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Kelly E. Arenson Date

Pleasure and the Absence of Pain:
Reading Epicurus' Hedonism Through Plato's *Philebus*

By

Kelly E. Arenson
Doctor of Philosophy

Philosophy

_____

Steven Strange, Ph.D.
Advisor

_____

Timothy O'Keefe, Ph.D.
Committee Member

_____

Richard Patterson, Ph.D.
Committee Member

_____

Jack Zupko, Ph.D.
Committee Member

Accepted:

_____

Lisa A. Tedesco, Ph.D.
Dean of the Graduate School

_____

Date

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Kelly E. Arenson
M.A., Emory University, 2007
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An abstract of
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Abstract

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By Kelly E. Arenson

Epicurus made a name for himself in the ancient world when he identified pleasure with the absence of pain and proceeded to distinguish it from a second, seemingly different variety of pleasure—that found 'in motion' (kinetic). I interpret Epicurus' distinction through the lens of Plato's *Philebus* and the ancient debates concerning that dialogue. At issue in these debates and the theories that arise from them is whether pleasure is a process or an end and how pleasure ought to be conceived in terms of the harmonious functioning of a living organism. I argue that Plato identifies pleasure with the perceived process of restoration of an organism's natural harmony and that he uses this description to deny that pleasure is the good. Aristotle, rebuking the Platonic position, counters that pleasures are not processes of replenishment but are associated with the activity of an organism's unimpeded functioning. In the Epicurean development of these ideas, kinetic pleasure is the perceived restoration of the natural functioning of a living organism, and katastematic pleasure is painless, natural functioning itself, or health. On this reading, Epicurus considers any perceived affection that does not involve pain to be katastematic and thus the highest pleasure, including everyday sensory pleasures, such as taste. I show that Epicurus' distinction between pleasures serves as a dialectical response to the *Philebus* and bears the marks of Aristotle's response to the dialogue as well.

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CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

A	G. Arrighetti, *Epicuro, Opere*
Ad Hdt.	Epicurus, *Letter to Herodotus*
Ad Men.	Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus*
De Fin.	Cicero, *De Finibus Malorum et Bonorum*
DL	Diogenes Laertius, *The Lives of Eminent Philosophers*
DRN	Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*
EN	Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*
GT	J.C.B. Gosling and C.C.W. Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasure*
N	B. Nikolsky, "Epicurus on Pleasure"
Non Posse	Plutarch, *A Pleasant Life Impossible*
PD	Epicurus, *Principal Doctrines*
Phil.	Plato, *Philebus*
Rep.	Plato, *Republic*
SV	Epicurus, *Vatican Sayings*
Tusc. Disp.	Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*
U	H. Usener, *Epicurea*

[Full citations of these works can be found in the Bibliography.]

NOTES ON THE TEXT

Most of the Greek text of Epicurus' letters and sayings, as well as the fragments of passages about Epicureanism, are from G. Arrighetti's compilation, *Epicuro, Opere*. When citing fragments and material concerning Epicureanism that are not readily available in other compilations, I provide the passage number from Arrighetti's edition, followed by 'A.' If the passage appears only in H. Usener's compilation, *Epicurea*, I give the passage number from that edition, followed by 'U.' Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the Greek of Epicurean material are my own. The Latin text of Cicero's *De Finibus* is from J. Madvig's edition; the translations are R. Woolf's. Translations of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* are that of M. Smith; the Latin text is from C. Bailey's Oxford edition.

All translations of Plato's *Philebus* which appear here are D. Frede's, with some revisions. Translations of the *Republic* are G.M.A. Grube's, revised by C.D.C. Reeve. The Greek texts of all the Platonic works I cite in this dissertation are from J. Burnet's editions (Oxford). For Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, I have used W.D. Ross' translation, revised by J.O. Urmson, and the Greek text from J. Bywater's edition (Oxford). Citations for the Greek text and translations of other Platonic and Aristotelian works are provided in the footnotes.

INTRODUCTION

Undoubtedly, the absence of pain makes for an unusual pleasure. One who equates the two terms clearly has some explaining to do. It is unfortunate, then, that the extant texts of Epicurus—the most notorious proponent of such an equation—should complicate rather than clarify matters. In his texts we find Epicurus appearing to claim not only that pleasure is an overall condition of painlessness, but also that pleasure is associated with the experience of sensory titillations involved in, for example, taste, vision, and sex.[1] Hence we have derisive reports like that from Alciphron, that the Epicurean Xenocrates experienced the highest Epicurean good—that is, the absence of pain—by embracing an unscrupulous dancing woman while ogling her lasciviously.[2]

The main text from which the apparent obscurity in Epicurus' conception of the highest good derives is Cicero's *De Finibus*. It is primarily from this text that we know of a distinction—purportedly Epicurean—between two genera of pleasure: one that involves change, affecting our senses with an agreeable feeling (*voluptas in motu*), and one that is the condition of feeling no pain (*voluptas in stabilitatem*).[3] These are often translated as 'kinetic' and 'static' pleasure, respectively.[4] In Book 1 of *De Finibus*, Cicero has his Epicurean interlocutor, Lucius Torquatus, give the following description

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[1] Cf. DL 10.6; Athenaeus 12.546e (22 A); and Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 3.41.

[2] Cf. Alciphron *Epistularum* 3.55.8 (432 U).

[3] At *De Fin.* 2.9, Cicero has Torquatus say that one pleasure is *alio genere* from the other. The description of pleasure as an agreeable feeling is given by Torquatus and echoed by Cicero himself later. See, for example, 1.37 and 2.6-8. For the term *voluptas in motu*, see 2.9, 2.16, 2.32, and 2.75. Cicero refers to the agreeable feeling also as *movens* (2.31). At 1.37, Torquatus describes the other kind of pleasure as a condition of feeling no pain. At 2.9 and 2.16 he calls it *voluptas in stabilitatem*. He also refers to it as *stans* (2.31), *status* (2.28, 2.32), and *stabilis* (2.32, 2.75).

[4] As do H. Rackham (Loeb) and Rafael Woolf (Cambridge), for example.

of the two types: "We do not simply pursue the sort of pleasure which stirs our nature with its sweetness and produces agreeable sensations in us: rather, the pleasure we deem greatest is that which is felt when all pain is removed" (1.37).[5] This description is echoed by Cicero himself at 2.6, followed at 2.7 by a few examples from Epicurus' lost text, *On the Telos*, of what Cicero has called 'pleasures in motion.' In *On the Telos*, Epicurus claims, "I do not know how I will conceive the good if I take away the pleasures of taste, if I take away sexual pleasures, if I take away pleasures of hearing, and if I take away the pleasant movements of form in vision."[6] Armed with this statement of the good, Cicero accuses Epicurus of twisting words. According to Cicero, Epicurus describes two different phenomena as if they were identical: pleasure—as most Greek and Latin speakers understand it,[7] namely, a delightful feeling—and the state of being without pain. Epicurus would be better off, Cicero argues, following the lead of either Hieronymus of Rhodes, who equates absence of pain with the good yet not with pleasure, or Aristippus, who understands pleasure to be a delightful feeling of the senses. A more reasonable approach for Epicurus, Cicero continues, would be to combine the views of Hieronymus and Aristippus so as to have two ultimate goods;[8] Epicurus, Cicero argues, combines these two views into a single ultimate good, resulting in the difficulty of proving that the

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[5] "*Non enim hanc solam sequimur quae suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet et cum iucunditate quadam percipitur sensibus, sed maxumam voluptatem illam habemus quae percipitur omni dolore detracto.*"

[6] Athenaeus 12.546e (22.1 A): "Οὐδε γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω τἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς δι᾽ ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς δι᾽ ἀκροαμάτων ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς κατ᾽ ὄψιν ἡδείας κινήσεις." Cicero repeats a version of this at *De Fin*. 2.7: "*quipped qui testificetur ne intellegere quidem se pose ubi sit aut quod sit ullum bonum praeter illud quod cibo et potione et aurium delectatione et obscena voluptate capiatur.*"

[7] This claim goes unsupported by Cicero.

[8] At *De Fin.* 2.19, Cicero gives examples of this practice of combining, yet retaining the distinctness of, two ends: Aristotle combines virtue with prosperity over a complete lifetime; Callipho, pleasure and moral worth; and Diodorus, moral worth and freedom from pain.

absence of pain is pleasure. This mistake manifests itself in the discrepancy between so-called kinetic and static pleasures, for, as Cicero has it, Epicurus subsumes them under a single ultimate good despite the fact that they are completely dissimilar. On Cicero's view, it is "absolutely impossible" to create a single ultimate good out of such disparate things (2.20). Although Torquatus does not explicitly equate kinetic and static pleasure,[9] he does maintain that the Epicurean *summum bonum* is static pleasure[10] while paradoxically defending Epicurus' claim that the kinetic pleasures of taste, hearing, etc., are integral to the highest good.[11] When pressed at 2.17 to explain further, Torquatus demands an end to questioning, thereby confirming Cicero's complaint in Book 1 that Epicurus is a poor logician, having handed down "no system for conducting and concluding arguments" (1.22). Thus, in Cicero's eyes Epicurean hedonism is a broken enterprise, not least of all because its founder has no idea what pleasure really is.[12]

One must keep in mind, however, that Cicero is a hostile source. He takes issue with the Epicurean subordination of virtue to pleasure, claiming that any Epicurean would be shamed by Cleanthes' portrait of the Virtues ministering to Pleasure, grandly attired and seated far above them (2.6). Furthermore, he describes his discussion with Torquatus as a "contest" [*certatio*] between virtue and pleasure (2.44).[13] So, although

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[9] In fact, he clams the opposite at 2.9, thereby facilitating Cicero's argument that kinetic and static pleasures are totally dissimilar.

[10] Cf. 1.37.

[11] Cf. 2.7.

[12] Cf. 2.6.

[13] He continues this language into the opening chapters of Book 3, where he makes the following comments: the previous books would have compelled pleasure to "concede defeat" were it not for her "tenacious advocates" (3.1); pleasure would be shameless "to resist virtue any longer" (3.1); he and Brutus were "forceful enough" in their discussion with Torquatus (3.2); and finally, "the topic of pleasure militates against really sharp or profound discussion" (3.2).

Cicero is our most complete source for Epicurean hedonism, he may not be our fairest. For this reason, one of my aims in Part I is to examine whether the distinction between kinetic and static pleasure as Cicero formulates it in *De Finibus* ought to be considered Epicurean.

What strikes one as odd about the distinction between kinetic and static pleasure is that, for all Cicero's fussing, there is no mention of it in Epicurus' extant major works. In none of his major letters, his *Principal Doctrines*, or the *Vatican Sayings* do we find an elaboration of the description of kinetic and static pleasure that is the basis of Cicero's critique in *De Finibus*. In fact, the only known place where Epicurus himself mentions the distinction is a short quotation from another of his lost texts, *On Choice*, given in Diogenes Laertius' doxography that follows the *Letter to Menoeceus*.[14] Epicurus' words are as follows: "Tranquility [ἀταραξία] and painlessness [ἀπονία] are katastematic pleasures [καταστηματικαί ἡδοναί], joy [χαρά] and gladness of mind [εὐφροσύνη] are seen to consist in motion and activity" (DL 10.136).[15] Right before this we are told that the Epicureans Metrodorus and Diogenes of Tarsus claim that Epicurus conceives of pleasure "both as that which consists in motion [κατὰ κίνησιν] and that which is a state of rest [καταστηματικῆς]" (DL 10.136).[16] Evidently, *some* form of distinction goes back to Epicurus, yet we have little evidence that Epicurus himself or his prominent followers classify certain pleasures as kinetic or katastematic in the same way as Cicero.

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[14] The full title of this text, *On Choice and Avoidance* [Περὶ αἱρέσεων καὶ φυγῶν], is given by Diogenes Laertius earlier in the same paragraph and in his list of Epicurus' texts at 10.27-28.

[15] I leave aside for the moment discussion of the various textual difficulties with this passage. My translation here is only meant to show that Epicurus does evidently use the terms καταστηματικαί and κατὰ κίνησιν to describe pleasures.

[16] I give here the standard translation of this line. Later, I discuss the difficulties with reading katastematic pleasure as a state of rest.

That is, we have little evidence that Epicurus considers kinetic pleasures to be sensory delights, like those he describes in *On the Telos*, or that he considers katastematic pleasures to be states lacking agreeable sensory stimulations and defined in terms of what they are not (for example, absence of pain, lack of disturbance, etc.).

I want to argue that we have good reason to believe that Epicurus does not describe kinetic and katastematic pleasures in the way Cicero claims. If we believe, following Cicero, that Epicurus bifurcates pleasures into two incommensurable classes—that is, into classes which have nothing in common and thus are not covered by the same general conception—it is hard to see beyond Cicero's depiction of Epicurus as a sloppy logician who cared little for consistent argumentation.[17] The first of many difficulties that arises if we follow Cicero is the obvious problem stressed in *De Finibus* that Epicurus' conception of the *summum bonum* is at best very foggy. How can Epicurus describe the *summum bonum* as freedom from pain in the body and disturbance in the soul, as he does in his *Letter to Menoeceus*,[18] yet also proclaim that he cannot conceive of the very same *summum bonum* without the so-called kinetic pleasures of taste, sex, etc.? Second, if we take it that the *summum bonum* is katastematic pleasure defined in opposition to sensory pleasures, we struggle to comprehend why Epicurus considers himself a hedonist.[19] Cicero is convinced that other ancient thinkers do not associate

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[17] For the view that the two pleasures are incommensurable, see Phillip Mitsis, *Epicurus' Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of Invulnerability* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 49n99. Essentially, the first part of this dissertation is an argument against precisely the sort of Ciceronian reading of Epicurus Mitsis puts forth.

[18] Cf. *Ad Men.* 131.

[19] Malte Hossenfelder has argued that anyone who equates freedom from pain with pleasure is not really a hedonist but is attempting to accommodate hedonism to another agenda. In Hossenfelder's opinion, the agenda in Epicureanism is the Stoic and Pyrrhonian ideal of making the individual independent from everything unattainable. See Hossenfelder, "Epicurus—Hedonist Malgré Lui," in *The Norms of Nature:*

'pleasure' with the kind of state that he believes Epicurean katastematic pleasure entails,[20] and we know of at least one figure—Hieronymus of Rhodes—who denies that the absence of pain is pleasure yet has no problem designating the former as the *summum bonum*.[21] Why would Epicurus bring pleasure into the equation at all? On the one hand, Cicero's account leads us to ponder why Epicurus even bothered with the term 'pleasure,' yet on the other his account gives us few resources with which to satisfy our wonder. A third difficulty concerns Epicurus' so-called 'cradle argument,' that it is evident that pleasure is the s*ummum bonum* from the fact that infants and all animals seek pleasure and avoid pain.[22] To Epicurus, infants and animals are reliable indicators of what is natural since they are not corrupted by false assumptions [ὑπολήψεις ψευδεῖς] about what is good and bad. But if katastematic pleasure, *the summum bonum*, is described as nothing more than the inert state of the absence of pain and contrasted with agreeable sensory stimulations, it is difficult to see how the first impulses of any creature could be directed toward anything but kinetic pleasure (as Cicero describes it). This difficulty leads Cicero to quip, "Which sort of pleasure, static [*stante*] or kinetic [*movente*] (to use the terminology we have learned from Epicurus, heaven help us), will the bawling infant

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Studies in Hellenistic Ethics, ed. Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 250n3.

[20] Cicero does not name names, but he must mean at least the Cyrenaics, who consider pleasure to be primarily bodily.

[21] Another figure may be Speusippus, although this is less clear. As Gosling and Taylor point out, Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata* 2.22.133) claims that Speusippus identifies the good with ἀοχλησία: not being bothered or overwhelmed. And, in Book 7 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle attributes to Speusippus the view that pleasure is not the good (*EN* 1153b4-6).

[22] At *De Fin.* 1.30, Torquatus reports that Epicurus makes use of such an explanation, coined the 'cradle argument' by Jacques Brunschwig. The argument appears in several other places: cf. Plutarch, *Adversus Colotem* 1122d-e; DL 10.137; Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes.* 3.194 (398 U) and *Adversus Mathematicos* 11.96 (398 U).

use to determine the supreme good and evil?" (2.31). These three problems are just a few of the difficulties we encounter by taking Cicero's testimony about Epicurean pleasure at face value.

Practically all scholars of Epicurean ethics follow Cicero's description of Epicurus' notion of kinetic and static pleasure: agreeable sensory stimulations are kinetic; states of rest and lack of pain are static. For example, Phillip Mitsis concludes that kinetic and static pleasures are "incommensurable,"[23] and Philip Merlan claims that the source of kinetic pleasure is an external stimulus, while the source of static pleasure is the organism itself.[24] A minority of scholars understand Epicurus' conception of pleasure independently of Cicero's testimony. J.C.B. Gosling and C.C.W. Taylor argue that not all sensory pleasures are limited to the kinetic class; some are katastematic, namely, those that are a matter of sensory pleasure without pain. On their view, the katastematic pleasure of ἀπονία, or absence of pain, "is not a non-sensory pleasure but a condition of sensory pleasure";[25] that is, a sensory pleasure that is not mixed with pain. Since the fact of a pleasure's being sensory is not the criterion by which to differentiate kinetic from katastematic pleasures, Gosling and Taylor suggest that what counts as properly kinetic are those pleasures linked to the replenishment of or the movement toward the proper functioning of the organism, and what counts as katastematic is the organism's painless, natural functioning. Boris Nikolsky, building on the work of Gosling and Taylor, argues that for Epicurus all pleasure "consists in an impact on the organism of some force

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[23] Cf. Mitsis, 49n99.

[24] Cf. Merlan, *Studies in Epicurus and Aristotle* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1960), 2.

[25] Gosling and Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasures* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 372 (hereafter abbreviated 'GT').

bringing it into a natural state, and which in the most general sense is referred to as ἡδονή."[26] On this reading, Epicurus does not starkly contrast the process toward the body's proper functioning with the result, but rather each is an aspect of a single pleasure that Epicurus describes in terms of the impact of an external restorative force on the body. Furthermore, according to Nikolsky these two aspects are intimately related, for the result of restoration is necessarily connected to the process that brings it about.[27]

My own reading of Epicurus' conception of pleasure builds on the work of Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky. In Part I, I discuss at length their positions and specify how I will draw on them. In this introduction I will make only a few general remarks about the aspects of their readings on which I am building and with which I disagree. Most importantly, I share their desire to avoid bifurcating Epicurus' notion of pleasure in the way Cicero has—into two incommensurable types understood in contradistinction to one another. In this dissertation, I prefer to leave the terms 'kinetic' and 'katastematic' untranslated so as to avoid rendering the latter like Cicero's 'static,' which biases us toward the view that katastematic pleasure is the state of a corpse. I believe that leaving the terms untranslated allows us to consider their meaning untainted by Cicero's interpretation. As I discussed, there are many reasons why we should avoid attributing to Epicurus the view that kinetic and katastematic pleasures are understood in terms of a pleasurable feeling in the body and a passive state of ἀπάθεια, respectively. Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky are attempting to provide a general description of pleasure by virtue of which the kinetic and katastematic varieties can also be called pleasure. Although

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[26] Nikolsky, "Epicurus on Pleasure," *Phronesis* 46, no. 4 (2001): 453 (hereafter abbreviated 'N').

[27] Cf. N, 447.

there are differences between Gosling and Taylor's position and Nikolsky's on this point, their projects share an overall intent, which I adopt, to attribute to Epicurus a more coherent notion of pleasure than that which Cicero has left us.

That said, there are several points of Gosling and Taylor's and Nikolsky's interpretations that I either reject outright or hope to improve upon, three of which I will mention here. First, both of their interpretations are rather undeveloped in terms of articulating the difference between kinetic and katastematic pleasures. Gosling and Taylor claim that in no text other than *De Finibus* that treats Epicurean ethics "does one find any sign that the distinction between katastematic and kinetic pleasure is of any importance in Epicureanism" (385). Yet, since Gosling and Taylor are attempting to give new meanings to the terms 'kinetic' and 'katastematic,' it is unclear why or how they are reformulating a distinction that is apparently irrelevant to Epicureanism. Nikolsky also wavers between wanting to claim that the authenticity of the distinction can be questioned and tending to describe pleasures of the process of restoration and those of the result as if they were two separate phenomena.[28] I believe there is an unresolved tension in their interpretations between, on the one hand, needing to redescribe the terms of the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasures and, on the other, wanting to deny a distinction in the first place. In my reading, I intend to provide a clearer formulation of the sense in which the descriptions of both kinetic and katastematic pleasure are given in terms of the functioning of the living organism.

Second, both of the interpretations on which I am building fail to take into account the complexity of other scholars' versions of Epicurus' notion of pleasure.

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[28] Cf. N, 441.

According to Gosling and Taylor, practically all scholars classify pleasures as either kinetic and katastematic based on the criterion of sensation, following Cicero. While this is true generally, it is painting with a very broad brush. Consequently, Gosling and Taylor have overlooked the nuances of the interpretations of, for example, Merlan, Carlo Diano, and John Rist, attention to which could have produced in some ways a better interpretation of Epicurean pleasure. The same goes for Nikolsky, who fails to consider the powerful counterexamples to a reading like his own provided by, for instance, Jeffrey Purinton. Throughout this dissertation, I address various other interpretations of Epicurus' conception of pleasure. Since my own reading is based on those of Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky, I believe that by addressing important counterexamples and alternative readings that fell by the wayside in their accounts I can strengthen mine.

Third, I disagree with Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky's wholesale rejection of Cicero's description of the Epicurean distinction between kinetic and static pleasure. Although I agree wholeheartedly with their claim that Cicero is a hostile source and is mistaken about how Epicureans describe their *summum bonum*, I do not conclude with them that Cicero is entirely wrong about there existing genuine Epicurean descriptions of something called 'kinetic' pleasure and something called 'katastematic' pleasure. We have evidence independent of Cicero that confirms that the distinction goes back to Epicurus, such as Diogenes Laertius' quotation from Epicurus' *On Choice* (DL 10.136), the statement that precedes it from Metrodorus and Diogenes of Tarsus, and the many passages in Plutarch's *Non Posse* (*A Pleasant Life Impossible*) where Epicurean pleasure is described using some form of the term 'καταστηματικός.' The correct conclusion to draw from Cicero's inaccuracies is not that there is *no* distinction between kinetic and

katastematic pleasure, but that there is simply a *different* distinction than the one Cicero describes. It could be that the distinction matters less to Epicureanism than Cicero claims, but even then we would have to acknowledge that Cicero is right that there is *some* distinction between Epicurean kinetic and katastematic pleasure. These three objections to Gosling and Taylor's and Nikolsky's approaches naturally do not constitute the full extent of my disagreements with them. In the first section of Part I, I discuss in detail my disagreements with their interpretations.

I believe we need a new reading of Epicurus' notion of pleasure, one that takes into account the fact that Epicurus himself uses the language of 'kinetic' and 'katastematic,' but avoids Cicero's criticism that Epicurus' hedonism is rife with contradictions. Along the lines of Gosling and Taylor, I will argue that Epicurus conceives all pleasures in terms of the perceived natural functioning of the organism. In other words, Epicurus does not consider kinetic and katastematic pleasures to be pleasures by virtue of different things: kinetic pleasures are perceived processes of restoration of the healthy functioning of the organism, and katastematic pleasures are perceived states of health and painlessness. I will argue that the pleasures Cicero describes as kinetic (i.e., sensory titillations which are not restorations—the same ones mentioned by Epicurus in *On the Telos*)[29] are in fact katastematic, since they are painless in themselves and do not presuppose a lack. Although Epicurus distinguishes kinetic from katastematic pleasures, he defines them in terms of one and the same general notion of pleasure, namely, the perceived healthy functioning of the organism.

[29] Cf. DL 10.6.

Part I, the main elements of which I have sketched here in the introduction, is organized in the following way: first, I examine Gosling and Taylor's and Nikolsky's interpretations of Epicurus' conception of pleasure. Since my interpretation is based generally on theirs, I attempt to familiarize the reader with their positions and identify their weaknesses. In the second section, I argue for my position that I described briefly above. Here I include the bulk of my textual analysis as well as possible counterexamples from various primary and secondary sources. The third section contains my examination and critique of Cicero's description of Epicurean pleasure in the first two books of *De Finibus*. Lastly, section four contains my conclusion to Part I.

In order to provide a sense of the philosophical background against which Epicurus forms his ideas, I turn, in Part II, to the ancient debates about pleasure that center on Plato's *Philebus*. Fourth-century ancient Greece was a hotbed of philosophical controversy concerning the nature and value of pleasure. The hedonism of Eudoxus was pitted against the antihedonism of Speusippus, possibly spurring Plato to write the *Philebus*, a dialogue whose central concern is the role, or lack thereof, that reason and pleasure play in the best human life. In response, Aristotle sympathizes with Eudoxus' hedonism, even if he does not wholeheartedly accept it, and rebuts the antihedonism of the *Philebus*. These debates turn on several issues: the feasibility of a hedonist lifestyle; pleasure's worth as an object of pursuit; and whether pleasure is the chief good or just one good among many. Threaded throughout the ethical evaluations of pleasure featured in these debates are two competing descriptions of the nature of pleasure itself. On the one hand, there is the Platonic notion of pleasure as a perceived process of restoration of an organism's natural state. This description takes center stage in the *Philebus* and is

thought to be endorsed by Speusippus, Plato's nephew and successor as head of the Academy. On this early Academic view, pleasure is nothing more than a means to an end—a progression toward a good state but not a good in itself. Aristotle responds that pleasure is not a movement, process, or restoration; it is associated with the activities of an organism that functions as it should, without impediment. Moreover, on his view pleasures are ends, not means, and in this he echoes Eudoxus, who claims that pleasures are objects of choice in themselves rather than simply means to other goods. But, although Aristotle sympathizes with the view that pleasure and the good are not opposed, he ultimately rejects the Eudoxan claim that pleasure is the highest good.

The purpose of Part II is to highlight various problems and themes in these ancient debates that bear on Epicurus' evaluation of pleasure. It is my contention that one of the focal points of the ancient debates about pleasure is Plato's *Philebus*, where Plato puts forward a description of pleasure that seems to reflect the disputes about hedonism within the early Academy. Furthermore, Aristotle takes aim at the dialogue's treatment of pleasure in passages of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, and his dissatisfaction with the Platonic line is echoed in parts of the Peripatetic *Magna Moralia*. It seems natural, then, that an evaluation of the philosophical roots of Epicurus' notion of pleasure should include and be structured around an analysis of the *Philebus* and its ancient reception.

As many have noted, the *Philebus* is a busy text. In addition to the dialogue's extended treatment of pleasure, a sizable portion is devoted to metaphysics—to classifying all things into metaphysical groups having to do with limitedness, unlimitedness, causes, and so forth. Other parts feature discussions of the One and Many and classifications of different kinds of knowledge. My investigation of the *Philebus*

sticks to Plato's treatment of pleasure, roughly 31b-54d, with some discussion of the metaphysical passages pertaining to the categorization of pleasure entailed by the fourfold division of beings (23c-31b). My goal is to isolate the philosophical issues that are pertinent to my examination of Epicurean pleasure from Part I.

The first order of business in Part II is to examine Plato's conception of the nature of pleasure in the *Philebus*. While scholars hold fairly uniformly that Plato understands at least some pleasures to be processes of restoration of an organism's natural harmony, few have noticed the important role of perception in Plato's theory of pleasure or have argued that Plato has a general definition of pleasure that he weaves through all the various kinds of pleasure he mentions in the large middle part of the dialogue. In the first section of Part II, I argue that in the *Philebus* Plato describes pleasure in general as a perceived processes of restoration of an organism's good state, and pain as the perceived process of disintegration. I contend further that Plato's qualification that the processes must be perceived is crucial to his evaluation of pleasure in the dialogue. This 'perception requirement,' as I will call it, enables him to distinguish between mixed and unmixed pleasures: both are preceded by a deficiency, but only mixed pleasures entail that the deficiency is perceived. Furthermore, the perception requirement allows Plato to deny that a neutral state—a state in which movements away from and toward the organism's natural harmony go unnoticed—is pleasure. Given the perception requirement, the neutral state must be pleasureless. In addition, I argue that the perception requirement constitutes a significant improvement to Plato's earlier theory of pleasure in the *Republic*, where pleasure consists simply in a process of restoration. Next, I analyze the three types of mixed pleasures in the *Philebus* (those of the soul,

body, and soul and body together), Plato's rejection of the neutral state, and his account of unmixed pleasures. Finally, I examine what Plato understands by a pleasure's being mixed with pain.

In the second half of Part II, I describe first how, in the *Philebus*, Plato's own definition of pleasure is featured in an argument that he attributes to a group or person referred to as the κομψοί ("clever people"). The κομψοί supposedly propagate an argument (which I will refer to as the 'process argument') that pleasure is not the good. It runs as follows: if pleasure is a process of replenishment, and if processes are for the sake of some end, then the end is properly what is good in itself while the processes belong in a different class; therefore, pleasure is not the good. That Plato adheres to this argument, even though he puts it in the mouth of others, is evident from the fact that he himself holds that all pleasures are processes, a point I attempt to establish in the first section of Part II. Next, I discuss Aristotle's rebuttal of the Platonic definition and diminishment of pleasure and argue that Aristotle is taking issue precisely with the *Philebus'* description of pleasure as a process and the rejection of pleasure from the class of things good in themselves. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle comes out strongly against the view that pleasure is not the good because it is a process, movement, or replenishment. In Book 7, he holds that pleasures are activities, meaning that they are complete at any moment rather than progressions in stages toward ends in themselves. In Book 10, he adds that pleasure is the activity of unimpeded functioning, requiring senses and organs that are in optimal condition. Rather than a process toward such a good state, pleasure is linked with the activity of a subject who experiences proper functioning. In this way Aristotle can contend, in sympathy with Eudoxus, that the argument that no

pleasure is a good falls apart. The second section of Part II thus follows the following progression: first I lay out the Platonic process argument, with a brief discussion of the identity of the so-called κομψοί; next I evaluate the Aristotelian response to the process argument, beginning with Aristotle's initial agreement in the *Rhetoric* with the Platonic line and continuing on to his later rejection of it in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Lastly, I briefly discuss some passages from the Peripatetic *Magna Moralia* that echo and in some ways enhance Aristotle's comments from the *Ethics*.

The fourth-century debates about pleasure within the early Academy and among Platonists and Aristotelians are, essentially, disagreements about whether to conceive of pleasure as a process or an end and how that problem bears on the moral status of pleasure. Is pleasure a process of reaching a condition of proper functioning, or is it the actual activity of a healthy organism that has already achieved proper functioning? And what can be said about pleasure's goodness in light of these different ideas? On my view, the disputes over these issues laid fertile ground for Epicurus, a hedonist attempting to structure his notion of pleasure around the concept of healthy, natural functioning of an organism.

When considered in light of the ancient debates within the Academy and among its members and Aristotle, Epicurus' distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure functions as a dialectical response to the Platonic description of pleasure and the process argument. By means of his distinction, Epicurus asserts that not all pleasures are processes; any painless affection and the state of health that results from processes of restoration are pleasures too. And since not all pleasures are processes, some of them could, given the process argument, belong in the class of things good in themselves.

Here Epicurus' position bears the mark of Aristotle's rebuttal of the Academic view of pleasure: in an Aristotelian vein, Epicurus wants to associate pleasure with the perceived natural workings of the human organism. As I show, Epicurean hedonism is the next stage in the ancient debates about pleasure that centered on the *Philebus*.

In addition, I argue that Epicureanism is a far cry from the intellectualism that characterizes Plato's philosophy. Plato finds little value in the pleasures of the body and the fulfillment of nonintellectual desires; these aspects of human nature are anathema to him. And really, all pleasures, mental and bodily, are antithetical to the life of reason in the *Philebus*; indeed, the goal of the dialogue—to decide which is more the cause of the good life, pleasure or knowledge—presupposes some great rift between pleasure and reason. At every turn Plato does his best to undermine pleasure—from the process argument, to his claim that the divine life is pleasureless, to his ranking of pleasure near the bottom of the causes of the goodness of the best human life. In many ways, Epicurean ethics constitutes a complete rejection of the intellectualism of Plato. As I argue, philosophy is of interest to Epicureans insofar as it brings pleasure; *knowledge* is subordinate to pleasure, and not the other way around. Furthermore, according to Epicurus the pursuit of physical pleasure is not incompatible with happiness. I contend that Epicureans pursue affections that do not presuppose or result in pain, and this involves fulfilling desires that can pertain to either the body or the soul. Thus, the elements that Plato considers to be nonrational and antithetical to the good life play central roles in Epicurean hedonism.

As is evident from this introduction, this dissertation is as much about Plato and the ancient controversy over pleasure as it is about Epicurean hedonism. In a way, I am

simply following Socrates' advice to Protarchus when they begin searching for the good in the *Philebus*: "When you are looking for somebody, you first find out where he actually lives. That would be a major step towards finding him" (61a-b). My search for Epicureanism takes us to its home, so to speak, there among Plato's theory of pleasure in the *Philebus* and the controversies surrounding it.

PART I

EPICURUS ON PLEASURE

I.1

Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky

A. Gosling and Taylor

According to Gosling and Taylor, it is usually the case that scholars of Epicurean ethics follow Cicero in considering all sensory pleasures (e.g., pleasures of taste, sex, hearing, etc.) to be kinetic and to constitute a distinct class from katastematic pleasures (365). On this 'traditional reading,' Epicurus distinguishes two classes in order to differentiate his *summum bonum*, namely, the katastematic pleasures of ἀταραξία (lack of disturbance in the soul) and ἀπονία (absence of pain in the body), from that of the profligate, namely, the wanton pursuit of sensory enjoyment. This appears to be confirmed by the *Letter to Menoeceus*, where Epicurus explains that when he calls pleasure the *telos* he means ἀταραξία and ἀπονία rather than "the pleasures of the prodigal and the pleasures of sensuality [τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας]" (*Ad Men.* 131).

Against this traditional reading, Gosling and Taylor argue that we are left with no 'positive' definition of katastematic pleasure if all sensory pleasures are considered to be kinetic; that is, katastematic pleasures become nothing more than "conditions of being without various forms of distress" (367). They claim it is hard to understand why Epicurus did not follow the lead of Hieronymus of Rhodes and possibly Speusippus and call the *telos* insensibility or simply painlessness, rather than pleasure. Furthermore, they argue that we know from *On the Telos* that Epicurus touts the importance of certain sensory pleasures (that is, those the traditional interpreters call 'kinetic'): he claims to be

unable to conceive the good without the pleasures of taste, hearing, vision, and sex.[1] So either katastematic pleasure is just a condition of being without pain, and thus Epicurus really is ignorant of the meaning of pleasure (as Cicero claims), or those kinetic pleasures without which Epicurus claims he cannot conceive the best life are actually part of the good. Either way we have no satisfactory description of the purported Epicurean *telos*, namely, katastematic pleasure.

Gosling and Taylor's own alternative interpretation of Epicurus' conception of pleasure is based largely on a passage in Epicurus' *On the Telos* that Cicero quotes in the *Tusculan Disputations*. The first part of the quotation is Epicurus' statement I just mentioned, that he cannot understand what the good is without the pleasures of taste, hearing, etc. But in the quotation's second part, Epicurus adds the following: "Nor can one hold that joy of mind is alone among the goods. For as I understand it the mind is in a state of joy when it has hope of all those things I have mentioned above, that nature may acquire them with complete absence of pain."[2] According to Gosling and Taylor, Epicurus does not understand absence of pain to be simply a condition free of distress; he has something more constructive in mind, namely, a condition of having sensory pleasure without pain. In other words, the goal that Epicurus articulates here is "a life of sensory pleasure untainted by pain" (GT, 371); we should pursue sensory pleasures as long as

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[1] Cf. Athenaeus 12.546e (22 A); DL 10.6; and *Tusc. Disp*. 3.41-42. Of course, Epicurus does not believe that all sensory pleasures ought to be pursued. He favors those which are the object of either natural and necessary desires (e.g., drinking due to thirst) or natural and nonnecessary desires (e.g., eating a fancy meal). He rejects as harmful those that are the object of nonnatural and unnecessary desires (e.g., the desire for fame). Cf. *Ad Men.* 127 and *PD* 29.

[2] We do not have this passage in the original Greek. The text of Cicero's Latin translation of the quotation, at 3.41-42, is as follows: "*Nec vero ita dici potest, mentis laetitiam solam esse in bonis; laetantem enim mentem ita novi, spe eorum omnium, quae supra dixi, fore ut natura iis potiens dolore careat.*" The English translation of the Latin is Gosling and Taylor's (368). Unless otherwise noted, all translations of the *Tusculan Disputations* are J.E. King's, and the Latin text is from that edition (Loeb).

they do not bring pain in their wake. The profligate is mistaken about the proper goal, for he pursues sensory pleasures to excess without paying heed to their limit—the absence of pain. Gosling and Taylor explain that the profligate seeks more and more sensory pleasures by, for example, continuing to stuff himself with food even after he is perfectly sated, ignorant of the fact that once he has removed his pain he cannot increase the quantity of his pleasure. On Gosling and Taylor's view, the point of the Epicurean good life is to have pleasure without pain, not just the absence of pain (372). Since the *telos* just is a life of sensory pleasure unaccompanied by pain, Gosling and Taylor conclude that there is no inconsistency between Epicurus' statement in *On the Telos* that he cannot imagine the good without certain sensory pleasures and his claim in the *Letter to Menoeceus* that the end is pleasure understood as the absence of pain. On their view, sensory pleasures become problematic when they are pursued without heed to their limits, beyond which they bring pain.

Furthermore, Gosling and Taylor contend that when an organism experiences sensory pleasure without pain (i.e., katastematic pleasure) it is operating properly. They argue that this reading is reinforced by Lucretius' account of pleasure and pain in *De Rerum Natura* (2.963-72), where pain occurs when atoms are disturbed from their natural positions, and pleasure occurs when they return (GT, 404-5). For Epicurus, pain just is the consciousness of disturbance to the body's natural condition, and pleasure just is the awareness that the organism operates properly. On their view, katastematic pleasure, or sensory pleasure without pain, is the pleasure of an organism in proper condition.

For Gosling and Taylor, then, a pleasure's being sensory is not the criterion by which Epicurus distinguishes kinetic from katastematic pleasure, for on their view the

latter consists in sensory pleasure without pain. But once sensory pleasures that are unaccompanied by pain are shifted to the katastematic camp, what remains to count as kinetic? According to Gosling and Taylor, kinetic pleasures are those of movement, in the sense of replenishment or restoration of the natural state of the organism (373). Kinetic pleasures are understood as processes back toward the proper functioning of an organism that has been disrupted in some way. In this process of restoration, some part(s) of the organism begins to operate properly again, while another part(s) may still be deficient. For example, when I drink while thirsty I gradually quench my thirst, and thus I gradually restore the natural balance of my body. Until my thirst is entirely quenched, some part of the organism has not returned to its proper functioning. But, there is a gradual increase in the overall natural functioning in my body. Kinetic pleasures on Gosling and Taylor's view are linked to the movements toward the organism's proper functioning.

Since kinetic and katastematic pleasures are both defined in terms of the natural functioning of the organism, Gosling and Taylor claim that they are not different kinds of pleasures: katastematic pleasures are those of the organism in proper condition, and kinetic pleasures are those linked to the movements toward that proper condition. They clarify this as follows:

> First, kinetic pleasures are not a different kind of pleasure from katastematic ones; they too are sensory and are a matter of some part of the organism operating properly. When one quenches one's thirst some parts of the organism are working naturally, some not, and there is a steady increase in the area of natural operation; but no different account of the nature of pleasure is needed. (374)

In other words, kinetic and katastematic pleasures are pleasures by virtue of the same thing, namely, the proper functioning of an organism. It is not by virtue of a pleasure's

being sensory that it is either kinetic or katastematic, but by virtue of its being either proper functioning itself or a movement toward proper functioning. Their interpretation essentially rules out Cicero's classification of Epicurean pleasures into sensory and nonsensory kinds.

B. Agreements and Disagreements with Gosling and Taylor

As I will explain in section I.2, I believe Gosling and Taylor's explanation of Epicurean pleasure in terms of an organism's consciousness of natural functioning is on the right track. Essentially, I will attempt to build on, while modifying, what I believe is the core of their reading, namely, their description of kinetic pleasure as the consciousness of movement toward the natural state of the organism, and their description of katastematic pleasure as the consciousness of the organism in proper condition. With them, I contend that both kinetic and katastematic pleasure are described in terms of a single definition of pleasure given in terms of the natural functioning of the organism.

My aim is to argue for this position more thoroughly than Gosling and Taylor have, while modifying it somewhat. Although one gets the gist of their interpretation from their single chapter on the difficulty with Epicurus' conception of pleasure, many aspects of their interpretation either require further explanation or are not supported by the texts. As I mentioned in my introduction, they are consistently unclear about the nature of the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure: at times they attempt to redefine the terms—thereby admitting that Epicurus understands something by them—while at other times they argue that Epicurus is not referring to the definitions of kinetic

and katastematic pleasure that they themselves have given when he uses the terms κατὰ κίνησιν and καταστηματικαί in his *On Choice*, quoted in Diogenes Laertius' doxography. It is crucial to explain why, if the distinction has no theoretical significance, Epicurus bothers making it at all. I intend to clarify how Epicurus distinguishes the two pleasures and why he might have done so.

Additionally, I believe that Gosling and Taylor misrepresent the so-called 'traditional' interpretation against which they are arguing. On their description, traditional interpreters, following Cicero, divide kinetic and katastematic pleasures into sensory pleasures on the one hand, and nonsensory pleasures on the other. Gosling and Taylor equate 'nonsensory' with 'nonperceptive,' and proceed to argue in much detail that katastematic pleasure cannot be a state of nonperception because Epicurus holds that perception never ceases in a living organism. For example, in *PD* 2 he claims that there is no life without perception;[3] at *Ad Men.* 124 he claims that good and evil are found through perception;[4] and at *Ad Hdt.* 64-6 he explains that so long as there is a soul in a body, "perception never ceases."[5] All this suggests that if katastematic pleasure is not a state of perception, then it is the state of a corpse, as the Cyrenaics claim about the Epicurean highest pleasure,[6] and that it is not the good, since the good is given in perception. Obviously, Gosling and Taylor conclude, Epicurus does not believe that katastematic pleasure is a state of unconsciousness. Indeed, I would comment that it is so

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[3] "Ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δ'ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς."

[4] "Συνέθιζε δὲ ἐν τῷ νομίζειν μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τὸν θάνατον· ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἐν αἰσθήσει."

[5] "Διὸ δὴ καὶ ἐνυπάρχουσα ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδέποτε ἄλλου τινὸς μέρους ἀπηλλαγμένου ἀναισθητεῖ."

[6] Cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 2.21 (451 U). The Cyrenaics also liken the Epicurean highest good to the state of one asleep. Cf. DL 2.89.

obvious that katastematic pleasure is not the pleasure of unconsciousness that it would seem impossible for anyone, even if she were drawing on *De Finibus*, to claim that Epicurus thinks it is. Gosling and Taylor misrepresent Cicero's description of katastematic pleasure as a condition defined in contradistinction to sensory, kinetic pleasures. In their eyes, Cicero must mean that katastematic pleasures are nonsensory; that is, they do not involve perception and thus are the state of a corpse. On their reading, any interpreter who draws on Cicero is likewise distinguishing between pleasures that are perceived and the pleasures of a passive, unfeeling state. On my view, Cicero does not explicitly describe ἀπονία and ἀταραξία as states of nonperception, although he does describe katastematic pleasure in contradistinction to sensory, kinetic pleasures. In general, he is unclear about the exact nature of katastematic pleasure (reflecting, perhaps, his belief that the Epicureans themselves are ignorant of its description). And, as far as I can see, no traditional interpreter argues that katastematic pleasures are states of nonperception.[7] Yet Gosling and Taylor perfunctorily attribute the claim that katastematic pleasure consists in a state of nonperception or unconsciousness to all major studies of Epicurean pleasure that follow Cicero's classification. Gosling and Taylor fail to take into account the nuances of the individual 'traditional' interpretations that they so hastily group together. These other readings neither present katastematic pleasures as the utterly objectionable 'states of unconsciousness,' nor do they all adopt the same reading of Epicurus' ethical theory generally. As it is, Gosling and Taylor have created for themselves a straw man by their claim that traditional interpreters uniformly consider

[7] Although, Purinton, whose article postdates Gosling and Taylor's work, comes close. Although he argues that katastematic pleasure is not felt, he does not mean that katastematic pleasure is a state of unconsciousness. See Purinton, "Epicurus on the Telos," *Phronesis* 38, no. 3 (1993): 292-302.

katastematic pleasures to be states of nonperception. Attention to the intricacies of these theories and a more thorough examination of Cicero's account in *De Finibus* would in fact buttress Gosling and Taylor's position. In response to these shortcomings, I will respond in the following sections to various other interpretations, such as those of Diano, Rist, and Merlan, and I will examine Cicero's account of Epicurean pleasure in detail.

C. Nikolsky

In his article on Epicurean pleasure, Nikolsky attempts to build on the work of Gosling and Taylor.[8] He shares with them a distrust of Cicero's division of Epicurean pleasure into kinetic and katastematic kinds, believing that "the authenticity of the classification may be called in question" (N, 440). He also shares with them a desire to provide a single description of Epicurus' notion of pleasure from which certain aspects can be discerned. For Gosling and Taylor, that single description is the proper functioning of the organism; for Nikolsky, it is the impact of an external restorative force on the organism. The distrust of Cicero and the belief that Epicurus has a single description of pleasure go hand in hand: if Epicurus does in fact recognize two aspects of a single phenomenon called pleasure, then Cicero's division of pleasure into two opposing classes cannot be correct. According to Nikolsky, Cicero probably encounters the distinction between katastematic and kinetic pleasure in Epicurus through Antiochus of Ascalon's use of the *divisio Carneadea*, in which Epicurus' ethical doctrine was

[8] Nikolsky writes, "Many of their arguments seem to me quite convincing and will be used in this article. The hypothesis advanced by Gosling and Taylor, who deny the authenticity of the division of pleasures, has not been properly appreciated. In my view, however, the possibilities of argumentation in its favour have not yet been exhausted" (441n4).

classified as a synthesis of the Cyrenaic conception of pleasure 'in motion' (i.e., sensory) and the claim of Hieronymus of Rhodes that the *telos* is the absence of pain.[9]

In contrast to Gosling and Taylor, Nikolsky frames the difficulty of differentiating kinetic from katastematic pleasure not in terms of a sensory pleasure versus a state of nonperception, but in terms of "a state presupposing active stimulation of pleasant sensations, and secondly, a state negatively defined as the absence of pain and suffering" (441).[10] He is wise to describe the difficulty as he does, for, as I argued previously, Gosling and Taylor misconstrue the traditional interpretation's distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasures. Nikolsky avoids attributing to Cicero and to scholars who build their interpretations of Epicurean pleasure on *De Finibus* the position that katastematic pleasure is a state of unconsciousness. For Nikolsky, the main shortcoming of Cicero's account, and thus with modern interpretations that build on it, is its lack of a 'positive' description of the Epicurean *summum bonum*: all we can glean from Cicero is that the Epicurean highest pleasure, that is, the highest good, is a state of lacks—lacking pain, lacking suffering, lacking disturbance. It would seem unlikely, Nikolsky argues, that someone unable to conceive the good to be exclusive of pleasures of taste, hearing, etc., would give such a description of the *summum bonum* in terms of lacks or would have called it a state of ἀπάθεια (443).

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[9] Cf. N, 462-65. This explanation seems more likely than Gosling and Taylor's that Cicero misconstrues the contrast between kinetic and katastematic pleasure because he understands very little about Epicurean hedonism. Cf. GT, 385.

[10] In his article, Nikolsky claims that he disagrees with Gosling and Taylor about one issue, namely, a translation of a passage from the *Tusculan Disputations* (cf. N, 449n35). However, Nikolsky evidently does not realize that he differs from Gosling and Taylor concerning the very basic issue of how they construe the problem regarding Cicero's and several scholars' treatments of Epicurean pleasure.

Furthermore, Nikolsky is suspicious of interpretations that rely on Cicero's account of Epicurean hedonism because there is no consensus among scholars about what Cicero means by 'kinetic'; that is, what he means by 'in motion' (*in motu* or *movens*). For instance, on Cyril Bailey's reading, Cicero considers kinetic pleasures to be those that accompany the satisfaction of desire, and 'static' pleasures to be the states experienced when desires are satisfied. He writes the following:

> Then, if the means of satisfying the desire is within our attainment, there follows another movement accompanying the process of satisfaction: this movement (κίνησις) is a kind of pleasure. As the result of the completion of the process there ensues a second kind of pleasure (ἡδονὴ καταστηματική), the static pleasure of the equilibrium (εὐστάθεια) or freedom from pain (ἀπονία) which the body now enjoys.[11]

As Nikolsky points out, Bailey believes that Cicero means by 'motion' a change in the state of the organism overall (N, 441). In contrast, scholars like Rist and Diano believe that Cicero means by 'motion' a change in the state of individual sensory organs.[12] In support of their position, Rist and Diano cite Lucretius, who explains in *De Rerum Natura* that once food is no longer on the palate pleasure ceases.[13] Rist and Diano take this to mean that kinetic pleasure presupposes the presence of a katastematic pleasure in the same organ, since Epicurus denies that pleasure and pain can be experienced simultaneously in the same location;[14] on their view, pain must first be absent in the organ in order for kinetic pleasure to be experienced. But, they continue, this is just to

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[11] Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus* (1928; repr., New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), 492.

[12] Cf. Rist, *Epicurus: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 109-111; and Diano, "Questioni Epicuree 1," in *Scritti Epicurei* (Leo S. Olschki: Florence, 1974), 67-128.

[13] Cf. *DRN* 4.627-29. I treat this passage and Diano and Rist's interpretations of it in more detail in a later section.

[14] Cf. *PD* 3, where Epicurus says that where pleasure is present there is no pain.

say that kinetic pleasure presupposes katastematic pleasure, since the latter is defined as the absence of pain. During eating and drinking, for example, the palate experiences pleasure while the stomach, which has not yet been satiated, experiences pain. As food moves down to the stomach, kinetic pleasure ceases in the palate while the stomach enjoys the katastematic pleasure of having been satisfied. Thus, Rist and Diano claim that kinetic pleasure is experienced when an individual organ (e.g., the palate) experiences some 'extra' phenomenon that adds to the painlessness already present. Contrast this reading with Bailey's, which also relies on *De Finibus* yet treats 'in motion' as a change in the organism as a whole.

Nikolsky goes on to point out that Cicero himself vacillates on the meaning of 'in motion': sometimes Cicero claims that the motion is a change in the whole organism,[15] other times that it is a change in the sensory organs themselves.[16] To be fair, it is possible that Cicero's vacillation could merely reflect inconsistencies in Epicurus' hedonism itself. Even so, Nikolsky's point is that due to the confusion in Cicero's account and the discrepancies between modern interpretations based on it, we have good reason to suspect that Cicero's rendering of kinetic and static pleasure is not Epicurean.

Setting Cicero aside, Nikolsky presents his own interpretation of Epicurean pleasure based mainly on Epicurus' own writings and those of Lucretius and Plutarch. On Nikolsky's view, Epicurus' conception of pleasure differs little from a popular ancient notion that "pleasure is experienced when the atoms of the human body, acted upon by a certain force, find themselves in their proper places, i.e., when the organism

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[15] Cf. *De Fin.* 2.9, where Cicero considers satisfying one's thirst to be an example of kinetic pleasure.

[16] Cf. *De Fin.* 2.6-7 and 2.75, where Cicero claims that kinetic pleasure is an agreeable motion of the senses.

attains its natural state under the effect of some influence" (N, 446). This conception is familiar from Plato's *Timaeus*, where it is said that the return to our natural condition is pleasant, whereas the opposite is painful.[17] Aristotle also is known to conceive pleasure in terms of the restoration of an organism's natural state, particularly in his *Rhetoric*.[18] And one understands from the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the Peripatetic *Magna Moralia* that this description of pleasure was in circulation among the ancient schools.[19]

Yet, Nikolsky recognizes that Epicurus and those writing about Epicureanism use several different terms to talk about pleasure—κατὰ κίνησιν, καταστηματική, ἀπονία, τὸ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα, etc. Wanting to avoid concluding that there is no common link between the terms, Nikolsky provides a general explanation of Epicurus' conception of pleasure. Incidentally, Nikolsky's explanation is a good statement of his overall interpretation of Epicurean pleasure:

> From my point of view, all the terms that are mentioned above—ἡδονή, κίνησις, ἀπονία, εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα/εὐστάθεια—serve to describe different characteristics of the same phenomenon, which consists in an impact on the organism of some force bringing it into a natural state, and which in the most general sense is referred to as ἡδονή. (453)

According to this reading, Epicurus believes that pleasure consists in a restorative impact on the body. This phenomenon has two aspects: first, the smooth motion of atoms as they penetrate the pores, which is the process of restoration and defines the physical

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[17] Cf. *Timaeus* 64c-d. Although, it is true that the *Timaeus* account of pleasure is silent on the matter of the external force.

[18] Cf. *Rhetoric* 1369b33-35.

[19] Cf. *EN* 1153a9-15, where Aristotle denies that pleasure is a process while arguing that pleasure is an end and an activity. See also *EN* 1173a31-1173b2, where he maintains that pleasure is not a movement. Similar ideas are expressed at *Magna Moralia* 1204bff.

nature of pleasure;[20] second, "the state of an organism that is experiencing pleasure" (453), which is the result of the process of restoration and is known as the εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα and εὐστάθεια. Nikolsky derives his description of the second aspect from Plutarch's polemical treatise, *Non Posse*, where the Epicurean *telos* is understood to be the good state of the body, stability, and health. Nikolsky claims that Epicurus means by this good state of the body "such a state which is necessarily the effect of some external force restoring or supporting the organism" (447). Epicurus' description of pleasure, then, consists in a single phenomenon: the impact of some external force that restores the natural condition of the organism (i.e., its good state or health). The result and the process of restoration are aspects of this single description of pleasure in terms of a restorative impact on the body. This means, Nikolsky concludes, that "both 'movement' and ἀπονία are to Epicurus not different types of pleasure but, rather, different ways of describing one and the same pleasure" (465). Nikolsky floats the idea that perhaps Epicurus conceives pleasure in this way in order to respond to arguments familiar from Plato's *Philebus* that pleasure is linked with the process of restoration rather than the result (N, 448).

Furthermore, Nikolsky understands Epicurus to mean that the process of restoration and its result are necessarily related: the process of being restored necessarily brings about the good state of the body, since the latter is the effect of the former. In support of this position, Nikolsky cites *SV* 33. There Epicurus claims that the cry of the flesh is not to be hungry, thirsty, or cold, and whoever has these things and confidence of

[20] Nikolsky writes that κίνησις "defines the physical nature of pleasure—the penetration into the organism of atoms coming from the outside and their influence on the totality of atoms constituting a person's organism" (453).

maintaining them in the future rivals the gods in happiness.[21] Not being hungry, thirsty, and cold are states that are the effects of some external force restoring the organism; for example, not being hungry comes about by eating—the process of restoring an organism's lack. Similarly for not being cold: "Pleasure from the absence of cold, i.e., pleasure from warmth, is one of the pleasures caused by pleasant sensations in the sense-organs" (N, 448). The εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα—the good state of the body—is causally related to the physical process of restoration that brings about the good state.

D. Agreements and Disagreements with Nikolsky

Although Nikolsky does make a compelling case based on *SV* 33, he is not so compelling elsewhere. He cites *Ad Men.* 131, where Epicurus writes that the consumption of plain fare like bread and water confers the highest pleasure when hunger is present.[22] By this Nikolsky takes Epicurus to mean the following: "Obviously, Epicurus means by this the state of satiety, but he does not in any way separate it from pleasure from eating and drinking that leads to this state" (447). Yet, neither *Ad Men.* 131 nor *SV* 33 shows that Epicurus does not "in any way" differentiate the pleasure of the process of restoration from the result. In fact, as I just discussed, Nikolsky attempts to argue by way of *SV* 33 that the states of satiety, warmth, etc. are logical *results* of the process of restoration, meaning that there must be at least one way of dividing them—into cause and effect. While we may grant that Epicurus does not believe that the result (i.e., the good κατάστημα) is brought about independently of the process, we do not also

[21] "Σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἔξειν κἂν <Διὶ> ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο."

[22] "καὶ μᾶζα καὶ ὕδωρ τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἀποδίδωσιν ἡδονήν, ἐπειδὰν ἐνδέων τις αὐτὰ προσενέγκηται."

have to grant that there is no difference between these based on the evidence cited by Nikolsky. After all, Nikolsky has claimed that there are two aspects of pleasure, not just one. This points to a fundamental confusion in his view: are the process and the result distinguishable or not?

This confusion appears in Nikolsky's article more than once. He discusses a statement that Plutarch and Athenaeus both make about the Epicurean belief that the beginning and root of every good is a pleasure of the stomach.[23] According to Nikolsky, what is meant by 'pleasure of the stomach' is satiety. Yet in the same passage, Plutarch mentions a letter from Metrodorus where the pleasure is understood to be that from eating and drinking.[24] From these passages, Nikolsky concludes (confusedly, I believe), "Thus, Plutarch does not differentiate between pleasure from eating and satiety" (447-48). Again, I think this conclusion is at odds with both his position that the process and the result are two aspects of pleasure and his argument from *SV* 33 that the process and result of restoration are necessarily related as cause and effect. If Nikolsky believes that Epicurus—and Plutarch writing about Epicurus—does not distinguish between the good state of the body and the process of reaching it, we have a hard time understanding why Epicurus would mention two so-called aspects of pleasure whose difference is negligible. In short, Nikolsky vacillates between wanting to show that there is no distinction between the so-called kinetic and katastematic pleasures and wanting to redefine the terms of the distinction. He can redraw the distinction only if a distinction exists—a claim that Nikolsky denies.

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[23] Cf. Plutarch *Non Posse* 1098d; and Athenaeus 12.546f (227 A).

[24] Plutarch *Non Posse*, 1098c.

Nikolsky might respond in his own defense that his main point—that Epicurus describes pleasure generally in terms of the impact on the body of a restorative external force—remains untouched. However, I believe that the most significant error in his account concerns precisely this general definition of pleasure. Recall that Nikolsky considers all cases of Epicurean pleasure to be impacts on the body by a *restorative* external force. His words again:

> From my point of view, all the terms that are mentioned above—ἡδονή, κίνησις, ἀπονία, εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα/εὐστάθεια—serve to describe different characteristics of the same phenomenon, which consists in an impact on the organism of some force bringing it into a natural state, and which in the most general sense is referred to as ἡδονή. (453)

In order to argue that kinetic and katastematic pleasures (as he defines them) are necessarily connected, Nikolsky must claim that pleasure is defined in terms of an impact that is necessarily restorative, for on his view kinetic and katastematic pleasures are related because they are the process and result, respectively, of the organism's being restored. In other words, if an impact were not restorative, then it would neither engender a process of restoration nor result in the conclusion of that process. I think we have good reason to believe that Epicurus does not hold that all pleasure consists in the impact of a *restorative* external force. In the quotation from Epicurus' *On the Telos* given in the *Tusculan Disputations*, the pleasures without which Epicurus claims he cannot conceive the good—pleasures of taste, hearing, vision, and sex—need not have anything to do with the impact of a restorative force. The pleasures of taste, for example, need not be restorative, since the external force that provides pleasure, namely, food, does not necessarily restore a lack. This is evident from the fact that one can experience the pleasure of taste even if one is not experiencing a lack that needs to be filled, like hunger.

On Nikolsky's reading, we are made to believe that Epicurus thinks that once a person is full from her meal she may as well lay down her fork, since she can no longer experience the pleasure of taste. Not only is there no evidence from Epicurus to support such a claim, our own experience tells against it: every day people enjoy the taste of their desserts after they have filled themselves up on their dinners. Moreover, experiences of this sort are surely what Epicurus is referring to when he claims that pleasure can be varied without being increased.[25]

Yet, Nikolsky treats pleasures like those Epicurus mentions in *On the Telos* as if they were the same as pleasures that actually do consist in the impact of an external restorative force. He writes:

> Pleasures from tasting, hearing and contemplating can be explained in a way similar to what was said above concerning pleasure from warmth: a person experiences various external influences, which are pleasant or unpleasant; in the former case they give pleasure and ensure 'the good state' of the organism and in the latter, they result in a pain and loss of 'the good state.' (449)

Nikolsky believes that Epicurus considers pleasures like those mentioned in *SV* 33—not being hungry, thirsty, or cold—to be pleasures in the same way as those mentioned in *On the Telos*, such as pleasures of taste and hearing. However, if Epicurus does define all pleasure in terms of restorative impact, as Nikolsky has it, then he cannot also hold that the pleasures mentioned in *SV* 33 are pleasures by virtue of the same thing as those mentioned in *On the Telos*, since the latter are not restorations of a lack. One could grant that Nikolsky is correct insofar as the pleasures mentioned in *On the Telos* do consist in the impact of *some* external force on the body, since Epicurus believes that the pleasures of hearing, taste, and vision, for example, involve the penetration by atoms through the

[25] Cf. *PD* 18.

pores of the body. But Nikolsky goes further than the texts can support with his claim that the external force is restorative. This is not just a semantic problem, for the difficulty remains even if we excise 'restorative' from his account. As I mentioned previously, his argument that there is a necessary connection between the two aspects of the general description of Epicurean pleasure requires restoration to be a factor in that general description, for he defines the aspects in terms of the process and result of being restored. Nikolsky gives us no other way to understand how, if the external force is not restorative, the process of being affected by an external force is inseparable from the result of being affected. Thus, Nikolsky's reading of Epicurus' general description of pleasure is not very comprehensive, since it can account for only those pleasures that presuppose a lack in the organism. Why Epicurus considers the pleasures of taste, hearing, etc., to be enjoyable remains a mystery on Nikolsky's reading.[26]

It is worth remarking that Nikolsky's account of Epicurean pleasure differs from Gosling and Taylor's. On the latter view, Epicurean pleasure consists in the proper functioning of the organism, which can take the form of either the process of reaching or the state of proper functioning. Pleasures that are not restorations of lacks—pleasurable tastes, for example—are classified as katastematic rather than kinetic. Nikolsky, as we have seen, attempts to describe all pleasures in terms of the impact of a restorative force; Gosling and Taylor, on the other hand, acknowledge that not all pleasures are restorative.

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[26] Nikolsky does state ambiguously that the external force can "support" (447) or "ensure 'the good state' of the organism" (449), which may suggest that restoration is not the only link between a kinetic pleasure and a katastematic one. I see two major problems with this move: first, nowhere does he explain what it would mean for an external force to "support" the good state of the organism; secondly, in the passage from page 453 that I have quoted twice now in this section Nikolsky explicitly states that Epicurus' general description of pleasure is in terms of the impact of a *restorative* force.

Although I think there are many problems with Nikolsky's interpretation, I do believe that my reading, which I present in the following section, is in the spirit of his. In general, I am sympathetic to his intention to show that Epicurus has in mind a more constructive, 'positive' description for his *summum bonum* than simply painlessness or a state without various disturbances. I agree with Nikolsky that, given Epicurus' statements from *On the Telos* and Plutarch's and Athenaeus' remark that the root of all pleasure is the stomach, we have good reason to attribute to Epicurus a more robust description of his *summum bonum*. But as I have argued, I think Nikolsky's description of the Epicurean highest pleasure (namely, the result of the process of being restored by an external force) is fraught with difficulties. Therefore, I share Nikolsky's intent to show that Epicurus has a general description of pleasure with reference to which certain aspects are defined, but not the particulars of Nikolsky's reading.

More importantly, I think Nikolsky is right to point out that Epicurus' conception of pleasure is perhaps a dialectical response to Plato's attempt in the *Philebus* to link pleasure to the process of restoring the body's natural functioning rather than to the result or end. Nikolsky writes the following:

> Epicurus, however, differed from his predecessors on one essential point. When speaking about pleasure as restoration, Plato and his followers meant by this only the process of restoration, separating this process from its result and believing that it leads to a neutral state, a state of rest, when both pleasure and pain are absent. Proceeding from this, they proved that pleasure cannot be the actual good and end: from their point of view, it is a process of becoming leading to another end different from it—the absence of pain. For example, when we satisfy hunger, the end is not pleasure but the state of satiety regarded by the Academics as neutral. By contrast, I propose, and aiming to refute this argument, Epicurus links pleasure not only with the process but also with the result of restoration, i.e., with the natural state which the organism attains. (446)

According to Nikolsky, Epicurus might be using the claim that the process of restoration and its end are necessarily connected in order to argue, in response to Plato, that the end constitutes pleasure just as much as the process. Although I believe that ultimately Nikolsky's attempts to describe how the process is necessarily related to the result are problematic, I think he is right to draw on the philosophical debates of the fourth century BCE. Like Nikolsky, I believe that Plato's *Philebus* in particular is a fertile source for our understanding of pleasure-based ethical theories in antiquity, like Epicurus'. But I do not share Nikolsky's belief that Epicurus rebuts arguments like Plato's in the *Philebus* by claiming that the process of restoration and the result are indistinguishable or inseparable. In my view, Epicurus responds to the *Philebus* by showing that the so-called kinetic and katastematic pleasures, while still distinguishable, are defined in terms of a single general conception of pleasure, namely, the perceived healthy functioning of the organism. Kinetic pleasure is the perceived movement toward the state of healthy functioning, and katastematic pleasure is the perceived condition of health itself. Incidentally, Plato couches his definition of pleasure in terms of natural, healthy functioning of the organism, but he links pleasure only with what Epicurus would understand to be kinetic—the movement toward the organism's good state. On my view, Epicurus attempts to argue with Plato on Plato's own terms by showing that the perceived process of achieving the state of health *and* the perceived condition of health itself —the latter of which Plato denies is a pleasure—are pleasures by virtue of having to do with healthy, natural functioning of the organism. Pleasure's relation to the functioning of a living organism was a popular topic of debate among members of the early Academy and

among those members and Aristotle. I leave until Part II my discussion of the fourth-century controversies.

In summary, my interpretation of Epicurean pleasure builds on the work of Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky in the following ways: first, I share their distaste (although perhaps not to the same degree) for Cicero's claim that kinetic and static pleasures are defined in contradistinction to one another. Second, I share their belief that Epicurus has a general definition of pleasure with reference to which both kinetic and katastematic pleasure are explained. Because of these two features, their interpretations can be considered alternatives to the traditional reading, which holds generally that Cicero's account is a faithful report of Epicurean hedonism and that kinetic and katastematic pleasures are opposed or incommensurable. Insofar as I am sympathetic to Gosling and Taylor's and Nikolsky's accounts, my reading may also be characterized as 'alternative.' Yet, as I have discussed, Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky present definitions of Epicurean pleasure with which I do not entirely agree, and they are unclear about whether they are reinterpreting the terms of the traditional distinction proposed by Cicero or whether they are attempting to do away with the distinction altogether. Thus, although Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky have laid the foundation for an alternative interpretation of Epicurean pleasure, in my view the details of such an interpretation have yet to be worked out.

I.2

Epicurean Pleasure: A New Reading

My task in this section is to argue that Epicurus conceives of pleasure in general in terms of the well-being, health, and functioning of a living organism. This does not mean, however, that I will repeat Nikolsky's, and sometimes Gosling and Taylor's, dubious claim that Epicurus does not distinguish different kinds of pleasure. I will contend that Epicurus does differentiate kinetic pleasure from katastematic pleasure, and that he fits them both into the framework of his general conception of pleasure. That is, his definition of each type of pleasure is an aspect of his notion that pleasure in general is bound up with the painless, healthy functioning of an organism. Evidence from Epicurus and Epicurean sources suggests that kinetic pleasure is the perceived movement toward a state of health—a process of restoration of physical and/or mental well-being. When the goal of restoration is reached, we have katastematic pleasure—the perceived condition of health and painlessness. On this reading, kinetic pleasures are 'mixed': they involve pain from a lack that is being remedied. In contrast, katastematic pleasures are 'pure': in themselves they are unmixed with pain.[27]

In what follows, I shall argue for this general reading of Epicurean pleasure in the following steps: first, I formulate a description of katastematic pleasure based on sources other than Cicero's *De Finibus*, such as Epicurus' writings themselves, Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*, Plutarch's polemical works against Epicurus, Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, and a few passages from several minor figures. Next I consider what Epicurus calls 'kinetic' pleasure, the examination of which poses more problems than

[27] The Platonic terminology is deliberate on my part.

that of katastematic pleasure, for although we do not find either the term 'kinetic' or 'katastematic' in any of Epicurus' letters or sayings,[28] we come upon some clues to Epicurus' understanding of the latter in Plutarch's discussion of the Epicurean pleasure of the κατάστημα. As for kinetic pleasure, we have to content ourselves with scanty textual evidence. From the texts I named above, I believe it can be tentatively concluded that Epicurus holds the view of pleasure I suggested at the beginning of this section, namely, kinetic pleasure is the perceived process of restoring painless functioning in an organism, and katastematic pleasure is perceived painless functioning itself, which is sometimes the result of the process of restoration, but not always. In the third part of this section, I explain how the katastematic pleasures that do not directly result from processes of restoration ('nonrestorative pleasures') fit into this schema. Next I treat possible counterexamples to my reading that could be suggested from various texts, including Epicurus' own work, *On Choice*. I deliberately avoid Cicero's account from *De Finibus* until the final part of this section, not because I have any belief that it is prima facie less reliable than the other sources, but because I believe that the first two books of *De Finibus* are the source of much of the controversy about Epicurean pleasure.[29] I

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[28] We know of only one text in which Epicurus himself uses the terms kinetic and katastematic, namely, his lost work, *On Choice*. The term κατάστημα does appear also in two places in Plutarch's *Non Posse* (1089d and 1090a), but it is not entirely clear if Plutarch is quoting directly from an Epicurean source, since he does not cite a text or other authority.

[29] Nikolsky claims that Plutarch is prima facie a more reliable source than Cicero (cf. N, 444). I believe we have no reason to believe this is true, especially since Plutarch's expressed intent is to be polemical. This is made plain by the title of his main work against Epicureanism, *That Epicurus Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible*, and the opening chapters of that work, where Plutarch and his interlocutors make jokes about their forthcoming rebuttal of Epicureanism. Plutarch exclaims to his comrades, "'Oh!' I said laughing, 'You seem like you will leap upon the bellies of those men and make them run for their flesh'" (1087b; trans. Benedict Einarson and Phillip H. De Lacy, with revisions). Of course, Cicero's account is also polemical, but not prima facie more polemical than Plutarch's. That said, Plutarch's texts concerning Epicureanism have not sparked as much controversy nor caused as much confusion as Cicero's *De Finibus*. Later, I argue that ultimately Plutarch's account of Epicureanism is more genuine. I chide Nikolsky because he simply assumes from the beginning that this will be the case.

examine Cicero's account in *De Finibus* and its relation to my reading of Epicurean pleasure only after I have examined the other texts in detail. Thus, the present section follows the following progression: based on various texts, I argue that Epicurus' definitions of kinetic and katastematic pleasure stem from his general description of pleasure in terms of the perceived health of the mind and body. I buttress this reading by addressing possible counterexamples and difficulties that might emerge. Lastly, I discuss how the first two books of Cicero's *De Finibus* fit with the new reading.

Before turning to the texts, I should mention that while I am making every effort to show that the text bears out the reading I propose, it is certainly the case that I cannot account for every piece of evidence concerning Epicurean ethics. Due to the volume of fragments about Epicurus and his philosophy and the fact that many of the fragments are often polemical or ridiculing (or both), one who wishes to fit together the pieces of this puzzle that is Epicurean pleasure has her work cut out for her. Inevitably, some pieces will fall by the wayside. My goal is to justify as much as possible the reading I am proposing and to address the most serious counterexamples and difficulties. In so doing, I attempt to give a very plausible account of Epicurus' conception of pleasure—'a very plausible account' being the most certain account anyone can give of the subject. Let us turn to the texts.

A. Katastematic Pleasure

In the *Letter to Menoeceus*, Epicurus claims that "the end of the blessed life [τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν . . . τέλος]" is "health of the body and tranquility of the soul [τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν]" (*Ad Men.* 128). He goes

on to equate these greatest goods with the highest pleasure: "So when we say that the end is pleasure . . . we mean that there is neither suffering in the body nor trouble in the soul" (*Ad Men.* 131).[30] The *telos*, then, is pleasure defined as the absence of pain and disturbance, and the absence of pain is synonymous with the health of the body. Here Epicurus takes the important step of defining the highest pleasure, that is, his highest good, in terms of healthy states of the body and soul.[31]

Because Epicurus is careful to distinguish his conception of pleasure from that of the sybarite, he contrasts the pleasure that should be the aim of life with 'sensory pleasure.' He writes, "So when we say that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as some believe who either are ignorant and disagree or willfully misunderstand" (*Ad Men.* 131).[32] There one might think that Epicurus wishes to oppose sensory pleasures to the pleasures he identifies as the *telos*, namely, painlessness and tranquility, but the text does not bear this out. Epicurus intends to distance his conception of pleasure not from sensory pleasures per se, but from the pleasure the profligate believes he achieves by wantonly pursuing sensory pleasure without any heed to the consequences of overindulgence. This is evident in the next line of *The Letter to Menoeceus*: "It is not an endless string of drinking-bouts and carousals, nor the enjoyment of boys and women, nor the consumption of fish and many

[30] "Ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν . . . τὸ μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα μήτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν." Epicurus notes that he does not mean by pleasure overindulgence, which is the prodigal's opinion of pleasure. I discuss this difference in this section.

[31] As we will see later, Plutarch in *Non Posse* (1090d) reports that this is the Epicurean view of pleasure.

[32] "Ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν, οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας λέγομεν, ὥς τινες ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦντες ἢ κακῶς ἐκδεχόμενοι νομίζουσιν."

other things of an extravagant table, which produce a pleasant life" (*Ad Men.* 132).[33] Here Epicurus claims that the sensory pleasures that the unthinking person mistakenly believes will give the most pleasure—binge drinking, becoming dependent on the opportunity for sexual fulfillment, and luxurious meals—are not part of the Epicurean lifestyle. It is evident that Epicurus is sensitive to a misconception of his time that Epicureanism entails the wanton pursuit of 'sensory pleasure'—an endless bout of revelry. In these lines from the *Letter to Menoeceus*, Epicurus feels the need to contrast his conception of pleasure with 'sensory pleasures' in order to distance himself from polemical accounts of Epicureanism that make it out to be a recipe for indulgence. His statements here are not meant to indicate that the highest Epicurean pleasure is somehow nonsensory; rather, they are meant to emphasize that the highest Epicurean pleasure does not involve *overindulgence* in sensory delights. *The Letter to Menoeceus* thus fills-in part of the picture of the Epicurean highest pleasure: it is understood to be the absence of pain and disturbance, which Epicurus equates with health of the body and tranquility in the soul. Furthermore, the highest pleasure is not brought about by overindulgence, as the profligate wrongly supposes.

This picture of the Epicurean highest pleasure is rounded out further by *SV* 33, which I mentioned earlier in connection with Nikolsky's reading. It reads as follows: "The cry of the flesh: not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to be cold. For if someone has these things and is confident that he will have them, he might contend <with Zeus>

[33] Here Epicurus draws on his threefold classification of desires. According to Epicurus, we ought to pursue the objects of natural and necessary desires; the scholiast to *PD* 29 provides the example of drinking when thirsty. We may also pursue natural and unnecessary desires, like costly food, as long as doing so does not bring us pain. But, of course, the profligate does not mind the limit to pleasure—the absence of pain—and overdoes it. Epicurus rejects outright the pursuit of unnatural desires, e.g., the desire for fame. Cf. *PD* 29.

for happiness." Here Epicurus describes the best life in negative terms: it lacks various conditions of bodily distress and anxiety about one's future bodily condition. We can add to the picture by investigating how Epicureans understand conditions like hunger, thirst, and being cold. According to Lucretius, these conditions involve the disruption of an organism's painless functioning. This can be seen in his description of the nature of thirst and how it is quenched:

> The numerous particles of heat, whose accumulation causes a burning in the stomach, are dispersed and quenched, like a fire, on the arrival of the moisture, so that the parching heat can no longer consume the frame. In this way, then, our body's panting thirst is swilled away, and the craving of hunger satisfied. (*DRN* 4.871-76)

On Lucretius' description, thirst and hunger disrupt an organism's painless state when the accumulated heat particles begin to burn the stomach and eventually the whole frame. When quenching or sating is complete, we are aware of the result, namely, no longer being thirsty or desiring food; that is, we are aware that our organism is no longer in distress. The craving for food, or hunger, involves the awareness that the body needs food; in other words, we cannot hunger without knowing about it. Likewise, we cannot satisfy a hunger unknowingly. Although we may restore a physical lack in the body without being aware of either the lack or the filling, we cannot satisfy hunger without knowing that the body has been filled.

In addition, Lucretius explains being cold in terms of the disruption of the organism's natural state. He likens the cold penetrating the human body to great winds shaking the earth: "Even if the wind fails to burst out, its impetuosity and fierce force spread, like an ague, through the numerous pores of the earth and so cause a tremor, just as, when cold penetrates deep within our limbs, it shakes them and makes them tremble

and shiver involuntarily" (*DRN* 6.591-95).[34] On Lucretius' reading, cold penetrates the body and disrupts its customary functioning: the body begins to shake unintentionally in response to the blows rained onto it by the cold. Lucretius' explanation of hunger is along the same lines as thirst and cold: it too is a disruption of the natural functioning of the organism. Hunger occurs as a result of the body's loss of nourishment through the pores in the form of sweat, breath, etc.[35] Lucretius makes it evident that the loss of particles that leads to hunger cravings is a disruption of the constitution of the whole body:

> For, as I have shown, many particles flow away and withdraw from things in many ways. But animals inevitably suffer the greatest loss of substance: being always restless and on the move, they exude many particles in sweat from deep within, and exhale many through the mouth when they pant from exhaustion. As a result of these losses the body becomes rarified and the whole constitution is undermined. Consequently nourishment is taken to support the frame and restore the strength by its diffusion throughout the limbs and veins, and to stop the gaping cravings for food. (*DRN* 4.860-69)

Thus, on the Epicurean view we perceive that our bodies are compromised when we are aware of our hunger—or our thirst, or our being cold, etc. We eat to restore the organism's painless functioning that has been disrupted because of the outflow of particles from the body. And when we are replenished, we are aware of the lack of disturbance to our bodies because we no longer experience hunger.

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[34] At *DRN* 4.256-64, Lucretius explains being cold in terms of the disruption of the natural state; cold involves blows falling on the body: "In this connection, you should not consider it strange that, although the images that impinge on our eyes are individually invisible, the objects themselves are visible. After all, when the wind whips us with fitful blasts, and when biting cold flows upon us, we do not feel the individual particles of wind or cold, but rather their combined effect; and we then perceive that blows are falling upon our body, just as if some external force were whipping us and giving us the sensation of its body."

[35] The Epicureans believe that living things eventually disintegrate and die because they are constantly losing more particles than they can replenish and because particles hammer them with external blows. Cf. *DRN* 2.1120-50 and 4.860ff.

Since the Epicureans understand conditions like thirst, hunger, and being cold to be disruptions of the organism's natural state, it makes sense that they would think of states in which we are aware of not being thirsty, hungry, or cold as instances of painless, natural functioning. For example, if hunger is a perceived disturbance to the natural condition of the organism, then perceiving a lack of hunger is synonymous with perceiving the absence of that disturbance to the organism's natural condition. And to perceive the absence of disturbance is just to perceive that the organism is functioning naturally and painlessly. While it is true that the one who rivals even Zeus for happiness is without various forms of distress, more fundamentally this one rivals Zeus because she perceives that her body functions naturally, without impediment, and has confidence that her bodily health will persist.

Although I have focused on the physical side of katastematic pleasure, namely, the painless functioning of the body, pleasures of the soul can also be described in terms of healthy, painless functioning. This is evident in the notion of confidence, the mental pleasure Epicurus mentions in *SV* 33. Confidence in the future painlessness of the body amounts to being without worries and fears concerning one's physical state.[36] To be without such mental pains is just to experience the healthy functioning of the mind, or mental katastematic pleasure. Unlike its physical counterpart, mental katastematic pleasure is not always defined in negative terms; for example, we have seen it described as tranquility and confidence, and not simply 'absence of pain in the mind' or something

[36] Admittedly, confidence is a tricky example of mental katastematic pleasure, since in some sense confidence is a cause of painless mental functioning (e.g., if I have confidence, then I will not be beset by mental pains) and it is constituent of that painless functioning itself, since confidence just is a state of being without the mental pain of anxiety. Epicurus and those writing about Epicureanism, like Plutarch, describe confidence both ways.

equivalent to the usual description of bodily katastematic pleasure. Because Epicurus, Epicureans, and those writing about Epicureanism tend to describe mental katastematic pleasure in more positive ways (that is, in more substantial ways) than physical katastematic pleasure, the former has not been misconstrued as a state of nonperception or senselessness like the latter (or, at least not nearly as much). For this reason, I have focused and will continue to focus on unraveling the Epicurean notion of *bodily* katastematic pleasure, since it, rather than the mental variety, has been the locus of so much misunderstanding.

From these discussions, we can see that the highest Epicurean pleasure, understood as the highest Epicurean good, according to the *Letter to Menoeceus*, is experienced when we perceive the painless functioning of the organism, or health.[37] This description is reinforced by another passage from *De Rerum Natura*, where Lucretius elucidates the mechanics of pleasure and pain. He writes the following:

> So you will have no difficulty in recognizing that substances capable of affecting our senses pleasantly are composed of smooth and round atoms [*levibus atque rotundis / esse ea quae sensus iucunde tangere possunt*]; on the other hand, all that are perceived as bitter and harsh consist of an interlacement of more hooked atoms, and for that reason are apt to tear open the passages leading to our senses and to force their way through the body in effecting their entrance.[38] (*DRN* 2.402-7)

On Lucretius' account, pain occurs when atoms of a certain shape wreak havoc on the

[37] Note that on this reading, health is the perceived painlessness of the mind and body. One might object that health is present even when it is not being focused on, as, for example, when one's body is free from pain but the mind thinks about other things. In this situation, would not health, i.e., katastematic pleasure, be present even if it goes unperceived, (in the form of underlying, general well-being)? I would respond that I do not think Epicurus' view entails that a condition of health could be present but not be perceived. On my reading, Epicurus is claiming that any perceived painless working of the mind or body is health. No matter whether I am reading, walking, thinking, etc., as long as I am not experiencing pain, I am experiencing health. We would not say that someone who cannot perceive—someone in a coma, for instance—is in a state of health, even though his or her body may function perfectly well. Health cannot be attributed to an organism that lacks perception, since health is constituted by perceived painless moments.

[38] Cf. also *DRN* 4.615-32.

pores of the body as they move through them. As a result of this disfiguring of the pores, we perceive bitterness. The natural state of the organism is disturbed because barbs of some atoms "tear open" the pores of the body, forcing their way in and letting others escape. The barbed atoms do not flow easily and naturally through the passages like the smooth and round atoms associated with pleasant sensations. With the latter sensations, there is no disruption of the organism's painless functioning because the atoms are of such a shape as to move easily through the channels of the body. In this way, the Epicurean physiological explanation of pain and pleasure is given in terms of the natural state of the organism: in the case of pain, the natural state is disturbed by atoms tearing up the pores, causing an unpleasant sensation; in the case of pleasure, the natural state persists undisturbed as atoms flow freely through, causing a pleasant sensation.

In his *Non Posse*, Plutarch confirms that the highest Epicurean pleasure is understood in terms of the healthy state of the organism. In a passage where Plutarch contends that an ethical theory that considers pleasure to be the *telos* is just a recipe for constant debauchery, he gives the following description of Epicureanism:

> It is this, I believe, that has driven them, seeing for themselves these oddities, to take refuge in the 'painlessness' [ἀπονίαν] and the 'stability of the flesh,' [εὐστάθειαν τῆς σαρκός] supposing that the pleasurable life is found in thinking of this state as about to occur or as having been achieved; for the 'healthy state of the flesh' [εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα] and the 'trustworthy expectation' [πιστὸν ἔλπισμα] of this condition contain, they say, the highest and the most assured joy [χαράν] for men who are able to reflect.[39] (1089d)

According to Plutarch, the Epicureans understand painlessness [ἀπονία] to have a couple of meanings: the stability of the flesh [εὐστάθεια τῆς σαρκός] and the healthy state of

[39] Trans. Einarson and De Lacy, with many revisions. The Greek text of Plutarch's *Non Posse* is from the Loeb edition.

the flesh [εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα];[40] they understand tranquility [ἀταραξία] as the well-founded expectation of this stable and healthy condition of the body. It is noteworthy that Plutarch uses the term κατάστημα (state) to describe Epicurean pleasure, for it indicates that the Epicurean highest pleasure is a perceived *condition* (of healthy functioning) as opposed to a perceived *process* (toward such a condition). Furthermore, that Plutarch uses the term κατάστημα when reporting on Epicureanism lends support to the view that Epicurus himself is referring to the perceived health of the body when he uses a variation of the term κατάστημα, namely, καταστηματική, in *On Choice*, quoted in Diogenes Laertius' doxography.

A few lines later in the *Non Posse*, Plutarch elucidates what the Epicureans mean by the stable condition of the body. This elucidation appears in the context of Plutarch's discussion of the Epicurean claim that criminals are miserable because they have no assurance that they will escape detection; they are constantly troubled by the thought of being caught. Plutarch objects that contrary to what Epicureans say, people worry about maintaining the pleasure of the body to the same extent that the criminal worries about being caught: neither maintaining pleasure of the body nor avoiding detection are sure things. And so, on Plutarch's view, the Epicureans are wrong to believe that pleasure of the body can be secured easily without worry. Plutarch concludes his objection as follows: "We often enjoy in the body a 'stable condition,' that is, health, but it is

[40] Aulus Gellius gives an identical description: "Epicurus posits pleasure as the *summum bonum*, which, however, he defines thus: τὸ εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα τῆς σαρκός" (*Noctium Atticarum* 9.5.2 = 68 U; trans. Purinton).

impossible to acquire the confidence that it will remain" (1090d).[41] Whether Plutarch's objection is telling against Epicureanism is a separate issue;[42] for my purposes what is important to notice is that Plutarch understands the Epicureans to equate the stable condition of the flesh with our enjoyment of health. And since the Epicureans equate the highest pleasure with "the stability of the flesh," we can infer that the Epicureans understand "enjoyment of health" also to be a description of the highest pleasure. Health is a state in which an organism functions painlessly: there are no disturbances in or impediments to an organism's customary operation. It is clear from Plutarch's testimony, then, that Epicureans conceive their highest good in terms of healthy, painless functioning of the organism and the sustained confidence that it will continue. Moreover, Plutarch's testimony reflects Epicurus' own description of the *telos* in the *Letter to Menoeceus*: recall that at *Ad Men*. 128 Epicurus claims that health of the body [τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν] and tranquility in the soul [ἀταραξία τῆς ψυχῆς] comprise the blessed life. And as I have argued, Epicurus' statement in *SV* 33 to the effect that happiness is to be without hunger, thirst, or cold and to have confidence that one will continue to be without these in the future can be understood, with the help of Lucretius,

[41] "εὐσταθεῖν μὲν γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑγιαίνειν τῷ σώματι πολλάκις, πίστιν δὲ λαβεῖν περὶ τοῦ διαμένειν ἀμήχανον." Trans. Einarson and De Lacy, with revisions. Essentially, his argument is that it may be possible to maintain ἀπονία, but not ἀταραξία.

[42] Plutarch may very well be right that confidence is something that is separable from and not identical to katastematic pleasure, but this is his own prejudice against the Epicurean position. Plutarch's objection highlights the fact that Epicureans do consider confidence to be an essential part of mental katastematic pleasure, which is why the passage is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the Epicurean position.

to mean that Epicurus conceives the good in terms of the perceived painless functioning of the organism and the well-founded expectation of the body's future health.[43]

Finally, we have Cicero's testimony from the *Tusculan Disputations* about the nature of the Epicurean highest pleasure. In Book 5, Cicero presents an objection to Metrodorus (a prominent disciple of Epicurus) that is similar to Plutarch's against Epicurus, namely, that one can never be assured that pleasures of the body will continue because misfortune can strike at any moment. Cicero writes the following:

> But you, Metrodorus, seeing you have stored up all good in the flesh and marrow of the body, and have defined the highest good as bound up with a stable condition of body [*firma corporis adfectione*] and an assured hope of its continuance, have you blocked the approaches of fortune? How? Why, of such a good you can be robbed this night. (5.27)

Again, we need not be concerned with the merits of Cicero's argument;[44] what is noteworthy for our purposes is that Epicureans, and here notably Metrodorus, Epicurus' right-hand man, conceive the highest good in terms of the stable condition of the body and the hope that that condition will continue.

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[43] Thus, I agree with A.A. Long when he says, "It is possible in English to speak of 'enjoying' good health, and we may also call this something gratifying or something a man rejoices in. Epicurus' use of the word pleasure to describe the condition of those who enjoy good physical and mental health is not therefore purely arbitrary." *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 64.

[44] Although I am not concerned with the merits of this objection, Epicurus' response to this sort of complaint is interesting nonetheless. First of all, Epicurus does not hold the naïve assumption that we have complete control over the future. In the *Letter to Menoeceus* he states, "One must remember that the future is neither completely ours nor completely not ours, in order that we may not expect that it assuredly will be nor that we may despair that it will assuredly not be" (127). But, even though the future is not entirely predictable, Epicurus believes that we can mitigate the risk of being vulnerable to misfortune. For instance, we can accustom ourselves to getting by on very little, so that when we lack for much we will not suffer disappointment, and when we are faced with a bounty, we will be less liable to overindulge. Furthermore, we can understand that death will not be a painful experience (since it will not be an experience at all), the gods will not strike us down, and severe pain will not last long. By removing these fears, there is little of consequence left to worry about. So, although Cicero and Plutarch might be right that misfortune may strike tomorrow, Epicurus would say that his doctrine gives us a way to control the effects of any damage.

We can see from several sources that Epicureans have a very robust conception of the highest pleasure. 'The stable state of the body' and 'health' mentioned by Epicurus, Plutarch, and Cicero is not captured by the term 'painlessness'; furthermore, 'confidence in future bodily functioning and health' is missed by 'tranquility.' Whereas 'painlessness' indicates merely a state of being without suffering, and 'tranquility' merely a state of not being disturbed, the descriptions of the highest pleasure mentioned by the sources named above are more constructive. Those sources suggest that the Epicurean good is not the state of a corpse (a state in which no condition of the body or soul is perceived), as the Cyrenaics are wont to say about the Epicurean state of painlessness. Rather, the Epicurean good is the healthy, balanced state of an organism that suffers no disturbance in its normal operations and maintains confidence that its painless state will continue. Moreover, those sources confirm that the Epicurean highest good is indeed a state or condition: Plutarch mentions that it is a κατάστημα, and Cicero, an *adfectione*. And although it is a state, it is not one of unconsciousness or insensibility. The texts I have discussed in this section indicate that Epicurus considers katastematic pleasure to be the perceived natural functioning of the organism, or health.

B. Kinetic Pleasure

It is often argued that the Epicureans describe kinetic pleasures as agreeable movements of the flesh, and that they use this description to distinguish kinetic from katastematic pleasures.[45] That Epicurus does not distinguish pleasures in this way is

[45] Cicero is a proponent of such a view, as are most scholars. I treat the details of Cicero's position later in Part I. Along these lines, it is often argued (cf. Purinton 282-287) that Epicurus formulates his notion of katastematic pleasure in response to the Cyrenaic conception of the nature of pleasure and the *telos*, viz., that "the *telos* is the smooth motion given to sensation" (DL 2.85, trans. Purinton). I do not deny that

evident from Plutarch. In a passage in *Non Posse*, where Plutarch discusses the Epicurean supreme good, he writes that the Epicureans hold dear "every pleasing movement of the flesh [πᾶσα διὰ σαρκὸς ἐπιτερπὴς κίνησις] that is sent up to give some pleasure and joy to the mind" (1087b). We can understand from Plutarch's account that the Epicureans do not oppose the supreme good to sensory pleasure (that is, an agreeable movement of the flesh), since Plutarch mentions the supreme good and sensory pleasure together without remarking on any fundamental distinction between them. We can conclude from Plutarch's account that, unless Plutarch is ignorant of what would have been an essential distinction in Epicureanism, the Epicureans hold that katastematic pleasure has some sensory aspect.

This conclusion is echoed in *Adversus Colotem*, where Plutarch discusses the Epicurean appeal to nature to justify the goodness of pleasure: "Without a teacher these fine, smooth and gentle movements of the body [τὰ καλὰ ταῦτα καὶ λεῖα καὶ προσηνῆ κινήματα τῆς σαρκός] themselves summon, as they themselves claim, even one who altogether denies and disagrees that he is guided and appeased [μαλάσσεσθαι] by them" (1122e). According to Plutarch, Epicureans claim that we need no instruction in order to realize that pleasure is the good, for we can do so naturally. As Nikolsky points out, if the Epicureans mean by this argument that the goodness of kinetic, as opposed to katastematic pleasure, is realized naturally, the argument would seem inconsistent, for the Epicureans would be claiming that the *telos*—katastematic pleasure—is realized naturally, yet they would be using the description of a lower kind of pleasure—the kinetic

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Epicurus might be influenced by Cyrenaic doctrine and perhaps formulates his theory of pleasure with it in mind. However, I think we should avoid the conclusion that the Cyrenaics are the only group by which Epicurus, in formulating his particular brand of hedonism, is influenced. As I will argue, there are good reasons to believe that Academic notions of pleasure are influences as well.

variety—to prove their point.[46] On my view, the conclusion to be drawn from Plutarch's account is that the Epicureans do not consider a pleasure's being a "smooth movement of the body" sufficient to classify it as either kinetic or katastematic; we must look elsewhere to discover what is distinctive about Epicurean kinetic pleasure.

One might be tempted to turn to a more atomic explanation, in which kinetic pleasure is understood in terms of the movement of atoms in a part of or the whole organism. However, Epicurus' theory of perception is in terms of the movement of atoms generally, so it is difficult to distinguish the movement of atoms specific to kinetic pleasure from the movement of atoms occurring at all times in a living organism. We know from several sources that Epicureans believe that all atoms continually move, not just those that would be involved in kinetic pleasure. For example, in the *Letter to Herodotus* Epicurus writes that "the atoms move continually forever," either vibrating in their positions when they are bound by other atoms or recoiling as a result of atomic collisions (*Ad Hdt.* 10.43). This is confirmed by other sources: Lucretius writes, "If you suppose that the primary elements of things can stay still, and by staying still can produce new motions in compound bodies, you are straying far from the path of sound judgment" (*DRN* 2.80-82);[47] and Sextus Empiricus writes of Epicurean physics that "the atom in

[46] Cf. N, 452. He draws our attention to Rist's confusion about this passage. Rist, who believes that Plutarch is talking about kinetic as opposed to katastematic pleasure in the passage, sees no way to mesh the Epicurean argument that humans desire pleasure naturally as their good with what Rist believes is a description of kinetic pleasure, namely, "the agreeable movements of the flesh." Rist concludes that Plutarch was simply mistaken: he should have spoken about katastematic pleasure rather than kinetic. Cf. Rist, 1972, 102n9. I agree with Nikolsky that a better conclusion is that Epicurus does not use the criterion of "agreeable movements of the flesh" to distinguish pleasures.

[47] This idea of 'continual flux' is found also in Plato's *Philebus*, where Plato concedes to Protarchus that the body is always moved in one direction or another by being filled or emptied. Cf. *Phil*. 42e-43b.

itself is in everlasting motion."[48] Because Epicurus' physics is in terms of the movement of atoms generally, it is not the case that the definition of only kinetic pleasure could be formulated in such terms; both kinetic and katastematic pleasure would involve atomic motion.[49] Thus, it is not the case that kinetic pleasure is defined in contradistinction to katastematic pleasure based on a certain type of atomic motion.

Whether Epicurus in fact believes that an atomic explanation of pleasure can or ought to be given is controversial. A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, for example, deny that Epicurus' physics has any bearing on his ethics. They write the following:

> Contrary to what is often claimed, the details of Epicurus' atomic theory do not appear to be presupposed by his ethics. Pleasure and pain are never *identified* with movements of atoms, even though Lucretius explains the differences between pleasant and painful tastes by the shapes of the 'bodies' that affect our mouth and palate. As 'accidents' of perceivers, pleasure and pain have no existence at the atomic level, but only at that of consciousness. (122)

Several sources confirm that Epicurus thinks of pleasure and pain as accidents of perceivers: Sextus Empiricus, reporting the views of Epicurus according to Demetrius of Laconia, a first-century BCE Epicurean, writes that Epicurus thinks of pleasures and pains as accidents belonging to those who feel them.[50] And Lucretius explains that bodies and void are all there is; everything else is either a fixed attribute or an accident of

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[48] *Adversus Mathematicos* 10.219 (164 A), trans. Long and Sedley.

[49] Again, perhaps Epicurus is looking back to the flux-theory of the *Philebus*. Cf. *Phil.* 42d-43a.

[50] "As for presence and absence of feelings, these are either pains or pleasures, and hence they are not substances, but accidents of those who feel pleasant or painful—and not timeless accidents." Sextus Empiricus *Adversus Mathematicos* 10.219-27 (164 A), trans. Long and Sedley.

them, pleasure being the latter.[51] Thus, Long and Sedley's claim that pleasure and pain are not identified with atomic motion but are accidents of perceivers is justified.

On the other hand, scholars such as Rist believe that Epicurus' atomic theory is essential to his ethics.[52] Rist describes kinetic pleasures as those "deriving from a steady, though limited and temporary, change in the state of those atoms" (1972, 102) and katastematic pleasures as those "deriving from a well-balanced and steady state of the moving atoms in a sensitive organ" (1972, 102). On Rist's view, kinetic and katastematic pleasures are defined in terms of a change or lack thereof in the state of moving atoms. Now, it is not clear on his view whether the "change" in the state of the atoms is a change in the motion of atoms themselves or is a change in some other respect. Either way, there is no evidence that Epicurus distinguishes kinetic from katastematic pleasure based on a change in the motion of atoms or a change in the atoms themselves. Nowhere does he claim that kinetic pleasure derives from speedier or slower atoms or from any other atomic changes. According to Epicurus, all atoms are in motion, and he does not

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[51] "Hence no third *per se* substance beside void and bodies can be left in the sum of things, neither one that could fall under our senses at any time nor one that anyone could grasp by the mind's reasoning. For all things which are spoken of you will find to be either fixed attributes [*coniuncta*] of these two or accidents [*eventa*] of them. A fixed attribute is that which can at no point be separated and removed without fatal destruction resulting—as weight is to stones, heat to fire, liquidity to water, tangibility to all bodies, and intangibility to void. By contrast slavery, poverty, wealth, freedom, war, peace, and all the other things whose arrival and departure a thing's nature survives intact, these it is our practice to call, quite properly, accidents." *DRN* 1.445-58, trans. Long and Sedley.

[52] David Glidden makes a similar claim. He writes, "And his [Epicurus'] confidence in our ability to detect the feelings, or *pathē*, of pleasure and pain does not rest on the certainty of a Cartesian self-consciousness, but rather on the material identity of these *pathē* with atomic motions in our bodies, understanding these psychophysical experiences, with Freud, in mechanical terms." Glidden, "Epicurus and the Pleasure Principle," in *The Greeks and the Good Life*, ed. David J. Depew (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980), 184. Others have disagreed with Glidden's view. For instance, Mitsis argues that Epicurean pleasure cannot be understood as a strictly atomic phenomenon, for there are features of pleasure that require another explanatory level, i.e., reference to our subjective states, intentions, and wants (cf. Mitsis, 46n93). My reading is more in line with Mitsis', although I disagree with much of his reading of the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure.

associate a certain motion of atoms with one kind of pleasure and a different motion with another.

Although Long and Sedley are right to claim that Epicurus does not identify pleasure with the *movement* of atoms per se, Epicureans sometimes explain pleasure atomically. This is apparent in Lucretius' atomic description of kinetic pleasure as the perceived restoration of an organism's painless state. He comments on the nature of pain and pleasure and why atoms can feel neither:

> Furthermore, since pain occurs when the particles of matter in the living flesh of the limbs are disturbed by some force and reel in their places within the body, and seductive pleasure is produced when they return to their position [*Praeterea quoniam dolor est ubi materiai / corpora vi quadam per viscera viva per artus / sollicitata suis trepidant in sedibus intus, / inque locum quando remigrant, fit blanda voluptas*], it is evident that the primary elements are immune to pain and cannot feel any pleasure by themselves. The fact is that they do not consist of atoms whose displacements could cause them pain or bless them with pleasure, the sustainer of life. Therefore they cannot be endowed with sensation.[53] (*DRN* 2.963-72)

The definition of pleasure and pain bears directly on the question of why atoms can feel neither, which is why Lucretius includes the explanation of the former in this passage. Because pain and pleasure are understood in terms of the disruption and return of painless functioning, respectively, and since atoms themselves are not composed of smaller components that could be disturbed or rearranged by some force, they cannot feel pleasure or pain. Notice that Lucretius' explanation of pleasure and pain is atomic: pleasure is associated with the physical return of atoms to their positions, and pain with

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[53] Lucretius' statement at 4.660 is also instructive: "Thus when fever has assailed someone through excess of bile, or when a violent disease has been provoked by some other cause, the whole body is at once disordered and the positions of the constituent elements are all changed. Consequently particles that previously suited the person's taste are now unsuitable to it; others prove better adapted to it, and these penetrate the pores and produce a bitter sensation." Here Lucretius associates pain with the dislocation of atoms from their natural positions.

the corresponding disruption. Yet Lucretius is making a statement not so much about the motion of atoms as about the significance of the motion. In other words, pleasure and pain are associated with the movements of atoms from one place to another, but the movements themselves are not the point of Lucretius' explanation of pleasure and pain. The point is that pleasure and pain are perceived restorations and disturbances, respectively, of the natural functioning of the organism. The motions are insignificant divorced from the second-order explanation of pleasure and pain in terms of perceived restoration and disturbance. Note that Plutarch's statement I addressed earlier from *Non Posse* also bears this out: the κίνησις of the flesh is perceived by the mind.

We are able to construct, then, a plausible description of kinetic pleasure as the perceived movement toward an organism's painless functioning, or, stated differently, the perceived restoration of an organic deficiency.[54] It is clear that Epicurus does not distinguish kinetic from katastematic pleasure based on motion and rest. As I have argued, such descriptions make little sense on Epicurus' theory, since he does not identify kinetic and katastematic pleasure with different types of atomic motion.[55]

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[54] Thus I disagree with Rist's claim that "pleasure is never identified as a restoration (κατάστασις) or as a process (γένεσις)." "Pleasure: 360-300 BC," *Phoenix* 28, no. 2 (1974): 173. Rist believes that Epicurus follows the Aristotelian division of pleasures into those 'in rest' [ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ] and those 'in motion' [ἐν κινήσει]. Long also believes that Epicurus follows the Aristotelian division. Cf. Long, 62. In my final conclusion, I argue against the view that Aristotle's distinction pertains to Epicurean hedonism.

[55] One could argue that composite bodies, e.g., the organism as a whole or its individual organs, could be at rest even if its constituent atoms are always in motion. One making this argument could then distinguish between motion and rest at the macroscopic level. But what would such a distinction at that level look like? And what would it mean for the mind to be 'at rest' or an organ to be 'at rest,' and why would that be pleasure? If we answered that a composite body at rest is one that does not change, this begs the question, What does it mean for an organism to not change? It could not be that its atoms remain motionless, for Epicureans claim that atoms are always moving. Neither could it be that some atoms are moving faster than others, for Epicurus does not associate a certain speed of atomic motion with a certain kind of pleasure. Motion and rest at the macroscopic level are caused by microscopic phenomena, and we simply cannot distinguish between kinetic and katastematic pleasure based on those phenomena.

Against my reading of kinetic pleasure one might cite the end of *PD* 3, where Epicurus seems to deny the coexistence of pleasure and pain. It runs as follows: "Wherever the feeling of pleasure is present, so long as it is present, there is neither pain nor distress, nor both together."[56] This could be problematic for a reading such as mine that holds that kinetic pleasure occurs in the presence of pain. For instance, simultaneous with the pleasant experience of becoming filled with food is a lack that is being filled. If pain and pleasure cannot coexist in the same location, then any interpretation that holds that kinetic pleasures are restorations and therefore occur alongside deficiencies must be incorrect.[57] Incidentally, because of *PD* 3 several scholars, such as Purinton, Rist, and Diano, believe that every kinetic pleasure presupposes the presence of katastematic pleasure in the same organ. On their view, since pleasure and pain cannot coexist, there must already be a state of painlessness (viz., katastematic pleasure) in the location of kinetic pleasure.[58] For example, in the case of eating while hungry, the presence of kinetic pleasure in the palate presupposes the presence of katastematic pleasure in the same location. This entails that pain is located in an entirely different organ, in a different location: the stomach.

I think my reading of kinetic pleasure avoids the conclusion that pleasure and pain coexist because I contend that perception is a requirement for Epicurean pleasure: kinetic

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[56] Trans. Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson, with revisions.

[57] This is one of Purinton's arguments against the view that kinetic pleasures are restorations to a natural state. I disagree with this argument in what follows. Cf. Purinton, 305-6.

[58] Purinton, drawing on Rist and Diano, argues, "Hence, wherever there is kinetic pleasure (e.g., in the tongue as one chews), there is no pain. But painlessness is a katastematic pleasure. So, wherever there is kinetic pleasure, there is also katastematic pleasure" (306). Cf. Rist, 1972, 110-11. Incidentally, they, along with Cicero, define kinetic pleasure as sensory stimulation. Obviously, I disagree with them on this point as well, but that is not the issue here.

pleasure is the *perceived* process of the body's restoration to its healthy state. When we perceive that the body is being restored, we are not immediately aware of a deficiency. In such cases, the source of pain is present—that is, there is a physical deficiency of some particular substance in the body—but if the deficiency is not perceived, the physical phenomenon alone does not properly count as pain.[59] Experience bears this out: when we eat while hungry, we are not aware at every moment of our physical deficiency; we do not feel hungry when our hunger is being satisfied, but rather, we feel the hunger before we begin to fill ourselves. Since we do not actually perceive a lack *while* it is being filled, we do not experience kinetic pleasures and pains at once.[60]

Admittedly, my explanation is complicated by the fact that Epicurus is thought to believe that in instances when pain is counteracted by some pleasure, the physical disturbance to the body is still perceived. Diogenes Laertius reports that Epicurus believes that the sage, even though he maintains his happiness while on the rack, "will moan and wail" (DL 10.118). Presumably the sage cannot moan and whimper while at the same time remaining unaware of disturbances in his own body.

In response, it must be noted first that although this issue of counteracting pain does complicate my own position, it also tells against Epicurus' own position in *PD* 3

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[59] Even Rist's position requires this. He writes, "Similarly when Epicurus said on his last day that, although his bodily pains were now intense, yet he was still enjoying happiness, he must have meant, in terms of the atomic theory, that, although he was suffering in some of his bodily structures, yet the atomic compounds in his mind and in the rest of his body, the vast majority, that is, of his atomic structures, were free from pain and thus enjoying the supreme happiness" (1972, 110-11). Rist, who denies the coexistence of pleasure and pain, admits that pleasure can be present in the face of pain. So, since pleasure and pain cannot coexist, any disturbance that is present, no matter how insignificant, must not be perceived.

[60] This explanation parallels Purinton's in a way. He writes, "[Epicurus] advises us to endure pains by focusing our minds elsewhere, implying that we can become oblivious to our pains without implying that these pains are made thereby to cease to exist" (293-94). The main difference between our positions here is that he believes it is *pains* that can go unperceived, whereas I hold that it is *disturbances*.

that we cannot experience pleasure and pain simultaneously in the same location.[61] Perhaps, then, we should consider that *PD* 3 might not be the most solid piece of evidence. In fact, *PD* 3 can be contradicted by *PD* 4. In *PD* 4, Epicurus discusses one of the four Epicurean 'cures': terrible pains will be short-lived, while chronic pains will usually be mild. He then states, "That degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not last for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh."[62] One could take Epicurus to mean here that pleasure and pain coexist during periods of illness, but pleasure usually comes out on top. An example of this would be the sage on the rack, whose pleasure outweighs his pain. So, either Epicurus does not cling too firmly to his belief that pleasure and pain cannot coexist—in which case the position of Purinton, Rist, and Diano is unnecessary, and my reading of kinetic pleasure is strengthened—or he does believe pleasure and pain can coexist, and he (possibly) contradicts himself with the example of the sage. Either way, this would seem to be a problem with the content of the texts themselves and not necessarily with my reading.

Nevertheless, I do believe we can reconcile somewhat the sage's awareness of his pain and my contention that we do not actually experience pain when we perceive a lack being filled. For one thing, the cases are qualitatively different: the sage's body is not being restored to healthy functioning—it is being tortured. Thus, the sage's situation

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[61] Regarding *PD* 3 and Epicurus' take on the sage's pain, Rist argues that "the two statements can be fitted together only if we realize that the happiness of the wise man is the happiness of the largest groups of his bodily and especially of his mental constituents, while the pain is experienced in atomic structures composed of smaller numbers of atoms" (1972, 111). This view, however, does not solve the problem, for we still have pleasure coexisting with pain—just very little pain alongside a lot of pleasure. Nevertheless, they coexist.

[62] Trans. R.D. Hicks.

does not confront us with the same problem as does that of the person being restored, for in the latter case we would not say that someone experiences a lack and a restoration simultaneously—that would be like saying one knows one is both hungry and not hungry at the same time. The sage's case is different, for his pleasure and pain are not two sides of the same coin as they are in the case of deficiency and restoration. The sage's perceived disturbance in his body does not directly conflict with his pleasure, which is present because he has memories of past pleasures and confidence that he will be fine in the future. What *would* be a problem—and what would be the analog of the case of the person being restored—is if the sage were to perceive both that his body is being disturbed and that there is no disturbance in his body (ἀπονία). We would have to conclude that if the sage is aware of a disturbance in his body, he must not be aware at the same time that his body is without disturbance—the same conclusion I drew in the case of restoration of a lack. And this is just what we find, for when the sage is tortured he perceives that his body is not functioning healthily, meaning that he does not also perceive that his body is without disturbance (i.e., he does not have ἀπονία). His pleasure is not the perceived healthy functioning of his body (ἀπονία), but the memories and the confidence that his circumstances will improve (ἀταραξία).[63] Thus, in the sage's case, there is not a direct conflict between his pleasure—ἀταραξία—and his awareness of disturbances in his body. There would be a conflict only if Epicurus were to claim that the sage is without pain in his body even though he moans and groans.[64]

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[63] In this sense, his ἀταραξία is more essential to his happiness than his ἀπονία, meaning that he can be happy even without ἀπονία. Because of this, I disagree with Gosling and Taylor's statement that "the value of *ataraxia* is parasitic upon that of *aponia*" (372).

[64] This point leads into the very interesting issue of whether the sage can ever lose his ἀταραξία. A discussion of this in the text would be a digression, but I will say here that there is evidence that Epicureans

Later, I discuss the historical reasons we have for attributing to Epicurus the reading of kinetic and katastematic pleasure that I have given. In Part II, I discuss a theory of pleasure popular among philosophers in the early Academy (and in force in Plato's *Philebus*), in which pleasure is linked with the perceived restoration of an organism's natural harmony. I think that Epicurus borrows from this tradition of linking pleasure with the perceived process of restoring healthy functioning,[65] while at the same time responding to it dialectically by linking pleasure also with the state of health itself. In Part II, I expand on the Academic background that will enable us to connect earlier theories of pleasure to Epicurean hedonism. For the moment, there is much work to be done in fleshing out the reading I have given. In the following sections of this part, I work through various problems confronting my reading, and in the process I treat the remainder of the evidence concerning Epicurean pleasure.

C. Nonrestorative Pleasures

My reading holds that Epicurus' descriptions of kinetic and katastematic pleasure stem from a general conception of pleasure given in terms of the painless functioning of the organism. Kinetic pleasure is the perceived movement toward painless functioning, that is, the restoration of the organism's healthy state; katastematic pleasure is the perceived painless state itself, understood as the healthy, stable condition of the organism. At first glance, it is not clear how what appears to be a third type of pleasure

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believe that rational suicide is an acceptable option for the wise man who can no longer fend off pain. Cf. *De Fin*. 1.49 and 1.62.

[65] As in the *Philebus*. Cf. especially 42d-43c, which I discuss in detail in Part II.

fits into this grouping.[66] Epicurus is known to highlight the value of sensory pleasures of the body like those of taste, sex, vision, and hearing, no doubt fueling the polemical charge that Epicureanism is profligacy disguised as a serious philosophical theory. Hence Cicero's quip in *De Finibus* about Epicureanism, "If you want to indulge, become a philosopher first!" (2.30). Pleasures of the senses like those just mentioned are usually considered to be kinetic.[67] However, on my reading such pleasures cannot be kinetic since they are not movements toward painless, healthy functioning. I contend that pleasures like taste, sex, sound, etc. are painless in themselves, and thus, katastematic; whether they occur in the midst of pain—for example, eating tasty food when hungry—or isolated from pain—for example, eating dessert after filling up on dinner—they are simply the painless workings of the organism. I shall hereafter refer to this group as 'nonrestorative pleasures.' In this section, I examine the thesis that nonrestorative pleasures are katastematic.

In a famous passage from what is evidently one of Epicurus' most comprehensive works, we find mention of what I am calling 'nonrestorative pleasures.'[68] The fullest

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[66] Indeed, the existence of this type of pleasure leads Gisela Striker to reject the view that kinetic pleasures are associated with the process of restoration. She comments, "Eating when hungry, admiring a beautiful statue, or enjoying a surprise party are not cases of replenishment or satisfaction of antecedently felt desires, but they also do not seem to be states of relief or contentment." Striker, "Epicurean Hedonism," in *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 206. She then considers and rejects the solution I endorse, namely, that nonrestorative pleasures are actually katastematic. She does so for two reasons: first, it contradicts Cicero's account in the second book of *De Finibus*; and second, Epicurus calls joy a kinetic pleasure (cf. DL 10.136) but "there is no good reason to think that joy is necessarily tied to the removal of pain" (206). I address these two charges in later sections (I.3 and I.2.E, respectively). I argue that we have good reason to be wary of Cicero's testimony in *De Finibus*, and that Epicurus' statement about joy is not characteristic of his treatment of joy elsewhere (since he usually considers it to be a katastematic pleasure).

[67] Gosling and Taylor's and Nikolsky's readings are the exceptions.

[68] Cicero claims that the description appears "in that book which embraces all your teaching" (*Tusc. Disp.* 3.41). Presumably, this is *On Nature*, which is listed first in Diogenes Laertius' record of Epicurus' works and which totaled 37 books. Cf. DL 10.27. However, as I mention in a note below, a shorter version of the

version of the passage appears in Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, where Cicero, who claims to be translating Epicurus' exact words about this group of pleasures, points out what he believes is an inconsistency in Epicurus' statements about the good.[69] Cicero quotes Epicurus as follows:

> '[1] For my part I find no meaning which I can attach to what is termed good, if I take away from it the pleasures obtained by taste, if I take away the pleasures which come from listening to music, if I take away too the charm derived by the eyes from the sight of figures in movement, or other pleasures produced by any of the senses in the whole man. [2] Nor indeed is it possible to make such a statement as this—that it is joy of the mind which is alone to be reckoned as a good; for I understand by a mind in a state of joy, that it is so, when it has the hope of all the pleasures I have named—that is to say the hope that nature will be free to enjoy them without any blending of pain.'[70] (3.41-42)

Several other sources provide at least the first sentence of this quotation, where Epicurus appears to be extolling the goodness of certain bodily pleasures. Athenaeus gives a version that is slightly different in wording and length, but essentially the same in content;[71] Diogenes Laertius gives a shorter version of the first sentence;[72] and, interestingly, Cicero gives only the first sentence in *De Finibus*.[73] Cicero and others who

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quote is said to have appeared in Epicurus' *On the Telos*. Perhaps by "that book which embraces all your teaching" Cicero refers to only ethical teachings, meaning he could have in mind *On the Telos*.

[69] Cicero says, "For I shall now play the part of translator, that no one may think I am inventing" (*Tusc. Disp.* 3.41).

[70] Numerals added.

[71] 12.546e (22.1 A). Athenaeus' version includes the following: "καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς κατ' ὄψιν ἡδείας κινήσεις." Cf. another version given by Athenaeus, at 7.278f (67 U).

[72] DL 10.6: "I do not know how to conceive the good if I take away the pleasures of taste, if I take away sexual pleasures, pleasures of hearing, and pleasures of form." According to Diogenes Laertius, this quotation is from Epicurus' *On the Telos*.

[73] This fact is interesting because it is clear from the *Tusculan Disputations* that Cicero is aware of both sentences. Nikolsky makes much of the omission: in his mind, it is evidence that Cicero has Epicurus wrong and thus that we should not base interpretations of Epicurean ethics on Cicero's testimony in *De Finibus*. Cf. N, 448-49.

provide the quotation usually introduce it in order to argue that Epicureanism is synonymous with profligacy: taken out of context, the first part of the quotation is used to show that Epicurus is really only interested in grand feasts, lasciviousness, and other sordid affairs. The first sentence is also used to show—again, with the caveat that the quotation is taken out of context—that Epicurus himself does not know what pleasure is, for as we have seen he also argues that the highest good is to be without pain and disturbance.

On the face of it, Epicurus' claim about the primacy of certain pleasures of the body to the good life does seem at odds with his claim that the *telos* is pleasure understood as the absence of pain.[74] Stated differently, the position that the highest good is katastematic pleasure does not square with the claim that certain kinetic pleasures, like taste, hearing, etc., make up the best life. I believe this problem occurs because nonrestorative pleasures have been wrongly classified as kinetic, following Cicero, and because their function in Epicurus' ethical system has not been fully understood. It should be noted that not all of the ancient philosophers commenting on Epicurean ethics understand there to be a problem: for example, neither Lucretius nor Plutarch mentions Epicurus' claim that he cannot imagine what the good is without the pleasures of taste, sex, etc. This may mean that reconciling the highest good as the absence of pain with the

[74] It could be argued that Epicurus' statement about the primacy of pleasures of taste, sex, etc., to the good life is an epistemological point; that is, Epicurus means that he is able to know the highest good through these kinds of pleasures. This point was suggested to me by Dr. Steven Strange. I agree that the statement could be taken as an epistemological point, for as I will argue in this section, these sorts of pleasures are indicative of healthy, painless functioning of the organism. However, I do not believe we should take Epicurus to be making the stronger point that we know of the highest good only through these sorts of pleasures, for I want to argue that we can be aware of painless functioning in a second way also, namely, when we simply perceive the organism's healthy functioning on its own. I argued earlier based on *SV* 33 that Epicurus believes that we experience healthy functioning when we perceive that our organism is not disturbed. Therefore, I think Epicurus may be making an epistemological point in his statement about pleasures of taste, sex, etc., but we should not take him to mean that these are the only experiences through which are aware of the highest good.

highest good as certain bodily pleasures is a problem only for Cicero—a problem that was subsequently passed down to modern scholars who base their interpretations of Epicurean ethics on *De Finibus*.

I want to argue that scholars misclassify nonrestorative pleasures as kinetic. Instead of following Cicero, we should take our cue from Lucretius and Plutarch and reject the belief that there is some great gap to be bridged between nonrestorative and katastematic pleasures. We have our work cut out for us, since Lucretius and Plutarch do not tell us *how* Epicurus might consider nonrestorative pleasures to be katastematic. I will treat Cicero's testimony later, but for now I contend that if kinetic pleasures are understood as perceived restorations of painless natural functioning, then nonrestorative pleasures are not kinetic. This point is illustrated by a simple example: the pleasure of tasting a scrumptious piece of cake can be had on a full stomach, when there is no need for restoration. The other pleasures Epicurus mentions in his popular passage quoted in the *Tusculan Disputations* and elsewhere are all of this sort: the pleasures of sex, hearing, and vision are not replenishments of any lack; all can be experienced when the organism is already in a painless state, which suggests that Epicurus does not think they are kinetic.[75]

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[75] It has been suggested to me by Dr. Tim O'Keefe that there is another group of pleasures that seem to be neither kinetic nor katastematic given my descriptions of these categories, namely, those pleasures based on unnatural and empty desires, which Epicurus mentions in his *Letter to Menoeceus* (127) and which come up in *PD* 29. The scholiast to *PD* 29 mentions as examples of this group "desires for crowns and the dedication of statues [to oneself]." Epicurus claims that even pleasures such as these, though they are based on unnatural and unnecessary desires, are good qua pleasures, but they should not be chosen (*Ad Men.* 129). One could argue that the pleasure that results from the desire for fame, for instance, is neither a restoration of painlessness nor a condition of painlessness itself. As I see it, these sorts of pleasures are in fact katastematic, since in themselves they are the result of having removed a disturbance to painless mental functioning. For example, I may have an intense desire to be famous, a desire that brings me great anxiety since I am at the mercy of other people's opinions. Fame is not entirely in my control, and I worry about attaining it; it greatly disturbs my mind, which is to say it brings me mental pain. If and when I finally do become famous, I have, in a sense, relieved that pain; I feel pleasure at being without the worry that people do not know who I am and I need not be anxious about getting people to honor me. If I am

If nonrestorative pleasures are not kinetic, then they must be katastematic. Before I attempt to describe how Epicurus might understand nonrestorative pleasures to be katastematic, I would like first to dispel the notion that Epicurus is being inconsistent by including nonrestorative pleasures in the best life. As I have mentioned, Cicero and others hostile to Epicureanism claim that Epicurus maintains two mutually exclusive positions: one, that the good life consists in the absence of pain, and two, that the good life cannot be conceived without nonrestorative pleasures. I want to argue that Epicurus does not believe that the pursuit of nonrestorative pleasures is intrinsically antithetical to the best life of painlessness. There is evidence to suggest that Epicurus has no qualms about enjoying the pleasures of taste and sex as long as they do not threaten the painless functioning of the organism.[76] In themselves these pleasures pose no threat to happiness; they become detrimental to happiness when they are pursued to excess beyond the limit of absence of pain. This is supported by *SV* 21, where Epicurus writes, "One must not force nature but persuade her. And we will persuade her by fulfilling the necessary desires, and the natural ones too if they do not harm [us], but bitterly reject the noxious

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experiencing the pleasure of fame, I cannot also be experiencing anxiety about becoming famous; my mind is free of disturbance with respect to becoming famous. But, if I enjoy fame now I may very well start to worry about maintaining my fame in the future, which would result in more anxiety and thus more pain. This effect would be a reason for me to have rejected my desire for fame in the first place, but it has no bearing on the goodness of the pleasure of fame qua pleasure. In itself, the pleasure of fame is a state that involves the mind functioning without mental pains, which is just to say that it is katastematic.

[76] Admittedly, Epicurus sometimes disapproves of sex. Diogenes Laertius reports in his doxography that Epicureans claim that "intercourse never benefited anyone, and one must be content if it did no harm" (DL 10.118). But this may not mean that Epicurus disapproves of sex itself. Rather, it could mean that he disapproves of the troubles he believes are brought on by sexual love, such as making oneself vulnerable by becoming dependent on sexual enjoyment, neglecting other duties, etc. Lucretius speaks disparagingly of sexual love, but does not claim that there is anything inherently harmful about sex itself. Lucretius actually recommends casual sex as an outlet for sexual desire: "You should ejaculate the accumulated fluid into any woman's body rather than reserve it for a single lover who monopolizes you and thus involve yourself in inevitable anxiety and anguish" (*DRN* 4.1065-67).

ones."[77] The scholiast to *PD* 29 provides examples of the different desires: "Epicurus regards as natural and necessary those which bring relief from pain, like drink during thirst; while he regards as natural but not necessary those that only vary the pleasure without removing the pain, like very expensive food; he regards as neither natural nor necessary those like desires for crowns and statues erected for oneself." Epicurus is not urging us to avoid nonrestorative pleasures; rather, he is urging us to avoid them if they bring us harm. For example, if I am sure that eating a piece of chocolate cake will bring me no pain now or in the future (that is, I am not allergic to chocolate; I have not already eaten too much; eating this cake will not fuel my chocolate addiction and lead to insatiable cravings and despair in the future; etc.) then I am not likely to jeopardize my happiness by consuming it, and thus I have no reason to reject my desire for the cake. What we are after, Epicurus wants to argue, is pleasure without pain: the functioning of the organism without disturbance. I should reject certain of my desires if, in the long run, pursuing them will bring more pain than pleasure. Nonrestorative pleasures, like taste, are not intrinsically antithetical to the highest good, so we need not believe that Epicurus could not possibly consider them to be katastematic.

What remains to be explained, then, is why nonrestorative pleasures are in fact katastematic. We can get an idea from Lucretius' explanation of the mechanics of taste, which I mentioned earlier. The pleasure of taste, he explains, involves smooth and round atoms moving through the pores of the mouth (*DRN* 2.400ff). These atoms travel seamlessly through the passages leading to the senses, causing no pain on their way. The rough and barbed atoms involved in unpleasant tastes, on the other hand, catch on the sides of the passageways, tearing them and causing pain. On this explanation, the

[77] Trans. Inwood and Gerson, with revisions.

pleasure of taste is the painless working of a part of the organism—in this case the palate. The other pleasures Epicurus mentions in the passage from *On the Telos* can be explained in the same way: the pleasures of hearing, vision, and sex are in themselves painless happenings in the organism. The only difference between nonrestorative katastematic pleasures and katastematic pleasures generally is that the former usually occur in a part of the organism, like the palate or the ear, rather than in the organism as a whole. But the basic description is the same: nonrestorative pleasures, like all katastematic pleasures, are healthy, painless workings of (some part) of the organism. Unlike kinetic pleasures, the nonrestorative variety does not presuppose a lack that needs to be filled.

To this description I should add the following point: sometimes nonrestorative pleasures presupposes healthy and painless functioning in the organism as a whole. Consider the following example: when we are ill, we do not derive pleasure from foods that we normally find agreeable; it becomes more difficult for us to enjoy pleasures like taste when the organism is disturbed. A passage in Lucretius confirms that Epicureans believe that unhealthy functioning impedes the experience of certain pleasures, namely, those I have been calling nonrestorative. Lucretius writes the following:

> Thus when fever has assailed someone through excess of bile, or when a violent disease has been provoked by some other cause, the whole body is at once disordered and the positions of the constituent elements are all changed [*perturbatur ibi iam totum corpus et omnes / commutantur ibi positurae principiorum*]. Consequently particles that previously suited the person's taste are now unsuitable to it; others prove better adapted to it, and these penetrate the pores and produce a bitter sensation. (*DRN* 4.664-70)

According to Lucretius, certain particles bring pleasure when they harmonize with a certain atomic arrangement in the body. When the atomic arrangement is disturbed, certain pleasure-inducing particles do not coalesce with the new arrangement, impeding

our experience of pleasure. Lucretius is clear that we do not experience a *different* pleasure as a result of the disorder; rather, we experience *no* pleasure. In his example, the taster who is wracked by fever senses bitterness rather than a pleasant taste because she is not healthy; the displacement of atoms from their usual positions that occurs when an organism is unhealthy impedes the experience of nonrestorative pleasures. Many other nonrestorative pleasures that Epicurus mentions—sex, hearing, and vision, for instance—can all be explained similarly to that of taste: in the case of sex, a disturbance in our bodies can result in an inability to engage physically in intercourse; in the cases of hearing and vision, we often find ourselves unable to enjoy and pay attention to a concert or play when, for example, we have the flu or are extremely hungry.

What we can conclude from Lucretius' explanation is that some nonrestorative pleasures indicate the presence of healthy, painless functioning in the organism overall and consist in painless functioning. This would mean that some nonrestorative pleasures are in some sense manifestations of healthy functioning: they are made possible by and constituent of the health of the organism. This is not to say that *all* such pleasures presuppose painless functioning in the organism overall: one can, of course, experience a nonrestorative pleasure while suffering from some deficiency. For example, one takes pleasure in the taste of food even though one hungers. But even these nonrestorative pleasures are in themselves perceived painless workings of some part of the organism, even if they occur in the midst of some deficiency. In general, nonrestorative pleasures sometimes do indicate the presence of overall organic functioning, but not necessarily. Despite their variety, all nonrestorative pleasures are painless experiences that

presuppose no lack and are not restorations—which is to say they are katastematic pleasures.

Now that the definitions of katastematic and kinetic pleasures have been accounted for, we can see the extent to which these two types actually differ. Both kinds are pleasures by virtue of the same thing, namely, their relation to the health and painless functioning of the organism: kinetic pleasures are perceived movements toward painless functioning, while katastematic pleasure is perceived painless functioning itself, either in the organism as a whole or in some part. The definitions of each represent different ways of thinking about an organism's condition, but they are surely not inherently contradictory or incommensurable.[78]

[78] 'Incommensurable' is Mitsis' terminology. He claims that kinetic pleasures make little difference to the sage's happiness since they are mere variants of higher pleasure that has already been achieved. For this reason, he believes that "kinetic pleasures and katastematic pleasures are incommensurable" (49n99). I disagree with this view throughout Part I, not only for the reasons I have presented thus far but also because his reading seems to have several internal flaws. Mitsis holds that kinetic pleasures are, on the one hand, the means to achieve katastematic satisfaction (since for him the former are experienced in satisfying a desire, which is required if we are going to have a desire that has been satisfied [cf. 45]), and on the other, mere variations of katastematic pleasure (cf. 47, 49). He claims that on either view, "kinetic pleasure cannot add to the completeness of an overall state of katastematic pleasure" (47n95). I respond that while it may be the case that we do not choose *between* kinetic pleasures (e.g., I will get the same kinetic pleasure from eating brown bread or white bread), I still do *choose* kinetic pleasure in order to achieve katastematic pleasure. For if we define the highest pleasure, viz., katastematic pleasure, in terms of having a satisfied desire, then the process of satisfying that desire—the realm of kinetic pleasures as Mitsis understands them—is necessary for human happiness. Granted, the goal we seek is katastematic pleasure, not kinetic pleasures themselves, but we cannot say that the process is wholly unconnected to the end and conclude that the two pleasures are incommensurable. Ultimately, I think this difficulty with Mitsis' reading stems from his attempt to frame Epicurus' account of pleasure both in terms of the satisfaction of desires and in terms of the formal conditions for happiness, like invulnerability (cf. 39). Mitsis tries to balance Epicurus' commitment to objective elements of pleasure, like desire satisfaction, with subjective elements like autonomy and self-sufficiency. Given this dichotomy, either kinetic pleasures are necessary for states of satisfaction, or kinetic pleasures are just mere inconsequential variations of katastematic pleasure that only serve to facilitate our invulnerability. Mitsis' reading requires that both be true, which, I submit, does not seem possible.

D. *Principal Doctrine* 18

Some scholars refer to *PD* 18 to show that Epicurus considers the pleasures of taste, sex, etc., (which I have been calling nonrestorative pleasures) to be kinetic rather than katastematic.[79] The relevant part of *PD* 18 reads as follows: "Pleasure in the flesh admits no increase once the pain of want has been removed; but rather, it is only varied [οὐκ ἀπαύξεται ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡ ἡδονή, ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ τὸ κατ᾽ ἔνδειαν ἀλγοῦν ἐξαιρεθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται]."[80] In Book 1 of *De Finibus*, Cicero's Torquatus echoes the saying.[81] In Book 2, in response to Cicero's classification of Epicurean pleasures into kinetic and katastematic kinds and his subsequent claim that Epicurus is using the word 'pleasure' for very dissimilar things, Torquatus refers Cicero back to Book 1: "'Do you not remember,' [Torquatus] replied, 'what I said a little while ago, that once all pain is removed, pleasure can vary in kind but not be increased [*omnis dolor detractus esset, variari, non augeri voluptatem*]?'" (2.10).[82] Cicero's response, which is the basis of modern interpretations of *PD* 18, is that kinetic pleasure provides variation, but it fails to add to the pleasure of being free from pain. According to Cicero, this means that kinetic

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[79] Cf. Rist, 1972, 107-8 and 170; Mitsis, 47. Cf. also Sedley, who does not mention *PD* 18 in his discussion of kinetic pleasures but does believe they are variants. Interestingly enough, though, Sedley believes that Epicurus' description of kinetic pleasure is bifold: "Kinetic pleasure is the process of stimulation by which you either arrive at static pleasure, such as by drinking when thirsty, or 'vary' it, such as by drinking when not thirsty." Sedley, "The Inferential Foundations of Epicurean Ethics," in *Companions to Ancient Thought: 4, Ethics*, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 130. Although I agree with the first description, I disagree with the second, as I argue in this section. Sedley's two descriptions appear to map onto Cicero's two descriptions of kinetic pleasure in *De Finibus*, descriptions which, as I point out in section I.3, are in fact very different from one another.

[80] Trans. Hicks, with revisions.

[81] Cf. *De Fin*. 1.38: "But Epicurus thinks that the absence of pain constitutes the upper limit of pleasure. Beyond that limit pleasure can vary and be of different kinds, but it cannot be increased or expanded [*Omnis autem privatione doloris putat Epicurus terminari summam voluptatem, ut postea variari voluptas distinguique possit, augeri amplificarique non possit*]."

[82] Note that mention of 'kinds' of pleasure is not made in the Latin or in the original Greek passage from which Cicero's Torquatus is presumably drawing this statement (viz., *PD* 18).

pleasure and katastematic pleasure are two completely different classes: one, a class that has nothing to do with the absence of pain, which Cicero apparently believes includes nonrestorative pleasures like the pleasure of taste, since they do not remove pain; and the other, the state of being without pain. Cicero's interpretation of the saying is clearly at odds with my reading of Epicurus' description of pleasure. My task in the present section is to show that in *PD* 18 Epicurus is not attempting to draw a distinction between one type of pleasure that is merely a variation, and another that is the state of absence of pain.

First, why does Epicurus claim that there is an upper limit to pleasure? Nikolsky provides a compelling reason: Epicurus is probably trying to avoid arguments like that found in Plato's *Gorgias* against hedonism. There, the hedonist is likened to someone continually filling leaky casks.[83] Nikolsky describes the Academic argument succinctly:

> In developing his doctrine, Epicurus had to respond to the Academic criticism of hedonism based, among other things, on the following argument: if pleasure consists in the satisfaction of desires, while the result of being satisfied is a neutral state and not a pleasure, then hedonists should provoke desires and avoid their complete satisfaction, making themselves like someone compelled night and day to fill leaky casks; their desires prove to be insatiable and the satisfaction of these desires has no limit. (451)

To combat this type of argument, Epicurus would want to set some limit to pleasure. *Principal Doctrine* 18 simply establishes what this limit is: the absence of pain. Once this limit has been reached, the Epicurean hedonist knows that more is not always better—that eating more or having a few more drinks will not increase his pleasure, for example. He *can* eat more or have a few more drinks, but only if doing so will not jeopardize his good state. Epicurus' intent in *PD* 18 may be to indicate how his

[83] Cf. *Gorgias* 493-4.

philosophy stands up to arguments like the leaky-cask rather than to differentiate kinetic from katastematic pleasures in the way Cicero suggests.

Furthermore, if Epicurus holds that kinetic pleasures are restorations of the health of the organism, there would be nothing inconsistent about the claim that once the organism's natural functioning is restored, kinetic pleasures do not augment that natural functioning. On the other hand, it would be odd for Epicurus to claim that when the state of absence of pain is achieved, kinetic pleasures, which before have been movements toward this state, become variations. If we experience kinetic pleasures during the process of restoration , then it would be inexplicable why, once our healthy state obtained and the process complete, we would not cease to experience kinetic pleasure altogether. It would be a mystery why we would continue to experience kinetic pleasures in the form of variations once all our pain is gone.[84] *Principal Doctrine* 18 makes sense once we see that Epicurus is not talking about kinetic pleasures at all: the variation is in katastematic pleasure itself.

Why should we believe that the variation mentioned in *PD* 18 is of katastematic pleasure? For one thing, in various passages where mention is made of the variation, the pleasure that is varied appears in the singular: in *PD* 18, ἡ ἡδονή is varied; at *De Fin.* 1.38, it is *voluptas*; and in *Non Posse*, Plutarch uses the singular when reporting Epicurus' views: "For nature increases pleasure [τὸ ἡδύ] as far as doing away with pain, and it does not force pleasure to go on further in magnitude, but rather the pleasure, when

[84] Incidentally, I think Cicero, in Book 2 of *De Finibus*, creates this confusion because of his inconsistency in describing kinetic pleasures: sometimes they are linked with replenishments of lacks, sometimes they are nonrestorative pleasures like taste. Cicero, never failing to point out an inconsistency in Epicurus' ethics, seems to be unaware that these descriptions of kinetic pleasure are different. This fact leads me to believe that the confusion is Cicero's, not Epicurus', for the former would certainly have pointed it out if he had noticed it. I discuss Cicero's account of Epicurean ethics in *De Finibus* in more detail, including this problem, later in Part I.

there is no pain, admits of some unnecessary variations" (1088c). If Epicurus means that the variation is in kinetic pleasures, it would make more sense for him to use the plural. As it is, every source uses the singular, which means it is possible that the highest pleasure—katastematic pleasure—is varied.

But what does it mean to say that katastematic pleasure is varied? This is answered easily if Epicurus considers nonrestorative pleasures to be katastematic, for he acknowledges that there are varieties of nonrestorative pleasure—the pleasures of sex, hearing, and vision, for example. And although these pleasures are different in the sense that they originate in different sensory organs, they do not differ quantitatively from each other, and their presence indicates one and the same condition, namely, the painless, well-functioning state of the organism. Their variations, then, are 'unessential,' as Plutarch reports.

My interpretation of *PD* 18 is based partly on John Cooper's explanation of the relation between katastematic pleasure and pleasures of taste, sex, etc. According to Cooper, the fully functioning state of the body is experienced through the pleasures of an organism's various capacities, like taste. He writes, "In order to experience our organism (including in that, of course, our minds) as it is when in this tip-top condition we need to exercise some or other of our various capacities of mind and body: it is only in such activity that we can experience it at all, or at least experience it fully."[85] In other words, healthy functioning can be made known to us through our experiences of various pleasures of the body and mind like those Epicurus mentions in *On the Telos*.

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[85] Cooper, *Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 513.

Cooper goes on to counter Cicero's interpretation of *PD* 18. According to Cicero, Epicurus believes that pleasures 'in movement' and pleasures from the absence of pain are two species of a common genus, namely, pleasure. Epicurus is seriously confused about his own project, Cicero continues, because he *actually* introduces two distinct genera of pleasure. Cooper writes, "Now, for purposes of criticism, Cicero makes Epicurus's distinction one between two *genera* of (alleged) pleasure—in fact he is talking about two totally different things which, Cicero argues, he arbitrarily and unjustifiably decides to treat as two species of the same broader kind, pleasure" (511). Cooper argues, and I agree, that if Epicurus thinks that pleasures in movement (what I am calling nonrestorative pleasures, and what Cicero describes as sensory titillations or pleasures *in motu*) and pleasure from the absence of pain are distinct species of one genus, then Epicurus would have a difficult time explaining how it is that one distinct phenomenon varies a completely different phenomenon. As Cooper rightly maintains, it makes no sense to claim that pleasures 'in movement' bring variation in a second, distinct species of pleasure (namely, katastematic pleasure). Thus, on Cooper's reading Cicero's account of the idea expressed in *PD* 18 is misleading, for Epicurus is not making the senseless claim that one kind of pleasure varies a completely different kind of pleasure. Cooper supports this by arguing that Epicurus does not believe that pleasures in movement and katastematic pleasures are distinct types. Cooper writes, "The distinction between pleasures 'in movement' and katastematic pleasure is a distinction based on the objects or causes of that phenomenon under different conditions, not a distinction of kind at all within the phenomenon in question itself" (512).[86] On this reading, Epicurus cannot be

[86] On Cooper's reading, all pleasure for Epicurus is "a certain state of consciousness or perception" (511); it is the delightful perception that we are free from pain that is pleasure, rather than the absence of pain as

talking about the variation of one kind of pleasure by another, since pleasures in movement and katastematic pleasure are not phenomenally different. Cooper concludes that the variation is not of a kind of pleasure completely distinct from the katastematic kind, but is of katastematic pleasure itself:

> Cicero tells us, quite believably, that it is by pleasures 'in movement' that a happy man is to vary his 'katastematic' pleasure. This has to be understood as the actual variation *of* that pleasure itself, not as the addition of some pleasures of one kind by bringing them into the presence of pleasure of another kind. On the latter view, Epicurus could speak of a person's overall state of mind as being varied by the presence of the pleasures 'in movement,' but that is not in fact what he does say: he says that the pleasure in the pain-free condition, itself, gets varied. (511)

Thus, on Cooper's reading, *PD* 18 is evidence that what is varied once all pain is removed is katastematic pleasure rather than a species entirely distinct from it.

Although I agree with Cooper's evaluation of *PD* 18, I disagree with his thesis that pleasures 'in movement' are kinetic. He describes them as follows: "The pleasures in movement, then, with which we vary our constitutional pleasure when in the pain-and distress-free state, will be any of the pleasant activities—sensory ones like eating, drinking, or even sex . . . which, in themselves, involve movement and active employment of one's bodily and mental faculties" (513). Now, there is no support from any Epicurean text for Cooper's definition of 'in movement' as "active employment of one's bodily and mental faculties," and the definition is not consistent with other discussions of movement in connection with pleasure found in, for example, the Cyrenaic

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such. The greatest Epicurean pleasure, according to Cooper, is found in what follows the absence of pain, namely, "pleasurable consciousness" (497). Although I agree with Cooper's claim that in *PD* 18 Epicurus is not distinguishing two completely different phenomena, I am skeptical of his general reading of Epicurean pleasure. In my opinion, the claim that pleasure is "pleasurable consciousness" is somewhat meaningless, for it begs the question of what "pleasurable consciousness" is. Furthermore, to claim that pleasure is just a belief about one's bodily and mental situation merely avoids—rather than sorts out—Epicurus' important notion of 'absence of pain.'

or Academic schools. And ultimately, Cooper's description of kinetic pleasure only encourages us to conclude that katastematic pleasure is a passive, inactive state. For, in contrast to the movement of one's body and exercise of one's faculties characteristic of kinetic pleasures, inactivity and lifelessness seem characteristic of katastematic pleasures. This stark contrast is precisely what Cooper hopes to avoid, yet his definition of 'in movement' and his linking of that definition to kinetic pleasure deeply divides the two types.

That katastematic pleasure itself could vary is far from uncontroversial. Rist, taking over Diano's position, argues for the homogeneity of katastematic pleasure based on *PD* 9. It reads as follows: "If every pleasure were condensed with respect to place and time and were present in the whole compound or in the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would not ever differ from one another."[87] How does Rist understand 'condense' [καταπυκνόω] in this context, and how does he deduce the homogeneity of specifically katastematic pleasure from *PD* 9? Rist gains his understanding of 'condense' from the following Greek usage: the comic poet Damoxenus says that Epicurus condenses pleasure by chewing carefully.[88] Rist believes that 'condensing' implies "squeezing out the maximum of pleasure, getting the highest possible amount of pleasure" (1972, 115). And, based on different evidence, Rist argues that only katastematic pleasure is condensed: according to Alciphron, the Epicurean Xenocrates claimed he attained freedom from bodily pain while lasciviously embracing and ogling a

[87] "Εἰ κατεπυκνοῦτο πᾶσα ἡδονὴ τ<όπ>ῳ καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα ὑπῆρχεν ἤ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως, οὐκ ἄν ποτε διέφερον ἀλλήλων αἱ ἡδοναί."

[88] "Ἐπίκουρος οὕτω κατεπύκνου τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐμασᾶτ' ἐπιμελῶς." Damoxenus, fr. 2 Kock (Rist, 1972, 114).

dancing woman, and that this was condensed pleasure.[89] From these passages, Rist argues that condensation is getting the maximum amount of *katastematic* pleasure, for Alciphron's Xenocrates is talking about freedom from pain, the highest Epicurean pleasure.[90] Rist goes on to explain that the condensation of katastematic pleasures points to their homogeneity:

> [Epicurus] says that, if all pleasures are condensed, that is, maximized and spread over the whole organism, then pleasures will not differ from one another. This means that the katastematic pleasure of touch and the katastematic pleasure of taste or sight do not differ with respect to quality. *Qua* pleasure they are equally pleasurable, in so far as they all equally consist in an absence of pain.[91] (1972, 115)

There are several problems with this reading. First, according to Rist *PD* 9 has "serious textual difficulties," and he himself admits that Diano's text, on which Rist relies, is "arbitrary" (1972, 114n2). Rist comments that others emend the texts in ways "for which there is little justification" (1972, 114n2). Thus, *PD* 9 does not seem to be the clearest piece of evidence from which to argue for the homogeneity of katastematic pleasure. Second, the passage from Damoxenus does not say anything about absence of pain, so Rist's claim that katastematic pleasure is condensed is supported only by the account from Alciphron. As for that little vignette, I agree with Gosling and Taylor that Alciphron's report is not to be taken as a serious account of Epicurean pleasure, since it is clearly meant to be a joke. Gosling and Taylor explain, "There is obvious irony in describing the lecher as free of disturbance of the flesh, and again the reference to

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[89] "τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς ἀόχλητον." Alciphron *Epistularum* 3.55.8 (432 U).

[90] Cf. Rist, 1972, 115.

[91] Perhaps this is the origin of Jeremy Bentham's view that quality is not a factor by which we measure pleasures. Cf. chapter 4 of *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, "Value of a lot of pleasure or pain, how to be measured."

condensation is either just picking on an Epicurean phrase for ironic purposes for a situation when a man's limbs are obviously loosed, and/or is suggesting erection of the penis" (379-80). Clearly one should not base the serious claim that katastematic pleasure is homogenous on a report that is fairly obviously intended as comedy. Gosling and Taylor bring up the additional objection that Rist's interpretation entails the negative view that katastematic pleasure is nothing more than the absence of pain. Such a view leaves Epicurus vulnerable to the charge that he is ignorant of the real meaning of pleasure (as Cicero understands it), namely, a pleasure of the senses. As Gosling and Taylor conclude, "It is not, then, clear why Epicurus would want to hold that katastematic pleasure is homogeneous except on this negative thesis" (378). And as I have argued, following Gosling and Taylor, Epicurus describes katastematic pleasure in terms other than merely the absence of pain: it is the healthy, natural functioning of the organism. Even if one does not believe that Epicurus describes katastematic pleasure in terms of organic health, one would still have to reject Rist's view due to the fact that we know of at least two katastematic pleasures from Epicurus' texts: ἀπονία and ἀταραξία.

So, if we take *PD* 9 out of the equation, we have no reason to believe that in *PD* 18 Epicurus is insisting on the homogeneity of katastematic pleasure. And if it is not homogeneous, then we are allowed the reading that it may admit of variety. Thus, it is perfectly plausible that in *PD* 18 Epicurus is not talking about variations in kinetic pleasure but a variation in katastematic pleasure itself. Moreover, if Epicurus considers nonrestorative pleasures, like those of taste and sex, to be katastematic, then it makes sense that they supply the variation Epicurus mentions in *PD* 18. This means that Epicurus is not talking about a distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure at all

in *PD* 18, but rather, he is attempting to set limits to pleasure in order to distance himself from the profligate who frustrates her pleasure by cultivating unlimited, insatiable desires.

E. Diogenes Laertius 10.136

At 10.136, Diogenes Laertius reports a quotation, purportedly from Epicurus' lost work, *On Choice*, wherein Epicurus gives examples of kinetic and katastematic pleasure. At first glance, it appears that with these examples Epicurus paints a different picture of pleasure than the one I have given. In particular, it is not clear how his examples of kinetic pleasure, namely, joy [χαρά] and gladness of mind [εὐφροσύνη], map on to my description of kinetic pleasure as the perceived restoration of painless organic functioning. Furthermore, any attempt to claim that joy and gladness of mind are kinetic pleasures, no matter what the definition of 'kinetic,' must confront the fact that Epicurus himself usually describes joy, at least, as katastematic. These are the difficulties I will address in this section.

To begin, let us look at the passage:

> (1) Similarly Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his *Epilecta*, and Metrodorus in his *Timocrates* say the following: "Pleasure being considered as both kinetic and katastematic." (2) Epicurus, in his *On Choice* says the following: "for on the one hand, tranquility and painlessness are katastematic pleasures, and on the other joy and gladness of mind are seen to be kinetic and in activity."
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> (1) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ <ἑπτακαιδεκάτῃ> τῶν Ἐπιλέκτων καὶ Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ Τιμοκράτει λέγουσιν οὕτω· Νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς. (2) ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρεσεων οὕτω λέγει· Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ <ἡ> ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί· ἡ δὲ χαρά καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται.

I have divided the passage into two sections for ease of discussion. Before I treat the sections individually, I would like to offer a few general comments. First, any interpreter of Epicurean pleasure must deal with the fact that DL 10.136 presents us with evidence that Epicurus himself and his prominent pupil Metrodorus use the terms 'kinetic' and 'katastematic.' Any reading that denies that Epicurus gives descriptions of these terms is problematic, since we have no reason to doubt the legitimacy of these quotations. Second, controversial among interpreters of DL 10.136 is how to translate κατὰ κίνησιν and καταστηματικαί; one's choice of translation is inevitably governed by one's interpretation of Epicurus' ethics. For example, if one follows Cicero's reading, one is inclined to translate κατὰ κίνησιν as 'a motion of the senses,' following his *movens* and *in motu*, and to translate καταστηματικαί as 'a state which consists in rest,' following his *stabilis*, *in stabilitate*, and *stans*. These are the translations favored by most, including Hicks (Loeb) and Long and Sedley.[92] In my translation, I have simply transliterated the Greek for κίνησιν and καταστηματικαί so as to disconnect the terms from the interpretations that usually accompany them. My task in this section is to show that although I am rejecting the traditional translation of kinetic and katastematic as the movement of the senses and a state of rest, respectively, my reading of the kinetic/katastematic distinction in Epicurean ethics is not at odds with DL 10.136.

In the first section of the passage, Diogenes Laertius provides what appears to be a single quotation from two sources: the Epicurean Diogenes of Tarsus and Metrodorus. We can gather from the quotation that Epicureans contend that there is something called

[92] Long and Sedley leave κίνησιν as kinetic and translate καταστηματικαί as 'static.' Cf. Long and Sedley, eds., *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 118.21R. But see Inwood and Gerson's translation of DL 10.136, which has κίνησιν and καταστηματικαί as kinetic and katastematic. Inwood and Gerson, trans., *The Epicurus Reader* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 44.

pleasure κατὰ κίνησιν and something else called pleasure τῆς καταστηματικῆς. Since neither Diogenes of Tarsus nor Metrodorus defines these terms, this section of 10.136 neither rules out nor confirms any particular reading of Epicurean pleasure (except, of course, a reading that denies that Epicureans recognize pleasures called kinetic and katastematic—that reading is flatly contradicted by the passage). My reading of kinetic and katastematic pleasure does not conflict with the quotation, since I acknowledge that Epicurus recognizes both kinds and I account for them: kinetic pleasures are perceived *restorations* of organic health and painlessness, and katastematic pleasures are perceived *conditions* of health and painlessness.

It should be noted that the sense of the quotation rendered by my translation is in line with that of most others. I too am claiming that the quotation reports the fact that Epicurus holds that there are two kinds of pleasure. My reading of the quotation differs from most others on the issue of how Epicurus understands the two pleasures. And as I just mentioned, since the quotation does not reveal anything about how Epicurus defines kinetic and katastematic pleasure, the quotation itself does not prove or disprove any particular take on the kinetic/katastematic distinction. This is all just to say that my translation and reading is as legitimate as any other.

Let us consider next the second passage from 10.136, the quotation purportedly from Epicurus' *On Choice* that gives examples of kinetic and katastematic pleasures. Epicurus' examples of katastematic pleasure, painlessness and tranquility, pose no problem to my reading, since I have based my description of katastematic pleasure on them. The second set of examples, however, is more problematic. The most obvious

reading is that joy and gladness of mind are meant as types of kinetic pleasure.[93] While I see no reason to doubt this assumption, it does create some problems for my reading, for on the face of it, joy and gladness of mind do not appear to be perceived restorations of organic health and painlessness. Indeed, Epicurus usually mentions joy in connection with katastematic, rather than kinetic, pleasure.

Before I turn to a discussion of how Epicurus might understand joy to be a pleasure of restoration (or even a kinetic pleasure at all), it would help to look first at some ways in which Epicureans use the term 'joy.' They do not explicitly define joy, but they sometimes seem to equate χαρά (joy), and its associated verb, χαίρειν (to enjoy), with tranquility, a mental pleasure. For example, Epicureans use terms such as 'tranquil' and 'undisturbed' to describe the gods,[94] and they also use χαίρειν, as Epicurus does in a letter to his mother.[95] That tranquility and joy are both attributed to the gods suggests (but of course does not prove) that Epicureans may use the two terms interchangeably. This would mean that Epicurean joy, like tranquility, is the painless functioning of the mind when it reflects on the current and future state of the body. More evidence of a correspondence between tranquility and joy is found in Plutarch's *Non Posse*: Theon claims that the stable and settled condition of the flesh and the trustworthy expectation

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[93] This is the opinion of Long and Sedley, who claim that joy and gladness of mind are "two terms for kinetic pleasure." Most scholars share this opinion, save Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky. Cf. Long and Sedley, 125.

[94] In *PD* 1 Epicurus claims, "A blessed and eternal being neither has troubles himself nor gives them to another." Lucretius writes about the need to expel false beliefs about the gods, understanding that the gods experience utter tranquility: "Unless you expel such notions from your mind and put far from you all thoughts unworthy of the gods and incompatible with their peace, their sacred persons, thus disparaged by you, will often do you harm" (*DRN* 6.68-71). A few lines later he refers to the gods as "tranquil and peaceful beings" (6.73). Trans. Long and Sedley.

[95] Diogenes of Oinoanda fragment 52-53 Chilton (72 A, lines 38-40): "ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ζῶμεν, ὁμοίως τοῖς θεοῖς χαίρο[μ]εν."

are said by Epicurus to "contain the highest and the most assured joy [χαράν] for those who are able to reflect" (1089d). A few lines later, Theon again equates joy with tranquility: he exclaims, "You hear them protesting and shouting that the soul is disposed to rejoice [χαίρειν] and be tranquil [γαληνίζειν] in nothing save pleasures of the body either present or expected, and that this is its good" (1088e). In another place, it is reported that Epicurus equates joy with mental pleasure in general.[96]

If Epicurean joy is equated with tranquility, as it seems it is, then joy should be classified as katastematic, just like tranquility. That joy is katastematic is supported by further observations about the pleasure of the gods. We are told that the gods' pleasure does not increase or decrease,[97] a feature that I argued belongs to katastematic pleasure, which cannot be increased but only varies. Of course, it is possible that the gods experience both kinetic and katastematic pleasure, in which case Epicurus might be claiming that joy applies to the former as much as or instead of the latter. We could certainly doubt Epicurus' association of joy with katastematic pleasure if this argument about the gods were the only indication that the terms are linked. But there is the additional evidence from *Non Posse* concerning the connection between joy and tranquility, and Cicero also indicates that joy is katastematic. Cicero uses the verb *gaudere*, the Latin equivalent of χαίρειν, to describe katastematic pleasure: at *De Fin.* 1.56 he writes, "Rather, we take delight [*gaudere*] in the removal of pain even if this is

[96] See *Non Posse* 1087b, where Plutarch writes that the Epicureans hold dear "every pleasing movement of the flesh that is sent up to give some pleasure and joy [χαρά] to the mind" (1087b).

[97] Cf. DL 121: "τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν διχῇ νοεῖσθαι· τήν τε ἀκροτάτην, οἵα ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν θεόν, ἐπίτασιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν, καὶ τὴν <κατὰ> προσθήκην καὶ ἀφαίρεσιν ἡδονῶν."

not followed by the kind of pleasure that arouses the senses."[98] Epicurean usage of the term 'joy' indicates that it is katastematic.[99]

While it is a problem for Epicurus that he normally considers joy to be katastematic but calls it kinetic in the passage at DL 10.136, it is not my main task here to find a solution. Rather, I am calling attention to DL 10.136 because it lists joy, a condition that Epicureans usually associate with tranquility and undisturbedness (leaving aside its being katastematic), as a type of kinetic pleasure, which I claim is a process of restoration. What needs to be explained is what joy might look like as a pleasure of restoration.

We do have evidence that Epicurus, in at least one circumstance, considers joy to be a pleasure of restoration. In his letter on his deathbed to Idomeneus, Epicurus claims that his joy is buttressing his tranquility. He writes, "My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them; but over against them all I set joy of mind [τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον] at the remembrance of our past conversations" (DL 10.22).[100] First, we need to be wary of concluding from this passage that Epicurus is actually counteracting his *bodily* pains, rather than his mental pains, with his joy, as Merlan has claimed.[101] If Merlan means that Epicurus no longer feels bodily pain as a result of setting his "joy of mind" against his poor condition, then I believe we

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[98] Although I do not think this passage from *De Finibus* presents a correct view of Epicureanism generally, the claim that katastematic pleasure is associated with joy is corroborated by Plutarch. I address this passage later in Part I.

[99] I disagree with Diano's assertion, as given by Merlan, that joy always designates kinetic pleasure (cf. Merlan, 14n16). In my opinion, the passages I mention contradict that assertion.

[100] Trans. Hicks, with minor revisions (52 A).

[101] "And when he reports to Idomeneus of his last day (fr. 138 Us = fr. 153 Diano), he writes that his bodily pains are counteracted by τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον." Merlan, 14.

must reject his reading, for, in a letter reported by Philodemus, Epicurus writes that he feels bodily pain. In that letter Epicurus says, "As I am writing this, it is the seventh day that I have not urinated and have had pains that lead to one's last day."[102] He does not counteract his pain in any physical way, for he still feels pain, just as the sage on the rack still feels the hurt in his body; Epicurus has lost his ἀπονία—the healthy, painless condition of his body—but he maintains his ἀταραξία, his lack of anxiety about his body and death. But how does all of this happen? Epicurus does not describe exactly how he manages to assuage his mental pain, but somehow his joy functions as a pleasure of restoration to buttress his tranquility, which has been disturbed by sickness. His usage of 'joy' here does not seem to correspond to his usage I mentioned earlier, namely, as tranquility and a condition of painless functioning (of the mind), for it involves no reflection on the current or future state of his body that would enable him to dispel worries about his condition. Here his joy from his past pleasant memories may serve to distract him from his present physical pain and allow him to avoid worrying about his body. Admittedly, this explanation is rather hazy, but it reflects the fact that Epicurus' description of his joy on his deathbed is itself rather hazy.

Of course, one might contend that this explanation leaves untouched the problem that Epicurus usually considers joy to be katastematic, yet in our passage at DL 10.136 he claims that joy is kinetic. This, I submit, is a problem for Epicurus' theory of pleasure, but not necessarily for my interpretation of it. My treatment of DL 10.136 is meant to show that it is not unrealistic to suppose that Epicurus thinks joy is a type of restorative

[102] Philodemus, Πραγματεῖαι 31.5-10 (78 A). "ἑβδόμη[ι] γὰρ ἡμέραι, φησίν, ὅτε ταῦτ' ἔγραφον, οὐχὶ ἀπο[κεχ]ώρ[η]κεν κα[τὰ] τὴν οὔρησιν [ἐ]μοὶ οὐθέν, καὶ ἀλγηδόνες ἐνῆσαν τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τελευταίαν ἡμέραν ἀγουσῶν."

pleasure (i.e., kinetic). That Epicurus thinks that joy is also a katastematic pleasure is another issue.

However, many scholars claim that this problem in DL 10.136 bears on the issue of whether Epicurus believes there is a distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure at all. Since I am trying to further an interpretation that entails that Epicurus does distinguish between these, we should examine the attempts to resolve the inconsistencies in DL 10.136. The most provocative interpretation of the passage is Gosling and Taylor's. They argue that Epicurus does not intend to distinguish χαρά and εὐφροσύνη from ἀταραξία and ἀπονία. They claim that by the phrase κατὰ κίνησιν Epicurus does not indicate a different type of pleasure from the katastematic variety; rather, he is merely pointing out with his examples of kinetic pleasures aspects of ἀταραξία and ἀπονία. They write, "In fact '*chara*' and '*euphrosunē*' seem to correspond to '*ataraxia*' and '*aponia*' in being their positive counterparts" (389), that is, further glosses on what it means to be tranquil and without pain. On their reading, Epicurus means to describe ἀταραξία and ἀπονία as the experiences of χαρά and εὐφροσύνη (392). So as to avoid an interpretation that would indicate that Epicurus asserts the existence of two kinds of pleasure, Gosling and Taylor translate the first part of the passage (the quotation from Diogenes of Tarsus and Metrodorus) as follows: "but with both kinetic and katastematic pleasure being apprehended by the mind" (390). On their translation, the participle νοουμένης is rendered so as to express the apprehending activity of the mind, meaning that Epicurus would be claiming that both kinetic and katastematic pleasures, and the latter in particular, are experienced by the soul and thus

are not negative states of ἀπάθεια. On their view, the passage does not show that Epicurus or his followers believes there to be two distinct kinds of pleasure.[103]

Nikolsky takes up their cause, adding that in DL 10.136 χαρά and εὐφροσύνη, far from being kinetic pleasures and wholly distinguishable from the katastematic set, are emotional responses of the soul to certain states of the mind and body, namely, ἀταραξία and ἀπονία (N, 456). In short, he believes there is no classification of pleasures in the passage, for ἀταραξία, ἀπονία, χαρά, and εὐφροσύνη are definitions of "two coexistent aspects of any pleasure" (456), namely, states and their respective emotional responses.[104] Thus, Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky try to avoid the interpretive difficulty with χαρά by claiming that Epicurus does not sharply distinguish kinetic from katastematic pleasure. For this reason, they conclude that it is futile to quibble about the group to which χαρά belongs.

Their reading, however, does not seem borne out by the construction of the passage, and hence I think it ultimately fails to resolve the difficulty with χαρά. That Epicurus means to mark a contrast between two groups, namely, kinetic and katastematic pleasures, is indicated by the μέν/δέ construction in the second part of the passage at 10.136 (that is, the quotation from *On Choice*). This construction indicates that Epicurus is claiming that, on the hand, there is one kind of pleasure, and on the other, another. The sense of the μέν/δέ construction is lost in Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky's interpretation,

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[103] Gosling and Taylor comment on the passage's wording, noting the strangeness of a single quotation attributed to two authors and appearing in the genitive absolute. Because of this odd grammatical construction, they reinterpret the sense of the passage so as to avoid attributing it to anyone.

[104] He explains 'ἐνεργείᾳ' in the passage as indicating an "activity of the soul responding to the states of ἀπονία and ἀταραξία" (N, 456). He cites the philosophical precedent for such a reading: Plato thinks pleasure is a motion of the soul, calling it joy (cf. *Rep.* 583e), and Aristotle similarly considers pleasure to be a psychic motion (cf. *Rhetoric* 1369b33-1370a1).

for their reading erodes the contrast between the two types of pleasure. Furthermore, their reading does not fit the context of Diogenes Laertius' discussion in the passage overall. Just before 10.136, Diogenes Laertius is comparing the Epicureans and the Cyrenaics, noting that the latter are concerned only with kinetic pleasures, while the former are concerned with both kinetic and katastematic pleasure. The quote from Diogenes of Tarsus and Metrodorus at 10.136 is meant as proof of this difference between the schools, for it attests to the fact that Epicureans are concerned with both kinds. In this context, Gosling and Taylor's version of the first part of quotation is a non-sequitur: it provides an explanation for an issue that is not raised, namely, *how* Epicurus understands kinetic and katastematic pleasure (and their answer would be that both are apprehended by the soul). But the issue that *is* raised in the passage is simply *that* Epicurus is concerned with both kinetic and katastematic pleasure; the quotation from Diogenes of Tarsus and Metrodorus is presented as proof of this fact. For these reasons, it seems likely that Epicurus means to distinguish two pleasures—kinetic and katastematic—and means to classify joy among the former. Thus, the problem remains of how to understand joy as kinetic.

Purinton has taken a different strategy from Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky. He argues that Epicurus does not consider joy to be a pleasure at all, but rather, an intentional state whose object is pleasure (284).[105] According to Purinton, Epicurus distinguishes joy

[105] "We should rather conclude, then, that Epicurus does not think of joy as a pleasure, but as the intentional state which has pleasure as its intentional object" (287). In support of this reading, he cites several lines from Plutarch's *Non Posse* (1089d; 1091a-b), including a quote reported therein from Epicurus' lost work, *On the Telos*, where pleasure appears to be equated with the object of joy, or, stated differently, with what provides joy. He cites also a passage from Cicero's *De Finibus* (1.37), where Torquatus reports Epicurus' argument for the equation of painlessness and pleasure and remarks, "Everything in which we rejoice is a pleasure [*omne autem id, quo gaudemus, voluptas est*]" (trans. Purinton). Purinton believes that we should "assume that Cicero has Torquatus accurately report Epicurus' argument for the thesis that painlessness is a pleasure" (285), since "Cicero promises to provide as accurate an account of the Epicurean position as any

[χαρά] from its object [τὸ χάρτον], namely, pleasure, which means that in the quotation reported at DL 10.136 Epicurus could not be making the point that joy is a pleasure. Rather, on Purinton's reading Epicurus is claiming that we take joy in and have gladness of mind about both kinetic and katastematic pleasure, but only the joy and gladness of mind that we take in kinetic pleasure are experienced in activity; that which we take in katastematic pleasure, the *telos*, does not arise in activity. He claims that although Diogenes Laertius' intention is to provide evidence of Epicurus' belief that there exists both kinetic and katastematic pleasures, Diogenes mentions kinetic pleasures only indirectly, that is, as the intentional object of 'joy and delight in motion' (291n20).[106] Thus, on Purinton's reading we are not confronted with the problem of how Epicurus classifies joy at DL 10.136, since on his reading Epicurus does not consider joy to be a pleasure at all but an intentional state with pleasure as its object.

There are several difficulties with this reading.[107] If Diogenes Laertius' intention in quoting Epicurus is to provide evidence of two kinds of Epicurean pleasure, why would he pick a passage that shows this only indirectly? What Purinton's reading of the passage ends up showing is not that Diogenes Laertius intends the passage to illustrate that Epicurus believes there to be two different kinds of pleasure, but that Diogenes intends it to describe different kinds of Epicurean χαρά and εὐφροσύνη: one arising in

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presented by the Epicureans themselves. It would be surprising, then, if he then proceeded to have Torquatus formulate so fundamental an argument incorrectly" (284). In addition, he cites Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata* 2.21.130 = 451 U), who reports that the Epicureans rejoice in pleasure.

[106] This is Purinton's translation of χαρά καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ.

[107] While I express my reservations about his reading of DL 10.136 in particular in what follows, I also have several misgivings about his interpretation of Epicurean joy in general. I take issue with the fact that Purinton's analysis involves very little Epicurean source material itself, but relies instead mainly on passages from Cicero, Plutarch, and others. This is particularly troublesome since the quote reported at DL 10.136 contributes nothing to Purinton's claim that Epicurus does not consider joy to be a pleasure; this point is read into the passage from these other sources.

activity and one not. And thus, like Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky's interpretation, Purinton's seems out of synch with the intent of the passage overall, which is to show that Epicurus considers there to be two kinds of *pleasure*.

One possible solution is that Epicurus is using one word—joy—to designate two different types of pleasure: one kinetic, the other katastematic. We have seen evidence that Epicurus often equates joy with tranquility, a katastematic pleasure, but there is also evidence that he equates joy with gladness of mind, the second example of kinetic pleasure in the passage at DL 10.136.[108] Purinton identifies several passages concerned with Epicureanism that suggest that joy and gladness of mind are simply two words for the same thing.[109] For example, at *Non Posse* 1092d, Plutarch has Theon say, "The merriment of the mind concerning the flesh and the comfort of the flesh . . . someone would not consider to be either 'mental' [ψυχικὰς] or a 'joy' [χαράς]," for this is not "what is worthy and right to be considered gladness of mind [εὐφροσύνας] and joy [χαράς]."[110] Here Plutarch uses the terms as if they were synonyms. At *Non Posse* 1097f, Theon states that nobody would consider such things as very small comforts to be

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[108] There is a an interesting problem with εὐφροσύνη in this passage, having to do with how Epicurus' examples map onto his schema of bodily and mental pleasures. In DL 10.136, Epicurus lists ἀταραξία and ἀπονία as examples of mental and bodily pleasures, respectively, and one would assume that the examples of kinetic pleasure follow suit, such that χαρά is the mental and εὐφροσύνη the bodily example of kinetic pleasure. However, we know that εὐφροσύνη is normally used to indicate mental rather than bodily pleasure. Some scholars claim that εὐφροσύνη is a kinetic bodily pleasure. Merlan, for example, writes, "It is true that some scholars interpret εὐφροσύνη as designating corporeal pleasure. Such an interpretation can be hardly ruled out" (Merlan, 6). According to Merlan, Prodicus, who insists in Plato's *Protagoras* (337c) that εὐφροσύνη should be used to designate only mental pleasures, might have so insisted if it was common practice to consider εὐφροσύνη as both a mental and a bodily pleasure. But as many have rightly commented, εὐφροσύνη should really only describe mental pleasure, given its etymology from φρήν, the heart or seat of thought. Cf. N, 455; and Diano, 'La psicologia d'Epicuro e la teoria delle passioni,' in *Scritti Epicurei*, 179.

[109] Cf. Purinton, 290n17.

[110] Theon explains that what properly deserves to be considered εὐφροσύνη and χαρά is pure of the taint of its opposite and involves no element of pain or regret.

"true gladness of mind [εὐφροσύνας] or joy [χαρὰς] belonging to healthy people," again suggesting that the terms are equivalent. Purinton mentions several other passages that are along these lines from other sources.[111] I would add to his list *Non Posse* 1099f, where Theon, discussing the memories of the accomplishments of great men, says, "So we may conceive how great was the gladness of mind [εὐφροσύνη] and joy [χαρά] and delight [γηθοσύνη] present in their lifetimes to those actual authors of deeds the memory of which, after five hundred years and more, has not lost its cheer [τὸ εὐφραῖνον]." Here also there is no distinction drawn between gladness of mind and joy. There is also *Non Posse* 1101a, where Aristodemus says that the Epicurean treatment of providence and divination "does not allow gladness of mind or joy [εὐφροσύνη δὲ καὶ χαράν] from the gods," since it "causes us to be thus with respect to the gods: neither being troubled [ταράττεσθαι] nor rejoicing [χαίρειν]." Again, gladness of mind and joy appear to be two words for the same thing.

There is evidence, then, that Epicurus equates joy with gladness of mind, a kinetic pleasure, and also with tranquility, a katastematic pleasure. One explanation, however unattractive it may be, is that he uses the same word to mean different things. What is left unaccounted for, however, is why, in the passage at DL 10.136, Epicurus lists joy as an example of only kinetic pleasure. But, again, this problem does not complicate my interpretation of Epicurean pleasure.

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[111] E.g., DL 10.120; Diogenes of Oinoanda *New Fragment* 12 (fr. 43 Smith); Athenaeus 12.513a-b; and Hippolytus (359 U). Cf. Purinton, 290n17.

I.3

De Finibus 1 and 2

Thus far I have given an interpretation of Epicurean pleasure without reference to Cicero's account of Epicureanism in the first two books of *De Finibus*. The reason for this, as I mentioned before, is that Cicero's account itself is controversial, and I hoped to deal first with Epicurus' works themselves and with those texts whose content is less hotly debated than *De Finibus*.

By now it should be clear that the interpretation of Epicurean pleasure that I have presented runs counter to Cicero's. I have argued, *contra* Cicero, that a pleasure's being sensory is not the criterion by which kinetic and katastematic pleasures are differentiated. In this section, I want to investigate Cicero's understanding of the two pleasures and argue that his account is rather confused, particularly the parts concerning kinetic pleasure. In the first two books of *De Finibus*, we find Cicero switching between two conceptions of kinetic pleasure without any acknowledgment on his part that he is doing so: on the one hand, he describes kinetic pleasure as a sensory titillation, and on the other, as the filling of a lack. My main task in this section is to discuss this inconsistency in *De Finibus* in order to show that my reading of the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure does in fact map on to Cicero's somewhat, but his presentation of the Epicurean position remains fairly unclear. A secondary task will be to address Torquatus' statement at *De Fin.* 1.56 that the absence of pain does not arouse the senses. Purinton takes *De Fin.* 1.56 as evidence that Epicurus could not have held that katastematic pleasure involves sensory awareness. Admittedly, at first glance the passage

does present difficulties for my reading.[112] In response, I will offer an explanation of *De Fin.* 1.56 so as to show that the statement is out of keeping with Epicurean doctrine.

At *De Fin.* 1.37, Cicero has Torquatus give the following description of the types of pleasure Epicureans pursue:

> We do not simply pursue the sort of pleasure which stirs our nature with its sweetness and produces agreeable sensations in us; rather, the pleasure we deem greatest is that which is felt when all pain is removed. For when we are freed from pain, we take delight in that very liberation and release from all that is distressing. Now everything in which one takes delight is a pleasure (just as everything that distresses one is a pain). And so every release from pain is rightly termed a pleasure.
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> *Non enim hanc solam sequimur quae suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet et cum iucunditate quadam percipitur sensibus, sed maxumam voluptatem illam habemus quae percipitur omni dolore detracto. Nam quoniam, quom privamur dolore, ipsa liberatione et vacuitate omnis molestiae gaudemus, omne autem id, quo gaudemus, voluptas est, ut omne, quo offendimur, dolor, doloris omnis privatio recte nominata est voluptas*.

Here Cicero has Torquatus attempt to distinguish two types of pleasure: pleasant sensations caused by sensory stimulations, and delight at being without pain.[113] My purpose in citing this passage here is to identify what I call the 'first description' of kinetic pleasure in *De Finibus*, namely, pleasure as an agreeable sensation. In addition, there are several interesting elements of this passage that should be mentioned: first, notice that Torquatus does not deny that Epicureans seek the first kind of pleasure, sensory pleasure; the point is that they do not seek *only* sensory pleasure. Second, Torquatus does not use the language of 'kinetic' and 'katastematic' here; those terms are

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[112] Cf. Purinton, 303. He brings up this point in order to argue against Gosling and Taylor's reading in particular.

[113] It is irrelevant to my point here whether Cicero is describing the Epicurean greatest pleasure as the process of removing pain or as the state of being without pain. My point is that Cicero has Torquatus contrast the greatest pleasure, however it is defined, with sensory pleasure.

introduced by Torquatus later, after much goading by Cicero.[114] Third, the passage suggests that Torquatus believes that both kinds of pleasure are perceived: the first is a felt sensation, and the second is a conscious feeling of having all pain removed (that is, the delight that results from the removal of pain). According to Torquatus, the highest pleasure is that experienced as a consequence of the complete removal of pain. In his example of the highest pleasure, which follows immediately on the passage given above from 1.37, Torquatus makes plain his belief that the highest pleasure is specifically the *result* of the removal of pain. He writes, "When food and drink rid us of hunger and thirst, that very removal of the distress brings with it pleasure in consequence. In every other case too, removal of pain causes a resultant pleasure" (*De Fin.* 1.37).[115] This example leads into Torquatus' denial of a neutral state between pleasure and pain, the idea being that once pain is removed pleasure immediately flows in to take its place. The example also reinforces the idea that the absence of pain is brought about by an external element (in this case food or drink), and involves the experience of pleasure without pain. There is no indication in Torquatus' initial description of Epicurean hedonism that the highest pleasure is either nonsensory or goes unperceived, even though Torquatus does describe what is assumed to be kinetic pleasure as particularly sensory.

However, Torquatus does intend some distinction between the pleasures he mentions in 1.37, for he talks of pleasure that "titillated the senses [*titillaret sensus*] and flooded them with a stream of sweetness [*ad eos cum suavitate adflueret et inlaberetur*]" as though it were different from the feeling of complete emancipation from pain (1.39).

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[114] Cf. *De Fin*. 2.9.

[115] "*Ut enim, quom cibo et potione fames sitisque depulsa est, ipsa detractio molestiae consecutionem adfert voluptatis, sic in omni re doloris amotio successionem ecficit voluptatis.*"

In the story of the hand at *De Fin.* 1.39, Torquatus appears to distinguish the absence of pain from an 'active sensation.' The story goes that Chrysippus used to give the following syllogism: "'Does your hand want anything, while it is in its present condition?' Answer: 'No, nothing,'—'But if pleasure were a good, it would want pleasure.'—'Yes, I suppose it would.'—'Therefore pleasure is not a good'" (*De Fin.* 1.39). Torquatus claims that this argument tells against a Cyrenaic but not an Epicurean, since the former counts as pleasure only that which "titillated the senses and flooded them with a stream of sweetness," and so the hand, which feels no pain, would indeed be pleasureless. Torquatus states, "Neither the hand nor any other part of the body could be satisfied with the mere absence of pain and no delightful surge of pleasure [*vacuitate doloris sine iucundo motu voluptatis*]" (*De Fin.* 1.39). Epicureans, according to Torquatus, sidestep Chrysippus' argument because they believe that the absence of pain is pleasure. So the hand does indeed want nothing, but it is not without pleasure. The Epicurean dodges Chrysippus' criticism only if there is a difference between a "delightful surge of pleasure" and the pleasure associated with the complete removal of pain.

Now, from his story it is rather unclear whether Torquatus thinks that the highest pleasure and sensory awareness are mutually exclusive. However, I think we should avoid the conclusion that the Epicurean highest good is a state of nonperception, for right before the story of the hand Torquatus states that awareness is a condition for the experience of pleasure and pain. He claims, "Now whoever is to any degree conscious of how he is feeling must to that extent be either in pleasure or pain [*Quisquis enim sentit, quemadmodum sit adfectus, eum necesse est aut in voluptate esse aut in dolore*]" (*De Fin.*

1.38). The highest pleasure must therefore involve some kind of awareness of one's condition.

Furthermore, we should not consider that Torquatus' initial contrast between 'sensory' pleasure and the absence of pain is meant as a sharp division. There is no indication in Torquatus' initial description that a pleasure that "titillates the senses" or "floods them with a stream of sweetness" cannot lead to the absence of pain. Furthermore, I believe that he discusses the absence of pain in contrast to 'regular sensory pleasure' in order to press the point, which Epicurus himself makes in the *Letter to Menoeceus*, that if sensory pleasures are pursued without any mind to their limit (i.e., the absence of pain), unhappiness will ensue in the form of frustrated desires, an abused body, etc. At *De Fin.* 1.32, Torquatus mentions the Epicureans' concern with overindulgence and heedlessness: "People who shun or loathe or avoid pleasure do not do so because it is pleasure, but because for those who do not know how to seek pleasure rationally great pains ensue." A little later in 1.32, Torquatus claims that no one has the right to criticize a person "who wished to enjoy a pleasure that had no harmful consequences," and at 1.33 he adds that Epicureans chastise men who are so entranced by pleasure and blinded by desire that they cannot foresee the pain that awaits them. Moreover, Torquatus' stated goal at the beginning of his discussion of the highest pleasure is to convince Cicero "how serious, sober and severe is Epicurean philosophy, notwithstanding the view that it is sensual, spoilt and soft [*voluptaria, delicata, mollis*]" (1.37). Torquatus' goal is to distance the Epicurean *telos* from that of the profligate rather than to argue that the *telos* is nonsensory. He attempts to guard against a pejorative view of Epicureans as wantonly pursuing sensory pleasure without also securing the absence of

pain. There is no indication that the Epicurean good life is exclusive of rationally pursued sensory pleasures, for Epicureans do not take issue with those who pursue pleasures that entail no annoying consequences.[116]

At any rate, this 'first description' of kinetic pleasure as an agreeable sensory stimulation found at 1.37 appears again in the course of Cicero's arguments against Epicureanism. When questioning the Epicurean notion that once the complete removal of pain is reached there can be no increase in pleasure, but only variation, Cicero states:

> The variation you are speaking of is rather unclear: you say that the height of pleasure is to be free from pain, and that when we taste those pleasures which give the senses a sweet sensation, then we experience 'kinetic' pleasure. It is this sort of pleasure, you claim, which brings variation, but fails to add to the pleasure of being free from pain, though why you call the latter pleasure at all is a mystery to me. (2.10)
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> *Ista varietas quae sit, non satis perspicio, quod ais, quom dolore careamus, tum in summa voluptate nos esse, quom autem vescamur iis rebus, quae dulcem motum adferant sensibus, tum esse in motu voluptatem, qui faciat varietatem voluptatum, sed non augeri illam non dolendi voluptatem; quam cur voluptatem appelles, nescio.*

His criticism aside, it is clear that Cicero believes that Epicureans consider kinetic pleasures to be defined in terms of an agreeable sensation. Later in Book 2, Cicero criticizes the Epicurean 'cradle argument,' which holds that the *telos* is pleasure because infants and nonrational animals instinctually pursue it. On the Epicureans' logic, the *telos* is that for which we have a natural, instinctual desire.[117] Cicero, however, wonders why a creature would desire to seek the absence of pain instinctively, since according to

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[116] Thus I agree with Striker when she claims, "The contrast is not between different types of pleasures, but rather between different conceptions of the greatest pleasure—the misguided one of the luxury-seekers and the correct one of the Epicureans. Even the profligates are ultimately seeking freedom from pain and trouble, according to Epicurus; they just have the wrong idea about how this is to be achieved" (205).

[117] For more on this Epicurean argument, see Jacques Brunschwig, "The cradle argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism," in *The Norms of Nature*, 113-44.

him only kinetic pleasure would arouse an appetitive desire: "Only the caress of sensual pleasure has this effect [*At ille pellit, qui permulcet sensum voluptate*]," namely, the arousal of desire (*De Fin.* 2.32). The *telos* cannot be the absence of pain because "the static condition of freedom from pain [*status non dolendi*] produces no motive force to impel the mind to act" (*De Fin.* 2.32). His criticism aside, the point is that here again kinetic pleasure is being distinguished from katastematic pleasure based on a belief that the former has a sensory nature while the latter somehow does not. Cicero makes this belief evident once more, at *De Fin.* 2.16, where he claims that Epicurus understands kinetic pleasure to be a particularly sensory phenomenon. Cicero writes, "[Epicurus] calls the sweet sensation 'kinetic' pleasure; the freedom from pain 'static' pleasure [*sic enim appellat hanc dulcem, in motu, illam nihil dolentis, in stabilitate*]" (*De Fin.* 2.16). And again, at *De Fin.* 2.30, Cicero mentions "the 'kinetic' sort of pleasure (this he terms those pleasures that produce, as it were, a sweet sensation) [*hanc in motu voluptatem—sic enim has suavis et quasi dulcis voluptates appellat*]." Lastly, in his comparison of Epicureanism and Cyrenaicism, Cicero claims that sensory pleasure is the only phenomenon the Cyrenaics recognize as pleasure; they do not recognize also the freedom from pain. He mentions to Torquatus, "Aristippus and all the Cyrenaics, who did not shrink from regarding pleasure as the supreme good—I mean the kind of pleasure that arouses the senses with an intense sweetness [*quae maxuma dulcedine sensum moveret*]. They had no time for that freedom from pain of yours [*vacuitatem doloris*]" (*De Fin.* 2.39). Clearly, Cicero uses the criterion of sensation to differentiate kinetic from katastematic pleasure. From these many passages, we gain a sense of what I am calling

Cicero's 'first description' of kinetic pleasure, namely, a sweet, agreeable feeling of the senses.[118]

With this description, Cicero neatly sets up for himself the following major objection he presents several times in the early sections of Book 2: the common conception of the Greek word ἡδονή and the Latin *voluptas* is kinetic pleasure, yet Epicurus insists that the highest pleasure is katastematic. Cicero claims, "Everyone agrees that the Greek word ἡδονή and the Latin word *voluptas* refer to an agreeable stimulus that gladdens the senses" (*De Fin.* 2.8).[119] According to Cicero, Epicurus cheats and blatantly ignores the accepted terminology by using the word 'pleasure,' which normally carries the connotation of an agreeable feeling, to designate a state which involves no agreeable feeling at all but is simply the absence of pain. Cicero has devised quite a clever strategy: if he describes kinetic pleasures as agreeable sensory phenomena and contends that they differ from katastematic pleasure, then he can easily show that Epicurus is playing with words when he calls katastematic pleasure his highest good.

In Book 2 we encounter a second description of kinetic pleasure, this one proposed by Cicero himself and then confirmed by Torquatus. At 2.9, Cicero has the following exchange with Torquatus:

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[118] *De Fin*. 1.37, 2.10, 2.16, 2.30, 2.32, 2.39.

[119] "*Omnes enim iucundum motum quo sensus hilaretur Graece hedone, Latine voluptatem vocant.*" Cicero repeats this belief elsewhere: at 2.14 he claims that most Latin speakers understand by *voluptas* "the enjoyment of a delightful stimulation of one of the senses [*In eo autem voluptas omnium Latine loquentium more ponitur, cum percipitur ea quae sensum aliquem moveat iucunditas*]."

> "Then tell me," I said, "in the case of one who is thirsty, is drinking a pleasure?" ["*Estne, quaeso," inquam, "sitienti in bibendo voluptas?*"] "Who could deny it?" "Is it the same pleasure as having a quenched thirst?" ["*Eademne quae restincta siti?*"] "No, it is quite a different kind. A quenched thirst is a 'static' pleasure, whereas the pleasure of having one's thirst quenched is 'kinetic'" ["*Restincta enim sitis stabilitatem voluptatis habet, illa autem voluptas ipsius restinctionis in motu est*"].

Here, pleasures are described in terms of fulfillment of a lack: kinetic pleasure is that experienced while a lack is filled (e.g., pleasure in the act of drinking while one is thirsty), and static pleasure is experienced as a consequence of having one's desire satisfied. Torquatus confirms that the two pleasures are indeed different: they are "*alio genere*."

My task here is not to argue against the position that kinetic and static pleasures are different genera, for I have already done so in the previous sections of this dissertation. Rather, my task is to point out that here at 2.9, and in a few other places that I will mention in a moment, Cicero has adopted a new and different description of kinetic pleasure from Torquatus' initial description at 1.37. There and in many other passages of the first two books of *De Finibus*, the description is in terms of an agreeable sensory stimulation, whereas here in 2.9 Cicero frames the description of both pleasures in terms of fulfillment of a lack. The 2.9 description is echoed at 2.17, where Cicero questions Torquatus about the distinction between kinetic and static pleasure on which they have just agreed. Cicero asks, "So do you claim that in mixing a drink for another when one is not thirsty oneself one feels the same pleasure as the thirsty person who drinks it?" (*De Fin.* 2.17). And instead of answering, Torquatus requests an end to questioning, thereby confirming Cicero's opinion that Epicureans cannot stand up to the rigors of

philosophical discussion.[120] At any rate, in this passage, like the one before it at 2.9, Cicero couches the description of kinetic pleasure in terms of fulfillment of a lack. A very interesting feature of the 2.9 passage is Cicero's qualification that the drinker is thirsty; a kinetic pleasure is preceded by a lack and is therefore linked to the restoration rather than to the tasting. This qualification lends support to my contention that pleasures that are experienced independently of a lack (e.g., the pleasure of a tasty dessert one eats when full) are not in fact kinetic at all but ought to be considered katastematic.

Interestingly enough, immediately after Cicero suggests that kinetic pleasures are experienced in the fillings of a lack, he reverts back to Torquatus' initial description of kinetic pleasure in terms of sensory arousal: at 2.10 Cicero claims that the Epicureans understand kinetic pleasures as "those pleasures which give the senses a sweet sensation." There is no indication on Cicero's part that this description of kinetic pleasure, which echoes Torquatus' from 1.37, is in fact different from the one Cicero just gave at 2.9 and that he mentions again at 2.17.[121] Given that Cicero appears to have no qualms about exposing any and all inconsistencies in the Epicurean conception of pleasure, it is a wonder that he foregoes this opportunity to lay bare what would most definitely be grist for his anti-Epicurean mill, namely, a clear case of Epicurean equivocation about the nature of pleasure (in this case, specifically *kinetic* pleasure). As

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[120] At *De Fin*. 1.22, Cicero expresses his distaste for Epicurus' ignorance of logic and argumentation: "Take next the second main area of philosophy, the study of inquiry and argument known as logic. As far as I can gather, your master is quite defenseless and destitute here. He abolishes definition, and teaches nothing about division and classification. He hands down no system for conducting and concluding arguments; he gives no method for dealing with sophisms, or for disentangling ambiguities."

[121] And again at 2.32, where Cicero claims that it is kinetic, rather than static, pleasure that would be sought instinctively by children and animals, since the former consists in "the caress of sensual pleasure" that impels the mind to seek it. According to Cicero, nothing impels us to seek instinctively the absence of pain.

we have seen, Torquatus suggests early on in *De Finibus* that the defining feature of such pleasures is their sensory nature, while later in the text he confirms Cicero's description of them as fulfillments of lacks. Why does Cicero fail to point out this shift and to use it against Torquatus as evidence of Epicurean equivocation about the nature of pleasure? Perhaps Cicero himself is confused about Epicurean kinetic pleasure and therefore might have been reluctant to point out the inconsistency in the two descriptions, lest he reveal his own uncertainty. Or perhaps he simply did not realize that the descriptions are different.

Any answer would, of course, be speculation, but I would argue that the presence of these different descriptions of kinetic pleasure should make us wary of building so much of Epicurus' ethical theory on Cicero's testimony in *De Finibus*. We cannot derive a clear picture of Epicurean pleasure from that text, and there is the fact that Cicero is a hostile source, disinclined to give the Epicureans a fair hearing. For instance, when the discussion turns to the crucial equation of the absence of pain with pleasure (concerning the meaning of the equation and its possibility), Cicero has Torquatus demand an end to questioning, leaving us with no explanation or defense of the main Epicurean ethical position. *De Finibus* is a very problematic text, a fact that should lead us to be conservative in our reliance on it.

Now, this is not to say that there are no valuable clues to understanding Epicurus' ethics in Cicero's account. On the contrary, I believe that the second description of kinetic pleasure, as the filling of a lack, and the description of static pleasure as the pleasure of having had this lack filled, is compatible with the interpretation I have argued for in this dissertation. I hesitate to use these parts of Cicero's account in support of my

reading, since, as I discussed, there is another, different description of pleasure at play in the first two books of *De Finibus*. But, despite the presence of two different descriptions, the idea that Epicurus believes restoration plays a role in pleasure does have a historical precedent in Cicero.

Lastly, in this section on Cicero I would like to address what could be seen as a counterexample to my contention that the Epicureans understand the absence of pain to be sensory. At *De Fin.* 1.56, Torquatus flatly denies that the absence of pain arouses the senses:

> But we do not hold that when pleasure is removed distress immediately follows, unless it is a pain that happens to take its place. Rather, we take delight in the removal of pain even if this is not followed by the kind of pleasure that arouses the senses. One can see from this the extent to which pleasure consists in the absence of pain.
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> *Non placet autem, detracta voluptate, aegritudinem statim consequi, nisi in voluptatis locum dolor forte successerit; at contra, gaudere nosmet omittendis doloribus, etiam si voluptas ea, quae sensum moveat, nulla successerit; eoque intellegi potest, quanta voluptas sit non dolore.*

Here it seems that Torquatus suggests a middle state between pleasure and pain, for he explains that there are moments when we may experience neither distress nor pleasure. Alternatively, Torquatus might not be arguing for a third state (which would be very un-Epicurean of him) but arguing instead that there are two kinds of pleasure: one which arouses the senses, and one which does not (namely, the absence of pain). Whether he is arguing for three different conditions—pain, pleasure, and a middle state that is neither—or for two—pain and pleasure, the latter understood to be bifold—his point is the same: the absence of pain is not the kind of pleasure that arouses the senses. Clearly, anyone wishing to combat the presumption that the Epicurean highest pleasure is a state of nonperception must address Torquatus' claim.

While there is no disputing that Torquatus, or at least Cicero using Torquatus as a mouthpiece, believes that the absence of pain is nonsensory, doubts emerge concerning the statement's legitimacy when it is juxtaposed with other statements Torquatus makes about Epicurean pleasure and with standard Epicurean doctrine. Torquatus' claim that pain does not flow in when pleasure is removed contradicts the basic Epicurean tenet that there is no neutral state between pleasure and pain (cf. *De Fin.* 1.38). Presumably, when pleasure flows out, but pain does not flow in, some kind of neutral state must be present. Earlier, Torquatus himself denied the existence of a neutral state when he claimed that any conscious individual is feeling either pleasure or pain.[122] Torquatus might defend himself by arguing that when pain recedes, pleasure, rather than a neutral state or a sensory pleasure, emerges in the form of absence of pain. Yet, Torquatus cannot have his cake and eat it too; that is, he cannot claim that the absence of pain is different from sensory pleasure while at the same time maintaining that there is no neutral state. In order for his statement at 1.56 to make sense, the absence of pain has to be sufficiently different from 'sensory' pleasure; otherwise, Torquatus would have to admit that when pain exits, the sensory kind of pleasure enters. But his point is precisely that it is *not* the sensory kind of pleasure that enters when pain recedes; it is another kind, namely, the absence of pain. Torquatus must admit either that there is some third, neutral state or that pleasures are not divided into those that arouse the senses and those that do not. Since no

[122] Cf. *De Fin*. 1.38: "Now whoever is to any degree conscious of how he is feeling must to that extent be either in pleasure or pain."

Epicurean would admit the former,[123] one can assume that his claim that the absence of pain is somehow a nonsensory phenomenon should not be taken too seriously.

In this section I have attempted to accomplish two things: first, to point out a confusion in Cicero's account of Epicurean pleasure; second, to respond to the possible counterexample to my view inherent in Torquatus' statement that the absence of pain does not involve sensory arousal. With respect to the first task, I argued that Cicero presents us with two views on the difference between so-called kinetic and static pleasures. On the one hand, kinetic pleasures involve sensory titillation, while static pleasures do not. On the other, kinetic pleasures are experienced in the process of filling a lack, while static pleasures are those of having a lack filled. As I have discussed, Cicero vacillates between these different explanatory frameworks without acknowledging that he is doing so. A look at the first two books of *De Finibus* should convince us to exercise caution when drawing on Cicero's account. However, Cicero's account is not without merit, for, as I have argued in this section and in the dissertation thus far, one of his descriptions of the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure matches up closely with my own. I have argued that we have good reason to believe that Epicurus does describe pleasure in terms of the healthy functioning of the organism and in terms of having a lacked filled. In this respect, Cicero's description is not entirely at odds with my own. The problem, again, is that this is not Cicero's *only* description of kinetic and katastematic pleasure. My point is simply that we need not conclude with Nikolsky that

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[123] And neither would Torquatus, since he claims at *De Fin*. 1.38 that any person aware of how he or she is feeling is either in pleasure or pain. Cf. my previous note. Moreover, Diogenes of Oinoanda reports that when pain is removed, pleasure *does* immediately follow. He writes, "When feelings by which the soul is troubled have been taken away, pleasures enter [τῶν ὀχλούντων τὴν ψυχὴν παθῶν ὑπεξαιρεθέντων τὰ ἥδοντα αὐτὴν ἀντιπαρέρχεται]." *Diogenis Oenoandensis fragmenta*, ed. J. William (Leipzig: Teubner, 1907), 38.9-13.

Cicero's confusion forecloses the possibility of anything true emerging from *De Finibus*. Rather, we should simply be wary of constructing an account of Epicurean pleasure based primarily on that text.

Nikolsky has suggested, and I think rightly, that Cicero's belief that kinetic and katastematic pleasures are two separate phenomena—one sensory, and one not—derives from the *divisio Carneadea*, the Middle Academy's classification of ethical doctrines according to ends.[124] Cicero's account of Epicurean ethics reflects the Carneadean approach of combining two ethical doctrines to form a third: Epicureanism is the combination of the approaches of Aristippus and Hieronymus of Rhodes. As we know from *De Finibus*, Cicero believes that Epicurean ethics is a failed attempt to combine bodily pleasure with the absence of pain—the ethical ends proposed by Aristippus and Hieronymus, respectively. If this is the case, then Cicero's account is more a reflection of the *divisio Carneadea* than a faithful portrayal of Epicureanism; all the more reason for one to be conservative in one's reliance on *De Finibus*.

[124] Cf. N, 462-65.

I.4

Conclusion

In the introduction, I framed the problem with which I have been concerned thus far in the following way: how can we make sense of the purportedly Epicurean distinction between the so-called kinetic and katastematic pleasures? Many sources, particularly Cicero in his *De Finibus*, bring this problem to the fore. Cicero emphasizes that no one would equate pleasure with a state lacking pain, for the two are completely dissimilar: the former involves sensory titillations while the latter lacks them completely. Epicurus himself is confused on this point, Cicero continues, for he splits pleasures into two distinct genera—kinetic and static—and then maintains that both are of supreme importance to the good life.[125] Clearly, the Epicurean distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure was not well understood.

I have argued here that Epicurus understands katastematic pleasure to be a perceived state of health and natural functioning of the organism. Far from an unconscious state void of awareness of one's bodily condition, being without pain involves awareness that the organism is working as it should. I argued that according to Epicurus we perceive healthy functioning in two ways: first, when we are aware that our bodies and minds are without disturbance—when we are aware of not being cold or hungry, for example. This is a negative awareness in the sense that we perceive healthy functioning when we perceive a lack of unhealthy functioning. To experience no impediment to natural, painless functioning is to experience health. Second, we perceive painless functioning when we experience pleasures such as taste, sex, and sound. These

[125] E.g., at *Tusc. Disp*. 3.41-2 and Alciphron *Epistularum* 3.55.8 (432 U).

pleasures are painless in themselves; they are not inherently preceded by or mixed with pain. For this reason, they ought to be considered katastematic.

On my reading, Epicurean kinetic pleasure is the perceived restoration of the body's healthy functioning. Cicero, it would seem, was right to say that Epicurus classifies as kinetic the pleasure one experiences while quenching a thirst. Both kinetic and katastematic pleasure, then, are linked to healthy functioning of the organism: the former is the process of restoring healthy functioning, the latter is that healthy functioning itself.[126]

From these descriptions of kinetic and katastematic pleasure, we gain a sense of the meaning of the terms 'mixed' and 'unmixed' pleasures. Mixed pleasures, which correspond to kinetic pleasures, are preceded by a deficiency; they are directly linked to a lack that needs filling. In contrast, unmixed pleasures—Epicurus' katastematic pleasures—are not preceded by a lack and are not defined in terms of the replenishment of a deficiency.[127]

As I will explain in Part II, much of the Epicurean language concerning pleasure closely parallels Plato's in the *Philebus*. The language of mixed and unmixed pleasures, the description of pleasure in terms of the perceived functioning of the organism, and the importance of the 'flux theory' in both the Epicurean and Platonic theories of pleasure should lead one to investigate the influence of the Academic discussions on Epicurean hedonism. In addition, Epicurean hedonism serves as a dialectical response to several

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[126] Thus, I agree with Long when he says, "'Kinetic' pleasure is thus (or so I think) a necessary condition of at least some 'static' pleasure" (65).

[127] The term 'unmixed' appears in *PD* 12: "And so, without an inquiry into nature there was not the taking of unmixed pleasures [ὥστε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίους τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν]."

Academic ideas about pleasure introduced in the *Philebus*, particularly the notion that the absence of pain is a neutral state, and the charge that pleasure cannot be the good since it is a becoming rather than being. The Academic ideas and the debates surrounding them are the subject of Part II.

PART II

THE *PHILEBUS* AND THE FOURTH-CENTURY DEBATES

II.1

The Restoration Model in Plato's *Philebus*

It is clear that in the *Philebus* Plato describes at least two kinds of pleasure—namely, mixed pleasures of the body and soul together and those of the body alone—on a restoration model, that is, a model on which pleasure is identified with the restoration of a living organism to its natural state.[1] That Plato's description of all forms of the two main kinds of pleasure in the dialogue, namely, the mixed pleasures [μειχθείσαι ἡδοναί] of the soul, body, and the soul and body together, and the unmixed ones [ἀμείκτοι ἡδοναί], follows this same model is less obvious, and, consequently, more disputed.[2] In this section I intend to argue the following points: first, that Plato does have a uniform conception of pleasure in the dialogue—namely, the restoration model—that underlies his description of mixed and unmixed pleasures. While I am not the first to raise this issue,[3] I believe insufficient attention has been paid to an important modification Socrates makes to the model in a discussion with his main interlocutor, Protarchus, at 42c.[4] There

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[1] As, for example, in discussions beginning at 31d and 42d. I will look at these passages and others in detail in what follows.

[2] Both Dorothea Frede and Gerd Van Riel argue in favor of the view that the restoration model underlies Plato's descriptions of mixed and unmixed pleasures. See Frede, "Disintegration and Restoration: Pleasure and Pain in Plato's *Philebus*," in *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, ed. Richard Kraut (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 425-63; Frede, *Platon: Philebos*, Platon, Werke: Übersetzung und Kommentar (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992), 229-318; Frede, introduction to *Plato: Philebus* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), xii-lxxx; and Van Riel, *Pleasure and the Good Life* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 17-29. Several scholars disagree. For the contrasting view see GT, 136 and 140; Gosling, *Plato, Philebus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 122 and 213; and Gabriela Carone, "Hedonism and the Pleasureless Life in Plato's *Philebus*," *Phronesis* 45, no. 4 (2000): 267-270.

[3] Cf. the previous note.

[4] George Rudebusch, for instance, writes, "Finally, it is noteworthy that the *Philebus*, though a later dialogue, assumes that one can coherently talk of a person unconsciously enjoying pleasure (*Phlb*. 21a-b)." *Socrates, Pleasure, and Value* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 71. See also my next note regarding Frede.

the two agree that pleasure is to be identified with *perceived* restorations, rather than restoration per se. Which brings me to my second point: this modified description is crucial to Socrates' contention that a neutral state of freedom from pain is not a pleasure.[5] I intend to show that by distancing pleasure from the absence of pain, Plato identifies the issues that anyone (like Epicurus, for instance) who wishes to argue in favor of their association must confront, namely, the perception requirement and the restoration model. In line with this discussion, my third task in this section is to show how Plato's treatment of mixed and unmixed pleasure in the *Philebus* constitutes an advancement in his thoughts on the physiology of pleasure from Book 9 of the *Republic*. One of the main advancements, I will argue, is the perception requirement for pleasures and pains.

Before I turn to a general account of Plato's treatment of pleasure, I should note that I am concerned with the intricate metaphysical passages early in the *Philebus* (i.e., 11a-31b) only insofar as they bear on the subsequent analysis and critique of pleasure in the rest of the work. Although these early discussions have much to interest us in their own right, they are not germane enough to the issues I am investigating here to warrant extensive treatment. That said, let us turn to a general account of restoration and perception in the *Philebus*.

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[5] Frede at times loses sight of the key issue of perception in Socrates' rejection of the neutral state. She writes, "To call a state of undisturbance 'pleasure' clearly violates Plato's definition of pleasure as the *restoration* of a disturbance" (1993, xlix). To call such a state 'pleasure' does not in fact violate Plato's definition as Frede has reported it, i.e., pleasure as a restoration *simpliciter*, for restorations and destructions continue to take place in the body even in a 'neutral state.' Rather, the violation is of the perception requirement entailed in the modified definition at 42c: the neutral state does not involve the perception of restoration, and thus it cannot be a pleasure.

A. The Restoration Model and the Perception Requirement: A General Account

Early in Plato's treatment of pleasure in the *Philebus*, Socrates tells Protarchus that since pleasure and pain arise together, they must be studied jointly (31b). Socrates assumes that there exists a certain harmony [ἁρμονία] or natural balance in the functioning of a living organism,[6] a natural state of health [ὑγίεια] and bodily integrity.[7] When this harmony is disrupted, the organism begins to disintegrate and pain arises (31d4-6). Conversely, when harmony is in the process of being reinstated, pleasure arises (31d8-9). A little later, Socrates reinforces the definition, noting, "it has now been said repeatedly" that pain arises as a result of various processes disruptive to the natural functioning of the organism, be they combinations [σύγκρισεις], separations [διάκρισεις], processes of emptying, decay, or growth (42c9-d3). He goes on to reinforce the definition of pleasure after emphasizing again the frequency that the definition has been mentioned: "But when things are restored [καθιστῆται] to their own nature again, this restoration [κατάστασιν], as we established in our agreement among ourselves, is pleasure" (42d5-7). Thus, the theory proposed is that pleasure arises in the process of the body's restoration [κατάστασις] to its natural state, and pain in the process of the

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[6] At first this harmonious state appears to apply only to the body, but, as I argue later, Plato attributes it to the soul as well. Cf. my later discussion of the mixed pleasures of the mind alone, viz., the emotions, which I claim are deficiencies in the soul itself and are thus disruptions of a natural, painless state of the soul.

[7] The natural state consists of the natural combination of πέρας and ἄπειρον, two of the four beings in the universe that Socrates brings up earlier in the dialogue (23b-27c). Although Socrates does explicitly state that the natural condition of living organisms is the combination of πέρας and ἄπειρον (32b), it is not entirely clear what this means in terms of the functioning of an organism. Does an organism in its natural state undergo restorations and destructions? Is it even possible for any organism subject to eternal flux to achieve a state of harmony and balance? For a discussion of the difficulties with the combination of πέρας and ἄπειρον in 23b-27c, see Frede, 1993, xxxiii-xxxix. A.E. Taylor has noted that this restoration model goes back to Alcmaeon of Croton, who held that health is a condition of ἰσονομία. Taylor, *Plato: Philebus and Epinomis*, ed. Raymond Klibansky (1956; repr. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1972), 56.

destruction of that state.[8] Pleasure, then, presupposes a lack that is being filled or righted. From these passages, there can be no doubt that Plato gives an account of pleasure on a restoration model in the *Philebus*.

Furthermore, Plato understands pleasure and pain to be changes very similar to (if not the same as) motions, given that he uses the language of flux and rest to aid in his descriptions. The language of restoration and deficiency implies that pleasures and pains are movements toward or away from a certain state, and this is reinforced by the metaphysical discussion of pleasure and pain in the dialogue's early conversations. These discussions are bound up with Socrates and Protarchus' attempt to decide which is the good: reason or pleasure. They decide that the best life is a combination of both. In attempting to decide second prize, Socrates claims that whatever it is that makes the combined life good and choiceworthy is more akin to reason than pleasure (22d). In his eyes, pleasure would not even receive third prize, since it would follow after the mixed life, the cause of the mixture's goodness, and reason (22e). Protarchus, of course, disagrees; he refuses to let Socrates go without a thorough discussion of which—either pleasure or reason—is most akin to what makes the mixed life good or is itself the cause of its goodness. Claiming that they need "a different device" to settle the issue (23b), Socrates proposes a method of division of everything that exists [τὰ ὄντα] into four kinds: the unlimited [τὸ ἄπειρον], limit [τὸ πέρας], what results from their mixture [τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν ἕν τι συμμισγόμενον], and the mixture's cause [αἰτία] (23c-27c).

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[8] It should be noted that Plato begins using a slightly different definition of pain toward the end of his treatment of pleasure: in the case of unmixed pleasures, he describes pain as just a lack rather than as a process of disintegration. This should not worry us, since the second version is merely a *re*description rather than a new description: a process of disintegration itself is a lack. At any rate, the shift is of little consequence to the dialogue, since the change does not result in any modification to the definition of pleasure.

Members of the unlimited, such as hot and cold, admit of more and less and do not possess a definite quantity (24c), being always in flux [προχωρεῖ] (24d). By contrast, limit imposes a definite number and measure on the unlimited (25e). It turns out that pleasure, as something that admits the more and less, belongs to the unlimited (28a) and is thus always in flux: "Pleasure itself is unlimited and belongs to that kind that in and by itself neither possesses nor will ever possess a beginning, middle, or end [μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος]" (31a).[9] The notion that pleasure is a change,[10] described in language that suggests it is a motion, is reinforced by the fact that it is a member of the ἄπειρον and thus never stands still.[11]

Having established the general restoration model, Plato modifies the account significantly with the perception requirement for pleasures and pains, which he introduces in his discussion of the false pleasure of the neutral state (42c-44b). There Socrates asks Protarchus what would happen if our bodies were being neither restored nor destroyed, "not moved in either direction [μὴ κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφ' ἑκάτερα]" (42e9). Protarchus responds that such a state is impossible, since our bodies are always being affected [πάσχει] one way or the other. Socrates allows this, conceding

[9] This fact about pleasure no doubt contributes to Socrates' rejection of it as a candidate for the good in the so-called 'process argument' attributed to certain κομψοί at 53c. The argument runs as follows: since pleasure is a process of generation [γένεσις], it necessarily comes to be for the sake of something else, and it is that 'something else' that should properly be said to be the good since it is being [οὐσία], rather than becoming.

[10] And pain also, since it is treated as a member of the unlimited as well. Cf. 27e.

[11] Although pleasure itself belongs to the unlimited, its coming-to-be and generation must involve limit (which is why Socrates says that pleasure and pain "arise together in the common kind" (31c), i.e., the mixture of the limit and unlimited). This is evident from Socrates' description of the third class of beings, the product of the mixture of the unlimited and limit: when limit imposes measure on the unlimited, there is a coming-into-being [γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν] (26d). In actuality, we do not experience unlimited pleasure, since in order for pleasure to come into being it must be accompanied by limit. Thus, the movements of pleasure are not unlimited; they are movements toward some definite end state, i.e., the natural integrity of the organism. But, even in its combination with limit, pleasure is always a movement and not a stable state.

the flux theory of "the wise men [οἱ σοφοί]" that "everything is in an eternal flux, upward and downward [ἀεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντα ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω ῥεῖ]" (43a). Having agreed, then, that a state of rest between restoration and disturbances is impossible, Socrates must modify his theory of pleasure if he wishes to continue to maintain the possibility of a neutral state. So he changes tack, and asks whether we always notice it when we are affected by various processes of restoration and destruction. Protarchus responds that indeed "almost all of these processes totally escape our notice" (43b). Socrates then adds the perception requirement to the restoration model: a process of replenishment must be perceived in order to be pleasure.

What is the physiology behind Plato's perception requirement? Earlier in the dialogue, before his treatment of false pleasure, Socrates maintains that perception occurs when both the body and soul are moved, in their respective ways,[12] by one and the same affection (34a). When an affection moves the body but does not penetrate the soul, the latter remains unmoved and thus takes no notice of what impinges on the body. In such circumstances, the condition is one of "nonperception [ἀναισθησία]" (34a).[13] In the discussion of the false pleasure of the neutral state, Socrates adds to this physiological account the point that only great changes cause pleasure and pain (43c). This fact jibes with the physiology he has already explained: if in order to be perceived an affection must penetrate both body and soul, then large affections will be the ones that manage to effect this double penetration, and they, rather than smaller ones, will be perceived.

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[12] ". . . a kind of upheaval that is peculiar to each but also common to both" (33d4-5).

[13] With this term, Socrates corrects his earlier labeling of such a condition as "obliviousness [λεληθέναι]" (33d-e). Obliviousness might be linked to forgetting, a situation in which an affection does not penetrate all the way to the soul. In such a situation, "no memory has yet arisen" (33e4), and so a new name should be given, viz., nonperception, that has no association with forgetting.

Small changes, too weak to reach the soul, terminate in the body. At this point, then, Plato has modified the restoration model with which he began his investigation into the nature of pleasure by qualifying that only those processes of replenishment that are perceived count as pleasure.[14] As I will explain in the following section, the restoration model in the *Philebus* surpasses that in the *Republic* because of the perception requirement.

B. Pleasure as a Filling: *Republic* Book 9

In Book 9 of the *Republic*, Plato presents a description of the nature of pleasure that is similar in many respects to that in the *Philebus*. In both, Plato links pleasure with the filling of a lack. Although the physiological account of pleasure in the *Republic* is less elaborate than in the *Philebus* (presumably the later dialogue),[15] the same basic elements of the *Philebus* model are found in Book 9: pleasure is associated with what is

[14] Gosling and Taylor note a difficulty with the perception requirement. They claim that even though perception is a necessary condition for pleasure, it remains unclear what the nature of pleasure actually is: is it a form of perception or a category of physical replenishment, "rather as taxis form a subset of motor-cars, those that carry passengers for a fare" (179). They lean toward the former option, while making sure to deny that Plato in these passages believes pleasure is a feeling that is perceived (181). They wonder, then, of what exactly bodily pleasure is a perception, and answer that it must be replenishments. Yet even here they are tentative, noting that "Plato's own language is ambivalent" as to whether the replenishments are the objects of perception or the causal conditions for perception (182). For my part, I think it makes most sense to understand pleasure in the dialogue as a category of physical replenishment, namely, those that are perceived. But, it must be emphasized that even if pleasure is a category of physical replenishment, the restoration's being perceived is its defining feature. That Plato reformulates his position on the neutral state in light of the perception requirement and that this requirement is necessary for his description of pure pleasures suggests that a restoration's being perceived is not a mere minor quality of pleasure. Furthermore, the so-called 'process argument' later in the dialogue, in which pleasure is rejected from the ranks of the good because it is a process toward an end rather than an end in itself, would be impotent if pleasure were a perception rather than a category of replenishment, since perceptions are not processes. I bow out of Gosling and Taylor's discussion of objects of, versus causal conditions for, perception, since one can hold that Plato has a theory of pleasure on a restoration model without settling the issue.

[15] I agree with Gosling and Taylor, Frede, and the majority of scholars who place the *Philebus* among Plato's latest dialogues and therefore after the *Republic*. For the later dating of the *Philebus*, see GT, 128; Frede, 1997, 383-389; and R. Hackforth, *Plato's Examination of Pleasure (The Philebus)* (1945; repr., Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. n.d.), 1-4. For an argument that the dialogue is earlier, see Robin A.H. Waterfield, *Plato, Philebus* (Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 1982), 11.

natural and harmonious ("Being filled [τὸ πληροῦσθαι] with what is appropriate to our nature is pleasure" [585d]); and physical and mental deficiencies are explained in terms of lacks in the body and soul ("Aren't hunger, thirst, and the like some sort of empty states [κενώσεις] of the body?" [585a-b]; "And aren't ignorance [ἄγνοια] and lack of sense [ἀφροσύνη] empty states of the soul?" [585b]). Furthermore, pleasure and pain are explicitly said to be motions [κίνεσεις] (583e), jibing with the same assumption—at play but not explicitly stated—in the *Philebus*.

What strikes one as quite different, however, is the lack of the perception requirement in the *Republic* account.[16] There is a direct equation of pleasure and pain with replenishment and deficiency, respectively, without the added feature found in the *Philebus* that one must be aware of these affections in order for one to have pleasure or pain. Without the perception requirement, the neutral state in the *Republic* is a condition in which no processes occur in the organism at all. Described in this way, the neutral state in the *Republic* corresponds to Plato's initial description of it in the *Philebus*, before he modifies it in light of the flux theory. Furthermore, with only the simple filling model of Book 9 and no perception requirement, Plato has his work cut out for him in explaining pure pleasures. For if pleasures are plain fillings, and pure pleasures are those that do not involve a lack, how can there by a filling without a lack, and thus, how can any pleasure be pure? The perception requirement resolves this difficulty, for, as Plato maintains in the *Philebus*, pure pleasures are preceded but an *unperceived* deficiency.

[16] Some have failed to notice this. A.E. Taylor, for instance, does not believe there is a real difference between the *Republic* and *Philebus* accounts of pleasure, noting that the latter "has nothing in principle to add" to the repletion-depletion theory in the former (96).

To comprehend how Plato's thoughts on the nature of pleasure improve between the *Philebus* and *Republic* accounts, we should examine his formulation of the neutral state in the latter dialogue more closely. In Book 9 of the *Republic*, the neutral state is said to be a stasis between two motions [κίνεσεις], namely, pleasure and pain (583e); it is "a sort of calm of the soul [ἡσυχία] by comparison to them" (583c).[17] He claims that when the ill say that health and the cessation of suffering are the greatest pleasures, what they are really praising is not pleasure at all but the absence of and relief from pain, namely, ἡσυχία (calm of the soul) (583d). Accordingly, when people move from experiencing true pleasure to a state without pain and suffering (again, ἡσυχία), they find such a state to be odious and painful (583e). In a clever turn of argument, Socrates asserts that ἡσυχία seems to resemble both a pleasure (when it is achieved after being in pain) and a pain (when achieved after pleasure). Since what is neither of two things cannot be both of them, the appearance that ἡσυχία is either pleasant or painful must be deceptive: "There is nothing sound in these appearances [φαντάσματα] as far as the truth about pleasure is concerned, only some kind of magic [γοητεία]" (584a). In Plato's eyes, ἡσυχία is a neutral state between pleasure and pain and is not to be confused with either one.[18] Plato goes on to liken the three-fold classification of states to levels on a vertical line: ἡσυχία finds itself in the middle of the line, and higher and lower are (true) pleasure and pain, respectively. Socrates asks Glaucon, "Do you think someone who was

[17] It is noteworthy that Plato never uses the term 'ἡσυχία' to describe the neutral state in the *Philebus*. If my analysis is right, ἡσυχία would be inappropriate in that dialogue because the neutral state is not actually a state of calm in the sense of motionlessness; fillings and diminishments continue to affect the body even when the soul is unaware of them.

[18] Interestingly, Socrates does not deny that when ἡσυχία is juxtaposed with pain the former does appear pleasant, or that when ἡσυχία is juxtaposed with pleasure the former does appear painful. Cf. 584a.

brought from down below to the middle would have any other belief than that he was moving upward? And if he stood in the middle and saw where he had come from, would he believe that he was anywhere other than the upper region, since he hasn't seen the one that is truly upper?" (584d). The vertical line image seems to directly correspond to the explanation given before at 583d: the sick, escaping their pain, believe they are moving upward toward pleasure; the healthy, looking back on their suffering, also believe they have moved upwards to a state of pleasure. According to Plato, the higher state into which the ill believe they have come is only the middle, neutral state of freedom from pain, not pleasure.[19]

For Plato, the discussion of the neutral state is convenient because it brings to light a phenomenon, which I alluded to above, that he feels must be distinguished from true pleasures. The appearances of pleasure, which are experienced by those who compare their calm, painless states to the painful ones that precede them, are more than once likened to "shadow-paintings [τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένα]" (583b, 586b). These pseudo-pleasures, or "bastard [νόθος] pleasures" (587c1), are preceded by pain and only *seem* pleasurable to those who contrast it with its opposite, having never experienced a 'real' pleasure.

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[19] Others understand differently the correspondence between the levels on the line and the states of pleasure, pain, and ἡσυχία. Frede claims that the lowest level corresponds to the "bastard" pleasures, the middle to the neutral state, and the higher to real, pure pleasures. Thus, she places the neutral state "'in between' the 'truly upward' motion of 'genuine' pleasure and the 'bastard' pleasure of liberation from pain" (1992, 440-41). Van Riel takes the same line: "As we have seen, in the *Republic* he indicated that this intermediate state, between pure pleasure and pleasure that is always mixed with pain, cannot itself be pleasure" (25). It seems to me that an account such as these, which places the neutral state between pure and bastard mixed pleasures, leaves out a key element in the spectrum: pain itself. In my view, ἡσυχία is intermediate between pain and pure pleasure, as Plato indicates in his explanation of the neutral state at 583c-584b and in his claim at 584e that those who are inexperienced in the truth have unsound opinions about "pleasure, pain, and the intermediate state," indicating that these are the three levels. The bastard pleasures are illusions that arise when one moves from the bottom level, viz., pain, to the middle, viz., ἡσυχία. Therefore, in my view the "bastards" do not have a proper place on the line.

So that nobody would think these "bastards," which in Plato's eyes are really just the absence of pain, are all there is to the nature of pleasure, Plato introduces pure pleasures, which are not preceded by pain. His examples, which he considers to be "especially good" specimens and uses again in the *Philebus*,[20] are the pleasures of smell: "They suddenly become very intense without being preceded by pain, and when they cease they leave no pain behind" (584b). He suggests that pure pleasures are not unusual ("There are plenty of other examples as well") and are sharply distinguished from "relief from pain [λύπης ἀπαλλαγή]" (584c).

Here, Plato distinguishes between bastard and pure pleasures in the following ways: on the one hand, the bastards are not pleasures at all but are merely the appearances of them; on the other, bastards are preceded by pain while pure pleasures are not. These distinctions, unfortunately, are rather untidy. It is unclear, for instance, whether the bastard pleasures ought to be considered pleasures or not. Although it may seem obvious that Plato believes they are "images" and "shadow-paintings"—likenesses of pleasures rather than actual ones—the distinction between them and pure pleasures muddles the issue. For it seems that the second distinction, based on purity, implies that there is something 'real' about impure pleasures. One could argue that Plato is distinguishing between species of real pleasures: those that are pure and those that are not.[21] It would be silly for him to distinguish real pleasures that are pure from fake pleasures that are impure, for purity would be inconsequential to their comparison if they belong to different genera. The problem, as Frede has commented, lies in Plato's failure

[20] Cf. 51b-e.

[21] On this point I agree with Frede, who mentions that with regard to pseudo-pleasures Plato "does regard them as pleasures albeit impure ones" (1985, 159).

to separate the fake pleasures from the neutral state: Plato binds their explanations together such that it is unclear whether the bastard pleasures are those of the neutral state or whether they are their own category (Frede, 1992, 435-37). In the *Republic*, Plato leaves the issue unsettled.

In Book 9 of the *Republic*, Plato is setting up the hedonistic terminology that carries over into the *Philebus*: we find the language of pure and impure, mixed and unmixed, and the mention of a neutral state. That there are problems with these topics should by now be evident. Plato has not worked out a theory of the nature of pleasure and has not yet included perception as a part of his basic filling model. In the *Philebus*, one of the main problems from the *Republic* is resolved, namely, that of the ontological status of mixed pleasures. In the later dialogue, Plato presents a theory of pleasure that confers legitimacy on pleasures of restoration: pleasure is a perceived process of restoration. As Frede comments, "Plato has thus discarded the *Republic*'s troublesome distinction between motions that are pleasures but 'not quite real ones': All motions that are restorations are real pleasures" (1992, 441).[22] In the *Philebus*, Plato more clearly distinguishes pleasure from pain, giving each its own definition, and separates the neutral state cleanly from both. No longer is the neutral state confusingly bound up with illegitimate pleasures that may or may not be real, for the neutral state has its own nature as a state lacking perception of fillings and depletions. It is the perception requirement of the *Philebus* that allows Plato to resolve many of the obscurities of the *Republic* account.

[22] Granted, Frede is speaking generally about Plato's theory of pleasure, but this is another case in which she loses sight of the importance of perception in the theory of pleasure in the *Philebus*.

C. The Model and Mixed Pleasures

Having presented a general account of the restoration model and the perception requirement in the *Philebus*, in this section I intend to continue my argument that the model underlies Plato's explanation of mixed and unmixed pleasures in the dialogue. It is thus my contention that in the dialogue, Plato has a general description of pleasure, namely, the restoration model, that he threads through all the types of pleasures he mentions. Some have argued the opposite view: Gosling and Taylor, for instance, maintain that the replenishment model does not hold for most of the pleasures Plato introduces in the *Philebus*. On their view, no general account of pleasure can be found in the dialogue, since Plato is not looking for one.[23] Gosling, in his commentary on the *Philebus*, presents the same view, as does Carone.[24] At first glance, one finds support for their position in the dialogue's early discussions, where we encounter Socrates asserting, against Protarchus, that pleasures "are *unlike* each other and that some are opposites" (13c). However, Socrates does not deny that there can be a unity to dissimilar things ("Colors certainly won't differ insofar as every one of them is a color" [12e]). His main gripe with Philebus' thesis that the good is pleasure is that one cannot call 'good' a host

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[23] They write, "It seems clear that in the *Philebus* Plato has no general formula to encapsulate the nature of pleasure. . . . It seems probable that because of his views on the dissimilarity of pleasures he actually thought that no such account was available" (136). And: "Further, the very variety disclosed might well make anyone doubt whether any general account, even of the schematic sort offered in the *Republic*, could ever be found. So the actual enquiries concerning pleasure would chime in with quite general misgivings about hunting for similarities in certain types of case, to make Plato sceptical of the possibility of finding an account. Certainly, the *Philebus* contains none, and arguably by that time Plato thought it a sign of innocence to look for one" (140).

[24] Gosling writes, "We have in fact quite different sorts of pleasure requiring different accounts" (213). He notes that in the *Philebus* Plato is not attracted to a search for some sort of overall account as he seems to be in *Republic* 9: "that search is rejected in 12c" (213). Furthermore, "A science of pleasure is needed to justify their being put in a single class, and that is not being supplied in the *Philebus*. In short, Plato does not, in the *Philebus*, give us an account of pleasure, if at that time he had one" (213). Cf. also Carone, 267-70, especially 267n19, where she argues that not all pure pleasures are fillings of a lack.

of dissimilar things, for some of them may turn out to be bad.[25] Plato's beef is with the attribution of 'good' but not necessarily with the practice of attributing some unity to a collection of dissimilar things that all possess a similar trait, like colors. Thus, this early discussion does not immediately condemn the enterprise of finding a unity to mixed and unmixed pleasures. And, as I will argue, the general account of pleasure I described previously manifests itself in some form in both mixed and unmixed pleasures.

In the present section I will begin with mixed pleasures, Plato's general definition of which is the following: "When someone undergoes restoration or destruction he experiences two opposed conditions at once [Ὁπόταν ἐν τῇ καταστάσει τις ἢ τῇ διαφθορᾷ τἀναντία ἅμα πάθα πάσχῃ]" (46c). Of the mixed pleasures, Plato distinguishes three kinds: those of the body alone, those of the soul and body together, and those of the soul alone. He does not describe each in its entirety all at once, so one must reconstruct his account of them from his explanations scattered throughout the dialogue. I will note where I am reorganizing the text and justify my reorganization in those places.

[25] This is evident at 13a-b, where Protarchus wonders at the harm to their present inquiry in attributing a unity to pleasures in the same way that dissimilar colors can be unified under the general name of 'color.' Socrates replies that the problem is with applying a unity that the pleasures do not all share, viz., goodness: "Now, no one contends that pleasant things are not pleasant. But while most of them are bad but some good, as we hold, you nevertheless call them all good, even though you would admit that they are unlike one another if someone pressed the point. What is the common element in the good and bad pleasures that allows you to call them all good?" (13b). This leaves open the possibility that there is some common element among pleasures that allows us to call them *pleasures*.

1. Mixed Pleasures of the Body

Following on Socrates' general account of the nature of pleasure is his description of mixed bodily pleasures. These pleasures are his prime example of the restoration model in play, and he uses them to illustrate the account he has just given. He then proceeds to distinguish them from other types of mixed pleasures; those of the body are discussed at 31d-32b and 46a-47c. Although Socrates does not explicitly state in the first of these two passages that the pleasures are mixed, in the second he does call 'mixed' the same kind of experience that he describes at 31d-32b, namely, "when someone undergoes restoration or destruction" (46c).[26] It therefore seems likely that these two passages ought to be considered parts of a single explanation.[27]

The earlier passage features a whole host of examples of mixed physical pleasures, each helping to illustrate the general restoration model. Hunger is a case of disintegration [λύσις] and pain [λύπη] (31e), eating is the corresponding refilling [πλήρωσις] and thus pleasure (31e); thirst is a destruction and pain [φθορά καὶ λύπη], while filling with liquid what is dried out is pleasure; unnatural separation and dissolution [διάκρισις δέ γ'αὖ καὶ διάλυσις ἡ παρὰ φύσιν], the affection caused by heat, is pain (32a), while cooling down, the natural restoration [κατὰ φύσιν δὲ πάλιν ἀπόδοσις], is pleasure (32a); lastly, "the unnatural coagulation of fluids in an animal through freezing is pain, while the natural process [κατὰ φύσιν ὁδός] of their dissolution or redistribution

[26] At 46b Protarchus suggests, "Then let us take up the whole tribe of these pleasures." Socrates responds: "You mean the ones that have that mixed nature?" (46b).

[27] I therefore agree with Waterfield, who groups the two passages together. He notes that the first passage does not include the language of 'mixed' because "the purpose of this part of the discussion is to establish a general model for pleasure. It follows from this general model that these and most other pleasures are mixed, and this is brought out in the case of physical pleasures in 46a-47c" (18). This seems entirely plausible.

is pleasure" (32a). As I discussed previously, Plato has in mind a natural condition of the organism, a state of balance and harmony; a disruption of this state is pain, a restoration is pleasure. At the end of this list of examples, Socrates says that they should accept what happens in the processes of restoration and destruction "as one form [ἕν εἶδος] of pleasure and pain" (32b6). We need not take Plato to mean that mixed physical pleasures are their own genus; he means merely that mixed physical pleasures are a form of pleasure that falls under his general description, namely, the restoration model. There should be no obstacle here to the argument that Plato has the restoration model in mind in the case of mixed physical pleasures.[28]

Later in the text (46a-47c), the topic of mixed physical pleasures arises again, this time accompanied by new examples: itching while rubbing, feeling hot while shivering, and feeling cold while sweating (46a). Regarding the condition described in the first example, Protarchus comments that it "really would seem to be a mixed experience [σύμμεικτον]" (46a), and he and Socrates proceed to investigate "the whole tribe of these pleasures [αἱ τούτων συγγενεῖς]" (46b).

In cases of mixed physical pleasures, some kind of restoration is occurring simultaneously with destruction. The pleasure (i.e., the restoration) can outweigh the pain (i.e., the destruction), or vice-versa, and the whole experience is called one or the other based on which predominates. Socrates comments, "At one time the combination of both will be called pleasure; at other times it will be called pain," depending on which,

[28] Indeed, those who deny that there is a general theory of pleasure in the *Philebus* believe that Plato has the restoration model in mind for at least the mixed physical pleasures of the body. Cf. GT, 136.

the restoration or the destruction, prevails (46c).[29] In a later section, I will discuss the physiology of mixed pleasures; that is, what it means for pleasure and pain to arise simultaneously in an organism. Here I have wanted to show only that the restoration model is at work in mixed physical pleasure.

2. Mixed Pleasures of the Soul and Body Together

After Socrates introduces the mixed pleasures of the body alone, he moves on to a second form of mixed pleasure: those experienced jointly by the soul and body. Like the first form of mixed pleasure, Plato's discussion of the second is scattered throughout the dialogue. His main considerations are found at 32c-32d and 47c-d.[30] At 36b, the pleasures of soul and body together—namely, those arising when a hope of replenishment coexists with bodily pain—are described as mixed: "This is, then, the occasion when a human being and other animals are simultaneously undergoing pleasure and pain [λυπεῖταί τε ἅμα καὶ χαίρει]." Later, at 47c, Socrates explicitly calls them mixed,[31] and he references unambiguously the earlier passage ("We have talked about them earlier"); this confirms that the two discussions are related.

Admittedly, the discussion is not as tidy as it may look: in the earlier passage (32c-32d) this particular form of pleasure is said to be of the soul alone, not of the soul

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[29] At 46e there is again the mention of one affection predominating over the other. In the discussion of the mixed pleasure of scratching an itch, Socrates claims there is "a mixture of pains and pleasures, whichever way the balance may turn."

[30] Again I agree with Waterfield's grouping of passages, although I modify somewhat: he believes the first passage is 33c-36c, and I believe the discussion extends slightly in both directions. Cf. Waterfield, 19.

[31] Socrates asserts that when the soul's experience is opposed to that of the body's, the two "are finally joined in a mixed state [εἰς μίαν ἀμφότερα κρᾶσιν ἰέναι]" (47c), and "the final result is a single mixture [μεῖξις μία] that combines pleasure and pain" (47d).

and body together (32c, 33c). When moving on to the second form of pleasure after mixed physical pleasures, Socrates says, "But now accept also the anticipation by the soul itself of these two kinds of experiences [παθήματα] [viz., processes of restoration and destruction]" (32b-c); and a little later he adds, "but now as for the other kind of pleasure, of which we said that it belongs to the soul itself . . ." (33c). Yet, much later, in the short second passage at 47c-d, the body is clearly involved: this is a case "where soul and body are not in agreement" (47d), and "the soul's contributions are opposed to the body's" (47c). To resolve this, it helps to note that the scope of the two passages is different. In the first, Plato distinguishes only two kinds of mixed pleasure: physical and psychic; in the second, he explicitly distinguishes three: "mixtures that have their origin in the body and are confined to the body; then, there are mixtures found in the soul, and they are confined to the soul. But then we also find mixtures of pleasures and pains in both soul and body" (46c). Waterfield's explanation of this apparent discrepancy is useful: "In the earlier passage Plato is concentrating on the psychic element of what is later called a mixed experience" (19). Of the earlier passage, Waterfield is right to point out that Plato, at that moment, is interested in describing the mental components of the pleasure, namely, memory, desire, and hope. It would make sense that as part of an explanation of these mental elements he would emphasize the psychic aspect of the mixed pleasures of the soul and body. It is not necessary to claim that Plato has changed his mind about these pleasures, for he seems to have merely shifted his emphasis.

In what sense are these pleasures 'mixed'? The mixture of pleasure and pain arises when the pleasure of the mind coexists with the body's pain. Plato describes the mixed pleasure of hope as follows: "One of us is emptied at one particular time, but is in

clear hope [ἐλπίς] of being filled" (36a-b).[32] He explains that a person experiences pain when she perceives her body being emptied; at the same time, she knows what would relieve her pain because she has a memory of past fillings of just this sort of deficiency. Because of memory, she can hope to be replenished in the future by the appropriate filling. Thus, the person who enjoys the mixed pleasure of anticipation is "simultaneously undergoing pain and pleasure" (36b).

Plato begins his explanation of hope by defining a few terms.[33] He claims that memory, perception, and desire are crucial factors in anticipations; indeed, he goes so far as to say that the pleasure of anticipation "depends entirely on memory [μνήμη]" (33c). According to Plato, memory is "the preservation of perception [σωτηρία αἰσθήσεως]" (34a). Recall that perceptions in the *Philebus* are motions arising from the penetration of both the body and the soul by one and the same affection. Affections that are extinguished before they reach the soul go unperceived, while those that reach the soul are perceived and stored in the soul by memory. Courtesy of memory, the soul can recall and relive what it once experienced with the body. Memory also enables the soul to identify objects of desire. Because we can remember what filled a certain lack in the past, we can have a desire for that object when we experience the same deficiency. For instance, in the past we might have perceived that filling with liquid remedies thirst.

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[32] This condition is contrasted to that of twofold pain, where the body is emptied and there is no hope of being filled. A person in such circumstances experiences pain in both body and soul. Cf. 36b-c.

[33] A terminological point should be made here: Plato does distinguish ἐλπίς (hope) from προσδοκία (expectation, anticipation), and he does so in a very straightforward and uniform way. Expectations/anticipations are the genus of which hope is a species. All hopes are expectations, but not all expectations are hopes; fear, for example, is an expectation, but quite different from hope. Plato uses προσδοκία when he is referring to the whole group of experiences, some of which have as their object restorations (hopes), some of which have as their object destructions (fears). He uses ἐλπίς when he is referring to the particular kind of expectation. Cf. 32c, 36b, and 47c. Frede's translation obscures this terminological difference because she translates ἐλπίς sometimes as hope, sometimes as expectation.

Consequently, when we experience our body's present liquid deficiency, we desire what we remember has helped us in the past, namely, being filled with drink.[34] As Socrates claims, "Something in the person who is thirsty must necessarily somehow be in contact with filling [πλήρωσις]" (35b). The point of contact is memories in the soul (35c). The soul thus desires the opposite of what the body experiences, for the body is being emptied while the soul desires filling.[35]

The implication of this theory of the nature of perception, memory, and desire is that the first time someone is emptied who has no memory of the remedy—a baby, for instance—he or she will have no desire. Again, since desire is intentional (as Socrates reminds us at 35b: "But we do maintain that he who has a desire desires something"), and since a baby has not yet perceived a restoration, a newborn can neither associate being filled by a particular object with a restoration nor know an object toward which desire can be directed. This implies that it is incorrect to say that the baby experiences thirst, since thirst is a desire. Now, this is not to say that a baby will not require filling or feel pain from deficiency, for it continues to have the physical need for drink; that is, the baby perceives the disturbance to its body and thus has pain.[36] The theory implies that in order

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[34] According to Plato, experiences like thirst, hunger, etc. are desires for filling with a particular object (and not, as Socrates makes clear, desires for an object per se without reference to its filling function; e.g., desires not just for food but for *filling* with food). When we are thirsty, we desire to be filled with liquid; when hungry, with food, and so on and so forth. Daniel Russell helpfully points out that elsewhere Plato makes this same qualification, namely, that what is desired is not an object per se but to be filled with that object: "Cf. the similar point at *Euthydemus* 280c that to desire something is not, in fact, to desire *that thing*, *simpliciter*, but to desire to engage in some activity with respect to it. Plato's argument at *Gorgias* 466a-468e relies on this point as well. The object of desire, in other words, is not strictly a thing but an action." Russell, *Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 175n14.

[35] From this Plato concludes that desire is an activity of the soul rather than the body. Cf. 35c.

[36] Again Russell is helpful: "A very young baby may become parched and experience pain as a result, but without the recognition that that pain is a desire *for drink*, the baby will have the painful need for drink but will not experience the desire of 'thirst,' as older children and adults do" (176).

for a person to desire, she must have a memory of a past filling, and thus she must have at one point perceived a filling that was later stored in her memory. So, since anticipations involve a desire for a future replenishment, we must have some memory of what will fill us.

Plato goes on to explain the role of memory and perception in the formulation of judgments (about the past, present, and future), and how judgments, in turn, are involved in both true and false pleasures of anticipation. Judgments are statements or assertions [λόγοι] about sense-perceptions [παθήματα]. When we perceive something—a figure standing beneath a tree, to use Plato's example—the soul checks that impression against what is in memory and other perceptions relevant to the situation. This 'fact-checking' activity of the soul leads to a judgment (e.g., that the figure under the tree is a man), an assertion that the soul 'says' to itself. This statement is 'written' in the soul just as sentences are written in a book: memory and the other relevant faculties "inscribe words [λόγους] in our souls, as it were" (39a).[37] In addition to a scribe, the soul contains a painter, "who follows the scribe and provides illustrations [εἰκόνας] to his words in the soul" (39b). If what the scribe writes is true, the painter's illustrations will be true too; if what the scribe writes is false, the pictures will also be false.

That these words and illustrations do not apply solely to the past and present but also to the future allows Plato to link them to hopes. Because statements and pictures of statements are the work of the soul alone, they can speak of and illustrate events the body has not yet experienced (but which, of course, must be based on experiences the soul once had with the body, since judgments are based on memories and perceptions of

[37] Trans. slightly modified.

actual events). According to Plato, hope is the assertion—the statement that is written in the soul: "There are, then, assertions [λόγοι] in each of us that we call hopes [ἐλπίδας]" [40a]). These hopes (i.e., the assertions) are about future restorations. They are statements to the effect of, "Tomorrow I will finally find some food and relieve my hunger." As for pleasure, Plato claims that it is not the assertion/hope of our replenishment, but the *picture* of restoration. He writes that people "have pleasures that are painted [in their minds]" (40b),[38] indicating that pleasure is the picture itself. We can gather that the imagined picture is of a restoration, given that, first, the picture is an illustration of an assertion about a restoration; and second, Plato comments elsewhere that the person who is experiencing the pleasure of anticipation is, at the same time, being depleted and thus has a desire for filling.[39] Every time Plato mentions the mixed pleasures of the soul and body together he notes that the hope for replenishment coexists with a process of emptying (36b, 47c). The picture is an image of a process of restoration, something that the depleted person creates and watches.[40] Plato's imagery of painting, illustrating, and visualizing is clearly meant to show that the hopeful person literally watches himself being restored in his mind; he "sees" the event as if it were real.

If Plato's description of these pleasures of hope seems scant,[41] it is because his purpose is not actually to describe in what, exactly, these pleasures consist, but to set

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[38] Trans. modified.

[39] This means that Plato thinks that pleasures of anticipation occur only when the organism is disintegrating, for we would not have a desire for filling if we were not being depleted.

[40] Thus, I disagree with Gosling and Taylor when they comment, "While in the *Republic* pleasures of anticipation are confusingly assimilated to ones of replenishment, in the *Philebus* at 32c they are said to constitute a distinct class, and no attempt is made to give anything approaching a replenishment analysis of them" (136).

[41] Note that I use that term "pleasure of hope" loosely, and so does Plato; the hope itself is not a pleasure.

himself up to undermine pleasures by showing that they can be false. Plato seems to have geared his whole discussion of pleasures of hope—that is, the role of memory, judgment, etc.—toward being able to claim that some pleasures are false and that certain people, namely, the wicked, are more likely to paint a false picture than a true one (40b). This double disparagement of certain pleasures and the people who experience them now shows itself as having been the point of Plato's discussion of these pleasures all along. This is borne out by the fact that his only example of the mechanics of pleasures of hope—that the pleasure is found in a mental picture that the person watches as if it were real—turns out to be an example of a false pleasure, one of those "quite ridiculous imitations of true ones [μεμιμημέναι μέντοι τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα]" (40b). The example involves a person who "envisages himself in the possession of an enormous amount of gold and of a lot of pleasures as a consequence. And in addition, he also sees, in this inner picture himself, that he is beside himself with delight" (40a).[42] The wicked person exaggerates the image by envisioning a ridiculous amount of money, far more than he needs to restore his solvency. Yet, even the wicked person envisions that he will experience pleasure by 'being filled' with what he lacks, namely, money, which he can use to purchase other things he lacks that will bring him "pleasures as a consequence." This point is somewhat difficult to see since Plato is interested not so much in describing the details of (true) pleasures of hope but in making Protarchus see that pleasures, like judgments, admit of falsity.

[42] Although this is an example of a false pleasure, it does, incidentally, also show that pleasure is identified with the picture rather than the hope.

3. Mixed Pleasures of the Soul

From 47d-50d, Plato describes the third form of mixed pleasures: those the soul experiences on its own without the body, namely, the emotions. The example Plato chooses to discuss in detail, comic malice [παιδικός φθόνος],[43] seems to confuse rather than clarify both the role of restoration in the explanation of the emotions and the sense in which the emotions are 'mixed' experiences. This has led some scholars to conclude that these pleasures are not part of the restoration model at all. For instance, Gosling and Taylor, skeptical of the model's applicability in general, claim that "no replenishment analysis seems appropriate for malicious pleasures discussed in such detail from 48-50, nor is any offered" (136). I admit that some creative maneuvering is required to see how this last form of mixed pleasure involves the model that I have argued is present in the other forms and to understand why they are a category of mixed pleasures. Nevertheless, I believe the case can be made that here the restoration model is indeed appropriate.

At the beginning of the discussion of this third group, Socrates makes plain that the emotions belong to the class of mixed pleasures. He states, "Here we are still left with one further kind of mixture of pleasure and pain" (47d). He elaborates: certain emotions—wrath, fear, longing, lamentations, love, jealousy, and malice, for example—are pains within the soul itself, yet we find "that they are full of marvelous pleasures" (47e). He proceeds to quote a passage from Homer in which wrath is said to be "sweeter than soft-flowing honey" (47e). Socrates and Protarchus agree that a mixture of pain and

[43] I agree with Frede's translation of φθόνος as 'malice' instead of 'jealousy,' and with Russell's argument for the former: the comedy in a pompous person's downfall does not really arouse our envy. Cf. Russell, 189n47. I would add that, in the list of emotions given at 47e, φθόνος is mentioned immediately after ζῆλος, which would be rather redundant if φθόνος here means 'jealousy.' For a contrasting view, cf. Van Riel, who prefers 'jealousy' (23).

pleasure is often engendered by tragedies: in tragic plays there is often laughter combined with weeping (48a). Socrates' account begins to blur around the edges when he extends it to the emotions aroused by comedies; he wishes to claim that even here we find a mixture of pain and pleasure. Protarchus admits he does not follow, and even though Socrates himself acknowledges that "it is indeed not quite so easy to see that this condition applies under those circumstances [viz., comedies]," the reader cannot help but sympathize with the interlocutor at any of the many occasions[44] during the brief discussion in which he expresses confusion (48b).[45]

Socrates' discussion centers on comic malice, an emotion that he claims is a mixture of pleasure and pain. He explains first how a mixture presents itself in everyday malice: malice is a pain of the soul, but the malicious person also experiences pleasure at his neighbor's misfortune. That the malicious person takes pleasure in his friend's misery shows that the former must bear the latter some ill will, for presumably a person who bears her friend only goodwill would not rejoice in that friend's ruin. To understand how malice can be understood in the context of comedy, Socrates follows a rather sinuous path, telling Protarchus that they must first look at ignorance [ἄγνοια] and its

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[44] Cf. 48a and 48b, where Protarchus expresses his initial puzzlement; 48c, where he says in response to Socrates' query about the nature of the ridiculous, "you tell me"; 48d, where he does not know the ways in which it is possible not to know oneself; 49b, where he again expresses his confusion as to how comic malice is a mixture of pleasure and pain. Interestingly, by the end of the discussion Protarchus seems to have completely come around, sounding almost cocky when responding to the question whether or not he understands that the whole explanation about the mixture of pleasure and pain in the emotions applies also to longing, malice, and wrath. He replies, "How could we fail to understand that?" (50c). Plato thus does not seem to cover up the fact that his point is unintuitive, yet he still believes it is comprehensible.

[45] Many modern readers have expressed dissatisfaction with this passage in the *Philebus*. Russell, for instance, says that the account "seems at least as idiosyncratic as the view it is meant to illuminate, and it is unlikely that it will resonate with us" (189). Also Van Riel, commenting on the mixed pleasures of soul and body, writes, "This group is discussed extensively, but in an incredibly superficial manner" (22). Some commentators have shied away from the passage altogether. Waterfield, for instance, provides a scant two sentences about it (19).

divisions in order to understand the nature of the ridiculous [τὸ γελοῖον]. The ridiculous, he claims, is a vice having to do with a particular form of ignorance, namely, that having to do with lack of self-knowledge (48c). According to Plato, there are three kinds of ignorance that involve not knowing oneself: one may think oneself richer than one is, better looking than one is, or simply better, that is, more virtuous, than one is (and since wisdom is a virtue, it is included in this latter division, such that one may hold oneself to be wiser than one is) (49e-49a). This discussion leads to the point that the ridiculous is one who does not know herself and is also weak; she is unable to avenge herself when laughed at (49b). Plato contrasts the ridiculous person to the dangerous and hateful: she also does not know herself but is capable of exacting revenge from ridiculers (49b-c). According to Socrates, the former situation is laughable, while the latter is "odious and ugly," for harm comes even to friendly neighbors of those who are both ignorant and dangerous (49c). It is the former situation that bears on the discussion of comic malice, for if the one who is ignorant and weak is a friend, it turns out that we, as members of the audience, are laughing at the misfortune of a friend. According to Socrates, enjoying a friend's misery is never just (49d). Since taking pleasure in a friend's misfortune is the product of a pain in the soul (namely, malice), comic malice involves a mixture of pleasure and pain.[46]

[46] An unstated premise in Socrates' explanation is that being ignorant of oneself is a misfortune. It is difficult to see how ignorance is among "evils that happen" to someone, rather than something one does to oneself (49d). Here Hackforth is helpful: he comments about the phrase "ἐπί κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας" at 48b that "κακά here is not so narrow as 'misfortunes': it means anything not ἀγαθόν or καλόν, and would include poverty or ugliness or low birth" (93n1). If we take misfortune as a broader term, then, we may have less trouble seeing how ignorance is a case of it. For a discussion of the sense of κακά, see also Gosling, 120. Cynthia Hampton makes the unstated premise explicit. See Hampton, *Pleasure, Knowledge, and Being* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 65.

It must be remembered that comic malice is simply one of the many emotions that Socrates claims falls under the heading of mixed pleasures of the soul. Recall the list of emotions before the extended discussion of comic malice: wrath, fear, longing, love, etc. (47e). That these emotions are examples of pleasure mixed with pain is fairly evident to Protarchus, who agrees with Socrates that there is "no need for further reminders; in all these cases it must be just as you said" (48a). Socrates goes on to extend his analysis of the mixture of pleasure and pain constitutive of comic malice to all other emotions experienced not only at the theater but in real life: "The upshot of our discussion, then, is that in lamentations as well as in tragedies and comedies, not only on stage but also in all of life's tragedies and comedies, pleasures are mixed with pains, and so it is on infinitely other occasions" (50b). Socrates suggests that he chose the case of comic malice as his example because it would be easy to discern the mixture in all the other emotions if he and Protarchus could discern it first in the most challenging and unintuitive case. He claims, "Now, what precisely do you think was the purpose for which I pointed out to you this mixture in comedy? Don't you see that it was designed to make it easier to persuade you that there is such a mixture in fear and love and other cases?" (50c-d). Evidently, there is no question that Socrates believes emotions to be mixtures of pleasures and pains.[47]

But how can we understand pleasures of the soul as fillings of deficiencies? The key is to understand pain in the soul—malice, for instance—as a kind of deficiency, in

[47] It is interesting that in making his point about comic malice, Socrates does not appear to be appealing to an actual experience of pleasure mixed with pain. He deduces its mixed nature purely through proof, not by an appeal to actual feelings. 50a reads: "Our argument leads to the conclusion that if we laugh at what is ridiculous about our friends, by mixing pleasure with malice, we thereby mix pleasure with pain." That Socrates proves this by logic alone may explain why comic malice, as an example of a mixed pleasure, seems so unintuitive to Protarchus (and, of course, to us).

line with the description of pain Plato has been pushing all through the dialogue up to this point. If we couch the deficiency in terms of desire, as Plato does in his discussion of mixed physical pleasures, things become clearer. 'Being filled' in this context means having a desire fulfilled, the desire being a direct extension of the deficiency.[48] To take malice as an example: the malicious person desires misfortune to befall her friend; that is, she desires her ill will to come to fruition and thus possesses some lack she desires to be filled. Her desire is fulfilled when her ill will is realized (by, for instance, witnessing or learning of her friend's misfortune). 'Fillings' in this case are explained in psychic rather than physical terms, which reflects the fact that the emotions are pleasures that belong to the soul rather than to the body.

Frede comments that such desires are the product "of an impure emotional state" and "a *need* to see [others] make fools of themselves" (1993, lii). While I agree that Plato might be attempting to identify some inherent flaw in human emotions (viz., that they are always impure), we should not confuse a *need* with a *lack*, as Frede does.[49] Although needs and lacks are both deficiencies, it is only needs, when filled, that restore the natural harmony of an organism. Lacks, of course, can be filled, but their being filled does not necessarily bring about proper functioning and balance. For instance, we do not cease to be malicious once we realize that our friend has been ridiculed, for we are

[48] This account of the emotions is not altogether the same as that in *Republic* 4, although not in conflict with it. In the *Republic*, most of the emotions have their seat in the appetitive part of the soul (anger, notably, is said to belong to the spirited part). The appetitive part bids the soul to seek objects of its desire (e.g., food, drink, sex, etc.), but the rational, calculating part can overrule it (cf. 439c-e). This language of 'bidding' [κελεύω] indicates an urge or need, a tension that the appetitive part desires to be resolved. This is not too far from the *Philebus* account I am arguing for here.

[49] I am indebted to Dr. Tim O'Keefe for bringing this to my attention.

malicious precisely because we desired her to be ridiculed in the first place.[50] A lack is filled in the process of experiencing our friend's devastation, but the lack is not something we *need* to have filled; it is only something we *want* to have filled.

While this suggests that the mixed pleasures of the soul are not movements toward proper functioning, and further, that they do not fit the restoration model that Plato establishes in his discussion of the pleasures of the body, it is the case that the emotions are structurally similar to the pleasures of removing thirst, hunger, etc. Just like the pleasures of the body, the emotions consist in a filling of a lack. Even though the emotional filling does not result in organic harmony, it is nevertheless a process of bringing about a state in which I no longer have a painful desire. And it could be that this is what Plato has in mind as a 'good state,' for he mentions early on that the most godlike life is to be without pleasure and pain (33b). But, even if we are not convinced that Plato would have thought that fulfilling malicious desires would lead to a 'good state' (perhaps he would have advised us to overcome, rather than satisfy, our base desires), the fact remains that the mixed pleasures of the soul bear a structural similarity to pleasures that Plato emphatically describes on a restoration model.

[50] It seems Plato needs to be able to make a distinction between having the disposition of a malicious person and actually engaging in malicious activity, for we might say that someone who desired harm to a friend last week is a malicious person, even though her need to see a friend devastated has already been satisfied, i.e., she is not currently harboring ill will toward a friend. So perhaps Plato's explanation of the emotions in the *Philebus* is addressing only the aspect of the actual exercise of the emotions, not their dispositional aspect.

D. The Neutral State

Essential to this discussion of the restoration model in Plato's *Philebus* is an examination of one of the key ways the model is put to work in the dialogue, namely, Plato's denial that a neutral state is pleasure. I touched on this earlier in my discussion of perception, but now we are better prepared to understand the neutral state since we have a grasp of the restoration model itself. I intend to argue in this section that both the restoration model and the perception requirement are essential elements in Plato's formulation of the neutral state and his rejection of it as a pleasure.

There are two distinct places where Socrates argues for the existence of a neutral state between pleasure and pain.[51] The first, beginning at 32e, does not feature the perception requirement, and it is subsequently revised by Socrates in his second discussion at 42cff.[52] Clearly, he desires to make known the existence of this neutral state, since it is the object of discussion more than once. In the earlier of the two passages, the restoration model is employed to show that the neutral state is neither pleasant nor painful, for if pain consists in disintegration, and pleasure restoration, then logically there could exist a state in which a living animal were neither disturbed nor

[51] Here I do not mean places where the neutral state is simply mentioned, of which there are many, but instances where Socrates gets Protarchus to follow a train of thought that will lead to the conclusion that there exists a neutral state that is neither pleasant nor painful.

[52] This is missed by Hampton, who explains Socrates' *first* discussion of pleasure and pain in terms of nonperception. She writes: "He notes that the processes of depletion and replenishment are not necessarily accompanied by pain and pleasure respectively. One may not experience either pain or pleasure and thus participate in the life of the mind, which perhaps is the most divine of lives (32E-33C)" (53-54). In Plato's first discussion, the neutral state is described as lacking restorations and disturbances altogether. So, it is not a matter of these processes going on without our knowledge (as Hampton suggests), but that they are not going on at all.

restored (32e),[53] experiencing neither pleasure nor pain. Such a condition would be a "third one besides the one in which one is pleased or in which one is in pain" (32e). Socrates instructs Protarchus to keep in mind that such a state exists, for "it makes quite a difference for our judgment of pleasure" (33a).

When Socrates revisits the neutral state later, it is the third of either three or four false pleasures discussed in the dialogue,[54] depending on how the discussions are divided.[55] In this third case, Socrates takes on those who call a state of freedom from pain—that is, the neutral state—pleasure: such people misconceive pleasure, for they believe it to be something it is not.[56] Socrates sets up this second discussion of the

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[53] Socrates takes this a step further and speaks as though the neutral state is not just a possibility but an actual condition. He asks, "What kind of state should we ascribe to animals when they are neither destroyed nor restored?" (32e), and goes on to add that "there is, then, such a condition . . ." (32e-33a).

[54] In this section I am concerned with only the third false pleasure, viz., the neutral state, and not with the others. I do not mean to suggest that the others are somehow unimportant to the work, but only that they are not germane to my project of examining the restoration model and its manifestations in the dialogue.

[55] Frede, Russell, and Terence Irwin consider there to be four different types of false pleasure: those of anticipation, those of size, the neutral state, and those intrinsically mixed with pain. Cf. Frede, 1993, xlv-liii; Russell, 176n17 and 188n42; and Irwin, *Plato's Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 328-29. Others have claimed that only the first three should properly count as false pleasures, while the last, mixed pleasures, should be a group of their own. Cf. Waterfield, 22-25; Hackforth, 85-97; and Andrew McLaughlin, "A Note on False Pleasures in the *Philebus*," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 19, no. 4 (1969): 58. Damascius, who mentions only three false pleasures, leaves out mixed pleasures. Cf. Damascius, *Lectures on the Philebus, Wrongly Attributed to Olympiodorus*, ed. L.G. Westerink (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1959), §171. I tend to agree with the latter group (i.e., Waterfield, *et al.*), since the mixed pleasures, but not really the three false pleasures, seem to be the ones Plato directly contrasts with unmixed pleasures. Of course, pure (or unmixed) comes to be associated with 'true' later in the dialogue (cf. 63e), such that it would seem that pure pleasures are being contrasted not only with mixed pleasures but all false pleasures. Yet, it seems that purity is the standard by which Plato accepts or rejects pleasures in the ranking of goods at the end of the dialogue, suggesting that impurity is a more significant qualification in the dialogue than falsity. This suggests that mixed pleasures ought to be considered separate from the false pleasures. In other words, what is false about false pleasures does not contrast very tidily with the trueness of pure, unmixed pleasures, whereas mixed pleasures seem to contrast naturally with unmixed. I agree with Cooper's explanation that although purity and truth are equated in the dialogue, the terms are not the same: purity and impurity are ontological notions, while truth and falsity are epistemological. Cf. Cooper, 155.

[56] It is widely acknowledged that Plato is using several different senses of 'false' in his discussion of the different types of false pleasure. Gosling, for instance, claims, "It seems impossible to acquit Plato of the charge of rank equivocation" (212). In the ancient literature, Damascius claims that pleasure is false in each of the three senses of falsehood held by Theophrastus. Cf. Damascius, §168. Frede also points out

neutral state much like he did the first: he asks Protarchus what would happen if living bodies were neither restored nor destroyed (42d). Instead of responding the same as before, Protarchus, this time less compliant, queries back, "When could that ever happen, Socrates?" (42d).[57] After conceding that such a state of total stagnation could never occur—agreeing with "the wise men [οἱ σοφοί]" that "everything is in eternal flux, upward and downward [ἀεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντα ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω ῥεῖ]" (43a)[58]—Socrates revises his description of the neutral state: it is no longer a state in which nothing disturbs the body, but a state which lacks perception of disturbances, the point being that although restorations and disturbances never cease to move the body, we are not always aware of being affected, as in the cases of growth and digestion (43b). It is no longer simply "changes 'upwards and downwards,'" that is, restorations and destructions, that constitute

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Plato's many senses of 'false,' but she argues that Plato is fully aware of his equivocation and "distinguishes carefully between the different meanings" (1985, 161). For a helpful description of the different senses see Frede, 1993, xlv-liii.

[57] It is unclear why Protarchus does not bring up this objection in the first discussion of the neutral state, especially since Socrates phrases the issue the same way there.

[58] Carone has argued that Socrates does not take the flux theory seriously, and thus his description of the neutral state as a state of nonperception of disturbances rather than a state of inertia is not in earnest. She thinks Socrates concedes the flux theory "only for the sake of argument" (269n22). She affirms this as part of her larger claim that some pure pleasures belong to the domain of οὐσία rather than γένεσις, and thus some of them are not restorations. On her view, if some pure pleasures belong to οὐσία, then they must not be in flux, and thus the flux theory is not meant seriously. I think her claim regarding the flux theory is undermined by the fact that Socrates adheres to it in other dialogues. In the *Republic*, for instance, one of the ideas expressed in the divided line passage (509d-511e) is that the whole visible world is changeable, in contrast to the intelligible, which is always the same. This idea is expressed also in the *Timaeus*, where the created world is differentiated from the intelligible realm based on (among other factors) the former's changeability: what is intelligible is "stable and fixed" (29b), "unchanging" (28a), "neither receives into itself anything else from anywhere else, nor itself enters into anything else anywhere" (52a), while what is perceived with the senses, i.e., the created world, "comes to be and passes away but never really is" (28a) and "is constantly borne along, now coming to be in a certain place and then perishing out of it" (52a). (Trans. Donald Zeyl.) Furthermore, one could argue that the Theory of Forms is a consequence of the flux theory. Cf. *Cratylus* 440a-d, where the changes in the sensible world necessitate the existence of stable Forms; the discussion at the end of *Republic* Book 5, where the objects of knowledge are said to be what really are, while the objects of opinion come to be; and the *Theaetetus* (although the status of the flux theory here is more controversial). Thus, as I see it Carone's dismissal of the flux argument in the *Philebus* seems unwarranted. As to her larger claim, I explain my disagreement with it later on, in my section on pure pleasures.

pleasure, but *perceived* changes—*perceived* restorations and destructions. If we do not perceive the restoration or the destruction, we cannot be said to experience either pleasure or pain.

Along with this new description of the neutral state and the modified description of pleasure, Plato provides a physiology to explain how it is possible for affections to go unperceived. He claims that the determining factor is size: great changes cause pleasures and pains, while smaller ones go unnoticed (43c). This explanation is supported by Plato's theory of perception that he presented earlier in the dialogue: perception consists in a motion of both the body and soul instigated by one and the same disturbance (34a).[59] Changes that are large enough to be perceived are those that penetrate all the way through the body to the soul; those that are weak penetrate only the body, leaving the soul untouched. The neutral state is thus a case of disturbances being too weak to penetrate further than the body.

Socrates then uses the modified description of pleasure formulated in his definition of the neutral state to chastise those who call a state of freedom from pain pleasure. He acknowledges that such a state is indeed painless, but it is "also devoid of charm [χαρμονή]" (43c); it is a third kind of life, between the life of pleasure and the life of pain (43d).[60] Given the restoration model and the perception requirement, the neutral state of freedom from pain is not identical with pleasure, and thus those who equate the

[59] Socrates claims that perception occurs when affections penetrate both body and soul "and provoke a kind of upheaval that is peculiar to each but also common to both" (33d4-5).

[60] "Ἐκ δὴ τούτων τιθῶμεν τριττούς ἡμῖν βίους, ἕνα μὲν ἡδύν, τὸν δ᾽αὖ λυπηρόν, τὸν δ᾽ ἕνα μηδέτερα" (43c-d).

two "hold a false judgment about pleasure" (44a).[61] To emphasize the point, Plato provides a metaphor involving three metals: if we have gold, silver and another substance that is neither, it would be impossible for the third to turn out to be either of the other two (43e). Similarly, we have pleasure, pain, and a third state, freedom from pain, which neither is nor can ever be either of the others; "Freedom from pain and pleasure each have a nature of their own [ἡ φύσις ἑκατέρου]" (44a).

Socrates goes on to mention a group of natural scientists, the so-called "enemies of Philebus [πολέμιοι Φιλήβου]" or "dour ones [οἱ δυσχερεῖς]," who claim that pleasure is in fact nothing more than escaping from pain [ἀποφυγὴ λυπῶν] (44b).[62] I agree with Frede that Plato is cranky with this group because their description of pleasure—that it has no reality over and above the absence of pain[63]—denies his own theory of it as a perceived process of restoration. According to Plato, the dour ones not only confuse the neutral state with pleasure, but they refuse to acknowledge a description of pleasure that is in line with Plato's own, namely, the restoration model.

I believe this analysis shows that Plato's denial that the neutral state is pleasant flows right out of his description of pleasure and pain as the perceived restoration and

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[61] People who believe that they are pleased when they are not in pain hold a false judgment (44a). This amounts to them having a false conception of what a pleasure is, since they believe it to be something it is not.

[62] The identity of these enemies is much disputed. The usual suspect is Speusippus, for which see John Dillon, "Speusippus of Athens," in *Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Keimpe Algra, Pieter van der Horst, and David Runia (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 99-114; and Malcolm Schofield, "Who Were οἱ δυσχερεῖς in Plato, *Philebus* 44aff?" *Museum Helveticum* 28, no. 1 (1971): 2-20. Other suspects include Archytas of Tarentum and perhaps Socrates himself from other dialogues in which he holds positions strikingly similar to the ones he attacks in the *Philebus*. For a run-down of the debate, see Frede, 1997, 273n77.

[63] Frede comments that it is "a theoretical misconception to describe this agreeable state as pleasure, and to use this agreeable state as the ground for the nonexistence of pleasures of restoration" (1997, 273n83; my translation from the German). Her claim involves the premise that the Lusthasser, i.e., the dour ones, believe that pleasure is at least one thing, namely, the absence of pain. Cf. Frede, 1997, 272.

destruction, respectively, of the living organism. The discussion of the neutral state at 43e is thus highly relevant to our unraveling of Plato's thoughts on the nature of pleasure and pain in the dialogue.

E. Pure Pleasures

Following his discussions of the neutral state and mixed pleasures, Plato turns to the unmixed pleasures (50d), also called pure [καθαρός] (52e) and true [ἀληθεῖς] (51b) in the dialogue. I believe it is impossible to understand this group of pleasures without the restoration model and the perception requirement. At 51b Socrates gives the physiology behind this kind: pure pleasures are "those that are based on imperceptible and painless lacks, while their fulfillments are perceptible and pleasant [ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας]" (51b7).[64] Unlike mixed pleasures, the pure pleasures have no admixture of pain since they do not involve the perception of a lack. But like mixed pleasures, they do involve the perception of a restoration, and so the pleasure is experienced in the process of being restored. Thus, even pure pleasures are processes rather than ends.[65] In Plato's explanation of pure

[64] As I noted much earlier, Plato shifts his description of pain slightly here. He has moved from thinking about pain as processes of disintegration or destruction to thinking about it as a lack. Plato does not remark on the shift probably because it is of no consequence: it does not affect his description of pleasure nor his ability to reject pleasure from the ranks of the good.

[65] This point is essential to Plato's denial that pleasure is the good on the grounds that pleasure belongs to the realm of becoming rather than that of being (53c). Since all pleasures are processes, they come to be for the sake of something else, and thus they are γενέσεις εἰς οὐσίαν, rather than οὐσία itself. For an argument that Plato does not believe that pure pleasures are processes, see Carone, 264-270 and A.E. Taylor, 79-80. I treat the former in particular later. As for Taylor, he holds that Plato does not believe that pure pleasures are γενέσεις, since (according to Taylor) pure pleasures do not involve deficiencies. To enjoy knowledge, Taylor argues, it is not necessary that we forget what we have learned, whereas with the mixed pleasures it is necessary that, for instance, we become hungry; pure pleasures are not reliant on a flux back to a deficiency. In other words, what gives us mixed pleasure is "getting" something; what gives us pure pleasure is "having" something (80). While it may be true that pure pleasures do not involve this continual flux back and forth between deficiency and restoration, they must involve a deficiency of some

pleasures, several elements have carried over from the discussions of the other forms of pleasure: first, the restoration model is clearly in play, for pleasure again is linked with fulfillment, and pain with deficiency; second, the perception requirement is key to pure pleasures, for what makes them pure is precisely the fact that the deficiency is not perceived, which is to say they involve no pain; third, the flux theory is evident in Plato's contention that pure pleasures involve a deficiency that is merely unperceived rather than completely absent. That is, he acknowledges that fillings and deficiencies are still occurring in the organism even though the latter may go unnoticed. Thus, in the case of pure pleasures Plato has not given up his commitment to the restoration model, the perception requirement, and the flux theory that form his notion of pleasure so far in the dialogue.

As examples of pure pleasures Socrates mentions pure colors, shapes, most smells, and sounds (51b). These do not involve a perceived lack, and thus the pure pleasure of the filling can be enjoyed unadulterated by pain. To these examples he adds a few caveats: he does not mean just any pure shapes, but those that are beautiful absolutely, "by their very nature forever beautiful by themselves," (51c), drawn with proper proportion. Socrates claims that the pleasures of smell are of a "less divine tribe [ἧττον θεῖον γένος]" (51e),[66] yet because they are not mixed with pain they are worthy

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kind if they are to be a sort of restoration, as I have argued Plato believes they are; they are perceived restorations of an unperceived lack, as Socrates plainly states. This means that, while we may not need to revert constantly back to the same deficiency to experience pure pleasure (e.g., we do not need to constantly relearn the same thing), if there is to be a restoration, and thus a pleasure, there must be a deficiency. Which induces me to believe, *contra* Taylor, that both pure and mixed pleasures are a 'getting' and not a 'having.'

[66] It is not entirely clear why he does not treat them as equal to the other pure pleasures. Perhaps it is because they belong more to the body than the others, and he is just resurrecting his old prejudice, at work in the *Republic*, against bodily pleasures.

to be treated as "counterpart [ἀντίστροφος] to those others" (51e). In the *Timaeus*, Plato reinforces the treatment of smell in the *Philebus* by claiming that fragrances are examples of "intense and substantial" replenishments of "gradual departures from [the body's] normal state or gradual depletions [κατὰ σμικρὸν τὰς ἀποχωρήσεις ἑαυτῶν καὶ κενώσεις]" (*Timaeus*, 65a).[67] Bodies that experience this phenomenon of an intense filling of an insignificant lack "are unaware of their depletions but not of their replenishments [κενώσεως μὲν ἀναίσθητα, πληρώσεως δὲ αἰσθητικὰ γιγνόμενα]" (*Timaeus*, 65a). Plato, then, seems fairly committed to the view of pure pleasure as a perceived filling of an unperceived lack.

Admittedly, it does seem unclear how these pleasures involve a lack in the first place, or how they themselves are restorations. Of what are shapes and smells restorations or fillings? I think Frede is right that Plato must treat anything we do not have as a lack, such that if we have not experienced a certain smell, for instance, we can be said to be deficient with respect to that experience.[68] When we do experience the smell, we are filled in the sense that our lack of awareness is replaced or filled by smelling. We gain something we did not have before, namely, an awareness of a smell. The same can be said of shapes and sounds and other pure pleasures: we are not aware of lacking the experience beforehand, but when we gain it, we are nonetheless filled with

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[67] All translations of the *Timaeus* are Donald Zeyl's.

[68] She gives a very plausible explanation that humans are always without something that they do not know they need, and that this is all part of the human condition. She writes, "There are lots of things we do not have, know, hear, feel, or see, and that will enrich our existence even if we do not have any perceived need for them. We are born needy creatures, and as Plato's reference to the possibility of a 'painless loss' of knowledge (52a-b) reminds us, a state of completion once attained need not remain such; everything that is not strictly eternal needs constant maintenance and restoration, even knowledge" (1992, 453). Damascius, too, takes something we do not have to be a deficiency: "The organism has need, not because anything has been lost, but because it is not present" (§206).

something we were not aware of previously. This does not mean that we experience a pure pleasure when we gain any old thing we happened to lack: as I mentioned, Plato restricts what can count as an object of pure pleasure. The colors, shapes, sounds, etc., that provide pure pleasure must not be beautiful or melodious in a relative sense, but possess these qualities by nature. For instance, we experience pure pleasure in shapes "constructed out of these with a compass, rule, and square. . . . Those things I take it are not beautiful in a relative sense, as others are, but are by their very nature forever beautiful by themselves" (51c). In order to bring pleasure, that with which we are filled must be the best example of its kind.

The deficiency and filling aspect of pure pleasures is more evident in an additional example that Plato mentions at 51e, namely, the pure pleasure of learning. In this case the lack is fairly obvious: knowledge. Learning is the process of gaining what we did not know before, with the caveat that we were not aware that we did not know; we lacked a "hunger for learning [πεῖνα μαθημάτων]," for if we had been aware, the lack would have been perceived and the pleasure mixed with pain (52a).[69] Consider the

[69] A counterexample to the reading that perception is an essential element to pure pleasures could be formulated from the discussion at 52a-b, where Socrates asks Protarchus whether pain arises when someone forgets knowledge she once learned. Protarchus responds, "none that could be called inherent by nature, but in our reflections on this loss when we need it, we experience it as a painful loss." It is Socrates' response that is troublesome: "But, my dear, we are here concerned only with the natural affections [παθήματα] themselves, apart from reflection [λογισμός] on them" (52b2-3). It seems that Socrates is claiming that there are certain affections that by their nature just are pain-free or that just are mixed with pain, that perhaps involve no deficiency at all. Such a claim would be opposed to the position he has been pushing so far that it is the lack of perception, and not the lack of deficiency, that makes these pleasures pure. Indeed, he claims that we are not concerned with reflection at all but simply the affections themselves. To forestall this kind of criticism, it is necessary to point out that Plato here is talking about λογισμός rather than αἴσθησις; reflection is too weak a word for the former, for λογισμός involves a sense of calculation or reasoning that goes beyond bare perception. Up until this point, Plato has not used the term 'λογισμός' in relation to pleasure. It would make sense that Socrates would claim that he is uninterested in calculations about pleasures, for he is concerned simply with our bare perception of them. Viewed this way, the passage does not present an objection to the reading of pure pleasure I have presented.

example of a child who learns something in school that she had no idea even existed before—the planets in the solar system, for example. She was not aware of her ignorance of the planets, yet she was without knowledge of them all the same. Her learning was not preceded by a "hunger," and thus she experiences no pain when her mind is filled with knowledge she once lacked.

Later in the dialogue (66c), these pleasures are called 'painless [ἄλυπος],' and it is important to distinguish the particular painlessness of pure pleasures from that of the neutral state. At first glance, they seem similar, since both entail that the living animal is unaware of a deficiency. In the case of the neutral state, however, we are aware of neither the deficiency nor the restoration, whereas with painless pleasures we are aware of being filled. Confusion may arise from the fact that Plato calls the neutral state "freedom from pain [ἀπαλλαγὴ τῶν λυπῶν]," and then at times calls pure pleasures 'painless.' It should be kept in mind that the former term is reserved for a state that is neither pleasant nor painful and the latter for the experience of pleasure unmixed with pain.[70]

Some scholars have argued that the restoration model and perception requirement do not apply to unmixed pleasures. Carone, for instance, contends that only some pure pleasures are perceived restorations of painless lacks.[71] She bases this on an argument against Frede's translation of 51b, where Socrates responds with a list of examples when

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[70] Such confusion has come up in the secondary literature. Carone, for instance, writes, "these pure pleasures (whose essence consists in freedom from pain, cf. 66c4)" (262). At 66c4 Plato says merely that the pure pleasures are painless [ἄλυπος], not that they consist in freedom from pain [ἀπαλλαγὴ τῶν λυπῶν]. The difference is significant, since Plato means two different conditions by the two terms, as I have noted above. Probably Carone means by 'freedom from pain' simply 'painlessness,' but in this case one must be precise.

[71] Cf. 264-70, in particular 267n19.

Protarchus asks him which pleasures are true. Frede's translation of the passage runs as follows:

> Protarchus: But, Socrates, what are the kinds of pleasures that one could rightly regard as true?
> Socrates: Those that are related to so-called pure colors and to shapes and to most smells and sounds and in general all those that are based on imperceptible and painless lacks, while their fulfillments are perceptible and pleasant.
>
> ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεῖς δ᾽ αὖ τίνας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαμβάνω ὀρθῶς τις διανοοῖτ᾽ ἄν;
> ΣΩ. Τὰς περί τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας παραδίδωσιν.

On Frede's translation, all of the examples are meant as cases of the general definition of pure pleasure listed last, namely, perceived restorations of painless lacks. Carone, however, believes that Plato understands the general description given at the end of the passage to be a separate case of pure pleasure, rather more like another example but not representative of pure pleasures in general. She bases this on her belief that the phrase "in general" is not required by the Greek, and that the repetition of καί in the passage indicates that the list is just "a simple enumeration of examples" (267n19). To her, there are some pure pleasures—beautiful forms and sounds, for example—that are not restorations (and thus not processes) but perceived states of being undisturbed. She writes, "In the case of pure pleasures, by contrast, the soul positively enjoys the state of fulfillment they represent" (269n23).[72] Carone's reading is meant to show that in the *Philebus* Plato does not consider all pleasures to be processes of restoration, and thus

[72] She also describes it as the soul's perception of "the positive feeling it is undergoing" (269n23). This, I submit, is very unclear, for what defines a 'feeling' in the dialogue? If anything, it would have to involve a change in the organism, which would then be perceived as a process. I do not believe Plato has any particular notion of a 'feeling' in the dialogue that does not involve changes or processes in the organism.

some belong to the realm of being [οὐσία] and ought to be included in the best human life.

It should be evident that this reading conflicts with mine (and with Frede's), since it entails that Plato identifies perceived states or results of restoration with pleasure. In response, I would argue that Plato gives no indication that the perception involved in pleasure is of something other than a change in the organism. That he should come to believe that pleasure is associated with perceptions of certain feelings in a stable state would mean he is introducing a new form of pleasure without giving any explanation of its nature. In other words, it would mean that Plato retains the perception language yet changes the object of the perception, with virtually no indication he is doing so.[73] Furthermore, one of the examples of pure pleasure that Carone seeks to define as a state rather than a process is the pleasure of smell, but this example is also found in *Republic* 9, where, as I discussed previously, pleasure and pain are identified with processes of filling and emptying, respectively. In that discussion, no mention is made of a different description of pleasure that would involve a perceived state of fulfillment. Such a state would have to involve a cessation of processes of restoration and filling; that is, it would be a state in which the body is undisturbed by external elements. But at *Philebus* 43a Protarchus and Socrates agree that everything is in eternal flux; it is impossible for a living creature to be unaffected by disturbances. Such a state belongs only to the gods, who are not subject to processes of restoration and destruction. Lastly, there is no need to exert oneself in trying to prove that pure pleasures belong to the realm of οὐσία rather

[73] Damascius, for one, does not acknowledge any difference between the examples of pure pleasure Plato mentions. Pure pleasures are simply those not preceded by a perceived deficiency. He evidently takes Plato's description to apply to all pure pleasures. Cf. Damascius, §206.

than γένεσις so that they can be included in the good mixture of pleasure and knowledge sought for in the dialogue, for Plato includes even the "worthless [φαῦλος]" (55e) forms of knowledge in the good mixture, namely, those that deal "not with things eternal, but with what comes to be, will come to be, or has come to be [οὐ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἀεί, περὶ δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γενονότα]" (59a).[74] Given that Plato has no scruples about admitting lesser forms of knowledge, it should come as no surprise that he allows pure pleasures, which are also imperfect and come to be.

On my analysis, then, the pure pleasures arise when one perceives the process of restoration but not the lack that precedes it. Thus, the perception requirement and the restoration model are essential to understanding this form of pleasure, as I have argued is true of all the mixed pleasures as well. The various forms of pleasure can be schematized as follows: pure pleasures involve an unperceived deficiency but a perceived restoration; the neutral state entails a perception of neither a disintegration nor a filling; and mixed pleasures entail the perception of both a disintegration and a filling. One can find a tidy arrangement of the different types of pleasure when one discerns how the restoration model and the perception requirement are threaded through them.

F. The 'Mixedness' of Mixed Pleasures

In this section I would like to address a topic that I have merely glossed over in the previous sections, namely, how we should understand the 'mixed' aspect of mixed pleasures. What does it mean for a pleasure to be *mixed* with pain in the *Philebus*? In

[74] At 62c, Socrates exclaims, "Do you want me, then, to yield like a doorkeeper to the pushing and shoving of a crowd, and to throw open the doors and let the flood of all sorts of knowledge in, the inferior kind mingling with the pure?" Protarchus responds that he can see no harm in doing so.

this section, I intend to argue that mixed pleasures are preceded by a perceived deficiency while pure pleasures are not. I have argued so far that Plato believes that mixed and pure pleasures alike are preceded by a destruction or deficiency of some sort. What I am arguing in this section is an extension of that point, for I am contending that the main advantage pure pleasures have over the mixed is not that the former are free from admixture with deficiency (which they are not), but that they are free from admixture with pain, since pain requires *perception* of a disintegration or a lack. The view I wish to oppose is that Plato believes the defining trait of 'mixedness' to be the actual co-existence—in the same place and time, with respect to the same process—of pleasure and pain. I contend that although Plato uses terminology like 'simultaneous' and 'co-existence,' his examples do not indicate that he means for the two affections to be perceived in the same place at once. But rather, for restorations and destructions that are concerned with the same process (e.g., both involve eating), either the destruction is perceived prior to the restoration or the processes are occurring in different locations at different times.

Take first Plato's example of itching and scratching, a mixed physical pleasure. Socrates describes the process of relieving an itch through scratching in the following way:

> Now, when the irritation and infection are inside and cannot be reached by rubbing and scratching, there is only relief on the surface. In case they treat these parts by exposing them to fire or its opposite—they go from one extreme to the other in their distress—they sometimes procure enormous pleasures. But sometimes this leads to a state inside that is opposite to that outside, with a mixture of pains and pleasures, whichever way the balance may turn, because this treatment disperses by force what was mixed together or mixes together what was separate, so that pains arise besides the pleasures. (46d-e)

Now, this passage indicates that when scratching an itch, pain is on the inside of the body, while pleasure is on the surface of the skin; pleasure and pain do not coexist in the same location. Furthermore, if a treatment for itching is applied, such as exposing the affected area to heat, the inner and outer areas are again said to be opposite, such that the pleasure and pain are not commingled in the same place. In this example, then, Plato does not mean by 'mixed' that a restoration and destruction occur in the same location simultaneously; we should look elsewhere for a description of 'mixedness.'

In another passage, he discusses mixtures in which the pleasure outweighs the pain. He says, "Now, in all those cases where the mixture contains a surplus of pleasure, the small admixture of pain gives rise only to a tickle and mild irritation" (47a). This passage does not say anything about restorations and depletions being perceived as occurring in the same place, with respect to the same process. All it says is that when there is much pleasure, there is little pain. This could be taken to mean that when a very large restoration is perceived, perhaps less attention is paid to destructions or they are minor and perceived as only a small annoyance. The passage does not force the conclusion that pleasures and pains coexist.

Furthermore, earlier in the dialogue Plato denies that the body can be filled and emptied simultaneously. This comes out in his discussion of the role of desire and memory in the physiology of pleasure and his subsequent denial that desire belongs to the body. He writes the following:

> Socrates: Something in the person who is thirsty must necessarily somehow be in contact with filling.
> Protarchus: Necessarily.
> Socrates: But it is impossible that this should be the body, for the body is what is emptied out.
> Protarchus: Yes. (35b)

They reach the conclusion that desire must belong to the soul, since, presumably, the body cannot undergo filling and emptying simultaneously. This means that physical pleasures cannot be mixed in the strict sense; that is, a restoration and a destruction cannot be perceived simultaneously, in the same location, with respect to the same process. Such a commingling would violate Plato's claim that the body cannot undergo filling and emptying simultaneously.[75]

How, then, should we understand the mixedness of mixed pleasures? I suggest that Plato provides at least two explanations: first, a pleasure is mixed if it is preceded by a perceived process of disintegration.[76] That Plato believes restorative pleasures presuppose a prior deficiency is borne out in his examples of the mixed pleasures of the body: eating, for example, is "the corresponding refilling" of the body after hunger, which is "a case of disintegration" (31e); thirst is "a destruction and pain, while the

[75] Theoretically, it may be possible for something to undergo both filling and emptying simultaneously, but in reality either one of these processes of change can be discerned only when one predominates. For instance, imagine water being poured into a glass as water is being siphoned out. If both happen at the same rate, we would say there is no change. If one happens at a slower or faster rate than the other, we would say the glass is either being emptied or filled based on which process is occurring at a quicker rate. Although theoretically both are occurring, experience would say that the glass is either being filled or emptied, not both. In the case of pleasure and pain, if restorations and destructions occur at equal rates, there is no change, and Plato's logic from the *Philebus* tells that neither pleasure nor pain would occur (as in the case of the neutral state). If either the restoration or the destructions predominates, the experience is called either pleasurable or painful depending on which prevails. Theoretically, in this case both processes are going on, but we would not be able to experience both as occurring—only one or the other, as in the glass of water example. Perhaps this is what Plato means when he claims that the body cannot be filled and emptied at the same time (35b): overall, either the body is being restored or destroyed, but not both at once.

[76] Damascius describes pure pleasures in the same way, noting the temporal relationship I am drawing out: pure pleasures are not *preceded* [προγίγνομαι] by discomfort (§206).

process that fills what is dried out with liquid is pleasure" (31e-32a). Once Plato appends the perception requirement to the restoration model, it is understood that the mixed pleasures of the body are preceded by *perceived* disintegrations rather than disintegrations *simpliciter*.

Second, mixedness can entail that pleasure and pain arise simultaneously in separate parts of the organism. The mixed pleasure of the body and soul together is an example: there can be a pain in the body (e.g., a perceived physical disintegration due to lack of food) along with a pleasure in the soul (e.g., an imagined future restoration). In this case, the pleasure and the pain are not together in the same location.

Against my reading, it might be suggested that Plato believes pleasure and pain can be experienced at the same time in the same place when he claims that a person in the throes of a mixed pleasure may "feel hot while shivering or feel chilled while sweating" (46c). However, if that is what Plato is claiming, then he contradicts himself, for heating and cooling are processes of filling and emptying,[77] and he has already argued that the body cannot undergo filling and emptying simultaneously. So what is Plato saying here? One explanation is that shivering and sweating are simply physical responses that do not necessarily entail feeling either hot or cold: a person who shivers while feeling hot may only shudder but not feel chilled. Or, Plato could have something in mind like the itching and scratching example: heating is perceived in one place, cooling in another. Plato's

[77] As Plato claims at 32a: "And the unnatural coagulation of the fluids in an animal through freezing is pain, while the natural process of their dissolution or redistribution is pleasure."

language at 46c does not commit him to the position that humans actually feel hot and cold simultaneously; a person experiences only one of those affections at a time.[78]

It might also be objected that mixed pleasures on my reading bear a strong resemblance to pure pleasures, since both are free of admixture with pain. Gosling, for instance, rejects this sort of view in which pleasure and pain are two separable experiences that may or may not occur together. He comments as follows:

> The talk of mixtures might suggest that Plato thinks of pleasure and distress as separately identifiable feelings that sometimes occur simultaneously—i.e. mixed. But on such a view no pleasure is in any strict sense mixed—it is always just a pure pleasure accompanied, sometimes or occasionally, by pure distress, each aroused by some other experience. On such a view there is no interest in, or even *prima facie* puzzle about, mixed pleasures. (117)

He goes on to claim that this view runs the risk of calling 'mixed' a condition that consists in completely unrelated pleasures and pains, like learning one is triumphant in a game just after banging one's shin. As I see it, 'mixed' and 'unmixed' are terms that describe a certain relation between pleasure and pain: if pleasure is preceded by pain, it is mixed; if not, it is unmixed. Furthermore, it does not seem likely that Plato would call 'mixed' a combination of just any pleasures and pains (like the shin and game example), for in his examples of mixed pleasure the restorations and destructions are correlative,

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[78] Which is to say that once a restoration begins to be perceived, the destruction cannot be perceived also; it is one or the other. In this I disagree with Waterfield, who writes: "The general model is that pleasure is always remedial of a prior pain. This is ambiguous, but 44d ff. makes it clear that we should understand 'prior' not in the sense that at the onset of pleasure the pain vanishes. Rather, quenching thirst, for instance, is *only* pleasant because the thirst (the pain) is there to be quenched" (18). He is right that quenching a thirst is pleasant because the agent thirsts (and thus experiences pleasure from the filling of a lack) but nothing says that the thirst cannot simply be prior to the pleasure of filling the body with liquid. 44dff does not tell against this. I have essentially the same response to Cooper, who comments: "From their first appearance (52c2), 'impure' pleasures are identified as those in whose constitution there is some essential link to pain, the very opposite of pleasure. It is not just that the pleasure is normally or always accompanied by pain or as facts stand purchasable only at the price of pain; the very experience that is enjoyed is enjoyed in part precisely as being painful, or as involving pain in some way" (155). I think "involving pain in some way" need not exclude pleasure preceded by pain.

meaning that a restoration goes with a certain destruction: for example, thirst and a filling with liquid (32a); dissolution because of heat and replenishment by cooling (32a); itching and scratching (46d), etc. If we are dealing with a "medical model" in the *Philebus*, that is, a model in which pleasure and pain are associated with processes of filling and emptying in a living organism, then it is logical that certain fillings correspond to certain lacks. Physiologically, it makes no sense to say that a deficiency in one part of the body is remedied by a filling in a completely different organ; I cannot quench my thirst by being warmed up, for instance. This does not have to mean that there is some experience of pain inherently built into certain pleasures, but merely that, logically, fillings go along with certain deficiencies. Gosling does not consider that, even if pleasure and pain are defined separately, mixed pleasures differ from the unmixed variety because the former are preceded by a perceived destruction, while the latter are not.[79]

G. Closing Remarks

In this part I have argued that Plato presents a general theory of the nature of pleasure, namely, the restoration model, which he threads through his discussions of mixed and unmixed pleasures, the neutral state, and the very notion of what it means for a pleasure to be 'mixed.' I have also argued that this model is accompanied by a perception requirement, such that in the dialogue pleasure is described as a perceived restoration rather than a restoration *simpliciter*. Such a description of pleasure in terms of processes of restoration sets Plato up very effectively for his critique of pleasure in the so-called 'process argument' later in the *Philebus*. Having spent much of the *Philebus*

[79] Perhaps this is lost on Gosling because he does not believe Plato is using the restoration model as his general theory of pleasure in the dialogue.

painting pleasure as a coming-into-being [γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν], Plato claims that pleasure is not being [οὐσία] itself and thus cannot be the good. Following Plato, in the next part I treat the 'process argument' attributed to certain unnamed clever people [κομψοί]. Part I of this dissertation will have served as an essential step in understanding Plato's treatment of pleasure in the dialogue—both his general theory and his critique—as well as the response of later hedonists and antihedonists to the *Philebus* account.

II.2

The Process Argument in Plato and Aristotle

In the *Philebus*, Plato presents us with a description of pleasure as a perceived restoration of an organism's natural state. Bound up with this description is the notion that pleasure is a process—a work in progress—rather than a state. This notion is crucial to an argument Socrates reports at *Philebus* 53c-54d against pleasure as the good. The argument entails that all processes, because they are for the sake of something else (namely, the goal toward which they progress), belong to the realm of becoming [γένεσις] rather than the realm of being [οὐσία]. Since the good is a member of the latter class, pleasures, qua processes, are at best means to the good, but not good in themselves. This 'process argument,' as I shall refer to it, was a popular topic in the discussions about the nature of pleasure among members of the early Academy and Aristotle. A few things are generally assumed about the argument: first, that it was propagated by Speusippus, Plato's nephew and successor as head of the Academy; second, that Aristotle is noting his disagreement with the process argument in Books 7 and 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*; and third, that a section of the Peripatetic *Magna Moralia* echoes many of the strikes found in the *Ethics* against the argument. What is at stake in these discussions is not so much the overarching hedonistic or antihedonistic ideology of which they are a part, but the definition of pleasure that underlies the ethical evaluation. Thus, for example, when Aristotle argues against extreme hedonism in Book 7 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, his target is not only what he believes to be the skewed ideology of his opponents, but the very definition of pleasure at the core of that ideology.

I begin this section by analyzing the details of Plato's process argument in *Philebus* 53c-54d. Next, I discuss Aristotle's response to it in Books 7 and 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as well as the Peripatetic response in Book 2 of the *Magna Moralia*. In these works, the process argument is explicitly rejected and pleasure is described as an activity [ἐνέργεια], in contrast to a process [γένεσις] or movement [κίνησις].[80] Within these discussions, I examine the situation in the early Academy vis-à-vis the disagreements between Eudoxus and Speusippus about the nature of pleasure, as well as the place of these disagreements in the *Philebus* and Aristotle's relevant writings. Ultimately, I intend for this investigation to reveal that Epicurean hedonism is rooted in precisely these fourth-century discussions about the nature of pleasure.

A. The Process Argument: *Philebus* 53c-54d

After his elucidation of the kinds of pleasures, Socrates presents an argument against the desirability of pleasure, namely, the process argument. He attributes the argument to some "clever people [κομψοί]" who have tried to pass their doctrine on to others. He tells Protarchus that they should be grateful to the κομψοί, since, as becomes evident as the argument progresses, their doctrine supports an evaluation of the worth of pleasure to which he and Protarchus are sympathetic, namely, that pleasure is not the good.

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[80] Thus, my goal in this section is to discuss the process argument in the *Philebus* and Aristotle's rejection of it. In this, I will basically follow the work of Van Riel on Aristotle and the *Philebus* (cf. Van Riel, 43-67). More generally, this section is intended to be a step toward my larger argument, viz., that Epicurus' theory of the nature of pleasure is a response to Plato's and to Aristotle's descriptions of pleasure. This section attempts to show that Aristotle's description of pleasure is intimately bound up with the Platonic line and the debates in the early Academy.

Socrates begins his retelling of the argument by posing the rhetorical question to Protarchus, "Have we not been told that pleasure is always a process of *becoming*, and that there is no *being* at all of pleasure [ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς]?" (53c). There are two kinds of things, Socrates explains, "one kind sufficient to itself, the other in need of something else [τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό, τὸ δ᾽ ἀεὶ ἐφιέμενον ἄλλου]" (53d); and further, one kind possesses "supreme dignity," while the other is inferior (53d). He summarizes these remarks: all things are either for the sake of something else, or are that for which others come to be (53e). Stated differently, if we have two things, the generation [γένεσις] of all things and being [οὐσία], the former exists for the sake of the latter (54a). Shipbuilding is given as an example: the craft is for the sake of ships, not the other way around (54b). As Socrates elaborates on his remarks, he loses the phrasing that would suggest any tentativeness about the views he has expressed. He claims, "I further hold [φημί] that every process of generation [γένεσιν] in turn always takes place for the sake of some particular being [οὐσίας], and that all generation taken together takes place for the sake of being as a whole" (54c). Not only are all things either generations or being, but all the former are for the sake of some one of the latter.

This distinction between means toward ends and ends themselves neatly sets Socrates up to introduce the good: that for the sake of which something comes to be (e.g., being or ships) should be put into the class of things "good in themselves," while those which come to be for the sake of others "belong in another class [μοῖραν]" (54c). The argument is clinched by the statement that pleasure, as a process of generation, comes to

be for "some being" (54c).[81] As something that comes to be for the sake of another, pleasure is disqualified from membership in the class of the good, as Socrates goes on to remark: "But if pleasure really is a process of generation [γένεσις], will we be placing it correctly, if we put it in a class different from that of the good?" (54d). Protarchus responds affirmatively.

With the process argument, Plato has the rejection of pleasure from the ranks of the good fairly locked up. First he contends, on a general level, that all things are either means or ends—among the class either of generation or of being, respectively; next, that the latter are among things good in themselves, while the former belong to a different class; and finally, since pleasure is a perceived process toward an organism's natural state, as he has indicated throughout the dialogue,[82] pleasure is firmly planted in the class of generation rather than being and thus cannot be the good. What is clearly crucial to the conclusion of the argument—namely, that pleasure is not the good—is the definition of pleasure on which it is based. If pleasure turns out to be something other than a means and thus not among the class of generations, it has a chance of qualifying for membership in the class of things good in themselves. As it is, pleasure can be only an incidental good or a means to the good;[83] the definition is bound up with its moral status. Van Riel

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[81] Which is nothing new in the dialogue, for Socrates has described all pleasures mentioned thus far in the dialogue—mixed pleasures of the soul, body, and soul and body together, as well as unmixed pleasures—as processes.

[82] See Part II.1 for the evidence for this view.

[83] It is important to note that the process argument does not imply that pleasure is bad or evil just because it does not belong to the class of things good in themselves, for pleasure, as a γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν, leads to something Plato would consider good, namely, οὐσία. For this reason, Frede describes pleasure in this context as "ein Hilfsgut," which seems apt (1997, 314). As Plato reports at 54e, the κομψοί are known to chide those who set as their ends processes of generation rather than the ends for which those processes take place. These foolish sorts "take delight in generation as a pleasure and proclaim that they would not want to live if they were not subject to hunger and thirst" (54e).

has suggested, and I think rightly, that what is important to Plato is not so much the conclusion of the κομψοί but the definition of pleasure that their conclusion requires.[84] That is, Plato is concerned with the question, how is pleasure a generation? And he answers that it is a perceived process of replenishment of the organism's natural state.

Having reviewed the process argument, we can see why Socrates claims that he and Protarchus ought to be grateful to the κομψοί:[85] all are of one mind about the fact that pleasure belongs to the class of becoming rather than being ("we ought to be grateful to the person who indicated to us that there is always only generation of pleasure and that it has no being whatsoever" [54d]) and that pleasure is not good in itself (the unnamed κομψοί "will just laugh at those who claim that pleasure is the good" [54d]). The κομψοί deserve thanks because they have helped Socrates and Protarchus find fault with pleasure—one of their stated goals in the dialogue[86]—and have done so with an argument whose premise Socrates and Protarchus have already adopted, namely, that pleasure belongs to the class of generations.

However, scholars disagree on whether Plato does in fact adhere to the view attributed to the κομψοί that all pleasures are generations. It has been suggested that the phrasing of 54c and 54d indicates some doubt or tentativeness on Socrates' part about describing pleasure as a process of generation. In these lines, Plato uses 'if' [εἴπερ] in his phrases about the nature of pleasure ("if [εἴπερ] pleasure is a process of generation," for

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[84] Van Riel comments, "Whoever is meant here, it is not the thesis of the subtle thinkers itself that is crucial, but rather the definition upon which it is built: one can accept that pleasure is not an end only if one agrees that it is defined as a kind of movement towards an end, viz. 'a perceptible process towards a natural state'" (47).

[85] Which he claims twice, once at the beginning of the argument (53c) and once at the end (54d).

[86] At 55c, Socrates says to Protarchus that they should be sure to give reason and knowledge the same scrutiny as pleasure: "Let us rather strike them valiantly all around."

example), indicating that the conclusion, namely, that pleasure is not the good, is only conditional.[87] In this vein, Carone advises the reader to "pay attention to the hypothetical mode in which the whole passage is put, and to the fact that Socrates does not express any commitment to that thesis [that all pleasures are generations]" (265). Socrates is maintaining his distance, she writes, by putting this theory of the nature of pleasure into the mouths of the κομψοί (265). On Carone's reading, Plato believes that at least one kind of pleasure is not a γένεσις, namely, pure pleasures.[88] She argues that since these are not processes, they could qualify for membership in the class of things good in themselves.

While it is true that Socrates does at first put the process argument in the mouth of another and that Frede's translation of εἴπερ as 'since' rather than 'if' does obscure the somewhat tentativeness of some of the phrasing in the passage, there are several reasons to believe that Plato himself adheres to the κομψοί view that Socrates reports. The whole of the previous section of this dissertation has been an argument for the view that Plato believes all mixed and unmixed pleasures that he mentions in the dialogue are bound up with the restoration model; they are all generations [γενέσεις] and thus would all be targets of the process argument. So, although Plato has Socrates put the argument in the

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[87] Frede translates εἴπερ as 'since,' thus rendering the relevant part of 54c, "Now, pleasure, since [εἴπερ] it is a process of generation, necessarily comes to be for the sake of some being." Carone calls Frede on this translation of εἴπερ, noting that it "suggests commitment" on Plato's part to the views of the κομψοί (265n17). Hackforth has also commented that the conditional phrasing of some of the lines in the process argument suggests that Plato does not support the conclusions of the κομψοί (105-7). As I see it, Frede is right to chastise Hackforth for this view, given the fact that he has no explanation for why Plato would put so much stock in a theory whose premises he does not accept (cf. Frede, 1997, 307n130).

[88] In this she agrees with A.E. Taylor, who contends that Plato does not commit himself to the view that all pleasure is a γένεσις, for, in Taylor's opinion, this may be true about mixed pleasures but not about pure pleasures (cf. A.E. Taylor, 79-80). Gosling and Taylor have also argued that it is improbable that Plato thinks that the γένεσις account could apply to all pleasures (153-54). I have argued against the view expressed by all of the scholars just mentioned, including Carone, in section II.1.E.

mouths of the κομψοί, the argument is one whose premises Plato accepts and has in fact been laying out throughout the dialogue.

Furthermore, Socrates does not qualify his statement that all pleasures are a coming-into-being [γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν] or his remark that pleasure belongs in a class other than that of the good (54d).[89] Plato has an opportunity to modify the views of the κομψοί so as to express whatever misgivings he may have about painting all pleasures with the same brush, but he does not take it.[90] If he were not committed to the views attributed to the κομψοί—if, perhaps, he means that only mixed pleasures are properly generations, or only certain mixed pleasures like nutrition—why would he not say so? But he expresses no reservations about their position—really, how could he without contradicting himself, since their description of pleasure is precisely the one he has pushed all through the dialogue up to this point. As it is, Plato presents the premises and conclusion offered by the κομψοί without any stated modification. If he had wanted to make some major changes to the process argument of the κομψοί, it would have been better for him to have given the argument himself and not have attributed it to another, for a modified view along the lines that Carone would like—namely, that Plato believes

[89] I follow Frede in this reading. On her view, Plato thinks "all pleasures have in common one feature, that rules out the possibility that any of them can be an unqualified good, namely, that pleasure by its very nature is always *becoming* (*aei genesis estin*) and has no *being* (*ousia*)" (1993, lv). Cf. also Frede, 1997, 314, where she discusses her belief that Plato does not make any exceptions to the view that pleasure is a process, even pure pleasure; and 1997, 307, where she discusses the issue that Plato does not treat the κομψοί with irony.

[90] In this I agree with Rist's comment, "At *Phlb*. 53c 4-7 it is suggested that the identification of pleasure as a γένεσις is a theory of the κομψοί to which, by implication, Socrates is not committed. Thus it looks as though the path may be open for the suggestion that only one type of pleasure is a γένεσις; but whether that path is intended to be open or not, Plato does not go along it" (1974, 168n4).

neither that all pleasures are generations nor that no pleasure is the good—hardly resembles the view of the κομψοί as Plato presents it.[91]

In addition, we might also note that in the early metaphysical discussions of the dialogue (23c-27c) the language of becoming and being is used in reference to pleasure, indicating that Plato has not introduced the terminology γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν only at some later stage in the dialogue or borrowed it entirely from another source. Plato himself claims that in actuality pleasure, although it is in theory a member of the class of τὸ ἄπειρον (the unlimited), belongs to the division of things that result from the combination of πέρας (limit) and ἄπειρον—that is, things that are generated. There is a "coming-into-being [γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν]" created when πέρας imposes measure on ἄπειρον. That he uses the same language in our selection at 53cff should incline us to believe that he does take seriously the notion that all pleasures are processes toward an end. If the κομψοί believe this too, then they are all in agreement.

A second point of scholarly debate has been the identity of the κομψοί. This topic has been treated extensively elsewhere, and I do not intend to enter into the debate here. I would like only to mention the usual view, as it bears on my later discussion of Aristotle's response to the process argument. Most scholars believe that Plato has Speusippus in mind for the κομψοί[92] and that Plato wrote the *Philebus* in response to debates within the Academy between Speusippus and Eudoxus, the latter of whom was

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[91] One might wonder why Plato never has Socrates own up to the fact that the description of pleasure threaded throughout the dialogue is the same as that inherent in the process argument of the κομψοί, or why Plato does not have Socrates give the process argument as his own in the first place. Perhaps Plato wants to shield himself (and Socrates) from criticism by being able to deny that he ever said that pleasure is not the good. Perhaps he did not want to explicitly take sides in a debate taking place within his own school.

[92] The κομψοί could very well be a single person rather than a group, since in the passage Plato sometimes refers to the author(s) of the process argument in the singular. Cf. *Phil*. 54d-e.

noted for his arguments in favor of hedonism.[93] It could be that Plato, taking Speusippus' side, repeats his nephew's argument as part of his larger antihedonist agenda in the dialogue.[94]

What should be clear from this section is that Plato is committed to the premises and conclusion of the process argument, namely, that pleasure is among the class of things that come to be for the sake of another (it is a γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν) and for this reason it is not among things good in themselves. While Plato's desire to disqualify pleasure from the ranks of the good is no doubt central to his introducing the process argument in the dialogue, it must be emphasized that Plato is able, through Socrates, to effect that rejection because of the definition of pleasure he has carefully constructed throughout the *Philebus* and which forms the crux of the process argument. As we will see, the definition becomes a point of disagreement among Aristotle and the Academics.

B. The Aristotelian Reply to the Process Argument

As Van Riel notes, Aristotle's response to arguments against pleasure as the good recounted in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is a strike more against the definition of pleasure on which several of those arguments are based than against the hedonism or

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[93] E.g., A.E. Taylor (24-25) and Gosling (114, 166), the latter of whom notes that Philebus probably does not represent Eudoxus, but the dialogue is most likely Plato's formulation of his own ideas in relation to Eudoxus. The main critic of this view has been Frede, who argues that Plato is referring to himself, evidenced by the places in other dialogues where he describes himself as κομψός (*Phaedo* 105c; *Rep*. 525d; and *Theaetetus* 156a). As such, she believes that Plato is committed to the premises and conclusion of the process argument, since he is their creator. She claims that Eudoxus probably does not play much of a role in Plato's formulation of the dialogue, except to act as its "catalyst," since he was not a philosopher of ethics, or even a philosopher at all. On her view, Plato has a reason to rethink his theory of pleasure that has nothing to do with Eudoxus or Speusippus, namely, his undeveloped account of pleasure in the *Republic*. Cf. Frede, 1993, lv, lxxi, and 63n3; 1997, 307-8. Van Riel is inclined to accept her view (47); Gosling and Taylor express skepticism about Speusippus' presence in the dialogue without coming to any clear conclusions (231-34).

[94] I treat the evidence for Speusippus in the next section.

antihedonism of which they are a part (Van Riel, 47). This is plausible when one considers that, in the *Philebus*, which contains the description of pleasure as a process that Aristotle will reject, Plato is as concerned to further this definition as he is to lambaste hedonism. No wonder, then, that Aristotle takes up the task of rejecting the definition of pleasure, even if he does not also entirely reject antihedonism.

In addition to reacting to the *Philebus* account of pleasure, Aristotle is also responding to his own earlier account that echoes the *Philebus*. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle describes pleasure as the perceptible restoration of the soul toward its natural state and pain as the perceptible movement of the soul away from the natural state.[95] On this view, pleasure involves the awareness of the soul's progression toward a state of normalcy. The account is not identical to that of the *Philebus*, for Aristotle indicates that the restorative movement occurs in the soul, whereas Plato suggests that the movement can be in either the soul, body, or both.[96] But, this difference is minor compared to the overwhelming similarities between the two passages.[97] For one, the perception requirement is explicitly mentioned by Aristotle, indicating that he is borrowing not from the *Republic*, which conspicuously lacks any mention of perception's role in pleasure, but the *Philebus*. Secondly, in both the *Rhetoric* passage and the *Philebus*, the term

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[95] "We may lay it down that pleasure is a movement [κίνησιν], a restoration [κατάστασιν] by which the soul as a whole is consciously [αἰσθητήν] brought into its normal state of being [τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν], and that pain is the opposite" (1369b33-35). All translations from the *Rhetoric* are W. Rhys Roberts'. The Greek text is from Ross' edition (Oxford).

[96] As evidenced by the three groups of mixed pleasures: those of the soul, the body, and the soul and body together.

[97] Rist brings up the point, I think mistakenly, that the *Rhetoric* account is different because in it Aristotle treats all pleasures as restorations, whereas Plato treats only some as restorations (namely, the mixed pleasures). Aristotle's account, Rist claims, is "a sloppy oversimplification" of the Platonic view (1974, 169). As I see it, Plato believes all pleasures to be restorations in the sense of fillings, as I have argued in section II.1, and thus Aristotle is correctly reporting, and not oversimplifying, the Platonic view.

κατάστασις is used to indicate a process of restoration. Furthermore, the *Rhetoric* contains discussions of pleasures of memories and expectations (1370a27-1370b6), which appear prominently in the *Philebus* account. Lastly, Aristotle mentions pleasures related to the emotions, particularly anger (1370b10-15), referencing the same passage from the *Iliad* (18.109) that appears in the discussion of the mixed nature of anger in the *Philebus* (47e).

Although the similarities between the *Philebus* and *Rhetoric* accounts of pleasure would indicate that in the latter Aristotle adopts aspects of the former, and then later, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, comes to reject his earlier position, there is some uncertainty as to the dating of the *Rhetoric*, whether it precedes or follows the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[98] The problem, as Gosling and Taylor have explained, involves references in *Rhetoric* 2.22 to events that occurred very late, and 1.8 refers to the *Politics*, which is traditionally thought to postdate the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The main reason I can see for rejecting the later dating of the *Rhetoric* is that this would involve Aristotle in an odd progression of thought: he would have first thoroughly rejected the Platonic view of pleasure in all its forms (κίνησις, γένεσις, ἀναπλήρωσις) only to later adopt that discarded view. Although the converse—that Aristotle first adopted the Platonic view and then later rejected it—also involves Aristotle in a reversal of thought, it is not as unlikely as the other option. Aristotle's adoption of the Platonic view in the *Rhetoric*[99] is not nearly as

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[98] Gosling and Taylor, for instance, discuss the *Rhetoric*'s dating. Ultimately, they conclude that it is more likely that the *Rhetoric* came after *Philebus* but before the *Nicomachean Ethics*. For their helpful discussion of the evidence, see GT, 196-97.

[99] And the other scant references to pleasure in the early Aristotelian corpus, viz., *Physics* 7.247a19 and *Posterior Analytics* 1.87b5-15. In both texts pleasures are said to be changes. Yet, we do find a different account in *De Anima*; cf. 431a10-11. (I thank Dr. Steven Strange for bringing the *De Anima* passage to my attention.)

involved as his later rejection of it: parts of two books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as well as the *Magna Moralia* feature extensive arguments against the Platonic view, while Aristotle's statements in favor of it are fleeting. From his presentation and rejection of the account of pleasure as a process, movement, and restoration, it seems that his mature view is that the Platonic account is fatally flawed.[100]

What is the account that Aristotle claims to be rejecting? In *EN* 7.1152b1-1154b34, Aristotle responds to specifically three groups of antihedonists, whom he lists as follows: first, those who think no pleasure is a good, either in itself or incidentally ("pleasure is not a good at all" [1152b12-13]); second, those who think some are good, but most are bad; and third, those who hold that even if all pleasures are goods, the best thing cannot be pleasure. Aristotle elaborates on the reasons for all three views, but only the first and third groups concern us here; both feature the process argument in their rejection of pleasure. The first position sounds as if it was lifted directly from the *Philebus*: pleasure is not the good because "every pleasure is a perceptible process to a natural state [πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσίς ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή], and that no process is of the same kind as its end [οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν], e.g. no process of building is of the same kind as a house" (1152b13-15). This position is not explicitly attributed to Plato, but it bears a strong resemblance to the Platonic process argument.[101]

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[100] In any case, the exact chronology of the texts is irrelevant to my overall goal of identifying the philosophical influences on Epicurus' views. No matter whether Aristotle's mature view on pleasure lies in the *Rhetoric* or instead in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and Peripatetic *Magna Moralia*, the content of these texts would have been in circulation among various philosophical schools by Epicurus' time.

[101] Hampton is incorrect when she claims that Aristotle attributes this theory to Plato. She writes, "According to Aristotle, Plato believed the end to be superior to the process of reaching it, so that the *genesis* of pleasure cannot be an end or good any more than building a house, as opposed to the house itself, can be an end (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1152B12-15)" (74). While it is true that Plato does espouse this view, Aristotle does not expressly attribute the theory to him at *EN* 1152b12-15 . Aristotle merely says, "it seems to some [τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ]" that no pleasure is (a) good (1152b8).

The reasoning of the third group echoes that of the first: "The reason for the view that the best thing is not pleasure is that pleasure is not an end but a process [οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις]" (1152b22-23). Both groups appeal to the process argument in support of some version of antihedonism.

In Book 10, the antihedonistic attacks appear to be targeted directly against Eudoxus' hedonism rather than against hedonism generally. In turn, Aristotle's response is formulated as a defense more of some of Eudoxus' arguments for hedonism than of hedonistic arguments generally.[102] In *EN* 10.1172b9-25, Aristotle recounts Eudoxus' main arguments for the claim that pleasure is the good. First, all things, rational and irrational, aim at pleasure; it is an object of choice in itself, and not chosen for the sake of something else. What is most the object of choice—as pleasure is, since all things, even though they are different, move toward the same object—is the greatest good.[103] Second, all things avoid pain; therefore, pain's contrary, pleasure, must be an object of choice and hence the good.[104] Finally, all pleasure, when added to any good, makes the good more choiceworthy; goods can be made more choiceworthy only by the addition of pleasure.[105]

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[102] As I mention later, Aristotle does not wholeheartedly accept Eudoxan hedonism. He is sympathetic to the Eudoxan idea that pleasure is related to the good, but not to the notion that pleasure is *the* good. In this sense, Aristotle neither defends nor rejects Eudoxan hedonism or Speusippan antihedonism, although he agrees and disagrees with parts of both.

[103] "Thus the fact that all things moved towards the same object indicated that this was for all things the chief good (for each thing, he argued, finds its own good, as it finds its own nourishment); and that which is good for all things and at which all aim was *the* good" (1172b12-15). Diogenes Laertius also reports the view that Eudoxus thought pleasure is the good (DL 8.88 = Lasserre fragment T7).

[104] "He believed that the same conclusion followed no less plainly from a study of the contrary of pleasure; pain was in itself an object of aversion to all things, and therefore its contrary must be similarly an object of choice" (1172b18-20).

[105] "Further, he argued that pleasure when added to any good, e.g. to just or temperate action, makes it more worthy of choice, and that it is only by itself that the good can be increased" (1172b23-25).

Aristotle goes on to explain that these arguments hold water because Eudoxus is considered to be a very unbiased source: his temperance and self-control are evidence that he is not attempting to justify an immoderate, hedonistic lifestyle that he himself possesses. Rather, Eudoxus' arguments are based on his belief that all facts point to the conclusion that pleasure is the good; in other words, Eudoxus is merely telling it like it is.[106]

It should be noted that although Aristotle does reject the process argument that forms part of the attacks on pleasure he reports in Books 7 and 10, he does not wholeheartedly accept hedonism or disagree entirely with some of the antihedonistic arguments against Eudoxus. For instance, Aristotle claims that Eudoxus' third argument for pleasure—that when added to another good pleasure makes that good more choiceworthy—shows only that pleasure is *a* good, not the *chief* good, since every good is more choiceworthy when it is added to another good (1172b26-28). Aristotle acknowledges that his point against Eudoxus recalls Plato's argument in the *Philebus* (cf. 21b-d, 60b-e) that, first, since the pleasant life is more desirable with reason than without it; second, since the mixture of pleasure and reason is better than the former taken alone; and third, "the good cannot become more desirable by the addition of anything to it," pleasure is not the good (1172b31-32). It is interesting that Aristotle rejects Eudoxan hedonism even as he rejects the antihedonistic process argument. That Aristotle goes out of his way to refute the theory of pleasure as a γένεσις or κίνησις, even though he ultimately agrees with its authors that pleasure is not the good, shows that the definition

[106] Aristotle writes, "His arguments were credited more because of the excellence of his character than for their own sake; he was thought to be remarkably temperate, and therefore it was thought that he was not saying what he did say as a friend of pleasure, but that the facts really were so" (1172b15-18).

of pleasure on which the process argument is based is, in itself and independently of the ideology of which it is a part, of central importance to Aristotle's discussion of pleasure in the *Ethics*.

Despite his criticism of Eudoxus' point, Aristotle takes it upon himself to refute several arguments against Eudoxan hedonism that he deems incorrect. Aristotle objects that it is nonsense to claim that "that at which all things aim is not necessarily good" (1172b36), as some have held, since everyone does seem to think that what is most the object of choice is the good. Furthermore, Aristotle objects to the antihedonist view that it is not the case that the opposite of what is evil is good.[107] Eudoxus argues, as I mentioned, that pleasure is the good since it is opposed to pain, an evil. Again Aristotle appeals to prevailing opinion on the matter: "In fact people evidently avoid the one as evil and choose the other as good; that then must be the nature of the opposition between them" (1173a11-13).

In *EN* 10.3, Aristotle mentions the process argument as one of the objections to Eudoxus' view, and here we find another statement of the argument that he mentions in *EN* 7. Unnamed objectors begin with the assumption that the good is complete, while movements and comings into being are incomplete. They then try to show that pleasure

[107] Aristotle attributes a similar view to Speusippus in Book 7 (1153b4-7). From Aristotle's report there, Speusippus attempts to show that pleasure is not the good based on the analogy that pleasure, pain, and the good are opposed in the same way that the lesser and the greater are opposed to the equal: neither the lesser nor the greater is the same as the equal, even though they are opposed, and similarly neither pleasure nor pain is the good, even though pleasure and pain are opposites. Speusippus' point apparently is that pleasure is not the good, even though it is opposed to the bad. This reference to Speusippus is supported by a passage in Book 10 (1173a5-28), where he is not named but the view described fits with the one expressly attributed to Speusippus in Book 7. In the Book 10 report, pleasure and pain are both described as being opposed to a neutral state, and Speusippus is known to have held that the good is a state of freedom from disturbance [ἀοχλησία] (cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 2, 22.133.4, which I discuss in this section). Leonardo Tarán has argued convincingly that Speusippus is meant in both the Book 7 and 10 passages. Cf. Tarán, *Speusippus of Athens: A Critical Study with a Collection of the Related Texts and Commentary* (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 438-43.

is a movement and a coming-into-being (1173a25). One way they attempt to demonstrate this is with another claim that Aristotle reports "some people" making, that "pain is the lack of that which is according to nature, and pleasure is replenishment [ἀναπλήρωσιν]" (1173b7-8). Here we have pleasure being called a process and a movement on the basis of a description of pleasure as a restoration.

No doubt the similarity between this description at *EN* 1173b7-8 and the definition of pleasure as a perceived restoration to a natural state in the *Philebus* is striking,[108] yet Aristotle does not name the source. Presumably, the author of the view is one and the same individual or group as the κομψοί (which is to say that the view is the same as Plato's in the *Philebus*). Again we return to Speusippus, who it has been argued is Aristotle's target in Books 7 and 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[109] Clement of Alexandria reports that Speusippus believes that the good is a steady state of freedom from disturbance: "Speusippus, the nephew of Plato, declares that happiness is a perfect state in the area of what is natural, or the state of (possession of) goods, which is a state for which all men have a (natural) impulse, while the good aim at freedom from disturbance [ἀοχλησίας]."[110] John Dillon claims that since Speusippus thinks that the good is a state of nondisturbance, he discounts pleasure based on its being "a *process*,

[108] I think Irwin has it right when he comments that Aristotle is probably responding to *Phil*. 53c-54c, although it should be noted that Aristotle can have the *Philebus* in mind only for the argument that pleasure is a γένεσις, but not also that it is a κίνησις, since Plato never explicitly describes pleasure as a κίνησις in the dialogue. Cf. Irwin, trans., *Nicomachean Ethics*, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), 303n3.§4. But, Plato does explicitly describe pleasure as a κίνησις in the *Republic* (583e), leading me to believe that Aristotle is probably rejecting all of Plato's attempts to bring pleasure under the heading of change (either as a γένεσις or κίνησις).

[109] See, for example, Dillon, 100-106.

[110] *Stromata* II.22.133.4 (Tarán fragment 77), trans. Dillon.

and an open-ended, disorderly one at that."[111] If this is right, then it would seem very likely that Speusippus is the target of Aristotle's criticisms of those who associate pleasure with motion, a process, or a restoration.[112] But again, this is to say that Aristotle may have in mind *Philebus* 53c-54d, and Speusippus only indirectly.

One of Aristotle's main points against the description of pleasure inherent in the process argument is that processes that restore us to our natural states are only incidentally pleasant rather than pleasant in themselves. When an organism undergoes restoration, the locus of pleasurable activity is not the part of the organism being restored, but the part that remains unimpaired (1152b33-36). He explains that when someone is being cured, the curative activity arises from the part of the organism that remains healthy. People erroneously associate the process of being cured with pleasure because they see the two occurring simultaneously. He writes, "By things pleasant incidentally I mean those that act as cures [τὰ ἰατρεύοντα] (for because as a result people are cured through some action of the part that remains healthy, for this reason the process is thought pleasant)" (1154b17-19). That the activity of pleasure is found in areas of normal functioning rather than areas of deficiency is evident, Aristotle points out, from the existence of pleasures that involve no pain or appetite. He reasons that if the activity of pleasure were linked only to processes of restoration, there would be no pleasures that

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[111] Dillon, 104. This clam is based on a statement attributed to Speusippus from *EN* 10 that pleasure is indeterminate. Aristotle comments, "They say, however, that the good is determinate [ὡρίσθαι], while pleasure is indeterminate [ἀόριστον], because it admits of the more and the less [μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον]" (1173a15-17, trans. modified). This passage comes immediately after one in which Aristotle has most likely been referring to Speusippus' argument that pleasure and pain are both opposed to the good as the greater and lesser are opposed to the equal (see my earlier note). So, as Tarán concludes, "It is legitimate to infer that Speusippus equated the good with τὸ ἴσον and pain and pleasure with τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον." For further discussion, see Tarán, 438-43.

[112] As Dillon claims (111n42). Gosling and Taylor argue otherwise. They claim that there is not enough evidence to associate Speusippus with the arguments against pleasure as a process or motion in either *EN* 7 or 10 (cf. GT, 239).

have nothing to do with deficiencies or replenishments. He claims, "For there are actually pleasures that involve *no* pain or appetite (e.g. those of contemplation [θεωρεῖν]), the nature in such a case not being defective at all" (1152b36-1153a2). Aristotle wants to claim that there are pure pleasures—that is, pleasures that are untainted with pain, and have nothing to do with deficiencies and restorations. His example—contemplation—shows how his idea of pure pleasure differs from Plato's. In the *Philebus*, Plato considers all pure pleasures to be replenishments of unperceived lacks. He cites learning as an example, since, unlike contemplation, it is a *process* of filling learners with some knowledge they lack. Aristotle's idea of pure pleasure, then, is a revision of Plato's, since the former entails that pure pleasures involve no deficiency at all—not even unperceived lacks.

Aristotle's critique of the process argument is part of his larger point, only briefly touched on in Book 7 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, that pleasures are activities and ends. He argues that it is not the case that pleasure is inferior to something else in the way that processes are inferior to the ends towards which they are directed. As activities rather than processes, pleasures do not have ends different from themselves. In Book 7, Aristotle is rather vague on the details of the difference between an activity [ἐνέργεια], a process [γένεσις], and a movement [κίνησις], but his general idea is that pleasure is the activity of natural functioning that carries on without impediment, not any processes or movements that may be associated with that activity.[113] Whomever he has in mind as his

[113] The crucial passage is 1153a7-15: "Again, it is not necessary that there should be something else better than pleasure, as some say the end is better than the process; for pleasures are not processes nor do they all involve processes—they are activities [ἐνέργειαι] and ends; nor do they arise when we are becoming something, but when we are exercising some faculty; and not all pleasures have an end different from themselves, but only the pleasures of persons who are being led to the completing of their nature. This is why it is not right to say that pleasure is a perceptible process [τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν], but it should rather

target—Speusippus, Plato, perhaps others—he pokes at precisely the formulation of pleasure found in the *Philebus*.

In Book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle lays out in more detail his notion of an activity and explains how it is opposed to a process and a movement. Because the Book 10 account is an elaboration of a topic he introduces earlier (back in Book 7), there is much scholarly debate concerning the extent to which Aristotle's treatments of pleasure differ. The topic has been covered extensively in the secondary literature, and I do not wish to add significantly to it here. However, it is important to note that in both books Aristotle is reacting against the view that pleasure is either a process or a movement; that he disagrees with the process argument remains a constant across the two books. Moreover, I believe that Aristotle's reaction to the process argument appears more developed, for whatever reason, in Book 10, for there he gives a more substantial formulation of his notion of an activity.[114] On that note, let us turn to the Book 10 account.

As part of his task to flesh out his notion of an activity, Aristotle begins Book 10 with arguments specifically against pleasure as a movement and a process, arguments that do not appear in Book 7. Pleasure is not a movement, he argues, because speed and slowness are proper to movements, but speed and slowness do not apply to pleasure. We may *become* angry or pleased quickly or slowly, but we cannot *be* pleased quickly; speed applies only to the process of achieving pleasure, but not to pleasure once achieved. In

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be called activity of the natural state [ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως], and instead of 'perceptible' 'unimpeded [ἀνεμπόδιστον].'"

[114] In this I agree with Irwin, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 271n13.§2; Van Riel, 52-53; and J.O. Urmson, "Aristotle on Pleasure," in *Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. J.M.E. Moravcsik (London: MacMillan, 1968), 323. They argue that Aristotle's position vis-à-vis the process argument is more clearly laid out in Book 10.

other words, I cannot enjoy a great concert quickly; I can only *reach* my state of enjoyment at a certain pace. And this, Aristotle claims, is why pleasures differ from movements like walking or growth: speed applies to these movements *while they are being performed*. He sums up: "While, then, we can change quickly or slowly into a state of pleasure, we cannot quickly exhibit the activity of pleasure, i.e. be pleased" (1173b2-1173b4). He argues further that pleasure is no more a process than it is a movement. His argument here is closely linked with his subsequent comments against pleasure as a restoration or replenishment. According to Aristotle, those who say pleasure is a process give the following description of the nature of pleasure and pain: a thing does not come to be out of any random thing, but "a thing is dissolved into that out of which it comes into being; and pain would be the destruction of that of which pleasure is the coming into being" (1173b5-7). What these people do, Aristotle suggests, is attempt to identify the object of pleasure's coming-into-being and pain's perishing. He reports that it is believed that pleasure is the coming-into-being of an organism's natural condition, and pain is the emptying of the natural condition (1173b7-8), such that some people hold that pleasure is synonymous with replenishment [ἀναπλήρωσις], and pain with destruction. Aristotle thus links processes and restorations in the following way: he asks, if pleasure is a coming-into-being, of what is it a coming-into-being? Answer: the natural condition. And what is the coming-into-being of an organism's natural condition? A restoration. Therefore, pleasure, on the view Aristotle opposes, is a process and a restoration.

Aristotle counters that if one claims that pleasure and pain are restorations and destructions, respectively, then they are both bodily experiences, since the body is the locus of filling and emptying: "If then pleasure is replenishment with that which is

according to nature, that which feels pleasure will be that in which the replenishment takes place, i.e. the body" (1173b9-11). To this Aristotle responds, flatly, "That is not thought to be the case" (1173b11). His point is that pleasures have a mental component; they are not completely under the purview of the body.[115] This would not technically be a revision of the *Philebus*, since there Plato does not describe all pleasures as bodily. Plato acknowledges pleasures of hopes and memories and the emotions, all of which are distinctly mental. Aristotle himself acknowledges that this view about pleasure as a replenishment (and thus as a process) comes from observances of the pleasures and pains accompanying nutrition, that is, from "the fact that when people have been short of food and have felt pain beforehand they are pleased by the replenishment" (1173b14-15). His critique is simply that not all pleasures belong solely to the body.

In a further objection, Aristotle repeats a response to the process argument from Book 7, but this time he provides more examples: not all pleasures involve the filling of a lack and thus pain, "for the pleasures of learning [μαθηματικαί], and among the sensuous pleasures, those of smell, and also many sounds and sights, and memories and hopes, do not presuppose pain. Of what then will these be the coming into being? There has not been lack of anything of which they could be the replenishment" (1173b16-20). In direct contrast to the *Philebus*' discussion of pure pleasures, Aristotle claims that the same pleasures that Plato describes as preceded by unperceived lacks—namely, learning, smell, sights, and sounds—involve no lack whatsoever. I argued in section II.1 that Plato treats anything that we do not have as a lack, such as unknown facts, smells we have

[115] I agree with Irwin when he comments, "Aristotle assumes that pleasure is a condition of the soul, not a purely bodily condition, since it requires awareness (and Plato recognizes this, *Phil*. 34a)" (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 303n3.§6).

never encountered, etc., such that pure pleasures are preceded by a sort of deficiency, although it goes unperceived. Aristotle's revision of this is to say that it is a gross oversimplification to portray all pleasures as replenishments, since some do not presuppose a lack. That he chooses the same examples as Plato suggests that he is responding directly to the *Philebus*.[116]

From these objections, Aristotle moves to elucidate his own description of pleasure. As in Book 7, he asserts in Book 10 that pleasure is an activity. Aristotle's complicated distinction between an activity and a process and movement rests on the following: an activity is complete in the moment; that is, unlike a process or movement it is not a progression in stages in which some potentiality is gradually realized until it is actualized. At any point during a process of change, what is changing is different from itself: it is different from the end state that it will become, any previous stages, and any further stages. Some states realize potentialities without doing so in progressive stages. Aristotle's example is seeing: at no moment while I am seeing am I waiting for a progression of stages in order to complete my seeing; seeing is complete in the moment, meaning "it does not lack anything which coming into being later will complete its form" (1174a15-16). When I am seeing, there is not some further element that is required for

[116] Frede argues otherwise. On her view, that Aristotle uses these same examples suggests that he is not thinking of the *Philebus*, for if Aristotle has taken note of Plato's use of the examples there, he would realize that Plato himself makes room for pure pleasures that do not presuppose pain. She writes, "Aristoteles wendet nämlich einerseits ein, daß diese Erklärung nur auf körperliche Vorgänge zutrifft, andererseits verweist er auf Freuden, die keinen Schmerz voraussetzen, wie etwa die Freude am Lernen, an Gerüchen oder an schönen Tönen. Diese Einwände zeigen, daß er weder Platons Gründe für die Einbeziehung geistiger Freuden zur Kenntnis genommen hat, noch auch seine Erklärung für die reinen Arten von Lust kennt, sonst hätte er nicht Platons eigene Beispiele gegen ihn zitiert" (1997, 422-23). I think what Frede misses is that Aristotle's inclusion of these examples is part of his rebuttal of Plato's view that all pleasures are processes, including pleasures that do not presuppose pain. Aristotle can use Plato's examples against him if Aristotle is arguing, as I claim he is, that these pleasures are not in fact processes. The point would be that Aristotle is saying to Plato that the pleasures the latter considers to be processes are really activities in the Aristotelian sense.

me to complete the activity.[117] Similarly, pleasure does not lack anything that could come to be later to complete it; lasting longer will not add anything to pleasure's form, since it is already complete in itself. Inherent in this idea of completeness is the notion that activities, such as pleasure and seeing, are whole rather than divisible into parts; if activities are without parts, then when I engage in an activity there cannot be some other element of it that has yet to be completed. A task that is divisible into parts, such as building, takes time to complete and is for the sake of some end; it is a movement, complete only in its final moment when all its parts are put together. Aristotle writes of movements, "In their parts and during the time they occupy, all movements are incomplete, and are different in kind from the whole movement and from each other" (1174a21-23). On his view, it is not possible to find a movement complete in form at all times, but only when all of its parts are taken together. He adds that pleasure cannot be a process for one of the same reasons it cannot be a movement: processes, like movements, apply only to divisible things, not to wholes (1174b10-12). He concludes, "Plainly, then, pleasure and movement must be different from each other, and pleasure must be one of the things that are whole and complete" (1174b6-7).

Aristotle goes on in Book 10 to further define the relation between pleasure and activity. Pleasure, according to Aristotle, completes an activity, but not just any activity: one that is performed by a "well-conditioned organ in relation to the worthiest of its objects" (1174b22-23). Aristotle understands every organ (or sense) to be active in

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[117] J.L. Ackrill suggests that activities can be distinguished from movements based on the following test: if the perfect tense is applicable to a point in time of the object in question, it is an activity. For example, 'is gazing at the statue,' entails 'has gazed at the statue,' and thus Aristotle would consider 'gazing at a statue' to be an activity. In contrast, "'is building the house' is inconsistent with 'has built the house,'" and so it is not an activity. Ackrill, "Aristotle's Distinction Between *Energeia* and *Kinesis*," in *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, ed. Renford Bambrough (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), 129. Within the scope of Book 10, I think this distinction is helpful.

relation to something; an organ in good condition, operating at its best, acts in relation to the best of its objects (1174b30). When the organ is in tip-top condition and working with the finest objects, "this activity will be the most complete and pleasant" (1174b18-20).

Much ink has been spilled over whether Aristotle believes pleasure to be an element that supervenes on an activity or identical to an activity.[118] He appears to espouse the latter in Book 7 of the *Ethics*, and many scholars believe him to adhere to the former in Book 10. Those who support the reading that Aristotle understands pleasure to be a supervenient element cite the following remark from Book 10: "Pleasure completes the activity, not as the inherent state does, but as an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age" (1174b31-33).[119] Translated in this way, Aristotle does unmistakably appear to say that pleasure is not itself an activity but supervenes on one. And although it has been argued that the passage says nothing about a "bloom of youth," but actually reads, "bloom in those who are vigorous" (as Van Riel has it [57]), most still believe that Aristotle means to describe pleasure as a supervenient element. I do not wish to enter into the debate about the differences between Book 7 and 10, although it does seem that Book 10 is more likely to represent Aristotle's mature

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[118] Cf. G.E.L. Owen, who believes that the theses of Books 7 and 10 are not answers to one question but to two different ones, namely, what is being enjoyed and what it means to enjoy. In his view, because the passages are addressing entirely different questions, it is fruitless to ask whether Aristotle is presenting the same definition of pleasure in each. Owen, "Aristotelian Pleasures," in *Logic, Science, and Dialectic*, ed. Martha Nussbaum (1971-72; repr., Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 334-46. Van Riel contends that although the two passages cannot belong to the same work because of the lack of cross references, "there is no essential difference of opinion between them" (43). Gosling and Taylor give an extensive rebuttal of Owen (cf. GT, 204-224).

[119] This is W.D. Ross's translation (revised by Urmson). Irwin translates very similarly: "Pleasure completes the activity—not, however, as the state does, by being present [in the activity], but as a sort of consequent end, like the bloom on youths." Martin Ostwald's translation is similar.

view, given the breadth of his treatment of pleasure's relation to activity in the later, as compared to the earlier, book.[120]

My goal here has been to show that in both books Aristotle responds to precisely those claims about pleasure found in the process argument of Plato's *Philebus*. As I have argued, Aristotle's main response to those who define pleasure as a becoming, movement, or restoration, is that pleasure does not involve a progression toward a goal, but is more like a complete goal in itself. Now, what Aristotle believes that goal to be in the case of pleasure is controversial; as I have noted, it could be either an activity or some element that supervenes on an activity. Nevertheless, in both books pleasure involves the state of an organism's optimal functioning. In Book 7, Aristotle explains that the pleasure experienced in being restored to health after illness is the activity of the parts of the organism that remain healthy. In the same vein, he claims in Book 10 that pleasure arises when a sense organ is functioning well, doing what it should in the best way that it can. If an organ is not functioning properly, the potential is diminished for pleasure to arise.[121] In both books, Aristotle disagrees with a view of pleasure as some kind of progress toward a good state, and he does so by claiming that pleasure is bound up with the good state itself, rather than its process of achievement. In this I echo Van Riel, who states the issue succinctly: "Pleasure as such is *not* to be found in the repletion of a lack, but exclusively in the faculties or dispositions that function as they should" (66).

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[120] In this I agree with Van Riel.

[121] In this I agree with Rist, who claims, "Pleasure depends on the state of each organ, and tiredness will lead to a decline in pleasure, just as it leads to the decline in the successful use of the organ itself (1175a 4-10)" (1974, 174).

The Peripatetic *Magna Moralia* features some of the same objections to the process argument that are found in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Again it is stated that some think pleasure is not part of the good because pleasure is incomplete. And further, it is reported that some say pleasure is "a conscious restoration to a normal state [ἀποκατάστασις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή]" (1204b36-37).[122] The Peripatetic response to these criticisms is very much along the lines of the *Ethics*: there are pleasures that have nothing to do with processes of becoming. For instance, pleasures of thought, seeing, and smelling are not the result of deficiency. In a bolder move than the *Ethics*, the author of the *Magna Moralia* asserts that *no* pleasure is a becoming, not even eating or drinking (1204b20ff).[123] The reasoning behind this is reminiscent of Book 7 of the *Ethics*: the activity of pleasure is that of the soul, operating as it should. In other words, the locus of pleasure's activity is not the body, which is deficient, but the area of the organism that remains healthy, in this case the soul.

What the author of the *Magna Moralia* lays out from these conclusions is rather interesting: he notes that "there are pleasures both of a nature undergoing restoration and also of one in its normal state [ἡ ἡδονὴ καὶ καθισταμένης τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας]" (1205b21). The former are "satisfactions which follow upon deficiency"; the latter are pleasures "of a nature in its normal state," such as sight and hearing (1205b22-24). The author claims that "the pleasures of both kinds are activities [ἐνέργειαι]" (1205b25). Now, if the author is following Aristotle's rejection of the

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[122] Unless otherwise noted, all translations of the *Magna Moralia* are those of St. G. Stock, and the Greek text is from F. Susemihl's edition (Teubner).

[123] "But generally no pleasure is a becoming [γένεσις]. For even the pleasures of eating and drinking are not becomings, but there is a mistake on the part of those who say that these pleasures are becomings" (1204b20-23)

process argument from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and if the author desires to maintain consistency within the *Magna Moralia*'s treatment of pleasure itself, then he cannot mean that one kind of pleasure is a process of restoration. The fact that the author claims that both kinds—namely, pleasures accompanying restoration and those of the normal state—are activities make it clear that pleasure is not here being identified with a process. I think we should take the text to mean that pleasure can arise when a deficiency is present—for example, when pleasurable activity occurs in healthy parts of an organism that is also experiencing some kind of deficiency—but it can also arise when no deficiency is present, when an organism experiences pleasures of contemplation, smell, etc., which Aristotle mentions as examples in the *Ethics*. Given these two options, it makes sense that the author would claim that the latter kind of pleasure, which involves no deficiency, is preferable to the former, even though both consist in the natural, optimal activity of an organism. Although the ideas presented in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Magna Moralia* are quite similar—the same process argument is introduced and rejected in both—the author of the *Magna Moralia* more clearly defines a pleasure associated with restoration and one associated with a normal state.[124] At any rate, the *Magna Moralia* is very much aligned with Aristotle's general response to the Platonic process argument: pleasure does not consist in some kind of movement or process.

[124] This, I will conclude, bears similarities to Epicurus' notion of katastematic pleasure. Epicurus may have been responding both to Plato's conception of pleasure as a process and to Aristotle's rejection and response to the Platonic view.

C. Closing Remarks

As I noted earlier, the process argument in itself must be of interest to Aristotle, and not just the antihedonist ideology of which it is a part. This should be evident from the fact that he disputes the argument even though he does not entirely disagree with the antihedonism of its authors. Although he does offer a defense of some of Eudoxus' arguments for the position that pleasure is the good, ultimately Aristotle disagrees with the hedonist thesis. This is clear from his notion that pleasures are linked to activities: as activities differ in degree of goodness, so do their concomitant pleasures; some pleasures are choiceworthy, while some are "bad" and "to be avoided" (1175b25). That Aristotle goes out of his way to rebuke those who hold that pleasure is a process, movement, or restoration, even though he agrees, at least in part, with their antihedonism, strongly suggests that these descriptions of pleasure were of interest in themselves and not just cogs in larger enterprises to devalue pleasure.

II.3

Conclusion

Here in Part II, I have attempted to elucidate the main issues in the ancient debates about hedonism: Is pleasure a process or movement toward some state of proper functioning, or is it a condition of optimal functioning itself? And if it is the former, is it disqualified from inclusion in the good life? I argued that in the *Philebus*, Plato treats all kinds of pleasure—mixed and unmixed with pain; that of the body, soul, and soul and body together—as perceived processes, comings-into-being, progressions toward a state of fulfillment. On his view, there is no kind of pleasure that is not a filling of some deficiency; all presuppose a lack in either the body or the soul. The process argument flows naturally from this definition of pleasure, for if pleasure is a process, and if processes are not the good, then pleasure cannot be the good; Plato's adherence to the first premise sets the whole argument in motion. Thus, Plato's treatment of pleasure in the *Philebus* should be understood not as a series of disjointed conversations meant to highlight the differences between kinds of pleasures, but rather as an extended thesis about the nature of pleasure, meant, on the one hand, to underscore the general description that underlies all its forms, and on the other, to cement pleasure's exclusion from the good life.

That Speusippus may endorse the process argument and thus he may be the κομψοί of the *Philebus*, and that Aristotle is responding against him in defense of some of Eudoxus' arguments, are certainly interesting and perhaps likely theses, but we need not solve those puzzles in order to argue that Plato threads the restoration model through all types of pleasure and uses that model to systematically undermine hedonism.

Aristotle outright rejects the process argument that Plato supports in the *Philebus* and that Aristotle himself accepts in the *Rhetoric*. In Books 7 and 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, we find Aristotle associating pleasure with a state of good functioning rather than a process, movement, or restoration. The Aristotelian *Magna Moralia* echoes this response.

Interestingly, although Aristotle bristles at the definition of pleasure inherent in the process argument, he maintains part of its vital core: pleasure is somehow linked to proper functioning of the organism. For Plato, pleasure is linked to the process of attaining proper functioning; for Aristotle, to the activity of that state once achieved. For both, the idea is that pleasure is somehow linked to an organism's natural, unimpeded existence—a condition of health and stability. This contrast points to a topic worth exploring further: in the works discussed here Plato and Aristotle differ as to the subject of this organic stability. Plato suggests that the body and the soul each play a role in the human experience of pleasure: there are some pleasures that belong only to the soul, such as hopes and memories, and some that belong only to the body—some of which are pure and true—such as pleasures from smells. And in general, Plato believes that the natural state toward which the human organism progresses in processes of restoration consists in mental *and* physical harmony. Aristotle, on the other hand, recognizes that although it *seems* like the body is the locus of pleasure, the soul is properly the seat of enjoyment. This contrast points to an interesting reversal of roles for Plato, at least: he appears to be somewhat sympathetic to working the body into his notion of what is healthy and natural.

Furthermore, Plato and Aristotle's different views on the nature of pleasure—as process and end, respectively—inform their views on divine pleasure. In the *Philebus*,

Plato denies that the gods experience pleasure and pain, since they are not subject to the processes of depletion and restoration that plague mortal bodies (33b). Aristotle, on the other hand, since he defines pleasure as an activity and an end rather than a process, movement, or restoration, can acknowledge there to be divine pleasure. Indeed, at the end of Book 7 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle claims that god's pleasure is an activity (1154b26-28). He explains that god's nature does not consist in opposing elements that can be out of synch and upset the natural balance of an organism; god's nature is simple and cannot be disturbed. Because pleasures according to Aristotle are not restorations but activities of a stable state, there is no difficulty in attributing enjoyment to god. It seems that for both Plato and Aristotle, the issue of divine enjoyment is bound up with their respective conceptions of the nature of pleasure.

In addition, the Platonic and Aristotelian views of pleasure certainly inform their respective views on its moral status. Plato argues that, as a process toward a good but not a good itself, pleasure must be excluded from the good life. In striking down the *Philebus'* notion of pleasure, Aristotle maintains that, as activities, pleasures can be the objects of choice in themselves, differing in quality based on the activities with which they are associated. Thus, on the Aristotelian account, there are pleasures worth pursuing and pleasures worth avoiding. In this way, Aristotle's mature view lies somewhere between Eudoxus' hedonism and Speusippus' antihedonism, and is most certainly not, at least in his later writings, a defense of the Platonic process argument or the description of pleasure it entails.

CONCLUSION

EPICURUS' HEDONISM AND PLATO'S *PHILEBUS*

In this dissertation, my intention has been to present a reading of Epicurean kinetic and katastematic pleasure that sheds light on an often misunderstood doctrine of the ancient world's most notorious hedonist: the highest pleasure is to be without pain. Because our most comprehensive guide to Epicurean hedonism—Cicero's *De Finibus*—tends to frustrate rather than facilitate attempts to discern Epicurus' meaning, my reading was informed mainly by Epicurus' own texts, Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*, and Plutarch's accounts of Epicureanism. On the basis of these texts I argued that Epicurus conceives of the absence of pain in the body and disturbance in the soul not as negative states, defined entirely in terms of what they are not, but as perceived painless functioning, or health. In other words, to be without pain and disturbance is to experience mental and physical wellness. As a way to support this reading—to buttress it historically, so to speak—I argued that it has a noteworthy philosophical and historical lineage, namely, the description of pleasure found in Plato's *Philebus* and the ancient debates about pleasure centered on that text. This dissertation, then, has been as much about the Platonic theory of pleasure in the *Philebus* as about Epicurean hedonism. Here in the conclusion I would first like to draw attention to the main points of my readings of these subjects. Next, I will make explicit the connections that I have suggested link Epicurean pleasure to other hedonistic and antihedonistic philosophies that preceded it. And finally, I will mention some further, less historical ramifications, of this project.

I have argued that several texts—in particular, Epicurus' *Letter to Menoeceus* and Plutarch's *Non Posse*—suggest that the Epicurean highest pleasure is a condition in

which one is aware of painless organic functioning. I argued further that this description applies to katastematic pleasure, since Epicurus claims it is the highest pleasure. While katastematic pleasure is the actual perceived condition of well-being, I claimed that Epicurean kinetic pleasure is the perceived process of restoring that well-being, or stated differently, the perceived replenishment of a felt lack. Traditionally, scholars have distinguished Epicurean kinetic and katastematic pleasures based on Cicero's claim that Epicurean kinetic pleasures involve some perceived phenomenon or a change in the sensory organ, while katastematic pleasures do not. I argued that this traditional interpretation is in need of revision since Epicurus' own texts and ancient reports on Epicureanism suggest that katastematic pleasures also involve a perceived phenomenon, namely, health.

My reading of Epicurean pleasure entails that certain pleasures that scholars have traditionally considered to be kinetic, such as tastes, sights, sounds, and sex, do not necessarily fall into that category. Since one can experience these pleasures even when one's organism is not in need of replenishment—enjoying one's dessert on a full stomach is an apt example—they are not always restorations, and thus they are not always kinetic. From this fact I argued that one way to describe certain 'sensory' pleasures that are usually thought to be kinetic, like the ones just mentioned, is as manifestations of healthy functioning, that is, manifestations of the perceived painless workings of the body and mind. Any perceived affection that is not accompanied by pain presupposes the presence of organic well-being and is constitutive of well-being. This is illustrated by Lucretius' example, which I mentioned in Part I, that a person in poor health will often be unable to experience the pleasure of taste. Here Lucretius acknowledge that the underlying health

of an organism is usually a prerequisite for the experience of certain 'sensory' pleasures like the ones Epicurus mentions in the passage from *On the Telos*. Now, this is not to deny that a person may experience the pleasure of taste, for example, in times of illness or when the body is in the process of being depleted, as in the case of hunger. In such circumstances, the pleasures of taste, sex, sound, etc., are not indicative of an organism's underlying health, since they coexist with illness or depletion. Nevertheless, these pleasures themselves are not painful, they just are experienced in the midst of painful functioning. In themselves, these pleasures consist in the perceived, painless workings of *some part* of an organism; they are painless affections that sometimes accompany kinetic pleasures. That is, they can occur concurrently with a perceived restoration but are not restorations themselves. The pleasure of taste, for example, is not what satisfies the body's hunger, for filling is accomplished by the nutrients in the food, not its flavor. The taste accompanies the restoration of the body, but is not itself restorative. Again, this shows that pleasures like taste, sex, etc., are katastematic rather than kinetic, since they consist in perceived, painless functioning.

This reading of Epicurean pleasure resolves the apparent inconsistency in Epicurus' statements about pleasure: the highest pleasure is to be without pain, yet the highest good cannot be conceived without pleasures like taste and sex. The inconsistency dissolves if we understand Epicurus to mean that pleasures like taste and sex consist in perceived, healthy (i.e., painless) functioning of all or some parts of the mind and body, for this is precisely his description of the absence of pain.

Such a reading of Epicurean kinetic and katastematic pleasure becomes more plausible when framed against the backdrop of the fourth-century BCE debates about

pleasure. The core of these debates is the conception of pleasure featured in Plato's *Philebus*, namely, that pleasure is the perceived restoration of an organism's natural harmony and balance. The goal of the second part of this dissertation was to elucidate the development of this conception of pleasure in the *Philebus* and to show how Plato uses it to reject pleasure from the ranks of the good. I argued that Plato does have a general description of pleasure in the dialogue, one that encompasses all of the types he mentions—the mixed pleasures of the body, soul, and body and soul together, and the unmixed pleasures. I argued that with respect to all these kinds, pleasure is defined as the perceived filling of a lack. With mixed pleasures, the lack as well as the restoration is perceived; with unmixed, or pure, pleasures, only the restoration is perceived.

One of Plato's most interesting employments of his definition of pleasure in the dialogue can be found in his argument against the identification of pleasure with a neutral state, the freedom from pain. Initially in the dialogue, Plato describes the neutral state as a condition in which the body is neither disturbed nor restored, unaffected one way or the other. Later in the dialogue, Protarchus remarks that bodies never seem to be completely unmoved. In response, Plato revises his initial description of the neutral state, acknowledging that everything, including bodies, is always in flux, and thus no body is ever impervious to affections like restorations and depletions. In light of the flux theory, Plato revises his notion of the neutral state: instead of being void of restorations and disturbances, it is void simply of the *perception* of such affections. It is clear that the neutral state cannot be either pleasurable or painful, given Plato's general notion of pleasure and pain in the dialogue—namely, the perceived process of restoration and disturbance, respectively, of an organism's good state.

Later in the dialogue, Plato reports an argument against pleasure as the good, an argument which I have contended in this dissertation is one which Plato himself endorses despite the fact that he puts it in the mouths of others. The 'process argument,' as I call it, entails that all processes are secondary to that which is their end. That which is the end is properly said to be the good, while the processes toward the end belong to another class and cannot be among things good in themselves. The definition of pleasure on which this argument relies is precisely the one Plato offers in his exposition of pleasure in the *Philebus*. As we saw, pleasures are perceived processes of restoration rather than states; they proceed toward ends that are different from themselves. As such, pleasure cannot be the good. With this argument, Plato affirms both that pleasure is a coming-into-being [γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν] and that it cannot be admitted to the ranks of the good.

Plato's treatment of pleasure in the *Philebus* appears in the midst of a debate among members of the early Academy concerning both the nature and ethics of pleasure. In this dissertation, I have attempted to sketch out the positions of the main players in this debate in order to show that a complex web of ideas about pleasure forms in the fourth century and sows the ground for a theory of pleasure like the one Epicurus would propose a few years later. The *Philebus* brings to the fore questions about the ontology of pleasure and its moral status. The dialogue makes sense as a chapter in the debates between Speusippus and Eudoxus on the nature and morality of pleasure, constituting on the one hand in Plato's defense of the Speusippan position that pleasures are processes and therefore cannot be goods, and, on the other, in his rejection of Eudoxan hedonism. Of course, Plato's two approaches—namely, his defense and rejection—go hand in hand

as attempts to lambaste hedonism by eroding its foundation; that is, he is interested in attacking the description of the nature of pleasure underlying moralistic evaluations of it.

In turn, Aristotle enters the debate against Speusippus, but not entirely in favor of Eudoxus. Aristotle rejects both the Speusippan/Platonic description of pleasure as a process and the Eudoxan line that pleasure is the highest good. Aristotle argues that at least some pleasures are not processes or motions: they are activities and ends, desirable in themselves. I argued that his position appears to be directed against the descriptions of pleasure found in the *Philebus*. Aristotle contributes to the debates by not only rejecting the views of others but also by formulating his own substantive account of pleasure. According to Aristotle, pleasure is the unimpeded activity of natural functioning of an organism. When a deficiency is being replenished in an organism, the parts that remain healthy during the restoration are responsible for pleasure, not the parts that are undergoing filling.

I want to argue that Epicurus is a participant in this same debate about the nature and ethics of pleasure that emerges in response to Plato's *Philebus*. What I have attempted to provide is the material necessary for drawing the conclusion that Epicurus' conceptions of kinetic and katastematic pleasure, when interpreted along the lines I have explained, fit squarely into the fourth-century debates just outlined. While the materials for this conclusion have been presented in the preceding sections, it is expedient here to make explicit the connection between Epicurus' hedonism, Plato's conception of pleasure in the *Philebus* and its early Academic milieu, and the Aristotelian response to the dialogue.

The primary conclusion that I wish to draw from this web of passages and arguments is that Epicurus' conceptions of kinetic and katastematic make sense as responses to Plato's description of pleasure in the *Philebus* and Aristotle's notion of pleasure as an activity in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and Peripatetic *Magna Moralia*. Regarding the Platonic influence, we can understand Epicurus to be incorporating the *Philebus*' definition of pleasure into his own conception of kinetic pleasure while at the same time rejecting Plato's contention that *all* pleasures are defined as perceived processes toward ends. Furthermore, we find Epicurus considering the merits of Plato's larger thesis in the dialogue that it is properly the results of processes of restoration, and not the processes themselves, that are the good. To understand these developments, it will help to recall that Epicurus describes kinetic pleasure as the perceived process toward physical and mental health and katastematic pleasure as the perceived condition of painlessness, or health. With these in mind, one can detect the roots of kinetic pleasure in Plato's *Philebus*, for there Plato describes pleasure as a perceived movement toward an end—a process of restoration in which a perceived replenishment is preceded by a perceived deficiency. While Epicurean kinetic pleasure and the Platonic account share the notion that pleasure (at least some kinds, anyway, for Epicurus) is connected to processes of restoration, such a conception of pleasure is neither uniquely Platonic nor uniquely Phileban, and so this similarity does not adequately reveal the *Philebus*' influence on Epicurean hedonism. What I am arguing here is that this influence *is* revealed in Epicurus' appreciation of the perception requirement for pleasures and pains, which I have contended is particularly Platonic and developed almost entirely in the *Philebus*.

It must be noted that Epicurus does not adopt wholesale the Platonic definition of pleasure: the former's reworking of the latter demonstrates that Epicurean hedonism is also a dialectical response to the dialogue. Whereas Plato considers only perceived *processes* toward restoration to be pleasure, rather than the *conditions* that result from such processes, Epicurus holds that a condition of perceived painlessness is a pleasure in its own right too. Such a condition is, of course, Epicurean katastematic pleasure, and what Plato claims is neither a pleasure nor a pain because it does not involve a perceived restoration or deficiency. Epicurus' formulation of the notion of katastematic pleasure, when understood as perceived, painless functioning, or health, makes sense as a dialectical response to Plato's insistence in the *Philebus* that painlessness is a neutral state. Epicurus wants to claim not only that some pleasures are not processes but also that restorations and depletions are not the only phenomena whose perception counts as pleasure; just because one is not perceiving the process of being restored or depleted does not necessarily mean that one experiences a neutral state between pleasure and pain. For Epicurus, to perceive a condition without pain is to experience the highest pleasure: health and well-being. Such a condition is not, Epicurus would claim, a middle state between pleasure and pain.

In addition to dissenting from parts of the Platonic description of the nature of pleasure, Epicurus also takes issue with the Platonic evaluation of pleasure's moral worth. We saw that Plato employs the process argument to reject all pleasures from the class of things good in themselves. Epicurus does not conclude that pleasure is not the good despite the fact that he agrees with Plato that some pleasures are perceived processes of restoration. Epicurus rebuts the Platonic rejection of pleasure from the good

life by responding that some pleasures—the highest ones—are actually conditions of perceived painlessness. The Epicurean reasoning might be the following: if pleasure can be something other than a process—if it is linked also with a perceived condition of mental and physical well-being—it would qualify as a good even given Plato's standard. Admittedly, Epicurean kinetic pleasures would still be vulnerable to the Platonic process argument, but against this Epicurus would have been able to counter that if some pleasures are not processes, Plato would have to concede that they qualify for inclusion in the class of things good in themselves.

Epicurean hedonism functions as an attempt, on the one hand, to dissent from Plato's painting all pleasures with the same brush and excluding them entirely from the ranks of the good. On the other hand, Epicurus appreciates the essential core of the *Philebus*' description, namely, the importance of perception to our experience of pleasure and the framing of the whole discussion in terms of the status of an organism's functioning. By building on the Platonic infrastructure—the perception requirement and the process argument—Epicurus attempts to argue against the antihedonism of the *Philebus* on Plato's own terms.

Plato's conception of pleasure in the *Philebus* is not the only influence latent in Epicurean hedonism: Aristotle's treatment of pleasure also left its mark on Epicurus' thoughts on the nature of pleasure. As we saw, Aristotle comes to reject Plato's description of pleasure as a movement or restoration in favor of his own assertion that pleasure is an activity, an end in itself that does not necessarily involve a lack. Like Aristotle, Epicurus believes that pleasure is associated with an organism's healthy functioning. This emphasis on the condition of unimpeded functioning—that is, the

activity of an organism that is healthy and balanced, as opposed to the process of attaining health and harmony—is what characterizes the Aristotelian response to Plato's *Philebus*, and, in part, Epicurus' response as well. As I argued, Epicurus is not interested in rejecting the Platonic account entirely, since his own conception of kinetic pleasure is rooted in Plato's description of pleasure as a perceived process. In addition to functioning as a dialectical response to the *Philebus*' discussions of the nature and moral worth of pleasure, Epicurean katastematic pleasure bears an affinity to Aristotle's own theory of pleasure that he formulates in response to Plato's antihedonism.

Although I do find a connection between Epicurus and Aristotle, I disagree with the view for which Rist and others have argued that Epicurus' katastematic and kinetic pleasures map onto Aristotle's 'pleasure in rest' and 'pleasure in motion' mentioned at 1154b22ff in Book 7 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[1] There, Aristotle does not mean that there are two kinds of human pleasure; rather, he means to distinguish human pleasure from divine pleasure. He explains that god's pleasure is single and simple because god's nature is single and simple; one thing is always pleasant to god and this is found "more in rest than in movement [μᾶλλον ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει]" (1154b28). In contrast, there is no one thing always pleasant to humans since their nature is not simple but complex (1154b20-24): one element in us may find an action pleasant, while another element may find that same action unnatural. Human pleasure is an activity of movement rather than a single unchanging activity; as Aristotle claims, "there is not only an activity of movement, but an activity of motionlessness [οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια

[1] Cf. Rist, who claims, "There is little doubt that these distinctions of Aristotle form at least part of the background for the distinction between what Epicurus calls 'katastematic' pleasures and 'kinetic' pleasures or pleasures in movement (ἐν κινήσει, κατὰ κίνησιν)" (1972, 102). He makes a similar point in his 1974 article (174).

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας]" (1154b26-27). We should note that Aristotle is not distinguishing a movement from a state of rest, but rather, he is describing two kinds of ἐνέργεια: an ἐνέργεια of immobility and an ἐνέργεια of movement. The intent of this passage is thus not to differentiate two kinds of human pleasure based on motion and rest but to describe the different kinds of pleasure associated with different kinds of existence, to note that each of those is an activity, and to make a qualitative statement about those pleasures. Divine pleasure is different from and superior to human pleasure—that is the point of the passage. To claim that Epicurus draws on this passage to formulate his notion of the nature of kinetic and katastematic pleasure would seem to require us to read into Aristotle's discussion what is not there, namely, a distinction between kinds of human pleasure based on motion and rest.[2]

However, this is not say that Epicurus could not have been influenced in other ways by Aristotle's comparison of divine and human pleasure, especially Aristotle's attribution of pleasure to the divine. Epicurus too claims that the gods experience pleasure, a move that aligns him with Aristotle but distances him from Plato, since in the *Philebus* Socrates agree with Protarchus' conjecture that it is "not likely that the gods experience either pleasure or the opposite" (33b). Epicurus tends to mention the divine life as an example of superlative pleasure and happiness, much as Aristotle does in the passage at 1154b22ff in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

My analysis of Epicurean kinetic and katastematic pleasure is intended to show that Epicurus sits squarely within the debates about pleasure with which Plato's *Philebus* is suffused, namely, the controversy between Speusippus and Eudoxus over the nature

[2] In this I share the opinion of Nikolsky. Cf. N, 455.

and moral status of pleasure, and Aristotle's contribution to the disputes between Plato, Speusippus, and Eudoxus. Epicurus reveals his interest in the themes of these debates in his conceptions of kinetic and katastematic pleasure. He finds himself considering the nature of pleasure in the following ways: Is pleasure a process or a condition? Does it presuppose a lack in the organism that must be filled? Does pleasure's existence as a process or condition affect its moral status? We find him answering in line with the *Philebus* that some pleasures are perceived processes, while answering against the *Philebus* that some pleasures are perceived conditions or states. Furthermore, we find him asserting that some pleasures presuppose lacks in an organism, while others do not. And lastly, in these answers we can identify his argumentative strategy to overcome Plato's rejection of pleasure from the good life: the highest pleasure is to be without pain, but painlessness is not a state of ἀπάθεια; it is a perceived condition of health, a goal to be pursued in itself. According to Epicurus, pleasure is not merely a means to an end. In this last point, Aristotle's influence on Epicurus' conception of pleasure is revealed.

The reading of Epicurean kinetic and katastematic pleasure that I presented in Part I of this dissertation and my elucidation in Part II of Plato's account of pleasure in the *Philebus* and its attendant controversies were meant to enable us to situate Epicurus' hedonism within the philosophical theories and controversies of the time. In turn, this was meant to illuminate two further topics: what Epicurus might mean by calling the absence of pain a pleasure, and how pleasures of taste, sex, etc., fit into Epicurus' hedonism. While Plato uses the term κατάστασις to designate *processes* of restoration, Epicurus uses a related term, καταστηματική, to describe a condition of painless functioning. According to Epicurus, painless functioning can directly or indirectly result

from processes of restoration. Pleasures like those of taste and sex, without which Epicurus claims he could not conceive the good, simply are painless functioning—workings of the mind and body that in themselves do not presuppose an organic deficiency. By looking to the conceptions of pleasure that precede Epicurus and by showing his indebtedness to the Platonic and Aristotelian attempts to define pleasure, I have attempted to shed light on the progression of ancient ideas on this topic and to illustrate where Epicurus is coming from, both philosophically and historically.

It should be noted that I am not the first to suggest that Epicurean hedonism has its roots in Plato's treatment of pleasure in the *Philebus*.[3] In her discussion of the dour ones [οἱ δυσχερεῖς] and the neutral state in the *Philebus*, Frede remarks briefly on the connection between the dialogue and Epicureanism. She claims that Plato sees it as a theoretical problem to first describe a state in which one experiences neither restorations nor disturbances as pleasure and then to argue based on the existence of such a state that pleasures of restoration are fictions. According to Frede, this is precisely the strategy of the dour ones, the true enemies of Philebus. In making this point about their strategy, Frede comments that the distinction between pleasures of restoration and pleasures of states inherent both in the δυσχερεῖς position and in Plato's discussions in the dialogue is precisely that made by Epicurus himself with his kinetic and katastematic pleasures. According to Frede, Epicurus' katastematic pleasure is a state of undisturbed contentment, and kinetic pleasure is the filling of a lack or restoration. She concludes

[3] Although such a suggestion has been made before, I am aware of no extensive treatment of the role of the *Philebus* and its attendant debates in Epicurus' hedonism. Frede and Striker's suggestions, which I discuss next, appear in footnotes to their works and are not developed. Gosling and Taylor and Nikolsky also mention that Epicurus may be responding to Plato, but they are even less specific than Frede or Striker. Cf. GT, 373-74; and N, 446.

that "it is assumed that this distinction in Epicurus was directly or indirectly influenced by the *Philebus*" (1997, 273n83).[4] Striker too comments briefly on the plausibility that Epicurus' distinction goes back to the *Philebus*. In reference to Gosling and Taylor's position she remarks that if the difference between Epicurean katastematic and kinetic pleasures is that the former are "affections that go along with replenishments or desire-satisfaction as opposed to those that occur in an undisturbed state of well-functioning" (Striker, 206), then "the distinction coincides with Plato's distinction between 'mixed' and 'unmixed' pleasures in the *Philebus*" (206n11).[5]

While clearly I sympathize with the view of Frede and Striker that Epicurus was influenced by Plato's discussion of pleasure in the *Philebus*, I have attempted to show that Epicurus does not so much directly appropriate the categories of pleasure in the *Philebus* as respond to the dialogue dialectically. Although Epicurus does appropriate some of the Platonic description of pleasure, Epicurus' position is more nuanced than Plato's. For example, not all Epicurean pleasures are processes: katastematic pleasures are conditions of well-being that can be the result of processes of replenishment but are not processes themselves. While Epicurus applies the language of 'mixing' to pleasure—and indeed, he uses the term 'unmixed' in one of his *Principal Doctrines*—he does not share Plato's aversion to associating freedom from pain with pleasure.[6] I have attempted to show that Epicurean katastematic pleasure bears the marks of Aristotle's thoughts on pleasure, which themselves are responses to the Platonic process argument. Again, this is

[4] Translation of the German is mine.

[5] It should be noted that she is skeptical of this position, but notes that it is plausible.

[6] Cf. *PD* 12.

all to say that the *Philebus* laid the ground for the development of conceptions of pleasure in the fourth and early third centuries BCE. While I sympathize with Frede and Striker's suggestion that the *Philebus* is relevant to the development of Epicurean hedonism, I have attempted to show that the precise nature of that relationship is more complex than scholars have tended to notice. Epicurean hedonism forms part of a nexus of ideas in ancient Greece about the nature of pleasure, a nexus that begins with the *Philebus* and extends on through Aristotle.

Although I have examined mainly the historical connections between Epicurean hedonism and fourth-century theories of pleasure, the conclusions of my investigation do have philosophical implications. One of the philosophical avenues down which my project leads is the status of the lived organism, both the body and the mind, in ancient conceptions of the good life. Epicureanism reflects Plato's turn to physiology to explain the nature of pleasure and pain. Like Plato, Epicurus defines pleasure in terms of human functioning. It is noteworthy that these descriptions center on the status of the lived organism—that is, an organism's current and anticipated future functioning. For both Plato and Epicurus, the status of the mind and body is essential to defining all types of pleasure. Epicurus goes one further: the living organism is essential to conceiving the good life, since for him pleasure is the good.

An implication of this centrality of organic functioning to the good life is that activities that can foster optimal functioning ought to be preferred to others that can foster less. And this is exactly what Epicurean ethics entails. When we find Epicurus advising us to seek pleasure and avoid pain, he is advising us to pursue those activities and elements that will lead to a healthy mind and body and to avoid those activities and

elements that do the opposite. Eating, drinking, listening to mellifluous sounds, seeing beautiful shapes, and having sex—activities that Epicurus mentions in a passage from *On the Telos*—are either related to the process of restoring a good state (as in the cases of eating when hungry and drinking when thirsty) or are activities in which one can experience that good state (like having a good meal or admiring an exquisite work of art). When Epicurus advises us to avoid pain he does not mean that we should seal ourselves off from the world, as if to build a barrier between ourselves and external elements. Rather, we can avoid bodily and mental distress by engaging in painless physical and psychological activities like those mentioned in *On the Telos*, provided they will not bring trouble in their wake.

From this reading, we can see that Epicurean ethics is a rather nonintellectual endeavor, one that sets it apart from other theories of the good life proposed by Plato and Aristotle, for example. For Epicurus, the good life is characterized by the everyday activities that one pursues in order to ensure a healthy mind and body—not solitary contemplation of truths or forms. For the most part, Epicurus advises us to concern ourselves with philosophy only insofar as it will lead to pleasure. We should learn the truth about the gods, the limits of pain, and our abilities to get what we desire because having this knowledge will spare us the mental anguish caused by needlessly worrying about things we cannot change. The Epicurean good life does not center on contemplating truths about the gods or nature but on what this contemplation and understanding engender, namely, the absence of mental pain regarding our present conditions and a lack of anxiety about the future. This is a far cry from the Platonic notion that the most divine life is achieved through contemplation of the forms and

Aristotle's assertion in the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that happiness lies in the life of study.

Furthermore, Epicurus claims that even mental pleasure derives from reflection on the state of the body: we must observe the nonintellectual aspects of our organisms to achieve psychological well-being. Even a sage's tranquility will diminish if he lacks the reasonable expectation that his bodily pain will cease in the future; he may consider suicide if he realizes that circumstances do not bode well for his future bodily pleasure and if his memories are insufficient to compensate for his present pains.[7] The happiness of the Epicurean sage is by no means imperturbable. This suggests that the Epicurean sage's happiness cannot be considered independently of his physical state, for his mental pleasure that works overtime, so to speak, in the face of pain is based ultimately on his confidence that better times lie ahead for his body. While rational suicide in Epicureanism is an interesting topic in itself, I do not wish to expand on it here. I mention it as part of my larger point that the Epicurean good life deeply involves engaging in and being aware of nonintellectual aspects of life such as food, drink, and the status of one's body.

To a certain extent—admittedly the extent is slim, though still noteworthy—we see hints of nonintellectual components of the good life in Plato's *Philebus*. Pleasure is given a place in Plato's formulation of the best human life during the ranking of goods at the end of the dialogue. In this ranking of what makes the mixture of the elements in the best life good, fifth place goes to "those pleasures we set apart and defined as painless,

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[7] Torquatus states, "Thus if the pain is tolerable, we can endure it, and if not, if life no longer pleases us, we can leave the stage with equanimity" (*De Fin.* 1.49). And, "Epicurus represents the wise person who is always happy as one who sets desire within limits; is heedless of death; has knowledge of the truth about the immortal gods, and fears nothing; and will not hesitate to leave life behind if that is best" (*De Fin*. 1.62).

we called them the soul's own pure pleasures, since they are attached to the sciences, some of them even to sense-perception" (66c). The painless pleasures to which he refers are those mentioned at 51a-52b: pleasures related to pure colors, shapes, smells, sounds, and learning. It is striking that Plato's definition of pleasure in the dialogue forecloses the possibility of there being pure intellectual pleasures of contemplation, since all pleasures according to Plato are bound up with perceived restorations of lacks. Learning, rather than contemplation, fits his definition of an intellectual pleasure. The other pure pleasures, particularly smell, are rooted in sense-perception rather than intellect. That such pleasures are included in the final run-down of the good life is noteworthy for Plato since his overall tendency in the dialogue is to use his restoration model to distance all types of pleasure from the good.

In short, Epicurean ethics is not rooted in the intellectualism of Plato or Aristotle, nor does it entail the Platonic and Aristotelian position that pleasure cannot be the highest good. Yet, Epicurus is deeply indebted to the conceptions of the nature of pleasure found in the *Philebus*, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and the debates about pleasure surrounding those texts. This dissertation has attempted to situate Epicurus within a constellation of ancient figures—Plato, Aristotle, Speusippus, and Eudoxus—and to show that, for better or worse, his ethics constitutes a chapter in the development of their ancient disagreements.

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