongoing confrontation between the South and North because the ceasefire treaty that was made between the United States and North Korea had not yet been changed into a peace treaty since it was made in 1953. While some members expressed their deep disappointment in me, the situation was truly heart-breaking since we

³³⁵ The United Nations Command established the Northern Limit Line (NLL) at the close of the Korean War (1950-1953).

are not supposed to be enemies, but brothers and sisters – and also heart-breaking that people often choose to be fueled by more hatred.

Personally, I take this case as one of my pastoral failures because it is apparent that something was not functioning properly, although I hate to admit it. I still believe that all the involved parties were responsible for the incident, and, therefore, all in need of repentance. As I look back on it now, years later, I realize that my sermon may have intensified the shame of the members. I lost a number of people from the congregation (especially in the conservative group) who had previously been very supportive of me, and I felt sad and ashamed. One thing is clear: that all of them wanted to hear the gospel; they wanted to know Jesus' love and grace. Somehow my message did not provide what they needed most. I am not yet sure how I can re-construct the sermon as a part of the ministry of restoring *Shameability*. I know something must be changed, but the dilemma is how I can preach it differently with my theological conscience and integrity intact as a pastoral theologian and not hurt people so much. I must admit that I am still wondering what it would mean for preaching to utilize the distinction between shaming people and affirming them in their capacity of *Shameability*.

Nevertheless, this incident helped me to realize that the ministry of the church for restoring *Shameability* involves not only individuals and the community, but also the wider global context. From the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, the clinical pastoral materials within a Korean parish setting are not separate but deeply related to the larger context of distorted shame. This situation explains why the ministry of the church needs to include efforts to help restore the *Shameability* of the larger community especially

in the area of theological anthropology, because it influences the dynamics of policy-making and international relationships particularly in the Korean context where the country is still divided.

Fc's Case: Towards Restoring the Ultimate Sense of Shame on a Global Level

Fc is the global community that is interrelated with the above-mentioned cases. From the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, the clinical pastoral materials within a Korean parish setting are not separate but deeply related to the global context of distorted shame. This means that the sufferings of people that I have presented are in fact not separate from the collective shame distortions at the global level. While more than two hundred countries belong to this global community, it can best be described as a huge chunk of collective *Shame* and *Shamelessness* that is headed towards self-destruction at the moment. The case of the divided Korea is certainly one of the most imminent and dangerous ones; small wonder it is often called a “powder keg” of the world. This situation explains why the ministry of the church needs to include efforts to help restore the *Shameability* of the global community and especially of the global leaders. In order to understand the underlying context of why the global leaders need *Shameability* more than anything else, it is useful to have an overview of the historical background where global members can also be divided into three main categories of *shame*, *shamelessness*, and *shameability*.

***Shame* Category: Korea³³⁶**

³³⁶ When I categorize communities or countries based on the three-six shame model, I do not mean that all the aspects of the communities simply fall into a certain category of shame. I rather categorize them based on particular aspects they have as communities. This means that the communities still have a very complex and

Both North and South Korea belong to the *shame* category, and there is a long historical background for this. Because they have lived for the last five thousand years in between the world's most dominating people, like the Chinese, Mongols, Japanese, Russians, and Americans, Koreans have been invaded and occupied numerous times. Each one of the invasions was humiliating and shameful. As the most recent example, the Chosun people (Koreans) were colonized by the Japanese and served under them from 1910 to 1945. During that period, Koreans were not allowed to speak their own language, and they were even forced to change their names to Japanese ones. In this period of forced occupation, Japan used colonial exploitation policy towards Koreans. There were countless cases of forced labor, violence, abuse, imprisonment, torture, killing, medical experiments on living human bodies, unlawful transfer of land ownership, and the removal of Korean heritage as well as of many historical artifacts; the Japanese took numerous young men to use as human shields on battlefields and young women to use as comfort women for their soldiers. Every Wednesday afternoon at Insa Dong Seoul, Korea, one can still see a group of protesting old women who during the Japanese occupation were taken from their homes to battlefields and forced to service Japanese soldiers. Yet, Japan shamelessly continues to deny its wrongdoings through distortions of history while glorifying its motivation for its colonial occupation of Korea.

Chosun was liberated from Japan on August the 15, 1945, a few days after the Americans dropped two nuclear bombs – one on Hiroshima and the other on Nagasaki. However, it was not true liberation for Koreans because the peninsula was divided into two

multilayered shame phenomena within them, although the community/country as a whole can be best understood as falling into a specific category of shame when some particular features are considered.

parts in the process of post-war negotiations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Shamelessness Category: Dominant Parties

As Korea had already been abused by the Japanese from 1910-1945, it was by the *collective proto shamelessness* (l-i) of the dominants that Korea was divided in 1945. According to Bruce Cumings (1981)—a history professor at the University of Chicago and an expert on Korean issues—it was because of the United States’ concern about the Soviets that they felt the need to occupy at least a part of Korea in order to avoid threats to security and maintain an American presence. From early 1944, territorial subcommittees of the State Department carried out the planning of this task; Hugh Borton, John Carter Vincent, William R. Langdon, and H. Merrell Benninghoff were among the key figures who decided the logistics of occupying Korea.³³⁷

A paper by Benninghoff, Vincent, Borton, and Alger Hiss, among others, said that,

Korea may appear to offer a tempting opportunity to apply the Soviet conception of the proper treatment of colonial peoples, to strengthen enormously the economic resources of the Soviet Far East, to acquire ice-free ports, and to occupy a dominating strategic situation in the Far East, and its repercussions with China and Japan might be far reaching, the State Department in March 1944 took note of post-war potential for occupying Korea.³³⁸

Shortly after the Japanese surrendered to the United States upon the atomic bombs being dropped on August 6 and 9, the Americans decided to draw a line at the 38th parallel; they reached this decision during an overnight session of the State-War-Navy Coordinating

³³⁷ Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 113-4.

³³⁸ *Ibid.*, 114-5.

Committee on August 10-11, 1945. The Soviets agreed to the proposed division, and the dividing line stands to this day.³³⁹

The Hebrew word covenant comes from a derivation of *biritu* – which in the times of the Ancient Near East referred to the “cutting” or bonding of an agreement through cutting an animal in half.³⁴⁰ In a similar fashion, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to divide the peninsula as a way of maximizing their own respective security. As we explored before, expanding one’s power is a form of human’s maladapted *proto-shamelessness* (s-i); the larger powers taking over Korea acted in the same way, increasing their own powers and attempting to gain more security instead of caring for the Koreans that were abused by the Japanese. The pain that this division inflicted upon Koreans is beyond imagining. The Korean War that broke out after five years of the division is just one of these examples. Indeed, the people of both Koreas are experiencing great cost at the expense of the larger powers that defend against their shame.

Shame of North Korea

Today, North Korea is one of the most isolated and closed countries on the surface of the earth. The North Korean government seeks only after military power while the economic situation of the country is slowly getting worse. They have not given up developing nuclear weapons and missiles, yet their people are starving to death. Behind these efforts, there is communal *proto shame* (s-i), communal *pathological (trauma) shame* (s-ii), communal *stigma shame* (s-viii) and communal *social shame* (s-iv) of North Koreans that is leading them to defend against shame(s).

³³⁹ Ibid., 120-1.

³⁴⁰ *The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible: an Illustrated Encyclopedia*, ed. George Arthur Buttrick (New York: Abingdon Press, 1962), volume I, 715-6.

North Koreans are defending against their shame(s) through hero-making by idolizing their leaders. My job in the Korean Army (1983-1985) was to listen to North Korean broadcasts and make written reports of them for professional analysts. Early in the morning, the first words coming out of the radio were always the same: “Long live our Greatness, Comrade Il Sung Kim!” All the songs played over the radio during the day were identical with Christian hymns except they praised the Kims instead of God. The hourly news always began with reports about people arriving at Pyongyang from all parts of the world in order to learn the *Juche* Philosophy of Kim. I will never forget one particular story about General Kim. One day Japanese soldiers surround him and his followers, who thus could not escape the situation because they were backed against the Arok River. In this situation, so we were told, Kim made a boat out of a leaf and crossed the river with his subordinates. The story reminded me of the miracle stories of Jesus.

North Korea is still run by its long deceased leader Il Sung Kim. The country is now under the control of his third hereditary monarch named Jung Eun Kim who appears to be as dictatorial as his grandfather. Recently, the world received shocking news about the execution of North Korea’s second most powerful figure, Sung Taek Jang, probably at the behest of his nephew, Jung Eun Kim. Many people say how brutal the North Korean dictatorship is; many analysts predict that this unpredictable country will become even more dangerous in the near future by developing more nuclear weapons. From the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, this is all related to the North’s defending against its *proto shame* (s-i) in the context of the Korean division. Under this pretext of the division, as well as the continuing threat of “the United States’ invasion” of

North Korea, the North Korean regime continues to justify numerous incidents of human rights violation and suppression.

Shame of South Korea

The South Korean government has also been using the situation of the division as an excuse for abusing human rights and obliterating democracy. Over the years, many people have been persecuted, imprisoned, tortured, and even murdered under the national security law of Korean governments. Though they have achieved economic growth in many areas, the people of South Korea are still paying too costly a price while defending against their shame as a result of the trauma.

My son who attends college in the United States used to ask me whenever he came to Seoul in the summer, “Why do Koreans look so alike?” Actually, many Koreans are alike in their appearance—the way they clothe themselves and the way they live. The structure of their dwellings, and the way they arrange furniture and appliances in their apartments are similar too. Young women are even facially similar to each other because there are many who have plastic surgery in order to be ‘beautiful.’

South Korea is a country where many things are standardized. Because of this uniformity, many school kids suffer. It is difficult to survive in Korean schools if one does not master the topic at hand one even shows up at school. It is abnormal if a child who begins elementary school does not know how to read and write yet. It is also abnormal if a first grade student does not know second grade level math. This is because there are many private tutors and educational institutions in Korea. In order to receive extra education from these institutions called *hakwon*, many students leave their homes before daybreak and

return home only late at night. In many cases, such fierce competition is related to defending against *proto shame* (s-i), *trauma shame* (s-ii), *stigma shame* (s-iii) and *social shame* (s-iv) both at the individual and communal levels because people are afraid of falling behind and being perceived as incompetent.

The problem does not stop there. There are many workaholic adults in South Korea. Many people suffer from alcoholism, addiction, substance abuse, depression, perfectionism, defeatism, and many forms of ‘shallow living’ that are materialistic and hedonistic. Diverse communities experience painful splits because of regionalism, classism, and exclusivism while many Koreans undergo marital and family crises as well. There are many highly educated people with exceptional talents; however, the sad thing is that many of them live without a sense of their ‘true self’ even in the midst of prosperity. In light of this, it is no surprise that Korea has one of the highest suicide rates in the world. From the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, these are all related to the trauma of the divided Korea that is toxic enough to perpetuate the multi-layered shame through ‘multi-generational transmission.’³⁴¹

In this situation, many Korean churches operate on the shallow level of fundamentalism, prosperity theology, and the mega-church syndrome. Some people say that Korean Protestantism has become *Gaedokyo*, which means ‘a dog-like religion’ (or ‘a religion that dogs follow’). Many Christians who once held leadership positions in the nation have been involved in various national scandals and tragedies. One example is the tragedy of the *Ferry Sewol* that sunk en route to Jeju Island from the port of Incheon on

³⁴¹ Murray Bowen, *Family Therapy in Clinical Practice* (New York: J. Aronson, 1978).

April 16, 2014. The sinking of the *Ferry Sewol* represented the inherent corruption within the socio-political fabric of Korean society; indeed, it was the *Guwonpa* (a Christian cult in South Korea) that owned this ferry. In the wake of the tragedy of *Ferry Sewol*, many questions are being raised about moral, ethical, and theological issues. As many people are leaving churches nowadays, to many people Korean Protestantism has become a cause for shame rather than a healer of shame. Christ called some religious people of his day a ‘whited sepulcher,’ (Matthew 23:27); this could be an apt metaphorical expression for many contemporary Korean Christians and churches that defend against shame(s) with their religion.

Nevertheless, the level of church leaders’ self-awareness appears to be low. I had a chance to serve as a member of a preparatory committee for the Institution for Korean Church Growth and Development in 2011. The members of the committee consisted of mega church pastors in South Korea. While the committee was in this sense not an appropriate match for me since I was a pastor of a small church, I had to be there a few times because Rev. Young Joo Kim, the general secretary of the Korean National Council of Churches, asked me to do so since I was serving as an officer for the executive committee of KNCC at that time. I was very surprised that the pastors of the mega churches were blaming reporters of the press who often write negative things about Korean churches rather than looking deeply into themselves to understand the shameful situation of Korean Protestantism. It seemed that they were convinced that it was not the church but the press and the rest of the world that were the problem. In the few meetings I attended, the main

topic of conversation was always how Korean churches could change others, not how they could change themselves.

Behind such a problem there is theological education that is as shallow as the education in other areas of the country. In Korean theological schools, students are usually educated in four major areas: biblical theology, systematic theology, historical theology, and ‘applied theology.’³⁴² There are some schools where ‘pastoral theology’ courses are offered, but the majority of them seem identical to others in terms of their teaching method because ‘pastoral theologians’ usually lecture on ‘pastoral theology’ in classrooms using standardized textbooks. Students take exams, turn in papers as usual, and they get good grades if they work hard enough. I see this as one of the examples of dysfunctional education under the context of the divided Korea where the focus is wrongly placed on competition and personal gain as a way of defending against shame(s) rather than being on nurturing, empowering, and liberating one’s seed of *Shameability*.

Shamelessness of the United States

Though it is not the case for the whole of the United States, many aspects of the country as a dominant party fall into the category of *shamelessness*—particularly at the *proto* level; some U.S. examples of defending against shame can be seen in its militarism, imperialism, economic and political exploitation, unfair trade, unjust occupations, prejudice in international affairs, the high-handedness of big corporations, hedge funds all over the world, nationalism, individualism, separatism, racism, classism, and Mammonism. Western shame theorists, in general, often believe that Western societies including the United States

³⁴² Emmanuel Yartekwei Lartey, *Pastoral Theology in an Intercultural World* (Peterborough: Epworth, 2006).

have less shame than many Eastern societies. However, I suggest that from the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, in reality the United States is probably suffering from a more severely distorted sense of shame than the East, namely, the state of being immune to *shamelessness*, as they try to defend against the shame of the above-mentioned examples.

One example is that the United States is still not willing to end its policy of maintaining the current status of the divided Korea, despite the enormous suffering that this division engenders. Actually, there have been many chances for the U.S. to help alleviate that suffering. Since the Korean War ended, North Korea has continued to ask the United States to replace the ceasefire treaty (1953) with a peace treaty. However, the United States continues to reject the North's request, and there still remains the hostile 38th parallel between the South and North even sixty years after the War ended.

Rather than helping, the United States has often caused more pain. For example, in his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, President George Bush classified Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the "axis of evil," referring to those countries' pursuit of developing weapons of mass destruction. As a matter of fact, it was the United States that had more interest in pursuing the development of such weapons, and Bush's shameless remark could only make the situation worse. During President Bush's time, the relationship between North and South Korea was at its worst. In response to Bush's message, the North accelerated its development of nuclear weapons, especially after the country saw what was happening with Saddam Hussein of Iraq (2003). Had the United States accepted the North's

request and agreed to change the ceasefire treaty to a peace treaty early on, the North perhaps would not have had to develop nuclear weapons.

After a number of military confrontations under President Bush's administration as well as South Korean President Lee Myoung Bak's regime, March 26, 2010 marked a new low when a South Korean Navy ship carrying 104 people sank on the west coast of the peninsula near Baengnyeong Island, killing 46 soldiers. Then, the Yeonpyeong Island incident followed in November of the same year when the North shelled the island.

Overview

Just as there are three supposed categories of *shame*, *shamelessness*, and *shameability* on the global level as well, it seems that there is no global leader that belongs to the category of *shameability* under the chaotic situation of the world today. This is the context in which the ministry of church needs to concentrate its earnest efforts of nurturing, empowering, and liberating *Shameability* for developing such a global leadership along with its prayers, words, pastoral formation, and pastoral care. This is one of the motivating factors behind this project. Such efforts are especially important to transform Western shame theories (which includes theological anthropology) because the West tends not to recognize the *Shamelessness* of the dominant parties.

Among the many problems found in Western shame theories, there is the dichotomy of shame and guilt. As Western shame theories in general are built upon the assumption that shame and guilt can not only be distinguished but can also be separated, this notion in fact is a part of their defense against the dominant parties' shame. Based on this defensive assumption, it is widely accepted in today's Western shame theories that there are *shame-*

prone and *guilt-prone* categories.³⁴³ From the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*; however, there are instead *shame-prone* and *shamelessness-prone* categories, and there is one more category – the *Shameability* category—to which both categories of *shame* and *shamelessness* need to be restored. As Western shame theories, in general, are often designed as ways of defending against the shame of the dominant party, now is the time to redirect them toward restoring *the ultimate sense of Shame*. For this reason, restoring *Shameability* (p-vi) as a part of theological anthropology is more important than ever.

Conclusion

Starting with my pastoral encounters, I have observed that the problem of distorted shame is a significant reality in the human condition. Prompted by my need to understand shame better in the context of my postcolonial ministerial settings within the context of divided Korea, I have reviewed selected literatures, mainly the psychological, sociological, philosophical, and theological views of shame developed primarily by thinkers in Europe and the U.S. I have discovered that these views are helpful to a certain point, but that they are not sufficiently comprehensive from my perspective as a Korean American pastoral theologian. The existing Western theories of shame: 1) tend to focus on low level, or maladaptive shame, resulting in a negative view of shame in general; 2) are often heavily dependent on the guilt versus shame dichotomy (sometimes as a way of defending against the theorists' shame, or the shame of the dominant group to which they belong); 3) seem to

³⁴³ Tangney and Dearing.

discuss shame at an individual level while excluding the problem of communal levels of shame; 4) tend to include a psychology of shame that in general is not sufficiently sensitive to the powerless, subordinate groups of our society; and 5) do not include ‘shame’ as an integral part of human nature, or of the image of God.

As this dissertation grew out of the need to expand the meaning of shame under the context of theoretical limitations, what is missing overall from my pastoral theological perspective is what I call *Shameability* (p-vi). Therefore, I made a constructive proposal about what I think *Shameability (the ultimate sense of Shame)* is, based on the pastoral theological research method as I adapt my Neo-Confucian heritage of *suojishim* (수오지심 羞惡之心). A critical literature review has been completed through the selected materials, employing insights from psychology, sociology, philosophy, theology, and biblical texts. Through the review, I have shown that shame is viewed as a complex and multilayered phenomenon, and I have proposed that there are three categories of shame-related states, which are distributed across six different levels of individual and communal dimensions of the human experience. The three categories of shame-related states are: 1) *shame*—sense of disconnection, 2) *shamelessness*—lack of awareness of one’s disconnection, 3) *shameability*—a sense of connection while aware of the possibility of disconnection.

The six levels are: 1) *proto* (innate physiological precursors to the experience of shame), 2) *pathological* (where shame is distorted based on various forms of pathology and trauma), 3) *stigma* (where shame is distorted based on different kinds of stigma in human society), 4) *social* (where shame is distorted based on the audience, reputations, and value-system that people share in a given group, society, or culture), 5) *moral* (where shame is

distorted based on human conscience that people share or being personally convinced based on the value related systems), 6) *ultimate* (where shame is either distorted [*Shame* and *Shamelessness*], or undistorted [*Shameability*] depending on the quality of relationship with God).

While this schema allowed for a total of eighteen different kinds of shame-related phenomenon, the pastoral theology of *Shameability* holds that *the ultimate sense of Shame* (p-vi) is the only undistorted form of shame that God has originally granted human beings as it is found in the person of Jesus the Christ.

Having made this proposal, I took three more steps beyond that point: 1) I tried to draw out its implications to theological anthropology which includes *Shameability*; 2) I tried to illustrate how a revised theological anthropology can affect, or redefine, our interpretation of the ministry of church; 3) I tried to illustrate why the revision of theological anthropology is also important for human interactions on a more global/international level of policy-making using the case of a divided Korea under the global context of distorted shame. I suggested that because the dominant parties of the West have denied *Shameability* they have been insensitive and shameless to what their decisions mean for the people who are affected by these policies.

With shame being widely misunderstood and mal-adapted, this is the time that we need to rethink shame. *Shameability* is part of the core of being a true human being as well as part of the image of God, and it should be included in theological anthropology. While the world is still filled with distorted shame both at the individual and communal levels, it was through the revelation of God in Jesus that the seed of *the ultimate sense of*

Shame/Shameability (p-vi) was sown again, nurtured faithfully, liberated, and restored through his graceful participation of revelation and daily life of prayer, words, pastoral formation, and pastoral care for the distorted. Unlike others' shame, the *Shameability* of Jesus as a true and fully human being was something that was deeply related to God's love. It was through *the ultimate sense of Shame* that he could see and recognize the potential of disconnection (*Shame*) as he was in a state of full union with God.

In Jesus, we realize that God is the God of *Shameability*, meaning that God can never be the God of *Shame*, or *Shamelessness*. Through Jesus' ministry, we find that the "God of *Shame*" is a result of shame distortion typically found in the marginalized, subordinate group in our humanity while the "God of *Shamelessness*" is found in the powerful, dominant group. In him, we also find that neither the "subordinating God image (God that belongs to the *Shame* category)" nor the "dominant God image (the God that belongs to the *Shameless* category)" can fill the need of people who are broken. What we need is to help restore the God image of *Shameability* as we find it in Jesus, the truest example of human being.

Although it can be ugly when it is distorted, shame still offers hope for us because there is something about it that affirms our humanity before God. It is in this context that the pastoral theology of *Shameability* defines the ministry of the church as the ministry of restoring *the ultimate sense of Shame*. In this ministry of restoring *Shameability*, the caregiver's job is not to help relieve, remove, hide, conceal, repress, suppress, cover up, run away from, or defend against shame, but to help restore a person to *the ultimate sense of Shame*. It is by nurturing, empowering, and liberating the innate seed of *Shameability* based

on Christ-centered care that the restoration of *the ultimate sense of Shame* can be achieved by the grace of God. Such efforts cannot guarantee any successful results; however, that is the only direction in which the ministry of church can helpfully head, as we see from the example of Jesus. For this ministry of restoring *Shameability*, the most important quality of a caregiver (both at the individual and communal levels) is *Shameability* because it is the state in which the agent is self-aware and relational and therefore can nurture, empower, and liberate others as well.

Appendix: The Case of North Korea

Many people blame the North for its hostility; however, it is important to note that even the most severely distorted shame(s) has a deep yearning to be reunited. What is most needed for the ongoing hostile situation of the Korean peninsula is a global leader who is equipped with the quality of *Shameability* (p-vi) so that such a leader may see and recognize the yearning of the North, as well as the potential of *Shame* on a global level; that is the potential scenario of the co-destruction of the two Koreas, the Far East, and possibly beyond, including the United States. It is not helpful to further isolate North Korea, or shame the country through blaming, stigmatizing, attacking, and putting the country under a more severe form of international sanctions. Any party that desires to be a global leader should realize that peace and reconciliation do not come through shaming the other but through affirming their *Shameability* based on our shared humanity. In order to be a leader like that, it is important for the candidate to restore his or her own *Shameability* before claiming a leadership position. Otherwise, that person's leadership ends up being shameless in nature.

While restoring *Shameability* of global leadership is more important than anything else, it is good to remember the example of the late South Korean President Dae Jung Kim who applied the *Sunshine Policy* towards North Korea. Under this policy, the South persistently pursued cooperation with the North with guarantees that the South would not make any attempts to attack or absorb the North. Some conservative people still criticize Kim's policy, yet it was during his regime that the South, North, and the United States were most successful in terms of moving forward to peace, justice, reconciliation, and

reunification. From the perspective of a pastoral theology of *Shameability*, this model is the track that global leaders need to pursue, since it models the leadership of the Good Samaritan. Better to remember that Korea is like the half dead man on the Jericho road. God will certainly not be pleased if someone robs the already robbed person instead of helping him. This is a kind of shameless character that perhaps even Jesus could not imagine when he was teaching with his parable of the Good Samaritan.

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